Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies: Strategy and Process 9781685853518

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PEACEBUILDING IN

POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES

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PEACEBUILDING IN

POSTCONFLICT SOCIETIES

Strategy and Process

Ho-Won Jeong

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Published in the United States of America in 2005 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU © 2005 by Lynne Rienner Publishers. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Jeong, Ho-Won. Peacebuilding in postconflict societies: strategy and process/ by Ho-Won Jeong. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-1-58826-335-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN 978-1-58826-311-7 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Peace-building. 2. Postwar reconstruction. I. Title. JZ5538.J464 2005 303.6'6—dc22 British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992. 5 4 3 2

2004026066

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Thinking of my father

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CONTENTS

Preface

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1 Issues and Approaches

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Behavioral and Structural Contexts 3 Peacebuilding Dimensions 12 Assessment 13 Overview 15

2 Peacebuilding Design

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Principles and Concepts 19 Defining Goals and Processes 21 The Scope of Changes 21 Contextual Variables 23 Assessing Implementation Strategies 24 Functional Interdependencies 27 Time Frames 29 A Multilevel Process 32 Endogenous Dynamics and Exogenous Support 34 Evaluating the Peacebuilding Processes and Outcomes 35 Final Comments 37

3 Security and Demilitarization

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Confidence Building 39 Demobilization and Disarmament 44 Enforcing Peace 52 Maintaining Law and Order 58 Protection of Human Rights 60 Institutional Reform 64 Final Comments 73

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Contents

4 Political Transition

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Transitional Government 77 Interim International Administration 81 Politics for State Rebuilding 83 Negotiating New Political Institutions 89 Power Sharing and Electoral Systems 92 Institutional Arrangements 94 The Role of Elections in a Political Transition 103 Electoral Politics and Demobilization 104 Logistical Prerequisites for Elections 107 Organization of Elections 110 Postelection Politics 112 Elections and Democracy 114 Civil Society 120 Final Comments 121

5 Development

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Recovery and Violent Conflict 124 Overcoming the Legacy of a War Economy 127 The Impact of Macroeconomic Policies 128 Economic Priorities and Peace Implementation 132 Economic Rehabilitation 134 Refugee Resettlement and Transition 136 Integrative Community Development 138 Community Development Activities 142 Reintegration of Former Combatants 143 Land Transfer Programs 147 Development for Peace 148 Health Sectors and Functional Cooperation 150 The Politics of Aid 152 Final Comments 152

6 Reconciliation and Social Rehabilitation Goals and Principles of Reconciliation 156 Interactive Processes 158 Psychosocial Rehabilitation 159 The Social and Political Context 161 Truth Seeking 163 Balancing Justice and Social Harmony 165 Judicial Trials and Prosecution 169 The Role and Functions of Truth Commissions 171 Social Rehabilitation and Empowerment 180 Traditional Civil Society and Reconciliation 182 Final Comments 184

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Contents

7 Operational Imperatives and Coordination

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Issues and Challenges: Strategic Considerations 187 International Commitments 192 Different Modalities of Intervention 195 Civil-Military Coordination 197 Coordinating Authorities 200 Institutional Politics 204 Organizational Imperatives 205 Coordinating Structures 207 Interagency-Level Coordination 214 Partnership with NGOs 215 Conclusion 219

List of Acronyms Bibliography Index About the Book

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PREFACE

Reconstructing violence-ridden societies poses a great challenge to the international community, and consequently there remains a thirst for new knowledge about peacebuilding. Both conceptually and in terms of practical policy matters, former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali clearly provided the vision and direction for peacebuilding in his 1992 document An Agenda for Peace, prepared at the request of the Security Council. The definitions and strategies presented by the Secretary-General have greatly influenced our understanding of the peacebuilding enterprise. Peace operations were originally received with great optimism, hailed as a panacea for overcoming violent social orders and creating a better world. However, the experiences in Somalia, Liberia, Haiti, and BosniaHerzegovina in the mid-1990s taught us that sustainable peace based on justice can be an illusive goal in the absence of the long-term perspective of structural transformation. Many lessons (learned from mistakes in various operations) have been widely discussed, and it is an appropriate time to reflect on them in the hope of advancing the field. Perhaps chief among these lessons is the recognition that an emphasis on political and military stabilization alone is not sufficient to end a protracted conflict based on ethnic and religious rivalries and opposing political and economic interests. Thus, the discussion of peacebuilding operations in this book goes beyond political and strategic considerations to incorporate the perspectives of civilian security, social rehabilitation, and reconciliation, reflecting on the concerns of the populations that have been victimized by violence. The examples that I present in the book include both successful and unsuccessful experiences. Also, seeking to link research to policymaking, I examine concepts of policy design, operation, and implementation in terms of their applicability to the real world. It is my hope that the result will be useful to university students, researchers, and policymakers alike.

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Preface

I wish to express my intellectual debt to Chadwick F. Alger, John W. Burton, Johan Galtung, Elise Boulding, and Juergen Dedring, whose work has always been an inspiration to my research. I greatly appreciated broad consultation with colleagues whose thoughts have been valuable to my work. In particular, my gratitude goes to Charles Snare, Jim Whitman, Charles Lerche, Johannes Botes, Janie Leatherman, Gustavo Gozzi, Luc Reychler, Jessica Senehi, Sean Byrne, and Earl Conteh Morgan. I also found the work of the following experts particularly useful as I wrote this book: Christopher Mitchell, Ronald Fisher, Abdul Aziz Said, Richard Rubenstein, Kevin Avruch, Dennis Sandole, Mary Clark, Michelle LeBaron, Nadim Rouhana, Mohammed Abu-Nimar, Dean Pruitt, Louis Kriesberg, Daniel Druckman, Kent Kille, Courtney Smith, Nathan Funk, Jacob Bercovitch, Susan McKay, Daniel Lieberfeld, George Oliver, Michael Pugh, Mary Hope Schwoebel, and Cristos Kyrou. The fellowship awarded by the Government and Parliament of the Region Emilia-Romagna, Italy, in the summer of 2000 was pivotal to the development of the early stage of my research project on peacebuilding. I am grateful to Eleftherios Michael and Robin Salmon for their excellent research and editorial assistance. Krista Rigalo, Laura Villanova, and Shizu Maekawa have also provided valuable research assistance. I greatly appreciate Lynne Rienner for all her encouragement and patience and her assistant, Lisa Tulchin, for her kind support, as this book had to be completed in the very challenging circumstances of my father’s critical illness. Most important, Mary’s unfailing support and Nimmy’s loving nature have spurred me on to accomplish this task. I dedicate this book to my father, who lived through World War II and the Korean War to truly appreciate the struggle for peace.

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PEACEBUILDING IN

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1 ISSUES

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APPROACHES

As peace negotiations have resulted in the settlement of intrastate violence and wars since the late 1980s, more than two dozen societies have been going through difficult phases of postconflict reconstruction. The negotiated settlement of long-term conflict brings new challenges as well as opportunities for social transformation. Whereas dramatic changes were brought to South Africa, East Timor, and Namibia, some countries such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are still in the transition toward a stable political entity despite heavy international intervention. The formation of a transitional government in 2003 was expected to bring an end to the devastating civil wars of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which killed an estimated three million people either as a direct result of fighting or in ensuing humanitarian disasters. The demand to rebuild divided societies emerging from serious long-term conflict in Angola, Burundi, Sudan, Liberia, and Haiti as well as the DRC is overwhelming, and recent efforts reflect the complex nature of the process of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding involves a process comprising various functions and roles. It often entails a wide range of sequential activities, proceeding from cease-fire and refugee resettlement to the establishment of a new government and economic reconstruction. The end of violent conflict has to be accompanied by the rebuilding of the physical infrastructure and the restoration of essential government functions that provide basic social services. In the long run, stability cannot be achieved without the participation of former adversaries in a democratic political process and socioeconomic reform. The dynamics of peacebuilding are affected by dialectic human interactions and perceptions as well as the social environment. It takes time to overcome both psychological and structural obstacles resulting from protracted conflict locked in vicious cycles of confrontation. Social reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reconciliation are essential elements that make a peace process durable and sustainable (Galtung 1998). The practice of peacebuilding originally evolved out of an institutional adjustment to peacekeeping and humanitarian intervention responding to internal conflict situations. Although Nigeria and the Congo had to rebuild 1

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war-torn societies in the 1960s (in the case of the Congo with UN political and military intervention), more systematic attention was drawn to postconflict reconstruction with the shift of the international focus from Cold War politics to civil wars, often arising from interethnic conflict. Since the Namibia operation in 1989, peacebuilding has been widely recognized as a distinctive area of policy and operations. The efforts to bring stability to Afghanistan and Iraq can be understood in the context of the new U.S.-led war on terrorism rather than reflecting on the transformation of local conflict dynamics through negotiation. Projects of establishing new governments as well as social reconstruction have been driven by the demand to create a local political order that is compatible with Western global strategies. Other peacebuilding efforts devoted to democratization and development have been geared toward supporting military and diplomatic activities. Reconciliation and social rehabilitation will remain remote goals until ongoing hostilities and armed resistance come to an end. Not all peace processes are the same, especially in considering divergence in inherent conflict situations, including the intensity and level of violence in intergroup relations and their impact on transformative dynamics. However, some overall conceptual and analytical approaches can be suggested to identify steps and actions for bringing about harmonious relations between former adversaries and reconstructing postconflict societies. To enhance our understanding of the strategies necessary for lasting peace, we need to look at how various dimensions of peacebuilding can contribute to behavioral changes and structural transformation. This book is grounded in an understanding that analysis of the complex processes of peacebuilding has to be more systematic and coherently organized. Most reconstruction programs rely heavily on “democratic” institution building and economic recovery through free market–oriented policies. It is often assumed that a peacebuilding process ends with the establishment of a new government along with the introduction of economic recovery packages. Not much analysis has been conducted as to how institution building and political transition are undermined by the lack of social and economic foundations. While establishing a stable government at the center is important, not enough attention has been paid to local political and social context, which can determine the sustainability of peacebuilding projects. Peacebuilding approaches oriented toward helping to reestablish the former status quo in post–civil war situations are not likely to lead to longer-term social transformation. This is well exemplified by the return of authoritarian rule in Zimbabwe, political killings and intimidation by the dominant political party in Cambodia, and the continuing influence of former political and military elites accused of massacres in Guatemala and El

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Salvador. A focus on mere restoration of order has serious limitations, for it ignores imbalances between groups in existing political and economic structures. Democratic processes and development are undermined by political and economic arrangements that allow the use of mineral or other resources to benefit former warlords, military generals, or government officials as well as those whose interests are protected by them. Peacebuilding strategies must be geared toward modifying social structures and processes associated with such power imbalances. Strategies for the effective mobilization of institutional and communal resources to overcome the legacy of violent conflict need to be investigated along with specific circumstances under which various peacebuilding approaches can be applied. To be best adapted to existing realities, implementation programs have to be contextualized to the particular circumstances of a recipient society. The needs of victims of violence (such as women, children, and the elderly) and their role in development and social rehabilitation must be taken into account in the construction of peace. In examining the complexities of peacebuilding, this book begins with an investigation of major assumptions, objectives, and conditions under which peacebuilding proceeds and has been implemented. Then it explores security and demilitarization, protection of human rights, political transition, development, reconciliation, and social rehabilitation. The analysis draws on past and ongoing experiences of peacebuilding and, when appropriate, suggests areas where existing strategies and approaches need to be reconsidered.

Behavioral and Structural Contexts The task of peace builders in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Liberia, Cambodia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and other post–civil war societies is to confront unique psychological and ethical situations arising from a conflict system. Even with a negotiated settlement, shooting, bombing, shelling, and other types of violence do not necessarily stop immediately. Where there is still violence or threats of violence, physical safety is obviously an important concern. In addition, the end of an internal war poses many social problems such as disputes over ownership rights and organized criminal violence. The pain surrounding the conflict remains evident and serves as an obstacle to a return to normal life. Thus, overcoming physical, mental, and emotional challenges remains a crucial challenge for those who have to rebuild their own societies. Peacebuilding operations are, in a technical sense, charged with “monitoring or implementing a negotiated settlement between two or more hostile

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parties” (Bertram 1995, p. 388). In practice, postconflict peacebuilding starts when conflict has been controlled to the degree that normal social activities can be resumed for the reconstruction of a violence-torn society. As intense violence becomes less visible, conditions for longer-term political and social stability take root. Reconciliation and reconstruction designed to transform intercommunal relationships can take place in the absence of active violence. The control of violence at the interpersonal and intercommunal level is thus a prerequisite to establishing a constructive relationship. Because conflict does not disappear in many social circumstances, its proper management is an important task in transforming adversarial relationships. To prevent the disruption of a peace process, a cease-fire and other agreed-upon peace settlement measures have to be observed and, under certain circumstances, may have to be enforced. However, peacebuilding cannot merely depend on violence control methods or therapy imposed on unwilling patients. Trust- and confidence-building measures have to be taken in order to induce cooperation and produce positive attitudes that create an atmosphere more conducive to the peaceful settlement of differences. Given that progress in peacebuilding relies on improvements in intercommunal relationships, psychological transformation has to be supported by correcting the damage and loss inflicted upon victims of oppression and violence. Changes in perception promoted by education and reconciliation have to proceed alongside structural reform to prevent a return to dominant relationships. It would be naive to believe that a few training workshops and facilitated dialogue sessions, designed for reconciliation activities, could break the cycle of violence. Failing to provide solutions to the root causes of the problems that generated the war allows new conflict dynamics to undermine the search for peace. Although the operating goal of peacebuilding has been considered to be averting the revival of a violent conflict brought under control, it should not be understood as a mere short-term prevention strategy. The main issue is to gradually create conditions which will ensure that there is no reason to resort to destructive means again, and thus peacebuilding is a long-term activity going beyond the immediate imperative of stopping the armed conflict. To prevent a recurrence of violence, root causes have to be tackled by structural transformation. Thus, a long-term strategy is aimed at addressing “the principal political, economic, social and ethnic imbalances that led to conflict in the first place.” Peacebuilding can be generally characterized in terms of supporting “structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid relapse into conflict” (Boutros-Ghali 1995, p. 32). Agreement needs to be reached in key reforms, leading to a broad scope of structural changes.

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Challenges Whereas dynamics of conflict resolution have to be extended to a comprehensive and durable peace process, the implementation of peace agreements may not necessarily be linear or orderly, and may not even guarantee an expected outcome. In some postconflict settlement processes (e.g., Liberia, Sudan, Burundi, the DRC), continued hostilities and mistrust end with renewed fighting, and efforts to reach another settlement need to be undertaken. For instance, an agreement between contending groups in Liberia in September 1995 did not end the chaos but was followed by renewed war. The negotiations of new terms finally resulted in the election and creation of a new government in 1997. However, subsequent abuses of power by Charles Taylor, a former warlord elected as president, engulfed Liberia once again in a civil war, requiring a cease-fire agreement between the government and rebel forces in 2003. The entire cycle of war, peace agreement, collapse of a new government, renewed fighting, and requirement of a new negotiated settlement has been causing unnecessary human costs. Sudan, from independence in 1956 to the present, has also manifested a pattern of entrenched wars and periodic efforts at peacemaking between the predominantly Muslim north and the animist and Christian south. Settling Africa’s longest-running civil war proved to be difficult because of the persistent attempts by the minority government to impose an Islamic state on a largely non-Muslim population. The newest settlement process, begun with a 2002 accord granting some autonomy in the south, was likely to be complicated by a separate conflict in the western region of Darfur in 2004, involving systematic killings of civilian populations by government-supported militia forces. Even though it is not easy to bring adversarial parties to the negotiation table, it is an equally formidable task to ensure that the parties maintain their commitment to abide by the agreement. Postconflict situations not only provide opportunities but also pose substantial risks for former adversaries. As long as the residue of anger and hatred endures, the outcomes of security and political arrangements such as disarmament and elections involve high stakes. As efforts are made to carry out the provisions of a formal accord, the society will be marked by intense uncertainty and struggle over the scope and pace of prescribed reforms. Divergent expectations, feelings of insecurity, and a lack of established political procedures and normative standards increase the tension. During the interim period, continuing suspicion generates an unpredictable atmosphere for the future that makes community cooperation difficult. In El Salvador, the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN) responded to a lack of progress in the land transfer program by halting a phased disarmament in October 1992, and the govern-

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ment made a failed attempt to stop former rebel groups from participating in elections following the discovery of hidden stockpiles of weapons that should have been turned in. The process of implementing a peace agreement can unravel for various reasons. First of all, the parties may come to the conclusion that the agreement fails to address their underlying concerns and thus abiding by it no longer serves their best interest. New issues arising during the implementation, as well as old issues underlying adversarial relationships, have an impact on postconflict settlement, as illustrated by the Northern Ireland and Palestinian-Israeli peace processes. When there are multiple parties in a conflict, any settlement arrangement becomes very complex; the government may reach an agreement with one party that is objected to by another party. In Burundi, a serious obstacle to the implementation of power-sharing terms between the government and the main Hutu rebel group (regarding the allocation of political, military, and police posts) may arise as another rebel group enters the process. The challenges of a postconflict settlement process are different from those of small group negotiations or mediation settings. The stated goals of peace agreements, developed out of compromise solutions at the negotiation table, may contradict the demands of various group members. In most instances, the concerns of all elements in civil society are not likely to be incorporated in making compromise deals (e.g., territorial divisions, return of refugees). The compromise solutions often encounter internal opposition of the rank-and-file whose interests may have been neglected in a pact reached at the elite level. Thus, the challenges to a postconflict settlement process stem from the fact that a significant part of the constituents may not support the negotiated solutions. In fact, peace agreements do not necessarily result in an outcome that satisfies everyone’s interests (such as those of the Jewish settlers in the Israel-Palestinian conflict or Unionist party members opposed to power sharing with Catholics in Northern Ireland). In the midst of internal factional struggles, even the proponents of the original agreement may begin to lose enthusiasm when their support base wanes. If extremists on either side choose to destroy progress with violent tactics, the accord may unravel altogether. In short, peace agreements do not simply mark the end of an old conflict, and sometimes they contain the seeds of their own destruction. Footdragging and broken promises reignite intercommunal fighting with accusations of cheating, generating new hostilities. On the other hand, an insistence on too rigid terms for settlement produces a political crisis because restrictive provisions may bring about more disputes over implementation. Renegotiation of provisions contested by powerful constituents is necessary for a flexible adjustment of peace plans. Thus, the

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postaccord process has to evolve in a way to respond to the concerns of new stakeholders and expand the number of constituents. Commitment and Motivation A lack of genuine commitment makes the transition to peaceful relations very difficult. The long civil war in Angola, which can be traced back to the struggle for independence from Portugal in 1975, illustrates how difficult it can be to bring about stability. The brutal phase of Angola’s armed conflict continued with the rejection of the election victory of the incumbent government by the opposing National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) guerrilla forces in 1992 and its resumption of insurgency. A peace implementation process could genuinely begin only after the death of the rebel leader Jonas Savimbi in 2002. In the Cambodian peace process, destructive forces such as the Khmer Rouge had to be brought under control before there could be political stability. Warring factions do not suddenly change their behavior after a peace agreement. The need for peace enforcement depends on the parties’ respective degrees of commitment to the accord. The continued intolerance of other groups in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina is a good indicator of the potential for renewed violence, and preventive deployment of forces was necessary. Thus, the effects of nonviolent problem solving have to be carefully assessed with the evolution of the political transition and community building. The commitment will be weak if the parties do not have enough stake in a shared future. When the main parties withdrew from the transition governments in the Ivory Coast (2003) and Burundi (2004), the fragile process could easily have broken down completely without external support. Intermediaries can change the dynamics of a conflict by getting involved in continued efforts to diffuse tension (Mitchell 2002; Pruitt and Kim 2003). Proactive intervention measures should focus on detecting threats and minimizing the risk of violent escalation. Unfortunately, in the midst of escalating violence in Rwanda, the threat of a UN withdrawal by the end of March 1994 was not effective in convincing the parties to stop politically motivated murders and assaults. In the absence of trust, an escalating spiral of alleged violations and counter-recriminations is likely to occur without third party intervention. The significance of a third party’s role in preventing the eruption of renewed violence in volatile situations is well demonstrated by the timely intervention of the international community to stop the withdrawal of rebel forces from the 1994 election process in Mozambique. In the implementation of a peace agreement, third parties can bring both incentives and deterrence power to keep the peace process from derailing. External aid can be used not only to prevent the breakdown of a fragile

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peace process but also to lend support to new initiatives. Material incentives have been commonly employed as a carrot to motivate former adversaries to abide by their agreement. The commitment will be weak if the parties do not find enough stake in transition; therefore major donors often promise funds to support demobilization of former combatants and development assistance. Side payments, given in the form of rewards, have been used to induce cooperation especially when former adversaries depend on a third party’s resources for rebuilding their own communities. When there is failure to comply with peace provisions, a balanced response is considered more appropriate. Caving in to an unreasonable demand has not proved productive, because it encourages further demands by the obstructing party while being unfair to the complying party. In fact, the case of Cambodia suggests that concessions to an aggressive faction can bring serious disruption. When Hun Sen refused to accept the election outcome in 1993, concessions were made to help his party share government power, but this policy emboldened him to wipe out his opponents from cabinet positions militarily in 1997. External actors’ failure to insist on respect for human rights (as a means for soliciting cooperation) permitted an atmosphere of intimidation and undermined popular confidence in democracy and human rights protection. If one of the parties is willing to violate rules despite the concessions of the other parties, difficult policy questions are raised. Obviously, obstructers need to be counterbalanced with supportive elements. Policy tools and mechanisms have to be developed for weakening the positions of spoilers who attempt to disrupt a peace process. Such policies may include not only direct intervention (e.g., peace enforcement in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo, and Somalia) but also strengthening one of the parties (e.g., Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina). In the event that one of the former opponents returns to violence (e.g., attacks on UN peacekeeping troops as well as civilians by rebel forces in Sierra Leone in April and May 2000), an enforcement function might be called for to prevent a breakdown of law and order. Powerful third parties may threaten military sanctions to impose rules and overcome the resistance of extremist parties to negotiate. Given the high cost of military operations, peace enforcement functions have been seriously considered only when political institutions and norms do not exist to regulate the behavior of the parties or when violent opposition to a peace process becomes an obstacle. In Bosnia, where extreme nationalists and war criminals attempted to obstruct political institution building and movements of other ethnic groups, the deployment of NATO troops served as an instrument of coercive diplomacy. Enforcement was also used to bring war criminals in Bosnia to justice through the international judicial system. Coercive measures can be selectively applied to targeted groups to bring about desirable effects. Coercion is a short-term option and can involve a

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high cost. It should be employed to inhibit recurrent violence that may disrupt the entire process or lead to mass killings. The application of successful coercion has not been easy without well-coordinated efforts, as we have seen in the failure of the 1993 UN operations to control local militia groups in Somalia. Mechanisms to Resolve Differences Renegotiation of the process to settle differences may be required if many unresolved issues surface on the road to the creation of political institutions and economic reform. Given that failure to identify and manage incompatible positions is likely to set back a political settlement, there has to be continued confidence in resolving conflict peacefully with a concrete package of mutual commitments and actions. As negotiations, rather than threats and intimidation, must be a principal norm to guide behavior, a mechanism to sort out opposing interests is crucial to overcome the ambiguities and confusions. Effective communication between former enemies is essential for confidence building. This can be achieved through a successful operation of such mechanisms as the joint political-military commission in Mozambique. National forums were organized in South Africa and Ethiopia to discuss proposed new national constitutions. Institutions that facilitate a collaborative process can help reduce transaction costs in managing relationships between various parties. Identification of common interests through negotiation, consultation, arbitration, mediation, and problem-solving measures contributes to sustaining and reinforcing the process to explore mutually satisfying formulas. The system of communication also has to allow marginalized groups to express their unmet needs and translate their concerns into constructive agendas. Differences of interpretation arising from ambiguities in a peace agreement may be effectively handled in a multilateral negotiation forum, sometimes with third-party mediation or facilitation. An impartial forum, along with formal conflict management mechanisms such as ethnic conciliation commissions, can be created to conduct fact-finding missions and hold public hearings on issues that have caused intergroup tension. A mutually satisfying formula can also be explored by an informal search for alternative ways and means to clear suspicion. Confidential negotiation may be conducted at a higher level to break through the impasse especially at the height of intergroup hostility. A nationwide network can contribute to mitigating widespread political violence, especially when a society is deeply divided by ethnic and/or class differences. As happened in the postconflict settlement in several Central American countries, critical issues such as land distribution can be overseen by national and local peace commissions comprised of various warring fac-

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tions. After the peace agreement was reached in El Salvador, both the progress and the problems of the peace process were discussed by the National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), which included two government representatives and two FMLN members as well as representatives from each party in the legislative assembly. Consultative mechanisms of dialogue and understanding can solidify cooperative relations, thus preventing a fragile settlement process from dissolving into a renewed outbreak of violence. Conciliation commissions representing diverse ethnic groups can be designed to provide an impartial forum for the peaceful expression of majority-minority conflicts. These mechanisms are used to investigate potential or actual incidents and suggest solutions to the community problems that generate intergroup animosity. A facilitated process can be used to renegotiate such aspects of a peace accord as a revised schedule of demobilization of forces, reform of the security apparatus, and land transfer. Resolving differences at the negotiation table does not necessarily lead to building trust at a societal level, and there is a continuing need for the reconciliation of competing values and interests in achieving sustainable peace (Botes 2003). In South Africa, civil society building could not have proceeded without the healing of past wounds and the search for a common future; this is contrasted with Northern Ireland where not all the stakeholders were fully engaged in overcoming ethnic and religious fragmentation. A more desirable and successful settlement of violent conflict relies on the commitment of warring parties to determine their future in political forums but not through violent tactics. The strategies and rules of survival during peacetime are different from those of wartime when planning inevitably focused on immediate survival. If rules of peaceful competition for power are to be established, losers may have to be persuaded, even pressed, to accept the outcome of implementation of the agreement. As those who benefit from the status quo want to maintain their privileges, some form of serious confrontation is inevitable. A process of peacebuilding must give real evidence that the dominant party cannot simply impose its will or eliminate the other side while the weaker party is committed to nonviolent structural transformation. Even though demands for change made by a weaker party are often not met, peace agreements should help provide a framework for continuing efforts to transform unbalanced relationships. The goal of peacebuilding needs to be formulated out of a shared vision arising from mutual understanding and a collaborative spirit of problem solving. Institutional Transformation The notion of “neoliberal peacebuilding,” characterized by the establishment of formal democratic processes combined with promotion of a market

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economy, has been accepted almost universally in spite of some reservations about its application strategies (David 2002; Duffield 2002; Parris 1997). At one level, liberal democratic visions stress formal institutions and rules as well as political representation through elections. Thus, reforms in the direction of democratic institution building mostly focus on creating a fair process for political competition. At another level, the existence of civil society is a precondition for expressing popular demand and enhancing democratic values. A plurality of groups and associations need to be promoted to balance out any abusive power of the state. Without nurturing a civil society, the social-political dimension of peacebuilding is highly fragmented, permitting a concentration of power or oppressive relations. Nonstate associations can symbolize the elements of trust, cooperation, and inclusion needed for the growth of a mature civil society (Bernardo and Ortigas 2000). Formal elections in Liberia and Haiti were not accompanied by an empowerment of civil society and prevention of renewed violence. In El Salvador and Guatemala, dominant political structures still exist, and the continued domination of the military and landlords has weakened prospects for democracy and economic reform. In the absence of a pluralistic democratic tradition, serious attention needs to be paid to the substantive outcomes of the formal political process, which may lead to deepening social and economic disparities. It has often been pointed out that a competitive political process is not always adequate as a response to deeper causes and consequences of communitarian violence reflecting ethnic cleavages, internal colonization, regional grievances, and a lack of cultural autonomy. In political transition, the majority of international programs “appear to focus on the form and structure of the rule of law while evading its substantive content” (Mani 2000a, p. 101). When it is seen as a technical task, institutional reform fails to take into account the specific cultural and historical needs of individual societies such as postcolonial ethnic hierarchies. The process of transforming the dynamics of an intrastate conflict is closely associated with a social/historical trend toward demands for greater group autonomy. In the midst of ethnic hostility and other social divisions, it takes time to institutionalize the expression of diverse demands of social groups in a functional manner. Democracy can be consolidated with mature political conditions promoting both external and internal legitimacy. A stable political order does not necessarily emerge from a new constitutional framework. Political mobilization in a divided society often leads to strengthening ethnonationalism, politics of exclusion, and partisan loyalties (Byrne and Keashly 2000). Harmony of opposing values and norms cannot be achieved without a reconciliation of social divisions along ethnic, religious, and class lines deepened by the fragmentation of political life. The existing realities of managing and regulating conflict often contradict political pluralism in which success relies on the assumption that

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power is more or less evenly distributed among a plethora of interest groups. In fragmented societies, special attention needs to be paid to political institutions that channel demands and translate them into policy. Where there is insufficient institutionalization of the political process (e.g., Tajikistan, Sierra Leone, and Liberia), personal and patrimonial links have an impact on the distribution of assets and access to economic gains as well as political positions (Boas 2001; Conteh-Morgan 2003). In Bosnia-Herzegovina, privatization of state industries based on market rationalism was manipulated to reward loyalty to the nationalist corporate system. Nationalist parties, controlled by patrimonies, manipulate formal politics, infusing fear into voters. By successfully co-opting ethnonationalism, patrimonies have effectively controlled political parties, while lending legitimacy in relation to the external world for negotiating power with international institutions (Pugh 2001). Postconflict reconstruction is a more challenging task for societies marked by the deep social inequalities that are common to many divided and impoverished countries. As we have seen in Zimbabwe, political stability and social reconciliation hinge, in the long run, upon how to decrease the gross inequalities between racially and ethnically divided groups through poverty reduction. In fact, inequality was used as a means of political manipulation by President Robert Mugabe, who wanted to maintain his power. In promoting development and social rehabilitation, civil society can be empowered to be aware “of the socio-economic and cultural circumstances that shape their lives and their capacity to transform that reality” (McKay 1998, p. 359). In addressing political and social causes of communitarian violence, peacebuilding encompasses much more than technical tasks such as setting up government institutions and providing judicial and other services. Multiethnic and multicultural configurations significantly influence the success of elections and other formal democratic procedures that have to reflect respect for greater autonomy and diversity. In the areas of judicial and police reform, ethnic balance is as important as the development of professional ethics and the establishment of universal standards for human rights. Distributional aspects of macroeconomic policies have to be considered in the context of social and political needs if inequity and animosities are to be reduced; a strict consideration of inflation control and other technical indicators is not enough. New institutional arrangements will result from a renegotiation of the political balance in ethnicity, economic status, gender, and generation.

Peacebuilding Dimensions Activities involved in rebuilding war-torn societies are designed to enhance public security, generate economic recovery, facilitate social healing, and

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promote democratic institutions. Peacebuilding in postsettlement settings entails both short-term and long-term frameworks. In the aftermath of a negotiated agreement, the management of humanitarian crisis situations changes to become assistance in social and economic rehabilitation. Shortterm management plans are based on intense negotiations to defuse volatile situations and respond to the immediate needs of returning refugees and other marginalized groups. In the absence of local administrative structures (needed for basic social services), essential government functions can be restored by international administrators or peacekeeping forces. Most settlement agreements include a timetable for a cease-fire, the subsequent demobilization of armed combatants, and the organization of local and national elections. Stable relations between communities can be created through efforts to rebuild political, economic, and social structures that have collapsed or are dysfunctional. Such peacebuilding strategies as the promotion of national reconciliation, social and economic improvement, as well as reform of state institutions and political representation, aim at reducing socioeconomic cleavages and regional animosities. Thus the end of a violent conflict must be accompanied by significant changes in socioeconomic institutions that extend beyond the maintenance of a cease-fire, disarmament, and the conversion of warring factions into political parties. The re-creation of political institutions is a crucial task for maintaining stability in failed states such as Liberia, Somalia, and Afghanistan where civil wars have destroyed the foundations of both governmental and civic institutions. Movement toward the long-term goals of a sustainable economy and self-governance will enhance the prospects for empowerment and trust building. What has happened in the past needs to be confronted in order to heal a fractured community, and the parameters of peacebuilding will eventually be tested by attempts to bring former perpetrators to justice. The goals of peacebuilding will ultimately be achieved by reconstruction and reconciliation that are geared not only toward changing behavior and perceptions but also toward social and institutional structures that can be mobilized to prevent future conflict.

Assessment There has been a growing interest in research on the conduct of existing peacebuilding operations, especially since the mid-1990s, among policymakers and scholars. United Nations agencies, the World Bank, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and other international agencies have created special units that deal with postconflict reconstruction, while Western governments have contributed to peacekeeping operations and development aid for societies recovering from violent

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conflict. Research on peacebuilding, thus, has reflected on practical experiences rather than being engaged in purely theoretical debates. The majority of research has been concentrated on peacebuilding experiences in Cambodia, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Liberia, South Africa, El Salvador, Guatemala, former Yugoslavia, and other countries that involved significant international intervention.1 While some of this research is descriptive with a focus on one country, others try to compare the experiences of countries as a group. Scholarly interest has also led to a proliferation of literature on different aspects of peacebuilding, ranging from the dynamics of ending civil war (Fortna 2004) to peacekeeping and policing (Gordon and Toase 2001; Dwan 2002); from elections (Kumar 1998; Reilly and Reynolds 2000) and political transition (Call and Cook 2003; Milliken and Krause 2002) to reconciliation (Bloomfield, Barnes, and Huyse 2003; Gloppen 2002; Hayner, 2001); from development assistance (Esman and Herring 2001; Collier et al. 2003) to gender and rehabilitation (Date-Bah and Walsh 2001; McKay 2000). Such areas as peacekeeping and reconciliation drew more attention than development and political transition. Conceptual efforts have also been made to put a diverse range of topics together but without much success in integrating multiple dimensions of peacebuilding (Jeong 2002; Newman and Schnabel 2002; Pugh 2000a; Reychler and Paffenholz 2000; Sampson et al. 2003; Stedman, Rothchild, and Cousens 2002). Some studies take short-term crisis intervention approaches with an extensive focus on emergency relief and control of violence. Conflict management efforts such as peacekeeping need to be linked to a longer-term process of not only transforming the psychological environment of adversarial relationships but also social change. By illustrating the interdependence of various elements of peacebuilding roles, our research will be able to accomplish a more thorough examination of complex aspects of peacebuilding. Due to continuing challenges and questions, the issues surrounding peacebuilding operations need to be investigated more fully. One of the best-known experts observes that the field is in the stage of identifying the pieces of the puzzle that are essential to rebuild divided societies recovering from communal violence (Alger 2000). The challenge is how to deepen knowledge about the potential contributions of each piece while attempting to discern how the various strategies fit together. The diverse aspects of peacebuilding have yet to be integrated in a manner that would help us assess whether and how each fits into an overall process. This book seeks to provide an integrative peacebuilding model with an assessment of past achievements and current trends. The conceptual framework presented here can be applied not only to societies that have been successful in restoring relatively stable relations between former adver-

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saries (e.g., Mozambique, El Salvador, and Namibia) but also to societies whose reconstruction efforts have yet to produce visible results (e.g., Bosnia, Kosovo, and Somalia).

Overview This book examines social and psychological as well as political factors that play important roles in the success or failure of initiatives to bring peace. Some chapters discuss security and political transition, while others are devoted to such topics as development, reconciliation, and social rehabilitation. These themes are illustrated in terms of conditions under which the project of rebuilding a postconflict society has proceeded in different countries. In assessing what has worked and has not worked, most importantly, the book’s analysis examines conceptual and policy approaches that have been applied in various circumstances. This introductory chapter has surveyed the major assumptions, objectives, and obstacles to the implementation of peacebuilding. It can be a long, difficult process to overcome deep-seated hostilities in a society that has been sharply divided by the experience of violence. While the reestablishment of a national government through elections following control of violence is certainly a very important step toward sustainable peace, changing behavior and attitudes as well as structural constraints to peace cannot be easily obtained without addressing other dimensions. Based on this understanding, the second chapter, “Peacebuilding Design,” discusses the conceptual tools needed for assessing and explaining various experiences of postconflict reconstruction. In a synergetic approach, public security, democratic transition, social rehabilitation, and development complement each other in reweaving the fabric of deeply divided societies. Issues surrounding the formulation of peacebuilding goals and strategies as well as priorities for different types of operations are explored. The chapter also looks at ways in which different dimensions of activities connect to each other in terms of sequence and levels of analysis. For instance, social and political change will not start without the control of violence in the short term. At the same time, short-term emergency aid and other humanitarian activities have to be considered in the context of their impact on civil society building at a local level. Improving the economic and social conditions—even though it may take time—is critical to longterm political stability. Diverse approaches to the control of violence, maintenance of order, and protection of civilians from human rights abuses are discussed in Chapter 3, “Security and Demilitarization.” Control of violence and commitment to the nonuse of violence require demilitarization and conversion of mili-

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tary functions for the construction of civil society. Continuing violence inhibits intermediate- and long-term reconstruction efforts. The experiences of Namibia, Mozambique, and other countries suggest that such demilitarization programs as demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants into productive sectors of society are critical to the creation of a sustainable security environment. In the initial stage of peacebuilding, normalization of relations is supported by confidence-building measures along with the acceptance of mutual security. In the process of demobilization of combatants, clear sets of norms and expectations among former adversaries can be introduced along with making each other’s motives transparent. Peacekeeping, illustrated by the examples of East Timor, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, can be used to stabilize a postconflict situation by enhancing a security environment through maintenance of order and enforcement of rules. Improvement in human rights is a major component in institutional reform, in that oppression, left unchallenged, would continue to be a source of social tension and violence. Chapter 4, “Political Transition,” examines diverse paths to the creation of stable political order and, more importantly, sustainable democratic relations between groups within a new political structure. Establishing order especially in failed states such as Somalia and Afghanistan is difficult due to a lack of common political loyalty and affiliation. Since it is not always easy to find a satisfactory political framework after many years of struggle, it sometimes takes extended negotiation sessions and considerable compromise. The design of a new political structure must reflect cultural practices and social experiences; further, mechanisms to reconcile the incompatible demands of group interests should be explored in ethnically divided countries such as Ethiopia. A variety of constitutional models for power sharing between majority and minority groups can be examined in terms of how to overcome exclusive ethnic, religious, or regional loyalties. Holding elections is only the first step toward the establishment of a functioning political system. Political stability is not immediately brought about by elections without stable institutional relations and consensus on political values, as is suggested by the case of Liberia. Building a political and administrative infrastructure requires a delicate balance between different concerns for the fulfillment of conditions for democracy. Different models of power sharing can be arranged to guarantee self-rule for identity groups and encourage tolerance of different values and cultures as well as protect diverse economic interests. Development strategies are the main theme of Chapter 5. A development process is a means for supporting economic conditions of marginalized groups as well as improving material well-being. Owing to the problems related to a lack of human capital and destruction of physical infrastructure,

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it is a challenging task to restart economic development halted by violent conflict. The capacity of indigenous organizations to mobilize resources in a local setting is the key to a grassroots development approach. Synergies for development have to be generated by humanitarian assistance in order to meet the emergent needs of refugees and local populations. Economic growth and patterns of income distribution have to be considered in an integrative framework of building harmonious relations between different social groups. Economic programs must be designed to bring about stability and equity, since social tension is created by not only perceived but also real imbalances in income and wealth. In promoting the goal of peace, development programs (e.g., land reform in El Salvador) need to address the social and economic ills that are the roots of violence. Development cannot be easily disentangled from democracy and security. How to build renewed ties between groups beyond meeting their immediate physical survival needs is one of the central questions of social rehabilitation. Practices of and approaches to social rehabilitation and reconciliation are discussed in Chapter 6. Communities tormented by repeated violence do not have a social foundation of security, because the violence has destroyed the realm of ordinary life. The threads of personal well-being and intergroup harmony are rewoven through the promotion of social justice and equity. The process of resolving community problems benefits from the utilization of indigenous cultural institutions and norms. As we have seen in Bosnia and Rwanda, violence leaves psychological and social wounds that have to be healed by reconciliation efforts. Envisioning a new future is not possible without acknowledging past abusive relationships. Reconciliation, based on compassion, forgiveness, and restitution, facilitates a return to normality by bringing both psychological and social healing. The truth commissions set up in South Africa and other postconflict societies compile a record of human rights violations for preventing future abuses, although they are, in general, not given authority to conduct criminal proceedings in order to avoid resistance from former abusers. Chapter 7, “Operational Imperatives and Coordination,” looks at intermediary activities along a continuum from violence prevention to social reconstruction. To fit in a particular postconflict settlement process, these third-party functions may be modified. For instance, peacekeeping has been expanded beyond its traditional role to such areas as assisting in food distribution, confiscation of weapons of local militia groups, and restoration of basic government infrastructure and transportation systems. Intermediaries coordinated by the UN and other international organizations can change the dynamics of a conflict, as they contribute to a continuing dispute resolution process. In general, there is a division of roles between different agencies in their involvement in crisis management, help-

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ing renegotiate timetables, and providing technical expertise as well as financial and material resources for infrastructure building. The level of intervention can be, in part, determined by the degree of local administrative capacity. Overall this book suggests what can be done to improve peacebuilding practice and integrates the main themes explored in earlier research. The recovery of a fractured community increases its ability to change the dynamics of the cycle of conflict. Social and psychological processes of peacebuilding are geared toward illuminating transformative possibilities that correct imbalanced relationships. The transformation of adversarial relationships ultimately has to focus on the problems attributed to original and new sources of serious conflict. A participatory process is designed to enhance the long-term goals of a sustainable economy and self-governance. Conditions for the success or failure of peacebuilding are affected by not only objective but also subjective environments that enhance or prohibit transition to a sustainable peace. Conceptual tools are needed to assess the impact of different conflict transformation activities. For strategies to be effective, timing, priority setting, and other conditions that have an impact on behavior and structure should be taken into consideration. To understand the effectiveness of different elements of peacebuilding, we would do well to examine how security, political, social, and economic components support each other in reweaving a divided society’s fabric.

Notes 1. For case studies, refer to Adebajo 2002; Anstee 1996; Arnson 1999; Bose 2002; Byrne 2001; Candio and Bleiker 2001; Cramer and Goodhand 2002; Hirsch 2001; Holiday 2000; Manning 2002; Lincoln and Sereseres 2000; Marks 2000; Martin 2001; Mekenkamp, van Tongeren, and van de Veen 2002; Rogel 2003; Suhrke, Arne, and Kristian 2002.

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2 PEACEBUILDING DESIGN

Given all the complexities involved in rebuilding societies emerging from violent conflict, a clear, policy-relevant conceptualization of a peacebuilding process is necessary. Although multiple paths and different visions exist for peacebuilding, their differences can be compared as we examine sectoral and sequential activities as well as operational goals and environments. It is important to develop a clear understanding of the diverse dimensions of peacebuilding and how various strategies can be put together to achieve sustainable peace. A peacebuilding design process should go beyond assembling a checklist of a vast array of tasks such as demobilization of armed groups, refugee resettlement, development assistance, institutional reform, and the advancement of human rights. In this chapter, a synergetic approach is suggested for a more concerted strategy to rebuilding postconflict societies.

Principles and Concepts One of the reasons that too many projects lack sustainable effects is a failure to determine clear and compelling goals of peace and to coordinate strategies to achieve them. Incoherence derives from the pursuit of different goals by multiple actors and a lack of consensus or clarity of definition of peace that presents a long-term vision extending beyond humanitarian assistance and control of violence. Decisionmakers must be sensitized about the complexity of peacebuilding in formulating a more integrated policy framework. A learning curve will be slow without comparative analysis and evaluation criteria. While peacebuilding does not always proceed as planned and should be adapted to unforeseen conditions, it needs to be a goal-oriented process. A designing approach to peacebuilding relies on a conscious process of developing priorities and strategies.1 Mapping peacebuilding components and processes in the context of local circumstances should be seen as more than a list-making exercise. Peacebuilding design can help clarify priorities and 19

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goals, identify means to achieve them, and assess their effects on the overall process. The operational level focuses on orchestrating field elements in such a way as to ensure that tactical actions do not work counter to the strategic plan. Activities at the tactical level are geared toward achieving outcomes in a given area rather than the overall aspects of the peacebuilding project; tactical objectives are more finite with limited logistical boundaries and times. Human rights monitors, UN civilian police, peacekeeping forces, and election support personnel are important on the ground; however, without harmonization of their work with each other and across chains of command, an overall strategy cannot be effectively pursued. Whereas goals are defined in terms of desirable and achievable conditions for peace, a strategy has to do with logistics and means that are appropriate to the pursuit of the objectives. More specifically, implementation strategies have to be based on the identification of actors and the coordination of activities in various sectors within a given time frame according to priorities. Consideration of the different needs faced by societies recovering from a violent political conflict must be incorporated into a peacebuilding design. Policy frameworks and planning should entail the analysis of not only the scope and duration of the impact of any strategy but also their opportunity costs, as related to the level of sustained efforts required for the achievement of the original objectives. Various strategies can be assessed in terms of their possible impact and their salience in an overall process relative to the time needed to achieve the primary goals. Sustainability can be incorporated into strategic analysis, since no matter how ideal the outcome might be, it must also be durable, providing the necessary infrastructure for long-term peace as well as being achievable within an acceptable time frame. Multidimensional analysis helps with assessing the strengths of the peace potential by examining the impact of diverse policy tools on the outcome (Reychler 2000). Since peacebuilding initiatives can be reversible and precarious, a coherent policy plan should consider the compensatory effects of a series of measures that would either accelerate or inhibit progress toward the implementation of a peace agreement. Generic categories of peacebuilding can be listed in an inclusive design (Doyle and Sambanis 2000), but such a standard model has to be adapted to identify strategies that respond to specific sets of problems. Formulating a conceptual model for a system-wide strategic plan needs to be supported by a comprehensive analysis of the original conflict. Design of each component of peacebuilding (e.g., security, development, reconciliation) must take into account the diverse nature of past violence (e.g., deep ethnic divisions, military imbalance) and its causal antecedents as well as an assessment of future prospects. Memories of past events and visions for the future have significant effects on the present struggle.

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Defining Goals and Processes Effective implementation of individual or overall policies requires a compelling definition of peace. The goal of peacebuilding lies not only in reducing physical and material suffering but also in achieving self-sufficiency. Beyond responding to immediate needs, local capacity building is necessary for the institutionalization of peace (Cockell 2000). For deconstruction of a violent system, attitudinal and motivational changes are needed to reduce organizational and social vulnerabilities. Thus sustainable peace can be defined as a collective good to redress the past legacy of violent conflict, helping the population overcome extreme vulnerability and move toward self-sufficiency. Integrative social development, geared toward meeting human needs, should be the ultimate focus of postconflict reconstruction and rehabilitation. The process of postconflict peacebuilding is characterized by a move from the presence of violence and domination to the creation of sustainable relationships between former adversaries (Lumsden 1999). However, the “very notion of peace” is based on “social constructions shaped by a particular material and political context” (Lizee 1999, p. 18). Thus the conditions of peace are affected by particular configurations of social structures and political forces that attempt to reproduce disparities among groups, legitimizing the existing order. Whether peace can actually prevail in a society is determined by the extent to which coercion and violence are used for maintaining political order; for example, political assassination of opponents is a tactic that has been used to consolidate Prime Minister Hun Sen’s rule in Cambodia. Peacebuilding needs to be broadened and redefined as an integrated social process for an associative engagement with the overall aim of creating a mutually accepted framework of rules and institutions guiding the conduct of former belligerents (Pugh 2000a). The quality of transition has an important impact on the nature of relations between the conflicting parties as well as institutional reform. If the goal is not the restoration of an old order, promotion of peace should lead to facilitating change, rather than a return to the status quo, with empowerment of the marginalized. Peacebuilding is based on the expectation that long-term security interests are served by the realization of a just society. Merely providing order does not guarantee the right to justice and dignity, especially if it does not allow the expression of needs and grievances in a constructive manner.

The Scope of Changes Each peacebuilding measure differs in terms of the width and depth of its impact on the overall process. The scope of change is affected by the

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orientations of different peace approaches and their existing potential. Some measures focus on law and order, emphasizing the restoration of a strong government, while others are more geared toward facilitating a change in social structures associated with a violent political order. Formal agreements at a political level are concerned with arms reduction, restoration of law and order, and liberal economic reform, while community-level activities must be directed toward reducing everyday violence against women, children, and minority group members. Civil society needs to be empowered to the point that local institutions can bear democratic scrutiny. In a minimalist approach that stresses maintaining law and order, peacebuilding focuses on prevention without necessarily creating positive conditions for structural transformation. The control of violent behavior for personal and community security is only part of a larger approach to peacebuilding since it does not address the root causes of the original conflict (Duffield 2002). Normally, monitoring the cease-fire, providing relief, and supervising elections constitute a formal peacebuilding package. The majority of reform programs concentrate on the form and institution of the rule of law, consequently evading its substantive content (Mani 2000a). Democratic order and justice based on respect for human value cannot be achieved by a mere focus on formal legality. An emphasis on law and order such as arresting war criminals can be helpful for changing the dynamics of local conflict by weakening extremist factions. However, these are not enough to overcome the structural, cultural, and relational roots underlying conflicts. Thus, in a maximalist approach oriented toward justice and human dignity, development and human rights are critical elements in institutional reform. The promotion of processes that will transform existing social, economic, and political structures is opposed to a “quick-fix” engineering approach (Pugh 2000a). A wider and greater impact on the system can be brought about by changes in social, political dynamics (related to power and cultural norms). For instance, demobilization would not be sufficient to bring about stability without efforts aimed at transforming a cultural affinity for resolving conflicts with weapons. The scope of change can differ, depending on the priority given to improving individual and group well-being or to institutional reform. There are different strategies to combine structural reform with improving intergroup relations. Projects addressing individual needs (e.g., the rehabilitation of child soldiers) or intergroup reconciliation in a communal setting may benefit a small number of targeted beneficiaries. Interpersonal approaches do not affect a large number of people, though they can contribute to personal healing and inner change at a deeper level. Programs offering training in practical conflict resolution skills, seeking changes in attitudes,

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perceptions, and behavior, can generate intensive psychological effects at a small group level (Fisher 1999). Compared with psychotherapeutic approaches, development assistance programs bring about positive changes on a larger scale but generally have a less intensive impact on interpersonal processes. Reconstruction programs need to be geared toward reducing social discrimination as well as improving the personal welfare of members of underprivileged groups. A broader and greater change derives from expanding the tangible impact at the lowest grassroots level. Most importantly, approaches oriented toward individual needs or interpersonal issues eventually have to move beyond a small number of beneficiaries to develop an institutionalized base. In order to have an impact on institutional reform, the base of grassroots projects can be broadened by reaching out to diverse groups of people. In particular, the active engagement of individuals who are in a position to influence their own community can be expanded to provide a foundation for community building. Cumulatively, social effects of communal processes such as healing can bring positive changes in national consciousness, policies, and institutions.

Contextual Variables As postconflict situations differ greatly, contextual variables such as the nature of conflict and the methods of its settlement have differing effects in particular strategies. The duration and priorities of implementation activities vary according to the divisiveness of groups, the extent of economic and social destruction, and the role of external actors. More serious political and social challenges are expected where there is a combination of political rivalry, economic collapse, radical changes in ethnic boundaries, and malfunction of the central government such as in Somalia and the Balkans. A comparative analysis of South Africa, Bosnia, and Rwanda suggests that the methods for ending violent conflict (through negotiated settlement or military victory) have an impact on postconflict political configurations (such as majority rule, carving up territorial divisions, ethnic or racial hegemony through control of military and state institutions). The settlement methods also create different prospects for democracy such as degrees of tolerance of opposition.2 When there has been no clear victor in a civil war, the involvement and cooperation of former adversaries is essential in such matters as the integration of militias and rebels into a national army. Ending conflict with a military victory creates unbalanced power relations that, in turn, lead to difficulties in democratic governance as was exemplified by Rwanda.

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The length and level of intensity of violent conflicts (civil war versus low-intensity conflict with limited armed struggle) may determine difficulties in social reconstruction and reconciliation. The experience of a long civil war creates such challenges as a large number of refugees and/or large-scale civilian death as well as the need to rebuild an economic infrastructure.3 In particular, it takes longer and more complex activities to reconstruct societies emerging from ethnic cleansing or genocide (e.g., Bosnia, Rwanda) that has produced a high level of social destruction. A divisive political process is generated by the fractured nature of groups and a weak political and organizational infrastructure. When there are several rebel groups fighting independently, signing a peace accord with one of them does not necessarily mean the end of a civil war (e.g., Burundi). Allocation of government positions to two main rebel and unarmed opposition groups has been a contentious issue in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Motivational factors can also differ, and a strong commitment to a peace process tends to increase with a high level of psychological exhaustion following long-term civil conflicts (e.g., El Salvador and Mozambique). The nature of state apparatus such as a limited public administrative capacity influences social rehabilitation. Poor indigenous capacity as well as the depth of hostility among groups can be compensated for or overcome by the existence of a strong international commitment. Economic recovery and social rehabilitation are affected by the extent of existing development and by levels and types of war damage. Poor countries with great income disparities (e.g., Haiti, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guinea-Bissau) are under heavier pressure to meet the daily needs of their populations and pursue economic reform especially after a long, intense civil war. Severe economic recession, in combination with a revival of ethnic rivalries, creates an unstable environment that may lead to renewed violence.

Assessing Implementation Strategies Prospects for the successful implementation of negotiated settlements can be affected by timetables and logistical requirements. Resource allocation needs to reflect the salience and difficulties of the tasks as well as their sustainability. A large and diverse UN administrative and military deployment is required to meet the challenges arising from pursuing complex tasks simultaneously. Tasks ranging from the demobilization and disarmament of belligerents to repatriation of several million refugees and displaced persons are sometimes scheduled to be completed within a relatively short time frame before elections are held (Harris and Reilly 1999). The opportunity structure can be pre-assessed in terms of the syner-

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getic effects of each policy option and implementation costs as well as the degree of salience. Since financial support for rehabilitation of former combatants can reduce aid for resettlement of returning refugees, demobilization and reintegration become more than technically complex issues. Political assessment is necessary in determining a trade-off between the demobilization of former combatants and support for returning refugees. Setting an appropriate target number of returned refugees or a specific goal of increasing economic productivity is not easy without looking at the specific challenges ahead. The level of sustained efforts that is expected in pursuit of any goal should be commensurate to the difficulty involved, according to strategic and logistic definitions of the tasks. Equally importantly, the outcome ought to be achievable within an acceptable time frame. Developing long-term policy goals thus relates closely to supporting the constituents of peacebuilding. Some measures aim at bringing about direct, tangible outcomes in political, economic, or social arenas while others seek to have an impact on indirect, intangible psychological, cultural, and spiritual dimensions of transition. Subjective criteria such as the satisfaction of constituents are based on perceptions and expectations, and they are not easily quantifiable. Nonmaterial, emotional, nonrational psychological elements are not easy to predict or calculate, and some kinds of value judgments are inevitably involved in decisionmaking. Objective standards and subjective criteria should be synthesized within a consolidated needs assessment. Since de facto developments in the field do not always follow anticipated and guided operational strategies, unintended, as well as intended, effects need to be considered. The processes of elections and liberal economic reform can bring about unintended consequences such as ethnic polarization and growing income disparities. In El Salvador and Nicaragua, human development agendas have been undermined by monetary and other macroeconomic policies that were prescribed by Western donors as conditions for aid; these policies were originally designed to reduce government spending and control inflation. The regional implications of demobilization are well illustrated by such examples as the proliferation of arms in Somalia that resulted from extensive illegal arms transfers following the end of the Ethiopian civil war. In a peacebuilding context, a missed opportunity can refer to a moment when the failure to carry out certain measures within a given time frame results in a setback to the entire process. Postponement of some interventions such as slow or ineffective international measures to prevent or stop violence can prove deadly. The failure of timely intervention in transforming postconflict dynamics has proven to be devastating in the continued cycle of violence. Lost opportunity has to be considered in such areas as the deployment of troops following peace agreements and mediation efforts to

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bring implementation back on track. The core mission to establish a national political authority (along with a national police force and judicial system) in Somalia stumbled with the UN failure to disarm militia forces. Failed peacebuilding efforts have been marked by histories of lost opportunities. Overcoming a long history of animosity and mutual accusations can be easier during the early implementation stage when people still have great optimism (e.g., Palestine, Northern Ireland). It is costly to miss the moment when all the parties cherish hope for future cooperation following the euphoria of peace agreements. When support for the cause of peace evaporates, more time-consuming negotiations are necessary to revitalize the peace process. In the event that the level of hostilities is deep, an easy task can be undertaken first to test trust and confidence. Steps taken in public health or economic development can improve relationships needed to resolve political and military differences. Implementation Strategies: Concentration Versus Diffusion Peacebuilding can move forward through concentration on a few sectors with a limited time frame. Concerted efforts can be made in such areas as refugee return, organization of elections, and judicial and police reform. The demilitarization of politics is pursued through the transformation of armed groups into political parties and the demobilization of soldiers. In Namibia, short-term objectives of demilitarization were the main focus, since it was believed that demobilization of guerrilla forces and security sector reform would promote political stability. Peacebuilding efforts conducted in a short time frame with a heavy external presence include the UN mission deployed to Cambodia in 1991. As the central government lacked legitimacy, a transitional structure (managed and supported by 22,000 international military and civilian staff) lasted for two years, with daily monitoring of the government administration until national elections were conducted in 1993. The tasks were to oversee demobilization, facilitate refugee return, prevent human rights violations, and support the legal infrastructure. In a security-first approach, adequately controlling physical violence and maintaining order, along with humanitarian activities, take priority over qualitative social development such as economic and social progress. This approach posits that social development is more easily achieved once order is established (David 2002). In diffusion strategies, security measures based on peace enforcement, however, do not necessarily lead to democratic institution building. When development projects are delayed because priority is given to security sector reform, long-term security conditions may actually be jeopardized; a high unemployment rate, for example, may produce increased violence. Prioritizing one sector over another may not be beneficial within an organic process of peacebuilding.

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While resources can be concentrated in a few priority sectors at the initial stage, a long-term sustained investment of time and resources is required in societies like Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, or Afghanistan where the control of violence cannot be achieved without concurrent social and political aspects of peacebuilding. Nation building has an open-ended timeline reflecting the reality that reconciliation among former adversaries takes time. Peacebuilding is a long-term project, especially with insufficient local capacity; artificial deadlines set up by third parties reflect the concerns of donor countries more than logistical realities. When local leaders’ power is better established, in places like Somalia and Afghanistan, a gradual approach to state building can be adopted with the maintenance of loose local administrative structures. Despite elections in Bosnia, its central government barely functions without the imposition of external decisionmaking authority. When weak central control exists in a fragmented and militarized society, building a new political structure can rely on step-by-step approaches to mending ethnic relations through the development of organic relationships. Long-term social and economic development agendas are needed for substantive achievement in reconstituting war-torn societies.

Functional Interdependencies The complexities of peacebuilding require coherent approaches to the multiple domains of peacebuilding, including security, development, social rehabilitation, and political reform. Many tasks of peacebuilding are faced with overcoming human suffering and economic destruction as well as institutional failure. Each measure has to be implemented to be compatible with the conditions required by other aspects of building sustainable peace. Activities in one area may have harmful effects in other arenas if they are not integrated in a complementary manner. The intended changes should be positive and strong enough to mitigate any negative effects (Reychler 2000). Due to their interdependencies, activities in various sectors should be complementary to each other. The restoration of basic economic functions and the maintenance of political order can be hampered without the control of violence. At the same time, supervising the cease-fire, providing humanitarian assistance, and monitoring the elections are not sufficient in themselves to generate long-term synergetic effects. Demobilization is successful only when it is supported by a development process that creates employment opportunities for ex-combatants in the civilian economy. In the absence of the recovery of economic activities and affirmation of human rights as the examples of El Salvador, Haiti, and Guatemala suggest, there is an increasing risk of getting caught up in criminal and sociopolitical violence.

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Neglecting social and economic development contributes to an inadvertent return to the origin of conflict. Disarmament and demobilization efforts alone would not decrease the danger of re-escalation (Pugh 2000a). Development and social rehabilitation strategies have to be designed to help reduce a high level of crime, insecurity, and volatile sociopolitical situations that may follow the demobilization of soldiers. Therefore integrated social development has a synergetic impact on the control of social violence. Humanitarian assistance has to be closely integrated with social reconstruction efforts. Relief activities need to be carefully designed to have a great impact on social rehabilitation and development especially where the displacement and victimization of a significant number of prewar residents are an obstacle to community building. To build stable communal relations, humanitarian principles have to be applied to the protection of minority ethnic groups exposed to violence. The gap between humanitarian aid and reconstruction programs undermines integrative approaches to community building. With careful phasing out of humanitarian and emergency relief (oriented toward the immediate survival of communities), investment in local capacity building and empowerment is needed to overcome poverty, gender inequalities, educational decline, and unemployment. Income can be boosted by investment in basic infrastructure building, roads, housing, transportation, power, telecommunications, water, and sanitation. Repair and reconstruction of physical infrastructure can be combined with food-for-work programs that generate employment opportunities. Development and social rehabilitation have to be able to produce a synergetic effect (David 2002). By increasing the income-earning opportunities for various members of the community, such projects as microcredit programs, revitalization of smallholder agriculture, and improved access to land and credit contribute to a reduction in communal violence. While undermining the role of small producers, privatization in the agricultural sector of East Timor led to sharp reductions in state services along with higher unemployment (Martin 2001). Efforts to establish macroeconomic stability have focused on reductions in government budgets and privatization of state industries, yet infrastructure building requires an increase in spending on reconstruction projects. The loss of jobs following economic austerity measures normally brings protests from former employees at a volatile moment of political and military transition. Most importantly, economic rationale is often contradictory to political reality in the way the achievement of economic balance can undermine social and political reconciliation. In Cambodia, the World Bank pressed for reducing the cost of running social services programs, but that was

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incompatible with a power-sharing agreement which permitted an increase in appointments. Measures aimed at advancing the projected goals of democratization and development must be compatible with each other. Equitable social and economic development flourishes in a nonoppressive political environment. A land redistribution program in El Salvador is inseparable from the political struggle between the government and its opponents. In a society with growing income gaps, political democratization is less likely to be enhanced by privatization of public lands and industries.4 Projects of reconciliation and civil society building require transformative perspectives. Institutional reform of the police and judicial sectors is not easy without democratization (Mani 2000a). Most importantly, the main task of reconstruction is to help local communities become self-reliant. A foundation for durable communal relations can be laid by social and economic improvement. Overall, there are different degrees of synergetic effects across sectors, depending on the types of mutual interactions between activities and their intensity. For instance, the synergetic effects of security are immediate and can be readily felt in economic and other sectors, whereas development and social rehabilitation may be considered more indirectly linked with security, even though economic and social cooperation has to be fostered to build confidence among former adversaries.

Time Frames An overall plan is needed to determine circumstances under which short-, intermediate-, and long-term programs are favored. Temporal relationships among activities can be examined in terms of their mutual effects. Time frames should be considered in terms of the significance of each activity in a temporal order (either sequential or synchronic). In the design of multiphase programs, in general, different time frames have been suggested for crisis management, institution building, and structural transformation. Short-term military and diplomatic approaches focus on averting violence and managing a crisis while sustained time commitments have to be made to social rehabilitation and reconciliation. Long-term approaches are involved in not only changing conditions that have underpinned conflict but also influencing perceptions and behavior. Timetables must be set up in light of the links between short-term crisis management plans and long-term structural reform. Some programs such as relief aid are limited to meeting the immediate physical and material needs of local populations. Short-term projects of humanitarian aid and

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peacekeeping mostly focus on the immediate concerns of human wellbeing. Restoring confidence is critical to preventing a return to violence. The control of both intensive and extensive levels of violence cannot be neglected in guaranteeing long-term stability. While fulfilling short-term requirements, the protection of refugees and emergency relief contribute to preventing future disorder by meeting the increased humanitarian needs. Short-term strategies aim to give an effective response to the emergent material needs of devastated communities; in the early postconflict stage, issues of immediate survival take priority. In preventing the eruption of future conflict, reconstruction and reconciliation programs seek long-term changes in culture and behavior. A short-term emergency response has to be followed by resource mobilization, professional training, and the intermediate-term project of restoration of administrative functions. In the intermediate term, it is crucial to reform government institutions, restore law and order, establish new local administrative structures, and train the personnel necessary to preserve them. The administration and supervision of fair elections precedes the formation of a legitimate government. The process ultimately has to move on to the integration of formerly warring factions into a new political structure and the protection of human rights and justice. While establishment of administrative structures can be achieved in intermediate terms, it takes time to promote new behavioral norms and rules of the game that are commensurate with democracy. In most peacebuilding efforts, little preparation has been made for long-term or even intermediate-term changes. It is often the case that the management of a humanitarian crisis quickly turns into peacebuilding activities after a negotiated agreement has led to a cease-fire. It is a long process to change the sociopsychological relationship of the parties; activities designed for long-term goals have to be able to regenerate themselves for transforming the cycle of conflictual behavior. Peacebuilding following prolonged armed conflicts is implemented in complex social situations, and requires longer time frames with multidimensional responses. A gap between short-term humanitarian aid and longer-term reconstruction programs inhibits integrative approaches. Crisis situations obviously require refugee and other types of disaster management with a search for immediate solutions. However, long-term views are often missing from the preoccupation with logistical responses and a lack of preparation to deal with complex future situations. Though serving the needs of refugees must receive primary attention in the initial stage, relief activities also have to take into account future needs and possible long-term consequences such as aid dependency. Before moving to the next stage, the achievement of some tasks serves as a prerequisite to further progress in other areas. Demobilization of regu-

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lar and militia forces and the creation of safe zones are critical initial steps toward the stabilization of a volatile political situation. Most settlement agreements tend to have an official schedule for a cease-fire and the subsequent demobilization of armed combatants as well as elections. Demobilization and integration of guerrilla forces into a reformed army had to proceed before elections in El Salvador, Namibia, and Mozambique. Although the schedules can vary according to the level of logistical support and readiness for political participation, a new government is generally established in one to three years from the initiation of a peace process. Complete or substantial disarmament is often considered necessary prior to elections, since it prevents the losers of the election from returning to fighting. The collapse of the Angolan peace process in the aftermath of the September 1992 elections is widely ascribed to a failure to disarm and demobilize the combatants before elections, especially in the absence of confidence building between the former adversaries. However, though the Khmer Rouge abandoned the Paris agreement, a general election proceeded in Cambodia in 1993.5 Where strict implementation would delay the entire process, flexible management of priorities is more prudent. Although holding elections and reestablishing political institutions have to immediately follow the control of military violence, social and economic reconstruction of a fractured society requires a long-term vision. The schedule of land resettlement, democratic rule, and other key aspects of accords has an impact on long-term stability. Resumption of full economic activities takes longer (e.g., three to five years were needed for El Salvador, Uganda, and Mozambique), and early attention to development activities was hindered by a lack of political consensus on economic priorities (e.g., containing the budget deficit versus public welfare spending). Logistical conditions determine the time needed for achieving particular goals. The operational logic and environment for projects related to long-term, civil society building and reconciliation differ from those of short-term, emergency operations. With transition to intermediate- and long-term stages, development funding has to be increased concurrently with a reduction in emergency and other humanitarian interventions. Not every peacebuilding process progresses according to a sequential order, reflecting on changes in local political and military balance. In overcoming rigid short-term and long-term gaps, synchronous strategies pursue different tasks simultaneously. For instance, elections and other measures for reestablishing political institutions cannot be delayed to wait for the emergence of appropriate social and economic conditions for democratic reform. It would be difficult to prioritize economic development over democratization or vice versa. Given their interdependent nature, democracy and development should be pursued concurrently and in a complementary manner.

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The implementation across sectors may not always be linear. Despite initial efforts for reform supported by more than four years of UN special missions, the Haitian police reverted to old habits. Although demilitarization is a more urgent goal than institution building, the former will be undermined in an unstable political and economic environment. A failure of institutional reform can cause a setback for control of violence and confidence building. Some activities need to be implemented prior to others, but many activities (police reform, human rights education and democratization, sociopsychological reconciliation, etc.) can be pursued simultaneously with different levels of intensity from the outset. The timing and sequential order have to be considered in light of the unique circumstances of each operation.

A Multilevel Process There are different dynamics between the macro and micro social space of peacebuilding. Obviously it is more difficult to create positive conditions for conflict transformation at the local level without a complementary process at national and regional levels (e.g., state collapse). Insecurity at a macro level does not nurture a political environment that allows community reconciliation and rehabilitation. In the absence of a national government, local-level initiatives must compensate for the lack of central administrative structure. In failed states such as Somalia, community leaders and traditional cultural and social institutions have played an important role in meeting basic needs. Strategies at different levels (interpersonal, group, and society) need to be synchronized, while peace initiatives can be taken at any level. For example, UNESCO projects on peace culture in El Salvador and other divided societies have been targeted at the grassroots level, but are intended to bring about national awareness of violence. Successful communitybuilding and social rehabilitation efforts have a positive impact on healing at an individual level. But, community-level reconciliation would not be effective without the cooperation of national elites in mitigating ethnic hatred. Peacebuilding strategies must be adjusted to diverse patterns of interaction at different levels (Cain 2001). Strategies at the national level have to be able to utilize the creative processes that exist at the local level. At the same time, national political negotiations on land reform, for example, can have an impact on efforts to resolve disputes at a community level. Civilian security can be enhanced by the presence of international peacekeeping forces deployed to serve as a buffer between adversarial communities.

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Activities, regarded as appropriate at one level, can have a negative impact on other levels. Elections conducted to restore political institutions at a national level, as we have seen in Bosnia, can actually deepen ethnic divisions at a community level. The analysis of relationships among actors must take into account formal elite networks, grassroots organizers, and their constituents (Lederach 2000). It is important to identify the roles played by the prime actors, including civil authorities, chiefs, churches, and village committees. Those directly involved in interaction with local communities have different agendas from those of politicians and diplomats. Multiple and complex relationships exist between local authorities and international agencies in terms of their influence over local residents and returnees. Health officials and refugee camp leaders are more closely connected to meeting the needs of local people than are the political and military elite, who are mostly detached from aid recipients. As is best illustrated in the transition in Angola after 2002, it is often rebel military commanders who benefit from luxurious offices and economic gains while demobilized soldiers are left in poor living conditions. A critical mass of groups in support of peace is needed to counterbalance warlords and paramilitary groups. Communal groups can be empowered as a countervailing force to militia groups in food distribution and community reconstruction. People viewing themselves as deeply affected by violence must be motivated to participate in decisionmaking. Though nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) do not have the financial or military clout, many of them can be considered more suitable to develop links across communal boundaries with informal, low-key, nonthreatening contacts. Ownership of the process by broad sectors of society is the key to the effectiveness of the participatory mechanisms upon which the implementation of peace accords depends. Therefore, one of the most critical conditions for making a peace process sustainable is the inclusion of local communities. It may be more difficult to achieve social transformation and other major changes than political compromise at the top level (Abiew and Keating 2000). In response to the collapse of formal government institutions, traditional structures such as councils of elders and village committees are put in a position to provide political and social networks. In Somalia, elders and clan groups have been involved in organizing peace conferences and development projects. Such intercommunal activities as cross-border trade and coordination of health policies can affect the direction of broad political conflict.

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Endogenous Dynamics and Exogenous Support In contrast with exogenous measures, which depend on initiatives prescribed, induced, or imposed externally or from the top, endogenous measures are elicited from those directly affected by the outcome. A long-term process of socioeconomic transformation can be best promoted by selfsustaining, endogenous approaches of groups within a society. An assessment of local capabilities and needs can identify the areas requiring external support (Orr 2004). Successful peacebuilding cases are characterized by a sufficient level of commitment of time and resources as well as political will both on the part of external and internal actors. Conflicts can be transformed by internal dynamics, but the opportunity may also be provided by external actors. The role of external support has to be flexibly adapted to the specific conflict context. The extent of external involvement in reconstruction depends on the degree of local administrative capacity as well as former adversaries’ commitment to mutual cooperation. External intervention should assist in the creation of a mutually interdependent relationship and reduction in asymmetric economic and political power. External intervention is inevitable until an alternative structure emerges to reduce continuing ethnic tension. A large, intrusive mission with heavy military presence was introduced to Cambodia, where international support had to make up for a weak internal capacity to govern themselves. Direct international administration in the form of trusteeship provided security and governance in the absence of an integral state or effective administrative structures—illustrated by civil war in Bosnia, political anarchy following the withdrawal of former Yugoslav federal troops in Kosovo, and transition to a new statehood in East Timor. An increased capacity of internal actors allows a reduction in international support. United Naitons Development Programme (UNDP) assistance to the National Haitian Police Force was coordinated with the phasing out of the civil police component of the UN operation that oversaw a transition to civilian government following the removal of the military regime in 1994. The need for longer-term assistance in building administrative structures of the newly established government in East Timor resulted in the extension of UN presence by setting up the UN Mission of Support in 2002. Political legitimacy can be based on external norms but has to be supported by the local reality. Such terms as accountability and good governance have been interpreted in terms of a Western normative order, and have sometimes been applied without considering strategies that would be more suitable for local cultures and social structures. Indigenous economic and social programs can be strengthened to satisfy the local community’s

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needs. Peacebuilding has to raise hope for integrative social development with the mobilization of people’s long-term commitment to and improvement of indigenous capacity.

Evaluating the Peacebuilding Processes and Outcomes While peacebuilding continues to be directed mainly at conflict management, its ultimate success will be judged in terms of the effectiveness of policy instruments designed for addressing the root causes of violent conflict. As evaluating the outcome is a rather elusive business, success tends to be a relative concept (Pugh 2000a). There are different interpretations of what should be considered success because of a lack of clear agreement on criteria and time frame. The length of time it has taken to accomplish the same or similar tasks is one basis for comparison. Given the challenges arising from local conflict dynamics (such as the resistance of extreme nationalist groups) and ethnic relations, the political transitions in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina have been more protracted than the experiences of Cambodia and East Timor. There are obvious cases of failure characterized by resurgence of violence after a tentative cease-fire and implementation of some initial security and confidence-building provisions. In several noticeable situations, a series of peace settlements have not been sufficiently sustainable, and in some instances, they collapsed. The repeated cycle of civil wars was experienced in Angola and Sierra Leone before these two countries finally achieved a stable path to political compromise and demobilization of guerrilla forces in 2002. Liberia was plunged into yet another war in 2003, while a violent uprising against President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and his exile in 2004 put Haiti under another UN supervision. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the government cannot function autonomously without international intervention due to ethnic rivalries; at the same time massive foreign aid did not yield sustained growth. Points of reference for success can be found in commonly accepted goals and objectives entailed in most peace agreements.6 Thus some common benchmarks (e.g., demobilization of former combatants, elections, and creation of a new government) exist, even though thresholds of success differ in each case. Direct and tangible outcomes in political, economic, and social arenas can be assessed by progress toward such targets as the number of returned refugees or increased economic productivity. Nonmaterial, qualitative elements (e.g., justice, democracy, and reconciliation) can be evaluated in terms of changes in psychological perceptions and cultural values.

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Peace is not likely to be achieved in a linear time frame and with a single area focus. Progress can be assessed separately in each category, or overall assessment of combined categories can be made in an integrative manner (Leonhardt 2001). Improvements in different dimensions can be compared in regard to their overall impact on the process. Separate areas can be measured according to different time frames—for example, reconciliation takes more time. In some cases (e.g., Mozambique, Namibia), reconciliation and justice did not draw much attention despite accomplishments in demobilization and political transition. As progress varies in diverse sectors, some peacebuilding components may be considered more important than others in determining success. In measuring overall success within a short time frame, security can be weighted more heavily than other categories since a successful political transition and economic rehabilitation would not be possible without control of violence. In the long run, however, continuing human rights abuses and a lack of democracy and institutional reform are major indicators of failure, since these are considered the main causes of insecurity and violence. Even when violence has been reduced temporarily, many unresolved issues can regenerate fresh confrontation. This is well illustrated in Cambodia and other cases where political repression and human rights violations continue. It is critical to manage the continued violence that threatens the disruption of ordinary day-to-day life, but failures of democracy have had a devastating impact on long-term peacebuilding efforts in Tajikistan, Liberia, and Cambodia. The establishment of new governments in these countries did not markedly improve social and political conditions. In most cases, the record of compliance with the agreed peace accord is rather mixed. Namibia, El Salvador, Mozambique, and Nicaragua have maintained political stability for more than a decade following demilitarization, repatriation of refugees, and elections. Yet despite successful political transitions indicated by elections held at regular intervals, poverty and economic disparity remain serious concerns. Regime change took place peacefully in Nicaragua through regular elections, but that did not translate into economic growth. Imbalanced relationships between sectors continue in most peacebuilding cases. In the absence of political integration, economic and social rehabilitation in Somalia has relied on traditional clan networks. El Salvador and Guatemala demonstrate a certain level of success in the security sector reform specified in peace agreements, but perpetrators have not yet been brought to justice. Most observers would agree that peace implementation is full of contradictions and compromise; the need for political stability and the desire to reform the institutions of political oppression may be opposed to each other.

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Final Comments The design for a peace structure requires the analysis of the components or processes to transform conflict dynamics. Peacebuilding efforts can generate a synergetic impact by simultaneously stimulating the fulfillment of other requirements. In a synergetic interaction, the total effect is greater than the sum of activities within each sector. In the design of a coherent action plan, any measures have to be considered in terms of complex interdependencies across domains (political, military, humanitarian, social, and economic), time frames (short-, intermediate-, and long-term) and levels (communal, national, and international). Peacebuilding has to be judged in light of the fact that the human costs of a failed transition to a stable society are very high. It is important to develop clear sets of agreed norms and expectations among various groups in formulating coherent approaches to peacebuilding. There is also a great demand for linkage and coordination of the separate functions that otherwise may not be compatible with each other. Since imagination and creativity are essential traits in designing a peacebuilding process, art is as important as science (Reychler 2000). Notes 1. Conscious design permits values, structures, and processes to be aligned with visions for change and support for building the social infrastructure. 2. Cases in which the outcome was determined by arms include Rwanda following the victory of Tutsi rebel forces; Ethiopia with the victory by rebel forces; and intervention in Kosovo by outside powers. South Africa, however, did not get involved in an intensive military struggle between armed forces. 3. More than three decades of civil war in Guatemala (1962–1996) resulted in the estimated deaths of 100,000 people and at least 25,000 disappearances along with displacement of about one million refugees. Many of the killings were committed by the Guatemalan army, which massacred villagers in retaliation for the guerrilla attacks. Twelve years of brutal civil war in El Salvador, which ended with peace accords in January 1992, killed around 75,000 people. 4. In the absence of participation and equity, the sociopolitical dimension of peacebuilding is highly divisive. 5. The Khmer Rouge did not cause any devastating effect on the election since they were neutralized by internal feuding and a lack of international support. 6. Criteria for success can be devised according to maximal (oriented toward justice entailed in positive peace) and minimal (maintenance of political order and control of military violence represented in negative peace) approaches to peacebuilding. Effectively measuring the achievement of maximal goals call for a longer time frame.

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3 SECURITY

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DEMILITARIZATION

Maintaining a cessation of all violent conflict is the foundation for a peaceful transition to the creation of a new government, economic development, and social reconstruction. As a critical early step, security in former conflict areas should be consolidated with confidence building and other measures to control violence. Reducing tensions and suspicion is a precondition for complete demobilization and disarmament, but at the same time the latter’s successful implementation reinforces mutual commitment to peace. Steps toward demilitarization are composed of force reduction, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants into society. One of the most urgent tasks in the initial stage of peacebuilding is to prevent a resurgence of violence and provide public security so that basic societal functions can be protected. In addition to sustaining a cease-fire among belligerents, the control of violence against civilian populations is the main security agenda for upholding the rule of law. Since the end of an armed conflict does not necessarily mean a substantial reduction in political violence, public insecurity and violent crime present significant hurdles to maintaining the civil order that is essential for economic transactions and a functioning social life. In a postconflict setting, public security is considered in the context of the protection of group and individual well-being and an end to human rights violations by the state.1 International observers can monitor the control of abusive force, and police training includes an emphasis on human rights. The incapacity of a government to ensure civilian security invites international assistance in the establishment of professional police and judicial systems. Institutional reform in the security sector along with the protection of citizens is an essential component of creating an environment conducive to a sustainable process of democratization and development.

Confidence Building Overcoming fragmentation and reducing animosities is essential to the 39

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successful implementation of peacebuilding plans. In the normalization of relations, the acceptance of mutual security is accompanied by confidencebuilding measures. The traditional notion of confidence building (employed to verify reductions in military forces and armaments among state actors) has been applied to mitigating volatile relations between former belligerents coming out of intrastate conflict. However, the methods of confidence building in the Cold War period (focused on technical military verification) need to be modified to improve relations among former adversaries in a civil conflict. Especially in the absence of clear sets of agreed-upon norms and expectations among armed groups in internal conflict, confidence building is designed for sustaining negotiated settlements (and preventing the dangerous escalation of uncontrolled, local conflict to develop into a serious blow to the entire process). Demilitarization and peaceful transition cannot be successfully carried out in the midst of suspicion. Confidence building is affected by the political atmosphere of a settlement process, which may not necessarily end competition for unilateral gains. Gradual trust can be built through transparent, incremental, verifiable actions that comply with a peace accord (Spears 2000). The security dilemma (associated with the unilateral implementation of military aspects of an agreed framework in the absence of reciprocal actions by adversaries) “acts as a main obstacle of disarmament, demobilization” (Tanner 2000, p. 79). Where there are a lack of trust and fear of being attacked, protagonists continue to keep stockpiles of arms for future use. In order to generate an atmosphere of trust, former adversaries need to demonstrate that they have no hostile intentions nor plans to launch a surprise attack. The risks of renewed fighting, initiated by miscalculation, miscommunication, and misunderstanding of intentions, can be significantly reduced by making each other’s motives transparent. Constraining military activities reduces hostile misperceptions. One side’s good intentions can be conveyed to the other side through the cessation of hostile propaganda and tolerance of free movement of people and goods. The risk of rearmament can be reduced and eventually eliminated by on-site inspection and other verification procedures. The exchange of reliable information and increased communication are designed to remove misperceptions. In order to reduce vulnerability and uncertainty, adversarial parties should be able to raise questions about each other’s activities and establish forums to investigate claims of violation of accords. Transparent tests of commitments rely on a mutually accepted framework of rules and institutions such as a national peace committee, secretariat, or commission, as adopted in South Africa, Mozambique, Tajikistan, and many other countries involved in ending violent struggles. A joint commission of the Tajik government and its main opposition groups’ representatives

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served as a vehicle to monitor the decommissioning and demobilization of rebel forces and their integration into a unified military following the agreement on a cease-fire in 1994. Members of the commission worked together to convince different sides as well as representing their own group interests (Zoir and Newton 2001). The gap between expectations and performance occurs due to differences in the perceived needs of security, reflecting the local dynamics and actors. Establishing clear sets of agreed-upon norms and expectations among various groups is critical to effectively handling crises and confrontations. For instance, the National Party and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa adopted a code of conduct for political parties and organizations as well as rules of conduct for the police and the South African Defense Force. Even though confidence building can be solidified following each important step of peace implementation, initial security guarantees such as amnesty for former commanders and combatants are often demanded for such important measures as demobilization. The end of armed rivalry is signified by the formation of joint armed forces and reorganization of police forces. Prospects of gaining political legitimacy and having access to government positions give the leaders of former insurgent forces a stake in relinquishing arms. During the early stage of peace implementation, international presence in the form of observer missions discourages renewed fighting. A small contingent of the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) I was charged with monitoring the withdrawal of Cuban forces in 1989. Following the 1996 signing of a peace accord, the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala, consisting of 155 military observers, was dispatched to monitor compliance with the military component of the accords. Success in the implementation of the Lancaster House settlement (which ended the Rhodesian conflict in 1979) is attributed to a well-designed cease-fire plan supported by the Commonwealth Monitoring Force and the Commonwealth Observers’ Group. Securing troops and deploying them in a timely fashion is an important step toward alleviating deep mistrust between the parties. Due to the presence of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), a large number of deaths did not occur in Namibia (Howard 2002). However, in the north of the country there were nine days of fighting in the early stages that caused a bloodbath. This violence could have been prevented if there had been adequate support for the timely deployment of UNTAG. Coordinated mechanisms can be created to strengthen the ability to constructively manage confrontations and crises. In order to improve interethnic relations, the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) invited political leaders of various communities to a decisionmaking process on a consultative basis.

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When there is an established leadership, confidential negotiation may be conducted at a higher level to quickly resolve group hostilities. In Mozambique, bilateral meetings as well as the establishment of telephone contacts and other direct lines of communication between the president and the leader of the Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana (RENAMO) were crucial for settling disputes and misunderstandings. Differences arising from ambiguities in interpreting an initial agreement have to be resolved through group facilitation, mediation, and arbitration as well as bilateral negotiations. A negotiated method of resolving conflict helps opposing parties reach an agreement on the common tasks of peacebuilding. Peace commissions can be set up as the primary national institution for various purposes, ranging from investigation of communal violence to demobilization of combatants. Cooperative relations can be solidified through consultative mechanisms of dialogue and understanding. An impartial forum may also be created to conduct fact-finding and hold pubic hearings on community problems attributed to intergroup tension. In South Africa, the National Peace Committee (NPC) functioned as a council of leaders that oversaw the implementation of the peace accord at the highest administrative level. The committee ensured that political parties adhered to the code of conduct, which committed each party to respect the right of people to vote without intimidation and to organize freely (Knox and Quirk 2000). Chaired by church and business community leaders with representatives from the largest political parties, the NPC resolved differences through consensual decisionmaking. The Commission of Inquiry Regarding the Prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation, comprised of a judge, a senior advocate, and three other legally qualified persons, was involved in investigating cases of violence and intimidation. Its work entailed not only identifying those responsible but also recommending action following the examination of the nature and causes of violence. A broad consultative process in South Africa was extended to a regional level, as the National Peace Secretariat coordinated dispute-resolution committees at local and regional levels. Regional peace committees worked to control violence through mediation; representatives of political organizations, community-based organizations, churches, trade unions, tribal authorities, and businesses worked together to tackle the sources of conflict. The Committee on Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development brokered development projects designed to reduce communal violence. In several Central American countries, the implementation of peace accords was similarly overseen by national and local peace commissions comprised of members from the opposing factions. The 1992 peace agreements in El Salvador (brokered by the UN) led to the creation of a National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ).2 While the representation

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within COPAZ encourages consensual decisionmaking, a stalemate was inevitable since committee members often voted evenly according to opposing ideological perspectives. The deadlocked issues eventually had to be resolved by bilateral negotiations between the government and its main opposition, the FMLN. The Supervision and Control Commission set up by the Mozambican government and the RENAMO was responsible for settling differences and questions emerging from interpretation of the peace accord signed in October 1992 as well as coordination in the creation of the subsidiary commissions. The specialized commissions focused on the reintegration of ex-combatants, reform of the army, and preparation for the elections. The responsibility of managing demilitarization belonged to the Cease-fire Commission, the Commission for the Reintegration of Demobilizing Military Personnel, and the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defense Force. These commissions were created to ease implementation tensions by encouraging and supporting joint decisionmaking. The major political actors and donors participated in a consultative process chaired by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General. Given deep historical hostilities derived from a sixteen-year civil war, overcoming its legacies had to be supported by effective UN involvement. In comparison, the two unsuccessful attempts to move toward peace in Angola following the signing of the Bicesse Peace Accords in 1991 and the Lusaka Protocols in 1994 can be ascribed, in part, to the UN’s limited intervention. For instance, the entire process of implementing the Bicesse Peace Accords was supervised by the Joint Political-Military Commission made up of representatives from the government controlled by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the opposition National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) with foreign observers of three member countries, the United States, Russia, and Portugal. The two sides took on most of the burden of monitoring each other’s compliance in such areas as the cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization of an estimated 200,000 soldiers, the formation of joint armed forces of 50,000, and the development of a neutral police force. Even though the party’s capacity and will to carry out its commitments were limited, the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) II, with its maximum strength of 350 military observers, was not able to play an active role to ensure whether the two sides honored their obligations. In addition, the UN was not even a formal member of the Joint Political and Military Commission, the central authority set up to oversee the implementation process of the agreement. Though some sixteen months passed with no war, numerous violations of military measures occurred, owing to mutual mistrust and hidden agendas, eventually leading to another round of war. The Lusaka agreement was reached after two years of even more ferocious war,

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which destroyed any climate of cooperation and produced deeper mistrust between the parties. Even though UNAVEM III (1995–1997) was better equipped, with a force of 7,000 Blue Helmets, to fulfill a mandate that was vastly expanded over that of UNAVEM II, confidence building became more difficult with mounting tensions prior to full-scale fighting in 1998. The failure of peace implementation in Angola during the 1990s gave way, however, to a new implementation process following the 2002 death of UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi, who had been mistrusted by the government. Under the Luena Accords, the parties agreed to support a cease-fire with demobilization of UNITA forces and creation of conditions for a blanket amnesty under the supervision of the Joint Military Commission, comprised of military representatives of both sides and observers from the UN and the three member countries. One of the unique aspects (compared with the previously failed processes) was UN Special Envoy Ibrahim Gambari’s chairing the Joint Commission that monitored the implementation of the Lusaka Protocol eight years after it was signed. As the confidence was built between the former adversaries, the medium- and long-term tasks were to be handled bilaterally between the government and UNITA. Confidence-building measures are not limited to military and political matters such as the withdrawal of troops and reduction in armed forces, but they also entail the creation of participatory processes in various decisionmaking areas. The extension of state administration to rebel areas must be accompanied by support for the local population and reconciliation efforts. In El Salvador and other places, the residents of rebel-occupied territories opposed the redeployment of government officials, in particular, those connected to past abuses. In Mozambique, however, the government’s supply of basic public services in education, health, and social welfare, instead of a premature reclaim to rebel-held territory, reduced the fear of the population. In addition, the government and RENAMO worked together through humanitarian assistance committees and other forums created in 1993 to deliver food aid, organize vaccination campaigns, identify areas where landmines were planted, and open up vital land routes at provincial and district levels.

Demobilization and Disarmament Demilitarization and disarmament are critical steps after warring parties have agreed to a negotiated settlement. In a post–civil war situation, demobilization and force reduction are the major steps toward demilitarization. The guerrilla groups were disbanded following the withdrawal of the former Yugoslav army from Kosovo and the deployment of NATO military troops. After the military regime in Haiti was toppled (1994), adequately

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disarming the remnants of the former Haitian Army and its paramilitary ally was undertaken with the goal of eliminating a major instrument of internal repression. In Angola, political reconciliation was promoted through the establishment of a prompt process to demobilize 50,000 UNITA soldiers after the government and the new leadership of UNITA signed a cease-fire treaty in April 2002. Steps taken toward demobilization early in peace implementation are significant not only militarily but also symbolically. Successful demobilization is “a litmus test for the political commitment of the parties” and increases confidence (Ejigu and Gedamu 1996, p. 22). Difficulties in decommissioning created disruptive conditions for implementation of the 1998 agreement made in the Northern Ireland peace talks. Attaining the goal of total disarmament of all paramilitary groups following the establishment of the International Commission on Decommissioning depended on the influence of the parties in negotiation over armed factions within their own communities. However, demobilization did not take place within the agreed framework of two years following the endorsement of the agreement on the overall settlement, and the Unionists argued that without the decommissioning of the Irish Republican Army (IRA), its affiliated political party, Sinn Fein, should not take part in the administration (Cox, Guelke, and Stephen 2000). Demobilization and disarmament elements have rarely been carried out as originally scheduled (Tanner 2000).3 Parties may hide arms to facilitate their return to fighting in case a cease-fire and elections do not work. Thus substantial demobilization following the end of a civil war is not always easily achieved. In Angola, the successful demobilization of rebel soldiers in May 2003 had been preceded by two failed attempts following the Bicesse Peace Accords (1991) and the Lusaka Protocol (1994).4 In Sierra Leone, even though the various factions reached an agreement to end the civil war in July 1999, it was not until the elections in May 2002 that combatants were disarmed. In the Ivory Coast, a mutiny organized by soldiers disgruntled with the demobilization process in 2002 quickly turned into full-scale rebellion. Demobilization may have to move forward without cooperation from one of the parties. In Cambodia, the process of demobilization and integration of troops was hampered by mistrust among the parties. Challenges arose especially since the Khmer Rouge was backing away from what they agreed under the Paris Peace Accords even though the settlement permitted each party to retain up to 30 percent of their military strength held during the civil war. In the midst of continuing suspicion, a gradual approach can be taken in disbanding armed groups along with the collection of their weapons and ammunition. In recognition of the continued necessity of self-defense, guer-

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rilla forces in El Salvador were allowed to disarm gradually at the pace of 20 percent per month. During the cantonment process in Zimbabwe, a large number of guerrillas arrived at a camp after trust with the monitoring force was developed by the successful demobilization of a small number of troops. Internal and external pressure is essential to initiating demobilization and disarmament without sufficient trust building. For instance, the Mozambique government and RENAMO had to yield to pressure from the UN and recognize the unpopularity of continuing the war among soldiers soon to be demobilized, even though each side wanted to hold back troops to maintain its military capability. Political matters are more important than logistical and technical concerns in determining the outcome of a demilitarization process. Since returning to war is the result of political decisions, weapons are not the cause of war, only an instrument. Following the 1993 establishment of a new constitutional structure in northern Somaliland, progress in disarmament was possible after one major clan faction unilaterally surrendered its heavy weapons; the remaining factions felt shame and followed suit (Spears 2002). The international community can provide a needed guarantee of the compliance of each party. Such measures as the withdrawal of armed forces and the surrender or reduction of arms are made easier with third-party supervision. In Nicaragua, the International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV), established by the Organization of American States (OAS), monitored the cease-fire and the movement of resistance forces into the security zones in the process of demobilization carried out by the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). The CIAV also facilitated the resettlement of FMLN fighters in El Salvador. In support of the general demobilization of all forces required by the Toncontín Agreement between Contra rebel forces and the Nicaraguan government in 1990, CIAV and OAS personnel provided security for Contra representatives (Lincoln and Sereseres 2000). Logistics for Demobilization Demobilization is not a simple task, consisting of cantonment, disarmament, and demobilization phases. In addition, demobilization is accompanied by the subsequent reintegration of former combatants either into society or into an army of national unity. As the first step toward demobilization, troops from the rival armies enter the designated assembly points. In the assembly areas, combatants are identified and registered, and their weapons are collected before demobilization starts. Control of personnel and verification of weapons and materials are essential to ensuring precision and producing reliable data. A peace operation does not always have enough time to complete the

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collection and verification of weapons. ONUMOZ was not able to collect all the weapons before its mission was over. According to Mozambique’s General Peace Agreement, demobilization was supposed to be completed by April 1, 1993 (180 days from the effective date of a cease-fire October 15, 1992), with the elections being set in October 1993. However, the process of demobilization was protracted even into the establishment of the new government. To provide adequate independent monitoring of the demobilization process in Mozambique, the UN was heavily involved in the encampment and registration of government and RENAMO soldiers. Both the government and RENAMO wanted to choose locations based on strategic considerations rather than access to basic necessities of the combatants. The final agreement was formulated through negotiations between the two sides under the coordination of Aldo Ajello, the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General. The locations of the assembly areas and the procedures for troop movements and conduct within the assembly areas were approved by the Cease-Fire Commission chaired by the UN, and comprised of representatives from the government, RENAMO, Portugal, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Alden 2001). ONUMOZ eventually set up 150 assembly areas in which soldiers gathered and were registered. The process can be flawed by a high number of deserters and by the collection of weapons in poor operational condition. Troops should not be allowed to enter the quartering areas without their weapons, so that heavy arms do not remain outside of the rule of law. In the demobilization following the 1991 Angolan peace accord, a high proportion of quartered soldiers were not, in fact, well-trained troops but ordinary people conscripted to make up the required numbers. Instead of going to the camps, the best UNITA fighting units were guarding diamond and other interests in two northern Angola provinces. Therefore, demobilization inevitably failed due to inaccurate initial numbers, desertion of soldiers without proper registration, and a deliberate retention of the best troops out of the quartering areas.5 Conditions for Success Time pressure and the vast number of people and groups involved complicate efforts to coordinate demobilization. Ideally an extended time span is preferable to discharge a large number of soldiers, especially for economic reasons and social adjustments. However, schedules for postconflict demobilization tend to be arranged within the space of one to two years to allow prompt elections and fulfillment of other provisions of peace agreements— a shorter time frame than is desirable for thorough demobilization.6 Most importantly, a minimum level of political confidence building is needed to

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generate the commitment of the parties to demobilization. Amnesty provisions have often been included in peace agreements in return for participation in the demobilization process. Discontent arises from delays in implementation decisions as related to unreliable supplies for fighters in assembled areas, and failure to deliver promised economic benefits or government appointments (Kingma 1997). A lack of progress in implementing the key agreements by the government generates suspicion in the rebel groups to be disarmed. In considering the full demobilization of the FMLN guerrilla army in December 1992 following more than a year-long cease-fire, El Salvador stands out as a successful example. However, a serious threat had to be overcome in October 1992, when the FMLN decided to discontinue its phased disarmament due to a lack of progress in the land transfer program.7 Assurances were needed to break the impasse, and the UN brokered an agreement that helped expedite the transfer of lands. In Nicaragua, foot-dragging over actual demobilization along with the delays in implementing political agreements led to unrest among demobilizing and demobilized soldiers. The remobilization of a significant part of the Contra army by 1991 is attributed to a lack of land, resources, or training. With the failure of the self-styled reinsertion, thousands of former soldiers began to reorganize and surfaced as a disruptive group, attacking or looting international aid agencies and warehouses as well as blocking roads and detaining hostages and vehicles (Abu-Lughod 2000). The negotiation process for demobilization in Nicaragua was complicated by suspicions about co-optation and betrayal among the Contra troops along with feuds between top leaders and threats of expulsion. Varying arrangements were made with Contra factions to induce a second demobilization with more land or legal titles for resettled troops. Commitment was also made to provide payments of cash and vehicles for Contra leaders. Despite human rights organizations’ disgruntlement about impunity, the government offered general amnesties three times between 1990 and 1993. In the absence of political leaders’ capacity to control their own military commanders, cooperation of the field commanders can emerge from direct negotiations among rival factions. For example, details for demobilization had to be worked out by negotiations among local commanders for demobilization in Tajikistan (Abdullo 2001). Social Reintegration The demobilized soldiers and their family dependents, upon discharge, are to be transported to their chosen destination. As part of administrating and

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discharging former combatants at a demobilization assembly point, compensation is needed in the form of transition allowance, transportation, and severance pay. Programs in the assembly areas may include literacy classes, sports, and cultural activities. Ex-soldiers may receive aid for transportation, emergency food assistance, and a cash grant in order to return to their place of origin or other chosen destination. Reinsertion support (shelter, medical care, food, and clothing) serves as a transitory safety net for veterans. Care of the combatants and their families, organized by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in Honduras and Costa Rica, was essential to moving forward the demobilization of Contra soldiers. The ex-combatants received civilian clothing, educational materials, and tool kits before their transportation and reinsertion. The programs on assistance in resettlement within Nicaragua were subsequently managed by the OAS (Lincoln and Sereseres 2000). Support for settlement in their home districts includes but is not limited to retraining for new skills and counseling for reintegration. Other types of support range from assistance in housing and education to microcredit facilities tailored to the special needs of rural and urban ex-soldiers. In the case of Mozambique, the resettlement program entailed three months’ food rations, another three months’ paycheck from the government, and subsidy for another eighteen months in their home districts (Synge 1997). In resettlement, job referrals and training programs for excombatants as well as provisions for a two-year subsidy can be considered the standard package. Although short-term efforts such as supervising the demobilization of combatants and guaranteeing their security as well as monitoring the ceasefire can be more easily achieved, long-term demilitarization has to be supported by sufficient and available financial and human resources (Knight and Özerdem 2004). Reintegration allows ex-combatants to become part of a community, detached from their military past. Social integration is a mediumand long-term process, requiring more than two or three years. Adequate economic and social support is necessary to provide ex-combatants with rudimentary skills of literacy, vocational training, or, where appropriate, microcredit and enterprise development support. Ex-combatants are rewarded economically for their re-entry into civil society with the understanding that substantial material benefits avert a resort to violence. Prior to the disarming and demobilizing of combatants, a reintegration strategy should be put in place with adequate funding. In the implementation of the 2002 agreement signed by the government and UNITA rebels in Angola, supporting the livelihood of 105,000 demobilized UNITA soldiers, who live in quartering areas with an average of six civilian dependents each, became a humanitarian issue. While careful planning and adequate

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financing are critical at an early stage, resource mobilization “is often a long, drawn-out process”; it entails making appeals for funding and designing convincing projects (Ejigu and Gedamu 1996, p. 22). Failure to reintegrate former combatants into the civil society and civilian economy can be a destabilizing factor. Even if former paramilitary groups are no longer in a position to pose a threat to, or seize control of, the government, many of their members may retain weapons especially in the event of an uncontrolled disintegration of their armies. Soldiers who desert without handing over their weapons are likely to become a source of additional crime and violence. Military Integration and Restructuring The demobilization process is often connected to an agreed-upon integration of former combatants of opposing forces into a restructured national army (Cooper 2000). Military integration can begin before a transfer of power to the new government, along with joint training schemes under the international authority. One-third to one-half of former guerrillas were integrated into the newly created government armed forces in Mozambique and El Salvador. Former military factions of the African National Congress have been recruited into the regular armed forces with the reform of the military in South Africa. The political transition permitted ANC military staff to play an important role in the reorganization of the South African security forces. Military reintegration is an important indicator to signal new relations between former adversaries. On the other hand, political tension can derail the process of military restructuring. In Cambodia, the coup by Hun Sen and his monopoly of government power led to the persecution of military generals who were loyal to an opposing political faction. Disarmament Disarmament generally seeks the elimination of both heavy weapons and small arms. Such verification instruments as routine, on-site inspections can be adopted as part of disarmament procedures to eliminate tanks, armed vehicles, and artilleries. Designated agents take responsibility for not only verifying arms depots and caches but also collecting and destroying small arms. However, medium and small weapons cannot be easily relinquished without voluntary cooperation from the militia group members. In Mozambique, the participation of local communities was instrumental in identifying and dismantling hidden stashes of weapons. Compared with removal of heavy weaponry, it is more difficult to con-

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trol the proliferation of small arms in society. Through gun buy-back initiatives, cash was given as an incentive for surrendering arms in El Salvador and elsewhere. In order to absorb arms that had been readily available in the countryside, the Nicaraguan government adopted a weapons buy-back campaign. However, the UN Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) did not embark on a gun buy-back program because such schemes can boost the demand for weapons by fortifying the black market. The task of forcibly disarming widely dispersed and lightly armed rogue elements is either not viable or impractical without coordinated efforts at local, regional, and international levels. Even though small arms are used for more than 90 percent of killings in Africa, it is difficult to verify their elimination since they can be concealed easily. The cultural affinity for weapons that often develops during a civil war is an impediment to voluntary disarmament. Disarming unwilling factions in Afghanistan and Somalia through a foreign-imposed attempt alone was not successful without changing the warrior culture. Disarmament is futile in the absence of an arms embargo managed by border control. The proliferation of arms in Somalia derives from widespread illegal arms transfers from Ethiopia and Eritrea especially following the defeat of Ethiopia's Marxist government in 1991. Given a failure to protect borders, Somali warlords had access to a massive supply of arms brought from neighboring states and made available for sale (Menkhaus 2004). Bilateral and regional cooperation is important to address the spread of small arms and light weapons. The prospects for complete and unconditional disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of warlord forces in Afghanistan appear to be recognized as either premature or unrealistic as long as fighters who are loyal to warlords or to the Taliban retain their arms (Suhrke, Arne, and Kristian 2002). Political instability and factional rivalries have greatly undermined demobilization in Afghanistan. Many civilians are part-time members of irregular forces, easily called up on short notice. Disarmament efforts have been limited, since the warlords have become part of the U.S. allies’ strategy to fight the Taliban. The Haitian Armed Forces were gradually demobilized over more than eight months in 1994–1995. During the first phase, only 187 soldiers were discharged through a voluntary demobilization program from October 1994, one month after the landing of the first multilateral contingents in Port-auPrince, to the end of December. Then a force of 1,500 soldiers was reduced through a nationwide demobilization scheme put into effect in January 1995. President Aristide dissolved the army and disbanded the officer corps by March when 3,042 troops were required to report to their posts for processing and demobilization. Roughly 3,300 soldiers from 7,000 Haitian

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Armed Forces were chosen to join the Interim Public Security Force (with human rights abusers excluded); the rest of the soldiers were demobilized. In the last phase, starting in June 1995, former FADH members who belonged to the interim police force were discharged and replaced with persons who had been newly trained at the Haitian Police Academy (Forman, 2000). The Bosnian parties and their neighbors agreed on arms control through negotiations supervised under the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The June 1996 Agreement on Sub-Regional Arms Control (called the Florence Agreement) set numerical ceilings on artillery, battle tanks, attack helicopters, combat aircraft, and other heavy weapons. Though some allegations of cheating were made, early progress in arms and troop reduction was monitored by 185 mutual inspections that took place between August 1996 and October 1997. However, Bosnian arms control was somewhat undermined by U.S. support for training and equipping federation military forces, though this had been proposed within the overall limit of arms control. Sending a message of deterrence against future Serb aggression was seen as necessary, but various factions ended up having been trained in preparation for possible future wars. Military balance has been the most important reason behind arming Bosniacs; weapons and financing were provided by the United States and a group of Islamic countries (Cousens and Cater 2001).

Enforcing Peace The risk of renewed violence is high even after fighting has been stopped by military intervention or through diplomatic agreements. Deployment of peacekeeping forces can be approved by the UN Security Council under a Chapter VII mandate that permits the use of all necessary means to establish a secure environment for peace and stability. Food and other vital supplies from international donors cannot be disbursed as long as security conditions remain precarious. Full-scale military intervention can be used to prevent deteriorating security or humanitarian crises such as famine in Somalia in the early 1990s. Troops need to maintain security for sea and airport facilities, other major installations, and food distribution centers. Humanitarian activities can be supported by guaranteeing a free and open passage of relief supplies in countries such as the former Yugoslavia and Somalia, which struggled to emerge from violent interethnic civil wars. In Iraq, aid agencies withdrew because of violence; in Afghanistan humanitarian assistance was not easily expanded beyond Kabul. International enforcement of peace in protracted conflicts has to be supported by sufficient force to confront chal-

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lenges from extreme factions. Heavily armed contingents are needed for deterrence if highly organized armed groups attempt to organize killings and destruction of other communities. The International Force for East Timor (INTERFET) was formed by the Security Council to halt the violent campaign of heavily armed militia groups supported by the Indonesian security forces. After the approval of independence in the UN-organized referendum of August 30, 1999, by an overwhelming majority vote, pro-Indonesian armed groups attacked and killed people at random, engaging in kidnapping as well as burning and looting entire towns and villages in order to disrupt the separation of East Timor (Smith and Dee 2002). Troops from Australia and New Zealand had to restore security; to guarantee the safe return of refugees, they blocked the infiltration of militias that had taken shelter in West Timor. Beginning in December 2001, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan helped maintain a secure environment in Kabul and its vicinity as well as protect the personnel of the United Nations with the support of the Afghan Interim Authority. Since the deployment of the ISAF in Kabul was not initially envisioned as a full-scale security measure, it did not have a military capability to enforce a cessation of fighting beyond the country’s capital. Full-fledged peace has been difficult to attain owing to continuing hostilities associated with the war on terrorism and rivalry between warlords. Delivery of aid and assistance to the besieged population has been hampered by a lack of adequate security presence. Safety remains a priority for international humanitarian personnel, let alone the Afghan public (Monshipouri 2003). Since no clear delineation was drawn between the termination of combat and the beginning of peace operations, the ISAF is distinguished from other peacekeeping functions designed to enforce or to monitor an agreement among the warring parties. The ISAF’s main role has been considered transitional in preparation for the introduction of the new Afghan national security forces. The process was made more complex by combat operations of U.S. and allied troops under a separate command structure in the fight against resurgent remnants of Taliban and Al-Qaida (Weinberger 2002). Operational environment and goals have an impact on determining force structure, posture, and capability. Traditional peacekeeping oriented toward the observation of a cease-fire is helpful to monitor withdrawal and demobilization of troops, but more robust forces are needed to prevent any aggressive action. Missions deployed as part of confidence-building strategies can operate with a small contingent not overburdened by multiple roles. Transition toward the establishment of a new political order along with demilitarization in El Salvador and Nicaragua became easier with the logistical support of small contingents, which helped the UN civil operation’s monitoring tasks. Stronger forces have been dispatched to control

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local factions, especially in the absence of agreements such as in Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan. In Somalia, restoring order and controlling local militia groups could not have been feasible without the massive power of the United Nations Task Force (UNITAF). The level of commitment of local parties to peace can determine the proper size and capability of the force. A small contingent can be successful when opposing factions are willing to cooperate for the maintenance of a cease-fire and the control of violence. In the absence of cooperation from adversaries, stronger enforcement contingents can provide a secure environment for economic reconstruction and political transitions such as internationally monitored elections. The main goals of humanitarian intervention are maintenance of order and protection of civilian populations. Due to ensuing humanitarian disasters, the small contingents of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) I were replaced by UNITAF with the deployment of 38,000 well-armed U.S. and allied troops. The intervention of a stronger force was inevitable after the failure of UNOSOM I to break the cycle of clan violence with 500 peacekeepers.8 The international intervention in Somalia was designed to bring food to a starving population in the absence of a functioning central government to maintain order. After stopping the banditry that had sustained a famine prior to its intervention, UNITAF transferred the operation to UNOSOM II in May 1993. To meet stable conditions for humanitarian assistance, UNOSOM II pursued disarmament, since it was considered an imperative for relief and reconstruction. With a new Security Council mandate, UNOSOM II was authorized to use enforcement power in overcoming resistance by tenacious warlords and carrying out reconstruction efforts. However, UNOSOM II failed to arrest warlord Mohamed Farah Aidid, whose faction ambushed a contingent of Pakistanis sent to inspect weapons dumps in South Mogadishu on June 5, 1993. Most importantly, U.S. casualties resulting from the military action aimed at capturing a local warlord on October 3–4, 1993, prompted U.S. withdrawal, thus effectively ending UN intervention in Somalia in March 1995. Since the reestablishment of new political institutions remained fragile with the failure of UN troops to disarm militia groups, UN assistance concentrated on the organization of a local-level cease-fire. The premature replacement of UNITAF by UNOSOM II represented a missed opportunity, since UNITAF was in a stronger position to disarm the militia groups that were obstacles to restoring stability. Despite the resistance of militia factions and less troop strength than UNITAF, about 28,000 troops of UNISOM II searched out and attempted to confiscate munitions dumps. The strength of UNITAF (equipped with tanks, helicopter gunships, and other heavy armaments) provided capabilities to easily disarm the

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much smaller and less armed militias, but the U.S. military leadership decided to leave the warlords alone in fear of any serious opposition (Allard 2002). When UNOSOM II showed determination to pursue disarmament with fewer forces than UNITAF, the warlords (especially Aidid) responded by hitting back. In the event of a lack of cooperation, then, international forces often face difficult choices, especially when they do not have the capability to stop resumed fighting or to enforce compliance. The initial deployment of strong contingents generates the expectation of compliance even though the force size may be reduced once a violent situation is under control. The dispatch of stronger contingents to BosniaHerzegovina (following the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995) reflects the necessity to control violence by well-armed local militias (Findlay 2002). A NATO-based Implementation Force (IFOR) was in charge of providing a safe environment for refugee returns and control of communal violence, but the reduced level of ethnic tension enabled IFOR to be downsized to a smaller Stabilization Force (SFOR) a year later. As law enforcement operations, the actions of NATO troops thwarted violence motivated to gain control over areas designated for the coexistence of different national communities such as Sarajevo and Mostar. Forces were also necessary to apprehend war criminals indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia. But, the exclusion of the Republika Srpska from the NATO forces’ control permitted continued ethnic cleansing in Serb-held areas and further ethnic partition. Success in peace enforcement functions, in particular, relies on the credibility of deterrence and the political will of the intervener. By combining flexible rules of engagement and a credible coercive capability, the Multinational Interim Force dispatched to Haiti in 1994 was able to collect large numbers of weapons from the former regime’s supporters and successfully managed to achieve its other mandates. The lack of any serious challenges to the force except on one occasion is attributed to its ability to respond decisively to any resistance. The U.S.-led forces intervened again to restore order after a spread of armed conflict that led to the exile of President Aristide in February 2004. The Multinational Interim Force later relinquished authority to the UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti established in June 2004 to support the transitional government. Robust rules of engagement can be applied to reduce violence by controlling any factions that renege on their commitments to a peace agreement. In peace enforcement, local consent is not required, especially with a UN mandate. Impartiality does not necessarily suggest that all parties be treated equally under all circumstances, especially in cases where obvious aggressors and victims can be clearly identified (Gibbs 2000). In peaceful coexistence based on a precarious balance, the status quo is maintained through deterring the use of destructive strategies. Intervention forces may

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support a status quo by simply controlling violent confrontation between local factions, but they may be able to contribute to changing the political balance through such actions as arresting international war criminals. The extent to which local parties can be pressed depends on enforcement capability. Since internal agreements do not have the legal status equivalent of international treaties between governments, local factions are less likely to abide by their agreements. However, enforcement is not common even in the case of noncompliance, due to a fear of armed counterattacks that might follow an aggressive pursuit of violators. In order to change the behavior of protagonists, intervention strategies must be appropriate to local contexts. Military intervention has been employed selectively to enforce a settlement or help disadvantaged parties. Some missions failed to provide security (e.g., Rwanda, Angola) and even reduced their strength in the face of escalating violence. Sometime before the Lusaka process finally ground to a halt in Angola, the better-armed UNAVEM III was replaced by a scaled-down observer mission (which was also closed down in the course of 1999). The scale of renewed fighting led the Security Council to conclude that little could be done until the emergence of new conditions that would be more conducive to negotiations. A lack of the international community’s will to act and consequent escalation of violence and disorder have been evidenced in Rwanda and Somalia, where UN troops reacted rather passively to outbreaks of new violence and eventually withdrew instead of confronting aggressors. Mass killings took place after the withdrawal of peacekeepers from Rwanda, following an escalation of violence organized by Hutu extremists. The Belgian contingent of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) withdrew precipitously after securing the safety of Westerners (Wheeler 2000). Genocide was not prevented in Rwanda, a failure attributable to the inability of the UN to reinforce its troops and adjust the mission’s mandate along with an ambiguous French policy and U.S. disinterest. This experience may be contrasted with the more active and prompt intervention of British and French troops that successfully controlled escalating violence in other African countries. French troops intervened in the Ivory Coast after violent opposition that threatened to derail the 2003 peace agreement that the French had been instrumental in drafting. British intervention forces were dispatched to Sierra Leone after the rebel group Revolutionary United Front (RUF) held UN soldiers hostage and seized heavy weapons and vehicles in May 2000. A brief British military intervention between May and June stabilized the situation in Freetown and helped rebuild the Sierra Leonean army. In addition, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) sent a 3,000-strong rapid reaction force, largely made up of Nigerians, to bolster the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), which struggled to control rampaging rebels engaged

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in looting properties, burning villages, raping women, kidnapping children, and executing civilians. After an initial humiliation in March 2000, UNOMSIL was finally able to respond more forcefully by July, freeing some of the hostages (Hoffman 2004). The operation of UN forces in Sierra Leone could have never been successful without the reinforcement forces from Britain and West African states. The regional African forces preserved order, eventually playing a key role in bringing stability in Liberia as well as Sierra Leone. Instead of immediately controlling the armed factions in Liberia in the early 1990s, the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) ended up being dragged into the civil war. ECOWAS, along with the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), was eventually able to reinitiate the peace process despite the resistance of belligerent parties. The Abuja Agreement was signed in August 1995, but the faction leaders procrastinated over procedures following the formation of the Council of State. The collapse of the Abuja Agreement in April 1996 along with the outbreak of fighting in Monrovia was no surprise, since the armed factions simply did not have the will to work together to form an interim coalition government. In August 1996, when the factions accepted a new timetable, ECOWAS enhanced its oversight role by imposing sanctions on any faction hindering the process. By taking steps to deter aggressive actions, ECOMOG contributed to restoring a climate of security. The broad-based deployment of ECOMOG was essential to building the confidence necessary to hold elections and to implement reintegration programs as well as disarmament by the first half of 1997 (Olonisakin 2000). As the reescalating Liberian civil war caused President Charles Taylor to flee in August 2003, Nigerian-led peacekeeping troops sent by ECOWAS had to intervene again in order to secure Monrovia. The African forces were soon subsumed into much larger UN peacekeeping forces that began to disarm former combatants and move into rebel territory starting in December 2003. Along with deploying observers, ECOMOG provided security for humanitarian assistance in Guinea-Bissau. Following the signing of an agreement in Nigeria’s capital, Abuja, in November 1998, observers were deployed in a buffer zone between warring parties along the borders of Guinea-Bissau and Senegal. The outbreak of fighting in the north of Bissau on January 31, 1999, put peace in jeopardy, prompting the flight of 200,000 returned refugees. The situation was stabilized, however, with the arrival of a 600-strong battalion from Benin, Gambia, Niger, and Togo constituting the core of ECOMOG III, which opened international airports and seaports by mid-February 1999 (Adebajo 2002). If the international community wants to take an uncompromising line on violations, sufficient force levels have to be maintained to set early expectations. As a short-term option, coercion can be used to induce all par-

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ties to honor the agreement and implement their obligations. Successful coercion may not be easy, though, especially when the effects on the targeted groups are not so clear. International intervention should eventually be combined with cultivating good working relationships with local parties.

Maintaining Law and Order Public safety and order cannot be ensured without suppressing murder, violent assaults, arson, and other criminal offenses; international humanitarian and human rights laws must be observed (Strohmeyer 2001). The domestic security gap needs to be reduced through the restoration of law and order. When a local police force does not exist or does not have enough experience, soldiers can serve as a public security force. Efforts to reestablish order in the collapse of a central government are threatened by general lawlessness and expressions of public grievances about shortages of food and other basic necessities. In addition, the immediate aftermath of war is often characterized by revenge attacks, looting, theft, and organized crime, as it was in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and East Timor. With the collapse of law enforcement and judicial systems, criminal elements in society attempt to take control of scarce resources. Deficiencies in law enforcement capabilities and administration of justice follow the collapse of the old order. Local capabilities need to be built up to meet the challenges posed by organized crime, including smuggling, drug trafficking, and kidnapping. Internal security cannot be brought back until criminal structures and old habits are controlled. An assessment of the extent and nature of local violence is necessary when intervention strategies are being designed. Riots or other civilian disturbances can be handled by military police once they are better prepared for street patrols and interacting with the population. It is generally believed that especially in the earlier stages of their deployment, NATO troops in Kosovo did not actively tackle unorganized mob violence targeted at ethnic minorities or threats that may have come from paramilitary organizations. With insufficient time to prepare the international police officers for their duties, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), comprised of NATO troops, was mandated to protect property and basic rights of minority groups (Leurdijk and Zandee 2001). The international force took responsibility for ensuring public order and the safety of all the groups prior to the UN civil presence. Despite making efforts to control vicious Albanian violence and reprisals against Gypsies and Serbs left behind following the withdrawal of the Federal Yugoslav army, KFOR reinstated only basic public order from the beginning of its campaign. Some national contingents of NATO

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troops were initially unwilling to stop revenge attacks. For instance, French soldiers stood idle even when returned Albanian refugees were burning Serb houses, Orthodox churches, and monastery buildings in Vucitrn in June 1999 (O’Neill 2002). The Serb and other non-Albanian minority communities were destroyed by ethnically motivated murders, looting, and arson by Kosovar Albanians. The lack of security led to a complete desertion by Serbs in Prizren, Pec, and other cities as well as the division of the towns of Mitrovica and Orahovac along ethnic lines. The failure of KFOR to protect minority enclaves allowed reverse ethnic cleansing. The 150,000 population of Serbs, Roma, and other non-Albanians was driven out of Kosovo by a broad-based intimidation (Rogel 2003). KFOR’s soft policy on revenge attacks was, in part, attributable to a fear of interference and retaliation by the Kosovo Liberation Army. After a slow start in protecting minorities, KFOR eventually had to respond to the rising security concerns and grave violations of international humanitarian and human rights law (such as torture, abduction, and the forced expropriation of properties) by conducting large-scale arrests. The control of the initial chaos by the international force allowed the transfer of law and order functions to the international civilian police, and eventually to local police. The UN provided an all-purpose civilian police force with full executive authority before the Kosovo Police Service eventually took up responsibilities from the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Because the UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) is not part of KFOR, the commissioner as head of the UN civilian police reports directly to the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General. In order to perform its function of maintaining public law and order properly, the UN police were armed and had been given power to make arrests and detain suspects. In addition to assuming public-order functions, international police personnel in Kosovo took charge of internal security as well as border control. UN civilian police are introduced to maintain a safe and stable environment for public security; the international military force remains as “the backup that helps to force violence down to levels where effective civilian police can handle it” (Last 2000, p. 84). Interim law enforcement forces are prepared to manage interethnic and nonethnic violence and intimidation, as well as the solidification of organized crime networks until the development of an effective national police force. International civilian police units, along with peacekeeping forces, support the UN transition authority as well as monitor the work of the local police force. Reflecting the changing direction of peacekeeping, an increasing number of UN civilian police forces have been introduced. The number varies as of 31 August 2004: 1,500 in Namibia, 3,600 in Cambodia, 1,800 in Bosnia, 4,800 in Kosovo, 1,622 in Haiti, 1,115 in Liberia, 350 in the Ivory Coast, 134 in the Demo-

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cratic Republic of the Congo, 139 in East Timor, 120 in Burundi, 119 in Sierra Leone. International civilian forces have diverse roles and capacity; some have full executive authority especially in the absence of a legitimate local authority (Dwan 2002). With the unusual UN assumption of some state functions in Cambodia, for instance, UN police officers carried out such duties as arresting suspects for charges initiated by a special UN prosecutor. In particular, the work of international police monitors helped neutralize the activities of local police considered to be extensions of military factions. Police functions are more suitable than the military for controlling mob violence, since police are trained to use a minimal level of force to restore public order. In maintaining order, police functions rely less on an explicit use of force and coercive tactics and more on fostering local support. Force needs to be minimized, restrained, and applied in very exceptional situations, while eruptions of violence should be controlled to allow space for the negotiated settlement. Contact with and support from the local populations are needed for security operations. Building good community relations requires an understanding of local concerns.

Protection of Human Rights The protection of human rights is an essential component of civilian security in the aftermath of conflict. It is important to build the capacity of individuals and groups to enjoy and exercise the political, economic, and civil rights that correspond to the status of citizens, especially where populations “have long been stripped of their rights and dignity, subject to deep insecurity and indignity” (Mani 2000b, pp. 17–18). A partition of divided territories following ethnic cleansing can be perpetuated through the local police’s intimidation. Killings and other human rights violations by police are continuing sources of public grievances. In many war-torn societies, the majority of gross violations of human rights are committed by state security and law enforcement agencies as well as militia forces. Individuals can be detained unlawfully or be subject to coercive means to obtain confessions. Law enforcement officials’ inaction or inappropriate response to human rights violations leads to failure to prevent continued abuses, ethnically motivated crimes, and sexual or domestic violence. The police may refuse to patrol areas where members of minority ethnicity are exposed to repeated incidents of intimidation. An absence of disciplinary or criminal proceedings, as well as failures of adequate investigation, leads to a fundamental distrust of governmental authorities. Early attention needs to be paid to international monitoring of human rights. One hundred UN human rights monitors were deployed to dissuade the parties from violence in El Salvador in July 1991 even before

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the completion of the peace accords. Human rights verification and police supervision later became important functions performed by the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador. In agreement with the government in late 1994, 147 human rights field officers under the auspices of the UN High Commission on Human Rights were deployed to ethnically diverse communities in Rwanda. Their activities included not only investigations into violations of humanitarian law but also technical cooperation and support for the administration of justice. In rebuilding civil society, the field operations were also aimed at supporting confidence building for the return of refugees and displaced people. In pursuit of these objectives, responsibility for special investigations belonged to the Legal Analysis and Coordination Unit of the Human Rights Field Operation for Rwanda. The Technical and Cooperation Unit organized local training and educational programs (Manikas and Kumar 1997). In UN peace operations, human rights units have been playing an increasingly important role in carrying out monitoring, training and educating government officials regarding their treatment of citizens. The CIVPOL unit in the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations has supported the establishment of reliable and legal monitoring systems (Bellamy, Williams, and Griffin 2004). In promoting human rights agendas, civilian components have also been developed to enhance the capabilities of not only advising and training but also monitoring the performance of the local law enforcement agency. International observers advise the local police on bringing law enforcement practice up to the international standards. The immediate effect of a foreign presence is to prevent or dissuade further human rights violations. Human rights investigations help identify and address persistent institutional deficiencies by issuing noncompliance reports against law enforcement officials. The functions of CIVPOL vary according to the degree of authority granted by a particular UN mandate. The UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) for former Yugoslavia exerted more extensive power and was entrusted with investigating human rights abuses by police and administrative authorities. In carrying out their responsibilities, IPTF personnel were allowed immediate and uninhibited access to any record, person, activity, proceeding, and events at any facility related to law enforcement activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Their reports of human rights violations can result in actions by the Human Rights Ombudsperson and other national bodies. Whereas the UN Police Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina had sanctioning abilities, the civilian police in Mozambique and Namibia could not directly respond to complaints but urged the local police to be more responsible. Even though the 1,144 police personnel were scattered across eighty-three field offices and provincial capitals, CIVPOL in Mozambique lacked authority to stop or put sanctions on the violations of political rights.

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Despite documented brutality, UNTAG in Namibia was not able to establish its credibility by failing to impose sanctions on the South West African Police (SWAPOL) under the control of the Administrator General (Hearn 1999). Such functions as investigating local police actions would not be successful without the support of military forces, especially considering that cooperation from local police is unlikely (Call and Barnett 2000). NATO troops routinely accompanied the unarmed IPTF, for example, for major inspections of police facilities or prisons because local police were antagonistic to verifiers. The IPTF was incapable of asserting control over local Bosnian Serb Ministry of Interior police in the absence of the intervention of NATO-led troops, for the unarmed IPTF became powerless in the face of the strong-arm tactics of the Bosnian Serb police, who carried grenades and long-barreled rifles. The Serb police were indeed capable of committing war crimes and atrocities against civilians by not only hampering freedom of movement for non-Serbs but also inhibiting the return of refugees and displaced persons. The Bosnian Serb police’s strong resistance to reform resulted in the deployment of NATO forces, with their superior power to enforce compliance. Military force may shut down police stations in the event that local police violate the human rights guidelines (Cordone 2000). The monitoring activities of the Human Rights Office for the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), established in November 1997, are linked to the investigation not only of direct violations of human rights by law enforcement agencies but also of failures to investigate ethnic attacks.9 Serving as one of the two main components of the UNMIBH, the Human Rights Office, along with the IPTF, can recommend that local officials be prohibited from exercising any police powers (Okuizumi 2002). In human rights investigations, both police and civilian skills are supported by not only acquaintance with the local legal system and actors but also the appreciation of the political contexts. Knowledge of international human rights standards comes from civilian experts. On the other hand, the quality of investigations can be enhanced when there are technical skills and experience in managing complex inquiries. In a wider perspective, monitoring cannot be done without considering the social and political environment that directly or indirectly influences the performance of local enforcement agencies (Hartz 2000). Observing or reporting complaints leads to reviewing actions against local officials and making a recommendation to remove uncooperative officials through enforcement activities. As one of the most decisive actions by UNMIBH, the Bosnian-Croat local police were disciplined for tolerating Bosnian-Croat residents who harassed and expelled Bosniacs returning to their homes in Jajce. Serious negligence on the part of the police chief and

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other officers was discovered through IPTF monitors’ direct observation and information gathering. The proceedings of a disciplinary tribunal set up in December 1997 led to sacking the police chief and ordering the BosnianCroat police authorities to take their own measures. Heavy pressure on the highest level of the Croat leadership was necessary to bring about disciplinary hearings and obtain compliance from local Croats (Cordone 2000). In identifying problems faced by internally displaced ethnic groups in Kosovo, the Joint Task Force on Minorities, formed by the UNHCR and OSCE in August 1999, issued a series of periodic reports documenting violence against non-Albanians. This task force made a significant contribution to forging protection strategies by reporting on the ongoing violence (O’Neill 2002). Even after the departure of the UN Transition Authority in Cambodia, human rights conditions continued to be monitored along with technical assistance to the government by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) through the mandate of the Paris Peace Agreements. Despite the government’s threat, it was necessary for the local UNHCHR office to occasionally take a critical stand on such abusive practices as the killing of sixteen demonstrators in front of the National Assembly by a grenade attack. In particular, the assassinations and murders of some forty military advisers of co–prime minister Prince Ranariddh by the Hun Sen faction in the July 1997 coup were scrupulously investigated and reported by the UN rapporteur for human rights Thomas Hammarberg. Unfortunately, this evidence of repeated human rights violations documented by the international human rights offices failed to serve justice, owing to a lack of sufficiently strong pressure by the international community. The presence of international agencies plays a critical role in protecting citizen security, especially in the absence of clear local standards for human rights (Hansen 2002). But, the involvement of multiple agencies, without any coordination, creates confusion because of differences in approaches. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, the local police and victims have to cope with monitors from separate organizations such as the UNMIBH and the OSCE, which investigate the same cases but are “not necessarily operating on the basis of the same standards or making consistent recommendations” (Cordone 2000, p. 201). Insufficient coordination undermines effective long-term development of human rights standards and practice at a local level. Strengthening the protection of human rights can be linked to improvements in the efficiency of a human rights ombudsman. The mandates of an ombudsman’s office permit independent investigation of military and police conduct. Its authority is strengthened if it has ability to bring cases of civil rights violations to the courts. El Salvador’s National Counsel for the Defense of Human Rights “has given victims of abuse an avenue of recourse and has proved its ability to help defuse volatile situations such

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as land invasions and large protest marches” (Orr 2001, p. 166). The ombudsman’s office was designed to assume many of the functions performed by the Human Rights Division of the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL). In general, the ombudsman’s office is established to investigate human rights abuses, encourage prosecution of violators, and assist victims (Dodson and Jackson 2004). As the operation of the human rights ombudsman’s office is often impeded by a lack of government will, international technical and financial assistance is necessary. In particular, overcoming a past legacy of oppressive security policies requires more than setting up institutional mechanisms and procedures. The need to maintain internal order should not be used as an excuse to justify a lack of progress in human rights protection. Considering that injustice and oppression are still a source of social tension and violence, the protection of human rights must be recognized as one of the primary goals for reforming public institutions. To be effective, enhancement of a legal framework for human rights has to be accompanied by judicial reform, the restructuring of security forces, and the retraining of civilian police. Legal and institutional accountability can be enhanced by the presence of an international military contingent that supports the enforcement of human rights standards, but long-term effects require fostering public awareness. The ability to protect human rights can be strengthened by nongovernmental organizations as well as national institutions (Gaer 2003). To have longterm effects, international support needs to be devoted to strengthening grassroots groups that monitor the implementation of the government’s human rights policies.

Institutional Reform The rule of law based on the protection of basic human dignity and rights as well as the abolishment of discrimination is necessary for guaranteeing an overall environment of public security. However, war-torn societies generally have weak state institutions, particularly in police and judiciary sectors, with a consequent paralysis of governance. Even when killings of innocent civilians are still routine, there is no reliable legal system to indict offenders without a functional law enforcement apparatus. Rebuilding the legal, police, and other state institutions is imperative where civil authorities are absent as in the complete withdrawal of Yugoslav federal armies from Kosovo and the departure of Indonesian authorities from East Timor (Leurdijk and Zandee 2001). In strengthening the rule of law, the police, court, and prison systems have to function in conformity with international standards of criminal justice and human rights. New civilian police and judiciary bodies must be constituted to serve as neutral arbitrators instead of protecting dominant inter-

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ests. Because the proper exercise of police functions requires the framework of a fair and effective judicial system, police restructuring is organically related to establishment of the rule of law. A well-trained police force is doomed to be ineffective without a conducive legislative framework and functional courts. Any excessive use of force and abuse of authority should be held accountable through the legal system. Police Reform In order to support stability and democratization within troubled states, “a national police must be organized, trained, and equipped with the ability to provide public security” (Garver 1997, p. 3). A new national police needs to be sufficiently developed to protect democratic institutions, especially in a society long dominated by the military. Failure to introduce an effective national police force contributes to the deterioration in law and order with dramatic increases in serious crimes such as homicides and gang-related violence involving youth. Police functions include the protection of citizens and their rights as well as the maintenance of public order. Retooling the police force should never degenerate into legitimizing abusive acts of the government. Creating a professional civilian police has been the most crucial public security agenda in Haiti and in other countries where police abuse has become a source of oppression and violence. Institutional reform in the public security arena entails training and restructuring local law enforcement forces. The 1992 Chapultepec Peace Accords signed by the Salvadoran government and the FMLN called for getting rid of the police who had been dominated by the security forces and had had a history of human rights abuses. The reformed National Civil Police adopted a new organizational structure, officer corps, education and training mechanisms, and doctrine (Burgerman 2000). Following years of militarized conflict, the re-created civilian police force also served the important purpose of demilitarizing internal security with fundamental changes to the constitution, excluding the military from routine public-order functions. The pervasive abuse of the past, derived from a lack of separation of the military and police as independent institutional entities, could be overcome by the creation of a professional civilian police force and the phasing out of internal security forces that belonged to the Ministry of Defense. In cases where internal security forces are responsible for organized or random abuses of civil liberties on a massive scale, a major refurbishment is necessary for the development of a professional police force. In order to restore public confidence, former officers, associated with abuse, need to be banned from recruitment into the new police through a screening process. Recruiting and training new officials from scratch can be part of a strategy to establish professional ethics and culture.

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The process of screening and training a completely new police force can be organized by CIVPOL, since even under a newly formed civilian government it is often quite difficult to transform an old police force (Hartz 2000). Designing reformed civilian police forces has been one of the most important tasks in El Salvador, East Timor, Kosovo, and Haiti. A focus on institution building is illustrated by the increased role of international civilian police, following the CIVPOL mission in Haiti and the UN Police Support Group in Eastern Slavonia in the mid-1990s. Ending the military’s domination of civil and political life was sought through the creation of a professional civilian police force with the support of the UN Observer Mission in El Salvador. The CIVPOL in Mozambique was responsible for monitoring police activities across the country as well as providing technical assistance to the National Police Commission. Substantial assistance from such bilateral donors as the United States, Britain, Spain, Sweden, and other countries has been devoted to police reform in a number of countries. A British advisory team offered training to a reconstructed Namibian police force (composed of former combatants of SWAPOL, the South West African Territorial Force, and newly recruited Namibians) as part of the efforts to develop ‘“policing by consent” instead of the use of oppressive tactics (Mani 2000b). The development of a new police force may begin with the deployment of an interim security force to meet the immediate security needs. This is followed by reconstruction of the local police force; new recruits undergo a short course covering human rights, a code of conduct, and development of technical skills. Once they are deployed, the conduct of police forces can be monitored and supervised by the CIVPOL. In the development of an organized crime unit, specialists can be placed alongside their local counterparts. The institutional development of police is supported by the launching of a new police academy. Monitoring local police can be combined with giving on-the-job training and advice designed to improve performance on community policing and human rights. The CIVPOL may escort novice police officers for their regular responsibilities, granting them the benefit of their own experience. For instance, the presence of ONUSAL civilian police personnel in the field provided an opportunity for hands-on technical assistance and professional support for newly trained and inexperienced police officers. In the face of different political allegiances, recruitment of personnel from opposing camps is essential to meet the need to create a neutral police force. A multiethnic national police force in Afghanistan was drawn equitably from all the provinces of the country regardless of past political alliances. In the case of Cambodia, the amalgamation of all the opposing political factions was critical in re-creating a civilian police force, as happened to other public sector cadres. In general, success in integrating for-

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mer enemy fighters within a single police force relies on accomplishing changes in the value and quality of the service of the force. Priorities in Eastern Slovania, Bosnia, and Kosovo have been not only professionalization but also ethnic representation. Detailed quotas in the allocation of positions were established for Bosniacs, Bosnian Croats, and Serbs in the recruitment and selection of personnel for the police corps of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the formation of a multi-ethnic police force was significantly constrained by intransigent positions of the ethnic parties, and three years passed before its initial inauguration in 1997. Unfortunately, integration was not entirely successful owing to the persistence of a norm that permits informal ethnic-based chains of command. To enhance the ethnic diversity in a national police force, local communities can get involved in the selection of personnel. Reforms in Guatemala in 1998 moved toward establishing a more indigenous police force evidenced by the recruitment and deployment of police academy graduates with Ixil descent by the largely Mayan department of El Quiche (Kincaid 2000). This symbolizes an important step toward developing a police force that is more sensitive to community needs even though realizing communal justice still remains a far-reaching goal. Establishing essential systems for a functioning police force has to be sensitive to the incorporation of diverse policing cultures and concepts. Police doctrines can be adjusted to local contexts where there are unique patterns of relations between the police and the community. Home-grown strategies can be explored to penetrate into the subcultures of the population to tackle various forms of organized crime. Community policing is suggested as a means of gaining public trust and cooperation in countries that do not have positive past experiences in interaction between residents and authorities. The methods of community policing were introduced to form better relations with diverse groups of local residents, as seen in the establishment of Public-Police Relations Committees throughout Namibia. Responses to complaints or questions from the community through participation in regular town meetings or radio appearances by police officers help retain a vital line of communication. Mediation procedures can be adopted as less costly and less time-consuming methods of resolving numerous noncriminal disputes brought to police attention. The success of the reform can be assessed in terms of increased public confidence and development of an effective mechanism for internal control and accountability as well as reduced levels of common crime. The establishment of a professional civilian police force has proved to be a difficult process characterized by institutional weaknesses and continuing human rights violations. The original timetable for replacing old institutions is often extended for various reasons such as rising crime rates. For

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instance, it was not until January 1995 that the old El Salvadoran National Police Force was dismantled, though the original schedule was the end of 1993. In fact, the Salvadoran police reform reverted into an encroachment of the military on police functions. Governments have used increases in crime and paramilitary activities as an excuse for delaying a police reconstruction program. Most importantly, human rights abuses by police still remain a major concern despite the initial training and establishment of procedures and systems. A new professional police force may not be free from accusations of abuse of authority, a propensity for ill treatment, and the excessive use of force (Popkin 2000). Despite the police training offered by UNTAC’s CIVPOL unit in Cambodia, no major changes in the organizational culture and practice took place to support human rights. Currently, Cambodia’s police force has inspired no confidence in the population with the continued domination of the government over law enforcement functions. Developing an appropriate internal investigative and disciplinary capacity remains a key agenda for most police reform. The performance of local police must be evaluated in terms of human rights laws stipulated in various international instruments. Universally approved standards of human rights and criminal justice derive from provisions entailed in multilateral treaties based on the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or legal norms that have obtained the status of customary international law (Hartz 2000). The allegations of human rights abuses result from resurrection of the most heinous attitudes of the disbanded security force. There are also wider, contextual issues that have an impact on the effectiveness of capacity building. Police reform confronts many institutional and logistical obstacles ranging from the improper levels of training, equipment, and salaries to poor organizational support. One of the most common challenges to the formation of a dependable and disciplined police force in postconflict countries, especially when the government is unable to amass sufficient internal funds and external assistance, is insufficient or inadequate salaries for the law enforcement personnel and extensive arrears in payment of salaries. Police involvement in organized banditry and other types of corruptions reveal the strong connection between reforming law enforcement and broader issues of governance. Recruiting, training, and disciplining programs are seldom successful in separation from the existence of an adequately developed institutional infrastructure such as the legislative system, the judiciary, as well as the macroeconomic environment. In particular, failure to ensure accountability of the police force through judicial channels and executive authority ultimately results in continued abuses.

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Judicial Reform A dysfunctional judicial system adversely affects efforts to restore political stability necessary to the development of democratic institutions. Enhancing the performance of judicial functions is critical in enforcing the accountability of security forces. A functioning judicial system is essential to bring legal procedures to bear on those who have committed war crimes. As long as the perpetrators of serious crimes remain at large, evidence of violations of international humanitarian law can be destroyed. Such a situation does nothing to help create an atmosphere of confidence conducive to the return of refugees and the initiation of social and economic reconstruction programs. A failure to respond to past and continuing violence can effectively impede progress toward the broader objectives of establishing foundations for justice. Rehabilitation of basic judiciary functions should be a main concern from the beginning stages of peacebuilding. Laws are no longer acceptable to the population if they are politically charged. The local population’s willingness to respect the rule of law is inhibited by a failure to bring criminal offenders to justice. The biggest obstacle to the reestablishment of a judicial system occurs where there is an almost complete absence of even minimally trained lawyers, as we have seen in Kosovo, East Timor, Rwanda, and Cambodia. In such cases, the personnel, capable of carrying out judicial tasks, have departed or are regarded as inappropriate due to their perceived affiliation with the previous regime. Owing to ethnically one-sided appointments and training, only thirty out of 756 judges and prosecutors in Kosovo were Albanians. The total collapse of the judicial sector resulted from the exodus of Kosovo Serbs, accompanied by the departure of the Belgrade troops and police (Doubt 2000). Meanwhile, many Kosovar Albanian lawyers had either gone underground or taken refuge abroad in the months preceding the deployment of UNMIK. The preexisting judicial infrastructure in East Timor was decimated: court buildings were burned and looted; all court registers, archives, case files, records, and other legal resources were dislocated or lost. In addition, all judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and many judicial support staff closely associated with the Indonesian regime fled East Timor. The few remaining lawyers were not sufficiently trained to meet the challenges of a new East Timorese justice system. In the absence of any justice system left to be administered, minimal judicial and prosecutorial functions have been performed by ad hoc arrangements. Military personnel may operate a temporary arrest and detention system for criminal offenders, as Australian-led INTERFET did in the absence of a civilian mechanism. However, minimal judicial functions need

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to be installed to try, convict, and sentence a growing number of criminals involved in violent assault, rape, and murder since the military are usually neither mandated nor equipped to do so. Normally a judicial mechanism is set up to review the arrests and detentions carried out by international forces. In both Kosovo and East Timor a prompt dispatch of military legal personnel along with troops assisted the detention and judicial hearings on individuals arrested on criminal charges. One of the reasons that rebuilding a judicial system needs to be carried out in the initial stages is that restoration of legal institutions is a relatively slow process. It is a time-consuming task to draft legislation and train personnel from scratch. In reviewing existing laws and drafting new laws, expertise is necessary to ensure compliance with international human rights standards. Reestablishing the judiciary entails training judges and prosecutors as well as monitoring judicial proceedings. The development of legal policies and the amendment of legislation should be consistent with international standards (Chesterman 2002). As Haiti’s judiciary was rebuilt from scratch, for instance, its penal system was boosted up to satisfy basic standards of civil rights and decency. Initiatives for rule of law reform have been putting a higher priority on efficiency in administering justice, as most international assistance programs are directed toward improving the competence and effectiveness of the justice system. More attention may need to be devoted to increasing access to justice and the independence of the judiciary with the appointment of qualified judges and prosecutors. Penal reform can be initiated through the monitoring of prison conditions and the legal situation of detainees. At a minimum, a genuine rule of law has to be based on the creation of an independent, impartial, and multiethnic judiciary. Adoption of objective and verifiable criteria, along with consideration of ethnic and political balance, is essential to judicial appointments. Independent judicial commissions fulfilled an important function in preserving a transparent process of identifying and selecting candidates for judge and prosecutor positions in both Kosovo and East Timor (Strohmeyer 2001). International assistance has concentrated on technical support and advice in the diagnosis of judiciary problems as well as constitutional legislation. The most common forms of assistance involve training judges and court personnel as well as support for the rehabilitation of physical facilities for courts. The United Nations has offered assistance for the legal and judicial systems of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Cambodia, Haiti, and other postconflict societies. The joint OAS and UN International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH), established in 1993, played a critical role in creating the Public Defender’s Office by furnishing not just theoretical and practical train-

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ing for its staff, but also technical assistance and moral support. Support for projects on legal protection and penal defense in El Salvador and Guatemala came from the UNDP (Santiso 2002). Through its assistance programs for Rwanda’s justice sector, the UNDP devoted $4.6 million to training a core of qualified judicial professionals. Rehabilitating tribunals, courts, and prosecutors’ offices in Rwanda aimed to prepare the system for the trials of persons suspected of taking part in the 1994 genocide. In the absence of indigenous administrative capacity, UN administration took responsibility for rebuilding coherent judicial and legal systems for the entire territories of East Timor and Kosovo. A search for qualified lawyers and other legal personnel in Kosovo was conducted by the regional offices of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe along with nominations by such main political forces as the Democratic League of Kosovo (O’Neill 2002). A Judicial Affairs Office, established as part of the civil administration component of UNMIK, took responsibility for administering courts and prison services as well as prosecutions. Effectiveness of international assistance in strengthening the judiciary is affected by differing levels of political commitment and public trust. Despite international assistance, the governments of El Salvador and Cambodia resisted legal reform that is consistent with an international standard. Their judicial systems are undermined by the retention of many of the same staff who had not respected a standard of impartiality under previous governments. Reforming the law becomes partisan in an adversarial political context such as the continuation of the old regime in Tajikistan or rule by a victorious army in Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Many judges in Guatemala are under death threats but have not been protected by the government, while high-ranking government officials continue to be guilty of corruption. In April 2003, an anticorruption prosecutor was forced to flee to Mexico following numerous death threats. In Haiti, similarly, a vacuum of political commitment and authority made the government’s lack of capacity inevitable. The majority of reform programs are oriented toward the formal institutional structures of legal enforcement instead of being serious about the substantive content of justice. A reformulation of legislation is deemed necessary to preserve law and order or regulate private economy sectors. Too much emphasis on technical expertise, however, leads to demands for quick results with a heavy focus on administrative aspects of reform (Mani 2000a). When security forces violate, instead of upholding, the rule of law and fundamental human rights, judicial reform should be able to help restore and ensure public security. The right to justice and dignity cannot be substituted with mere order in society.

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Demilitarization of Internal Security Systems Demilitarization of security functions is a necessary condition for public citizen security. Personal security and the rights of civilians are the least protected by militarized internal security organizations that oversee death squads carrying out extrajudicial executions. During civil wars, the domination of the military over the police weakens the separation of roles between the two institutions. The differences between state and citizen security are further blurred when parallel police units are formed. Apart from the civilian police, special units might carry out operations independently, and often such units are accused of atrocities. The maintenance of order through a military doctrine becomes either irrelevant or inappropriate to the promotion of security at the community level. It is most often the military that justifies torture, abduction, and mass killings in the name of protecting “state security.” Given the rigidity of military doctrines (as opposed to police doctrines), military troops are not appropriate for protecting civilian security; however, civilian police forces have often been employed to support military operations. In such situations, human rights safeguards can be enhanced by diminishing military control over internal security. The armed forces’ role in internal security must decrease to enhance the conditions for public security that are supposed to protect human rights and ensure the safety of the population (Call 2002). Such principles as democratic values, respect for human rights, and subordination to civilian authority have been applied to reform military institutions. In South Africa, El Salvador, and other places where gross human rights violations were committed by military personnel, paramilitary patrols that had been performed by the armed forces were brought under the control of civilian authorities. The intensive reorientation and professionalization of armed forces need to be accompanied by the closure of military bases that existed for counterinsurgency purposes along with the transfer of intelligence functions from military to civilian hands. In the demilitarization of the security sector in Haiti (1994) and Panama (1989), an internal security apparatus had to be weakened and abolished to overcome abuses that had been condoned by authoritarian regimes. In Haiti, the much-hated army (responsible for internal violence) was abolished and replaced by police. The size of the Salvadoran military was dramatically reduced, from approximately 40,000 troops in 1992 to 28,000 in 1994 and 17,000 by 1998 (Kincaid 2000). One of the biggest achievements in El Salvador was the demobilization of combat battalions and civil defense patrols that had operated during more than ten years of civil war. Along with required changes in police

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practice in El Salvador, a National Council of Public Security comprised of prominent civilians began to oversee the reconstitution of internal security institutions in 1996 (Vickers 1999). The creation of a new national army followed the disbanding of the Treasury Police and the National Guard along with the replacement of the National Intelligence Directorate by a new agency under civilian control. Like El Salvador, Guatemala disbanded its Mobile Military Police and the rural paramilitary forces, and new training of military personnel incorporated respect for the privacy rights of individual citizens. Despite new institutional arrangements, reforms have been slow in reducing military intervention in public security. This is ascribed to the incapacity of the police and the justice sector to respond to rising levels of violent crimes (Ladutke 2000). It was not unusual for soldiers to greatly outnumber police agents in urban military-police patrols, while the main policing responsibilities in rural areas fell to the military. The continued use of military forces in place of the police resulted in remilitarizing internal security, illustrating a concomitant reversal in the legal guarantees of citizen rights. Military and police missions can be redefined in conformity with a democratic model of civil-military relations, which significantly diminishes military prerogatives. The principle of civilian control over the military is supported by the appointment of a civilian as defense minister, the legislature’s control over military budgets, and executive control over the internal promotions of senior military officers. Defying this principle, however, the armed forces of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras still conserve a considerable degree of autonomy despite the reduced scope of their power. Final Comments Progress in security sectors can be eventually measured in terms of how to control violence and prevent police and military abuses. The principles of public security support the affirmation of human rights, for example, in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, but increases in criminal and sociopolitical violence destabilize the institutionalization of democratic reform (Pugh 2000b). Insecurity associated with high crime rates may be attributable to multiple factors, including a volatile sociopolitical situation stemming from a large number of frustrated, unemployed ex-combatants and repatriated refugees. Such security threats are aggravated by a surplus of cheap and easily available arms provided by drug trading, arms smuggling, contraband, and other activities of the underground war economy. Thus priorities in the security sector should be put on the collection and control of small arms, the

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demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatant as well as the rebuilding of the police. The export of violence to neighboring countries is, to a certain extent, prevented by a well-funded demilitarization program (Cooper 2000). The prevalence of the rule of law is one core element in nourishing democracy with the control of violence. Given that the judiciary and law enforcement agencies are “the standardized and replicable pillars of the rule of law,” a weak justice system handicaps the transition to a new democratic state (Mani 2000a, p. 101). Most importantly, a security sector reform should be directed not only to control violence but also to solidify positive peace that centers on the protection of human dignity. Given their inseparable nature, pursuing one aspect of reform while neglecting the other is invalid. If security means more than coercive maintenance of order, reform of the security sector must go beyond achieving the limited aim of averting a collapse into renewed violence. Diverse security challenges need to be overcome to meet a precondition for political stability and development. However, merely enforcing order is “a slippery slope” toward an excessive use of force “to the detriment of the principles of justice and rights” (Mani 2000b, p. 22). It is important to integrate long-term security concerns, from the start, into post–civil war reconstruction plans via institutional reforms of the military and law enforcement agencies.

Notes 1. Security can be seen in terms of eliminating violence inflicted upon civilian populations. Human rights are an essential element in enhancing individual well-being. 2. Subcommissions were set up to monitor progress in such areas as police reform, human rights, and the redistribution of lands to ex-combatants and residents of former conflict zones. 3. One party may cheat while the other party cooperates (as happened in Angola in the 1990s). Sometimes both parties do not sufficiently carry out the demobilization agreement (e.g., Northern Ireland conflict). 4. The objective of demobilizing 70 percent of the armed forces agreed in the Bicesse Accords was never obtained, while two years of serious efforts to demobilize UNITA forces ended up in a renewed civil war. 5. Failure to end Angola’s lengthy and intense civil war after peace accords in 1991 and 1994 is attributed to a complex variety of factors such as difficulties in enforcing disarmament of the rebel groups and inadequate independent monitoring of the demobilization process. UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi had little incentive for disarmament because of his control over territory with lucrative assets (such as oil and diamonds estimated to have earned UNITA U.S.$300 million a year). 6. A massive return of refugees can distract attention from demobilization. For instance, as the Mozambican soldiers from the two warring camps started to gather in their assembly areas toward the end of 1993, the flow of refugees moving back to Mozambique was accelerated.

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7. In addition to delays in government land reform, demobilization and disarmament processes in El Salvador were loaded with accusations following discovery of FMLN weapons deposits in Nicaragua and the government’s insistence on disqualifying FMLN from participation in the elections. 8. UNOSOM I (1992) sought a cease-fire between warlords contending for power, but its small number of troops were not sufficient to support humanitarian assistance. 9. The human rights office has been divided into the main headquarters in Sarajevo, seven regional/district offices, and the station offices located throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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4 POLITICAL TRANSITION

A peaceful transition requires the establishment of a functioning government acceptable to the different parties, along with the formation of mutually agreeable expectations and rules for intergroup dynamics. A minimal consensus regarding the rules of political competition is essential to institution building. Since it is not always easy to find a satisfactory political formula following many years of struggle for autonomy, independence, and social justice, it takes long negotiation sessions and compromise to develop a final political framework. Negotiating a new order among former adversaries focuses on discussions about a variety of models of power sharing and regional autonomy. Given the impact of formal institutional structures on political functioning, adopting an appropriate political system is important. In divided societies, exclusive ethnic, religious, or regional loyalties erect obstacles to the process of institution building. Constitution making needs to be carried out within a process of national discourse. The design of a new political structure has to reflect cultural practices and social experiences as well as an exploration of mechanisms to reconcile seemingly incompatible demands of group interests. The ability to seize power through military might is replaced by the electorate’s choice, which may give victory to opponents. The success of electoral competition largely depends on the willingness of the losers to abide by the outcome as well as the victorious party’s acceptance of the opposition party’s role in the new political system.

Transitional Government There are varied processes within a transition toward a functioning government. In the absence of local capacity for self-governance, an interim administration is set up before administrative control is transferred to newly elected officials. When neither side has won a decisive victory in the civil conflict, peace implementation processes can be carried out by the existing 77

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regime or by a coalition government during transition from cease-fire to elections. Regardless of the types of arrangements, democratic transition requires compromise as the main method to reach an agreement. Sustainable political arrangements will require extended periods of negotiation preceding elections. A quick political transition has the benefit of reducing uncertainties, but local situations often dictate the speed of the implementation process. The transition period can become inevitably extended especially if the new government structure has to reflect a delicate balance between different groups. Following difficult negotiations of different political interests of the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) and other insurgent forces, the transitional government, formed after the overthrow of the ruling military government in Ethiopia, lasted from 1991 to 1995. In a drawn-out process of constitution making, a lengthy transition during which the old government retains power can arouse mistrust. In the case of South Africa, the basis for transition was established by an interim constitution negotiated between the white minority government and opposition groups heavily represented by the African National Congress (ANC). Transitional governments, councils, and coalition cabinets rely on power sharing and joint decisionmaking to enhance legitimacy. The burden placed on the transitional government can be reduced by the organization of forums at all levels of governance. A transitional government of national unity (sometimes called a government of national reconciliation) is adopted before the installation of a new government for various reasons, ranging from international pressure to a need to demonstrate harmony. Power sharing is attractive to parties with a declining status who are compelled to protect their long-term interests (for example, the National Party [NP] representing the white minority population in South Africa). Moreover, political stability during the transition period can be a main motivation for power sharing by an emerging party such as the ANC (Spears 2002). Overall, power sharing is based on temporary provisions for the purpose of keeping unmanageable conflict under control while negotiations are taking place to determine future political arrangements. Power sharing is transitory, mostly serving to demonstrate the degree of confidence. In South Africa, power sharing did not bring a significant representation of the minority party except a brief inclusion of prominent National Party member Derek Keys as finance minister. The consensual decisionmaking quickly shifted to a competition to gain more power and resources. The minority NP withdrew from the government of national unity soon after the 1994 transitional elections and chose to be the opposition within the system. This reflects confidence in the system rather than insisting on artificial power-sharing arrangements.

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Power sharing often reflects the military balance during the internal war as well as the negotiating power of opposing parties. In Liberia, under the Abuja Accord (1995), each faction had an equal number of representatives in the transitional government. In the power-sharing agreement in Tajikistan (1997), the government retained 70 percent of the positions, while the United Tajik Opposition (UTO) was allocated the rest, reflecting the balance of power resulting from the war. In the DRC transitional government installed in July 2003, leaders of the two main former rebel groups, the Rally for the Congolese Democracy and the Congolese Liberation Movement, were appointed as vice-presidents and the top commanders of ground and naval forces. The main rebel group Forces for Defense of Democracy (FDD) in Burundi was allocated 40 percent of the military command and 35 percent of the police command as well as political posts in an interim administration through a South African–brokered deal (called the Pretoria Protocol on Political, Defense and Security Power Sharing) signed in 2003. The process leading to the establishment of a legitimate government in Mozambique was considerably more difficult due to the incumbent government’s refusal to yield to international and domestic pressure for an inclusive interim government. The government rejected the idea of a unity government demanded by donors and the opposition (Manning 2002). As the war was ending, the incumbent government was in a stronger position and was less willing to make a political compromise. The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) had to use hard bargaining tactics coupled with threats to pull out of the election process. The establishment of a transitional government is not always successful or easy. In Guinea-Bissau, the leaders of the military junta, engaged in the armed conflict, turned down the offers of positions, including a military adviser to the presidency and minister of defense in the new parliamentary coalition government (set up in February 2000). This transition became even more difficult owing to arrests of opposition leaders and a withdrawal of support by the coalition party Resistencia da Guine-Bissau (RGB) in November 2000 (Adebajo 2002). Power sharing can be seen as an indicator of willingness to accept each other. The stability of the interim political arrangement is unstable when the parties do not accept the need for coexistence. Inclusiveness is necessary to overcome an insecure political environment. In Rwanda, the 1993 assassination of Hutu president Melchior Ndadaye in a Tutsi-led attack produced intense anti-Tutsi sentiment. Perceptions of threat led to the mobilization of Hutu extremists, derailing the Rwandan peace process, which had entailed plans for a power-sharing interim government (Mamdani 2001). In the case of Angola, the existence of a transitional government prevented a serious violation of the cease-fire, but unfortunately the arrange-

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ment did not last up to the elections. Following the Lusaka Protocol of November 20, 1994 (thought to overcome problems with the Bicesse Accords), the establishment of a government of national unity provided a stake at local and provincial levels, as well as in the capital, for the opposition party. A power-sharing agreement awarded UNITA not only four cabinet minister and seven deputy minister positions but also administrative control over three provinces and dozens of municipalities. Thus prominent UNITA members nominated by their leader Jonas Savimbi took cabinet memberships in a Government of National Unity and Reconciliation and provincial governor positions in April 1997 following a cease-fire. However, the interim arrangements did not lead to the initiation of a new political process. A lack of agreement on the extension of power sharing to a postelection government did not help prevent the outbreak of renewed hostilities in the latter half of 1998. A spirit of good will and cooperation is important for the success of any coalition government during a transition period. Reflecting on the failures in implementation of two previous peace accords and the bitter civil wars that had followed them, warring parties in Angola have made conciliatory gestures since 2002, in the latest attempt to move toward a stable political order. Whereas the rebel leaders apologized for the prolonged war, President Eduardo dos Santos consulted with UNITA before appointing a prime minister. UNITA nominated four ministers and seven vice-ministers to serve in the government of unity. The Angolan government accommodated the time needed for the rebel groups to transform themselves into credible political parties prior to national elections. In Sierra Leone, a power-sharing provision was included in the Lomé Agreement, signed on July 7, 1999, between President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah’s government and a rebel delegation, made up of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC). The RUF leader Foday Sankoh was appointed as vice-president and chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, while other cabinet posts in a government of national unity were allocated for his RUF supporters. AFRC’s Johnny Koromah was later appointed chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace to monitor the implementation of the peace agreement (Adebajo 2002). The power-sharing arrangements collapsed, however, after Sankoh took advantage of access to his government office, further entrenching his control of the diamond-producing areas and eventually resorting to violence against civilians and UN peacekeepers as well as government troops. In countries emerging from civil wars such as Mozambique, El Salvador, Angola, and Tajikistan the control of the central administration was extended to areas occupied by rebel groups. Dual administration of former rebel territory was established in Mozambique and El Salvador. In Tajik-

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istan, government authority was extended rather easily to areas controlled by the United Tajik Opposition in the interim period following a settlement in June 1997. However, extension of the administrative presence of the government in rebel-held areas does not always go smoothly. Brutal behavior of reintroduced government police and security forces often generates hostility in the local population. After a peace accord was signed between the FMLN and the Salvadoran government in January 1992, the government wanted to reimpose administrative and political power on the areas that had been under the control of resistance forces. Using nonviolent methods of struggle against government programs, people demonstrated that they would not accept arbitrary authority imposed on them, eventually forcing the government to negotiate with regional community organizations.

Interim International Administration Direct international rule might be imposed with comprehensive mandates during a transition period. Such involvement is applied to the reconstruction of failed states or for the creation of new states after a settlement through either international military intervention or external political pressure; examples include Kosovo, Afghanistan, and East Timor. In these cases, local groups are incapable of exercising administrative authority due to political differences or a lack of administrative capacities. An international transition authority can be set up for an interim period to take over the administration and get involved in not only restoring physical infrastructure and facilities but also providing basic social services and other essential government functions (Matheson 2001). In the absence of sovereign authority in Kosovo, the UN exercised executive, legislative, and judicial authority to fill the security vacuum and provide essential public services. The UN also performed administrative functions in East Timor, since the population lacked the capacity for selfrule before gaining a newly independent state status following the withdrawal of Indonesian troops. Afghanistan and Iraq have only partial selfrule due to limited government capacity; international authorities played a critical role in selecting the leaders. The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) initially exercised full administrative power, because institutions of self-government had not yet been created. With the deployment of administrators in July 1999, the UN Regional Administration in Prishtine, Mitrovice, Peje, Gjilan, and Prizren took responsibility over a number of communes. A municipal administrator was deployed in September and October to take charge of each commune with legal authority, but at first not enough resources were available to offer con-

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crete services to restore public life. Though a policy framework was developed by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General, much was left to the initiative and resourcefulness of the individual administrators.1 In addition to their duties of maintaining daily operations, civil administrators were engaged in the institutional reconstruction of a full-fledged government apparatus (Morphet 2002). The UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) had to run a government, improve human rights, organize refugee returns, and conduct elections. The International Transition Administration was introduced to fill the void created by Indonesia’s departure and the militias’ destruction (Candio and Bleiker 2001). Establishing UNTAET in the field proved to be a much slower process than was politically desirable, due to a lack of ready reserves of administrators, judges, technicians, and other specialized personnel. While the level of East Timorese participation in administration increased, leading to a model of cogovernance in July 2000, the UN Special Representative remained the final legislative authority responsible for the implementation of regulations.2 In a mixed cabinet, four Timorese ministers were in charge of internal administration, infrastructure, and economic and social affairs, while four foreign nationals were responsible for justice, police, finance, and political affairs (Martin 2001; Steele 2002). As seen above, the protectorate role of international missions was applied to state formation in Kosovo and East Timor following international intervention (Wilde 2004). In Kosovo, an “Interim Council” comprised of representatives of all political factions functioned as a prelude to the envisioned self-governing arrangement constituted by a provisional government and parliament. Local advisory councils consisting of representatives of different groups were recognized as a mechanism of consultation that would contribute to a more participatory public management. UNTAET was involved in the appointment of judges and public prosecutors as well as decisions on government services by an advisory board made up of individuals representing the political spectrum. Political transition is more difficult when ethnic divisions create tense relations between the communities. In former Yugoslavia, the Joint Interim Commission, comprised of the prime ministers of the Bosnia-Croatian Federation and the Serbian Republic, failed to function properly as a joint decisionmaking body. The High Representative, who served as the chair of the commission, ended up making unilateral decisions on contentious issues.3 In addition, the top international administrator forced not only the mayors of Banja Luka and other cities but also the governors and ministers of UtaSana and several other cantons to resign by making charges of extralegal activities (Bose 2002). Deep distrust between the parties necessitates a higher degree of international intervention. Though the existing administrative structures were

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maintained in Namibia and Cambodia, temporary trusteeship was introduced to allow an international representative to run, advise, or supervise the government before elections (Baskin 2004). In Namibia, the leadership of the Administrator General continued to be in charge of government operations under the supervision of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG). The UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) monitored and supervised the existing administrative structures at national and provincial levels, even though the Supreme National Council embodied sovereignty during the transition period. The UN SRSG Yasushi Akashi was the final arbitrator in decisions related to the Paris Peace Agreement, although Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s role in the Council was important in mediating different political interests. As seen in Iraq and Afghanistan, in the absence of legitimacy recognized by the local population, it becomes hard for an external authority to provide stability and order. In Iraq, the national council played an advisory role in decisionmaking for the U.S. administrator of occupation forces, but it was widely discredited by the local population. Creation of a protectorate in Afghanistan, analogous to the status of East Timor or Kosovo, was shunned by international actors due to their endeavor to eliminate Taliban and Al-Qaida forces. As the balance between provincial power and the central government is still precarious in Afghanistan, competing warlords constitute most of the blocs in a decentralized structure. Although the power of warlords was kept in check by international military power, the government headed by President Hamid Karzai has not significantly extended its authority to other parts of the country beyond Kabul.

Politics for State Rebuilding Nation rebuilding is necessary where state authority and functions have collapsed. In order to avoid a militarized conflict resulting from the suppression of minority views, different communities and groups need to have access to decisionmaking institutions. The concentration of power in state institutions by one group aggravates social and political cleavages. When sovereignty is contested or becomes ambiguous, new state institutions and identities have to be created to represent the general interests of the population. In doing so, it is inevitable to accommodate the needs of different ethnic, racial, or other groups based on regional and economic identity. A functioning government emerges by rebuilding public institutions of a national nature and developing capacity to manage them. The most essential functions of institutions are effective and equitable management of state affairs and the economy. The exercise of sovereignty is restricted in the

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event of a failure to demobilize existing militia with the limited control of the national army and police force over the territory. The formation of a legitimate government is a necessary condition for order and stability. Trust and confidence in a national government can be gained through the establishment of democratic principles reflecting an inclusive representation. State reconstruction needs to be supported by establishing a democratic process, which involves the drafting of a new national constitution, and proceeds from the organization of free and fair elections following voter registration and education. A national conference can build consensus on the distribution of authority and functions among different branches and levels of government. Efforts to maintain national cohesion include bringing ethnic, regional, and religious representations into balance as well as equitable distribution of development benefits among regions and communities (Milliken and Krause 2000). The establishment of national authority is compatible with the devolution of power to local institutions, a shift of government services toward local levels, and delegation of resources. The process of state building reflects the translation of divisions created by wartime alignments into postconflict politics (Yannis 2002). Existing ethnonational loyalties must be harmonized with the efforts to develop cross-ethnic shared identities. Since a maximum representation of different ethnic groupings is allowed in Ethiopian politics, many political parties are formed through ethnic affiliations. However, the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front consists of not only the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front but also several other ethnically based political movements. When a victorious army forms the government, little room may be left for democratic governance. Political parties in Rwanda have multiethnic members, but they are dominated by Tutsis who also control the military (Mutebi et al. 2003). By promoting a paternalistic state, the Rwandan leadership determines the political activities of its population. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) set limits to democratization, and political parties were barred from local elections conducted in the late 1990s. The Tutsi leadership is concerned about the possibility of increasing power and influence by a new Hutu leadership that emerges from the ruins of the postgenocide repression and a consequent challenge to the new state ideology justifying Tutsi minority rule (Waugh 2004). The transformation of the RPF into a political party has been complicated by an internal political struggle within the ruling Tutsi leadership. The upper tier of the government and army officials consists of Anglophone Tutsi elite from Uganda, dominating state institutions in Kigali; provincial and less significant national offices are occupied by Francophone Rwandese who used to exile in Burundi, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic

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of the Congo. The resistance to Hutu autonomy is more visible among the Francophone Tutsi political elite. The independent state of Eritrea stems from a well-organized and successful liberation struggle waged by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF). When Eritrea became independent after the civil war in Ethiopia, the military-political infrastructure of liberation forces was converted into administrative functions (Joireman 1997). The EPLF transformed itself into the People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ) and established a transition government staffed by former fighters. The EPLF emerged from the integration of highland Christians and Muslims in the eastern lowlands in resistance movements. A strategy to unite the heterogeneous and diverse population relied on the development of a unitary political organization supported by the notion of a common Eritrean identity (Bereketeab 2002). Thus religious differences and kinship relationships have been suppressed in the interests of building a more coherent national identity. All levels of state institutions and the military are heavily penetrated by the loyalists to the ruling party. This originates from a practice during the liberation struggle that institutionalized the hegemonic power of a small committee of the top EPLF cadre in making all key strategic decisions. In the transition government more power was accumulated by EPLF leader Isaias Afewerki and a number of associates close to him. The heavy concentration of power and control of government and party structures by Afewerki has been made possible through his usurption of the positions of president, chair of the National Assembly, and chief executive of the Council of State. By using government regulations and tactics of intimidation, the PFDJ not only reigns in productive economic sectors but also deprives labor unions, professional associations, and religious institutions of independent mobilization capabilities (Woldemichael 1999). The lack of democracy in the Eritrean state has been revealed in the arrests of elders, repression of government opponents, restrictions on university campuses, and the closure of independent presses. As a prominent example, the chief justice was forced to resign when he complained about external interference in judiciary processes. A centralist unitary strategy based on assimilation and coercion does not generally prove to be a viable means of state building, since a centralized authoritarian system must be violently imposed. Given that local political institutions and culture are considered obstacles to creating a centralized government, the imposition of modern state institutions is often derived from undermining traditional social relations and cultures. Centrally appointed administrators have substituted locally elected assemblies and diminished kinship-based bodies and systems. Village-based decision-

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making mechanisms have also been undermined through the disconnection of kinship ties from land allocation. In Tajikistan, President Emomali Rakhmonov promoted political culture based on structures of loyalty and patronage in order to bolster his own personal power. Strengthening government control derives from efforts to counterbalance the traditional regional networks of Tajik political life with a strategy to reduce the potential for fragmentation. The establishment of a legal system may be challenged by strong religious traditions. In Tajikistan, the relationship of Islamic parties to a secular state has been redefined as all political actors have had to confirm their commitments to adhere to secular laws. The legal status of the Islamic Renaissance Party that emerged with the demobilization of the rebel groups was approved when it accepted the secularism that was regarded as central to the Tajik constitution. Somalia’s Struggle for State Building Anarchy and internal armed conflict can follow a political vacuum created by the collapse of an authoritarian regime without external intervention or in the absence of an internal political consensus. In addition, public institutions disintegrate along with a collapsing economy. Somalia presents unique challenges to state rebuilding in the absence of any dominant force capable of unifying the country politically and militarily (Ahmed and Green 1999). Since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991, a loose, decentralized governing structure has replaced a centralized government in Somalia. The UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) and UNOSOM II failed to provide a national political authority, although initial efforts were made to establish a national police force and judicial system. Strengthening local political and administrative capabilities can be part of a strategy to develop a more effective governing structure. Administrative councils at district and regional levels were formed as part of a transitional Somali government structure in accordance with the Addis Ababa agreement of March 1993. The procedures adopted in the selection of council members were based on consensus in accordance with Somali traditions as stipulated in the agreement. A deadlock in the selection process was mediated by UNOSOM II prior to its pullout in 1995. Legitimacy has to be embedded in the institutions of a reestablished state and of the governing structure itself. In Somalia, internationally sponsored conferences did not bring about a stable government at the central level due to fear and suspicion. Creating a national government has been regarded as one clan’s attempt to take power at the expense of others. The fear that one clan might monopolize the state to the exclusion of others has driven efforts to establish de facto regional governments. A low-level local

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conflict continued after the 1995 UN withdrawal, but mechanisms for regional cooperation and reconciliation also emerged. State-building experiences reflect regional dynamics combined with political stability and military balance. In the central and northeastern areas of Somalia, the tranquility was maintained by the balance among leaders of local factions such as the Somali Salvation Democratic Front, contrary to the continuing rivalry and violence in the south. Much of central and southern Somalia has been marked by continuing instability associated with recurrent interclan violence and fighting among rival militias. It has been slow and ineffective to bring peace and stability by creating a Transitional National Government (TNG) and undertaking reconciliation talks between the warring militias. The TNG’s effectiveness has been reduced by opposition coming from not only the Somali Reconstruction and Restoration Council (SRRC) comprised of a coalition of warlords in southern Somalia but also Hussein Mohamed Aidid’s United Somali Congress–Somali National Alliance (USC-SNA). The new TNG faces an uphill struggle as it has little influence outside Mogadishu where over 300,000 militiamen roam the countryside. The instability and anarchic violence of the south is contrasted with noteworthy transformation in the northwest under the hegemonic control of the Somali National Movement. In the northwest, substantial progress in improvement of governance and administration contributed to a secure environment and significant economic recovery. Overcoming factional, clan, and subclan differences, the formation of the state of Somaliland has resulted, in part, from the devolution of power through the active participation of local leaders in administrative functions (Samatar 2001). Cooperation for the creation of a federated state has not yet been abandoned, but regional authorities in the northeast and northwest have been seeking independent statehood. In fact, the northwest (Somaliland) and the northeast (Pundtland) have been able to maintain order and provide social services with the formation of their own local administrations. The authorities in the northwest, in particular, declared themselves an independent state along with the adoption of its own constitution and made themselves the most likely candidate for succession. However, Somaliland has not been recognized in the absence of international support for the self-proclaimed new state. This contrasts with the acceptance of the independent state of Eritrea (formerly part of Ethiopia) by the international community following its referendum in 1993. In the absence of a recognized national government in Somalia, decentralized governance consisting of civil society organizations and local administrations provides a substitute. Intraregional mechanisms based on civilian clan leadership have replaced a central government in maintaining

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order. In this situation, the implementation of basic local peace agreements can reduce the potential for violent conflict, providing conditions for fostering small-scale enterprise and encouraging agricultural production. In Somalia, rehabilitation and reconstruction are based on the empowerment of local leadership charged with community responsibility. Despite continuing conflict, tasks of rehabilitation have been taken up by a number of civil society organizations, ranging from groups of elders to local NGOs and occupational groupings (Menkhause 2004). Business groups and women’s associations as well as Islamic courts play vital roles in resource allocation and other decisionmaking. A process of decentralization affects and reinforces political, economic and social activities still governed by traditional cultural institutions. The Guurti (council of elders) has depended on indigenous settlement processes in arbitrating sensitive subjects such as water and grazing rights between clans (Jan 2001). As traditional clan authorities and structures take responsibility for handling intercommunity conflicts, a measure of social stability has been provided by the introduction of shari’a and other traditional Somali law. Statehood and Internal Self-determination Partition into independent states can be adopted as a remedy to manage conflicts in divided societies. New states such as Namibia, Croatia, East Timor, and Bosnia-Herzegovina have emerged from interethnic struggle. The Kurds were promised a ministate within Iraq as part of the guaranteed autonomy they had long sought. Substate autonomy exists in Kosovo, even though its future status remains undetermined. A new state has to be internationally recognized and internally legitimized. In dealing with interethnic and regional rivalry following military victory in 1991, Ethiopia approved a wide range of unconditional rights to selfdetermination, from cultural autonomy and self-governance to secession. Reflecting its wish for independence, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front was allowed to form a separate administration even before Eritrea became a sovereign state with Asmara as its capital (following the April 1993 referendum). Unfortunately, the independence of Eritrea did not prevent its border war with Ethiopia in 2000. In short, partition can freeze the status quo of hostile relations without ensuring any efforts toward reconciliation. Internal self-determination with increased autonomy has been adopted when territorial status quo is preferable to permanent partition (Bose 2002). Even though the population of Eastern Slavonia preferred unification with Serbia, they had to be satisfied with internal self-determination. In this case, the territory was transferred to Croatia following a secret pact between Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic and Croatian president Frajo Tudman.

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A model of governance based on unified city/district status was introduced to Mostar and Brcko through administrative acts. In Mostar, a dispute between two local factions concerning city government within the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina was settled through the imposition of administrative acts by the European Union administrator. The Bosnian Croats aspired to integrate West Mostar into a new state of Herzeg-Bosna (constituting the Croatian areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina) or Croatia proper, and their ambition had to be controlled. International commitment to a unified state of Bosnia-Herzegovina led to the imposition of a “united” administration on a city emblematic of the Bosniac/Croat divisions in the country. Reintegration of the city of Brcko and its surrounding area, located in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina, was seen as the solution to a boundary dispute following the division of a formerly multiethnic community at the end of 1995. Each side of the two constitutive entities of the Bosniac-Croat Federation and Republika Srpksa was claiming exclusive title over the whole district. Following a new territorial settlement derived from the arbitral tribunal’s decision in 1999, Brcko became an autonomous district between the two entities. This settlement was implemented through administrative acts (creating an Interim District Assembly) by the Office of the High Representative. The district government has a multiethnic police, judiciary, and town council ruled by international administrators (Karnavas 2003). It has been a remarkable achievement since extremists, war criminals, and petty thugs have been under control. However, the multiethnicity in Brcko has been maintained entirely by international pressure, and it is rather superficial, especially considering that almost all non-Serbs in the multiethnic administration and police live outside of the town.

Negotiating New Political Institutions A negotiated democratic transition requires political dialogue that can lead to easing tensions over the process. A more inclusive political climate contributes to popular support and legitimacy. A national conference should be participatory and inclusive with the involvement of all groups previously engaged in conflict. The rules and institutions of stable political relations derive from negotiating a transition from a delegitimized authoritarian rule to new political arrangements. The constitutional structure is an important issue since in many divided societies the state represents more than a single ethnicity and culture. The rights and status of ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities have been a root cause of contention, and all division of state functions and institutional power has to reflect concerns of diverse communities. The foundation for ethnic

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peace derives from recognizing collective needs for self-determination along with freedom to associate with identity groups. National conferences and constitutional assemblies, held in Somalia, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and South Africa, have been mechanisms to facilitate discussion about future political arrangements and to reach an agreement on political institutions and rules. The conferences lay the groundwork for a political legislature and set guidelines for competitive elections. While a maximum level of consensus is desirable, a national conference at least provides a public space for developing a plan for the political future. A nationwide political dialogue is based on the expectation of exploring steps toward increased political representation. An internal consensus on democratization and transition from conflict should reflect a wide representation of groups. Representatives of major religious, professional, and political interest groups can work together toward forming a new political culture based on compromise and negotiation. Sustaining a national forum is a challenge with the presence of widely divergent political interests. One of the best-known examples of national conferences was the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) I held in December 1991. Nineteen different political organizations participated in negotiations on a new South African constitution. Despite high hopes for mutual accommodation, the convention’s atmosphere was hampered by accusations between Nelson Mandela and F. W. de Klerk (representing the National Party). CODESA II meetings (held in May–September 1992) also failed to avoid a stalemate. Even though the meetings ended in failure, positions were clarified for future negotiations. The National Party resisted accepting black majority rule during the early transition period. The failure of CODESA led to strife and, most seriously, the massacres of more than forty people in Boipatong and King William’s Town, which resulted in a sense of urgency for the beginning of new negotiations. Finally, the multiparty negotiation process from January 1993 to January 1994 was able to finalize the interim constitution that ensured democratic principles for the transition period, followed by the first democratic elections held in South Africa on April 27, 1994 (Christie 2000). National conferences were also used in Afghanistan to enhance the legitimacy of a transitional government and to search for a new political structure. The Bonn Agreement of December 2001 formulated schedules for national elections following a transitional period. Preliminary consultations through the traditional forum of the loya jirga were designed to provide political legitimacy for an electoral system. Finally, an agreement was reached at the national level in December 2003 to determine the future structure of the government. In Eritrea, the process of constitution making was controlled by a tenmember executive committee of a commission whose fifty members were drawn from veteran liberation fighters, women, and nine ethnic groups as

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well as business and professional communities. The final draft was formally approved by the parliament, and eventually by a Constituent Assembly representing the whole country, but public debate and representation were limited due to an authoritarian political atmosphere (Selassie 2002).4 Organizing political debates is far more than determining technical and logistical matters, since they involve huge stakes. In Mozambique, the electoral law was drafted by the government in consultation with RENAMO and other political parties before its submission to the parliament (1993). The multiparty conference collapsed on September 17, 1993, but the deadlock was broken with the visit of UN Secretary-General Boutros BoutrosGhali. On November 26, 1993, a multiparty technical team agreed on a draft law involving not only party representation on election commissions but also the establishment and composition of the electoral tribunal (Manning 2002). The opposition party used participation in multiparty negotiations as a bargaining chip to increase its political leverage. The details of the election processes in Namibia were not determined in international agreements drafted by the Administrator General (AG) and then approved by the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General. A system of proportional representation for the Constitutional Assembly was adopted after prolonged discussion from May to November in 1989 about the actual mechanisms of elections. The AG’s office preferred a system that would encourage the greatest representation of small parties and wanted to keep the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) from obtaining the two-thirds majority required to write the constitution alone. SWAPO members of the Constitutional Assembly took a conciliatory approach at the final negotiation stage; the leadership was eager to take up office without too much delay, so they adjusted their stance to suit the political climate. Methods of adopting an electoral system can be imposed as well as being designed by national dialogue. Bosnian experts appointed by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) drafted new election laws, but they were rejected by the Parliamentary Assembly in 2000.5 However, under pressure the assembly eventually passed a newly drafted law proposed by the OHR and OSCE. Rules imposed by occupation forces (e.g., the U.S. administration in Iraq) for indirect elections of delegates for a constitutional assembly are more likely to face resistance from local political forces than those devised by groups with political legitimacy within the country. Organizing a negotiated process for a future political order is difficult when security and political order is lacking. Despite high administrative costs, the participation of a broad spectrum of society in shaping the new constitution is generally desirable, since it will produce a political framework that is more durable and more likely to be supported. In order to

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encourage political participation, town and village meetings can be organized to promote civic education and public dialogue.

Power Sharing and Electoral Systems The levels of centralization/decentralization of power and electoral systems need to be set up with an eye to manage relations between minority and majority ethnic groups. Along with representation, political stability and nation building are major issues for determining the appropriate type of electoral system. Different levels of decentralization and diverse forms of power sharing have been considered for inclusion of racial groups in South Africa and Namibia as well as the integration of Catholic and Protestant communities in Northern Ireland. Electoral systems rewarding interethnic accommodation have the best chance for political sustainability (Horowitz 2002). The theory of a modern liberal state presupposes a culturally homogeneous society (Ghai 2002). However, this, of course, does not fit in the realities of many divided societies emerging from conflict. Group identities and spatial distribution of groups have implications for the nature of political mobilization and formation of political forces and parties (Reilly and Reynolds 2000). An electoral system for a divided society should consider societal divisions. Minority concerns can be ignored by a majority favoring an electoral system that does not have power-sharing mechanisms. Voting systems need to be designed to guarantee that opposition voices are heard. Majoritarian electoral systems exclude small minority parties while producing a decisive outcome for the dominant party from the beginning. The victor receives a simple majority of the votes cast in a nonproportional, single seat–based electoral system. In a majoritarian democracy, losers of elections do not have direct access to power. Such a system, which allows the winner to take all, does not ensure the rights of minorities, especially following a zero-sum contest wherein positions of winners and losers are sharply divided. Minority parties are alienated owing to a lack of a numeric superiority in winner-take-all elections instead of having an opportunity to join a government of national unity. But, it has been argued that a winner-take-all system provides political stability with a clear, simple majority of seats. Barriers for effective representation of ethnic minorities become lower with a more accurate translation of votes cast in the allocation of parliamentary seats. In proportional representation, the composition closely matches the demographic distribution of the electorate and their interests

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and viewpoints. Ideally, the number of seats obtained by each party needs to reflect the percentage of votes even though various distortions such as electoral thresholds can be permitted. In order to reduce the risk associated with the easy entry of small extremist parties in proportionality, electoral systems may set up legal thresholds. Proportional electoral systems are desirable for empowering underrepresented groups such as ethnic minorities and women and increase opportunities for the inclusion of smaller parties in the legislature and power sharing, thus reducing undemocratic practice. There are various ways of selecting candidates within a proportional representation system. In the simplest system, there are no electoral districts. Without geographic demarcation, each party may determine its electoral list of candidates, and voters do not have the opportunity to select candidates who are associated with a specific district. Regional or national lists were adopted for elections in Namibia (1989), Nicaragua (1990), Cambodia (1993), South Africa (1994), Mozambique (1994), and Bosnia (1996). In the Cambodian election, for example, proportional representation was based on a list of candidates prepared by each political party at a provincial level (Hughes 2003). In a closed list, women and ethnic minorities may be given high priority (Reilly and Reynolds 2000). A mixed system was adopted in the August 2001 elections for East Timor’s constituent assembly; out of eighty-eight assembly member seats, seventy-five were determined by nationwide proportional representation with the equal allocation of the remaining seats among thirteen electoral districts. Ethnic leaders are easily elected through proportional representation with closed party lists for legislative bodies. In fact, hard-line nationalist parties gained strength in the first post–civil war general elections in Bosnia (1996). The system was modified for the 2000 elections to reduce the narrow, sectarian appeal by permitting choice between candidates within the same party. Proportionality based on votes for only party and coalition lists does not encourage accommodation when a deeply divided conflict sustains hostile relations between ethnic groups. Ethnically based parties are more successful if voters in favor of one group are not prepared to vote for others. The list drawn by the party has a disadvantage of not being able to connect the elected representative to the electorate. Electors vote for political parties, not for a candidate, thus lessening geographic accountability. An open list system can increase the accountability of the elected officials to constituents by giving the electorate an opportunity to vote for their own candidates. Multimember constituencies seek to build direct links with specific candidates. In Bosnia, municipal and general elections in 2000 permitted voters to choose a candidate of their preference.

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Institutional Arrangements Institutional arrangements such as consociationalism and federalism are designed to accommodate opposing group interests and prevent recurrence of violence. A variety of constitutional models (based on power sharing at the center and delegation of decisionmaking to minority regions) can be suitable for different traditions and social contexts. Political institutions can mitigate the impact of intergroup cleavages by ensuring the autonomy of minority groups. Institutions that encourage bargaining and accommodation are more likely to produce political stability. Coalitions can be built to undermine intergroup rivalries and preserve national cohesion, but the political rights of groups that do not belong to a ruling coalition have to be protected. Federalism entails a decentralized design for regional power sharing through such devices as a division of power between legislative houses. However, pluralistic or corporatist interest groups are better represented in consociationalism where power sharing is based on the representation of all significant groups in political decisionmaking especially at an executive level (Lijphart 1969). Group autonomy provides ethnic and other entities with authority to run their own internal affairs, for example, in the areas of education and culture. Consociationalism Successful democracy in divided societies is embodied in the sharing of executive power and group autonomy (Lijphart 2002). The protection of vital group interests and fair minority representation (as well as easier access to power sharing in coalition cabinets) have been reflected in consociationalism as is often exemplified by the multiethnic democracy in Lebanon before the civil war in the mid-1970s. In consensual democracy, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and other major sociocultural divisions are accepted and institutionalized into inclusive decisionmaking through a division of major state offices among the dominant cultural and political groups. Diverse ethnopolitical groups are more easily integrated in multiparty coalition governments generally combined with proportional representation. In the selection of members of a parliament, proportional representation awards each faction voting power representing the percentage of its votes at the polls. The creation of a coalition government follows intensive bargaining after elections are over. Executive power can be shared among the representatives of all significant groups through a grand coalition in the cabinet. Incentives for cooperation in bridging group differences are provided by proportional representation of diverse ethnic and political groups at var-

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ious levels of government (Norris 2002). Specific ratios between ethnic groups for jobs in the public service, the legislature, and the courts can be set up to reduce intergroup tensions. Losers in elections can be involved in the new government through power-sharing schemes such as a specific quota of seats in a legislative body and a guaranteed distribution of administrative positions. Power sharing is necessary to ease transition, reduce uncertainty, and construct the broadest possible coalition in the government. The principles of autonomy are supported by not only cross-community power sharing through proportionality but also veto rights for minorities. Each segment possesses a veto over matters of great concern such as religious autonomy. In Northern Ireland, the development of political institutions such as the Northern Ireland Assembly is based on mechanisms and norms that promote power sharing and cross-community relationship building (Byrne and Irvin 2001; O’Neill 2003). Group interests are also best protected by fair methods of allocation of public funds as well as civil service positions. Protection of the sociocultural, religious, and linguistic rights of individuals is combined with arrangements of equal funding for Catholic, Protestant, and integrated schools. The Executive Committee of Northern Ireland, headed by a first prime minister and a deputy first minister, was elected together through a parallel consent procedure that created incentives for unionists and nationalists to nominate a candidate who would be acceptable to a majority of the other bloc’s assembly members. In the first elections for these posts, proagreement unionists in the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) voted for the combination of David Trimble of the UUP and Seamus Mallon of the Social Democratic and Labor Party (SDLP), allowing a nationalist and a unionist to share the top two positions (Byrne 2001). In the creation of a coalition government, allocation of the remainder of the executive committee posts to parties was made in proportion to their strength in the assembly. The inclusion of ethnopolitical minorities in legislatures and coalition governments has been pursued to overcome ethnic cleavages based on cultural, linguistic, religious, ethnic, and/or racial identities. Consociationalist elements were reflected in power-sharing arrangements in the 1998 peace agreement for Burundi, which allocated 45 percent of cabinet positions to Tutsis. The treaty, which was not implemented due to the renewal of civil war, also proposed that the prime minister (elected by the opposition parties) countersign presidential decisions to protect Tutsi interests. The elements of consociationalism in Somaliland based on leadership rotation within the Somali National Movement originate in the indigenous traditions of power sharing among elders. In part, compromises among local clans were forged to “preclude the south’s ability to reclaim Soma-

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liland” (Spears 2002, p. 133). The desire for power sharing derives from the need to respond to external military threats from Mogadishu by reducing internal conflict. Consociationalism has not always been viewed as making a positive contribution to ethnic reconciliation. It can be easily argued that “consociation tends to reify ethnic/national identities and entrench cleavages and divisions” (Bose 2002, p. 217). The major assumption of consociationalism is the existence of clear ethnic-political identities and mobilization of political parties according to identities. However, ethnicity is difficult to operationalize because one-dimensional indicators based on the number and size of ethnic groups do not take into account the geographical distribution of groups and different degrees of political mobilization (Norris 2002). In addition, there are groups that are not based on ethnic identity and prefer another identification. Elected assembly members in Northern Ireland are designated as “nationalist,” “unionist,” or “other.” This division poses tough questions for the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, and other cross-community parties, although they were identified as “others” for the first assembly elected in June 1998. It may well be argued that the reifying of ethnic and factional identifications undermines crosscutting activities of civic associations. Reliance on ethnicity as the boundary of political parties does not always prove helpful to reconciliation. Social divisions can be deepened by political mobilization through exclusionary associations. Identification with and loyalty to religious, social, ethnic, tribal, and political organizations prevent an aggregation of issues across ethnic boundaries that would reflect on common concerns and interests. Cooperation between groups deeply divided by ethnic conflicts is considered essential to power-sharing arrangements. A prerequisite for consociational democracy is the existence of a certain level of consensus following substantial diminishment in the levels of hostilities. Without a culture of compromise, nothing will get accomplished through governmental decisionmaking. Thus it is often observed that consociationalism is seen as the result of, rather than the cause of, tolerance. However, at the same time, consociationalism represents a commitment to preventing future violent conflict by minimizing tension over decisionmaking power in a divided society. The effect might be socialization through learning compromise. Power sharing may result in political rivalry and instability if there are not the established relationships of trust. A coalition government in Cambodia was run by a copremiership with division of the two most senior posts in each ministry between the two parties that garnered the highest number of votes. This complicated arrangement based on an “equal” division of power between the two co–prime ministers derives from a unique

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political compromise following the 1993 elections. Political instability characterized by a lack of compromise deprived Cambodia of an opportunity to develop strong democratic foundations. This arrangement resulted in further politicization of the civil service and a reinforcement of the already existing vacuum in public sector management. The struggle between the two parties competing for state power failed to foster national reconciliation. Overarching cooperation at the elite level between segments is key to a workable consociational arrangement. Relationship building between leaders from opposing communities plays a critical role in reducing intense competition for power. A model based on cooperation among elites representing social segments has been successful in advanced European countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria, but there are obstacles in many poor countries. Negotiating broad economic issues involving labor contracts, general welfare, and economic growth can be effectively achieved within corporatism. In representing economic divisions along with different interests, corporatism relies on a tripartite structure of government, unions, and business. This system, which has been popular in Sweden, Germany, and Austria, protects a delicate balance between different socioeconomic interests through political arrangements that uphold mutual concerns. Corporatism in postconflict reconstruction resembles a South African practice. The corporate arrangement in South Africa is based on the existence of powerful and well-organized groups such as business and labor that create a bargaining chamber. The involvement of the government, business, and labor in corporate bargaining reduces the effects of the inherited racial divide. However, it has increased cleavages within black society, neglecting the poor. The National Recovery Program of El Salvador (NRP) was carried out through consensus building among the government, the FMLN, and business sectors. Conflict over the allocation of resources in peace-related programs can be considerably reduced by means of consultative mechanisms representing different economic interests. In the above models, interaction between different social segments at the mass level is not encouraged, although elite-level communication on matters of mutual concern reduces group tensions. Representation and aggregation of various cultural, religious, educational, and economic organizations is important in negotiations of beneficial economic and social arrangements by elites on behalf of their members. Group mobilization takes place in separate organizational structures to find compromise between conflicting factional interests. One of the conditions for associational democracy is that social factions and units preserve highly developed internal bargaining mechanisms.

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The advantages for democracy of a robust associational life are counterbalanced by weakness in an organizational foundation. In addition, enforcing the social agreements made on the members’ behalf requires a certain level of discipline, and top leaders should be able to have control over their own members. Unfortunately, it takes time to develop widespread allegiance in new democracies. The viability of consociational and corporatist devices can be undercut by the weakness of civil society and the uncertain nature of leadership in postconflict democracies. Federalism One method to regulate conflicts based on ethnicity or other identity differences is to mute conflicts among groups by rearranging relations between the central state and subnational communities. Political liberalization often accompanies pressure for reduced control of the center over the regions. Confederation and federation enhance regional autonomy by granting certain levels of legislative, judicial, and executive power. For overcoming ethnoregional frictions, federalism has been viewed as one of the more common arrangements, since it allows ethnically distinct groups to control their own provinces. In addition, effective representation of geographic areas in national bodies can be ensured by ethnoregional allocation and rotation of political offices; ethnic and subethnic balancing can also be accomplished at a subfederal level. Thus ethnic plurality can be protected by the structure of the federal government or other types of a decentralized political system. Stability in multiethnic countries derives from balanced power distribution between the center and the region (Aalen 2002). Delegation of power to regions and districts can ease fear of minority groups concentrated in particular geographic areas. Each region would, for example, be entitled to the right to choose and teach its official language as well as a national language. Tasks and responsibilities in public sectors may be deferred to regions to give autonomy to diverse ethnic groups. Regions then determine their own administrative structures, exercise tax authority to generate revenue, and have separate police forces. Under specified conditions, regions may also have the right to secede. The rights of nations and groups are more easily affirmed through decentralization and self-rule derived from federal arrangements. With the guarantee of regional autonomy and representation, the constitution does not permit a central government to abolish judicial rights, or amend or redefine territorial units; any radical institutional rearrangement has to be approved by the extraordinary majority of the constituent units. Decentralization has been successfully adopted by multilingual states such as Switzerland, Belgium, and India.

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Different ethnic and political groups share power at the federal government level with regional representation. At the same time, self-rule is promoted by regionalization and relegation of legislative, judicial, and executive powers to the states and consequently to the local governments within states. Separation of power through a more sophisticated type of representation, both nationwide and territorially based, prevents the concentration of power in the hands of a few. Even though minorities can still be outnumbered at the federal level, the territorial-based regional units can enjoy self-rule. Although there are variations in the structures and roles of legislative bodies, the legislative functions are, in general, divided between two chambers, to reduce control of the central government by the majority ethnic population. An upper house, appointed by the councils of the regions, can be charged with interpreting the constitution and deciding revenuesharing questions. A lower house, comprised of representatives elected by secret ballot at regular intervals, may be responsible for passing federal laws for the president’s signature. Federalism is favored for various reasons. Through decentralization of government functions, a political system with dispersion of power reduces the fear of domination by one group in an ethnically diverse country. Federalist solutions can mitigate the appeal of secessionist movements by legitimizing ethnoregional claims to power. This political settlement may allow the existence of regional power centers as an alternative to the centralized one. Domination at the central level of government is modified through changes in the existing power configurations of regional forces. In the first Republic of Nigeria, internal boundaries were constructed around three rival cultural segments, consequently institutionalizing the hegemony of one constituent unit (the north) over the rest of the federation. In order to reduce regional, ethnic tension following the Biafran War, these boundaries were transformed into nineteen states in 1967 and were rearranged again in 1979 (Babawale 2001). In a multistate federation, polarization can be decreased at the central level by encouraging decentralization, which, in turn, allows political competition at a subfederal level. As diffusion of resource allocation decisionmaking places less burden on the federal government with the transfer of responsibility to local constituencies, the state becomes an alternative arena of power; thus struggle is reduced at the federal level. However, political corruption, intolerance, and reduced government revenue can result in weak regional governments, as seen in Nigerian federalism, which was accompanied by military rule during the 1984–1999 era. Despite the return of civilian rule in 1999, state governments do not have much independent policymaking power due to a weak subfederal administration and an unreliable

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internal income base often resulting from the generation of less than 30 percent of revenue. Asymmetrical relationships among constituent states lead to questions about the viability of federalism. Weak foundations for democratic coexistence are attributable to economic underdevelopment, and competition and polarization associated with pervasive ethno-cliental ties. In reflecting on the political objectives of the Dayton Peace Accords, the common state of Bosnia-Herzegovina was designed as a multitiered, loose confederal union between the Bosniac-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. The confederation is thus constituted by an asymmetric union between Serb and Muslim-Croat entities; the latter’s viability rests on power sharing between Croats and Bosniacs. Though the territory is shared, it exists as a decentralized state. Most power is vested in the republic, and the federation has largely external sovereignty. A variety of institutional and economic links have yet to arise from the principles of the free movement of people and the right of refugees to return. Since ethnic communities remain as separate corporate bodies, the communities are regarded as building blocks for representation and power sharing. The Parliamentary Assembly has fifteen delegates—five Croats, five Bosniacs, and five Serbs. The House of Representatives consists of forty-two directly elected members with twenty-eight from the federation and fourteen from the Serb entity “the Srpska” (Bose 2002). The representatives of the federation were elected by the cantonal assemblies to ensure territorial representation. Only ethnic parties succeeded because they can intensify their appeals to narrow interests. There are different degrees to which regional units can be incorporated into decisionmaking procedures at the national center. Arrangements to disperse power to local governments, outside national prerogatives of defense and foreign relations, can lead to strengthening regional administrations based largely on ethnic affiliation. Various forms of regional autonomy were permitted in Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Uganda. In Eritrea, district- and village-level assemblies and administrative structures constituted the basis of local governance, although the transition to decentralization was tightly managed by the government. Ethiopia’s ethnicity-based federation serves as a clearer example of federalism and decentralization with the devolution of administrative responsibilities and power to regions. The federalization of Ethiopia was adopted as a response to the exacerbation of ethnic relations accompanied by a long period of centralization attempts (Beyene 2000). It also derives from accommodating various concerns of the ethnic-based liberation movements whose coordinated attacks resulted in the overthrow of Mengistu’s regime in May 1991. Following the removal of the military government by the forces of Eritrea, Tigray, and Oromo, a provisional charter was adopted at the National

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Conference that included four hundred delegates representing twelve political groups. In lieu of centralized governance, a federal republic arrangement emerged in Ethiopia with the creation of the newly demarcated and largely ethnicbased eleven states represented in the Constitutional Assembly. Most regions are dominated by single ethnic groups such as Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, and Somali despite the existence of three ethnically mixed urban and other diverse areas (e.g., Southern Ethiopia People’s region).6 Each large ethnic group can govern its historic homelands within the regional structure of the federal state. The existence of religious institutions divided along ethnic lines further reinforces the legal and political recognition of ethnic groups (Alemseged 2004). For instance, the majority of the Oromo and the Somalis are Muslims, but the Tigrayans and the Amhara predominantly follow the Orthodox faith. In addition, the languages of instruction changed to reflect the preference of the majority population of each region. The legislative function is divided between two parliamentary chambers to rule out control of the central government by members of the majority ethnic population. The Council of People’s Representatives, a lower house, comprised of representatives elected every five years, is charged with passing federal laws. The Council of Federation, an upper house whose members are appointed by ethnic groups or regional councils, is charged with interpreting the constitution and allocating revenues and subsides.7 The Federal Council manages ethnic relations by settling disputes between states and making decisions on claims to secession and other demands for self-determination. Successful governments and opposition movements concentrate on issues that cross ethnic boundaries and aggregate common concerns and interests. Through coalition building, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF)—made up of the TPLF, the Oromo People’s Democratic Organization, and the Amhara National Democratic Movement—became an effective national party. The chances of becoming major players in national politics are slim, as long as political parties remain ethnic organizations. While coalitions across ethnic lines became important in Ethiopian federal politics, several competing parties emerged within ethnic groups. For example, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) has the same constituent base with five other Oromo parties, including the Oromo National Congress, United Oromo People’s Liberation, Oromo People’s Democratic Organization, and Oromo Abo Liberation Front. Such plurality of parties and competition among them is likely to reduce interethnic competition at the federal level. While this type of ethnicity-based federation, experimentally used in Ethiopia, has been praised for dismantling an overly centralized state, it has some weaknesses. Because of differences among the regional states in socio-

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economic development and varying financial capabilities of regional governments, the Ethiopian federal system is considered asymmetrical. Whereas ethnic identity or language in practice has been adopted as a crucial factor for determining the constituent units, there are wide differences among subfederal units according to size of population and area, economic development, political landscape, and administrative capacity in such areas as tax collection. Some see the formation of the federal Ethiopian system along ethnic lines as a part of EPRDF’s strategy to assure the ruling coalition’s hegemony by institutionalizing a divide-and-rule system (Aalen 2002). If a federalist system is seriously adopted, minorities can exercise more control over their own administrative matters, culture, education, language, and local economy. However, critics contend that ethnic politics fail to protect minorities within a subunit and encourage increased group divisions. Redrawing new boundaries is not easy in areas where multiethnic groups have lived together for generations. The arrangement also politicizes ethnicity with exclusion and marginalization of minorities in a newly created region. In fact, several minority groups exist in each region created for a large ethnic group. Institutionalized solutions through a form of decentralization, partition, or secession will not eliminate intolerance of minority groups left behind in new territories.8 In addition, artificial segregation can exacerbate interethnic tensions over resources such as land, water, and minerals. Consociationalism Versus Federalism Federalism and consociationalism have both advantages and disadvantages. In consociationalism, stability is ensured through constitutional guarantees of a share in political power for all key political groups. Thus constitutional arrangements based on accommodation and harmony through proportional representation in divided societies are seen as a powerful tool for political engineering. On the other hand, decentralization can allow federal boundaries to coincide with ethnic and other divisions (Manning 2002). Federalism and regional autonomy can be favored for the reason that intragroup competition at a regional level reduces intergroup tensions at the center (Horowitz 2002). Federalist elements can be combined with consociationalist approaches to power sharing. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a group-based power-sharing system is evident in the principal executive and legislative organs, reflecting internal consociationalism. The collective state presidency consists of copresidents, one Bosniac, one Croat, and one Serb directly elected from their constituent territories. The chair of the presidency rotates every eight months with decisions being made by consensus. Consociational models are supposed to provide supporting structures to postconflict societies along with developing stable leadership and social

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organization. However, mutual stalemate is seen in the experience of Bosnia-Herzegovina under the national constitution established by the Dayton peace plan. Joint institutions have not been functioning since the parties were unwilling to compromise, often stalling and blocking decision-making. Many issues on matters of “vital interest” have not been resolved in the national presidency due to the veto power held by each ethnic group. The intervention of the High Representative appointed by the international community is often necessary to resolve differences on minor issues such as telephone area codes, common license plates, and travel documents. To resolve disagreement over allocation of power between the federal and regional governments, different systems can be adopted, mirroring specific local conditions such as ethnic and racial balance. In South Africa, one of the most difficult issues was centered on how much power could be delegated to local councils. Since the white population was greatly outnumbered by blacks, they preferred to maintain autonomy achieved through the reduced role of the central government. In contrast, blacks wanted redistribution of resources and insisted on a strong central government. The politicization of ethnicity becomes less salient with inclusive institutional incentives (Reilly 2002). However, a caution should be raised: often too much faith is placed in institutional engineering and popular elections, as if they were a panacea for a highly ethnically divided country. Political reform can be made difficult when extremist groups are mobilized in civil society. In an ethnically heterogeneous society, a political system must evolve through a bargaining process over a long period.

The Role of Elections in a Political Transition Elections serve as a clear milestone for internationally managed peace agreements, signifying a watershed often characterized by the reduction and ultimate termination of multifaceted field operations. Indeed, conducting free and fair elections needed to establish a legitimate government has been the overriding objective under which all other international activities are generally subsumed. Postconflict elections in Namibia, Nicaragua, and South Africa meant not only the cessation of hostilities but also the formation of a new government. Successful elections contribute to national unity and reconciliation by serving as part of the political process of terminating an armed conflict (Kumar 1998). Even though an election alone is not always sufficient to guarantee a smooth transition, voting allows people to insist that power not be legitimized without popular participation. In order to be successful in elections, insurgent forces must be converted into effective political parties that mobilize the masses through rallies instead of guns and roadblocks.

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Elections usually imply a step forward in state building and democracy with former adversaries pursuing their opposing ideologies and interests in a nonviolent fashion. Political prerequisites for elections include the existence of credible electoral authorities, political parties, and a quality interim administration. Equally important is that the groundwork for multiparty elections reflects an agreement on the electoral systems, whether proportional or majoritarian. New electoral laws should be adopted in the spirit of the rules established under the peace agreement. At least two years of preparation may be necessary for such countries as the Democratic Republic of the Congo where democratic elections have not been held since its independence in 1960. Premature timetables for elections inhibit rather than enhance conditions for democracy. Postconflict elections in an ethnically divided society are likely to aggravate rather than moderate political cleavages and ethnic tensions without adequate safeguards and restraints. Elections are one of the most important means in transition from war to peace, but they can also trigger violence given the high stakes of the transition period. For instance, prior to South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, violent conflict erupted between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party. Elections are affected by such violence that may erupt within highly fragmented postconflict societies. In Namibia, fears were raised by the assassination of Anton Lubowski, one of the most senior political figures in the liberation movement, along with attacks on other individuals and various incidents of political intimidation.9 Deliberate sabotage and the politics of violence were the methods chosen by organized armed militias and insurgent movements in Afghanistan and Iraq. For free elections to be guaranteed, violence must be controlled. Leading up to elections, along with preparation for voter registration, one of the most important concerns is removing or minimizing any climate of intimidation while ensuring the continued demobilization of former military personnel. Physical security is necessary for freedom of expression, movement, and organization. Not only progress in demobilization and disarmament but also improvements in human rights should not be considered secondary to the holding of successful elections. An observer military and police force is often necessary to monitor human rights and ensure security.

Electoral Politics and Demobilization Effective demobilization and disarmament have, in general, been considered fundamental to the success of elections. Uncertainty always remains with the presence of a large number of armed combatants who are loyal to opposing groups. The danger of reverting to fighting following a loss at the

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polls looms unless there has been effective and complete disarmament (Kumar 1998). Postelection sabotage is made less likely by the demobilization of guerrilla forces and also possibly by the creation of a new unified army. The disbanding and reduction of forces leaves few choices for former adversaries but to accept election outcomes even when they are unfavorable. Thus, ideally, elections need to be followed by significant levels of demobilization of former combatants. In Namibia and El Salvador, free elections were held after a complete demobilization of forces and military restructuring. Prior to elections in Namibia, the UN Transition Assistance Group supervised the withdrawal of South African forces and the disbanding of civilian-armed groups as well as observance of the cease-fire. Any failure of demobilization, in general, leaves the possibility of resuming fighting as an option, both psychologically and materially. The best-known example is the UNITA rebel leader Savimbi’s refusal to accept Angola’s election outcomes in 1992. The means of choosing a return to war were available when demobilization had failed prior to the election. Completion of demilitarization was particularly important in Angola due to a high level of mistrust embedded in a long history of rivalry traceable back to the mid-1960s. Subsequently, based on the experience of past failures, new efforts to integrate UNITA into political life in Angola, under the Luena Accord signed in April 2002, focused on a complete demobilization within fourteen months of the cease-fire agreement and a lengthier process of preparation for the presidential election, which is scheduled for 2006. Engagement of conflicting parties in an electoral strategy results from strong international pressure, but it often starts without full demobilization and disarmament of all the contenders. In fact, it may not always be feasible to reach polling day with full demobilization of former combatants participating in the electoral process. Even though the presence of ex-combatants carries the risk of poor security, demobilization is seldom completed before elections. The military balance on the ground can determine whether elections without demobilization can pose a serious threat to stability. In Cambodia, the 1993 general election had to proceed even though the party of the People’s Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), more widely known as the Khmer Rouge, had decided to pull out. This was, in part, because the Khmer’s human rights record would result in its members’ prosecution for crimes against humanity, and, in part, because they easily predicted the elections would bring defeat for their party. Even though the Khmer Rouge was not fully demobilized and disarmed, it was not able to disrupt the conduct of elections with its military strength weakened. Similarly, since it is difficult to expect cooperation from every belligerent party, it was urged that legislative elections in Burundi, scheduled to be held before the end of 2004, proceed as planned.

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Elections may move ahead, despite difficult or even unrealistic timetables, to put pressure on the parties. In some instances, in fact, demobilization schedules were accelerated to meet demands for timely elections. At the same time, a significant level of disarmament prior to the elections can be sufficient even though full demobilization may have to wait until after the election outcome is known. Election schedules should be flexibly arranged in coordination with progress in demobilization and the political/military balance. In Mozambique, it was agreed that elections would be held within a year of the signing of the peace accord, but the timetable was changed due to incomplete demobilization. The demobilization and integration of guerrilla forces into a new army were hastened on the eve of the election conducted in October 1994. Though demobilization and disarmament were still incomplete, the troop strength of both the government and RENAMO was not significant enough to destabilize the political process. The acceptance by RENAMO (called the Khmer Rouge of Africa) of having lost the elections and subsequently joining parliamentary politics, along with disarmament, can be ascribed to the successful intervention of international actors. Transformation of Military Organizations A successful process of demilitarization of politics and establishment of predictable rules of democracy derives from the transformation of the militias into political parties and their gaining experience in transitional administration. Since insurgent strength in warfare does not convert automatically into political power, former fighting forces, especially in newly independent or secessionist states, must adjust themselves to transition from liberation movements to democratic politics. There are various circumstances under which guerrilla organizations are successfully transformed into political parties. In El Salvador, the successful transformation of the FMLN into a political party relied on alliance building with other parties. Through this process, FMLN changed from a warring faction to a moderate political organization in order to compete in elections. In Mozambique, the legitimacy of RENAMO had to be found in establishing itself as a viable partner in constitutional politics. To do so, they had to develop a grassroots base. Obtaining civilian skills and mobilizing resources is crucial in representing key constituencies and, most importantly, competing effectively in an electoral process. In the 1997 Liberian elections, Charles Taylor’s faction successfully turned into the National Patriotic Party contrary to the unsuccessful experiences of other military factions to become viable civilian political forces. Evolution from a liberation armed movement to an organizational structure in charge of a national government committed to democratic norms has been a tricky business for the EPLF, the EPRDF, and,

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to a lesser extent, SWAPO and the ANC. It takes time for groups of resistance fighters to transform into democratic parties without the benefit of an already developed civilian administrative structure. Since national liberation movements seldom have enough time to cultivate a democratic political culture, authoritarian political regimes, without meaningful competition between political parties, tend to follow successful liberation movements. Short election timetables give an advantage to the candidates who are supported by well-developed organizations. Rebel groups are generally in a disadvantaged position to win elections in competition with an incumbent government, since they must be quickly reorganized into political parties to field candidates and mount campaigns. In most elections of this sort, the government has maintained power through postaccord elections with the exception of Nicaragua in 1990. Even in that case, a civilian opposition leader was elected as president, while the Contra rebel group failed to form into a political party. The difficulties faced by opposition parties are well illustrated in the 1999 and 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections in Tajikistan. Even though the United Tajik Opposition had two to three years to get organized as a political party following the settlement with the government in June 1997, it was not able to gain a meaningful share in electoral politics. In the ongoing transition of Angola, the government wanted to hold elections sooner with an early completion of demobilization, but they were delayed until 2006 at UNITA’s insistence. The opposition UNITA party does not feel ready for early elections, since it needs more time to nurture its political organizational structures. Its participation in the transition government of unity is expected to provide its leaders with an opportunity to adopt valuable political and administrative skills.

Logistical Prerequisites for Elections Election schedules should be flexibly arranged to reflect not only progress in the formation of political parties but also the development of a political infrastructure such as the approval of electoral law. In the conduct of elections, there is a necessary institutional and technical capacity that supports electoral training and the equitable access to the media and ballot counting as well as voter registration. These preconditions for competitive elections are either extremely fragile or nonexistent in many war-torn societies (Kumar 1998). An adequate electoral infrastructure depends on the organization of administrative structures that can manage logistical tasks as well as the establishment of independent election commissions. Civil society organizations can be mobilized to undertake the tasks of voter education and election monitoring.

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Regulations for the registration of voters are one of the most contentious issues of an election where basic demographic data are guesswork. In societies coming out of civil war, few voters have proper documentation to prove their national identity and age, a situation that is mirrored at the societal level with poor population data. The voter registration process is further complicated with the arrival of returnees since issues of citizenship are not always clear. In holding multiethnic elections in Kosovo, voter registration was not possible without first having a civic identification process and a census of citizens residing both in and outside of the territory. The return and reintegration of refugees and other war-displaced populations often serve as a support base for a particular party. In Namibia, eligibility was defined in an inclusive manner to allow people across the northern border in Angola and whites in South Africa to participate in the vote. Given all the complexities, voter registration was extended from June through September, and elections were held from October 27 to 29, 1989. In preparations for the 1992 election in Angola, the voter registration process was even more complex given that 2.8 million people were internally displaced with half a million living in neighboring countries. Hundreds of thousands who lived in zones controlled by UNITA for many years did not have even identity documents. International Assistance Not only transparent electoral laws, rules, and regulations but also the capacity to monitor and verify are preconditions for a fair election. Any aspect of planning, financing, execution, and monitoring can be supported by the international community’s involvement to varying degrees. International presence itself has political and symbolic significance; the UN has provided technical and logistical assistance in conducting, supervising, or entirely organizing elections. Electoral assistance was given to Nicaragua in 1990, Haiti in 1991, Angola in 1992, and El Salvador and Mozambique in 1994 with differing degrees of intensity. In particular, the UNDP and other international agencies played pivotal roles in setting up election infrastructures from scratch in such countries as Liberia, Mozambique, and Cambodia. In most cases, technical assistance as well as monitoring has been provided in a more frequent and less intensive pattern. Technical assistance has been given in such areas as the revision of electoral laws, the design of electoral systems, and the administration of elections. In particular, the UNDP has been actively involved in technical assistance in Central America and other African countries in close consultation with the UN Electoral Assistance Division (EAD). The UNDP also assisted in the operation of El Salvador’s Supreme Electoral Tribunal in the 1994 elections. In addition, the agency has been engaged in trust building along with guaranteeing the legitimacy of elections in a volatile political context.

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The costs of most internationally sponsored elections are, to a significant degree, covered by international assistance. In Liberia, national election commissions were able to register 502,678 electors, 91 percent of the eligible voters, with international financial support and technical assistance. Civic education, computerization of the voter list, and training of election workers as well as procuring and delivering ballot boxes were all supported by $4.5 million from the European Union, the Netherlands, and Japan (Adebajo 2002). In addition to having international election monitors present, the National Election Commission of Ethiopia received over $5 million in direct cash and in-kind contributions from not only the UN and the Organization of African Unity but also twenty bilateral donors (Harbeson 1998). The October 1996 elections in Nicaragua could not have been conducted without foreign assistance, since close to 60 percent of the election budget came from international donors (McCoy 1998). In the case of Mozambique, international political support was critical to the implementation of the agreement. On the first day of polling, the RENAMO leader threatened to boycott even though his party eventually accepted seats in the parliament. International actors’ promise of fair elections, as well as pressure from neighboring countries, persuaded RENAMO not to boycott the elections. In the absence of local capacity and, more importantly, where continuing suspicion exists between parties, international authorities are charged with the organization and supervision of national elections. In Namibia and Cambodia, the administrative responsibilities for organizing and managing elections were taken over by the UN. The Cambodian election, conducted from May 23 to 28, 1993, was overwhelmingly prepared, organized, and administered by the UN with the support of more than 20,000 international troops. This signaled an important departure from the international community’s traditional role limited to monitoring elections. The OSCE has also displayed its organizational capacity in shaping the rules and political environment for elections in the Balkans. It took complete charge of organizing and running national elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The Economic Community of West African States, along with UN agencies, was the lead player in holding elections in Liberia with the support of international and domestic observers. The creation and preservation of an environment conducive to free and fair voting processes is an essential element for any successful election. Fairness is always an important concern, especially when administrative capacity and public programs have been used to support government candidates. The preservation of a level playing field among the key political parties is an important condition in contesting the elections. This includes ensuring that no donor or UN programs can be used to unduly influence public opinion in favor of any of the parties or to use their administrative capacity to tilt the balance in anyone’s favor.

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The broad electoral responsibilities of UNTAC included supervising and controlling governmental components that might attempt to manipulate the election outcomes. Virtually all of the UN’s operations in Cambodia between 1991 and 1993 were geared to supporting the overall effort to establish a freely elected government.10 In order to ensure that the capacity of the ministries would not be used to unduly affect the outcome of the elections, international civil administrators and technical specialists were deployed in all of the key ministries in Phnom Penh to monitor their activity. Efforts to organize elections can suffer from not only poor preparations for building a necessary infrastructure but also unfavorable political conditions. In Ethiopia, the National Electoral Board was not in place with sufficient time to establish rules and regulations; by November 1993 it was still not ready to prepare for elections scheduled in June 1994. Local governments were responsible for making sure that citizens were registered to vote, providing polling places, and registering candidates. Most importantly, numerous irregularities should not come as a surprise in a country, like Ethiopia, that used to have a one-party system with predetermined election outcomes. During the formative stage of election games, political entrepreneurs attempt to manipulate the rules in their favor or to undermine challengers’ campaigns by organizing subversive activities. Opposition parties in Ethiopia accused the government of detaining their campaign workers and closing their offices while the ruling party was allowed to mobilize neighborhood and other types of associations. The refusal of many opposition parties to participate in the 1992 and 1994 elections was prompted by concerns about the government’s unfair restrictions of their political campaigns. Organization of Elections Neutral oversight and regulatory electoral bodies contribute significantly to guaranteeing the credibility and legitimacy of elections. The independent commissions of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, in fact, have been crucial to meaningful elections in those countries. To overcome mistrust, election commissions are comprised of former adversaries, and develop rules along with continued political negotiations. In El Salvador, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal was comprised of representatives from five political parties. However, the tribunal created by the accords gave unfair advantage to the governing party (del Castillo 2001). In Mozambique, it took months to resolve a dispute between the government and RENAMO over the makeup of the National Election Commission. A political compromise was eventually achieved through the involvement of the UN Special Representative to extend the implementation of elections from one to two years.

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The control of national elections may have to be put in the hands of international management authorities before both capacity building and fairness are ensured. It takes time to transfer the control of election management to local administrators especially in places of deep ethnic divisions and civil wars. The Provisional Election Commission, made up of OSCE and OHR representatives and local nationals, established electoral rules and regulations that were to remain in place until Bosnia set up its own commission. The commission chaired by the OSCE mission head determined “rules governing eligibility and registration of parties, candidates, eligibility and registration of voters, method of voting, codes of campaign conduct, and the role of domestic and international observers” (Cousens and Cater 2001, p. 112). Seven years passed before major responsibilities were transferred to local authorities for the Bosnian general elections in October 2002. Election Monitoring Monitoring decreases the probability of large-scale manipulation and fraud, thus enhancing the credibility of elections and the acceptance of their outcomes. International observers are invited to oversee a plebiscite when there is need to ensure free, democratic conduct of the election. The Nicaraguans requested international monitoring since they had more confidence in outsiders such as the Organization of American States (OAS) and European countries (McCoy 1998). Where there are charges of fraud and cheating, external election monitoring investigates irregularities and fraudulent practices. Comprehensive monitoring promotes the domestic and international legitimacy of elections in a polarized political environment. An outside presence helps alleviate the distrust of all sides by bringing fairness and security to the process. The joint OAS/UN International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH) covered monitoring local, legislative, and presidential elections. In Mozambique, international civil monitors were attached to local police units to report any incidents of intimidation or violation of human rights. Monitoring election campaigns has often been the responsibility of the UN Civilian Police in other operations. The mobilization of domestic organizations is complementary to international monitoring since domestic actors are familiar with local political events. A coalition of human rights groups, professional associations, and social service organizations can expose discrepancies in vote counts and other electoral flaws. However, often international monitoring efforts have not been successful in building on activities of domestic monitors, although they provided moral support.

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Postelection Politics Successful elections can be characterized in many different ways. First of all, if elections have any meaning, the vote has to be sincere and well organized. The entire process of elections should be conducted, in a fair manner, without a boycott by major opposition parties. Second, the outcome needs to be fully accepted by every party, especially the losers. The vote would not have the expected effect if the losers rejected the outcomes despite a fair process. Elections can serve as an effective step forward in establishing a multiparty democracy only if all the parties abide by the rules and results. There are a variety of illustrations, ranging from relatively successful experiences in Central America to the most dramatic failure, as illustrated by the 1992 Angolan election. The 1994 Salvadoran elections were peaceful, and the outcome was regarded as reasonably fair by most observers despite some incomplete voter registration and polling irregularities. It was considered a landmark event, given that the FMLN participated in elections for the first time despite the ruling ARENA party’s success in occupying the largest share of seats in the Legislative Assembly. In elections in Mozambique, Tajikistan, and other instances where the overall election process was declared fair and free with only some minor fraud or irregularities, the results were also fully respected by all sides with the exception of Angola and Cambodia.11 A high level of expectation about possibilities for change leads to popular participation in postconflict elections. In Angola, El Salvador, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and Cambodia, there was a popular response to the first multiparty elections held following the cessation of hostilities. A high rate of voting in those countries demonstrated the level of expectation for peace and a better life raised by elections. Between 86 and 88 percent of total registered voters participated in the February 1990 Nicaraguan presidential election, the Cambodian constituent assembly election held in May 1993, and the October 1994 Mozambican presidential election. Ninety-two percent of the registered electorate turned out to vote in the October 1992 Angolan presidential election. Some of the voters walked for days through the bush and then stood for hours under the broiling sun to cast their ballot (Ottaway 1998). In El Salvador, Guatemala, Angola, and Mozambique, the incumbent governments during the conflict won elections and have remained in power, reflecting the advantages of controlling state institutions. It is exceptional that a former war contender gained the majority vote in Cambodia, but his party was forced to accept a power-sharing arrangement with the threat from the incumbent party. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista government lost the 1990 presidential election to a newly formed civilian opposition party (not

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a civil war rival) that was once a political ally after the Sandinista overthrow of the Somoza dictatorship in 1979. In general, inequality in resources hampers competition, and puts opposition parties in a disadvantaged position. Government parties enjoy a huge advantage over their rivals in the areas of financial and organizational capacity and media control. They have financial resources for organizing political speeches, rallies, marches, and such popular entertainment as music, dance, and games. Ruling parties tend to dominate the means of communication with maintenance of an office in each electoral district and monopolization of the airwaves in contrast to an opposition group’s limited access to signs and stickers, trucks and buses. State-controlled media and voter-counting procedures in the 1999 and 2000 presidential and parliamentary elections in Tajikistan aided in the consolidation of power by the incumbent president Imomali Rahmanov. Nicaragua is one of a few exceptions in which challenging political parties have been able to deliver their messages via state-run television channels. For an election to be fair and free, the conditions for competition should be acceptable to all the major contestants. In some elections, charges have been made regarding unequal conditions, and opposition forces boycotted the elections or threatened to do so. A boycott of 1995 elections by opposition parties in Ethiopia led to the resounding victory of the EPRDF with a majority of seats in the House of People’s Representatives and in the regional assemblies. Because the divisive elections left Ethiopian politics largely unopposed, electoral victory by the government without participation of the opposition in elections did not advance democracy.12 Even in fair and free elections, the typical response of defeated parties is to make charges of the unfair conduct of elections. With few exceptions, however, they eventually abide by the election result, accepting the role of opposition often under international pressure. In Cambodia, the royalist party National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) won the most seats, but Hun Sen’s Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) rejected its loss at the polls and maintained its prerogatives. In order to reverse the election results, Hun Sen employed the tactics of blackmail; power-sharing arrangements, forced by the ruling CPP, resulted in the creation of extraconstitutional dual prime minister positions. The refusal of UNITA leader Savimbi to abide by the results of the 1992 democratic election (which was based on the agreed constitution and judged to be free and fair by the UN) can be, in part, attributed to a lack of incentives for the party that lost elections. The Bicesse Accords of May 1991 had adopted a winner-take-all system without any power-sharing provisions such as allocation of a share of ministerial positions or provincial

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government posts to a defeated party. The lack of any prearranged role for the leader and party that came in second generated reduced incentives for cooperation. Malawi gave seats to the opposition in the cabinet and so avoided the winner-take-all outcome that had had such disastrous effects in Angola. Similarly, following their loss in elections in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas were allowed to control the military. Political representation that strengthens accommodation and moderation is more likely to make an election outcome acceptable to even the losers. Accommodations might involve coalition governments or the allowance of some control over government power by opposition groups. The losers are likely to become the loyal opposition if they have, at least, some stake in remaining in the system. Continued support by international actors encourages both winners and losers to cultivate conciliatory postelection politics.

Elections and Democracy Holding elections is only the first step toward the establishment of a functioning political system and multiparty democracy. Violence was renewed with the destabilization of postelection politics marred by revolts in Haiti (2004), a military coup in Sierra Leone (1997), and assassination of the president in Burundi (1993). Political stability is not immediately brought about by elections without stable institutional relations and consensus on political values. Democratic development has to be based on social consensus regarding the system of rules that govern the expression of political differences and competition. Thus elections by themselves are not seen as being equal to, or the same as, democracy without established rules accepted by all the players. It is widely assumed that the institutionalization of free and fair elections is not only key to the cultivation of a democratic culture but also a mechanism for self-determination. Holding regional and national elections as well as drafting a constitution serves as a legal and institutional basis for creating new government structures, while responding to the contentious issues of political legitimacy. In particular, democratic elections are regarded as an important condition for fulfilling a fundamental human right. The ruling party may win the elections, but the opposition should be able to gain enough representation to stay within the system. The maintenance of power by an existing government derives from its legitimization through regular elections. Opening the political system through regular multiparty elections gives losers a continuing stake in the system. It is not easy to elicit compliance without guaranteeing future political opportunities through fair competition.

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By failing to foster a continuing institutional context for political competition, one-time elections do not make a democracy. Regular elections are a necessary condition for bringing about changes in government. In Mozambique, President Joaquim Alberto Chissano spent seventeen years in power before stepping down following the 2004 election. However, institutional development failed in Zimbabwe where President Mugabe retained power over two decades with oppression of opposition parties. Repeated competition for power through free and fair elections serves the development of democracy. In 1999, El Salvador’s ruling Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista, ARENA) party kept its hold on the presidential palace, but the former FMLN guerrillas and their supporters increased their seats in the legislative assembly from fourteen in the 1994 elections to twenty-seven in 1997, falling only one seat short of ARENA’s. While the ARENA party had previously enjoyed dominance in the vast majority of municipal elections, the FMLN also scored victories in fifty-three municipal elections, which gave them responsibilities for local governance over almost half the Salvadoran population (Orr 2001). The critical test of democracy is whether new relationships can develop among former adversaries emerging from elections. Players need to be convinced that participation in the election will give them at least a voice in policymaking. The new political process needs to provide losers with some tangible benefits, symbolic and even material, from participation in the system. Elections can seal the legitimacy of new power structures, but, by themselves, they are not sufficient to structure a viable and sustainable democratic order. In fact, having a constitution and voting does not necessarily mean that democratic institutions are fully operative unless institutional norms of political competition and compromise are accepted by all the parties. Elections and other forms of democratic institutions cannot easily operate in socially fragmented and politically polarized societies, especially if they have been designed to justify a national power structure. The victory of Paul Kagame in Rwanda’s first postgenocide presidential election (2003) with 95 percent of the total votes cast was not a healthy sign of the presence of a credible opposition. As a matter of fact, enforcement of order by authoritarian leaders can be legalized through such an electoral outcome. In practice, democracy depends on a political culture and structure evolving from the elections and the role of the opposition in national politics. In Tajikistan, the influence of seats in the parliament or cabinet is marginal in a strong presidential system where power is highly concentrated in the executive branch. The ruling party in Mozambique, FRELIMO, rejected pressure to form a government of power sharing with the opposition RENAMO. Even though FRELIMO won just 43 percent of the vote, it

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obtained a majority in parliament due to the application of dubious electoral laws. Further, FRELIMO re-demonized RENAMO through the governmentowned media to avoid any calls for a national unity government. Elections may not bring to power a leader committed to democratic order and do not always guarantee a stable political order with fragile social institutions. In Liberia, the power of a former warlord was solidified by victory in national elections, helping eliminate all other forms of opposition. Charles Taylor’s landslide victory in the July 1997 presidential elections, held after nearly eight years of factional fighting, stemmed from voters’ apparent desire to maximize the chances of stability in fear of further bloodshed.13 Many Liberians preferred a strong leader who has the capacity to contain the militia forces, maintaining political order (Boas 2001). However, subsequent repression and abuse of presidential power eventually forced Taylor into exile in Nigeria in 2003. In the political vacuum derived from the legacy of violent conflict, even a government elected through a popular vote may not be fully devoted to liberal democratic principles. Individual rights can be easily curtailed by a tendency for elected governments to usurp power, especially in fledgling democracies that did not inherit pluralistic, liberal political traditions. In fact, internationally endorsed elections can be used to claim absolute sovereignty and power. The centralization of authority through extraconstitutional means such as the imposition of emergency and special laws may be justified by continuing instability or low-intensity conflict. Elections may even strengthen divisive politics with further reification of ethnic divisions. Fundamental political differences may not be resolved by legal/institutional approaches. Where competing interests are not easily incorporated in an election process, electoral victory may produce uncompromising attitudes on the part of the winners. Narrow representation of group interests is a source of further fragmentation. In the absence of broad-based support, political parties appeal to a single ethnic group with exclusivist messages. In this way, elections can further polarize a divided society by actually generating more competition and animosity. Leaders in the former Yugoslavia wanted to hold onto power at any cost by appropriating state funds improperly and fueling renewed ethnic nationalism. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, nationalistic parties scored a major victory in the 1996 election with chauvinistic pledges while small multiethnic parties received few votes. In countries emerging from civil war with deep societal divisions, democratic elections lead to stability only with the promotion of political compromise. Elections have to be combined with a proper representational system to contribute to the management of ethnic conflict through democratic principles.14 There is no doubt that elections and electoral systems, as an international peacebuilding tool, have a tremendous potential to effect positive

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change. However, the desired goal of solidifying democratic norms is not easily obtained simply by institutionalizing elections. Postconflict elections too often have been perceived as an answer to political stability and an exit strategy for international agencies and donors. The majority of democratic failure has been relegated to heavy dependence on the technical aspects of elections as a “quick fix” remedy. While administrative efficiency and conduct on election day cannot be ignored, democratic systems do not function without the injection of nonauthoritarian culture and behavior among political elites. Democratization is generally initiated under international support and pressure, but, in the majority of cases, democratic values have not been internalized with a consequent lack of attention being given to broader dimensions of institution building. As the means for aggregating and representing societal interests, elections reflect one of the manifestations of democracy. Political representation based on the full participation of national, ethnic, racial, religious, and linguistic minorities provides suffrage for everyone regardless of their status. Election outcomes should reflect the will of critical constituencies; a viable form of multiparty democracy cannot be developed without political opening. An exclusive victory for a warring party and the consequent domination of a government by a single party reaffirms the problems associated with ending the war without broad-based political reconciliation. Ethiopia’s democracy, for example, is weak because the domination of one party is reinforced by a lack of credible opposition. On the positive side, elections transformed one-party systems to multiparty political processes in Nicaragua, Cambodia, and Mozambique; former adversaries were accepted in a newly negotiated political system in Guatemala and El Salvador. Institutionalization of Rules of Democracy Factional politics, hierarchical political order, and personalized rule may follow elections. In order to maintain power and status, politicians may need to deliver patronage to their supporters in exchange for loyalty. Behind the formal rules of democracy formulated by international support, real power is then vested in the hands of a small number of political elites. The costly UN mission in Cambodia, which prepared for the 1993 elections, only partially modified the status quo. The example of Cambodia suggests that constitutional design alone is not sufficient to resolve struggles for political power and dominance especially in the absence of genuine reconciliation and functioning democratic institutions. Even though elections were reintroduced under international pressure following the violent eruption of political tensions between co–prime ministers Prince Norodom Ranariddh and Hun Sen in July 1997, Hun Sen’s coup lent him freedom to complete his control over the state and the electoral machinery (Albritton

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2004). As electoral laws were altered to help consolidate the power of Hun Sen’s CPP, the subsequent allocation of electoral power did not represent the will of the voters.15 Since its transition to a democratically elected government, Nicaragua has faced the recurrence of sporadic conflict (Nygren 2003). The country’s fragmented and polarized political system was not able to effectively respond to legislative paralysis, repeated outbreaks of violence, and an economic crisis. Institutional incoherence is characterized by ad hoc rules made through executive decrees along with irregular decisionmaking processes. This was manifested especially in a constitutional crisis and the subsequent paralysis of administrative functions in the mid-1990s. The procedural democracy adopted in Guatemala did not easily break away from the authoritarian past with the election of officials connected to the previous government (Alfonso Portillo in 1999) and the influence of ex-general Efrain Rios Montt, who had been a de facto head of state during the most oppressive period of the early 1980s. Public cynicism was reflected in the rejection of a May 1999 referendum on constitutional amendments that represented an effort to comply with provisions of the peace agreements (Jonas 2000; Holiday 2000). Democratic structures and procedures can be substantially supported by reduction in military prerogatives and development of new political space. Institutions and Democratic Transition The meaning of elections can be found in widening and deepening democratization and civil society building to reaffirm the rules of participatory decisionmaking (as opposed to tyranny by the majority) and nurture a culture of respect for basic human rights. Independent institutions and civil networks need to be firmly established to prevent the abuse of power or the replacement of civilian authorities by force. Reconstructing the foundations of democratic rule is based on restoring law and order, reviving the legitimacy and credibility of government. Strengthening judicial and legislative powers can be combined with reforming the public sector and enhancing the inclusion of ethnic minorities (Barnes 2001). Accountability of both national and local governments is critical to human rights and democracy. The legitimacy of the democratic process rests with the success of this transition. The ability of a state to provide neutral political space is a fundamental prerequisite for stability and democracy. However, a viable state does not exist where decades of violent conflict have caused dramatic degeneration of the fundamental structures of society. The overall framework for postconflict reconstruction is weakened in a “failed state” whose institutions do not command authority and effectiveness.

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Democratization contributes to conflict management through the use of negotiation, not coercion, to settle differences. Newly legitimized institutions carry out public mandates through regularized, collaborative, nonviolent procedures. It was a lack of legal constraints on the use of power that allowed violence and intimidation to become common currency in the resolution of political disputes in Cambodia and Liberia. The malfunctioning of the Cambodian civil bureaucracy, even in technical and management areas such as accounting, financing, and budgeting, resulted from the failure to operate beyond party loyalties. Physical, financial, and human resources are not utilized when officials from adversarial parties attempt to reduce each other’s influence in public initiatives. Resistance from CPP officials, who occupied most positions within the civil service bureaucracy, was the main obstacle to incorporation of FUNCINPEC nominees in the government structure. Even the functions of civil service are not effective without a neutral political environment. The administrative organs of the state may be indistinguishable from the party organs when the role of state agencies has been weakened by party loyalty. An institutional framework to accommodate democratic culture requires a longer-term horizon for change. The institutions and procedures associated with a fully fledged democracy have not yet promised to yield minority gains in the electoral arena. In Mozambique, the police abuse the rights of citizens; the judiciary is inefficient and corrupt; and the press is almost entirely owned by the government and exercises self-censorship despite such achievements as a growing economy and an absence of armed conflict (Cabrita 2000). In Haiti, despite democratic elections, violence has been used against political opponents. The rule of law is strengthened by democratic institutions, in particular, the judiciary and the legislature. Reinventing government through parliamentary assistance oriented toward improving legislative and administrative skills would not be successful in the absence of a democratic culture. A legislative body does not operate if political parties do not abide by democratic principles. Newly formed political parties have to adjust their behavior to a new process of compromise. The asssumption of power by elected political officials has not often guaranteed an effective system of checks and balances that is characteristic of the institutionalization of democratic government. Political behavior associated with a weak culture of consensus and compromise stems from continuing political polarization and widespread distrust. Weakness in governing institutions of democracy, such as uncertain civilian control of the armed forces, is attributed to the continuing legacy of military rule. Where the armed forces remain a central political force, the democratic environment is on shaky ground with the fragility of the rule of law.

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Civil Society Civic groups in weak democracies such as Ethiopia and Tajikistan have been underdeveloped and therefore unable to hold their governments accountable (Harbeson 1998; Foroughi 2002). In such circumstances, democratization can be disrupted by political leaders’ pursuit of self-interest and power struggles. Various features of civil society can be understood in terms of a public space that allows a variety of actors to seek to mediate relations between citizens and state authorities. In a weak institutional environment, civil society organizations can serve as a means to facilitate political and social interaction. By promoting cooperation, compromise, and inclusion, nonstate associations in pluralistic traditions are often equated with democracy and nonviolent solutions. In many war-torn societies, civil society institutions have been rapidly created or imported from abroad as a historical construct with the hope of increasing the prospect for democratization at both national and local levels (Pugh 2000b). The exposure of Cambodian civil society to human rights issues and democracy can be ascribed to the influence of UNTAC. The emergence and proliferation of new NGOs across Cambodia was supported by the establishment of the office of the UN Center of Human Rights in Phnom Penh. In assisting in the 1993 election, the UNTAC radio service disseminated information that put Cambodians in a better position to organize themselves and to press for political change (Akashi 2000). In empowering the dispossessed, associations organized by farmers, teachers, students, and factory workers also played a critical role in replacing cults of power. Yet it would take time to build confidence, courage, and knowledge of political mobilization given the lack of such a tradition of associations in Cambodia. Civil society building is inhibited by authoritarian political systems, which often see civic associations as threats. Social programs are often based on a community-level understanding of past discriminatory practices and inequality in employment and education. Democratic institution building is geared toward civil society assistance, with particular attention paid to nurturing advocacy groups, organizations for civic education, independent media, and trade unions. The growing prominence of civil society can focus on turning institutional forms of democracy into democratic substance. Local peace commissions contribute to gradual changes in a political culture and the construction of a new system (Midgley 2002). A democratization unit of the OSCE worked on building the capacity of local NGOs as well as political parties with their efforts to enhance women’s participation and leadership of local groups. Domestic nongovernmental organizations observing elections, such as Ética y Transparencia en Nicaragua, were actively supported by international NGOs involved in monitoring the elec-

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toral process. Between elections, some NGOs shift their attention to monitoring and overseeing progress in democratization. Imposing outside priorities on the direction, form, or speed of internal political change is likely to lead to negligence of local institutional environments and sociocultural traditions. Most importantly, local democratic traditions must be incorporated into the process of rebuilding social and political institutions. For example, it is difficult to imagine building a new Somali society without the engagement of local leadership and structures that have survived the serious ravages of famine and warfare. Religious leaders and subclan figures have mobilized support for common interests through indigenous organizations.

Final Comments The end of an armed struggle is symbolized by the participation of belligerents in a political process through the formation of political parties and peaceful mobilization of their supporters. If the elections are part of a winner-take-all system, the state ends up being the prize to seize. The stability of a multiparty system relies on an economic and social structure that reduces ethnic and economic divisions. Overall, the institutionalization of democratic practice is a long process interacting with not only the formation of new social groups but also historical traditions.

Notes 1. With modest contacts between UNMIK headquarters and UN staff in the field, limited guidance was given to civil servants in the local administration. 2. An eighty-eight–member Constituent Assembly (that served as the legislature since independence) was created following the elections held in August 2001. Jose Alexandre Gusmao, the charismatic leader of the guerrilla army, was elected as president in April of 2002. 3. Appointments to such positions as the governor of the Central Bank in Bosnia-Herzegovina were made by the International Monetary Fund. 4. Contrary to Namibia where the parliament served as a constituent assembly, the same type of institution in Eritrea was employed to approve a decision by the parliament (Selassie 2002). 5. In fact, the constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina was prepared and proposed primarily by lawyers from the U.S. Department of State (Bose, 2002). 6. Ethiopia is made up of about ninety distinct cultural-linguistic groups, with ethnicity being one of the major criteria for drawing boundaries between regions. 7. In order to mirror ethnicity in the balance of legislative power, the members of the Council of People’s Representatives and the Council of the Federation are selected every five years by universal suffrage and by the elected parliaments of the states, respectively.

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8. Slovenia deprived nationals of other former Yugoslav republics of residence rights after its independence was achieved with Western European recognition of the Slovenes’ aspirations. 9. Despite the fears produced by political violence in the north of the country, the international presence helped the days of voting pass without any major disruptions. 10. Preparations for holding fair elections in Cambodia, as elsewhere, entailed the preservation of a level playing field for all parties to the Paris Accords. 11. There are different degrees of acceptance even if the losers do not resort to violence to nullify the result. For instance, following the 1996 elections in Nicaragua, the Sandinistas acknowledged the legality of the new government, but did not respect its legitimacy without calling for protests (McCoy 1998). 12. The June 1992 election was boycotted by the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the All-Amhara People’s Organization (AAPO), the Ethiopian Democratic Action Group, and the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia, which together represented a significant percentage of the potential Ethiopian electorate. As the OLF was the prime political organization campaigning on behalf of the Oromo, appealing to at least half of the Ethiopian population, its withdrawal from the elections was an especially severe blow to the democratic process. The OLF ceased to campaign because of the persecution of its candidates, while other opposition parties, the AAPO in particular, felt that the transitional regime was inhibiting their ability to compete effectively because of government control over the national media and its better organizational apparatus in the countryside. The AAPO, the Southern Coalition, and the Coalition of Alternative Forces for Peace and Democracy in Ethiopia all refused to participate in the electoral process from an early stage. In addition, the OLF and the Coalition of Ethiopian Democratic Forces were no longer formally accepted as political parties within the country. 13. Along with the electoral victory of Charles Taylor as president, his National Patriotic Party (NPP) obtained twenty-one of the twenty-six Senate seats, and fortynine of the sixty-four seats in the House of Representatives. 14. It is also important to recognize local or traditional forms of population participation. 15. In the July 1998 elections marked by widespread intimidation and fraud, Hun Sen and the CPP garnered 41 percent of the votes, but the CPP, through a controversial change in the formula for allocating seats, was awarded with a majority of sixty-four seats out of 122 in the National Assembly.

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5 DEVELOPMENT

Development policies should be considered an integral part of a broader peace process, given that poverty and inequality, sustained after internal conflict, remain to undermine peace by breeding discontent and anger. Development has to improve a social reality that is inhospitable to human material well-being. Owing to a lack of human capital and the destruction of physical infrastructure, it is a challenging task to reinitiate economic development halted by violent conflict. Peace agreements create high expectations for economic improvements. However, continuing gaps between these expectations and existing realities become a major source of social unrest. It takes time to rebuild systems of transport and communication, banking, health care, education, and agriculture that have been damaged or destroyed by fighting. In addition, inadequate distribution of land and other resources weakens a community’s ability to recover from war wounds (Collier et al., 2003). Prospects for early economic recovery are further hampered by environmental degradation resulting from the conduct of war and consequent population movements. In countries that have endured long civil wars, local communities bear a major share of the costs of repopulation and other economic recovery activities, given the national government’s indebtedness stemming from high military spending. In initiating economic recovery precluded by violent conflict, major attention is generally paid to a production increase in agriculture, manufacturing, and construction. The establishment of small enterprises and commerce goes along with a resumption of savings and credit. However, sustainable development projects must be compatible with protection of the environment that supports the survival needs of local populations. Long-term development strategies are needed to bring lasting transformation of economic structures. It is often the case that due to low domestic capacity for raising revenue and high demands for expenditure, foreign donors with financial resources play a significant role in economic recovery (Harris 1999). Development cannot easily be disentangled from political transition and security. While economic growth is not sustainable without a lasting 123

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peace, economic instability is one of the main obstacles to democracy. In particular, peace would not be durable without equitable development that benefits the majority of people in the society combined with income-creating opportunities for the poor. Thus, development activities need to be geared toward mitigating economic hardships and reintegrating the society across ethnic, racial, religious, and other divisions. In most peacebuilding packages major attention is devoted to reform oriented toward a market economy; the establishment of liberal economic policies is often a condition attached to international assistance (Moore 2000). Classic economic policies need to be carefully introduced since budget cuts and other economic stabilization measures designed to reduce government deficits and foreign debts create hardships for people who desperately need economic assistance. Given the fact that incentives for local development activities are not generated by pure liberal economic policies, investment in human and physical resources should counterbalance an introduction of austere financial and monetary measures. Diverse types of economic policies have been introduced to address both short-term and long-term needs. Even though short-term needs are to be met through humanitarian assistance, long-term development goals can be achieved through investment in human capital and infrastructure building. The gap between emergency assistance and long-term sustainable development needs to be bridged through effective coordination between sectors that focus on different aspects of reconstruction of a war-torn society and economy. How much, for what purposes, when, and in which sectors aid should be delivered are more than technical issues. Development has to be pursued to improve conditions for peace by meeting the needs of economically marginalized groups and, most importantly, benefiting the entire community, not just one specific group. The initiatives can be derived from local development projects organized by grassroots communities.

Recovery and Violent Conflict Many postconflict societies have to overcome serious challenges to economic rehabilitation and development. The level and type of wartime damage create different conditions for economic recovery. With human displacement and suffering as well as damage to buildings and roads, both human capital and physical infrastructure are often left in shambles. Loss of income and livelihood as well as unemployment are a direct result of the destruction of productive assets, farmlands, and other work places. When twenty-two years of civil war ended in Mozambique in 1992, about 58 percent of primary schools and almost half of health clinics had

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been destroyed. Two-thirds of the population were still in absolute poverty two years after the cease-fire. At the end of four years of war in BosniaHerzegovina in November 1995, half of the population was unemployed, with two million people internally and externally displaced (Date-Bah and Walsh 2001). In 1998 nearly half of 1.7 million Kosovo Albanians became refugees in neighboring Albania, Macedonia, and Montenegro with the internal displacement of about half a million people. Economic rehabilitation in Kosovo was burdened by the return and integration of refugees in a short time span (O’Neill 2002). A lack of electricity and other energy sources as well as running water is the source of major discontent in Iraq, and restoring the infrastructure has become not only an economic but also political issue in the country. Social and political tensions accompany population movements and competition for resources; there is always a great potential for conflict between returnees and the community. Since postconflict societies usually have deficient resources to support returning refugees and displaced people, external assistance supports the transition. The prospects for development are hampered by the economic legacy of internal war such as the destruction of capital and a low level of savings and investment. Postwar economies also face such challenges as the destruction of production capacity and displacement of the skilled labor force. The economies of Kosovo and East Timor, previously dominated by outsiders, were left in a vulnerable position with a lack of investment and skilled workers. Guinea-Bissau, a tiny country of about 1.3 million people located on West Africa’s Atlantic coast, was emerging from the civil war in early 2000. It was one of the poorest countries in the world, with a debt of $964 million, and its real gross domestic product (GDP) was reduced by 28 percent a year before a peace agreement was signed (Adebajo 2002). Initial priorities in Afghanistan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cambodia, and other such countries that have experienced a long and intense civil war are to overcome the enormous wartime destruction. A heavy injection of foreign aid is necessary for rebuilding infrastructure as well as refugee resettlement and training. Donor programs have to focus on not only immediate needs for health care and education but also long-term reconstruction of war damages. Investment in human resources and the economic integration of communities contribute to removing the social and economic causes of violence.1 In communities where a large number of the prewar population is displaced, production facilities do not function properly given a shortage of skilled labor and managers. Heavy investment was needed in East Timor, which had no civil servants, almost no doctors, and few secondary school teachers, with 46 percent of the adult population being illiterate.2

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While the public sector is often too weak or destroyed to generate new employment after a significant civil conflict, development of the private sector is hampered by the long-term impact of interruption of production activities. The effects of economic sanctions, prior to the U.S.-led military action, continue to cripple the economies of Haiti and Iraq, even when the coalitions that intervened want to move toward reconstructing these countries. In Haiti, the embargo shut down many productive businesses, ranging from sporting goods suppliers to textile manufacturers. As these manufacturers left the country and did not find any incentives to come back, large numbers of the population remained unemployed. Income-generating programs are needed where large numbers of people are unemployed. Special economic assistance is necessary for the increased number of female-headed households, many of which live in extreme poverty following a loss of financial support and jobs. In some countries, with poor industrial development and low urbanization, farming or grazing is the only means for subsistence. Over 65 percent of the population in Somalia works on the land, but farming is threatened by the high cost of fuel and shortages of water supply as well as such natural disasters as drought. Poor harvests then result in a rise in the cost of local and imported food. Since widespread poverty can be attributed to poor environmental conditions, environmental rehabilitation has emerged as a new agenda in Haiti, El Salvador, and other countries.3 By removing forest cover, especially on hillsides, deforestation has hastened the loss of fertile soil; this process of soil erosion is aggravated by unsustainable agricultural practices. In turn, the soil has silted up significant portions of the coastline that were once rich fishing grounds. Because of concentration on the growth of large-scale commercial agriculture, along with environmental degradation, Haiti has become increasingly reliant on imports of rice and other staples. With deteriorating terms of trade in export of heavily agriculture-dependent commodities, the vulnerability of food security has increased. A similar situation can be easily developed in Guinea-Bissau, which relies heavily on foreign exchange from cashew nuts and fishing, and whose income thus fluctuates, being at the mercy of the international market. Economic development promotes a positive social environment by bestowing families and neighborhoods with opportunities to work together rather than finding an excuse to attack their adversaries. Bridges between former enemies can be built by substantive development ideas that strengthen cooperative human endeavors. New economic and social boundaries need to be established to provide a community basis for reconstruction. New markets have to be found to compensate for the loss of trade ties that brought about economic disruptions. A more vibrant and integrated regional economy, stimulated by foreign aid, is necessary to remedy war-

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time destruction, especially in places like Bosnia-Herzegovina where the industrial sector declined significantly from 51 percent of production to only 9 percent at the end of the civil war.4 A loss of trade ties with Ethiopia after a border war had a devastating impact on Eritrea. Reconciliation can start with the recovery of economic transactions. In addition, outside trade and commercial links create crosscutting, modern, economic, and professional identities among interest groups that counter political elites and the state.

Overcoming the Legacy of a War Economy In postwar economies, it is not unusual that a gray economic sector coexists with the legacy of a lucrative war economy. Diamonds, gas, oil, and other rich natural resources were used to maintain the war economy in Sierra Leone, Angola, and Sudan. Both government and rebel forces in Angola financed their war efforts with incomes coming from $500 million a year in the export of diamonds, plus over $3 billion in oil revenue. Such income sources need to be converted to benefit the population. With significant illegal harvesting of forests, the potential for economic recovery in Cambodia has not been fully realized, and the consequent revenue losses have been as much as $100 million to $300 million a year. The economy of a postwar state may be also hampered by international drug trafficking, corruption, and millions of landmines. In Afghanistan, dependency on the illicit production of narcotics for clandestine trade has grown with the fall of the Taliban regime, and the livelihood of many peasants depends on the narcotics trade. An essentially criminalized economy and the associated corruption do not provide incentives for healthy economic activities. The widespread criminalization of the economy within international networks and competition for control over resources are major obstacles. The role of informal sectors needs to be examined in formulating economic survival strategies (Peirce and Stubbs 2000). War entrepreneurs may convert a patron-client system into the postconflict political economy, often characterized by the control of organized crime and other special interests. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, for instance, friends and associates of political leaders profited from controlling scarce commodities in violation of sanctions. In particular, criminals benefited from cross-border operations with the division of Bosnia into ethnic parastates. The distortion of the economy, originating from war and sanctions, is illustrated by exclusive permits for specific economic activities (Pugh and Cooper 2004; Väyrynen 1997). Another structural obstacle to economic recovery is the lack of a competent civil service that can supervise the complex transition from a state-

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controlled to a market-driven economy. Poor governance reflecting corrupt legal and judicial systems allows special interests to prevail against economic reform. The formulation of economic policy is undermined by the weakness of political and legal institutions. Delays in the payments of government salaries and other obligations, caused by aggravating economic conditions and reduced revenues, are often a source of disorder and social instability. The failure to pay soldiers and police in Nicaragua and Sierra Leone was responsible for banditry. The cases of Ivory Coast, Somalia, and Liberia illustrate that militia violence and looting became part of a conflict cycle characterized by continued economic deterioration and lawlessness. In the Central African Republic, the failure of the newly elected government to pay salaries in 1999 resulted in mutiny by soldiers, strikes, and demonstrations by civil servants. Flawed or weak national institutions need to be reformed to prevent corruption and inefficiency (Doyle 2001). Corruption is the end result of underpayment of the bureaucracy even at the very highest levels of the government. Often government salaries are insufficient to meet the needs of civil servants and continue to decline in real terms. However, the government may not be able to adjust salaries to be commensurate with the rising cost of living, since wages encompass the largest portion of the government budget. Capacity building is essential especially where the administrative structure has completely collapsed (e.g., Kosovo, Bosnia) or where poverty persists with limited public administrative capacity (e.g., Haiti). Public administration and civil service reform can strengthen the state’s capacity to facilitate modern economic development. Even at the initial stage of rebuilding the economy, reform in central bank, tax, and customs administration cannot be postponed to a later date.

The Impact of Macroeconomic Policies In internationally supported financial recovery programs, macroeconomic balance and efficiency are of central importance for relaunching economic growth. Macroeconomic adjustment has been adopted for achieving monetary and budgetary balance through deficit reduction and control of inflation. It is often suggested by the World Bank and most Western donors that economic performance can be strengthened by a greater reliance on market forces in the exchange and trade system. The premise of monetary reform is increased market efficiency in the allocation of resources, laying a basis for achieving the goal of balance of payments. The main recovery programs in Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Mozambique concentrated on fiscal equilibrium and control of government spending (Arndt, Jensen, and Tarp, 2000). Managing a budget deficit

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generally involves not only the elimination of subsidies for public services and other basic necessities but also streamlining a bloated bureaucracy. Despite the adoption of such policies, it has not been easy to obtain a sustainable level of balance between payment capacity and foreign debt servicing obligations. Continued debt prohibits economic development by draining fiscal and foreign exchange resources. The low levels of development in Nicaragua and Honduras are, in part, attributable to high external debts and trade deficits. In spite of significant export expansion, the external sector has not successfully reduced the debt level, since foreign currency is earned through the export of a few agricultural commodities whose prices fluctuate every year. Low world coffee prices as well as rising international oil prices along with investor uncertainty were the main causes of Guatemala’s economic troubles in 2002. The main strategies for economic recovery have also relied on fostering entrepreneurship and private initiatives. Privatization of state enterprises has been introduced to improve their operating efficiency. In addition, a reduction in government control over the economy is illustrated in the removal of state monopolies in the marketing of agricultural commodities. Orthodox economic policies, carried out in many countries for more than ten years, have not significantly improved the external balance despite considerable international support (Brück et al. 2000a). Despite various measures to reduce government control and stimulate a free market economy, the private sector has not achieved the high levels of domestic investment and savings needed for economic growth. Meanwhile, not much attention has been devoted to growth in the small-holder output (engaged in rural and regional trade and production), which may have more direct relevance to improving living standards of less privileged sectors. When significant parts of the state sector are dismantled to reduce expenditures, there have been serious implications for unemployment. Layoffs in the public sector accompanied by privatization of state-owned industries increase unemployment. In Nicaragua, a slow pace of investment, along with privatization, has kept nearly 50 percent of the active working population unemployed or underemployed. The experience of Mozambique indicates that gradual approaches to privatization reduce the negative effects on urban unemployment and poverty (Falck et al. 2003). Sufficient support for the recovery of food production has not been a main concern of structural adjustment policies oriented toward monetary balance. In Nicaragua, exports recovered to help improve external solvency without any increase in the food production needed for reducing poverty. A neglect of support for small farmers, exemplified by the withdrawal of rural credit, resulted in increasing poverty levels, further undermining political consensus (Brück et al. 2000a). The outward-oriented, free market model of the agriculture and livestock sectors in Nicaragua put small producers at greater risk due to price competition (McCleary 1999). On the

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other hand, the example of Mozambique shows that a more rapid revival of small-scale agricultural production contains absolute poverty better, even though the export sector may not improve sufficiently under this model (Brück et al. 2000c). Despite privatization and economic deregulation, insufficient employment opportunities are generated where there is a lack of capital. In the majority of poor countries, the traditional mix of economic deregulation and privatization of state industries has led to sudden unemployment without a significant increase in foreign investment. Reduced public sector and state administration are supposed to enhance market efficiency. Where industry is underdeveloped, however, a market is not genuinely open and competitive. Privately owned companies may engage in transferring profits into foreign accounts rather than into reinvestment. Privatization of state energy utilities and other sectors has often resulted in patterns of monopoly by the new owners. The sale of public sector industries may tolerate corruption without fair bidding and an open process for selection of the buyer. Haiti’s privatization of a major state-owned sugar enterprise was not transparent, and private ownership has not improved efficiency. On other occasions, privatization has strengthened the economic positions of those associated with extreme nationalist groups—for example, a transfer of the control of such economic assets as an aluminum plant to military and political organizations in the Croatian part of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Appropriate reconstruction strategies consider initial conditions in a particular country and access to external financing required for the reestablishment of production and trade. Special care is necessary to address the main concerns of macroeconomic policies. Introducing effective macroeconomic management is related to creating the right framework for international assistance. In Nicaragua and other postconflict economies, little public money is available to be invested in the infrastructure from roads and bridges to sanitation, while uncertainty depresses private investment. Private sector activities do not generate sufficient tax income needed to fund infrastructure and social provision; the public expenditures are not fully supported owing to a lack of improved economic performance. Thus foreign finance is needed to support large portions of public investment and total government budgets (Brück et al. 2000a). Unreliable revenues stem not only from weak economic activities but also from an ineffective taxation system. Sufficient government income cannot be generated by mere dependence on licenses, tariffs, and duties. Strengthening fiscal policy is not successful in the absence of efficient tax and customs administration and introduction of a value-added tax as well as

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public expenditure management. Immediate assistance should be available to enhance the administrative capacity of ministries of finance, planning, trade, and investment as well as a central bank (UNDP 1999). Many postwar societies struggle with joblessness for the majority of the working-age population, while few employment opportunities have been created through a focus on the development of the private sector. Employment possibilities have not increased even in primarily low-paying manufacturing jobs for foreign enterprises. Economic growth is not sustainable if it relies heavily on short-term production opportunities derived from aid-dependent and urban-based service sector activities. Not many job opportunities would be created if foreign investment is concentrated on services or natural resource exploitation. An attempt to allocate resources optimally, which may make sense from a purely economic point of view, does not reflect many financial and technical constraints. Economic policymaking is not business as usual given all the peculiarities created by postconflict transitions. An emphasis on macroeconomics and revenue collection is appropriate in a more settled situation. The negative impact of a focus on economic efficiency and rationality needs to be balanced with compensatory programs. Standard macroeconomic policies, suggested by the international financial institutions, have not been adequately adjusted to local economic conditions of postconflict societies. Economic underdevelopment continues to be a cause of social instability in Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Haiti. The short-term stability of macroeconomic policy through austerity measures, sponsored by international financial institutions, involves social costs. It takes time to put the economy on a fiscally sound footing with financial adjustment and market reforms; meanwhile social progress will lag if there is insufficient attention to poverty alleviation. Economic measures such as budgetary constraints need to be imposed only with serious consideration of the local economy’s ability to absorb the negative consequences in the short term. Income inequalities not only jeopardize peace but also undermine any potential for long-term growth. A concentration of income in the top quintile of the population in South Africa continues to undermine social stability (Iheduru 2004). The government has not been able to do enough to tackle poverty among black South Africans, which is now considered to be the root cause of violence (Bollens 2000; Shupp 2002). The Reconstruction and Development Programme was adopted to support the impoverished black majority; it had to be balanced with only a minimal loss of economic privileges for the white community (Knox and Quirk 2000). The program paid great attention to the integration of marginalized regions and planned to support an estimated 10 to 15 million South African youth and adults

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who live under the poverty line and lack basic literacy and other skills. Reflecting this goal, the five-year plan (from 1994 to 1999) called for the construction of a million new homes, redistribution of 30 percent of the country’s farmland, health care for all, clean water, sanitation, and a public works program for the creation of jobs. However, achieving these goals through mobilizing funds from domestic savings was undermined by a shift toward more market-friendly, private–sector oriented approaches represented in the June 1996 macroeconomic policy document “Growth, Employment, and Redistribution.” The new emphasis on the creation of jobs through private investment is consistent with the demands of international financial institutions, foreign investors, and local businesses. A development strategy based on public expenditure was abandoned in lieu of export-led growth, an annual GDP growth rate of 6 percent, and a more flexible labor market (Schneider 2003). The earlier priority on social redistribution was downgraded while a new emphasis was placed on fiscally responsible public budgets and privatizating or streamlining of public agencies. Recovery in war-prone societies needs to be aimed at the alleviation of absolute poverty and economic diversification. However, these objectives have not been easily achieved, as a postwar supply side is deficient with a lack of a civil sector investment in agriculture, transport, water, education, and health. To meet the economic needs of local communities, an increased emphasis should be placed on the vitalization of productive activities by smallholder and local trade associations (Jenkins 2003).

Economic Priorities and Peace Implementation Programs that are critical to the successful implementation of a peace process need to be sufficiently financed early on so as not to endanger progress. Peace dividends from a reduction in military expenditures easily dissipate and thus do not translate into increased health and educational expenditure, due, in part, to the continued burden of external debt servicing. Financial rules imposed by IMF-sponsored monetary policies should be applied flexibly to a reduction in government budgets not only because of postwar spending commitments of the government but also because of a continued low level of revenue collection (Wood 2003). In particular, human development agendas are usually contradicted by monetary and other macroeconomic policies prescribed by international financial institutions. In the longer run, investment in human resources can be linked to restructuring the delivery of health and educational services.

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Activities called for by the peace agreement in El Salvador were not fully supported financially, as a succession of IMF-supported programs were implemented. The intended objectives of the framework of the National Reconstruction Plan (NRP) for 1992–1997 were satisfaction of the most immediate needs of the population most negatively affected by the conflict, reconstruction of damaged infrastructure, and development of the former conflict zones. Yet the NRP was designed and carried out within the framework of an austere macroeconomic plan. Despite some flexibility in meeting the fiscal target during its early implementation period (1993–1994), the program was constrained by the fiscal restrictions imposed by the economic stabilization program (Boyce 1995). The Salvadoran government’s commitment to poverty eradication has not been strong despite compensatory mechanisms funded by foreign donors. El Salvador’s gross public investment, as a share of GDP, is not high relative to other countries in Latin and Central America. Its low primary-school enrollment has not been significantly increasing because of insufficient spending. Such mechanisms as the Social Investment Fund created under the peace accord temporarily cushioned the negative effects of structural adjustment, but burdens on the poor were not eased due to a failure to fundamentally reorder economic or social priorities (Orr 2001). Sustainable growth creates employment and alleviates poverty, thus contributing to national reconciliation. Economic growth was supposed to promote greater equality of income through trickle-down effects, but the opportunity for human development has never been realized through free market policies (Woodward 2002). Infrastructure building may be followed by increased provision of basic services in tandem with temporary employment in the early stages of a postwar transition. Investment in social infrastructure is necessary for reducing poverty, improving the education and health of the population as part of the efforts to raise the standards of living. Development has to embody an active political strategy for conflict prevention, and thus it needs to be steered by political goals (Wood 2003). Financing expenditures related to implementing the provisions of peace agreements is likely to exert pressure on the fiscal objectives of macroeconomic adjustment. Large expenses are involved in reconstruction, land transfers, demobilization, and judicial, military, and police reform. Meeting the financial needs of reconstruction requires more flexible fiscal targets through a relaxation of constraints imposed by IMF austerity programs (del Castillo 2001). Most reconstruction efforts have been conducted in a framework of macroeconomic stability with strict spending control. On the other hand, the financial needs of postconflict societies arise from the challenges of ful-

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filling basic needs for large segments of the population that have suffered significant declines in their living standard. An investment fund is necessary to facilitate social justice by responding to the needs of the marginalized and vulnerable groups such as children, whose high death rates result from poverty, malnutrition, lack of sanitation, and poor health facilities. Fiscal and monetary targets of IMF-sponsored programs need to be adjusted to facilitate the rehabilitation of human capital, physical infrastructure, and basic services that were damaged or interrupted as a result of conflict. In addition to social and economic infrastructure building, peace-related programs include the transfer of land to former combatants and supporters as well as the resettlement of displaced persons and their reintegration through microenterprise development. Postconflict transition encounters a higher risk of returning to civil unrest without adequately carrying out such activities as the delivery of emergency aid to the former conflict zones and the reintegration of former combatants into productive sectors of the economy. Funding is also necessary for the reform of the armed forces and the creation of national civilian police forces as well as strengthening the judiciary, the electoral system, and other democratic institutions. Political considerations often determine economic priorities, as these decisions reflect priorities in postconflict activities. For instance, cash assistance given to demobilized soldiers for Mozambique was ten times higher than aid for civilian returnees. Preferential treatment is believed either to dissuade a return to arms or to reduce the grievances or hardships experienced during violent conflict. One of the conditions for the consolidation of peace is reintegrating those who were part of or were affected by disruptive conflict. Opportunities for employment support the reintegration of former combatants, returnees, and displaced persons into productive activities. In achieving political and social stability during postconflict transition, adequate funding is required for successful implementation of the measures negotiated in the peace accord. The World Bank’s emphasis on decreasing the number of government employees in Cambodia and elsewhere has been contradictory to the political arrangements that call for opportunities to absorb unemployed former combatants and followers of opposing political factions.

Economic Rehabilitation Integrated social development has to intersect with both relief and rehabilitation (Pugh 2000b). Famine and malnutrition can be either an indirect or direct product of civil war, and relief is channelled into reducing the suffering of vulnerable civilian populations. In general, it does not take more

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than nine months to accomplish immediate rehabilitation and relief work except in special circumstances. Economic and social rehabilitation is essential to local capacity building and to providing foundations for longterm prosperity. The experiences of El Salvador, Uganda, and Mozambique indicate that three to five years are needed for the resumption of full economic activities. In order to meet pressing needs and facilitate a return to normal life in devastated countries, humanitarian programs target essential infrastructure repairs and short-term reconstruction efforts. Emergency assistance ranges from food aid, adequate shelter, clean water, and sanitation to medical treatment. In addition, there is a great demand for other relief and survival items such as seeds for agricultural production and education materials for children, as well as employment to meet the needs of not only the local population but also the internally displaced persons and refugees returning from neighboring countries. The relief-development continuum is characterized by a seamless transition from humanitarian action and aid to reconstruction. The stage of longer-term development follows the massive infusion of food aid, the rapid expansion of supplementary feeding, supply of clean water, sanitation, hygiene, and the provision of basic health services. While meeting shortterm needs, rehabilitation activities have to be able to support long-term goals of development and capacity building for the community (MancusiMateri 2000). In addressing short-term humanitarian emergencies, relief work focuses on fast-disbursing and flexible community improvement programs. Relief efforts should be designed to pave the way for the eventual recovery of civil society through resettlement and institutional building. Rehabilitation of the economic and social infrastructure becomes the principal focus of the mission once the most dire humanitarian needs are satisfied. Humanitarian relief is eventually replaced by reconstruction and rehabilitation of civil society, which reflects longer-term social needs. The rehabilitation of areas hit hard by internal war can be supported by small-scale, labor-intensive projects. In creating employment opportunities in the immediate postwar period, repair and reconstruction of physical infrastructure can be combined with food-for-work programs. In rural areas, supplying basic grains and livestock is important for sustainable economic activities. Agricultural recovery programs begin with expanding distribution networks of seeds and tool packages for households. Economic activities are stimulated by infrastructure building in such areas as roads, housing, transportation, electric power, telecommunications, and a water supply system. Identification of the infrastructure rehabilitation that must be undertaken at the very outset of the program cycle needs to be made on the basis of priorities established in the peace process at the

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national level. Improvements in education and health services contribute to the smooth resettlement and reintegration of people. International development agencies can financially and technically support local communities to rebuild extensive community infrastructure such as schools, housing, and bridges. International agencies often play a vital or primary role in the restoration of public utilities where government structures are rudimentary or ineffective at both national and local levels. Especially in a complex political emergency following state collapse (e.g., Liberia and Somalia), local capacity building is a crucial element in the transition from relief to development (Harvey 1998). Through their country assistance programs, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Programme (WFP), and World Health Organization (WHO) offer technical training programs and deliver urgently needed services as well as supporting social and economic reform. Resources have been more quickly put in the hands of local populations through the WFP’s Food for Work program and the International Labour Organization’s (ILO’s) Labour-Based Roads program. Incentives for strengthening the self-reliance of local communities can be designed for aid structures and practices. Access to external resources would not be fully utilized without initiatives by local communities. Through decentralization of the aid delivery system, local communities are encouraged to develop a stake in rehabilitation. At the same time, targeted assistance to farmers and small businesses, as a dominant form of economic activities in the absence of large-scale foreign investment, needs to be designed to generate synergetic effects in stimulating the local economy. Major beneficiaries of labor-intensive and small-scale public work projects can be chosen by targeting the most vulnerable geographic areas and groups. In Kosovo, unemployment and deteriorating infrastructure were addressed through public work projects such as the Village Employment and Rehabilitation Programme. In addition, local industry and businesses were supported through the Small Enterprise and Development Programme, which delivered loans (UNDP and UNPF 2001).

Refugee Resettlements and Transition The repatriation of refugee populations is an integral part of economic recovery and rehabilitation especially in the support of the impoverished communities that absorb the bulk of the burden. The challenge of resettlement derives from the sheer number of refugees and displaced people to be supported as well as the need for a quick response to their return. For instance, the UN worked with the Mozambique government to supply emergency

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assistance for the return of 3.2 million people even before the peace agreement was signed. UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations brought back more than 370,000 Cambodian refugees from Thailand. The emergency assistance for this was coordinated by the UNDP and the UN Special Coordinator for Emergency Relief Operations as well as UNHCR. The repatriation of refugees has to be connected to reintegration and longer-term development activities. A sudden influx of refugee populations puts pressure on planning and implementation capacity. Ideally, the local capacity needs to be created before embarking on a full-scale project. The pressures of an externally established timetable, however, do not leave much time for a deliberate start-up phase dedicated to the development of community-based institutions. Because of concerns about tight deadlines and possible political accusations that refugees were being left to their fate, a number of projects have been approved without consideration of the long-term economic, social, or environmental effects, and many of these projects became unsustainable without continuous external funding. Longstanding refugee populations are not equipped with skills for making a living in a rural environment. Their full participation in a range of development activities such as microenterprise projects could enhance the prospects for success of resettlement and reintegration programs. Quick Impact Projects have been developed to overcome challenges to the return and integration of dislocated populations by focusing on economic activities with a high potential for rapid results. They are intended to bring tangible benefits to local communities and returnees alike in the immediate postconflict stage, with an emphasis on income boosting through small projects. Community rehabilitation can be jump-started within a short time span to bring an immediate impact on economic recovery with a concentration on fishing and agriculture. Cooperative efforts are also necessary to improve local infrastructure such as roads, schools, clinics, wells, and sanitation. These projects were implemented, on a large scale, in Nicaragua and were later introduced in Cambodia and Mozambique in the 1990s, as well as in Liberia and Ethiopia following a civil war and border war respectively in the early 2000s. In collaboration with the rehabilitation component of the UN Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), UNHCR supervised the implementation of fifty Quick Impact Projects that were also supported by a range of partners, including UNDP and other UN agencies. Financial support of $7.8 million permitted the opening of 32 medical centers, distribution of seeds to 60,000 families, as well as repairing 220 kilometers of roads, and constructing 1,300 reservoirs (Akashi, 2000). Overall, Quick Impact Projects organized by UNHCR, mainly in agriculture, assisted 1,728,002 returnees between 1992 and 1995 (UNDP 1999).

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The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) and other peacekeeping operations also began to adopt Quick Impact Projects in responding to the immediate needs of women, children, and other vulnerable populations in the Temporary Security Zone in close consultation with local partners. In supporting small-scale relief services, UNMEE projects, with $700,000 included in its 2000/2001 first-year regular budget, were engaged in restoring and enhancing water distribution services, supplying public sanitation, delivering medical services, repairing school buildings, establishing electricity, and assisting in housing renovations for returning refugees (UNMEE 2003). More than 50 percent of the Quick Impact Project budget of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was devoted to the rehabilitation of damaged educational infrastructure, in recognition of the role of education in reintegration and reconciliation. Since December 2003, approximately $240,000 was spent to rehabilitate twenty-five schools benefiting more than 16,700 students. Funding projects in the areas of energy, health institutions, shelter, water, and transportation have been related to preparation for the assisted returns and reintegration of refugees; the continuation of these programs is expected with additionally committed funding of some $380,000 (UNMIL 2004). Short-term projects for vulnerable groups are not enough, however, to address the structural sources of impoverishment. Given their temporary nature, the effects of Quick Impact Projects will eventually be judged by their successful integration into or linkages with national development strategies. These projects are less effective without being adequately guided and monitored by experienced staff in community development. Due to the immediate demands and time pressures, the reality is that a handful of staff run national programs without sufficiently screening partners for the projects.

Integrative Community Development Community rehabilitation cannot be achieved without initiatives to solve the issues of integrating refugees and displaced people. Displaced people come back to rebuild their community, but many may not settle in their original homes due to destruction and population movements. Settlement patterns in one area could have an impact on ethnic balance in other regions, so that the management and distribution of relief aid becomes central to national and local politics (as seen in Somalia and Mozambique). Competition for limited resources and economic opportunities is inevitable with the material demands of ex-combatants, refugees, and other populations displaced by war. If left unattended, friction and communal conflict can contribute to an overall breakdown of social order. Because of

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fears of creating friction with the local population, development assistance has to be tendered to support not just returning refugees and internally displaced persons but also residents living in the areas of settlement. Reintegration assistance can support a longer-term development goal by promoting organic relationships between new settlers and old residents of the community. The required volume of assistance is thus significantly larger than needed for the sustenance of refugees in camps. Paradoxically, considerable declines in available resources for refugees upon repatriation hamper a more integrative settlement process. In promoting the recovery of war-affected communities, Area Development Programs have been introduced to restore social capital and reactivate communal decisionmaking structures. The common platform for community-level activities supports areas most affected by reintegration processes. Area-based assistance takes multisectoral approaches to economic and social rehabilitation, as was illustrated by Area Development and Peace-Building in Central America (PRODERE) implemented in the late 1980s. Another example includes the Cambodia Resettlement and Reintegration Programme (CARERE), which successfully assisted demobilized soldiers and returnees from Thailand. In the above programs, reintegration of ex-combatants, returnees, displaced people, and other waraffected groups benefited from technical assistance and capability building. In the early stages, UNHCR and UNDP jointly planned and managed area-based programs in Bosnia, Croatia, Eritrea, Guatemala, Mozambique, Somalia, and Tajikistan. Targeted geographic areas are selected on the basis of a high density of war-affected populations and the need for rehabilitation of economic and social infrastructure such as roads, bridges, schools, clinics, and housing (UNDP 2000). While rural area programs have drawn attention, a more refined approach has been taken for social, economic, and political reintegration in urban and peri-urban settings. The programs were also tailored toward varying groups of refugees of different ages and gender. The community development schemes by the UNDP and other donors have focused on laying the foundation for essential services, including primary health-care, water, and veterinary services. These programs benefited from the improved planning and management capacity of indigenous institutions of civil society. With the adoption of a participatory approach, a local governance structure can be used to identify priorities, mobilize resources, and develop technical capacity. Uprooted populations need to be integrated into development programs with an emphasis on self-sufficiency and sustainability. The participation of local populations in rebuilding their communities gives them a sense of regaining control over their own lives. External resources are provided to support the mobilization of local contributions. Through the Srebrenica Regional Recovery Programme in former Yugoslavia, the UNDP coordinated

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fourteen social and economic projects in support of 760 families in collaboration with the municipal government and local NGOs since October 2002 (UNDP 2003). Geographic areas and productive sectors are selected with the expectation that they would, in turn, create opportunities in related sectors and for neighboring communities. Drawing on experience gained under the Sudan program, which raised local communities’ confidence and capacities to plan and manage, area development schemes have served as an excellent framework that allows international development agencies to work directly with local communities. Capacity building among local civil society organizations is essential to empowering beneficiaries and decentralizing the management of development. Local ownership has been maximized where a mechanism has been created for participatory planning of development activities (UNDP 1999). Development of community-based decisionmaking systems focuses on expanding traditional village committees and institutions such as a council of elders. The local planning process involves identifying priority actions and making decisions on how to respond to village-level problems (Mubangizi 2003). Local development councils are typically involved in allocating funds among target villages. These committees eventually expand to incorporate women and minority tribal group members. In the Sudan program, for instance, the composition of the village councils was adjusted to ensure the incorporation of the viewpoints of diverse groups. Building the capacity of local community groups and national NGOs has been one of the most important approaches in the absence of a stable government. It provides an excellent framework for decisionmaking involving the officials of all opposing factions. Area Development Schemes in Afghanistan have been means to respond to the needs of communities under the control of diverse political groups. Beneficiaries from territories held by different military and political factions can be integrated under common programs. Roads, schools, irrigation, and enterprise development often straddle political and military boundaries. For this reason it is imperative that representatives with allegiance to all of the different political factions be involved in development planning institutions. Sharing skills and resources leads to successful integration and reconciliation with the promotion of the common development concerns of villagers. Economic rehabilitation sheds light on the needs of both ordinary local populations and returnees within the context of entire communities, thereby contributing to a reduction in social friction. Participation of ethnic, tribal, clan, religious, and other groups in the decisionmaking process helps break down social and cultural barriers. An area development approach attempts to achieve long-term economic and social integration of populations that have

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suffered from extreme poverty and social exclusion. Human rights training is also appropriately introduced as part of a development program. Overall, reintegration and development have to be based on long-term commitment and flexibility. In the case of Central America, the existence of relatively strong social networks promoted capacity development of both local governments and civil society organizations. Most importantly in the case of PRODERE, the Area Development Scheme was deployed across national boundaries as a mechanism for reintegration of war-displaced populations into entire communities.5 The overall subregional management structure generated technical exchanges across borders and facilitated decisionmaking on a number of cross-border issues that were pivotal to recovery. Issues such as repatriation and reintegration as well as cross-border trade and movements have been effectively handled through this structure. Compared with Central America, communitybased projects have been far more challenging in Cambodia, not only because development associations were less mature in terms of their organizational structures and capacities but also because government institutions did not have a strong basis of legitimacy. The deployment of most assistance for the reintegration of refugees in Cambodia under the umbrella of the CARERE was connected to the support of broader UN objectives such as the repatriation and registration of 380,000 refugees in time for elections (UNDP 1999). Reconciliation remains crucial with the rekindling of political unrest and further conflict in rural areas. As one of the mechanisms for settling disputes between the existing residents and returnees, temple committees and traditional village associations were promoted. The local planning processes in Cambodia relied on participation of returnees and the original residents as well as local officials from all of the key political parties. The first planning cycle involved the undertaking of 361 village development schemes for construction of clinics, schools, roads, irrigation, and water supply systems. In addition to covering primary education and health care, the program was engaged with the development of capacity for management schemes in such areas as land redistribution, reforestation, and agriculture-related industries. One of the goals for development activities was to explore an opportunity to integrate territories that had been prohibited from access because of the Khmer Rouge’s control. Throughout the implementation of CARERE, regular weekly working meetings were organized in which all of the four key political parties to the Paris Accords were represented in arranging project activities and determining priorities. The joint mechanisms served as natural forums for discussion of common concerns among groups bitterly opposed to each other.

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Development should be seen within the broad context of governance programs designed for long-term stability. In establishing decisionmaking mechanisms, all of the political parties should be represented in carrying out medium- and longer-term planning for the integration of war-affected populations. Local administrative structures were developed for planning through area-based schemes in Bosnia, Croatia, Mozambique, and Somalia (UNDP 2000). Indigenous institutions need to be strengthened in order to provide a more sustainable basis for achieving goals of social and economic wellbeing. For instance, indigenous natural resource management institutions in Africa have been involved in addressing the needs of people and the preservation of the environment through utilization of existing customs and cultural norms. The roles and responsibilities of institutions in natural resource management have been interpreted in terms of political, judicial, and legislative functions. By establishing the rules for the day-to-day running of wells, for example, indigenous institutions prevent conflict over the use of water. Local governments and NGOs can benefit from indigenous technical expertise in formulating development strategies. Shuras (as council of elders) in Afghanistan have been important in developing sustainable grassroots programs in such areas as irrigation and roads. In southern Sudan, local capacity building and accountability drew serious attention in developing agriculture and health-related projects. Local communities can play an important role in medium- and small-sized infrastructure building managed by UNDP economic and social recovery projects (UNDP 2000).

Community Development Activities Given severe competition for external resources, community members should always be encouraged to develop self-sustaining programs. Many communities depend on their own skills and resources and identify their own strengths through diverse economic activities. Informal groups and networks have been formed to work collectively to provide not only credit but also the means of survival for households. Various projects organized at the community level such as production cooperatives, savings and loan associations, job training, and literary programs operate in the informal economy. Income-support activities are common forms of struggle in grassroots economies. Initial training and small credit can be provided for developing projects that can be sustained by local resources. In low-income countries, indigenous technology projects are popular in addressing local needs. Small-scale agricultural production and microentrepreneurship are two major areas of income earning in many developing societies. The microenterprise sector benefits from an increased access to credit and technical

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training. It is difficult for small and medium firms to get credit from banks without formal collateral or mortgageable assets (Fafchamps 1998). Since banks are not the primary sources of credit in many low-income countries, alternative sources are necessary. Light-industry projects may lead to the development of local enterprises. A series of short-term workshops can teach individuals practical skills ranging from microcredit and business development to organizational skills. Cooperatives can be formed in textiles as well as auto repair, carpentry, and welding (Osirim 1998). Capacity development for agricultural production may focus on upgrading small-scale cultivation, distribution, and marketing. Market access for small producers can be facilitated by the organization of farmers’ cooperatives that grow and market directly without the traditional middlemen. Rural agricultural development in Mozambique relies on diverse incomegenerating activities that expand household income and the asset base. Many rural residents are now more actively engaged in agricultural processing (e.g., making sunflower oil), carpentry, tool making, microtrading, sewing, and brewing as well as maintaining irrigation and well facilities (Brück et al. 2000). Demographic changes increase the role of women in reconstruction. Women and children are vulnerable to shocks to the economic system, and thus they need to be protected by food security or microinsurance schemes (UNDP and UNPF 2001). With the increasing number of women-headed households and the feminization of poverty caused by war, communitybased groups have been involved in mobilizing an income base for the poor. In order to meet the needs of poor women, the Zimbabwe Women’s Finance Trust provides credit based on successful completion of training programs (Osirim 1998). Women’s contributions are particularly important in economic and social rehabilitation (Agnes 2004). A program carried out in five communities surrounding Monrovia by the Liberian Women’s Initiatives pursued empowerment of women and improvement in the quality of life. Many women initiated village cleaning-up projects and other small businesses that produced soaps and other basic necessities. A nationwide literacy campaign was led by the Women’s Association of Cambodia. Women also took the lead in caring for the thousands of war orphans and in developing a nationwide system of cooperatives to regenerate local social and economic activity.

Reintegration of Former Combatants Economic support is critical for the integration of combatants into productive sectors. To become part of a community and not revert to their military past, former combatants need to be fully integrated. The reintegration of ex-

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combatants in Angola, Cambodia, and Central American countries was an important part of development assistance programs. If they are not properly integrated, many former soldiers are a potential threat to security and social stability as seen in their resorting to banditry in El Salvador and Guatemala. Many Haitian soldiers were left at-large among the population and without jobs following the rapid demobilization of the Haitian Army in 1994. Even though it was controversial due to many former soldiers’ record of abuses, a program funded by the U.S. Agnecy for International Development (USAID) and run by the International Organization for Migration provided civilian job training for members of the defunct armed forces in order to encourage their reintegration into Haitian society. Veterans and their dependents are often characterized by their lack of civic awareness, low skill levels, limited resources, and a culture of dependency (Özerdem and Barakat 2005). In Mozambique, three of every four combatants were functionally illiterate, and 30 percent were under the age of eighteen. In most instances, combatants are school dropouts and often have minimal levels of literacy. Recruited or forced at very young ages into the armed forces or militias, these young men possess little experience relevant to a settled life with their family. One of the most important steps toward their reintegration into the civilian economy is to find employment opportunities following retraining programs. Initial priority should be given to retraining programs along with promotion of self-help projects, since many ex-combatants are devoid of any vocational skills. Job training centers can be created to improve literacy and basic vocational skills as well as providing counseling. Training and vocational kits can also be offered in camps prior to demobilization. Employment opportunities can be increased by packages of credit and referral services. In Mozambique, the Information, Referral, and Counseling Services provided 26 percent of demobilized soldiers with access to information on the job market along with occupational skills development (UNDP 1999). Credit programs endow demobilized combatants with opportunities for a viable livelihood (Schafer 2001). The vulnerability of ex-combatants during the transition period is reduced by demobilization allowances. Through the reintegration support schemes, former combatants and their families may be granted subsidies in the form of cash disbursements. Given limited funding, a transitional safety net of cash is generally equivalent to meeting basic needs for a six-month period or one crop-growing season. Eritrea’s 1993–1994 demobilization experience indicates that private sector training and psychological counseling can be tailored to meet requirements of different groups based on gender and personal needs. A large number of former fighters made the transition to civilian life through a combination of programs, consisting of cash bonuses, access to government

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loans, grants of farm land, as well as vocational training. In particular, reinsertion assistance needs to provide means for the successful economic reintegration of the majority of veterans and their families through availability of land. Programs for the training of ex-combatants can be adapted to the socioeconomic profile of the veterans categorized in terms of needs and aspirations. Training, skills conversion, self-employment schemes, and job placement can be tailored to meet special needs of different gender and age groups such as child and female soldiers. Interaction between physical and social capital of communities and a veteran’s financial and human capital determines, to a great extent, the success of reintegration. The majority of ex-fighters settle in urban areas and seek job training; others receive credit as a demobilization benefit. Vocational training and small enterprise development programs tend to be less successful with former militia members than with the general population, due to the formers’ lower skill levels. It is difficult for demobilized soldiers to re-establish personal connections within society that are essential for setting up small businesses. Programs built within communities have proved to be more effective in reintegrating soldiers, training them in conjunction with civilians from the same areas. Such incorporation of returning combatants, as beneficiaries, into area development-based reintegration programs of the UNDP was supported by the ILO. The tight schedule associated with demobilization within the overall peace process requires the quick installation of rehabilitation programs for ex-combatants. However, assistance for the social reintegration of the soldiers is not a quick fix, since economic reintegration is not feasible in the short term. In Mozambique, more than 70 percent of demobilized soldiers were not employed within the first two years of the postwar period. As it is a complex, time-consuming process, reintegration cannot be achieved within artificially imposed deadlines. Instead of establishing unrealistic deadlines, it is more important to allow for a sufficiently nurturing program. Many reintegration programs face difficulties resulting from underfunding as well as inconsistent application and delay (Cooper 2000). At the same time, targeting ex-combatants at the expense of noncombatants generates resentment. Employment projects for soldiers who have previously committed violence against civilians are not favorably accepted especially in communities where many civilians remain unemployed. Psychological resistance associated with fears of weak prospects of income or employment in civilian life on the part of former combatants is often another major obstacle for demobilization. Much of the dissatisfaction found among former soldiers is linked to unrealistically high expectations that living standards would improve

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quickly. Alternative sources of income gained through vocational training or agricultural employment promised by externally supported peace agreements have not proven a sufficient substitute for livelihoods from legal and illegal use of arms. At least in the short to medium term, a life of crime with the use of weapons learned during violent conflict is almost inevitably more lucrative than the employment opportunities found in civilian life. Especially when there is a breakdown in salary payments, some soldiers readily take to a life of crime, operating in gangs. Where only partial demobilization has taken place, as in Nicaragua, ex-combatants have often found that they can earn a better living utilizing their military training and combat experience for illegal activities such as armed banditry than by attempting to learn and apply new professions. International assistance has been tailored to different countries; in contrast to the short-term-focused training offered in Angola and Namibia, the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was oriented toward long-term goals as well as short-term objectives of reinsertion (Alden 2001). The comprehensive nature of the demilitarization program in Mozambique was supported by UN funding. A Commission on Reintegration chaired by the UN undertook the planning, organization, supervision, and monitoring of programs for the economic and social reintegration of demobilized soldiers. A comprehensive program of retraining and reintegration of former combatants into civil society can also be supported by various levels of government agencies and NGOs such as the International Committee for the Red Cross. A National Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of the Former Army and Disabled War Veterans, established by the Ethiopian transitional government after the civil war in 1991, took charge of the demobilization and integration of rebel forces in co-ordination with regional and district offices. Reintegration programs have been costly, as illustrated in the expenses per demobilized soldier: Ethiopia, $400; Namibia, $1,200; Uganda, $1,100. Like other aspects of reconstruction and recovery programs, support for the settlement of returnees relies heavily on donors (Collier 2003). Timely and adequate funding through coordination of the financial assistance of the international community is critical to the management of settlement programs. Political will, needs-based planning, and donor coordination contribute to timely and effective program completion. In the cases of Cambodia and Angola, the UN operation for the disarmament and cantonment of troops provided essential supplies during the transition period. The UNDP and ILO developed vocational training programs and small enterprise development projects for ex-combatants. The reintegration program, supported by the World Bank’s Emergency Relief and Recovery Program and bilateral donors, offered housing, health, farmland, and credit as well as education.

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Land Transfer Programs In promoting the goal of peace, development programs have to address the social and economic ills that are the roots of violence. Long-term economic planning has to consider such social issues as land distribution. Those who own coffee plantations or hold a monopoly over other means of production can still exercise a dominant influence on rebuilding the local economy. Land rights can be allocated among returning refugees and demobilized fighters as well as the rural landless who lack employment. The land program has served as the main vehicle to assimilate those most closely caught up with conflict into a productive life under the Salvadoran and other peace accords. The process of land transfers needs to be expedited by government or international funds. Secure and demarcated rights to land use are essential to attract investment for commercial farming. The multiple systems of land tenure in many African countries derive from local politics, community practice, and colonial traditions. The Land Proclamation of 1994 in Eritrea supports a mixed land tenure system reflecting on different categories of land interests (WoldeGiorgis 1999). A customary land tenure system covers grazing lands, woodlands, and water rights in combination with the state lease of particular lands. The land redistribution program in El Salvador mentioned in the accord reflects the special needs of the peace process. Since land has been one of the main root causes of the conflict, the agreement entailed an arms-forland exchange approach. The Land Transfer Program targeted not only forty thousand former combatants but also peasants in the former conflict zones to be integrated into peacetime productive life (Kowalchuk 2003; McReynolds 2002). After being plagued by delays, only about 10 percent of agricultural land ownership was shifted to more than thirty-five thousand recipients under international pressure and support by the end of 1998. Despite support given through international financing, skyrocketing prices became a serious barrier to the land distribution program.6 The use of market mechanisms in the valuation of the land left the program short of funds and the new landowners with over $100 million in debts. Many recipients of land “are saddled with debts for land acquisition which they are unlikely to be able to repay” (Orr 2001, p. 171). In addition, the new landholders face “problems with agricultural pricing, debt, credit, and a lack of technical assistance” (Orr 2001, p. 171). Land reform would not be successful without providing farmers with land titles, market access, and other support needed to participate in the market economy. The economic liberalization programs of governments put a downward pressure on commodity prices along with floods of imports. However, smallholders find it difficult to take advantage of lucrative export markets due to insufficient infrastructure and credit. The example of El Sal-

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vador indicates that in the absence of agricultural credit and technical assistance, land transfer programs leave new small landowners worse off than before.

Development for Peace Economic programs have to be designed to bring about stability and equity, because simply rebuilding prewar infrastructure does not automatically stop protracted communal violence (Morales 2002). Ending a long civil war does not necessarily induce significant changes in a country’s overall economic structures. Political stabilization is undermined by both perceived and real imbalances in income and wealth as well as resource shortages. In order to reduce deep and expanding social disparities, an economic system has to be reformed in a way to strengthen the development potential of different ethnic groups and ultimately to produce benefit to all the groups. Relief and other economic aids can be redesigned to strengthen participation in production activities that meet the needs of local communities. Development should improve the economic livelihood of the poor while enhancing cooperation. Development projects involving former adversaries contribute to regional economic integration. Resolving differences in such matters as resource allocation and infrastructure building requires careful negotiation assisted by international donors. Trust building emerges from development programs that benefit all and can be implemented in collaboration with former enemies. Interdependence between formerly hostile groups brings new incentives for collaboration. Former adversaries may participate in rebuilding the prewar infrastructure with a collective mobilization of resources. Nurturing collaboration in politically neutral endeavors would produce a thrust for more broad-based and far-reaching reconciliation at the national level. There has been a growing awareness that development can build bridges between different communities instead of generating contentious competition for resources. Tension in Sudan was reduced with the resumption of trade links between southern and northern areas. Opening up grazing land and setting up collectively owned enterprises should be carefully oriented toward the promotion of cooperation between former adversaries. Housing reconstruction projects for returning refugees and displaced persons may also involve various groups within the local population. Improvements in living standards through economic cooperation would provide incentives for reducing animosity between communities. Long-term economic planning must be concerned with building new functional relationships that discourage the initiation of a new cycle of violence. Development projects have been used as a mechanism for fostering

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common ground and reconciliation. For instance, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, international donors involved both Serbs and returning Muslim refugees in housing projects. In Gadime village, Kosovo, rehabilitation activities have generated an atmosphere of trust built on common interests shared by both the Albanian and Roma communities. In rebuilding the village’s economic and social life, both communities made substantial contributions to providing building materials and machinery, along with support given by the EU. Peace markets have been created in some African villages to bring diverse ethnic groups together following communal violence. Exchanges of goods can be made between neighboring villages that used to be antagonistic. Common development needs can be met through projects designed to straddle internal political and military boundaries that have separated the participants. Regular contacts between opposing parties help ease local tensions before and after a peace agreement. In Cambodia, agricultural, education, water, and sanitation projects were stretched over territories controlled by four opposing parties, including the Khmer Rouge. In Tajikistan, the UNDP supported development projects that cut across areas held by government and rebel forces. Similar attempts were made in other conflict zones with community-based activities to encourage contacts between opposing factions and ease tensions. Appreciating diverse perspectives can arise from opportunities for cooperation in specific sectors and pursuit of shared development needs. In forming a business association, a group of individuals may seek credit together and develop access to funds. Local initiatives based on intercommunal collaboration can lead to building roads, rehabilitating houses, or digging wells. Mutual benefit can be maximized by joint planning to preserve and manage regional resources such as water and forests. While elders negotiate to end fighting over water points between subclans in an African village, an international development agency’s technical assistance programs can ease communal tension emanating from water shortage by digging additional water points. In Northern Ireland, funds were channeled to cross-community projects through international financial institutions and the EU Special Support Program for Peace and Reconciliation to overcome structural inequality in areas hit hard by violence. In particular, the programs were projected to assist the Unionist and Nationalist working-class communities in alleviating chronic unemployment (Murtagh 2001). Promoting sustainable economic development and social inclusion were related to developing a web of relationships across multiple levels of society. While development projects oriented toward mutual benefit can contribute to political reconciliation, they are, at the same time, vulnerable to deterioration in the broader political environment. Local development programs may not sufficiently overcome old animosities for a short time even

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though support for peace can be nurtured by beneficiaries of economic transactions. Sustained efforts are necessary for reintegration and expansion of the economic horizons of the affected communities.

Health Sectors and Functional Cooperation While health has been integrated into reconstruction and development programs, it can also bring adversarial parties together to identify an area of common concerns such as disease control and children’s immunization. Sharing health concerns serves as an entry point to further dialogue and joint action in development and peace. Intercommunal communication (involving medical professionals) is fostered by the delivery of primary health care (such as pediatric immunization beneficial to opposing sides). Health care delivery may be combined with training in medical skills across political and communal boundaries. Health infrastructure and specialized training and skills can be used to enhance the ability to “develop goals that transcend the immediate interest of warring parties” and are “valued in the long-term” (Mori et al. 2004, p. 188). By acting on common health values, former foes can overcome ethnic, social, and political divisions; equal access to a health care system for all members of society can generate feelings of being part of a broader, more inclusive community, leaving less room for hate-based mobilization. Major social rehabilitation initiatives based on joint planning were introduced to Central American regions to promote health care for development and democracy. Local peacebuilding can be strengthened through “participative community action in health and health-related sectors” sponsored by WHO Health and Development for Displaced Populations pilot projects (Beigbeder 1999, p. 40). The program was introduced to Croatia, Mozambique, and Sri Lanka from 1991 to 1995 with a goal of encouraging sustained dialogue focused on common interests in primary health care. In particular, health outreach activities in the Mozambican project were coordinated through a committee represented by religious organizations, traditional leadership, and a district government. Creating a safe space for dialogue on technical issues in health matters has resulted in forming the basis for conflict reduction and rehabilitation. Meetings of health authorities in former Yugoslavia were organized to press for the exchange of information and to raise the awareness of human rights violations. Eventually integrated community mental and physical care programs were conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina with an emphasis on training, analysis, and data collection. Through a joint committee on health in

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the Eastern Slavonia region of Croatia in 1996, Croat and Serb medical workers joined together in technical analysis, contributing to confidence building. Medical personnel develop intimate relationships with individuals and communities by serving as healers. Health professionals from all sides work together to set standards of best practice in public health, thus contributing to reconciliation among opposing parties. High social legitimacy and respect for the role of health professionals in conflict situations derives from the neutrality and impartiality associated with the codes of ethics requiring the medical treatment of victims irrespective of their status in armed conflicts. Actions oriented toward improving health serve as a bridge for interethnic reconciliation and understanding. The intentions behind “Health as a Bridge for Peace,” developed by the ministries of health in Central American countries, were to combine conflict management with cooperative health care delivery, thus bridging gaps between adversarial parties. Practical guidance on peacebuilding skills for medical professionals was actively introduced by the Health as a Bridge for Peace project sponsored by the WHO Division of Emergency and Humanitarian Action in the mid1990s. In healing trauma and rebuilding society with improved quality of life, the Medical Network for Social Reconstruction for the former Yugoslavia pioneered a broad range of psychosocial healing programs involving the training of professional and lay people (Gutlove and Thompson 2004). Negotiations between the governments and rebel forces were arranged to establish “a corridor of peace” that allowed the safe transfer of medical supplies and vaccines in Sudan, Uganda, and Lebanon. Pediatric immunizations organized by UNICEF were durable and feasible owing to specially arranged cease-fires in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and El Salvador that guaranteed the safety of doctors (Mori et al. 2004). Doctors and scientists from the Congolese government’s Ministry of Health were permitted to move across the dividing lines when the ebola virus broke out in a rebel-held town. The deadly disease emerged as a common concern shared by all Congolese. Health-related policies and activities for demobilized soldiers can be supported by emergency task forces assigned to the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit. Arrangements on the classification of disabilities between experts of government and rebel administrations were brokered by public health officials, helping to determine a legal basis for formulating benefits to disabled war victims and demobilized soldiers. In forging legal instruments for assistance in supporting the disabled ex-combatants, negotiations between the two parties were organized by international medical experts.

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The Politics of Aid Prospects for peace often come with an influx of cash into a war-torn country, as large numbers of international donor agencies arrive along with multilateral troops. Sometimes funds are promised as incentives for parties to fulfill their commitment to an agreement. However, funding is available only in restricted areas or on a short-term basis, since bilateral and intergovernmental donors stress such objectives as macroeconomic stability. In 1997, for instance, the World Bank “released only one third of the funds made available for Bosnian reconstruction” when the parties were reluctant to initiate economic reforms (Väyrynen 1997, p. 166). Conditions attached to grants and loans led to a tussle between the Aristide government in Haiti and the World Bank and IMF over privatization. Aid flow has been sharply reduced due to Haiti’s ruined relations with the international financial institutions and other donors as well as political tension resulting from the disagreement over monetary policies. Despite its significance, external aid without local input faces difficult challenges. UNOSOM II failed to undertake the necessary consultation with the Somalis regarding the specific components of development objectives. While NGO projects rely on microlevel initiatives, their implementation can be directly funded by the World Bank and foreign donors, bypassing the recipient government (Doyle 2001). Projects for rebuilding schools and health clinics and repairing rural roads can be easily made unsustainable, however, by a lack of coordination of donors with local authorities. For instance, newly rehabilitated school and clinic facilities would not function without staffing of teachers and health professionals who have to be paid by the government. International economic intervention brings not only intended but also often undesirable consequences. While meeting urgent physical needs, external relief activities create employment and new sources of income for local populations, particularly in urban areas. However, the dominance of foreign assistance can result in distortions of the local economy; aid can create dependency by impeding self-reliance. Prolonged assistance can reduce incentives for local production, undermining long-term economic viability. An unprepared withdrawal of foreign aid will lead to a sudden scarcity of resources, since a local community’s ability to rehabilitate itself has been hampered by aid dependency. Final Comments Many countries emerging from civil war face highly unbalanced economic situations. Countries in postconflict transitions have, as a general rule, devastated or at least severely distorted economies. Reconstruction and eco-

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nomic recovery encompass immediate humanitarian relief and the rehabilitation of health, education, and other essential services. Post–civil war economic policies set the conditions for the quality of sustainable development. Economic growth and patterns of income distribution have to be considered in an integrative framework of building harmonious relations among social groups. Divisions and struggles over economic policies follow peace agreements (such as in El Salvador, Haiti, and Nicaragua) where economic disparities have been a major source of social conflict. Disagreements on macroeconomic management and reform have led to political struggle in Haiti and other poor countries that experienced years of sharp polarization on economic and social issues. The logic of a market economy provides opportunities to pursue selfinterest but does not create conditions for social harmony. Macroeconomic reforms aimed at stimulating the economy can generate income gaps with unequal development across different regions and groups. Meanwhile, cutbacks in public spending and real salaries designed to reduce budget deficits undermine the spirit of peace accords. Development policies would be most successful if they can be organically linked to the priorities of reconstruction rather than a series of disconnected technical projects (Peirce and Stubbs 2000). Economic restructuring can be supported by a historically informed political-economy approach to postconflict societies. Drawing on the capacity of indigenous organizations to mobilize resources in their local settings is a key strategy for long-term peacebuilding. Notes 1. Growing populations with few natural resources do not help economic recovery. 2. Eighty percent of the teachers who left in 1999 were Indonesians (Martin 2001). 3. Poor communities have explored solar and other alternative sources of energy and agricultural inputs available locally. 4. The disruption of economic activities is caused by the loss of economic ties. Such natural resources as iron ore produced in the eastern part of Republika Srpska used to be processed in facilities located in the Croat-Muslim Federation. Bosnian Serbs also lost the main source of energy and other production input from Muslimcontrolled Tuzla. 5. The execution of the PRODERE program involved joint efforts of UNDP, UNHCR, ILO, and WHO. It has also been supported by other agencies of the UN system: the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), UNICEF, and WFP. 6. More than fifty percent of the rural population were left landless or deprived of proper agricultural land.

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6 AND

RECONCILIATION SOCIAL REHABILITATION

One of the most immediate concerns in the aftermath of violent conflicts is rehabilitating the network of social interaction, torn by the deep and widespread effects of violence. In setting up future goals, communities have to move beyond meeting immediate physical survival needs and build renewed ties between groups. Thus reconciliation and social rehabilitation are considered one of the major components of reconstructing postconflict societies. Repairing relationships at a psychological level is critical in social healing and reconciliation. In addition, broadening conditions for social justice and equity supports the reconstruction of the frayed social and human fabric in a war-shattered region. Recovery from psychological trauma occurs in a broader social environment as well as the intrapersonal environment of the individual psyche. Community building has to be able to make links between personal wellbeing and harmony at a group level. Personal fear needs to be overcome for a community to be rebuilt, since a loss of familiarity in the routine and mistrust of others have generated dysfunctional relations. Communities tormented by repeated violence lack a social foundation of security, since the realm of ordinary life has been destroyed. Because envisioning a new future would not be possible without truth and accountability for past acts, abusive relationships have to be acknowledged to prevent future violations. Reconciliation, based on compassion, forgiveness, and restitution, contributes to the return to normality by focusing on both psychological and social needs. Overall strategies of reconciliation are affected by political constraints and evolving intergroup relations in a postconflict society. Given the inadequate capacity of government institutions to attend to victims and their grievances, the participation of community groups can maximize social and cultural resources in rebuilding longstanding relationships. Religious and community leaders, healers, social workers, and educators play important roles in social rehabilitation. This chapter looks at not only psychological but also political and social dimensions of reconciliation in promoting justice. In particular, it examines the practice of both truth and reconciliation commissions and communal healing. 155

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Goals and Principles of Reconciliation In reaction to the experience of violence, people tend to accept losses that they believe cannot be changed. However, atrocities and victimizations can be repeated without accounting for the perpetrator’s acts and transformation of the institutionalized dynamics that have legitimized violence. Victims are able to move toward the future only after they have found answers for why certain atrocities happened and who is responsible; most importantly, they want to have assurances that the same thing will not occur again. Rebuilding trust depends on open recognition of guilt and acceptance of responsibility for physical and psychological injury. The truth about the past and the present will never be revealed without open and shared recognition of the pains suffered and the losses experienced by the victims (Pouligny 2002). Reconciliation is currently carried out on a variety of levels by various means—small group workshops, high-profile truth commissions, and apologies for past wrongs by senior politicians. A democratic political transition is supported by social consciousness at a collective level, while personal healing is important at an individual level. Moral order cannot be reconstructed through judicial instruments alone; political, cultural, psychological, and spiritual means are demanded as well (Kiss 2000). Reconciliation can be generally defined as a process of mutual accommodation comprised of acknowledgment of past wrongdoing and contrition from the perpetrators in exchange for forgiveness offered by the victims. As a critical first step, guilt needs to be recognized with the acceptance of responsibility for atrocities or other events symbolizing intercommunal and interpersonal relations. Since reconciliation invites actions of both victims and offenders, the process of apology and forgiveness comes as all sides are better able to humanize each other. Thus apology has symbolic meanings for not only victims but also perpetrators of violence. Apology from aggressors is a vital condition for victims to forgive and move on to the promise of a more peaceful future. Moreover, offenders of violence can recover their own humanity through apology proceeding from an admission of misdeeds in the past. Therefore, real liberation comes through a process of forgiveness following apology (Long and Brecke 2003). It is also an act of compassion to make a peaceful society. Through mercy and forgiveness, those who have suffered harm accept the humanity of those who have committed the injuries. High levels of harmony and unity can be achieved through mutual respect and security. This process may be followed by restitution, compensation, and/or punishment of the offenders. As part of recognition of the sufferings, financial or other forms of reparation/compensation are often necessary for the sur-

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vivors of violence. For justice to be attained, at the same time, the perpetrators may have to be brought to trial. Judicial and political processes in court and parliament can be accompanied by public denunciation of past atrocities. Through improved group relations based on justice and healing, reconciliation helps stop a cycle of violence, victimization, and revenge. Mutual accommodation is possible with changes in social consciousness and prevention of further victimization and dehumanization. A commitment to this process derives from a minimum agreement on coexistence (Minow 2000). Through a broad concept of the self and self-interest, people can acknowledge interdependence and accommodate each other. To achieve “harmony and cooperation,” psychological approaches focus on a group process of healing. Reconstruction of legal and political systems needs to be pursued along with trauma healing and restoration of communal links. The overriding goal of reconciliation is to build a just political order in which all citizens are accorded dignity and respect. At the same time, the repair of broken human relationships throughout a society results from moral reconstruction. A sense of security can be supported not only by sociopsychological effects but also by transformation of the institutions of law and order. In addition, social reform is necessary to prevent future abuses and atrocities. Long-term reconciliation is facilitated by changes in the distribution of power and resources as well as reconsideration of fundamental group values and identity. A logical longer-term outcome of reconciliation is the elimination of the social conditions that made atrocities possible or acceptable in the first place. Constructing a common future requires overcoming sharp political polarization as well as the ideological, ethnic, or religious divides that remain as the legacy of conflict.1 Grievances of former adversaries can be addressed through the establishment of an adequate institutional framework that fosters national reconciliation. Promotion of reconciliation as a means to reduce psychological distance and alienation should be balanced with concerns for justice. Fragile political processes in a transitional society can undermine the realization of justice as well as the achievement of harmony and cooperation. Deep structural divisions need to be analyzed and rethought in a search for social identity, meaning, and values. Considering that a psychological process of healing needs to be followed by the realization of social justice, a reconciliation agenda can mean more than changes of attitude among conflicting groups. Besides reducing social divisions, the greatest challenge is to reconstruct the social and moral systems that have been devastated by violence. Ideally a new political order should arise from cooperation among all participants with legitimate claims on a reconstructed society.

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Truth commissions, war crimes tribunals, apologies by political figures, and other very public instances of remembrance serve unique social functions in divided societies. The meaning of reconciliation at a national level can be contrasted with empowerment in a community setting. For instance, in South Africa, overcoming social, economic, racial, and political division and building a new national identity rely on consensus on how the past is to be remembered (van der Walt, Franchi, and Stevens 2003). At an individual and group level, the main focus is on helping the victims overcome feelings of alienation and marginalization so as to create conditions for communal bonds. Both real and perceived threats have to be substantially reduced in the process of social rehabilitation.

Interactive Processes Neighborhoods should be encouraged to work together rather than looking for a reason to attack and defeat the opponent after an intense and destructive struggle. A debilitating political-psychological climate arises from hostility, fear, pessimism, and cynicism, especially in the aftermath of genocide and massive attacks on civilians. Hostile feelings increase the chances of misperceiving one’s situation and failing to see the real interests at stake. Through intergroup processes of healing, members of adversary entities can gradually overcome their feelings of hate, fear, and loathing and their desires for revenge and retribution. To enhance trust and reduce fear and hate, sociopsychological methods contribute to gaining insights into intergroup and interpersonal dynamics. In overcoming the experiences of violent conflict and ensuing mistrust, collective trust emerges from a group process of healing. Relationships can transcend a cycle of revenge through the release of all the harmful emotions connected with past incidents. The way people choose to act can be transformed by reorganizing unconscious principles of violence (Lumsden 1999). In order to ensure the prevention of the same abuses in the future, the systematic dehumanization of victimized groups can be redressed through psychotherapeutic treatment. The behavior of the victims is affected by despair and distrust, whereas the offenders’ mental world is characterized by historical falsification, stereotyping, and indifference. Motivation for change is essential to developing skills and know-how for dismantling emotional walls with the help of social workers, therapists, and artists. In a small group setting, people can learn about the feelings and thoughts of people belonging to the other side as well as getting acquainted with each other’s sufferings. As victims speak the truth of what others have done, dialogue also provides an opportunity to hear the other side’s experiences and

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explanations. Demonic images of enemy groups can be replaced with the formation of a more realistic understanding that not everyone has contributed to atrocities. A new image of “the others” may come from the realization that many people on all sides have suffered from violent acts. The interactive process of conflict resolution is based on the assumption that antagonistic relationships are driven by such subjective factors as misperceptions, mistrust, and fears as well as rational calculation of power and interests. Successful reconciliation among antagonistic groups can be pursued through a process of dialogue and conflict analysis. Interactive problem-solving approaches can be adopted to control recurring patterns of violent conflict by giving priority to analysis of such human needs as security, identity, and social bonding (Fisher 1999). People can tell their experiences, perceptions, and feelings in a safe environment where different understandings of the past can be shared. In a specially designed workshop context, trained neutral third parties can conduct therapeutic exercises to help participants from both sides feel secure. Changes of perceptions, feelings, sentiment, and opinions that have come about through the small group setting then need to be transferred to the public sphere to help reduce the fear and hostility of a passive majority and minimize the influence of any factional leadership. Where the parties are still suspicious of each other, an incremental approach permits confidencebuilding for establishing trust.

Psychosocial Rehabilitation The need for successful programs in grassroots psychosocial recovery arises from the fact that violence disrupts social networks and structures, as illustrated in segmentation between clans in Somalia and two major ethnic groups in Rwanda and Burundi. The destruction of a social fabric is caused by dislocation of families and the consequent loss of a sense of community as well as such traumatic experience as torture, rape, and killing. The deterioration of communal life sustained by schools, religious institutions, and medical facilities is further aggravated by a lack of the psychological support that would normally be available through extended household and friend networks. Estrangement associated with migration further results in the loss of familiarity in daily routine (Maynard 1997). Paths to recovery reflect different types of symptoms and causes of communal violence as well as cultural variation. Social and psychological rehabilitation may focus on the coexistence of multiethnic communities after ethnic identities have been manipulated for violent struggles such as in Rwanda and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Atrocities committed by the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone were more astonishing for the

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brutal treatment of civilians than for the length of the civil war. Thus reempowering extended kinship systems, elders, and religious figures is key to rebuilding support networks. Atrocities of violent conflict are mostly inflicted upon civilians, many of whom are females and children with experiences of losing close family members, homes, and many other possessions. As these civilian victims suffer great mental distress and lose their capacity for social trust, rehabilitation is necessary to reintegrate them back into their communities. The traumatized quickly become marginalized and a burden to society without healing from abusive violence such as sexual assault and recovery from the psychological loss of mental control. Localized violence is responsible for psychosocial war damage associated with the devastation of regular individual and interpersonal functions; post-traumatic stress disorder is further characterized by an incapacity to sustain the healthy relationships required to address personal and communal needs (Nygren 2003). Capacity for social trust is undermined by such negative feelings as estrangement, despair, betrayal, social withdrawal, and hypervigilance. The participation of local communities is essential to soothing emotions at the personal and social levels. A period of mourning may entail sharing traumatic experiences with others for the purpose of healing. The communalization of grieving takes place in a group setting or is organized in a public fashion such as the construction of public symbols in recognition of those killed. In addition, ritualistic burials of the dead can be conducted in the form of an open, symbolic bereavement ceremony. In Guatemala, before reconciliation with the living, many Mayans insisted on reconciling with the dead. Dozens of mass graves “have been exhumed on the initiative of local communities throughout the country” (Sieder 2001, p. 194). The cultural energy of personal and communal rehabilitation can be situated at different levels. Microprocesses of healing are not fully separated from a broader social context that reflects ethnic, gender, and generational differences (Leslie 2001). The collective healing process in Chile was supported by a series of acts of purification and spiritual renewal observed with the return to a democratic rule. Rituals for prisoners of torture and murder were held in popular places of assembly such as stadiums to remember their sufferings. In overcoming fear and mistrust, healing strategies must include various activities at the individual, family, and community levels. Overcoming grief is the most important element in healing on an individual level. At both social and individual levels, trauma healing requires respect for the loss of the victims. Mental health professionals support a mourning process by encouraging testimony about what happened. A healing process entails not only the expression of the feelings of fear, hatred, and mistrust but also grieving over what has been lost. Though it takes time for former adver-

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saries to face each other, a process of grief shared by victims and perpetrators is eventually needed to generate conditions for forgiveness and ultimately rebuild new relations with the emergence of a sense of justice. In a postconflict region, mental health workers may provide professional care for those who have experienced grave atrocities, but initiatives by religious institutions and human rights groups are also necessary to develop support networks (Agger 1998). Forgiveness rooted in the tradition of Christianity, practiced by Western therapies, has not seriously focused on local cultural traditions of morality, justice, and truth seeking. Changing social dynamics in a conflict-ridden zone requires consideration of such factors as community bonds based on traditional social networks. In Sierra Leone, guerrilla groups killed elders as their political targets, and ignoring these issues will not help in reestablishing community relations. Many excombatants and ex–child soldiers have not been easily accepted into their communities given their abusive treatment of ordinary people during the war. Leaving the past alone does not create a secure social environment for re-engagement in community building. A traditional practice has been employed for reintegrating former offenders and traumatized civilians into families and communities by restoring their honor. When seeking forgiveness, an offender should confess and acknowledge wrongful deeds with the help of traditional healers and community elders. Purification rituals such as communication with the spirits of the ancestors have served as a means of healing child soldiers, returning refugees, and sexually abused women in Mozambique. These rituals are aimed at reconciliation among the living as well as mediating between the spirits of the living and the dead (Cicuecue 1997). Postconflict healing processes effectively focus on issues of mistrust and betrayal by creating an atmosphere of safety. The restoration of social morality facilitates the development of guidelines for individual behavior. Renewing interpersonal relationships starts with personal psychological recovery and reestablishing honor. Psychological healing and closure are needed for future planning and development of the entire community with the restoration of democratic discourse.

The Social and Political Context The quality of justice and reconciliation is affected by social contexts and circumstances. Once one moves from the interpersonal to the collective and public level, all efforts in the name of reconciliation inevitably have a broader social dimension and impact. “The conflictual social system has a very direct impact on the way people come to define their interests and their ability to pursue them [even] at a personal level” (van der Merwe 1993, p. 270).

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The full meaning of justice and reconciliation would never be realized without a restoration of people’s human rights and dignity. Improving group relations is not easy under an authoritarian regime that maintains structures of inequality and marginalization. Social reconciliation is conceived of as an integral aspect of a process through which a common set of values is formed for democratization. Social stability and peaceful coexistence rely upon a democratic framework of government that respects human rights values. At the same time, improved relations between adversaries through national reconciliation and healing are a precondition for consolidating new democratic societies fostered by a consensus on preventing future atrocities (Gloppen 2002). Victims’ rights have often been negotiated away through compromises undertaken for political “harmony” in the tumultuous environment of a transitional society. Especially in Guatemala and other countries dominated by the remnants of the former military regime, the political reality can divert society completely from the realization of justice. Mutual “rehumanization” of conflict protagonists would not be pursued in isolation from eliminating the state of affairs that has produced the cycles of violence. A new political order needs to be created; reconciliation should not mean restoring the past social arrangements or state of affairs. It is particularly important to note that reconciliation is not compatible with promoting extreme nationalism. For the legacy of conflict to be overcome, exclusive ultranationalism needs to be delegitimized in order to permit the emergence of a moral and political climate that offers a new basis for political identity. The process of building ethnic harmony in Croatia underwent a dramatic setback with President Frajo Tudman’s reckless policy of nationalism that “revived and rehabilitated Ustasa fascist symbols, a senseless provocation against the Serb minority” (Akhavan, 2001, p. 11). This policy is obviously not sustainable or acceptable to the international community, and it had to be reversed by a newly elected leadership following Tudman’s death in 1999. Compared with Tudman’s self-destructive policy, the interests of the Tutsi government in Rwanda were better served by not pursuing revenge and distinguishing itself from the Hutu extremists committed to genocide. With international recognition of the Tutsis’ status as victims of genocide, moral credibility became a valuable political asset for the postgenocide regime. Revealing and sharing past wounds in a public space should be used to transform the existing political reality. Reconciliation is politically expedient during a transition when the new government is committed to democratization. Effective mediation of interests of all social groups in a multiethnic society serves as a basis of transforming the existing relations between political institutions and civil society.

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Besides wishing to heal the wounds of the past, postconflict regimes may want to increase their legitimacy and support by distancing themselves from their predecessors. A new regime’s internal and external credibility is enhanced by adopting national reconciliation as part of a broader agenda of political change to promote good governance. Especially in transition to a new political order, the government can adopt a strategy to individualize the guilt and displace the threats of revenge in order to establish the rule of law for its legitimacy and stability. In order to “deepen democracy and promote just economic development in the future,” reconciliation should confront “the fundamental causes of repression and human rights abuses such as racism and economic inequality” (Crocker 2000, p. 107). Omitting the welfare of marginalized groups runs the risk of leaving the root causes of social violence and victimization unacknowledged in the course of reconciliation. In consolidating a democratic transition, it is important to publicly affirm the human and civic dignity of the victims of political atrocities and gross violations of human rights denied in the past. In restoring dignity and empowering the voice of victims, perpetrators of injustice ought to be held accountable for the harms done to others. In many postconflict societies, oppression is still seen not only as an acceptable norm but also as a functional response to causes of violence. Continuing social and economic disparities as well as a high level of violence at an interpersonal level can be attributed to the exclusion of various groups.

Truth Seeking Reconciliation is facilitated by truth telling and some form of justice—either restorative or criminal. When justice is not feasible, past abusive relationships may have to be simply forgotten, left in oblivion. Impetus to a new consciousness of human rights can also be inhibited by deliberate forgetting, which is often a general desire after a society has been overwhelmed with horror stories and pictures of atrocities in the media (Carroll and Pasco 2002). A lack of structural mechanisms to provide truth seeking in Mozambique is ascribed to little desire to dig up the past, as people are exhausted with war and fear (Hayner 1999). Although some countries (e.g., post-Franco Spain) seem to have succeeded in collective amnesia by drawing a thick line between past and present, public truth telling has become the preferred path since the Latin American experience of the late 1980s and early 1990s. The process of seeking truth can help restore the basic self-esteem and confidence of the victims by allowing them to recount their own experiences in the form of public hearings structured as nonadversarial and sup-

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portive forums. Seeking the truth of what happened is a precondition for socially acknowledging the significance of the injury (Hamber 2001). In establishing justice as recognition, victims want their statements to be heard as legitimate sources of truth. By disclosing their acts, the perpetrators can accept public accountability for their part in the political atrocities of the past. Truth telling can be used to support the rights of the injured to seek repair for the damage, material and psychological (Biggar 2001). Given its adversarial nature, the process of prosecutions does not provide a comfortable environment for victims to tell their stories as well as remembering the painful truth about the past. It may even be argued that the adversarial nature of criminal prosecutions through trial can cause psychological harm to victims. Promoting truth supports the basic political objectives of restoring the civic and human dignity of victims who suffered gross violations of human rights. In South Africa, social consciousness of past racial killings was enhanced through public testimony. Institutionalizing a common memory in a nonadversarial hearing becomes part of a unified nation building process to reconcile differences (Christie 2000). It is often suggested that knowing the truth sets victims free and helps heal a society by exposing the evils of the past; naming crimes in itself, even without trials, permits the expression of moral condemnation (Minow 2000). Victims gain a sense of rest and catharsis after having an opportunity to publicly state their injuries. A public ethical process of revealing and condemning atrocities is supported by many different social-psychological forms of reconciliation. The Guatemalan truth-telling process is characterized by the participation of civil society in reconstructing memory. In particular, its grassroots politics of memory served as a means to further justice with an extensive report prepared by Catholic churches. For healing the traumatized society and its individual members, the truth about past events must become public knowledge. A new society “could not be built as long as the fate of the disappeared remained shrouded in lies or hidden in sealed records” (McCaughey 2001, p. 259). Like the Guatemalan truth-telling process, reconciliation in South Africa was facilitated through disclosure (Quinn and Freeman 2003). Creating a new culture of storytelling is a starting point for developing societal capacity of fabricating constructive relationships. In rendering justice to the victims, the admission of wrongdoing and expression of remorse can be considered as a counterpart to the general principle of strict criminal liability. It is often suggested that trials of perpetrators are not always the best means to seek explanations for why terrible acts happened to the victims. On the other hand, it can also be argued that limited responses to truth telling cannot redress the wrongs of the past. Acknowledging the victims of crimes does not necessarily preclude punishing the offenders (Lerche 2000).

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Though there seems to be much agreement that knowing what happened is a necessary condition for forgiveness, it is not a sufficient condition (Hamber and Wilson 2002). Making the truth known at the national level, through either commission reports or perpetrators’ testimony, does not necessarily lead to contrition and forgiveness. Disclosure of the truth and its acknowledgment cannot fully heal the individual and collective wounds of the past, since truth telling, by itself, does not satisfy the victims’ demands for justice. In particular, merely to know truth does not bring about reconciliation as long as injustice persists. Moral and political dilemmas can be created when full disclosure does not come with the apology from the perpetrators. Even when the crimes of security forces engaged in torture or disappearances are made public, a consensus on interpretation of these facts may not easily arise.2 Despite expressing regret for his acts, a former torturer may still insist that the act was necessary, if not entirely legitimate, as we have seen in the testimonies of Latin American generals who argued that extraordinary measures were inevitable to protect “national security”

Balancing Justice and Social Harmony Legal justice is often advocated by the claim that it can break the cycle of hatred by eliminating the need for revenge through punishment of perpetrators. Asking for justice at a social level is a crucial condition for signaling a clear departure from the past while responding to a demand for accountability. Building trust in the new social order, justice provides a foundation by discrediting not only leaders but also institutions and ideologies attributed to abuses. Criminal prosecution ideally serves as a deterrent against future abuses while reducing temptation for extrajudicial retribution by victim’s groups. The occupation of the Western Slavonia region of former Yugoslavia by Croatian authorities did not result in mass killings of Serb civilians, in part, because of the deterrence effects of war criminal prosecution in The Hague (Williams and Scharf 2002). Legal punishment of rights violators represents a powerful means of affirming the dignity of victims, as torture, abduction, and murder are punishable by international law. The assignment of collective guilt can be minimized by directing guilt to specific perpetrators. Restoring justice by punishing perpetrators is often vital for enabling victims of human rights abuses to attain closure and restore healthy relations with others and themselves. One of the difficult questions in defining legal justice is whom it should be applied to. Although genocide and other crimes are difficult to be officially forgiven on legal grounds through amnesty, punishment of all those involved in human rights violations has been difficult. It may not be realis-

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tic or feasible to uncover every detail and prosecute all of the soldiers and civilians connected to the violence . If the number of those found to be guilty is small and they are not capable of organizing renewed violence, it is easier to hold them accountable. The task of obtaining retributive justice in a traumatized society is daunting when a large number of factions and their supporters are engaged in fighting, looting, murder, and rape. The decision to “pardon or prosecute” seems most often to be made on political grounds such as the necessity of impunity as a condition for stable political transition. When justice is desirable but its application to every perpetrator is not feasible, limited amnesty approaches have been adopted. Plea bargains can be used in order to elicit stories from perpetrators through individualized solutions. Single persons, not an entire group, can be granted immunity from criminal prosecution in return for a full disclosure of the facts; South Africa experimented with this type of conditional amnesty based on individual circumstances (Garkawe 2003). On the other hand, a lack of requirements for repentance and reparation permits perpetrators to get away even without apology for the deeds of torture or illegal killing. If amnesty or impunity is the price for public truth telling, the seemingly logical progression from acknowledgment to contrition becomes muddled. As part of national reconciliation strategies, reparations have been adopted as one way to compensate for victims. In the wake of acknowledgment, the perpetrator should take some action to redress the past wrong as an expression of contrition. Thus the international community increasingly views impunity for large-scale atrocities as an impediment to reconciliation and stability. By violating the principles of international law, blanket amnesties and pardons create an atmosphere of impunity. The consistent position of the international legal system prohibits granting amnesty in respect of crimes against humanity, including genocide (Akhavan 2001). With an increased public and international expectation of accountability for an atrocity, an important issue lies in the balance between justice and social harmony. In general, a limited amnesty approach, as has prevailed in East Timor and Sierra Leone, can be adopted with the exceptions of genocide, murder, rape, and other serious crimes (Stahn 2001). The international community can be more proactively involved in ameliorating intergroup tensions by providing a legal justice system. Developing procedures to carry out international human rights norms, fraught as it is with political difficulties, represent an essential step forward in setting more universal standards. For example, special international courts were established to shed light on widespread human rights abuses during the civil wars in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.

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Even though peace accords often contain conditions for amnesty, those who have committed acts in violation of the Genocide Convention cannot be unconditionally exempted from trials and punishment. As part of an internationally sponsored solution to the horrific war in Sierra Leone, absolute amnesty was given to RUF leader Foday Sankoh despite the exhaustive use of terror by his combatants. But the rebel group’s continued atrocities eventually resulted in a rescinding of the amnesty provisions of the Lomé Agreement, and international conventions on crimes against humanity were applied at a UN-sponsored tribunal (Akhavan 2001). Under either international or domestic pressure or both, the legal systems of Chile, Argentina, and El Salvador have curbed the scope of amnesty laws by excluding categories of excessive human rights violations from amnesty provisions. An exception to the internationally acknowledged standards regarding torture, genocide, and forced disappearance was made in a blanket amnesty law emerging from the compromise between the Guatemalan government and guerrilla forces; the December 1996 agreement was intended to clear responsibility of those who committed politically motivated crimes commonly related to an armed conflict (Sieder 2001). In the case of Chile, the military provided itself with a broad impunity in 1978, but in 1999 the Supreme Court ruled that the crime of forced disappearance is not unpunishable. Restorative Justice The principle of individual criminal responsibility can be reconciled with the need to grant selective immunity for the restoration of a war-torn society. Amnesty can be granted for less serious crimes such as arson, looting, and theft, but not for crimes against humanity such as genocide and forced disappearance. In dealing with past human rights tragedies, criminal prosecution does not need to be separated from community-based rehabilitation, facing the practical realities of transitional justice. The judiciary can be relieved of heavy burdens by the application of selective, partial immunity for low-level crimes. The prosecution of such criminal offenses as murder, torture, rape, and other sexual offenses committed during hostilities surrounding the 1999 referendum on independence remained under the exclusive jurisdiction of legal procedures set up by the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). Exemption from criminal and civil prosecution can be justified when perpetrators of nonlethal crimes fulfill some form of service to the benefit of the victims and the residents of a community. Those responsible for less serious criminal offenses are reintegrated if they perform a visible act of remorse serving the interests of the people affected

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by the original offense (Stahn 2001). At the same time, the courts have been allowed room for more weighty proceedings than numerous low-level criminal trials. Restorative justice is committed to building moral foundations, distinct from punishment of the guilty in specific legal mandates. In societies emerging from a period of repression, restorative justice serves as “a coherent alternative to retributive notions of justice which require criminal prosecution and punishment” (du Toit 2000, pp. 122–123). The humanity of both victims and offenders can be recovered by putting personal and institutional transformation ahead of retribution (Kiss 2000). The traditional dichotomy between punishment and reconciliation can be transcended through the incorporation of dimensions of mercy into justice. Restorative justice takes an individual-centered approach with a continuing emphasis on personal motivations and transformations. Remorse and community service are indispensable prerequisites for a grant of immunity, along with an alternative form of sanction that has a compensatory nature—monetary compensation for loss and damages—and a public apology. The accountability of the guilty is an essential element in restoring moral order, but at the same time healing is more easily achieved by compensating for damages through psychological, social, and economic means. In redressing imbalance with harmony, restorative justice privileges healing over retribution through punishment. At the same time, justice is affirmed in restoring the human and civic dignity of victims with an emphasis on the harm inflicted by perpetrators (Kiss 2000). Tension between insistence on accountability and readiness for healing can be overcome only by a leap of faith in the possibility of moral transformation of both persons and institutions. The very concept of justice may need to be reframed from “the punishment of the perpetrator” to “the vindication of the victim” (Biggar 2001). At the same time, it should be borne in mind that to date, restorative justice has been limited to less serious offenses. Justice and Political Reality Although justice is a desirable aspect of reconciliation, there are often serious political and practical obstacles. Imposing justice on members of the former regime has a disruptive potential, especially in the event of strong resistance by their remnants. In Latin American countries coming out of repressive military dictatorships in the 1980s, the quest for justice was compromised by the threat of a military coup. Those involved in human rights abuses may be able to manage to control the transition process and

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continue to hold power. In Chile and Argentina, outgoing military regimes even passed amnesty laws to indemnify themselves. Arguments against trials stress that political stability is critical to the reestablishment of a democratic system in a transitional state; an amnesty solution may have been chosen to reduce the resistance of powerful elites of the former regime. In addition, any attempt to carry out legal justice confronts a judiciary still influenced by the old regime’s political sympathesizers and supporters, uncooperative police and security forces. It is crucial not to provoke still-powerful elements in the armed forces that retain political veto power during a fragile democratic transition. In efforts to set realistic goals or criteria for national reconciliation, drawing lines between the ethical and legal demands of justice and the political requirements of stability has not been easy. It has often been argued that without amnesty, the armed forces would not have accepted changes in the military’s role in a new constitution or reduction in the size of the armed forces, as seen in El Salvador. However, it can equally be argued that by allowing blackmail and neglecting accountability, the rule of law would never be affirmed. In building democracy, moral justification cannot be sacrificed at the expense of the interests of individuals and groups committed to addressing human rights violations. Realistically, the use of punishment for correcting past wrongs and guaranteeing future deterrence hinges on balance between political forces. Even though accountability for human rights violations is considered critical in a transition to new political relations, amnesty has been advocated for political convenience. The new government attempts to avoid provoking tensions by confronting old forces, in the fear that legal prosecution might further divide a society in need of moving forward (Crocker 2000). In a fragile political situation, alternative means such as truth and reconciliation commissions can be negotiated to avoid provoking resistance from perpetrators. Where a new regime is still dominated by old elites committed to state terror or intergroup violence, legally redressing past crimes is only a remote possibility.

Judicial Trials and Prosecution No matter how difficult it may be to bring justice, criminal courts cannot be easily dismissed as not essential for preventing future abuses. The existence of permanent judicial structures equipped with professionally trained judges allows trials by the judiciary. Trials against alleged perpetrators in Ethiopia, including forty-six former military government officials and twenty-five other absentees, were opened in April 1996. Trials cannot be

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fair when the entire justice system is in disarray or when a domestic judiciary is still linked to the former regime. Appropriate legal provisions are often neglected in trials following genocide, owing to devastation of the law enforcement and justice system in combination with the massive number of criminal offenses. An adequate institutional response is difficult when a domestic justice system is ad hoc. Some 115,000 people were arrested by the Tutsi government following the Rwanda genocide, but fewer than fifty lawyers were available to “muster defense” for the accused. Due to the shortage of legal experts, local dispute mechanisms were adopted as special courts called Gacaca tribunals (Uvin and Mironko 2003). Individuals were sentenced to long-term imprisonment through a communal court system. The quality of justice was sacrificed with arbitrary detention, a lack of a judicial review of arrests, one-sided investigation, and the absence of legal representation (Minow 2001). Ad hoc joint tribunals were created in Cambodia and Sierra Leone where domestic and international judges worked side by side. The creation of a tribunal (involving international prosecutors and judges) was authorized by the Cambodian National Assembly in January 2001. The joint international-national tribunals tried Khmer Rouge leaders charged for the death of approximately 1.7 million people in the 1975–1979 genocide. In 2003, the Special Court in Sierra Leone issued its first indictments for war crimes committed by the former rebel leader Foday Sankoh and his military commander Sam Bockarie during the 1991–2001 civil war. The UN-backed court in Freetown also brought charges against not only eleven other prominent figures but also Charles Taylor for his role in fueling Sierra Leone’s vicious civil war. A growing international trend to stress justice led to the creation of international tribunals authorized by the UN Security Council.3 Ad hoc criminal tribunals have been active to prosecute violations of international humanitarian law in former Yugoslavia and Rwanda (Bogdan 2002). The Rwandan International Tribunal was created following the report of a special rapporteur who gathered and compiled information on human rights violations, including acts of genocide (Uvin 2001). The eleven trial judges of the Rwanda tribunal were drawn from an international roster and elected by the UN General Assembly. They began their work at the tribunal set up in Arusha, Tanzania, in September 1996. Although six of the judges were specifically assigned to the Rwanda tribunal, five others were jointly appointed with the tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda share the prosecutor appointed by the Security Council. More than eleven hundred staff members work for the International Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia. The War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague has

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tried Slodoban Milosevic and others who were accused of ordering ethnic killings in former Yugoslavia. The dismal state of the Rwandan justice infrastructure led to the first judgment for genocide being made by an international court. Former prime minister Jean Kambanda pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Foreign national courts have also convicted perpetrators of crimes against humanity committed in other countries. Rwandan nuns accused of supporting genocide were indicted in the Belgian court. Spanish courts asked for the extradition of former military junta members in Argentina and Chile and ordered the surrender of an Argentine military officer exiled in Mexico for human rights violations. Although convictions for past human rights crimes cannot be easily obtained in domestic courts in Argentina due to amnesty laws passed by former military regimes, former military officers can be tried in foreign countries.

The Role and Functions of Truth Commissions Since 1974, more than two dozen commissions of truth and reconciliation or inquiry into human rights violations have been formed either to support an ongoing peace process or to promote democratic reforms.4 These commissions served diverse purposes in times of political transition, indicating a break with the past and endowing a new government with legitimacy. In rewriting an official history of past events, the commissions serve as a potential political tool through the allocation of moral blame (van der Merwe 2001). The goals of truth commissions reside in gaining public acknowledgment of atrocities and enhancing national unity. In general, commissions focus on the most egregious acts committed during civil wars or dictatorships. Truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) set the tone for the whole process “by holding victims’ hearings first, along with relevant statement taking and investigations” (Shea 2000, p. 51). Truth commissions gather names and testimonials of victims and document the scope of killing, torture, and other atrocities. The National Commission in South Africa established the causes, nature, and extent of gross violations by conducting investigations and holding hearings that resulted in cutting through myths and false pictures of the past. Commission activities attempt to promote psychological healing for individuals and groups by meeting victims’ needs to know the facts. At the same time, truth commissions provide a therapeutic process for individual victims by listening seriously to their stories and validating them with official acknowledgment. On the individual level, testimony pro-

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vides a constructive way to channel anger and hatred by allowing the expression of feelings. It is important for victims to have opportunities to tell the stories of their trauma and contribute to a public account of the past. Testimony redirects people’s desires for recrimination through “a highly visible process of public investigation into past atrocities” (Minow 2000, p. 252). In the public domain, testimony entails the presentation of a legal document of evidence as well as serving as a witness to history. Thus the restorative power of public testimony comes from helping victims “discover ways to talk about personal suffering” as well as the public acknowledgment of past events (Mertus 2000, p. 151). As part of forging a national consensus, this process leads to making recommendations to satisfy the victims’ demands for justice and to encourage society as a whole to confront and rectify past crimes. One of the most important goals of truth commissions is to prevent a repetition of the abuses by seeking a broad analysis of the social, historical, and psychological causes of the conflict. This can be contrasted with the pursuit of narrow interpretations of the truth in the form of assigning criminal responsibility to a few individual perpetrators sought by tribunals. Human wrongs committed during a specific political conflict are investigated to “amass a more comprehensive and diversified record of past injustices than individual criminal trials” (Stahn 2001, p. 954). Instead of establishing an individual’s guilt, thus, the functions of truth commissions lie in uncovering the broad patterns of past abuses and looking into the wider set of conditions causing them. These functions are supported through the examination of historical events and political structures surrounding incidents of abuse and violence. Following a report on serious acts of violence, recommendations are normally made to prevent a repetition of these events. These often entail institutional reform geared toward eliminating the elements of the armed and security forces responsible for past crimes. By serving various purposes that are not met by the absence of or limited objectives of national and international criminal judiciaries, truth and reconciliation commissions provide an appropriate route to closing the painful pages of recent history (Humphrey 2003). Although justice is an important issue, the work of various commissions can be judged in terms of nonjudicial effects, including exposure and shaming stemming from the naming of perpetrators. The suffering of victims is acknowledged by offering nonjudicial forms of justice, ranging from monetary reparations to public identification of the perpetrators. The moral and material compensation of victims as well as promoting acknowledgment of war crimes fosters national reconciliation.

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Origins and Mandates of Commissions The functions and orientations of truth and reconciliation commissions can differ by the size of their staff and mandates. The length of commissions’ existence ranges from six months to more than two years with different levels of domestic and international support. The creation of truth commissions can be internationally driven or depends on an executive decision, a parliamentary process, and law. Commissions have a strong impact on a reconciliation process when they are supported by a strong national consensus derived from the agreement of former adversaries and international sponsorship. In Argentina and Chile, the commissions were created swiftly by presidential decrees following the transition of military rule to civilian government without requiring either the support of or authorization from the legislature. The National Commission on the Disappearance of Persons in Argentina was established by President Raul Alfonsin in December 1983. Thirteen commissioners, with the support of a staff of sixty, investigated approximately 9,000 disappearances during the military dictatorship from 1976 to 1983 for a duration of nine months. Nine commissioners were appointed to the Chilean commission by a government decree with the aim of uncovering the truth about past violations, deaths, and disappearances. Its mandate was to discover the whereabouts of victims and recommend reparations and measures to prevent future violations. The commission lasted for nine months from, May 9, 1990, to February 9, 1991, and its contribution was revealing the system of repression under the military rule. An Ecuadoran Truth and Justice Commission, established by President Abdala Bucaram on September 17, 1996, investigated close to 200 cases of human rights abuses from the previous seventeen years. The commission’s credibility was supported by the inclusion of members of local and international human rights groups in inquiries and investigations. Haiti’s commission, established by President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in March 1995, investigated human rights violations by the former regime during the period of 1991–1994. In its ten-month existence, 8,600 cases were presented to the commission. Seven commissioners worked with a staff of fifty to one hundred. The legislative or executive branch of a democratically elected government may take initiatives creating commissions, as seen above, but the commissions can later be supported by a legal act of the UN. The UN Security Council sponsored the truth commission for Burundi (1995–1996) upon the government’s request to investigate human rights abuses between 1993 and 1995. The commissions in Sierra Leone, El Salvador, and Guatemala were established as part of the UN-mediated peace accords. Guatemala’s

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Historical Clarification Commission, comprised of two lawyers, a Mayan woman professor, and one foreign national, was set up to investigate disappearances, killings, torture, and other abuses in the thirty-six-year internal conflict. Its report, entitled “Memory of Silence,” was published in February 1999, based on over 8,000 testimonies. The Salvadoran truth commission, La Comisión de la Verdad, was formally set up on July 15, 1992, as stipulated by the peace accords. The commission, made up of three highly respected international figures, faced the daunting task of reviewing 22,000 denunciations, the majority of which focused on torture, forced disappearances, and extrajudicial executions. It was mandated to investigate all the cases and prepare a report on twelve years of political violence within eight months. In a territory of East Timor under the transitional UN administration, the Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (CRTR) was created in Dilli by a regulation of the UN special representative. Its logistical plan was prepared by UNTAET’s Human Rights Unit with the assistance of international experts and local representatives. On January 21, 2002, seven national commissioners, including human rights activists, a businesswoman, lawyers, and other professionals, were appointed through a public nomination and selection process. The commission’s main goal was to establish the truth about the human rights violations (including an estimated 200,000 deaths) committed in the territory between April 1974 and October 1999. Its other function was facilitating the reintegration of minor criminal offenders into East Timorese society through restorative justice. Truth commissions do not always operate smoothly. The Burundi commission stopped further action due to renewed violence. The International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda was established in 1993 by the government and rebels to investigate abuses during the civil war between 1990 and 1993. Its investigation led to unearthing mass graves, but the commission had to leave the country when fighting broke out afresh. The delay in the establishment of the truth and reconciliation commission in Sierra Leone, mandated by the July 7, 1999, Lomé peace agreement, was caused by a resumption of war following the quick collapse of the Lomé process. Although the commission’s activities started in late 2002, it faced various challenges, including poor funding related to donor fatigue and management difficulties such as a lack of transparent hiring. The operation was further complicated by accusations that the government was meddling in the commission’s work as well as tension between national and international members of the commission. Nationally organized bodies generally have weaker functions than internationally funded and monitored commissions. The limited mandates of commissions in Haiti and Uganda are attributable to a lack of popular

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enthusiasm and political support as well as insufficient funding. The early commissions in Latin America grounded in tenuous political settings had only a small staff with a narrow focus (mostly confined to disappearances and killings of citizens) for a shorter time frame ranging from six to twelve months, compared with two and a half years for South Africa. The scope of commissions in Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, and Uruguay paid less attention to torture, assault, and imprisonment in their investigations, while concentrating on deaths and disappearances (Rigby 2001). The Bolivian National Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances (created by a decree of President Hernan Siles Suazo on October 28, 1982) could not complete its work and failed to produce a final report due to a lack of resources although it documented 155 cases. The commission in Uruguay, established in 1985, documented 164 disappearances, but its effects were minimized by the failure to investigate torture cases. Even though the Commission of Official Inquiry into the Disappearances in Uganda (1974–1975) found security forces guilty in 308 cases, its report was largely neglected by the government. Several Latin American commissions were not even endowed with the right to determine individual responsibility for past wrongdoing. In Argentina, statements were heard in closed chambers with no public testimony or subpoena of financial or telephone records. Not only investigation procedures but also methods of reporting may be compromised due to resistance from abusers associated with the military and other elements of the old regime. The Honduras National Commission for Human Rights wanted to provide a clear assessment of an overall pattern of violence by investigating various events surrounding the disappeared from 1980 to 1993. Despite its identification of institutional responsibility in 136 of the 179 cases, the commission’s preliminary report on disappearances in Honduras, entitled “The Facts Speak for Themselves,” released on December 29, 1993, named a small number of military personnel as responsible for the violations.5 Interviews with victims of torture or prolonged detention were included in the commissions’ reports, but perpetrators’ names were not made public in Argentina or Guatemala. In contrast, intense pressure from the military high command and top government officials did not stop the truth commission in El Salvador from publishing the names of individuals and moderating the report’s content. In comparison with El Salvador’s commission, the Guatemalan commission operated with such restrictions as no naming of perpetrators demanded by the military. The weak truth commission’s mandates, shaped in the peace accords, reflected the strength of resistance by the old regime’s remnants. Former protagonists were not interested in an agreement to uncover past killings and other crimes (Rigby 2001).

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In general, UN sponsorship or backing provides legitimacy and international prestige, as seen in El Salvador and Sierra Leone. In contrast with commissions staffed entirely by national governments, internationally sponsored commissions have great political independence and secure funding. The legitimacy and prestige of the Salvadoran truth commission derives from its international sponsorship with full payment of staff by the UN (Kaye 1997). To ensure objectivity, the UN Secretary-General selected three internationally known commission members: Belisario Betancur, ex-president of Colombia; Thomas Buergenthal, ex-president of the InterAmerican Court; and Reinaldo Figueredo, ex–minister of foreign relations for Venezuela. In general, the UN sponsorship tends to ensure adequate staffing and funding for a thorough investigation into past human rights violations. The international community’s direct sponsorship also means greater security and more cooperation in access to documents. Victims are more likely to have confidence in offering testimonies and evidence with the guarantee of security. In contrast with most other nationally organized commissions, a strong commission grew out of negotiations among former adversaries in South Africa; in part, it reflected a commitment of all the parties to a stable transition to civilian democracy. The South African political elite did not pursue legal procedures and demonstrated self-restraint because they feared that further ethnic and racial divisions might threaten national unity. The South African commission has been the most distinctive in its sheer size, resources, and sophistication. It was larger and better financed than any other commissions; an annual budget of approximately $18 million for each of its two-and-a-half-year existence allowed hiring 300 staff in four national offices. The level of investigation pursued by the commission was reflected in the number and kind of hearings held as well as the depth and breadth of its staff. Statements were given by 21,297 victims and their family members. The investigations were far more transparent than those of any Latin American commissions (Hayner 2001). Support for Judicial Processes Truth commissions normally do not have a juridical basis, since they do not get involved in conducting criminal proceedings. In general, it is incumbent upon tribunals to apply appropriate sanctions to perpetrators responsible for atrocities. Although truth commissions are not regarded as a formal mechanism for seeking legal accountability, their reports can identify institutions or individuals guilty of human rights violations. The investigation of a truth

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commission is not a substitute for the legal route to justice, but truth commissions may operate simultaneously or in tandem with formal prosecutorial mechanisms such as a special court set up to adjudicate cases of human rights crimes (Crocker 2000). Thus truth commissions have gradually become supplementary to the legal justice machinery in support of the authority of national or international prosecution. Running parallel to judicial procedures, the commission in Sierra Leone supported transitional justice mechanisms (Schabas 2003). The Argentine commission has also been perceived as a predecessor to trials, since the names of perpetrators were leaked, and the material was later used for trials against the military regime despite the failure of the commission’s report to name perpetrators. The outcome of the Rettig Commission in Chile also contributed to bringing some cases forward to the legal system. The widely publicized report generated legal support for the inviolable right of relatives to search for the disappeared with the establishment of the National Reparation and Reconciliation Corporation on February 8, 1992 (de Brito 2001). The above cases are contrasted with the failure of the justice system in Uganda and Haiti to act on strong recommendations for prosecution forwarded by the commissions (Hayner 2001). Investigative Functions and Roles Both extensive inquiry-related subpoena power and operational independence are essential to the organization of effective investigations and hearings. Some truth commissions can interview, freely and in private, any individuals, groups, or members of organizations even without the authority to conduct formal criminal proceedings. The participation of forensic anthropologists in the exhumation of nearly 1,000 civilians killed in the 1981 massacre at El Mozote, El Salvador, led to the discovery that the vast majority of skeletons were of young children (Burgerman 2000). Thus the role of the foreign experts was critical in confirming an atrocity that had been long denied by Salvadoran and U.S. government officials. The UN-mandated commission in El Salvador had far-reaching subpoena, search, and seizure powers. The commission had authority to visit any state facility and seek information (Hayner 1999). The same kind of power was given to the Sierra Leonean commission, whose hearings had a quasi-judicial character. The South African commission had the strongest investigative power to search premises and seize evidence as well as authorization to subpoena witnesses. In order to obtain confessions, conditional amnesty was granted for political crimes and human rights abuses on all sides upon full disclosure of the facts. The Investigation Unit worked

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closely with the commission’s three committees on human rights violations, reparations and rehabilitations, and amnesty (Shea 2000). The investigative functions and roles of truth commissions can be constrained, to various degrees, by political settings (Zalaquett 1999). In particular, presidentially appointed commissions cannot usually subpoena witnesses to give testimony or turn over evidence, since this type of power is likely to require an act of parliament. In the absence of strong investigative power, commissions have to depend on voluntary cooperation. Despite a hope for voluntary compliance with requests for documents, the commissions in Chile and Argentina had minimal cooperation from the armed forces. The military claimed that no information on the disappeared was available, although in Chile a few retired military officers offered testimony (Hayner 1999). Sparse investigative power was wielded by the Honduras commission, owing to insufficient human and financial resources. In-depth investigations of disappearance cases were not possible with mere information gathering, which, in turn, relied heavily on reports made available not only in the United Nations and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights but also in the press and governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Moral and Political Implications Truth commissions with more powerful mandates were able to publish abuses to deter future occurrences by airing public concern, bringing transgressors to account, and embarrassing wrongdoers without trials. An official history was established through the investigation of serious acts of violence that occurred between January 1980 and July 1991 by the Salvadoran commission. Its report condemned the armed forces for their role in abhorred acts of violence, including the massacres in Rio Sumpul (1980) and El Mozote (1981) as well as the assassination of Archbishop Romero (1980). Based on the collection of 9,000 testimonies that reported 42,000 victims, the Commission for Historical Clarification in Guatemala denounced rights abuses, identified causes and consequences and formulated recommendations for prevention of future occurrences. In the commission’s conclusion, political violence in Guatemala was ascribed to not only acute socioeconomic inequalities but also a history of racism against the indigenous majority. The estimates documented by the commission’s investigation include the killings and disappearances of approximately 200,000 people during the armed conflict. It highlighted institutional responsibilities by attributing 93 percent of investigated cases to the military and their agents. The report suggested that the state deliberately carried out genocide against the Mayan population between 1981 and 1983 (Sanford 2003). The nature of the Guatemalan commission’s work was more than tinged with grassroots human rights politics. Prior to the commission’s

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work, the first extensive report during the armed conflict was published by the Human Rights Office of the Catholic Archdiocese in April 1998.6 The report documented atrocities based on approximately 6,500 testimonies collected in parishes across the country for over three years. Because of concerns with the safety of witnesses, the report could not include all the names of perpetrators contrary to its original intention (Sieder 2001). However, it registered a massive 55,000 victims, including 25,000 murders attributed mostly to the state security forces. Impact on Reform and Justice The call of truth commission reports for the professionalization of armed forces and revision of their doctrines in respect for human rights as well as the abolishment of old security forces has brought about some personnel and institutional changes in several Latin and Central American countries. The discovery of gross abuses can result in the reform of military intelligence and elaboration of a new military code. Significant restructuring of the military has to go along with removing military and police officers accused of human rights violations (Ladutke 2004). Such policy recommendations are designed to strengthen democratic institutions and to prevent future violations of human rights. The Salvadoran truth commission’s recommendations entailed not only the removal of military officers responsible for perpetrating violent acts against civilians but also the dismissal of government officials and judges engaged in covering up human rights crimes. In addition, it suggested that the removed officials be disqualified from all positions of public security. The proposed measures therefore indicated the importance of a break from not only El Salvador’s tradition of impunity but also a nonfunctioning judicial system. The truth commission’s report increased the pressure on President Alfredo Cristiani to confront the military. More than one hundred high-ranking officers implicated in human rights atrocities were forced to resign following the commission’s report, which revealed their personal records. Even though the government had announced a blanket amnesty, the removal of officers from their posts was regarded as a sanction for their crimes. The commission report also resulted in the replacement of judges as well as the dismissal of high-ranking military commanders. Psychological and economic assistance through a reparations program has been widely available to the families of the disappeared. In many cases, a commission’s recommendations have led to creating a fund for compensation, designating a national day to remember the victims as well as establishing a national monument with their names. The Guatemalan report recommended a national program to search for disappeared children and the exemption of direct descendents of victims from military service. In addi-

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tion, it proposed the official acknowledgment by the state of responsibility and the building of a monument in memory of those killed. Reconciliation measures in Honduras also encompassed not only compensation payments to the families of victims of government atrocities but also locating the bodies of the disappeared. In reparation for abuses under the military rule of Augusto Pinochet, the Chilean government paid about U.S.$5,000 per year to each family affected by deaths or disappearances along with various health and education benefits. President Patricio Aylwin also made an “apology on behalf of the state for human rights violations committed under the Pinochet regime” (de Brito 2001, p. 153). In Argentina, too, the state devoted U.S.$3 billion to compensate survivors of the country’s dirty war and their families. These reparation programs were important especially when judicial justice was denied to victims through a general and unconditional amnesty for all war crimes. Compared with reparation, institutional reforms of the legal and political system were more challenging in countries where the military has had the highest degree of power and retained autonomy. The nature of the political restraints and the level of polarization of a postconflict society explain the degree to which justice is realized. Civil society groups have been active in bottom-up initiatives for truth and justice. The Center for Human Rights Action and other Guatemalan human rights NGOs have been challenging military immunity by demanding the prosecution of high-ranking officers through either domestic or international legal mechanisms. Such actions help many victimized sectors of society raise their voices for justice and achieve their rights (Sieder 2001).

Social Rehabilitation and Empowerment Future sources of conflict can be removed by enhancing civil society’s ability to resolve conflict (Belloni 2001). Despite differences among elites at a national level, communal groups have served as vehicles for nonviolent expression of different interests and values in El Salvador, Cambodia, Somalia, and other war-torn societies. Shared involvement and dialogue among group members support a sense of unity. Local peace commissions and grassroots workshops contribute to gradual changes in political cultures and the construction of a new system. In particular, NGOs have been active in facilitating an informal, low-key, non-threatening dialogue through their capacities to develop links across ethnic boundaries. By serving as a space for communication, civil society creates opportunities for broad public involvement ranging from community councils to neighborhood associations, consequently contributing to a more sustainable

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postconflict reconciliation (Lumsden 1999). In Liberia, as part of a community project, Talking Drum Studio sought a reduction of political and ethnic violence through a storytelling program designed to revisit and restore Liberian traditions. The media can be used for reconciliation by exposing diverse views instead of dividing groups. Recently new attention has been paid to exploring mutual understanding through the coproduction of television news and public documentary programs between different ethnic communities. Ethnically diverse teams of reporters can be trained together to report balanced views. The production of pan-Caucasian television programs in the wartorn region of Georgia, southern Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan was intended to help overcome group hostilities. Media programs on conflict education in 1995 were aimed at improving cross-ethnic understanding by covering all the communities. They attempted to avoid partisan coverage with a multiethnic approach to reporting social tensions. Different levels of hostilities need to be considered in achieving social cohesion. For instance, property disputes can be managed at a community level as a way to empower the marginalized. Participatory training methods were adopted by the joint OAS/UN International Civilian Mission in Haiti to help peasants with limited literacy skills be better organized.7 Dialogue and exchange have served as opportunities for poor peasants and community leaders to search for peaceful methods in tackling land-reform projects (Granderson 2000). A vision for peace can be based on a shared meaning of life and a deeper understanding of others from different cultures and identities (Bernardo and Ortigas 2000). Peace education has come to be viewed as developing the full maturation of the human person, not only as an individual but also as part of the community. A culture of peace programs was introduced in the education systems of Mozambique and El Salvador. Schools and social associations can be linked to each other by various NGO initiatives. Links across ethnic boundaries grow out of informal, lowkey, nonthreatening dialogue. In Northern Ireland, a number of community groups have been involved in bringing together Unionists and Nationalists to get to know each other. These groups have contributed to rebuilding confidence and reducing fear at both the personal and community levels. As a coordinating network in Belfast, the Community Relations Council enhanced tolerance and harmony among social, cultural, and religious divisions through increased contact and networking between Protestants and Catholics. Financial support for churches and groups was utilized as a means to reach out to the antagonistic communities. A variety of political and socioeconomic backgrounds was emphasized by the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition in building cross-communal ties overcoming rigid political positions.

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The activities of women’s groups carry high moral value, given their status of being frequent victims of ethnic conflict and civil war. In particular, the Association of Mothers and Sisters of Srebrenica and Podrinja in Bosnia-Herzegovina developed emotional bonds in delivering messages of caring for the well-being of war victims. Through nonviolent communication, they were engaged in dialogue as opposed to the masculine domination of others. Their moral authority strengthened their political clout and the power of their message. Feminization of the victim image is “contrasted with war, ethnic cleansing, poverty, corruption and unemployment produced by the political sphere” (Helms 2003, p. 27).

Traditional Civil Society and Reconciliation A grassroots peacebuilding process has to make use of indigenous cultural institutions and norms in resolving community problems. The impact of conflict resolution activities on reconciliation would not be adequately appreciated without examining the role of a traditional network. Procedures to assist in healing those damaged by war have been developed by religious institutions, extended families, and traditional healers (Cicuecue 1997). Conflict resolution strategies can be better adapted to the demands of traditional societies by reviving the conflict prevention capacity of village councils. The influence of grassroots organizations has grown considerably, as governments and foreign donors have relied increasingly on communitybased structures for delivering basic services. Traditionally in Tajik society, local conflict was discussed at a shared dinner in the local mosque or other community-organized events, as well as in a council of citizens called the Mahalla. A historically well-developed Tajik civic network is embedded in self-organized communities in both rural and urban areas (Collins 2003). The Mahalla councils were allowed to participate in local governments through a network of semiofficial institutions called Jamoats. The indigenous civic network comprised of village councils and elders regained its authority with the waning power of local field commanders following the end of the civil war. The authority of the elders and Mahalla councilors was used to mitigate conflicts between refugees returning to their home villages and other groups. For instance, indigenous social networks were engaged in reducing tensions arising from the repatriation of Tajik refugees from Afghanistan in 1995–1996 with the support of the UNHCR and OSCE. The most respected representatives from different groups were invited to dialogue meetings, which helped to open communication over incidents of harassment, physical attacks, and murders of refugees as well as employment

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discrimination and forced labor. The intervention of local council members contributed to smoothing relationships, especially in southern regions, where intense fighting had displaced large numbers of people (Mullojanov 2001). These cumulative efforts of conflict prevention reduced a hostile atmosphere stemming from the arrival of the last wave of returnees in 1997. Overcoming Communal Conflict The instruments of dispute settlement in Uganda, Somalia, and Rwanda include local forums where different group or individual interests are represented. Community-based mechanisms include a mediated dialogue managed by village chiefs or family elders of offenders and victims. In Sierra Leone, traditional and religious leaders supported healing and communal rehabilitation by mitigating conflicts originating from past abuses and atrocities. Local peacebuilding mechanisms were applied to resolution of personal and group conflicts between refugees and those left behind in rebelcontrolled territory. In Rwanda, traditional functions of the local dispute resolution system, mainly focused on settling claims to land rights and property damage, were transformed into special mechanisms to handle serious crimes in the absence of a modern court system (Corey and Joireman 2004). Peace monitors were utilized to help assure a just solution of conflict triggered by a spontaneous movement of refugees and their return to southern Pujehun, Sierra Leone, following the ousting of the junta in February 1998. In order to resolve false claims to other people’s property, theft, separation, and marital disputes, people preferred calling on peace monitors to turning to the official court system, whose decisions are often based on favoritism. Because the communities are predominantly Muslim, the peace monitors depend on the Quran for dialogue (Baker and May 2004). More complicated issues, involving tensions between different villages, require the participation of representatives of diverse communal segments who form a grievance committee administered at a chiefdom level. Utilizing Local Cultural Traditions Restoring interdependence is one of the first steps to mend the breakdown of family and community ties ascribed to the usurpation of authority by militia commanders during a war. The disruption of existing social and political customs and allegiances caused by the war is evident in social misbehavior that affects youth. Many youths are engaged in using drugs and destroying sacred places in the absence of civil authority. As their parents or local authorities have no control over them, traditions and customs collapse.

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Various activities for community-based social rehabilitation instill values of human rights and democracy, as well as economic initiatives that target the poverty that underlies much social unrest. Support for communal reconciliation comes from the restoration of social and cultural norms destroyed by civil war. The reconstruction of the social fabric relies on cultural traditions that stress strong familial and communal ties and respect for elders. In recovering a sense of community, part of the efforts may also include honoring traditional rituals that were not practiced during violent ethnic conflict (Jonen 2000). Social mobilization for oppressed people can be based on universal values of compassion, nonviolence, and solidarity (Dalai Lama 2002). Despite the dangers of being killed or injured, peace marches such as the Dhammayietra (Pilgrimage of Truth) were reinvigorated to bring a message of hope and encouragement to all Cambodians with a visible condemnation of violence. The four-week march has become an annual event since its 1992 historic journey, which started from the Thai border and passed through insecure regions of Cambodia. More recent marches by the “army of peace,” comprised of refugees and monks, raised awareness on landmines and deforestation. As a symbolic gesture of peace and compassion, the 1996 marchers planted 2,000 trees along the route. Buddhism’s universal values of love and solidarity harnessed the hidden potential for constructive social and political change in Cambodia and also provided a model of nonviolent mobilization of oppressed people (Khemacaro 1998).

Final Comments Empowering people derives from restoring cultural norms and achieving the well-being of those who were victimized by violence; rebuilding relationships is based on acknowledging interdependence. Reconciliation, which encompasses actions such as forgiving and apologizing, needs to be defined within a cultural context. The achievement of justice eventually brings about shared norms and leads to rebuilding trust. In comparison to support for development and democratization, reconciliation programs tend to be very small and attract less funding in official peacebuilding projects. As a long-term process, reconciliation itself cannot be expected to be a project that will yield immediate results. Because years or decades might be required to rebuild broken relationships originating in genocides, mass killings, and repression as observed in Rwanda, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, short-term efforts such as one-week workshops and conferences would be far from sufficient, generating a need for long-term commitments with an emphasis on follow-up and expansions of groups involved. In par-

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ticular, developing long-term goals of reconciliation based on social justice and institutional reform can help transform the scope and depth of old adversarial relationships.

Notes 1. The early release of Irish Republican Army members convicted of terrorist crimes, as a means of supporting the Good Friday Agreement, became controversial since many Unionists regarded that as diminishing the significance of the victims’ suffering (Biggar 2001). 2. The alignment of forces at the time of transition shapes the nature and degree of truth revealed. The parameters of publicly acknowledged truth can be deepened as peace increasingly proves its resilience (Rigby 2001). 3. In contrast with the two well-known international tribunals in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia, a judiciary body was established to try war criminals in East Timor under the UN administration. 4. It can be claimed that the Commission of Official Inquiry into the Disappearances of People in Uganda, created in 1974, was the first in existence. 5. The commission attempted to underscore a break with past violations just as the newly elected government did, but it was not well equipped to achieve its goal. 6. Two days after the report’s publication on April 26, 1998, Bishop Monseñor Juan Gerardi, the head of the interdiocesan project Recovery of Historical Memory, was brutally murdered by an army faction. 7. The program, initiated in 1995, was supported by and developed as part of human rights promotion and advocacy activities in conflict transformation and resolution for a region prone to violence over land rights.

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7 OPERATIONAL IMPERATIVES AND COORDINATION The complex tasks of peacebuilding involve multiple functions, ranging from peacekeeping and election support to development assistance. Diverse operations can be characterized in terms of a balance not only between military and civilian components but also between sectoral differences. The complexities in the composition of peacebuilding operations also depend on the number and size of international agencies involved. Overall capabilities and types of international operations can, in turn, have an impact on the choice of tactics and strategies. The coordination of different functions becomes more important with the limited commitment and organizational resources. Coordination and teamwork are essential for maximization of the effects of each component’s operation. To be effective, the work of the various organizations should be embedded in each other’s activities in the overall peacebuilding framework. Improved planning and organizational coordination are crucial for operational effectiveness. After reviewing various types of peacebuilding operations, this chapter examines organizational challenges and coordination strategies not only in terms of the operational imperatives of the separate sectors but also the overall context of fulfilling international objectives. In addition, the chapter sheds light on the coordinating mechanisms applied to strategic and tactical levels of operations. In particular, it looks at institutional politics and interorganizational relationships to understand major features of vertical and lateral coordination.

Issues and Challenges: Strategic Considerations Peacebuilding has been introduced into diverse settings, and operational goals and activities need to be compared in explaining different types of missions. The lack of a clear policymaking structure and local political uncertainties would complicate the manner in which various initiatives are introduced and conducted. 187

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Peacebuilding operations are officially accompanied by the authorization of international mandates, ideally from the UN Security Council. Though the majority of international peace operations have been executed by the UN, because of its overcommitment and dwindling resources, some functions have increasingly been relegated to regional organizations or ad hoc groupings of countries that may also act with a UN Security Council mandate (Boulden 2003). Regional arrangements were made for operations in El Salvador through the Organization of American States (OAS). UN political missions or small contingents of observer missions in the Ivory Coast, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and other African countries have been supported by the forces of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), especially when large UN forces were not available. The European Union and NATO have performed either civilian or military functions in collaboration with UN agencies in the former Yugoslavia. The UN Security Council approved U.S.-led military interventions in Haiti both in 1994 and 2004, which paved the way for expanded roles of UN civilian missions. The UN’s role in institution building and rehabilitation may derive from a demand for a long-term commitment to a sustainable order beyond sponsoring or organizing negotiated solutions to end armed conflicts. With its expanded roles, over the years, the UN has gradually been engaged in verifying and, if necessary, enforcing the final agreements as well as getting actively involved in negotiations. In El Salvador, Cambodia, Angola, and Mozambique, the UN participated as an observer, mediator, and sponsor of peace accords. In deteriorating security situations, political missions can be replaced by larger missions that include significant military roles. The politically oriented UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was designed to help carry out the peace agreement signed in January 2003. However, it was superseded by the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire in April 2004, after having failed to reunite the rebel-held north and the government-controlled south. Existing missions in Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and elsewhere have been widened with the addition of more complicated tasks after a cease-fire. The establishment of the UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL, July 1998 to October 1999) was designed to advise on police practice, training, and recruitment and report on human rights violations as well as to monitor the disarmament and demobilization of former combatants. It was replaced by the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), whose peacekeeping operation has been enlarged several times (February and May 2000 and March 2001) with an expanded role in demobilization and reintegration plans. The UN Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala deployed more than 250 police, legal experts, and

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indigenous specialists to conduct confidence-building activities prior to the conclusion of the treaty in 1994. Once the agreement on a ceasefire was signed in December 1996, the mission was broadened to include a group of military observers under a new official name: the UN Verification Mission in Guatemala. Its main focus was to help not only reform the police force and judiciary but also carry out disarmament and demobilization of former guerrilla forces. While there are variations, the primary activities of international assistance normally cover disarmament and demobilization, support for refugees, elections, police reform, and human rights protection. The UN Operation in Burundi was deployed in June 2004 to secure a safe environment for elections and provide humanitarian assistance for the voluntary return of refugees. The UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL) was established in July 1991 to verify accord implementation in such areas as confidence building, reduction of armed forces, reform of the judicial systems and police, human rights, land tenure, and other economic and social issues. Preexisting contact between the international community and belligerent parties facilitates an immediate humanitarian response following successful negotiations to end conflicts (Lange and Quinn 2003). In Mozambique, the World Food Programme, UNICEF, WHO, and the International Committee of the Red Cross were able to expand their activities in supplying food, seeds, tools, water, and health care to the RENAMO territories with the support of both the government and rebel groups. Entry and Exit Both logistic and political considerations have an impact on the questions of the timing of entry and exit of international operations. The organization of contingent groups results from approval of the UN mandate following the signing of peace agreements between belligerent parties. A quick establishment of UN peacekeeping contingents reduces the fear of renewed violence. However, a tardy deployment of troops can create volatile conditions, especially when the cease-fire and demobilization of combatants need to be monitored and supported. A delayed implementation of arms reduction and eventual disarmament can increase chances that the transition from violent conflict to reconstruction will be rough rather than smooth. Because of disagreement over funding, 75 percent of the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) contingents did not arrive before an official cease-fire became effective on April 1, 1989. A lack of serious presence of UN forces in northern Namibia allowed uncontrolled fighting prior to the arrival of the full contingents (Hearn 1999). With the painfully slow recruitment and deployment of UN civilian personnel, the Kosovo

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Liberation Army was able to develop and extend its parallel and illegitimate structure, inhibiting efforts to enforce the rule of law and norms of respect for human rights. Before the civil administration was ready to offer basic services for all Kosovars, the militia group had installed themselves in the municipal offices and assumed responsibility for the civilian authority (Corrin 2002). The UN troops may have to stay until the restoration of a reasonable degree of order and essential public functions and services. Timetables have to be adjusted to match the progress in confidence building and verification. The UN peacekeeping involvement, as seen in Cambodia and other countries, largely ends with installing a new government after national elections. Since the timing of elections has often been treated as an end in itself, the establishment of a newly elected government has been regarded as a yardstick for the successful accomplishment of the objective. However, prematurely scaling down or wrapping up international operations can leave several fundamental issues such as human rights protection and administrative reform unresolved. Some missions have been protracted due to a lack of institution building with continuing suspicions between the government and the opposition. Five years after the deployment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the country does not yet have a reliable army and police force; there is fear that pulling out UNAMSIL would lead to a slide back into chaos. Many verification functions can remain active beyond the initial periods of intensive operations to monitor the political transition or provide technical support. When the main UN force leaves, a smaller mission can be left behind to support continuing police reform (UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti, December 1997–March 2000) or administrative infrastructure building (UN Mission of Support in East Timor, May 2002 to present). Since many issues were not resolved during the presence of the UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (December 1994–May 2000), the UN Tajikistan Office of Peace-Building was created, after the withdrawal of the peacekeeping operation, to address the social and economic causes of the civil war through such means as job training. In order to facilitate reconciliation between President Charles Taylor and former rebel leaders, a small UN peacebuilding support office was established after the withdrawal of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) that helped with the elections in 1997. The transition from one type of operation to another should be considered in the overall context of providing stability and support for international mandates. In Somalia, the hasty replacement of UNITAF by UNOSOM II, with major differences in their mandates and capabilities, resulted in difficulties in developing integrative planning (Allard 2002). UNOSOM II was assigned the responsibility of assisting in the re-creation of national and regional institutions and civil administration as well as demining and the

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return of refugees and internally displaced people. The job could have been more easily accomplished if UNITAF had been engaged in the disarmament of militia factions with its superior military capabilities. Balance Between Functions and Tasks The strength and functions of a peacebuilding force have to be appropriate to the nature of its tasks. The main focus of a mission can change with the evolution of the situation, as is well illustrated by the extended functions of the UN mission in El Salvador. When the mission was created by the Security Council in 1991, its initial task was to monitor compliance with rules on human rights. With the start of the cease-fire in February 1992, the unprecedented human rights verification functions of ONUSAL turned mostly into traditional peacekeeping of ensuring the separation of armed forces. In addition to the supervision of conduct of existing police forces, ONUSAL soon became involved in mediating the interpretation and implementation of the accords to overcome delays and disputes arising from politically sensitive matters.1 Intermediary activities vary along a continuum of violence prevention to community building. Physical protection is the responsibility of peacekeeping forces, while the UNDP, UNHCR, and other UN specialized agencies have been providing humanitarian and development assistance as well as monitoring human rights. The most common forms of assistance, considered noncontroversial, include technical expertise and material support for infrastructure building. In reconstruction efforts, financial and technical assistance is often provided for NGO projects. The balance between intervention strategies can be adjusted to the demands of different functions in the evolving phases of postconflict societies. Preventing a return to violence with the support of coercive diplomacy is necessary for restoring confidence in the early stages. Activities following peace settlements also need to be supported by instruments for the resolution of intercommunal conflicts (Lund 2000). Mediation, conciliation, and arbitration can be introduced to defuse tensions arising from conflicting land claims or the pace of demobilization. Various tasks, including emergency aid and development in an integral notion of peacebuilding, should be incorporated to meet institutional and operational challenges. Imbalance between military and civilian sectors seems to be inevitable where security is not fully restored. Especially in the initial stage of operations, political and military components have ascendancy over development and reconciliation components. In Somalia, “UN and NGO agencies felt marginalized as the chain of command and decision making became predominantly political and military” (Slim 1997, p. 134). Reliance on political and military decisionmaking structures needs to be balanced to take into

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account the more decentralized nature of development assistance functions. The role of military and nonmilitary components of peacebuilding changes with the restoration of order and the demand for nonmilitary services. Although military intervention has to be prompt, attention should also be drawn to the roles of humanitarian and development agencies. NATO peace enforcement functions and humanitarian assistance agencies dominated the initial stage of the Bosnian operation, but the roles of the European Union and the World Bank as well as the UN have increased with the initiation of programs for creating local police forces and development projects. Successful coordination requires a proper allocation of resources, commensurate to the complexity of the tasks in diverse sectors. The UN civil administration in Cambodia established in February 1992 had to respond to difficult challenges derived from the comprehensive nature of the settlement, undertaking civil and electoral administration, repatriation, and protection of human rights. All these tasks had to be accomplished by fewer than two hundred inexperienced staff recruited to handle civil administration activities for the central and regional offices. While the UNTAC successfully conducted the elections, the UN office did not play a concerted role in promoting democracy and human rights.

International Commitments Mobilizing resources poses particular challenges when the costs of continued operation are not justified in terms of progress. High spending generates an expectation of results beyond a temporary respite from war. Some international interventions have been prolonged out of fear of the consequences of withdrawal with a slow pace of institution building. Under pressure to end missions quickly, donor countries tend to feel unenthusiastic, with the passage of time, in their support (Wiharta 2003). In Bosnia, given their extended presence, many large donors, including the World Bank and the United Nations, have been under pressure to cut their assistance. However, the level of international commitment has been considered in terms of the impact of major reductions in aid and troops on reigniting violence that, in turn, could prove more costly. In the absence of an internally sustainable support structure, foreign assistance can strengthen components that are essential for durable peace. In Angola, the incapacity and unwillingness of the international community to commit enough resources weakened the prospects for success of peacebuilding attempts in the 1990s. Angola’s two failed peace processes are contrasted with the successful example of Mozambique, which drew great attention from the UN leadership and donor countries. The lack of suffi-

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cient support for the Angola operation was, in part, directly related to competition for resources with Mozambique, Cambodia, El Salvador, and former Yugoslavia. Nearly $1 billion was spent in Mozambique with more than $1 million allocated to the daily expenses of ONUMOZ. The UN no longer had a sufficient level of available resources in 1997 when Angola had to implement the Lusaka Protocol. Current international peacebuilding activities have been challenged by heavy financial commitments to the geopolitical interests of Western countries. Despite overwhelming appeals for aid, the ability of international agencies to get involved in many parts of the world has been limited by an unbalanced distribution of resources needed for rebuilding war-torn societies. Large international donor pledges of more than $4.5 billion over five years were made at the Tokyo Conference on Afghan Reconstruction sponsored by the United Nations in January 2002. Much less has been made available for Burundi, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, all of which are coming out of long civil wars. Conditionalities and Support Third parties should be willing to intervene beyond passive traditional roles of neutrality. International pressure was sought when the Guatemalan military resisted investigation of human rights abuses. In Kosovo, conflicting relationships have been stabilized with external political support for those who are committed to nonviolent change. The desire of Croatia to be integrated into the European mainstream strengthened its commitment to democracy and willingness to arrest military figures convicted of war crimes. Political conditionalities have been applied to influence an aid recipient’s policies. Donor coordination is more effective if it is based on common understandings of the types of conditions to be placed on aid, the timing of sanctions in the event of noncompliance, and the ultimate objectives of such actions. Consensus is not easy to reach when certain countries have their own political interests and do not want to place pressure while others are unsure about the course of action. Donors’ leverage over a recalcitrant government may depend on their ability to issue a credible threat to withdraw support in the event of noncompliance. This problem is well illustrated by external actors’ failure to insist on human rights in Cambodia. The U.S. efforts to press for sanctions in response to Hun Sen’s coup in 1997 failed due to other Western donors’ decision to ignore the illegitimate use of force adopted to eliminate the opposing faction from a power-sharing coalition government. Prime Minister Hun Sen’s behavior could have been more effectively influenced with foreign aid; some $1.5 billion was channeled into Cambodia between 1993 and 1998, which constituted more than half the national budget (Hughes

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2003). However, Japan, France, and other major donors refused to use aid as a means to restore democratic institutional rules, thus allowing Hun Sen’s government continued intimidation. Placing conditions on the use of aid has both short- and long-term consequences for political and economic stability. These effects are not uniformly recognized, and need to be carefully examined prior to withholding aid as a means to pressure the recipient governments. In Haiti, half of $2.8 billion pledged in 1995 was cancelled because the government failed to comply with required economic reforms that were not popular among the population. A cutback of aid originally earmarked for police reform severely undermined institution-building efforts in the security sector. Many longterm programs supported by assistance in administrative reform are crucial to the success of democratic transition and, if halted, would jeopardize future political progress. If aid underpins efforts to alleviate extreme poverty, sanctions could have serious humanitarian consequences and heighten social tensions. Both international support and sanctions have to balance potential negative and positive impacts on various sectors. In the interim transitional period, there is an ample opportunity for international powers to seek to affect the balance of power among local actors, but such efforts require a clear understanding of what the international community can achieve in a given local setting. In Afghanistan, aid to warlords may have yielded some influence over their behavior, but the flow of aid from the outside has thus far strengthened the power of warlords who control major provinces due to the country’s decentralized structure.2 Humanitarian and other types of economic assistance have been channeled through local authorities because of the continuing fighting and the inadequate protection available to foreign aid workers. Local communities and donors do not always have the same expectations. International donors, in particular, bilateral donors, have proved reluctant to provide adequate funding to programs for developing human rights institutions, in part, because they have preferred less controversial programs such as economic reform. For foreign actors, the driving motive may not necessarily be of a moral or legal nature but cost-benefit management of regional conflicts. For instance, one of the incentives behind donor support for local police and security sector reform is to reduce the high cost of international peacekeeping personnel (Daudelin and Seymour 2002). In the effort to create a new multiethnic national police force in Afghanistan, a coordination office was launched in February 2002 with a German pledge of $8 million. An intervener’s priorities shape its perceptions of desirable roles associated with moral and political obligations. However, the allocation of international funding in different sectors needs to be tailored to different challenges arising from particular contexts. Reflecting on the past legacy of

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struggles with leftist governments in Central America, the U.S. government was willing to donate $2 billion to assist economic recovery and democratic institution building in the aftermath of the 1990 elections in Nicaragua. No matter how deeply third parties are involved, the participation of local groups is essential, given the external experts’ unfamiliarity with the local culture, languages, social structure, and past political history. Further, the power and moral authority of external actors is limited, owing to their inevitable short-term presence and commitment. International agencies have different attitudes, however, toward building a partnership with local actors. By superseding various local activities, the human rights work of ONUSAL actually undermined the contributions made by NGOs and the Catholic Church in El Salvador, which were the main advocates of victims of government abuses during the civil war period. Local support is critical for the accomplishment of nation-building tasks, and a self-sustaining process will not be generated insofar as a strong perception about Western domination exists. For example, the foundation for local ownership of confidence building, security, and reconstruction in Afghanistan has been undermined by heavy external interference in military and political arrangements and a lack of genuine efforts to improve living standards (Weinberger 2002). The International Security Assistance Force has vastly operated with Western strategic interests, being susceptible to local and regional challenges. When local priorities in reconstruction and rehabilitation are not taken into account adequately, an unhealthy dependency is likely to emerge. This is especially problematic because foreign intervention is planned as temporary, and eventual disengagement is inevitable. Mutual support between local and international elements can be based on the mixture of different backgrounds and skills. Local capacity building, for its part, faces difficulties because of the underdeveloped nature of civil societies and weak administrative structures. Local groups that are essential in a peaceful transition have to be supported by foreign agencies, especially when they do not have technical and financial capacities to carry out their own programs.

Modalities of Intervention Diverse types of roles and degrees of outside intervention are affected by such factors as internal conflict dynamics, including the power balance between former adversaries, the level of trust, and the capacities of local populations. Maintaining security, as a short-term goal, can fall on the shoulders of international actors. Where there is deep political mistrust, a third party may get involved in facilitating the renegotiation of a timetable for crisis management, as seen in Mozambique and El Salvador. Large,

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dominating, intrusive missions along with heavy military presence were introduced to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo where national and local civil organizations had ceased to function under the heavy weight of violent conflict. International activities have been expanded to maintain public order and support socioeconomic programs. In contrast with a minimalist approach, limited to cease-fires and restoring order, a maximalist approach is extended to development, public administration, and human rights protection, going beyond strengthening popular trust and confidence (Goodhand and Atkinson 2001). With the existence of reliable administrative structures supported by community groups, rebuilding a physical infrastructure may simply require outside technical support. However, international assistance is critical when local organizations do not have the technical and material capacities to meet both immediate and long-term community needs. A low level of public confidence in the local administrative authorities can be compensated for by more intensive support and assistance as was the case in Cambodia. In the absence of legitimate political authority, external intervention becomes a key element in managing the implementation of the settlement. Before the creation of a reliable political structure, the tasks of peacebuilding lie in the interface between police function on the one hand and public administration on the other, as observed in Kosovo and East Timor. A powerful UN verification role is critical in any peace settlement that involves significant institutional reform and political change. The UN special representative can have extensive review power over the activities of local administrators and help draft election laws. In the case of Cambodia, government agencies were not trusted, so the election process was organized and managed by the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Before the election, more importantly, UNTAC’s civil administration unit was involved in overseeing government functions as well as monitoring human rights conditions. When the local administration is in disarray, more direct international control needs to be authorized even to the point of allowing UN observers to set up and monitor local authority. Due to the collapse of the domestic administrative infrastructure, the UN administration took responsibility for rebuilding, from scratch, coherent judicial and legal systems for East Timor and Kosovo (Strohmeyer 2001). The international administration in BosniaHerzegovina has an overriding power to determine national or local policy decisions and even dismiss personnel. International intervention can also develop partnership arrangements to support certain functions of local administration. If an established government is acceptable to opposition groups and maintains a proper administrative structure, the role of international agencies is oriented toward assistance instead of having direct con-

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trol (e.g., El Salvador). When the incumbent government is able to carry out reforms, funds can be promised as incentives to promote reform instead of intrusive intervention (Pugh 2000b). The characteristics of international involvement are significantly influenced by the nature of local political balance. In scale and size, UN functions in Guatemala were much smaller than ONUSAL dispatched to El Salvador in 1992. In Guatemala, the burden of executing the 1997 peace accord belonged to the government; the UN’s limited intervention was due, in part, to a lack of resources. More significantly, the UN was able to take only a minimal role there due to the fact that even though the military conflict had been protracted for more than two decades (albeit with low intensity), the guerrilla presence was smaller in Guatemala than in El Salvador when the peace accord was nearing completion. As a consequence, the guerrilla group Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) had less leverage over government policies than El Salvador’s FMLN, which played a more decisive role in determining the terms of implementation. The factors influencing the nature of international intervention include the level of commitments and capacity of major political forces to abide by the agreed-upon rules. Achieving security reform in South Africa did not invite significant external intervention, compared with the Mozambique case, in which external pressure was critical in gaining compliance. Negotiations for elections and demobilization were rather challenging in Mozambique, given uncertainty surrounding competition between the two main parties. External support and pressure are necessary to provide assurances for demobilization and fair elections especially in the midst of suspicion and ambivalence. In the case of Namibia, the black opposition was poised to win majority rule, and its leaders were eager to move quickly to elections instead of wasting time arguing about the abusive power of the transitional administration. Civil-Military Coordination In a number of postconflict environments, peacekeeping has been expanded beyond its traditional functions to activities that support disarming, demobilizing, reconstituting armed forces, and overseeing elections, while being concerned with the protection of civilian populations or relief agencies and supplies, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, and Cambodia. Military roles are far less monolithic with the demand for a multiplicity of functions beyond patrols for ensuring compliance with a cease-fire agreement. Military forces, by default, undertook civilian tasks such as humanitarian relief and public administration in Kosovo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and East Timor until the establishment of civilian authorities.

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Variations in the compositions and mandates of troops have an impact on the readjustment of military operations to the functions of civilian organizations. The challenges of working in an uncertain social environment are new to traditional military forces, whose main targets are clearly defined enemies. In humanitarian disasters, the military occasionally has to take on tasks similar to those done by relief agencies. With such expanded mandates, the success of military operations is affected by the quality of collaboration with UN administration and aid agencies. Because of distinctive differences in decisionmaking styles and organizational structures, unified operations have not been easy to achieve. In general, the military’s well-defined lines of authority are not compatible with the decentralized decisionmaking of civilian agencies. The differences in operational modes are also reflected in different perceptions of each other’s roles. In UNOSOM II, for instance, the military expected civilian agencies to support the enforcement of order, but the civilian agencies wanted the military’s role to be supplementary to their task of delivering aid. Barriers to successful coordination arise, in part, from markedly distinctive organizational cultures in regard to attitudes toward authority and decision-making styles. In military operations, decisions are made in a top-down mode with finite deadlines, and the rules of engagement guide all parts of the structure from senior decisionmakers to soldiers on the ground. Whereas the military has clear and well-defined lines of authority within a hierarchical structure, civilian operations are usually decentralized within a relatively flat authority structure (Winslow 2002). Given their involvement in community-level projects, development agencies promote collaborative decisionmaking. The operation by the military chain of command is not based on consensus, nor a collaborative working relationship. Neither the head of the UN public administration nor a force commander has the ability to effectively control independent NGO activities, which are guided by informal management styles. As far as humanitarian assistance is concerned, NGOs can adapt more easily to a sudden rise in civilian needs on the ground than military operations relying on articulate mission objectives.3 In order to assist the same population and pursue the same objectives effectively, military units and civilian agencies have to coordinate their actions at both tactical and strategic levels. In a traditional peacekeeping setting, the role of soldiers was limited to maintaining buffer zones. However, technical, logistical, and security concerns are interwoven in the work of both the military and aid agencies that are responsible for organizing the return of refugees or delivering basic necessities to a population under threat. Parallel functions can be better coordinated through the deployment of military lawyers, doctors, education consultants, and communication and transportation technicians along with the troops.

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One of the most effective ways to manage civil-military relations is to appoint a liaison military officer to the civilian humanitarian coordination office. The designation of a development and humanitarian coordinator can facilitate mutual agreements between military and civilian organizations on basic questions of the means and ends of operations. The military can support civilian administrative headquarters run under the direction of a lead agency such as the UNDP, as in the operation in Rwanda in 1994. In a more common model (applied to Namibia, Cambodia, East Timor, and other places), both security and reconstruction efforts are under the supervision of a single overarching authority. In the UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia, dispatched in 1989–1990, for instance, military components were subordinate to a single head of the entire operation appointed by the Secretary-General. As development and peacekeeping are brought under a united leadership, communication between civilian administrators and military commanders has been improved. In Cambodia, joint civil-military coordinating groups successfully managed the challenges of maintaining security and holding elections despite threats from the Khmer Rouge. Whereas UNTAC’s military unit was assigned to high- and medium-risk areas to support electoral preparations, civilians in the areas of lower risk were protected by UN police observers. This type of coordination was more difficult in the Bosnian operation introduced following the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, due to the separation of NATO, which contributed the majority of forces for peacekeeping, from the civilian administrative function (Williams 1998). Cooperation has also been difficult in Kosovo operations with the institutional separation of military functions; NATO was in charge of preserving security while the UN administered humanitarian, development, and civil society capacity-building programs with the support of the NGO community. The NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) operates outside the UN Mission in Kosovo’s structure, reporting directly to NATO headquarters in Brussels; the national contingents get instructions from their own governments. In the absence of supervision over both civil and military offices by one person, Civil-Military Cooperation Centers can fulfill coordination functions. Although a unified command is difficult to achieve, in practice, an elaborate system of committees may be created at village, provincial, and national levels. Local diplomacy may have to become largely the military’s responsibility without an effective civilian administrative structure. For instance, the commander of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia (1992–1995) assumed diplomatic and public relations roles since no ranking civilian counterparts stayed in Sarajevo. When coordination efforts are not effective at a higher level, individual national contingents can coordi-

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nate military support for food distribution and other humanitarian work. In Somalia, Australian forces established their own civil-military operation team in order to improve communication with local elders, NGOs, and UN political officers (Patman 1997).

Coordinating Authorities In response to a demand for more organized leadership, a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) was endowed with the authority for the overall coordination of UN operations. Prior to the UNTAG in Namibia, commanders of peacekeeping forces operating under a UN mandate acted as de facto heads of the entire missions and carried out negotiations with the assistance of political advisers. However, more recently it has become the norm for the civilian component to be responsible for the integral nature of UN operations, including social rehabilitation, aid coordination, political and legal affairs, and the promotion of human rights. A Special Representative designated by the Secretary-General now has the authority to manage complex UN activities involving peacekeeping in most postconflict operations. The responsibilities of the SRSG include “mobilizing the support of the operational funds and programs for humanitarian and development activities” (Whaley 1997, p. 116). For drawing political, civil, and military elements together with a common approach, the SRSG should have the ability to effectively manage complex organizations. Possessing negotiation and political skills is critical to overcoming crisis and finding resources for infrastructure building. Years of experience in political negotiation are desirable; SRSGs are recruited from among lifelong UN officials, former diplomats, and army generals who have diverse backgrounds, experience, and expertise. A varied set of skills is required to respond effectively to a situation that may change unexpectedly. In a country where not all factions welcome the UN presence, the SRSG has to be careful not to be perceived as interfering with a one-sided attitude. In order to develop the zones for delivery of relief and regional reconciliation, the SRSG of UNOSOM I, Mohamed Sahnoun, an experienced Algerian diplomat, pursued dialogue with warlords, clan elders, and women’s representatives. SRSG Felix DownesThomas in Liberia had to face the challenges of mobilizing international assistance and communicate with the government despite the UN Security Council’s imposition of sanctions on the Charles Taylor regime in March 2001. The SRSG had to appeal for urgent assistance for basic health services and agriculture in a crisis situation caused by renewed fighting and international sanctions.

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Good reputations have been built by SRSG Martti Ahtisaari (Namibia), Aldo Ajello (Mozambique), Lakhdar Brahimi (Afghanistan), Sergio Vieira de Mello (Kosovo and East Timor), and Bernard Kouchner (Kosovo) as successful top UN representatives in reconstituting administrative structures and mobilizing international support. Martti Ahtisaari gained a reputation for successfully overseeing the Namibia mission’s planning and subsequent implementation. While his main task was to be in charge of thirty-five hundred civilians, of whom close to half were hired for the civilian police force, he cultivated trust relations with the local population. In keeping to the timetable set for elections, the SRSG had a critical role in skillfully managing the clash between the South Africa–appointed administration and SWAPO supporters. The work of monitoring and preventing violence depended on a network of district officers reporting on political developments. By informing the local population of the nature of the UN mandate, the SRSG was able to obtain their support for the legitimacy of UNTAG. The quality of leadership and external support affect the role and power of the Special Representative. Compared with the achievements of the SRSG for Mozambique, who effectively put pressure on the RENAMO leader not to pull his party out before the election, the ineffectiveness of the Special Representative in Angola could be attributed to a lack of international support as well as difficulties related to controlling local factions. The UN SRSG in Mozambique (1992–1994), Aldo Ajello, was able to control local situations better by participating in supervisory and monitoring commissions that included major antagonists. Despite the demand for more international intervention, the second UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II, 1991–1995) was not able to expand its functions beyond observing and verifying the national elections with limited personnel and resources. Insufficient international support constrained the role of the SRSG in changing local conflict dynamics in a meaningful way. Dual Authority Structures Overseeing the implementation of the Dayton Agreement in 1995, the Bosnian operation is based on an ad hoc, multiagency structure. The heavy presence of international organizations with different mandates has complicated coordination. A dual coordinating structure by Western allies and the UN resulted in multiple layers of authorities and responsibilities divided among different agencies. The High Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement was in charge of overall coordination and monitoring of civilian aspects of the operation. Contrary to the majority of UNheaded missions, the authority of the SRSG in Bosnia-Herzegovina was

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limited to the supervision of UN functions in human rights, demining, and policing. Although the World Bank and IMF were responsible for economic stabilization programs, humanitarian and development issues have become a main focus of UNDP, UNICEF, and other UN specialized agencies. Various activities in the military security arenas have been coordinated by the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR). In support of Western allies, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) took over the overall administrative function instead of the SRSG and is solely responsible for the ad hoc Peace Implementation Council based in London.4 The High Representative was given the final authority to interpret any aspects of the peace agreement on the return of displaced persons and refugees, humanitarian assistance, and the election process. The office also had the authority to dismiss public officials who did not comply with the Dayton Peace Agreement. The Office of the High Representative, in fact, forced the resignation of several federation government agency officials and issued decisions amending federation laws on fund management and employment. However, the critical test of OHR authority comes from the challenge of an undemocratic nationalist elite whose power depends on the resistance to any change in the gains they obtained during wartime. The military and political organizations in the Croatian part of Bosnia-Herzegovina exercise direct control over local communities through taxation and confiscation of production facilities. The European Union administration’s attempt to reorganize the administrative district in Mostar was met by resistance from Croats. Control of extreme elements that challenge the decisions of the High Representative needs to be supported by NATO contingents, but the military force was not effectively employed to back this administrative decision, instead simply avoiding violent confrontation with local thugs.5 Despite the designation of a High Representative for coordinating authority, various agencies have managed to maintain autonomy: the office of the SRSG was engaged in civilian police reform and human rights protection; the special envoy of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees paid major attention to repatriation and settlement of returnees; and the OSCE chief was in charge of conducting elections. Moreover, the civilian administration had no authority over NATO troops. Thus it has been difficult for the High Representative to develop a long-term, coherent strategy, since the office is not endowed with any centralized authority. The SRSG is responsible for managing the three major components of the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), comprised of the International Police Task Force (IPTF), Civil Affairs, and the Mine Action Center. The coordinating function of the SRSG also extended to other UN activities in the areas of humanitarian relief and refugees, human rights,

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elections, and rehabilitation of infrastructure. Interagency meetings were organized on a monthly basis to exchange information and coordinate overall UN activities with those of other international actors, especially the Office of the High Representative. Division of Functions In UN-sponsored operations in Cambodia, Kosovo, and East Timor, the role and capacity of the SRSG as a chief administrator were recognized in the supervision of the international civil presence. The single authority of the SRSG Yasushi Aksashi’s office provided institutional and structural simplicity to the Cambodian mission in guiding and supervising war termination. Members of the directorate of the SRSG included officers representing different agencies in charge of reconstruction and rehabilitation. The Civil Administration of UNTAC focused on macroeconomic fiscal management and control of natural resources. In the coordination of UN activities, the Resident Coordinator system of the operational activities for development served as a useful force to counter pressures for fragmentation. As a counterbalance to military and political operations, the UN Resident Coordinator has become responsible for harmonizing a response to development challenges at a country level (Santiso 2002). The Resident Coordinator may informally serve as deputy to the SRSG for humanitarian and development activities when a more integrated high-level coordination function is demanded. The Resident Coordinator of the UN system (also serving as the Resident Representative for the UNDP) was named as second in command at the UN Mission in Haiti. In the division of labor with the SRSG, long-term development programs have been left with the Resident Coordinator of UN agencies. As we have seen in East Timor, the UNDP Representative is, by default, more actively involved in daily operations when the SRSG is a political appointee without significant management experience. With their experiences in the field, UNDP Resident Representatives ensured the proper management of development assistance in East Timor, Rwanda, Haiti, and other countries. The office integrated the UNDP’s work in improving coordination between the government and donors in support of regional and grassroots development initiatives. In the absence of an SRSG, the Resident Representative plays the main coordinating role in his or her capacity as the Resident Coordinator. However, this role, limited to a functional focus, is contrasted with the political and managerial functions of an SRSG office. Since Resident Representatives perceive their UNDP role as being apolitical, managing political conflicts tends to be avoided. Due to their nonpolitical orientation, UNDP Resident Representatives are more likely to consult or delegate authority to the

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Department of Political Affairs at the UN headquarters (UNDP 1999). If it is warranted, they would initiate dialogue of a political nature in their capacity as UN Resident Coordinator.

Institutional Politics Overlapping boundaries between agencies seems to be inevitable, since many organizations tend to go beyond their areas of competence with the development of multiple functions. For instance, the main areas of expertise of the UNDP and UNICEF have been long-term social and economic development, but these agencies have recently been involved in relief work that addresses short-term humanitarian emergencies. In addition, the UNDP considers fostering human rights as an essential component of meeting long-term social needs. Coordination has been relatively easy in the more technical areas of elections and development assistance. The OSCE is the lead agency in organizing and holding elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo, but collaborative efforts involve the UN Civil Police, UNHCR, and SFOR in the registration and protection of voters. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, cooperative relations between the Office of the High Representative and other agencies such as OSCE and UNHCR have been imperative for the successful management of elections. The NATO Stabilization Force (and its predecessor, the International Enforcement Force, known as IFOR) provided the OSCE with logistical and technical support such as transporting ballot boxes to polling stations. Economic and social reconstruction is difficult to coordinate through the clear chain of command that is common in war zones. Various international agencies and NGOs resist any attempts to impose external authority over them and do not want to sacrifice their autonomy, making centralization difficult. In Angola, the UN coordinating body on humanitarian affairs maintained its distance from UNAVEM III, while NGOs wanted to ensure their autonomy of action from UN coordinating offices (Alden 2001). Since coordination has to reflect functional interdependencies, leadership lies in the capacity to orchestrate a coherent response and mobilize the key actors around common objectives and set priorities. The maximization of efforts fails when many organizations take simultaneous action to achieve opposing goals. Incompatibilities between activities may derive from different organizational goals, values, and cultures. As a coordinating agency, the UNDP was involved in mobilizing funds to carry out key areas of the peace accords in El Salvador, but these programs were undermined by the National Reconstruction Program (NRP), which

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was designed by the international financial institutions. Even though the UN designed the Salvadoran peace process, the World Bank and IMF did not properly consult with the UNDP and other agencies on the financial implications of the NRP’s economic austerity measures. Funds need to be mobilized to cover the large expenses of land transfer, demobilization, and judicial, military, and police reform through donor meetings. Fiscal constraints often imposed by IMF austerity programs put pressure on the local population. Although it is important to tackle monetary and budgetary issues, a program of macroeconomic stability needs to be counterbalanced with projects that focus on the development and rehabilitation initiatives of the UNDP, UNICEF, and other agencies. Ineffective coordination among organizations can be attributed to institutional competition and overlap. Turf battles contribute to the exclusion of particular actors from the provision of external assistance, creating suspicion and contentious relations. The prominent role of ECOWAS embedded in the peacekeeping operations was undermined by the dominant role of nonregional donors in election and reconstruction activities in Liberia. Suspicion was born with Western attempts to exert their own political economic influence at the expense of regional actors; the ability of ECOWAS and especially Nigeria to introduce democratic governance in West Africa was questioned by European and U.S. donors. The effects of African political-military intervention declined especially during the election phase of peacebuilding, complicating the intricate work of keeping sustainable order.

Organizational Imperatives Many international agencies have undergone adjustments of their organizational functions to cultivate competence in nontraditional areas of expertise. As new tasks have been embarked upon, organizational culture and structures have been adapted to incorporate new operational goals. Since external assistance influences relations between adversaries, the planning of development projects now has to consider components of protection of human rights and reconciliation. The UNDP role has been broadened beyond traditional development assistance to include political reform. Its role has been more visible especially when development has become an important concern in dealing with sources of conflict. The UNDP’s overriding concern has been to reduce the risk of a recurrence of conflict. Human rights and rehabilitation, as well as relief work designed to address short-term humanitarian needs, have become as important as technical assistance in fiscal management.

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The UNDP played a unique role in the peacebuilding processes following the 1992 accord in El Salvador, the 1996 Guatemalan accord, and the 1990 transitional elections in Nicaragua. It strengthened the monitoring capabilities of the human rights ombudsman in El Salvador through technical and logistical assistance. The UNDP, along with the Nordic countries, cofinanced the truth commissions of El Salvador and Guatemala, set up to shed light on cases of impunity. The UN agency also got involved in reforming security and civilian police forces as well as in projects to enhance legal protection and penal defense in several Central American countries. Drawing on its Central American experience in the early 1990s, the UNDP has expanded its programs of state reform and reconciliation to countries in other regions, including Burundi. The new operational orientations have been, to a certain extent, handicapped by the existing organizational culture, which resists involvement in “nonfunctional” matters of reform. The accustomed emphasis on technical aspects of institutional reform is ascribed to the agency’s focus on efficiency in economic and administrative control of national governments at all levels. Therefore, state reform has been geared toward increasing the competence and effectiveness of public agencies rather than emphasizing political accountability. The limitations of depoliticizing public administration are reflected in judicial reform projects that tend to prioritize efficiency in the administration of justice but fail to pay sufficient attention to the substance of judicial justice (Santiso 2002). The disjuncture between policy and political orientations is inevitable, since UNDP coordinators have been discouraged from participating in negotiations that entail political implications. The failure to integrate political analysis and technical assessments has consequently inhibited a more effective translation of policy guidelines into operational strategies. Policy frameworks should emerge from strategic-level considerations instead of ad hoc rationalization of new operational developments. In 1994 the UNDP established the Emergency Response Division (ERD) as a central unit that builds and shares knowledge in postconflict reconstruction (UNDP and UNPF 2001). Its main function is to monitor countries in special development circumstances and to lend assistance to the UN Resident Coordinators. The establishment of specialized administrative units coincided with the introduction of democratic governance to the UNDP’s core mission. Since development projects are often implemented in a politically sensitive environment, ignoring the political implications of even technical assistance has proven imprudent. Tensions can arise between human rights and democracy programs due to their different skill sets and approaches. Whereas democratization support activities cultivate a working relationship with local authorities, support for human rights involves responding to complaints against local offi-

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cials. This issue has become critical for the OSCE, which coordinates matters relating to democratic institution building, legal reform, and human rights at the same time. The organization’s democratization unit was engaged in developing the capacity of political parties and NGOs with an emphasis on women’s participation. On the other hand, major responsibilities of the human rights division encompass verification of individual and group rights violations. Human rights investigations may lead to confrontation with abusive authorities and actors. The duplication of programs between the rule of law and judicial affairs programs is related to the OSCE’s ambiguous division of labor in its Balkan operations. The Rule of Law Division is responsible for monitoring judicial proceedings, training judges and prosecutors as well as creating an ombudsman’s office. Its Kosovo operation was devoted to monitoring the compliance of international human rights standards in legal and judicial applications, which is also covered by the judicial affairs program. A more unified approach to institutional reform would not be achieved in the absence of proper consultation and harmonization among units within the same organization (O’Neill 2002). In international civil police operations, contingents coming from different countries have been put under the same command structure (Hansen 2002). Diverse policing practices within the International Police Task Force (IPTF) of the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina are ascribed to the multiple composition of the IPTF’s 2,057 international civilian police officers, coming from forty-three countries. The entire operation could have been improved by harmonizing the plethora of police cultures and policing concepts represented in UN CIVPOL contingents. In Bosnia, El Salvador, and elsewhere, disparities in practices and rivalries between technical advisers have been a source of confusion and reduced efficiency. Varied orientations to police ethics, standards, and techniques are not something unexpected given the discord and lack of communication among donor agencies. In addition, an endeavor to foster a more standardized training program has been obstructed by the turnover of senior police officers and other personnel and their replacement with persons who have little previous experience. Subsequently, trainees were given inconsistent advice on human rights protection and policing skills such as evidence treatment.

Coordinating Structures Coordination structures have to be adapted to support the needs of parallel functions performed by a multitude of actors with different types of

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resources. The overall process is hampered by the pursuit of inconsistent agendas by an array of international actors, especially in vast and decentralized countries such as the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, or Afghanistan. Organizational cultures and operating strategies are often shaped by the logistical requirements of mission objectives. Relief agencies tend to adopt more centralized approaches in response to the immediate concerns of repatriation of refugees coupled with tight deadlines. However, development agencies are more oriented toward network building, since they have a longer implementation time span that requires the active participation of local populations. The formulation of various types of arrangements can be utilized to redefine each agency’s functions in the field in the absence of clear leadership embedded in a single entity, while preventing confusion in operational relationships. Complex working relationships can be developed across divisions on elections, human rights, humanitarian relief, and development as well as the military and police. While the UNDP coordinates technical and financial aspects of institution building, UNESCO and ILO provide job education for ex-combatants. UNHCR has been responsible for coordinating and overseeing all humanitarian assistance programs in Kosovo and Cambodia. In Kosovo and other Balkan countries, the OSCE mission was appointed to take the lead role in matters relating to institution building and democratization, the rule of law, and human rights. Vertical and Horizontal Coordination The activities of each actor can be examined in light of the actor’s vertical and horizontal links to the overall organizational networks and infrastructure. Partnerships for coordination can be built either in particular sectoral areas or at an institutional level. Interorganizational coordination must take place at each of the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. At the same time, vertical coordination is needed within implementing agencies and the sector in general. Both vertical and horizontal coordination needs to be established when a large number of organizations are present with diverse responsibilities. In a multifunctional mission with geographical dispersion, there is always a danger of miscommunication if each component reports only to its central headquarters without lateral contact. In the 1993 Cambodian elections, the electoral component benefited from its partnership with information, education, and military units of UNTAC in the organization of registration and voting. Horizontal coordination is necessary to prevent organizations in the same theater of operation from working in isolation or against each other. The quality of an interagency framework at every level has a significant impact on the success or failure of the entire operation. For instance,

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accomplishing relief work and conducting elections require effective coordination of activities at operational and tactical levels. The existence of strategic partnerships among agencies at the headquarters level has a positive impact on the quality of an interagency framework in lower-level implementation. Since UNHCR requires more support of the military components than do other civilian agencies, a contact relationship between UNHCR and peacekeeping operations is established not only at a headquarters level but also at field office levels through a joint civil-military task force. Coordination is most likely to be sought by agencies that benefit from cooperation. In the event of a decentralized decisionmaking structure at the higher levels, collaborative arrangements can be developed on an ad hoc basis at the operational and tactical levels. In order to ensure carrying out a coherent strategy, the “coordination of activities within a mission presupposes a certain unity of command” (Mockaitis 1999, p. 135). Vertical coordination can take place across levels, passing the local wealth of knowledge to the higher-level agencies in support of strategic decisionmaking. In terms of vertical policy coordination, there are different ways strategic-level decisionmaking translates into operational tasks. Provincial offices can be staffed by public security, finance, human rights, and other officers. For example, twenty-one offices of the UNTAC civil administration set up at every provincial level in Cambodia in July 1992 consisted of four to six officers for each office, although human rights or financial officers were not made available in some provinces. Operation through vertical communication lines enhances the ability to harmonize the functions at international, regional, and local offices. Peacekeeping commanders may need to communicate with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) headquarters in New York in order to clarify ambiguities in priorities. UNTAC force commander General John Sanderson was left alone to negotiate operational and logistical matters without adequate support from New York when the UN headquarters was preoccupied with Somalia and Bosnia. To overcome command and control challenges, a small office staffed by UNTAC personnel had to engage in communication functions between the force commander and DPKO (Kim and Metrikas 1997). Diverse implementation arrangements can be made to complement different specialties. For instance, mine clearance priorities were set largely to meet requirements for the return of refugees through consultation between UNHCR and UNTAC in the overall framework of rebuilding Cambodia. At the field level, local as well as international NGOs were contracted to clear roads and several hundred villages of mines in time for the repatriation and migration of refugees. The UN coordinating experience in Cambodia is contrasted with the lack of a clear division of roles between agencies in El

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Salvador. ONUSAL was not adequately empowered to tender the necessary technical and material assistance, while the UNDP was not entrusted with sufficient capacity to provide immediate logistical support for FMLN combatants concentrated in demobilization camps following the cease-fire. Vertical-level coordination can be more easily organized by agencies that have the logistical capacities to operate at a field level. Especially when a mounting need of field operations (as in Kosovo and elsewhere) requires a quick and massive deployment, a limited budget and personnel shortages become obstacles to taking a prominent role. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) used to be a primary actor in all human rights activities in Kosovo, maintaining an office in Pristina prior to the start of the NATO air campaign. However, the UNHCHR lost the coordinating opportunity to the OSCE following multilateral deployment in Kosovo due to its insufficient field-level staff. Operating outside the structure of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), the UNHCHR seized opportunities to work with flexibility and freedom on issues that would have been difficult for UNMIK to handle. The UNHCHR was mandated to cover the entire former Yugoslavia, and it rendered its role visible by investigating the Kosovo Albanians detained in Serbia proper through its office in Belgrade (O’Neill 2002). A country framework has been adopted to promote collaboration with the main UN coordinating offices. In areas of police development, which are considered more technical than political, multiple agencies have been involved in different countries. Police programs should be embedded in the overall UN country operation, since police reform cannot be achieved without consideration of the overall country mission objectives. The OSCE supported police development programs in the Eastern Slovanian region of Croatia and also trained the new local Kosovar police in cooperation with UNMIK. In Somalia, the UNDP provided assistance to the Northwest Somalia Police Force as one of the earliest and most central steps in bringing the region back to a situation of law and order. This program was designed as part of the original UNOSOM II plan that was supposed to establish a police force at national, regional, and district levels along with assistance in training, communications, and mobility capabilities (Halim 1997). Strategic-Level Coordination Strategic-level decisions are oriented toward not only a balance between different sectors but also the arrangements within a given sector. Especially in the interorganizational framework of the UN, it has been common to have various coordinating structures suitable for institutional partnerships

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forged in particular functional areas. Due to the blurred divisions along the relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction continuum, close functional links have been formed among the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, relief agencies, and the UNDP. As a result of this recognition, the Department of Humanitarian Affairs was designated to exercise its role as the focal point, in particular, for the consolidation of UN humanitarian assistance with the administrative and technical support of an Interagency Standing Committee. Functional cooperation depends upon better understanding of different organizational cultures, technical approaches, and expertise. Longer-term development projects of the UNDP must be harmonized with short-term humanitarian priorities of the UNHCR in joint planning of transition activities from relief to infrastructure building. The support of the World Food Programme, the International Labour Organization, and other agencies was necessary for UNDP programs in Cambodia and El Salvador that focused on repairing roads, constructing reservoirs and medical centers, and providing seeds. Different types of expertise, based on theoretical, legal, and technical knowledge, complement each other. For instance, technical investigations by the police need to draw on civilian knowledge of international legal standards and political contexts. Reflecting on this functional necessity, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has assisted in training national police forces and its UN CIVPOL components in a diverse legal, cultural, and political context. UN CIVPOL has comprehensive implementation structures, but its work needs to be supported by the UNHCHR, especially in identifying international legal standards. Different expectations about setting up working relationships make coordination among agencies difficult. Interagency dialogue promotes a mutual understanding of differences in organizational norms, values, and beliefs. This is important especially because each international agency operates according to its own understanding of the situation, intervention policies, and practice. Despite recent reform efforts and considerable improvements in cross-departmental collaboration, the work of UN agencies remains compartmentalized. Departments, funds, and programs of the UN are highly turf-sensitive and resistant to close collaboration in their core areas of competence. For strategic-level decisionmaking at UN headquarters, country task forces meet regularly under DPKO chairmanship to coordinate actions (Moore 2000). More specific implementation strategies across vast mandates at a country level are, however, generally developed by the SRSG’s executive committee, including a principal deputy SRSG and the heads of humanitarian and other programs. The SRSG is also supported by a team of political, gender, and human rights advisers and a press office as well as a

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strategic planning unit. The level and types of coordination of activities within the civil sector as well as between civilian and military functions can have an impact on strategic decisionmaking. In the Kosovo operation, not only activities within the civil sector but also functional relationships between civil sectors and Kosovo Force (KFOR) have been redefined since the establishment of the SRSG. UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) staff were largely marginalized once a small team of political advisers to SRSG Bernard Kouchner (July 1999–January 2001) was formed. Yet the DPA people knew not only the key local players but also their relative strengths and degree of support within Kosovar society. DPA officials had extensive expertise and contacts based on their investigation of the ethnic conflict over the years, but the expertise of the DPA on local politics in Kosovo was not utilized. UNMIK did not benefit from the accumulated work of the DPA on the human rights situation, in general, and the Kosovo Liberation Army’s questionable commitment to human rights and the rule of law, in particular. Consequently, the quality of decisions by the SRSG and his team in Pristina suffered from dependence on less valuable information even known to the public (O’Neill 2002). The isolation of the DPA in Kosovo represents the turf battles that arise in the establishment of local administrative structures. Since peacekeeping in Kosovo is under NATO rather than UN command, the DPKO does not necessarily oversee UNMIK. Local administrative units have not been able to incorporate the policy assessment and information that was available to the DPA. It may need to be recognized that the DPA is more capable of making strategic decisions within a politically fluid situation affected by hostilities and mistrust. Tactical-Level Operation Having the capacity to gather information firsthand or to affect events directly is essential to any kind of field operations. Thus the ability of international interveners to control local situations is, to a great extent, determined by the degrees of each organization’s presence in the field. National-level coordination focuses on the management of overall aspects of operation rather than action on individual issues. The administrative structure of many international agencies does not always penetrate beyond the main regional offices. Peacekeeping and civilian police maintain a strong presence in many local towns and villages since their major tasks cannot be accomplished without daily operations at a community level. Military operations keep large areas under close observation through regular patrols. The UN civilian police have stations dispersed to the lowest level and accompany local police on patrol.

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To monitor human rights and political and socioeconomic conditions, staff of UN Civil Affairs were assigned with their civilian police colleagues at a village level in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The OSCE played a more prominent role in Kosovo by maintaining a strong field presence. Human rights field officers interviewed victims, gathered and verified incidents of violence against minorities, and submitted weekly reports (often circulated among the international press and agencies). In particular, the Human Rights Department was credited with discovering patterns of Albanian violence against other ethnic groups, indicating that this was systematically organized and frequently involved Kosovo Liberation Army leaders and fighters (O’Neill 2002). Some agencies rely more heavily on other agencies for accomplishing their operational goals. In recognition of its traditional work of protecting the rights of refugees, the UNHCR has been designated as a lead agency for assisting war victims. Because UNHCR protection officers lack resources to deal with a large number of interpersonal and intercommunal problems, an effective response to these matters is beyond the capability of a single organization. In its Balkan operations, the UNHCR developed extensive collaborative relationships with other agencies that have logistical capabilities at a local level. In responding to abuse of refugees, the UNHCR benefited from human rights reports of OSCE regional offices, and it depended on the IPTF and SFOR for the safety of returning refugees. The UNHCR also relied on other agencies to identify new returnees in local areas where it had little presence. Housing projects for returnees were supported by the UNDP, and they were implemented at the community level through contracts with NGOs. Translation of strategic decisions into implementation at the operational and tactical levels is not easy for organizations that do not have a pervasive command structure. Although international field officers of the OSCE and other major agencies have a wide variety of managerial, legal, and policy implementation skills, the small number of officers in regional offices restricts the level of their intervention. Language barriers and cultural differences also remain obstacles to the operation of many offices at the local level. In general, organizations in charge of military and police missions reach all the way down to the tactical level. The operational functions of administrative agencies such as the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, however, do not penetrate effectively beyond regional offices. To have a direct impact, international agencies depend on experienced NGOs that have skills to set up a local infrastructure in a short time (Last 2000). Peacebuilding initiatives are made more effective by a coherent campaign plan that incorporates skilled NGOs and utilizes their contacts embodied at the grassroots level. Due to the limitations of major international organiza-

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tions in reaching local communities, NGOs fill in the gaps between decisionmaking agencies at the center and local communities.

Interagency-Level Coordination The compatibility of field activities can be enhanced by the negotiation of interagency frameworks for action that may lead to establishing task teams on specific issues. Clear structures for coordination are necessary for developing a more formal division of labor among key actors. In the absence of a central coordinating structure, a rudimentary exchange of information is achieved through regular briefing sessions. A simple form of coordination is sharing information, exchanging different views, and consultation among local coordinators of international agencies. The liaison offices of the peacekeeping headquarters, UN civilian police, and the UNHCR can be assigned to each other, holding regular meetings and coordinating policies at an operational level where regional headquarters are located. Differences in the information presented by field offices can be reconciled among the regional office staff. One agency’s goal cannot be easily accomplished without the support and participation of other agencies in common tasks such as elections and refugee returns. In complex operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Cambodia, major agencies have drawn together to prepare for local elections and discuss planning of voter registration, transfer of ballot boxes, security, and other logistics. Successful refugee returns are not possible without close field-level consultation among refugee and humanitarian agencies, military units, and local police. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, this is well demonstrated by the coordination of weekly activities between local UNHCR and OSCE officers, along with the participation of the IPTF and SFOR, in response to an acute problem with Croat resistance to returns of Serb refugees in Drvar, a town in northwest Bosnia-Herzegovina (Jeong and Last 2002). UN Civil Affairs Officers, deployed with their civilian police colleagues in dispersed areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina, supported the activities of the IPTF, SRSG, and the High Representative by monitoring human rights, political, and socioeconomic situations. Alleged human rights violations are also investigated by the OSCE Human Rights Department. Its staff frequently meet with judges, prosecutors, and lawyers in order to support the creation of an independent judiciary. Organizational challenges stem from the tendency of the IPTF to sometimes conduct parallel investigations into human rights abuses by local law enforcement personnel and take action without properly consulting with the Human Rights Office. In order to improve coordination in investigative activities and develop com-

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mon enforcement standards, the Human Rights Office may report to the IPTF commissioner as well as the SRSG (Cordone 2000). Operational agreements at a regional level can be undermined by an inability of the headquarters of various organizations to determine a common policy. Headquarters focus on strategic decisions that are more complex than lower-level tactical operations. Exploration of an effective means of maximizing efforts at the tactical level is made difficult by friction generated in the headquarters of many organizations. Regular meetings organized by the international civic administration, military and security units, development and humanitarian agencies at the national level tend to be less effective than at the lower levels, where good will and support of other agencies are more critical in managing daily operations.

Partnership with NGOs The operational-tactical split between international agencies and NGOs has been particularly common in humanitarian relief and development work. Many NGOs have been given a contractual responsibility for specific programs or activities as implementation partners following recognition of their ability to bring peace and development to war-torn societies through grassroots-level activities. With the colonization of the operational space, in general, large international NGOs are in a position to raise and allocate resources according to their priorities rather than operating under the direct control of government or UN agencies. However, often the majority of NGOs work as either parallel or contracting managers in delivering food, medicine, and building materials as well as providing other services to meet humanitarian and economic needs. Many international NGOs have “acted as conduits through which donors reach local NGOs and civil groups” to support emergency relief and development projects (Peirce and Stubbs 2000, p. 173). Demining activities were initiated by the Dutch branch of Medicins Sans Frontiers in northwest Somalia in 1993 with funding from the UNHCR, the United States, and the EU. With the program’s expansion, later Somali NGOs (comprised of several clan/faction members) were awarded a demining contract. Overall, international agencies and donor countries set general directions by approving and funding projects implemented by NGOs. In the early period of transition prior to the complete withdrawal of ONUMOZ, NGOs managed 60 percent of $160 million of foreign aid for agriculture, health, education, and other related areas. Despite a lack of financial clout, NGOs are favored because of their ability to operate with low costs and recruit highly motivated people. In their coordinated scheme, many small

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NGOs deliver specific goods and services as subcontractors of larger NGOs. Through contacts with the UNHCR on the delivery of basic services for refugees, nongovernmental partners provide packages not only for returnees who need to mend or rebuild houses without roofs, windows, or furniture but also for farmers stripped of tools, seed, and livestock. When returnees face hostility, threats, and intimidation, some NGOs are engaged in unarmed accompaniment, going to their houses and assisting them with repairs (Lister 2003). The presence of an international witness helps deter threats and harassment. Advocate groups support and represent the rights of evicted elderly minority citizens and accompany their clients to local authorities. Legal assistance may be provided for vulnerable pensioners, refugees, and displaced people who have basic questions about their rights and how to pursue them. An extensive legal service network can be mobilized to advise refugees and returnees, and eventually represent them in court. In Banja Luka, Bosnia-Herzegovina, lawyers provided assistance at their offices, and even established a mobile team, dispatched regularly to visit nearby municipalities with a concentration of displaced persons and refugees. International organizations deal mainly with official government institutions, but have less contact with civil society. Their capacity to collect and disseminate information and take action at the tactical level is enhanced by entering into partnership with NGOs that possess valuable information about the relative dependability of local groups and individuals. For NGOs that have long-standing relationships with local communities, it is not difficult to set up logistics for various projects. Such partnerships are not limited to humanitarian and reconstruction work but also exist in the areas of developing civil society. Catholic Relief Services supported parent-teacher dialogue beyond the boundaries of ethnic communities throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. NGOs have provided information that allows IPTF or OSCE human rights officers to follow up on specific incidents of minority harassment (Evans-Kent and Bleiker 2003). The United Methodist Committee on Relief, serving as a partner implementing UNHCR programs, has also developed collaborative relationships with the IPTF and SFOR in identifying new returnees in northwestern Bosnia, where those organizations have low presence. The role of NGOs has been well known through their complementary involvement in UN activities in voter registration, electoral observation, and monitoring. In addition, some Western NGOs conduct programs that support the development of parliamentary rules and procedures, the organization of political parties and civic organizations, and the reform of legal institutions. Programs on local NGO development and the formation of political parties have often been sponsored and supported by the democratization unit of the OSCE and USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives.

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These programs have promoted participatory government and an increased presence of women in the political arena as well as an emphasis on behavioral change. NGOs have unique advantages in civil society building through their conscious efforts to establish relationships between adversarial communities, foster mutual confidence, and provide peaceful mechanisms of dispute resolution (Anderlini et al. 2001). Smaller NGOs have been engaged in reconciliation projects based on interpersonal and intercommunal dialogue. Networks of community groups can be established across ethnic boundaries to explore indigenous knowledge, skills, and attitudes of communities. Both existing and potential groups—such as youth, women, pensioners, displaced people, and refugees—can be organized as local grassroots associations within geographic areas. They can be linked together at the regional level to permit broader understanding and pursue common interests. Major international organizations develop or support local NGOs capable of carrying out projects because the intervention of international staff at the community level faces too many cultural and communication obstacles. The substance of peacebuilding often hinges on conflict resolution skills embedded in knowledge of a particular community. Through a communitycentered model, a mix of local and international facilitators can provide a framework for deploying key interpersonal and organizational skills at the grassroots level. Flexibility in partnership arrangements with NGOs is critical, since their activities cannot be easily judged by rigid organizational models. Donors should not insist too much on institutionally verifiable goals and a standardized format of evaluations with the demand for quick results, especially in sectors oriented toward long-term qualitative changes. Overall, the efficiency of small NGOs depends on a minimum administrative overhead without the necessity of a formal management structure. In the areas of development and civil society building, hierarchical structures with links to central headquarters are less effective at developing appropriate local strategies (Goodhand and Atkinson 2001). Nor is it desirable to manage and control NGOs that can operate autonomously within international mandates. NGOs certainly provide operational advantages, especially for timebound projects, bypassing bureaucratic hurdles and working efficiently through informal arrangements. Despite the presence of its 16,000 troops, the UN administration’s mine-clearing activities in Cambodia were hindered by bureaucratic constraints on insurance and liability. Eventually a mine clearance program was launched by hiring Norwegian NGO personnel whose life and medical insurance benefits were covered by their government. They trained and supervised Cambodian deminers who were contracted by the UNDP.

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Changes in operational culture and organizational structure seem to be inevitable with the expansion of NGO programs. Assistance programs have been adapted to a large framework of relationships between development efforts and war prevention. New priorities of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Save the Children, Oxfam, the Mennonite Central Committee, and the Brethren Service Committee affiliated with peace churches have become economic and social rehabilitation of war-torn societies where government services do not exist. Some programs such as those of Oxfam began to expand their support to demobilization programs in El Salvador and Mozambique. Consolidation of programs should help enhance efficiency of resource management in overlapping areas of legal assistance, business development, or psychosocial counseling. Diverse programs have to serve shared goals, since the limited pool of resources constrains the activities of each project. It is critical that a project take an integrated approach, for instance, by linking the provision of health care and development assistance to community reconciliation. Minority integration and return projects can be more effective when they are supported by health or legal assistance programs. Community reconciliation, intercultural communication, and education can be incorporated into all aspects of social service programs. UN agencies and international aid groups have varying relationships with the local population, depending on their awareness of local social and cultural contexts. For maintaining good relations with local communities, knowledge of the local culture has become a fundamental prerequisite. Familiarity with local people and knowledge comes from the presence of international aid workers in particular localities for an extended period. The resulting knowledge of local society and culture can be used to help efforts for peacebuilding from below. International missions can operate as part of the local environment and become an active element in community building. Familiarity with the local situation helps international aid agencies nurture contact with ordinary citizens and political elites alike in the areas where they are stationed (Sussman and Muliro 2000). The subtleties of short-term alliances among local groups, the strength of kinship relationships, and the nuances of religious differences are all important sources of operational knowledge. It is important to enhance local NGOs’ capabilities, since they eventually have to sustain the programs. Some international NGOs such as Catholic Relief Services normally leave behind trained local NGOs when they depart from the country. For that reason, their staff are mostly constituted by national staff with diverse ethnic backgrounds; for example, only five of its more than seventy staff in Sarajevo are foreign nationals, mostly engaged in technical support. CARE has focused on partnership and insti-

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tutional capacity building of local NGOs for water, health, and income-generation activities. The relations between international and local partners change with the advancement of peacebuilding missions. While international experts play a catalytic and organizing role at the early stage, later their role should move toward training, education, and mentoring instead of direct involvement in daily operations. In carrying out their own programs, local groups have to be supported by foreign agencies that have technical and financial resources. Short-term funding may be used for rebuilding basic infrastructure such as schools and health clinics or for a food-for-work project to be carried out by local NGOs. Many local groups emerge with external funding, as is illustrated by the increase in the number of independent Cambodian NGOs from almost none to over one hundred between the Paris Agreement signing in October 1991 and the withdrawal of UNTAC troops in November 1993. Local groups sometimes include individuals whose primary concern is making money and who have little capacity or experience (Harvey 1998). Limited accountability, corruption, and diversion of funds are challenges to be overcome.

Conclusion Given the complex processes resulting from the involvement of international organizations in peacebuilding, coordination is needed in achieving a defined political goal and operationalizing it. Not only because of limited resources, but also because of the complexities entailed in the involvement of multiple international organizations with different sector specialties and goals, coordination is critical in achieving both political and humanitarian objectives. Owing to the very different sets of circumstances under which international agencies get involved in rebuilding countries coming out of conflict, no single institutional formula has been applied to develop coordination mechanisms. Advanced planning is seldom organized, as peacebuilding operations are characterized by a reactive response and evolution on an ad hoc basis (Mockaitis 1999). Past experience suggests that finding an effective means for coordinating operations does not easily take place prior to deployment. Effective intervention requires a diverse set of coordinating strategies. The way coordination is organized in different sectors has an impact on the quality of entire country operations. Coordination is also an important issue in assigning different roles and activities to both external and internal actors. Since the goals of peacebuilding cannot be easily achieved in a short time span, international assistance has to pay more serious attention to pro-

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grams designed to support long-term social change with a focus on development and institution building beyond the protection of refugees. A thirdparty intervention can be considered successful if it has had a real and positive impact on the dynamics of existing political and social structures.

Notes 1. With the opening of an electoral office, the UN Mission in El Salvador also extended advice on the voter registration and election process. 2. Some aid workers were killed by Taliban resistance forces. Aid has not been seen as purely apolitical, since it has been proffered largely in the context of achieving Western political and military goals. 3. Differences also exist between NGOs focused on a quick response for relief and other NGOs oriented toward long-term development. 4. The Office of the High Representative reports to a Peace Implementation Council, comprised of G-7 countries, the EU, Russia, and Islamic countries. Given its size, the council has not been effective in developing a coherent strategy for social reconstruction. 5. In spring 2001, a Croat group instigated rioters to block the investigation of banks controlled by a Croatian nationalist party. A lack of effective political pressure by Western governments on the Croatian government (which could influence the local groups) weakened the position of the High Representative.

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ACRONYMS

AFRC AG ANC ARENA CARERE CIAV CIVPOL CODESA COPAZ CPP CRTR DPA DPKO ECOMOG ECOWAS EPLF EPRDF ERD EU FADH FDD FMLN FRELIMO FUNCINPEC GURN ICRC IFAD

Armed Forces Ruling Council (Sierra Leone) Administrator General (Namibia) African National Congress (South Africa) Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista) Cambodia Resettlement and Reintegration Program International Support and Verification Commission (Comisión Internacional de Apoyo y Verificación) Civilian Police (UN) Convention for a Democratic South Africa National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace Cambodian People’s Party Commission for Reception, Truth, and Reconciliation (East Timor) Department of Political Affairs (UN) Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN) Economic Community of West African States Cease-fire Monitoring Group Economic Community of West African States Eriterean People’s Liberation Front Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front Emergency Response Division of the UNDP European Union Haitian Armed Forces (Forces Armées d’Haiti) Forces for Defense of Democracy (Burundi) Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (El Salvador) Mozambique Liberation Front National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia Government of Unity and Reconciliation (Angola) International Committee of the Red Cross International Fund for Agricultural Development 221

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List of Acronyms

IFOR IFP ILO INTERFET IOM IPTF IRA ISAF KFOR MICIVIH MNF MPLA NATO NGO NP NPC NRP OAS OAU OHR OLF ONUCA ONUMOZ ONUSAL OSCE PDK PFDJ PRODERE PUP RENAMO RGB RPF RUF SDLP SFOR SRRC SRSG SWAPO SWAPOL

Implementation Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina) Inkatha Freedom Party (South Africa) International Labour Organization International Force for East Timor International Organization for Migration International Police Task Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina) Irish Republican Army International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan) Kosovo Force International Civilian Mission to Haiti Multinational Force (dispatched to Haiti) Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Nongovernmental Organization National Party (South Africa) National Peace Committee (South Africa) National Reconstruction Program (El Salvador) Organization of American States Organization of African Unity Office of the High Representative (Bosnia-Herzegovina) Oromo Liberation Front (Ethiopia) United Nations Observer Group in Central America United Nations Operation in Mozambique United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe People’s Democratic Kampuchea People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (Eritrea) Area Development and Peace-building in Central America Progressive Unionist Party (Northern Ireland) Mozambique National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana) Resistencia da Guine-Bissau Rwandan Patriotic Front Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone) Social Democratic and Labor Party (Northern Ireland) Stabilization Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina) Somali Reconstruction and Restoration Council Special Representative of the Secretary-General (UN) South West African People’s Organization South West African Police

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TNG TPLF UCK UNAMIR UNAVEM UNDP UNEAD UNESCO UNFPA UNICEF UNIPTF UNHCHR UNHCR UNITA UNITAF UNMIBH UNMIH UNMIK UNOMIL UNOMSIL UNOSOM UNPROFOR UNTAET UNTAG UNV URNG USAID USC-SNA UTO UUP WFP WHO

223

Transitional National Government Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (Ethiopia) Kosovo Liberation Army United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda United Nations Angola Verification Mission United Nations Development Programme United Nations Electoral Assistance Division United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization United Nations Fund for Population Activities United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations International Police Task Force (BosniaHerzegovina) United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola) United Task Force in Somalia United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina United Nations Mission in Haiti United Nations Mission in Kosovo United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone United Nations Operation in Somalia United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina) United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia United Nations Volunteers Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca U.S. Agency for International Development United Somali Congress-Somali National Alliance United Tajik Opposition Ulster Unionist Party (Northern Ireland) World Food Programme World Health Organization

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Abuja Agreement, 57, 79 Afghanistan: administrative authority in, 81, 83; aid to warlords in, 194; humanitarian aid for, 52; multiethnic police force in, 66; narcotics trade in, 127; peace enforcement in, 53; transitional government in, 90; warrior culture in, 51 African National Congress (ANC), 50, 78, 104, 107 Agricultural production, capacity development for, 142, 143 Ahtisaari, Martti, 201 Ajello, Aldo, 201 Aksashi, Yasushi, 203 Angola: cycle of civil wars in, 35; demilitarization and demobilization in, 43–44, 45, 47, 49; elections in, 107, 112; failed peace processes in, 31, 192–193; peace implementation process in, 7; transitional government in, 79–80; UN intervention in, 43 ARENA party (El Salvador), 112, 115 Argentina, truth commission impacts in, 173, 177, 178, 180 Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, 35, 51, 173; exile of, 55 Aylwin, Patricio, 180 Bicesse Peace Accords, 43, 45, 80, 113–114 Bockarie, Sam, 170 Bolivian truth commission, 175 Bonn Agreement, 90 Bosnia-Herzegovina: arms control in, 52; city/district model of governance in, 89; elections in, 109; electoral system in, 93; ethnic rivalries/ethnic cleansing in, 55; human rights investigations and monitoring in, 61, 62–63; multiethnic police corps of, 67; nationalistic party victories in, 116; NATO law enforcement troops in, 55; peace enforcement in, 8, 35;

power-sharing system in, 100, 102–103; privatization in, 12, 130; UN administration in, 196; wartime damage in, 125, 127 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 91 Bucaram, Abdala, 173 Burundi: civil war and peace process in, 6, 7, 24; postelection violence in, 114; power-sharing agreement in, 79; truth commission for, 173, 174; UN operation in, 189 Cambodia: civil bureaucracy in, 119; civil society in, 120; coalition government in, 96–97; community-based projects in, 141; demobilization in, 45, 50; donor aid and conditions in, 29; economic recovery potential in, 127; elections/electoral process in, 93, 105, 109, 112, 113, 117–118; external intervention in, 26, 34; human rights abuses in, 193–194; multiethnic police force in, 66, 68; peace process in, 7, 8; peace marches in, 184; political violence in, 21; UN operations in, 192, 209–210; war crimes tribunals in, 170 Catholic Relief Services, 218 Central American countries: Area Development and Peace-Building (PRODERE) in, 139, 141; health care promotion for development in, 150, 151; military restructuring in, 179; peace commissions in, 42–43; UNDP’s peacebuilding role in, 204–205, 206; U.S. government aid to, 194–195. See also specific country Chile: collective healing process in, 160; forced disappearances in, 167; truth commission, 173, 177, 178, 180 Chissano, Joaquim Alberto, 115 Civil service, and economic transition, 127

245

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Civil society: conflict resolution in, 180–184; and domestic NGOs, 120–121; organizations, capacity building among, 140; peace agreements and, 6; as precondition for democracy, 11, 120; reconstruction and, 12, 31, 135–136 Civil war: and political reconfigurations, 24; postwar social problems and violence in, 3–4. See also specific country Community rehabilitation, 139–143; capacity-building and decisionmaking systems for, 136, 140; and country assistance programs, 136; external resources for, 136; income-support activities in, 142–143; indigenous involvement in, 142; and refugee reintegration, 137, 138–139 Communal conflict: and competition for resources, 138–139; and institutional reform, 11; reconciliation and, 28; settlement instruments for, 183. See also Conflict prevention/resolution Conciliation commissions, 9, 10 Confidence building measures, 4, 41; demobilization and, 47–48; methods, 40; settlement process and, 40 Conflict prevention/resolution, 4; coercive diplomacy in, 8–9; democratization and, 119; civil society’s involvement in, 180–182; consultative process in, 42; development and, 133; interactive process of, 159; methods, 40–43; and peace monitors, 183; political pluralism and, 11–12; proactive interventions for, 7; traditional systems of, 182–184 Consociationalism: consensus and, 96; corporatist tripartite structure in, 97; elite-level cooperation in, 97; and ethnic reconciliation, 94–95; versus federalism, 102–103; power-sharing design in, 94–98; viability of, 98 Constitutions, interim, 89–91 Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA), 90 Corporatism, in postconflict reconstruction, 97 Costa Rica, demobilization in, 49 Crimes against humanity: amnesty and, 166–167; and truth commission investigations, 177. See also Genocide; Human rights violations Cristiani, Alfredo, 179 Croatia, national reconciliation in, 162 Dayton Peace Accords, 55, 100, 103, 199, 201–203

de Klerk, F. W., 90 Demilitarization: and confidence-building measures, 44; international monitoring/verification of, 40–41; national frameworks for, 40; participatory decisionmaking in, 44; politics and, 26, 46; security dilemma and, 40; and social reintegration of ex-soldiers, 48–50; steps toward, 39; thirdparty supervision of, 46 Demobilization, 43–52; amnesty and, 47–48; approaches to, 44–46; arms verification in, 50; and cultural transformation, 22; development process and, 27; disarmament procedures in, 43–44, 50–52; elections/electoral politics and, 31, 104–107; and gun buy-back initiatives, 50–51; and illegal arms transfers, 25; independent monitoring of, 47; and institutionalization of rules, 117–118; logistics and schedules for, 46–47; and military transformation, 106–107; and security guarantees, 41; and smallarms proliferation, 50–51; successful, 48; timing of, 189; and weapon collection/verification, 46–47 Demobilized soldiers: and costs/funding of reintegration, 143–144, 146; health policies for, 151; illegal activities of, 146; rehabilitation and retraining of, 22, 25, 46, 50, 143–145 Democracy: and civil society building, 22, 120–121; consolidation of, 11–12; and development goals, 29; elections and, 114–117; long-term peacebuilding and, 36; military transformation and, 106; multiethnic/consensual, 94; and national reconciliation, 162; and political opposition, 115; prospects, military victory and, 23; and security sector reform, 39 Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): legal and judicial reform in, 71; peace process in, 24; power-sharing agreement in, 79 Development, 123–153; and area development schemes, 139–141, 142; of agricultural sector, 142, 143; and civil service reform, 128; and civil society reconstruction, 135–136; conflict prevention and, 133; costs of, 123; criminalization of the economy and, 127; designed for peace, 148–150; entrepreneurship and, 129; environment degradation and, 123, 125, 126; equitable, 124; export-led growth strategy for, 132; and food production/security, 126, 129, 143; foreign

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Index donors’ role in, 123; and government corruption, 128; health-sector, 150–151; and human development agendas, 132; income-generating programs for, 126; infrastructure, 130, 133, 135–136, 137, 142; and job creation, 135; long-term goals for, 135; multisectoral approaches to, 139; political transition and, 123–124; poverty/income inequality and, 126, 131–121; private-sector, 126; privatization and, 129, 130; and refugee repatriation, 125, 134, 136–138, 143–146; and reintegration programs, 143–145; relief work and, 134–135, 136; security and, 123–124; and smallholder output growth, 129; social environment and, 126; of taxation system, 130–131; unemployment and, 129, 130, 131; women’s contributions to, 142. See also Community rehabilitation; Economic reconstructuring; Social rehabilitation East Timor: election process in, 93; humanitarian aid and peace enforcement in, 53; interim governance models in, 80, 81; legacy of war in, 125; police force reform in, 66; privatization of agriculture in, 28; truth commission, 174; UN administration in, 34, 196 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 56, 109, 188, 205; oversight role of, 57 Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), 57 Economic reconstructuring, 11–12; democratization and, 29; as donor aid condition, 25; long-term approaches to, 31, 124; macroeconomic policies and, 128–132; and market-oriented reforms, 124, 128–132; objectives of, 132; and Quick Impact Projects, 137–138; reconciliation and, 28–29; and social/political needs, 11–12; structural obstacles to, 127–128; war economy and, 127; and wartime damage, 124–125 Ecuador, truth commission in, 173 El Salvador: community-level reconciliation in, 32; demobilization and disarmament in, 31, 45–46, 51, 72–73; democracy and, 11; disarmament failure in, 5–6; elections in, 105, 110, 112; human rights protection/recourse in, 63–64; land redistribution program in, 147; legal

247

and judicial reform in, 71; local human rights work in, 195; military amnesty in, 169; National Reconstruction Plan for, 133; peace agreement in, 42, 204–205; peace process in, 10; police and security sector reform in, 36, 65, 68; truth commission, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179; UN mission in, 191; Western donor aid to, 25 Elections: and conditions for competition, 113; demobilization and, 31, 104–107; democracy and, 114–118; institutions and procedures associated with, 118–119; logistics and infrastructure development for, 107–110; monitoring, 111; multiethnic, 108; organization of, 110–114; as peacebuilding tool, 116–117; and political legitimacy, 114, 115; and political transition, 103–104; and postelection politics, 112–114; timing of, 30, 31, 104, 107 Electoral systems: design and adoption of, 91; interethnic accommodation in, 92; and international assistance, 108–110; majoritarian, 92; power sharing and, 92–93; proportional, 92–93; and voter registration, 108 Eritrea: constitution of, 90–91; demobilization in, 144–145; independence of, 88; land tenure system in, 147; transition government in, 85; wartime destruction in, 127 Eritrean People’s Front for Democracy and Justice (PFDJ), 85 Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), 85, 106–107 Ethiopia: elections in, 109, 110, 113; ethnic politics in, 84; federalism in, 101–102; self-determination rights in, 88; transitional government in, 78 Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), 101, 102, 106–107, 113 Ethnic cleansing, local police involvement in, 60 Ethnic/cultural minorities: and interethnic coexistence, 159; political representation for, 89–90; proportional representation of, 92–93. See also Interethnic conflict Ethnonationalism, 11, 12 Ethnopolitical groups/minorities: consociationalism and, 94–96; and powersharing arrangements, 95–96; proportional representation of, 94–95 Ethnoregional conflicts, federalism and, 98

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European Union, 202; peacebuilding functions of, 192 Failed states: direct international rule of, 81; local-level initiatives in, 32; recreation of political institutions in, 13 Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), 5–6, 10, 43, 81, 197; demobilization of, 46, 48; elections and, 112, 115; transformation of, 106 Federalism: versus consociationalism, 102–103; decentralization and selfrule in, 98, 99–199; ethnicity-based, 100–102; ethnoregional frictions and, 98; legislative functions in, 99; power sharing in, 94, 98–102; and regional harmony, 98, 100, 103; representation in, 99; viability of, 100 Female-headed households, poverty of, 126 Florence Agreement, 52 Forces for Defense of Democracy (FDD), 79 Former Yugoslavia: political transition in, 82; social/economic rehabilitation in, 139–140. See also specific country Fragmented societies: democratic institutions in, 115; elections in, 104; nation building in, 27, 92; reconciliation in, 157, 169; and rule of law, 11 FRELIMO party (Mozambique), 115–116 Genocide: amnesty and, 166–167; and legal justice, 169–170, 171; politicalpsychological impacts of, 158; and social reconstruction, 24 Government of national unity, 78 Guatemala: democracy in, 118; demobilization in, 73; democracy and, 11; genocide against Mayan population of, 178–179; human rights NGOs in, 180; indigenous police force in, 67; legal and judicial reform in, 71; reconciliation in, 160, 164; security sector reform in, 36; truth commission, 173–174, 175, 178–179; UN mission in, 41, 197 Guinea-Bissau: peace enforcement in, 57; transitional government in, 79 Haiti: aid conditionalities for, 94; demilitarization in, 44–45, 51–52, 72; legal and judicial reform in, 71; peace enforcement in, 55; police reform in, 66; postelection violence in, 114; sanctions on, 126; truth commission,

173, 174–175, 177; UN presence in, 32, 34, 35 Honduras: Contra demobilization in, 49; reconciliation in, 175, 180 Human rights protection: grassroots organizations’ involvement in, 64–65; laws, and local police performance, 68; military forces’ role in, 62; ombudsman’s office for, 63–64; and UN/international monitors, 60–61 Human rights violations: accountability and punishment for, 165–166, 169, 176; and disappearance cases, 178; and distrust of government authorities, 60; by police and state security forces, 60 Humanitarian aid: future needs and consequences of, 30; and reconstruction programs, 28 Indigenous programs, 34 Institutional reform: critical elements in, 22; and ethnoregional cleavages, 11–12; grassroots projects for, 23; human rights protection in, 64; liberal democratic vision for, 10–11; obstacles to, 77; peace enforcement and, 26; reconciliation and, 157; rule of law protections in, 64–65; stability and, 13; timeframe for, 31–32 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 178 Interethnic conflict: and emergence of new states, 88; federalism and, 98, 100–102; international intervention in, 35; negotiation mechanisms for, 41–42; and postconflict elections, 104 International assistance programs, 136 International civil police, 59–60, 207. See also UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL) International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH), 70–71, 111 International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia, 55 International financial institutions: austerity measures imposed by, 131, 133, 205; politics of, 152; reform conditions of, 124 International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), 53 International Labour Organization (ILO), 146, 145, 146, 208 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 133, 205 International Security Assistance Force

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Index (ISAF), 53 International Support and Verification Commission (CIAV), 46 Iraq: economic sanctions in, 126; international transition authority in, 81, 83 Irish Republican Army (IRA), 45 Islamic Renaissance Party (Tajikistan), 86 Ivory Coast: demobilization in, 45; peace process in, 7; UN intervention in, 56 Judicial reform, 64–65; and ad hoc arrangements, 69–70; democratization and, 29; and ethnic/political balance, 70; international assistance for, 69, 70–71; national reconciliation and, 157; obstacles to, 69; and political stability, 69; time-consuming tasks in, 70 Kabbah, Ahmad Tejan, 80 Kagame, Paul, 115 Kambanda, Jean, 171 Karzai, Hamid, 83 Khmer Rouge, 105, 170, 199 Kosovo Force (KFOR), 199, 212; failure of, 58–59 Kosovo Liberation Army, 59, 213 Kosovo: disarmament in, 44; elections in, 108; ethnic cleansing in, 58–59; interim government in, 81–82; Kurdish substate autonomy in, 88; police force reform in, 66; UN deployment in, 189–190, 196; wartime damage in, 125 Kouchner, Bernard, 212 Lancaster House settle (Rhodesia), 41 Land transfer programs, 134, 147–148 Latin America, military restructuring in, 179 Law enforcement sectors/officials: human rights violations of, 60–61; restructuring of, 64–65 Lebanon, democracy in, 94 Legal justice system: and human rights abuses, 165–166; reform, 157; reconciliation and, 157, 164, 165–167, 169–171; truth commissions and, 176–177 Liberia: cycle of civil wars in, 5, 35; elections in, 11, 109, 116; peace process, 57 Local communities: and economic recovery costs, 123; peace implementation role of, 33; peacebuilding

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strategies for, 34–35 Lomé Agreement, 80, 167, 174 Luena Accords, 44, 105 Lusaka Protocols, 43, 45, 56, 80 Mandela, Nelson, 90 Military forces: civilian functions performed by, 197–198; human rights violations of, 179, 180; internal security and, 72–73; transformed into political party, 84–85, 106–107 Military reform, truth commission’s impact on, 179 Milosevic, Slobodan, 88, 171 Mozambique: demilitarization, 31, 42, 43, 44, 46–47; economy of, 129, 130; elections in, 91, 106, 110, 112, 115; international intervention in, 197; peace process in, 7; police force in, 61–62, 66; political stability in, 36; transitional government in, 79 Mozambique National Resistance, 79, 91, 115–116, 201; demobilization/disarmament of, 106; elections and, 109, 110; legitimacy of, 106 Namibia: community policing in, 67; demilitarization in, 26, 31; elections in, 104, 105, 108; electoral process in, 91; police brutality in, 62; policing by consent in, 66; political stability in, 36; UN deployment in, 189 National Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (COPAZ), 10, 42-43 National Patriotic Party (Liberia), 106 National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), 7, 43, 80, 107, 108; demobilization of, 47, 49, 105 NATO, 199, 212; deployment of, 8, 55 NATO Stabilization Force, 204 NATO-based Implementation Force (IFOR), 55 Natural resource management, 142 Ndadaye, Melchior, 79 Nicaragua: demilitarization in, 46, 48, 51; democracy in, 118; economy of, 129; elections in, 109, 112–113; federalism in, 99–100; peaceful regime change in, 36; Western donor aid to, 25 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs): advocacy and legal assistance activities of, 216; and civil society development, 216–217; democratization and, 120–121; as

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donor conduits, 215; electoral process and, 120–121; emergence and proliferation of, 120; funding of, 152; and human rights protection, 64; international agencies and, 207, 209, 213–214, 215–219; peacebuilding support role of, 33; structural change in, 218 Northern Ireland: disarmament in, 45; ethnic/religious fragmentation in, 10; peace process in, 6; power-sharing mechanisms in, 95 Occupation forces, electoral systems and, 91 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), 52, 63, 109, 120, l71, 182, 204, 207, 213, 216; Human Rights Office, 214–215 Organization of American States (OAS), 11, 46, 188 Palestinian-Israeli peace processes, 6 Panama, security-sector demilitarization in, 72 Paris Peace Accords, 45, 141 Peace, defining, 21 Peace agreements: amnesty conditions in, 167; compromise in, 6; demobilization and, 31; enforcement of, 56; handling ambiguities in, 9; implementation and oversight of, 5–10, 33, 42–44; and prospects for democracy, 24; record of compliance with, 36; renegotiation of, 5, 9–10; settlement methods, 23; sustainability of, 33 Peace commissions, 9–10, 40–41, 42–43; and social rehabilitation, 180, 181 Peace enforcement, 7, 8; and democratic institution building, 26; and force levels, 57–58; and international community’s lack of will, 56; by local militias, 55; military intervention for, 56; rules of engagement, 55–56 Peace implementation: challenges to, 5–7; costs and tradeoffs in, 24–25; economic priorities and, 132–134; funding of, 132–134; international monitoring of, 26, 41; strategies/prospects for, 24–27; under transitional rule, 77–78; UN verification role in, 196 Peacebuilding: democracy and, 10–12, 13; elections and, 31; failures in, 26, 35, 36; and failures of democracy, 36; goals and priorities, 10, 26–27; and institutional change, 13; international financial institutions and, 193–194;

material incentives for, 8; psychotherapeutic approaches to, 22–23; successful and sustainable, 2, 20, 34, 35 Peacebuilding design, 19–37; and actor relationships, 33; formal, and rule of law, 22; goals and overall aim in, 19–20, 21; of implementation strategies, 24–27; interpersonal issues and, 22–23; justice and human rights in, 22; multilevel strategies in, 32–33; nature of conflict and, 23; principles and concepts, 19–20; scope of changes in, 21–23; sector integration in, 27–29, 31–32; security-first approach in, 26; tactical objectives in, 20; time frames in, 29–32 Peacebuilding evaluation, criteria and time frame for, 35–36, 37n6 Peacebuilding operations, 187–220; civil-military coordination in, 197–200; coordinating structures in, 207–214; entry/exit timing in, 189–191; force structure and capability in, 53; funding and allocation priorities in, 192–195; goals of, 54, 205–207; institutional politics in, 204–205; interagency coordination in, 214–215; international mandates and 188; intervention modalities in, 188, 189, 195–197; international monitoring of, 26; local political balance and, 197; as long-term investment, 27; mandates for, 188; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and, 207, 209, 213–214, 215–219; overall coordination of, 200–204; overview of, 188–189; for peace enforcement, 7, 8, 52–58; research on, 13–15; security for, 52–53; strategies, 210–212; tactical-level operations in, 212–214; Western geopolitical interests and, 193. See also United Nations (UN) Peacebuilding practice, evolution of, 1–2 Peacebuilding process: and behavior/structural reforms, 3–12; and civil society, 11; coercive diplomacy in, 8; commitment and motivation in, 7–9; confidence- and trustbuilding strategies in, 4, 9, 13, 9, 53–54; institution building in, 188; material incentives in, 8; maximalist approaches to, 196; mechanisms for dialogue and understanding in, 10; power sharing in, 6; and restoration of order, 2–3; sector-specific, 26; social-political dimension in, 11–13; synchronous strategies in, 31–32; synergetic interactions in, 27–29, 37.

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Index See also Conflict prevention/resolution; Demilitarization Penal reform, 70 Pinochet, Augusto, 180 Police sector reform, 64–68, 190, 194; assessment of, 67–68; bilateral donor assistance for, 66; and community policing methods, 67; democratization and, 29; ethnic representation in, 67; integration of ex-soldiers in, 66–67; and interim security force deployment, 66; and international human rights law, 68; monitoring and supervision of, 66; obstacles to, 68; of recruitment and training, 65–66 Political institutions: democratic, 118–119; and intergroup cleavages, 94; new, negotiation of, 89–92; proportional representation in, 90, 94–95. See also Institutional reform Political parties, transformation of armed groups into, 26, 84, 106 Political transition, 77–121; and accountability for crimes against humanity, 169; development and, 123–124; elections/electoral politics and, 103–107; and ethnic divisions, 82; external intervention and, 34; framework for, 77, 89–92; interim government in, 77–83; successful, 36; power-sharing institutional arrangements in, 95–102 Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), 43 Poverty and income inequalities, 126, 131–121; feminization of, 143 Power sharing: consociationalist elements in, 94–98; electoral systems and, 92–93; in federalist system, 98–102; and minority group autonomy, 94; and political rivalry, 96; and political transition, 95; principles of autonomy in, 95; in transitional governments, 78 Quick Impact Projects, 137–138 Reconciliation, 155–185; amnesty/conditional amnesty approaches to, 166–168, 177; apology and forgiveness process in, 156; and civil society initiatives, 180–184; and criminal prosecution, 157, 164, 165–167, 169–171; criteria and goals for, 168169; defined, 156; cultural context of, 161, 182–184; and democratic consolidation, 162; and disappearance cases, 167, 178; funding for, 184; goals and principles of,

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156–158; grassroots politics of memory in, 164; and grassroots psychosocial rehabilitation programs, 159–161; and group healing process, 157, 158–159; institutional framework for, 157; and institutional reform, 157; and international tribunals, 170–171; long-term goals for, 184–185; media and, 181; and military impunity, 179, 180; mourning process in, 160–161; and national rebuilding, 27; and new regime credibility, 163; political restraints on, 155; and psychotherapeutic treatment, 158–159; and public remembrance functions, 158; quest for justice in, 157, 163, 168–169; and reintegration of perpetrators and victims, 161; and reparations, 156–157, 166, 172, 179–180; and restoration of moral order, 156, 161; social and political context of, 161–163; and social rehabilitation, 156–158; and restorative justice, 167–168, 172; and successful elections, 103–104; in traditional societies, 182–184; transnationalism and, 162; and trials of perpetrators, 164; truth seeking and, 163–165; ultranationalism and, 162; and welfare of marginalized groups, 163; and women’s groups, 182. See also Truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs) Reconstruction: corporatism in, 97; and development project design, 149–150; local priorities in, 195; need for external involvement in, 34; programs, design of, 22–23; and sustainable growth, 133. See Economic restructuring; Social rehabilitation Refugees and displaced people: repatriation of, 125, 134, 136–138, 143–146; material needs of, 138–139; training programs for, 125 RENAMO. See Mozambique National Resistance Resistance National Mozambicaine (RENAMA), 42, 43, 44, 46, 47 Revolutionary United Front (RUF), 56, 80; atrocities committed by, 159–160 Rhodesia, peace settlement in, 41 Rule of law: and democratic institutions, 119; in fragmented societies, 11; and human rights monitoring, 61; and legal/judicial reform, 69, 70, 71; peacebuilding focused on, 22; and public security guarantees, 64 Rwanda: failure of peace process in, 79; paternalistic rule in, 84–85; post-

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genocide regime in, 115, 162; truth commission, 174 Rwandan genocide, prosecutions for, 170, 171 Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 84 Sanderson, John, 209 Sankoh, Foday, 167, 170 Savimbi, Jonas, 7, 44, 80, 105, 113 Security: development and, 123–124; synergetic effects of, 27–29; and UN interventions, 43–44 Security forces, crimes and human rights abuses of, 60, 165 Security sector, 39–74; agenda and context for, 39; and civilian protection, 39; confidence-building measures in, 39–44; and demilitarization of internal security functions, 72–73; and human rights protection, 60–64; and institutional reform, 64–73; and judicial reform, 69–71; military’s involvement in, 62, 69–70, 72–73; and national police reform, 65–68; peace enforcement methods in, 52–58; restructuring, 26, 36, 194; and restoration of law and order, 58–60; and violence against ethnic groups, 58–59. See also Demilitarization Sierra Leone: cycle of civil wars in, 35; disarmament in, 45; genocide in, 167; peace enforcement in, 8, 56, 57; postelection violence in, 114; powersharing arrangements in, 80; regional truth commission, 174, 176, 177 Sinn Fein (Ireland), 45 Small arms control, 73–74 Social justice, funding for, 134 Social rehabiliation: economic development and, 24; financial support for, 134; genocide and, 24; and grassroots NGOs, 180–182; humanitarian aid for, 28, 135; institutional change in, 13; and length/level of violent conflict, 24; long-term approaches to, 31; and monetary/macroeconomic policies, 132; multilevel effects of, 32; reconciliation, 13, 155, 156–158; structural reform and, 4; violence control and, 4, 28. See also Community rehabilitation Somali Salvation Democratic Front, 87 Somalia: arms proliferation in, 51; decentralized governance in, 87–88; genocide in, 56; peacebuilding efforts in, 33, 190; return to violence in, 9; state building in, 86–88; transitional government in, 87; UN presence in,

26, 54; warrior culture in, 51 Somaliland: consociationalism in, 95–96; disarmament in, 46; formation of, 87 South Africa: civil society building in, 10; confidence-building measures in, 41; corporatism in, 97; elections/voter registration in, 104, 108; federalism in, 103; income inequalities in, 131–132; international intervention in, 197; military reform in, 50; reconciliation in, 158, 164, 171, 176; transitional government in, 78; truth commission, 177–178 South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO), 91, 201 South West African Police (SWAPOL), 62 State building, 83–89; centralist unitary strategy of, 85–86; constitutional negotiations in, 89–91; cultural/ethnic group rights and status in, 89–90, 92–93; decentralized governance in, 87–88; democratic, 10–12, 13, 84; electoral system design in, 91, 92–93; interethnic/regional relations and, 27, 84, 88–89; internal selfdetermination and, 88–89; local support/priorities in, 195; logistics of, 31–32; national forums for, 90; negotiated process of, 89–92; political representation in, 89–90, 92–93; politics of, 83–89; rehabilitation tasks in, 88; unified city/district model of, 89 Sudan: genocide in, 5; war and peacemaking in, 5 Tajikistan: civic network in, 182–183; demilitarization in, 40–41; elections in, 107; power-sharing agreement in, 79; presidential system in, 115; state building in, 86; UN observer mission in, 190 Taylor, Charles, 5, 106, 116, 170, 194, 200 Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), 78, 84 Toncontín Agreement, 46 Transitional rule, 77–83; arbitrary authority imposed in, 81; in failed and new states, 81; interim constitution for, 89–91; international administrative structures in, 81–83; legitimacy of, 90; power sharing/joint decisionmaking in, 78–81 Truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs), 171–180; deterrence and,

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Index 178; functions of, 171–172; investigative powers of, 177–178; legal justice system and, 176–177; and nonjudicial forms of justice, 172; origins and mandates of, 173–176; preventive goal of, 172; reform and justice impacts of, 179–180; UN sponsorship of, 173, 174, 176 Tudman, Frajo, 88, 162 Uganda, truth commission of, 174–175, 177 United Nations: civilian police forces, 49–60; electoral assistance and sponsorship of, 108–110; institutionbuilding and, 188; judicial rehabilitation and, 70–71; monitoring and observer missions of, 41, 56, 60–61, 188, 191; peace mandate of, 188; and refugee repatriation, 136–137; verification functions, 190, 191 UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) 41, 44, 56, 204, 201 UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), 56 UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL), 59, 61–62, 207, 211; and police force reform, 66 UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), 209, 211 UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), 212 UN Development Programme (UNDP), 34, 108, 136, 137, 139, 203–205, 208, 210, 211, 217; Emergency Response Division (ERD), 206 UN Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 208; peace culture projects of, 32 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), 61, 63, 210 UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 49, 63, 137, 139, 182, 204, 208, 209, 213, 214, 215, 216 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 68 UN International Police Task Force (IPTF), 213, 214, 215, 216; powers and responsibilities of, 61–63 UN Mission for the Verification of Human Rights in Guatemala (MINUGUA), 188–189 UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), 62–63 UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), 41, 59, 71, 81–82, 210, 212; administrative power of, 81–82 UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), 190

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UN Mission in Sierra Leone, 188, 190 UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan, 190 UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), 46 UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), 60–61, 66, 189, 191, 197, 210 UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), 57 UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL), 56–57, 188 UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, 188 UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 46–47, 146, 193 UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I and II), 54–55, 86, 190–191, 198, 200, 210 UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 199–200 UN Security Council, peacekeepers deployed by, 52, 53 UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), 196, 211–212, 213, 214, 215, 216; Dayton Agreement and, 201–203; and division of functions, 203–204; election implementation and, 110; role and power of, 200–202 UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, 55 UN Task Force (UNITAF), 54–55, 190–191 UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), 41, 189, 200 UN Transition Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 51, 83, 120, 137, 192, 196, 203, 208, 209; electoral responsibilities of, 110 UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET), 82, 167; Human Rights Unit of, 174 UN Verification Mission in Guatemala, 41, 189 Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG), 197 UNITA. See National Union for the Total Independence of Angola United Tajik Opposition, 107 U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 144; Office of Transition Initiatives, 216–217 Violent conflict: civilian victims of, 160; and economic recovery, 124–127; mechanisms for mitigating, 9–10; and postelection politics, 114. See also Communal conflict; Conflict prevention/resolution

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War crimes tribunals, 170–171 World Bank, 128, 134, 152, 192, 205; structural reform conditions of, 29 World Health Organization (WHO), 150, 151 Zimbabwe: cantonment process in, 46; postconflict reconstruction in, 12

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ABOUT

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THE

BOOK

This much-needed, integrative discussion of the multiple dimensions of peacebuilding in postconflict societies offers a systematic approach to strategies and processes for long-term social, political, and economic transformation. Ho-Won Jeong links short-term crisis-intervention efforts to a sustained process that encompasses the entire complex environment of a conflict. His broad analytic framework and wealth of concrete examples provide a sophisticated, yet accessible, guide to the many strands and interrelations in this critical arena of world politics. Ho-Won Jeong is associate professor in the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason University. He has published extensively in the areas of conflict resolution and peacebuilding and is editor of the journals Peace and Conflict Studies and International Journal of Peace Studies.

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