Perspectives On South Asian Security 9789814407366, 9789814407359

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Published by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

PERSPECTIVES ON SOUTH ASIAN SECURITY Copyright © 2013 by World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd. All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher.

For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher.

ISBN 978-981-4407-35-9

In-house Editors: Sandhya Venkatesh/Nithin Jayan

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Printed in Singapore.

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Preface South Asia faces varied and multiple security challenges. The way the “global war on terror” has been waged by the U.S. and its NATO allies in the Af–Pak region for the past decade has enhanced the threat of terrorism rather than diminishing it. Pakistan is so deeply caught in addressing the internal challenge of terrorism that its very stability and existence is at stake. The prospects of drawdown of U.S. forces, leading to its ultimate withdrawal have given rise to additional anxieties and complex concerns. In a rather unprecedented manner, South Asia also presented two unique models of fighting insurgencies, one in Sri Lanka where the ethnic separatists, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), widely acknowledged as the world’s most well-organized and deadly guerrilla force, was militarily eliminated. The second in Nepal, the ten year old Maoist insurgency was brought to a peaceful conclusion by opening the political space for the Maoists to get streamlined as the force for democratic transformation. Both Sri Lanka and Nepal continue to cope with the post-conflict challenges of peace building, with final outcomes still uncertain. The rise of China and its impressive pace of military modernization have dragged India into an unenviable competition with its northern neighbor which cannot but have long term strategic and security implications for the countries of South and Southeast Asia. All these and many other issues are being researched and critically examined by the Security Cluster of the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), at the National University of Singapore. We at the ISAS invite prominent decision makers and established scholars for public addresses and presentations on these issues for interactive sessions. v

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Many of these presentations and scholarly papers are put on our website. We in the Security Cluster have however decided to put some of the selected papers and presentations of the year 2010–2011, in the form of a book for wider and lasting dissemination to the scholarly and policy making community in and outside South Asia. The book having a longer shelf-value, will not let the valuable ideas disperse into the cyber space forever. South Asian Security Perspectives is our first attempt in this respect. Two of the younger colleagues in the Security Cluster, Dr. Rajshree Jetly and Dr. Shanthie D’Souza have put together the Volume in a record time with great efforts. The Volume includes contributions from some of the region’s top personalities and policy makers like Dr. Abdullah Abdullah of Afghanistan, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai from Nepal and Ambassador Shyam Saran from India. Then there are contributions from other eminent scholars, academics and analysts from India and Pakistan as well. Some of them had specially been invited to speak at the ISAS. The subjects chosen present a range of contemporary issues covering terrorism, post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building and, regional security relations. The whole venture has been inspired and supported by the Director of ISAS, Prof. Tan Tai Yong. It would not have been possible to bring the Volume out without the encouragement and assistance provided by the ISAS administration led by Senior Associate Director, Johnson Davasagayam, Research Associate Ms. Gloria Spittel, former Research Associate Ms. Gayathri Lakshminarayan and former Executive Christopher Stonaker. They all deserve sincere thanks and appreciation of the Security Cluster. We hope to continue this practice in the interest of engaging and interacting with the wider community of scholars, policy makers and strategic analysts. S. D. Muni

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Contents Preface

v

Introduction

ix

Rajshree Jetly and Shanthie Mariet D’Souza Chapter 1

Is Asia Becoming a Militarized Region? — Implications for Regional Security

1

Shyam Saran Chapter 2

The India, Tibet and China Triangle

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Mohan Guruswamy Chapter 3

India and China: Emerging Dynamics and Regional Security Perspectives

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Rajshree Jetly Chapter 4

India’s “Look East” Policy: The Strategic Dimension

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S. D. Muni Chapter 5

Emerging Dimensions in Indo–Russia Defense Engagement P. L. Dash

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Post-Conflict Restructuring of Nepal: The Challenge and Prospects

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Baburam Bhattarai Chapter 7

Afghan Conflict: External-Internal Dimensions

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Dr. Abdullah Chapter 8

Karzai’s Balancing Act: Bringing “China” In?

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Shanthie Mariet D’Souza Chapter 9

Counter-Terrorism Challenges in Pakistan

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Samina Ahmed Chapter 10 The Challenge of Counter-Terrorism in Pakistan

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Moonis Ahmar Chapter 11 U.S. Mediation in the Kashmir Conflict: Mediation vs. Conflict Management

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Gayathri Lakshminarayan Index

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Introduction Rajshree Jetly and Shanthie Mariet D’Souza

The essays in the volume entitled “Perspectives on South Asian Security” are a series of speeches and lectures delivered at the Institute of South Asian Studies, National University of Singapore by political luminaries, noted scholars and experts on South Asian security. The book offers unique insights on the emerging security dynamics of South Asia. The issues covered are highly topical and include analyses of the militarization in Asia, conflict in Afghanistan, counter-terrorism in Pakistan, Kashmir, post-conflict restructuring in Nepal, India, Tibet and China. Chapters delve into the internal and geopolitical dynamics of the region, with particular emphasis on the implications of India’s rise as a great power. India’s foreign policy and defense relations with Southeast Asia, China and Russia are covered in detail in individual chapters. The book, which brings together insights from experts who have served at the highest levels of government as well as noted scholars from the region, highlights some of the significant security issues having a vital bearing on the future of South Asia. This book will be of interest to policy makers, students and observers of the South Asian security scene. The paper titled “Is Asia Becoming a Militarized Region? — Implications for Regional Security” by Shyam Saran focuses on the Asia-Pacific, including North-East, South-East and South Asian region. In assessing this dynamic and rapidly growing component of the ix

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global economy, Saran points out to the fact that this region is witnessing a parallel and competitive arms build-up. Since this region is also home to several nuclear weapon states, he focuses on the nuclear dimension of Asian security as a crucial parameter to regional stability and its impact on the Asian power balance. He provides an Indian perspective, particularly the espousal of an “open inclusive, transparent and balanced” security architecture in the region, to avoid a mutually counter-productive and competitive military build up which is not in the interest of any of the stakeholders. Asia is home to some of the biggest defense spenders in the world. China, with a current estimated military expenditure of U.S. $91 billion (2011), Japan with U.S. $51 billion, India with U.S. $36 billion, South Korea with U.S. $24 billion and Australia, with U.S. $30 billion are the region’s military heavy weights. All these countries are currently upgrading the military assets thereby significantly improving the force structures. Even Singapore has undertaken significant defense upgradation programme. China’s military modernization plans have been directed toward acquiring the attributes of a front-ranking comprehensive national power, for which military power is an essential component. Pointing at China’s growing and effective fleet of submarine and surface naval vessels, focused mostly on the Yellow Sea, the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea theatres, Saran predicts that it is only a matter of time before it makes its presence felt in the Indian Ocean. This raises concerns in India, for whom the build-up of Chinese military and logistics capabilities across the border in Tibet over the past decade is a more important factor in assessing the overall military balance. The long-standing military, including nuclear relationship between China and Pakistan means that Indian security planners have to cater to the possibility of confronting an interconnected single theatre to the North and the West as a worst case scenario, Saran points out. It is reported that India has launched a five year U.S. $80 billion defense upgradation programme. Similar programmes have been launched across the region, by Japan, South Korea and other countries. Saran is of the opinion that this complex and rapidly evolving security landscape creates conditions for an inclusive, transparent

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and balanced security architecture in the region. A formulation on these lines is included in the 2010 Declaration of the East Asia Summit convened in Hanoi and also reflected in the Sino–Indian Joint Communique of 16 December 2010 and the Indo–U.S. Joint Statement of 8 November 2010. He warns that a competitive arms build up, both conventional and nuclear, driven by mutual mistrust and suspicion, is likely to derail the real gains the region has made in economic terms, emerging as the new centre of gravity of the global economy. He argues in favor of multiple and parallel fora where engagement among countries can be fostered and expanded on a range of security related issues. China and India are two major Asian powers with the ambition and potential to be significant global players in the 21st century. Much has been made about the gradual improvement in relations between the two countries over the last decade, especially in terms of the explosive growth in trade and commerce. Despite this, both countries continue to have security concerns vis-a-vis the other due to historical legacies and contemporary developments. In their respective chapters, Mohan Gurusamy and Rajshree Jetly focus on two strategic issues that continue to be a matter of concern for the two countries. In his paper, Mohan Guruswamy deals with the Tibet–India– China triangle from a historical perspective to reinforce the important relationship that both countries share with Tibet and how it continues to impact upon Sino–Indian ties. Tibet has historically shared special relations with both India and China. It draws extensively on the spiritual and cultural fronts from India (Indeed, the present Dalai Lama has called Tibet, “A child of the Indian civilization”), while sharing close ties with China given the closer nexus of its geographical boundaries. Although Tibet’s early links with China date back to the mid-seventh century, it was under the Manchu’s (Qing Dynasty, 1644–1912) that the relationship matured. The Dalai Lama’s declaration of independence from China in 1912 was met with resistance from the new Chinese republic which sought to declare Tibet as an integral part of China. This was in keeping with Chinese historical tradition, where control of the peripheral areas was considered crucial to its security and defense. This has since defined Tibet’s unusual political equation with China; as Mohan notes, while “it never enjoyed “independence” as the term

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is commonly understood, it was also never an “integral part” of the mainland.” Tibet has emerged as a sensitive issue for both India and China. In the late 1950s, in the face of the Chinese intervention in Tibet, its religious ruler, the Dalai Lama crossed the McMahon Line and sought asylum in India, reinforcing China’s suspicions about India’s role in Tibet. Tensions resurfaced when in the wake of a massive protest against the Chinese rule in Tibet in 2008, the Dalai Lama declared Tawang (in Arunachal Pradesh), with its special significance as the birthplace of the 6th Dalai Lama, to be part of India. This upset the Chinese who have claimed the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, including Tawang. In keeping with its policy of developing the western regions, China is also engaged in a massive infrastructural push to increase its connectivity with Tibet. Naturally, this is a source of worry for India. However, Guruswamy believes that China’s economic development and modernization in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) could actually help Sino–Indian ties and brings benefits to Tibetans as well. The accelerated development of the area could uplift the conditions of the Tibetan people, reduce Beijing’s concerns over Tibet, and propel India to harness its historical linkages and strengthen cooperation in many areas including revival of economic ties through the Nathu La pass, and the re-development of Nalanda as a major center of learning. He remains optimistic about the fact that despite defense and military build-ups along the border areas, there has been no major confrontation between India and China since 1962 — a sign that good relations between the countries is both possible and necessary. Rajshree Jetly in her chapter “India and China: Emerging Dynamics and Regional Security Perspectives” flushes out the inherent challenges underpinning Sino–Indian relations in the context of regional security. This relationship is defined by historical tensions and modern ambitions with China and India both seeking to play a leadership role in Asia. At the same time, the two countries recognize that conflict would be destabilizing to the region and detrimental to Asia’s rise as the future centre of the world, which inturn would not be in either India or China’s interest. Thus, the two countries need to strike a delicate balance in cooperating for their mutual benefit while Indian relations invariably

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have regional and global dimensions which have to be factored in. Jetly argues that while the two countries may not be in open conflict with each other, equally, it is unlikely that the two countries will be in warm embrace of friendship and close alliance. Their cooperation will be strategic and pragmatic. The chapter sets out some security challenges confronting the two countries to illustrate the point. The border issue continues to remain a core concern in India’s long term security calculus. Additionally, China’s presence and growing economic, political and military linkages with South Asian countries, in particular Pakistan, have been a source of concern for India. On the other hand, India’s interactions and engagement with South East Asia (that lies at the junction of South Asia and South East) have fuelled a certain degree of competition between India and China in terms of their respective geopolitical influence and naval prowess in the region. The role of the US has also had a bearing on Sino–Indian ties. Ultimately, both India and China are competitors in a high stakes game of economic and political domination. Asia, their backyard, is already getting small for these two giants, and as that space shrinks their attention may shift from economic opportunities and cooperative competition to geopolitical security and more open rivalry. Jetly concludes that Sino–Indian relations will depend on how these dynamics are managed. Muni in his chapter on “India’s “Look East” Policy: The Strategic Dimension” brings interesting insight into the genesis of India’s Look East policy. Muni argues India’s “Look East” Policy (LEP) did not begin in the 1990s, rather it evolved in four different waves over centuries. The first wave of cultural and commercial engagement between India and its extended eastern neighbors lasted until the 12th /13th century. To this was added a strong strategic dimension by the British Empire in India during the second wave. The leaders of independent India, particularly first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, took the lead in launching the third wave by focusing on East Asia as an important part of India’s policy of Asian resurgence. However, the imperatives of the Cold War, intra-Asian conflict and rivalries, and India’s weaknesses on economic and military fronts did not let its Asia policy blossom. What is identified as India’s LEP since the early 1990s constitutes

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the fourth wave of India’s eastward (re)engagement, Professor Muni argues. Under the strategic thrust of this policy, India has not only reinforced its economic and cultural relations with the countries of ASEAN and East Asia, but also firmed up strategic relations with them through extensive consultations on regional and global security issues and consistent cooperation in defense sectors involving military supplies and naval exercises. India’s strategic vision for the East extends to the whole of Asia-Pacific region as India has manifested both its willingness and capability to play a critical role in the emerging strategic dynamics and architecture for this region. Muni advocates the need for India to exploit the full potential of cooperation with the extended eastern neighborhood. However, certain conditions must be met before this happens. India has to improve its economic performance. The World Bank and other international economic institutions are hopeful of the Asian growth being led by Indian sectors, and bureaucratic procedures have to be streamlined. Inadequate coordination between various concerned departments and ministries like External Affairs, Commerce, Defense, Finance etc., has cost India dearly in the past. The Economic Ministries need to develop a strategic perspective in harmony with the broader national strategic profile and interests in different regions of the world. India also has to shed whatever hesitation it has on the question of expanding and upgrading transport linkages through air and road with the eastern Asian region. Muni argues that there is considerable scope to activate India’s cultural diplomacy to provide necessary backup to its economic and strategic moves in the region. India’s rich cultural heritage can ring many sympathetic cords in the region and its multi-religious, secular and democratic ethos, as well as rich music, arts and architecture, theatre and cinema have huge responsive constituencies in all the near and extended eastern neighbors. Muni feels that Bollywood and cultural exchanges like that of the Ramayana troupes can work wonders in pursuing cultural diplomacy. Bollywood presence is extensively evident in Southeast Asian countries, but that is mostly commercially motivated and privately provided without any systematic and planned encouragement from the state. A carefully planned and sustained

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cultural diplomacy can speed up economic engagement and yield impressive results in the field of people to people relations and mutual political understanding. This cultural diplomacy can also be backed up by promoting cooperation in the field of education, science and technology, where India has notable assets and strengths. Muni laments that in many Southeast Asian countries, Indian diplomacy has not adequately reached educational and cultural establishments and has largely ignored mobilizing civil societies in pursuance of India’s perceived interests. However, projects like the revival of Nalanda University in collaboration with East Asian countries, for which Indian Parliament adopted a Bill in August 2010, can fill some of this gap. He argues educational links can provide a lasting and powerful stimulus to regional cooperation and integration. The chapter on “Emerging Dimensions in Indo–Russia Defense Engagement” by Dash focuses on the overall changing pattern of Indo–Russian defense engagement in the last two decades. Dash is of the opinion that Russian defense supplies to India are at the core of the debate, primarily because they impinge upon regional and global relationship pursued by the two countries. Despite all the vicissitudes experienced by Russia through the post-Soviet years, Russia remained and continues to remain a potential player in the world arms market. It has tried, rather successfully, to negotiate with the significant difficulties associated with its incredible transformations in cutting into arms market dominated by the West. Russia’s traditional clientele in Asia — China and India — remained largely tethered to it. Dash ascribes Russia’s success to two important factors. First, Russia’s military help, to Asian giants, China in the past and then to India, was a farsighted policy that provided it an edge over other competing powers in Asia. The present Russian leadership too continues with the policy after taking into account the huge demography of these two countries. This defense assistance creates a superstructure based on the original supply system, thereby giving Russia an edge in Asia. Second, even if both India and China decide to break away from their mainstay Russian supply system, breaking away altogether from the tether-post they have been tied to will not be successful, Dash argues. Armory and arsenal of China and India remain primarily Russian,

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secondarily western and tertiary indigenous. Dash predicts that the Indo–Russian military relations will continue and Russia’s domineering role will not be affected by competing powers cutting into Russian arms market. Baburam Bhattarai, one the prominent faces in Nepal’s Maoist movement, deals with the historical context of conflict and peace agreement between the contending political forces in Nepal while talking of the post-conflict restructuring in his paper titled “Post-Conflict Restructuring Of Nepal: The Challenge and Prospects”. Land-locked Nepal is sand-witched between two huge states — China and India. Being virtually India-locked with accessible open borders with India from the three sides and only a marginal link with China across the high Himalayas, development dynamics of Nepal both in the socioeconomic and political sense, is conditioned more by the development processes in South Asia than by those in East Asia. Internally, Nepal is a country of tremendous regional, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and socio-economic diversity. A continuous inflow of diverse stock of population throughout history with their own language, culture, religion and social mode of production, specially the Tibeto–Burman or Mongoloid stock from the north and the east, the Indo–Aryans from the west and south and Austro–Dravids from the south, has turned the country into a melting pot of incredible socio-cultural diversity. The combined effect of these exogenous and endogenous processes was the general fossilization of the economy and society and creation of an autocratic, centralized and bureaucratized state system presided over by the monarchy for about two and a half century. Bhattarai categorizes the conflict in Nepal as the fight of the overwhelming majority of marginalized people against a feudal, autocratic, unitary state system backed by internal and external retrograde forces. He describes the struggle as one aimed at the complete democratization of society, economy and polity of the country. This is followed by his prescription for the country’s woes. The post-conflict peace and development can be achieved only by total restructuring of all existing political, economic, social, cultural and international relations on a democratic basis, as has been elaborated in his chapter.

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Having set forth three scenarios, he warns against the worst-case scenario of the break-down of the peace process and the constitutionmaking process and relapse of the country into a new phase of armed confrontation. The scenario would be the most alarming as it is likely to trigger a regional conflict with involvement of the immediate neighbors, India and China, and also other international power centers, as in say Afghanistan. As a way forward he advocates two ways: first, either of the two sides would prevail over the other and impose its will; and second, the two sides would enter a new compromise as per the current objective necessity and the prevailing balance of political forces. Chapter titled, “Afghan Conflict: External-Internal Dimensions” by Dr. Abdullah, Chairman, Afghanistan National Alliance for Hope and Change and Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Afghanistan, raises very pertinent questions on the nature of the conflict and causes of the present instability in Afghanistan. As the country prepares for transition, amidst the plans for withdrawal of the U.S. troops and reconciliation with the Taliban, many pessimistic reports on the future of Afghanistan have emerged. In providing a timely assessment of the present conflict, Abdullah throws light on the external and internal dimensions of the Afghan conflict. The tragedy of Afghanistan has been time and again its internal contradictions which have got caught in the external power agenda. In rightly pointing out to two major external events as the beginnings of instability, Abdullah briefly touches on the destruction brought about by the Soviet intervention and the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. He delves into personal narratives of his involvement in the anti-Soviet resistance and also opposition to the Taliban regime. Abdullah went on to become a candidate in the presidential elections and continues to be a member of the opposition in the present democratic regime. He provides rare and insightful glimpses of the trajectory of the course of events orchestrated by external powers that has led to the present state of instability. Abdullah explains the cause of the present instability even a decade after American intervention by pointing out to a combination of internal–external factors. The democratic transition in Afghanistan

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has been problematic with allegations of fraud marring the election processes, issues of corruption, lack of governance and absence of rule of law, which has marred the credibility of the Afghan government. The Taliban based in their safe havens in Pakistan have actively exploited these internal fissures and weakness in Afghanistan. In a rather ominous note, Abdullah warns that the failure of Afghanistan and Pakistan to work together in eliminating the bases of the Taliban will hurt Pakistan in the days to come. Warning of the dangers of Talibanization of the region, he does not perceive any difference in the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans as both share a symbiotic nexus. Critiquing the reconciliation efforts with the Taliban, Abdullah argues in favor of the need for larger political sector reform, failure of which has led to the present stalemate. Highlighting the role of regional powers and their support for proxies in Afghanistan as a cause for the instability, he points out to the unique opportunity for regional countries to cooperate in dealing with a common threat. In the chapter on Karzai’s Balancing Act: “China” In?, Shanthie Mariet D’Sourza posits that China’s interests in Afghanistan are perceived to be mainly economic. It is unlikely that the March 2010 Sino–Afghan joint declaration, following President Hamid Karzai’s visit to China, will bring about a dramatic change in the present Chinese policy of abstaining from military engagement in the conflictridden country. However, as the scenario of the United States (U.S.) withdrawal from Afghanistan looms large, China will have to prepare itself for a much larger and crucial role for long-term stabilization and reconstruction of the war-ravaged country given that its interests would be at stake. Given the dangers of Islamic extremism engulfing the region and spilling over into its restive Xinjiang province coupled with increasing cross-border drug trade, China will have to do a policy rethink. Shanthie argues that this may not tantamount to joining the U.S.-led war, but would certainly involve steps that would have direct implications on the peace and stability of Afghanistan. A stable and strong government in Kabul with a capable military able to patrol the borders is surely in China’s interest. To that effect, China over the years has offered Afghanistan military supplies and personnel training.

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However, Beijing has abstained from any direct military engagement in Afghanistan. Shanthie argues that in the evolving prescription of a regional solution for Afghanistan’s woes, China will have a critical role to play. There are significant policy pointers of perceptible shift in China’s thinking in anticipation of the U.S. draw down from Afghanistan. Given China’s political and military relationship with Pakistan, it has considerable leverages to influence the latter’s Afghan policy, which will be critical to any long-term stabilisation effects in Afghanistan. Pakistan has been in the spotlight in recent years for many reasons, most significantly due to the spectre of Islamist fundamentalism and terrorism which is hobbling the country’s progress. Militant attacks are now directed against the Pakistani state itself, and the devastating impact has been all too clear in the last few years with Pakistan fast becoming the biggest victim of fundamentalist terrorism. In 2010 alone, there were a total of 2113 terrorist, insurgent and sectarian attacks reported across the country, resulting in 2913 deaths. Why is Pakistan in this dire state? Some of the reasons include a weak government, the alienating effects of the U.S. foreign policy, the limitation of the army in dealing effectively with terrorist activity and rising pockets of popular sympathy for some Islamic groups. While the Pakistani military has had some success in combating insurgent forces in sensitive areas such as Swat and South Waziristan, it has been constrained by a number of factors not in the least that Pakistan itself was ill-equipped for counter-insurgency operations. The Tehrike-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the major insurgent force, is still active and has indulged in many daring attacks against the state and its institutions. Samina Ahmed rightly brings out the fact that military operations have failed to deliver counter-terrorism dividends in Pakistan. She claims that counter-insurgency operations, are “reactive in nature, and not part of a holistic counter-terrorism strategy” to deal with the problem that has grown in both intensity and magnitude. The strategy of using excessive force, alternated with peace deals, has also not paid off as the peace deals have eventually broken down and given a further fillip to militancy.

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To deal with this problem, Ahmed recommends a more effective law enforcement strategy that envisages the transfer of internal security policy to civilian hands. She also proposes a civilian lead in external defense and foreign policy matters, in a country where foreign policy and security rest firmly with the army. In particular, she argues that Pakistan needs to make serious policy changes with regard to its perceived national interest vis-a-vis its neighbors, particularly India and Afghanistan. Pakistan has thus far not pursued an even handed policy to tackle terrorism and has protected groups that can be used as strategic leverage against India and Afghanistan. Members of the Afghan Taliban, such as Mullah Omar and the Haqqani network, are given sanctuary in Pakistan, and groups such as Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad that profess an anti-Indian ideology, are given a relatively free hand. Pakistan’s hesitation to launch an offensive in North Waziristan, home to the Haqqani network, is a manifestation of this dilemma. Critical of these policies, Ahmed argues that Pakistan’s India-oriented jihadi policies, and the use of Afghan Pushtun Islamist proxies to retain its influence in Afghanistan have in fact been counterproductive as these have strengthened radical Islamist groups in Pakistan, some of which have turned against the state. Whilst Ahmed hopes that the installation of a democratic government would bring about some transformation in the governments’ thinking, she is less sanguine about the prospects of such a strategic shift actually taking place as long as the army is in charge of national security. Given the omnipresent role of the army in Pakistani politics, the civilian government remains reluctant to confront the military on national security and foreign policy issues. Yet there are windows of opportunities that the democratic government can avail to confront the problem. Recent events such as the U.S. raid to kill Osama bin Laden, and the attack on the Mehran naval base have raised questions of the competence of Pakistan’s intelligence services and military. This, coupled with growing public concern about militancy in the country, could help the civilian government push back against the military in matters of national security and foreign policy. Moonis Ahmar also delves on the subject of counter-terrorism in Pakistan. Distinguishing the present context of terrorism with that in

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the 1980s, Ahmar argues that the present trend is fuelled by the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, which in conjunction with poverty and low levels of development, has made the Taliban attractive to new recruits. Recognizing the critical role of the U.S. in counter-terrorism operations, Ahmar calls for greater strategic consensus between Islamabad and Washington on issues where both hold divergent views such as the increase in drone attacks and the launch of a military offensive in North Waziristan. Acknowledging the gaps in Pakistan’s counter terrorism strategy, and drawing upon the arguments made in the previous chapter, Ahmar underlines the need for “better co-ordination among intelligence agencies, increase in capacity building of law enforcement agencies, curbs on terrorism financing and measures to prevent nabbed groups from operating across the country” to address this issue. He also identifies the lack of sophisticated technology for security agencies and the slow judicial process to deal with the culprits of terror attacks as further areas of deficiency in counter terrorism. Ahmar explains the successes and failures of Pakistan’s counterterrorism policy from four perspectives: state, society, politics and economics. At the state level, he identifies Pakistan’s long military rule as one of the key problems as the military treated national security as the equivalent of national interest. Counter-terrorism policies faltered because the military saw it as part of national interest to support militant organizations that were pro-Afghan Taliban or anti-India. This strategy has now come home to roost. At the societal level, Ahmar is critical of the silent majority who have allowed extremism to take hold by failing to stand up against the voices and actions of extremism. At the political level, Ahmar laments the lack of political will and consensus among political parties to deal with violence and terrorism. Religious parties do not categorically condemn suicide killings and secular parties are too timid to confront radical groups. There is a lack of leadership at the national level and there is no clear direction on counter terrorism strategy; indeed, it is not clear whether it is the military or civilian government or both who should take charge of these policies. Lastly, on the economic perspective, Ahmar says Pakistan’s involvement in the war on terror and the costs of home grown terrorism have taken a

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huge toll on Islamabad. Arguing persuasively for a pragmatic counterterrorism strategy, Ahmar concludes that a successful counter-terrorism strategy will inevitably require Pakistan to arrive at some sort of an understanding with India, which is perceived as its primary external security threat. The last chapter by Gayathri Lakshminarayan focuses on the Kashmir issue and the prospects of the U.S. mediation on a subject that has defied resolution since the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. Kashmir is the principal symbol of antagonism between India and Pakistan, leading them to go to war four times, including the Kargil confrontation of 1999. Several attempts have been made to find a breakthrough on Kashmir but these have come to naught and prospects for an amicable solution on Kashmir remain elusive even today. In the absence of any breakthrough in bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan, mediation by a third country has been raised time and again as an alternative means to find a solution for Kashmir. Unlike Pakistan, which welcomes the U.S. mediation on Kashmir, India has been steadfast in its refusal to allow third party mediation in what it considers a bilateral issue between India and Pakistan. However, since 1989, in anticipation of tension between the two nuclear armed neighbors spiralling out of control, the U.S. has been drawn into each of the crises that has broken out between the two countries, and has played an important role in diffusing the crises, particularly in the Kargil War of 1999. Due to the U.S.’s involvement in the region, there have been calls for the U.S. to get more involved and actually help in peace building and conflict resolution with respect to Kashmir. Some experts argue that the realities today may make it more palatable for the U.S. to play an active role in Kashmir, given the positive turn in Indo–U.S. relations, the return of a democratic government in Islamabad, and the rising spectre of Islamic fundamentalism which poses a major threat to India, Pakistan and the U.S. Some deem that if the Kashmir problem can be resolved, that could in turn lead to the reduction of extremism in Pakistan, which would have further knock-on effects of reducing the role of the Pakistani Army in supporting militancy in the region. These experts also believe that Washington’s role in the Kargil war of 1999

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was a signal to New Delhi that the U.S. involvement in the conflict could result in a settlement acceptable to India. This has made New Delhi more open to an active U.S. role, although it may not be willing to acknowledge this publicly. The author, however, maintains that the above arguments are overstated and takes the view that the U.S. role should be limited to crisis management alone. This is so because India Pakistan and the U.S.’s strategic interests inevitably collide, and as long as Pakistan is the U.S.’s ally in the war on terror, it cannot be a neutral mediator. Lakshminarayan also argues that India and Pakistan have used brinkmanship as policy given the stability instability paradox. She compares the policies of the Bush and Obama administration (during its initial phase) to show that a more hands off policy on Kashmir is preferable as it has allowed India and Pakistan to talk about Kashmir without third party involvement. Unfolding events in South Asia indicate a rising incidence of violence in the Af–Pak region. As the U.S. administration has announced its plan for draw down, the regional powers are hedging their bets and have renewed their support for the proxies in Afghanistan. The present situation can be best described as “stalemate”. As talks of reconciliation in a post U.S. negotiated order gather momentum, Pakistan is likely to position itself as a key interlocutor. Pakistan’s continued support to the Taliban leadership based in its territory and other allied groups, could lead to further destabilization of Afghanistan and Pakistan. As a classic case of “blow-back”, these groups would target the Pakistani state from within making for further instability in the country. The rise of militancy in Pakistan could also have an adverse impact on Pakistan’s relations with India. Indo–Pak relations hold the key to peace in the region. However, recent attempts to revive the Indo–Pak peace process have met with little success since the 2008 Mumbai blasts. At present, terrorism and Kashmir remain the intractable reference points for Indo–Pak relations. Both countries need to engage in greater confidence building, as instability between these two countries can have catastrophic consequences for South Asia given that both India and Pakistan are nuclear armed states. Similarly though Sri Lanka and Nepal have achieved some success in countering the insurgencies, the

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peace building processes are weak and fragile. Thus, the prospects for durable peace seem dim for South Asia. The rising pace of militarization in Asia will have wide ranging security implications for the region as a whole. As both China and India grow, both will inevitably have to strengthen their naval forces to project their power far from their shores in order to protect their interests. Invariably, this will result in mounting tension as both countries have considerable overlapping strategic interests. China’s growing fleet of submarine and surface naval vessels, focused mainly on the Yellow Sea, the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea theatres, will make its presence felt in the Indian Ocean, inevitably causing unease to New Delhi. In addition to the bigger arms contest, another potential flashpoint is Tibet. China has been developing infrastructure to increase connectivity with Tibet, which would also increase China’s military capability at the border. India has responded by shoring up its border security. In the final analysis the future of Sino–Indian relations will be determined by how the two countries manage their rivalries and competing geo-strategic interests in the region and beyond.

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Chapter 1

Is Asia Becoming a Militarized Region? — Implications for Regional Security Shyam Saran

Introduction In my presentation today I will be focusing mainly on the region of Asia–Pacific, including North–East Asia, South–East Asia and my own South Asian region. I will try and assess whether this region which is currently the most dynamic and rapidly growing component of the global economy, is also witnessing a parallel and competitive arms build-up. There will be an effort to examine the drivers of this build up and its likely impact on the Asian power balance. Since this region is also home to several nuclear weapon states, it may be worthwhile to explore the nuclear dimension of Asian security. And finally, I will explain the Indian perspective, particularly the espousal of an “open inclusive, transparent and balanced” security architecture in the region, to avoid a mutually counter-productive and competitive military build up which is not in the interest of any of the stakeholders. There is no doubt that Asia is home to some of the biggest defense spenders in the world. China, with a current estimated military 1

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expenditure of U.S. $91 billion (2011), Japan with U.S. $51 billion, India with U.S. $36 billion, RoK with U.S. $24 billion and Australia, with U.S. $30 billion are the region’s military heavy weights. What is more, there is ongoing upgradation of the military assets of all these countries. Examining publicly available information, one may point to the following significant improvement in the force structures of some major countries:

China China’s military modernization plans have been directed toward acquiring the attributes of a front-ranking comprehensive national power, for which military power is an essential component. In more specific terms, China’s acquisitions of capabilities have been motivated by the aim of sustaining a naval blockade of Taiwan against U.S. intervention of the kind that took place in 1996. These capabilities include a growing and effective fleet of submarine and surface naval vessels, acquired from Russia as well as indigenously manufactured. 12 Kilo class submarines, equipped with SS-N-27 Klub anti-ship cruise missiles, have been sourced from Russia. China has developed two Shang class nuclear attack submarines, 10 Song diesel electric submarines and two Yuan class diesel electric submarines. These are expected to replace the older and much noisier, Romeo and Ming class submarines. From Russia, China has also acquired, between 1997–2007, four Sovremanny destroyers equipped with S-N-22 anti-ship cruise missiles. Another eight are reportedly on order. Lately, there have been reports that China has developed a sophisticated anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), based on its Dongfeng 21 model specifically to target U.S. aircraft carriers. While Chinese naval forces are currently focused mostly on the Yellow Sea, the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea theatres, it is only a matter of time before we see a more visible Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. However, for India, the build up of Chinese military and logistics capabilities across the border in Tibet over the past decade is a more important factor in assessing the overall military

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balance. The long-standing military, including nuclear, relationship between China and Pakistan means that Indian security planners have to cater to the possibility of confronting an interconnected single theatre to the North and the West as a worst case scenario. The Indian Defense Minister, A. K. Antony, recently told Indian Parliament that apart from nuclear missile bases in Qinghai, China has built five fully operational airbases, the Qinghai–Tibet railway and 58,000 kms of roads in the Tibet Autonomous Region. With these upgraded logistics, Indian defense planners estimate that China may be able to move upto two divisions (30,000 troops) to the Sino–Indian border in just 20 days as compared to 90 days a decade ago. China is now the largest purchaser of weapon systems from Russia, displacing India. Between 2005 and 2009, out of total arms sales from Russia, China accounted for 35% and India, 24%. Chinese acquisitions covered mainly naval assets, but also top of the line Sukhoi aircraft.

Japan In December 2010, Japan announced revised defense guidelines, shifting its focus from the North and Russian oriented posture to a China and North Korea oriented South. It has unveiled plans to spend over U.S. $248 billion. between 2011–2015 to acquire five new submarines, three destroyers, 12 fighter jets, 10 patrol and surveillance aircraft and 39 helicopters. There will also be increased deployment of missile-intercepting Patriot missiles. The December guidelines have also removed the 1% GDP limit on defense spending. Taken together with the considerable military assets that the U.S. has based in Japan, this projected build up will add up to an impressive array of countervailing power.

India It is reported that India has launched a five year U.S. $80 billion defense upgradation programme which includes the procurement of 126 multi-role combat aircraft for U.S. $12 billion, the induction of the reconditioned Russian aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov for

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an increased price tag of over U.S. $3 billion, the construction of an indigenous 40,000 ton aircraft Carrier Vikramaditya, at Cochin, which will be inducted in 2014. These carriers will be equipped with 29 MIG 29K fighters and the indigenously produced Light Combat Aircraft, Tejas. India has also contracted with France to build six low noise Scorpene class submarines with a plan to construct six more subsequently. The first Scorpene will be inducted in 2015 having been delayed three years. The Indian Air Force, which has 32 fighter squadrons currently, expects to have 42 by 2022 and these will include 270 Sukhois, 126 multi-role combat aircraft and 120 Tejas. The U.S. is now an important new supplier of defense hardware to India. 6 C-130J tactical air lifters were acquired in an initial breakthrough in 2007. This was followed by the purchase of 8 P-8 Surveillance aircraft from Boeing in 2009 for U.S. $2.1 billion and 10 Boeing C17 transport jets for U.S. $4.16 billion. Israel has also emerged as an important defense partner for India. Rafael’s Derby air-to-air missile systems will equip 200 Tejas fighter jets. In 2008, the Indian Army purchased Israeli Spyder anti-missile systems for U.S. $270 million and in 2009, advanced anti-aircraft missile batteries were contracted for U.S. $1 billion. These have a longer range of 45 km. Analysts expect that in the next decade, India is likely to spend over U.S. $100 billion on new military equipment. On the nuclear side, the 6000-ton nuclear submarine Arihant, is likely to enter service soon. India’s nuclear capable missile programme has been making steady progress, with a whole range of short, medium and long-term missiles, including Prithvi, Akash, Trishul and Agni. There are plans to MIRV the later versions of Agni. A missile interceptor has been successfully tested recently. India has launched a major programme for the upgradation of its border infrastructure, particularly at the Sino–Indian border. Deployments at the Eastern sector have been augmented with the raising of two additional divisions and the planned basing of two Sukhoi squadrons at Tejpur in Assam. Several advanced landing grounds (ALGs) in the Eastern and Western sectors have been revived and are being upgraded.

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ROK In 2006, RoK announced a 15 year military modernization programme, totaling U.S. $550 billion. The programme is under review after recent armed clashes with North Korea. There is a likely increase in acquisitions of submarines, destroyers, F-15 or even F-35 U.S. made fighter jets.

Singapore Among the other countries in the region engaged in significant defense upgradation is a surprise entry — Singapore. Its military expenditures as a proportion of GDP have been consistently higher than other ASEAN countries, nearly 5%–6% totalling U.S. $8 billion currently and constituting 23% of all ASEAN defense spending. Singapore possesses one of the most modern and sophisticated military forces in the region, with its “third generation” assets. These are currently being further upgraded through the doctrine of Integrated Knowledgebased Command and Control, utilizing advanced electronics and signal processing, information systems security, advanced guidance systems, communications, electronic warfare, sensors and unmanned vehicles. Singapore has recently inducted six Formidable-class frigates, based on French “stealth” design. These are armed with Harpoon ASCM and French Aster-15 air defense missiles. Singapore’s submarine fleet has been augmented as well. Two Swedish Vastergotland class submarines have been retrofitted with Stirling engines for air-independent propulsion (AIP) permitting them to remain under water for longer periods of time. No other navy in the region has such sophisticated systems. Singapore’s Air Force is also the most advanced in SE Asia, with 74 F-16s and more recent acquisition of 24 F-15 SG fighters. For a small country, Singapore has deployed nine tanker aircraft for air-to-air refueling and is replacing its E-2C Hawkeye surveillance aircraft with newer four Gulfstream G550s equipped with Israeli Falcon radar. Also an order is 20 AH-64D Apache Longbow Attack helicopters, the first of which was inducted in 2006.

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Singapore is the only SE Asian country which is a partner in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter programme, an advanced 5th generation fighter jet. Let me round off this part of my presentation by briefly touching upon the trends in military upgradation and deployments of the Cold War superpowers, the U.S. and Russia. Russian military expenditures have begun to rise quite significantly in the recent past, after hitting a low point after the break up of the Soviet Union. It is reported that Russia’s military expenditures will rise from about U.S. $42 billion in 2010 to U.S. $66.3 billion in 2013. It was recently announced that the country will spend U.S. $650 billion to equip its armed forces with 600 new warplanes, 100 ships and 1000 helicopters by 2020. These will include 20 new submarines of which eight will be nuclear armed vessels, two French made Mistral Amphibious Helicopter carrier assault and command ships, 35 Corvettes and 15 Frigates, Su-34 and SU-35 fighters, Mi-26 transport and Mi-8 helicopter gun ships. Of interest for Asia-Pacific nations is the plan to deploy two Mistrals in the Far East, along with two batteries of the new S-400 surface to air missile systems. The Russian naval base in the Southern Kuriles and submarine base at Kamchatka, are being upgraded. Nevertheless, Russian military remains focused on its Western periphery. The United States of America remains, by far, the strongest military power in the world and in the Asia-Pacific. Its annual military budget of over U.S. $700 billion dwarfs all the other major powers put together. China, with about U.S. $90 billion in defense spending is still far behind and is likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. With substantial troops, about 60,000, deployed in the allied nations of Japan and RoK and basing facilities across the region, the U.S. has capabilities that far outstrip anything that potential adversaries like China and Russia can bring into reckoning. The quality of U.S. weapon systems, the advanced integration of different fighting platforms and its information, electronic, command control and communication systems, remain far superior to any other country’s. It has been reported that the U.S. has plans for a new, stealthy, long-range manned bomber, specifically intended to penetrate Chinese

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air defenses. 100 such aircraft are planned. Long-range spy drones are being based in Guam. The U.S. has also test-flown a carrierbased Drone fighter. A new supersonic anti-ship missile is under development. In Pentagon’s newly released Air Sea Battle Plan for the Pacific, the objective appears to be to thwart any Chinese assault on Taiwan and to limit China’s navy to within its territorial waters. In a recent speech (February 21, 2011) to Asia Society, Hongkong, Vice-Admiral Scott R. Van Buskirk said: “The 7th Fleet has actually increased its capabilities in several significant ways. The ships and aircraft that we operate today are vastly more capable than they were just a few years ago. At the same time, we have enhanced our maritime partnerships with navies around the region, enabling us to work together cooperatively more than ever before”.

The Vice-Admiral also revealed that on any given day about 70 ships on an average ply the Asia–Pacific region, about the same as 10 years ago but with increased capabilities. What is clear from the admittedly selective information presented above is that: (i) The major resident powers in Asia–Pacific are all engaged in a significant upgradation of their defense assets, although the rate of expansion and military spending does not qualify as an arms race, at least for now. (ii) Military spending and investment in upgradation appear to be focused mainly on maritime forces, air capabilities and missiles. It is clear that the emerging strategic order in the region is in the words of one analyst, “profoundly maritime” and that “geopolitically speaking, the maritime balance would appear to be the key to future stability in Asia”. (iii) While the U.S. retains overall military pre-eminence and, in particular, naval and air dominance in the Asia-Pacific theatre, there is a growing perception in the region that its hitherto overwhelming strategic superiority is being eroded steadily by the rapid expansion of Chinese military capabilities. However, even if Chinese capabilities continue to expand at the current pace, it will

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be some time before China could match U.S. power in the region, let alone globally. Being aware of this, China’s strategy appears to be to acquire asymmetric capabilities in the meantime, capable of neutralizing the superior firepower of U.S. forces in the region of greatest strategic interest to China i.e., Yellow Sea, Taiwan Straits and the South China Seas. In this sense, the shift of the center of gravity of global economic power to Asia, led by China’s extraordinarily rapid and sustained growth, has not led to a corresponding shift in the center of gravity of military power to Asia. There, is, therefore, an asymmetrical shift taking place and this is unlikely to change unless there is an unexpected collapse of the US economy. (iv) The military build up being witnessed in countries like Japan, India, Australia and South East Asia, represent a classic “hedging” response to the rapid accretion of China’s military capabilities, enabled by a four-fold increase in its military spending just over the past decade. As these capabilities continue to be augmented and upgraded, there will inevitably be countervailing responses, such as closer security arrangements with the United States and among other powers of the region, who feel threatened by Chinese power. This explains the growing defense collaboration between India and Japan, Japan and Australia, India and Australia and India and Indonesia. Such countervailing action may fall short of classic containment of the Cold War variety, but would act as a constraint on China’s ability to project its military power across a wider expanse of the Asia-Pacific region. Drivers: So what are the drivers of the changing security landscape in the Asia–Pacific region? Clearly, the most important driver of change is the emergence of China, within a short period of time, as a major economic and military power. It is today the second largest economy in the world, with the largest foreign exchange reserves, a volume of exports that has overtaken Germany and which is acknowledged as the world’s manufacturing workshop. It is the world’s third largest shipbuilder after Japan and RoK; it manufactures 90% of the world’s containers and Shanghai is the world’s largest cargo port. China has

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recently overtaken the U.S. as the world’s largest energy consumer and its dependence upon energy and other resources from around the world has dramatically increased in the recent past. Sea lines of communication, both East to the Pacific and West to the Indian Ocean, have become exceedingly important to China’s economic well-being. It is no surprise, therefore, that as China’s economy is becoming more globalised and interconnected with other economies in the region and the rest of the world, there is a concomitant emphasis on expanded military capabilities, in particular, naval capabilities, to safeguard these economic lifelines. There is, of course, an element of ambition engendered by a sense of opportunity. At the 17 CCP Congress in 2009, China’s leadership asserted that the global power structure had been transformed in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and the ability of the U.S. to continue leading the international order had decreased. Countries around the world were seeking development paths other than one led by the U.S. Therefore, China sees the current period as “a period of great development, great change and great adjustments”. This is a period in which “the competition among major powers for a position of overall, comprehensive strength is becoming an important feature of the changes in the global situation”. Reading between the lines, China sees a strategic opportunity to enhance its global stature and influence in the space created by relative U.S. decline. This too, is a driver. What is true for China is also true, perhaps to a lesser extent for other countries in the region, who are responding to their own greater dependence on maritime commerce as well as to fears of Chinese ability, as well as suspected intention to interdict these maritime links. The percentage of the GDP of Asia derived from international sea-borne trade is estimated to have risen from 47% in 1990 to 87% in 2006. It is probably over 90% currently. It is no surprise that all major powers in the region have sought to expand and upgrade their military capabilities, but most particularly their naval and air capabilities. The South China Sea is one of the world’s busiest shipping channels, with more than 40,000 vessels per year passing through.

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Further South and East, the Malacca Straits, which is a chokepoint between the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, handles at least 50,000 vessels annually. These ships carry over 30% of goods traded throughout the world, including oil from the Persian Gulf to East Asian nations including China. It is estimated that over 20 m barrels of oil traverse the Straits every day. The economic drivers are overlaid by festering territorial disputes in the region as well as politically contentious and often emotionally charged inter-state conflicts. These include the Japan–Russia dispute over the Kurile islands; escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula with an increasingly unpredictable but heavily armed North Korea; the Sino–Japanese dispute over the Senkaku islands; the unresolved status of Taiwan, which China considers a renegade province; the Chinese claim, recently and assertively reiterated, over the entire South China Sea; the territorial disputes over islands in the South China Sea between China on the one hand and the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei on the other; the unresolved border dispute between India and China; and over Kashmir between India and Pakistan, this long list creates myriad, intersecting points of potential armed conflict. The economic rise of Asia has taken place inspite of these inter-state disputes and hostility. Unless these are managed with statesmanship and enlightened diplomacy, there is every danger that Asia’s economic success story may grind to a halt or even be reversed as a result of a cumulative dynamic of rising mistrust and misunderstanding.

Nuclear Dimension of Asia–Pacific Security The security landscape in the Asia–Pacific region has also been complicated by the nuclear dimension of the arms build up in the region. Even if the U.S. and Russia are excluded, the region has, in the past decade and a half, witnessed the emergence of three new declared nuclear weapon states — India, Pakistan and more recently North Korea. Nuclear weapons and their delivery systems are being expanded in China, Pakistan and India. China is reported to be developing a strategic missile forces which could strike the U.S. mainland to deter the U.S. from intervening in a conflict over Taiwan. This force includes

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17 liquid fuel, silo-based DF-5A missiles with a range of 13,000 kms and six solid-fuel mobile DF-31 missiles with a range of 7200 kms. China has also been developing the Jin class ballistic missile carrying submarine equipped with the J-2 S missile with a range of 7200 kms, as part of a survivable second strike retaliatory capability. Chinese military planners claim that these nuclear forces will enable them to achieve “escalation dominance” in any conflict with the U.S. Of more immediate concern to countries in the region is a report that China has established two new missile bases in mountains north of Guangdong, which may be equipped with DF-21C ballistic missiles or CJ-10 long-range cruise missiles. There is speculation among U.S. military analysts that these bases may also be equipped with the DF-21D anti-ship missile or the so-called “carrier killer” to target U.S. aircraft carriers which may be deployed in the Taiwan Straits and the South China Sea. China has also engaged in what has been described as “containment through surrogates”. It has actively supported the acquisition of nuclear weapon and delivery capabilities by Pakistan to contain India and by North Korea, to deter a South-Korea led unification of the peninsula and to contain Japan. A Chinese official was quoted by the Russian commentator, Konstantin Garibov, as saying: “North Korea is our Eastern Germany. Do you remember what happened when Eastern Germany fell? The Soviet Union collapsed”.

Chinese assistance to Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme is well documented and hence I will not go into any details. However, there is recent evidence that Chinese support to Pakistan’s civilian as well as military nuclear programme continues apace. Despite being a member of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), China has agreed recently to construct two, possible three, civilian nuclear reactors in Pakistan, in addition to the two it has already constructed at Chasma, of 330 MW each. The latter were “grandfathered”, with China claiming that these contracts were concluded before it became a member of the NSG. These reactors will not be subject to full-scope safeguards which is a requirement for supplies from NSG members to other states. In addition, Pakistan has been building reactors to produce bomb grade

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plutonium at Khushab. While two are already operational, another two are reportedly under construction. Pakistanis nuclear arsenal may have now crossed the 100-mark and is being steadily expanded. India’s stockpile is still at a modest 70–80 weapons, but is being expanded though at a slower rate. Its delivery capabilities are being augmented with the new class of Agni ICBMs and the deployment of submarinebased nuclear missiles. This will give the country a true triad of nuclear forces which is essential to the credibility of its no-first use doctrine. There have been a limited number of nuclear CBMs between India and Pakistan. These include an agreement not to attack each others’ nuclear facilities, concluded in the 1980s, a declaratory commitment, post-1998, not to conduct any further nuclear tests, prior notification of missile tests and the establishment of a “hotline” to avoid nuclear war as a result of misunderstanding or accident. However, there are no nuclear CBMs between India and China. China’s nuclear assets and the doctrine governing their deployment and use remains opaque. India has released some information on its nuclear doctrine, but details are scarce. Adding to the region’s security concerns is, of course, the volatile domestic situation in Pakistan which leads to doubts about the safety and security of the country’s nuclear arsenal. A report by Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs states: “Despite extensive security measures [in Pakistan], there is a very real possibility that sympathetic insiders might carry out or assist in a nuclear theft, or that a sophisticated outsider attack (possibly with insider help) could overwhelm the defenses”.

There is also concern over North Korea’s nuclear weapon arsenal, its well-developed delivery capability coupled with the extreme unpredictability of its regime. The impending leadership transition is adding to the uncertainty in the Korean peninsula and it is not clear that China has the ability to rein in its ally and nuclear protégé. The fragile security situation in the region is, therefore, compounded by a worrying nuclear dimension, which has not been addressed in the limited engagement on security matters among the Asia-Pacific countries.

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A New Security Architecture for Asia–Pacific Given the complex and rapidly evolving security landscape in our region, it is essential that the major stakeholders create an open, inclusive, transparent and balanced security architecture in the region. A formulation on these lines is included in the Declaration of the East Asia Summit convened in Hanoi last year and also reflected in the Sino–Indian Joint Communique of December 16, 2010 and the Indo–U.S. Joint Statement of November 8, 2010. A competitive arms build up, both conventional and nuclear, driven by mutual mistrust and suspicion, is likely to derail the very real gains the region has made in economic terms, emerging as the new center of gravity of the global economy. It is unlikely that, in the foreseeable future, the several territorial disputes I have listed, will be settled. Therefore, they need to be managed in a manner that reduces the risk of precipitating armed conflict, which in some cases, may carry the risk of nuclear escalation. The region needs multiple and parallel fora where engagement among countries can be fostered and expanded on a range of security related issues. However, there should also be an effort to create a region-wide forum that looks at security challenges and confidence-building in a broader context. A possible reference point could be the Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Indian strategists have welcomed the establishment of the ASEAN+10 Defense Ministers’ Meeting, which brings all the major stakeholders in the region together on a single platform to specifically promote dialogue on security issues. It has the advantage of being inclusive and balanced, though only time will tell whether it will pursue transparency in terms of both capabilities and intentions. In our view, it may be worthwhile to initially attempt such an architecture in the maritime domain, since all the stakeholders have an overriding interest in the security and safety of sea lines of communication on which their economic well-being depends. Instead of competitive naval and related build up to secure trade routes and access to extraregional resources, Asia-Pacific countries could create a collaborative regime to safeguard these maritime routes and provide mutual assurance and guarantees of non-interdiction. These could be the preliminary building block of a more elaborate and comprehensive

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regime in the future, which should include the nuclear dimension to be effective.

Prospects for Maritime Cooperation As countries heavily dependent upon sea-borne trade, Asia–Pacific countries have been deeply affected by the growing incidence of piracy both in the South China Sea as well as currently in the Western reaches of the Indian Ocean off the Somali coast. There are bilateral and some regional agreements to combat piracy. For example, India and Japan have such understanding and Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia have had a trilateral agreement, codenamed Malsindo, since 2004. Recently, Thailand has also become a participant. In 2008, the first ever Indian Ocean Naval Symposium was convened in Goa, bringing together the naval chiefs of all major Indian Ocean littoral countries and user nations, to discuss the reinforcement of maritime security in the Indian Ocean. This was followed up by a second Symposium in Abu Dhabi in 2010. Quite predictably the major preoccupation of the Symposium has been growing threat of piracy but the forum can evolve into a valuable mechanism for regional confidence buildingregional confidence building and for building a network of professional and personal relationships among the naval forces of countries of the region. These initiatives could be expanded to cover other littoral and user countries both for the Asia-Pacific region and the Gulf of Aden. Indian and Chinese naval patrols in the latter theatre have been operating largely on their own, as have some other countries whose shipping has been threatened such as RoK. The menace of Somali-based piracy has become an international threat and merits a coordinated and collaborative response from major naval powers. The experience and more importantly, the habit of cooperation this would engender, could become the basis for a more ambitions maritime security regime in the region and beyond.

Nuclear Confidence Building Creating a less threatening nuclear environment in our region, could also benefit from some modest steps. At the first ever Nuclear Summit

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convened by the U.S. in Washington in April 2010, there was consensus on the need to take cooperative steps to ensure the security and safety of nuclear materials and to prevent such materials falling into the hands of non-state actors. Among the countries of our region, China, Japan and India announced the setting up of Nuclear Security Centers, open to participation by other countries, to promote the goals of the Nuclear Summit. These centers could also advance research and development in proliferation resistant nuclear technologies and capacity building. The next Nuclear Summit will be convened in Seoul in 2012. It would be worthwhile for the initiators of these centers in our region and the IAEA to work together to evolve a regionally coordinated effort to promote nuclear security and non-proliferation. These initiatives could hopefully pave the way for a frank and constructive exploration of the nuclear challenge confronted by the region and the means to address it.

Concluding Remarks Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, the countries of Asia-Pacific have every reason to be proud about the successes they have achieved in sustaining rapid economic growth, raising the living standards of our people and becoming a dynamic center of global manufacturing and trade. It is also to the credit of our countries that despite several lingering territorial disputes, ideological differences and differing perspectives, tensions have been contained, armed conflicts have been minimal and, by and large, an environment conducive to economic development has been maintained. However, rising prosperity and rapid transition bring new challenges in their wake. The world we live in is full of uncertainty and ferment. The reflexive reaction to this may lead to a competitive build up of military capabilities, heightening and exacerbating the several unresolved issues that our region is beset with. Our collective ability to maintain an environment conducive to continued economic and social development will require that we delve deep into Asia’s wisdom, its tradition of consultation and consensus building and capacity to adapt to changing situations, to construct a regional political and security architecture that

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reflects the region’s enhanced role and stature in the emerging world order.

Discussion Lively discussion followed Ambassador Saran’s presentation. Three areas covered in question/ answer session were China, India and the regional issues. China: Most of the questions centered on China’s rise and its implications. This was natural as Ambassador Saran had identified China’s rise as the principal driver of growing military acquisitions in South and Southeast Asia. Questioning the speakers contention that despite China’s economic rise, the U.S. would continue to be a dominant security player in Asia, one participant said that even with 7% growth, china would overtake the U.S. economy in a decade. Reiterating his basic contention, Saran said that China’s economic rise would not necessarily make it surpass U.S. military capabilities easily though the gap between the two may eventually, over a long time, be bridged. China in its military modernization programme, is selecting those assets where it can neutralize U.S. strength like in the areas of submarines and aircraft career, as also in acquiring such missiles that are known as aircraft career killers. But all this will take a very long time. For instance, the U.S. has 14 aircraft careers while China has only one. We should also not forget that the U.S. capabilities may not remain static, but will continue to improve and enlarge when those of China advance. Endorsing the point that since 1979, China has had no conflict with its neighbors Saran said that China is a prudent power and risk aversion is one its main policy consideration. However, he also drew the attention of the participants toward internal developments in China which is not known well to the world outside. The senior officers of China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army are increasingly asserting themselves on critical foreign policy issues. There have also been tensions recently between china and its neighbors like Japan and those in South China sea. Japan has pulled back on the Island issue but that should not give wrong signals to China. China has difficulties with the U.S. also as the

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U.S. respects only 12 mile limit of territorial waters and does not accept its naval movements to be restricted in any way in 200 mile range of territorial waters. China demands its right to be informed about such movements of third country naval ships in its territorial waters. Though China has otherwise been engaging with India in many areas, it is reluctant to take up nuclear issues in its discussions with India. This is because China is using the nuclear issues as a bargaining chip and is insisting on the UNSC Resolution which asked India to reduce and eliminate its nuclear arsenal. Ambassador Saran disclosed that since 2003, India has been raising the question of nuclear confidence building measures in its strategic dialogue with China but China only reiterates its globally known position on nuclear CBMs and does not consider India to be at the same level with itself on nuclear issues. Even in track-II discussions, China seldom participates on the question of nuclear CBMs with India. India: Answering the questions on India’s refusal to join the U.S. on Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Missile Defense initiatives, it was disclosed that India had decided to join the PSI, but when the question of Indo–U.S. Civil nuclear deal came, the U.S. made joining PSI as a condition and openly asked for it. This was not acceptable to India as it has huge political consequences domestically. The Missile Defense issue was raised by the U.S. during President Bush’s visit and it was discussed bilaterally. But then China reacted negatively to India participating in this. The main thrust of the U.S. move was in relation to Japan, to establish U.S.–Japan Missile Defense system. India was not viewed as a critical part of it. With regard to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), though India is not a signatory, “we have not done any thing to undermine it”. India is asking for a new consensus on NPT to remove its vulnerabilities (as indicated in the defiance by North Korea and Iran) and make it non-discriminatory. There has to be a credible link between horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. The non-proliferation debate has been opened and countries like India do not want it to be a restrictive regime.

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One of the participants observed that the rise in India’s defense budget should be seen only as an attempt to replenish its capabilities. China started its military modernization long back and it is trying to compete with the U.S. by building its offensive defense against the U.S. But such offensive capabilities become a matter of concern for all other countries specially those places like India. Nothing has been done by India for many years to keep pace with the Chinese capabilities. For instance, Indian Air Force had 32 squadrons but is left only with 22 now. Therefore budgetary resources are needed to maintain the levels of preparedness. Other Issues: One of the participants expressed concern that growth in militarization in Asia was a serious matter because with the GDP’s rising, military expenditures are also rising and it is a poor satisfaction to say that military expenditures were not growing as percentage of GDP. Maritime security in the region has become vulnerable and there was urgent need for greater transparency. Some discussion must also be held to explore the higher aspects of maritime security. In his response to this observation, Amb. Saran accepted the fact that with the rise in GDP, military spending in the region will also grow, but he stressed that there was no mad rush for weapons in the ASEAN region. The mistrust between U.S. and China and China and Japan as also in the Korean peninsula has increased. There is need for getting into the habit of collaboration which is missing. The immediate problem in the region is that of piracy, but the other layers of security issues are not addressed seriously. In terms of the security architecture in the region and higher aspects of maritime security, it may be easier to move incrementally rather than seeking big-bang solutions. ASEAN prefers a multilateral security balance but does not want to be sucked into great power rivalries. However, china’s rise is changing the situation in the region. If perception build up in the region that China is becoming assertive, then there would be countervailing efforts including acquiring additional capabilities. Therefore, the future of China’s power and how will it be employed is critical.

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It was also observed in the course of discussion that if India joins the Missile Defense, then Pakistan will also be encouraged to move in that direction; of acquiring greater missile capabilities, resulting in a missile race in South Asia. On the question of the territorial waters limit, there were differing perceptions in Bay of Bengal as well. Such differing perceptions led to tensions between Myanmar and Bangladesh which were brought down through the mediation of China. There was also sensitivity in this region on the Malabar type exercises jointly conducted by the U.S., India and Singapore.

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Chapter 2

The India, Tibet and China Triangle Mohan Guruswamy∗

Introduction This paper will trace the evolution of the two states and the different manifestations of the borders between China and India with respect to Tibet by different regimes and changing power equations. It will map the historical and contemporary perspectives from each state and discuss their validities. Finally, a suggestion will be provided for a possible resolution — to enable both countries to put this persisting problem behind them. Sino–Indian relations will remain troubled as long as massive armed forces confront each other over nearly 4000 km of the un-demarcated border. In a rapidly changing world where the fulcrum of global economic power is shifting decisively to Asia, the importance of good relations between its two largest nations and economies cannot be underscored. ∗ Mohan Guruswamy is Head of the Centre for Policy Alternatives and Distinguished

Fellow, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, India. The views reflected in this paper are those of the author and not of the institute. 21

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“Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our North-East Frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had friendly Tibet that gave us no trouble.” This was about to change with the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) occupation of Tibet. The “disappearance of Tibet, as we know it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates” presented India with a new and dangerous situation … Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, the Darjeeling [areas] and tribal areas in Assam” and “the undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of a potential trouble between China and ourselves.” 1 Tibet is India’s largest geographical neighbor, whether it is under Chinese control or otherwise. The Indo–Tibetan border begins at the easternmost tip of India in Arunachal Pradesh and ends in the icy heights of the Karakoram Range. Tibet’s influence manifested in the Tibetan strain of Mahayana Buddhism, which is seen throughout India’s Himalayan region. There are over 120 Buddhist monasteries in India’s Himalayan region where the Dalai Lama is venerated as the head of the faith. The languages spoken in Ladakh, Sikkim and Bhutan are all variants of Tibetan. The great gompas (fortifications of learning and faith) of Thigse, Shey, Rumtek or Tawang are architecturally similar to the gompas of Tibet, with a general design of a central prayer hall, benches for prayer or meditation and attached living accommodation. India’s ecclesiastical links with Tibet are well established. While Tibet has a distinct identity — its own religion, language, and history — in their fabric of civilization, the Tibetans borrowed their impulses from India. In sum, the ties between India and Tibet were spiritual bonds that date back almost two millennia. They were essentially of a nonmilitary and nonpolitical character, albeit with nominal overland commerce.2 As Nehru remarked, “Tibet, culturally

1 Letter from Patel to Nehru on 7 November 1950, quoted in Garver, JW (2001).

Protracted Contest: Sino–Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, p. 28. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 2 Mehra, P (2007). Essays in Frontier History: India, China and the Disputed Border, p. 110. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

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speaking, is an offshoot of India.”3 This is in direct contrast to the Chinese influence in the temporal sphere. Buddhism migrated to Tibet from India and with it went the best impulses of India’s traditions, philosophy and folklore. Even the Tibetan script originated from the ancient Pali, which was the dominant language of upper India during the period of Gautama Buddha and the great Mauryan and Magadhan kingdoms. The scripts of Thailand, Cambodia, Myanmar and Telugu and Kannada are also derived from Pali. Nevertheless, Tibetan is closest to Pali. Thus, today the countless Tibetan Buddhist monks in India are more apt to interpret the golden age of Bharat preserved in the manuscripts and etchings of the period to the people of India. Indeed, the present Dalai Lama has called Tibet, “A child of the Indian civilisation.”4 The holiest lake and mountain of the Hindu folklore and tradition, the abode of Shiva lies in Tibet. Even today, the parikramas of Lake Manasarovar and Mount Kailash are the highest ritual duties a Hindu can perform in one’s lifetime, or for that matter even in several. It is not coincidental that Tibetans also consider a kora or circumambulation of Manasarovar and Kailash as a religious duty. However, since the eleventh century, until the advent of British rule in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, India’s ties with Tibet suffered seriously. The Mongol invasions in the north, the great revival of Hinduism led by the first Shankaracharya followed later with the advent of Islam in India and the virtual eclipse of Buddhism, greatly tempered Indo–Tibetan cultural links. While Tibet has drawn extensively from both the geographical proximity and spiritual connection it has with India, it has always been a remote and exotic land to most Indians. This remoteness is almost entirely due to its physical geography. The tallest and lengthiest mountain range in the world, the Himalayas, impervious to all but the hardiest and most determined, separates Tibet from India. Thus,

3 Ibid., p. 109. Also, see Garver, JW (2001). Protracted Contest: Sino–Indian Rivalry in the

Twentieth Century, p. 41. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 4 Waller, D (1990). The Pundits: British Exploration of Tibet and Central Asia. Lexington:

University Press of Kentucky.

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while spiritually and geographically closest to India, Tibet has been historically closer to China and even Mongolia, because of the lay of the land that is naturally contiguous with fewer geographical barriers. Throughout its long history, the easy and continued Tibetan political intercourse with China and Mongolia determined its politics and present situation. Historically, there were many occasions when Tibetans conquered China and imposed their will upon them. The earliest of these was when Trisong Detsen seized Changan (now Xian) and appointed a new emperor. In 1642, the fifth Dalai Lama sallied forth to Peking to demand that the Ming Emperor recognized Tibetan sovereignty and independence, which he ceded to. Other times, the Mongols, Manchu’s and Hans dominated and ruled Tibet. Similar to Mongolia and Manchuria, Tibet was integral to the long saga of China’s historical evolution. Today, Tibet is a part of China, but it still remains a distinct nation even though it is no longer a separate state. China by virtue of being the sovereign to Tibet has become India’s neighbor in a de facto and possibly even de jure sense, but it is still Tibet that is India’s true neighbor. It is also true that the dispute over the Tawang Tract has flared up once again, due to the statement of the former Chinese Ambassador to India, Sun Yuxi. While China officially disputes the whole of Arunachal Pradesh, it is also well understood that their focus is upon the Tawang Tract, which India occupied in 1951, at about the same time Communist China occupied Tibet. The Chinese have based their claim on the premise that Tawang was administered from Lhasa and the contiguous areas owed allegiance to the Dalai Lama, the spiritual and temporal ruler of Tibet. Then the Chinese must also consider this. Sikkim in the nineteenth century was a vassal of Tibet and Darjeeling was forcibly taken from it by the British. By extending this logic, could they realistically stake a claim for Sikkim and Darjeeling? It would be preposterous to make such a claim. History has moved on. The times have changed. For the twentyfirst century to be stable the twentieth century borders must have been stable, whatever the national yearnings. At the crux of this issue, is the larger question of the national identities of the two nations and their evolution. The great Indian Empires of the Mauryans, Guptas and Mughals, spanned from Afghanistan

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to Bengal, well short of the Brahmaputra, but did not go very much below the Godavari in the South. The Imperial India of the British incorporated all of what is today’s India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, but never Afghanistan (not for want of trying). The British brought Assam into India in 1826 when they defeated Burma (Myanmar) and formalized the annexation with the Treaty of Yandabo. It was only in 1886 that the British first forayed out of the Brahmaputra Valley. It was a punitive expedition into the Lohit Valley in pursuit of marauding tribesmen, who began raiding the new tea gardens. Apparently, the area was neither under Chinese or Tibetan control as there were no protests from either the Dalai Lama or the Chinese Amban in Lhasa (see map below). The British stayed put.

Throughout the course of the nineteenth century, the British in India had made persistent efforts to open Tibet for commerce. They endeavored, unsuccessfully, to deal with the Dalai Lama’s government and, failing that, through the intermediacy of Manchu China.5 In the

5 Mehra, P (2007). Essays in Frontier History: India, China and the Disputed Border,

pp. 107–121. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. For British policies on Tibet see Lamb, A (1986). British India and Tibet: 1766–1910. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul and Addy, P (1984). Tibet on the Imperial Chessboard. Calcutta: Academic Publishers. For an extensive analysis that highlights the personal rivalry between Tibet’s supreme

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extreme western part of Tibet, British interest in pashm, used to make fine cashmere wool, led to the construction of the Hindustan–Tibet road between 1850 and 1858. Designed primarily to improve trade, the road went from the plains of India through Simla, the summer capital, before passing through Bashahr and terminating at Shipki on the Tibetan border.6 In the second half of the nineteenth century, the race to be first into Lhasa became the greatest challenge for explorers and adventurers. Not the least among these were the spies of the Survey of India, the legendary pundits. The most renowned of these was Sarat Chandra Das whose books on Tibet are still avidly read today. As soon as the adventurers — often military officers masquerading as explorers — began visiting Tibet the British in India began to worry. Reports that the most well known of Czarist-Russia’s military explorers, Col. Bronislav Grombchevsky, was sighted in Tibet had the Governor General of India, Lord George Curzon, very concerned. In 1903, Curzon decided to send a military expedition into Tibet led by Grombchevsky’s old antagonist, Col. Francis Younghusband. A mixed brigade of Gurkha and British battalions went over the Nathu La into the Chumbi Valley and advanced unhindered until Shigatse. A Tibetan military force met them there but offered what can only be described as passive resistance. As the British and Indian troops rained bullets on them, not a shot was fired back. It was a forerunner to the Jallianwalla Bagh massacre of 1919. From Shigatse, Younghusband made a leisurely march into Lhasa. The Chinese Amban, whose ability to function efficiently had been undermined by the collapsing Qing dynasty, sent out his personal guard to escort the Younghusband expedition into the city. The British were able to get the Tibetans to agree to end their isolation. Having extracted trade concessions and permanent British

incarnate lamas with its ramifications for India and China, see Harrasowitz, O (2004). From Conflict to Conciliation: Tibetan Polity Re-visited. Germany: Wiesbaden. Finally, for a Tibetan viewpoint, see Shakabpa, TWD (1967). Tibet : A Political History. New York: Potala Publications. 6 Waller, D (1990). The Pundits : British Exploration of Tibet and Central Asia. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

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military presence in the Chumbi Valley, they withdrew in 1904. However, broader diplomatic considerations of the British Empire meant much of Younghusband’s gains were repudiated by Whitehall. The 1906 Anglo–Chinese Adhesion Agreement largely restored the Amban’s authority over Tibet and the British bound themselves to non-interference in Tibet’s internal affairs. Furthermore, during the Anglo–Russian Convention of 1907, Britain and Russia agreed to leave Tibet “in that state of isolation from which, till recently, she has shown no intention to depart”. By 1908, British troops had withdrawn from the Chumbi Valley.7 As Alastair Lamb notes, “The most apparent result of the Younghusband Mission, which undermined the authority of the Dalai Lama, was to lay Tibet open to a reassertion of Chinese authority.” This began almost immediately after the withdrawal of Younghusband from Lhasa, when anti-Chinese risings in Eastern Tibet gave rise to strong and effective Chinese countermeasures.8 However, after this short period of Chinese consolidation Tibet would emerge as a de facto independent state with the collapse of the Manchu dynasty in 1912. In 1913, the Tibetans declared independence after the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the establishment of a republic in China under Sun Yat-sen. They attacked and drove the Chinese garrisons in Tibet into India through the Nathu La pass. In 1913, the British also convened the Simla Conference to delimit the India–Tibet border. In 1914, the British proposed the McMahon Line and the Tibetans accepted it. The Chinese Amban initialed the agreement under protest. However, his protest seemed mostly about the British negotiating directly with Tibet as a sovereign state and not over the McMahon Line as such.9

7 Lamb, A (1960). Britain and Chinese Central Asia: The Road to Lhasa, 1767–1905,

pp. 329–330. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 8 Ibid., p. 331. 9 It should be noted that the 1914 Simla Convention divided Tibet into an inner and

outer zone. Outer Tibet was considered for all practical purposes as part of China. Inner Tibet, which was geographically contiguous to India’s northern frontiers, was accepted as effectively autonomous.

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In 1935, at the insistence of Sir Olaf Caroe of the Indian Civil Service (ICS), then Deputy Secretary in the Foreign Department, the McMahon Line was notified. In 1944, J. P. Mills of the ICS established the British Indian Administration in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA), but excluded Tawang, which continued to be administered by the Lhasa appointed head lama at Tawang despite the fact that it lay well below the McMahon Line. This was largely because the Governor of Assam, Henry Twynam, lost his nerve and did not want to provoke the Tibetans. In 1947, the Dalai Lama sent newly independent India a note laying claim to some districts in the NEFA. On 7 October 1950, the Chinese attacked the Tibetans at seven different locations and made their intention known about reasserting control over Tibet. On 16 February 1951, Major Relangnao “Bob” Khating raised the Indian tricolor in Tawang and took over the administration of the Tawang Tract. It demonstrated that India’s claim over Arunachal Pradesh does not rest on any great historical tradition. India is there because the British went there. The Chinese similarly have no basis, whatsoever, to stake a claim either, besides of course, a few dreamy cartographic enlargements of the notion of China that persists from some of the hangers-on in the Qing Emperor’s court. The view from the Chinese side about what exactly constitutes China is no less confused. Apparently, like the British, the Manchu’s who ruled China from the seventeenth to the early twentieth century had a policy of staking claim to the lands that lay ahead of their frontiers in order to provide themselves with military buffers. However, as a leading Chinese historian, Professor Ge Jianxiong, Director of the Institute of Chinese Historical Geography at Fudan University in Shanghai and a veteran of the official history textbook advisory committees, has recently noted in an article titled, “How big was ancient China?” published in the China Review, that to claim that the ancient Buddhist kingdom “has always been a part of China” would be a “defiance of history.”10 In the same article Ge Jianxiong, elaborates, “To claim that Tibet has always been a part of China since the Tang

10 Cited in, Claude Arpi, China is a 20th century idea (27 March 2007). The Pioneer

and Venkatesan Vembu, Tibet wasn’t ours, says Chinese scholar (22 February 2007)

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dynasty; the fact that the Qinghai–Tibetan plateau subsequently became a part of the Chinese dynasties does not substantiate such a claim”. Ge also notes that prior to 1912 when the Republic of China (ROC) was established, the idea of China was not clearly conceptualized. Even during the late Qing Period (Manchu), the term China would on occasion refer to the Qing state including all the territory that fell within the boundaries of the Qing Empire. At other times, it would be taken to refer to only the eighteen interior provinces excluding Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Sinkiang. Professor Ge further adds that the notions of a “Greater China” were based entirely on the “one-sided views of Qing court records that were written for the courts self-aggrandizement.” Ge criticizes those who feel that the exaggeration of historical territorial claims would lead to a more fervent demonstration of patriotism. In this context, we would like to recall a recent conversation the author had with Ambassador Sun Yuxi, then China’s envoy to India. Ambassador Sun expressed that while he was soundly castigated in India for his unintended comment, he gained a major constituency in China, as there are elements in the politico-military hierarchy who do not wish to compromise with India. The Mandarins in Beijing would do well to take heed to Ge Jianxiong’s advice, “If China really wishes to rise peacefully and be on solid footing in the future, we must understand the sum of our history and learn from our experiences.” Historically, Tibet’s relationship with China has defied any precise definition. While Tibet never enjoyed “independence” as the term is commonly understood, it was also never an “integral part” of the mainland. However, there is a well-established Chinese historical tradition, namely, the primacy of inner Asia and its defense, as being integral to the security of China itself. This would largely explain the various institutional devices that Beijing’s rulers have forged to maintain control over these vast regions. Since, over the centuries, the periphery had served as a springboard for invasions into the mainland,

DNA India, www.dnaindia.com/world/report_tibet-wasnt-ours-says-chinese-scholar_ 1081523. Accessed on 1 April 2011.

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Chinese rulers have been exceptionally diligent in their efforts to control the periphery. Tibet’s links with China goes back to the mid-seventh century, when a Tibetan ruler married a Han princess of the ruling Tang dynasty. In its wake, came the Chinese influence — in manner of dress and mode of living. During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the Mongols, whose vast empire embraced China and Tibet, established close links with Tibet’s lamas, after accepting their faith. The Ming dynasty, which succeeded the Mongols, was relatively weak and thus between 1566 and 1644 political relations between Beijing and Lhasa were virtually non-existent.11 It was only under the Manchu’s (Qing Dynasty, 1644–1912) that the relationship evolved further. However, in essence it was a political relationship, not one with the Han people. After 1712, when Manchu armies of the Qing Dynasty marched into Tibet, Chinese power dominated all its border regions. Tibet’s treaties with foreign powers, especially those between 1856 and 1904, were concluded in the wake of military debacles inflicted first by the Gurkhas, and then by the British under Francis Younghusband. The thirteenth Dalai Lama maintained that “The relationship between Tibet and (Qing) China was that of priest and patron and was not based on the subordination of one to the other … The pattern was that of the traditional guru–chela relationship, the lay prince, buttressing the authority of the high priest, who in turn extended him spiritual support.”12 The office of the Amban was first introduced by Beijing in 1728, by which time Manchu armies had stabilized Tibet from Mongol intruders. From an initial garrison of 2000 men, it was later agreed that only 1000 Chinese soldiers would remain stationed in Lhasa. The Amban was essentially an ambassador appointed to look after Manchu interests and to protect the Dalai Lama on behalf of the Emperor. The Amban mission lasted until 1912.

11 Mehra, P (2007). Essays in Frontier History: India, China and the Disputed Border, p. 108. New Delhi: Oxford University Press. 12 Ibid., p. 111.

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In 1788, the Gurkhas attacked Tibet. The Dalai Lama appealed to the Qing Emperor for military assistance. By 1792, Chinese forces had reached Central Tibet, pushing back the Gurkhas into Kathmandu. The Chinese took the opportunity afforded by their intervention to strengthen control over Tibet, devising a new method of selecting the Dalai Lama. The Tibetans agreed to the “Golden Urn” formula. After 1792, China had acquired more power in Tibet than it had ever possessed before.13 The 1792, Chinese expeditionary force was the fifth army the Qing Emperor had sent to Tibet in the eighteenth century.14 In 1792, the emperor issued a 29-point decree which tightened Chinese control over Tibet. It strengthened the powers of the Ambans, who were in theory put on par with the Dalai and Panchen Lama and given authority over financial, diplomatic and trade affairs. It also outlined a new method to select both the Dalai and Panchen Lama by means of a lottery administered by the Amban in Lhasa. In this lottery, the names of the competing candidates were written on folded slips of paper which were placed in a golden urn. The tenth, eleventh and twelfth Dalai Lamas were selected by the golden urn method.15 Now, the Chinese interpret this as a right to have a say in the choice of the next Dalai Lama. They have already chosen the new Panchen Lama. The ninth, thirteenth, and fourteenth Dalai Lamas, however, were selected by the previous incarnation’s entourage with the selection being approved after the fact by Beijing. In May 1841, the Dogra General Zorawar Singh invaded Western Tibet and captured Taklakot by September 1841. The Amban at Lhasa, Meng Pao, reported, “On my arrival at Taklakot a force of only about 1000 local troops could be mustered, which was divided and stationed as guards at different posts. A guard post was quickly established as a strategic pass near Taklakot to stop the invaders, but these local

13 Lamb, A (1960). Britain and Chinese Central Asia: The Road to Lhasa, 1767–1905, pp. 22– 25. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 14 Goldstein, MC (1997). The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet and the Dalai Lama, p. 19. Berkeley: University of California Press. 15 Goldstein, MC (1989). A History of Modern Tibet, 1913–1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State, p. 44. Berkeley: University of California.

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troops were not brave enough to fight off the Shen-Pa (Dogras) and fled at the approach of the invaders. The distance between Central Tibet and Taklakot is several thousand li . . . because of the cowardice of the local troops; our forces had to withdraw to the foot of the Tsa Mountain near the Mayum Pass. Reinforcements are essential in order to withstand these violent and unruly invaders.”16 In December 1841, the Chinese finally responded. Chinese–Tibetan forces decisively defeated the Dogras and chased them back to Leh. Subsequently, Dogra forces counterattacked and finally defeated them in the first Battle of Chushul in August 1842. After the October 1911 revolution, which ended Manchu rule, the Dalai Lama repudiated all links with the Han, while the new Chinese republic sought to declare Tibet and Outer Mongolia as integral parts of China. Sun Yat-sen, and later, Chiang Kai-shek, reiterated Beijing’s declarations. So did Mao within a year of his declaration of the People’s Republic of China in 1949. Beijing has argued that the Dalai Lama’s declaration of independence in 1912 was unilateral and it could only have been valid if accepted by the other party. It is also pertinent to note that nineteenth century geopolitics, in a sense, preserved Chinese influence over Lhasa. Ironically, “the pattern of great power rivalry worked to uphold rather than destroy China’s legal claim to paramountcy, which Chinese nationalism would later translate into the more absolute concept of sovereignty.”17 As alluded to before, this was a by-product of the Great Game, whereby the British upheld Chinese “suzerainty” over Tibet to keep Russian influence at bay, while simultaneously ensuring both a degree of Tibetan autonomy and British–Indian influence in Tibet. Professor Ge’s recent introspection is reflective of a new dynamic in Chinese historiography within Chinese academia — that the concept of “China” has evolved over the millennia and is not the static notion that is generally portrayed by mainland historians. In addition, the first

16 Wikipedia contributors, “General Zorawar Singh”, Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, (11 April 2008), http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=General_Zorawar_Singh& oldid=204852941. Accessed on 6 May 2008. 17 Garver, JW (2001). Protracted Contest : Sino–Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century, p. 35. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

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time “China” was clearly conceptualized was with the founding of the ROC in 1912. As mentioned earlier, even during the late Qing period, “China” would have sometimes referred to as only the “18 Interior Provinces” excluding Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and Xinjiang. Thus, as Professor Ge notes, to understand the extent of ancient China’s territory, one has to identify that the control of the prevailing central power at any particular period, whose political fortunes fluctuated and, therefore, so did the frontiers of China. Thus, “to look back from the perspective of contemporary borders, China’s current territory contains many areas that form the perspective of the eighth century political control, were independent of the authority of the Tang Court [including Tibet].” In summary, it is imperative to distinguish between “China Proper” and what was variously called “Outer China” or the “Chinese dependencies”. Areas that were directly under the control of the central administrative bureaucracy were referred to as “China Proper”. For most of the Qing Dynasty, it consisted of the 18 provinces primarily populated by the Han Chinese. In contrast, “Outer China” or the “dependencies” referred to other areas, primarily populated by ethnic minorities, that were under the suzerainty of the Chinese state and whose subordination was made certain by force. During the Qing Dynasty, these included Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese Turkestan and Tibet.18 The last years of the Qing Dynasty are the most recent example of territorial disintegration of the historical cycle of expansion and contraction in regards to China’s historical frontiers. By 1912, this process of territorial disintegration ultimately led to a de facto independence for Tibet, which only after the Communists had consolidated central control by 1949 was forcibly compelled to re-unite with “China Proper”, only this time (after 1951) on terms that had been impossible earlier. Article 3 of the 1954 Chinese Constitution declared, China to be “a single multinational state” of which the national autonomous regions

18 Harding, H (1993). The Concept of “Greater China”: Themes, Variations

and Reservations, The China Quarterly, No. 136, Special Issue: Greater China, pp. 660–686.

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were “inalienable parts”. This position has remained unchanged in the later Constitutions of 1975 and 1982. In May 1991, Prime Minister Li Peng clarified that, “We have only one fundamental principle, namely, Tibet is an inalienable part of China. On this fundamental issue, there is no room for haggling … all matters except “Tibetan independence” can be discussed”.19 From China’s contemporary perspective, the economic integration of Tibet with mainland China and indeed Tibet’s own economic rejuvenation since 1980,20 aided since July 2006, when Beijing completed a 1956 km railway linking Lhasa to Xining, the capital of Qinghai Province, suggests that current Chinese control over the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) is perhaps more robust than it was in the past. Suffice it to say, such developments, which are consistent with China’s larger development strategy for its western provinces, are likely to placate Beijing’s concerns over Tibet and perhaps augurs for enhanced Sino–Indian ties in a hitherto complex triangular relationship. After a visit to Tibet in 2000, N. Ram, a noted Indian journalist, dispelled a long-held myth when he bluntly stated that historically ‘Tibet was a feudal serfdom. Land as well as most means of production was in the hands of the three categories of estate-owners — government officials, nobles, and upper class Lamas — who comprised of merely 5% of the population. The mass of the population, serfs and slaves, lived in extreme poverty, as appendages to estates owned by their masters, lacking education, health care, personal freedom, any kind of entitlement, obliged to provide unpaid labor services or ulag, an expansive Tibetan term for extortionate taxes.” He adds, “to ask it to remain frozen in its traditions, as romantic disillusionment with the process of modernization demands, is to be unrealistic as well as unfair to the mass of the Tibetan people. For all their observable religiosity, they are as keen as people anywhere else to solve basic problems of

19 N. Ram, The politics of Tibet: A 2007 reality check (5 July 2007). The Hindu. 20 In the period 1980–1998, Tibet’s GDP quadrupled. Since the 1990s, Tibet’s

economy has grown at close to 10%.

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food, clothing, shelter, transport, education, health, and decent work and to improve living standards as quickly as possible.”21 In 2007, N. Ram returned to Tibet and reported on the socioeconomic development on the plateau, which by now was palpable. He writes, “with a speeding up of the development of industry, the service sector, infrastructure, and education; with the modernization of agriculture and livestock practices; with adequate job creation; with an all-out poverty eradication effort; with an enlightened programme of environmental protection; and with scrupulous respect for the language, culture, religious beliefs and constitutionally mandated autonomy of the Tibetan people, rising China is eminently capable of achieving the all-round development of this autonomous region, which has been problematical in the past.”22 Today, India has by no means abandoned its historical cultural links with Tibet. In fact, India can “rediscover these historical linkages and revitalize them in the present day context.” Indeed, the joint declaration issued in New Delhi on 21 November 2006, during Hun Jintao’s visit, explicitly states the significance of religion and culture in bilateral relations: “The two sides agree to strengthen cooperation in the area of spiritual and civilizational heritage, discuss collaboration in the digitization of Buddhist manuscripts available in China as well as the re-development of Nalanda as a major centre of learning with the establishment of an international university on the basis of regional cooperation.” In addition, New Delhi could also revive its traditional economic ties with Tibet, an opportunity that arose again in July 2006, when the Nathu La pass was reopened as a trading route, after 44 years. Since 2006, the relations have taken many twists and turns. China opposed India in Copenhagen at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the civilian nuclear agreement with the United States. China and India were on the same side at Copenhagen in issues of climate. However, there has been a racketing up of active patrolling

21 Ram, N (2000). Tibet — A reality check, Frontline, 17(18). 22 N. Ram, Tibet in the time of high economic growth (3 July 2000). The Hindu.

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on the border leading to a threefold increase of “incursions” along the 4057 km long un-demarcated border.23 As both countries continue on their frenetic growth path with GDP growths — now scaling 9% each — defense spending has also increased, leading to substantial weapons accretion and military modernization. India has deployed two more mountain divisions and several additional squadrons of longrange SU-30 MKI fighter-bombers, to add muscle to its defense posture with China. A similar build-up can be noticed in Tibet and China. The PLA has built or expanded over a dozen new airfields in many major Indian towns in North and Eastern India within a 600 km range. Many observers consider this the greatest concentration of confronting military power in the modern world. Yet, not a shot has been fired across the border since 1967, when Indian and Chinese forces last engaged in fierce fighting. It would seem that peace and tranquillity has been reigning on the border since well before the last agreement was signed to formalize it.24

23 Jeremy Khan, Why India fears China (10 October 2009). Newsweek, www.newsweek.

com/2009/10/09/why-india-fears-china.html. Accessed on 1 April 2011. The Indian military reported a record 270 Chinese border violations last year — nearly double the figure from the year before and more than three times the number of incidents in 2006, says Brahma Chellaney, an expert in strategic studies at New Delhi’s Centre for Policy Research, an independent think tank. Noting that there was a reported incursion nearly every day this summer, Chellaney says this amounts to “a pattern of Chinese belligerence.” In June, the People’s Daily criticised recent moves by India to strengthen its border defences and declared: “China will not make any compromises in its border disputes with India.” It asked if India had properly weighed “the consequences of a potential confrontation with China.” 24 An Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control in the India–China Border Areas was signed on 7 September 1993. During President Jiang Zemin’s visit to India at the end of November 1996, the governments of China and India signed the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the China–India border areas, which was an important step for the building of mutual trust between the two countries. These agreements provide an institutional framework for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the border areas.

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Chapter 3

India and China: Emerging Dynamics and Regional Security Perspectives∗ Rajshree Jetly

Introduction India and China, both heirs to ancient civilizations, have emerged today as the two most powerful and influential Asian nations in terms of their economic capabilities and geopolitical standing. The two erstwhile adversaries have recognized the need for casting off the baggage of history and residual mistrust and have embarked on the path of forging a new pragmatic partnership. There are two mutually reinforcing components to this new partnership. One, both continue to have a vested interest in a peaceful neighborhood to focus on an uninterrupted process of economic and technological progress and to sustain their steady rise as important centres of power. Two, there is a greater understanding on the part of both China and India that cooperation could work to their mutual advantage and benefit. Any conflict between the two would not only jeopardize their national security, but would also have serious implications for their regional and global security perspectives. It would also go a long way in positioning Asia as the fulcrum of the future world order,

∗ ISAS Working Paper No. 114, 29 September 2010.

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a prospect which would only be in their long term economic and strategic interest.1 However, despite the recognition that cooperation may be in their mutual interest, this is easier said than done. Sino–Indian relations have always been complex with multilayered regional and global dimensions which have complicated their bilateral relationships. Even as India and China have traversed a long road from being friends to adversaries to pragmatic partners, a factor which has been constant in the conduct of their affairs is the fact that they are neighbors and geopolitical rivals who have as much to gain from each other as to fear from the other. It is argued in the following pages that Sino–Indian relations, driven as they will by the primacy of national strategic interests and quest for global influence, will continue to remain subjected to diverse pulls and pressures from their competing interests. A stable and cooperative relationship, which seems to be more or less on the cards in the foreseeable future, would thus not necessarily be translated into a closer relationship between the two Asian giants. It is contended that regardless of the thrust and pace of mutual engagement (cooperation), relationship between the two largest Asian countries will inevitably have strong under-currents of contest and rivalry as they seek the same economic and political space for future interaction. Therefore, it will be essentially not so much as to how India and China perceive the gains and opportunities of mutual cooperation but how they manage their geopolitical and strategic rivalries that will determine the future shape of their relations in the years ahead.

1 This pragmatism is clearly evident in government thinking in both countries.

For example, in a speech made by the Chinese Foreign Minister, Yang Jiechi, he reiterated that “Without friendly relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between India and China, there would be no development and prosperity of our respective countries, no harmony and rejuvenation of Asia, and no peace and progress of the world”. See Ministry of Foreign affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, Yang Jiechi delivers a Speech on China-India Relations (9 August 2008). http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/zyjh/t512134.htm. Accessed 2 September 2010. Also see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China, A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India (15 January 2008). http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/wjdt/2649/t399545.htm. Accessed 2 September 2010.

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Toward Cooperation India has steadily moved a long way from the shadows of hostilities generated by the 1962 war and is today constructively engaged with China in building a stable and cooperative relationship. The momentous visit of the then Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi in December 1988 — the first ever such visit after the 1962 hostilities — was the first clear signal of India’s readiness to end the stagnation and unfreeze the border issue which had immobilized Sino–Indian relations for over almost three decades.2 The visit was a landmark in lifting the relationship to a qualitatively new level. It set in motion a process of mutual engagement, marked by a greater sense of pragmatism and realistic expectations on both sides. The landmark Agreement on Maintaining Peace and Tranquillity along the Line of Actual Control of 1993 was a breakthrough in terms of a clear commitment on the part of both countries to ensure a peaceful environment along the Sino–Indian borders, even as substantial points of difference remained between them over the final settlement of the disputed boundary issue. Both countries have since remained engaged in a steady and uninterrupted dialogue to find a just and rational settlement of the vexing border issue. An agreement on “Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India–China Border Areas” was signed in 1996.3 Consequently, a number of confidence-building measures have been taken by the two countries to avert the threat of any accidental confrontation. Measures for reduction of troops on both sides, prior notification of

2 There is abundance of literature on the India–China border issue. For a good

historical background on the border dispute, see Ganguly, S (2004). India and China: Border issues, domestic integration, and international security, In The India–China relationship, Rivalry and Engagement, Frankel and Harding (eds.), pp. 103–133. Oxford: Oxford University Press. For details on the lead up to the dialogue and Rajiv Gandhi’s visit see, Jain, BM (2004). India–China Relations: Issues and emerging trends. Round Table 93(374), 253–258. Also see, Malone, DP and Mukherjee, R (2010). India and China: Conflict and Cooperation, Survival, 52(1), 252. 3 Muni, SD (2004). September 11: The Asian Giants get closer. In Regional Security in the Asia Pacific, 9/11 and After, Vicziany, Wright et al. (eds.), p. 84. Northhampton: Edward Elgar.

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military exercises, regular meetings between the local commanders and joint military exercises are securely in place to maintain peace and tranquillity on the borders.4 An important agreement for spelling out the political parameters and guiding principles to delineate and demarcate the lines of actual control was signed in 2005, calling for both sides to “make meaningful and mutually acceptable adjustments to their respective positions” and “give due consideration to each other’s strategic and reasonable interests, and the principle of mutual and equal security”.5 India and China have also moved to simultaneously accommodate each other’s concerns on some touchy and sensitive bilateral issues. Following the visit of then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Sikkim in 2003, there was a visible thaw in the approach of the two countries on the border. This was signalled by their decision to re-establish their Consulates General in Shanghai and Bombay and resume border trade through the Nathu La pass,6 for long an emotive issue for both India and China. India unequivocally accepted Tibet Autonomous Region as an integral part of the territory of People’s Republic of China. It reaffirmed its commitment to not allow the Dalai Lama to engage in anti-Chinese political activities on its soil. In a similar vein, China officially recognized India’s sovereignty over Sikkim, which it had been contesting for a long time. More significantly, it veered toward a more nuanced position on Kashmir. Its call to Pakistan to respect the LAC and resolve the dispute through negotiations rather than military action during the Kargil War,7 helped to allay India’s deep concerns of a Sino–Pak entente on its sensitive north-western borders. All these measures have gone a long way in palpably reducing tensions

4 Scott, D (2008). Sino-Indian security predicaments for the twenty-first century. Asian

Security, 4(3), 252. 5 Mansingh, S (2007). Rising China and emergent India in the 21st century: Friends or rivals? The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, XIX(4), 131. 6 Trade between Tibet and Nathu La pass (India) resumed in 2006 after a gap of almost 40 years. 7 For details on the Chinese response to the Kargil war, see Srikanth Kondapalli, S (1999). China’s response to the Kargil incident. Strategic Analysis, 23(6), 1039–1044.

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on the borders and generating greater transparency and trust between the two countries. India and China have also expanded multifaceted bilateral cooperation in a number of areas including, trade, investment, agriculture, education, cultural heritage and tourism. Terrorism has also emerged as a new area of cooperation between the two countries after 2001.8 While progress is underway in all the areas, economic cooperation has emerged as the dominant feature of the emerging Sino–Indian partnership. Notwithstanding a number of existing impediments,9 both countries are engaged in a steady endeavor to diversify the trade basket and exploit their present potential complementarities to their fullest potential. Bilateral trade between the two countries has witnessed spectacular growth over the last few years touching a staggering figure of 51 billion in 2008.10 China has also overtaken the U.S. as India’s largest trading partner.11 There is little doubt that the overriding framework of economic cooperation, based on expanding trade, commercial and investment linkages [not discussed at length as it does not fall within the scope of this paper], is going to remain the single most positive factor in Sino-Indian engagement and evolving partnership in the foreseeable future.

China’s Security Challenge: Discordant Notes on Border Settlement Given the fact that a stable and cooperative framework of relationship has remained firmly in place over the years, one can assert with

8 S. D. Muni, September 11: the Asian Giants get closer, op.cit., p. 92. 9 These range from the Chinese imposition of a series of tariff and non-tariff barriers

against Indian goods to India’s resistance to Chinese investments on security grounds into core sectors such as Telecommunications. 10 According to Chinese statistics, bilateral trade between India and China reached U.S. $ 51.8 billion in 2008 — registering a 34% growth over 2007. India–China trade is currently pegged at U.S. $ 43 billion. See Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs “India–China Bilateral Relations” (March, 2010). http://meaindia.nic.in/. Accessed 31 August 2010. 11 Government of India, Ministry of Commerce. http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/ iecnt.asp. Accessed 31 August 2010.

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reasonable certainty that, barring any unfortunate turn of events, Sino–Indian relations will move on a more or less even keel in the foreseeable future. However, at the same time, the complex overlay of geographical proximity and historical memories on the Sino–Indian strategic landscape, will make for strong undercurrents of competition and contest between the two Asian giants. China undoubtedly represents a major long-term, even the primary security challenge for India. While India has ample reasons to draw comfort from the steadily expanding ties with China, it also remains cognizant of the formidable reach of China’s technological, military and nuclear capabilities across its borders.12 With its undisputed power potential, China’s strong military and nuclear presence in Tibet looms large on India’s strategic horizon. China has stationed medium and intermediate range missiles in Tibet which have major Indian cities within their reach.13 It is also engaged in a massive infrastructural development to increase its connectivity with Tibet, keeping India vulnerable to its future designs. Apart from the main Qinghai–Tibet rail link and the 3900 km Beijing–Lhasa rail link (which may be extended later to Xigaze, South of Lhasa, and then to Yatung, near Nathu La pass that borders India), China is involved in the construction of airports and road projects that link most of its major cities with Tibet.14 Major highways such as the

12 This point was highlighted in the Indian Defence Ministry’s report for 2009–2010.

See Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Annual Report 2009–2010, p. 26. http://mod.nic.in/reports/welcome.html. Accessed 30 August 2010. J. Mohan Malik, India-China competition revealed in ongoing Border Disputes (9 October 2007). Power and Interest News Report No. 13 According to one source, there are 66 Chinese nuclear missiles stationed in Tibet which are directed toward India’s major cities. Cited in Bhasin, S (2009). The Big Three: The Emerging Relationship between the United States, India and China in the Changing World Order, p. 66. New Delhi: Academic Foundation. 14 Alerted by China’s heightened activity in the development of rail and road links with Tibet, the Government of India admitted to taking “necessary steps” for the upgradation of infrastructure and force structuring to secure the desired national security objectives along the Northern borders. See Government of India, Ministry of Defence Annual Report 2009–2010, p. 26. http://mod.nic.in/reports/welcome.html. Accessed 30 August 2010. India has already planned a 497 km Bilaspur–Manali–Leh

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Qinghai–Tibet (Central highway); Sichuan–Tibet (Eastern highway); Lhasa–Kashgar/AksaiChin/Xinjiang (Western highway); and the Yunnan–Tibet highway connect Tibet with neighboring provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, Qinghai and Xinjiang.15 Air connectivity is similarly enhanced through the Gonggar Airport (linking Lhasa with most other Chinese cities including Beijing, Shanghai, Guangzhou and Chengdu); smaller airports at Chamdo and Nyingch, and a new airport in Ngari, scheduled to open in October 2010.16 These developments cause grave anxiety in India regarding China’s intentions, particularly in view of the fact that the border issue has yet to be resolved. As aptly pointed out by a keen observer of the scene, “an unsettled border provides China the strategic leverage to keep India uncertain about its intentions and nervous about its capabilities, while exposing India’s vulnerabilities and weaknesses. . .”.17 It is important to note here that notwithstanding India’s readiness to engage with China without making border resolution a precondition for normalization of ties, the border dispute continues to remains a core concern in India’s long-term security perspectives. There is no doubt that Sino–Indian borders have remained by, and large, conflict free since 1962. Furthermore, nobody in the Indian strategic community believes that given the configuration of forces on the ground and India’s

rail link stretching from Himachal Pradesh to Jammu & Kashmir, to serve as an alternative route for movement of combat equipment along the Eastern borders. 15 See Monika Chansoria, Trendlines in China’s Infrastructure Development in Tibet, CLAWS Journal (2010). pp. 178–79. 16 Chris Devonshire Ellis, Investing in Tibet, the roof of the World, China Briefing. http://www.china-briefing.com/news/2010/08/20/investing-in-tibet-%E2%80%93the-roof-of-the-world.html. Accessed 28 August 2010. Also see Vijay Sakhuja, Military Buildup across the Himalayas: A shaky balance, China Brief, Vol. 9, Brief 18, James Town Foundation, 10 September 2009. http://www. jamestown.org/programs/ chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35469&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D= 25&cHash=255e0ccfe7. Accessed 28 August 2010. 17 J. Mohan Malik, India-China Relations. http://www.apcss.org/core/BIOS/malik/ India-China_Relations.pdf. Accessed 10 June 2010. p. 1145. Refuting this, a Chinese scholar points out that India’s threat perceptions are exaggerated and based on “Beijing’s capability instead of its intentions”, see Guhong, Z (2006). The rise of China: India’s perceptions and response. South Asian Survey, 13(1), 99.

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vastly altered power status, China will repeat any adventurist action against it, like in 1962. At the same time, India is keenly aware of the potential danger of unsolved borders which can be used as much as a strategic leverage as a territorial dispute by China, should it choose to do so at some future date. To recall briefly, the boundary dispute centres around Aksai Chin in the Western sector running into 40,000 sq. km and the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector, running into 92,000 sq. km, making Sino–Indian borders one of the longest disputed borders in the world. India’s claim that the Sino–Indian borders were legally binding for both countries under existing treaties, was refuted by China. China maintained that borders between the two countries had never been delineated or demarcated, and the so called legal treaties were a legacy of British imperialism, imposed unilaterally on China. That it would not hesitate to back its claims even by brutal force was underlined by its swift attack across the entire stretch of the borders in 1962, in which an unsuspecting and surprised India was defeated comprehensively by the Chinese forces. In its moment of complete victory, China declared a unilateral ceasefire, withdrawing from all the territories, barring the strategic Aksai Chin area that it had occupied during the brief but decisive war. It also simultaneously warned India of severe reprisals, should it breach the ceasefire or cross the Line of Actual Control in any sector. The situation has remained unchanged on the borders since, with India making no move to cross the Line of Actual Control or alter the status quo. Given the prevailing balance of power and China’s geostrategically advantageous position, India does not have much choice in accepting the ground realities. It has reconciled to the fact that being in the driver’s seat it is China which will ultimately set the pace of finding a negotiated settlement of the border dispute. China has displayed a certain degree of pragmatism in not allowing varying perceptions of national security to derail the ongoing dialogue. However, this does not detract from the fact that the resolution of the border issue is not a strategic priority or necessity for China, but a choice which will be dictated by political expediency. China is keeping the initiative fully in its hands and has displayed no great urgency to move toward a speedy settlement. Not surprisingly, despite an agreement for spelling out the

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political parameters and guiding principles to delineate and demarcate the Line of Actual Control in 2005, there has been no real progress on the final delineation and demarcation of the line of Actual Control. On the contrary, China has sought to keep the question open and has not hesitated to up the ante by periodically raking up its claims on Arunachal Pradesh much to the discomfiture of India. China has consistently refused to issue visas to State officials from Arunachal Pradesh on the grounds that with the state being a part of Chinese territory there was no need for any visas. At one point, it tried to score a point by even protesting against the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh’s electoral campaign in the State. Last year, it brazenly attempted to bloc funds from the Asian Development Bank to India on the ground that some of that money was to be used in Arunachal Pradesh.18 China also reacted sharply to Dalai Lama’s visit to Tawang (Arunachal Pradesh) which he declared for the first time as being part of India. This was particularly galling for China as Tawang holds special significance for Tibetans as the birth place of the 6th Dalai Lama and Dalai Lama’s statement came at a time when massive protests against the Chinese rule were taking place in Tibet. China officially cautioned India to exercise restraint and not to stir up trouble in the disputed area with a view to ensuring the sound development of China–India relations. It added as a pointed reminder that the two countries had never officially settled the demarcation of their border and China’s stance on the Eastern sector of the China–India border was “consistent and clear cut”.19 India, on its part, reiterated that regardless of what others had to say, “It is government of India’s position that Arunachal Pradesh is a part of India”.20

18 Jeff Smith, The China-India Border Brawl, Wall Street Journal (24 June 2009).

http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124578881101543463.html. Accessed 30 May 2010. Despite Chinese opposition, the loan was eventually passed. 19 MEA reiterates Arunachal Pradesh an Integral Part of India (13 October 2009). http://www.thaindian.com/newsportal/india-news/mea-reiterates-arunachalpradesh-an-integral-part-of-india_100260071.html. Accessed 3 June 2010. 20 Arunachal an Integral part of India: Nirupama Rao (16 October 2009). http:// www.asianetindia.com/news/arunachal-integral-part-india-nirupama-rao_90131.html. Accessed 3 June 2010.

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India recognizes that China’s consistent refrain on Arunachal Pradesh to mount pressure on India is, to no mean extent, a function of its own vulnerability in Tibet. Its tenuous hold on Tibet even five decades after it moved its forces into the region underlines its failure to achieve its declared objective of bringing Tibet firmly into the fold of the motherland. Seething unrest and insurgency in the sensitive region continues to make for a deep challenge to China’s central authority.21 Dalai Lama’s presence in India only heightens its anxieties and predicament in Tibet. Growing international popularity and support for Dalai Lama who is seen as a separatist figure by China adds to its international embarrassment. India has steadfastly maintained that grant of asylum to Dalai Lama as a revered religious and cultural figure was a purely humanitarian decision in keeping with its democratic traditions. The recent meeting of Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, with the Dalai Lama in August 2010, also reinforces this point. Notwithstanding its repeated assurance that he would not be allowed to indulge in any political activities on the soil, India has not given into China’s demand for imposing curbs on Dalai Lama’s travels within the country or abroad. India recognizes that it is in no position to play the Tibet card given its limitations in view of China’s vastly superior capabilities and its potential to rake up old issues at its will and time of choosing. For the rest, India wants to keep its options open and is in no hurry to curb Dalai Lama’s freedom or to mitigate China’s long-term concerns on Tibet. This is because India recognizes that for China the border issue — as it was fifty years ago also — is not only about territorial gains but also about erosion of India’s prestige as a major Power. China had won the 1962 war but had vacated most of the territory only to expose India’s vulnerabilities and effectively shatter its image in the region. To that extent, China’s posturing on the border issue is a reminder of the underlying volatility of Sino–Indian relations. It also underlines the

21 Tibet is deeply symbolic for China in terms of its full control in its outlying regions and China does not want other disgruntled ethnic minorities such as the Uyghur’s in Xinjiang and ethnic Mongolians in Inner Mongolia to draw inspiration from any Tibetan success in resisting the Chinese might.

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potential dangers of the dispute being reignited to score political points of sovereignty that go beyond actual territorial claims. Unresolved borders will thus continue to make for deep concerns in India regarding its security and strategic engagement with China. India’s worries are magnified further with the rapid modernization and upgrading of China’s military facilities. The 60th anniversary celebration of the PRC was centered on a massive display of China’s military might and further exposed the widening gap in the military capabilities of the two countries. According to one source, China’s defense budget in 2009 at U.S. $75 billion was two and a half times more than India’s at U.S. $30 billion. The PLA (People’s Liberation Army) is the world’s largest army with a much higher ratio of men and artillery as compared to India. Furthermore, the acquisition of sophisticated fighter planes such J-11 and J-12, has served to greatly bolster the Chinese Air force, at the expense of India.22

India and South Asia India remains a predominant power in South Asia, in terms of its size, location and power potential. It is, however, also aware of the need to carry the region with it in a cooperative framework to be able to fulfil its long term aspirations of playing a major role in global affairs. India therefore has a stake in not only playing a pivotal role in the region but also keeping it free from external powers’ presence and interference. Cognizant of India’s status as the most powerful South Asian nation, China has been reluctant to accept its unchallenged leadership in the region. Its strategy to counter balance India’s power and influence in the region tends to raise India’s security concerns vis-à-vis China’s encroachment in its own backyard and remains an integral part of India’s regional security perspectives.

22 According to one estimate, the Chinese will have as many as 2 300 combat aircrafts of the third/fourth generation by 2020 as compared to 750 aircrafts in India. For more details on the growing power differential in nuclear weapons, Army and Air force for India and China, see G. D. Bakshi, The Chinese Threat in Perspective. CLAWS Journal (Summer 2010). pp. 58–59.

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Sino–Pak Entente: Strategic Concerns Sino–Pak alliance in particular, ensconced as it is firmly in an antiIndia construct, has been the single most complicating factor in India’s regional security concerns. Sino–Pak friendship has been durable primarily because it has proved of great value to both countries in furthering their common objective of keeping India under check. China has a clear interest in building Pakistan as an effective counter against India, eroding its wider role in the region and keeping its global ambitions at bay. Close defense cooperation with China has, on the other hand, not only bolstered Pakistan’s defense and nuclear capabilities disproportionate to its power potential, but has also, in no small measure, enabled it to stand up to India and keep it mired within the subcontinental confines. Beijing remains Islamabad’s largest supporter in terms defense sales and technology. Between 1978 and 2008, U.S. $7 billion worth equipment was sold to Pakistan including ballistic missiles, small arms and conventional war-fighting weapons systems.23 More recently, Beijing approved the sale of 36 sophisticated J-10 fighter jets and two F22P frigates to Pakistan. It has, over the years also assisted Pakistan with the production of JF-17 Thunder advanced multi-purpose fighter aircraft, advanced training aircrafts such as K-8 Karakorum, Al Khalid Tanks, Babur cruise missiles and AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System).24 Additionally, a major source of concern for India is the potential fall-out of Sino–Pak nuclear collaboration on its long-term strategic interests. China has played a crucial role in assisting Pakistan’s

23 Cited in Bruce Riedel and Pavneet Singh, US-China Relations: Seeking Strategic Convergence in Pakistan, Brookings Policy Paper, No. 18, January 2010. http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/0112_us_ china_relations_ riedel/0112_US_China_Relations_Riedel.pdf. Accessed 27 August 2010. 24 Mohan Guruswamy, Pakistan–China Relations, Higher than Mountains, Deeper than the Oceans, CLAWS Journal (Summer 2010). p. 101. Also see Lisa Curtis, China’s Military and Security Relationship with Pakistan, Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (20 May 2009). http:// www.heritage.org/research/testimony/chinas-military-and-security-relationship–withpakistan. Accessed 1 September 2010.

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development as a nuclear power. As widely reported, China began to provide nuclear assistance to Pakistan in the early 1980s, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Subsequently, it also provided significant assistance in the development of Pakistan’s ballistic missiles programme, including the short and medium range Ballistic Missiles, Shaheen 1 and Shaheen 2, and Ghauri 1 and Ghauri 2, respectively.25 Even after signing Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1992 and 1996 respectively, China has reportedly continued providing nuclear assistance and missile technology to Pakistan, in contravention of its treaty obligations.26 For instance in 1994, China is believed to have sold unsafeguarded ring magnets to China, which were used in gas, centrifuges to enrich Uranium.27 Pakistan’s nuclear bomb is alleged to be based on the Chinese blueprints.28 China has also played a major role in helping Pakistan to set up the civilian nuclear plants Chashma I and Chashma II. Recently China has announced the sale of two nuclear reactors to Pakistan.29 China has assured India that its civil nuclear cooperation with Pakistan would be in accordance with its international obligations. Nonetheless, given Pakistan’s record of carrying out a clandestine nuclear weapon programme, there are concerns in India

25 See Arpit, R (2005). Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia, China India and Pakistan,

New Delhi: Sage Publications. Malik, M (2003). The Proliferation Axis: Beijing, Islamabad — Pyongyang, The Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, XV(1), 57–100. Also see Levy, A and Scott-Clark, C (2007). Deception: Pakistan, the United States, and the Secret Trade in Nuclear Weapons. London: Atlantic Publishers and Chakma, B (2008). Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons. New York: Routledge. 26 This is contested by some Pakistani scholars who have termed allegations of a Sino–Pak nuclear axis as highly exaggerated and not based on concrete evidence. See Cheema, PI (2002). The China Threat: A view from Pakistan. In The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality H Yee and I Storey (eds.), pp. 302–311. New York: Routledge Curzon. 27 Shirley Kan, A. China and Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles: Policy Issues, CRS Report for Congress RL 31555. 28 Deepak, BR (2006). Sino–Pak “Entente Cordiale” and India: A look into the past and future. China Report, 42(2), 129–151. 29 Ashish Kumar Sen, Chinese Deal with Pakistan Hems Obama (13 May 2010). Washington Post http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/may/13/chinese-dealwith-pakistan-hems-obama/. Accessed 30 August 2010.

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about a possible diversion of technology for its civilian nuclear plants for military use. India’s pointed reference to China as the primary threat and its nuclear support to Pakistan as the main factor underpinning its rationale for the 1998 tests clearly underlined India’s grave concern on Sino–Pak nuclear collaboration. In a letter to the U.S. President, Bill Clinton, Indian Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee justified India’s tests on the ground that China was an “. . . overt nuclear weapon state on our border, a state which committed armed aggression against India in 1962. Although our relations with that country have improved in the last decade or so, an atmosphere of distrust persists mainly due to the unresolved border problem”. He also referred to the material help this state had rendered to “another neighbor” of India to become a covert nuclear weapon state.30 Expectations in some quarters that a subtle shift in China’s stance on Kashmir31 — it maintained neutrally in the Kargil war — would lead to a more balanced approach by China vis-à-vis Pakistan have also been largely belied.32 According to some scholars, China’s moderate stance on Kashmir was a reflection of its concerns about potential Jihadi

30 For the full text of Vajpayee’s letter to President Clinton see Nuclear Anxiety, India’s

letter to Clinton on the Nuclear Testing (13 May 1998). The New York Times. Reacting strongly to the above charge, the Chinese Government asserted that the “gratuitous accusation by India against China is solely for [the] purpose of finding excuses for the development of its nuclear weapons.” See ‘India’s Nuclear Tests Show Fear of China’, Wall Street Journal (15 May 1998). p. A13. 31 Lisa Curtis, China’s military and security relationship with Pakistan, op.cit. 32 That China continued to support Pakistan fully on its claims on Kashmir was recently underlined by its decision to issue stapled instead of stamped visas for travellers of Kashmiri residence to China. China has also undertaken several projects in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) which India considers to be an integral part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. In 2009, India lodged a strong protest over China assisting Pakistan to build the Bunji Hydro-Electric power project in PoK. According to some recent reports, China has plans to connect Pakistan with rail line running close to Karakoram highway which connects Khunjerab pass with the Chinese town of Kashgar. The rail link will give China access through PoK and is seen by India strategic community a serious military infrastructure close to the Indian border (8 July 2010) Times of India. Recently, some reports alluded to the presence of 11,000 Chinese troops in Gilgit–Baltistan though this is denied by the Chinese. See China denies troops presence in Gilgit–Baltistan (2 September

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violence within its own territories in Xinjiang.33 Ethnic Tensions remain a concern for China but Pakistan has taken several measures — military and intelligence support and joint anti-terrorism exercises — to allay Chinese apprehensions on this score and avert any further deterioration in their ties.34 Quite clearly unless Pakistan descends into greater chaos and there is complete failure on Islamabad’s part to contain the rising tide of militancy for Beijing, Sino–Pak relations are unlikely to waver on this score. Any fundamental change in China’s calculation of leveraging Pakistan as a useful counterweight to India’s growing power is clearly not on the cards any time in the near future. As an analyst has argued, “Pakistan is the only country that stands up to India and thereby prevents Indian hegemony over the region thus fulfilling the key objectives of China’s South Asian policy”.35 More important, Pakistan is a trusted ally to keep India from emerging as an independent center of power outside the sub-continental balance. This is particularly in view of the growing Indo–U.S. strategic partnership which China sees as countering its growing power and influence in the region. With no prospects of China scaling down its support for Pakistan in the near future, it is clear that India will have to continue factoring Sino–Pak extent as a given in its larger regional security concerns for a long time.

China’s Growing Role in India’s Neighborhood Equally important for India is to factor in China’s quest for expanding its presence and influence the politics and security matrix of

2010) The Hindu. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article609016.ece. Accessed 2 September 2010. 33 Xinjiang has seen considerable violence, including terrorist tactics as part of the separatist movement by the Uighurs, a Muslim community that has been fighting for a separate state since the 1980’s, bringing them in direct conflict with the Chinese central authorities. 34 See Jetly, R and Lodhi, I (2010). Pakistan–China relations in the 21st century, retrospect and prospect. In South Asia: Societies in Political and Economic Transition TT Yong (ed.), pp. 162–163. New Delhi: Manohar Publications. 35 Malik, JM (2010). South Asia in China’s Foreign Relations. In Global Change, Peace and Security, 13(1), 85.

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other neighboring countries also. Over the years, China has steadily increased its presence in South Asia and carefully crafted economic, political and military linkages with the smaller South Asian countries to find its own space in the region. India has reasons to be concerned about China’s undisguised thrust to constrain its leadership and status in South Asia. One, India’s geostrategic location and power makes for India’s inevitable centrality in the region. Paradoxically, however, its extensive religious, linguistic ethnic and cultural affiliations with its neighbors have led to greater psychological distance between them. Heightened anxieties regarding their national identities and sovereignty have led to greater discord with their bigger neighbor, India. In the event, bilateral issues of water-sharing, trade and transit facilities, ethnic overspill and migration and in more recent years, cross-border terrorism, have acquired such deeply emotive overtones that they continue to defy rational settlement. Two, China comes with no baggage of historical memories and bilateral disputes. More important, it is seen by many of India’s smaller neighbors as an effective counterweight to India’s preponderant power. This gives a certain edge to China which can capitalize on the prevalent anti Indian sentiment to build its own bridges of friendship with these countries. Given these ground realities, China’s gradual encroachment into India’s traditional sphere of influence has long-term implications for India’s regional status which India cannot ignore.36 China has over the years developed extensive military links with Bangladesh and has emerged as its largest military supplier. It signed a defense cooperation agreement with Bangladesh in 2002 and has also assisted it in developing a missile launching pad near Chittagong port.37 The two countries have also signed an agreement for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. During the visit of Bangladesh’s Prime

36 It is not surprising that India was not at all keen for China to be granted an observer status in SAARC. It was only when Japan and the U.S. who could counter balance it also became observer countries that India finally acquiesced. 37 Anand Kumar, “Chinese Puzzle in India–Bangladesh Relations”, IDSA Comment (19 April 2010). http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinesePuzzleinIndiaBangladeshRelations_akumar_190410. Accessed 7 June 2010.

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Minister Sheikh Hasina to China in March 2010, China agreed to assist Bangladesh with the construction of a U.S. $8.7 billion deep seaport in Chittagong. The port can be used for gaining access to harbors in Chittagong and Cox’s Park as well as refueling facilities for China’s aircraft. China also desires to utilize this port as a passage for its southern Yunnan province, and is for the same reason pushing for the construction of a road link between Chittagong and Kunming (in Yunnan).38 China has also steadily expanded its trade and economic cooperation with Sri Lanka, surpassing Japan as its largest aid donor.39 Gradual reduction of aid and engagement by India, following Sri Lanka’s poor human rights record, left a void which China was quick to utilize for its increased interaction with Sri Lanka. China continues to play an important role in the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the northern and eastern provinces by upgrading facilities and infrastructure (roads, buildings and hospitals) in the country’s war-affected areas.40 It has been also actively collaborating with it in oil exploration and developing port and harbor facilities in Hambantota. Other significant projects include the construction of a second international airport at Hambantota, a U.S. $855 million coal power plant at Norochcholai (to be connected to the national grid by early 2011); and a U.S. $248 million expressway connecting the capital Colombo with the airport at Katunayake.41

38 Kriti Singh, Hasina’s visit to PRC: In Quest of a Comprehensive Partner-

ship, Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies (26 March 2010). http://www.ipcs.org/ article/china/hasinas-visit-to-prc-in-quest-of-a-comprehensive-partnership-3074.html. Accessed 28 August 2010. 39 See R. N. Das, China’s Foray into Sri Lanka and India’s Response, IDSA Comment (5 August 2010). http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/ChinasForayintoSriLanka andIndiasResponse_ rndas_050810. Accessed 28 August 2010. 40 China grants $ 66 million to develop hospitals in conflict-affected areas of Sri Lanka (21 August 2010). Colombo Page. http://www.colombopage.com/archive_ 10B/Aug21_1282371791CH.php. Accessed 28 August 2010. 41 Sudha Ramachandran, Sri Lankan Waters run deep with China (13 August 2010). Asia Times. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LH13Df02.html. Accessed 23 August 2010.

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China has also built a steady political relationship with Nepal, who has been ever willing to play the China card to offset India. India remains particularly sensitive to China’s forays in Nepal given its strategic location on the northern border adjoining China. Chinese investment in infrastructural development in the Himalayan Kingdom has been extensive; it is presently engaged in building a rail line linking Lhasa, the capital of Tibet, to the Nepalese town Khasa on the Sino–Nepal Border.42 It has also extended generous financial assistance to Nepal and its annual aid has increased by 50% to touch U.S. $22 million. China’s growing links with Myanmar, which technically does not fall within South Asia but abuts on India’s sensitive eastern flank while also sharing borders with China, cause deep concern in India. China has over the past few years established extensive military linkages with significant arm sales and infrastructural development in Myanmar. China’s remains Myanmar’s largest benefactor in the supply of defense equipment and technical assistance.43 China has also assisted with the construction of naval bases, roads waterways, and oil and gas pipelines to link Yunnan, its southernmost province, with Myanmar. China is also helping with the establishment and advancement of radar and communications systems and refueling facilities at the Hainggyi, Coco, Sittwe, Zadetkyi Kyun, Myeik and Kyaukphyu ports. In August 2010, two Chinese warships made a visit to Myanmar’s Thilawa port in an effort to strengthen military and naval exchanges between the two countries.44

42 China has an added reason to have its fingers in Nepal which has the second largest

Tibetan refugee community in the world. Abanti Bhattacharya, China’s inroads into Nepal: India’s concerns, IDSA Coment (18 May 2009). 43 China played a significant role in modernizing Myanmar’s army and remains its largest supplier of arms including tanks, fighter aircraft, radar systems, ammunition, surface-to-air missiles and short-range air-to-air missile systems. For details see China’s Myanmar Dilemma, International Crisis Group Report No. 177 (14 September 2009). pp. 21. http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs07/Chinas_ myanmar_ICG.pdf. Accessed 28 August 2010. 44 Chinese Navy Escort Warships make Port Call in Myanmar (29 August 2010). http://english.sina.com/china/p/2010/0829/336618.html. Accessed 2 September 2010.

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Closely related to the expansion of China’s military and economic presence in its immediate neighborhood is its relentless urge to secure the energy resources in the region. China and India are today the largest consumers of energy and as their needs grow, they are bound to compete for control and access to markets and resources. India remains concerned about China’s success in gaining exploration rights for developing natural gas fields in Bangladesh which had earlier turned down India’s proposal for a tri-national gas pipeline between India, Bangladesh and Myanmar.45 China is also engaged in exploration and production of gas pipelines linking offshore platforms in Myanmar to Kunming in China. The 2 806 km long natural gas line with a capacity of 1 billion cubic meters annually to Kunming is expected to be ready by 2012. India, which is expected to face a huge energy crunch in the years ahead, has yet to make any headway in accessing natural gas from either Bangladesh or Myanmar. Deeply aware that China’s inroads into its immediate neighborhood cuts into its power base, India has sought to mend its fences with its neighbors and taken manifold steps, even unilaterally, to strengthen its economic and political ties with these countries. Capitalizing on a pro-India government in Bangladesh after many years, India has taken significant steps to engage with it on a number of issues. These include bilateral trade, financial aid and assistance, and cooperation on terrorism among others. India recently extended U.S. $1 billion line of credit to Bangladesh.46 The two countries are also developing land and sea transport links including the use of Mongla and Chittagong Sea ports, and the construction of the Akhuara–Agartala railway line. Similarly with Nepal, India has acceded to Nepal’s long-standing demand for review of the 1950 Indo–Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, which has been seen by Nepal as compromising its autonomy in foreign and defense matters. It has also tried to offset China’s growing investment in

45 The proposal has since been approved by the Sheikh Hasina government in Bangladesh. 46 Dhaka to pen 1 billion loan from India today (7 August 2010). Daily Star. http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news-details.php?nid=149733. Accessed 28 August 2010.

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Nepal’s infrastructure by a granting U.S. $361 million for development of transportation links in the Terai region. In recent years, India’s policies in Myanmar have also undergone a visible shift in its engagement with the military Junta. After realizing that its deliberate distancing from the military government was benefiting China to consolidate its presence in the country at India’s expense, India for the past few years has been engaged in improving its relations with Myanmar.47 It has taken several steps to woo Myanmar which remains important for India’s strategic interests on its land borders as also for its maritime security in the Indian Ocean. India’s interests in Myanmar are spread across a range of sectors including telecommunications, energy, agriculture, industry, IT and education. In line with these priorities, India has taken on a more active role in disbursing aid and building infrastructure. It has, for example, extended U.S. $20 million credit for renovation of Thanlyan refinery and development of the Sittwe port, and is collaborating with the exploration of oil and gas projects with Myanmar.48 It is also assisting in building a transport corridor that will connect the port with Mizoram through the Kaladan River. The visit of Myanmar’s senior leader General Than Shwe to New Delhi in July 2010 provided a further impetus to growing relations between the two countries. Even as India accords the highest priority to its neighborhood diplomacy to maintain its preeminent position in South Asia, there is little doubt that China’s growing influence in its own backyard serves to heighten India’s long-term strategic and economic concerns vis-àvis its giant neighbor. More important, as long as China keeps up its pressure on India, there is little possibility of any let up in the subtle

47 For an Indian perspective on India’s renewed interest in Myanmar see, Rajeev

Bhatia (former Indian ambassador to Myanmar), Crafting a Richer India-Myanmar Partnership (10 August 2010). The Hindu. http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/ lead/article562944.ece. Accessed 28 August 2010. 48 Harsh V. Pant, Keep the General in Good Humour (2 August 2010). The Tribune (Chandigarh). http://www.tribuneindia.com/2010/20100802/edit.htm#6. Accessed 28 August 2010.

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competition between India and China in India’s neighborhood in the foreseeable future.

India’s Maritime Security: Emerging Challenges As a major peninsular power, surrounded by sea on three sides, India also has a vital interest of maritime security in the Indian region which it considers crucial for its security and trade. India has a clear stake in not only playing an active role in the region as a leading maritime power but also protecting its strategic and economic interests by keeping the Indian Ocean free from any potentially inimical dominance by other powers. India has over the years expanded its naval and maritime influence and positioned itself to play a pivotal role in the region by upgrading its naval capabilities and carrying on naval exercises with other powers in the region.49 With its aspirations for playing a leading role in the region, India is increasingly finding its interests intersecting with China. It is particularly concerned about China’s search for ports and military installations at various points stretching from the South China Sea on to the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Gulf to enhance its geopolitical and naval standing. China claims its “string of pearls” strategy is geared to protecting the Sea lines of communication to secure vital energy supplies for itself. India, however, sees the strategy as not only significantly boosting Chinese naval capabilities in the region where India has vital strategic, geopolitical, economic and energy interests but also encircling India all across its maritime borders.50 China’s search for naval bases and facilities in Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Maldives

49 India has built a naval base in Andaman and Nicobar islands. Its Far Eastern Naval Command at the Andaman islands has been upgraded to Far Eastern Command of all three services. 50 Some Chinese scholars have argued that India’s fears are misplaced and that China’s interests in South Asia and the Indian Ocean are purely economic and not targeting India. See, Guihong, Z (2006). The Rise of China: India’s perceptions and Responses. In South Asian Survey, 13(1), 99. Some Indian scholars also support this view. See Athwal, A (2008). China-India Relations: Contemporary Dynamics, p. 65. New York: Routledge.

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and Pakistan virtually hems in India from all sides with long-term implications for its maritime security.51 India in turn, has sought to shore up its naval projections by holding regular naval exercises with the U.S., Japan, Australia and Singapore near the Andaman Islands, close to Coco islands and near the strategic straits of Malacca. China has openly criticized these exercises as seeking to contain its influence in a region where it has significant security concerns vis-à-vis Taiwan, U.S. and Japan. India’s growing strategic relationship with Japan and the United States (to be discussed later) is particularly troubling for China which sees both these countries as its strongest rivals in the region. India has steadily built a strong economic and defence relationship with Japan; Japan–India Strategic and Global partnership Agreement in 2006 has cemented the ties further, settingup a new framework for closer cooperation between the two countries in future. Although India is not projecting its ties with Japan in an antiChina construct, it remains fully aware of the fact that as a historic rival of China, Japan has a vested interest in a regional balance of power, which does not tilt in favor of China to Japan’s disadvantage. As an analyst has put it, “while India’s move toward a quadrilateral axis of democracies’ with America, Australia and Japan has not been couched in overt anti-China terms’ it has an element of China containment inherent in it”.52 Although the strategy has already withered somewhat following Australia’s public statement that it did not intend to be party to any anti-Chinese exercise, China remains wary of India’s active participation in the region which it has traditionally considered its sphere of influence.53

51 China’s biggest pearl in South Asia is its deep water sea port in Gwadar Pakistan which is capable of offering berthing facilities for Chinese Navy. Pakistan’s deep hostility to India gives an extra edge to China’s potential to outmanoeuvre India in the strategic region at the entrance point to the oil rich gulf and energy rich central Asia. 52 Scott, D (2008). ‘The Great Power Great Game’ between India and China: The logic of geography. Geo Politics, 13(1), 13. 53 For more details on the idea of quadrilateral cooperation, see Raja Mohan, C and Ayres, A (2009). Shaking Realignment. In Power Realignments in Asia: China, India and the United States, A Ayer and C Raja Mohan (eds.), pp. 314–315. New Delhi: Sage Publications.

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India’s Engagement with South East Asia: Competing Dynamics India has also been actively engaging with South East Asia, a strategically vital region in terms of India’s maritime and economic interests. During the Cold war years, India had chosen to stay on the margins and allowed its interaction with the region fall into a state of benign neglect. The end of Cold War and the altered geopolitical regional dynamics has seen India take several steps to engage more constructively with the ASEAN countries. India’s Look East policy signaled India’s desire to give a push to revitalizing its economic and political interaction with the ASEAN region. Given India’s rapidly developing technological and economic capabilities, ASEAN countries have also found it useful to cooperate with India to reap the benefits of extensive economic and technological linkages. Over the years, India has forged strong economic ties with most ASEAN countries. Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand have already emerged as important trading and investment partners for India. More important, India has steadily expanded its strategic presence in the region. It became a dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1995; a member of the Asean Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996; and a signatory to the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation and the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN in 2003 and 2009, respectively. Over the years, India has also forged strong defence and naval ties with Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and Vietnam. It has a significant strategic relationship with Singapore with whom it signed a Defense Cooperation Agreement in 1993; and a year later the India–Singapore dialogue was inaugurated. India also signed a defense Agreement with Indonesia in 2007. In 2000, India had signed a defense pact with Vietnam and has been holding joint naval exercises as part of the new strategic partnership. India has also been helping Vietnam to significantly increase its naval and air power. It is pushing for a naval

It may be noted here in passing that China was not happy with India’s admission into East Asia Summit (EAS) and initially resisted it. Japan, on the other hand, openly supported India’s membership. India became a part of EAS in 2005.

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base in Cam Ranh Bay which would go a long way in augmenting its naval capability in the strategic region.54 South East Asia lies at the junction of South Asia and East Asia, traditionally seen by India and China as their respective spheres of influence. China has been a keen player in the ASEAN region for historical reasons in view of the existence of a large Chinese Diaspora, trade and investment linkages and protection of its maritime interests. It is also viewed with a certain degree of fear by most South East Asian Countries, in terms of its territorial claims on disputed islands in the South China Sea.55 India, on the other hand, has the advantage of not carrying any historical memories or baggage of bilateral disputes in the region. Over the last decade or so, India has steadily emerged as an important player in South East Asia, with many people in the region seeing it as a balancer against China. There is little doubt that the Asean countries will have some interest in maintaining a geopolitical balance of power between India and China for maximizing their economic and security. This could well lead to a quiet competition between China and India over expansion of their geopolitical influence and naval capabilities in the region.

India, United States and China: Emerging Balance of Alignments As India continues its surge toward emerging as a key regional power, it is bound to engage in the global environment as an autonomous center of power with its own regional agenda and global priorities. It will also continue to make efforts to seek its rightful place in the global community through strategic dialogue and partnership with

54 Some scholars have argued that India wants to use the Vietnam Card to counter

China’s supremacy in South China Sea. Rehman, I (2009). Keeping the dragon at bay: India’s counter containment of China. Asian Security, 5(2), 133. Also see Scott, D (2008). The Great Power “Great Game”, between India and China: The logic of Geography. Geo Politics, 13(1), 10. 55 In particular, Vietnam and Indonesia have been locked for many years in a dispute with China over territorial claims on Spratly islands.

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other centers of power, particularly the United States. The United States today remains the only power with the economic and military potential to impinge on a wide range of issues affecting India’s national strategic interests. Recognizing India’s growing economic power and regional influence, United States has shown greater willingness to deal with India. In 2005, President Bush called India a natural partner and publicly assured it of the U.S. support in its rise as a major power. In 2006, the momentous Indo–U.S. Nuclear deal was signed heralding a new chapter of mutual confidence and goodwill between the two countries.56 Apart from getting uninterrupted supply of nuclear fuel for the up-gradation of its civilian facilities, India was informally admitted in the nuclear club, without having to formally sign the NPT. Significantly, Pakistan a long time ally, was not considered for a similar deal, signaling India’s emergence as an independent center of power in South Asia, after years of carrying the vexing burden of India–Pakistan parity on its shoulders. That the momentum of Indo–U.S. strategic partnership was irreversible, regardless of changes in the U.S. administration, was brought to the fore by President Obama when he reiterated, “A fundamental pillar of America’s Comprehensive engagement with the world involves deepening our cooperation with the 21st century centers of influence — and that includes India.”57 India and the U.S. cooperation is also underpinned by strong defense ties and a robust economic relationship with Indo– U.S. trade growing from U.S. $26,807.80 million in 2005–2006 to U.S. $36,517.34 million in 2009–2010.58 The holding of the U.S.–India Strategic Dialogue in June 2010 was a strong reflection of the progress made by the two countries on important issues of security, terrorism,

56 Although the nuclear deal got locked in domestic opposition in India and is making

slow progress in implementation, it has given India an immense leverage in its international status. 57 Cited in Narayan Lakshman, After Strategic Dialogue, Big Push to USIndia Cooperation (5 June 2010). The Hindu. http://www.hindu.com/2010/06/05/ stories/2010060563170100.htm. Accessed 7 June 2010. 58 Indian Ministry of Commerce, Department of Commerce, Export Import Data Bank. http://commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnt.asp Accessed 30 August 2010.

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nuclear disarmament, trade, technology, energy security, science and technology, and education.59 India does not presently rank very high on China’s strategic radar, but the latter remains keenly aware of India’s potential challenge. This is borne out by its steady opposition to India’s bid for permanent membership of United Nations Security Council. It has also been resistant to the international-albeit informal-endorsement of India as a nuclear Power, following the Indo–U.S. nuclear deal.60 It also views with unease India’s steady strategic engagement with major global powers, particularly the U.S., which could increase its power capabilities and influence beyond its shores and emerge as a major rival for China in Asia and beyond. It is not surprising therefore that China has tended to view warming Indo–U.S. relations with some concern as potentially threatening its position in the region. According to a Chinese scholar, “unlike the U.S. which worries about the rise of China and not the rise of India, what concerns China most is how to prevent U.S.–Indian relations from becoming a formal alliance in South Asia”.61 Yet, China has exercised restraint in terms of any public statements against the improving Indo–U.S. relations for its own strategic reasons; China would not want to risk upsetting the United States as this would have a detrimental effect on Sino–U.S. relations. China and the U.S. already have security concerns and deep seated mutual suspicions. The U.S. is clearly uneasy with China’s rapidly modernizing military capabilities, human rights and intellectual property rights violations and balance of trade issues. China is unhappy with the U.S.’s arms sales to Taiwan, its politicization of human rights issues and the U.S. pressure to devalue the Yuan. Nevertheless, both countries

59 U.S. Department of State, U.S.–India Strategic Dialogue Joint Statement (3 June 2010). http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/06/142645.htm. Accessed 1 September 2010. 60 China had lashed out India’s nuclear tests in 1998 and openly criticized the Indo– U.S. nuclear deal as violating the existing treaty obligations. 61 Guihong, Z (2003). US Security policy towards South Asia after September 11 and its implications for China: A Chinese perspective. Strategic Analysis, 27(2), 161.

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are cooperating on several fronts. Both countries are cooperating in greater measure on global issues like climate change, terrorism, nuclear weapon proliferation and human and drug trafficking in their bilateral discussions. These are problems that cannot be solved individually by China or the U.S., as they are global in nature and any solution will require joint concerted action. Similarly, despite differences on trade issues, the economies of both countries are also highly dependent on each other. China holds 70% of its 2 trillion dollar reserves in USD, including 740 billion in treasury bonds, and both countries enjoy strong trade relations.62 This makes it difficult for them to ignore each other. It bears reiterating that for India, Sino–Pak–U.S. Conundrum has been a significant feature of South Asian strategic landscape. China and United States remain the key external players, who have in the past both separately and together played an important role in shaping India’s security dynamics in South Asia. There is little doubt that as long as India’s continues to be wary of China’s preponderant power across the border and its encroaching role in South Asia, it will find it useful to explore any relationship which will give it a certain leverage and diplomatic manoeuvrability in dealing with a powerful neighbor whose future intentions remain uncertain at best. Given United States’ long term interests in containing the increasing power of China, there is bound to be a strategic convergence between both India and United States who have a shared interest in checking China’s unbridled power in the region.63

62 An in depth analysis of U.S.–China relations is outside the scope of this paper

but recent writings on issues of cooperation and competition in U.S.–China relations include Rosemary Foot. China and the United States: Between cold and warm peace. Survival, 51(6), (December 2009–January 2010), pp. 123–146; Lieberthal, K (2009). The China–U.S. relationship goes global. Current History, 243–249; Ping, H, Wenzhao, T, Rongjun, W et al. (2009). China–U.S. relations, tending towards maturity. The International Spectator, 44(2), 9–16; and Qingguo, J (2010). Exception to the rule: The Obama administration and China–U.S. relations, Korean Journal of Defence Analysis, 22(2), 249–264. 63 Tellis, A (2009). US and Indian interests in India’s extended neighbourhood. In Power Realignments in Asia: China India and the United States, A Ayres and C Raja Mohan (eds.), pp. 224–225. California: Sage Publications.

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Having said that, it is important to keep in mind that India has a track record of not being a camp follower, and there is little doubt that it will strive to retain its own autonomy and initiative vis-à-vis China. It is unlikely therefore that it would either rock the boat of seeking normalization with China or be seen as being inextricably tied to the United States’ overarching global strategy. As an analyst has argued “the best insurance against assertive Chinese Power [for India] lies not in participating in any evolving anti-China alliance but rather in emerging as a strong and independent power center on Chinese periphery”.64 To that extent, Indo–U.S. relations may remain an irritant for China, but will not alter substantially India’s quest for keeping Sino–Indian relations on an even keel.

The Road Ahead As India seeks to play a major role in global affairs, its stake in the peace and stability in its immediate environment would call for the adoption of a climate of cooperation with China. At the same time, a greater challenge for Indian diplomacy is to engage with China in a cooperative framework within the larger context of geopolitical rivalry and competition between the two Asian giants. India will face increasing competition from China, as their interests intersect and overlap in both South Asia and beyond. This will make for inevitable contest, and competition between the two countries in the foreseeable future. In that context, it is clear that India’s regional and global policies will be increasingly driven not so much by seeking to countervail China’s preponderant power, as by seeking to find its own place as a power of some consequence. India’s broad orientation toward China will therefore have to rest on three pillars. One, it will have to continue to engage with China within the parameters already set and accepted by both countries. In other words, it will seek a negotiated settlement to the vexing issue of disputed borders, whilst simultaneously expanding

64 Ashley Tellis, U.S. and Indian Interests in India’s Extended Neighbourhood, op.cit.,

p. 227.

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its ties in other areas of mutual interest, particularly economic, to generate stakes for continued cooperation. Two, given the uncertainties regarding the long-term intentions of its more powerful and assertive neighbor, it will be prudent for India to continue building up its military strength, to meet any future challenge from China. Three, it will have to invest in building partnerships with its smaller neighbors in an overarching framework of bilateral and regional cooperation to enable it to play a more constructive and positive role of leadership in region. As India gains enhanced economic and military power and greater recognition as a regional influential, it will be easier for it to engage with China in a more relaxed and balanced framework. More important, as it gradually works out new strategic equations with other major powers to emerge as an influential center of power beyond the confines of South Asia, it is bound to gain greater leverage and manoeuvrability vis-à-vis China. Meanwhile, it will be as important to push for Sino–Indian cooperation as it will be to be prepared for greater competition with its powerful neighbor. The future of Sino–Indian relations will, in the ultimate analysis, thus remain contingent on not only how the two countries manage their geopolitical rivalries and divergent strategic priorities in dealing with each other, but also how they balance their competing interests and aspirations in dealing with the rest of the world. At best, Sino–Indian relations will remain an exercise in finding equilibrium between the competing poles of cooperation and contest.

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Chapter 4

India’s “Look East” Policy: The Strategic Dimension S. D. Muni∗

Introduction India’s “Look East” Policy (LEP) did not begin in the 1990s. It has evolved in four different waves over centuries. The first wave of cultural and commercial engagement between India and its extended eastern neighbors lasted until the 12th/13th century. To this was added a strong strategic dimension by the British Empire in India during the second wave. The leaders of independent India, particularly Nehru, took the lead in launching the third wave by focusing on East Asia as an important part of India’s policy of Asian resurgence. However, the imperatives of the Cold War, intra-Asian conflict and rivalries, and India’s weaknesses on economic and military fronts did not let its Asia policy blossom. What is identified as India’s LEP since the early 1990s constitutes the fourth wave of India’s eastward (re)engagement. Under the strategic thrust of this policy, India has not only reinforced its economic and cultural relations with the countries of ASEAN and East Asia, but also

∗ Professor S.D. Muni is a Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies, an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He can be reached at [email protected]. The views reflected in this paper are those of the author and not of the institute.

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firmed up strategic relations with them through extensive consultations on regional and global security issues and consistent cooperation in defense sectors involving military supplies and naval exercises. India’s strategic vision for the East extends to the whole of Asia-Pacific region as India has manifested both its willingness and capability to play a critical role in the emerging strategic dynamics and architecture for this region. India is an old civilization of sun worshippers. It has, therefore always been looking east. In this respect, it may not be correct to trace India’s LEP to the beginning of the nineties, when the Cold War ended as is usually done. For a proper perspective on India’s substantial engagement with the east, one can clearly identify four different waves of such engagement namely, historical or pre-colonial, colonial, postcolonial and contemporary.

Historical Evolution In the pre-colonial period, there is evidence of India’s dynamic and extensive relations with its eastern neighbors since the first century. This phase lasted until the 12th century and can be described as the first wave of “look east” in cultural and commercial engagement. During this period, the first Hindu Empire (in what later became the Indo– China region) flourished based entirely on cultural and philosophical contacts with India. No military missions were launched and no wars took place, save the South Indian emperor Rajendra Chola’s periodic encroachments into the Srivijiya Empire in Malaya and Indonesia in the 10th and 11th century, as illustrated in Fig. 1. The expansion of Hinduism was followed by the spread of Buddhism to the east. The religious and cultural messages travelled directly from India as well as through China. This led to the emergence of a cultural synthesis of these two major systems of faith and belief, the imprint of which is evident even today. The popularity of the Ramayana (with varying nuances from one country to another) in the Buddhist heartland of Southeast Asia may be seen as an unmistakable imprint of this synthesis. It is no wonder that the images of Ganesha, Garuda, Shiva, Parvati, Rama and Sita are adored and worshiped in many parts

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Fig. 1. The Chola Empire (1050 A.D). Source: http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_ugQUGrg2Qo8/TMCE6hcaChI/AAAAAAAA A-8/Lez9CPZM3vM/s1600/Chola+Empire+Map.png. Accessed on 24 January 2011.

of Southeast Asia, along with those of Buddha. This imprint is also visible in languages, where Pali and Sanskrit provide the texture and base of many Southeast Asian languages. The cultural synthesis is also reflected in the names of the people and places, lifestyles and festivities, patterns of old architecture and temples like Borobudur in Indonesia, Angkor Wat in Cambodia and Wat Phu in Laos. The Angkor Wat in Cambodia and the Luang Prabang temples in Laos have episodes of the Hindu epics, Ramayana and Mahabharata, engraved on their walls. It was in this period that Nalanda University in Bihar, India, emerged as the principal center of learning based on philosophical and religious (Buddhist) discourses for the whole Southeast and East Asian region. It facilitated the spread of Buddhism in China and Southeast Asia. In a very significant way, one of the couriers of culture from India to Southeast Asia during this period was commerce. The spice trade route from West Asia and the Persian Gulf stretched over to Indonesia

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and even beyond, bringing in traders and travelers from one part of Asia to the other. This commercial link also facilitated the spread of Islam in Southeast Asia. In India, Orissa’s annual festival of “Bali Jatra” commemorates the adventures of innumerable traders who braved rough seas across the Bay of Bengal, Straits of Malacca and South China Sea to carry commerce and culture to the eastern shores of the Indian Ocean.1

Colonial period The advent of Islam after the 12th century and then the colonial expansion that followed Muslim rule in India disrupted these cultural and commercial links. During the colonial period, the Second World War engulfed East Asia rather extensively. The war added a strategic dimension to India’s (then British) links with Southeast Asia. The British grasped the strategic centrality of India in Asia and sustained their colonial presence “east of the Suez” including in Southeast Asia, on the basis of their Indian empire.2 They built India as the bastion of their power and influence in Asia that protected their colonial holdings as far in the east as possible, up to Hong Kong. This period may be considered as the second wave of India’s LEP when strategic interests were brought upfront along with the commercial interests, at the cost of cultural and civilizational links. The legacy of India’s colonial sway persists in many subtle and diverse ways. It alerts East Asian countries and interested major powers to project and even exaggerate India’s possible “expansionist” and adventurist intents even when there is no evidence to support such intents. It also imbibes Indian policymakers to a wider strategic perspective that enhances the critical significance of the Indian Ocean and the eastern sea board in its security calculus, as was evident in the thought of Nehru and his associates, like Panikkar.

1 Chandra, L (1969). India’s Cultural Horizon. New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan. Also

see, Dash, S (2003). Roots of India’s cultural diplomacy in Southeast Asia. MPhil Dissertation. New Delhi: Jawaharlal Nehru University. 2 Braun, D (1983). The Indian Ocean: Region of Conflict or Peace Indian Ocean. London: C. Hurst.

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Post-independence period It was natural for India’s historical eastward orientation to reassert itself with the withdrawal of a western colonial presence. The third wave of India’s LEP was set in motion with the advent of independence. The eastern neighbors constituted one of the priority areas in India’s commitment to work for Asian resurgence. Nehru called the Asian Relations Conference in March 1947 even before the formal beginning of “India’s tryst with destiny.” He, as the philosopher and architect of independent India’s foreign policy, in general and its Asia policy, in particular, articulated this commitment while underlining the rationale and significance of Asian resurgence in India’s worldview. Speaking at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi, Nehru said: “We are of Asia and the people of Asia are nearer and closer to us than others. India is so situated that she is the pivot of Western, Southern and Southeast Asia. In the past her culture flowed to all these countries and they came to her in many ways. Those contacts are being renewed and the future is bound to see a closer union between India and Southeast Asia on the one side and Afghanistan, Iran and the Arab world on the west. To the furtherance of that close association of free countries, we must devote ourselves. India has followed with anxious interest the struggle of Indonesians for freedom and to them we send our good wishes.”3

Nehru’s vision of a “closer union” with the East was shaped by the strength of India’s geographical proximity, similarity of historical experiences, cultural identity, economic interests and common strategic concerns in relation to the countries of the East. The vast stretch of Indian Ocean and its economic and strategic significance in links with eastern neighbors was not lost on Nehru and his associates.4

3 Asian Relations, Report of the Proceedings and Documentations of the First Asian

Relations Conference, New Delhi, March 1947. Jawaharlal Nehru, Speeches, Vol. 1 (1946–49) and Vol. 2 (1949–53), Publications Division, Government of India. Delhi: Government of India, 1949 and 1953. 4 See, K.M. Panikkar, The Strategic Problems of the Indian Ocean (Allahabad, 1944); Panikkar, KM (1945). India and the Indian Ocean: An Essay on the influence of Sea Power on Indian History. London: George Allen & Unwin; and Levi, W (1952). Free India in Asia. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press.

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The emphasis on geography and culture in Nehru’s early eastward policy was aimed at building Asian solidarity. He took into account the aspirations of a new, independent and resurgent Asia. Accordingly, he put India in the forefront of mobilizing international support on issues ranging from Indonesia’s freedom struggle and Burma’s internal security and stability, to that of peace and freedom of Indo–China states. Delhi served as a host, in 1947 and 1949, to the conferences on Asian Relations and Indonesia. Indian policymakers and diplomats forcefully articulated the cause of decolonization and development of Asian countries in all possible international forums. The first Afro– Asian Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, in 1955, was the culmination of these early Indian initiatives and efforts to promote Asian resurgence. India strongly pleaded for China’s integration into the international community in the interest of Asian solidarity and pleaded that China should be treated more as a nationalist country than a communist revolutionary force. The characteristic feature of the third wave of India’s LEP was decolonization and Asian resurgence. Both of these aspects were primarily emotional and ideological in content. The Nehruvian vision had a strong political content to back them but was bereft of much tangible substance; of commerce, culture and economy, as was evident during the first wave period. Nor was much attention paid, save rhetorical recognition, to the security imperatives of the developments in Indian Ocean, except during the late sixties and early seventies when India encouraged and backed the proposals for reducing the great powers’ arms race in the Indian Ocean by getting it recognized as a “Zone of Peace”. Therefore, India’s efforts and initiatives with regard to Asian resurgence and Asian solidarity, though appreciated, could not be sustained as desired. The Bandung Conference was the first and last of its type. No Asian Relations Organization, as envisioned in the Asian Relations Conference, could take shape. The Cold War powers suspected any move toward Asian solidarity as contrary to their strategic moves and interests, and ensured that such moves did not succeed. In fact the whole of Asia got divided along the Cold War lines. The Asian leaders failed to forge a common front to emerge as a powerful balancing force in the global divide due to

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their economic dependence on the former colonial powers and their inherent political and military vulnerabilities. There were also internal conflicts and insurgencies that became proxy wars in the Cold War ideological divide. The unfolding Asian conflicts, some of which were the continuation of the colonial control in different forms such as in the Indo–China region and others that proved to be persistent (also involving India with Pakistan and China) facilitated the machinations of all those who worked to keep Asia divided. But India did not completely give up on its eastward orientation. It played a very constructive role, in working for peace and stability in the Indo–China region, under the UN (United Nations) auspices and as Chairman of the International Control Commission, following the Geneva Agreement of 1954. This difficult assignment delivered by India with passion and perseverance for peace is still appreciated and fondly remembered in Vietnam, Kampuchea (then Cambodia) and Laos. The goodwill earned by India in this region is and can be harnessed even today. Prior to this, India was also involved in the Korean Armistice in 1953 and played a constructive role between China and the West.5 Very few people know or remember that India under Indira Gandhi also associated itself with the process of the formation of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) during 1966–67. It worked intensely for evolving a broad-based regional organization of cooperation, which did not identify itself with any of the superpowers’ strategic and Cold War oriented interests. This however, was not acceptable to the powers involved in establishing ASEAN against a strategic backdrop of the messy Vietnam War. The result was an ASEAN representing an ideologically and strategically divided Southeast Asia in which India had no place.6

5 For details of India’s role see, Gonsalves, E (2007). Oral History, “Resolving the

Korean Crisis”. Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, Vol. 2, No. 2. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press-India. 6 Sridharan, K (1996). The ASEAN Region in India’s Foreign Policy. USA: Dartmouth Publishing Co. Also see India–ASEAN Relations: Evolution, growth and prospects in China, India, Japan and the Security of Southeast Asia, C Jeshurun (ed.). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993.

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India missed its second chance with the ASEAN in 1980. In May 1980, following a meeting between Indian and ASEAN officials in Kuala Lumpur, a framework for “step-by-step” cooperation between India and “ASEAN as a group” was agreed on, covering economic areas, specifically trade, international economic cooperation, industrial cooperation and scientific and technological cooperation.7 However, the pursuance of this agreement was vitiated when India, ignoring ASEAN’s collective position on Kampuchea, recognized the Hang Samrin regime that was seen as a protégé of Vietnam. This recognition was announced soon after Indira Gandhi’s return to power in midterm elections and just weeks before India was scheduled to participate in the ASEAN meeting to firm up its association with this regional grouping. Realizing that ASEAN would not approve of this action, India’s then Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao avoided participating in the ASEAN meeting in July 1980. ASEAN also did not bother to invite India subsequently. ASEAN turned cold toward India as a result of its political decision in favor of the Kampuchean regime. But why did the political position of the ASEAN members take precedence in what was proclaimed to be an organization primarily for economic cooperation? Obviously ASEAN took its collective strategic preference rather seriously. Whether India should have played its cards more cautiously, by delaying the recognition of Hang Samrin regime in order to evolve a balance between its immediate strategic priorities and long-term regional interests in Southeast Asia, would remain a subject of debate among policymakers, analysts and observers. In retrospect, the credibility of India’s position on Kampuchea and its stand on ASEAN as an organization was validated. Not only were the Pol Pot-ist forces then backed by ASEAN, China and the West discredited and defeated, but ASEAN today represents the whole of Southeast Asia. Thus, India’s bilateral relations with its eastern neighbors have waned and waxed during all these years.

7 For the Text of Joint Statement issued on this occasion, see, Kripa, ibid.

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The Current Fourth Wave of the “Look East” Policy The current and fourth wave of India’s LEP is credited to Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and is said to have been driven by economic and post Cold War imperatives of India’s foreign policy.8 But this ignores the initiative taken by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi during the late eighties in reviving India’s relations with its eastern extended neighbors. There was a sudden spurt in diplomatic exchanges between India and the countries of Southeast Asia during the five years (1985–89) of Rajiv Gandhi’s rule. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Annual Report for 1985–86 recorded: “There were hardly any high level contacts between India and ASEAN over the previous five years, but of late, a definite trend has emerged, which indicates that the ASEAN nations are interested in bringing bilateral relations back to the old level with the reestablishment of political dialogue.”

The next year, while commenting on Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Indonesia and Thailand in October 1986, the same report said that “the visit filled the long felt need to give more attention to this region.” The mutual desire on the part of these countries to develop closer bilateral relations with India was “manifested in the spontaneous and extremely warm reception accorded to [the] Prime Minister. . .”. During the five years of his rule, Rajiv Gandhi visited, besides Indonesia and Thailand, also Myanmar (Burma), Vietnam and topped these visits by undertaking a “ice-breaking” visit to China in December 1988. Moreover, he tasked his Minister of State for External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh, to travel to the Southeast Asian capitals for facilitating a resolution of the Kampuchean issue through mutual understanding

8 See some of the studies on the subject: Grare, F and A Mattoo (eds.) (2001). The

Politics of India’s Look East Policy. New Delhi: Manohar; Nanda, P (2003). Rediscovering Asia: Evolution of India’s Look East Policy. New Delhi: Lancer Publications; Devare, S (2006). India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies; and Mun, SC (2009). India’s Strategic Interest in Southeast Asia and Singapore. New Delhi: Macmillan Publishers India.

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between ASEAN and the Indo–China states. In return, India hosted a number of Southeast Asian leaders like Suharto of Indonesia, Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore, Mahathir Mohammad of Malaysia, Van Linh of Vietnam and Hun Sen of Kampuchea, besides Foreign and other Ministers as well as junior officials from these countries.9 This initiative of opening up to the east was essentially strategically driven. China, under Deng Xiaoping, had launched itself on a dynamic path of economic recovery and was building cooperation and confidence with its neighbors in the region, by withdrawing China’s support to local communist insurgencies and opening economic engagement. India also wanted to change the track of Sino–Indian relations as Rajiv Gandhi’s visit opened discussions on the border dispute as well as prospects of bilateral economic cooperation. The message that came out of Rajiv’s visit to China was to keep conflicts and disagreements on the back burner and start exploring areas of cooperation and understanding. Then under Gorbachev, there was a strong Soviet desire to normalize relations with China and get out of conflict situations in Afghanistan as well as Kampuchea (through Vietnam). Gorbachev’s initiatives eventually also led to the end of the Cold War. India was also concerned regarding suspicion in this region about its naval activities, which called for clarifying things and building mutual confidence. India’s naval intentions had been distorted and inflated by media and vested interests in this region as a result of India’s proactive role, involving the use of military power, in the internal conflict resolutions in Sri Lanka (1987) and Maldives (1988). This strategic drive on India’s part was not bereft of economic objectives. India maintained a steady growth of around 5% during Rajiv Gandhi’s period and was economically opening up. The idea of “one window clearance” was introduced to reduce bureaucratic hassle for investment proposals. This was aimed to encourage meaningful economic engagement with the world, particularly the economically

9 For details, see MEA Annual Reports of 1985–85 to 1989–90. Also, Speeches and

Writings of Rajiv Gandhi, All Volumes. New Delhi: Publications Division, Government of India.

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dynamic extended eastern neighbors. The political exchanges between India and the Southeast Asian countries during Rajiv Gandhi’s period also focused on issues of trade and commerce, avoiding double taxation, the search for energy and cooperation in the field of science and technology. Business delegations led by Federation of Indian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) visited ASEAN countries. After a brief interruption of two to three years due to the changes in governments when the Congress Party lost power and Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated, Narasimha Rao who came to power in June 1991 picked up the threads of Rajiv Gandhi’s eastward initiatives. It may be kept in mind that Rao had joined Rajiv Gandhi’s government as a Foreign Minister toward the later years and accompanied Gandhi on his China visit. Other significant changes had also taken place by the time Rao came to power. The government faced a severe balance of payments (BOP) crisis. The Cold War had ended. The uncertainties arising out of the collapse of India’s trusted friend and supporter, the Soviet Union and the emergence of a unipolar world dominated by the United States (U.S.) gave a certain jolt to the hitherto prevailing structure of India’s foreign policy. India was forced to explore other options, both regionally and globally, in search of preserving and promoting its economic and strategic interests, and there, the eastern neighbors offered a promising area of engagement. The ASEAN, with Japan, Korea and China put together, constituted economically the most dynamic region, not only in Asia but the whole world. Indian policy could not ignore this region particularly under the new situation when India was in dire need and desperate search for new openings for its “liberalizing economy.”10 India was also looking elsewhere in Asia by the beginning of the 1990s, like toward the newly emerged Central Asian Republics, not only for retaining them as the captive markets of the Soviet period, for its products and services, but also to meet the growing energy needs, as the hitherto prevailing arrangements had been disturbed due to the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991. The search of new options had also got India involved in the initiative

10 K. K. Katyal, Looking eastward for capital (24 January 1994). The Hindu.

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to build a cooperative structure in the Indian Ocean Rim Region. Southeast and East Asian countries naturally got a priority in this search for Asian partnerships, more so as new economic groupings like Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC) were taking shape there. There were other factors as well that strategically triggered India’s moves to reactivate its LEP in the post Cold War phase. Two of them may be of particular interest here. One was the developing situation in Myanmar (Burma), where both China and Pakistan were fast expanding their presence and influence with the post-General Ne Win military leadership that assumed power in 1988. On its part, India was isolated from the Myanmarese military regime due to its traditional support for the democratic forces that continued until Rajiv Gandhi’s period. The popular forces in Myanmar looked toward India for inspiration and encouragement in their struggle against the military order. China and Pakistan were supportive of Myanmar’s new military leadership, which refused to transfer power to the Aung San Suu Kyi-led democratic forces, even after their massive electoral victory in 1989. On China’s part, its support for the new junta in Yangon was also a reciprocal gesture for the Myanmar military leadership’s endorsement of the Chinese government’s position on the Tiananmen Square revolt of 1989. China preferred a non-democratic regime in its close neighborhood. For Pakistan’s military ruler General Pervez Musharraf, Myanmar generals were natural allies. While one can debate the role of ideology and democratic preference in foreign policy pursuit, in Myanmar, the political entrenchment of the military was a fact of life. The long drawn ethnic war in Myanmar and the fragile balance of popular forces between the Burmese and ethnic and tribal communities had tended to provide a certain incentive as well as legitimacy to the military to dominate political space. A question that arises is whether India’s adherence to democratic ideology in strategically sensitive situations is always desirable. Myanmar being India’s close and next-door neighbor, should have been dealt with greater resilience and ingenuity, if not utter realism. Later, in 1996, at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Indonesia, India was quite impressed by the down to earth practical approach of the ASEAN countries in their discussion of Myanmar’s admission

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into ASEAN, even in the face of strong opposition from the Western powers. There was not much wisdom and justification for the long indifference in India’s policy toward Myanmar from the early sixties to the end of the eighties. There were reports of the Chinese listening posts in Myanmar’s Indian Ocean islands to monitor developments in India’s missile programme. China had also spread its economic and military presence in Myanmar widely and deeply. Pakistan, with the help and support of China, had started supplying military equipments to Myanmar’s new military regime.11 India shuddered at the prospects of Pakistan consolidating its position in Myanmar in view of strong Pakistani links with Bangladesh’s security establishment and its propensity to support insurgencies in India’s northeast region. India could not afford to ignore Myanmar anymore in the face of these developments. The urgency for a basic shift in India’s Myanmar policy was injected by the deteriorating security situation in India’s northeast resulting from tribal insurgencies. Some of the insurgent groups were seeking shelter in Myanmar by exploiting ethnic harmonies across the border. Myanmar’s military regime could not care less in view of India’s explicit support for their democratic adversaries. Thus, a cooperative and congenial relationship with Myanmar was also an imperative of India’s internal (in the northeast) security concern. The second factor that prompted India to look toward the east more seriously and determinedly was to answer growing, but wholly untenable and baseless, allegations and suspicions on India’s naval expansion and assertive intentions in the Indian Ocean. Such allegations had been triggered during the Rajiv Gandhi period, by sponsored and ill-informed western and regional media reports.12 These reports were, perhaps, aimed at camouflaging intense military modernization

11 For more details on this subject, see, Muni, SD (2002). China’s strategic engagement

with the new ASEAN. IDSS Monograph, No. 2. Singapore: Institute For Defence and Strategic Studies. 12 Gordon, S (1995). India and Southeast Asia: A renaissance in relations? In India Looks East: An Emerging Power and Its Asia-Pacific Neighbours, S Gordon and S Henningham (eds.). Canberra: Canberra Paper No. 111, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University.

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programmes of a number of countries in the region including Australia. These developments were also related to the reported reduction of the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region as the Cold War had ended. India had to monitor these developments on its eastern front in its own long-term strategic interests. It also had to engage with its eastern neighbors strategically and explain its peaceful and nonexpansionist disposition toward the region. Accordingly, India’s current LEP has both economic objectives and strategic considerations. What is often not realized is that in a very significant way, Southeast Asia was also inducing India to have greater involvement with the region. This tendency started toward the end of the eighties as witnessed during period of the Rajiv Gandhi administration in India, when a number of ASEAN leaders had consultations with India on the question of resolving the Kampuchean issue. Along with the possibility of a reduction in the U.S. military presence mentioned above, there were also emerging signs of China’s growing economic and military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The ASEAN and other countries have always preferred a multilateral balance of forces in the region in the interest of greater stability and peace. Many of these countries found India a deserving candidate to be involved in this balance, because India had no record of an aggressive or expansionist approach towards this region in the past. India’s LEP was officially defined and articulated in September 1994, by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao in his Singapore lecture. He had stressed the point that India’s historical and cultural relations were very old and strong and there was nothing new in India looking toward reinforcing cooperative linkages with its eastern neighbors. He laid emphasis on building strong economic and security relationship between India and its eastern neighbors.13 The components of India’s thus articulated LEP were reiterated and elaborated upon subsequently by various prime ministers and foreign ministers and senior officials of India.

13 Text of Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s speech, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies,

Singapore, 1994.

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The LEP has not been pursued by India in a well-planned and structured manner. Rao’s Singapore lecture in 1994 was a broad articulation of India’s desire and rationale for connecting with its eastern neighbors. Since then, the policy has evolved in phases and directions gradually. One can clearly discern a greater engagement with ASEAN during the initial years with an emphasis on economic ties and institutional partnership. After almost a decade, the policy assumed a more pronounced strategic flavor and expanded to the countries other than ASEAN members like Australia, Japan and Korea. India’s then Foreign Minister Yashwant Sinha heralded the second phase of the LEP in 2003, by saying: “The first phase of India’s Look East policy was ASEAN-centered and focused primarily on trade and investment linkages. The new phase of this policy is characterized by an expanded definition of “East”, extending from Australia to East Asia, with ASEAN at its core. The new phase also marks a shift from trade to wider economic and security issues including joint efforts to protect the sea lanes and coordinate counter-terrorism activities.”14

The second phase of the policy was clearly marked by greater confidence on India’s part in dealing with China as a number of bilateral confidence building measures had been put in place between the two countries. A positive turn had also taken place in India’s relations with the U.S., and 9/11 had made India as well as other countries in the region, acutely conscious of the menace of terrorism. There have been raging Muslim insurgencies and revolts in Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar and Indonesia. There have also been a large number of initiatives in the field of defense cooperation with the countries of the region.15 Now after almost a decade of the second phase, a third phase of the LEP seems to be unfolding under which India’s economic and strategic engagement with the region will be

14 Yashwant Sinha’s Speech at Harvard University. Cambridge: 29 September 2003.

The full text of the speech is available at www.meaindia.nic.in/. Accessed on 25 January 2011. 15 For initial comments of the second phase of the LEP, see C. Raja Mohan, Look east policy: Phase two (9 October 2003). The Hindu.

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expanded and deepened, and India will be more willing and active to play a larger strategic role.16 India’s strategy to rebuild cooperative relations with its eastern neighbors in general and ASEAN in particular has had two dimensions namely, strengthening bilateral relations and getting integrated with the regional cooperative organizations in Southeast Asia.

Strengthening Bilateral Relations With regard to the first, India tried to reach out to its Southeast and East Asian neighbors in many ways. Through various exchanges of official visits, including at the highest political levels, India tried to explain to the eastern neighbors that India was a modern, peace loving, practical and cooperative country. In bilateral discussions, India’s attempt was to enhance political understanding, identify areas of mutual interests and initiate moves to harness these interests. The countries specially chosen for greater cooperation could be seen to fall in three categories, two of them from within ASEAN and the third category of countries from East Asia. Within ASEAN, India has adopted a differentiated approach between the new ASEAN members, namely Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam and the old ASEAN members. The new members joined ASEAN during the nineties and have been not only economically lagging behind the old ASEAN members, but also had a different strategic background and perspective. They have had centralized political systems, were at odds with the Western block during the Cold War due to their respective struggles of independence, which even led to the war in Vietnam, and were all located in the close neighborhood of China. China’s proximity to the U.S. since 1972 drove these countries towards the Soviet Union, where India shared strategic perspective with them in the context of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has made such strategic divides irrelevant and at present while India has vastly improved its relations with the U.S.,

16 Informal discussions with India’s National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister in

New Delhi (May 2010).

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the new ASEAN countries are also being vigorously courted by the U.S. through economic assistance and defense cooperation. The spurt in U.S.–Vietnam defense cooperation evident since 2008 may be seen as an evidence of it.17 The new ASEAN members also include the countries of the (former) Indo–China region, where India enjoyed a fund of goodwill and close understanding due to its role in the region under the UN Peace and Supervisory Commission established to overlook the implementation of Geneva Agreement of 1954. The deep roots of historical and cultural contacts between these countries and India have already been mentioned. As noted above, India also adjusted its policy in relation to Myanmar, by accepting the harsh reality of the military junta being firmly in power there. Its ideological commitment to democratic forces had to be balanced with pressing strategic and security interests. The conferring of the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Peace on Myanmar’s democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi in 1995 can be seen as an act of maintaining this balance between ideological commitments and security interests. India also tried to maintain a cautious position on the question of the Monks revolt in Myanmar in 2007.18 Incidentally, Myanmar was also administratively a part for some years, of the British Indian Empire and there existed close relations between the two countries from 1947 until 1964, when military took over power.19 The special focus on the new ASEAN countries in India’s LEP has, over the past years, also led to the creation of a separate administrative unit, the CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) desk, in the Ministry of External Affairs to deal with them. Special programmes of assistance and cooperation in diverse fields are being initiated

17 For a brief outline of major developments in U.S.–Vietnam cooperation, see www.

photos.state.gov/libraries/vietnam/8621/pdf-forms/15aniv-DAO-factsheet.pdf. Accessed on 25 January 2011. On the same subject also see, Christian Science Monitor (12 August 2010), New York Times (23 July 2010). 18 Muni, SD (2007). Monks, masses and military. Frontline, 24(20). 19 For India’s relations with the democratic regimes and leadership in Myanmar, see Muni, SD (2009). India’s Foreign Policy: The Democracy Dimension. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press-India.

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and executed in CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) countries through this unit. Among the older ASEAN members, India has laid greater emphasis on the dynamic economies of Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia. Singapore, on its own has been taking initiatives to harnessing the vast potential of economic growth in India. In recent years, India’s relations with Philippines, neglected for a long time, are also picking up. Singapore played an important role in facilitating India’s institutional linkages with the regional grouping. Singapore may have seen a greater promise and potential in India’s growing and liberalizing economy. As a result, India’s closest relations are with Singapore in the whole of the region, since the launch of the LEP. This is evident in trade, investments as well as defense cooperation areas. As for East Asia, special attention is paid to countries like China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. China is more to India than just East Asia. The constraints of time and space do not permit us here to go into the details of India’s China policy, but the shift in India’s approach, particularly since Rajiv Gandhi’s visit in December 1988, is clearly evident. The mutual confidence building measures between the two countries enshrined in the Agreements of 1993 and 1996, as well as the beginning of negotiations to resolve the contentious border issue and build economic cooperation through trade and investments, are reflections of the changed stance on the sides of both these giant Asian neighbors. Korea has also enhanced its economic cooperation with India — visible in the auto-industry and consumer durable production — over the past decade and more. President Lee Myung Bak of South Korea was invited as chief guest for India’s 61st Republic Day celebrations in January 2010. Political and strategic nuances of Japan’s perceptions and its economic slide did not allow the potential of its bilateral relations with India to be harnessed. However, the situation has radically changed toward a more positive direction in the last few years. India and Japan lobbied together for reforms in the UN and their seats in the Security Council as permanent members in 2005. They established a “strategic and global partnership” in December 2006 during Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh’s official visit to Japan and since then the bilateral relations are moving fast on various

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areas of cooperation including in the defense sector. The first ever Two Plus Two Dialogue at the senior defense and foreign affairs officials level was held between the two countries on 6 July 2010.20

Institutional Engagement Institutionally, India was accepted as a Sectoral Dialogue Partner by ASEAN in January 1992. The sectors identified for partnership were trade, investment and tourism. By comparison, the areas of cooperation agreed to in May 1980 were much broader than these. The Sectoral Dialogue Partner status was granted by ASEAN to both India and Pakistan at the same time. But soon the ASEAN countries realized that Pakistan had no inclination or potential to get economically engaged with the region. India on the other hand, was very serious in pursuing its economic engagement with the regional grouping. As a result, India soon earned the status of a (full) Dialogue Partner by ASEAN at its fifth summit in December 1995. The areas covered for cooperation and dialogue between India and ASEAN include trade and investment, human resources development, science and technology, transport, tourism and infrastructure, health, small and medium scale enterprises and people to people relations involving cultural and professional exchanges. The full dialogue partner status also enabled India to become a member of the then established unique security forum for the region called the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). India’s initial apprehensions that it would experience undue pressures within the ARF on account of its conflict with Pakistan and autonomy of its nuclear programme proved to be exaggerated. From a dialogue partner, India became ASEAN’s Summit partner in 2002.21 ASEAN has instituted the ASEAN + 3 structure of summit

20 For details of expanding relations between India and Japan see, Sharma, R. India– Japan ties poised for advance as both nations eye China. The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, www.japanfocus.org/-Rajeev-Sharma/3406. Accessed on 25 January 2011. 21 See the publication brought out on the occasion of the first summit, India–ASEAN: The first ASEAN–India summit, Cambodia, November 2002, Embassy of India, Phnom Penh, Cambodia.

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level interaction with East Asian countries, namely China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. India preferred to join this group by getting the ASEAN + 3 recast as ASEAN + 4 summit. This was not acceptable to some of the ASEAN as well as Plus Three (+ 3) members. The ASEAN + 3 concept had emerged out of the Malaysian initiative to establish an East Asian economic caucus and it was thought that India did not fit into the initially conceived framework. Perhaps, India was also viewed as a competitor for aid and investments by some of the ASEAN members, also under the influence of some of the Plus Three members like China. To further integrate itself with the regional economic structure, India started working on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and concluded the same in August 2009 after considerable delay and difficulties.22 The Agreement has become operational starting in January 2010. This would be encompassed in a broader structure of the ASEAN–India Regional Trade and Investment Area (RTIA). A Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between ASEAN and India was concluded in October 2003 during the Bali ASEAN summit. In pursuance of the thrust of this “Framework Agreement”, the two sides are also busy defining an “ASEAN-India Vision 2020” to give a firm direction and momentum to their joint endeavour toward “Shared Prosperity”.23 India was initially kept out of the Asia–Europe Meeting (ASEM) mechanism that started functioning since 1996, but since 2006, India has become a member of this grouping as well. The institutional integration of India with Southeast Asia has not remained confined to ASEAN alone. In 1997, India along with some of the South and Southeast Asian neighbors, also established a subregional grouping called Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Scientific, Technological and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) to promote rapid economic cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, tourism, fisheries, agriculture, transportation links and human

22 For a brief discussion of some of these difficulties see, Shankari Sundaraman, India–

ASEAN FTA: To be or not to be (14 April 2009). The Asian Age (New Delhi ). 23 RIS, New Delhi has a prepared a draft for this ‘Vision’ statement (December 2003).

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resources development.24 The initiative for BIMSTEC was taken by Thailand in search of expansion of its market and investment opportunities without competition from its strong ASEAN partners like Singapore and Malaysia as well as larger neighbor like China. It has been mentioned earlier that Thailand called this initiative as a reflection of its Look West policy. India spontaneously responded to this Thai initiative to break out of the rigid South Asian constraints where Pakistan was neither helping SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation) to grow nor seeking to normalize bilateral relations. Some observers have looked toward India’s participation in BIMSTEC as a move to isolate Pakistan in South Asia. This indeed may sound logical since all the SAARC members except Pakistan were members of BIMSTEC with the joining of Nepal and Bhutan in July 2004. Pakistan has not sought the membership of this organization and now SAARC has also expanded with the inclusion of Afghanistan as a full member along with a number of observers. The change in name also underlines the growing significance of the Bay of Bengal region where all the original members of the grouping share economic and strategic concerns. Besides BIMSTEC, India’s interaction with its eastern neighbors also take place in the Indian Ocean Rim Association For Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), established in 1997, and various forums for Asian cooperation. In 2000, India and the Mekong basin countries of Southeast Asia namely, Thailand, Myanmar, Laos, Kampuchea and Vietnam, established a Mekong–Ganga Cooperation (MGC) Forum with India. Initiative for this forum had also come from Thailand. China is excluded from this group. India is regionally well integrated now with the existing institutional structures to pursue its economic and strategic interests constructively. As and when the Kunming initiative takes a concrete shape, another forum for India to engage with China and other eastern neighbors like Myanmar and Bangladesh for cooperative

24 Initially BIMSTEC represented the first letters in the names of all the members, i.e.

Bangladesh, India, Myanmar Sri Lanka, Thailand, Economic Cooperation. However, this nomenclature created difficulties when Nepal and Bhutan were asked to join, hence, the change in the name.

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development would be opened. India may however not be very enthusiastic for this forum as it essentially is driven by China’s desire to connect it with the South Asian economies and open prospects for the growth of its landlocked region like Yunnan. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in continuation of the thrust of “Look East” policies has also given a call for building an Asian Economic Community.25 There is a section of Indian opinion that seeks full membership of ASEAN or APEC. It may however, be prudent to make an objective and indepth assessment of India’s interests and advantages in doing so, before a policy decision is taken in this respect.26 There were initial reservations on India joining the new organization of the East Asia Summit (EAS), the initiative for which by Malaysia may be traced back to 1991. In the perceptions of Malaysia and some other prospective members of this organization like China, India did not qualify to be an East Asian country. This was contested by India and other ASEAN members like Singapore and Japan. Eventually, India along with Australia and New Zealand, became its founding member when EAS was established in 2005.27 ASEAN forged another regional organization called the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM) in 2007, to cooperate, to begin with, in the areas of humanitarian and disaster relief. This meeting also adopted a concept paper on the expansion of this organization (ADMM Plus). At its fourth meeting in Singapore in May 2010, the ADMM became ADMM + 8, by including eight other members namely Japan, Korea, China, Australia, New Zealand, India, Russia and the U.S. The first meeting of the expanded ADMM took place in Vietnam in October 2010. If one looks closely at India’s efforts to integrate itself with the multilateral regional grouping, one can discern an undercurrent of

25 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said this while inaugurating the third Conference

of Indian Association of Southeast Asian Nations on 19 October 2004, www.global insight.com/SDA/SDADetail1269.htm. Accessed on 25 January 2011. 26 India’s institutional integration with ASEAN was outlined by the Cambodian Foreign Minister, Hor Namhong in his India–ASEAN Lecture in New Delhi on 14 March 2002. 27 S. D. Muni, India and the East Asia Summit, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi, and Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, Unpublished Monograph, 2007.

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strategic push centered around China. India has welcomed and actively encouraged such regional groupings where China does not figure at all. The examples of BIMSTEC and the GMC may be mentioned here. India has also sought membership and participation where there existed the prospects of China emerging as a major player and using the given organization to consolidate its presence and influence in Southeast Asia. India’s attempts to get the ASEAN + 3 enlarged into “Plus Four” by its own inclusion were pursued vigorously, though in vain. Subsequently, India keenly lobbied for its inclusion in the EAS in the teeth of opposition from China and Malaysia with the help of Japan and other ASEAN countries as mentioned above. In order to ensure that China does not get to dominate any organization in the region, India has been supporting the initiatives of the ASEAN and other countries to expand such organizations. The EAS accepting the U.S. and Russia and the expansion of the ADMM to include the U.S. and Russia, besides all other EAS members may be taken note of in this respect. India continues to have strong reservations on the “Kunming initiative” for instance with proposals that seek to make China a direct participant in South Asian economic activities. India accepted China as an “Observer” in SAARC after much trepidation and possibly as a bargain for India’s acceptance as an “Observer” in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO).

Economic Gains The biggest benefit of India’s LEP has been that India has been re-engaged with its eastern neighborhood closely and has gradually emerged as a significant player in the strategic dynamics of the region, which is centered around a rising China. In tangible terms, the gains are clearly evident in economic and strategic fields. Economically, India’s trade with ASEAN has grown impressively since the pursuance of the LEP — from U.S. $2.3 billion in 1991–92 to U.S. $45.34 billion in 2008–09.28 Singapore stands out as India’s largest trading partner in ASEAN followed by Malaysia and Indonesia. Growth of trade has

28 Based on Department of Commerce, Government of India.

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however been phenomenal between India and China where all the set targets have been broken time and again. By 2008–09, India–China trade in goods recorded a figure of U.S. $41.8 billion, but if the trade in services is also included, it goes beyond U.S. $50 billion.29 Most of India’s trade balance with ASEAN and China is negative and there are concerns about a growing deficit. But the Indian economy is less manufacturing and more service sector based as compared to China and the ASEAN countries. It may be hoped that with the increase in trade in services, India will be able to bridge some of its trade gap. India’s trade with Japan, Australia and the Republic of Korea is also picking up fast with the increasing momentum in the LEP. India has also received increasing investments from its East Asian neighbors, reaching a figure of U.S. $13.15 billion by August 2009. Singapore again tops the list of investors accounting for U.S. $8.66 billion. Singapore’s share of FDI (foreign direct investments) inflows to India is 8.72% of the total.30 Singapore is followed by Japan with U.S. $3.30 billion of FDI into India, which constitutes 3.44% of the total inflows. The Chinese companies seem keen to increase their investments into India but the security stigma attached to their operations creates difficulties. India’s investments in turn have also been growing into the Southeast Asian region. The highest Indian Direct Investments of U.S. $14.23 billion by 2008–09, have gone to Singapore, followed by Australia where India has invested U.S. $962.3 million by 2008–09. It is interesting to note that India has an investment of U.S. $911.1 million in China, the third largest in the region compared to China’s investments of U.S. $14.35 million in India.31 India’s economic integration with the East Asian region will grow gradually. While projecting a comprehensive economic partnership framework at the regional level, India has been moving on partnerships

29 Pandya, A and DM Malone (2010). India’s Asia policy: A late look east. Institute for

South Asian Studies Special Report, No. 2, p. 12. Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies. 30 Ibid, p. 11. 31 Ibid.

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at the bilateral level. The Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) with Singapore was signed in 2005 and now a similar agreement with Malaysia has also been finalized. Such partnerships will go beyond trade in goods and investments. It will cover the services sector in which India has strength, and may also include areas like science and technology, tourism, etc., to consolidate and expand economic cooperation. The pace of economic reforms in India will also give a further boost to not only India’s economic growth but also to its relations with the East Asian neighbors.

Strategic Engagement The emphasis in the first phase of the LEP was primarily on economic engagement. But the area of cooperation in defense and strategic matters was not completely overlooked.32 India not only supplied defense equipment to the ASEAN countries but also agreed to help upgrade and repair their major weapon systems like MiG (Mikoyan–Gurevich) fighter aircrafts and offer training to their defense personnel. Important agreements in this respect were signed with Vietnam, Malaysia, Laos and Singapore. Some of those agreements, particularly with Malaysia and Laos could not be fully implemented, partly due to the regional economic crisis and payments difficulties and partly due to inept handling by the concerned Indian defense organizations.33 Security cooperation was also an important item in the growing India–Myanmar relations. The two countries carried out a joint operation in 1995, code named “Operation Golden Eagle”, to deal with ethnic insurgency on their common border. Myanmar has also started appreciating India’s security concerns in relation to the growing presence of China and Pakistan in Myanmar. However, since the beginning of the second phase in the LEP, the question of strategic engagement and defense cooperation has been stepped up. The parameters of the policy, as noted earlier, have been

32 Muni, SD (2005). Strategic engagement of the east. Indian Defence Review, 20(4). 33 The author has firsthand knowledge of this in the case of Laos where he served as

India’s Ambassador from 1997–99.

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taken “beyond ASEAN” and “beyond economic interests.” There is also renewed and wider (other than ASEAN countries) interest in the region for defense cooperation with India. A typical example of this was evident in the year 2002 when India responded to the U.S. call of escorting its ships in the Straits of Malacca to protect them from sea piracy.34 India’s policy of strategic engagement with the eastern neighbors has developed various aspects. There are high-level political and military exchanges of visits where broader regional and global security issues are discussed. At the level of Ministries of External Affairs and Defense, bilateral dialogues and consultations on regular basis have been institutionalized. Then there were Naval and other services (Air Force, Army) visits and exercises. Indian ships have visited and conducted exercises with almost all the countries of the region, going as far as the South China Sea. There are of course differences in the quality and reach of these visits and exercises. India is also supplying defense equipments and servicing and upgrading them in many Southeast Asian countries and setting up training facilities and military academies there. In August 2008, India offered to setup an Air Force Academy in Laos. India is also slowly moving into the area of defense technology exchanges and joint production. With Singapore, India has the closest special security partnership in the region.35 The Kalaikunda Air Force Base in India’s West Bengal state was leased in October 2007 to Singapore for five years for training purposes. Next to Singapore, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia may be described as the countries having close defense cooperation with India. With Indonesia there has also been a proposal to establish joint production of military hardware.36 Beyond ASEAN, India has also developed close strategic understanding and cooperation with Japan, Australia, Korea and even China. Strategic partnerships, in different forms have been established with

34 Sudha Ramachandran, India signs on as Southeast Asia watchdog (5 April 2002).

Asia Times, www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DDO5Dfo1.html. Accessed on 25 January 2011. 35 Brewster, D (2009). India’s security partnership with Singapore. The Pacific Review,

22(5), 597–618. 36 India, Indonesia Mull Joint Defense Hardware Production, www.india-defence. com/print/3311. Accessed on 30 January 2011.

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these countries. India, Japan and Australia had joined hands with the U.S. in coordinating rescue and relief operations to deal with the 2004 tsunami in the region. There is a persisting speculation among strategic analysts that these countries may forge some sort of a united front, a kind of “Asian NATO” to keep China contained in the region.37 But such thinking may be a bit far-fetched and also not conducive to regional peace and stability, as it will make China feel insecure and in turn assertive and aggressive. India has, however, made no secret of its desire and capabilities to play an important role in ensuring Asia’s regional security. On 28 November 2005, Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, speaking at Economic Forum in New Delhi said: “India and the United States can contribute to much better balance in the region. . . . We believe in terms of managing the emerging security scenario in Asia, we need to bring more and more countries with in the discipline of a mutually agreed security paradigm for the region.”

Again in June 2006, Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee, speaking at the Fifth Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore said: “India is one of the important legs of the Asian juggernaut along with China, Japan and Indonesia. In the Asia-Pacific region, India’s growing ties with the United States and other countries in North and South America brings with it a commensurate role in the region…India’s role is crucial for ensuring and maintaining long-term peace, stable balance of power, economic growth and security in Asia…It straddles the land and maritime space between east and west, and provides

37 See following: Derek Chollet, Time for an Asian NATO (Winter 2001). Security Studies ; Frank Crass, U.S. and India Consider “Asian NATO” ( 29 May 2003) . NewsMax.com Wires, www.archive.newsmax.com/archives/2003/5/29/162032.shtml. Accessed on 25 January 2011; Praful Bidwai, Five-nation naval drill presages “Asian NATO” (7 September 2007). Inter Press Service, www.ipsnews.net/print.asp?idnews=39175. Accessed on 25 January 2011; D. S. Rajan, Suspicion of an “Asian NATO” in the four-nation dialogue (21 January 2007). China Monitor, Paper No. 9, South Asia Analysis Group, Paper No. 2103; Rick Rozoff, U.S. expands Asian NATO against China, Russia, www.rickrozoff.wordpress.com/2009/10/16/. Li Hongmei, Insidious, risky strategy: U.S. builds Asian NATO against China, global research (12 August 2010). People’s Daily Online, www.globalresearch.ca/PrintArticle.php?articleId=20593. Accessed on 25 January 2011.

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potential energy and trade corridors to Central Asia and Indian Ocean region. Responding to the challenges of globalization is one of the key issues faced by all nations today. As a pluralistic, democratic and English speaking society, India is well place to respond.”38

Thus, India’s advantages vis-à-vis other regional powers like China and Japan, in the region was clearly underlined. India’s capability to play a balancing strategic role in Southeast Asia will be considerably augmented after the completion of the project upgrading of Andaman and Nicobar “tri-service command” which was established in 2001, into a “major amphibious warfare hub” by 2020. It will have fully developed facilities for training and deploying sea and land fighting units. It will become a submarine base and an air force base to station Sukhoi 30 and Mirage 2000 fighting aircrafts. It would be possible to undertake Tactical Ariel Reconnaissance missions from this base to keep an eye on the movements in the Indian Ocean and the strategic Straits of Malacca in its eastern flank. Long back, India’s strategic thinker, K. M. Panikkar had said that “the Gulf of Malacca is like the mouth of a crocodile, the Peninsula of Malaya being the upper and the jutting end of Sumatra being the lower jaw. The entry to the Gulf can be controlled by the Nicobars and the narrow end is dominated by the island of Singapore.”39 It may be of interest to mention here that India’s escort missions for the U.S. ships in 2002 were undertaken by its ships anchored in Singapore. Besides being a full-fledged military base, Andaman and Nicobar will also have major facilities for hosting commercial traffic in the region.40 Besides building defense cooperation, the LEP has also helped India to get its own security needs better understood in the region. May 1998, when Pokharan-II (the test explosions of five nuclear devices) took place, the Western members of the ARF as well as

38 Text of the speech (3 June 2006), www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/

shangri-la-dialogue-archive/shangri-la-dialogue-2006/2006-plenary-session-speeches/ second-plenary-session–pranab-mukherjee. Accessed on 25 January 2011. 39 K. M. Panikkar, The Strategic Problems of the Indian Ocean (Allahabad, 1944), p. 21. 40 Ravi Velloor, The Straits Times (8 September 2010).

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Japan and Australia expressed strong reservations and disapproval, and imposed sanctions on India. These reservations have since melted away and both Japan and Australia are trying their best to make for the lost time and opportunities in India. The ASEAN countries showed considerable understanding, at least informally through bilateral diplomatic channels, of India’s security predicament. A number of ASEAN members are willing to support India’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council (UNSC). Understanding has also been shown to India’s position during the Kargil conflict and the persisting challenge of cross-border terrorism to India’s stability and political harmony. Thanks to the 9/11 events, today India’s concern with regard to cross-border terrorism is also better understood and appreciated among its eastern neighbors. The India–ASEAN Joint Declaration For Combating Terrorism, signed in October 2003, brings the two sides closer in this new area of security and commits them to “counter, prevent, and suppress all forms of terrorist acts.”41 Terrorism has since continued to be an important theme in India’s discussions with the countries as also in the regional groupings in the Southeast Asian region. It may not be out of place here to mention that the strategic thrust in the second phase of India’s LEP was prompted by not only India’s declaration as a nuclear weapons state but also its concern for the growing menace of terrorism.

Challenges and Prospects Any objective assessment of nearly the past two decades of India’s LEP would suggest that while notable progress has been made, there is still a long way to go and tremendous potential remains to be harnessed. The East Asian spread is vital for India’s economic progress and security needs. It can be a vehicle for India’s greater Asian identity and provide a constructive outlet to such of its energy and aspirations that cannot be absorbed in the South Asian neighborhood alone. This region is also

41 Text of ASEAN–India Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International

Terrorism, ASEAN Secretariat, www.aseansec.org/15276.htm. Accessed on 25 January 2011.

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emerging as the key theatre for the intense interplay of the forces of globalization that will affect the texture and contours not only of Asian, but even of world politics. The security significance of this region has been further reinforced in the context of “9/11 events” and the global war on terrorism, as India is also one of the most seriously affected victims of this menace. Reports about Al-Qaeda and Jihadi forces having links in the whole of Southeast Asia surface frequently. With the Islamic rebellions of differing intensity raging in various countries of the region like Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar, the threat of “global jihad ” linking up with regional extremists will continue to loom large on the region. The unfolding nexus between Pakistan and North Korea, with the possible connivance of China, in the nuclear and missile field needs to be watched carefully from India’s wider security interests in the region. India’s Defense Minister A. K. Antony’s visit to South Korea in (2–3) September 2010 has given further momentum to defense cooperation between the two countries. It is of interest to note here that while Pakistan has become a member of the ARF, it is excluded, along with North Korea, from the EAS and the ADMM + 8. The challenge for India’s LEP comes from three areas — (i) the rise of China; (ii) the fluid strategic triangle of India, China and the U.S.; and (iii) the capabilities and drive of the policy establishments at home. The LEP will accordingly be shaped by the way India deals with these challenges. In many subtle and explicit ways, India’s LEP has been driven by China’s rise. China has much deeper economic engagements with India’s eastern neighbors and these engagements are going to get stronger. Many of these neighbors find their engagement with China to be mutually beneficial, notwithstanding occasional reservations. India is not in a position to match this and can never provide alternative support to them. The countries of Southeast Asia want to keep India, and other countries engaged in the region in order to have a comfortable regional balance. The problem would however arise if and when China starts asserting itself on these countries. The instance of China’s gradually growing assertion in South Asia and also

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in the South China Sea region may be kept in view.42 As this assertion increases, India’s presence in the region may come under pressure. It must be kept in mind that while economic cooperation between India and China is growing, the strategic competition and rivalry between the two is also getting sharpened as well. Asia’s most critical strategic triangle is the one constituted by India, the U.S. and China. The strategic relationships between these three major Asian players are in a flux, transiting through the realm of uncertainty and anxiety. These relationships cannot be assumed at any time to be completely free from competition and tensions.43 China is particularly worried about any move toward greater strategic understanding between India and the U.S. aimed at constraining China’s emerging strategic presence and stake in the region. Accordingly, China will contest and resist any strengthening of the U.S.–India strategic equation, particularly in the context of Southeast Asia. China will, in that case, exploit the vulnerabilities and weaknesses in India’s relations with its neighbors in South and Southeast Asia. Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh’s worries on China’s expanding role in South Asia and the Chinese response to reiterate its interest in South Asia may be seen in this context.44 Also, as China consolidates its strategic presence in Southeast Asia, it will impinge on the U.S. stakes and influence, which Washington will resist. The sharpening of U.S.–China rivalry for strategic influence will create a dilemma for

42 Also, Joshua Kurlantzick, Avoiding a tempest in the South China sea, expert brief (2 September 2010). Council on Foreign Relations. www.cfr.org/publication/22858/ avoiding-a-tempest-in-the-south-china-sea.html. Accessed on 25 January 2011. Also see, Annual Report to Congress, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010, Office of the Secretary of State, Department of Defence, United States of America (2010). 43 Xiao Xiong Yi, Tensions mount in Asia, as China rise (25 August 2010). www.defence.pk/forums/world-affairs/70527-tensions-mount-asia-china-rises.html. Accessed on 25 January 2010. 44 Prime Minister Manmohan Singh expressed these concerns in his briefing to the Indian editors on 6 September 2010, and the Chinese response came from the official spokesman on foreign affairs in Beijing (7 September 2010). The Hindustan Times.

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India in terms of maintaining a proper distance between the two, which seems to be the crux of India’s policy at present. Lastly, the challenge comes from India’s own policy front. In order to exploit the full potential of cooperation with the extended eastern neighborhood, India has to improve its economic performance. The World Bank and other international economic institutions are hopeful of the Asian growth being led by Indian and Chinese economies. But for that, the pace of reform in financial and manufacturing sectors, and bureaucratic procedures has to be streamlined. Inadequate coordination between various concerned departments and ministries, like External Affairs, Commerce, Defense, Finance, etc., has cost India dearly in the past. The Economic Ministries need to develop a strategic perspective in harmony with the broader national strategic profile and interests in different regions of the world. India has to shed whatever hesitation it has on the question of expanding and upgrading transport linkages through air and road with the eastern Asian region. Then Prime Minister Vajpayee’s offer during the Bali Summit of October 2003, of a unilateral “open skies” policy to selected Southeast Asian airlines, India’s proposal to have a railway line connecting India’s northeast with Vietnam, and the flagging off of a car rally in December 2004 in the region, are firm indications that India is conscious of the challenge of its LEP. In April 2008, India signed the “Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project” to firm up connectivity with Myanmar. Energy and information technologies are emerging as significant areas of cooperation with some of the Southeast Asian countries. India’s economic diplomacy will have to gather dynamism and evolve constructive resilience to reap desirable benefits in these areas. This task cannot be accomplished by solely articulating a sound policy, but will also require concerted and focused action at the administrative as well as entrepreneurial levels. For instance, in defense productions and sales, private sector is being gradually involved and procedures are streamlined to ensure that commitments made to the friendly countries are efficiently executed. There is considerable scope to activate India’s cultural diplomacy to provide necessary backup to its economic initiatives and strategic moves in the region. India’s rich cultural heritage can ring many

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sympathetic cords in the region and its multi-religious, secular and democratic ethos, as well as rich music, arts and architecture, theatre and cinema have huge responsive constituencies in all the near and extended eastern neighbors. In fact Bollywood (cinema) and cultural exchanges, like that of the Ramayana troupes can work wonders in pursuing cultural diplomacy. Bollywood presence is extensively evident in Southeast Asian countries, but that is mostly commercially motivated and privately provided without any systematic and planned encouragement from the state. These areas have no conflicting edges. A carefully planned and sustained cultural diplomacy can speed up economic engagement and yield impressive results in the field of people to people relations and mutual political understanding. This cultural diplomacy can also be backed up by promoting cooperation in the field of education, science and technology, where India has notable assets and strengths. In many Southeast Asian countries, Indian diplomacy has not adequately reached educational and cultural establishments and ignored mobilizing civil societies in pursuance of India’s perceived interests. It is hoped that the projects like the revival of Nalanda University in collaboration with East Asian countries, for which Indian Parliament adopted a Bill in August 2010, will fill some of this gap.45 Educational links can provide a lasting and powerful stimulus to regional cooperation and integration.

45 S. D. Muni, Nalanda: A soft power project (31 August 2010). The Hindu.

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Chapter 5

Emerging Dimensions in Indo–Russia Defense Engagement P. L. Dash∗

Introduction The article focuses on the overall changing pattern of Indo–Russian defense engagement through post-Soviet two decades. Russian defense supplies to India are at the core of the debate primarily because they impinge upon regional and global relationship pursued by the two countries. Year after year, the Congressional Research Service has been bringing out reports on the conventional arms transfer by the developed to the developing countries. Similarly, SIPRI Year Books churn out data, statistics and reports on arms sale to countries around the world. These reports elucidate the activities of the arms suppliers, led mainly by the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

∗ Professor of Eurasian Studies and Formerly Director, Centre for Central Eurasian

Studies, University of Mumbai, India. 101

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They provide updates on the quantum of region-wise and countrywise deals, add definitional interpretation to various armaments and keep thereby the readers and researchers abreast of arms transfer business.1 These reports continue to insist year after year that the U.S. remains the leading arms exporter in the world followed by Russia. Despite all the vicissitudes experienced by Russia through the postSoviet years, Russia remained and continues to remain a potential player in the world arms market although it has faced significant difficulties associated with its incredible transformations in cutting into arms market dominated by the West. Russia’s traditional clientele in Asia — China and India — remained largely tethered to it.2 This has happened primarily because Russia continues to enjoy advantage in Asia from two angles. Russia’s military help, first to Asian giant China in the past and then to South Asian heavyweight, India, was a farsighted policy that has given Russia an edge over other competing powers in Asia. The present Russian leadership is well aware of Soviets designs in the past and Russian calculations at present and has taken into account the huge demography of China and India. And once this huge demographic base is tethered to a particular military arrangement supported and supplied by a particular power — in this case Russia — their evolving future militaries will have a superstructure based on that original supply system, and in the event of a conflict, Russia will always enjoy an edge in Asia. Second, even if the arms recipient countries break away from their mainstay Russian supply system, while forming future strategic alliances with other powers, they cannot altogether break away from the tether-post they have been tied to. Their armory and arsenal remain primarily Russian, secondarily western and tertiary indigenous. The analogy is applicable to at least two cases of tethering in South Asia — Russia siding with India and U.S. siding with Pakistan. The 2010 December dialogues between Dmitry Medvedev

1 For example see, Richard F. Grimmet, Conventional Arms Transfer to Developing

Countries 1996–2003, CRS Report for the Congress, Library of Congress, Washington, August, 2004, SIPRI Year Book, Stockholm, 2010. 2 Ibid., pp. CRS 7–8.

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and Manmohan Singh in New Delhi were not entirely oblivious of the aforesaid proposition with regard to Russian influence in South Asia in general and on India in particular. Looking from this Russian vantage, it is predictable that Indo–Russian military relations will continue farther onto the future and Russia’s domineering role will largely not be affected by competing powers cutting into Russian arms market.

Real Concerns In strategic calculations, there are three real concerns that matter for India: China’s growing military build-up following its incredible economic growth in last two decades, Pakistan’s increasing bellicosity toward India precipitated by that country’s internal turbulence, and nagging political instability and security scenario along India’s neighborhood. However, India’s genuine concern is China that provides a real angle of worry. It is the position of a sterling public sector in both India and China, initially built through Soviet aid, that irrevocably serve their nascent, but steadily growing military industrial complex. Production in such key sectors as steel and energy is in the public sector; and initially these enterprises were set up with Soviet collaboration. Thus, there is an organic linkage between the emerging defense industries and the existing state sector that no force can sever although public–private partnership in India’s defense production sector may be a slow reality unlikely to affect Indo–Russian military ties anytime soon. All three countries have strong public sector tie-ups to bring them strongly together in a strategic alliance in case of a crisis. Despite the economic downturn in early years of this century, India and China have heavily invested in their defense public sectors. What worries India is China’s rapid growth in military expenditure and consequent military prowess. China is engaged in building commercial ports across the Indian Ocean on the pretext that it has to ensure security of navigational channels that carry oil and other commodities to and from China. China has been building a deep-sea port at Gwadar in Pakistan, it is engaged in construction of ports at Sittwe, Mergui and Dawei in Myanmar. It is also collaborating with Sri Lanka in construction of Hambantota port. All these Chinese activities, presumably undertaken to guarantee safe passage of Chinese ships

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and ensure commercial facilities, are on strategic points in the India Ocean region, and if allowed to be used by China, it would give her a strategic leverage over India in South Asia in the years to come. A further Indian worry driving her to modernization of the defense forces is China’s rapid spike in military spending in the past one decade. Globalsecurity.org informs that from U.S. $14.6 billion in 2000, it has zoomed to U.S. $77.9 billion in 2010 — a 433% increase that puts China’s defense spending, second only to the United States.3 China’s projected defense budget for 2011, pegged at U.S. $91.7 billion, is still more alarming.4 The changing contours of regional geopolitics with an Af-Pak crisis everyday unfolding new nuances is India’s inescapable, neighborhood worry. Pakistan remains belligerent not against the U.S. drone attacks that continue to violate its sovereignty, but against India from where it perceives an imaginary threat. China’s overt military support to Pakistan and the U.S. ambivalence in taking Pakistan as ally in the fight against international terror have been frequently ruffling feathers in New Delhi to lean more on the Russians at the time of a crisis. Unpredictable regional geo-politics may usher in a phase of intense Indo–Russian military cooperation in years ahead, if Sino–Pak ties on the one hand and Pak–U.S. ties on the other are strengthened. New problems have cropped up and new solutions are to be found to tackle them. The Pak-based terror is a worrisome phenomenon. Terrorism originating from Af–Pak region and travelling from there to Chechnya and Mumbai and across Asia is a menace of which Russia and India are the victims. Joint cooperation and mutual consultations since 9/11 have brought both countries together to a common platform to handle terrorist threats.5 However, the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack provided a catalyst to pay attention to maritime terror as a real one in the Indian Ocean belt in general and littoral states in particular.

3 China’s Intentions Unclear: Mixed Signals Worry Neighbors, Asia Pacific Defence

Forum, Vol. 35, Issue 3, 2010, p. 36 (Report by a Forum Staff). 4 The Times of India, 4 March 2011. 5 India and Russia Discuss Anti-Terror Cooperation, New Theme, November–

December, 2006, p. 34.

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Russia and India have agreed on more naval vigilance to counter such terror. Medvedev was the first world leader to have visited India in the aftermath of Mumbai attack and he saw for himself the real danger of maritime terror as a common cause to fight. This commonality in approach to a common menace has ensured that Russia help India bolster its naval capability. Navy has turned out to be a tangible area of Indo–Russian strategic cooperation not necessarily because India has contracted for frigates and subs, not exactly because it is scheduled to receive aircraft carrier Gorshkov, but precisely because micro level cooperation for small and efficient fighter boats for the coast guards have emerged as a necessary target for synergy and Russia wishes to broaden this cooperation with India.

Strategic Asia A new trend is to conceptualize a strategic Asia. Aaron Friedberg and Richard Ellings were the conceptual architects of what they called “Strategic Asia” and drew attention to the vast size of the Asian continent. It encompasses numerous countries of the continent constituting Central Asia, South Asia, South East Asia and East Asia, including Russian Asia. Each region has potential countries and development to affect the ongoing process in another country as well as the overall strategic landscape in the continent, thereby making interdependence inevitable at a time when decreasing American economic clout, growing Chinese prowess, resurgent Russia and militant Islam compound the problems for Asia as never before.6 However, there is a new trend, a trend that has been in vogue for the past two decades. Since the end of the Cold War and disappearance of the Soviet Union there have been increasing investments by Asian countries in modernizing their defense forces. This trend has been incrementally continuing year after year since 9/11 in 2001, primarily with the assumption that militant Islam is the most potent force against which to guard is inevitable. This notion has been corroborated by the

6 Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg, Strategic Asia 2001–2002: Power and

Purpose, National Bureau of Asian Research, Seattle, 2001, pp. 4–6.

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demographic profile of more Muslims living in Asia than elsewhere. Indonesia, the most populous Muslim country with 229 million people is followed by Pakistan with 162 million and Bangladesh with 144 million. In addition India’s Muslim minority constitute 146 million people. Compared with these figures, the entire Muslim population of the Arab Muslim Middle east and Africa is just over 300 million.7 The more NATO will travel eastward, the more the fear of insecurity will haunt Eurasian countries, reminiscing what has been happening in Afghanistan and what had triggered Russia to invade Georgia in August 2008. And this, in turn, will lead to more investment in defense, particularly in those countries where Muslim population is dominating. Recent political volatility in countries such as Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, Libya, Yemen and elsewhere is a pointer to unending instability in the Asian periphery that will have bearing on all countries. The fact that Muslims are killing Muslims within a tense political atmosphere in a given region (Iran–Iraq, Pakistan–Afghanistan, Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan civil war) and elsewhere has further reinforced the fear of having not only large armies but effective modernized armies for self-defense. Since the ongoing war on terror is impliedly a war of “Islam versus the West and Islam versus the rest” that will conceptually alienate both the Russian infidels and the American aggressors, but not their weapons systems, essential for waging wars in various places and modernizing the military of less developed countries. Having realized that strategic Asia matters too much for them now than ever earlier, India and Russia have been conducting joint military exercises called “Indra” since 2003. The idea was conceived in 2002 and crystallized during Putin’s visit to India in December 2002. Joint exercise as a form of military cooperation has emerged in recent years, apparently to cut cost overrun on training defense personnel, who were earlier shuttling between the two countries, to learn how to man sophisticated weapon systems. As Indra continues with the Russians,

7 Wilson III, I and JJF Forest (2008). Handbook of Defence Politics: International and

Comparative Perspective, p. 179. London–New York: Routledge.

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India has conducted joint military exercises with the U.S. Air Force and has invited France to hold such events. This polycentric approach in military cooperation indicates the growing importance of India in strategic Asia and the visits of many world leaders to New Delhi in quick succession in the second half of 2010 had further corroborated how India was important in Asia in general and South Asia in particular in the eyes of big arms producers of the world. Russia has, however, a three tier approach to Asia. A Russian scholar, Yuri V. Krupnov, has thrown open a theory for debate about Russia’s “New Middle East”, where he argues that the volatile region of the post-Soviet world is located in the periphery of Russia, directly affecting her security. He draws one big circle that emanates from the Caucasus runs through Damascus, Af-Pak and North-West India, enters Chinese Xinjiang via Central Asia and goes through western China to encompass Mongolia and Russian Asia in west of lake Baikal. The upper edge of the circle travels from the Caucasus via northern Kazakhstan to the Urals and joins with lower flanks of the circle west of Baikal. Krupnov advocates two things (i) Industrialization of Afghanistan and other countries located within the circle, (ii) As new power equations emerge in volatile Asia, Russia has to be alert and watchful, forge alliance with emerging economies of Asia and join western efforts to bring stability to the region.8 Elsewhere he has suggested that Russia ought to shift its capital to a place in Russian Asia closer to China or set up another capital in the eastern flank to counter China in the Far East. The three tier policy embedded in this approach is to consider Central Asian countries as immediate, vital Russian frontier in its own underbelly, China and India follow next in importance as new Asian frontiers, and the third frontier is Russian Asia, where industrialization and focus on harnessing enormous natural resources could serve progress of this region. Krupnov is, however, silent about modernization of the Asian armies, apparently implying that economic power will drive China and India to modernize their

8 Yuri V. Krupnov, Russian should industrialize Afghanistan and Central Asia

(8 December 2008). Ferghana News Agency. see also: www.Ferghana.Ru.

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defense forces. And, in the process, they will inevitably seek Russian military assistance, which it will provide for two reasons: To keep these two demographic Asian heavyweights as its ally and help stabilize her own huge military industrial complex within Russia through arms sales to both of them. Despite post Soviet turmoil, Russia has not lagged behind in arms production. Faced with a dire situation of its very survival, the Russian military industry has come out with Sukhoi T-50 fifth generation fighter that compares and competes with F-22 of the Lockheed Martin.9

Changing Paradigm There has been a distinct paradigm shift noticeable since the early 1980s in matters of arms supply. Its genesis and growth were noticed during Iran–Iraq war. While big powers primarily sided with their respective clients, Russia with Iraq and France with Iran and U.S. with Pakistan — the horizontal transfer of arms and related defense technology underwent a sea change. A new tier of arms suppliers appeared on the scene. While arms trade was dominated by the Big Fives of the Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council, they remained the first tier supplier. At the same time, second tier suppliers — Israel, Brazil, Taiwan and Korea — penetrated into the arms market. It was noticed during the Iran–Iraq war that these second tier countries had a share of 15.77% in global arms trade, although their share after the war slid to a more stable 4% to 7%.10 The trend has more or less stabilized in the global arms market with Israel dominating the second tier countries. In April 2009, Tel Aviv and New Delhi signed a U.S. $1.1 billion deal to provide India with Advanced Tactical Air Defense System developed by Raytheon, a U.S. defense contractor. A month later, in May 2009, Israel delivered to India the first of three Falcon Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS). Israel has

9 For a comparison of Sukhoi T-50 with F-22 see, Ilya Kramnik, The Fifth generation

is Here, New Theme, Vol. 7, No. 1, Jan–Feb, 2010, pp. 9–11. 10 Mussington, D (1994). Arms unbound: The globalisation of defence production.

CSIA Studies in International Security, No. 4, p. 36. Washington: Brassey’s Inc.

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emerged as India’s second largest arms supplier and the cooperation continues. The new phenomenon of a globalized arms market is a combination of both horizontal and vertical opportunities for the suppliers wherever the market is available. The new trend is not the appearance of second tier suppliers, but two other types of defense related ties — one taking place among the first and second tiers of suppliers and the other taking place among the first tier suppliers. The U.S. contractor in Israel is developing AWACS delivered to India which is a strong Russian arms client. And the U.S. has agreed to buy from Russia M-17 copters, apparently to use them in Afghanistan.11 These trends in global arms market in general and Indo–Russian arms deals in particular bring afield both first and second tier arms suppliers to forge cooperation that was unimaginable a few years ago. By all likelihood, Russia will aggressively market its defense industrial products both horizontally and vertically all over the world. It will have a multi-tier approach: Special relationship with its former client states, normal relationships with emerging second tier suppliers and gingerly relations with established arms exporters. For Russia, the falling morass of yesteryears is passé. Revival of the Russian military industrial complex in a big way, thanks to the oil boom under Putin, has readied Russia to face competition from all other countries in the arms trade in the years ahead. Russia has accepted the globalizing character of arms market, accepted that even loyal client states will shun her if prices are uncompetitive and technology outdated. Judging from this angle, Putin’s idea of strategic partnership and Medvedev’s Skolkovo Innovation Project are grand designs to infuse new blood into

11 When Russian Defence Minister, Anatoly Serdyukov visited the U.S. on 15–16 September, 2010, both countries signed an agreement as per which U.S. will buy from Russia M-17 helicopters (which NATO calls Hip) for Afghan operation. Russia pledged not to increase its military presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia — two Moscow leaning separatist regions of the U.S. ally in Caucasus — Georgia. The Americans, in turn, will not seek to open new military bases in Kyrgyzstan and will close their only operating base at Manas after withdrawing from Afghanistan. See, Nabi Abdullaev, U.S.–Russia forge wide-ranging Pact (20 September 2010). Defence News, p. 4.

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the Russian MIC based on high-tech and nano research. As an integral part of Russia’s overall modernization agenda, Medvedev’s Skolkovo project had outlined in February, 2010 five priority areas of innovation that will have dual application, both in civil and military sectors: energy, IT, telecommunications, bio-medical and nuclear technology.12

New Realities The 1990s had thrown up a slew of challenges in Indo–Russian bilateral military relations. Aside from the difficulties in procuring spares and getting timely supplies as per earlier agreements, Russia had dithered on many earlier commitments, including on cryogenic engine delivery. 70% of lopsided, military dependence on Soviet armory had landed India in the limbo, when the very Soviet Union did not exist and its successor state — Russia — wished to appropriate past debt, but dithered to fulfill past commitments. There were several lessons for India from this predicament. First, states do behave strange, when it concerns their national interest and Russia did exactly that. Second, a huge country like India did not have any contingency plan for alternative procurement of weaponry. Third, India did not have any other spares to use in Russian machinery or in combination with it. Fourth, India learned the hard way not to put all her eggs in one basket any longer. Fifth, even items for which payments were made, the Russians were not forthcoming due to the collapse of their entire military supply system. Sixth, Rupee–Rouble exchange rate was no longer valid and ought to have changed appropriate to changing international order. Finally, this predicament of helplessness did teach a lesson to India not to tether itself exclusively to the Russians any longer and break free at the earliest opportunity available to buy arms and weapon systems from wherever it was available. However, escape route was unavailable because dependence level was too high. It was a cul de sac for the Indian defense forces. Finally, comparing her military profile with any other country along with the political profile of closeness, India reached the

12 Arun Mohanty, Medvedev and Russia’s Modernization Agenda, World Focus, No. 368, August, 2010, p. 333.

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conclusion that its military had more strategic compatibility with Russia than with any other country. The new realities therefore could not dictate an instant exit from the post-Soviet chaos that reigned throughout Russia and in the Indian arms procurement policy in the 1990s. The question of dependability bothered India more than anything else. And finally it was preferred to follow an open door policy of arms procurement and seek arms from different sellers in competitive international arms market. This approach was a windfall once again for Russia because it gave inducement to India, slashed prices of its products and quoted age old traditions of a reliable supplier. The friendship price tag was no longer available, but its replacement was substantial price reduction that suited India. A T-50 fifth generation fighter will cost less than U.S. $100 million which is 2.5 times less than the Lockheed martin/Boeing F-22.13 The altered post-Soviet environ brought about realization about half a dozen aspects in both countries. First, India’s military base is excessively Russia oriented and that cannot be easily eliminated overnight. Second, joint production with other countries will take time to materialize, energy to study properly the details and money to invest. With Russia things were on track, while with others it has been off the track. Third, Russia has been a regular participant at the biennial air show held at Bangalore. At the fifth air show on 9–13 February, 2007, Russia outwitted other suppliers, outpaced their manoeuvre and outstood in the competition as the performance of its products — MiG 29K, SU-30 MKI and IL-78 tanker gained prominence and became cynosure of all eyes.14 Fourth, Russia has offered a strategic partnership agenda that encompasses collaboration in nuclear and space research. The key components of nuclear and space research cannot be excluded from the defense-military applications in India because there are several areas of dual use technology to be shared both by civil and military sectors. Fifth, Russia’s Rosatomstroi is rock solid with India’s

13 Ilya Kraminik, The Fifth generation is here, op. cit. p. 11. 14 www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aero_India 2005, 2009. Aerospace Herald (Vestnik

Aviatsii i Kosmonavtiki), No. 1, Jan–Feb, 2005, pp. 6–7.

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nuclear programme much before the Indo–U.S. civil nuclear deal was signed. Its collaboration with Nuclear Corporation of India has been running for many decades. The Kudankulam power plant in Tamil Nadu is a living testimony of it and now it has decided to help India build a total of 18 reactors across the country. Finally, as Putin visited Bangalore during one his visits to India, it became evident that IT was going to play a key role in the defense sector too. President Medvedev’s December 2010 visit to New Delhi has raised hopes that the innovation city at suburban Skolkovo near Moscow is likely to witness joint collaborations between Indian and Russian scientists/innovators in the IT and defense sectors running into the future. However, the new reality for India is to break free from military overdependence on Russia. India is ready to collaborate with Russia. At the same time, it is free to set up defense, nuclear and space collaboration and strategic partnership with other countries — a phenomenon that has been evidenced in recent years. Rather than opposing such moves Russia has been appreciative of this.15 The new reality, however tends to be insinuating in one tangible aspect: The attitude of the younger and middle aged Russians to ties with India. The Russians, who studied in the university around the time of Velvet Revolution or through the Yeltsin years, have passed two decades in their career and business. In the bureaucracy they are in upper echelon of decision making. It is this segment of the society, very much oriented to the West and averse to relations with India. The closer the defense ties India forges with the Russians, the stronger becomes their belief that India is unimportant and like in the 1960s, the Russians can still come and set up IIT or IIM. They are unaware of the sixty years of progress India has made. The lopsided defense dependence gives the new Russian generation the ego of being superior to look down upon India as something intangible. However, the changing image of India has been slowly telling on them to change their attitude, but slowly.

15 Former Russian Ambassador, Vyacheslav Trubnikov, an ex-KGB strongman in Asia

turned diplomat, wrote in the Times of India an applauding piece, throwing Russia’s stoic support behind the Indo–U.S. nuclear deal.

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However, the case is not so at the diplomatic and political levels. All initiatives including that of Strategic Partnership with India have come from the apex political level, particularly from Vladimir Putin. Similarly on issues of international importance closely connected with national security and defense such as terrorism, internal security problems, narcotic trafficking, human trafficking, money and arms laundering, Russia and India evince a common approach and launch fight against these menaces from a single platform. People to people contacts are always good, as in Soviet years; so through post-Soviet times. The Russian bureaucracy that views India negatively has a litmus test to pass before their political bosses who perceive India positively as a rising Asian power to be reckoned with. Defense relations with such a power are a prestige symbol for the Russians rather than a burden. The lesson for India is to bank on this prestige, lessen the lopsided dependence on Russia, seek military and technological help from other countries in the selfsame sectors it has been relying on Russia, bypassing various tact that Russia follows. The sooner this happens, the better for India it is. And this will happen only when a strong India could dictate its own terms. The resolution of the problem of Russian bureaucracy looking in opposite direction of their politicians would land India in a greater limbo than did the aftermath of Soviet collapse in the 1990s and its implications are impliedly far-reaching that India understands well. The central problem of closer Indo–Russian defense ties in particular and strategic partnership in general will be adequately and positively addressed if the Russian politicians, bureaucrats, diplomats and military generals, involved with policy formulations of Indo– Russian military relations, speak a cohesive voice of support with India. Such cohesion is essential in an increasingly globalizing world, where compartmentalization of intra-state relationship creates impediments in fostering harmonious ties; hence must be abandoned. New partnership ethos has been sweeping bilateral and multilateral relations in recent years. Onetime arch enemies have become close to each other. India and China have signed strategic partnership agreements. Russia and China have buried their age old territorial dispute over the thousand of islands on Amur, Argun and Ussuri rivers. The U.S. and

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India are now strategic partners; Russia and India have done so too. Precisely, countries who do matter in international politics are becoming strategic partners of India in the unfolding games of international geopolitics, particularly in Asia. New alliances are emerging that impact defense ties. Beyond the ambit of Russia–India (RI) bilateral relations, there is China that has joined the game to make it Russia India and China(RIC) and Brazil from far away Latin America has made the alliance Brazil, Russia India and China(BRIC). The new realities have brought afield regional organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Asia Pacific Economic Community (APEC). All these emerging and existing alliances put their weight behind resolution of border disputes and affect mutual arms trade. Thus, what we witness is a shifting scenario from bilateral to trilateral, quadrilateral and multilateral alliances more often emerging to engage countries in various areas of cooperation, including defense. This provides India with an array of broader choices for arms procurement and military cooperation than it had enjoyed earlier.

Then and Now India of the 1960s was poor, looking forward to any country to help her; India is now a regional power to reckon with. It is one of the ten largest economies of the world. India accepted the MiG 21 in mid 1960s, because it was the marvelous fighter aircraft then making news against the NATO; now India is buying Sukhois in the midst of several other choices. Then India paid the Soviets for the MiGs in merchandise through barter arrangements. Now India pays Russia in dollar for everything it buys. Then India had no choice due to block politics, now India lives in a global village in the thick of globalization. Then India was completely non-aligned; now it is a strategic partner of most leading nations. Then it was industrially under developed; now it is an IT major in the world. The world has changed; so too have India and Russia. Therefore, both countries must take into account the dynamics of changes and attune their relations to shifting pattern in their international conduct. The foes of yesteryears are becoming friends of today. But something in Russian behavior has not changed — their mindset and the attitude, not of people but of the

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bureaucracy. The attitude remains largely friendly, while the mindset is fixed in an egotistic chauvinism that is unprepared to publicly admit the talent pool of India in fundamental and applied sciences as well as the economic progress India has made in recent years. Russian Indologists are no longer advising the Kremlin as they used to do in Soviet years, and reportedly, there have been fund cuts in recent years to indological studies in Russia. Yet, there are several positive aspects of Indo–Russian defense deals. First, because of its very nature of being public sector to public sector dealings, the vendor enjoys the advantage of downsizing the prices of products to such a low that no other competitor can survive in the periphery and the recipient can conveniently keep the price tag a secret. This privilege of the vendor can really supply cheap items to the recipient. That has been the case with most defense deals Russia has signed with India. Cheap and reliable availability is the one reason why India–Russia defense cooperation has been sticking together for years, then and now. Second, the vender can offer direct or indirect offset arrangement. Russia has offered India facilities for local assemble of MiG and Sukhoi components, tank assemble and various other offset projects. In fact Russia’s inroad into the Indian public sector to set up power plants and steel plants in the 1960s was primarily through offset arrangements and defense sector was no exception. Third, the privileged state sector vendor can offer certain technology transfer to share with the recipient country. Although such technology transfer has not helped in indigenization of technology in India; nor in economic development of the recipient country, it has successfully established a buyer–seller relationship irreversible in nature. And it is this trade relationship of yesteryears that is transforming itself to strategic partnership now in the changing context of globalization. Transfer of technology remains the crux of issues to be addressed in all defense deals as aspiration of the recipient country rises to a point of no end and vender country bargains with it to what extent it can accommodate this aspiration. In this bargaining process Russia has always won the Indian confidence and many projects in the defense sector have come up across India. Fourth, both local assemble and

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technology transfer involve an element of personnel training. The art of assimilating the technology and assemble tactics must be taught by the vendor to the recipient country in good faith. Thus, a personnel training arrangement must be in place. Russia and India have plenty of exchange programmes catering to the needs of personnel training. Defense personnel of various rungs are deputed to the production sites in the seller country to acquaint and train themselves in the art of assembling and manning those weapons systems. From training MiG pilots to T-90 operators, there is an adequate training mechanism in India–Russia defense relationship. Fifth, joint production of certain items as the BrahMos cruise missile has been a success not only in helping India build an adequate missile technological base, but also export missiles to third countries. Signed on February 1998 between the Republic of India and the Russian Federation, the BrahMos Corporation is a joint venture between the DRDO of India and Maschinostroyenie of Russia. India has a share of 50.5% and Russia 49.5%. Such joint venture arrangement is new and likely to increase in number in the years to come as competition in the defense sector would intensify. India as a potential power in South Asia is a big global market for defense hardware. Russia is aware that its own hardware combined with India’s software could achieve some defense innovations that would remain the symbol of synergy in key areas of bilateral defense collaboration. Therefore, there is a common realization that combining the scientific and technological prowess of Russia and India together to the extent of involving private sectors of both countries in defense innovations would go a long way in achieving bilateral rapprochement in defense production. Finally, Indo–Russian defense cooperation is loaded with a tradition of reliability and goodwill. Baring the 1990s, both countries have enjoyed mutual trust and confidence to boost their ties in the defense sector. Although the friendship price tag was over with the Soviet collapse, Russia’s pragmatic leadership is agile about India’s geopolitical weight in South Asia as a singular, reliable partner. And this posits India against all other countries of South Asia in all Russian strategic and geopolitical calculations. If Pakistan could enjoy billions of dollars of U.S. loan waivers, why not India a little concession in

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the price tag of Russian weapons system? After all, India is no longer asking for soft loans, it is buying weapons systems with its own money, and that too worth of U.S. $30 billion a year.

Conclusion The “Awara” years in Indo–Russian relations are passé; they are unlikely to return. A pragmatic geopolitical and strategic assessment has brought back India to the center stage of Russian diplomatic discourse. In all strategic calculations, a country like Russia that was drifting to the western orbit two decades ago but in vain, has regained its composure to come back to focus on Asia. The rise of China and India as economic power houses of Asia is an ineluctable process that has convinced the Russians to focus on the Eurasian character of their very existence, rather than looking lopsided to Europe and the U.S. On her part, India has learned the lessons from lopsided military overdependence on Russia and desires to diversify her defense procurement sources. This is the only and most crucial factor for which India depends on the Russians. For many years to come both countries would pass through a dilemmatic tangle: India how to free from the shackles of military overdependence on Russia and Russia how to tether India still firmly as the only frontline defense partner in South Asia. Traditional wisdom and goodwill will guide India and Russia along the fudgy way of geopolitics. Finally, however, realists will carry their day through a practical approach to put things in changing geopolitical perspective in Asia that would prevail over all other strategic calculations.

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Chapter 6

Post-Conflict Restructuring of Nepal: The Challenge and Prospects Baburam Bhattarai∗

Introduction Before coming to the question of post-conflict restructuring, it may be useful and prudent to deal briefly with the historical context of conflict and peace agreement between the contending political forces in Nepal. Nepal is a land-locked country sand-witched between two huge states of China and India. Physically it is 22 times smaller than India and 75 times smaller than China. It is virtually India-locked as it has accessible open borders with India from the three sides and only marginally linked with China across the high Himalayas. Hence, the development dynamics of Nepal both in the socio-economic and political sense, is conditioned more by the development processes in South Asia

∗ Talk delivered at Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), National University of Singapore

(NUS), Singapore, on March 25, 2011. 119

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than by those in East Asia. Over the years, a dominance-dependence relationship has developed with India as about two-thirds of the foreign trade of the country takes place with the southern neighbor as against only about 10% with the northern neighbor. Specially, since the Cold War days the country has been a hotbed of big power rivalry given its strategic geopolitical positioning between South and East Asia. As a result, the politico-strategic motivation of rival powers to maintain so-called stability in this sensitive region has encouraged autocratic and centralized state formation in Nepal for a long time. Internally, Nepal is a country of tremendous regional, ethnic, linguistic, cultural, religious and socio-economic diversity. The basis of this diversity lies in its amazing physical landscape of about 100 m height in the southern plains of Terai/Madhes rising dramatically to more than 8800 m in the Northern Himalayan mountains, all within a horizontal span of less than 200 km in a ladder like manner. Also, a continuous inflow of diverse stock of population throughout history with their own language, culture, religion and social mode of production, specially the Tibeto–Burman or Mongoloid stock from the north and the east, the Indo–Aryans from the west and south and Austro–Dravids from the south, has turned the country into a melting pot of incredible socio-cultural diversity. Similarly, the extremely fragmented and disarticulated physical space has given rise to a very backward economic system marked by pre-capitalist mode of production with a pre-ponderance of the agricultural sector, interspersed by modern industrial, financial and services sectors at certain urban nodes with better access to the outside world. The combined effect of these exogenous and endogenous processes was the general fossilization of the economy and society and creation of an autocratic, centralized and bureaucratized state system presided over by the monarchy for about two and a half century. With the intensification of anti-colonial movement in South Asia and the New Democratic revolution in China after the Second World War different political parties with ideological commitment to liberal democracy (e.g. Nepali Congress) and socialist or people’s democracy (e.g. Communist Party of Nepal) were formed in the country. Then ensued a series of people’s movement for the all-round democratization of the society,

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economy and polity of the country, specially in 1950, 1980 and 1990. The highest pinnacle of this movement was the armed People’s War(PW) led by the CPN (Maoist) from 1996 to 2006, which virtually wiped out the feudal roots of the autocratic monarchy from every nook and corner of the country. In November 2005, a 12-Point Understanding was reached between the traditional parliamentary democratic forces and the radical communist forces to launch a joint people’s movement against the monarchy. This resulted in the massive and decisive people’s movement in April 2006 that forced the monarchy to accept the basic sovereignty of the people. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed between the parliamentary democratic parties and the CPN(Maoist) in November 2006, that ended the ten years long armed PW and paved the way for completion of the democratic revolution continuing since the 1950s. The basic features of the CPA were the promulgation of an interim constitution, formation of an interim legislature-parliament and interim government, holding of elections to a Constituent Assembly (CA) to decide the fate of the monarchy and to make a new constitution, to restructure the state on a federal basis, to carry out scientific land reforms etc., on the political front, and to democratize the old Nepal Army (NA) and to integrate and rehabilitate the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), on the military front. The CA elections were successfully held in April 2008 and the 240 years old Shah Dynasty monarchy was finally abolished by the first session of the CA on May 29, 2008, declaring the country a Federal Democratic Republic. However, the CA failed to make the new constitution within two years of the stipulated time by May 28, 2010 and its tenure was extended by one more year till May 28, 2011. Also, other provisions of the CPA, specially the integration and rehabilitation of the PLA and formation of various commissions like one to look into cases of disappearances etc., are yet to be implemented.

The Challenge of Restructuring of Nepal The conflict or social class struggle in Nepal so far has been the fight of the overwhelming majority of the people subjected to class, nationality, regional, gender and caste oppression by a feudal, autocratic, unitary

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state system backed by internal & external retrograde forces. In other words, the struggle is for complete democratization of society, economy and polity of the country. Hence the post-conflict peace and development can be achieved only by total restructuring of all existing political, economic, social, cultural and international relations on a democratic basis.

Democratic restructuring of the state The most fundamental and perhaps the most important question in the current peace process in Nepal is that of finding a mutually acceptable model of democratic system of the state to be institutionalized through the CA. The traditional parliamentary forces and Maoist communist revolutionaries had joined hands since the 12-Point Understanding to abolish the monarchy and introduce a democratic state system through an elected CA. There was basic agreement on the process of institutionalizing democracy but not on the content or form of democracy. As is well known, the bourgeois democratic forces subscribe to liberal democracy, whereas the communist revolutionaries aspire for people’s democracy or socialist democracy. This great ideological-political divide is so deep-rooted in Nepal that the prolonged impasse in the constitution drafting process in the CA is basically hinging on this. Hence, a correct blend of positive and universally accepted features of both liberal democracy and socialist or people’s democracy could provide a model of democracy suited to the current level of socio-economic development and existing balance of forces in the country. Both sides need to make realistic compromises on this fundamental political issue. There is general agreement on the Maoist radical democratic camp that principal impediments to social progress in the presentday Nepal are the feudal remnants in different spheres of society, economy and state. Hence, the UCPN (Maoist) has identified its principal immediate task as the completion of the bourgeois democratic revolution. Furthermore, the Party has already declared its commitment to multi-party competitive politics, periodic elections, freedom of press and assembly, rule of law, human rights etc., which are

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considered inalienable features of liberal democracy. The Party’s only insistence has been that this political democracy should be grounded on concomitant democracy on economic, social and cultural fronts so that the basic masses of workers, peasants, women, dalits and people of oppressed nationalities and regions, too, can avail the real fruits of democracy. For this, certain specific measures to ensure the real participation of the basic masses of people in the state organs should be enshrined in the very constitution. As Benoit has rightly said, “The highest measure of democracy is neither the “extent of freedom” nor the “extent of equality”, but rather the highest measure of participation”. Similarly, fundamental rights to education, health, employment, food security, shelter etc. should be guaranteed to every citizen by the constitution of the state. The liberal democratic camp led by the Nepali Congress, however, has so far not exhibited much ingenuity and flexibility to develop a realistic model of democracy suited to the specific conditions of the country, apart from harping on the traditional model of parliamentary democracy of the Westminister type. The prolonged deadlock over the form of governance, whether the presidential or the prime ministerial system, is its direct manifestation. Though the number of disputed cases in the Constitutional Committee have been significantly resolved or reduced in recent weeks, a deep chasm between the two ideological camps on the issue of model of democracy persists, which threatens to derail the whole peace process. Since both sides have more or less unified understanding about the need to sweep away all feudal remnants and complete the democratic revolution, it would be prudent to united develop a transitional model of democracy incorporating the positive features of both liberal and socialist/people’s democracy and acceptable to both sides.

Federal restructuring of the state Though Nepal is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multi-regional, multireligious and multi-cultural country, it has been ruled by a unitary and centralized state system dominated by the hill Arya-Khas nationality with Kathmandu as the center of power. The Maoist PW, the United People’s Movement, the Madhesi Movement and various Nationalities

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Movement in different periods of time had federal restructuring of the state as a common agenda. Federal restructuring of the state, therefore, should be an important component of overall restructuring of Nepal in the post-conflict phase. Even if there is general consensus in the country about the need for restructuring the current unitary state on federal line, there are divergent views and positions on the modality of federalism. What should be the basis of federalism? What should be the number of federal units? What should be their names? Different parties and groups have different positions. However, the State Restructuring Committee of the CA has by a majority vote, proposed national/ethnic, linguistic and regional identity and viability as the basis of federalism and accordingly proposed 14 federal state units. Thus, three tiers of Center, State and Local Units have been proposed. Within the federal states there will be Autonomous Regions, Special Regions and Protected Regions for smaller and special groups. The federal states will be equipped with their own executive, legislative and judicial organs. The power-sharing arrangement among the three tiers have also been proposed. This provides a reasonable basis for the ultimate federal restructuring of the state. The traditional parliamentary democratic parties are, however, still dragging their feet on the issue of federal restructuring. There is a distinct polarization between the UCPN (Maoist), Madhesis parties and other janajati (indigenous people) based parties, on the one hand, and the parliamentary democratic parties, on the other, on this crucial issue, which threatens to wreck the whole constitution-making process. The UCPN (Maoist) is the most consistent on the federalism issue since the days of the PW. As there are multi-nationalities in the country, like the Madhesis and others, and there are oppressed regions with their own distinct identity, like the far-western Seti-Mahakali and Karnali regions, the basis of federalism should be the national and regional identity with adequate autonomy. Accordingly, the Party has proposed twelve federal units, while remaining flexible on the number of units.

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There is a need to be cautious and guard against two extreme positions on the question of federalism. While, on the one hand, the parliamentary democratic parties are virtually against federalism by denying national, regional or linguistic identity of oppressed nationalities and regions, some of the Madhesi and other janajati parties, on the other, over-emphasize the ethnic identity and border on separatism while talking of federalism. Both of these are erroneous and extremely dangerous positions, which unwittingly feed on each other to wreck the federal restructuring of the state and the ultimate constitution-making process. Also, Special Rights to compensate for past oppression against women, dalits and Muslims have to be enshrined in the new constitution.

Restructuring of the security sector Security forces, including the army, paramilitary and police are an indispensable and most important component of any state system. Hence, any democratic restructuring of the state is unthinkable without the accompanying restructuring of the security sector, principally the security forces. There are two aspects of restructuring of the security sector in the post-conflict context of Nepal. One is the democratization of the traditional Nepal Army (NA) and the other is the integration and rehabilitation of the Maoist army combatants or the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), according to the CPA. The NA was historically raised by the Shah kings during the state expansion campaign in the 18th and 19th centuries and hence has remained loyal to the monarchy throughout. Also, its composition specially the higher level leadership has been heavily skewed in favor of the ruling Arya-Khas nationality. Hence, after the successful antimonarchy democratic movement of April 2006, its name was changed from the “Royal Nepal Army” to “Nepal Army” and in the CPA signed in November 2006 a special provision was inserted “to democratize” the NA. This was also incorporated in the Interim Constitution, 2006. By “democratization” it was meant “to fix the appropriate size, to create democratic structure, to introduce national and inclusive character and to train it with the values of democracy and human rights.”

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It was a calculated move to restructure the entire security forces so that the army may not be used against the people and democracy as was done in the past. Unfortunately no tangible progress has been made to democratize the NA so far, and rather the leadership of the parliamentary parties is vying with each other to pamper the NA in its original form. This is a very crucial issue for the overall restructuring of Nepal, as any “restructuring” of state remains a mere pipe dream without the restructuring of the security forces. Another cardinal question is the integration and rehabilitation of the PLA. The CPA and the Interim Constitution accept the PLA (“Maoist Army Combatants”) as the legitimate security force of the new Nepali state at par with the NA. As of now we have two parallel armies in one state, which cannot continue forever. If making of the new constitution through the CA is the most important political dimension of the peace process then the integration and rehabilitation of the PLA is equally, if not more, important military dimension of the peace process. One cannot be completed without the other. Unfortunately the progress in the PLA front is moving in a snail’s pace. Though the PLA has been formally brought under the Special Committee formed by the Cabinet, the modality of integration has not been worked out yet. Rather there have been irresponsible remarks from the leaders of parliamentary parties, including the concerned Ministers, against the spirit of integration, as if it is equivalent of individual recruitment into the security forces. As the PLA was politically victorious and not defeated militarily, we have to devise our own indigenous modality of its integration into the security forces. Among the various options proposed by the UCPN (Maoist) are: the creation of a separate force, or a mixed force with matching numbers from other forces, or integration into different security forces including the NA, Armed Police Force and the civilian Police Force. Whatever modality is followed, there is no alternative to integration of the PLA for the completion of the peace process and democratic restructuring of the security forces. If it is not handled correctly it would prove the ultimate flash point for the breakdown of the peace process. Restructuring of the security sector also entails the formulation of an overall security policy of the country to suit the new democratic

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restructuring internally and to keep up with the changing security dynamics externally. Given the huge sizes of the security forces of both India and China, it may be more prudent for Nepal to downsize the standing army and focus more on devising other means including the arming of the masses of the people for national security.

Restructuring the economy The ultimate objective cause of any social or political conflict is the economy. This is all the more true in the underdeveloped socioeconomic context of Nepal. The ten years of armed conflict was basically fuelled by rampant poverty, unemployment, inequality and dependency. It is, therefore, imperative that the prevailing semi-feudal and semi-colonial socio-economic formation marked by predominant subsistence agriculture sector interspersed with certain islands of prosperity linked with the metropolitan capital, be restructured progressively. The agenda of transformation of the traditional agriculture sector into a modern industrial sector should top the agenda of economic restructuring, as two-thirds of the labor force and one-third of the GDP is tied up with the agricultural sector. A radical land-reform programme with judicious redistribution of land and promotion of modern farming system should be implemented with utmost urgency. Promotion of cooperatives among small producers should ensure reasonable growth with substantial social equity. Next focus of economic restructuring should be a campaign of national industrialization based on the principle of public–private partnership. Whereas the state should focus on development of basic infrastructures, including transportation and communication, electricity, tourism infrastructures etc., the private sector, both indigenous and foreign, should be encouraged to make investments on manufacturing, financial and service sectors, among others. A strategy of rapid economic growth with accompanying social justice measures should pay rich dividends in the short as well as long terms to restructure the economy. As there is tremendous diversity in the natural and human resource potentials of different geographical regions, a policy of balanced

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regional development must be followed. The current Kathmanducentric development model must be reversed to make maximum utilization of local resources and potentials. Also, Nepal should follow a development strategy of taking maximum advantage of rapid economic development of both China and India. Areas of comparative advantages, like hydro-power, tourism etc., must be identified and developed in close synchronization with the neighboring economies. It should be firmly grasped that only through a strategy of rapid economic restructuring and development the new democratic change can be sustained and institutionalized. Democracy amidst-rampant poverty, unemployment and inequality will be ever susceptible to revert to autocracy under different guise.

Restructuring of international relations As has been sketched earlier, the internal dynamics of Nepal has been largely conditioned by the external dynamics particularly that of India. Because of its sensitive geostrategic positioning between two giant neighbors it has attracted disproportionate attention from the international power centers. In the current post-conflict transition this attention has been further magnified among the three major powers that have major stakes, namely India, China and the USA. Hence, the restructuring of the international relations becomes an important dimension of overall restructuring of Nepal. Traditionally Nepal has been metaphorically likened to “a yam between two boulders” of India and China. This syndrome of helplessness has often given rise to national xenophobia, particularly vis-a-vis the southern neighbor, India. Now, with democratic transition in Nepal and the rapid growth trajectory pursued by both India and China, the traditional notion of inanimate and static “buffer zone” may be discarded in favor of a vibrant bridge between the two neighbors. This calls for change of old perceptions on the part of both Nepal and its immediate neighbors. Though China and the USA both have some strategic interests in Nepal, it is India that has larger interests, both in strategic and economic

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sense. Hence, relations with India demands more careful consideration and restructuring to suit the mutual interests in the new context. First of all, the historically developed dominance-dependence relationship with India needs to be restructured in favor of an equal and mutually beneficial relation. With the economic might India has acquired and the democratic transition Nepal has undergone in recent times, it is no longer necessary and prudent for India to try to maintain its influence in Nepal through force. Also, a democratic Nepal is the best bet for safeguarding genuine Indian interests there. UCPN (Maoist) being the largest political formation should be in a better position to assure India of this. Unfortunately, the relations between the UCPN (Maoist) leadership and India have further soured to the detriment of both in recent times. However, as India has played a very significant role to promote the current peace and democratic process and peace, stability, democracy and prosperity in Nepal will ultimately benefit India, it is in the enlightened self-interest of India to assist the current peace process to reach a successful conclusion. The dominant public perception that Indian establishment may not be very happy with the emergence of the Maoist forces as leading political actors in the neighborhood has helped neither side. As long as the Maoist side plays by the rule of the game as defined in the CPA and other agreements and it contributes to promote stability with change and prosperity, it may be better for India to encourage, rather than to stall, the peace process, irrespective of whoever is at the helm affairs in Nepal. On the Maoist side, it may be more prudent to try to restructure the relations with India for mutual benefit through political and diplomatic means than to choose the path of confrontation. As per Nepal’s relations with China, it has remained more or less frictionless over a long period of time. However, with the emergence of China as a global economic and military power and recent democratic changes in Nepal, it is quite natural for China to try to expand its influence south of the Himalayas, specially for safeguarding the security of Tibetan Autonomous Region. This may lead to an increased rivalry between India and China to keep Nepal under their area of influence. As the U.S., the sole superpower of the world, too, may try to maintain its strategic hold in this sensitive geostrategic zone, there may ensure

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a triangular contention of international power centers for supremacy over Nepal. But geographically, economically, socially and culturally, India enjoy a distinct advantage vis-à-vis its other rivals in the country. In this context, it is imperative for Nepal to restructure its foreign policy according to the changing dynamics in the region and specially maintain objective and balanced relations with its immediate neighbors. Any policy of courting one neighbor at the cost of the other may be counter-productive for the basic national interests of the country.

The Prospects As the dateline for making of the new constitution through the CA (i.e. May 28) and the completion of the peace process approaches, an air of uncertainty prevails in the political firmament of Nepal. Agenda of peace and democratic restructuring of society, economy and state seems to be relegated to the background and the political leadership is seen throttling each other for immediate power. As Frederick Engels had rightly said: “… it is the fate of all revolutions that this union of different classes, which in some degree is always the necessary condition of any revolution, cannot subsist long. No sooner is the victory gained against the common enemy than victors become divided among themselves in different camps and turn their weapons against each other.” (“Revolution and Counter-revolution in Germany”). History seems to be repeating itself in Nepal as the erstwhile democratic co-fighters against the monarchy, particularly the Nepali Congress and the UCPN (Maoist), are about to turn their guns against each other, leaving the whole peace process and constitution-making process in the lurch. The earlier triangular fight among the feudal monarchists, bourgeois parliamentary democrats and proletarian radical democrats, has now changed into a bipolar contention between the bourgeois and proletarian democrats. This is the essence of the current political stalemate. What should or will be the way out of this stalemate? The current political deadlock can be ended either of the two ways: First, either of the two sides would prevail over the other and impose its will; and second, the two sides would enter a new compromise as per the current objective necessity and the prevailing balance of political forces.

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In the first scenario, the traditional parliamentary democratic forces led by the Nepali Congress and backed by the international statusquoist forces, may defeat the proletarian democratic forces led by the UCPN (Maoist) and impose the traditional bourgeois democratic system. Though this probability cannot be ruled out, it is less likely to happen in practice on two counts. On the one hand, it cannot fulfill the objective necessity of progressive restructuring of the Nepalese state, society and economy for which the masses of the people have struggle for more than six decades, and on the other hand, the political balance of forces in Nepal over the past decades has decisively taken a left turn, which has been clearly manifested in the CA elections as more then 62% seats were won by the left candidates. As per the probability of a Maoist revolutionary takeover at the cost of the parliamentary forces, the existing internal military balance and international situation do not favor that and it can be safely ruled out for the moment, though there are occasional reports of an impending “people’s revolt” led by the UCPN (Maoist). The second scenario would be a new historical compromise between the two contending political forces, i.e., parliamentary democrats and Maoist revolutionaries, to take the peace process to a successful conclusion and make a new constitution through the CA to restructure the state, society and economy. Given the current stage of development of the Nepalese society transiting from feudalism to capitalism and the prevailing balance of political forces both internally and externally, this is a historical necessity and most sensible political move on both sides. Of course, the agreement should be for progressive restructuring of state, society and economy, and not for maintaining the status quo. For this, the UCPN (Maoist) and the Nepali Congress should take the lead of the respective camps overcoming the serious trust deficit on both sides at the moment, which needs to be backed by the international actors, particularly India and China. Agreement on basic content of the new constitution, including a suitable model of democracy, federal restructuring of the state, form of governance etc., and the modality of army integration, should form the cornerstone of the new political understanding. This should be the most apt and desirable

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prospect for present day Nepal that would ensure peace, democracy, stability and prosperity in the country and the neighborhood. The third and the most undesirable prospect would be the breakdown of the peace process and the constitution-making process and relapse of the country into a new phase of armed confrontation. The scenario would be the most alarming as it is likely to trigger a regional conflict with involvement of the immediate neighbors, India and China, and also other international power centers, as in say Afghanistan. This needs to be avoided at any cost. Otherwise we may be cursed by history, as George Santayana had rightly said, “Those who cannot remember history are condemned to repeat it.”

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Chapter 7

Afghan Conflict: External-Internal Dimensions Dr. Abdullah∗

In the past three decades, Afghanistan has been at the center stage of major global events. Toward the end of 20th century and at the height of the Cold War, the Soviets occupied Afghanistan. This was compounded by the internal problems within the country. Afghanistan was thereafter occupied by Taliban and Al Qaeda — a phenomenon which unfortunately covers most of the first half of the 21st century. Before September 11, 2001, 90% of Afghanistan was occupied by the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, and terrorists from all over the world, especially Asia and Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia and even from Europe, had found a sanctuary and training ground. The idea was to create an Islamic emirate and to export this ideology to different ∗ Speech by Dr. Abdullah, Chairman, Afghanistan National Alliance for Hope and

Change; and Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Afghanistan at the ISAS, Public Lecture Series. 133

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countries first by creating unrest and destabilizing those countries and later on by establishing regimes like the Taliban in Afghanistan. As a whole, the Taliban’s idea was to degrade human beings to a subhuman level in order to rule the country; to deprive the country from its riches, pride and identity, and later by following the international agenda which was part of the international terrorists’ agenda. There was a resistance to this in Afghanistan. I was in the resistance against the Soviets in the 1980s, as a medical doctor. Later on I got involved in politics and then my last adventure was to become a candidate in the presidential elections. Though I am not in the parliament, we have a parliamentary group there in the opposition which I am leading, in the alliance representing different parts of the country, different political parties which have now come under one alliance. In the period of Taliban rule over Afghanistan, these voices of Afghanistan remained unheard. We used to raise this issue in different forums but the issue was seen as a domestic issue at that time. I recall late Ahmad Shah Massoud, leader of the resistance at that time, in May 2001, when he was interviewed in Paris, a few months before September 11: “what’s your message for President Bush?” His answer was that if he did not help [in] bringing peace in Afghanistan, the fire which was in Afghanistan will catch his skirt — that in our language has a lot of meaning and connotation. At that period, Al Qaeda and Taliban believed that they could take advantage of the policy of Pakistan which was supporting Taliban. But their agenda was different from any state’s agenda because this kind of group which is ideological, tend to take advantage of every opportunity and pursue a different agenda. And it has been proved because Pakistani Taliban has turned against Pakistan’s state. But unfortunately this reality was not recognized at that time. So the Taliban became stronger, and then as a result of September 11, Afghanistan was liberated. So why is it that after ten years of international engagement, and billions of dollars which have been contributed to Afghanistan, and tens of thousands of international forces, of NATO forces which are serving in Afghanistan, still the situation is risky, to put it mildly. Domestically, Afghans were not able to utilize the opportunity which was there post September 11. The opportunity which the people

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of Afghanistan welcomed and supported the process, was squandered. President Karzai who came to power, as a result of a broad consensus in the country, was not able to maintain that consensus. That was the main domestic factor within Afghanistan. As a result, there was a growing gap between the people and the government, and then the Taliban took advantage of the situation. Also, post September 11, was a critical time when Taliban and Al Qaeda had lost ground in Afghanistan, in a matter of a few weeks’ time, with a few thousand international forces, and whole Afghanistan was secured. Then Taliban leaders fled to Pakistan and they set up safe havens there. That was a critical moment for Afghanistan and Pakistan to work together in order to deal with this phenomenon. But we missed that opportunity and unfortunately Taliban developed strength first in Pakistan and then in Afghanistan. In Afghanistan the domestic situation has changed, and they took advantage of that situation. And then, the United States went to Iraq. That shifted focus from Afghanistan to a different situation that was also important. As a factor it affected the situation in Afghanistan. Talking of today’s situation, unfortunately the weaknesses of the Afghan administration exists. The Afghan administration has not been able to bridge the gap between the people and the government to deliver according to the wishes of our people. Issues of corruption, injustice, absence of rule of law and other related issues, have affected the situation. That has provided Taliban to take advantage of this situation. As far as the region is concerned, there are certain realities, certain facts which are created on the ground which were not the facts of a few years ago. Like Pakistani Taliban turning against Pakistani institutions, military and state institutions. That in itself was predictable for those of us who knew the nature of these groups. Still, there is a distinction made between Pakistani Taliban and Afghani Taliban. Of course there is a distinction but as far as the agenda is concerned, “Talibanization” is their agenda; there we do not have a distinction. They do the same thing in Pakistan and Afghanistan. That will be a turning point as far as regional situation is concerned, when that realization dawns that stronger the Afghani Taliban is in Afghanistan, the stronger will be Pakistani Taliban. And they are helping one another through

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a symbiotic nexus with the Al Qaeda. We cannot unfortunately delink these groups. They have travelled, died and ruled together, and also have many things in common. Now it is part of a much broader problem than just a localized one. While in Afghanistan, the failure to deliver on the political process; whenever the idea of political process is concerned, talking to the Taliban comes to mind. This is one important part of the political process but the broader political process is the democratic process — the issues of governance, justice and delivery of services to the people of Afghanistan. If we fail in this broader political process, to gain in the smaller part of the political process of talking to the Taliban is a remote idea. So the failure of the current leadership and the current administration in Afghanistan in the broader political process has unfortunately affected the whole situation within the country. As far as the idea of talking to the Taliban is concerned, while we believe that the military pressure will continue and should continue, because they have not given up the idea of winning militarily, and also there is an important factor which we have to remember — they are not fighting against us or against international forces in order to be accommodated in a democratic system; they want to bring this system down. That cannot be ignored. So in this sort of situation what the Afghan leadership can do is to unite the country around the common vision, which the majority of the people of the country can associate with, which is a moderate Islamic country, democracy, rights, justice, development in Afghanistan, dealing with the day to day life of the people, betterment of life for the people of Afghanistan. At the same time, open the door for the people who want to join the peace process, and isolate those who want to fight to the end, regardless of what you offer or what you do not offer, because that phenomenon no matter how harsh, we cannot ignore it. There are groups whose idea is to bring any state institution anywhere down in order to develop. And with these people you have no choice but to isolate them and maintain pressure on them, and drive the sources of support for them, that is the way forward. As far as the international community is concerned, we are at a critical phase where a date for the transition is set and that is 2014. It is

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during this period that Afghanistan should start assuming responsibility of its own security as well as full sovereignty as a whole. But the failure of the current Afghanistan government does not make it a sort of a visible process ahead of us but rather a lot of question marks. Whether Afghanistan will be able to assume responsibility by that time is a question where the current situation continued. Also, the messages of the international community of staying in Afghanistan or leaving Afghanistan are confusing to the people of Afghanistan. It ranges from leaving tomorrow up to establishing permanent bases in Afghanistan. So in this sort of situation, both of which are problematic, the people of Afghanistan are confused. As far as the region is concerned, there are quite a few players who have their roles and sponsors among the neighboring countries in the region. Afghanistan has been in the vicinity of quite a few nuclear states and regional powers. So different countries have their own role to play in Afghanistan but as a whole, the threat is common threat to all if it is seen in a wider perspective and also if the longer term real interest is not sacrificed for their short-sighted policies. So, while the threat is common, the opportunities can also be enjoyed by all in the region through regional cooperation.

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Chapter 8

Karzai’s Balancing Act: Bringing “China” In?∗ Shanthie Mariet D’Souza†

Introduction China’s interests in Afghanistan are perceived to be mainly economic. It is unlikely that the March 2010 Sino–Afghan joint declaration, following President Hamid Karzai’s visit to China, will bring about a dramatic change in the present Chinese policy of abstaining from military engagement in the conflict-ridden country. However, as the scenario of the United States (U.S.) withdrawal from Afghanistan looms large, China will have to prepare itself for a much larger and crucial role for long-term stabilization and reconstruction of the war-ravaged country given that its interests would be at stake. Its friendly ties with ∗ ISAS Insights No. 98, 7 May 2010. † Dr. Shanthie Mariet D’Souza is a Visting Research Fellow at the Institute of South

Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. She can be contacted at [email protected]. The views reflected in this paper are those of the author and not of the institute. 139

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Pakistan would continue to be a great leverage when it decides to pursue such a policy. President Karzai’s three-day state visit to China, beginning 23 March 2010, culminated with the establishment of the China– Afghanistan comprehensive cooperative partnership. This first visit after the Afghan President’s re-election evoked immense international attention as an attempt by a beleaguered leader to indulge other big powers in the region at a time when he faces increasing criticism on corruption, cronyism and electoral reforms at home and abroad. Considering the fact that China’s role in Afghanistan thus far has remained limited, this visit has sparked speculations regarding increased Chinese engagement in that country. In a joint declaration, Chinese President Hu Jintao emphasized on five aspects of the cooperative partnership — (i) political and diplomatic; (ii) economic and trade; (iii) humanitarian; (iv) security and police affairs; and (v) multilateral efforts to build the comprehensive cooperative partnership of good-neighborliness, mutual trust and friendship for generations.1 Both Afghanistan and China pledged to step up greater economic engagement and cooperation in the security sector. The three agreements signed by the two countries span wide-ranging economic and technological cooperation that include providing favorable tariffs for some Afghan exports and technical training programmes. The reported bilateral trade which reached U.S. $155 million in 2008, is set to further enlarge following the inking of these agreements.2 President Hu Jintao has called for deepening political ties, while urging greater cooperation

1 (a) Karzai visit yields major pacts (25 March 2010). China Daily, www.chinadaily.

com.cn/china/2010-03/25/content_9637982.htm. Accessed on 26 March 2010; (b) China, Afghanistan plan closer partnership as Karzai concludes state visit (25 March 2010). People’s Daily Online. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90883/ 6930867.html. Accessed on 26 March 2010. 2 These levels are relatively low compared to bilateral trade between India and Afghanistan of U.S. $358 million for the fiscal year April 2007 to March 2008. Jayshree Bajoria, India-Afghanistan Relations (22 July 2009). Council on Foreign Relations, Backgrounder. www.cfr.org/publication/17474/indiaafghanistan_relations.html. Accessed on 27 April, 2010. Afghan and Chinese presidents sign trade agreements (24 March 2010). BBC. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8584331.stm. Accessed on 25 April 2010.

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in mining, agriculture, hydro-electric and irrigation and infrastructure projects. China has further expressed its willingness to “support and aid Afghanistan in its peaceful reconstruction and support Afghanistan’s efforts to establish sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity”.3 Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao pledged to extend aid and economic support for Afghanistan’s reconstruction, while calling for both nations to jointly fight terrorism and drug trafficking. Beijing has pledged to provide a grant worth 160 million Yuan (U.S. $23.4 million) to Afghanistan. In a separate meeting, Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie pledged military assistance to Afghanistan in talks with his Afghan counterpart Abdul Rahim Wardak.

China’s Economic Strategy in Afghanistan China’s early economic assistance to Afghanistan dates back to the mid-1950s when the two countries established diplomatic relations and Chinese engineers built hospitals and water conservancy projects. During the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Beijing played an active role in the anti-Soviet resistance by providing weapons and training along with the US and Pakistan. Sino–Afghan relations did not normalize until 1992, when the mujahedeen captured Kabul and established a new “Islamic State of Afghanistan”. In the ensuing fratricidal warfare between various mujahedeen factions, China withdrew its diplomatic staff from Kabul in February 1993 and did not reopen its embassy until February 2002.4 Since then, China’s interest in Afghanistan has been mainly economic. In May 2003, China and Afghanistan signed an Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement, which provided U.S. $15 million to the Karzai government in Chinese grants.

3 Afghan President Signs Economic Agreements on China Visit, Radio Free

Europe Radio Liberty (RFERL), (24 March 2010). www.rferl.org/content/Afghan_ President_Meets_China_Leadership/1992126.html. Accessed on 10 April 2010. 4 For further details on the history of Sino-Afghan relations see “China and Afghanistan”, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Peoples Republic of China (25 August 2003). www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/yzs/gjlb/2676/t15822.htm. Accessed on 15 April 2010.

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Since 2002, China has provided about 900 million Yuan (U.S. $130 million) in aid to Afghanistan. In 2009, China has almost written-off Afghanistan’s debt by pledging U.S. $75 million as grant assistance over the next five years.5 The security and development agenda of Afghanistan has been largely dominated by the U.S. and its allies. Though viewed with skepticism by Beijing, it has largely worked to its advantage. Since 9/11, the U.S.’ primary focus on the “Arc of Instability” from the Middle East to South Asia has diverted critical military resources and highlevel attention away from China and the Asia-Pacific, compelling the U.S. to function in the region with “one hand tied behind its back”.6 On the contrary, China having stayed out of military engagement has been able to focus on its economic growth and resource exploitation elsewhere as in Afghanistan and Africa. China’s interest in Afghanistan remained marginal until Karzai’s government opened up its energy, mineral and raw materials to foreign investment. In 2007, China emerged as Afghanistan’s fifthlargest trading partner, behind Pakistan, European Union (EU), the U.S. and India. China has been involved prominently in Afghanistan’s infrastructure development, including telephone networks, irrigation projects, public hospitals, and several other reconstruction projects. Chinese companies like Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment Company Limited (ZTE) and Huawei have sought collaboration with the Afghan Ministry of Communications to implement digital telephone switches. Moreover, Chinese companies and workers have been hired by the EU for various reconstruction projects, including road restoration and infrastructure development.7

5 China’s assistance pales in comparison to India’s pledge of U.S. $1.3 billion and is

the sixth largest bilateral donor. 6 Abraham M. Denmark, The Impact of China’s Economic and Security Interests

in Continental Asia on the United States, Testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (20 May 2009). www.uscc.gov/hearings/2009hearings/ written_testimonies/09_05_20_wrts/09_05_20_demark_statement.php. Accessed on 26 March 2010. 7 It would be pertinent to make a distinction between China’s role as a donor and contractor. For example, the China Machine-Building International Corporation

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Though the bilateral relations during 2001–2006 remained at best cordial, it was in 2007, having won the contract for the copper mines in Aynak that Afghanistan emerged prominently in China’s economic calculus. Since then China’s growing economic clout has been most telling in its relations with Afghanistan. It is already a major source of consumer goods for Afghanistan. Since 2006, China has applied zero tariffs on 278 items of export products from Afghanistan.8 Although the Afghan economy accounts for less than one-tenth of 1% of China’s overall trade, the availability of cheap natural resources on its western border is of tremendous interest to China.

China’s Quest for Resource and Energy What attracts China to Afghanistan is the latter’s reserves of unexplored natural resources and energy. Afghanistan, which has the potential of serving China’s surging demand for resource and energy, has witnessed a parallel development similar to China’s rapid advance in conflict-ridden and resource-rich countries of Africa.9 In 2007, China’s Metallurgical group won the U.S. $3.5 billion bid to develop the 28square-kilometre Aynak copper field in Logar province out-bidding Western competitors like the U.S. firm Phelps Dodge. This group is also favored to win the rights to iron ore deposits at Hajigak, when bids are considered in later part of 2010. The Aynak copper field, the largest foreign investment in Afghan history, is estimated to be the

(CMIC) was awarded contract by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in January 2005 for the design, manufacturing and erection of a 18.5 MW hydroelectric turbine-generator of the U.S.-funded Kajaki rehabilitation project. Coincidentally, this is Afghanistan’s largest integrated irrigation project built by the Morrison-Knudsen, a U.S. firm in Helmand in 1953 and destroyed during the U.S. military operations in October 2001. Likewise, Chinese companies are working as contractors mainly for USAID-funded projects as well as those of the Europeans. 8 China, Afghanistan forge closer economic ties (24 March 2010). Xinhua. http:// china.globaltimes.cn/diplomacy/2010-03/515723.html. Accessed on 27 March 2010. 9 “China & Africa” in The Chinese Community in South Africa, The China Monitor, Issue 21, The Centre for Chinese Studies, University of Stellenbosch, (August 2007), www.ccs.org.za/downloads/monitors/CCS%20China%20Monitor%20August%2007. pdf. Accessed on 27 April 2010.

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largest undeveloped field in the world with the potential for U.S. $88 billion worth of ore.10 It also involves the construction of a U.S. $500 million worth of 400 MW coal-fired power plant, hospital, mosque and a freight railroad passing from the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR) through Tajikistan to Afghanistan. The huge prohibitive costs notwithstanding, the Chinese Metallurgical group is willing to invest in the insurgency afflicted Logar province. This is in conjunction with China’s larger regional economic strategy of development of its underdeveloped western regions and linking them with regional trade routes through Central Asia, South Asia, Iran and Middle East. In recent years, the region has witnessed highly visible and substantial Chinese investments into the Gwadar port (Baluchistan province) and Karakorum Highway in Pakistan and a multi-billion dollar pipeline from Kazakhstan to Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR). China has also inked a U.S. $100 billion 25-year energy contract with Iran. Afghanistan and Pakistan are seen as key transportation and trade links to actualize this strategy extending from Iran to China. The Gwadar port facilitates China to import 60% of its energy needs from the Middle East.11 Beijing plans to connect the port with Xinjiang to secure a more efficient delivery of energy resources to meet its surging domestic demands. Such investments are largely in sync with China’s long-term goal of developing its volatile western region, an area of priority in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–2015). Following the July 2009

10 Ron Synovitz, China: Afghan Investment Reveals Larger Strategy, (3 June

2008). Eurasianet. www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/pp060308f.shtml. Accessed on 21 April 2010. 11 In 2003, China imported 51.0% of its total crude imports from the Middle East. While the Gwadar port is perceived to provide “strategic depth” for Pakistan against the Indian Navy southwest from its Karachi naval base that has long been considered vulnerable to blockade by the Indian Navy. China’s primary interests in the “naval anchor” are to continue consolidating its all-weather relationship with Pakistan through large-scale collaborative development projects, to diversify and secure its crude oil import routes, and to gain “strategic foothold” in the Indian Ocean, Arabian Sea and Persian Gulf. Ziad Haider, Baluchis, “Beijing, and Pakistan’s Gwadar Port” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs (Winter/Spring 2005). www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/GWADAR.pdf. Accessed 25 April 2010.

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ethnic violence, Beijing has increased its attention and resources to the development of its two restive provinces — the XUAR and the Tibet Autonomous Region. In the narrow strip of the Wakhan Corridor, where China shares the shortest land border of 76 km with Afghanistan, Beijing is funding the construction of a new road, supply depot, and mobile communications centre that will facilitate greater connectivity and trade across the border.12 There are numerous indications suggesting that China is set to increase its investments and presence in Afghanistan in the near future. Afghanistan has substantial reserves of oil and natural gas in the northern parts of the country. The Afghan oil reserves were recently upgraded 18 times by a U.S. geological survey with estimates pointing to a mean of 1596 million barrels, while its natural gas reserves were upgraded by a factor of three, at a mean of 15,687 trillion cubic feet.13 Likewise, Afghanistan has substantial deposits of iron ore between Herat and the Panjsher Valley, gold reserves in the northern provinces of Badakshan, Takhar and Ghazni, and copper fields in Jawkhar, Darband and Aynak.14 Not all of these resource-rich areas are situated in the relatively stable northern and north-western regions.

12 There are talks of China opening the Wakhjir Pass, the only high-mountain pass

between Afghanistan and China in the Hindu Kush at the eastern end of the Wakhan Corridor linking it with the Tashkurgan Tajik Autonomous County in Xinjiang. See Christian Le Mière, Kabul’s New Patron? The Growing Afghan-Chinese Relationship, Foreign Affairs (13 April 2010). www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/66194/christian-lemiere/kabuls-new-patron. Accessed on 17 April 2010. 13 Nicklas Norling, The Emerging China-Afghanistan Relationship, Central AsiaCaucasus Institute (14 May 2008). www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/4858. Accessed on 9 April 2010. 14 According to recent estimates, Afghanistan is projected to have 1.6 billion barrels of oil and 440 billion cubic meters (bcm) of gas, deposits of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, iron ore and gold. The Chinese are particularly interested in the country’s extractive sector as noted by the frequency of visits by Chinese delegations. Author’s discussions with government officials and locals during field visit to Afghanistan in May–June 2007. Also see Roman Muzalevsky, The Economic Underpinnings of China’s Regional Security Strategy in Afghanistan, Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol. 7, Issue 75, Jamestown Foundation, Washington DC, (19 April 2010). www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=36285. Accessed on 23 April 2010.

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These untapped resources would further increase China’s interest in Afghanistan. For instance, China’s demand for iron ore and copper has increased exponentially. The rising demand for natural gas has compelled China to explore alternate overland energy supply diversification in the neighboring states in Central Asia, and also potentially in Afghanistan. China benefits from a comparative advantage to most other foreign companies, since the roof of spending is almost limitless in sectors of strategic interest, which also speaks volumes about Beijing’s advantageous position in Afghanistan.

Understanding China’s Role and Interests in Afghanistan A stable and strong government in Kabul with a capable military able to patrol the borders is surely in China’s interest. To that effect, China over the years has offered Afghanistan military supplies and personnel training, some of it in the form of aid. However, Beijing has abstained from any military engagement in Afghanistan. The Chinese resource exploitation and “free-riding” on the U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) security efforts in Afghanistan, while simultaneously out-manoeuvring American companies such as Phelps Dodge, has not been viewed positively by the American political elite. China’s Metallurgical group has invested in the Aynak copper mines in the insurgency-affected Logar province where the U.S. and NATO troops provide security. There have been suggestions by the Western powers, particularly NATO that the Chinese match their increasing economic profile in Afghanistan with active participation in the security sector and long-term stabilization of the country. It is argued that the Taliban insurgency could pose threats to the Chinese investments in the days to come. Moreover, the scourge of drug trafficking, cross-border crime and smuggling also affects China’s interests. Heightened concerns about Islamic extremism on its western border have intensified particularly since the Uighur riots in July 2009 and are likely to amplify with the talks of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in the summer of 2011.

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There are reasons to believe that the Chinese policy toward Afghanistan has been significantly influenced by Pakistan. China, over the years, has not pursued an overtly aggressive anti-Taliban policy. During the Taliban years, China indulged in back door dealing with the Taliban through Pakistan. In August 2008, two Chinese engineers working on a cell phone project in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) were captured by the Pakistani Taliban. While one managed to escape to safety, the other was released by the Taliban after the Zardari administration intervened. China has significant leverage in Pakistan to influence its course of action both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), formerly the East Turkistan Islamic Movement, which China holds culpable for attacks in its territory, is based in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and Pakistan. The killing of Hasan Mahsum, the former TIP leader in South Waziristan by Pakistani security forces supported by Chinese intelligence officers in September 2003, is illustrative of the levels of counter-terrorism cooperation between the two countries. China stands to benefit by supporting Pakistan’s policy of regaining “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, as a counterweight to increasing Indian presence and deepening the Indo–U.S. partnership in the region. What apparently is guiding the current Chinese policy in Afghanistan is its wariness of the U.S. long-term presence in the region. China views the Af–Pak strategy as “selective” in targeting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and not addressing “nontraditional security threats such as drug trafficking, arms smuggling and other cross-border crimes.”15 In 2007, according to Li Xianhui, Director of Drug Prevention in China’s Ministry of Public Security, 386 kilograms of heroin were smuggled into China from the Golden Crescent of Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan — a total that exceeds the cumulative figure for 2001 to 2004.16 The burgeoning counter-terrorism relationship between

15 Sun Zhuangzhi, Afghanistan reflects US’ self-obsession, (24 March 2010). China Daily. www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-03/24/content_9632407.htm. Accessed on 16 April 2010. 16 As quoted in Christian Le Mière, Kabul’s New Patron? The Growing AfghanChinese Relationship, Foreign Affairs (13 April 2010). www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 66194/christian-le-miere/kabuls-new-patron. Accessed on 17 April 2010.

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the U.S. and Pakistan, its deepening relationship with India, and strengthening of linkages with Central Asia is viewed with concern by China as an American strategy of encirclement and undermining its spheres of influence. There are significant differences in the Chinese and American perceptions regarding the nature of regime in Kabul. While the U.S. emphasizes on a Western type of democratic regime in Kabul, the Chinese leaders would rather let the Afghans choose a type of government based on their local culture, tradition and domestic conditions. The Chinese leaders have reassured President Karzai that Beijing will not join the chorus of disapproval over corruption, cronyism and electoral fraud plaguing his government.17 In a significant political move, taken at a time when President Karzai received a delegation from the Gulbuddin Hekmatayr’s Hizb-i-Islami group of the Taliban insurgency for talks which the U.S. views with scepticism, China has expressed support for the Afghan-led reconciliation and reintegration process. The March 2010 joint statement between Afghanistan and China further reaffirmed “the principle of noninterference into other countries’ internal affairs, its respect for Afghanistan’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, its respect for the Afghan people’s choice of a development road suited to their national conditions”.18

Karzai’s Search for Alternatives President Karzai has publicly reiterated his ambition to emulate “America’s democracy and China’s economic success” in Afghanistan. This has been seen as a policy to strike a balance amidst great power rivalry, in consonance with the traditional policy of bi-tarafi (nonalignment or neutrality) that Afghanistan adopted during the

17 Christopher Bodeen, China Backs Karzai, Claims Total Agreement On Political Issues, (25 March 2010). The Huffington Post. www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/03/25/ china-backs-karzai-claims_n_513113.html. Accessed on 26 March 2010. 18 Christopher Bodeen, China reassures Karzai of friendship, (26 March 2010). The Washington Times. www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/mar/26/beijing-reassureskarzai-of-friendship/. Accessed on 10 April 2010.

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Cold War, which ensured competitive aid-giving between the two superpowers benefiting the country. President Karzai’s visit to China, which was followed by his visit to Iran within a week, raised hackles in Washington. Significantly, Karzai’s visit to China coincided with a high level U.S.–Pakistan strategic dialogue. As the beleaguered Afghan president seeks to strike new relationships in the immediate neighborhood, visits to these countries are being seen as attempts to break free from Western domination and criticism and establish his credentials as a regional leader. These visits described by the Western media as “slipping from the west” have been linked to President Obama’s unannounced visit to Afghanistan on 28 March 2010 for “on the ground update”.19 At one level, Karzai is taking a path to help develop an independent economic base and generate revenue for the Afghan economy to reduce the country’s dependence on external aid, a significant and necessary step for a “rentier state”. In this context, Chinese investments are seen to be generating invaluable service in generating employment, infrastructure development, and an enhanced state budget. The Aynak mine, in six years’ time, will generate employment opportunities for nearly 10,000 Afghans and the U.S. $400 million of projected yearly royalties contributing to more than half of Afghanistan’s current annual state budget. All these remain crucial in providing key services and extending Karzai’s writ among the alienated populace in the insurgency-ravaged areas. A number of studies, including the World Bank’s 2004 report Mining as a Source of Growth have identified the mining sector to be a potential engine in Afghanistan’s state-building effort. Karzai having emphasized on “regional cooperation” as a plank for Afghanistan’s development, has participated as an observer in the summits of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). A grouping of Central Asian nations, SCO is viewed as a counter to the U.S.

19 In Afghan Trip, Obama Presses Karzai on Graft, (28 March 2010). The New York Times.

www.nytimes.com/2010/03/29/world/asia/29prexy.html?pagewanted=all. Accessed on 20 April 2010.

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dominance in the region. Afghanistan’s entry into the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has opened its traditional economic and cultural linkages with other South Asian countries. President Karzai’s increasing overtures toward India is seen as an effort to balance the influence of neighboring Pakistan, with which Afghanistan shares a difficult relationship. In early March 2010, Karzai hosted the Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, almost at the same time as the U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates was visiting Afghanistan. While Karzai emphasized on the need to re-establish warm ties with a “brother nation”, Ahmadinejad used his brief visit to criticize the U.S. military presence and increasing civilian casualties.

Conclusion Economic interests remain central to China’s involvement in Afghanistan. However, it remains to be seen for how long it can choose to pursue “only economic activity” in Afghanistan. Given the dangers of Islamic extremism engulfing the region and spilling over into its restive Xinjiang province coupled with increasing cross-border drug trade, China will have to do a policy rethink. It may not tantamount to joining the U.S.-led war, but would certainly involve steps that would have direct implications on the peace and stability of Afghanistan. China will have to prepare for a scenario of the U.S. withdrawal from, or downsizing in Afghanistan, and the challenges posed by such an eventuality. In the prescription of a regional solution for Afghanistan’s woes, China will have a critical role to play. The present Sino–Afghan cooperative partnership might not mean as much as the comprehensive strategic partnership agreements with its all-weather ally, Pakistan, but has significant pointers of a change in China’s thinking in anticipation of the U.S. draw down from Afghanistan. Given China’s political and military relationship with Pakistan, it has considerable leverages to influence the latter’s Afghan policy, which will be critical to any longterm stabilisation efforts in Afghanistan.

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Chapter 9

Counter-Terrorism Challenges in Pakistan Samina Ahmed∗

Introduction Extremist violence and terror attacks have claimed thousands of lives in Pakistan. With homegrown terrorists gaining ground partly because of state policy and partly due to cross-border factors, particularly the conflict in neighboring Afghanistan, Pakistan’s failure thus far to confront this deadly violence bears implications for the country’s stability and the security of the region and beyond. A changed thrust in countering terrorism will, however, require a radical rethinking of perceived national security interests, particularly in the Indian context since support for India-oriented jihadi proxies has empowered radical Islamist groups at home. Pakistan will also have to change the directions of policy toward Afghanistan, abandoning the use of Afghan Pashtun Islamist proxies to expand its influence over its western neighbor, which have given Pakistani tribal militants an opportunity to expand their presences in country’s bordering provinces. The prospects of such a strategic shift in countering terrorism are slim so long as a powerful military establishment continues to control the levers of power. The current democratic transition, however, offers some hope that Pakistan might rethink the costs and benefits of a

∗ Samina Ahmed is the Project Director for South Asia at the International Crisis Group

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national security policy that has done little more than destabilize the state and undermine its standing in global and regional circles. Pakistani analysts and policymakers alike attribute the growth of jihadi groups and the resultant increase in terrorist threats to the Afghan jihad. Until then, religious militancy was largely confined to sectarian violence — Sunni versus Shia and at times Sunni versus Sunni. This explanation certainly has some value. During the 1980s, Pakistan was provided with billions of dollars for its role in the anti-Soviet jihad from diverse sources, ranging from the United States and China to Saudi Arabia, for the Afghan groups resisting the proSoviet government. However, the manner in which the Pakistani military and its intelligence arm, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), disbursed this assistance and hence shaped the nature of the Afghan resistance is often neglected in this narrative. Zia-ul-Haq’s military regime now had an opportunity to expand its influence over a hostile neighbor. Historical tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan were rooted in Pakistani concerns of Afghan irridentist claims on Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal regions, the result of a disputed international border. Pakistan also believed that Afghanistan fell within its sphere of influence since it had inherited Imperial India’s northwest borders. As a result, the Pakistani military had long interfered in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, as early as the 1970s supporting various Afghan Islamist groups opposed to ruling regimes in Kabul. The Soviet intervention also gave ample opportunity to General Zia-ul-Haq to advance his agenda of Islamisation, launched at home in the hopes of legitimizing authoritarian intervention.1 The end result was the disbursement of international, particularly U.S. assistance, to seven handpicked Islamist Afghan groups, including the faction that included the Taliban’s present leadership. At the same time, with Saudi assistance, the Afghan jihadis were trained in and provided recruits from Pakistani madrasas, run by Sunni Deobandi parties such as the Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam ( JUI).2 During the Zia years,

1 See International Crisis Group Asia Report, Pakistan: The Mullahs and the Military, 20 March 2003. 2 The JUI is divided into two factions: JUI-Fazlur Rehman ( JUI-F) and the JUI-Samiul-Haq ( JUI-S).

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the madrasa sector boomed in Pakistan. This growth of jihadi madrasas is directly linked to the rise of extremist violence in present-day Pakistan.3 Sunni extremist madrasas, many linked to the JUI, still continue to provide recruits to sectarian, regional and transnational jihadi organizations operating within Pakistan and from Pakistani bases in the region and beyond. The Pakistani military’s support for Afghan-based jihadi proxies did not end with the Soviet Union’s withdrawal from Afghanistan or the fall of the Soviet-backed government in Kabul. On the contrary, Pakistan played a major role in the civil war that followed, backing chosen Afghan, predominately Pashtun, Islamist allies, with partnerships forged mainly on the basis of their military prowess. Support for Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami, for instance, was replaced by all-out support for the Taliban once Mullah Omar’s militia gained the upper hand against its mujahideen rivals. The Taliban then, with Pakistani backing, swept through the country, capturing Kabul in 2006. Decades of civil war, however, destroyed the vestiges of state authority in Afghanistan, allowing the vacant spaces to be filled by violent extremists, Pakistani and Afghan. Despite Pakistani support,4 the Taliban, for instance, willingly partnered with Pakistani sectarian groups such as the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, fleeing a crackdown at home. The Taliban’s Pakistani allies, now responsible for the violence that engulfs most of the Pakistani tribal borderlands, are to a large extent the product of the Pakistan military’s interventionist policy in Afghanistan. Despite Pakistani misgivings, moreover, particularly after international pressure mounted on the Taliban to end their support for Al-Qaeda, the Taliban refused to accede to either pressure or persuasion to severe their alliance with Osama bin Laden, a relationship that has gravely undermined Pakistan’s stability and its international standing. The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, an insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and a host of well-trained, ideologically motivated jihadis

3 At Pakistan’s independence, there were only 137 madrasas; by 1954, there were 244

madrasas in all of West Pakistan. During the Zia years, the number of madrasas in Pakistan increased to almost 4000. 4 Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were the only three countries to recognize the Taliban regime.

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also gave the Pakistani military an opportunity to undermine India’s security. With a long history of conflict and hostility shaping the Pakistani military’s perceptions toward India, and conventional asymmetry working in India’s favor, the generals opted for proxy war instead, using Sunni jihadi groups such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba to undermine Indian security. Proxies were also used in the belief that India could not, given Pakistan’s nuclear capability, resort to conventional war. This misguided belief almost led the two nuclear-armed countries to war in 1999, when the Pakistani military, under General Pervez Musharraf’s leadership, sent regular troops and jihadi proxies across the Line of Control into Kargil. The resulting conflict, which claimed more than 1000 military casualties, was only prevented from escalating into fullblown war as a result of U.S. intervention.5 It did, however, claim a domestic victim — Nawaz Sharif’s government — ousted in a military coup both for its attempts at rapprochement with India and its criticism of the military misadventure. The military has since managed, despite other misadventures such as the 2008 Mumbai attacks, discussed further in the paper, to successfully exclude the civilian leadership from security policy, which could conceivably have resulted in a constructive, peaceful relationship with India and Afghanistan. On the contrary, the military still regards its jihadi allies as strategic assets to advance perceived national security interests in both countries. Yet this growing reliance on jihadi proxies has had a blowback effect on Pakistan’s security. In fact, the nexus between homegrown Islamist extremists, regional radicals and transnational terrorists now poses one of the gravest threats to the country’s stability as it does to regional and global security.

The Growth of Terrorism Al-Qaeda’s 11 September 2001 attacks on the U.S. homeland presented both a challenge and an opportunity to change Pakistan’s strategic directions and to reshape national security priorities. While

5 All-out war was narrowly averted though President Clinton’s mediation and Prime

Minister Nawaz Sharif’s unconditional and unilateral withdrawal.

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Musharraf’s military regime gave in to U.S.’ demands to crackdown on Al-Qaeda and to severe ties with Al-Qaeda’s Taliban hosts, it soon became evident that it was unwilling to act against India and Afghanistan-oriented jihadi groups. However, international pressure eased as scores of Al-Qaeda leaders and operatives were killed or captured in Pakistan, with many extradited to the United States. Yet scores of Taliban leaders and footsoldiers, fleeing U.S.-led operations in Afghanistan, entered Pakistan where they found safe havens, particularly in the Pashtun belt of Balochistan province, bordering on the Taliban’s southern Afghan homeland. Aided and supported by Pakistani Islamist parties, particularly the JUI-F, whose Deobandi madrasas had educated many of the Taliban leaders and commanders, with access to funds, training bases and recruits, the Taliban were to soon regain lost ground in Afghanistan. Indeed, Balochistan’s provincial capital Quetta is now considered the base of Mullah Omar’s shura, with the Taliban command and control guiding and overseeing insurgent operations against the Afghan government and security forces and foreign troops from across the border in Pakistan. Other Afghan insurgent groups too found sanctuary and a base of operations in Pakistan’s northwest tribal regions, including the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK, the former Northwest Frontier Province). The major beneficiary of Pakistan support during the anti-Soviet jihad, Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami once again found a Pakistani base to conduct operations in Afghanistan. Aligned loosely to the Taliban, though pledging allegiance to Mullah Omar, the Haqqani network, led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin also found many local allies among Pakistani tribal militants. Linked to Al-Qaeda, the Haqqani network is now the most active and dangerous of insurgent groups in Afghanistan, not least because of its alliance with jihadi groups in the Pakistani heartland, including the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad.6

6 Jeffrey A. Dressler, The Haqqani Network, Afghanistan Report No. 6, Institute for the

Study of War, October 2010.

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Instead of preventing this coming together of local, regional and transnational jihadis, Musharraf was far more concerned about consolidating military rule and bent on protecting and supporting the military’s jihadi proxies — Pakistani and Afghan. Regime consolidation required a civilian support base and also the neutralization of the military’s civilian adversaries. Choosing the mullahs as its favored allies, the regime rigged the 2002 national elections in favor of a six-party religious alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) in which the JUI-F, the Taliban’s mentor, was a major partner.7 While the rigged elections marginalized Pakistan’s largest moderate parties, Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP), and Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PML-N), the military’s decision to forge an alliance with the Islamist parties was to bear long-term implications for Pakistan’s security. From 2002 until the collapse of the military regime six years later, the MMA ran the provincial government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and was the major coalition partner in Balochistan’s provincial government with Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid-i-Azam (PML-Q). With access to state patronage and control over state resources, as the Islamist parties expanded their influence, so did the militant groups that shared their ideology. Although the MMA has since dissolved, the very fact that the JUI-I, the Jamaat-i-Islami and militant leaders such as Lashkare-Tayyaba’s Hafiz Saeed share common public platforms to fuel antiIndian and anti-Western, particularly anti-U.S., sentiments is evidence of a close and enduring relationship. Dependent on the mullahs for support, the Musharraf regime, despite repeated pledges, also failed to regulate the madrasa sector. Jihadi madrasas continued to churn out hundreds of indoctrinated youth, mainly from poor backgrounds, who now serve as the cannon fodder of militant jihadi organizations, conducting suicide attacks that have claimed thousands of civilian lives as also those, ironically, of security personnel — police as well as army soldiers and officers.

7 The MMA parties were: the JUI-F, the JUI-S, the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Jamiat Ulema-

e-Pakistan ( JUP) the Jamiat Alhe Hadith and the Islami Tehreek Pakistan, representing the Shias.

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Since U.S. attention remained focused on Al-Qaeda in the years following the Taliban’s ouster, there was little pressure on a military regime, delivering on Al-Qaeda, to change its strategic outlook and to abandon its perceived homegrown and Afghan jihadi assets. Even after another jihadi attack on India, this time on the Indian parliament in 2001, which took India and Pakistan once again to the brink of war, prevented by the U.S. successful firefighting, international pressure on the Pakistani military to take decisive action against India-oriented jihadis was neither consistent nor sustained. Although the UN Security Council labeled the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the Jaish-e-Mohammad as terror groups, with the Musharraf regime banning them, they were soon allowed to emerge under changed names and no action was taken against their leadership.8 Both groups function openly, continuing to recruit, to operate their training camps and to plan future operations. Not only did the U.S. turn a blind eye to this jihadi presence but also continued to bestow billions of dollars to the military regime, helping it to consolidate and prolong its control over the country. Even the presence of the Taliban high command or other insurgent groups on Pakistani soil did not cause a rethinking in the U.S. policy circles; the Pakistani military was still considered a valuable ally largely because of the perceived benefits of counter-terrorism cooperation against Al-Qaeda. Despite warnings by the U.S. and other Western commanders, as well as the Afghan government, about the links between a resurgent Afghan insurgency and cross-border attacks from Pakistani safe havens, it was not until foreign military casualties began to mount and the presence of insurgent groups expanded, that their warnings were taken seriously. And not until terror plots in Europe and the U.S. heartland were traced back to Pakistani soil were the links between Pakistani homegrown and India-oriented jihadis seen as a growing threat to global security. In the earlier stages of the Afghan campaign, however, with U.S. attention focused primarily on Al-Qaeda, the Pakistan military was

8 After it was banned in 2002, Lashkar-e-Tayyaba re-emerged under a changed name,

the Jamaat-ud-Dawa. Also banned in 2002, the Jaish-e-Mohammad now calls itself the Tehreek-e-Khuddamul Islam.

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urged to take action in those areas, primarily KPK’s tribal belt and FATA where Al-Qaeda’s leadership was assumed to have been given sanctuary by local tribal sympathizers. Acceding to U.S. demands, the military began the first incursions into the FATA badlands, a region that, after almost a decade of independence, still operated under a separate political, legal and administrative code. Governed by the Frontier Crimes Regulations (1901),9 FATA’s citizens are deprived of constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights. With the military and civil bureaucracies governing the territory, deprived of other than token political representation in the national parliament, lacking economic development, with the laws of the land not applying to the region, FATA’s economy is based on criminality. Although civilian leaders, including the present government, have, to varying degrees, attempted to incorporate FATA into the mainstream, the military, refusing to cede control over the tribal borderlands, has long used it as a base to conduct operations, overt and covert, in Afghanistan. Given almost a decade of MMA rule in neighboring KPK, it is unsurprising that Islamic orthodoxy thrives in FATA. Nor is it surprising, given the history of using FATA’s residents as proxies in external adventures that militancy is thriving in the tribal belt. PostSeptember 11 imperatives have, however, turned some tribal militants against their erstwhile military patrons. Strongly urged by the U.S. to take action against those elements responsible for sheltering Al-Qaeda’s leaders and operatives, the military launched operations in FATA, which have proved disastrous. Ill-equipped to conduct counter-insurgency, the military has either resorted to excessive force, creating more recruits for militants among alienated populations, or entered into peace deals with militant groups,

9 FCR allows tribesmen to regulate their own affairs in parts of FATA, allows tribal jirgas

(councils) to deal with civil and criminal offences, with the seven agencies kept outside the jurisdiction of Pakistan’s regular court system. While citizens are deprived of due process of law, the center’s representative, the FATA administrator (Political Agent), a civil bureaucrat, has executive authority to deal with lawbreakers and can impose harsh (or “collective”) punishments on entire communities for crimes committed on their territory. Since military operations began in FATA, military commanders are, for all practical purposes, the supreme authority in the FATA agencies.

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aimed at minimizing military casualties. Reneging on peace deal after peace deal, militant groups, now working under an umbrella organization, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) have further expanded their hold over the territory and, turning their attention to the settled areas of KPK, are now threatening the Pakistani heartland. In 2009, the Pakistani Taliban captured Swat and Buner in Malakand division, just a few hours drive from the federal capital Islamabad. Replicating Mullah Omar’s Taliban rule, the militants set up a shadow government and courts, killing officials and terrorizing citizens. While the military did launch a successful operation that forced the militants to withdraw from their Malakand strongholds, the decision to accede to militant demands to impose shariah law on the region10 in the hopes of appeasing the religious radicals has only emboldened them further. Moreover, as in the case of other flawed operations in FATA, the military’s failure on the one hand to take decisive action has already resulted in a resumption of attacks on state institutions and personnel. On the other hand, as in FATA, the “clear” phase of counter-insurgency has yet to move to “build”, let alone the transfer of authority from military to civilian institutions. So long as Malakand’s economy and the institutions of governance are not rebuilt, militants will take advantage of local alienation, with the state losing hearts and minds.11 Military operations have certainly failed thus far to deliver counterterrorism dividends; instead the use of excessive force, including helicopter gunships and mortars, have only destroyed civilian homes and livelihoods, fueling local anger and forcing the worst hit to join militant ranks in the absence of any other alternative. Moreover, as earlier stated, almost all military operations in the conflict-hit zones of KPK and FATA have been followed by peace deals in the hopes of appeasing the militants and thus ending their attacks on military personnel. These peace deals have for the large part proved short-lived,

10 Nizam-e-Adal, or Islamic law was imposed in the Malakand region in 2009, with

Qazi courts now replacing the jurisidiction of the Peshawar High Court. 11 See International Crisis Group Asia Briefing No. 111, Pakistan: The Worsening IDP Crisis, 16 September 2010.

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and have provided militant groups opportunities to regroup and rearm and to resume attacks. As militant attacks resume, so do military operations. But since these operations are reactive in nature, and not part of a holistic counter-terrorism strategy, they result at best in a temporary lull in militant activity, with militants in many regions merely withdrawing to safer areas only to return once the military lets down its guard. In the conflict-hit zones of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan’s security managers mistakenly assume that counterinsurgency is the answer, and not counter-terrorism. What is needed here, and indeed countrywide is a law-enforcement approach. Instead of hoping to either physically eliminate violent extremists or to bring them into the fold, applying the laws of the land and treating jihadis as criminals would prove far more effective.12 However, this approach would require a transfer of internal security policy to civilian hands. It would also depend on a civilian lead over external defense and foreign policy, particularly with regards to neighboring India and Afghanistan. Although terror, including suicide, attacks claimed a mounting toll of civilian casualties and also the lives of security personnel, police as well as military, the military continues to regard certain jihadi groups as allies both in the Indian and Afghan contexts. Hence, counter-terrorism efforts have inevitably failed. The distinction made between good and bad jihadis has proved particularly counter-productive. Actions against sectarian militants, for instance, have been accompanied by a willingness to allow perceived strategic assets, particularly banned terror groups such as the Lashkar and Jaish in the Punjabi heartland, to operate freely under changed names. As their alliance with Al-Qaeda has consolidated, these homegrown jihadis in Pakistan’s heartland are now focusing their attention not just on India but also to the West. A similar distinction has been made regards to Pakistani Pashtun militants, with action against some accompanied by peace deals with others. As a result, some of the most dangerous of Pakistani Taliban

12 See International Crisis Group, Asia Report No. 196, Reforming Pakistan’s Criminal

Justice System, 6 December 2010.

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groups such as the Al-Qaeda and Haqqani network-linked Gul Bahadur group in North Waziristan and the Maulvi Nazir group in South Waziristan have expanded their influence within the tribal belt and beyond FATA to the settled areas of KPK. With the support of the Pakistani jihadi groups, Mullah Omar’s shura and even more so the Al-Qaeda-linked Haqqani network have also expanded their activities across the border with Afghanistan, claiming increasing numbers of casualties, international and Afghan.

Looking Ahead: Opportunities and Constraints In 2008, after a prolonged struggle for democracy, General Perzez Musharraf finally stepped down. General elections resulted in Asif Ali Zardari’s PPP emerging as the largest party with Sharif’s PML-N emerging as the second largest. The return to democracy, the victory of the two largest moderate parties, with the Islamist parties routed through the ballot box, created opportunities to restructure the country’s strategic priorities, including relations with India and Afghanistan. Such a strategic change would have had major implications for counter-terrorism since both the PPP and the PML-N supported rapprochement with New Delhi and Islamabad. Yet the potential for such a strategic change through civilian control over national security policy and empowered democratic institutions has yet to materialize. Instead, the military high command, now under General Ashfaq Parvaz Kayani’s leadership,13 has successfully pushed back against any civilian attempt to assert control over internal security policy or to shape Pakistani policy with India and Afghanistan. While it is unrealistic in the early stages of any democratic transition for the military to cede all control of power and authority to civilian hands, Pakistan’s elected government is particularly vulnerable to military pressure. Because the 2008 election was selectively rigged by

13 Kayani was Director General ISI under General Musharraf, taking over the post of Army Chief when Musharraf stepped down. He has since gained an additional full term extension and is due to retire in 2013, the year the next general elections are due in Pakistan.

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a military regime conscious that too blatant, an attempt to manipulate the polls would face strong public opposition, the selective rigging deprived the PPP of even a simple majority. Forced to form coalition governments with unreliable partners such as the Muttahida Qaumi Movement, Musharraf’s ally and coalition partner during the years of military rule, lacking a stable parliamentary majority, remembering the fate of earlier equally weak governments that fell victim to military manipulated ousters, the PPP-led government is unwilling to confront the military, particularly on the directions of national security and foreign policy.14 Some abortive attempts were certainly made including, for instance, to exercise civilian control over the military’s main intelligence agencies. Faced with strong military resistance, the government backed down. An early attempt to open relations with India also soon stalled and has since become the casualty of the 2008 Mumabi attacks, carried out by the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba. While India insists on effective action against the Lashkar leadership, and the government has indeed arrested some accused in the Mumbai attack, the jihadi group continues to operate openly with the military continued backing, with Lashkar leader Hafiz Saeed addressing public rallies countrywide, inciting jihadi violence not just against India but also the West. In the Afghanistan context too, Islamabad’s efforts to normalize relations with Kabul remain hostage to insurgent safe havens on Pakistani soil, and military backing in particular of the Al-Qaeda linked Haqqani network, the most dangerous of Afghan insurgent groups. Moreover, the PPP-led government’s political reform efforts in FATA, albeit modest, which would have extended at least some judicial and economic oversight over that no-man’s land, have stalled in the face of military resistance.15 In the heartland too, particularly in Punjab,

14 During the failed democratic transition of the 1990s, Benazir Bhutto’s PPP twice

formed government was ousted both times through military-manipulated interventions. 15 On 14 August 2009, President Asif Ali Zardari announced a FATA reform package lifting restrictions on political party activity; curtailing the Political Agents’ arbitrary powers of arrest and detention; establishing an appellate tribal and envisaging the

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Pakistan’s most populous province, the military’s support for violent jihadi entities undermines the effectiveness of the police and civilian intelligence agencies. Yet despite all the challenges that presently confront the civilian government in formulating and implementing an effective counterterrorism strategy, should the democratic transition survive and stabilize, it would offer opportunities to tackle jihadi militancy and violence. Since the Pakistani public now views these extremists as the greatest threat to their security, effective government action would receive strong public support. The Pakistani public is also increasingly skeptical of the military’s ability to successfully counter terrorism, given its failure to prevent jihadi attacks on its own institutions, including the General Headquarters of the Pakistan army. Nor is there a desire among the public at large for conflict with India or Afghanistan, which would further strain the scarce state resources that are already insufficient to provide basic services. With public backing, and through a democratic sustained transition, elected civilian governments could reduce the military’s hold over national security and foreign policy, provided the international community, particularly the United States, also supports them. The U.S. has made increasingly clear that it intends to transit, and indeed many of its NATO partners are already in the process of transiting, from Afghanistan, by end-2014, or if conditions permit even earlier. If the exit strategy is based on a peace deal with the insurgents,16 the Pakistan military’s cooperation will be seen as vital to success. This could lead the U.S. and other Western partners to once again fall back on a failed policy of placing all their eggs in the military’s basket, undermining the civilian leadership and institutions. The dangers of a hasty deal, with the Pakistani military’s support are amply clear. The capture of Afghan space by the Afghan insurgents, with international acquiescence, will have direct implications for

audit of Fate’s funds by the auditor general. This president has yet to sign the package into law. 16 See Secretary Hillary Clinton’s remarks on Afghanistan and Pakistan at the Asia Society’s Series of Richard H. Holbrooke Memorial Addresses, 18 February 2001.

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Pakistan’s security since that space will also be available to their Pakistani extremist allies. Given the links between insurgent groups such as the Haqqani network with the Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and the Taliban with Pakistani tribal militants, it would be near impossible for Pakistan to confront this nexus of terror in an effective and holistic manner. The answer to Pakistan’s terrorism challenges lies in civilian law-enforcement, authorizing and equipping the police and civilian law-enforcement agencies to effectively combat jihadi criminal violence. The international community must understand that this will only be possible if there is civilian control over counter-terrorism, which would in turn depend on the survival of a fragile democratic transition.

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Chapter 10

The Challenge of Counter-Terrorism in Pakistan Moonis Ahmar∗

Introduction The threat of terrorism is now a global phenomenon. Significant to dealing with the threat of terrorism is the methodology to counter the menace that has caused unprecedented insecurity and physical damage to mankind. In the last forty years, Pakistan has experienced unabated incidents of terror claiming thousands of innocent lives. Yet, despite the deepening of terrorism in different parts of Pakistan, there is no clear and coherent policy to counter terrorism. Subsequently, one can observe the permeation of violence and acts of terror in different segments of Pakistani society.

∗ Moonis Ahmar is Professor, Department of International Relations, University of

Karachi and Director, Program on Peace Studies and Conflict Resolution. The views reflected in this paper are those of the author and not of the institute. 165

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Counter-terrorism is not only a forceful response to the acts of terror, but a comprehensive combination of both hard and soft power. The use of military or semi-military means to counter terrorism is one way to prevent the further loss of innocent lives. However, in order to effectively deal with the threat of terror, the application of social, psychological, economic and political means is also essential. With a population of 180 million people and vulnerable to external and internal factors that augment violence and terrorism, Pakistan’s predicament as a nation-state is twofold. First, the insurgency in Afghanistan has dangerous security implications for Pakistan and second, the fragile nature of the state and the society tends to promote non-state actors that attempt to establish their own order and way of life by force. With the rise of extremism and terrorism in different parts of Pakistan, one can expect further marginalization of moderate forces at the societal level. While analyzing the issue of counter-terrorism in Pakistan, some pertinent questions emerge: (i) What is the nature of a terrorist “threat” in Pakistan? (ii) Can Pakistan “cope” with the threats and implications of terrorism by formulating a clear and coherent counter-terrorism policy? (iii) How can Pakistan deal with the “fault lines” in the state and societal structures which are largely responsible for augmenting the level of violence and insecurity? (iv) How can Pakistan counter the threat of terrorism when dealing with those external issues which are a source of “intensifying” the acts of terror? This paper aims to examine the challenge of counter-terrorism in Pakistan by broadly covering the following themes: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)

Conceptual framework The deepening and transformation of terrorist threat The role of state actors in formulating a counter-terrorism policy Gaps in counter-terrorism policy External factors in mapping counter-terrorism policy Successes and failures of counter-terrorism policy

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Conceptual Framework Counter-terrorism as an approach to effectively deal with the threat of terror varies from case to case. Depending on the nature of threat, individuals or groups involved in that threat and the damage caused as a result of the act of terror, strategies for counter terrorism are formulated. Therefore, while defining the strategy of counter-terrorism it can be stated that, “when referring to counter-terrorism measures we mean both defensive measures, to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts, and offensive measures, to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism, doing with any contingency measures preparing for or having the ability to respond to a terrorist attack/incident.”1 Counter-terrorism measures cannot be taken in isolation or without considering domestic realities into account. If the society is vulnerable to forces that have a free hand in carrying out violent and terrorist acts, counter-terrorism measures need to be formulated while considering the level of indigenous support. While discussing “counter-terrorism, one must first understand what motivates those whom the counterterrorist is trying to defeat.”2 As without motivation, no violent or terrorist individual or group can sustain its existence. Counter-terrorism measures got a new push in the post-9/11 scenario because of two reasons. First, the level of threat which was encountered by the United States (U.S.) after September 11 was unprecedented and required a holistic approach that sought the support of other countries. Second, a better understanding of the mode of operation, support base, funding, training and activities of terrorist groups was now deemed essential to launch effective counter-terrorism measures. Counter-terrorism measures which may have positive impact in neutralizing the activities of terrorist groups and organizations relate closely to the political, social, educational, economic, military, intelligence, judicial and media domains.

1 For further information see, Graeme, SC, Steven, CS and Gunaratna, R (2004).

Counter Terrorism: A Reference Handbook, p. 102. Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO Inc. 2 Ibid., p. 32.

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A combination of hard and soft power can yield better results from counter-terrorist measures. Political measures include political reconciliation, accommodation, empowerment, tolerance and coexistence. When some of the groups are marginalized and politically not on board, hard line and extremist elements take advantage of the situation and become a source of violence and terrorism. In case of social measures, one way to deal with extremism and radicalization in society is to promote social harmony, mobility and interaction between and among different social groups so that a better sense of understanding can be created. By promoting literacy and better education, one can defeat those elements who take advantage of ignorance and illiteracy for inducting extremism and militancy. Economic measures are a key to counter-terrorism because violence and acts of terror can get adequate space when there is poverty, unemployment, under-development and backwardness. By providing equal employment opportunities, introducing various development and training programmes, and bettering the country’s economic profile, there may be a possibility of neutralizing those elements who take advantage of the economic predicament of people. Military measures include targeting militant and terrorist hideouts and sanctuaries and cutting off their command and control set-up including supplies. However, the problem with military counterterrorism measures is the possible loss of human lives and/or collateral damage. When the Pakistan military launched anti-terrorist operation in tribal areas in 2004 and in Swat in 2009, it was reported that civilian casualities had taken place and millions of people were rendered homeless. The drone attacks launched by the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the tribal areas of Pakistan also resulted into collateral damage. Intelligence measures can help counter the planning and operations of terrorist groups. These can also help contain the funding and supplies of terrorist groups and isolate their rank and file. Judicial measures can ensure prompt hearing and award of punishment to those found guilty of acts of terror. If the judicial system is less efficient and more corrupt, terrorist groups may get space to sustain and broaden their activities. Finally, media measures include providing awareness to people about the threats of terrorism

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and militancy. If people are better informed about the negative features of militancy and terrorism, it will be easier to neutralize the activities of terrorist groups. In a nutshell, counter-terrorism measures, if devised properly with adequate planning can go a long way in effectively dealing with a threat which has taken millions of people as hostage. In counter-terrorism strategy, the role of the U.S. is critical because in the last ten years or so, Washington has been heavily involved in dealing with the threat of terrorism at different levels. The question that arises while examining the U.S. counter-terrorist strategy is to what extent is there a difference between the Bush and Obama administrations in dealing with terrorism? Audrey Kurth Cronin gives the following account of the difference in counter-terrorism strategies of the two administrations: “There were two key policy differences between Obama and Bush administration approaches to counter terrorism, flushed out publicly by the new administration in mid-2010. First was the effort to disaggregate the threat to respond to different elements of Al-Qaeda differently. The second broad shift was the administration’s attempt to inoculate the American people in advance of a tragedy. An emphasis on protecting core values, planning for contingencies, and avoiding fear and paralysis in the wake of held out hope of defusing the classic power of terrorism to leverage popular fear, inflame political factions and provoke devastating overreaction.”3

It seems that even after more than two years of coming into office, the Obama administration has not been able to undo the legacy of Bush’s handling of the terrorist threat. There is no qualitative or significant change that has taken place under the Obama administration, except coming up with the Af–Pak policy, while dealing with the issues that impact negatively on the image of the United States before the outside world. Except his decision to close down the Guantanamo bay prison, Obama has not deviated from any of the policy steps taken during the Bush administration to combat terrorism.

3 Cronin, AK (2010). The evolution of counter terrorism: Will tactics trump strategy?

International Affairs, 86(4), pp. 854–855.

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In the dynamics of counter-terrorism, much depends on how the U.S. is able to rationalize its counter-terrorism strategy. So far, Pakistan has not been able to forge consensus with Washington on counterterrorism, particularly on the issue of drone attacks and launching military operation in North Waziristan. The U.S. Af–Pak policy, as outlined by the Obama administration in 2009, aims to deal with the threat of terrorism under the framework of a joint policy on Afghanistan and Pakistan. That policy is criticized in Pakistan because it does not take into account the fact that Pakistan, which has suffered enormously because of countless acts of terror, cannot be equated with Afghanistan where the mishandling of affairs by the foreign forces tends to augment violence and terrorism. Furthermore, when the U.S. officials remind Pakistan to “do more” in combating terrorism in what they consider as the “safe havens” of terrorist groups in the tribal areas, it only perpetuates further stalemate in U.S.–Pak relations. The problem with Pakistan is that its military is now overstretched in counter-terrorism operations. Opening another front in the form of military operation in North Waziristan will put more pressure on the government and also invite domestic backlash. Certainly, there are serious gaps and differences in the U.S. and Pakistan counter-terrorism perceptions and strategies. Both sides also differ on the identification of threat and the use of force against groups perceived by the U.S. close to Al-Qaeda.

Terrorist Threat and its Transformation The threat of terrorism in Pakistan surged in the post-9/11 period. Yet, even before 9/11, incidents of violence and terrorism caused enormous loss of human lives. During the 1980s and 1990s, the nature of terrorist threat was different as most of the acts of terror were the direct consequence of the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan and the deepening of political, sectarian and ethnic strife within the country. In early 1980s, the military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq held Al-Zulfiqar, a group established by Mir Murtaza Bhutto, the elder son of former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, responsible for carrying acts of terror namely the hijacking of a domestic flight of Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) on 3 March 1981. Al-Zulfiqar was also

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held responsible for various acts of terror by carrying out assassination attempts, bomb blasts and targeting communication networks in order to exert pressure on the Zia regime. What has happened in the last four decades is the transformation of terrorist threat in Pakistan. The growth of extremism and intolerance has augmented the terrorist incidents in Pakistan. Till the year 2000, suicide terrorist attacks were not common in Pakistan but in the post2000 period, there has been a rapid increase in these attacks in public places, military installations, mosques, religious schools and churches. The U.S. led attack on Afghanistan and the dismantling of the Taliban regime has further compounded the level of terrorist threat in Pakistan. As has been remarked by a Pakistani strategic analyst, “Since 2001, the threat posed by militancy has increased as the ongoing conflict, poverty and lack of development has made it easier for Taliban to recruit foot soldiers. The new leaders of the various Taliban and militant groups are young men, mostly in their thirties, who are battle-hardened from the last decade and are far less willing to compromise.”4 The mingling of Taliban with the local population particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former North Western Frontier Province) and Balochistan, the two provinces of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, indicated indigenous sympathy, if not direct support, for a cause that demanded resistance against the foreign forces in Afghanistan. Not only the tribal, but also the settled areas of Pakistan came under the grip of terrorism believed to have been carried out by the banned Tehriki-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other sectarian groups. According to a report published in IISS’s (International Institute of Strategic Studies, London), “Within the settled areas, Pakistan has continued to see high levels of jihadist violence both against its security perpetrated by groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Jaish-e-Mohammad, HUJI and Harkatal-Mujahideen which together with LeT, are collectively known as the “Punjabi Taliban,” a term which reflects their growing alignment

4 Siddiqa, A (Winter 2011). Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy: Separating friends

from enemies. The Washington Quarterly, 31(1), p. 140.

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with the TTP and Afghan Taliban. That such groups pose a threat to Pakistani state is no longer in doubt and reflects the degree to which Jihadism in Pakistan has become a double-edged sword.”5

The real test for Pakistan is to deal with the escalation of terrorism and ascertain the extent to which force can be deployed to neutralize the terrorist infrastructure. The resurfacing of banned terrorist groups under different names adds to the predicament to the state authorities because it becomes a major challenge to neutralize the mode of support base and mode of operation of individuals and groups that continue to operate by carrying out more terrorist activities under different names. One way to effectively deal with the threat of banned and clandestine terrorist organizations in Pakistan is to first understand the nature of transformation that takes place in the rank and file of such organizations and then to isolate them from the mainstream population. The problem faced by the successive governments in Pakistan is that they have failed to mobilize people, particularly in those areas where enormous civilian causalities have taken place as a result of terrorist acts. There are two contradictory perceptions related to the threat of terrorism in Pakistan. First, there is no likelihood of reducing the terror threat unless CIA managed drone attacks on the tribal areas of Pakistan are stopped and the U.S.-led forces leave Afghanistan. The surge of anti-Americanism as a result of Taliban-led insurgency against foreign forces, and the non-combatant causalities caused by drone attacks in the tribal areas, has tended to increase the level of anger and antagonism and give space to groups that use violence and terrorism as a means to fight what they call “jihad” against foreign forces and their allies both in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Furthermore, unless the domestic issues which deepen economic miseries of people are sorted out, the threat of violence and terrorism in Pakistan cannot be curtailed. In a country of 180 million people where there are serious issues of governance and economic disparities, enough space is provided to militant and extremist groups to manipulate religion or ethnicity for the pursuance of their political objectives.

5 South Asia still Beset by violent extremism, IISS Strategic Comments, http:11sn130w.

snt.130.mail.live.com. Accessed on 12 January 2011.

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If there are negatives in the transformation of terrorist threat in Pakistan, there are also positive aspects. For instance, after reaching its peak, terrorist threat has subsided to some extent. According to a report released by the Pakistan Institute of Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad in January 2011, “Pakistan gained ground against militant violence in 2010, but urban terrorism is a growing threat and military success will not bring stability unless a comprehensive strategy is developed. Incidents of violence and terrorism in Pakistan fell by 11 in 2010 compared with the previous year. The number of suicide attacks fell by 22% to 68% in 2010 compared with 87% in 2009.”6 According to PIPS’s report, “A total of 2113 militant, insurgent and sectarian attacks were reported across the country in 2010 killing 2913 people. As many as 93 militant attacks which killed 233 people were reported in 2010.”7 Yet despite decrease in violent and terrorist incidents in Pakistan, as cited in PIPS report, what is lacking in counter-terrorism strategies are, “better coordination among intelligence agencies, capacity building of law enforcement agencies, curbs on terrorism financing and most importantly, adequate measures to prevent banned militant groups from operating across the country remained persistently lacking.”8 To what extent are the state authorities able to cope with internal fault lines which impede efforts for tracking down and punishing those involved in various terrorist incidents? Transformation in effectively dealing with the threat of terrorism in Pakistan is quite slow because of two main reasons, the lack of sophisticated technology available for the security agencies to cope with the acts of terror and the slow judicial process to deal with the cases of terrorism.

The Dilemma of Counter-Terrorism The challenge of counter-terrorism in Pakistan is different as compared to other countries. First, no country has witnessed as many terrorist acts, including suicide attacks, as Pakistan has in the last four years. It is not

6 Karachi Section (17 January 2011). Daily Dawn. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid.

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only the number of casualties and injuries but also the diverse nature of terrorist attacks that have taken place in Pakistan. The terror targets are not only security forces and government installations, but also mosques, religious schools, shrines, shopping centers and churches. When the threat of terrorism in Pakistan is so massive, the question of countering that threat is also quite critical. Are there any anti-terrorism mechanisms in operation in Pakistan? To what extent, can the use of hard power in counter-terrorism operations yield positive results? Why is the role of clergy in Pakistan, to effectively counter terrorism, not that significant and how can the civil society play a vital role in isolating violent extremist and terrorist groups? In the realm of counter-terrorism, the role of the state is crucial because it is responsible for the protection and safety of its citizens. One important segment of the state, which plays a major role in counter-terrorism measures in Pakistan, is the military. The emergence of various militant religious groups in Pakistan, with a regional and global network, cannot be overlooked. Therefore, it is not wrong to argue that no amount of counter-terrorism operations will work unless the Government has a plan to generate a new discourse that can counter takfiri ideology and the orthodox interpretation of Sharia law. It is critical for the Pakistani government and civil society groups to join hands and emphasize that terrorism is linked with an ideological battle within the country.9 Elaborating the flaws in Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy, Ayesha Siddiqa, a noted security analyst of Pakistan, states that the “primary flaw of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy, is that it is defined and driven by the military and that institution’s strategic objectives. It is easier to use the military option than to address the problem of changing the basic narrative and socio-economic condition that drive military in the first place.”10 This type of an approach pursued by the military can set up several obstacles for counter-terrorism operations.

9 Siddiqa, A (Winter 2011). Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy: Separating friends

from enemies. The Washington Quarterly, 31(1), p. 159. 10 Ibid., pp. 149–150.

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For instance, a widely shared perception in various strategic circles in the West and also in India about Pakistan’s military approach on countering-terrorism is its reluctance to take action against group(s) who are perceived to be involved in cross-border terrorism. As long as there is no clear cut policy on the part of Islamabad to follow an even-handed approach vis-a-vis all terrorist groups, one cannot expect its counter-terrorism strategy to yield positive results. When the U.S. Vice-President, Joseph Biden visited Islamabad in January 2011 he insisted that the Pakistan military launch operations in North Waziristan. The proposal was, however, cold shouldered by Pakistan. Perhaps, the reluctance on the part of the army generals to target what the U.S. believes are “safe havens” of Al-Qaeda in North Waziristan was to avoid opening up another front. However, this plays into Kabul’s repeated allegations that Pakistan was not doing enough to prevent terrorist groups from operating across the border. Underlining the contradictions of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy with respect to Afghanistan, Ayesha Siddiqa argues that Pakistan is “caught between the inclination to fight militant forces and yet having to partner with some to strengthen its future bargaining position. The policy flows out of Pakistan’s multiple strategic requirements: It needs to remain engaged with the United States, to save itself from the Taliban attacking the Pakistani state, and to fight India’s growing presence in Afghanistan. Caught between these issues, Islamabad’s counter-terrorism policy and objectives continue to lack clarity. At best, the policy illustrates the tension between Islamabad’s need to protect itself against an internal enemy and its sensitivity toward the external threats from India.”11 As long as the Pakistani army continues to differentiate among the various groups on the basis of their tactical position vis-a-vis the Pakistani state, terrorism will continue. Sidiqqa also notes that “There seems to be little interest to marginalize or eliminate the core militant groups operating inside Pakistan.”12 It remains to be soon

11 Ibid., p. 149. 12 Siddiqa elaborates flaws in Pakistan’s counter terrorism by arguing that, “one of the

greatest flaws of the overall counter terrorism approach of the allies, certainly Pakistan is the concentration on the use of force. This is not to argue that the military option

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how long Pakistan’s military will pursue the approach of protecting its “human strategic assets” who also happen to be “dangerous people” threatening not only American/Western interests, but is also a major source of instability in the region. Islamabad has tried to carefully sidetrack the pressure from the United States, to “do more” to dismantle what it calls “terrorist infrastructure”, particularly in the tribal areas of Pakistan. Siddiqa examines the dichotomy in Pak–U.S. relations in the context of terrorism by arguing that, “Both the U.S. and Pakistan appear to lack clarity on how to define the threat they are facing and what are the attainable objectives. Although the prospective date of the U.S. withdrawal has caused its fair share of controversy, Islamabad’s counter-terrorism policy suffers from its own set of problems, beginning with over emphasizing the military approach. On a safeguard level, the main issue with Islamabad’s approach to fighting terrorism is that it is almost completely controlled by the armed forces. They have a four tiered approach: clear, hold, develop, and disintegrate, an approach used by the army in its operations in Swat in 2007 and in South Waziristan in October 2009.”13

Then there is the issue of who formulates and controls counterterrorism strategy in Pakistan: Whether it is under the military or under civilian control and to what extent the two are able to effectively coordinate on dealing with the threat of terrorism in the country? Samina Ahmed, director of the International Crisis Group (ICG), Pakistan is of the opinion that, “until and unless there is meaningful civilian control over a counter-terrorism policy, accompanied by the necessary investments in police and prosecutors to enhance investigative capacity and case building and until judges and witnesses are protected, even those terrorists that are captured and tried are likely to

should not be used at all or that the state must not protect itself against terrorists. The military option, nevertheless, does not help eradicate militancy and emphasise the idea that change comes about through the use of force. In this respect, the drone attacks seem to add to the problem of the military. Ibid., p. 158. 13 Ibid., pp. 150–151.

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go scot-free.”14 This brings into focus major flaws in Pakistan’s criminal justice system where those involved in deadly crimes are able to get away by taking advantage of loopholes in the trial process. As a result, counter-terrorism mechanisms in Pakistan are unable to cope with the rise in violent and terrorist acts. Referring to the shortcomings in the procedure for punishing those involved in terrorist activities, Samina Ahmed argues: “The failure of Pakistan’s criminal justice system to pre-empt, investigate and convict terrorists and other major criminals is alarming. A low conviction rate, hovering between 5%–10%, is unsurprising in already decrepit prosecutors, also poorly trained fail to build cases strong enough to stand in court. Corruption and intimidation run rampant in a system that lacks the most basic modern tools, including forensic evidence and timely access to telephone records.”15

Another challenge then is to deal with gaps in Pakistan’s judicial system to seek a breakthrough in counter-terrorism. Since 1997, some headway has been made to streamline anti-terrorism laws. When there was a surge in terrorist acts in Pakistan as a result of sectarian conflict, the then government under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif promulgated the Anti-Terrorist Act (ATA) of 1997. The Act declared that “if a provincial government needed military and civilian armed forces to prevent terrorist acts or scheduled offences it could request the federal government which would decide which forces are required for deployment to the affected area (Section 4). The Act provided all powers to law enforcement personnel to arrest any person and enter and search any house without warrants.”16 The act became a source of criticism at the hands of the opposition, particularly the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), which blamed the ruling party of using the ATA for political purposes. Various changes were made in the act through

14 Samina Ahmed, Pakistan: The hidden war (23 December, 2010). Foreign Policy, www/crisisgroup.org.en/regions/asia/south.asia/pakistan. Accessed on 10 January 2011. 15 Ibid. 16 Saba Noor, Evolution of counter-terrorism legislation in Pakistan, Peace and Conflict Studies (September 2008), p. 5.

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ordinances and amendments such as Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance 2001; Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002; AntiTerrorism (Amendment) Ordinance, 2004; and Anti-Terrorism (Second Amendment) Act 2005. Yet, according to Noor, “despite a long history of anti-terror laws in Pakistan, the country continues to suffer from widespread terrorism and invites frequent comments from the Western media regarding its failure to ensure peace, law and order.”17 Against this background, four major fault lines that can be identified in the context of the judicial process for counter-terrorism in Pakistan are: reluctance of witnesses and testify in the Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) out of fear; less stringent laws to deny bail to the suspects; unscientific methods of interrogation; and undue delay in winding up cases. Overall, it is the environment which matters in pursuing an effective counter-terrorism strategy. If the environment is conducive for groups who cause fear, panic, and insecurity, then it becomes difficult for the state to take strong action against individuals and groups responsible for the acts of terror. On the other hand, if the environment is unfavorable and hostile to the groups that intend to carry out their terrorist activities, one can expect a better counter terrorism strategy to emerge.

Success and Failures If terrorist groups are motivated and ideologically committed to achieve their objectives, can there be a matching ideological response to deal with the acts of terror? How can the counter-terrorism policy transform its failures into successes? A Pakistani security analyst points out that, “A counter ideological response to neutralize and defeat terrorism has become a popular theme in the anti-extremism discourse. It is widely believed that ideology is the key motivating force behind the current wave of terrorism. In fact, academic journals and counterterrorism experts take for granted that Islamic extremism has roots in a particular extremist version of religion. Therefore, promotion of a

17 Ibid., p. 15.

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moderate and peaceful version of religion is essential to combat terrorist roots.”18 An effective ideological response to terrorism is therefore an effective policy option that needs to be formulated in a manner that the moderate segment of clergy is able to neutralize the influence of those groups who justify the use of violence and terrorism in the name of religion. The successes and failures of Pakistan’s counter-terrorism policy can be analyzed from four perspectives. First is the state perspective which is again divided into military and civilian spheres. In the postMusharraf era, one has yet to see firm control over national security affairs by the civilian leadership. During the military and quasi-military rule in post-1971 Pakistan from the days of Zia-ul-Haq till Musharraf, national security and national interests were equated resulting in the mess which one can see in present day Pakistan. The military made sure that national security policy must also represent the country’s national interest whether it was the issue of supporting particular Mujahideen groups in Afghanistan, or supporting the Taliban regime. Same was true in the case of India as the military establishment resolved that it was in the national interest of Pakistan to use Jihadi groups against the Indian controlled parts of Jammu and Kashmir. The permeation of Jihadi culture, violence and terrorism in Pakistani society was the direct consequence of equating national security with national interests. It is yet to be seen, in the post-Musharraf era, if there is any change in statecraft with reference to national security and national interests because theoretically there is a civilian government and the military is supposed to remain subservient to the civilian authority. Second, is the societal perspective which remains divided because of a fragmented civil society. When extremism becomes part of the culture and the majority remains a silent witness to the developments, it means counter-terrorist efforts have failed. When a handful of extremists take society hostage and try to impose their way of life,

18 Mohammad Amir Rana, Counter-ideology: Unanswered questions and the case

of Pakistan, Perspectives on Terrorism, www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/ article/view/29/59. Accessed on 4 January 2011.

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insecurity and instability in the society deepens. When the Punjab Governor Salman Taseer was gunned down by his own body guard in January 2011 for criticizing blasphemy laws, the majority of people remained silent and failed to condemn the heinous crime. Third, is the political perspective, as political parties are not serious in dealing with the threat of terrorism. In fact, religious parties are unwilling to categorically condemn acts of terrorism, particularly suicide killings. So-called secular parties lack the courage and political will to take on religious fanatical groups. Lack of consensus among political parties to deal with violence and terrorism has been counterproductive because the forces of intolerance and militancy seem to have gained traction. Pakistan’s Parliament, which could have taken the initiative in pursuing counter-terrorism measures, is not playing a substantial role. It is still not clear who is going to formulate the counter-terrorism strategy: Should it be the military or the civilian leadership, or both, who should arrive at a consensus on the methodology to deal with terrorism. Finally, the economic perspective, as sustained violence and terrorism has caused serious damage to the country’s economy. It is estimated that Pakistan’s cost of war on terror has increased to 40% to Rs. 678 billion from Rs. 484 billion in 2007, causing an adverse impact on the country’s socio-economic development. The expected direct cost of war on terror was Rs. 114.03 billion in 2008–2009 up from Rs. 108.527 billion in 2007. The indirect cost will increase to Rs. 563.760 billion from Rs. 375.840 billion.19 An official document of the Finance Ministry, Government of Pakistan revealed that “owing to being part of the U.S. led war against terrorism, Pakistan has estimated a loss of Rs. 2.080 trillion on its economy on account of exports, foreign investments, privatization, industrial output and tax collection during the last five years from 2004–2005 to 2008–2009.”20 Addressing a press conference in the United Nations on 13 November 2008, Pakistan’s

19 Pervez Zaiby, Economic impact of war on terror and continuing recession (8

December 2008). The News International. 20 See Mehtab Haider, Pakistan to seek $20 billion from IFIs to compensate for wars on terror losses (15 November 2008). The News International.

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then Foreign Minister Shah Mahmud Qureshi said that, “over the past seven years losses suffered by Pakistan in the war against terrorism amounted to U.S. $34.5 billion.” He further said that, “Pakistan paid a huge price, both in economic and human terms, to protect itself and the world.”21 Pakistan’s involvement in war on terror and the costs of home grown terrorism seem to have put Islamabad in a quandary. Anti-terrorist military operations in Swat and in tribal areas have also imposed a heavy burden on the country’s economy. Since Pakistan will have to live with the phenomenon of terrorism for a long period of time, it is essential that a plausible and pragmatic counter-terrorism strategy is formulated and implemented. If an approach based on seriousness and professionalism is pursued by Islamabad for the removal of terrorism, one can expect some headway in dealing with groups responsible for causing misery and pain. Furthermore, Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy may not be effective unless an understanding with its eastern neighbor, India, is also reached. This requires formulation of a counter-terrorism policy jointly implemented by New Delhi and Islamabad, while addressing areas of mistrust, including issues that compel the two sides to launch allegations and counter allegations against each other for supporting acts of terror. On the whole, if terrorism is a challenge, it is also an opportunity. It is time, Pakistan, both at the state and non-state levels, deals with the issue of terrorism in a serious and professional manner. Counterterrorism mechanism would require a better coordination between the civilian and military authorities to liquidate the network and activities of various terrorist groups. If the opportunity to effectively counter terrorism is lost, one can expect the deepening of violence and instability in Pakistan in the years to come.

21 See Pakistan suffered loss of U.S. $34 billion in war on terror: Qureshi (11 November

2008). Dawn.

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Chapter 11

U.S. Mediation in the Kashmir Conflict: Mediation vs. Conflict Management Gayathri Lakshminarayan∗

Introduction Kashmir has been labeled one of the world’s most “intractable” conflicts, ranking alongside Israel–Palestine affairs, the China–Taiwan problem and the North Korean–South Korean issues as conflicts on the forefront of global problems. The Kashmir question is almost inseparable from rivalry between India and Pakistan as this conflict has contributed to three wars and various crises since the countries were carved out of the British Raj in 1947.1 Conflict resolution and peace building in the Kashmir conflict remains elusive, after decades of attempts through multilateral, bilateral and unilateral forums have not made much headway. Third party mediation, particularly by the United States has often been proposed to break the deadlock in Indo–Pakistani negotiations on the issue or when Kashmir reaches a boiling point. The logic being, Washington as the world’s superpower wields considerable influence over India and Pakistan, with the necessary diplomatic, military and economic power to mediate on the issue. Experts have ∗ Gayathri Lakshminarayan was a Research Associate at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. The views reflected in the paper are those of the author and not of the institute. 1 Ganguly, S. Introduction: A relationship of unremitting hostility? Conflict Unending, p. 1. New York: Columbia University Press.

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been calling for the U.S. to move beyond episodic crises management to peace building and conflict resolution in the post-Cold War era. This paper will examine the existing debates in favor of increased the U.S. involvement in conflict resolution of the Kashmir question and argues in favor of the U.S. limiting its role to crises management.

A Brief History of American Involvement in Kashmir Third party mediation on the Kashmir question has been a contentious one. While it was Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru who took the dispute to the United Nations (UN) in 1948, New Delhi has vehemently opposed third party mediation, since the Bangladesh War in 1971.2 Pakistan on the other hand has directly and covertly tried to force U.S. intervention on the issue. India which is making large strides on the global stage is keen on maintaining status quo, while Pakistan seeks international intervention on the issue as it perceives it to be the only way to resolve the dispute fairly. The stakes for both states involve far more than territorial claims, the question of control of Kashmir goes to the very basis of the statebuilding enterprise in South Asia. India considers Kashmir an integral part of the Indian Union by virtue of the Maharaja Hari Singh’s accession to India in October 1947 and confirmation in 1954, of this act made by the state’s elected assembly. Pakistan on the other hand regards the whole state as disputed territory whose status is to be decided by the internationally supervised plebiscite UN resolutions passed in 1940s. India considers Kashmir integral to its secular polity while Pakistan, which was founded on the basis of creating a Muslim homeland in South Asia, stakes its claim on a Muslim majority in Kashmir. The Kashmir issue has proved a conundrum for the U.S. policymakers ever since Washington attempted its hand in mediating the dispute, by drafting a resolution in 1948, for an internationally

2 The asymmetry in power between India and Pakistan after the Bangladesh war was

so great that Islamabad was in no position to challenge the regional status quo, see Ganguly, S and DT Hagerty. Preventive war fears. Fearful Symmetry, p. 49. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

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supervised plebiscite in the UN. American involvement in South Asia during the Cold War years, when it forged a series of military alliances with Pakistan to curb Soviet influence in the region, had profound repercussions on the Kashmir conflict and Indo–Pak relations. The potentially explosive Kashmir issue threatened to destabilize the region, providing the Soviets an opportunity to expand their influence in the region.3 The U.S. inked a series of security alliances with Pakistan, given its strategic location and the willingness of the Pakistani leaders to support the Western allies unlike Indian leaders who were staunch about pacificism and neutralism, during the height of the Cold War.4 The power asymmetry between India and Pakistan changed, as Islamabad became Washington’s “most allied ally” and laid the foundation for a prolonged pattern of intra regional conflict.5 Pakistan’s motive behind joining hands with the U.S. was to bolster its defenses by using American diplomatic and economic aid against the threat it perceived from India.6 This alignment brought an end to the last sustained effort to resolve the Kashmir issue through bilateral negotiations, until the two sides tried unsuccessfully to come to terms in a series of talks they undertook, facilitated by the Americans and British, almost a decade later. Nehru said that American military assistance had a direct impact on demilitarization issue, as India would have to maintain a greater military presence in Kashmir to deal with the stronger forces that Pakistan could mobilize.7 In the beginning, the U.S. believed the conflict could be settled through the auspices of the UN. It played a major role in drafting

3 Ibid, p. 95. 4 Gould, HA (2008). The Reasons Why: America’s Half-Century Struggle to Control

the Political Agenda in South Asia. In Making U.S. Foreign Policy Toward South Asia, LI Rudolph and SH Rudolph (eds.), pp. 110–111. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 5 Ibid, p. 114. 6 Schaffer, HB (2009). Impact of the Alliance with Pakistan. The Limits of InfluenceAmerica’s Role in Kashmir, p. 46. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 7 Ibid, p. 46.

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UN resolutions for an internationally supervised plebiscite. While it was non-partisan in the beginning, its security alignment with Pakistan made Kashmir a Cold War issue. Pakistan had sought to use its membership in the SEATO and Baghdad Pact to put these organizations on record in support of its position on Kashmir.8 U.S.–Pakistan alignment led Nehru to look toward Moscow as a balancing force, which meant that it would wield its veto power to kill any Security Council draft resolution New Delhi found unacceptable. The U.S. also used the carrot and stick approach from time to time. President Dwight D. Eisenhower tried to break the impasse by pushing India and Pakistan to negotiate on three problems — Kashmir, division of waters in Indus River system and accelerating the South Asian arms race. Washington assumed that the high level of economic assistance that the U.S. gave New Delhi and Karachi would give it leverage to win Indian and Pakistani acceptance. While President John F. Kennedy was prepared to supply India with major military aid during the Sino–Indian border conflict if New Delhi should agree to negotiate a suitable point on Kashmir.9 The India–Pakistan War over Kashmir in 1965 was a serious setback for the U.S. interests as the two sides, India and Pakistan used arms the U.S. had supplied to counter Communist aggression, against one another.10

Crises Management Efforts Washington’s attempts to mediate the Kashmir conflict, in the decades following the independence of India and Pakistan, met with little success.11 However, since insurgency began in 1989, there have been

8 Ibid, p. 50. 9 Ibid, p. 79. 10 Ibid, p. 5. 11 For a list of major bilateral negotiations, international peacekeeping and mediation

efforts relating to India-Pakistan disputes over Kashmir see Wirsing, RG (1994). India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Problem, pp. 264–267. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

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recurrent crises and on each occasion the U.S. has been drawn in Footnote 12. The U.S. intervention has seen some success in the form of crises management since the 1990s.13 The insurgency in Kashmir started in 1989 as a result of political mobilization in the face of institutional decay.14 The Pakistani Army supported the insurgents fighting in Kashmir, by providing sanctuary and training Kashmiri militants which ratcheted tensions and gave a new reason for heightened conflict between the South Asian neighbors.15 Kashmir evolved from a primarily civil conflict into international crises that brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war from time to time, with both militaries on high alert and issuing war threats. The U.S. intervention in the form of crises management has played an important role, in diffusing the crises. The U.S. crises management was evident in the aftermath of the attack on the Indian Parliament, on December 13, 2001. New Delhi responded by deploying forces on the border, putting the combined military forces on alert. In doing so, the Indian government served notice that unless Pakistan stopped supporting jihadi groups, India might resort to destroying the terrorist training camps and sanctuaries in Pakistani Kashmir. India moved half a million troops to the parts of Punjab, Rajasthan and Gujarat bordering Pakistan and Islamabad responded by mobilizing its own troops to the adjacent border areas of Punjab and Sindh. India hoped to put pressure on Pakistan through the U.S. and Pakistan hoped the issue would force a more active U.S. role in solving the Kashmir question. Similarly in the Kargil War of 1999, U.S. pressured Pakistan to put an end to its operation in Kargil.

12 Satu P. Limaye, Mediating Kashmir: A Bridge Too Far? (Winter 2003). Washington

Quarterly, p. 158. http://www.twq.com/03winter/docs/03winter_limaye.pdf. Accessed on June 4, 2010. 13 Ganguly, S and DT Hagerty (2005). Introduction. Fearful Symmetry, p. 11. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 14 Ganguly, S (1997). The Crises in Kashmir — Portents of War, Hopes of Peace, p. 24. Australia: Cambridge University Press. 15 Hagerty, DT. US policy and the Kashmir dispute: Prospect for resolution. India Review, 4(2). http://pdfserve.informaworld.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/362941_ 771087986_714039921.pdf. Accessed on June 2, 2011.

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A more recent example includes the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008, which left over a hundred fifty people dead.16 The attackers were identified as Pakistani nationals and the India threatened military action if Pakistan did not cooperate on with regard to investigations. Pakistan responded by moving troops along the Indian border, voicing concerns of a surgical strike by New Delhi. Washington is said to have worked closely with both countries to make sure the situation did not escalate. Apart from crises management, Washington has nudged both sides together to hold bilateral talks when Indo–Pakistani relations are in a deep-freeze. To cite an example, Washington reportedly played the role of facilitator in the Agra Summit in July 2001, between Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. The summit was an effort to resolve long standing issues between both countries. It is similarly believed that the foreign secretary level talks between India and Pakistan held in June 2011 was partly as a result of pressure from Washington. Both sides have engaged in talks for the first time, after the Mumbai attack of 2008.

Paradigm Shift? There are a section of South Asia experts, policymakers and journalists who have pointed out to a changed environment to make a case for the U.S. mediation on the Kashmir issue. They argue that the circumstances are more favorable for the U.S. to take up such an endeavor owing to the strengthened Indo–American relations, a democratic government in Pakistan; India, Pakistan and the U.S. currently being involved in fighting terror, post 9/11, as reasons why Washington should be more proactive in the Kashmir conflict. However, these experts claim that the most important factor is the change in New Delhi’s attitude toward the U.S. involvement in resolving the conflict, especially since

16 Somini Sengupta, Dossier give details Of Mumbai attacks (6 January 2009). The New

York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/world/asia/07india.html. Accessed on June 8, 2011.

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the Kargil War of 1999, though New Delhi might be hesitant to acknowledge it publicly. The Kargil War was the fourth war between India and Pakistan, when the Pakistan Army and Pakistani supported Kashmiri insurgents crossed the LoC to Kargil.17 On a political level, Islamabad probably wanted to refocus the international community’s attention to an insurgency that seemed to be petering out.18 As both India and Pakistan are nuclear weapon states, Pakistani officials could portray Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint in order to induce third-party mediation and, possibly a settlement of the dispute on terms acceptable to Islamabad. The significant turning point many commentators have pointed to is therefore, in the wake of the Kargil war the Indian government has realized that the U.S. role in seeking a resolution to the Kashmir problem need not necessarily be against India’s interests.19 New Delhi which has been battling the insurgency for years may allow or encourage such a third party intervention in the belief that it could lead toward a negotiated settlement acceptable to India. It has been emphasized that it is not just Pakistan but also India that has been approaching Washington during various Indo–Pakistan crises in the last decade. While these arguments may have some merit, Washington’s influence over New Delhi is clearly overstated. While New Delhi has not been shy in involving Washington to exert pressure on Pakistan, rein in jihadi groups and to stop supporting and providing sanctuary to militants; it will not allow Washington to intervene on the Kashmir issue. There are a number of reasons for this. First, strategic interests of India, Pakistan and the U.S. collide. As during the Cold War, Pakistan is still Washington’s ally on in its

17 Howard B. Schaffer, Reconsidering the US role (Spring 2001), The Washington

Quarterly, p. 202. http://www.twq.com/01spring/schaffer.pdf. Accessed on June 5, 2011. 18 Hagerty, DT (2011). US Policy and the Kashmir Dispute: Prospect for resolution. India Review, 4(2). http://pdfserve.informaworld.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/362941_ 771087986_714039921.pdf. Accessed on June 2, 2011. 19 C. Raja Mohan, A paradigm shift toward South Asia? (Winter 2002–03). The Washington Quarterly, 26(1), p. 151.

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“War against Terror” in Afghanistan. Given its ties with the Taliban and its geography, Pakistan is still vital to the U.S. strategic interests in the region, which it has been able to leverage from time to time. Therefore the U.S. cannot be a neutral mediator, particularly from New Delhi’s perspective. Second, India as well as Pakistan have been using brinkmanship as a policy. However, there is a difference in the nature of brinkmanship used by both countries. Pakistan’s and India’s brinkmanship is not reckless but designed to meet policy objectives.20 Pakistan, as the weaker state in the bilateral relationship ratchets up tensions over Kashmir to force external (mainly the U.S.) pressure on India. New Delhi uses coercive diplomacy to pressure Pakistan to stop supporting militants through Washington. Moreover, both countries cannot afford to go through a long drawn out war as they are both nuclear powers and lack the resources and foreign support. According to the stability–instability paradox, mutual possession of nuclear weapons in an adversarial context gives both parties a strong interest in avoiding resorting to full scale war for fear of escalation to a nuclear level. However, mutual recognition of the danger to a large scale conflict also leads states to undertake probing actions at lower levels of conflict in the expectation that risks of such probes are both controllable and calculable.21 Experts say this is best explained in the Kargil War. Third, any overt enthusiasm on the part of Washington to intervene in Kashmir has repercussions on the valley, which are counterproductive. The U.S. taking Kashmir off the table has not only helped

20 Satu P. Limaye, Mediating Kashmir: A bridge too far (Winter 2002–03). The Washington Quarterly, p. 159. 21 The only significant strategic benefit of the Kargil incursion if it had succeeded would have been to cut off India’s key access routes to northernmost areas of Kashmir in Ladakh and the disputed Siachen Glacier and would not have placed any vital Indian political or military assets at great risk. The Pakistani leadership knew that the risk of initiating a conflict with India that had the potential for escalation and therefore chose to make an incursion in areas of no fundamental strategic or military value. See Ganguly, S and DT Hagerty (2005). Wars without end? Fearful Symmetry, pp. 37–38. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

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improve bilateral relations with both countries but also nudged both countries to negotiate bilaterally instead of talking through Washington. The impact of different levels of the U.S. involvement in Kashmir, in the valley can be studied through a comparison of former President George W Bush’s policies and the one pursued by President Obama’s administration.

Obama vs. Bush In a departure from the Bush administration’s hands-off approach on Kashmir, President Obama emphasized that working with India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue was one of the critical tasks for his administration.22 The fresh wave of protests in the Valley during July 2010 put conflict on the front burner again and separatist groups in Kashmir and Islamabad lobbied hard for U.S. involvement on the Kashmir question especially since the current U.S. administration dual hyphenates Kashmir to the Af–Pak theatre. In the midst of heated debates on the U.S. diplomatic intervention in the conflict, President Obama offered the U.S. mediation in reducing Indo–Pak tensions, including the Kashmir question.23 However, he did not follow through on this after the strong Indian lobbying. The Obama administration’s policy for South Asia is markedly different from its predecessor. The “Dehyphenation” policy,24 ensued

22 Bobby Ghosh, Will Kashmir be an Obama foreign policy focus? (28 January 2009). TIME Magazine, www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1874627,00.html. Accessed on 22 October 2010. 23 Obama backs India for UN Security Council seat (8 November 2010). Hindustan Times. www.hindustantimes.com/specials/coverage/obamavisit/Obama-backsIndia-for-UN-security-council-seat/newdelhi/SP-Article10-623524.aspx. Accessed on 12 November 2010. Obama offers U.S. role in Kashmir (8 November 2010). NDT V video upload www.ndtv.com/article/india/obama-offers-us-role-in-kashmir65016. Accessed on 9 November 2010. 24 The dehyphenated policy in South Asia emphasized on systemically decoupling India and Pakistan; U.S. policy, with each state would be governed by an objective assessment of the intrinsic value of each country to U.S. interests rather than how U.S. relations with one would affect relations with the other. Successive U.S. administrations faced difficulty in crafting an appropriate policy toward India and Pakistan as they

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by the Bush years, valued autonomous engagement with both India and Pakistan as far more important to the U.S. interests than handling the complex and often frustrating relationship between the neighbors.25 The Bush administration pursued a dehyphenated policy toward India and Pakistan in an effort to strengthen bilateral ties with both countries.26 While the traditional approach managed to alienate India and Pakistan, making bilateral frictions between the two countries more difficult to resolve, dehyphenation conveyed that while Islamabad was an important U.S. ally, Pakistan has to make peace with India. Bush’s policy of strengthening India’s capabilities forced Islamabad to pursue back-door talks with New Delhi. Some policy experts would even argue that the remarkable progress made in Indo–U.S. relations during the eight years of President Bush was not only because of the landmark civilian-nuclear deal, but also because the U.S. refused to intervene on the Kashmir issue.27 The course pursued initially by President Obama could not be more different, switching from policy of dehyphenation to dual hyphenation. The regional approach strategy links the U.S. success in Afghanistan to fixing problems in Pakistan. This, in turn, links to ending Pakistan’s insecurities vis-à-vis India, especially Kashmir.28 According to this logic, the Pakistani government is not fully committed to weeding out different Islamic groups, as it perceives the U.S. war

found it difficult to balance what were often conflicting demands involving these two countries. U.S. policies often ended up supporting one of the two countries. So the Bush administration sought to adopt a dehyphenated approach to ensure U.S. was in a position of enjoying good relations with India and Pakistan simultaneously while both states seek to sustain a durable peace with one another. However, U.S. policy was moving toward dehyphenation during the last years of the Clinton administration. For a more detailed explanation see, Ashley Tellis, The merits of dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. success in engaging India and Pakistan (Autumn 2008). The Washington Quarterly, 31(4), pp. 21–42. 25 Ashley Tellis, The merits of dehyphenation: Explaining U.S. success in engaging India and Pakistan (Autumn 2008). The Washington Quarterly, 31(4), pp. 21–42. 26 Ibid. 27 C. Raja Mohan, How Obama can get South Asia right (April 2009), The Washington Quarterly, 32(2), pp. 173–189. 28 Ibid.

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in Afghanistan in the context of its relationship with India. Pakistan, while allying with the U.S., does not want a unified Afghan government that is led by a Pashtun sympathetic to India like Karzai, or building a large Afghan army on its borders, which is America’s policy.29 This is encouraging Pakistani hedging in a self-defeating cycle and causing Pakistan to aid the Afghan insurgency that the U.S. is trying to overcome.30 Pursuing the regional approach, the new U.S. administration wanted to include Kashmir to the portfolio of Af–Pak envoy, Richard Holbrooke. This sounded alarm bells in New Delhi and Indian diplomats lobbied to get Kashmir dropped from the special envoy’s mandate. President Obama did not follow through on Kashmir, realizing early on in his presidency that any overt enthusiasm by way of expressing intent on mediating on Kashmir publicly or appointing special envoys will only be met with fierce resistance from New Delhi and will undermine the peace process.

Propositions on Course of Action A number of propositions have been made on varying degrees of the U.S. involvement in the issue. These range from being interventionist, proactive to quiet diplomacy, working behind the scenes. Experts proposing a more interventionist stand suggest a coordinated approach for the U.S. administration to work together with the European Union, Russia, Japan and perhaps China to design a solution. This policy suggestion included Washington talking directly, but privately, with the Hurriyat Conference leaders urging them to engage in negotiations with the state and central government.31 Some have called for Washington to publicly declare the U.S. support for converting the

29 Woodward, B (2010). Obama’s Wars, p. 163. United Kingdom: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd. 30 Ibid. 31 Navneeta Chada Behera, Kashmir: Redefining US Role, The Brookings Institution Policy Brief # 110, November 2002. http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/Files/rc/ papers/2002/10india_behera/pb110.pdf. Accessed on May 20, 2011.

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Line of Control into a permanent boundary or appointment of a special negotiator to work with India and Pakistan.32 Bruce Riedel, the architect of Obama’s Af–Pak strategy according to Bob Woodward’s book “Obama’s Wars”, also endorsed President Obama sealing the Kashmir deal during his visit to the subcontinent. Reidel says Obama’s challenge lay in quietly helping New Delhi and Islamabad to work behind the scenes to get back to the proposal put forward by former Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf in 1995.33 Experts such as Ganguly and Hagerty have lamented over the U.S. policy in the last two decades as it has emphasized on Confidence Building Measures (CBM) and arms controls while favoring the crises management instead of taking bold initiatives toward conflict resolution.34 They argue that Washington has used its good offices and minimal diplomatic pressure to push both sides into bilateral negotiations, which have failed. They propose that Washington should come up with a tentative road map for a resolution and ask India and Pakistan to pursue it. Others urge Washington to work quietly behind the scenes informally suggesting ideas to the parties when negotiations appear to be reaching a deadlock. However, any attempts made by Washington to appoint a special envoy to negotiate on Kashmir or public announcements showing interest in resolving the conflict, will be met with stiff resistance from New Delhi. It will also have an effect on the valley, as the militant groups may increase the spectre of violence, if they sense that the U.S. may intervene on the Kashmir issue. Therefore, a more proactive U.S.

32 Schaffer, HB (2009). Impact of the Alliance with Pakistan. The Limits of Influence-

America’s Role in Kashmir, p. 195. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press. 33 The most out-of-the box solution on Kahsmir was put forward by former Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf in 1995. The proposal came closest to India’s negotiated position on Kashmir. His proposal included making borders irrelevant, a joint management of Kashmir by Indians, Pakistanis and Kashmiris, if India was willing to allow more self-governance and demilitarize (29 September 2010). Indian Express, Obama must try and seal a Kashmir deal during India visit: Riedel, www.indianexpress.com/story-print/689994/. Accessed on 21 October 2010. 34 Ganguly, S and DT Hagerty (2005). Wars without end? Fearful Symmetry, p. 202. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

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role is not desirable and will be counterproductive. As experts such as Satu P. Limaye argues, “episodic crises management and behind-the scenes facilitation, however cumbersome and unsatisfying, are feasible, effective and more commensurate with the U.S. interests.”35

Conflict Management, not Mediation Third party mediation efforts in the past have been overshadowed by realpolitik of great powers, yielding nothing more than failed attempts to resolve the issue. There has been a lot of enthusiasm about Pakistani polity return to institutionalized governance which some believe will allow a more conducive atmosphere for peace building. However, this is overstated as, while Pakistan’s has a legitimately elected government, foreign policy and security firmly remains in the hands of the Pakistani Army. The Pakistani establishment has a vested interest in keeping the Kashmir conflict alive, to preserve its position of power. Hagerty says resolving the Kashmir issue would actually threaten the dominance of the powers in Pakistan and hence it resists transforming LOC into an international boundary.36 There is clearly no solution in sight for the Kashmir issue in the near future, which is acceptable by all parties. Stephen Cohen, an American expert on South Asia predicts “The India–Pakistan conflict which includes Kashmir, amongst other problems will last for 100 years or more.”37 In such a pessimistic scenario, the U.S. role is crucial as its interventions in the form of crises management act as a buffer when conflict flares up, ensuring the sabre rattling, even if it is brinkmanship, does not prove to be costly. The U.S. has also

35 Satu P. Limaye, Mediating Kashmir: A bridge too far (Winter 2002–03). The

Washington Quarterly, p. 158. 36 Hagerty, DT. US policy and the kashmir dispute: Prospect for resolution. India Review, 4(2). http://pdfserve.informaworld.com.libproxy1.nus.edu.sg/362941_ 771087986_714039921.pdf. Accessed on June 2, 2011109. 37 Kashmir Conflict will last for 100 years: Author Stephen P Cohen (31 May 2011). DNA. http://www.dnaindia.com/india/report_kashmir-conflict-will-last-for-100-yearsauthor-stephen-p-cohen_1549551. Accessed June 2, 2011.

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been effective in facilitating bilateral talks on long-standing issues when Indo–Pak relations have gone into a deep-freeze, through pressure or incentives. These nudges to help bring both countries to the negotiating table, prevent the Indo–Pakistani conflict from escalating. Therefore, while mediation is not a viable option, Washington has seen better success in episodic crises management. The U.S. role in the conflict has to be restricted to crises management as it is effective, feasible and more importantly has been accepted by New Delhi and Islamabad on a number of occasions.

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b1399-index

Index 5th generation fighter jet, 6 7th Fleet, 7

Air Sea Battle Plan for Pacific, 7 air-independent propulsion (AIP), 5 aircraft Carrier Vikramaditya, 4 aircraft carriers, 11 Akash, 4 Al Qaeda, 133–135, 147, 153, 155, 157, 160–162 ally, 12 Amban, 25–27, 30, 31 American, 146, 148 American companies, 146 anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), 2 anti-Soviet resistance, 141 anti-Taliban policy, 147 Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC), 178 Anti-Terrorist Act (ATA), 177 APEC, 78 Arc of Instability, 142 Arihant, 4 armed conflict, 10 arms market, 111 arms race, 7 arms smuggling, 147 arms suppliers, 101 army, 125 Arunachal Pradesh, 44–46 ASEAN, 59, 60 ASEAN+10 Defense, 13 Asia, 72 Asia–Pacific, 1, 7 Asia–Pacific region, 10 Asia-Pacific, 6, 142 Asia-Pacific theatre, 7

A. K. Antony, 3 Abdul Rahim Wardak, 141 Abu Dhabi, 14 accretion, 8 acquisitions, 3, 5 Admiral Gorshkov, 3 ADMM, 88 advanced landing grounds (ALGs), 4 adversaries, 6 Af–Pak, 104 Af–Pak policy, 169, 170 Af–Pak strategy, 147, 194 Afghan, 133, 135, 136 Afghan economy, 143, 149 Afghan President, 140, 141, 149 Afghan-led reconciliation, 148 Afghanistan, 106, 139–155, 158, 160–163 Africa, 142, 143 Agni, 4 Agni ICBMs, 12 Agra Summit, 188 agreements, 140, 141, 150 agriculture, 141 Ahmad Shah Massoud, 134 aid, 141, 142, 146, 149 aid-giving, 149 air capabilities, 7 air dominance, 7 Air Force, 5 197

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198

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Perspectives on South Asian Security

Asian power balance, 1 Asian security, 1 Assam, 4 asymmetric capabilities, 8 asymmetrical shift, 8 augmented, 12 Aung San Suu Kyi, 78 Australia, 2 Autonomous Regions, 124 AWACS, 108 Aynak, 143, 145, 146, 149 Badakshan, 145 Baikal, 107 balance of payments, 77 balanced security architecture, 13 Balochistan, 171 Baluchistan province, 144 Bandung, 72 Bangalore, 111 Bangladesh, 19, 52, 53, 55, 57 bargaining chip, 17 basing facilities, 6 Bay of Bengal, 19 Beijing, 141, 142, 144–146, 148 Bhutan, 87 bi-tarafi, 148 big powers, 140 bilateral relations, 74 bilateral trade, 140 BIMSTEC, 86 Boeing, 4 bomb grade plutonium, 12 border infrastructure, 4 borders, 146 BrahMos, 116 Brazil, 108 BRIC, 114 British Empire, 67 Brunei, 10 Buddhism, 68 Bush, 17 Bush administration, 169 C-130J tactical, 4 Cambodia, 69

b1399-index

capacity building, 15 cargo port, 8 carrier killer, 11 CBMs, 12 CECA, 91 cell phone project, 147 Central Asia, 144, 146, 148 Central Asian Republics, 77 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 168 Chasma, 11 China, 1, 21, 22, 24–36, 139–150 China’s 12th Five-Year Plan (2011–15), 144 China’s Metallurgical group, 143, 146 China’s Ministry of Public Security, 147 China’s Peoples’ Liberation Army, 16 China-Afghanistan, 140, 145 Chinese companies, 142 Chinese Defence Minister Liang Guanglie, 141 Chinese intelligence officers, 147 Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, 141 chokepoint, 10 civilian, 11 civilian casualties, 150 CJ-10 long-range cruise missiles, 11 CLMV, 83 coal-fired power plant, 144 Cochin, 4 Cold War, 6, 8, 67, 149 collaborative, 14 collapse, 8 colonial, 68 command control, 6 communication, 127 communication systems, 6 Communist Party of Nepal, 120 comparative advantage, 146 competition, 9 comprehensive, 140, 150 comprehensive strength, 9 confidence-building, 13 conflict management, 183, 195 conflict-ridden, 139, 143 Congressional Research Service, 101

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b1399-index

Index constraint, 8 consumer goods, 143 containers, 8 containment, 8, 11 contemporary, 68 contracts, 11 cooperation, 14 cooperative, 140, 150 cooperative partnership, 140, 150 cooperatives, 127 coordinated, 14 copper fields, 143, 145 copper mines, 143, 146 corruption, 140, 148 Corvettes, 6 counter-terrorism, 151, 157, 159–161, 163, 164 counter-terrorism cooperation, 147 counter-terrorism relationship, 147 countervailing action, 8 countervailing power, 3 countervailing responses, 8 CPN (Maoist), 121 credibility, 12 criticism, 140, 149 cronyism, 140, 148 cross-border crime, 146, 147 cross-border crimes, 146 cryogenic, 110 cultural linkages, 150 Dalai Lama, 22–25, 27, 28, 30–32, 40, 45, 46 Darband, 145 Dawei, 103 Declaration, 13 declaratory commitment, 12 defence cooperation, 48, 59 defense assets, 7 defense budget, 18 defense collaboration, 8 defense hardware, 4 defense spenders, 1 defense spending, 3 defense upgradation, 3 Delhi, 72

199 delivery capability, 12 delivery systems, 10 democratic regime, 148 democratic restructuring, 125 Deng Xiaoping, 76 Deobandi, 152, 155 deployed, 11 derail, 13 Derby air-to-air missile systems, 4 destroyers, 3 development agenda, 142 DF-21C ballistic missiles, 11 DF-31 missiles, 11 dialogue, 13 digital telephone switches, 142 diplomatic, 140, 141 Director of Drug Prevention, 147 Dmitry Medvedev, 102 domestic conditions, 148 DRDO, 116 driver, 9 drone attacks, 168, 170, 172, 176 Drone fighter, 7 drug trafficking, 141, 147 EAS, 89 East Asia, 105 East Asia Summit, 13 East Turkistan Islamic Movement, 147 Eastern Germany, 11 Eastern sector, 4 Economic, 139–146, 148–150 Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement, 141 economic base, 149 economic lifelines, 9 Egypt, 106 electoral fraud, 148 electoral reforms, 140 electric submarines, 2 electronic warfare, 5 emergence, 8 employment, 149 encirclement, 148 energy, 142–144, 146 energy consumer, 9

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200

Perspectives on South Asian Security

Perspectives on South Asian Security

engagement, 13 engineers, 141, 147 enlightened diplomacy, 10 escalation dominance, 11 ethnic violence, 145 European Union (EU), 142 executive, 124 export products, 143 exports, 8, 140 external aid, 149 extremism, 166, 168, 171, 172, 178, 179 F-15 SG fighters, 5 F-16s, 5 FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), 155 FICCI, 77 fighter jets, 3 fighting platforms, 6 fora, 13 force structures, 2 foreign companies, 146 foreign exchange reserves, 8 foreign investment, 142, 143 fragile, 12 France, 4 fratricidal warfare, 141 freight railroad, 144 French Aster-15, 5 Frigates, 6 GDP, 9 geopolitical rivalry, 64 Georgia, 106 Germany, 8, 11, 26, 130 Ghazni, 145 global economy, 13 global financial crisis, 9 global manufacturing, 15 global power structure, 9 global security, 68 global stature, 9 globalised, 9 Goa, 14 gold reserves, 145 Golden Crescent, 147

b1399-index

good-neighborliness, 140 grant, 141, 142 great adjustments, 9 great change, 9 great power rivalry, 148 greater connectivity, 145 Guam, 7 Guangdong, 11 Gulbuddin Hekmatayr, 148 Gulf of Aden, 14 Gulfstream G550s, 5 Gwadar, 103 Gwadar port, 144 Hajigak, 143 Hambantota, 103 Hanoi, 13 Haqqani, 155, 161, 162, 164 Harpoon ASCM, 5 Hasan Mahsum, 147 Hawkeye surveillance aircraft, 5 hedging, 8 helicopter gun ships, 6 Herat, 145 heroin, 147 Himalayas, 22, 23, 119 Hinduism, 68 historical, 68 Hizb-i-Islami, 148 Hong Kong, 70 hospitals, 141, 142 hotline, 12 Huawei, 142 humanitarian, 140 Hun Jintao, 35 hydro-electric, 141 IAEA, 15 inclusive, 13 independence, 141, 148 India, 2, 21–30, 35–65, 140, 142, 148, 150 Indian Air Force, 4 Indian Ocean, 2, 9 Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, 14 indigenous people, 124

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b1399-index

Index Indira Gandhi, 74 Indo–Pak relations, 185, 188, 196 Indo–U.S. Civil nuclear deal, 17 Indo–U.S. Joint Statement, 13 Indo–U.S. partnership, 147 Indo–U.S. relations, 62, 64 Indonesia, 14 industrial, 127 information systems, 5 infrastructure, 141, 142, 149 infrastructure development, 142 initiators, 15 insurgency, 144, 146, 148, 166, 172 insurgency afflicted, 144 Integrated Knowledge-based Command and Control, 5 inter-state conflicts, 10 interconnected, 9 interdict, 9 Interim Constitution, 125 internal affairs, 148 international threat, 14 intervening, 10 IOR-ARC, 87 Iran, 17, 144, 147, 149 Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, 150 Iraq, 106 iron ore, 143, 145, 146 iron ore deposits, 143 irrigation, 141–143 irrigation projects, 142 Islam, 70 Islamic extremism, 146, 150 ‘Islamic State of Afghanistan’, 141 Israel, 4, 108 Israeli Falcon radar, 5 Jaish-e-Mohammad, 155, 157 Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam ( JUI), 152 Jammu and Kashmir, 179 janajati, 124 janajati parties, 125 Japan, 2 Japan–Russia dispute, 10 Jawkhar, 145

201 jihadi, 151–157, 160–164 Jin class ballistic missile, 11 joint statement, 148 Joint Strike Fighter programme, 6 judicial organs, 124 Kabul, 141, 146, 148 Kamchatka, 6 Karakorum Highway, 144 Kargil War, 187, 189, 190 Karnali, 124 Karzai, 135 Kashmir, 10 Kashmir conflict, 183, 185, 186, 188, 195 Kathmandu, 123, 128 Kazakhstan, 144 Khushab, 12 Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa, 171 Korean peninsula, 10, 12 Kremlin, 115 Krupnov, 107 Kurile islands, 10 labor force, 127 land-reform, 127 Laos, 69 Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, 153 Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, 154, 155, 157, 162, 164 Lee Myung Bak, 84 legislative, 124 leverage, 140, 147, 150 Lhasa, 24–28, 30–32, 34 Li Xianhui, 147 Libya, 106 Light Combat Aircraft, 4 limited engagement, 12 littoral countries, 14 local culture, 148 Logar province, 143, 144, 146 long-range manned bomber, 6 long-term stabilisation, 139, 150 Look East Policy, 59, 67 Madhes, 120 Madhesi, 125

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madrasa, 153, 156 madrasas, 152 Mahayana Buddhism, 22 major powers, 9 Malabar, 19 Malacca Straits, 10 Malaysia, 10, 14 Maldives, 76 Malsindo, 14 Manchu’s, 24, 28, 30 Manmohan Singh, 84 Maoist, 121–126, 129–131 maritime, 13 maritime commerce, 9 maritime cooperation, 14 maritime forces, 7 Maritime Security, 56, 57 McMahon Line, 27, 28 Mediation, 183, 184, 186, 188, 189, 191, 195, 196 Medvedev, Dmitry, 102 Mergui, 103 MGC, 87 Middle East, 142, 144 militarization, 18 military, 139, 141–143, 146, 150 military assets, 2, 3 military assistance, 141 military balance, 3 military build up, 1 military engagement, 139, 146 military expenditures, 5 military modernization, 2, 5, 18 military power, 2 military presence, 150 military spending, 7 military supplies, 146 military upgradation, 6 mineral, 142 Ming dynasty, 30 mining, 141, 149 Ministry of Communications, 142 MIRV, 4 Missile Defense, 19 Missile Defense system, 17 missiles, 7

Mistral Amphibious Helicopter, 6 mobile communications centre, 145 Moscow, 112 mujahedeen, 141 multilateral, 140 Mumbai, 104 Muslim, 70 Myanmar, 19, 54–57 Narasimha Rao, 77 Nathu La pass, 27, 35 national power, 2 NATO, 93 natural resources, 143 naval base, 6 naval blockade, 2 naval exercises, 68 naval patrols, 14 Ne Win, 78 Nehru, 67 Nepal, 54, 55, 119 Nepal Army, 121, 125 Nepali Congress, 120 neutrality, 148 neutralizing, 8 New Zealand, 88 no-first use doctrine, 12 non-alignment, 148 non-interdiction, 13 non-interference, 148 non-proliferation, 15 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 17 non-state actors, 15 non-traditional security threats, 147 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 146 North Korea, 10, 17 North Waziristan, 170, 175 North–East Asia, 1 North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), 147 northern provinces, 145 nuclear, 10 nuclear assets, 12 nuclear confidence building, 14 nuclear environment, 14

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b1399-index

Index nuclear escalation, 13 nuclear facilities, 12 nuclear missile, 3 nuclear protégé, 12 Nuclear Security Centers, 15 Nuclear Summit, 14 Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG), 11 nuclear weapon arsenal, 12 Obama administration, 169, 170 oil and natural gas, 145 oil reserves, 145 Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe, 13 Pacific, 9 Pakistan, 10, 40, 48–51, 58, 61, 140–142, 144, 147, 148, 150–153, 155–157, 159, 161, 163, 164 Pakistani army, 175 Pakistani security forces, 147 Pakistani Taliban, 147 Panjsher Valley, 145 paramilitary, 125 partnership, 140, 147, 150 Patriot missiles, 3 patrol, 146 peace building, 183, 184, 195 Pentagon, 7 People’s Liberation Army (PLA), 22, 125 People’s War, 121 Persian Gulf, 10, 69 personnel training, 146 Pervez Musharraf, 78 Phelps Dodge, 143, 146 Philippines, 10, 84 pipeline, 144 piracy, 14 PLA, 121 plebiscite, 184–186 police, 125 police affairs, 140 policy, 139, 140, 147, 148, 150 political, 140, 146, 148, 150 political elite, 146

203 post-colonial, 68 pre-colonial, 68 precipitating, 13 President Hamid Karzai, 139 President Hu Jintao, 140 President Obama, 191–194 Prithvi, 4 private sector, 127 proliferation resistant nuclear technologies, 15 Proliferation Security Initiative, 17 Protected Regions, 124 public hospitals, 142 public–private partnership, 127 Putin, 106 Qing dynasty, 26, 27, 30, 33 Qinghai, 3 Qinghai–Tibet, 3 Rajiv Gandhi, 75 Ramayana, 68 raw materials, 142 (re)engagement, 67 re-election, 140 reactors, 11 reconstruction, 139, 141, 142 reconstruction projects, 142 region, 140, 142, 144, 145, 147, 150 regional agreements, 14 regional cooperation, 149, 150 regional economic strategy, 144 Regional Security, 37, 39, 47, 48, 51 regional solution, 150 reintegration process, 148 renegade province, 10 rentier state, 149 research and development, 15 resident powers, 7 resource exploitation, 142, 146 resource-rich, 143, 145 resources, 142–146 revenue, 149 RIC, 114 road restoration, 142 Royalties, 149

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204

Perspectives on South Asian Security

b1399-index

Perspectives on South Asian Security

RoK, 2 Rouble, 110 RTIA, 86 Rupee, 110 Russia, 2 Russian military, 6 SAARC, 87 safeguards, 11 Saran, Shyam, 16 scenario, 139, 150 SCO, 89 Scorpene, 4 Sea lines of communication, 9 sea-borne trade, 14 second strike retaliatory capability, 11 sectarian violence, 152 security, 140, 142, 145–147 security architecture, 1 security arrangements, 8 security landscape, 8, 10 security planners, 3 security sector, 125, 140, 146 Senkaku islands, 10 sensors, 5 Seoul, 15 Seti-Mahakali, 124 Shanghai, 8 Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), 149 Sharia, 174 shipping channels, 9 signal processing, 5 signatory, 17 Sikkim, 22, 24 silo-based DF-5A missiles, 11 Singapore, 5 Sino–Afghan, 139, 150 Sino–Afghan joint declaration, 139 Sino–Indian border, 4 Sino–Indian border issue, 39, 43, 44 Sino–Indian cooperation, 65 Sino–Indian Joint Communique, 13 Sino–Japanese, 10 Sino–Pak Entente, 40, 48 Sino-Afghan relations, 141

SIPRI, 101 smuggling, 146, 147 Somali, 14 South Asia, 47, 51, 52, 54, 56–58, 60–65, 142, 144 South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 150 South China Sea, 2 South China Seas, 8 South East Asia, 59, 60 South Waziristan, 147 South–East Asia, 1, 73 Southern Kuriles, 6 sovereignty, 141, 148 Soviet intervention, 141 Soviet Union, 77 Special Regions, 124 Special Rights, 125 spheres of influence, 148 spy drones, 7 Spyder anti-missile systems, 4 Sri Lanka, 53, 57, 76 stability in Asia, 7 stakeholders, 13 state budget, 149 state-building, 149 statesmanship, 10 stockpile, 12 strategic, 67 strategic depth, 144, 147 strategic dialogue, 17 strategic missile forces, 10 strategic opportunity, 9 strategic superiority, 7 submarine, 2 submarine-based nuclear missiles, 12 suicide attacks, 173 Sukhoi, 108 Sukhoi aircraft, 3 Sukhois, 4 summits, 149 supersonic anti-ship missile, 7 supply depot, 145 supply system, 102 surface naval vessels, 2 surrogates, 11

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b1399-index

Index

205

surveillance aircraft, 3 suzerainty, 32, 33 Swedish Vastergotland, 5 Syria, 106

tribal areas, 147 Trishul, 4 Tunisia, 106 Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), 147

Taiwan, 2, 108 Taiwan Straits, 2, 8 Tajikistan, 144 Takhar, 145 Taliban, 133–136, 146–148, 153, 155, 157, 159, 160, 164 Taliban insurgency, 146, 148 tariffs, 140, 143 Tawang, 22, 24, 28 technical, 140, 141 technological, 140 Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), 159 Tejas, 4 Tejpur, 4 Tel Aviv, 108 telephone networks, 142 Terai, 120 territorial disputes, 10 territorial integrity, 148 territorial waters, 7, 17 terrorism, 95, 141, 151, 154, 163, 164 Thailand, 14 theatre, 14 third country, 17 third generation, 5 Third party mediation, 183, 184, 195 Tibet, 2, 21–36, 40, 42, 43, 45, 46, 54 Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), 3, 34, 145 track-II, 17 trade, 140, 143–145, 150 trade links, 144 trade routes, 13 trading partner, 142 tradition, 148 training, 140, 141, 146 training programmes, 140 transition, 12 transparency, 13 transparent, 13 transportation, 127, 144

U.S., 2 U.S. firm, 143, U.S. forces, 8 U.S.–Pakistan, 149 U.S.–Pakistan strategic dialogue, 149 UCPN, 122 UCPN (Maoist), 124 Uighur, 146 UN Security Council, 101 unification, 11 United Nations, 184 United States (US), 42, 49, 58, 60–63, 139, 142, 143 unmanned vehicles, 5 unpredictability, 12 UNSC, 95 UNSC Resolution, 17 US Defense Secretary Robert, 150 US firm, 143 US geological survey, 145 US long-term presence, 147 US withdrawal, 146, 150 Vietnam, 10, 74 volatile, 12 Wakhan Corridor, 145 war-ravaged, 139 Washington, 15, 145, 148, 149 water conservancy projects, 141 weapon systems, 3, 6 weapons, 141 West Asia, 69 West Bengal, 92 western border, 143, 146 Western periphery, 6 western region, 144, 145 withdrawal, 139, 146, 150 World War, 120 Xinjiang, 43, 46, 51, 144, 145, 150 Xinjiang province, 150

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206

Perspectives on South Asian Security

Perspectives on South Asian Security

Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), 144 Yellow Sea, 2, 8 Yemen, 106 ynuclear weapon states, 10

b1399-index

Zardari administration, 147 zero tariffs, 143 Zhong Xing Telecommunication Equipment Company Limited (ZTE), 142