Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level: European Discourses and Practices 3031209427, 9783031209420

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Contributions to Political Science

Gilles Rouet Thierry Côme   Editors

Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level European Discourses and Practices

Contributions to Political Science

The series Contributions to Political Science contains publications in all areas of political science, such as public policy and administration, political economy, comparative politics, European politics and European integration, electoral systems and voting behavior, international relations and others. Publications are primarily monographs and multiple author works containing new research results, but conference and congress reports are also considered. The series covers both theoretical and empirical aspects and is addressed to researchers and policy makers. All titles in this series are peer-reviewed. This book series is indexed in Scopus.

Gilles Rouet  •  Thierry Côme Editors

Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level European Discourses and Practices

Editors Gilles Rouet ISM-IAE de Versailles St-Quentin-en-­ Yvelines, LAREQUOI Paris-Saclay University Guyancourt, France

Thierry Côme Institute of Technology, LAREQUOI Paris-Saclay University Mantes-la-Jolie, France

ISSN 2198-7289     ISSN 2198-7297 (electronic) Contributions to Political Science ISBN 978-3-031-20942-0    ISBN 978-3-031-20943-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20943-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

Science and technology have always fed utopias and often, unfortunately, violent political ideologies. Humanity wants technological progress promotes social and human progress. And this is particularly true since the 1830s with the Industrial Revolution, up to the digital revolution, with this sentence constantly heard: “Technology will adapt to Humans”. Alas, this is wrong. The opposite has always been the case: Humans have adapted with difficulty to technology, and not the reverse. Each time, we notice the illusion of a happier, free, egalitarian, humanist society… Certainly, there has been progress but also a lot of “defeats” and “damages of progress”. Digital technology is the umpteenth symbol of this technological utopianism, but it is even more seductive than the automobile, railroad, air travel and space revolution because it concerns the brain, and the heart of the brain: the information. Thanks to the abundance, speed of production, circulation and interaction of information, people will know each other better, and society will be more egalitarian. In short, the Internet is the symbol of an optimistic utopia. Since information is abundant, everyone can produce it and appropriate it, and debate. There is less inequality, power and hierarchies. The reality? Humans are unfortunately as good, or bad, in a digital universe than yesterday, and the inequalities and the power of people are also decisive. The GAFA are today the first economic, technological and financial powers of the world. If everyone can access everything, and we must not forget the fake news, the information revolution is not synonymous with a “revolution” of truth or communication. There are as many inequalities and positions of power in today’s information society as there were in yesterday’s industrial society. Access to all information does not guarantee more equality. To inform is not to communicate (2009). Today, three drifts illustrate the challenges of the political ideology of the digital era: 1. Direct democracy: Everyone would become the actor of politics and intermediaries would be useless. It is the opposite, the more society is online, the more it becomes necessary to maintain the intermediary cultural, social and political v

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logics: teachers, doctors, judges and journalists, among others. Each individual does not have the knowledge and the culture to do everything and decide. Moreover, nobody can think naturally from the local to the global. Cultures and civilizations are now establishing radical breaks. The more the world is “transparent and interactive”, the more it is necessary on the contrary to add distances which allow to respect each other and to cohabit. Direct democracy cannot manage politics from an “interactive sofa”. Moreover, the open technical world is no more peaceful than the closed one of yesterday. The Internet individualizes human and social relations to the maximum, with the risk of segmentation and communitarianism. The risk of the twenty-first century is that of the defeat of the collective. The same danger haunts “direct” democracy. To increase the capacity of action of the citizen, giant of information and not of action, yes absolutely. To lock up the political action in the localism under pretexts of direct social relations, no. People of “basic democracy” are not more democratic than the classic citizen, and it is necessary to learn to cohabit at three scales, local and regional, national, and European and global. Managing everything at home through screens and without any experience other than that of the keyboard is not a future. On the other hand, rethinking the frameworks of experience, action and negotiation is indispensable. The challenge here is political, not technological. 2. On the other hand, globalization of information, culture and knowledge makes it necessary to preserve cultural diversity. This is not a remnant of the past, but the condition for respecting each other in an open, standardized and rationalized world where everything circulates and is similar. Respect of cultural differences is the indispensable condition to avoid transforming the fear of the other into hatred of the other. The other, omnipresent thanks to the abundance of information, becomes a threat and therefore a factor of instability, especially since the other can only be as present as long as we remain at a distance from them. Yesterday, borders in a closed world were an obstacle, today in an open world they are a condition for peaceful cohabitation. The problem of the twenty-first century is that of the right distance in cultural cohabitation, of not feeling threatened by the other. Cultural diversity is an indispensable and increasingly violent fact that forces us to think about political negotiation and to build cultural cohabitation. There is nothing technical or digital in all this but only politics to domesticate the otherness and the fears of the other. Learning to live together peacefully when everyone sees each other, without understanding or caring about each other, is a challenge at least as important as that of ecology, beyond respect for nature and animals, to invent a new political cohabitation. 3. The third challenge, that of culture, communication and reception, is no less complicated. The performance of “pipes” in terms of production and circulation of information is not enough to create a knowledge society any more than digital technology is enough to create an interactive and participative local democracy. Culture and knowledge are not only accumulated information. This, plus something else, is tradition, erudition, negotiation between sciences and disciplines, the weight of contexts… If digital technology accentuates the number and speed

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of circulation of information and data, that is not enough to create an egalitarian knowledge society for all, and this is, first of all, because inequalities, from childhood to adulthood, persist, and not because everything is more accessible than everything is more equal. The division of labour and inequalities exist in our continent as elsewhere. And above all the reception is never in line with the sender and the message. Besides, the biggest problem in political communication is always the receiver, who is much more disobedient than we think, not to mention the inequalities existing between civilizations. The great progress of the Internet is freedom, free access, innovation and speed, but not necessarily, contrary to appearances, inter-comprehension. Its absolute limit is the confusion between technological performance and the complexity of human and social relationships. Not only does the increasing volume of information not create more communication, it also does not create more cultural equality. To dissociate technology from society and culture is indispensable if we do not want the technological ideology to impose itself. And never forget the “dark side” of the Internet, which is at least as strong as the ideal side of the Internet. Man is not better with the Internet. The nineteenth century is the century of the information revolution; the twentieth century is the century of communication, exchange and openness; and the twenty-­ first century is the century of learning the most peaceful cultural cohabitation possible between cultural and political universes that everything separates, but those are more and more visible to each other. The challenge? Not to confuse technical performance with social and political complexities. If it were enough for there to be more information in circulation and more interactivity for there to be more mutual respect, peaceful negotiation and cohabitation between the two sides, this would be a reality! The incredible progress of technology is not enough to create political progress and to guarantee peace. We have already seen this for a century. There has never been so much information, exchange, culture and openness without creating proportionally more inter-understanding. In reality, the “progress” of information, culture and knowledge does not naturally create more respect on a human and social level. The solutions? Dissociate information and communication. To think of the negotiation between different cultural worlds. Do not bring the logic too close together, organize their cohabitation. In other words, dissociate technical performance from human and social progress. In a word, to think the incommunication. Distinguish the rare moments of sharing, as we all experience them, and avoid acommunication, that is to say, ultimately failure then death. To think of the most frequent situation, that of incommunication, that is to say the one which obliges us to make mutual concessions which allow cohabitation, without illusions. To think the incommunication? The condition is to save the ideal of the communication. To understand the limits of the technological performance, to learn to think the human and social discontinuity. To understand that there are two great philosophies of the communication, technical and political. The paradox and the error are that for 50 years we have thought that progress is technological, and we realize that it is not. Technology is not enough to bring

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humans together, and only politics, which values other logic than the circulation and interaction of information, can try to understand and bring together heterogeneous logic. The heart of technological ideology? To hope that the performance of technology will allow the decrease of human and social incommunications (2020, 2022). The more technology progresses, the more politics becomes central, but politics is much more complex and disappointing than technology. We would therefore dream that technology, through its progress, could subvert the difficulties of politics. It is us humans who make peace and war, not computers or robots. The regime of technology obliges us to revalue the regime of politics, which does not dissolve in the regime science and technology. Dominique Wolton, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Paris, France [email protected]

References Wolton, D. (2009). Informer n’est pas communiquer. CNRS Eds. Wolton, D. (2020). Vive l’incommunication. La victoire de l’Europe. Les Peregrines Eds. Wolton, D. (2022). Communiquer, c’est négocier. CNRS Eds.

Acknowledgements

This volume brings together the results of research by academics and experts from 12 countries of the European Union (Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland, Romania and Slovakia), as well as from Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United Arab Emirates. A total of 49 authors have combined their efforts and expertise to produce this multidisciplinary overview of the current evolution of participatory democracy and digital tools, adopting the proposed problematic and using different approaches from political science, economics, public management, communication sciences, international relations or administrative sciences. We would like to thank all the authors for their valuable contributions and for the patience and responsibility with which they have always responded to our requests and solicitations for the editing and revision of their chapters. We would also like to thank our colleagues from LAREQUOI who participated in the revision of the contributions. We started this project in 2021, after a presentation at ASPA, and a very fruitful contact with Lorraine Klimowich, our editor in New York. She believed in the project, and thanks to her, we planned a specific and, for us, original implementation process. First of all, we organized an international conference in January 2022, at our university and in hybrid mode. This conference was included in the programme of activities of our management science research laboratory, LAREQUOI, of the Jean Monnet ad personam Chair “identities and cultures in Europe”, and of the European Marketing and Management Association (EUMMAS). We are particularly grateful to Annie Bartoli, Professor of Public Management and Director of LAREQUOI, for her support to this project. After the presentation of nearly 30 contributions, we completed the list of authors by mobilizing everyone’s networks. The following months were then devoted to the production of this volume. The elaboration of this project owes much to the numerous informal and friendly discussions with the team of the Hermes Review, of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, and its director, Dominique Wolton, notably during joint trips to Slovakia and Georgia, in the framework of the Hermes Offices abroad.

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Acknowledgements

Finally, this project would not have been possible without the special involvement of Stela Raytcheva, Petia Gueorguieva and Katarina Vitálišová, to whom the two coordinators wish to express their gratitude.

Contents

Introduction: Local Participatory Democracy, Discourses, and Practices in Digital Age����������������������������������������������������������������������������    1 Thierry Côme and Gilles Rouet Part I Participatory Democracy in the European Union  Participatory Democracy as Practice: Actors and Discourses��������������������   13 Stela Raytcheva  Evolution of the Legal Framework in Europe for the Use of Digital Participation at the “Local” Level: The French Case����������������������������������   31 Camille Morio European Free Mobility and Participatory Democracy: Knowledge and Digital Technology as a Bridge��������������������������������������������   43 Marco Cilento and Mihaela Gavrila Youth and Democracy: Digital Opportunities for the Future of Participation������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   67 Alessandro Ambrosino, Simon Cecchin Birk, Carlotta Mingardi, Georgios Nikolou, Lukas Spielberger, Elodie Thevenin, and Alice Trinkle Freedom of Speech and Democratic Values in the Digital Epoch: A Critical Perspective on the Post-totalitarian Media Culture�������������������   85 Diana Petkova The Relationship Between Participatory Democracy and Digitalization in Europe: Is There an East-West Divide? ��������������������   97 Loredana Maria Simionov, Ramona Ţigănaşu, and Gabriela Carmen Pascariu Differences and Similarities in Local Participative Governance in Slovakia and Lithuania ������������������������������������������������������������������������������  125 Katarína Vitálišová and Jaroslav Dvořák xi

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Part II Digital Tools for Democracy 4.0  Online Citizens’ Consultations for More Democracy in Europe: EuropaNova’s Experience Since 2018������������������������������������������������������������  149 Elise Bernard  (Dis)empowering Citizens at the Local Level in Bulgaria: Digitalization, Local Democracy, and Participatory Practices Before and Post-COVID-19��������  155 Daniela Bozhinova and Petia Gueorguieva  The Conditions of Social Learning in Formal Deliberative Settings: A Study of Municipal Councils in Brussels������������������������������������������������������������������  177 Mohamad-Amin Alomar, Mohammad Al Saleh, David Aubin, and Stéphane Moyson  Could Facebook Save Cities? The Case of “Save Sofia”������������������������������  193 Ildiko Otova Digital Transformation in Local Municipalities: Theory Versus Practice����������������������������������������������������������������������������  207 Katarína Vitálišová, Katarína Sýkorová, Samuel Koróny, Peter Laco, Anna Vaňová, and Kamila Borseková  Digital Best-Bid: Internet Voting for the French Abroad?��������������������������  227 William Guéraiche Part III Participatory Budgeting: Discourses and Realities Participatory Budgeting: Behind the Words, the Euros. Empirical Study of 4043 Projects in Paris (2014–2021) ������������������������������  241 Thierry Côme, Stéphane Magne, and Alexandre Steyer ICT Use in Municipal Participatory Budgeting in Czechia: Similar Patterns or Heterogeneity?����������������������������������������������������������������  255 David Špaček and Marek Navrátil Digitalization, Co-production, and Participatory Budgeting at the Local Level in Slovakia ������������������������������������������������������������������������  269 Juraj Nemec, Martina Balážová, Jozef Gašparík, and Daniel Klimovský The Impact of Online Technologies on Participative Practices: Learnings from Digital Participatory Budgeting in German Local Governments����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  287 Jens Weiss City as a Platform and the Role of Participative Democracy in Big Romanian Cities������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  307 Alexandru Roja and Nicolae Urs

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Part IV Evolution and Perspectives Benefits of Remote Work in the Self-­Service Model in the Public Utility Sector������������������������������������������������������������������������������  327 Justyna Trippner-Hrabi, Jacek Chądzyński, and Aygun Kam The Digital Transformation of Local Democracy During the Pandemic ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  347 Evelina Staykova  The COVID-19 Crisis: An Accelerator of Digital Democracy? ������������������  361 Gilles Rouet Democratic Innovation in Europe: Conditions for Ethical Participatory Practices������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  379 Kalli Giannelos Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  403

Notes on Contributors

Mohammad Al Saleh  holds a bachelor’s degree in informatics engineering from Arab International University (AIU) in Syria (2013). Actually, he is a full stack developer at UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain) and the developer of eD&lib software Mohamad-Amin  Alomar  holds a Bachelor of Law from Damascus University, master’s degree in public administration and PhD in political and social sciences from UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain) in Belgium. Actually, he is a postdoctoral fellow and Invited Professor of Public Management at UCLouvain. His main areas of research and interest are participative and deliberative democracy, e-government, public procurement, public management and international relations. Alessandro Ambrosino  is a PhD candidate in International History and Politics at the Geneva Graduate Institute. In Geneva, he has worked as Research Assistant for the project “The Myth of Homogeneity” and currently he works as a teaching assistant in the Department for Interdisciplinary Masters (MINT). He obtained his master’s degree in international relations (European Affairs) from the University of Bologna and he completed an internship at the European Committee of the Regions, after having worked at the Liaison Office of the Autonomous Region of Friuli-­ Venezia Giulia in Brussels. He is a contributor for “Pandora Rivista” and collaborates as “young historian” with the RAI (Italian National Television) programme “Passato e Presente”, conducted by Paolo Mieli. David  Aubin  holds a PhD in political science (2005) and is professor at the UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain) where he teaches policy analysis, evaluation and environmental policy. The comparative research projects he is involved in regard study policy work, collaborative innovation and environmental policies. With Marleen Brans, he co-edited the book Policy Analysis in Belgium, Policy Press, 2017.

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Martina  Balážová  is currently a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at Comenius University in Bratislava. After completing her master’s studies in Slovakia in the field of International Trade (2013) she also completed her political science-oriented studies in Italy in the field of World Politics and International Relations (2016). In her research, she focuses on participatory budgeting, inclusion, and empowerment mechanisms, paying specific attention to the situation of young people and their role in active policy making. In addition, she works as a project manager for NISPAcee (The Network of Institutes and Schools of Public Administration in Central and Eastern Europe). Elise Bernard, PhD  in Public Law from the Institute of European Studies of the University of Paris III – Sorbonne-Nouvelle, is Studies Manager at the Think Tank “Europanova”. Her research fields: post-communist Europe and the harmonization of law in Europe. She is also a lecturer in European law and institutions, procedures and law of fundamental freedoms in various universities and institutions. Simon  Cecchin  Birk  is a doctoral fellow at the University of Copenhagen and participated in the Europaeum Scholars program. Kamila  Borseková  is the Coordinator of Research at UMB and the Head of Research and Innovation Centre in the Faculty of Economics with a profound interest in urban and regional topics. She is an associate professor in the Faculty of Economics, her main scientific research is in the field of smart and creative cities, resilience, and sustainable urban and regional development. She has extensive research experience from dozens of national and international research projects related to smart, creative, and resilient cities, urban and regional development, strategic planning, and policy. She has authored and co-authored more than 120 scientific publications, including scientific articles, chapters, studies, and books. Daniela Bozhinova  is an independent Researcher in democratic governance with PhD in Political Science (New Bulgarian University). She has been awarded Fulbright Scholarship for her study in the politics of initiative, referendum and recall and Raul Wallenberg Fellowship for the study of human rights. She has authored and edited publications on direct democracy, populism and the Progressive Era, e-participation, such as the books Хората решават (The People Decide, 2014) or E-Democracy (2016). Chairperson of the Bulgarian Association for the Promotion of Citizens’ Initiative and Vice-President of Democracy International, currently she serves as an elected city councillor in Burgas, Bulgaria. Jacek Chądzyński, PhD  in Economics, master’s degree in sociology (specialization in social research methods and techniques), is an assistant professor in the Department of Local Government Economics, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, University of Lodz (Poland), and manager for the public sector within the Center for Training and Apprenticeships (Faculty of Economics and Sociology University of Lodz). His research areas include: organization and functioning of local

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government in Poland, the third sector (non-governmental organizations) in socio-­ economic development at the local level and clusters, and innovative entrepreneurial environments (milieu). Marco  Cilento  teaches Political Science and Comparative Politics at Sapienza University of Rome. He’s President of the Bachelor of International Cooperation and Development programme. His research interests are democratization, political systems, political elites and public policies at local level. Thierry  Côme  is Professor of Public Management, Université de Versailles St-Quentin-en-Yvelines (France), Paris-Saclay University, Head of “Institut Universitaire de Technologie”, expert of European programmes in Russia, Georgia and Macedonia from 1993 to 2014, and he was also, for 2002 to 2007, the Vice-­ President for International Relations, University of Reims-Champagne-Ardenne. Member of the National Council for Universities (CNU) for 2007 to 2019 and of the National Council for High Education and Research (CNESER) for 2011 to 2019. He has published 26 articles, written or directed 11 books and also published 32 chapters in scientific books and about 120 contributions and papers, in particular about Management of Education, Public Management and European Neighbourhood Policy, Bologna Process, Local Democracy or Corporate Social Responsibility. He is also involved in several scientific journals and director of The Revue Africaine de Management Public. Jaroslav Dvořák  holds a PhD in Political Sciences (2011) and, since 2020, is Full Professor at the Klaipėda University (Lithuania). He was visiting researcher at the Uppsala University, Institute of Russian and Eurasian Studies in Sweden (2017), and visiting professor at the Bialystok University of Technology in Poland (2017–2018). Since 2021, Jaroslav Dvorak is a visiting associate professor at the University of Johannesburg (South Africa). He is also involved in the editorial boards of international scientific journals. He is a research board member at People Powered. Jozef  Gasparik  is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science, Comenius University, Bratislava. He graduated in the field of Political Science several years ago, and before his PhD study he had worked as a public servant in an office of one self-governing region. His present research interests are focused on participatory democracy and various participatory processes at sub-national levels. In his PhD thesis, he compares selected cases of participatory budgeting in Slovakia in terms of citizen participation. His research is co-supported by the Slovak Research and Development Agency (APVV). Mihaela  Gavrila  teaches Sociology of Cultural and Communicative Processes and Entertainment and Television Studies at Sapienza University of Rome. In December 2017, she was appointed as a member of the Media and Minors Committee at the Ministry of Economic Development. She is Director of the Master of Security,

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Interforce Coordination and International Cooperation at Sapienza University, in agreement with the Interagency Law Enforcement Academy of Advanced Studies. She manages the activities of RadioSapienza University Radio Station. Kalli Giannelos  is a Postdoctoral Researcher at Sciences Po, Paris. She holds a PhD in social sciences (EHESS, Paris) and has an interdisciplinary background in moral and political philosophy, arts, culture and innovation. She has worked in international cultural cooperation (ICOM, UNESCO), on the comparative analysis of innovation ecosystems at MINES ParisTech, on responsible innovation in the culture and media sector (C-Factor) and on participatory democracy projects. She currently works at Sciences Po’s Centre for Political Research as a postdoctoral researcher on innovation ethics, participatory practices and digital ethics, as well as a lecturer (political theory). Her current research stands at the crossroads of responsible innovation, the ethics of media and emerging technologies, and public participation. Petia  Gueorguieva  holds a PhD in Political science from Université libre de Bruxelles. She is an associated member of LAREQUOI, UVSQ and member of the Observatory of public policies in epidemic and post epidemic situation OPPEE, Université de Bordeaux. She has published several papers and analysis on political parties and actors in Central and Eastern Europe. Currently, she is a senior assistant professor in the Department of Political sciences at the New Bulgarian University. William  Gueraiche  is an associate professor at the University of Wollongong Dubai (UOWD), where he is also the director of the Master of International Relations course. He successively taught at the American University of Dubai (AUD), the American University of Emirates (AUE). In his last edited volume on traditional and non-traditional issues, Facets of Security in the United Arab Emirates, Routledge, 2022, he explores different topics such as Cybersecurity, Demographics and Community security, or the securitization of the Covid 19. Aygun  Kam  is a doctoral student and member of the Council of the Self-­ Government of Social Science Doctoral School at the University of Lodz. He holds a BBA and an MBA from Balıkesir University in Turkey. He has been working as an accounting process specialist in an international company over 1 year, interested in economy and finance research fields. Daniel  Klimovský  completed his master’s studies in the field of Public Administration, and his PhD study in the field of Political Theory. In addition, he successfully completed a habilitation procedure in 2015  in the field of Political Theory. Since 2003, he has worked for a few universities in both Slovakia and the Czech Republic, and since 2017 he has begun to work as an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at Comenius University in Bratislava. His research and teaching activities are focused on public administration as well as political issues linked to sub-national levels. Concerning his international

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recognition, he has taken part in several important research projects and published dozens of various publications. He has rich experience with lecturing abroad, and he has closely cooperated (or still cooperates) with various international organizations, institutions as well as public administration units, too. Samuel Koróny  is a researcher at the Innovation and Research Center in Faculty of Economics at Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica. He is oriented mostly on the issues of comparison on the basis of effectiveness. He has 30 years’ experience in statistical and optimizing data analysis most in the area of social and natural sciences. He has authored or co-authored more than 150 scientific publications including scientific articles in indexed scientific newspapers. Peter Laco  is a graduate in the Faculty of Economics at Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, where he currently works as the head of the information systems section in the Department of Quantitative Methods and Information Systems. In his scientific, publishing and pedagogical activities, he focuses mainly on commercial internet usage, websites development, business graphics, data, information and knowledge management. He is a creator of dozens of internet websites and intranet solutions for organizations, companies, individuals and projects. Stéphane Magne  is Assistant Professor of Management Sciences at the University of Paris 1  – Panthéon-Sorbonne (PRISM Laboratory of the Sorbonne School of Management). His research rooted in the relationship between design, brand and innovation led him to explore the motivations of the consumer-citizen and to evolve towards responsible marketing and public marketing. Carlotta Mingardi  is a H2020 Research Fellow at the University of Siena. Her research interests focus on EU foreign policy, EU enlargement and the MENA region. Camille  Morio  is Associate Professor of Public Law at Sciences Po Grenoble (France). Her work mainly focuses on public administration matters and more specifically on participatory democracy law. She writes on French national initiatives of participatory democracy processes (for instance, the “Grand débat national”) and on local processes and is the author of Guide pratique de la démocratie participative locale, Berger-Levrault, 2020. Her work puts forwards that a legal framework is currently developing about participatory democracy, and studies how this affects and renew existing legal principles. Stéphane Moyson  is Assistant Professor of Public Administration at the Institut de Sciences Politiques Louvain-Europe, UCLouvain (Université Catholique de Louvain). His research aims at a better understanding and modeling of policy change processes through the study of decision-makers’ cognition and their social interactions.

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Marek Navrátil  is pursuing a PhD in Public Economics, focusing on the implementation of artificial intelligence and big data analytics in health services. He holds a BA in Applied Mathematics and Economics as well as an MA in Public and Social Policy. His research interests span the areas of economics, psychology, policy and philosophy. Juraj Nemec  is full time Professor of Public Finance and Public Management in the Faculty of Economics and Administration at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic, and part time professor in the Faculty of Economics at Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Slovakia, with 40 years’ experience in teaching at pre-graduate, graduate and doctoral levels. He is the member of the Committee of Experts on Public Administration at United Nations and serves/served in different leading positions in international professional organization. He has published over 500 books, book chapters and scientific articles. Georgios  Nikolou  is a DPhil (PhD) candidate in Constitutional Theory in the Faculty of Law at the University of Oxford (St Cross College). His research focuses on judicial review of legislative measures enacted during public emergencies. Ildiko  Otova  holds a PhD in Political science. She is a laureate of the Mozer Scholarship for excellence in Political science studies and civil courage, and currently serves as a visiting assistant professor in her Alma Mater New Bulgarian University and in Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”. She works also as research assistant in CERMES (Centre for Refugees, Migration and Ethnic Studies). Her teaching and research interests include migration and refugee issues, integration, urban policies and (e)citizenship, populism, far-right and extremism, current forms of antisemitism. Gabriela Carmen Pascariu  is Full Professor of European Economics and Policies at Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi (Romania). She is the Director of the Centre for European Studies, Jean Monnet Professor and Team Europe expert. Her research interests focus on economics of integration, regional development and European cohesion policy and cross-border cooperation and ENP. Author of numerous articles and book chapters, she is editor-in-chief of the Eastern Journal of European Studies. Diana Petkova  has a PhD in sociology and is an associate professor in Faculty of Journalism and Mass Communication at Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Bulgaria. Her research interests are focused on the cultural, ethnic, religious and gender identities in different regions of the world. She teaches cultural studies, intercultural communication and psychology of communication. Currently she is Chair of the Communication, Public Relations and Advertisement chair of the Faculty of Journalism and Mass Communication and Vice Dean of the international relations and Erasmus coordinator of the Faculty.

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Stela Raytcheva  is Associate Professor of Management Sciences at the University of Versailles-St-Quentin-en-Yvelines and Deputy Director of ISM-IAE, in charge of international and student relations. Her research interests include intercultural management, communication, epistemology and organizational theories. She studies the social production of cultures and politics in everyday life. Alexandru Roja  is PhD lecturer at Cluj-Napoca Babeș Bolyai University, Faculty of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences (FSPAC) and Director of innovation at Transylvania IT Cluster. Alexandru Roja has 20 years of experience in academia and research specific to the management of organizations and expertise in the field of digital innovation, entrepreneurship, strategic management, digital transformation, digital economy. and e-governance. In recent years, he has orchestrated innovation and entrepreneurial ecosystems by defining fertile and competitive contexts for innovation and digital transformation as well as for capitalizing on innovation capacities and capabilities and digital transformation strategies. Gilles Rouet  is Professor of Public Management, Paris-Saclay University. Head of the Institut Supérieur de Management, Institut d’Administration des Entreprises de Versailles St-Quentin-en-Yvelines since 2015, he holds the ad personam Jean Monnet Chair “Identities and Cultures in Europe” since 2009. Coordinator of various European programmes from 1993, he was also, for 2004 to 2014, Attaché at the Embassy of France in Slovakia and in Bulgaria. He has published about 50 books and more than 240 contributions and papers, in particular about Communication, European Identities, Public Management and European Neighbourhood Policy. He is also member of the Board of Hermès, La Revue, CNRS. Loredana Maria Simionov  is a Researcher at the Centre for European Studies of Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi. She holds a PhD in Economics and International Affairs, having as main research interests the post-Soviet space, as well as the EU’s relations with Russia and its eastern European neighbours. Her research is primarily focused on interdisciplinary approaches meant to decipher the complexity of this geopolitical space, thus combining concepts and insights from international relations, international economics, as well as European integration processes and policies. Additional research interests: EU foreign policy and resilience, the resilience of democracy, the future of democracy and digitalization. David Špaček  is an associate professor in the Department of Public Economics, Faculty of Economics and Administration, Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic. He has researched in public administration and public management and focused especially on theories and practices of administrative reforms, strategic planning and management in public organizations, participatory initiatives in the public sector, quality measurement and management in public administration and digitalization of public services, including e-participation.

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Lukas Spielberger  is a doctoral researcher at the Institute for Political Sciences at Leiden University and a Europeaum Scholar 2020-21. His main research interest concerns the international cooperation between central banks in Europe and international financial governance. His work has been published in the Journal of European Public Policy and Comparative European Politics. Evelina Staykova  is an Associate Professor at New Bulgarian University. She is head of the department of Political sciences and coordinator of CERMES (Centre for Refugees, Migration and Ethnic Studies). Her teaching and research interests include migration and urban studies, citizenship and e-democracy, populism and far-right extremism. Alexandre Steyer  is a professor at the University of Paris 1 – Panthéon-Sorbonne, former “Academy Rector”, graduate of the Ecole Normale Supérieure (physics) and telecommunications engineer. His research focuses on social interactions and the contribution of physics to management. Katarína Sýkorová  works as an assistant professor in the Department of Public Economics and Regional Development. In her scientific works she is oriented in the issues of local and regional development, and the concept of smart governance. She deals with elaboration of strategic planning documents and control in public sector. Elodie Thevenin  is a PhD student in Political Science at the Doctoral School in the Social Sciences of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. She also works at the JU Institute of European Studies as a research assistant on the EU Horizon 2020 project “EU Differentiation, Dominance and Democracy (EU3D)”. Her academic interests encompass subjects related to migration, parliaments and identity, especially in the European context. Her doctoral research focuses on the discussion on migration in national parliaments in relation to the development of European integration. She has been a fellow of the Europaeum Scholars Programme (2020/2021). Ramona  Tiganasu  is a doctoral researcher at the Centre for European Studies (CES), Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Romania. Her research interests focus on formal and informal institutions, governance systems, convergence versus divergence in the European Union (EU), growth poles, core-periphery patterns, resilience, European economy and regional policies. She is editor of the Eastern Journal of European Studies (EJES) and so far, she has been involved in many national and European research projects. Over time, she coordinated 10 volumes in national academic publishers, which had as main topics: the challenges facing EU economies during times of crisis, European and global governance, sustainable development in the EU, European policies, etc. Alice Trinkle  is a project doctoral researcher and PhD candidate at Free University Berlin, at the Cluster of Excellence “Contestations of the Liberal Script” (SCRIPTS). She is a global historian with an area expertise on Hungary and China. Her research

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addresses economic reforms in both countries since the 1970s until the early 2000s. Before starting her PhD, Alice studied Chinese studies, History, German language and literature and Education at SOAS University of London, Potsdam University and the University of International Business and Economics Beijing. She worked and lived in both Hungary and China. Previously, Alice has worked in academic language education, local politics and PR/media. Justyna Trippner-Hrabi  holds a Doctor of Economics Science within the scope of management (specialization: self-management in public administration, flexible organizational structures, turquoise management). She is an English language graduate from Lite London Institute of Technology and scholar at the University Alcala de Henares in Spain. She is a lecturer at the University of Lodz, International School Zhengzhou University and Clark University  – where she conducts classes in the master’s and MBA programmes. She is manager and trainer with and experience in Britain and Poland. She was vice president of the Association for Ph.D. Candidates and Ph.D.  Career Development PolDoc. Her publications include more than 50 articles and books that refer to the subject of local government economy and management. Nicolae  Urs  is Vice-dean of the College of Political, Administrative and Communication Sciences in Cluj-Napoca, Romania. He is actively involved in public institutions’ digitization projects, both at the level of the city of Cluj-Napoca, as well as at a national level; he also coordinated or took part in a number of strategic development plans for municipalities around Romania. He was one of the coordinators of the Digital Transformation Strategy of Cluj-Napoca. He is a member of Code4Romania and co-chair of the Central and Eastern European e|Dem and e|Gov Days, coordinator of the E-government Working Group at NISPAcee, as well as member in the editorial board of two scientific publications. Anna  Vaňová  is an author and co-author of more than 140 scientific papers (domestic, foreign, scientific monographs, articles in impact and CC journals), published and presented mainly abroad. She has worked and works as a principal investigator and a deputy researcher or team member in more than 60 domestic and foreign research projects in the various fields of spatial development. She actively develops cooperation with practice at national, regional and local level (cooperation at the creation of strategic documents, consultations for local, regional and national authorities, etc.). Katarína  Vitálišová  is an associate professor in the Department of Public Economics and Regional Development, Faculty of Economics, Matej Bel University (EF UMB). She orients her research on the issue of public and local governance, building and maintaining relationships and partnerships between stakeholders, strategic planning of the spatial development and implementation of new approaches in it, including creative and smart cities, places marketing what is represented by more than 130 publications. She is a member of several international expert networks in

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the field of regional and local development, management and marketing places. She has been involved in many national and international projects as a principal investigator or as a co-researcher. Jens Weiss  is Professor of Administrative Science at Harz University of Applied Sciences in Halberstadt, Germany. He is concerned with policy making, management and transformation in the public sector. His current research focuses on management practices and digitalization in local governments. Dominique Wolton  sociologist, is director of research at the Centre National de la Recherche Scientific (CNRS) and a specialist in communication sciences, public space and political communication. His research contributes to the development of a conception of communication that privileges man and democracy rather than technology and economy.

Introduction: Local Participatory Democracy, Discourses, and Practices in Digital Age Thierry Côme and Gilles Rouet

Within representative democracies, participatory mechanisms have been progressively implemented, often based on a legal obligation to consult citizens on various subjects, such as public services, urban planning, the environment, etc. These mechanisms can include the selection of panels of people, by co-option or randomly, public meetings likely to interest a wider public, or the use of referendums or petitions. All over Europe, locally and nationally, these practices are becoming established in public spaces, in particular by mobilizing digital tools, and often go beyond the strict framework of legal obligations: for example, many municipalities have set up participatory budgeting systems to entrust citizens with deciding on the allocation of part of the municipal budget. It is no longer simply a matter of giving an opinion or organizing a debate among citizens that may precede a decision by elected officials, but rather of letting citizens decide on part of the allocation of collective budgets, even if the budgetary leeway often remains limited. In different forms, participatory democracy has thus become part of the political landscape. Depending on the place, it is more or less formal, more or less institutionalized, more or less recurrent. While citizens, in the end, invest little of their time in public affairs, in the context of often-old representative democracies, both trust and participation in elections tend to decline. In France, an estimate of 2017 shows that 1% of the population is a priori concerned by participatory devices (Petit, 2017); this seems little, but by taking into account the propensity of the population

T. Côme Institute of Technology, LAREQUOI, Paris-Saclay University, Mantes-la-Jolie, France e-mail: [email protected] G. Rouet (*) ISM-IAE de Versailles St-Quentin-en-Yvelines, LAREQUOI, Paris-Saclay University, Guyancourt, France e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Rouet, T. Côme (eds.), Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20943-7_1

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to use social networks, to publish opinions, to share opinions, then it seems possible to relate a desire to act and individual concernment for public things with a renewed institutional offer. The literature on participatory democracy is vast and varied; however, the common thread of this collective work is based on a theory of practice, with reference, notably, to works that further research practices as performances, on the one hand (Geibel & Joas, 2013; Bherer, 2019; Santomer et al., 2008), and others that focus more on practices as the articulation of certain elements (Buza-Garcia, 2015; Lindgren & Persson, 2011; Kohler-Koch & Quittkat, 2013), on the other. Participatory democracy, in general, is at the center of a great deal of discourse, especially political. It is legitimate to ask about the articulation between these discourses and the practices that are or could be linked to them. Today, the political discourses (in the broadest sense, from local and national elected representatives, but also from citizen organizations that participate in the life of the city), disseminated within European public spaces, seem for the most part positive, even very positive, with regard to the current evolution of citizen participation, particularly at the local level. The Internet, in particular, would promote citizen participation, a new form of citizen participation, which would strengthen democracy (Cardon, 2010). Indeed, the latter is in dire need of renewed methods and tools, if only because a significant portion of citizens have been turning away from voting for several decades, but also because citizens often feel that their requests are not being listened to. The Internet would thus constitute a fundamental element of a democratic renewal, or even of a change of democratic paradigm, which could challenge or adjust systems of representative democracy with systems of participatory democracy (Pateman, 1970, 2012; Fischer, 2009; Röcke, 2014; Beebeejaun, 2016), even if it means suggesting that this participatory democracy would be a direct democracy. It is also, sometimes within the European Union, about promoting a new form of deliberative democracy (Fishkin, 2011), the modus operandi of which would be made possible by online consultations and debates. Numerous experiments of this type, with digital devices, have been set up, particularly in France, from the 5-year term of Nicolas Sarkozy to become a political systematization with the current government. These discourses are also, very often, voluntarist and participate in a technocentric stance that puts forward the technical device before its appropriation, the solution before the problem (Morozov, 2013). Emphasis is thus often placed on resources, training, and access to networks and services. Risks are minimized or even denied, such as the exclusion of part of the population (not necessarily on the basis of age criteria, cf. Rouet, 2019), or the establishment of a safe society (or secure) to the detriment of public freedoms, denounced with the dictatorship of algorithms (O’Neil, 2016), including in the public sphere (Rouet, 2019). The intentions are thus more or less clearly supported by a global or globalizing vision of the society of the future, of the digital citizen. However, and perhaps paradoxically, the discourses are often directive, based on a necessity without really basing it on any particular analysis. Futurists foresee the society of tomorrow, more

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or less realistic utopias that often respond to electoral objectives, but rarely in an operational way. It is often a question of foreseeing the implementation of tools, without any hindsight on their functioning and, above all, on their appropriation by citizens, based on expert arguments which then legitimize political decisions. Discourses rarely envisage different scenarios, “B plans,” and thus contribute to a blissful optimism linked to a belief in a saving technical progress (Bellanger, 2014). Analysts who attempt to put “digital powers” (Griziotti, 2016) or the effects of technical communication on human relations (Wolton, 1999; Turkle, 2011) into perspective, for example, are very often considered technophobic, backward-looking, and ultimately enemies of progress and therefore of democracy. But these types of discourses are not the ones that interest the main thread of this book. In general, discourses may or may not be linked to local actions, and local practices, of course, generate discourses, often different ones. In terms of democracy, at the local level, practices and discourses can (must) be considered together. Local practices, as many examples in the next chapters will illustrate, develop within given contexts, based on realities. Actions are often dictated and justified by pragmatic positions, driven by locally shared perspectives of needs, wishes, and opportunities. Even when these actions have a clearly expressed ideological justification, it is difficult to envisage generalizing them, despite the tendency toward “good practice” universalism which has become the rule in many aspects of public life and which is also linked to the “solutionism” mentioned above. This difficulty of generalization is a weak point, while the discourses are strongly incentive-based and promote a normative isomorphism (Côme et al., 2019), sometimes coercive and above all mimetic, with an approach that often leads to significant waste of resources. To make the discourse performative, experiments are set up by adapting, sometimes minimally, what is done elsewhere, in other contexts. The fashion effect is obvious and is linked to the commodification of the necessary tools. These adaptations to new audiences and new uses lead to the emergence of real catalogues of solutions that are more or less adapted locally. The actions can then be confiscated by a bureaucratic technostructure that does not want to relinquish its power and which, in fact, limits citizen participation by invoking numerous reasons, all of them legitimate, of security, confidentiality, societal responsibility, etc. Experiences of participatory democracy are seen in this book as a social practice that exists within a set of other social practices: voting practices, social movement practices, political campaigning practices, political marketing practices, lobbying, administration, etc. For Schatzki (1996, p. 89), a social practice is a “dispersed temporal and spatial nexus of doings and sayings,” organized around shared understandings (Schatzki, 2002). The sayings (oral or written) constitute the discursive part of the practices, and the understandings of the shared practices are partly implicit in the “saying” and “doing.” Practices can be studied both as a routine articulation of doings and sayings and as a particular performance (Shove et al., 2012): in the first case, the study is focused on the routine articulation of elements of practice at a historical and structural level, and in the second case, a particular case, a specific spatiotemporal realization of practice. Discursive practices allow for the categorization and negotiation

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of the roles and positions of social actors, technologies, and performances and participate in the process of articulating other elements of the practice. The embodied part of “doing” involves being present and competently participating in practice (Shove et  al., 2012). Technology in use means that tools and devices do not have a rigid and deterministic impact on social practices. From a socio-material perspective, technology has affordances that must be activated by their users (Heath & Luff, 2000). Like discourses, embodied behavior and the technology used also participate in the articulation of the elements of participatory democracy. The discourses are not necessarily connected with local actions, which could be more concrete, precise, limited, and adaptable and correspond to given realities and contexts. Nevertheless, discourses make particular doings and sayings intelligible. The objective of this book is to understand, through the description, the comparative analysis, the criticism, and the prospective study of numerous experiences and practices of local participatory democracy throughout Europe, how local authorities can circumscribe the crises of democracy and give new meaning to the notion of citizenship by associating it more intensely with decision-making and the control of actions. Digitalization is at the heart of this democratic objective, but it can also limit its scope. Is “Democracy 4.0” now a reality? However, the question is not whether or not technology can “boost” citizen participation, but rather whether this participation can be encouraged or improved through current technological developments. The aim is to give an account of “real democracy,” lived in practice as well as in discourse. This book thus proposes perspectives on the appropriation of digital tools for the development of participatory democracy practices at the local level, which makes it possible to consider digital issues from the local level, from the actors, and not from certain types of discourse. In the end, the convergence of practices seems to be much more founded than the convergence of discourses. The first part of this book constitutes a European tour of local democracy practices and their foundation in terms of discourse, law, usage, or value. It allows us to establish a convergence of views on the democratic crisis in Europe and the need to remedy it, mainly at the local level, through the multiplication of experiences mobilizing digital technology. It also underlines the capacity for initiative of citizens and/ or actors by noting the precedence of participatory democracy experiences using digital tools over the discourse of political decision-makers and legal responses, which could lead to the belief that a bottom-up mechanism is being established, which is obviously positive in terms of democracy. Stela Raytcheva introduces this chapter by studying more particularly the discourse of the actors associated with the practices of participatory democracy and the differences with the reality on the ground. Camille Morio, through the study of the French case in the European context, shows the necessity but also the difficulty of legally framing this use of digital tools in public consultations, in particular in order to ensure respect for the principle of transparency, since each citizen must know how he or she can give his or her opinion and, above all, how this opinion will be

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treated. Logic would dictate that the data of the consultation should be in open-­ source, which is currently not the case. For Marco Cilento and Mihaela Gavrila, digital can be considered as a “bridge,” in particular, from the point of view of participatory democracy, with regard to “mobile” European citizens, who invest the European space. This theme is also explored by Elodie Thevenin and her colleagues who highlight the opportunity to strengthen the participation of young people in democratic life through the use of digital tools, based on the analysis of the platforms of three major European cities (Krakow, Leiden, and Trieste) and their use. Freedom of the press is an essential democratic value. In countries where the traditional media are highly influenced by economic or political interests, networks can be a very effective counter-power whose freedom must be protected. However, in the absence of regulation and media education, these networks can convey fake news and propagate anti-democratic values. Diana Petkova highlights this paradox in the case of Bulgaria. Loredana Simionov, Ramona Ţigănaşu, and Gabriela Carmen Pascariu address the link between participatory democracy and digitalization by examining it from a Central and Eastern European perspective. In particular, they recommend a specific policy of digital convergence between the two parts of Europe to increase participatory democracy. This comparative approach is an avenue also pursued by Katarina Vitálišová and Jaroslav Dvořák who study the differences and similarities of local participatory democracy between Slovakia and Lithuania. Thus, all the chapters of this first part underline the strong imbrication between the use of digital technology and the developments of local participatory democracy. Then, the second part of this book illustrates this link by analyzing the tools put in place at the local level to strengthen participatory democracy in Europe. As a prelude to this chapter, Elise Bernard describes an innovative experiment, born of a citizen’s initiative, of online consultation allowing for the development of a debate on the future of Europe: EuropaNova, an experiment disrupted by the health crisis. Petia Gueorguieva and Daniela Bozhinova also examine the impact of Covid-19 on the use of digital tools and participatory democracy in Bulgaria. They highlight the accelerating effect of the health crisis on the digitalization of democratic practices at the local level. Mohamad-Amin Alomar and his co-authors, by studying the Brussels city council, give a concrete example of the development of digital tools to increase participatory democracy. Based on 17 semi-structured interviews with council presidents or general managers of 13 municipalities in the Brussels-Capital Region, they analyze the conditions necessary for the appropriation of these tools by citizens and suggest concrete ways of improvement. Ildiko Otova looks at a non-institutional digital tool, the Facebook account of the NGO Save Sofia Project, and shows that a citizen’s opinion network can be transformed into a real public policy tool, participating in the decision-making process and contributing to improving the city’s environment.

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Katarina Vitálišová and her co-authors study the digital transformation of local governments in Slovakia. Using a Delphi method, the research confirms that the use of digital practices has many positive impacts on the quality of life in cities in Slovakia. However, in this country, the use of digital tools remains limited, due to the average size of the cities: e-administration may have difficulty in imposing itself in human-sized cities. William Gueraiche studies a controversial digital tool, the Internet voting to elect deputies representing French citizens living abroad, and shows the risks of a break in legitimacy due to the fact that, in addition to electronic voting, ballot voting is maintained. The third part of this book is devoted to an emblematic element of participatory democracy, now present in many European communities, often in various forms: the participatory budgeting. Based on practical European examples, it allows us to understand the gap that sometimes exists between the very positive speeches and the less enthusiastic realities. As a preliminary to this part, Thierry Côme, Stéphane Magne, and Alexandre Steyer analyze the 4043 projects submitted and financed by Paris from 2014 to 2021. The results show that the title of the project, through the descriptive terms used, determines the value of the project and that it is the most unexpected words that vary the amount of the allocated budget. Thus, the participatory budgeting would ultimately be more of an additional political communication tool than a real tool for participatory democracy. David Špaček and Marek Navrátil describe the use of participatory budgeting by Czech municipalities. They show the heterogeneity of these budgets, but note a structuring of practices, particularly with regard to the final online vote. In addition to the role of digital tools for the co-creation and co-production of local public services, Juraj Nemec and his co-authors make an almost exhaustive inventory of the uses of digital technology in the policies of Slovak municipalities to develop the use of participatory budgeting by citizens. They show in this chapter the role of private companies in this increase in the offer of digital tools intended for citizens, due in particular to their positioning and their image in terms of social and environmental responsibility. Jens Weiss analyzes the influence of digital technologies and especially social networks on the introduction and development of participatory budgeting in Germany. In particular, he underlines the role played by these networks in transforming the participatory budget as a vehicle for greater democracy (following the Porto Alegre model) into a kind of additional democratic offer, which does not change the decision-making process and does not increase the effective participation of citizens in the elaboration of the budget. Focusing on the example of Cluj-Napoca, Alexandra Roja and Nicolae Urs describe the main challenges of participatory democracy in Romania and analyze how the implementation of a multiservice digital platform by large cities can foster this citizen participation. The case of Cluj-Napoca and the description of the proposed services support this analysis.

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The digital tool often leads to debates about the increased freedom it allows, the undeniable openness to information and culture, and the risk of enslavement it may entail, from the fan of online games to the conspiracy follower of fake news. The arguments exchanged converge toward the need for regulation, and the question is then to know who should ensure this regulation and what is the role of the citizen in it? Participatory democracy has benefited, especially in large cities, from the use of digital technology. However, as it appears in the three previous parts, this development can be cosmetic, superficial, and more a matter of discourse than reality. It is also constrained by the technological evolution but also by the international situation, the economic, social, and health crises. The end of history is not for tomorrow, and the triumph of participatory democracy is still a distant hope even if the resilience of the model and its adaptability are very strong. The fourth part of this book considers the different possible evolution of the current model of participatory democracy and its future perspectives between the need to adapt to new emerging constraints and the maintenance of its strong capacity of resilience. Justyna Trippner-Hrabi, Jacek Chądzyński, and Aygun Kam envisage a strong evolution of the role of the citizen who, beyond the user who can be asked for his opinion through digital tools, becomes an actor in the production of public services. This perspective is attractive, but it must be supervised and it is important to maintain democratic institutions that balance the possible drifts of an organization based on the market as a whole, in order to be able to guarantee all citizens their rights. Evelina Staykova returns to the role of the pandemic in the digital transformations of local democracy and underlines the strong capacity of the model to adapt to a hostile environment. For Gilles Rouet, the Covid-19 crisis can be considered as a gas pedal of digital democracy. But in the verification of information often under the control or oriented by transmitters of fake news and conspiracy theories, the liberticidal drifts sometimes observed have increased the need for a strong citizen counter-­ power, which paradoxically can strengthen the local participatory democracy. Kalli Giannelos concludes this part with the need to integrate an ethical dimension to citizen participation and to the use of digital tools, with the irreducible objective of increasing, through their use, the consulted population. Based on this principle, she describes ways to verify the ethics of the tool used. Democracy is necessarily a part of our digital environment, so it’s not surprising that new tools are being used. However, digital technology, as such, does not solve the issue of trust nor that of abstention. At best, for some citizens, a banal use of digital tools can be a lever of involvement. But we must also take into account both the “digital divide” and “digital abstention.” Throughout Europe, even if unequally distributed, there are “white” and “gray” zones, places without the possibility of connection. While citizenship is becoming “digital,” and more and more information to citizens is transiting through a digital channel, citizenship can only be exercised on the basis of a “right to connection,” with a satisfactory flow and availability. Technical inequalities are not the only problems; socioeconomic and cultural disparities are also obstacles. Nor do all citizens have the necessary skills to use digital tools. The Covid-19 health crisis, which limited physical contact and travel for almost 2 years, may be both an acceleration of the evolution of the appropriation of

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tools by citizens and an element of convergence of these practices within the European Union. However, local democracy is not (completely) linked to the Internet, which should not be analyzed as either a cause or a solution: it is not technology and digital tools that define practices, but rather practices, generating discourses, which may evolve with the tools available, including digital, depending on the meaning that the actors, citizens, give to their actions. Nevertheless, European countries, which are all involved in e-administration and are offering more and more services on the Internet, are developing strategies to make the networks available as much as possible; to provide training, starting at school; to develop skills; and to provide support, with mediators, mobile offices, etc. The aim is to limit these digital divides as much as possible, if not to limit them. But, for some citizens, a political choice, a posture, can lead to a refusal to participate via the Internet, for example, for fear of data theft or hacking. It is then a chosen form of abstention, of refusal to participate with the digital. Thus, in the context of digital divides, digital technology provokes both undergone and chosen abstentions. The local level is certainly the most relevant to consider the development of a participative democracy integrating digital tools: the relational in the real world is indeed always possible, and the tool can also be tamed, the reticence and the brakes removed, within the framework of communications between citizens. Within third places like civic tech or even shared gardens, new modes of representation, and citizen expression, new modes of management of the “commons” appear and progress (Rouet et al., 2022). However, the different current forms of democratic systems (representative, deliberative, participatory, direct) remain poorly articulated between them, and even if participatory democracy is developing, elected officials often do not seem to take the measure of it to make their own postures evolve, and this does not necessarily allow them to encourage citizens to take initiatives. Experiments in participatory democracy, particularly at the local level, will obviously not solve the often described and analyzed crisis of representative democracy, illustrated by the levels of abstention in elections, but they are likely to encourage elected officials to articulate the different forms of political democracy in a different way. Digital tools can also be mobilized for this purpose, with the implementation of new hybrid forms: the time is no longer for a hierarchy of systems, but for the cultivation of trust and meaning based on the practices invested by citizens.

References Beebeejaun, Y. (Ed.). (2016). The participatory city. Jovis. Bellanger, P. (2014). La souveraineté numérique. Stock. Bherer, L. (2019). The participatory democracy turn. Routledge. Buza-Garcia, L. (2015). Participatory democracy and civil society in the EU: Agenda setting and institutionalization. Palgrave Macmillan.

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Cardon, D. (2010). La démocratie internet. Promesses et limites. Seuil. Côme, T., Magne, S., & Steyer, A. (2019). Être ou ne pas être une smart city: Une étude empirique des innovations valorisées sur le site web des villes. Gestion & Management Public, 7(2), 73–101. Fischer, F. (2009). Democracy & expertise. Reorienting policy inquiry. Oxford University Press. Fishkin, J. S. (2011). When the people speak. Oxford University Press. Geibel, B., & Joas, M. (2013). Participatory democratic innovations in Europe: Improving the quality of democracy? Barbara Budrich Publishers. Griziotti, G. (2016). Neurocapitalism. Mediazioni tecnologiche e linee di fuga. Mimesis. Heath, C., & Luff, P. (2000). Technology in action. Cambridge University Press. Kohler-Koch, B., & Quittkat, C. (2013). De-mystification of participatory democracy: EU-governance and civil society. Oxford University Press. Lindgren, K., & Persson, T. (2011). Participatory gouvernance in the EU: Enhancing or endangering democracy and efficiency? Palgrave Macmillan. Morozov, E. (2013). To save everything, click here: The folly of technological solutionism. PublicAffairs. O’Neil, C. (2016). Weapons of math destruction. How big data increases inequality ad threatens democracy. Crown. Pateman, C. (1970). Participation and democratic theory. Cambridge University Press. Pateman, C. (2012). Participatory democracy revisited. ASPA presidential address. Perspectives on Politics, 10(1), 7–19. Petit, G. (2017). Pouvoir et vouloir participer en démocratie. Sociologie de l’engagement participatif. Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne. Röcke, A. (2014). Framing citizen participation. Participatory budgeting in France, Germany and the United Kingdom. Palgrave Macmillan. Rouet, G. (Ed.). (2019). Algorithmes et décisions publiques. CNRS Editions. Rouet, G., Côme, T., & Raytcheva, S. (2022). Third places, catalysts of resilience. In A. Zaheer, D.  Chabaud, C.  Gall, F.  Pratlong, & C.  Moreno (Eds.), Resilient and sustainable cities: Research, policy and practice. Elsevier. Santomer, Y., Herzberg, C., & Röcke, A. (2008). Les budgets participatifs en Europe. La Decouverte. Schatzki, T. (1996). Social practices: A Wittgensteinian approach to human activity and the social. Cambridge University Press. Schatzki, T. (2002). The site of the social: A philosophical account of the constitution of social life and change. Pennsylvania State University Press. Shove, E., Pantzar, M., & Watson, M. (2012). The dynamics of social practice. Sage. Turkle, S. (2011). Alone together: Why we expect more from technology and less from each other. Basic Books. Wolton, D. (1999). Internet, et après ? Une théorie critique des nouveaux médias. Flammarion.

Part I

Participatory Democracy in the European Union

Participatory Democracy as Practice: Actors and Discourses Stela Raytcheva

1 Introduction Bherer et  al. (2018) observe the tendency they called “participatory democratic turn.” According to Blondiaux (2021), participatory democracy (PD) is defined as all the measures, policies, and approaches that aim to involve citizens in the political decision-making process. Bherer et al. (2018) argue that PD practices were imagined as empowering citizens and allowing them to influence government (local or national) bureaucracies’ administrative decisions. Thus, participatory democracy seems to be a guarantee for a more inclusive society and the solution for the loss of trust between citizens and professional politicians. In consequence, the practices associated with this concept are socially valued, partly driven by the digital technologies, which are also supposed to promote everyone’s expression and access to information by associating technological progress with social progress. Nevertheless, when these initially disruptive ideas are applied in the everyday local or national governance, the outcomes are not so radical (Bherer et al., 2018). Why? Participatory democracy implies the participation of citizens in the management of territories and communities, but it is supposed to be organized by local and national governments. Put differently, one paradox occurs: participatory democracy mechanisms are socially valued, but they still require an institutional endorsement. Does participatory democracy only a formal method of citizen’s political participation? Participatory democracy research study PD cases all over the world. When based on quantitative methodologies, these works do not take into account the local context specificities, while qualitative methodology surveys suffer less from this S. Raytcheva (*) LAREQUOI, Paris-Saclay University, Guyancourt, France e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Rouet, T. Côme (eds.), Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20943-7_2

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limitation (see, e.g., Zittel & Fuch, 2007). Nevertheless, this research focuses mainly on a selected PD mechanism and does not follow the dynamic of the PD practice as intertwined with other local social practices. So, is the knowledge of one PD mechanism developed in one sociopolitical space transferable to another and how? We argue that the social practices approach is able to provide answers to these paradoxes and questions. The social practices turn is another tendency in political analysis (Jonas & Litting, 2017). It allows us to study social life in its complexity and the social actors as engaged in meaning-making cultural processes. We propose to explore the insights of the social practices approach to the study of PD mechanisms. First, we will summarize some key dimensions of the social practices approach. Then, we will illustrate the discursive articulation of some PD practices’ elements, namely, the actors and their relationship to the tools mobilized. Finally, we will outline the contributions of the participatory democracy approach as a set of social practices.

2 The Social Practices Approach The social practices approach encompasses a multitude of currents (Bourdieu, 1980; Schatzki, 1996; Giddens, 2012). Despite their diversity, these theories share the effort to reduce dualisms (nature-culture, structure-agency, materiality-sense, change-stability, theory-practice, etc.). Indeed, based on Heideggerian or Wittgensteinian philosophies, the social practices approach rejects representationalism and methodological individualism. We will recall the Heideggerian and Wittgensteinian approaches to social practices before defining social practices and their elements.

2.1 Heideggerian Equipment and Wittgensteinian Language Games As a phenomenologist, Heidegger is interested by the way we live and connect to the world as Being. For him, the Being is thrown into a pre-existing world of objects, persons, language, practices, and cultures and cannot be detached from. Intersubjectivity determines our physical, reflexive, social, temporary, and spatial engagement with the world that is shared, relational, and intertwined with that of the other’s world. Being in the world is not being with other beings (objects and subjects) as individual entities but as a network. Our Being in the world is always partial (perspectivist) and relational. Put differently, the Being both is determined by and determines the network of other Being and objects in which it is thrown. For example, the civil servant identity and role can be understood only in reference to

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citizens, governments, public services, etc. At the same time, a person who is a public servant is a much more complex (can be also swimmer, driver, etc.). Nevertheless, when participating in public services practices, the person is referred only as officer in relation to residents, citizens, law, etc. Thus, the Being is social; it is always a person in context (Smith et  al., 2009). If this seems banal and self-­ evident, this relational perspective implies that meaning making, identity, and everyday life are always locally constructed and relatively fluid. Heidegger refuses the primacy of cognition in favor of engagement with things. Thus, phenomena do not have meaning in themselves but according to their use or to our relationship to them. For Heidegger, things (objects, theories) are “equipment,”1 “in order to” (Olsen, 2013), serving to do something else. Moreover, these “equipment” are themselves connected to each other and form a totality of equipment. Equipment (objects) and Being are always connected as a reference of something to something (constant translations)2 (Olsen, 2013). We do not see the object (in the sense that things are not the focus of attention) when we are practically involved with them (e.g., it is likely that the voter is non-concerned by the pencil when signing his vote participation). Equipment is “ready to hands.” For Heidegger, being “ready to hands” does not mean that our senses do not process things, but only that our gaze goes beyond them, we see the object (e.g., a pencil) not for it, but for the “totality” of the equipment (electing a president) (Olsen, 2013). The same objects participate in different networks of “ready to hands” (e.g., the same object can be both a “hammer” to nail two planks of wood and a “blunt object” to kill someone). Thus, each equipment refers to the totality of equipment (social practice) in which the first is intelligible as equipment. For example, an object of the type “hammer” is intelligible (equipment) in construction, judicial practices (totalities of equipment) and refers to these practices. The relationality of the equipment implies that it points to its relational background (social practices) (Wisnewski, 2017). The non-fulfillment of our expectations about our interactions with one object creates another mode of consciousness (a form of awakening) which is that of “present to hands.” The consciousness is then concerned by the object which becomes something that can be thought of in an abstract, theoretical way. The “present to hands” mode is activated when a phenomenon is not in the right place in a network, in a process, or when it is experienced as an obstacle. Any unfamiliar object can make visible (thematic) the invisible, or the taken-for-granted, totality of equipment. Thus, we are able to question some of our relationships with the world and make them more authentic.3 For his part, Wittgenstein considers that lifeforms (Heideggerian world) allow the creation of language games (social practices). These social practices mobilize or  The term “equipment” does not suffer from associations to “materiality” associated with the word “thing” or “object” (Wisnewski, 2017). 2  These translations are in fact reductions of the objects in terms of focus or in terms of the involvement of Being. 3  This does not mean that the “present to hands” is the more authentic mode of Being, but only that we can rework our relationship with the equipment under focus. 1

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actualize in a conventional way, or through their grammar (a set of rules), some of the logical possibilities available in a particular lifeform. Put differently, like Heidegger, Wittgenstein considers that the elements that compose these social practices are articulated and their meaning is relational (Harris, 1989). Social practices are themselves interconnected and form sets of social practices or the background (common sense4) of other practices. For Wittgenstein, as for Heidegger, meaning is not internal to an actor, but public, collective, intersubjective, and therefore cultural. This supposes that meaning, cognition, knowledge, action, and agency are distributed within the social practices. In other words, the social actor is not an isolated entity and cannot rely solely on his cognition. Therefore, no social practice element has complete control over the practices in which it is enrolled. Wittgenstein attempts to dissolve the nature-culture and mind-body dualisms by merging these extremes. For him, we act by speaking and signify by acting. Meaning and materiality are grammatically connected (Hacker, 2018). Materiality illustrates (as a sample) meaning. All materiality is enrolled in our social practices through meaning. At the same time, meaning has material impacts by partially directing our uses. Any object, actor, or phenomenon is characterized by a materiality with a multitude of affordances and a polysemy. Some of these capacities and multiple meanings will be actualized in the context of its participation in a social practice; others will be actualized in other social practices or put in the background or ignored. To study the logical possibilities or grammar of a language game is to study which capacities or meanings are possible and which are actualized by the practice under focus. According to Wittgenstein, if rules of the social practice’s grammar are not reproduced in an identical manner but are always activated and applied according to the context (here and now), the rules are not interpreted (in the hermeneutic sense). Participating in a social practice implies being competent or, in other words, being able to recognize and perform a multitude of behaviors (verbal or non-verbal) as “synonymous expressions” of the same rule or as appropriate (Kenny, 2006). Wittgenstein suggests that social life is based on innumerable agreements. These represent prior knowledge, understandings, know-how, and a more or less shared vision of what is a good performance for a practice. This implies taking into account the judgments’ agreements both on the use of concepts (intelligibility) and on the sampling of their materiality (objects, actions, performances) (Kenny, 2006). These agreements are not individual, but intersubjective and inter-agency.5 All practice elements participate in the daily negotiation of these judgments and in the development of social actors’ skills. Thus, a social practice and its rules can only be understood as intersubjective achievements. All practice’s elements and articulations are constantly evaluated and  Common sense does not mean that it is “really” common, but that it is supposed to be.  We dissociate ourselves from the radical constructivist point of view and argue that intelligibility of the world is not only human construction but is also influenced by the world itself in a dialogic process. 4 5

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monitored. In this sense, social practices need to be practiced, not only cognitively learned. All practice members, without exception, participate in the practice construction and maintenance. In short, the Wittgensteinian approach can be presented as allowing us to identify the conditions necessary for our activities to be intelligible and recognizable. These conditions are both conceptual and material. They offer sets of potentialities. Social practices actualize some potentialities and not others (foregrounding some material and meaningful capacities and not others). Our structure of social practices (organize, make intelligible) but without determining (several different applications are appropriate) our uses, our identities, our projects, our power relations. Social practice ontology incites us to reject essentialization and to question some of the taken-for-granted assumptions that allow the everyday reproduction of our practices. These philosophical insights were mobilized in social sciences research focused on social practices.

2.2 Definitions and Articulation of Social Practices According to Wrathall, “a practice is a social structure that sustains action. This structure is particular way of organizing the world and agents into settings within which normatively articulated purposive activities can be pursued coherently” (2017, p. 4). For his part, Schatzki (1996) defines practice as a set of doings and sayings (purposive activities). Thus, he draws attention to the fact that a social practice is materialized by its reproduction in everyday life. We define social practices as articulated sets (structure, Wittgensteinian grammar) of socio-material elements (social actors, objects, etc.) in the framework of human activities (Heideggerian totality of equipment). By their reproduction, they are recognizable and intelligible. Wrathall (2017) suggests that social practices are composed of actors with competencies related to the practice in question, of Heideggerian equipment, and of a socially shared vocabulary defining the identity of actors, things, and performances. The competences of the actors are their capacity to apply the grammars of the social practice, whereas the totality of Heideggerian equipment is the network of artifacts and social actors mobilized in the practice. Two practices are differentiated from each other either by the elements that compose them or by the articulation of the latter. It is not possible to distinguish the elements in an artificial, decontextualized way; their meaning and their uses are constructed in their integration in a network, the ones in relation to the others. Thus, if the links between the elements are undone, the practice is no longer the same. While elements can survive outside practices and do not change (much physically) when integrated into other practices, what is transformed is their meaning or identities, their uses, the necessary skills, in short, their position in the Heideggerian “totality of equipment.” However, the apparent physical stability of these elements (actors, objects) leads us to consider them as stable and with essences. A confusion that Wittgenstein’s analytical philosophy tries to remove.

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Performances in one practice may have impacts on other ones (Shove et  al., 2012). Some elements are strongly marked by the practices in which they participate (e.g., satisfaction surveys in the marketing practices of private companies, etc.). When these performances are associated with other practices (e.g., user satisfaction surveys in public organizations point to market relations as a grammar of traditional marketing practices), they are likely to affect existing articulations in the reception practice (as well as “resistances” due to different practice backgrounds). Practices connect in different ways (co-location, co-existence, co-dependence) more or less rigidly to form more complex families of practices (Shove et al., 2012). Elements both are components of practices and are points of connection between them. In other words, practices connect to each other in complexes just as their elements are connected to form the former. Some practices in the complex may be dominant over others, in the sense that they are more institutionalized with more rigid grammars or serve as a background for other practices (Schatzki, 1996). However, we suggest that the articulations between practices are not given but negotiated intersubjectively. From this perspective, the actor is only a member of the practice, carrying certain elements of the practice (skills, interpretations, verbal or non-verbal behaviors), but is not the only actor in its activation. Shove et al. (2012) present it as a body and a brain for the benefit of one or more practices. The unit of analysis is not the individual, but the practice with its background (set of practices). An actor can be recruited or not by the practice. The existence of a practice is conditioned by the more or less high number of carriers, with more or less similar performances. Practices are social and not individual and organize the social order (Schatzki, 1996). They are intelligible and intentional (in the sense of having a direction6). They are in the background, because when we act, we are concerned by the action (e.g., voting) and not by the practices that support it (candidates’ applications, other members of the practice of voting, other political practices, etc.). Thus, for both Heidegger and Wittgenstein, the intelligibility of the world is that of public practices articulated in ordinary language. The public dimension of these practices is obscure by its obviousness and familiarity. The study of social practices allows to unveil this public intelligibility. Our social practices are considered as “natural,” “already there,” and beyond our control. Given their intelligibility, their regular performance, their recognition by members and even by some of the non-members, practices become taken for granted. Nevertheless, no social practice is totally “natural.” Furthermore, the social construction of practices implies that they must be accessible and communicable to everyone (Wrathall, 2017). The equipment is usable by all who have the skills. Thus, practices have a tendency to generalize. Generalization allows for intelligibility. Situations are understood in terms of the practices that are possible in them and thus orient toward important versus secondary, normal versus abnormal aims and actions, etc. Thus, in carrying out our practices, we do what others would have done.

 They are not “given,” but co-constructed.

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The “we” is constructed within social practices, in a constant dialogue between the “I” and “they” between the “I” and “you” (see also Bakhtin, 2006). Within each practice, the activity of different actors with different roles is coordinated. Our practices are normative and organize power relationships. This normativity implies values and norms and thus diverse valuations, evaluations, and statuses of actors, actions, and equipment. The social practices’ normativity is also constructed through the relations maintained between the practice of focus within a set of intermingled practices. Indeed, Dreyfus (2017) reminds us that each practice has its background of other practices (e.g., to participate in participative budgeting, actors must master practices of greeting, communicating, budgeting, neighborhood practices, etc.). Some of these background practices are Wittgensteinian deep grammars. For example, the representative democracy is part of deep grammar. Foreground practices make limited parts of the world intelligible; background practices make a vast part of the world intelligible. However, in the complex contemporary world, even these deep grammars can be questioned. In short, projects and concerns make sense and are coordinated within the framework of social practices. Social practices, themselves, draw their intelligibility from their intermingling with other practices or from the social and moral order they construct. Therefore, to understand and perform an action, one must understand and participate in the social practices that enable it. To understand and participate in a practice competently, one must also know some of the practices that interact with the target practice (Blue & Spurling, 2017). While participating in a practice “in order to” (Heideggerian equipment, vote, participatory budgeting), the actors also structure a social (power) and moral (normative) order and vice versa (Wittgensteinian grammars, e.g., maintain local neighbor culture, representative democracy, tax collection, etc.). The explicit “in order to” (participatory budgeting) requires but at the same time makes invisible the sociocultural order that is reproduced in parallel. Yet the latter is just as material and has an impact in terms of intelligibility, identities, articulations, and uses. Practice competent members master the social arrangements specific to the social practices they recognize. At the same time, these agreements are not fixed; the social practices and their articulations are complex and partially undefined. Thus, members have the leeway to renegotiate and transform them.

3 Participatory Democracy as a Set of Social Practices We propose to consider participatory democracy as a set of practices (participatory budget, neighborhood councils, etc.) integrated in a network of other local social practices (of voting, of decision-making at the national or local level, of dialogue, of neighborhood, etc.) in a geopolitical space-time. We propose to illustrate a part of the approach of the participatory democracy as social practice by focusing on the shared vocabulary and background knowledge needed to practice it. Put differently, we propose to study the discursive elements

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(intelligibility) of the practice. The discursive or saying elements (Schatzki, 1996) are characterized by all practice’s specificities presented earlier. The discourse is a Wittgensteinian language game. It is an articulated set of propositions, whose meaning is relational. It is normative and coordinates social roles and power relations. One focal discourse meaning is understood with reference to other societal discourses. Discourses as practice are also performative, intersubjectively created, and maintained and thus need the engagement of their bearers. Through a literature review and critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 2013), we will illustrate some of the discourses relevant to PD mechanisms held by the different groups of social actors from their partial positions in the PD practices. Discourses are not representations, but public sayings that are used to render phenomena intelligible. An individual draws from different discourses that circulate in the public space and create a complex attitude to the practice of focus. We based our analysis on statements toward PD that circulate in the public space through literature review and websites relevant to the social actors engaged in these practices. For each statement, we retrieve the presuppositions it encloses. Then we assembled these statements that are similar in content or in presuppositions and point to an underlying discourse. The social actors enrolled in a PD practice may differ from one practice to another, but some of them are needed in order to recognize the practice: citizens or residents and national or local civil servants. To this limited set of elements can be added also experts, NGO, media, etc.

3.1 PD Discourses Held by Citizens Drawing from the empirical studies of Garcia-Espin and Ganuza (2017), Holdo (2016), Yang and Callahan (2007), and Blanc and Beaumont (2005), we identify five PD discourses.7 1. Societal change discourse This discourse presupposes that representative democracy suffers from democratic deficit and that the citizens do not always consider the decisions taken in this political regime as legitimate. Thus, a solution is to mobilize PD mechanism. Indeed, in this discourse, citizens are supposed to be active and knowing better that governments what is good for the society. But in order to preserve legitimacy, the citizen’s participation needs to be voluntary. If PD is supposed to be empowering for individual citizens, it implies the individualization of participation can put in danger societal bonds. This discourse is based on PD philosophy as empowering and bottom-up politics. Societies are in need to change in order to become more inclusive and  These studies are not all focused on discourses and mobilize a variety of methodologies. We draw from them statements in order to reconstruct the underlying discourses. 7

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politically responsive. Actually, citizens are seen as impeded by the representative democracy, while the professional politicians are seen as not enough responsive. 2. Cost for the society discourse In this discourse, PD mechanisms are evaluated to the efficiency finality. PD as empowering effect is backgrounded, and the focus is on the cost of PD organization by government and municipalities that already lack resources. The tax inflation as solution to municipal shortage of resources is automatically rejected here. Moreover, PD is considered as needing important investment of time and resources but with outcome not so important (“crickets chirping”) or slower decision-making. In addition, PD is seen as potential for political uncertainty and unrest. Here, the representative democracy model is supposed to be superior to the PD one. More conservatively oriented, this discourse sees participatory democracy as disruptive and dangerous, at least as, not economically rational. The focus is only on short-term cost and outcomes. Territories and countries are seen as firms to be managed and not as societies to be maintained. Authority and control are unquestioned values. 3 . Citizens are not ready This discourse does not take position on the relative value of participatory democracy versus representative one but considers that one basic condition for the PD mechanisms success, that of invested citizens, is not present. The last ones are seen as passive and unskilled. In the absence of this necessary condition, the representative democracy model is considered better than the PD one. Nevertheless, this discourse differs from the previous one. In the “cost for society” discourse, control is valued, while in this discourse, the expertise is appreciated. In the previous discourse, citizens are presupposed to be active, while here they are seen as passive. Indeed, citizens are seen as lacking interest in public matters. So, they are not motivated to invest time and effort in order to participate to public decision-­ making. When engaging in PD mechanism, citizens are considered to need expertise and technical skills that they lack. So, their participation is supposed to be irrelevant. People are considered in need of political culture and communication skills, but that they lack. Finally, and maybe most importantly, citizens are considered as lacking solidarity bonds in favor of defense of only partial interests. Just as the previous discourse, this one focuses on the short-term PD outcomes. Moreover, everyday experience of public services users is considered less valuable than that of expertise. Thus, what is implied is that elected officials and civil servants are seen as holding expertise and global view. 4 . Not so common good oriented The PD mechanisms are resented as deceptive. Even if the philosophy of PD is attracting and empowering, everyday experience with it is supposed to be less than the concept itself. The PD mechanisms are seen as a way of expression of only “present” participants’ interests, not all. However, the access to PD events is not equal because of citizens’ missing availability, information, or skills. Thus,

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access to information, the lack of self-confidence, and the time availability prevent some population to engage in PD practices, and the inclusivity principle of the PD is not achieved. This discourse considers explicitly the relationship between citizens and public servants. What is implied is that when PD events set up, civil servants develop relationships with participants and are attempted to be responsive to PD participants more than to all citizens concerned by their decisions. Thus, PD is experienced as favoring the biggest opposition and clientelism more than responding to problems of the communities. Finally, in this discourse, PD mechanisms are seen as an opportunity for community leaders to gain legitimacy. Meanwhile, civil servants are supposed to try to orient, even to manipulate participants in accordance with the election or program issues. In this discourse, it is not PD that is questioned, by the motivations of its stakeholders. Here, the lack of citizens engagement is not seen as people’s passivity but because they are impeded. This situation is supposed to favor and to satisfy the small simple of participants and public servants’ partial interests. 5 . Governments resist to change This discourse presupposes that even when authorities mobilize PD mechanisms, they do not intend to change their organizational habits and loss their control. This lack of willingness to change is implied by the bureaucratic and rigid way governments use PD tools. Some of the last are seen as too restrictive; not enough time is devoted to deliberation and expression, excessive technical authority, etc. So, PD mechanisms are seen to be redirected by civil servants for their own interest or to preserve existing bureaucracy. Again, PD is supposed to be an empowering political philosophy, but it is deformed by public officials because of their bad faith and lasting habits. At the same time, citizens play the good role, they are active, but their ideas are not implemented. So, in fact, they are disempowered and have the perception of no influence. If civil servants are seen as resisting to change, it is not because they lack competencies. Indeed, citizens do not imagine PD events as a way for officers to learn. In short, the five PD discourses are all interrelated with representative democracy ones. The formers are intelligible in relation to the letters and vice versa. Each discourse supposes different articulations, power relations, and normativity for both members and background discourses.

3.2 PD Discourses Held by Civil Servants Based on the research of Holdo (2016), Yang and Callahan (2007), and Blanc and Beaumont (2005) and the website of the French national learning center for territorial public officers, we identify four PD discourses mobilized by civil servants.

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1. Enthusiastic normative discourse This discourse considers PD as a response to a presupposed loss of legitimacy of the representative democracy. In this discourse, as in the societal change discourse held by citizens, people are presented as active and engaged. But the similarities stop here. For public officers, PD mechanisms are seen mainly as a way to create social cohesion, stimulate dialogue between participants, and reinforce social relationships. Put differently, PD is a way to create and maintain local community in the same spirit as cultural and sport events. Nevertheless, in the case of PD mechanisms, there are supposed to be additional impacts like dialogue with civil servants, enhancing confidence in administration, and sense of more transparency. Moreover, PD basic philosophy is supposed to incite civil officers to organize PD events as widely accessible and, thus, inclusive. So, PD is a reason for professional pride. Indeed, PD philosophy is close to some of the values at the heart of the civil servant’s culture, at least in France. PD mechanisms are supposed to be valuable but not enough widespread. So, public servants see it as an “innovation,” as a way to differentiate themselves from other municipalities and governments and thus to enhance their status. Moreover, one of the good points of PD mechanism for civil servant is that they are seen as being politically “neutral.” Put differently, there is not an opposition to projects only based on the fact that they are initiated by the opposite political party. Thus, PD tools can be even a way to advocate projects supported by citizens despite the political opposition. 2. PD as an education process In this discourse, PD mechanisms are still valued, but the conditions for their success are seen as missing. The problem is supposed to be the citizens that have no competencies, but they can learn them by doing. Indeed, paradoxically, citizens are seen as lacking citizenship experience, but as engaging to PD events. So, the last ones are considered to be a kind of citizenship school. Moreover, in the beginning, the citizens are presupposed irrespective to different communities and lacking participation skills. But when they engage in the PD process, they become more self-confident, tolerant, and citizenship oriented. Thus, in this discourse, PD mechanisms are considered to be empowering but more for the individual, than for the community (not as in the previous discourse). It is a kind of personal citizenship development. As in the enthusiastic normative discourse, public servants consider themselves as a valuable provider of services to residents. 3. Expert discourse In the expert discourse, public officials consider themselves as experts, while citizens are supposed lacking competencies and skills. Thus, science and technical expertise are seen as superior to the knowledge of everyday use. PD is supposed to be a danger to rational decision-making because of the experts’ loss of autonomy. Consequently, PD mechanism can be an obstacle to innovation. Citizens are presented as conservative and resisting change. PD modes of decision-making are only loss of time and of resources for less rational outcomes. Thus, this discourse implies that experts deserve better status

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and power because of their superior and “rational” technical knowledge. It is a variant of representative democracy discourse where “elite” is poised to take better decisions on behalf of people. 4 . Bureaucratic discourse The bureaucratic discourse is also more supportive to representative democracy. Indeed, PD mechanisms are considered illegitimate because they allow non-elected participants to take decision for all while the biggest part of citizens lack of interest and time. Indeed, citizens that participate are seen as having partial interests and not pursuing common good. They are represented as consumer with “the shopping list” requirements. These attitudes are at the origins of divisions and conflicts between participants. Moreover, PD mechanisms are seen as manipulated by community and NGO’s leaders in search of legitimacy. So, PD is even dysfunctional in regard to representative democracy. The bureaucratic discourse favors civil servant neutrality and bureaucratic procedures’ following in order to be accountable to all and to deal with citizens without favoritism. So, the PB organization and integration into existing administrative practices is seen as complex and difficult to legitimate. In this discourse, citizens that participate are seen as capricious children, while the civil servant is represented as a responsible adult. We can infer that citizens and public servants draw from partly overlapping PD discourses. Both “social change” and “enthusiastic normative” discourses favor PD over representative democracy. Citizens are considered active. Nevertheless, the two discourses differ on the value attached to public officers and the PD expected performance: as social change versus society maintenance. There is also an interdiscursivity between “citizens are not ready” and “PD as an education process,” but still the two groups of social actors have a different accents (Bakhtin, 2006). The same can be said for “cost for society” and “expert” discourses. Finally, “not so common good oriented” and “governments resist to change” are linked to “bureaucratic discourse” but in a complex relation of support and opposition. We underline the normativity of theses discourses and the different valuations of actors and political regimes that they implicitly enclose.

3.3 NGO Participatory Democracy Discourses Following Mosley (2016), Renault-Tinacci and Arhip-Paterson (2020), and two NGO (DemocracyOS; make.org) promoting participatory democracy websites, we identified two types of discourses. 1. Know better the interests of their members In this discourse, NGO suppose that citizens do not have time and expertise, so their participation is not efficient, and they can be manipulated by public officials. In order to protect them and through NGO thematic expertise, they can advise citizens and even represent better their interests. Again, what is supposed

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is a disempowered people in need of protection and representation not of empowerment. 2 . PD mechanisms are manipulative The second type of discourse is also suspicious but toward public officers. They are supposed to make participatory democracy washing and thus aiming to manipulate NGO in favor of their own electoral agenda. When NGO engage in PD mechanisms, it is so for instrumental reasons: have funding for other projects and be more visible and legitimate to represent citizens. As intermediary, NGO implicitly favor representative democracy model (not as legal organization, but as philosophy). There is interdiscursivity between “citizens are not ready,” “expert discourse,” and “know better the interest of their members.” In addition, another interdiscursivity is present in “governments resist to change” and “PD mechanisms are manipulative.”

3.4 Digital PD Discourses Based on Anderson et al. (2007), Talpin and Wojcik (2010), and the website of the French national learning center for territorial public officers,8 we identify an e-PD discourse held by digital platforms’ service providers, NGO promoting e-PD and by civil servants. 1. Civic techs are the solution (platform provider and participatory democracy NGO) This discourse is very optimistic. The PD face-to-face mechanisms are supposed to maintain power relations because they are initiated by public servants. In contrast, e-PD platforms allow for less intermediaries and promise to “uberize” the politics through facilitating information flow, dialogue, and participation. They are supposed to enhance inclusion and democracy. In this discourse, the lack of democracy and inclusion is supposed. Then, in addition to power imbalance, this shortage is explained by space and temporal constraints for participants (and not for, e.g., by lack of political interest). This discourse is based also at the presupposition that PD is initiated by citizens (not bureaucrats) and that they are active. PD is highly valued, and digital platforms are presented as social innovations. Naturally, digital platform promoters are presented as mastering technical issues (text, video, security) and as a useful intermediary. 2. Civic techs are only one of a multitude of means toward participatory democracy (municipal managers) This discourse is much more nuanced than the previous one. It presupposes that political engagement is not an individual but a collective affair, so no democratic regime can be “uberized.” The civic tech can enhance democracy only on  Cf. https://www.cnfpt.fr/ (15/06/2022).

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the basis of an already existing participative culture. The last one is supposed to be developed mainly in face-to-face PD.  So, the civic tech is seen not as a replacement but as a complement to the existing PD mechanisms. In addition, the need of the latter will be persisting because of the complexity of multiple platforms’ use and the need of competencies and technical resources  for their users. This discourse presupposes a civil servant culture and the habit to consider all citizens (not just the digital natives). It preserves the position of the public servant as an intermediary in the PD mechanisms.

3.5 Normative and Performative Effects of PD Discourses Looking at the PD discourses as a discursive practice allows us to consider the discourses circulating in the public space not as specific to a given social actor but as presupposing the social practice under focus and, thus, the positions and the articulation of its elements. For example, each discourse defines taken-for-granted skills, attitudes, and values for its members and does so in accordance with their enrollment in the practice. For example, as said earlier, the “social change” discourse preserves positive role for citizens and less positive one for civil servants. Moreover, it presupposes a PD model discourse and implicitly aims at its achievement at the expense of the representational democracy one. Put differently, each discourse can be said to narrate a specific story about the PD mechanisms. At the same time, it also points to a specific Wittgensteinian grammar of the type of democratic regime to be valued. Each individual actor draws statements from different co-existing discourses, and thus, she makes them dialogue through interdiscursivity. Indeed, the PD mechanisms cannot be intelligible without reference to representative democracy ones. We argue that the current PD mechanism development is the achievment from this dialogue of discourses supporting and implicitly valuing one type of political regime over another. The different members of PD practices hold varied positions and have specific perspectives (Bakhtinian accents). NGO and e-PD providers, at least in France, consider the PD mechanism in their more radical form. Civil servant, at least in France, sees it in much more conformist conception as a way to sustain representative democracy. Citizens activate a multitude of discourses. All actors take a position toward democratic model to be maintained, and all these discourses are normative; when one values one element of a practice, one also has an attitude toward the other elements according to the articulations sustained between them. Unfortunately, our illustration of the discursive elements of the PD practices is uncomplete because of lack of ethnographic access to one particular case. Thus, we are not able to illustrate the richness of the social practices approach. For example, we need to observe the discourses mobilized in the everyday practice of say participant budgeting or neighborhood councils. Moreover, we should follow the

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intermingling of the PD practice (participatory budgeting) with other ones (municipal decision-making, neighborhood practices, NGO practices, etc.) or study their material dimensions.

3.6 The Value Added of Social Practices Approach to the Study of the Participatory democracy  In addition, following social practices approach, we infer that participatory democracy includes a deliberative one. The first is impossible without the second. However, the second is not to be conceived as formal deliberation but as intersubjective meaning making. In the same vein, using social practices approach incite us to study PD practices engagement as intermingled with other practices in the realization of the everyday activities. Thus, we need to study the political participation in formal PD situations but in relation to informal neighborhood activities or social network communication. PD is a set of normative discourses that affect identities (innovative versus resistance to change, democratic versus authoritarian, etc.) and attributes values and status for social actors according to their role in promoting PD mechanism. The same is true for technologies that sustain PD practices. At the same time, the PD mechanisms are intelligible not in a social vacuum but only in reference to existing representative democracy.9 So, the balance between the participative and the representative democracy is the achievement of a dialogue (interdiscursivity) between these different types of democratic practices. Finally, this approach allows us to consider the richness of the local context of action and interlacing of local sociocultural and political practices with PD ones. For example, Baiocchi (2003) study of PD mechanism in two districts of the city of Porto Alegre shows that the citizen’s participation is much more democratic and inclusive in the district with a participatory culture and habits where active NGO maintain an informal everyday public space for dialogue between citizens and with active social networks than in the other district. Put differently, the intelligibility of the participatory budgeting meetings is co-constructed by the current practice and its background of other local sociopolitical ones. Ideally, we need to study participatory democracy in its complexity (longitudinal studies, taking into account other administrative and political practices, formal and informal participation, etc.) favoring ethnographic methods that allow us to follow the practices’ dynamics.

 When it exists.

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4 Conclusion This chapter began with four questions relevant to the participatory democracy: Why do the initially disruptive PD ideas, when applied in the everyday local or national context, generate outcomes that are not so radical? Why do, if participatory democracy mechanisms are socially valued, they still require an institutional endorsement? Does participatory democracy only a formal method of citizen’s political participation? Why do they not follow the dynamic of the PD practice as intertwined with other local social practices? Our response for all these questions is the mobilization of social practices approach for the study of participatory democracy. In that aim, we recalled some of the philosophical bases of this social theory and its constitutive elements. Then we illustrated a partial application of participatory democracy as practice approach by focusing on the intelligibility articulation of some elements of the PD practices. Indeed, PD mechanisms need to be integrated in the existing practices of bureaucracy10 and representative democracy. When considered in relation to existing representative democracy, when analyzed in reference to it, the participatory one is seen as less radical. Indeed, PD cannot be implemented in a vacuum. In the same sense, in order to be generalized to all citizens and not only participating ones, PD needs an intermediary that is legitimated by the actual representative democracy. Participatory democracy cannot be separated from other social practices of participation, citizenship, and everyday practices (communication, greeting practices, social network practices, political information seeking and analyzing practices, etc.). These PD mechanisms’ uses need to be studied in their temporal and spatial dynamics in order to avoid some rapid essentializing value judgments on the “relative” PD success.

References Anderson, K. V., Henriksen, H. Z., Secher, C., & Medaglia, R. (2007). Costs of e-participation: The management challenges. Transforming Government: People, Process and Policy, 1(1), 29–43. Baiocchi, G. (2003). Emergent public sphères: Talking politics in participatory gouvernance. American Sociological Review, 68(1), 52–74. Bakhtin, M. (2006). Discourse in the novel. In M. Holquist (Ed.), The dialogic imagination by M.M. Bakhtin (pp. 259–422). University of Texas Press. Bherer, L., Dufour, P., & Montambeault, F. (2018). The participatory democracy turn. Routledge. Blanc, M., & Beaumont, J. (2005). Local democracy within European urban development programmes. Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 96(4), 409–420. Blondiaux, L. (2021). La démocratie participative: une réalité mouvante et un mouvement résistible. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from https://www.vie-­publique.fr/ parole-­dexpert/279196-­la-­democratie-­participative-­par-­loic-­blondiaux

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Blue, S., & Spurling, N. (2017). Qualities of connective tissues in hospital life. In N.  Hui, A. Schatzki, & T. E. Shove (Eds.), The nexus of practice: Connections, constellations, practitioners (pp. 24–37). Routledge. Bourdieu, P. (1980). Le sens pratique. Les Editions de Minuit. Dreyfus, H. (2017). Background practices. In M. A. Wrathall (Ed.), Background practices: Essays understanding of being. Oxford University Press. Fairclough, N. (2013). Critical discourse analysis: The critical study of language. Routledge. Garcia-Espin, P., & Ganuza, E. (2017). Participatory skepticism: Ambivalence and conflict in popular discourses of participatory democracy. Qualitative Sociology, 40, 425–446. Giddens, A. (2012). The constitution of society. Polity. Hacker, P. M. (2018). Wittgenstein: Comparisons and context. Oxford University Press. Harris, R. (1989). Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein. Routledge. Holdo, M. (2016). Reasons of power: Explaining non-cooptation in participatory budgeting. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 40(2), 378–395. Retrieved 12 June 2022, from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/1468-­2427.12378?casa_ token=0hFUoGRjf4EAAAAA:1s-­pkDb5VC_eediEkKgitL9X2Z3-­5IoUYMDfCRMkPEW 0jT_nQbTiJ7ne-­AN_0iKmpBIvBTKsU00Ueftv Jonas, M., & Litting, B. (2017). Praxeological political analysis. Routledge. Kenny, A. (2006). Wittgenstein. Blackwell publishing. Mosley, J. (2016). Nonprofit organizations involvement in participatory process: The need to democratic accountability. Nonprofit Policy Forum, 7(1), 77–83. Olsen, B. (2013). In defense of things, archeology and the ontology of objects. AltaMira. Renault-Tinacci, M., & Arhip-Paterson, W. (2020). Implication des associations dans la démocratie participative. Le cas du budget participatif parisien. Institut national de la jeunesse et de l’éducation populaire. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from https://injep.fr/wp-­content/ uploads/2020/09/IAS38_democratie-­participative.pdf Schatzki, T. (1996). Social practices: A Wittgensteinian approach to human activity and the social. Cambridge University Press. Shove, E., Pantzar, M., & Watson, M. (2012). The social dynamics of social practice: Everyday life and how it changes. Sage. Smith, J., Flowars, P., & Larkin, M. (2009). Interpretative phenomenological analysis: Theory, method and research. Sage. Talpin, J., & Wojcik, S. (2010). Deliberating environmental policy issues: Comparing the learning potential of online and face to face discussions on climate change. Policy and Internet, 2(2), 61–93. Wisnewski, J. (2017). Heidegger: An introduction. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Wrathall, M. (2017). Introduction: Background practices and understanding of being. In M. Wrathall (Ed.), Background practices: Essays understanding of being. Oxford University Press. Yang, K., & Callahan, K. (2007). Citizens involvement efforts and bureaucratic responsiveness: Participatory values, stakeholder pressures, and administrative practicality. Public Administration Review, 67(2), 249–264. Zittel, T., & Fuch, D. (2007). Participatory democracy and political participation. Routledge.

Evolution of the Legal Framework in Europe for the Use of Digital Participation at the “Local” Level: The French Case Camille Morio

1 Introduction This chapter will analyze European discourses and practices concerning the use of digital tools in the legal framework of participatory democracy, focusing specifically on the French case. France is a decentralized unitary State. Local authorities, called “collectivités territoriales,” have legal personality (i.e., they coexist with the State and can adopt decisions and own properties) and are run by elected representatives. They benefit from autonomy with regard to the State. At the same time, local authorities do not have legislative power and must make decisions that respect national laws. In addition, they do not have the “competence of their competences” or “the authority over their authority” which means that they are not able to decide to give up their power to other persons, such as inhabitants of their territory. Therefore, they cannot put participatory tools in place through which non-elected people can make decisions themselves unless they are authorized by the law to do so. Participatory mechanisms that they create must only be consultative, i.e., non-decisional. The French legal system is classically structured by a hierarchy. The French Constitution of October 4, 1958, and the Charter for the Environment, along with other complementary texts, are at the top of this hierarchy and hold constitutional weight. Participatory detailed regulations exist in the next hierarchical level and are found mainly in four different codes: environmental code (abbreviated “Env.” further), urban planning code (abbreviated “Urb.” further), territorial collectivities general code (TCGC), and public and administration relations code (PARC). The first

C. Morio (*) Associate Professor of Public Law, Sciences Po Grenoble, CERDAP2, Grenoble, France © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Rouet, T. Côme (eds.), Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20943-7_3

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three codes are composed of a very sophisticated regulation of participation. The fourth code provides a large, flexible framework. The remaining regulations stem from the regulatory power of local authorities, which has already been described above as limited. The text is structured into two parts. The first part explains how the recent Covid crisis has undoubtedly increased the use of digital tools in participation, not only in practice but also in law. Such is particularly the case in the environmental field, which consequently raises a specific legal issue. The second part explains, beyond the environmental field, how, at the local level, the use of digital tools takes place in a legal framework that is currently booming without being specific to the local level. This chapter shows that if there is currently a real development of participatory democracy law in France, it is not specific to neither the “local” field nor the use of digital tools.

2 The Problematic Recourse to Digital in the Environmental Field The environmental field is concerned with many participatory mechanisms. Even if those mechanisms are not all triggered or monitored by local authorities, they often take place in a geographically situated area. This fact justifies that the mechanisms may be included in the scope of “local” participatory democracy. Usage of digital tools in the environmental field raises a specific issue because it can clash with the constitutional right to take part in the public decision-making processes that are likely to affect the environment. In spite of this constitutional constraint, French law authorizes the increased practice of digital tools, which has been accentuated by Covid crisis laws. In this situation, the National Commission for Public Debate, an independent public body, has affirmed itself as a key player in protecting the constitutional right to participate in environmental matters.

2.1 What Is at Stake? The Right of Each Person to Participate in Decision-Making Processes That Are Likely to Affect the Environment The Charter for the Environment of 2004 has constitutional value.1 Article 7 of the Charter states that “everyone has the right, in the conditions and to the extent provided for by law, to have access to information pertaining to the environment in the possession of public bodies and to participate in the public [decision-making] processes likely to affect the environment.”  Constitutional council, June 19, 2008, Loi relative aux organismes génétiquement modifiés, no 2008-564 DC. 1

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This right to participate in decision-making processes likely to affect the environment is stamped by an inclusion principle, insofar as “each person” shall have this right. However, a NISES 2020 study shows that in 2019, 12% of the French population did not have Internet access at home, whatever the tool (computer, pad, smartphone). The study, furthermore, identifies several disparities of Internet access, according to the type of territory and, in a more visible manner, according to the age of people and their diploma level (NISES, 2020). Another NISES study from 2019 shows that 38% of Internet users lack at least one basic skill involved with using the Internet. More generally, “digital illiteracy” affects 17% of the population when including non-Internet users (NISES, 2019). As the president of the French National Commission on Public Debate puts it, “the exclusive recourse to digital participation tools does not respect the requirements of information and participation rights” (NCPD, 2021a). Despite this contradiction between the fact that no one should be excluded from the right to participate in decision-making processes that are likely to affect the environment and the fact that not every person in France has access to nor knows how to use digital tools, the use of digital tools continues to increase.

2.2 The Increased Recourse to Digital Tools The use of digital tools has been increasing in ordinary law as well as in recent Covid crisis laws. 2.2.1 Ordinary Law When participation is put in place concerning a plan, program, or project that affects the environment, ordinary law gives participation organizers significant freedom concerning how they will manage the participatory democracy process. Such is the case for public debates (art. L121-8 to L121-15 Env.), preliminary concertations (art. L121-8 to L121-15 and art. L121-15-1 to L121-21 Env.), public concertations (art. L123-1 to L123-18 Env.), and concertations of the urban planning code (art. L103-2 to L103-7 Urb.). In these situations, organizers can use digital tools. At this point, each case then needs to be looked at individually in order to determine if article 7 of the Charter for the Environment is respected. Recent laws expanded the scope of digital participation. An order of August 3, 2016, authorized the digitalization of public concertations.2 Nevertheless, this modality is not exclusive, as non-digital tools can be used for this particular kind of participative procedure. For other forms of public participation, this same order of  Ordonnance n° 2016-1060 du 3 août 2016 portant réforme des procédures destinées à assurer l’information et la participation du public à l’élaboration de certaines décisions susceptibles d’avoir une incidence sur l’environnement. 2

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Fig. 1  Screenshot of an electronic public participation process (L123-19-1 Env.) about the project of delimitation of a zone where drinkable water can be tapped. The delimitation decision has to be taken by the local State representant (the prefect)

2016 either allows to use digital as a complement to classic modalities or imposes the exclusive use of digital means. For instance, participation is exclusively digital for every plan, program, or project that impacts the environment and that is not submitted to public consultation (L123-19 Env.). This rule applies to many local plans, programs, or projects, such as the creation of a commercial zone (Fig. 1). As the illustration above shows, electronic participation in this case has nothing to do with attractive interactive participation platforms: it is basically about indicating participants the address where they can send an email! If this order of 2016 is seen as an instrument of “modernization” of public participation (Zarka, 2016; Environment Ministry, 2016), it is, in a way, questionable regarding to art. 7 of the Charter for the Environment. On the other hand, in some cases, it created public participation where there was none before. So, where the order extended the scope of public participation, the choice was made to largely have recourse to digital tools, whether using those tools is facultative or mandatory. A law of December 2020 also authorized prefects to transform some specific public participation procedures in digital public participation.3 The National Commission for Public Debate criticized it (NCPD, 2021a), for the reason exposed above. This criticism has given no result.  Loi n° 2020-1525 du 7 décembre 2020 d’accélération et de simplification de l’action publique, art. 44. 3

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The tendency these years is to develop recourse to digital means, and Covid crisis only emphasized this phenomenon. 2.2.2 Covid Crisis Law Though it was not their purpose, a series of regulations adopted during spring 20204 caused in fact an increased recourse to digital tools (Antona-Traversi et al., 2020). Given that the lockdown prevented public meetings from being held, those texts suspended the periods of time during which participation had to take place.5 Normally, this new framework did not imply the possibility to replace classic means of participation by digital tools. Nonetheless, in some cases, those texts explicitly authorized this. For instance, in public consultations on urgent and national interest projects (“enquêtes publiques relatives aux projets présentant un intérêt national et un caractère urgent”), the organizing authority can replace normal means of participation (paper register, information and discussion meetings) by digital tools.6 In other cases, organizers of participation procedures were tempted to maintain their participation procedures in order to avoid a freezing of the project realization. To do so, they had recourse to digital tools. This is difficult to number but appears clearly in NCPD’s notices and reports (NCPD, 2020, 2021b). In this configuration, digitalization appeared as a means to compensate social distantiation. This phenomenon clearly appeared in NCPD’s publications during this period of time. The Commission warned against generalization of digital participation in environmental participation, making itself a key player in environmental participation.

2.3 The Affirmation of a Key Player: The National Commission on Public Debate (NCPD) The National Commission on Public Debate (NCPD) has been created in 1995.7 It has been attributed the status of independent administrative authority in 2002.8 The Commission is in charge of guaranteeing the right to participate in projects or policies impacting the environment. Its members are appointed either by presidential decree (by the President of the Republic on its own or on the proposal of other  Loi d’habilitation n° 2020-290 du 23 mars 2020, ordonnance n° 2020-306 du 25 mars 2020, décret n° 2020-412 du 8 avril 2020, ordonnance n° 2020-427 du 15 avril 2020, décret n° 2020-453 du 21 avril 2021, ordonnance n° 2020-539 du 7 mai 2020, ordonnance n° 2020-560 du 13 mai 2020. 5  Ordonnance n° 2020-306 du 25 mars 2020 relative à la prorogation des délais échus pendant la période d’urgence sanitaire et à l’adaptation des procédures pendant cette même période, art. 7. 6  Ordonnance n° 2020-306 aforementioned, art. 12. 7  Loi n° 95-101 du 2 février 1995 relative au renforcement de la protection de l’environnement. 8  Loi n° 2002-276 du 27 février 2002 relative à la démocratie de proximité. 4

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instances), by decree of the Prime Minister on the proposal of other ministers, by the President of the French National Assembly, by the President of the Senate, or by organized civil society instances or are elected by French supreme jurisdictions. As in February 2022, its missions and functioning are detailed at art. L121-1 and ­following of Env. and its president is Chantal Jouanno, former secretary of State for Ecology and former ministry of Sports. Thanks to its more than 20 years of experience, NCPD developed a doctrine on public participation, based on six principles: independence, neutrality, transparency, equality treatment, argumentation, and inclusion. Even more since the Covid crisis, it produced several memos, guidelines, and reports particularly insisting on the inclusion principle, which excludes fully digitalized public participation (NCPD, 2021b). Nevertheless, the NCPD’s power is not unlimited. The Commission does not intervene in every local participation process. So, the effectiveness of its agenda depends. On the one hand, NCPD applies and imposes its own decisions when the participation procedure depends on the Commission itself. For instance, during Covid crisis law, NCPD experienced several modalities that are compatible with social distantiation without being digitalized: written procedures, radio shows, and live TV shows (NCPD, 2021b). On the other hand, when it comes to participation procedures that do not depend on the Commission, the Commission only has an influence power. This influence expresses itself through “gray literature” that NCPD produces, for example, through stances expressed by its chairperson in public medias; see, for instance, Jouanno (2021). Therefore, if it asserts itself as a key player, the NCPD and its action cannot do without the jurisdictions’ activity to defend the constitutional right to participate in environmental decisions (Jamay, 2021). To conclude, in the environmental field, use of digital participation raises some specific issues, all gathered around art. 7 of the Charter for the Environment. Nonetheless, all participation discourses and practices do not turn about the environmental question. The second part of this chapter will show that beyond environmental question, at the local level as in the rest of French legal system, the use of digital tools takes place in a legal framework that is currently booming.

3 The Integration of Local Digital Participation in a Booming Legal Framework A real legal framework specific to participatory democracy is currently developing in France. Environment and urban planning questions put aside, this participatory democracy legal framework hesitates between old and restrictive legislation and more recent and flexible legislation. The old and restrictive framework is located in the territorial collectivities general code (TCGC). Among other things, it rules local votations. The local votations’

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legal framework is lined up with the common rules for elections. These common rules are, in France, quite conservative regarding digital tools (Rambaud, 2021). If voting machines are authorized,9 it is only the case in municipalities that are allowed to use them by the State. A moratorium is in place since 2008 upon this list of municipalities. The 1st of January, 2018, only 66 municipalities, representing 1421 constituencies, 1.39 million electors, that is 3% of the electoral body, use those machines (Sénat, 2018). In the same way, the Internet voting is only authorized for the vote of abroad French electors in a few elections,10 that is, not in local votations. In other words, taking part in a local votation shall have the same solemnity as electing a representant, and this solemnity corresponds in France with a ballot paper, polling booths, and ballot boxes. The more recent framework results from the public and administration relations code (PARC), in force since 2016. More precisely, it is contained in only one article – maybe that shows the poor level of concern of French politics about participatory democracy. This recent framework is much more flexible. It sets up two interesting points for our subject, the sincerity principle and maybe a transparency principle that remains to substantiate. Before presenting them, it is important to recall that the rules about data protection apply to digital public participation.

3.1 Personal Data Protection First, digitalization enhances the question of personal data. In this case, regulation of the European Union of April 27, 2016, on General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)11 applies. In France, it is detailed and completed by the revised law of January 6, 1978, on information technology, files, and liberties.12 A special commission, the National Commission on Information Technologies and Liberties (NCITL), is in charge of the ambitious task of assuring the effectivity of those rules. NCITL has the same status as the NCPD (i.e., independent administrative commission), but contrary to the NCPD, it has a sanction power. To carry out its mission, it publishes information about how to respect data protection rules, including on the theme of political participation (NCITL, 2019a). NCITL also offers special guidance directly to territorial collectivities (NCITL, 2020) or elaborates prospective reflection on civic tech tools (NCITL, 2019b). Obligations of entities  TCGC, art. R1112-6, referring to an article of the reglementary part of the electoral code that has been repealed in 2006. Nonetheless, the law authorizes it (Elect., art. L57-1), so it can reasonably be inferred that it applies for local consultations and referendums. 10  Elect., art. L330-13 and loi n° 2013-659 du 22 juillet 2013 relative à la représentation des Français établis hors de France, art. 21. 11  Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 27, 2016, on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data and repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). 12  Loi no 78-17 du 6 janvier 1978 relative à l’informatique, aux fichiers et aux libertés. 9

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that manipulate personal data in participatory processes are classical ones: only collect necessary data, be transparent with the user about what data is collected, the purpose and duration of its collection, respect the rights of access, rectification suppression or opposition, etc. Those rules apply irrespective of the public or private legal status of the participation organizer. Nevertheless, question of personal data in  local participatory democracy is merely one of the thousands of subjects the NCITL has to deal with. Local participatory democracy question does not emerge as a key subject matter in itself – which does not mean that legal rules regarding personal data do not apply. The next two principles are more specific to participatory democracy law.

3.2 Sincerity Principle The more recent and flexible framework on participatory democracy offers a highly interesting principle: the sincerity principle. As written above, one article of the PARC catches attention: art. L131-1. It has been completed with an important decision of the assembly of the French State’s Council (Conseil d’État): Occitanie, July 19, 2017 (nos 403928, 403948). A set of rules stem from both this article and jurisprudence. It applies when a public authority voluntarily organizes public participation that is not already submitted to specific rules. In this case, public authority has significant freedom concerning how it will organize participation. Notably, it can use digital tools. This liberty comes with a set of principles. The key one is the principle of sincerity. It means that the public participation must not be biased. The authority must be impartial itself and must take all necessary measures to avoid fraud. Concretely, if it uses digital tools, the organizer has to ensure that they are secure enough. In the case of a participation procedure that lays on a quantitative process (let’s say, a petition, voting, etc.), it has to put in place a minimum identity control of the participants and has to ensure at least a little that the same person cannot vote several times. In the case of a qualitative process (e.g., a digital platform where arguments can be exchanged and discussed), the security measures must be adapted. Law does not give precise indications from this point of view. The Occitanie case shows that the purpose of the judge is not to impose a general model of how the sincerity principle should be met and therefore a model of what kind of security measures should be adopted. Imposing such a model would be impossible and counterproductive regarding the necessary degree of liberty that practitioners in the field should benefit from. Instead, the judge sets up a standard. This standard takes the shape of what can be called a “proportioned means obligation.” As the government commissioner pleaded in the Occitanie case, this obligation is about “ensuring an exact adaptation of control means to what is at stake in the consultation” (Daumas, 2017). In other words, in case of a litigation, the judge will not check that the authority has secured every bit of the participation procedure. Instead, the tribunal will

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check that the organizer has put in place all the proportioned means to ensure sincerity, regarding the circumstances of the participation mechanism. For instance, in the Occitanie case, people aged of 16 and more and declaring having an affective tie with the Occitanie region were invited to classify several propositions of the name that could be given to the region. People were able to participate either by postal way or on an Internet platform. Given the affective tie criterion, it was impossible to identify a priori a list of persons who would be authorized to take part. To avoid multiple voting, the region asked each person voting on the Internet for a mobile phone number valid in France and an email address, and their validity was checked. The assembly of the State’s Council estimated that, taking into account the object of the consultation and the public invited to participate, the argument according to which the means put in place were insufficient to ensure the sincerity principle could only be rejected (Occitanie case, §22). Therefore, the use of digital tools in local participatory democracy implies, to respect sincerity principle, an obligation of due care, as opposed to an obligation of result. If the sincerity principle derives from the ancient principle of administrative action’s impartiality, it contributes to the current construction of a legal framework about French participatory democracy. Besides the sincerity principle, the use of digital tools is linked to the necessary respect of a transparency principle.

3.3 Transparency Principle, Toward an Open-Source Obligation? According to art. L131-1 PARC and Occitanie jurisprudence, when it runs public participation outside cases that are regulated by a specific regulation, the organizer must “make public the modalities” of the consultation. It means that every participant shall know how they will be able to give their opinion and how their opinion will be treated. This rule raises the question to know if, where participation uses digital tools, the functioning of the platform must be transparent as well. The question has never been ruled by nor posed in front of a jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it can be argued that there is at least an incitement to use open-source programs. “Open-source programs,” as opposed to “proprietary software” or “closed-source software,” are defined here as programs that give access to their source code. The source code is the recipe of the program, the algorithm that runs the program. It is the list of commands that the program will follow to function (Observatoire des civic tech et de la démocratie numérique, 2021b). For example, the code source gives instruction to the program about the order in which citizen contributions will appear on the webpage of a participation platform. Let’s imagine an online debate about “shall we maintain Zoom conferences?”. Imagine that the proposition saying “it is hard to concentrate on a Conference when

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we are on Zoom and hungry” will appear first, whereas the proposition saying “Zoom conferences with a good coffee are great” will appear at the bottom of the page. If you don’t have access to the code source, it is impossible to know why the platform “decided” this order of appearance. The point is that even if public participation is consultative, it takes place in a process orientated toward the adoption of public decisions. In this perspective, the way information and opinions expressed are treated in digital tools should be transparent, as a democratic requirement. This kind of remark has been formulated against the organization of the digital platform that hosted citizen contributions during the “Great National Debate,” the national consultation decided by President Emmanuel Macron and that took place between January and March 2019, following the “Yellow Vests” crisis. The platform worked with a proprietary software (Knaebel, 2019; Buge & Morio, 2019). At the local level, the 2021 Barometer of digital local democracy shows that 55% of the respondents use a proprietary software, whereas 45% declare using an open-source software (Observatoire des civic tech et de la démocratie numérique, 2021a). But given the number of clients of the biggest French civic tech corporations, which mainly use proprietary software, it is very probable that the percentage of local entities using proprietary software is largely underestimated (Observatoire des civic tech et de la démocratie numérique, 2021b). At the moment, the transparency principle applies, but the point to know whether it implies open-source programs is not clear and is not largely practiced.

4 Conclusion Data protection and sincerity and transparency principles are not specific to local digital participation legal framework. Answers to issues raised by digital local participation are to be found in the general framework about participation, not in a corpus of “digital local participatory democracy law,” that does not exist. Some proposals have been done to enhance this potential local and digital corpus (Dubreuil, 2018; Buge & Morio, 2019), but these proposals can be extended to national e-democracy. Last specificity to keep in mind, the juridical value of participation rules evoked above varies: art. 7 of the Charter for the Environment has constitutional force, and the personal data regulation benefits from the primacy of European Union law and from the force of French laws. Such is not the case for the sincerity and transparency principles: the PARC code they lay in is a reglementary Code that has not been ratified by the French legislator.13 As a consequence, those two principles, even if they have been made explicit by the French State’s Council, only have the value of general principles. In the French legal system, general  The law of December 27, 2019, inserts a reference to art. L131 PARC in art. L1111-2 GCTC, but this is not sufficient to give art. L131-1 the force of a law: loi n° 2019-1461 du 27 décembre 2019 relative à l’engagement dans la vie locale et à la proximité de l’action publique, art. 80. 13

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principles have supra-reglementary value but infra-legislative value. Maybe an important measure to take would be to build an integrated legal corpus giving appropriate juridical force to every principle composing it. It seems to us that sincerity and transparency principles should at least benefit from a legal row in the French hierarchy of norms. French legal framework is in full evolution from this perspective and has got a lot to learn from other European countries.

References Antona-Traversi, R., Chalopin, B., Guihéneuf, P.-Y., & Morio, C. (2020, May 21). État d’urgence sanitaire et droit de la participation. Note juridique. Institut de la concertation et de la participation citoyenne. Buge, E., & Morio, C. (2019). Le Grand débat national, apports et limites pour la participation citoyenn. Revue du droit public, 5, 1205–1239. Daumas, V. (2017, September 25). Conclusions upon CE Ass, July 19, 2017. Occitanie, Juris Classeur Périodique Administratif, 38–39, 2228. Dubreuil, C.-A. (2018). L’e-démocratie au service de la démocratie locale. Actualité juridique du droit administratif, 24, 1383. Environment Ministry. (2016, August 5). Report to the President of the Republic on the order n° 2016–1060. French Republic Official Journal n° 0181. Text number 13. Jamay, F. (2021). Principe de participation. JCI Environnement et Développement durable, 2440. Jouanno, C. (2021, September 24). Les défis de la transition écologique requièrent l’expertise de tous. Le Monde. Knaebel, R. (2019, March 7). Grand débat: pourquoi la plateforme de consultation en ligne est vivement critiquée pour son opacité. Basta Mag. NCITL. (2019a, November 27). Quels fichiers peuvent être utilisés à des fins de communication politique ? Retrieved from https://www.cnil.fr NCITL. (2019b). Civic tech, donnnées et démos. Cahiers Innovation et prospective, 7. NCITL. (2020). Guide de sensibilisation au RGPD pour les collectivités territoriales. Retrieved from https://www.cnil.fr/sites/default/files/atoms/files/cnil-­guide-­collectivite-­territoriale.pdf NCPD. (2020). Principes, formes et modalités du débat public pendant l’épidémie Covid-19. Positioning Document. NCPD. (2021a, March 3). Avis sur le projet de décret portant diverses dispositions d’application de la loi d’accélération et de simplification de l’action publique et de simplification en matière environnementale du 7 décembre 2020. NCPD. (2021b, May). 2020 report. NISES. (2019, October). INSEE Première, 1780. NISES. (2020, April 28). Les conditions de confinement en France. Insee Focus, 189. Observatoire des civic tech et de la démocratie numérique. (2021a, July). Baromètre de la démocratlie locale numérique édition 2021. Décider Ensemble. Observatoire des civic tech et de la démocratie numérique. (2021b, November). Quand la participation citoyenne s’appuie sur les logiciels libres et open source. Décider Ensemble. Rambaud, R. (2021). Droit électoral et Covid-19: l’occasion manquée du vote par correspondance. Actualité juridique du droit administratif, 9, 486. Sénat. (2018, October 24). Réconcilier le vote et les nouvelles technologies, rapport de mission d’information n° 73. In J.  Deromedi, & F.  Détraigne (Eds.), fait au nom de la commission des lois. Zarka, J.-C. (2016). La réforme du dialogue environnemental. JurisClasseur Administrations et collectivités territoriales, 41, 27–30.

European Free Mobility and Participatory Democracy: Knowledge and Digital Technology as a Bridge Marco Cilento and Mihaela Gavrila

1 Introduction A contribution like this cannot be separated from the choice of a point of view based on the definition of the field of investigation and, above all, of the phenomenon investigated: mobile citizens. A possible definition of “mobile citizens” means citizens holding the citizenship of an EU State other than the one they reside in.1 Besides wanting to understand what the characteristics of the so-called mobile citizenship are, we are interested in demonstrating, through some case studies, how digital technologies and the democratization of access to higher education and knowledge can encourage the participation of mobile citizens in European public and political life (Bouza Garcia, 2013). In fact, young people, education, and digital technology can be interpreted as bridge unifying actors in these processes, aiming to bring about a European consciousness. Is this a real opportunity to bring a sort of soft power, not for each national state separately, but a shared European soft power, i.e., a form of national power based on ideational and cultural attractiveness, used intentionally or unintentionally by actors in international relations to achieve strategic objectives? The term “soft power” which has been used in international relations since the 1980s to describe the ability of political power to persuade, convince, and attract, through intangible resources such as culture, values, and politics (Nye, 2004), has  Around two million citizens are cross-border daily commuters working or studying in one country but living in another (Eurostat, 2018; Herm, 2008). 1

M. Cilento · M. Gavrila (*) Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Rouet, T. Côme (eds.), Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20943-7_4

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become progressively strategic in describing and understanding a country’s ability to exert its influence on the rest of the world. Quoting Bajpai (2021, p. 1): With the increasingly complicated and connected global system of polities, the influence of each aspect of a state’s identity becomes a factor in defining the others within and beyond the state itself. The understanding of constitutive concepts that underline the outlook of the state and its policies occupy a central role in the dynamics they entail. Soft power, the state’s cultural, ideological, social, ethnic, and traditional outlook, has become increasingly important in the international arena as the outreach of the same has increased exponentially over the years.

The so-called “participatory democracy” theory, whose representatives include Rousseau and the British political scientist Pateman, is relevant. Derived from a line of thought that sees civil society and the state not as two distinct parts but in synergy, the basis of this theory is the elimination of the distinction between the governors and the governed. A political body is thus envisioned as one grounded in direct participatory democracy. It rests on the assumption that civil society has no apathy or disinterest since citizens are called upon to be active individuals constantly exercising their sovereignty within the country. In his theory, Pateman strongly criticizes Dahl and Sartori (Dahl, 1989; Sartori, 1993), who justify the use of representative democracy by the size of the population and the resulting impossibility of a direct exercise of power by the people. In addition, according to Pateman, the people are unjustifiably regarded as incapable of exercising the sovereignty that democracy re-possesses (2012). The theory of participatory democracy also rests on Rousseau’s concept of the “social contract,” which he identifies as the final moment in creating a moral and collective “body” within which decisions are taken collectively (1762). The construction of the image to define roles and aspirations imposes not only the renunciation of a “state-centric” politics in the face of the multiplication of centers of power and individual and collective senses of belonging but also full awareness of how communication, primarily networking, represents the first form of power to conquer transnational public spheres. Empowering one’s own distinctive traits through strategic narratives to propose a worldview, a causal interpretation, and a solution consonant with one’s own means and capabilities (Nye, 2009) therefore allows one to politically determine and realize the frames within which one intends to inscribe one’s positioning in the international environment. Such narratives play an essential role in the construction and management of an attractive national image, in which certain significant symbolic elements are isolated and exploited to capitalize on the attention of public opinion and define so-called nation branding (Miskimmon et al., 2013). The foundations are thus laid for establishing a new world order, guided and enhanced by diplomacy that is increasingly cultural and dependent on the evolution of soft power (Castellini Curiel, 2021). In today’s multipolar and interdependent political and economic context, held together by a creaky system of rules and norms in which “Power has become more diffuse, moving not just from West to East, but also away from governments, as

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more non-state actors play larger roles in driving global affairs” (Portland, 2019, p. 9), what is new is precisely the growing capacity of non-state actors and civil society to significantly influence global affairs through strategic narratives. It is in the exchange of ideas, information, and culture, operated by subjects belonging to the different spheres of associated living, that the capacity to attract other members of the international community takes shape and influences their behavior without resorting to direct instruments of military or economic pressure, that the consolidation of a nation’s geopolitical role can take place. This is a soft power that increasingly evolves in the direction of a social power (Van Ham, 2010), i.e., a form of power, very fluid and with unpredictable paths, that pushes states to adopt a model capable of effectively managing communication and relational networks to involve actors of different nature in the construction of the political message. In this direction, real empowerment of the ambassadors of national culture and identity, the mobile citizens acquire further relevance. To better illustrate some best practices aimed at facilitating social, cultural, and political participation and the exercise of citizenship rights at the national and transnational levels, two projects will be illustrated below: 1. “EUReKA – A Key Access to EU Rights” aims to contribute to facilitating the exercise of free movement rights and mobile EU citizens’ inclusion and participation in the host MSs through a joint local, national, and transnational circulation of capacity/expertise and an advanced level of access/usability of digital information. 2. “PRODEMO  – Promoting Democratic Engagement Through Mobile Participation” is coordinated by the Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza” and focuses on EU mobile citizens as citizens of voting age, eligible to vote, and residing in another EU Member State. The project specifically aims at identifying good practices for the promotion of EU mobile citizens’ political participation and focuses on the use of mobile tools and to inform EU mobile citizens of their political rights and procedures to participate in EP and local elections.

2 Traveling Citizenship: Toward an Identikit of Mobile European Citizens There is a dimension of social participation and the exercise of citizenship rights that is not usually part of public narratives and, even less, of the media agenda, which aims at seizing or disseminating issues of interest to national or transnational public opinion (McCombs & Shaw, 1972, 1993; Couldry, 2003; Gavrila, 2019); this is the dimension of international mobility and, in particular, the increasing tendency for European citizens to leave their country, mainly for reasons of study or work. In this transformative socio-cultural, economic, and political context, citizenship can no longer be seen as belonging to a single, territorialized national state. Instead, it has become an institution that is portable, mobile, and multiple. The two examples

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analyzed in this chapter, the EUReKA and PRODEMO projects, are evidence of small steps that can be taken to prevent contemporary transnational and European citizenship helps to reproducing local, national, and global inequalities (Fauser, 2020). According to Eurostat, there are currently 15 million EU citizens – 3.3% of EU citizens of working age (20–64 years old) – living in another EU country than their own (Eurostat, 2018). Over the last decade, especially between 2009 and 2019, before the COVID-19 impact, the share of EU mobile citizens has increased by 0.9%. This growth may have been favored by consolidating the beneficial conditions facilitated by the European Single Market’s four freedoms: the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital. Encouraged by the possibility to travel freely, study, work, and live across borders (and benefiting from the opportunity to access to better prices, higher environmental and social standards, as well as more comprehensive consumer protection), European citizens of all ages have been increasingly moving across EU borders. Who, then, are mobile citizens? A short breakdown (which we will illustrate more specifically) is: • • • •

A large number of young people or adults of working age (20–64 years old) A high level of education (normally tertiary education) A high level of digital literacy A more significant number of women than men

Below, the individual dimensions plotted will be analyzed more carefully, trying to articulate these features through Eurostat data 2021 (Fig. 1). A more in-depth analysis of the data reveals that in 2020, Romanian citizens of working age (20–64) residing abroad within the EU accounted for about a fifth

Fig. 1  European scenarios. Mobile citizens by country of citizenship. (Source: Eurostat 2021, based on 2020 data. EU mobile citizens of working age (20–64) by country of citizenship, % of their home-country resident population). (Cf. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-­explained/ index.php?title=File:EU_mobile_citizens_of_working_age_(20–64)_by_country_of_citizenship,_%25_of_their_home-­country_resident_population_09-­2021.png (15/06/2022))

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(18.6%) of the population residing in Romania, making them the most significant national group among EU mobile citizens. The following three national groups accounted for between 10.3% and 17.6%: Croatians (17.6%), Portuguese (10.6%), and Bulgarians (10.3%). The EU Member States with the smallest share of mobile citizens were Germany and Sweden (both under 1.0%). In nine other Member States, this share was 3% or less. Overall, EU mobile citizens accounted in 2020 for 3.3% of the total EU resident population, which was 0.9% more than in 2010. On the other hand, when looking at absolute numbers, in 2020, the most numerous national groups of mobile EU citizens aged between 20 and 64 were those from Romania (2,300,100), Italy (1,027,800), Poland (1,005,500), and Portugal (679,600). After clarifying who the “mobile by nationality” citizens are, it becomes equally helpful to identify the host countries receiving the most significant migration flows within the European territory. In the EU-27 (following Brexit), 13,350,691 EU mobile citizens were residing in other Member States on January 1, 2020. This amounted to 1.4% more than the previous year, compared to 3.5% per year in the 2017/2018 period, indicating a slowdown in mobility growth during 2019. The countries hosting the highest number of EU-27 mobile citizens are Germany (4.4 million), Spain (1.7 million), France and Italy (both with around 1.5 million), and Belgium (with just over 920,000). Together, these five Member States host 74.5% of all EU-27 mobile citizens, i.e., 9.9 million people (Fig. 2). Turning to the education level of our target group, a large share of EU mobile citizens has completed secondary education and holds a tertiary education certificate, according to Eurostat 2021 (based on 2020 data). Overall, 32.4% of mobile EU citizens have tertiary education, compared to a 30.1% average for the entire EU population (Table 1). Another helpful indicator for drawing a mobile citizens’ identikit concerns the quantity of employment. Compared with the EU average of 72.4%, the employment rate of EU mobile citizens in 2020 was 73.1%, ranging from 85.2% for the mobile Slovenes to 61.8% for mobile Bulgarians. Employment rates for mobile EU citizens increased faster over the last decade than for the total population. Analyzing the previous decade, the employment rate of mobile EU citizens rose from 69.1% in 2010 to 73.1% in 2020 (+4.0 pp). It is also interesting to note that women represent the most relevant part of mobile citizens. Perhaps for this reason, in the forecasts of some strategists, nations’ soft power is expressed through the results, public visibility, and social recognizability of young people and women. The employment rate of female mobile EU citizens in 2020 ranged from 83.3% for Finnish women to 52.2% for Bulgarian women, while the female EU average stood at 66.5%. In most cases, the employment rate of mobile EU women was higher than both the average EU female employment rate and that of women residing in the corresponding countries of citizenship. It is no coincidence that governments tend to identify the driving force of women as a tool of resilience and recovery, even during the post-Covid period. Governments who genuinely intend to better manage their international brands and improve their influence in terms of soft power

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Fig. 2  EU mobile citizens by hosting Member States, 2020 (% of the total population). Data of January 1 for UE-27. Data for Cyprus and Malta are not available. (Source: EUReKA project based on Eurostat 2021 data)

must strategically focus on young people in general (especially millennials) as they are considered the most receptive target to the “nation brand” (Brand Finance, 2022) and, more specifically, on female leadership, capable of generating governance practices oriented by a shared public agenda and social credibility, which can guarantee a resilient transformation (Fig. 3). However, apart from the aspects of women gaining important positions at the national and international level, there is another problem: to promote the quality of life of people and, therefore, also of women (Gavrila and Cilento, 2020). International mobility further exacerbates needs such as the fight against exploitation at work and trade union rights, recognition of their fundamental childcare function given to women in favor of maximizing profits, the right to health and a clean environment, the fight against all forms of racism, and war. With the crisis of the liberal value system, a new anti-capitalist, anti-racist, and eco-socialist (Arruzza et al., 2019, p. 15) international feminist wave has arisen, creating another feminism.

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Table 1  Population aged 20–64 with tertiary educational attainment (ISCED 5–8) by country of citizenship Country of citizenship EU Belgium Bulgaria Czechia (2) Denmark (2) Germany Estonia (1)(2) Ireland (2) Greece Spain France Croatia Italy Cyprus (1)(2) Latvia (1)(2) Lithuania Luxembourg (1)(2) Hungary Malta Netherlands Austria Poland Portugal Romania Slovenia (1) (2) Slovakia Finland Sweden Iceland(1)(2) Norway (2) Switzerland

EU mobile citizens 2010 (%) 23.7 50.4 21.5 33.0 46.9 44.7

EU mobile citizens 2020 (%) 30.9 50.3 23.7 38.6 55.4

58.1 15.5 30.5 54.5 9.9 19.0

25.8 43.7 66.4 21.1 31.6

29.2 30.6

40.7 41.6

35.4

35.2

42.3 38.1 23.9 6.0 12.2

48.7 51.7 32.3 15.8 15.2

28.6 39.9 48.8

43.6 65.2 51.3

40.4 49.5

37.3

Total population 2010 (%) 23.4 33.7 21.5 15.8 29.6 24.5 32.9 36.1 22.7 30.2 28.6 17.2 14.1 35.3 25.0 30.2 31.9

Total population 2020 (%) 31.3 41.1 27.6 23.7 36.7 29.2 40.0 46.3 31.0 38.4 39.1 23.9 19.3 43.3 38.9 41.7 43.4

Difference in EU mobile citizens 2020 vs 2010 (%) 7.3 −0.1 2.2 5.7

18.7 15.5 30.2 17.8 21.4 15.1 12.9 21.9

25.5 29.8 39.6 33.6 31.1 27.6 17.6 33.8

−0.2

16.6 34.8 31.4 28.9 34.0 31.3

25.7 43.5 41.8 39.7 42.4 42.2

15.0 25.4 2.5

10.7

10.4 13.3 11.9 11.2 12.6 11.5 11.0

6.4 13.6 8.4 9.7 3.0

−12.3

Source: Eurostat 2021 based on 2020 data

However, practical experience shows that there is still much to be done at the local level to make European mobility sustainable without creating severe difficulties in maintaining and achieving fundamental rights (work, vote, education, information, assistance, and freedom of movement).

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Fig. 3  Women’s leadership in the world after the COVID-19 impact. (Source: Data from Brand Finance, Global Soft Power Index, 2021)

In this context, could digitalization offer an opportunity to use these difficulties and facilitate access to information as an interface between European citizens and local institutions? Starting from these premises and questions, we present two initiatives, both founded by the European Rights, Equality and Citizenship (REC) Program, that have involved Italy but are also interesting at the European level: “EUReKA – A Key Access to EU Rights” and “PRODEMO – Promoting Democratic Engagement Through Mobile Participation” State.

3 EUReKA: A Key Access to EU Rights The first case study, EUReKA – A Key Access to EU Rights, is oriented toward identifying the obstacles that European citizens face when living in another Member State and solutions to recognizing their rights. Coordinated by Centro Studi e Ricerche IDOS (Italy), the project was implemented with partners from Croatia (Grad Zagreb), France and Portugal (Tandem Plus), Germany (Acli eV), Italy (Associazioni Cristiane Lavoratori Italiani ACLI, Patronato ACLI, Fondazione Mondo Digitale, ANCI Lazio), and Romania (European Institute of Romania, Novapolis Association, Cartel ALFA). The free movement of persons, without discrimination on the grounds of nationality, is one of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty of European Union. The project developed a survey by mixing benchmarking methods with

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user-­centered design methodology to identify examples of good practice (especially online) focused on providing easy access to information services for EU mobile citizens and implementing user-friendly communication without discrimination. Ten national thematic focus groups were organized to debate the survey results, exchange experiences and considerations, and develop “thematic collective narrative” preparatory for moving from exploration and analysis to problem-solving. This handbook has been produced to disseminate the identified good practices and the results of the opinion leaders through in-depth interviews and focus groups on fostering their transferability to different contexts. The conclusions of the general policy analysis present us with many obstacles and weak points that we could group into four main categories: 1. Access rights, mainly concerning the right of the spouse/partner/family member of an EU citizen to follow them in their migratory process, that are often limited by excessive delays, denial of free visas, and refusal of the accelerated procedure. 2. Residence rights, EU citizens and their families are often denied the right to register their presence in their EU country of choice, with delays in obtaining residence cards/permits, and in some cases, their right to reside in the country is met with unappealable administrative expulsions. 3. Social security rights, with the EU citizens forced to face bureaucratic red tape, such as the numerous obstacles in accessing pensions (as well as the double taxation on those pensions in some cases), healthcare, family, and unemployment benefits in other EU Member States. 4. The relevant problem of discrimination, usually based on nationality (mostly toward recent EU Member States like Romania and Bulgaria), ethnicity (mostly toward Roma and Sinti), and sexual orientation (e.g., due to the non-recognition in several EU countries of homosexual marriages and registered partnerships, birth certificates for children of same-sex partners could be refused, or, in case of death of one of them, the survivors’ pension could be denied) Following the research and analysis carried out, the EUReKA project proposes, above all, a set of integration tools2: • • • • • • • • • •

Data and statistics Definitions/dictionary Video tutorials Practical indications Helpline Legislation Medical assistance Search for employment Recognition of educational qualifications Information for political participation (Fig. 4)

 All the information and integration tools developed following the project are available within the portal: https://key4mobility.eu/italy/mobility-manual/ 2

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Fig. 4  EUReKA tools for integration

4 PRODEMO: Promoting Democratic Engagement Through Mobile Participation Project The PRODEMO project is in line with the previous case study and is oriented especially toward empowerment in terms of political participation. As EUReKA, this project was funded by the European Union “Rights, Equality and Citizenship” Program for 2014–2020. The research program is coordinated by the Università degli Studi di Roma “La Sapienza,” in partnership with three other research institutions: the Italian-based Progeu Istituto per lo sviluppo and Programma Integra società cooperativa sociale; the Democratic Society AISBL, headquartered in Belgium; and the Centro de Estudos Sociais (CES) of the University of Coimbra. The research project, which started in March 2020 and ended in March 2022, is divided into three consecutive phases: Phase 1: Field research and identification of good practices. During this phase, the research partners conducted desk reviews and research on a selection of European Union (EU) Member States: Italy, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain, and Portugal. Research efforts have focused on political engagement and civic awareness of EU citizens, specifically of EU citizens of voting age and

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eligible to vote, living in EU countries different from their native countries (EU mobile citizens). In particular, phase 1 has been dedicated to selecting and analyzing several good practices developed by national and local public EU authorities. Member States and civil society organizations promote (both online and offline) political participation and foster engagement of EU mobile citizens. In addition to the desk analysis, CES has prepared a survey to gather data about EU mobile citizens’ social and cultural backgrounds, voting attitudes, and political orientations. Phase 2: Information and awareness-raising. This phase focuses on fostering political awareness among EU mobile citizens, specifically regarding existing procedures/initiatives that regulate access to local and European elections in EU Member States. Phase 2 includes the organization of a social media campaign and realizing several information events and workshops (dedicated to EU citizens and civil society organizations’ personnel, respectively). Phase 3: Mobile application. The concluding phase of PRODEMO consists of developing and testing a mobile application that offers EU mobile citizens information and assistance in exercising their political rights. The application includes an informative section on political rights and participation procedures, as well as a platform on which EU citizens will be able to create geo-located surveys and discussions to highlight issues on a local and community scale.

4.1 EU Mobile Citizens and Political Rights: Legal Framework To bring the project into focus, the contextualization of the phenomenon is essential from the normative point of view. Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union, and decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen. A New Push for European Democracy is a priority of the Commission as announced by President von der Leyen in the Political Guidelines of the Commission 2019–2024. EU citizens consider free movement to be a major achievement of European integration. They are becoming increasingly mobile by exercising their right to live, work, or study in the other Member States. According to Eurostat data, on January 1, 2013.5 million EU citizens took advantage of the right to reside in another EU country (“mobile EU citizens”). Among them, about 12 million were of voting age, accounting for 3.25% of the entire voting population in the EU. Awareness and exercise of political rights among EU mobile citizens have become a matter of concern across political, institutional, and academic debates. This is caused in part by the uncertain legal framework concerning political rights in European and municipal elections and further exacerbated by the sporadic exercise of voting rights by EU mobile citizens. Since the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, EU citizenship has been crystallized in the Treaties, complementing national citizenships. In 1992, despite broad governmental

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support, the new legal regime of EU citizenship raised concerns and criticism among Europeans. French, Germans, and Britons were particularly concerned about the risk that European citizenship could erode national sovereignty. Also, in countries with large communities of ex-pats, conservative and nationalist voices in the public opinion grew stronger. Luxembourg is a case in point. The government eventually reached a political compromise regarding the qualifying period in which non-­ national EU residents could access voting and standing rights. This extension has been relaxed over the following years but never completely disappeared. We will now examine the legal framework concerning the political rights of EU mobile citizens, focusing on the issues created by applying the current system of rules. Right to Vote and Stand as Candidates in European Elections According to the existing rules, EU mobile citizens have the right to vote and stand as candidates in European elections in the host Member State under the same conditions as that State’s nationals. This right, enshrined in Article 22 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and Article 39 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, is given substance by Directive 93/109/EC. The latter rules that mobile EU citizens should have voting and candidacy rights in their country of residence unless deprived of their electoral rights in their home countries. In practice, voting and candidacy rights are accorded in line with national specificities, which impedes the creation of a universal electoral standard across the EU. This lack of uniformity applies to both passive and active electoral rights. Article 22 TFEU, comma 1, states “Every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate at municipal elections in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. This right shall be exercised subject to detailed arrangements adopted by the Council, acting unanimously under a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament; these arrangements may provide for derogations where warranted by problems specific to a Member State.” Comma 2 of the Article 22 states “Without prejudice to Article 223(1) and to the provisions adopted for its implementation, every citizen of the Union residing in a Member State of which he is not a national shall have the right to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament in the Member State in which he resides, under the same conditions as nationals of that State. This right shall be exercised subject to detailed arrangements adopted by the Council, acting unanimously in accordance with a special legislative procedure and after consulting the European Parliament; these arrangements may provide for derogations where warranted by problems specific to a Member State.” Articles 39 and 40 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights are dedicated to the right to vote and stand as a candidate at the elections of the European Parliament and the right to vote and stand as a candidate at the municipal elections, respectively.

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Right to Vote and Stand as Candidates in Municipal Elections EU citizens who live in another EU country also have the right to vote and stand as candidates in local or municipal elections in the country they live in, under the same conditions as the nationals of that country. This right is given substantial effect in Directive 94/80/EC, which contains detailed procedural rules on the exercise of the right to vote and stand as a candidate in local and municipal elections, as well as the rules regulating its limitations. As for Directive 93/109, however, Member States may impose the same restrictions they apply to their own nationals on EU mobile citizens, thus impeding the harmonization of electoral standards. For example, in several Member States, it is compulsory to be formally registered as a voter, as a separate act apart from being a formal resident or citizen. In more than half of the EU Member States, non-national EU voters are obliged to register separately on the electoral register, as in Belgium and Spain. Other obstacles may derive from residence requirements, which again can differ from Member State to Member State. In the case of Finland, non-Finnish EU citizens are automatically registered, but they are required to have been residents in Finland for at least 51 days before the elections. In addition, the definition of “basic local government unit” differs across the EU Member States. This creates de facto disparities in the range of local elections in which EU mobile citizens are entitled to participate. Finally, but importantly, EU Member States are entitled to restrict certain municipal offices to their own nationals  – and, in doing so, they may end up denying EU mobile citizens of certain Member States to run for specific posts. Three Issues of the Legal Framework Concerning EU Mobile Citizens Directives 93/109 and 94/80 make decisive steps toward reducing the misalignment of national citizenship and separation of electoral territories. However, they do not entirely solve the issue for three key reasons: 1. First, they do not fill the existing legislative gaps of EU Member States that deny citizens of other EU States the right to vote in their national-level elections and referendums. In practice, the non-national residents in EU countries have no decision-making power to elect the government of the country that affects their life the most. 2. Second, the Directives neglect to address the disparities in the ease with which mobile EU citizens can access voting rights. These disparities can be different but mainly concern administrative aspects. 3. Third, Directive 93/109/EC concerns only the EP voting rights of Union citizens in the country where they live, but not their country of origin The level of awareness of European citizens also seems to be cognizant of the concept of European citizenship: 91% declare awareness of their European citizenship (a steady increase from the 87% recorded in 2015). Nonetheless, a 2019 report published by the European media consortium European Data Journalism Network shows that only 8% of EU mobile citizens registered to vote in their country of residence in 2014. Even fewer return to their country of origin to cast a ballot. Today,

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63% of the European public opinion is supportive of the recognition of a right to vote in national elections and referendums for EU mobile citizens. This idea is strongly supported in Ireland, Spain, and Portugal (77%, 75%, and 74%, respectively) – less so in Sweden (35%) and Denmark (54%) – and by younger Europeans (77% among 15–24  years old). Similarly, 60% of Europeans support EU mobile citizens acquiring the right to vote and stand in regional elections. EU Mobile Citizens and 2019 European Elections In terms of engagement of EU mobile citizens, the situation did not change consistently in 2019. Turnout reached 50.55% – an 8-percentage point increase from 2014 and the highest percentage in 25 years. Young people (18–25) were among those who increased their turnout more consistently compared with previous elections (55 percentage points). Part of the merit of this positive outcome could be attributed to the intense communication campaign conducted by EU institutions. Of relevance was “This time I’m voting,” a peer-to-peer mobilization campaign aimed at bringing together European citizens around European values and working together to convince others to vote in the European elections. Despite this success, a meagre number of EU mobile citizens used their electoral rights. It is estimated that only 10% voted in their country of residence and 20% in their country of origin. Overall, the data shows mobile EU citizens are substantially less likely to vote than their counterparts living in their home countries. According to different surveys and methods, it is estimated that between 53% and 74% of mobile EU respondents did not vote in the 2019 European Parliament elections. EU Mobile Citizens and Municipal Elections To conclude, a brief look at the municipal level. The general relevance of EU mobile citizens in municipal elections is low, albeit with differences from country to country. While figures related to voter turnout in municipal elections were only available for the handful of states that collected this data, the low voter registration rates in the states that provided data suggest that this is the case. Mobile EU citizens in Poland, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Portugal, and Greece account for less than 0.2% of all people on the electoral rolls in the most recent municipal elections before 2019. At the other end of the scale, Luxembourg has the highest proportion of mobile EU citizens among its electorate, accounting for around 11% of all registered voters (followed by Sweden, Malta, and Denmark). But, in fact, even the 11% of registered voters in Luxembourg, compared to the 40% of the overall foreign population, indicated that EU mobile citizens are substantially under-represented. EU Mobile Citizens: What to Do? The question remains: why are so many EU foreigners not participating in elections or even giving themselves the opportunity to do so? The answer to this question is far from purely theoretical. As noted by those who have analyzed this topic, EU mobile citizens collectively form a group larger than the individual electorates of 21 of the 28 Member States. The lack of access to political rights of citizens potentially

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representing a sizeable proportion of voters in specific European locations may indicate that mobility could lead to a “representation gap,” undermining the views of EU mobile citizens compared with those of other citizens. The Review of Directive 93/109/EC However, efforts to fix the representational gap of EU mobile citizens date back to the early 2010s. Ahead of the 2014 European elections, the EU Commission carried out a comprehensive exercise to ensure the correct and complete application of Directive 93/109/EC to eliminate possible obstacles to EU citizens exercising their right to vote and, in particular, to ensure that national laws imposed no additional requirements on EU citizens from other Member States. The resulting report, published in 2013, identified several key actions to encourage political participation of EU mobile citizens and remove the barriers to exercising their rights. As indicated by the Commission, during the reporting period, it pursued dialogues with five Member States on the transposition of Directive 94/80/EC (right of EU citizens to participate in municipal elections). In ten further instances, the dialogue with national governments regarded the transposition of Directive 93/109/EC on the right of EU citizens to participate in European elections. The Directive aims, among other things, to prevent mobile EU citizens from voting in both their Member State of residence and their Member State of origin. To avoid this, it rules that those who register to vote in the State of residence have their names deleted from the electoral rolls in the State of origin. The Directive establishes an ad hoc mechanism for exchanging EU voter data among Member States to this scope. The reporting activity of the Commission has highlighted the heavy administrative burden on national administrations that would result from the exchange of voters’ data. For this reason, the Commission recommended several interventions to reduce administrative burdens. These included setting up a single contact authority in each Member State for notifying EU voters’ personal data or using common IT tools to transmit the data. In some cases, the debates between the Commission and Member States on the transposition of Directive 93/109/EC resulted in adopting new legislation (Cyprus, Poland, and Romania). In other cases (the Czech Republic, Slovenia, and Slovakia), amendments to national legislation were introduced.

4.2 Knowledge to Promote Political Participation: PRODEMO Project Survey We first describe the rationale and structure behind the survey developed by CES Coimbra. We provide a preliminary overview of the results collected after the survey distribution across EU mobile citizens. With this information in mind, we speculated some research hypotheses that will be elaborated in the following phases of PRODEMO. The survey was conceived with two goals in mind. The first was to gather additional information about EU mobile citizens (specifically about this

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community’s exercise of political rights). The second was to obtain insights that could be useful during the second phase of the research project to support the organization of the focus groups, as well as the construction of the requirements for the mobile application that will characterize phase 3 of the project. The survey is structured in five sections, each corresponding to a specific scope: • • • •

Section 1 introduces the respondents to the questionnaire. Section 2 regards voting rights. Section 3 focuses on EU mobile citizens and their familiarity with technology. Section 4 aims at deepening the knowledge of the personal background of each respondent. • Section 5 requires those who took the questionnaire to evaluate their experience and provide feedback. The survey required about 10–15 minutes to be completed. The confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents were the highest priority, according to the legal framework of the involved countries and the European Union General Data Protection Regulation. One crucial point is that the survey was not based on a statistically significant sample of EU mobile citizens. This choice was the direct consequence of the delays that the COVID-19 pandemic imposed on disseminating and distributing the questionnaire. Researchers had initially considered two versions of the survey, one online and one on paper, to be distributed among EU mobile citizens – in places where they are likely to gather (welcome desks or municipal offices). Due to the restrictions imposed by European governments from March to June 2020, however, the survey could only be distributed online, and the idea of having a paper version was eventually abandoned. Nevertheless, the results of the questionnaire distribution that occurred until September 2020 were encouraging. A total of 196 respondents took the survey (with 95% of the data validated). The respondents mainly self-selected in a range of middle to high social groups (in terms of formal education, employment, and migration history) and often with a highly politicized profile (regarding social activism and interests). In several cases, they self-declared their affiliation to political parties or movements. Quite interestingly, despite the general good level of knowledge and political awareness, most answers demonstrated some confusion regarding information related to political rights in intra-EU mobility. It is also worth pointing out that those who responded to the survey included EU citizens with recognized voting rights in the country of residence. These respondents’ answers have been validated in that they contribute to understanding the evolutions of the mobility situation. The team decided to make the survey available to respondents for a more extended period and programmed to engage in new rounds of dissemination. The goal was to attract a more varied pool of socio-cultural profiles and move beyond homogeneity.

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Four Research Hypotheses Another reason for keeping the survey open and having more respondents was to help the research group verify four research hypotheses that emerged during the elaboration of the survey. These hypotheses concern both the cultural background of EU mobile citizens and the relationship they establish with exercising their voting rights. In particular, the research team is intended to verify whether: 1. A correlation exists between the societal and cultural background of EU mobile citizens and the knowledge or interest in voting rights and the functioning of voting procedures. In other words, the researchers claim that the lower the degree of education and the skills, the higher the possibility that voting rights are neglected or ignored. 2. A direct connection exists between the level of knowledge of respondents and the number of countries to which each respondent is related. The research team argues that citizens with a complex travelling history, or double or triple nationalities, may experience additional issues exercising their rights. 3. There is a direct link between respondents’ knowledge of voting rights and the asymmetries existing in the regulatory frameworks on voting rights. In other words, the claim is that legal obstacles are both a cause and a consequence of the lack of knowledge of the rules regarding the exercise of voting rights by EU mobile citizens. 4. “Mobility” is a legally evolving situation regarding EU citizens. The researchers aim to investigate the extent to which the duration of the mobility situation determines the rise of new legal statuses for EU citizens The Level of Education and the Exercise of Voting Rights To verify the first hypothesis, the researchers selected the variables in question (knowledge or interest in voting compared to the degree of education, financial situation, and occupation, among others). They applied tests that allow knowing whether there is any degree of dependence between them and the strength of that dependence, when applicable. However, it is essential first to highlight the profile of the respondents regarding these questions (Fig. 5). The respondents’ level of education: most of the interviewees (91%) have a university degree or higher. It is, therefore, possible to observe that both knowledge of electoral rights in the country of residence and participation in the last election are more significant among those with the highest educational qualifications. The Use of the English Language A second aspect emerging from the survey concerns the use of English. Multilingualism is one of the fundamental principles of the EU as an international democratic organization. The legislation on communication in force in the EU requires a minimum of three official languages. According to the European Parliamentary Research Service, the most popular mother tongue among EU citizens is German (16%), followed by Italian (13%), English (13%), and French (12%), followed by Polish and Spanish (both with 8%). Yet, regarding knowledge of foreign languages, English ranks first (38% of

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None 1%

High School Diploma 7%

Master 40%

Ph.D. 25%

University Degree 27% Fig. 5  Identikit of the interviewees. Last formal education title. (Source: Data from Allegretti et al. (2020, p. 18))

Europeans know English as a second language), followed by French (12%), German (11%), and Spanish (7%). The data reveals a predominance of the choice of English by EU mobility citizens (71.4% of respondents). The Knowledge of Respondents and the Number of Countries Moving on to the second research hypothesis, unlike the first hypothesis, the data available do not provide a clear answer about the association between the variables, i.e., “knowledge of voting rights of citizens in mobility in the EU” and the “amount of citizenship” acquired by the interviewees throughout their lives. In this case, most respondents (52.8%) have only one citizenship (Fig. 6). Looking in more detail, it can be seen, on the one hand, among those with only one citizenship, the relative majority (66.7%) know their electoral rights as European mobile citizens. In contrast, only a small percentage do not know (9.7%) or are unsure (23.7%) of these rights. However, on the other hand, the knowledge-related percentages are higher among those with two or more nationalities, as noted below (86.2%; 3.4% and 6.9%). This may suggest a certain degree of association or influence between the variables mentioned. When observing that most of the interviewees are legally living in the country of residence and preferentially maintained their own citizenship, they were asked about the right to vote in the country of residence, to know if freedom of mobility

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N/A 31%

1 citizenships 53% 3 or more 1%

2 citizenships 15% Fig. 6  Identikit of the interviewees. Citizenships. (Source: Data from Allegretti et al. (2020, p. 19))

affects the interest in the political participation of the country ones currently live in or their country of origin. In this case, most interviewees (72.3%) answered to be sure about their right to vote in the country where they resided, regardless of their registration condition. Portugal stands out as a country of residence in which the percentage of certainty (5.8%) of the interviewer is lower than that of uncertainty (20.8%) and there is lack of knowledge about their right to vote in the country in which they resided (44.4%) (Table 2). Political Awareness and Engagement At this point, the survey seeks to know the degree of agreement of the interviewees on the approval of a law that allows European citizens in mobility to vote at all administrative levels in the country where they reside. Most of those who answered the questionnaire (79.2%) agree (37.7%) or fully agree (41.5%) with this proposal. There is a strong relationship involving knowledge of voting rights, having voted in the last election, and being in favor of applying a law that allows voting at any administrative level. Among those who agree with the approval of the law that allows European citizens to vote at all administrative levels in their country of residence, the highest percentage of respondents is those who do not define any conditions (such as the payment of taxes, 24.5% of respondents) for the exercise of this right (67.9%). Along the same line of reasoning, those who agree (33.9%) or strongly agree (37.3%) with the right to fully exercise their vote in the country of residence tend to agree (32.2%) or fully agree (33.1%), to a slightly different extent, with the right of the European citizen to be voted in their country of residence, regardless European country of origin (Fig. 7). For example, there is a strong relationship involving knowledge of voting rights, having voted in the last election, and being in favor of applying a law that allows voting at all administrative levels. Even if only the first can be inferred as the cause

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Table 2  Identikit of the interviewees. Country of residence Country of residence Austria Belgium Croatia Denmark Estonia France Germany Greece Italy Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden United Kingdom Total

% 2.3% 4.7% 2.3% 2.3% 0.0% 4.7% 2.3% 2.3% 18.6% 32.6% 9.3% 4.7% 2.3% 11.6% 100%

Residual −.6% −1.5% .7 .7 −1.5% 1.0 .7 .7 .8 2.8 −2.2 −1.5 .7 −.5

N 2 5 1 1 1 2 1 1 10 14 10 5 1 8 62

% 3.2% 8.1% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 3.2% 1.6% 1.6% 16.1% 22.6% 16.1% 8.1% 1.6% 12.9% 100%

Support for the law that allows voting in the residence Country

Source: Data from Allegretti et al. (2020)

6 5,8 5,6 5,4 5,2 5 4,8 4,6 4,4 4,2 4

Voting at the last local elections Yes

No

Fig. 7  Identikit of the interviewees. Awareness of the right to vote, “Knowledge about voting rights: Yes, of course.” (Source: Data from Allegretti et al. (2020, p. 22))

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of the second and contributed to the third variable, the lack of knowledge of electoral rights in the country of residence is associated with lower participation in the exercise of the vote. The Output of the PRODEMO Project: The Web and Mobile Application In the second part of the project, an application was created to provide information and increase the civic and political engagement of the so-called European mobile citizens in Italy, Portugal, and Belgium. The app includes two sections: 1. The first section provides information on political rights, elections, and procedures for mobile EU citizens to vote and stand as candidates in  local and European elections, specifically: • Information on the political rights of European citizens and any restrictions in force in the various countries • Information on how to register mobile European citizens in the partnership countries, including required requirements, necessary documentation, and offices to contact to vote and/or run for European and municipal elections • Deadlines for registration terms relating to the various local electoral rounds • News and insights on the political programs proposed by the candidates in the elections • Data on the results of the elections, including data on the turnout of European citizens 2. The second section provides an interactive platform where citizens will be able to initiate geo-localized discussions to highlight problems on a local and ­community scale. Users can select their territorial area of reference and, through a forum, • Report any inefficiencies and obstacles encountered in exercising their political rights • Ask questions, ask the community for clarification, and respond • Report public consultations • Report opportunities for volunteering, civic engagement, public events, and other demonstration and debate events The app’s output expires in the European Parliament elections of 2024; therefore, each analysis and survey are somewhat premature at the time of writing this chapter.

5 Conclusions: With the Young People Toward the European Participation Regarding ethical, political, regulatory, technological, and educational issues, the question regarding international and European mobility has always posed many problems, calling for human rights and international cooperation. It needs

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collaboration between all international organizations into question. These needs are applied to the offline environment but become even more complex in the online and offline experience continuity. We must remember that digital technologies also have a dark side: in addition to their social, educational, economic, political, and cultural benefits, the digital environment expansion has also led to several safety threats (hate speech – in most cases based on ethnic, religious, or nationality affiliations, violence, and ICT-facilitated crimes since they often do not fully understand the threats associated with these technologies, especially when sharing personal information, photos, or videos, and the increased risks of privacy and safety infringements). In this sense, EUReKA and PRODEMO projects function as compasses for international and European mobility, providing support, security, verified information, and useful services. In this scenario, young people represent a very interesting target and innovation testimonial. Young people were born in a time of complexity and fragmentation and during the rise of individualization, globalization, and urbanization combined with an erosion of fixed and long-lasting bonds enshrined in traditional institutions such as the family and belief systems relating to religion, democracy, and labor relations. Michel Serres (2012) calls the young people of today “Tom Thumbs” since they use their thumbs for most activities, from writing text messages, online experiences, interactions, and information searches to better carry out the related activities such as job-seeking or leisure pursuits. Although they are not always digital natives, these modern Tom Thumbs are hyper-connected. They communicate with each other through the Internet, Instagram, TikTok, Facebook, and Twitter and watch TV on the Internet. They do not feel politically engaged at the national level but can be very sensitive to international/European civic and political participation (CENSIS, 2021; Eurostat, 2021; We are social, 2021). Compared to previous generations, they have on their side ease and naturalness of access and show a great need to recover their roots, history, and place in society. All areas of social life, once exclusively mediated by traditional agencies, are now renegotiated in the light of the presence and use of technology: free time, training (online courses; research materials; the use of tablets, video, educational products, and books; etc.), work (job-seeking and work as online research, preparation for work, with the training in working in the media in schools and universities), travel, health, and, finally, interpersonal relationships. Looking at this technological identity of young people, it is natural to imagine that they detect the change and will be the future drivers. As well as being entirely digitally literate, young people are also those most open to European and international mobility. European participation projects cannot turn a blind eye to these transformations. In fact, by merely being aware of these, a new European strategy can transform technologies into new opportunities for building bridges between the European states and different generations of people rather than erecting walls. Some call them the “Erasmus generation,” referring to the exponential growth in the number of students who have taken advantage of the opportunities of the Erasmus Programme to explore Europe and its cultures and info-diversity.

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Those who belong to the “Erasmus generation” have been able to take advantage of the opportunities offered by the universalism of university institutions to travel, understand, and explain European variety to other people: people, cultures, values, job opportunities and study, geography, growth, civilization, and civic and political participation. European young people are not isolated within the rigid borders of the national states. As explorers of the new world, for whom geographical boundaries are a mere formality, young people are the perfect influencers and opinion leaders and mediators with other generations regarding the opportunities of technologies for safer international mobility. Another dimension, calling for the opportunity for joint action between the EU and the nation-states, was added. Together they could start a strategy to strengthen the European participation of mobile citizens based on joint initiatives at both the European and national levels. Quoting Rifkin (2010): “When a large amount of small fish starts to produce and share, the power of the centralised model becomes nothing compared to the power of the distributed model.” But the distributed model loses its relevance without the centripetal strength of a unifying institution, in our case, the European Union. In this sense, the projects outlined here specifically aim at empowering citizenship that can allow widespread participation and the production of “an energy of European citizenship,” which is also expressed in electoral participation (Beck, 2013). Projects such as those analyzed and financed through the European Rights, Equality and Citizenship (REC) Program (actually Citizens, Equality, Rights, and Values (CERV) Program) could become a concrete opportunity that could have the feedback and impact assessment with the next European elections (2024). Obviously, some aspects need to be updated in light of the accelerated digitization generated by the COVID-19 pandemic event and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. However, the current historical moment calls for something more: a common European strategy to prevent moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999) and create something in between, civic activism based on awareness, knowledge, training, empowerment, solidarity, and ethics.

References Allegretti, G., Sgueo, G., & Xavier, S. (2020). PRODEMO – Promoting democratic engagement through mobile participation. Retrieved 15 June 2022, from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=3718674 Arruzza, C., Bhattacharya, T., & Fraser, N. (2019). Feminism for the 99 percent: A manifesto. Verso. Bajpai, S. (2021). Pulse of soft power in India’s foreign policy: Exploring the derivative potential of COVID-19 diplomacy. Academia Letters, (1031). https://doi.org/10.20935/AL1031 Bandura, A. (1999). Moral disengagement in the perpetration of inhumanities. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 3, 193–209. Beck, U. (2013 [2012]). Europa tedesca. La nuova geografia del potere. Anticorpi – Laterza. Bouza García, L. (2013). The significance of the European citizens’ initiative for pan-European participatory democracy, Stockholm, Sweden. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA). Retrieved 14 June 2022, from https://www.idea.

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Youth and Democracy: Digital Opportunities for the Future of Participation Alessandro Ambrosino, Simon Cecchin Birk, Carlotta Mingardi, Georgios Nikolou, Lukas Spielberger, Elodie Thevenin, and Alice Trinkle

1 Introduction The political disengagement of the youth remains a core challenge in Europe and beyond. Although multiple initiatives have been taken to mitigate this problem at both the national and the European Union (EU) level, today, young people are more disconnected from the democratic process compared to older generations (Kitanova, A. Ambrosino The Graduate Institute Geneva, Geneva, Switzerland e-mail: [email protected] S. C. Birk University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, Denmark e-mail: [email protected] C. Mingardi University of Bologna, Bologna, Italy e-mail: [email protected] G. Nikolou University of Oxford, Oxford, UK e-mail: [email protected] L. Spielberger Leiden University, Leiden, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] E. Thevenin (*) Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Krakow, Poland e-mail: [email protected] A. Trinkle Free University Berlin, Berlin, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Rouet, T. Côme (eds.), Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20943-7_5

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2020). They also have fewer liberal attitudes and are more likely to vote for populist parties than the general population (Foa & Mounk, 2016; Foa et al., 2020). What is more, they have disproportionately been impacted by the financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic given stubbornly high rates of unemployment, mental illhealth, and deprivation among the youngest Europeans. The young are most likely to be engaged online. Being digital natives, they spend more time than the general population on the web and are more open to online activism. While the young can be mobilized politically as clearly shown by the environmental movements, current e-participation platforms are generally not catering to their needs and hence do not reach them. Yet, if e-participation platforms take measures to target the younger cohorts, they have a valuable opportunity to help overcome their disconnectedness. Against this backdrop, this chapter addresses the issue of youth participation. Based on a review of selected cases of e-participation platforms, interviews with policymakers, and a survey among our target group in three European municipalities, we analyzed the possibility of e-democracy platforms to cater to young people’s needs. Our results demonstrate that the youth’s eagerness to get involved politically is present, and providing online tools and methods that this target group is familiar with and attracted to would be a significant opportunity to foster democratic participation. This chapter is structured as follows. The first part presents the key elements that make the youth a specific target group within contemporary democracies and the current policies set up by the EU in that regard. Moving on to our empirical account, we first focus on the successful examples of e-participation platforms before putting into perspective our interviews and a survey conducted in Krakow (Poland), Leiden (the Netherlands), and Trieste (Italy). Eventually, we conclude on the democratic need to better engage with young people, notably through e-participation platforms.

2 Understanding the Youth and Its Participation and Current EU Youth Policies This chapter focuses on the long-standing crisis of political participation among the European youth (Kitanova, 2020). This presents a significant challenge that has only increased as the youngest generations display decreasing levels of attachment to traditional forms of political engagement such as voting and political party membership (Mycock & Tonge, 2012). At the same time, research shows that young people are increasingly disengaged from informal political activities such as protests and campaigns when compared to older generations, albeit with notable variations between places (Foa & Mounk, 2016; Grasso, 2014). A landmark report on democratic legitimacy underscores the imminent need for policymakers to engage the youth (Foa et al., 2020). This report concludes that the lower levels of political engagement among young people are paired with a worrying shift in democratic attitudes among this cohort (idem). More specifically, it

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appears more cynical “regarding the value of democratic norms such as compromise, free exchange of ideas, or the independence of third-party institutions that may block transformative change” (2020, p. 24). At the same time, increasing numbers of young people are now attracted to populist parties on the right or the left of the political spectrum, above mainstream moderate parties. Compared to the general population, younger cohorts are also significantly more likely to dismiss their political opponents as morally flawed and view their viewpoints as illegitimate. If the disenchanted youth have become increasingly antipathetic to liberal ideals, this may represent a turn toward a Manichean populist conception of democracy that clearly distinguishes between friend and foe. Moreover, the young have also been disproportionately affected by the impact of the financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic. The former resulted in a surge in youth unemployment particularly in Southern Europe (Guerrieri, 2014; Meierkord et al., 2017). While the long-term effects of COVID-19 are yet to be established, it appears that the young have been systematically impacted by the negative effects of the pandemic (ILO, 2020), suffering a worsened and less equal educational environment, an increase in mental health problems, and, most probably, another surge in unemployment (Gregorczyk & Wolff, 2020; Butler & Bannock, 2021; Fell, 2020). Young people also report feeling overlooked by politicians, especially when it comes to public policy responses to crises (Butler & Bannock, 2021; OECD, 2020). Unfortunately, this is not an isolated issue. No less than 71% of young people feel that they are misunderstood in contrast to 50% of those aged 25 or above (Roberton & Brown, 2019). Part of the reason that the youngest generation of Europeans feel misunderstood may be that they differ in important ways from their older peers. Most notably, they are digital natives. More so than the previous generations, they spend much of their time online and relying on social media for obtaining information (Albert et al., 2020). Their interest in traditional media has also decreased (Gentilviso & Aikat, 2019), and they tend to prefer audiovisual over written content. They have a shorter attention span and are attracted by the typical punchy social media post formula of no more than five words and a picture (Rue, 2018). At the same time, they are more pragmatic and concerned with time management (Idem). Through online shopping, they have also learned to expect both speed and quality, along with personalization when they consume. Hence, they expect well-functioning, point, and click interfaces with a smartphone-friendly interface and responsive design and have little patience for clunky time-consuming software (Boadu, 2021; Rue, 2018). Moreover, despite their decreased political activity, the pragmatic young still seek change on specific issues that are relevant to their lives. Most notably, they care about the economy and the environment. They also seek inclusion and diversity and are generally driven by forms of community-oriented activism (Ha & Angus, 2021; Rue, 2018). In this context, the EU set up different initiatives in matters of democratic participation among young people. The promotion of democratic, civic, and political engagement among the European youth indeed falls within the objectives of the EU. The promotion of democracy is a core objective enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU), and by virtue of Articles 165–166

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TFEU, the EU is explicitly committed to the democratic participation of young people, by facilitating vocational training (Art. 166), youth exchanges, and the participation of young people in democratic life. However, the EU does not have exclusive competence when it comes to youth-related policies and acts largely through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), which typically does not lead to binding EU legislative measures. In matters of democratic engagement among young people, the EU has, to date, launched several initiatives that are intended to counter the disengagement of young people that utilize digital technologies for civic participation. Its flagship project for youth engagement is the European Union Youth Strategy which during the current cycle (2019–2027) aims, among other objectives, to “connect the EU with youth” and specifically to “explore and promote the use of innovative and alternative forms of democratic participation e.g. digital democracy tools” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2018). Under the COVID-19 pandemic, however, consultative projects that were anticipated under this framework, such as Youth Dialogue and the European Youth Forum, have not taken place, and digital technologies remain so far underutilized. Similarly, the first EU Youth Coordinator, a figure which appeared in the 2019 strategy, was appointed only fairly recently (in June 2021). Though the EU has recognized the need for action, it has itself so far fallen short of providing a digital communication infrastructure specifically designed for young people. By contrast, for other fields of its work, the EU has set up various formats of online consultation and deliberation. Public consultations have been used for some time and in principle allow all EU citizens to express their opinions on a piece of draft legislation, but these are predominantly used by interest groups. More recently, the online platform set up to accompany the Conference on the Future of Europe provides various opportunities to propose ideas and exchange opinions. A last pillar in the EU’s strategy for youth engagement pertains to the National Youth Councils which provides toolkits and resources to support consultations in various formats. But still, these are largely intended for in-person meetings rather than engaging in the online world. In summary, the EU clearly has some awareness of the potential use of deliberative and e-democracy tools to facilitate youth engagement, but has not yet matched these ambitions with concrete actions. The following section presents our empirical research focused on the analysis of established e-participation platforms, as well as the investigation of youth democratic participation in different European cities.

3 Engaging the Youth Through E-Participation Tools 3.1 Methodological Notes We adopted a multidisciplinary approach to our research, which is presented in this section. Firstly, we undertook desk research to learn about a range of successful e-participation platforms that have been deployed in various cities around the world

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to identify examples of best practices and to learn about cutting-edge technologies in this field. We analyzed several prominent online public consultation examples from around Europe and further afield, and we identified the features that have allowed them to thrive. Our present chapter focuses on examples set up in Iceland, Spain, and Taiwan; we also conducted interviews with policymakers in that regard (see Table 1). Furthermore, we gathered original data to strengthen our understanding of the pros and cons of e-democracy initiatives geared toward young people. In this perspective, we undertook interviews with local policymakers and leading world experts in this field (see Table 1). Secondly, we conducted a survey among more than 60 young people in 3 European cities regarding their attitudes toward e-­democracy. Drawing all this together, we identified several opportunities for the more effective provision of e-democracy initiatives which have informed our analysis.

Table 1  List of conducted interviews (anonymized) List of interviews Locality Format EU level Online interview EU level Online interview Reykjavik z Online (Iceland) interview Krakow Online (Poland) interview Krakow (Poland)

Online interview

Krakow (Poland)

Online interview

Leiden (Netherlands) Leiden (Netherlands) Trieste (Italy)

Online interview Online interview Online interview Online interview Phone interview

Trieste (Italy) Trieste (Italy) Source: Authors

Information (date of the interview) Interview with former MP and Convenor of the Citizens’ Convention for UK Democracy (16.12.2020) Interview with Citizen Deliberation Coordinator at the European Citizen Action Service (27.04.2021) Interview with President/CEO at Citizens Foundation and Founder of Better Reykjavik (26.03.21) Interview with officer in charge of public consultations in the City of Krakow (Department of Social Policy and Health, Office for Participation and Dialogue) (24.06.2021) Interview with the officer responsible for the Civic Budget in the City of Krakow (Department of Social Policy and Health, Office for Participation and Dialogue) (24.06.2021) Interview with the person in charge of local initiatives in the City of Krakow (Department of Social Policy and Health, Office for Participation and Dialogue) (24.06.2021) Interview with policy advisor in education in the municipality of Leiden (20.05.2021) Interview with student coordinator at the municipality of Leiden (20.05.2021) Interview with local youth activist and member of cultural organization (04.06.2021) Interview with local youth activist and member of cultural organization (04.06.2021) Interview with member of the Youth Municipality Council of Trieste (26.06.2021)

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3.2 E-Participation Tools: What Works? Public consultation is defined as every process by which the public is asked to offer insights regarding one or a set of policy proposals – we more specifically looked at e-participation platforms through which public consultation is sought. In this perspective, Better Reykjavik is arguably one of the most successful e-participation tools in the world. Founded in 2011, Better Reykjavik essentially works as an umbrella for various programs, including the municipality of Reykjavik’s participatory budget-drafting process and the City Council’s participatory law-making project (Congress). The initiative has generated significant public engagement, with some 27,000 registered users and over 20% of Reykjavik’s population using the platform. Based on conducted interviews and the review of Better Reykjavik, four key inferences for effective online deliberation can be pointed out. To begin with, deliberation must be constructive. On Better Reykjavik, citizens can “upvote” and “downvote” proposals, but they are discouraged from making unconstructive or critical comments, and it is not possible to reply directly to submitted proposals. Instead, participants can write a standalone counterpoint. The central aim of this is to draw the passion out of the process, unlike in a heated Facebook discussion. While this can be a bit restrictive, it also reduces destructive and negative dialogue that many people find alienating about online civic engagement. Artificial intelligence (AI) is also employed to scan and remove comments that are deemed to be toxic or destructive. Furthermore, as highlighted by several of our interviewees, deliberation must be transparent. Moderators should not over-promise regarding what the platform can achieve. One of the main lessons out of the Better Reykjavik experience is that people primarily want to be listened to and are, generally speaking, reasonable. So, even if a proposal that is reached after deliberation cannot be fully implemented (e.g., because of its cost implications), it is crucial that both policymakers and those running the platform get back to the people who participated in the deliberation and explain why their proposal cannot be fulfilled. This is much better, and more accountable, than just not responding. This feedback cycle helps to keep people engaged and provides meaning to their involvement. Opportunities must be advertised appropriately. 80% of the Better Reykjavik budget goes into advertising the platform. Clearly, without adequate promotion, even the best designed platform could end up without participants. In the same vein, big data analysis and content promotion through networks and social media platforms play a crucial role in the platform’s success. During our interview, it was notably mentioned that Twitter is better when it comes to promoting political content compared to Facebook. Finally, deliberation must be visualized. Images and videos play a key role in getting people engaged with the platform, since they help to simplify and contextualize participation and the issues under discussion. Our interviewee also mentioned that young people have the tendency to be more sophisticated in their online interactions compared to older generations. Another interesting aspect is that young people

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were more reluctant to participate in the budgeting process compared to other features on the platform. To conclude, the trinity of success can be summarized as “keep it simple, don’t make it toxic and promote” (Interview 26.03.21). A further prominent example of an e-participation platform that drew our attention was Decide Madrid. Following requests from many Spanish citizens for better-­ quality democracy, in 2015, the Madrid City Council launched the Decide Madrid website. This online platform represents an innovative experiment of online citizen participation. In fact, through this platform, all the citizens resident in the city can submit ideas and proposals to change Madrid. The members of the portal can then vote on each proposal. In February 2017, the platform achieved its first major success when more than 200,000 Madrileños used the platform to vote in a city referendum on 3 proposals to improve the quality of life in the city. The proposals concerned reducing the traffic in the city center, introducing a single ticket for all the public transports, and a series of measures to make Madrid “100% green.” According to a City Council spokesperson, the referendum was a success and demonstrated the importance of such channels for engaging in dialogue with the citizens. The process of submitting proposals and of deliberation is at the same time both straightforward and rigid. Any citizen can submit a proposal on the platform, and the proposal then has 12 months to receive the support of 1% of the city’s inhabitants. If it succeeds, the proposal moves to a second stage of public discussion, and after these, users can vote to either accept or reject the proposal. If accepted, the proposal is then considered by the City Council, which needs to submit a report on the proposal’s legality, cost, feasibility, etc. within a period of 30 days. The municipality has sought to maximize participation by providing assistance for people lacking either access to the internet or familiarity with online processes. However, in an interview conducted for an academic paper, some citizens cited the lack of information about their contributions as one of the main shortcomings of the platform (Royo et al., 2020). The same interviewees claimed that the most important motivation for using the platform is the possibility of their proposals being implemented or at least being taken into account (Idem). In that regard, the elephant in the room for this and for other platforms is that municipalities still seem reluctant to allocate a significant portion of their budget toward e-participation proposals. In the case of Madrid, participatory budgeting conducted through Decide Madrid still amounts to slightly less than 2% of the annual municipal budget. Finally, the accessibility of the platform is a double-edged sword, as the volume of proposals submitted is very high, which arguably leaves a lot of quality proposals going unnoticed. Looking further afield, in an attempt to bypass polarized political attitudes, the online-offline deliberative and consultation process implemented in Taiwan since 2014 called vTaiwan is designed to promote consensus in decision-making. Born in response to a highly contentious political exchange that emerged in the context of a proposed trade agreement with China and the subsequent “Sunflower Movement” (a protest movement driven by students and civil society against the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement between Taiwan and China), the platform aims to move political exchange “beyond” polarization. The online platform has direct links with government representatives and other elected bodies to increase legitimacy and

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transparency within the decision-making process. Unlike traditional social media platforms, whose algorithms often create echo chambers and merely invigorate conflict, vTaiwan allows users to express opinions on contentious policies. Notably, the platform highlights areas of similarity between proposals as opposed to points of contention in order to facilitate – and even gamify – the development of consensus. While replies to expressed opinions are not published on the platform to avoid trolling, the up- and downvotes are rendered publicly and depicted in a map to identify gaps, cleavages, and agreements. The platform has seen some notable success, for example, with respect to transport, by helping to overcome the divide between proand anti-Uber participants by developing a legislative proposal that underpins how ride-sharing apps function in the territory that was acceptable to both camps. In sum, the added value of participatory processes in policy development is the inclusion of those directly affected by the decisions. Thanks to an interactive dialogue with institutions and administrators, decision- and policymakers also obtained insights into what really matters to young people.

3.3 Youth Participation in Krakow, Leiden, and Trieste The empirical account of our research investigates the demand and supply sides of youth e-democracy initiatives in three European cities. By focusing the following case studies  – Krakow (Poland), Leiden (Netherlands), and Trieste (Italy)  – our research takes account of the (geographical) diversity of Europe and examines cities with different population sizes and cultural backgrounds. All three cities have old, established universities and considerable student populations, but Leiden stands out for its high share of young residents compared to Krakow and Trieste (Table 2). We studied both supply and demand side factors regarding youth e-democracy initiatives. We conducted several expert interviews in these three cities to understand their considerations and experiences of e-democracy and youth involvement in politics, and we reviewed policy initiatives for deliberation with young people in each city. Simultaneously, based on exploratory methods, we conducted a web-­ based survey among young people in those localities to investigate their patterns of online and offline democratic participation. Overall, we find that young people are Table 2  Population of the three studied cities City Krakow Leiden Trieste

Overall population 770,000 110,000 200,000

Share of young people among residents 5.5% (18–24 y.)a 17% (15–25 y.)b 5.9% (18–24 y.)c

Source: Author from various data a Cf. https://ugeo.urbistat.com/AdminStat/en/pl/demografia/dati-­sintesi/m-­krakow/20626777/4 b Cf. https://allecijfers.nl/gemeente/leiden/ c Cf. https://ugeo.urbistat.com/AdminStat/en/it/demografia/dati-­sintesi/trieste/32/3

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willing to participate more, but that public administrations will have to change their approach to succeed in reaching them. Our first case study of Krakow highlights the difficulty of attracting young people to conventional consultation formats. The City of Krakow has implemented three major participation tools to gauge the needs and opinions of citizens, namely, public consultations; participatory budgeting, in which inhabitants submit and vote for projects to be implemented; and local initiatives through which inhabitants can cooperate together while being financially and/or materially supported by the local government. Activities are coordinated by the office responsible for Participation and Dialogue, which provides extensive feedback to citizens following consultations. Activities are aimed at all age groups: with the exception of local initiatives where participants must be 18 years or older, there is no age limit to participate. In this regard, the city promotes participative tools via different channels of communication aimed at reaching various age groups. Nonetheless, there is an overall absence of young people in all public consultation processes – in terms of both attendance and the number of initiatives and projects submitted. While the majority of activities were usually held face to face with inhabitants, the COVID-19 pandemic increased the use of online tools. Consultations were moved to an online format, which neither affected nor changed citizens’ participation. Overall, the city tries to reach out to the youth in several ways; yet, even here, engaging effectively with young people has proved challenging. In Leiden, the problem has not been a lack of opportunities for consultation, but how to process it. The municipality of Leiden solicits input from young people in a variety of formats, targeting not just the city’s sizable student population but even pupils as young as 10. The municipality can draw on well-established cooperation with the major student associations in the city, as well as schools and neighborhood youth councils for younger target groups. The city takes a bespoke approach to consulting with different groups and accounts for the variation of attention spans and levels of maturity across age groups. Leiden provides a comprehensive digital offering. For young people, the municipality maintains a professional Instagram account and age-specific WhatsApp groups. Last year, the municipality launched a CitizenLab for public consultations with all age groups, but an integrated framework for processing the input of young people is still missing. Our interviewees explained that there are some pitfalls in cooperating with young people. Maintaining interest in the Instagram account has proven challenging, owing to the dry content of most municipal announcements. Further, relying on different technologies to reach specific target groups renders it difficult to report the results in a uniform way. As a result, despite broad political support in the municipal council, getting input from young people accepted within the administration remains a challenge. Lastly, the experience of the city of Trieste underlines how lockdowns during the COVID-19 pandemic have increased the need for online formats. There exist some active programs which aim to target the youth and its needs, attempting to involve

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young people in  local democratic participation. The most relevant are, however, very recent. One specific initiative (active since April 2021) was set up by the local council in reaction to specific demands for inclusion from young citizens; it takes the form of an informal consultation body and directly targets citizens under 30 and aims to bring young citizens close to the local administration. In terms of digital offering, there is no previous substantial experience in targeting the youth with specific communication channels. However, both in-person and online meetings have been held through the GoToMeetings platform during the pandemic, which might have played a catalyzing role in the digitalization offering. Another relevant initiative gathers multiple youth local associations that are active in various fields of interests such as democratic participation and citizenship, education, job market opportunities, international mobility, art and culture, sport, and wellbeing. To juxtapose the information gained from talking to policymakers, we conducted a survey among our target group of young people. The objective of our survey was to find out more about young people’s experience with and expectations of digital deliberation. We wanted to gauge specifically young people’s knowledge of and attitudes toward democracy, their levels of political activism online and offline, and what might encourage or keep them from using opportunities for participation and to elicit specific recommendations for the design of an application. Our results suggest a considerable potential to use e-democracy to promote democratic participation among young people. Our survey was run in three aforementioned cities from mid-July to mid-August 2021. The survey was set up online and distributed among the cities through similar channels of communication, with the help of respective municipal offices and universities. In all three cities, the survey was available in the official national language of the country, as well as in English. We received a total of 61 responses (see Fig. 1 for breakdown by cities). The survey was answered by young people aged between 17 and 30 (average age 22.5 years). While the majority of respondents (67.2%) were university students, the survey presents a relatively even distribution of respondents across gender (see Fig.  2) and education levels. University student respondents came from a wide range of programs of study. The most potential for political participation seems to lie at the local level. Though respondents indicated that they felt least informed and least interested Fig. 1  Share of respondents by case cities. (Source: Authors)

8% 33% 59%

Krakow

Leiden

Trieste

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3%

Fig. 2  Gender of respondents. (Source: Authors)

44%

Female

53%

Male

Other

Fig. 3  “How satisfied are you with democracy on the following level?” Young people expressed relatively high satisfaction with democracy at the local level. (Source: Authors)

in local politics, their level of satisfaction with democracy was slightly higher than with democracy on the national level (see Fig. 3). Moreover, the level of interest for getting involved in  local politics was equal to national politics, at six out of ten responses. Taken together, these findings suggest that local politics might offer a good entry point for young people into democratic participation (Fig. 4). A second major finding concerns differing patterns of political activity online and offline. In general, online media were far more widely used than their offline equivalents for other forms of political participation. As shown in Graph 4, almost 80% of our respondents indicated that they had signed an online petition in the past 2 years, against one-third who had signed a petition with a pen; and while one in three participants had attended a demonstration in person, more than half had expressed political opinions on social media. While restrictions related to the pandemic might have limited young people’s capacity to gather offline, these findings suggest that young people are comfortable with several ways of expressing political views online.

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Fig. 4  “Have you in the past 24 months…?” Most young people have signed online petitions and posted about politics online. (Source: Authors)

A similar conclusion can be drawn when it comes to direct consultations with governments. Though the number of respondents that engaged in citizen dialogues was around 10% for both online and offline formats, other channels for providing input were more widely utilized. One in four respondents indicated that they have used participation instruments or communication channels that are made available by the local government; roughly one in five interacted with consultation instruments made available by EU institutions. Next, our findings suggest that young people care most about the substance of deliberations. By far, the most common reason given for participating in online e-participation or political activities was that it concerned topics that were important to the respondents, while the importance of appealing interfaces or the possibility to share on social media came last (see Fig. 5). Yet the respondents also indicated that young people clearly appreciate and need low thresholds to participation. Half of the respondents considered easy accessibility to be important, and seven in ten indicated that the major impediment to engagement was lack of information about such activities (see Fig. 6). By contrast, only about a quarter of respondents expressed a lack of interest in such offerings. In sum, many young people seem willing to participate, but it seems that they want to be approached about such opportunities and cajoled into participating. Our survey concludes with recommendations for policymakers regarding the effective design and delivery of applications that can be used to promote the engagement of young people with online e-participation/e-democracy platforms. More than 80% of respondents found using a web-based app suitable or very suitable for such purposes. Notably, respondents expect accountability for how the input from consultations would be used – their expected time interval would not exceed a week following the consultation. Lastly, respondents provided some suggestions for how best to reach young people. Some stressed the potential of social media and the use

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Fig. 5  “What would make it more likely that you participate in e-participation activities?” Young people care most about being consulted on topics that they find important. (Source: Authors)

Fig. 6  “What would make it less likely that you participate in e-participation activities?” The main impediments to online participation are lack of information and lack of time. (Source: Authors)

of influencers to promote opportunities, but civic education in schools and through civil society organization was also highlighted as an important channel. Based on our survey, it is clear many young people are keen to contribute to political discussions and decisions. Many more have expressed themselves politically online than offline. Yet policymakers that want to engage young people will have to take the initiative and must provide opportunities to participate in policymaking that makes young people feel that they are taken seriously and that offers them intuitive ways of expressing themselves and of influencing and shaping their communities.

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4 Conclusion If one wants to reach out to young people, this has to be done in an effective manner, via providing easily accessible platforms that are promoted effectively and include a feedback loop. To ensure young people’s participation, the chosen policy topics should concern young people. Dialogue should be constructive, and the level of engagement (local, national, European) should be picked wisely. While the insights gained through our interviews in Krakow and Trieste demonstrated that reaching out to young people was challenging compared to other age groups, our respondents clearly showed a keen interest in wanting to participate in democratic processes and policymaking. At the same time, the results also underline how policymakers should not expect initiatives to originate from young people and must take the initiative themselves. Young people want to be contacted by e-­platforms’ initiators. They want to feel recognized and validated. However, in terms of accessibility, respondents felt they lacked information about opportunities to participate. This was mirrored by policymakers expressing difficulties attracting young people to e-participation platforms. Therefore, promotion of e-platforms plays a crucial role in attracting young people to engage them democratically online. These findings are confirmed practically by successful e-participation platforms such as Better Reykjavik, which spent the bulk of their budget on promotion through social media and civil society, making it one of the most successful e-participation platforms worldwide. Through the cooperation with stakeholders, digital platforms can furthermore bridge the existing information gap between institutions and young people. If e-participation platforms want to reach young people, they should provide feedback and act in an accountable manner. According to our research’s findings, young people demand fast feedback about the procession of their input. They also require more explanation than older participants. However, whereas our survey respondents expect speedy feedback to their input, policymakers have expressed that properly processing input from members of the public (including young people) from consultations takes time. It can be technically challenging for multifaceted and complex multi-year projects. Especially when consultation formats are adapted to different target groups, it becomes difficult to process input and to present the results in a uniform, digestible way. E-participation platforms hence should include mechanisms that inform participants in a timely fashion about the impact of their recommendations on informed policy decisions; they need to be transparent. Having one consolidated application, platform, or interface might allow policymakers to register responses clearly and to keep participants updated over the course of a project. If policymakers engage meaningfully with e-participation for young people, they can help to promote civic engagement, cultivating a citizenry that has a stake in their communities, promoting active, socially cohesive, and sustainable societies with a high living quality. Another surprising finding addresses the question of social media usage by local municipalities. The municipalities of Leiden and Krakow, for example, invested in

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the curation of professional Instagram accounts to reach young people: however, the survey’s respondents appear to care more about the substance of matters of deliberation than about the presence of local institutions on social media per se. In line with existing research, young people are more pragmatic than older generations. Consequently, it is crucial for e-participation platforms to focus on tangible, concrete policy issues that are dear to young people. Well-designed platforms can furthermore foster constructive and pluralistic deliberation. As seen in the analysis of our case studies, by taking simple steps like content moderation and AI, Better Reykjavik and vTaiwan have created a positive discussion atmosphere and counteracted tribalism and polarization. The enactment of a constructive dialogue facilitates empathy and strengthens mutual understanding. It motivates young people to use an e-participation platform. At the same time, the survey’s findings stressed the relevance to work with an appealing and accessible interface design. As digital natives, young people are comfortable expressing political opinions online. But they are used to snappy, visually appealing websites and have short attention spans. E-participation platforms therefore have only a few seconds to capture their attention. Since young people navigate their environment predominantly through smartphones, designs should be suitable for mobile devices, too. A more promising way to disseminate opportunities to participate in local democracy might rely on cooperation with civil society organizations. Our survey has indicated that young people have high levels of trust in democracy at the local level, even though they know little about it. Therefore, small-scale initiatives might allow participants to consult on practical policy issues close to their everyday lives. This was demonstrated by the successful Madrid and Iceland’s experiences. EU institutions could promote the adoption of these actions within the framework of the EU Youth Initiative and provide financial support. By involving young people in local initiatives, policymakers can lean on pre-existing trust and deliver concrete results. To conclude, it is clear that young people are not a lost cause to democracy. On the contrary, many are keen to contribute to political discussions. Many more have expressed themselves politically online than offline. Yet policymakers who want to engage young people will have to take the initiative and must provide opportunities to participate in policymaking which makes young people feel that they are taken seriously and offers them intuitive ways of expressing themselves and of influencing and shaping their communities. Acknowledgment  This research is based on the work of the “Unmute the Youth!” project conducted as part of the Europaeum Scholars Programme. Previous versions of this work can be found in the form of a policy brief: https://45n1ej27ymq723ofrn2vh7nc-­wpengine.netdna-­ssl.com/wp-­ content/uploads/2021/10/Unmute-­the-­Youth_Policy-­brief.pdf and policy proposal: https://45n1ej27ymq723ofrn2vh7nc-­wpengine.netdna-­ssl.com/wp-­content/uploads/2021/10/ Unmute-­the-­Youth_Policy-­report.pdf. We would like to thank the team behind the programme and especially our supervisor Barry Colfer.

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Freedom of Speech and Democratic Values in the Digital Epoch: A Critical Perspective on the Post-totalitarian Media Culture Diana Petkova

1 Introduction Although the freedom of speech seems to be an outdated topic, it has gained new importance in the post-pandemic world where rumors, conspiracy theories, and false news have become an inseparable part of the virtual space of the social networks. The freedom of speech is a topic especially relevant to the countries of the ex-socialist block that have often been defined as “transitional democracies.” According to some of the most prestigious global studies, Bulgaria, together with other former socialist countries, occupies one of the last places in the rankings of democracy and freedom of speech. For example, the world organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF) introduced in 2002 the World Press Freedom Index, which is determined by several criteria (RSF, 2021). These criteria are the independence of the media, the quality of the media legal system, as well as the safety of the journalists in their home countries. The researchers from the Reporters Without Borders explicitly emphasize that this ranking does not assess the public policies or the quality of journalism in any country or region. The degree of freedom available to journalists in 180 countries is determined on the basis of the results obtained from the answers to questionnaires filled in by the experts in the given countries. The collected empirical data are combined with quantitative data on abuses and acts of violence against journalists during the evaluated period. The criteria used in the questionnaire are pluralism, media independence, media environment and self-­ censorship, legislative framework, transparency, and quality of the infrastructure that supports the production of news and information (RSF, 2021).

D. Petkova (*) Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Sofia, Bulgaria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Rouet, T. Côme (eds.), Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20943-7_6

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In the official report of the RSF in 2021, Bulgaria is ranked 112th out of 180 countries according to the World Press Freedom Index. This is one place lower than its ranking in 2020. In the same report, the top positions of the freedom of speech are given to the Nordic countries, such as Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark. The so-called Scandinavian model has for decades been shown as an example of participative democracy and media freedom. Opposite to it are the countries of the ex-socialist camp that for years have been undergoing democratic transitions. This fact also underlines the extreme relevance and importance of the question of freedom of speech both in the postmodern digital society and in post-totalitarian countries, such as Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, or Serbia. This chapter will study the main reasons for the present situation of the freedom of speech in the post-totalitarian countries and particularly in Bulgaria. First, it states that in order to exist, democracy and freedom of speech have to be perceived, maintained, and cherished as basic values of society. And second, the paper claims that the rankings of the Reporters Without Borders may show the current situation of the freedom of speech in the press, but cannot and should not be applied to the other media or the other forms of speech, such as the digital social media, or the live social protests, etc. In the post-totalitarian countries, and especially in Bulgaria, there is a real paradox: while the traditional press might be under the strong pressure of business interests or political parties, in the social media, in the opposite, there are no censorship and even no regulation of speech. The latter phenomenon has both positive and negative sides. On the one hand, in the social media, individuals can openly speak out what they sincerely and truly think. On the other hand, rumors, conspiracy theories, and fake news proliferate and become part of the everyday life, especially during the pandemic of COVID-19. In the following chapter, the paper will discuss and study in details these two statements.

2 Freedom of Speech as a Social and Cultural Value in Postmodern Society Another report of the Pew Research Center (2018) underlines the difficulties with which the Eastern European societies adapt to the traditional European values and norms, such as individualism, freedom of speech, and acceptance of minority groups, especially ethnic, religious, cultural, and sexual communities. Thus, freedom of speech is considered to be one of the most important values in democratic society. In this sense, the freedom of speech emerges as a complex and socially significant problem that affects all areas of the mediatized postmodern society – from the political systems and the legal regulation of society to the economy, media and entertainment industries, media pedagogy, and education. Moreover, the in-depth scientific research in this problem should inevitably dwell on the value models in different societies as a basic prerequisite for the presence or absence of freedom of speech. Social and cultural values are responsible for the formation of different

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models of democracy in the postmodern world and at the same time point to the main challenges to the freedom of speech in specific regions and countries. A democratic culture is defined as the one in which individuals have the opportunity to actively participate in the decision-making processes concerning the social communities. However, most of the contemporary studies nowadays are related to the freedom of speech in the press. In his book on the construction of news in the press, Lebovic (2016) brings out the idea of the mediatized capitalism that he sees as a complex synthesis of history, law, administration, economic power, and the media. The author also outlines the main challenges that the press has faced in the postmodern epoch. Unable to maintain the old circulation in the age of the Internet, newspapers and magazines limit the number of their reporters and thus the opportunities for investigative and interpretive journalism. As a result, the classical media, Lebovic (2016) argues, are less able to serve as a corrective to the processes in society. In this regard, freedom of speech depends not only on the specific political situation and the legal framework in a given country – the challenges are also underlined by the weakening influence of the classical media, which previously had a strong influence in society. At the same time, proponents of the so-called cultivation theory have questioned some of the basic understandings about the freedom of speech in the electronic media and particularly in television. According to these researchers, the broadcasting of violence on television is one of the main reasons for the development of violence and aggression in society. A number of social psychologists have also emphasized the tendency of some individuals to “imitate” the behavior they perceive in the electronic media, including staging robberies, kidnappings, and other crimes based on movies or even on television footage. This is why researchers, such as Hurley (2004), bring to the fore the ethics in public communication and outline important questions for any society: Should freedom of speech include the expression of aggression? And how to regulate violence, aggression, and hatred in society? In this respect, numerous studies have recently been conducted on the hate speech in the press and in the electronic media. Van Dijk places special emphasis on the functions of the news, as well as on the media elite in the process of constructing the public opinion. His discourse analysis of media content shows that, even in the European Union, there have been various demonstrations of hatred, xenophobia, and racism. According to the researcher, the European majorities still underestimate the representatives of the ethnic minorities, the immigrants, and the refugees (Van Dijk, 2016). Josey, too, offers a detailed analysis of the discourse of racism and hatred in the digital space. Distinguishing between “open” and “covert” racism, the researcher argues that the introduction of new technologies has contributed to the emergence of new strategies for creating and maintaining identities based on xenophobia and racism defined by him as “neo-traditional racist identities” (Josey, 2010). All these questions, raised by well-known media experts, sociologists, philosophers, and psychologists, have become even more complex and significant in the virtual space of the digital media. According to Batkin, most of the theories about the freedom of speech have focused mainly on the political parties, and they have underestimated the importance of the non-political expression of speech as well as

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the individuals’ personal freedoms. The scholar claims that due to the digitalization of the mass communication, the opportunities for individual participation and contribution to society have significantly increased, but at the same time, the same technologies that provide many personal freedoms create and produce new methods for tracking, influencing, and controlling the public opinion (Batkin, 2004). Most of the researchers nowadays emphasize on the active citizenship that has developed in the context of the digital media. Authors, such as Fischer, even argue that especially in the Western countries, the Internet, with its freedom of speech, provides a new impetus for active participation in political elections and important public decision-making (Fischer, 2009). In such a way, the Internet has become an important element of the democratic revival and a major mechanism for transformation in the transitional democracies. However, based on the numerous analyses, it is possible to claim that the digitalization of the postmodern society is a twofold process – on the one side, it creates various opportunities for participative democracy and freedom of speech, and on the other side, it becomes a fertile environment for negative phenomena, such as xenophobia, aggressive nationalism, racism, sexism, hatred, and intolerance in society. In the digital media, the individuals are not passive receivers, but they are active participants in the processes of communication. The digitalization of the media, and especially the appearance of the social media, has contributed to the fragmentation of society and to the formation of various and diverse communities by affiliation and interests. On the one hand, this includes the ability of ethnic, religious, cultural, and sexual minorities to assert their rights and to openly demonstrate their views and attitudes. On the other hand, there are exactly the opposite processes too: nationalist, racist, and xenophobic groups can easily be created in the social media. Moreover, because of the digitalized communication, these groups have the ability to quickly organize themselves for protests, attacks, and even crimes. All these issues related to the freedom of speech in the digital epoch bring to the fore some of the ideas of the spiral of silence theory that was first introduced in 1974 by Noelle-Neumann. It emphasizes on the ability of the electronic media to create public opinion that is shared by the majority, while minority views are suppressed or ignored. According to this theory, the individuals who do not share the opinions of the majority are forced to become silent in order to prevent stigmatization and isolation in society. In such a way, Noelle-Neumann states that an illusion of social consensus has been created (Noelle-Neumann, 1974). If the spiral of silence theory seems to be justified in relation to the traditional media, the postmodern processes demonstrate its limited application to the contemporary digital media. Referred to the virtual space of the Internet and the electronic media, this theory shows some shortcomings. The Internet and the social media have imposed the individualization of the public communication and, thus, have created numerous possibilities for establishing minority identities. Thus, in the digital environment, there is exactly the opposite process – disintegration and fragmentation of the public opinion, a phenomenon, which, in some cases, even leads to the loss of public consensus. Simultaneously, in the virtual space of the new media, the

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representatives of the minority groups have become less silent, and they actively express their worldviews and opinions. Freedom of speech has for decades been one of the basic values in democratic societies. However, a number of contemporary researchers have strongly criticized the European Union for failing to distinguish in its communication policies between the old members of the Western democracies that make up the core of the European Union and the newer member states of the former socialist block. In this respect, Valentini argues that the Western European countries traditionally raise European values of equality, democracy, and participation in civil society, while in Eastern Europe, the emphasis is put more on the economy (Valentini, 2008). Other researchers claim, too, that the European institutions must look for new ways to encourage freedom of speech and recognition of different identities. However, according to them, common messages addressed simultaneously to all member states are unlikely to be effective enough (Busselle & Bilandzic, 2009). It is through the recognition of cultural diversity, as a result of a socio-cultural historical heritage, that the European Commission’s strategic campaigns can provoke a wide public response, both at the common European Union level and on local levels. In such a way, the research in the freedom of speech in the post-totalitarian countries, and particularly in Bulgaria, in comparison with different cultural regions and countries of the European Union, may outline the foundations for a broader public discussion on the future of democracy and the democratic practices on the European continent. The main hypothesis of the present paper is that together with the political and media law systems, the value models are decisive for the presence or lack of freedom of speech. In fact, the new digital environment enables to put the accent on older and newer theories that dwell on value models. Benedict is one of the first to outline different cultural models with their basic values. The researcher claims that the culture, as well as the individual, is a constant model of thinking and acting. The culture of a social community, nation, or civilization is not just a sum of different elements but the result of a unique arrangement and interaction between these elements (Bеnedict, 2005 [1946]). Developing the ideas of Benedict, Kroeber believes that anything that happens as an achievement, change, consistency, or sustainability in a culture is most likely to happen through the mechanisms of activation of the cultural model and its values (Kroeber, 1952). The World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Studies (EVS) examine the attitudes of the Europeans and of the citizens of over 180 countries in the world. On the basis of these studies, Inglehard and Welzel (2015) outline several types of values: traditional values, secular-rational values, survival values, and values of self-expression. The model of traditional values emphasizes on the importance of religion, authority, and family, as well as on the relationships between parents and children. Societies built on secular values are diametrically opposite to the traditional ones. They focus on the rights of individuals, such as divorce, abortion, and even euthanasia. The survival model puts the accent on the economic and physical survival. It is also associated with ethnocentrism, low trust in institutions, and a low level of tolerance in society. And the fourth model of self-expression gives

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priority to the protection of the environment and the rights of minority groups (Inglehard & Welzel, 2015). Based on the WVS and the EVS, it can be concluded that most of the post-­ socialist countries belong to the cultures where survival values dominate. Bulgaria in particular represents a special case where the two models of the traditional and survival values have been intersected. This fact can also explain, at least to a certain extent, the suppression of the freedom of speech in the traditional media and especially in the press, as it is shown by the Reporters Without Borders organization. The freedom of speech in a country is a result of prominent cultural factors and social values, such as individualism/collectivism, universalism/particularism, etc. The detailed research in the report, proposed by the Reporters Without Borders, proves this statement. Countries placed on the top of the World Press Freedom Index, such as Norway, Finland, Sweden, and Denmark, are highly individualistic societies, while more collectivistic cultures, such as the post-totalitarian countries, show much more restrictions regarding the freedom of speech. Collectivism here should be understood in a much broader sense, not just as a cultural heritage from the times of socialism but as an emphasis on social groups, rather than on individuals. In this respect, some Southern European countries that have never been part of the socialist system, such as Greece and Italy, for example, have been placed much lower in the World Press Freedom Index too. It seems that societies where the accent is put on the family and social groups have lower ranking regarding the freedom of speech, while highly individualistic cultures take the front positions. This fact is also proved by a representative public opinion poll, conducted in the year 2017 by one of the biggest agencies in Bulgaria “Trend.” The interviewed Bulgarians had to pick up in a questionnaire what the most important values according to them were. It turns out that for the Bulgarians, the most important values are the family, peace, and security, while other values, such as freedom, and especially freedom of speech and democracy, are not given priority (Fig. 1). In a previous representative poll opinion, conducted by the Alpha Research Agency in 2003, the values of the Bulgarians were studied too. According to the results, the Bulgarian respondents placed the highest priority on the family, followed by the work and security. Less than half of the respondents considered freedom to be an important value (Angelova, 2003). The results of the two poll opinions, conducted in 2003 and 2017, show that for almost 15 years, the attitudes of the Bulgarians have not changed significantly. The research also proves that collectivistic societies, where people are more oriented toward family, kinship, and personal relations, cannot be universalistic cultures. Rather, these societies are particularistic. Particularism here should be understood in a sense that laws and rules might exist but they are applied in a different way to different categories of people, depending on their authority, prestige, as well as relations in society. This fact is also proved by the ranking in the World Press Freedom Index. In Bulgaria, the press is closely related to business and political groups and interests. This is why many Bulgarian journalists have stated in the questionnaire that they have been censored. Many journalists have also reported about

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Fig. 1  The most important values for the Bulgarians. (According to the data of Trend Agency)

self-­censorship as a result of the pressure exercised on them by the business groups or the political parties. However, in Bulgaria, there is a real paradox. The restriction of the freedom of speech is related mostly to the traditional media and especially to the press. It does not apply to the digital and new media, as well as to other forms of speech, such as the public protests. In the digital media in Bulgaria, there is exactly the opposite process. During the pandemic of COVID-19, fake news, disinformation, rumors, and conspiracy theories predominate. The influence of the digital and social media has been so strong that the traditional media have failed in providing reliable news and opposing the mass disinformation. As a result, Bulgaria has the least number of people vaccinated in Europe. Only about 30% of the Bulgarians have taken COVID-19 vaccines, while the majority of the population has remained unvaccinated due to the beliefs in conspiracy theories, spread by the digital and the social media. As a result, Bulgaria has one of the highest percentages of deaths from COVID-19 in the world. The belief in conspiracy theories and rumors in Bulgaria might be sustained because of cultural reasons too. It seems that societies that have been under authoritative regimes are more susceptible to believe in conspiracy theories and may show lack of trust in the official institutions, authorities, and the traditional media. This is exactly the case of the post-communist countries, and particularly of Bulgaria and Romania, where there is a high level of distrust in the state and in the traditional media. This fact is due to the collective memories from the times of socialism when propaganda and misinformation had been widely used by the socialist states. This is an important reason for the post-socialist societies to become nowadays highly susceptible to rumors and conspiracy theories.

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An example of this statement is the fact that in December 2021, after a public protest against the green certificates in the center of Sofia, the protesters had left a huge poster behind them in front of the Parliament. The text on the poster read: –– We declare war to the COVID-19 lie –– We declare war to the obligatory vaccination in Bulgaria –– We declare war to the killer vaccines Astra Zeneca, Pfizer, Moderna, Jonson & Johnson, Jansen and Sputnik. –– We declare war to the vaccination passports/ certificates. –– We declare war to the chemtrails […] –– We want death-sentences through hanging for all the politicians – criminals. (Cf. Fig. 2)

For a country like Bulgaria, because of the cultural memories from the past, it is not a surprise that many people believe in conspiracy theories and show high suspicion to the state, to the official authorities and institutions, as well as to the traditional media. However, it is a surprise that a poster that affirms conspiracy theories and spreads hatred and threats has stayed more than a month in the center of the capital, in front of the Parliament. A well-known TV journalist has called the municipality to ask why the poster had not been removed from the scene. The answer received is that everybody has the freedom to express their opinion and that the municipality cannot remove the poster because this is a freedom of speech. This particular case raises a number of questions: Can the expression of hatred, violence, and intolerance be allowed in society in the form of freedom of speech? Should the state authorities tolerate rumors and conspiracy theories, especially when they endanger the health of individuals? These questions also prove that in the post-totalitarian countries, such as Bulgaria, there is hardly any balance in society or in the media: from the pressure exercised on journalists and reporters in the traditional press and media when they speak the truth to the lack of any regulation of

Fig. 2  The anti-vaccine poster in front of the Bulgarian parliament. (Photo: Author)

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the digital media where fake news and conspiracy theories have proliferated and have thus formed the public opinion. One explanation of the proliferation of fake news and conspiracy theories during the pandemic of COVID-19 is the necessity to reduce anxiety. According to Kapferer, the source of rumor has little importance. What must be explained in the genesis are the adherence and the ability to mobilize groups (Kapferer, 1992). The uncertainty turns out to be one of the main reasons for rumors to be sustained in society for a long time. A rumor may be partly true or totally false. While there may be some reliability and plausibility in rumors, the researchers put the accent on the fact that in most of the cases, the truth is distorted or exaggerated. Very rare are rumors that turn out to be 100% true. Thus, in the social sciences, rumors are often linked to misperception too. The latter is defined as a belief in evidently or demonstrably wrong facts. In such a way, conspiracy theories, as well as rumors, arise in moments when there is an emergent need for understanding. Having clear, even though wrong, explanations for events and phenomena turns out to be more important for individuals and societies than sustaining uncertainty in looking for the truth. If after the two World Wars rumors and conspiracy theories have been spread by word of mouth, from person to person, and sometimes even with the help of the official media, after the 1990s of the twentieth century, rumors have become inseparable part of the online social networking. This is why Kapferer (1992) as early as in the beginning of the 1990s puts the accent on the mobilization of communities by means of rumors. Other scholars, too, claim that the evolution of rumors is from person to person, to rumor chains, and finally to rumor communities (Edy & Rasley-­ Baird, 2016). The Internet and the social networks provide nowadays the possibility for everyone to equally participate in the process of communication and to actively express their opinions or to share the opinions of others. Thus, varieties of social groups can be created, including such that maintain rumors and spread fake news and conspiracy theories. In other words, the phenomenon of spreading fake news and rumors is nowadays closely linked to the development of technologies and the appearance of the digital media. All these examples from Bulgaria prove that in a democratic society, there should be a balance between the individual rights and freedoms, including the freedom of speech, on the one side, and the regulation of the media, on the other. There is an urgent need of a critical research in the digital media and their importance for the formation of public opinion. Moreover, it is obvious that for the existence of citizens’ participative democracy, media education becomes increasingly important.

3 Conclusion The main belief in this chapter is that cultural values are deeply embedded in the collective consciousness and that all major political and social processes in a given country are underlined by them. The search for truths and the verification of truths in the media are determined not only by universal professional standards but also by

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the main values rooted in the particular culture. This is why the study in the freedom of speech in the mediatized postmodern world requires an application of a number of different interdisciplinary approaches that provide a broad platform for the discussion in the field of media studies, law and political science, psychology, sociology, philosophy, and cultural studies. The research shows that together with the political and law systems, the main prerequisites for the freedom of speech are the social values. The latter are also responsible for the construction of different cultural and political models. This fact is visible in the report of the Reporters Without Borders (RSF) where Bulgaria has been placed 112th in the World Press Freedom Index. In Bulgaria, there is a huge paradox: while the traditional media, and especially the press, are under the strong influence of business groups and political parties, in the digital media, there is practically no regulation of speech. Thus, during the pandemic of COVID-19, fake news, conspiracy theories, and rumors have been widely spread. In such a way, it is obvious that in the post-totalitarian country, there is practically no balance between individual rights and freedoms, on the one hand, and media regulation, on the other. The research also shows that societies with high individualism, such as Norway, Finland, and Sweden, have been ranked at the top positions in the World Press Freedom Index, while family- and group-oriented cultures, such as Italy, Greece, and especially Bulgaria, have much lower positions. Thus, countries exhibiting stronger collectivism have to cope with much bigger challenges in relation to the freedom of speech. The spreading of rumors, conspiracy theories, and fake news in Bulgaria is predetermined, too, by the cultural memories from the historical past, when media had become the major tool of the socialist propaganda and even of the misinformation of the population. Thus, democracy in the digital media is a twofold process: on the one hand, the digital and social media create various opportunities for participation of citizens in the democratic decision-making; on the other hand, they can become a fertile ground for negative phenomena and a platform for spreading fake news, rumors, conspiracy theories, aggression, and intolerance in society. This fact also underlines the importance of media laws, media regulation, and media education in the postmodern world.

References Angelova, R. (2003). The values of the Bulgarians. Retrieved June 1, 2022, from https://alpharesearch.bg/post/672-­cennostite-­na-­bulgarite.html Batkin, J. M. (2004). Digital speech and democratic culture: A theory of freedom of expression for the information society. New York University Law Review, 79(1), 1–58. Busselle, R., & Bilandzic, H. (2009). Measuring narrative engagement. Media Psychology, 12(4), 321–347. Bеnedict, R. (2005 [1946]). The chrysanthemum and the sword. Patterns of Japanese culture. Houghton Mifflin Harcourt.

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Edy, J. A., & Rasley-Baird, E. E. (2016). Rumour communities. The social dimensions of internet political misperceptions. Social Science Quaterly, 97(3). https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12309 Fischer, F. (2009). Democracy & expertise. Reorienting policy inquiry. Oxford University Press. Hurley, S. (2004). Imitation, media violence and freedom of speech. Philosophical Studies, 117, 165–218. Inglehard, R., & Welzel, C. (2015). Modernization, cultural change and democracy: The human development sequence. Cambridge University Press. Josey, C. S. (2010). Hate speech and identity. An analysis of neo racism and the indexing of identity. Discourse and Society, 21(1), 27–39. Kapferer, N. (1992, July–August). How rumors are born. Society, 53–60. Kroeber, A. L. (1952). The nature of culture. University of Chicago Press. Lebovic, S. (2016). Free speech and unfree news: The paradox of press freedom in America. Harvard University Press. Noelle-Neumann, E. (1974). The spiral of silence. A theory of public opinion. Journal of Communication, 24(2), 43–51. Pew Research Center. (2018). Eastern and Western Europeans differ on importance of religion, views of minorities and key social. RSF. (2021). World Press Freedom Index. Retrieved June 6, 2022, from https://rsf.org/en/ world-­press-­freedom-­index Valentini, C. (2008). Political communication in international settings. The case of the European Union. Journal of International Communication, 14(2), 102–116. Van Dijk, T. A. (2016). Elite discourse and racism. Sage Publications.

The Relationship Between Participatory Democracy and Digitalization in Europe: Is There an East-West Divide? Loredana Maria Simionov, Ramona Ţigănaşu, and Gabriela Carmen Pascariu

1 Introduction Although it is common knowledge that democracy processes and functions are being deeply altered by digitalization, it is highly challenging to have a clear picture of the effects that the digital world has on politics and society, considering the galloping speed with which these new technological tools evolve (BER, 2020); these transformations take place at a higher rate than scholars’ abilities to assess them or than policymakers’ capacities to integrate them into existing institutional designs. Moreover, from the various global risks and political threats (culminating with the terrorist attacks, refugees’ crisis, war in Ukraine) to digitalization and the shifts induced by the Fourth Industrial Revolution (the augmentation of social media and virtual reality, the rise of blockchain technology and cryptocurrencies, the fusion of advances in artificial intelligence (AI), robotics, the Internet of Things (IoT), etc.) (Mazilu, 2018), as well as the unprecedented challenges brought by the COVID-19 pandemics, the world seems to be reshaped by new forces, which irreversibly alter its inner fabric, in all its dimensions: sociologically, economically, and politically. Whether the democracy’s boundaries have been reassessed or, perhaps, our way of perceiving it has readjusted, or both, the very foundation and pillars of democracy seem to be transfigured. In this regard, it becomes clear more than ever that in the present society, understanding democracy is no longer an attribute for the political sciences alone. As creative destruction advances, with its digitalization gales, altering the way trust is formed; creating new elites, while eroding the old ones; and reshaping the media landscape (Nielsen & Fletcher, 2020), thus affecting the way information is being born and vehiculated, it became clear that an in-depth analysis L. M. Simionov (*) · R. Ţigănaşu · G. C. Pascariu Alexandru Ioan Cuza University of Iasi, Centre for European Studies, Iasi, Romania e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Rouet, T. Côme (eds.), Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20943-7_7

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of democracy can only be achieved by a systemic perspective, which connects political, economic, sociological, and technological dimensions. As a consequence, by carrying the footprint of these mutations, democracy has been warped, some voices acclaiming that it has reached the realms of a crisis (Mortimer, 2019), as by more than one measure (GSoD, 2019; EIU, 2020) democracy around the world is declining, with the backsliding taking place in some of the most mature democracies in the world. “Democracy is not in the best health. In the past decade, the global transition from authoritarian to democratic forms of government has stalled, imposed in many cases reversed”.1 The threats brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic acted as an x-ray examination test for democracy, revealing the reliability of its inner architecture, strengths/weaknesses, resilience capabilities, and morphing structures. Overall, the accelerated digitalization within the Coronavirus context is a non-reversible process which brought about specific shifts that will transform society long after the pandemic, having both benefits and exacerbating risks (especially those related to digital inequalities). In this context, the role of information technologies became overwhelming, highlighting that its largescale implementation requires a favorable legislative framework, adequate resources, and a supportive government. Under these considerations, we have identified as a research niche worthy of further investigation the extent to which the European Union (EU) democracies have the levers to adapt to changes caused by digitalization and thus to foster e-democracy (especially e-participation). In this regard, our research combines a set of factors that define the participatory democracy and governance (including the economic component as well) in association with digitalization, to respond to the following challenges: How open are European democracies to absorb issues related to digitalization? How are the historical past and the way of governing reflected on the integration to the Digital Single Market, especially in the case of Central and Eastern European countries? How will the European citizens be affected by the digitalization process? Should the measures that need to be implemented in the direction of digitalization be taken differently, depending on their territorial specificity? Generally, in order to address the above questions, our chapter aims at assessing the conditionalities between participatory democracy and digitalization within EU’s member states. More specifically, the research objective of the chapter is to emphasize the interdependencies between governance, democracy, and digitalization from the perspective of the East-West structural differentiations dynamics. The chapter is structured as follows: the first two sections of the chapter provide the theoretical framework, concepts, and instruments of analysis, by dwelling upon the relations between governance, democracy, and digitalization; the third section encompasses the research design and employed methodology, followed by a detailed discussion of the preliminary results. The last part of the chapter draws the main conclusions and implications of the findings, including a normative stance by outlining specific policy recommendations for enhanced democratic participation and digital convergence at European level.

 Cf. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2022/global-expansion-authoritarian-rule

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2 The Participatory Democracy-Digitalization-Development Nexus: Conceptualization and Theoretical Framework The main concepts and instruments of analysis on which the current research operates revolve around the participatory democracy-digitalization-development nexus. In this regard, the analysis builds upon the studies in literature that assess the relations between governance (democracy), development, and digitalization. Overall, there is a generous body of literature that addresses the three key concepts or the relations between some of them, as follows: participatory democracy and trust (Flinders, 2021; Offe, 2021; Sztompka, 1997), democracy and digitalization (Dermody & Hanmerlloyd, 2005; Kann, 2005; Flinders, 2021), (democratic) institutions and development (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; North, 1990, 1991), digitalisation and development (Bukht & Heeks, 2017) and democracy and development (Tapscott & Agnew, 1999). However, when it comes to the trilateral nexus, the scholarship lacks consistent analyses that focus on three dimensions at once: participatory democracy, digitalization and development. As such, we have identified a niche in literature in terms of focusing on the relation between participatory democracy, digitalization, and (economic) development in European context. As such, through its scope and objective, our chapter will bring an added value to the field, in terms of both theory (by investigating the correlations between participative democracy, digitalization, and development) and context (by elaborating a thorough study at European level). When it comes to the context, digitalization is by far a key priority on EU’s agenda, considering that “to make Europe greener and more digital are the twin challenges for our generation, and our success in meeting them will define our future” (European Commission, 2022a). Building upon the principle of subsidiarity, EU’s digital agenda has over two decades of integrating and developing digital convergence in Europe. Similarly, the EU also focuses greatly on participatory democracy, especially in the background of criticism of its democratic deficit. In this regard, the EU has instituted a specialized center within the European Commission that deals with issues related to participation, namely, the Competence Centre on Participatory and Deliberative Democracy (CCPDD).

2.1 Participatory Democracy Tony Blair defined participatory democracy as a vital tool that “can create efficient, effective and popular solutions to policy challenges presented by new digital technologies. Governance institutions use methods of participatory democracy to shape policy on digitalization, engaging people collaboratively in the decision-making that affects their lives” (Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2018). Along these lines, we can conclude that participatory democracy can be fostered and enhanced by the quality of institutions with trust (in institutions); culture change (East-West

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different historical past); openness to the absorption of new technologies; or strategic vision on long short and medium term being the main factors to be considered in enhanced participation and active engagement. When it comes to the EU, the latest surveys on Eurostat (2022a) in terms of active participation, voter’s turnout, or trust in institutions point out to the major differences among member states in terms of active participation in civil society with a clear identification of a West-East divide. The most active civil socieies were identified in Western countries like Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Finland, Luxembourg, or Germany (all registering scores above 15%) and having most of Eastern European countries scoring less than 5%, with the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Cyprus (Eurostat, 2022a). Regarding European citizens’ engagement in influencing political decision-making (having as units EU27) (Eurostat, 2022b), the data shows once more an East-West division, with Western countries like Ireland, France, or the United Kingdom among the most engaged, whereas Cyprus, Hungary, or Greece being the least active. However, the voters’ turnout at European Parliament elections (Eurostat, 2022c) is generally lower than national elections’ participation and does not display a clear East-West divide. The voters’ turnout indicator is usually used as a proxy for democratic legitimacy, and in this regard, across the EU, it averaged 50.7% in the 2019 European Parliament elections, ranging from highs of nearly 90% in Belgium and Luxembourg down to less than 25% in Slovakia (Eurostat, 2022c). Apart from active civil society and voters’ turnout, another important proxy for democratic legitimacy is trust. In this regard, the creed of democracy appears to be facing a current crisis of trust in public figures and formal institutions (EIU, 2020; BER, 2020; GSoD, 2019). In contrast, trust in informal institutions is growing with public opinions being rather shaped by obscure individuals (influencers), commercial interests, or platform owners. The scholars and experts alike pondered about the root causes of these worrisome trends in a consistent body of literature, reports, and op-eds, identifying as the most significant the continued erosion of trust in government and elected officials (EIU, 2020; Arpino & Obydenkova, 2020; BER, 2020; GSoD, 2019; Uslaner, 2018; Zmerli & Van der Meer, 2017; Abramson, 2017). Furthermore, “social media have enormously greater power to amplify certain voices and to be weaponized by forces hostile to democracy which have led, in turn, to calls for the government to regulate internet platforms in order to preserve democratic discourse itself” (Fukuyama, 2020). Within this context of declining trust, coupled with a lack of participation, the question that arises is whether digitalization could represent a solution? Many democracies around the world have raised concerns regarding the widening gaps between political elites, and their citizens have caused concern in many democratic states. The literature indicates that a more deliberative form of democracy, aided by technological advances, could help alleviate such concerns (Berg & Hofmann, 2021; Boelman et al., 2017). In this regard, the internet offers various possibilities to take part in different debates and discussions – including political ones – while municipalities and states now offer forums where citizens can inform themselves and exchange their views. Such increased transparency could lead to an enhanced

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interest and credibility and, thus, to an increased public participation. However, the main question that still stands is whether the digital debate can reach everyone? At EU level, the internet access of households has met a remarkable evolution since 2016, especially in the Eastern countries of the EU, so that in 2021, most of EU member states register high rates, most of them above 90% (Eurostat, 2022d). However, despite having high rates of internet access, there are still various digital disparities at EU level to be considered, especially in terms of e-participation.

2.2 Digitalization The digitalization of democratic processes has an obvious impact on the way citizens interact with their government and their public institutions by bridging the gap between these institutions and society, thus bringing decisions closer to the people they affect. This could definitely redefine the relationship between citizens and the state and spark shifts toward enhanced political participation. In other words, digital democracy generates participation itself, but there needs to be an initial spark of interest to create a reciprocal cycle while also considering specific factors like trust in institutions or cultural/historical aspects – the East-West divide. Overall, digital democracy became a buzzword, a very discussed but rather fuzzy concept lacking a clear definition. Nevertheless, the concept, also referred to as electronic democracy or e-democracy (European Commission, 2022b), is “viral,” and many scholars from various fields, but especially from political science, focus their studies on understanding the digitalization of classical processes within democracies, thus analyzing processes of e-governance (the digitalized governance process), e-participation (the digitalization of how we interact with democracy), or the I-Voting (electronic voting process) (Council of Europe, 2021; Dijk, 2012). Without a doubt, it is highly challenging to measure the effects of digitalization on politics and society, given the speed with which new technological tools are evolving (BER, 2020) leading to a progressive transformation of social networks into a main tool in electoral processes. For instance, the Twiplomacy Study (2018) counted on Twitter 187 world leaders with 951 accounts (372 personal accounts and 579 institutional accounts) with over 400 million followers. On Facebook, there were profiles of heads of government and foreign ministers from 179 countries, representing 93% of all United Nations (UN) member states, while on Instagram, 81% of all UN member states have created an account, on which they post pictures and share Instagram stories on a daily basis. Although difficult to assess, the impact of digitalization on participation is undeniable (European Parliament, 2020). However, the global rise of political advertising on social networks enhances e-participation and transparency, although it has also increased the risks of misinformation and polarization. In this regard, like any other process, e-participation entails both advantages and disadvantages. Most contributions to the conceptualization of digital democracy are keen on analyzing the ongoing transformation of democratic government. As such, while some studies focus on the de-institutionalizing

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aspects of this change, other approaches center on the experimental practices that may derive from new or modified democratic institutions (Berg & Hofmann, 2021). According to the first perspective, digitalization’s tools are portrayed mostly negatively, as threats to the liberal democracies around the world, thus reflecting upon ways of mitigating the fragmentation and hybridization of the public sphere; the concept of liquid democracy (too much participation) which could lead, in turn, to voter fatigue; (De Blasio & Viviani, 2020; Howard, 2020; Bennett & Livingston, 2020). At the other end of the spectrum, the narratives on democratic transformation perceive digital democracy as an “experimental setting for the active reform of existing representative institutions” (Berg & Hofmann, 2021): digital technologies and resources determine novel institutional settings with more transparent and direct decision-making processes (Deserris, 2020; Gerbaudo, 2019); with e-governance that enables more efficient management processes; with digital communication tools that strengthen the political debate, but also enhance participation through electronic voting; and with civil society prone to strive for more effective ways of holding the political elite to account or new platforms or other infrastructures that allow deeper citizens’ involvement (Bua & Bussu, 2021). Despite having contrasting views, both perspectives bring to light the fluidity of democracy, its potential for change, thus outlining new and various possibilities of shaping governance and democracy itself. Under these considerations, regardless of the perspective through which one sees digitalization’s advantages and disadvantages, the most pressing and debated challenge of e-democracy, e-governance, and e-participation consists of the fact that these processes do not reach the entire population, leading to rising digital gaps and inequalities (Durand et al., 2021; WEF, 2021; Deseriis & Vittori, 2019; Lutz, 2019; OECD, 2015). In this regard, digital democracy has not yet succeeded in removing inequalities between social groups, the Global Risk Report rating “digital inequality” as a critical short-term global threat (WEF, 2021). Bezuidenhout et al. (2017) consider that unequal access to technology is caused by three interdependent phenomena: The digital divide: considering that e-participation entails access to appropriate technologies, leaving those without it “speechless,” without voice. This divide does refer not only to individuals but also to countries and governments around the world who cannot afford the price of digitalization. The digital exclusion: the fact that some groups are systematically underrepresented (or excluded) in online political and social discourses. The digital ignorance: digital technology (especially social media) is responsible for spreading false news and misinformation and creating polarizing political opinions in political decision-makers. Furthermore, building upon these general considerations on the participatory democracy-digitalization-development nexus, the next sections of the chapter go further to investigate more closely the specific interconditionalities between institutions, digitalization, development, and participatory democracy, thus analyzing how they influence each other and whether there is an East-West digital divide in Europe.

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3 The Interconditionalities Between Institutions, Digitalization, Participatory Democracy, and Development In addressing the issues related to digitalization, the aspects that lead to the capacity of institutions to absorb new technologies, to have an environment open to innovation, allowing for medium- and long-term economic development, cannot be omitted. Thus, the relationship between institutions and development was and still is a noteworthy subject to debate on. There have been many empirical researches (Kunčič, 2014; Iammarino et al., 2019) that proved the existence of positive correlations between institutional quality and development, while other studies (Keune et  al., 2001; Dutraive, 2009; Rodríguez-Pose, 2013) reached the conclusion that territories should have a certain level of economic development in order to value appropriately the institutional matrix. In this regard, formal institutions (regulations, contracts, legal norms) and informal institutions (attitudes, values, traditions, religion, culture, social capital, trust, beliefs, behaviors, etc.) have to work together in a pro-efficient matrix in order to generate spillover effects (Wang et al., 2018; Fuentelsaz et al., 2019; Kapas, 2020; Godlewska, 2021). The interaction thesis of Pejovich (1999) highlights that if the changes in formal institutions correspond to the informal ones, their connection will lead to a cut of transaction costs, thus contributing to development. Considering this mutual interconditioning between formal and informal institutions, the analysis of development gaps is stronger when motivations and constraints such as preferences and systems of values are taken into consideration as an endogenous factor; moreover, formal institutions are the substance that gives strength and continuity or urges the change of informal institutions (Thelen & Conran, 2016; Samadi & Alipourian, 2021). The significance of “institutional innovation” concept is relevant as it associates elements without which the digitalization process cannot be put into practice: the ability to cope with change, share of knowledge, adaptability, openness to the assimilation of new technologies and to innovative processes, good cooperation between individuals, and efficient coordination of public policies (Gaube & Sedlacek, 2009; Komninos, 2016; Ţigănaşu et al., 2019). All these create the prerequisites for what development policies and strategies at EU level stipulate, namely, closeness to the citizen for generating inclusive, sustainable, and smart development. However, digitalization could also have negative effects, deepening inequalities, or, if we refer to accelerated digitalization, this could be considered a process of exogenous institutional disruption, through the conflict between the institutions that block digitalization and those that generate the need for institutional innovation (new laws, new contracts, new behaviors, practices, values). In relation to this, the actors can act in the process of institutional work for creating, maintaining, or disrupting the existing institutional system (Lawrence et al., 2011). Thus, a special role is given, on the one hand, to the institutions that govern the actions and, on the other hand, to the individuals that shape the institutions. Another key aspect in assessing digital disparities is represented by the institutional milieu, whose smart specialization is paying increasing attention, because it includes drivers, norms, values, and

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behavioral patterns based on which learning territories, social networks, and knowledge could enhance the assimilation of innovation. Although there is a relatively generous literature on the relationships established between the mentioned components (Tomor et al., 2019; Blanck & Ribeiro, 2021; Jiang, 2021; Scholl, 2021), the institutional milieu influence on smart governance and on digitalization is a topic that requires special attention, especially among researchers in Eastern Europe, where there is a shortage of such analyses. Similarly, regarding the digitalizationdevelopment relationship, there are studies in literature (Carlsson, 2004; Huang, 2020; Pyankova, 2020; Roy & Khan, 2021), but putting the digitalization approach in association with formal and informal institutions has to be the subject of scientific concerns in the European space. Although over time at EU level a set of regulations and directives has been developed (Digital Agenda, 2010; Digital Single Market Strategy, 2015; Digital Services Act, 2019; Digital Markets Act, 2020), in order to provide a better access to digital goods and services, and to transform digitalization into a strategic goal and a horizontal objective of integration, there are obvious disparities between member states, the Eastern ones being, according to the Digital Economy and Society Index (2020), on the last places in terms of integration of digital technologies in different sectors. In this context, there is a need to emphasize the importance of digitalization in the development process and to ensure the way forward through smart development; at the same time, it is essential to provide some measures in order to overcome the existing gaps between the European countries in terms of digitalization. In order to move to a digital economy, it is necessary to go through several stages, which involve, among others, the coordination of public policies, configurations related to digital transformation and institutional change, the existence of ICT specialists to provide computer programs, and expertise in all fields of activity: education, health, business environment, public administration, etc. (Lanzara, 2009; Haefner & Sternberg, 2020). In all this, a significant contribution has the citizens’ involvement in the decision-making process, the public debates representing a key landmark of the societies with a solid democracy. In view of this goal, the V-Dem Institute annually measures the index of participatory democracy, which captures the relationship between citizens, government, local institutions, and non-governmental organizations. The higher the scores of the countries, the higher the level of participatory democracy. If we take a look at the participatory democracy index in Europe, in Fig. 1, it is highlighted that over time (1900–2020), there has been a convergence, especially after 1990, when most of the Eastern states gained their independence by the fall of the communist regimes, which were based on dictatorship and restriction of individual freedoms. If, after the Second World War, Europe was fragmented, with the implementation of the ideas promoted by Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, it was possible to rethink the European reconstruction by establishing the European Economic Community, through the Treaty of Rome (1957), which become the EU today. This construct means, in fact, a guarantee of participatory democracy, respect for the rights and freedoms of the citizens of the member states, as well as financial support for their development. Financial support is very relevant on the background

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of the current requirements of the European single market. In recent years, the emphasis has been on the large-scale digitalization of public services, which can be achieved, mostly, thanks to European funds, whose central objective is to ensure cohesion by reducing the development gaps between states. The process of accession to the EU has also played an overwhelming role in shaping and strengthening democratic systems. States were motivated to make consistent efforts to meet the required criteria, based on a solid democracy and the principles of the free market. With the economic progress, the opening of the labor markets, and the expansion of opportunities, the premises for a higher involvement of the citizens in society have been built, the EU being guided by the principle of subsidiarity. At the same time, the World Bank has taken into account in its statistics on the quality of governance an indicator of voice and accountability, since 1996, which designates the extent to which the population of a country participates in the election of the government and has freedom of expression and of association and the media is free. These may be the reasons why the number of European countries with a high participatory democracy has increased significantly in recent decades, enhancing the partnerships between citizens, public institutions, business environment, and government. In essence, this is based on coordination measures to ensure economic and social cohesion, which can be achieved through a fruitful dialogue, the adoption of action plans to implement proper development policies, the constant evaluation of results, and adaptation to various contexts. To the extent that there is a very close collaboration between the mentioned actors, both the trust in the institutions and the interpersonal trust are also increased, which can facilitate the openness to innovation and new technologies and their easier absorption. In addition to the participatory democracy index, Fig. 2 shows the dynamics of civil liberties, political freedoms, freedom of expression, the participation of civil society in the decisionmaking process, as well as the division of power index. The latter index outlines the existence of local government and regional government, democratically elected and having a major role in territorial administration. All these components complete the picture of a functional democracy, in the center of which is the citizen. It is observed, therefore, that after a sharp collapse of the abovementioned freedoms during the Second World War, gradually, the European reconstruction took place, noting that especially after the 1990s, states have constantly improved their parameters related to freedoms. Moreover, starting with the successive waves of enlargement to the East, the countries that knew the burden of communism exceeded their initial conditions by participating in the democratic process, the transition not being an easy task. The reset of the governance systems meant a redefinition of the functioning principles of the economy, directed toward the free market. Analyzing the values of the indexes, on a scale from 0 to 1, where 1 designates the existence of a fully democratic environment, with well-defined rights and obligations for citizens and governing structures, their fragility is highlighted in 1957, when the European Economic Community was established. Thus, the fluctuation margins of the participatory democracy index were between 0.29 and 0.36, with a European average of 0.32, well below the performance coefficient, this reaching in 1990 an average of 0.53, with limits between 0.49 and 0.57. After the integration of the ten

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Central and Eastern European states in the EU, although this index has undergone positive changes, it should be noted that these were not significant, reaching, in 2020, an average of 0.58, with a minimum of 0.54 and a maximum of 0.63, this being explained by the systemic vulnerabilities that some of the former communist states still face. Also, since 1990, there has been a marked improvement in the freedom of expression index, the civil liberties index, and the political liberties index, all with an average of over 0.9. Thus, Europe has undergone profound changes over the last century, its position in the economic hierarchy being influenced both by the ability of states to manage internal multidimensional issues and by the capacity to adopt and implement measures to respond adequately to external challenges. Based on these specifications, in the next section, we aim to empirically emphasize how participatory democracy is linked with aspects related to digitalization and whether there is an East-West division in this direction in Europe.

4 Is There an East-West Division in Terms of Participatory Democracy and Digitalization? Recently, the EU has focused on providing tools to facilitate inclusive, sustainable, and smart development. To achieve this, the member states are working hard in every sector of the economy. In addition to the involvement of citizens in the decision-making process, the institutional quality has a special importance. Considering these aspects, it is interesting to raise some challenges: How open are European economies to absorb issues related to digitalization? How are the historical past and the way of governing reflected on the integration to the Digital Single Market, especially in the case of Central and Eastern European countries? Will the digital economy allow a significant recovery of the development gaps between EU countries or is there a possibility of deepening social inequalities even further? How will the European citizens be affected by the digitalization process? Should the measures that need to be implemented in the direction of digitalization be taken differently, depending on the territorial specificity? In the context in which there are currently more and more intense debates about the incorporation of digitalization in all fields of activity, it is necessary to identify, on the one hand, what could be the obstacles that stand in the way of its development and what are the medium- and long-term implications, on the other hand. The positive impact of digitalization should not be underestimated, but, at the same time, should not neglect the aspect that leads to inequalities, which can be deepened, if we refer to the economic and social differences between territories. There are regions or countries where financial and human resources and infrastructure allow the rapid absorption of new technologies, while in the case of those who do not have such comparative advantages, alignment with the requirements of the twenty-first century could disadvantage the local population. Rural communities in

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less developed countries of the EU may face such problems, affecting their access to information, education, health services, involvement in public administration issues, and decision-making. In order to reflect the way in which a set of factors that define the economic component, governance, and participatory democracy is associated with digital intensity in EU member states, and to capture if there is a division between the East and West in terms of digitalization (digital disruption), we resorted to regression and correlation analysis, Euclidean distance, KMO, and Bartlett’s test. The data needed for our analysis were collected from several sources: Eurostat, World Bank (World Governance Indicators), World Economic Forum, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Economist Intelligence Unit, Fraser Institute, V-Dem Institute, etc.; for 2020, the study sample consisted of the 27 EU states and the United Kingdom (N  =  28). Thus, Table  1 shows the Pearson regression coefficients, according to which it is found that in terms of democracy, the strongest links were obtained between quality of democracy and government effectiveness (0.903), respectively, quality of democracy and voice and accountability (0.901), these capturing the relevance of good governance and citizen involvement in the decision-making process. The stronger they are, the stronger democracy is. Concerning the technology adoption, this establishes close connections, with values above 0.800, with rule of law (0.882), regulatory quality (0.846), government effectiveness (0.825), control of corruption (0.821), voice and accountability (0.814), quality of democracy (0.809), and government integrity (0.803). These estimates highlight that if a state intends to absorb new technologies at a fast pace, it needs sound regulations, compliance with laws and property rights, a low level of corruption, integrity and transparency of decision-making, and good governance, based on social dialogue. Relevant to the central theme of this research are also other indicators that we will refer to below. Thus, at the level of the countries included in our analysis, it was found that the variable related to adaptation and innovation is most influenced by government effectiveness (0.774); e-citizenship indicator is significantly shaped by Table 1  Indices that define strong democratic systems – European Union dynamics (1900–2020) Civil liberties index Civil liberties index (CI) Civil society participation index Civil society participation index (CI) Division of power index Freedom of expression index Freedom of expression index (CI) Participatory democracy index Participatory democracy index (CI) Political liberties index Political liberties index (CI)

1957 0.62 0.59–0.66 0.54 0.44–0.64 0.47 0.58 0.52–0.63 0.32 0.29–0.36 0.58 0.54–0.62

Source: From V-Dem Institute data (2021)

1990 0.92 0.9–0.95 0.84 0.72–0.93 0.64 0.94 0.89–0.96 0.53 0.49–0.57 0.93 0.90–0.96

2020 0.91 0.89–0.94 0.86 0.73–0.94 0.77 0.90 0.84–0.94 0.58 0.54–0.63 0.91 0.87–0.94

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the rule of law (0.756), voice and accountability (0.751), technology adoption (0.750), control of corruption (0.743), and institutional quality (0.740). The government has a major role to play in supporting innovation, by directing resources to sectors with high societal potential, in the sense of registering benefits referring to the quality of life. In addition, the implementation of information technologies on a large scale creates the advantages of reducing transaction costs, saving time, ensuring transparency in the development of public policies, etc. In such circumstances, decisions are taken closer to the citizen, who has at disposal computer devices that allow to resort to various activities (e-citizenship): electronic voting, payment of taxes and duties, obtaining electronic medical prescriptions or services, online consulting, and others. But in order for all this to be put into practice, it is necessary, beforehand, that the voice of the citizen be heard, which characterizes an advanced democratic system. Therefore, if we look at the variable related to voice and accountability, it is seen that this is overwhelmingly linked with government integrity and control of corruption (a determinism of 0.915), rule of law (0.912), and quality of democracy (0.901). Institutions in a less corrupt country, where moral rules and transparency prevail, build strong relationships of trust with its citizens, sustainable smart networks, and economic development. When it comes to the integration of digital technologies in society, it is emphasized that the values of the coefficients are slightly lower compared to other variables taken into account in our analysis, which is explained by the fact that, especially in Central and Eastern European states, the trust in the legal systems also has lower rates, which implicitly influences the openness to innovation and adaptation to digital contexts. Thus, for the connection between the integration of digital technologies and the trust in the legal systems, a coefficient of 0.547 was obtained, while in association with adaptation and innovation, the coefficient is 0.567. To the extent that trust in legal systems is low, e-citizenship will also fluctuate: greater trust in institutions will lead to greater use of the computer media. In the case of the considered states, the dependency ratio between e-citizenship and the trust in legal systems is 0.561. Countries need to take steps to increase their level of trust in institutions, which contributes to the widespread support and promotion of digitalization. Moreover, an important advantage of this process is that it reduces corruption. Therefore, a very close relationship is noted between employed ICT specialists and control of corruption (0.867), on the one hand, and between employed ICT specialists and government integrity (0.866), on the other hand. Overall, analyzing the correlation matrix and the regression results (model summary and ANOVA tables), it is clear that the dependent variable referring to the quality of democracy is significantly influenced by the independent variables mentioned in Table 2 (R = 0.955; Sig. = 0.000). This means that it can be stated with a probability of over 99% that the closer the predictors record values to 1.000, the better the quality of democracy (Tables 3 and 4). For a differentiation between the EU countries regarding the quality of democracy, measured on a scale from 0 to 10, where 10 means the maximum performance, in Fig. 3, it is showed their positioning, as well as their distribution in the mentioned interval. Thus, the EU average is 7.91, most states having values between 7.00 and

Quality of democracy Quality of democracy 1.000 Government effectiveness .903 Government integrity .886 Institutional quality .750 Technology adoption .809 Trust in the legal system .601 Adaptation and innovation .631 E-citizenship .733 Voice and accountability .901 Integration of digital .755 technologies Regulatory quality .850 Rule of law .877 Control of corruption .876 Employed ICT specialists .794 (%) GDP per capita in PPS .680

Table 2  Correlations (Pearson coefficients) Government integrity .886 .886 1.000 .769 .803 .697 .655 .719 .915 .738 .893 .929 .976 .866 .689

Government effectiveness .903 1.000 .886 .695 .825 .584 .774 .737 .891 .683

.874 .935 .927 .805

.613

.544

.848 .742 .763 .782

Institutional quality .750 .695 .769 1.000 .758 .722 .532 .740 .711 .653

.663

.846 .882 .821 .716

Technology adoption .809 .825 .803 .758 1.000 .539 .742 .750 .814 .718

.419*

.705 .689 .716 .628

Trust in the legal system .601 .584 .697 .722 .539 1.000 .377 .561 .579 .547

.414*

.728 .740 .730 .638

Adaptation and innovation .631 .774 .655 .532 .742 .377 1.000 .674 .740 .567

.531

.706 .756 .743 .730

E-citizenship .733 .737 .719 .740 .750 .561 .674 1.000 .751 .687

110 L. M. Simionov et al.

.701 .754 .739 .714 .491

.862 .912 .915 .819

.669

.621

1.000 .910 .906 .846

Regulatory quality .850 .874 .893 .848 .846 .705 .728 .706 .862 .701

.640

.910 1.000 .952 .836

Rule of law .877 .935 .929 .742 .882 .689 .740 .756 .912 .754

.682

.906 .952 1.000 .867

Control of corruption .876 .927 .976 .763 .821 .716 .730 .743 .915 .739

All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed), except for *, significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Quality of democracy Government effectiveness Government integrity Institutional quality Technology adoption Trust in the legal system Adaptation and innovation E-citizenship Voice and accountability Integration of digital technologies Regulatory quality Rule of law Control of corruption Employed ICT specialists (%) GDP per capita in PPS

Integration of digital technologies .755 .683 .738 .653 .718 .547 .567 .687 .762 1.000

Voice and accountability .901 .891 .915 .711 .814 .579 .740 .751 1.000 .762

.601

.846 .836 .867 1.000

Employed ICT specialists (%) .794 .805 .866 .782 .716 .628 .638 .730 .819 .714

1.000

.621 .640 .682 .601

GDP per capita in PPS .680 .613 .689 .544 .663 .419* .414* .531 .669 .491

The Relationship Between Participatory Democracy and Digitalization... 111

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L. M. Simionov et al.

Table 3  Model summarya Model 1 ANOVAa Model 1

R .955b

Regression Residual Total

R square .913 Sum of squares 18.418 1.765 20.183

Adjusted R square .825 df 13 13 26

Std. error of the estimate .36846

Mean square 1.417 .136

F 10.436

Sig. .000b

Dependent variable: quality of democracy Predictors: (constant), employed ICT specialists (%), GDP per capita in PPS, trust in the legal system, adaptation and innovation, integration of digital technologies, e-citizenship, institutional quality, government effectiveness, technology adoption, voice and accountability, regulatory quality, control of corruption, rule of law Source: Authors’ estimates a

b

Table 4  KMO and Bartlett’s testa Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy Bartlett’s test of sphericity Approx. chi-square df Sig.

.903 436.583 91 .000

Based on correlations Source: Authors’ estimates

a

8.00, and four countries register values below 7.00 (Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania). At the other end of the scale, with democracy levels above 9.00, are Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Sweden. At the same time, it is interesting whether the level of development of a state is associated with a higher quality of democracy. To better reflect this, the ranking of countries in this direction is also presented, and it is pointed out that most countries in the sample have a GDP per capita between 50 and 100 (16 states), a GDP per capita >100 being found in 10 countries (Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Finland, France, Malta, Sweden, and the United Kingdom), Ireland has a GDP per capita >150, and Luxembourg has the highest GDP per capita (>250). The mean in terms of GDP per capita is 101.96. According to the correlations in Table 1, the determinism between the quality of democracy and GDP per capita is 0.680, which shows that the higher the degree of prosperity of a state, the more the premises for the functioning of a solid democracy are created (Fig. 4). The opening of economies to digital technologies can be influenced, therefore, by a multitude of factors, which refer especially to the democratic, institutional, and macroeconomic aspects, the endowment with financial and human resources, etc. If we look at the next figure, it is seen the positioning of the countries subject to analysis in terms of institutional quality, integration of digital technologies, and employed ICT specialists, with the obvious differentiation between the Western and Eastern Europe. However, among the integrated states after 2004, Estonia stands out in the

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Code 10,00

9,00

9,00

8,00

8,00

7,00

7,00

6,00

6,00 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0

10,00

Quality of democracy

Quality of democracy

AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK

Frequency Code 300,00

250,00

250,00

200,00

200,00

150,00

150,00

100,00

100,00

50,00

50,00

8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0 8'0 0'0 8'0

300,00

GDP per capita in PPS

GDP per capita in PPS

AT BE BG CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GR HR HU IE IT LT LU LV MT NL PL PT RO SE SI SK UK

Frequency

Fig. 3  Quality of democracy in EU countries and GDP per capita in PPS. (Source: Authors’ representation using SPSS software)

group of countries with a high absorption of digitalization, surpassing countries such as France, Austria, and Germany. This is due to Estonia’s efforts to integrate IT systems to make citizens’ daily lives easier, to facilitate their collaboration with the public administration, health institutions, decision-makers, and so on. In addition, this country enjoys a high institutional quality, as well as many ICT specialists to maintain the proper functioning of a digital economy. Also, the Nordic countries

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Mean = 7,91 Std. Dev. = ,867 N = 28

Frequency

6

4

2

0

6,00

7,00

8,00

9,00

10,00

Quality of democracy

8

Mean = 101,96 Std. Dev. = 42,031 N = 28

Frequency

6

4

2

0

50,00

100,00

150,00

200,00

250,00

300,00

GDP per capita in PPS

Fig. 4  Quality of democracy in EU countries and GDP per capita in PPS – histograms. (Source: Authors’ representation using SPSS software)

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115

Fig. 5  Distribution of countries in terms of institutional quality, integration of digital technologies, and employed ICT specialists. (Source: Authors’ representation using SPSS software)

(Finland, Sweden, and Denmark) have very good scores on all components included in our research (Fig. 5). An overview of the quality of democracy in the states in the sample used highlights the clear distinction between the group of Western countries and that of Eastern countries. The systemic vulnerabilities acquired over the historical chain for many years have left their mark on the way in which governments in Eastern states of Europe have had the capacity to implement sound development policies at all levels of society, so that the gaps between them and the EU-15 diminish. In the direction of the quality of democracy, the cluster of Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg is obviously distinguished. Romania, Croatia, Hungary, Poland, and Bulgaria have a significant deviation from this cluster (Fig. 6). In order to capture the distance between countries in terms of quality of democracy and integration of digital technology, in Tables 5 and 6, the Euclidean distance

116

L. M. Simionov et al. Scatterplot Dependent Variable: Quality of democracy

Quality of democracy

10,00

9,00

DE UK

MT

8,00 GR

RO

IT

CZ LT

DK FI

LU

NL

AT FR EE BE

SK LV

BG

7,00

SI

ES PT

SE IE

HR

HU PL

6,00 -3

-2

-1

0

1

2

Regression Standardized Predicted Value

Fig. 6  Quality of democracy in EU countries. (Source: Authors’ representation using SPSS software)

is emphasized, on a scale from 0 to 1, where lower values mean a closer neighborhood (immediate proximity) and higher values mean the existence of differences in the direction of the two variables considered. Analyzing the estimates for quality of democracy, it stands out that, in essence, the states of the West and North of the EU show a convergence, with relatively similar scores, the distances between them not being great, while their reporting to the countries of Central and Eastern European countries reflects a more obvious distance, which outlines the need for a process to recover the gaps in the quality of democracy. For instance, if Finland is taken into account, it is observed that it has the longest distances from Romania (0.952), Poland (0.907), Croatia (0.924), and Hungary (0.903) and the nearest neighbors are Ireland (0.003), Denmark (0.010), Sweden (0.048), and the Netherlands (0.083). Instead, if we look at the Eastern European states, they have values that are relatively close to themselves, which means that the democratic foundations are quite similar. Croatia, the last country integrated in the EU, in 2013, has Sweden at the opposite pole (0.972) and Poland (0.017) in the immediate vicinity. In terms of digital technology integration, it is found that in the case of Estonia, the distances from the Western countries are not so great (e.g., reported to Ireland, the distance is 0.589, to Finland, it is 0.456, to the Netherlands is 0.430), compared to the other new EU member states. The countries that have a close level of integration of digital technology with Estonia are Spain (0.001), Slovenia and Croatia (both with 0.004), Portugal (0.005), Austria (0.010), France (0.016), and Germany (0.028). The challenge to highlight the conditionalities between participatory democracy, some economic, governance factors, and digitalization, from the perspective of the East-West structural differentiations dynamics, pointed out the gap in this direction,

.403

.107

.472

.241

.207

.321

.134

.331

.059

.134

.297

.572

.328

.266

.276

.272

.179

.576

.090

.621

.386

.272

.038

.379

.079

CZ

DK

EE

FI

FR

DE

GR

HU

IE

IT

LV

LT

LU

MT .117

.248

CY

NL

PL

PT

RO

SK

SI

ES

SE

UK

.514

.814

.397

.162

.048

.186

.345

.141

.683

.317

.614

.162

.159

.169

.762

.138

.138

.569

.376

.766

.300

.755

.228

.193

.159

.210

.434

BG

.672

.972

.555

.321

.207

.028

.503

.017

.841

.476

.772

.321

.317

.328

.921

.021

.297

.728

.534

.924

.459

.914

.386

.352

.159

.369

.593

HR

Source: Authors’ estimates

.303

.603

.186

.048

.162

.397

.134

.352

.048

.052

.041

.552

.348

.072

.359

.166

.555

.090

.545

.017

.017

.369

.593

HR

.210

.434

BG

.224

BE

.224

AT

BE

AT

.321

.621

.203

.031

.145

.379

.152

.334

.490

.124

.421

.031

.034

.024

.569

.331

.055

.376

.183

.572

.107

.562

.034

.352

.193

.017

.241

CY

.286

.586

.169

.066

.179

.414

.117

.369

.455

.090

.386

.066

.069

.059

.534

.366

.090

.341

.148

.538

.072

.528

.034

.386

.228

.017

.207

CZ

.241

.059

.359

.593

.707

.941

.410

.897

.072

.438

.141

.593

.597

.586

.007

.893

.617

.186

.379

.010

.455

.528

.562

.914

.755

.545

.321

DK

.214

.514

.097

.138

.252

.486

.045

.441

.383

.017

.314

.138

.141

.131

.462

.438

.162

.269

.076

.466

.455

.072

.107

.459

.300

.090

.134

EE

Table 5  Euclidean distance for quality of democracy FR

DE

GR HU IE

IT

LV

LT

LU

MT NL

PL

PT

RO

SI

ES

.252 .138 .055 .376 .652 .248 .345 .355 .352 .100 .197 .169 .655 .169 .700

SE

.169

.655

.169

.197

.100

.352

.355

.345

.248

.652

.376

.055

.138

.252

.214

.241

.286

.321

.672

.514

.303

.079

UK

.466 .352 .117 .300

.417

.234 .652

.114 .348 .766 .348 .234

.114

.300

.117

.352

.466

.234 .348 .583 1.000 .700

.297 .183 .052 .469

.190 .303 .538 .955

.634 .521 .286 .131

.269 .155 .079 .497

.566 .452 .217 .200

.114 .000 .234 .652

.110 .003 .238 .655

.121 .007 .228 .645

.714 .600 .366 .052

.186 .300 .534 .952

.090 .024 .259 .676

.521 .407 .172 .245

.328 .214 .021 .438

.717 .603 .369 .048

.252 .138 .097 .514

.707 .593 .359 .059

.179 .066 .169 .586

.145 .031 .203 .621

.207 .321 .555 .972

.048 .162 .397 .814

.162 .048 .186 .603

.386 .272 .038 .379

SK

.048 .438 .245 .676 .952 .052 .645 .655 .652 .200 .497 .131 .955 .469 1.000 .766 .652 .417

.369 .021 .172 .259 .534 .366 .228 .238 .234 .217 .079 .286 .538 .052 .583

.603 .214 .407 .024 .300 .600 .007 .003 .000 .452 .155 .521 .303 .183 .348

.717 .328 .521 .090 .186 .714 .121 .110 .114 .566 .269 .634 .190 .297 .234

.952 .562 .755 .324 .048 .948 .355 .345 .348 .800 .503 .869 .045 .531

.531

.486 .045

.824 .338 .869

.421 .031 .224 .207 .483 .417 .176 .186 .183 .269 .028 .338 .486

.907 .517 .710 .279 .003 .903 .310 .300 .303 .755 .459 .824

.366 .459 .028 .503

.297 .069 .755 .269 .800

.083 .307 .114 .545 .821 .079 .514 .524 .521 .069 .366

.448 .059 .252 .179 .455 .445 .148 .159 .155 .297

.152 .238 .045 .476 .752 .148 .445 .455 .452

.452 .155 .521 .303 .183 .348

.003 .455 .159 .524 .300 .186 .345

.010 .007 .445 .148 .514 .310 .176 .355

.603 .214 .407 .024 .300 .600 .007 .003

.607 .217 .410 .021 .297 .603 .010

.593 .603 .600 .148 .445 .079 .903 .417 .948

.900 .307 .297 .300 .752 .455 .821 .003 .483 .048

.597 .207 .400 .031 .307 .593

.003 .386 .193 .624 .900

.903 .514 .707 .276

.276 .624 .031 .021 .024 .476 .179 .545 .279 .207 .324

.431 .707 .193 .400 .410 .407 .045 .252 .114 .710 .224 .755

.193 .238 .514 .386 .207 .217 .214 .238 .059 .307 .517 .031 .562

.628 .238 .431

.197 .193

.390

.390 .197 .628 .903 .003 .597 .607 .603 .152 .448 .083 .907 .421 .952

.466 .076 .269 .162 .438 .462 .131 .141 .138 .314 .017 .383 .441 .045 .486

.010 .379 .186 .617 .893 .007 .586 .597 .593 .141 .438 .072 .897 .410 .941

.538 .148 .341 .090 .366 .534 .059 .069 .066 .386 .090 .455 .369 .117 .414

.572 .183 .376 .055 .331 .569 .024 .034 .031 .421 .124 .490 .334 .152 .379

.924 .534 .728 .297 .021 .921 .328 .317 .321 .772 .476 .841 .017 .503 .028

.766 .376 .569 .138 .138 .762 .169 .159 .162 .614 .317 .683 .141 .345 .186

.555 .166 .359 .072 .348 .552 .041 .052 .048 .403 .107 .472 .352 .134 .397

.331 .059 .134 .297 .572 .328 .266 .276 .272 .179 .117 .248 .576 .090 .621

FI

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AT BE BG .448 .402 .448 .850 .402 .850 .014 .434 .416 .108 .556 .294 .159 .289 .560 .431 .018 .832 .010 .439 .411 .466 .018 .868 .026 .423 .427 .019 .467 .383 .219 .667 .183 .270 .718 .132 .598 .150 1.000 .165 .613 .237 .226 .674 .176 .156 .292 .558 .042 .491 .359 .254 .194 .656 .440 .009 .841 .253 .702 .148 .004 .444 .406 .276 .725 .125 .142 .590 .259 .006 .442 .408 .011 .438 .412 .378 .071 .779 .237 .212 .638

HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE GR HU IE .014 .108 .159 .431 .010 .466 .026 .019 .219 .270 .598 .434 .556 .289 .018 .439 .018 .423 .467 .667 .718 .150 .416 .294 .560 .832 .411 .868 .427 .383 .183 .132 1.000 .122 .145 .417 .004 .452 .011 .033 .233 .284 .584 .122 .267 .538 .117 .574 .133 .089 .111 .162 .706 .145 .267 .272 .149 .307 .133 .177 .378 .429 .440 .417 .538 .272 .421 .035 .405 .449 .650 .701 .168 .004 .117 .149 .421 .456 .016 .028 .229 .280 .589 .452 .574 .307 .035 .456 .440 .485 .685 .736 .132 .011 .133 .133 .405 .016 .440 .044 .244 .296 .573 .033 .089 .177 .449 .028 .485 .044 .200 .252 .617 .233 .111 .378 .650 .229 .685 .244 .200 .051 .817 .284 .162 .429 .701 .280 .736 .296 .252 .051 .868 .584 .706 .440 .168 .589 .132 .573 .617 .817 .868 .179 .057 .324 .596 .175 .631 .191 .147 .054 .105 .763 .240 .118 .385 .657 .236 .692 .252 .207 .007 .044 .824 .142 .264 .003 .274 .147 .310 .131 .175 .375 .426 .442 .056 .065 .201 .473 .052 .508 .068 .024 .177 .228 .641 .240 .362 .095 .177 .244 .212 .229 .273 .473 .524 .344 .425 .547 .281 .009 .430 .026 .414 .458 .658 .710 .159 .267 .146 .412 .684 .263 .719 .279 .235 .034 .017 .852 .010 .112 .154 .426 .005 .462 .021 .023 .223 .274 .594 .290 .169 .435 .707 .286 .742 .302 .258 .057 .006 .875 .156 .034 .301 .573 .152 .608 .168 .124 .077 .128 .741 .008 .114 .153 .425 .004 .460 .019 .025 .225 .276 .592 .004 .118 .148 .420 .001 .455 .015 .029 .229 .281 .588 .364 .485 .219 .053 .368 .088 .352 .396 .597 .648 .221 .222 .344 .078 .194 .227 .229 .211 .255 .455 .507 .362

Source: Authors’ estimates

AT BE BG HR CY CZ DK EE FI FR DE GR HU IE IT LV LT LU MT NL PL PT RO SK SI ES SE UK

Table 6  Euclidean distance for integration of digital technology

.061 .321 .123 .419 .605 .088 .169 .111 .023 .171 .176 .543 .402

IT .165 .613 .237 .179 .057 .324 .596 .175 .631 .191 .147 .054 .105 .763

.382 .184 .480 .665 .027 .230 .050 .084 .232 .237 .604 .462

LV .226 .674 .176 .240 .118 .385 .657 .236 .692 .252 .207 .007 .044 .824 .061

.199 .098 .283 .410 .152 .432 .298 .150 .146 .222 .080

LT .156 .292 .558 .142 .264 .003 .274 .147 .310 .131 .175 .375 .426 .442 .321 .382

LU MT NL PL PT RO SK .042 .254 .440 .253 .004 .276 .142 .491 .194 .009 .702 .444 .725 .590 .359 .656 .841 .148 .406 .125 .259 .056 .240 .425 .267 .010 .290 .156 .065 .362 .547 .146 .112 .169 .034 .201 .095 .281 .412 .154 .435 .301 .473 .177 .009 .684 .426 .707 .573 .052 .244 .430 .263 .005 .286 .152 .508 .212 .026 .719 .462 .742 .608 .068 .229 .414 .279 .021 .302 .168 .024 .273 .458 .235 .023 .258 .124 .177 .473 .658 .034 .223 .057 .077 .228 .524 .710 .017 .274 .006 .128 .641 .344 .159 .852 .594 .875 .741 .123 .419 .605 .088 .169 .111 .023 .184 .480 .665 .027 .230 .050 .084 .199 .098 .283 .410 .152 .432 .298 .297 .482 .211 .047 .234 .100 .297 .185 .508 .250 .530 .396 .482 .185 .693 .435 .716 .582 .211 .508 .693 .258 .023 .111 .047 .250 .435 .258 .281 .147 .234 .530 .716 .023 .281 .134 .100 .396 .582 .111 .147 .134 .049 .248 .433 .259 .002 .282 .148 .053 .244 .429 .264 .006 .287 .153 .420 .124 .062 .631 .373 .654 .520 .279 .018 .203 .490 .232 .513 .379

ES .011 .438 .412 .004 .118 .148 .420 .001 .455 .015 .029 .229 .281 .588 .176 .237 .146 .053 .244 .429 .264 .006 .287 .153 .004

SE .378 .071 .779 .364 .485 .219 .053 .368 .088 .352 .396 .597 .648 .221 .543 .604 .222 .420 .124 .062 .631 .373 .654 .520 .372 .367 .004 .372 .367 .230 .226 .141

SI .006 .442 .408 .008 .114 .153 .425 .004 .460 .019 .025 .225 .276 .592 .171 .232 .150 .049 .248 .433 .259 .002 .282 .148

UK .237 .212 .638 .222 .344 .078 .194 .227 .229 .211 .255 .455 .507 .362 .402 .462 .080 .279 .018 .203 .490 .232 .513 .379 .230 .226 .141

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which allow us to outline some policy recommendations to support a digital convergence at European level.

5 Conclusions Digitalization can be shaped by the manner in which formal institutions work with informal ones, in the sense that regulations and the legislative framework, coupled with the acceptability of new technologies by the population, can support their widespread implementation. Depending on the economic and social context, the uptake of digitalization may vary (e.g., the COVID-19 pandemic forced the digitalization process to some extent, even if some states were not adequately prepared). Moreover, the way in which the governance structures integrate in the development policies multidimensional aspects (institutional, socioeconomic, cultural, environmental, political), adapted to the various contexts in continuous change, will make the difference between territories. In essence, starting from a bottom-up approach (smart citizen-smart home-smart city-smart region-smart governance), the EU’s goal can be achieved, that of generating smart development (including large-scale digitalization). This highlights the need for norms and governance structures to develop and keep up with intelligent technologies. Otherwise, a widening digital gap can undermine prospects for an inclusive recovery, especially for the Eastern part of the EU. Although at the EU level are reflected important disparities (digital, socioeconomic, institutional), constant efforts to find the most appropriate mechanisms for absorbing new technologies can lead to the digital East-West divide diminishing. The case of Estonia is eloquent because it emerges from the cluster of EU-integrated countries after 2004 in the direction of digitalization, continuously improving its institutional and democratic quality. Good governance and democratic institutions are highly connected with digitalization and economic performance, as evidenced by the results of our research. The East-West gap could be enhanced by the digital transformation in the context of the institutional change and of the COVID-19 pandemic, countries having at their disposal the financial resources made available by the EU, which aims to strengthen their resilience capacity. The European policies have to integrate in a more efficient way the institutional convergence and also to look very carefully to the digital discrepancies between the member states and their impact on inequalities. At the same time, the emphasis should be on the needs of the citizen, the digitalization process contributing significantly to facilitating the access to public services, to savings on time and costs, to the transparency of government decisions, etc. In addition, the aspects that refer to the ethical issues of technological transformation (“leaving no one behind”) should not be omitted, a fact that has often been brought to the attention of the current health crisis. This pandemic has highlighted the institutional, legislative, and financial shortcomings that represent obstacles to digitalization, with less developed countries needing more consistent support to meet the challenges.

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Acknowledgment  R.T. and G.P. acknowledge the grant PN-III-P4-PCCE-2021-1878, within PNCDI III, project “Institutions, Digitalization and Regional Development in the EU” (CNCS – UEFISCDI). L.S. acknowledge the project no. 621262-EPP-1-2020-1-RO-EPPJMO-MODULE (European Commission, Erasmus+, Jean Monnet Activities).

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Differences and Similarities in Local Participative Governance in Slovakia and Lithuania Katarína Vitálišová and Jaroslav Dvořák

1 Introduction In democratic countries, the role of local municipality has changed during the past decades. Its role is more focused on creating conditions for the involvement of different actors in the decision-making process, as well as in development activities, in other words, local participative governance. The participation has become the core principle of local policy with the aim of creating better quality living conditions. The growing need of the local municipality to build partnerships with stakeholders, as well as the fast development of new technologies, also boosts the implementation of new digital tools of local policy. They are real measures that support the decentralization of power and redistribution of responsibilities to the lowest possible level of government – closest to the citizens. The chapter is specifically devoted to the local governance of two young democratic states  – Slovakia and Lithuania. They belong to the Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) in which the democratic system of governance has been developing for the past 30 years, yet still has numerous imperfections and, in particular, a lack of citizens’ awareness of the possibilities of their engagement as key stakeholders in local governance (Vitálišová et al., 2021a). Reflecting this situation, the main aim of the paper is to examine the differences and similarities between the K. Vitálišová (*) Matej Bel University, Faculty of Economics, Banska Bystrica, Slovakia e-mail: [email protected] J. Dvořák Klaipėda University, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Klaipeda, Lithuania University of Johannesburg, School of Public Management, Governance & Public Policy, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Rouet, T. Côme (eds.), Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20943-7_8

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local governance of two young democracies in Slovakia and Lithuania. Based on the literature review, it characterizes the specifics of local governance in these countries, focusing on its definition and bodies, and subsequently, identifies the good practices in the implementation of the digital tools and innovative participative forms of citizen participation (Dvorak et al., 2020). The main sources of material used are the national legislation, official national statistical data, as well as the data collected by interviews with civil servants and representatives of selected local municipalities. The chapter is divided into three parts. In the first two parts the local governance in Slovakia and Lithuania is characterized and subsequently, based on the results of comparative analysis, the main differences and similarities are defined.

2 Local Municipality in Slovakia The local level of governance in Slovakia was revitalized in 1990 by no. 369/1990 Coll. on municipalities amended and its importance was confirmed also by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic in 1993 (Act no. 369, 1990; Act no. 90, 2001). Gradually, the self-governing bodies were established, as well as the practical implementation of their competences, rights and responsibilities for public governance –an important and legitimate system of the country was constituted (Krnáč et al., 2018). By Act no. 369/1990 Coll. on municipalities amended, the municipality is an independent self-governing territorial unit of the Slovak Republic, associating citizens who have a permanent residence there. The role of the municipality is to care about the comprehensive development of its territory and the population living in it. The municipality takes its name, cadastral area, the right to own symbols (coat of arms, flag, seal, and anthem), and the right to associate with other municipalities. In Slovakia, a one-tiered municipal government was established beside the cities of Bratislava and Košice (cities with over 100 thousand inhabitants) with two layers of self-government – city and city district. In Bratislava and Košice, only two cities have more than 100,000 inhabitants. The division of tasks, responsibilities, and duties is defined by Act on the capital city Bratislava and the Act on the city of Kosice. The total number of Slovak municipalities is 2890, including 141 cities. 84.81% of municipalities have less than 1999 inhabitants. The structure of Slovak cities by the number of citizens is presented in Table 1. Municipalities decide autonomously and carry out tasks related to the management of the municipality and its property. The municipality in government performance according to § 4 sec. 3 Act no. 369/90 Coll. and Act no. 416/2001 Coll., on transfer of some competencies from state administration to municipalities and higher territorial units implements its own (original) competences (Act no. 369, 1990; Act no. 416, 2001). Other important acts include Act no. 138/1991 Coll. on municipal property, as amended, which identifies which property of the Slovak Republic passes to the

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Table 1  List of conducted interviews (anonymized) Municipalities by number of inhabitants Municipalities with less than 1999 inhabitants Municipalities with 2000–4999 inhabitants Municipalities with 5000–9999 inhabitants Municipalities with 10,000–19,999 inhabitants Municipalities with 20,000–49,999 inhabitants Municipalities with 50,000–99,999 inhabitants Municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants Total Towns by number of inhabitants 0–4999 5000–9999 1000–19,999 2000–49,999 50,000–99,999 100,000 and more Total

Number 2451 301 67 33 28 8 2

Share 84.81% 10.42% 2.32% 1.14% 0.97% 0.28% 0.07%

2890 Number 23 46 34 28 8 2 141

100% % 16.31% 32.62% 24.11% 19.86% 5.67% 1.42% 100%

Source: the authors from various data

municipalities and regulates the status and management of municipalities with their assets, and Act no. 583/2004 Coll. on the financial rules of territorial governments, which regulates the principles and rules for budgeting, and its approval and financial management of municipalities and higher territorial units (Act no. 138, 1991; Act no. 583, 2004). The transferred competence (delegated) is a part of the municipal competences, which has the nature of state administration and its execution is delegated by the State to the municipality. According to Art. 71 paragraph 1 of the Constitution: “The exercise of the certain powers of local self-administration may be delegated to municipality and higher territorial unit by a law. The costs of the delegated exercise of state administration shall be covered by the State.” (Slovak Republic, 1992, p. 28). The group of own competences include in particular those matters that primarily affect the lives of municipal residents, whose effect does not exceed this framework and for this reason the municipality can make decisions relatively individually. The activities carried out as delegated competences usually exceed their significance beyond the municipality. To this group belongs the scope of activities that the state plans to influence intensively (Krnáč et al., 2018). By the act no. 369/1990 Coll. on municipalities amended, two or more municipalities may merge into one municipality. The municipality can also be divided into several municipalities (1990). To merge or split the municipality can be realized only on the date of elections to municipal bodies. Merging and splitting municipalities can only be done based on the results of local referenda. Moreover, the municipality may be split only if the new municipalities will have cadastral territory or a set of cadastral areas forming a coherent unit, they will have at least 3000

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inhabitants, they will not have merged with other urban parts of town. The municipality cannot be split if there were realized investments on which the whole municipality depends. As a legal entity, a municipality is as eligible to have rights and obligations as any other legal entity. It has its own legal capacity. In practice, this means that a municipality may on its own behalf establish, modify, and cancel the legal relationship. It can buy or sell property. The mayor may negotiate an employment contract with a particular natural person, and so on. The municipality has its own property that can be used only in line with the law and with municipal board decisions; in principle, it cannot be given away. It also has monetary funds to finance autonomous tasks defined by law and development programs. Therefore, economic activity may be carried out on its own property and financial resources, which the municipality has. The basic possibilities of civic participation are guaranteed by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. They include taking part in the assemblies of the inhabitants of the municipality, local referenda, and municipal bodies (Vitálišová et al., 2017). Also, the Act on Municipalities oblige the municipal citizens with the power to participate in governance, but also obligations towards the governance, which means to protect the property of the municipality and to participate in municipal costs (to pay taxes and fees); to participate in protecting and enhancing the environment in the municipality; to help maintain regulations in the municipality; to provide personal assistance in the aftermath of natural disasters and accidents.

2.1 Main Bodies of the Local Municipality The decisive responsibility for the municipality is based on activities of the municipal bodies. Through the municipal bodies the implementation of self-governing functions is the most intensive. The basic municipal bodies are the local council and mayor. They are elected decision makers, each member of council as well as mayor decide individually without superiority or inferiority; they are thus mutually equivalent. The rules of the election of elected municipal bodies are defined by Act no. 180/2014 Coll. on the conditions for exercising the right to vote amended (2014). There is no such special claim on the mayor or member of local parliament apart from age (18 years) and permanent residence in the municipality, but it is important that a person elected to the municipal bodies should be a personality who is generally recognized, professionally capable, irreproachable, and should prove an active approach to public governance. The structures of other bodies performing the executive, control, advisory, and proactive functions in local municipality are shown in Fig. 1. The power of decision-making is in the hands of the municipal council. The decision-making power of the municipalities is not given only by the Constitution and the Act on municipalities, as well as by the procedures of their appointment.

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Fig. 1  Organization of the local municipality. (Source: the authors)

The members of council and mayor, are elected by the inhabitants of the municipality in direct elections, difference than the derived bodies, that are set up and are elected by the municipal council (the mayor appoints and dismisses the head of local authority). The municipal council is a representative body of the municipality, composed of members elected in direct elections by the municipal inhabitants for 4 years. The number of members of the municipal council shall be determined by the municipal council operating in the previous governing period. The Act on municipalities defines the number of members differentiated by the number of inhabitants within the range of 3 (municipalities up to 40 inhabitants) to 41 (municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants) (Plaček et  al., 2020). Municipalities with less than 40 residents require at least three members of the municipal council. The competences of both elected bodies are clearly separated and guaranteed by the act on municipalities. The municipal council cannot spread its scope of competences in other internal regulatory standards, such as the status of a municipality or organizational rules. The scope of the municipal council may designate other laws. An example is the Act on municipal property, and others. The mayor is a representative of the municipality (town) with the highest executive powers. Its function is public. He/she is a statutory body in the municipality and in property relations, as well as in staff labor relations of the municipality. In the administrative–legal relations he/she is an administrative body. Because of the independent position of each elected municipal body and because it is not in a relationship of mutual subordination and superiority, the mayor council cannot impose the specific term tasks in the form of commands by its resolutions. To impose an obligation can be only to its subordinate body (municipal board,

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municipal authority workers, committees, etc.). The Council resolutions that are related to the mayor can be in the form of “recommendation” or “requirement.” The governing period of mayors begins by an official swearing in. It lasts 4 years. The mayor cannot be a citizen who is a member of the municipal council or a municipal employee. The mayor can suspend execution of the council resolution in two cases: if it is contrary to the law or if it is obviously unreasonable to the village.

2.2 Advisory, Control, and Proactive Bodies of Local Municipalities The Deputy Mayor is an optional function. He/she is appointed by the mayor from among the members of the municipal council, usually for the full elected period. He/she represents the mayor if for some reason the mayor cannot perform his duties. If a municipal board is established in the municipality, the Deputy Mayor is a member. The municipal board is an optional body, which means that it may or may not be established. Its justification is particularly in the municipality with a higher number of members of the municipal council. It is composed of members of the municipal council. It is established by the municipal council for the whole elected term. The number of members of the municipal board established is settled by law to a maximum of 1/3 of the total number of members of the municipal council. At its composition, the grouping of political parties represented in the municipal council is taken into account. The municipal board is a proactive, efficient, and control body of the municipal council and advisory body to the mayor. It meets as needed, at least once a month. A meeting is convened and chaired by a mayor. It is able to negotiate if there is a majority of all members of the board. The meeting is not public and the board negotiates according to approved negotiating rules. The resolutions are adopted by an absolute majority of all members. Committees are established by the municipal council. They may be established permanently or temporarily (to solve a specific task). Members of the committees may be members of the municipal council, residents (professionals or nominees of political parties). The secretary is usually an employee of the municipality; the number and composition of the committees are determined by a municipal council. Committees have the following functions (Krnáč et  al., 2018; Astrauskas & Gecikova, 2014): • Advisory, preparing the comments on the municipal proposals as a basis for decision-making of the local council, • Initiative by developing concrete proposals and suggestions to resolve common issues of the municipality,

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• Control that verifies compliance with the resolutions of the municipal council as well as with generally binding regulations and checking the municipal authorities on highlight deficiencies. The committees are facultative bodies. The only exception is the constitutional law of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the incompatibility of functions that impose to the municipal bodies setting up a committee to protect public interest; the members of this committee may be only members of the municipal council. The creation of other committees is usually based on the basic functions of self-governing municipalities. The municipality may establish such committees, for example: finance committee for the administration of municipal property, transport, culture and sport, social services, housing, construction and land-use planning, and public order. The main controller of the municipality implements the control of tasks arising from the municipal obligations. Since 2002 it has been a compulsory function in the municipality. He/she controls in particular the treasury operations, the management and accounting of the municipality, the management of municipal property, and draws up an expert opinion on the draft of the general budget and the final account (Astrauskas & Gecikova, 2014). The main controller is elected by the municipal council for a period of 6 years. For his/her activities he/she is responsible to the council. He/she participates in meetings of the municipal council and the municipal board with an advisory vote. The results of inspections are submitted to the municipal council. The municipal police are also an optional self-governing body. The municipal police have a character of public order department and an executive body for the municipal council. The municipal council determines for the police the organization, volume of wages, and range of technical resources. Details of the municipal police activities are defined by the generally binding regulations. The municipal office is an optional mayor’s executive body, provides administrative and organizational matters of the municipal council and the mayor, as well as other bodies set up by the municipality. It is made up of municipal employees and its organization is determined by a mayor. The municipal council also provides the volume of wages, and the extent of the technical means necessary for its operation. The municipal offices are managed by local officials responsible for administrative and organizational matters (Nemec et al., 2001).

2.3 New Forms of Local Governance Even the Slovak Republic is a relatively young democracy. During the last decade citizen awareness has been developing and it also brings implementation of more participative tools in the local governance, later connected also to the great progress of information technologies. In the chapter, we focus on participatory budgeting, participatory planning, and IT tools.

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Participatory budgeting is a tool of civic participation moving the responsibility in the decision-making process on the budget to citizens who are influenced by it (Allegretti, 2006). It opens up the opportunity to be directly involved in the decisions about the implementation of public services (Murray-Svidroňová et al., 2016). According to the data of the Ministry of Interior of the Slovak Republic (2022) the interest in participative budgeting has been increasing over last few years. Currently, it is implemented by 60 municipalities and 4 regional self-governments. The Slovak legislation does not recognize the term ‘participatory budget’ and local municipalities must look for their own ways of dealing with the missing concept, especially in the sense of funding. The first participative budget was implemented in 2011. At the beginning, it was not based on the strategical approach. The local municipalities practically experimented or improvised, and in terms of content these first initiatives differed quite significantly from the simultaneous grasp of participatory budgeting. Later, the initiatives in public budgeting were oriented toward improving quality of local democracy and strengthening of citizen engagement. Despite the possibility of electronic forms of participation, most local governments have continued to use face-to-face information meetings to reach as many groups of the population as possible (Klimovský et al., 2021). Some changes in participatory budgeting were caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Some local municipalities have decided to also use the electronic forms of participative budgeting, but some of them stopped or totally cancelled participative budgeting (Bardovič & Gašparík, 2021). In the majority of Slovak municipalities, the participatory budgeting follows the Porto Alegre model for Europe, but it covers various target areas (e.g., social care, youth, environmental protection, culture, etc.). During the history of participatory budgeting, a few weak spots can be identified. There is a problem of unqualified criteria of evaluation of the project proposals in some municipalities. Another problem is low citizen participation in voting as well as in project preparation (Murray-­ Svidroňová & Klimovský, 2021). As we already mentioned, the local municipalities are not open to outsourcing e-tools that could be helpful to boost public interest. Participative planning is an approach based on involving stakeholders in the strategic planning process from the starting point to the final stage of reaching a consensus. Citizen participation in the planning process should contribute to informing, validating, and legitimizing the plan (Vitálišová et  al., 2021b). In Slovakia, this approach is implemented in the creation of plans of economic and social development for municipalities and regions. Furthermore, in the current programming period of the European Union it is also a main condition for gaining EU funds. Two famous initiatives in participative planning in Slovakia can be identified. The first one is a Metropolitan Institute in Bratislava and the second one is Spolka in Košice. These institutions are also authors of manuals prepared for the specific needs of cities in spatial planning (e.g., Banská Bystrica, Bratislava, Košice, etc.) and are the coordinators of the participative revitalization process. One of them is Medený Hámor (Copper Hammer) in Banská Bystrica. Copper Hammer was established at the turn of the Middle Ages as a modern regular technological enterprise for the factory processing of copper ore. It was mined in the mines in the surrounding

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villages and transformed into copper products here. Copper from the surrounding Banská Bystrica was even found in a shipwreck in Namibia. This company has contributed to the profits of the Thurzo-Fugger society that belong to the richest enterprises in Middle Ages in Banská Bystrica. Nowadays, the area is in a very bad condition, even though it is a national monument. Spolka, in cooperation with local activists, prepared the participative process of revitalization aimed at definition of a vision and the future utilization of the area. There realized a workshop in the area for the public with the expert interpretation as well as a questionnaire survey mapping public attitudes to the future of Cooper Hammer, interviews with the local actors, and special planning games. The outcomes of the survey confirm that the area should be rebuilt as a cultural and creative center. All outcomes are used as a material for the architectonic competition for revitalization of the area. The last group of examples are IT tools oriented toward citizen engagement. Generally, we can divide the Slovak municipalities into two groups. One group includes the IT tools provided by the private companies that are tailored to the specific claims of municipalities. The second group includes the tools specifically prepared regarding the individual needs of cities. A successful example is a mobile application with the title SOM, produced by PerrySoft. It operates currently in more than 100 towns and villages in Slovakia. It is the first platform developed for the conditions of Slovak cities in which residents find all-important city services in one place. Anyone who downloads an app of their city on their mobile phone will get up-to-date information about what is happening in the city. The app is available for Android and iOS devices for free. Inhabitants can find online newspapers and important phone numbers that can be dialed directly from the app, neighborhood exchange, etc. Basically, the app is developed as a complex platform for communication online in one device – the web, social networks, online newspapers, notifications, the official board, reporting problems, the neighborhood exchange, but also bus departures and arrivals. In the field of cultural policy, there is an app called BudíCheck (Alarmclock) that provides information about cultural activities, programs in cultural institutions, the possibility of buying tickets, of evaluating the event. The app is also available for Android and iOS devices for free. Trenčín is first Slovak city that has started to use this smart tool for communication with its citizens. Chatbot A.I. is prepared by the company Botmedia for city of Trenčín based on elements of artificial intelligence. The essence of the chatbot will be interactive personalized communication between Trenčín and its residents on the main topics of the city such as news, invitations to cultural events, changes in the organization of transport, notifications of repairs, comments on the official board, and information from the city council. Citizens will be able to choose the information they prefer to receive via “chat” in the Messenger application as well as in a web chat. One of the additional functions is educational gamification, which through conversational dialogue presents interesting historical moments of the city, with the possibility of obtaining a “seal” as a reward for knowledge, from Matúš Čak Trenčiansky. Chatbot is available to residents and visitors of the city at any time of

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the day or night. It can also perform various useful functions such as navigation, notification, receiving audio/video stimuli, displaying media, and much more. The increasing importance of open data in local municipalities for society is also mirrored in a smaller project of civic association in Alvaria. The project covers four apps. The new aspect can be identified in an app on open data about subsidies provided by local municipalities. The application collects information about subsidies from four Slovak cities – Banská Bystrica, Hlohovec, Levice, and Prešov. The web application compares the data by cities, supported area, years, applicants, supported and unsupported claims. It helps to stakeholders to be better informed about the subsidies policy at the local level. The web application uses the data provided by the local municipalities at the official websites and documents and processes them for visualization. The Association uses the application Data studio from Google (free available) for this purpose. For the municipality this tool brings a new form of informing and communication with citizens especially in the field of subsides policy. It contributes to a transparent municipality status.

3 Local Municipality in Lithuania There are 60 municipalities in Lithuania. There is one tier of self-government (Šaparnienė et al., 2021). The right of self-government for municipalities is guaranteed in Article 119 of the Constitution, which states that “The right of self-­government is guaranteed to the administrative units of the state territory provided by law. It is implemented through the respective municipal councils” (Republic of Lithuania, 1992). Municipal councils can decide and divide municipalities into smaller administrative units called elderships. The activities of the eldership are financed from the municipal budget and are headed by an elder who is a career civil servant. There are currently 545 elderships in Lithuania (Šaparnienė et al., 2021). After the reform of the territorial administrative division in 1994, compared with other Western European countries, municipalities became atypically large in terms of population (Burkšienė et al., 2017). At that time, the average population in the municipality was 60,000 (Burkšienė et  al., 2017). In recent years, municipalities have faced the challenges of internal migration and population change. At the beginning of 2022, we see that compared with 2019, the number of municipalities with more than 100,000 inhabitants increased, there were 4, now there are 6. The number of municipalities with 30,000 to 40,000 inhabitants decreased to 13, but the number of municipalities with 20,000 to 30,000 inhabitants increased to 18 (see Table 2). Such population changes mainly take place in the so-called ring municipalities, i.e., the municipalities around Lithuanian cities, for example, Vilnius, Kaunas, and Klaipėda.

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Table 2  Distribution of municipalities by population on 1 January 2022 Number of inhabitants More than 100,000 50,000–100,000 40,000–50,000 30,000–40,000 20,000–30,000 10,000–20,000 3000–10,000

Number of municipalities 6 5 6 10 18 11 4

Percentages 10% 8.3% 10% 16.7% 30% 18.3% 6.7%

Source: the authors from various data

3.1 Main Bodies of the Local Municipality According to the Republic of Lithuania Law on Local Self-Government, a municipality means “an administrative unit of the territory of the State, defined by law, the community of which has the right to self-governance guaranteed by the Constitution and implemented through a municipal council elected by the permanent residents of that administrative unit of the territory of the State, where such council establishes executive and other institutions and establishments accountable to it with the aim of implementing directly laws and decisions of the Government of the Republic of Lithuania (hereinafter: ‘the Government’) and the municipal council. A municipality shall be a public legal entity” (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 1994). The municipality concept stipulates that Lithuania is considered to be a highly centralized administrative system with relatively low fiscal autonomy of local government, which restricts opportunities for the financial autonomy of municipalities (Burbulytė-­ Tsiskarishvili et al., 2018; Vilke & Vilkas, 2018; Dvorak, 2021). On 1 March 2015, for the first time in Lithuania, elections were held, where residents elected the mayor directly. Prior to the amendments to the laws on local government and municipal council elections in 2014, it was legalized that from now on the mayor would not be elected by the municipal council, but would be elected by the residents. The change in the method of electing the mayor has changed the principles of his accountability – formerly accountable to the council, from 2015, the mayor became accountable to the council and the community (Mažylis & Leščiauskaitė, 2015; Mikalauskas, 2016). The mayor has been given a few more of the functions he has taken over from the Council. The Secretariat of the Municipal Council passed to the mayor (Mažylis & Leščiauskaitė, 2015). As participants in municipal council elections, the number of voters from 1995 to 2019 is shown in the Table 3. A newly introduced model in which the mayor is directly elected is presented in Fig. 2. In this model, the mayor is the chairman of the municipal council and the head of the municipality, but the director of the municipal administration has executive power (Astraukas, 2004). The director is often considered the “gray” head of the municipality.

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Table 3  Participants in municipal council elections, number of voters, % 1995 1997 2000 2002 2007 2011 2015 39.93 35.60 49.63 49.23 41.30 44.08 Members of the council 47.18

2019 Mayor Members of the council 47.17 47.9

Mayor 47.9

Source: the authors from various data Fig. 2  Lithuanian model of the municipal council and directly elected mayor. (Source: the authors)

Municipalities are established to perform certain functions provided by law. According to the abovementioned Republic of Lithuania Law on Local Self-­ Government, the functions of municipalities are: “functions related to local government, public administration and provision of public services defined by the Constitution and attributed to municipalities by this and other laws” (Article 3, Paragraph 8) (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 1994). Article 5 of the Law states that the functions of local government, public administration, and the provision of public services are categorized according to the type of activity. For the performance of each of these functions, the relevant local authorities are given the appropriate competence. The competence to provide public services (according to Paragraph 2 of Article 5) is assigned to service providers established by municipalities or other publicly selected natural and legal entities (according to concluded agreements). It is also provided (according to Paragraphs 3–4 of Article 5) that joint activity agreements may be concluded with other state institutions or other municipalities for the provision of public services, whereas public services may be provided by another municipality on the basis of agreements. In 1995, when the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania had been adopted a year before, and until 2000, when the Law Amending the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania came into force, the number of municipal functions was very limited (Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili et al., 2018). This can be explained by the limited administrative capacity and human resources of the municipalities. Since 2000, the most significant development of the number of municipal functions has been observed, marking an increase in the functions of municipalities, giving municipalities a more realistic opportunity to participate in

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public administration processes. It was from that year onward, with the exception of 2003–2004, that the number of functions increased periodically, and thus the importance of municipalities in the lives of citizens increased steadily. It is also necessary to note that in recent years (since approximately 2011) there has been no significant increase in the number of functions, the change in the number of functions is more related to the redistribution of existing functions, revision, and amendment of the wording of the law (Burbulytė-Tsiskarishvili et al., 2018). According to the Law on Local Self-Government, the functions of municipalities are divided into independent and state (transferred to the municipalities by the State) (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 1994). The functions of the municipalities are divided into local government, public administration, and public service provision, according to the nature of their activities. According to the current version of the Law on Local Self-Government, municipalities are responsible for 46 independent and 40 State-delegated functions (Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania, 1994). Public services provided by municipalities are further detailed in Articles 6 and 7 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania (1994, current wording as of 1 November 2021). Paragraphs 30 and 31 of Article 6 of this Law provide that “organization of heat and drinking water supply and sewage treatment” (p. 30) and “installation of municipal waste management systems, organization of collection and recycling of secondary raw materials, installation and operation of landfills” (p.  31) are attributable to the autonomous functions of municipalities. This means that municipalities are independent in organizing heat supply and implementing municipal waste management systems. Leščiauskaitė (2019) analyzed the strategic documents at the state, regional, and local levels and found that the cooperation between municipalities is included in the “White Paper on Lithuanian Regional Policy for 2017–2027,” the 2014 National Strategic Waste Management Plan. Despite the fact that cooperation between municipalities in Lithuania is not institutionalized by legal imperatives (as in Slovakia, for example), the existing legal environment (law on local self-­government and others) creates preconditions for municipalities to establish joint activities and develop cooperation along different trajectories (Burkšienė et al., 2017). According to Lithuanian researchers (Burkšienė et al., 2017; Bučaitė-Vilkė et al., 2019), the most successful examples of cooperation between municipalities can be considered in the field of municipal waste management (regional waste management centers have been established throughout Lithuania). Bučaitė-Vilkė et  al. (2019) argue that: waste management services are the most significant example of state-driven intermunicipal cooperation where services implementation arrangements are drawn from central authorities to municipalities. One of the few examples of cooperation between specialized municipalities is the Resort Association. The Lithuanian Resorts Association started its activities in 2007. It unites the Lithuanian resorts Birštonas, Druskininkai, Neringa, and Palanga municipalities and resorts in Anykščiai, Ignalina, Trakai, and Zarasai (Burkšienė et al., 2017). The association “Klaipėda Region,” which unites Klaipėda County municipalities, was established in 2012. However, despite its ambitions, the association’s activities focus mainly on tourism development and regional specialization plans (Burkšienė et al., 2017).

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In Lithuania, public services are provided only by municipalities under public private partnership (PPP) concession agreements. According to the data of 2020, the largest number of PPP projects was implemented in the fields of culture, sports, leisure facilities, equipment, and other infrastructure, and in waste use, recycling, and management – 20 and 15 projects respectively. In the fields of energy, including the extraction, transmission, distribution, and supply of heat and electricity, oil, and natural gas, and the public transport infrastructure, roads, bridges, tunnels, parking, and other road transport infrastructure, 8 projects were implemented respectively.

3.2 Participatory Budgeting In Lithuania, participatory budgeting is not legally regulated. However, in accordance with the principle enshrined in Article 4 of the Law on Local Self-Government of the Republic of Lithuania, which defines the participation of municipal residents in the management of public municipal affairs, pending petitions; encourages other forms of civic initiative. Municipal institutions implement the principles of self-­ government in educational, cultural, and other institutions, and support the initiatives of associations related to the management of public municipal affairs. It is clear that this principle imperatively allows citizens to participate in the drafting of decisions and to promote other civic initiatives, which are described as a participatory budget. Birskytė (2013) argue that the baseline for participatory budgeting was built by the Ministry of Finance of Lithuania during the global finance crisis, when they started to implement the project “Make your own budget.” In this initiative the residents of Lithuania were able to estimate the financing of government programs and make changes in allocation for each financial year (Birskyte, 2013). However, the main aim of the project was the education of residents and giving insights into how it is not easy to take part in financial decision making. In 2018, Alytus City Municipality became the first municipality in Lithuania to provide funding for residents’ initiatives, and they were able to propose projects and later vote for them. Alytus City Municipal Council, by allowing residents to vote for projects, approved the “Description of the Procedure for Selection and Financing of Project Initiatives for Improving the Living Environment.” The main goal of the document is to increase the opportunities to involve citizens in the formation of the city budget (Alytus City Municipality Council, 2018). The main tasks listed in this document are to promote citizens’ initiatives in the city, to bring together communities to live and improve the social and living environment, to activate business creation and participation in the renewal of territories, and to promote discussions on urban development (Alytus City Municipality Council, 2018). There is no evidence in the official documents that the participatory budget initiative came from below, that is, from the population. However, the respondent to the qualitative research noted that the idea of implementing a participatory budget

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came to the leaders of the city of Alytus after the representatives of the municipal administration and members of the council visited the Polish city of Suwalki (Interview with a civil servant in Lithuanian municipalities, 2019). Therefore, the initiative itself had political support, which, according to Lüchmann (2017) is considered to be one of the most important factors for the emergence or disappearance of participatory budgeting. It is obvious that the implementation of such an initiative in the Lithuanian context showed the innovativeness of the municipal leaders and council of Alytus city. In the first initiative for the implementation of the participatory budget of Alytus city, 1300 city residents voted, but only 993 votes were confirmed as appropriate.1 It was envisaged that residents of the municipality who have declared their permanent residence from the age of 16 will be able to submit projects and vote (Alytus City Municipality, 2018). The project proposal had to present the idea of the planned project, the budget, and collect the signatures of the 15 residents who supported the project. The requirement for 2020 has grown; now, 20 signatures need to be collected to support the project idea. This may also have led to a declining number of projects (see Table 4), as researchers note (Coleman & Cardoso Sampaio, 2017) that increasing participatory budget regulation diminishes public interest in this initiative. In 2018, 22 initiatives were proposed, 15 of which were selected for the vote. Some projects were not put to the vote because they were proposed for implementation on private land (Interview with a civil servant 2019). According to the description, the projects can be implemented only on plots of land for general use. In 2018, EUR 200,000 was planned for the participatory budget initiatives, which were distributed as follows: EUR 50,000 for small-scale projects and EUR 150,000 for large-scale projects. This accounted for 0.33% of the total municipal budget (total budget for 2018: EUR 61 million). However, in 2019, funding for smaller projects was reduced to EUR 25,000. According to the respondent to the qualitative study, this was because “it has been seen from the amounts that smaller ones are less, and larger ones are more money-intensive, an object is usually built” (Interview with a civil servant in Lithuanian municipalities, 2019). Table 4  Number of project initiatives of the participatory budget of the Alytus city municipality and planned financing Year 2018 2019 2020 2021

Size of the project Big Small 5 10 5 5 3 5 – 4

Financing (EUR) 50,000 for small projects and 150,000 for large projects 25,000 for small projects and 150,000 for large projects 25,000 for small projects and 150,000 for large projects 25000, for small projects and 150,000 for large projects

Source: Alytus City Municipality  In 2019, 47,000 inhabitants had the right to vote in the municipal council elections in Alytus City Municipality. This means that only about 2.7% of the city’s population participated in the participatory budget process. 1

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In 2020–2021, voting for residents’ initiatives, owing to the COVID-19 quarantine, took place electronically. In 2020, a total of 2137 residents of Alytus voted, but there were 1269 correctly filled in and valid ballot papers. However, in 2021, the population was less active and voted a total of 1219 times. There were 874 correctly filled-in and valid ballot papers in Alytus. This difference is because many did not indicate the exact date of birth, and some who declared a place of residence outside the city of Alytus voted or voted more than once. In summary, it can be stated that the example of this small municipality has become a reference point for the diffusion of the participatory budget initiative in Lithuania. Municipalities that have implemented a participatory budget initiative in the last few years have been run by left-wing political parties since the last election (Central Electoral Commission of the Republic of Lithuania, 2019) or won elections as electoral committees. This can be explained by the fact that the representatives of the electoral committees are trying to keep the attention of the population by presenting various innovations and to keep the focus on their political agenda. Finally, at the end of 2021, a group of parliamentarians amended the Law on Local Self-­ Government to make the participatory budget mandatory for all municipalities and to allocate 1% of the municipal budget to it. According to the initiators, the participatory budgeting program should become a municipal function.

3.3 Participative Planning In 2012, municipal administrations began to “shyly” involve stakeholders in the strategic planning process. This does not mean that all municipalities have immediately started to apply participatory governance practices in their activities, but the first steps in that direction have been taken. The demand for municipal administrations to involve stakeholders in the planning process arose from the requirement to create new strategic documents from 2013 to 2020 and to link them to the use of EU structural fund support (Dvorak, 2015). The participatory planning process can be divided into the following stages, namely, the conduction of a survey of municipal residents and the performance of focus groups on topics with stakeholders. In 2012, the number of stakeholders was rather limited and more elitist, as, in fact, the process involved municipal officials, politicians, representatives of institutions attached to municipalities, business associates, and higher education and study institutions. However, the development of a participatory planning culture has in recent years involved representatives of nongovernmental organizations, community organizations, and elders, and less involvement of local politicians and municipal administrations. Typically, the participatory planning process is contracted out to a private contractor, that is, a consulting/audit company that is hired by municipal administrations through public tenders, and such firms are responsible for preparing strategic planning documents. Finally, the new strategic management methodology approved in 2021, which replaced the strategic planning methodology, states that “in preparing strategic and programming level planning documents, the strategic

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management system subject participates in consultation with the public, social and economic partners, identifying and involving stakeholders in the strategic management system; stakeholders and the socio-economic partner” (Lietuvos Respublikos Vyriausybè, 2021; Government of Republic of Lithuania, 2021; National Audit Office of Lithuania, 2021).

3.4 IT Tools: Applications for Citizens In Lithuania, the populations of many municipalities face air pollution problems. In fact, it can be stated that there is at least one source of pollution in the territory of each municipality, which constantly resents the population. Klaipėda City Municipality has inherited a number of industrial facilities since the time of the USSR, and in addition, the city borders the Klaipėda State Seaport, the territory of which is not under the jurisdiction of the municipality, but the port’s performance and negative externality (pollution) affect the quality of life of city residents. After the restoration of independence in Lithuania, green organizations have been protesting against industrial enterprises in the city since the beginning of the 1990s, but such movements were suppressed by the economic transformation and privatization of enterprises and the challenges of the market economy (unemployment, growing poverty). Zdražil & Pernica (2018) argued that general political directions and priorities, or path dependence all impact the developmental patterns of local governments. Over time and as the well-being of the population improves, new urban ecological movements led by active residents began to emerge in the city from 2017 onward. As urban areas are affected by different sources of pollution, some from the dust of cargo handled by port companies, others from the odors emitted by industrial companies, in 2020 the first platform www.klaipedoskvapas.lt for the registration of bad odors appeared, as the initiative of one community leader. This platform has an interactive pollution map that shows the places in the city where the most pollution incidents are recorded. It received a great deal of interest and support from the city’s residents, as over 400 complaints were registered on the platform in the first 2 weeks alone (15 min., 2020). It can be argued that the lack of attention from the political leadership of the municipal administration had an impact on such success. It is also interesting that the collected information is transmitted to three state and municipal institutions, namely the National Public Health Center, the Klaipėda City Municipality Administration, and the Environmental Protection Department. According to the Law on Local Self-Government, one of the independent functions of the municipality is the administration of cemetery care. As the internal and external emigration of the population has intensified over the last decade, many emigrants have faced the dilemma of visiting and caring for family graves. With this in mind, some municipalities have digitized their cemeteries. This work was carried out by a private contractor, but after the original version was handed over to the municipal administration, it was still completed by the responsible officials. Special

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websites have been created where the location and image of the grave can be seen by entering information about the buried person. If the view of the grave seems inappropriate to relatives, they can send new ones to their municipal administration. At the cemetery gate, there is a table with a QR code, which, when scanned by a phone, opens the search website (Vainorius, 2019). The COVID-19 pandemic has become a driving force for municipalities to find ways to meet the cultural needs of the population under quarantine conditions. Since 2022, Kaunas has been the European Capital of Culture and this is likely to change the cultural values and beliefs of the population (Burksiene et al., 2018). Starting with the quarantine of the first wave of COVID-19, the community initiative “Fluxus Labas” and “Kaunas – European Capital of Culture 2022” initiated the Culture in the Yards program (Kaunas 2022, 2021). For the residents of Kaunas, performances of various types of art were organized in the courtyards, which lasted about 15–20 min, but in order for the artists to come to the courtyards of the residents, they had to register themselves electronically. It is no coincidence that this project was selected as one of the ten best projects in the Institute for Policy Innovation in Pandemic Europe in 2020, and in 2021 the project was selected as the most unique music project in the world in the Classical: NEXT 2021 Innovation Award (15 min., 2020). In summary, it can be stated that the discussed examples of citizens’ participation and stakeholder involvement in Lithuanian local government show that the influence of the traditional paradigm of public administration is decreasing, as the population is no longer just a passive recipient of public services. On the contrary, the growing impact of the new public management and the new public governance is being seen, as the needs of citizens become the focus of local governments, and networks of partnerships between stakeholders and local authorities emerge. The environment in which they live is very important to the population and the new governance model offers a bottom-up participation approach and dialogue with different actors through electronic means of communication.

4 Similarities and Differences The local municipalities in Slovakia and Lithuania had a very similar starting position after 1989. In both countries, the system of public administration reflected the previous system but was reformed to a democratic one, strengthening the role of citizens. The approaches of Slovakia and Lithuania in establishing local municipalities were different. Lithuanian municipalities became atypically large in terms of population, so their total number is significantly lower than in Slovakia. Slovakia is a more rural country with many municipalities (84.81%) with less than 5000 inhabitants. Thus, the local level of public administration is very fragmented, which seriously influences the ability of municipalities to fulfill the original tasks defined by law. Smaller municipalities, lower funds.

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There are no significant differences in the main bodies of local municipalities – the mayor and the municipal council. The key difference – in the election of the mayor – was overcome in 2015, when the first mayors in Lithuania were elected in direct elections by citizens. An inspiration for the Slovakian system may be the position of the director of the municipal administration in Lithuanian municipalities who holds the executive power. In the case of Slovakia, the director of the municipal office is only a head of office but does not have the power to significantly influence the execution of the municipal competences. The difference is also in the control body in municipalities, which is also fostered in the case of Lithuania by the Municipal Control and Audit Service, with supervision of the lawful, efficient, economic, and effective management of municipal activities. In the case of Slovakia, the control body is the only controller. Both countries implement at the local level various initiatives that directly strengthen citizen engagement and participation in local policy. The participative tools and techniques have become the core of local governance. In the chapter, we identified in both countries some examples in the field of participatory budgeting, participatory planning, and utilization of IT tools. In participatory budgeting the Lithuanian municipalities are more open to the implementation of electronic tools (e.g., for voting, presentation) as in Slovakia, and participatory budgeting also includes the large projects with budgets of EUR 150,000. In Slovakia, projects within participatory budgeting are oriented toward smaller projects, with individual support of up to EUR 10,000 or less. The principles of participative planning are implemented equally in Lithuania and Slovakia. In Slovakia, during last few years,´ various private and public initiatives have appeared, aimed at revitalization and protection of the exceptional areas (historical, natural, cultural) in a participative way. The fast development of IT brings many opportunities for municipalities in both countries. These new creative and innovative tools can be a source of effective citizen participation and contribute to citizen awareness. They mainly include various applications for citizens used for local public services or applications providing access to information, even more direct participation of citizens in local policy. Local government administration in Lithuania and Slovakia has a major influence on the emergence of new forms, tools, and channels for participation. Despite the fact that the participatory budget was introduced by Slovakian municipalities a decade ago, it is not yet widespread. In Lithuania, despite recent experience of the participatory budget, about a third of all municipalities already use it to promote citizen participation in decision making. Local governments also initiate the provision of services through various e-government and m-government tools, but Slovakian municipalities are more inclined to innovate, create value, and implement the concept of an enabling state. When in Lithuania, meanwhile, we see that the role of the resident is changing, from a passive recipient of services to a more active citizen, where self-government is perceived as being part of a certain community.

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Acknowledgement  The paper presents the partial outcomes of project VEGA 1/0213/20 Smart Governance in Local Municipalities and APVV SK-FR-19-0009 Financing cultural policies and creative industries (A Franco-Slovak comparison).

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Part II

Digital Tools for Democracy 4.0

Online Citizens’ Consultations for More Democracy in Europe: EuropaNova’s Experience Since 2018 Elise Bernard

1 Introduction On September 7, 2017, in Athens, the newly elected French President declared that democracy and trust in Europe are “in danger.” If the Greek crisis can be considered as a failure of the Union, so too can be the inability to preserve the European ideals of justice and freedom as well as the necessary constitution of an area was declared indispensable for the refoundation of Europe (Macron, 2017a). After several years of denouncing a lack of democracy, in Europe a clear euro enthusiastic government, President of the Republic, and National Assembly, has announced that Europe must, finally, be a daily reality for the citizens (Schmidt, 2020, p. 278). This is the guarantee of European legitimacy and effectiveness. With that aim, euro think tanks as EuropaNova became in charge to restore confidence, social cohesion, and the sense of belonging of the French and all European citizens. Unfortunately, no clear mandate was given nor written. Civil society stakeholders had to translate political intentions into an ambitious but achievable commitment to build a format that allows the transformation of the democratic process, placing citizens at the heart of the reinvention of the European project, and to respond fully to their expectations and aspirations. Four years and a half later, IFOP for EuropaNova and Le Journal du Dimanche in partnership with Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung and Corriere della Sera presented a view of the French, Italians, and Germans on the construction of Europe (IFOP, 2021). After 4 years of attempts of digital and participatory European democracy, EuropaNova commissioned IFOP to carry out an opinion survey in order to assess the opinions and feelings of the French, Italians, and Germans on E. Bernard (*) EuropaNova, Paris, France e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Rouet, T. Côme (eds.), Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20943-7_9

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European integration: in other words, assess the first results of the abovementioned non-clear mandate. The main findings of the study, on the eve of the start of the EU French Presidency of the Council (PFUE) (France Diplomacy, 2022), highlight a threefold French exception in European matters, particularly in relation to Germany and Italy. The first exception is that, in Germany as in Italy, national and European pride go hand in hand with a very high level of European pride, uniting three out of four citizens of all generations. In France, although European pride mobilizes two out of three French people, the correlation is not obvious. Some populations, such as young people or the self-employed, have little or no sense of European pride. The second exception, which is counter-intuitive, is that young French people’s level of European pride and their desire for greater European integration are low. In contrast, young Italians and Germans show a higher level of European pride and integration. The third striking French exception is that in Italy as in Germany, supporters of political parties from the extreme left to the moderate right have high and homogeneous levels of European pride and greater integration. In France, the moderate right is divided, contrary to the Italian and German situations (IFOP, 2021). The first conclusion would therefore be that the citizens’ consultations for Europe, organized in 2018 throughout the entire french territory, did not achieve the expected results, probably because of the french presidential system that polarizes opinion (Thiebault, 2006). If the President presents himself as pro-European, the opposition will tend to oppose Europe in general. The concomitance of the presidential elections and the 2022 PFUE is rather in the direction of an increased polarization. In Italy, as in Germany, the lesser personalization of power (Garzia, 2013) and the coalition culture (Evans, 2019) are favorable to a positive political carriage of European issues by all government parties.

2 2018–2019, the First Tools for Hybrid Mobilization of Citizens It must be admitted that it is too early to announce a success or failure in introducing digital and participatory European democracy in France. First, because the mandate was not clear so whoever wants to see it as a failure will see it as a failure. EuropaNova’s aim was – at the start in 2017 – to mobilize its network, expertise, and experience to involve as many citizens as possible in the collective reflection, through digital tools in parallel with face-to-face meetings. This is how from April to December 2018, according to the Ministry of European Affairs, 70,000 people in France have taken part in the “Citizens’ consultations on Europe.” 1076 meetings, called “citizens’ consultations,” had been organized in 97 French departments (Représentation permanente, 2018). Gradually, between April and December 2018, the Member States agreed to consult European citizens widely, with common methodological principles and a

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convergent objective: to bring up the fears and expectations of citizens. 50,000 responses had been sent to the online consultation open to all Europeans. These consultations took place in all EU countries except the United Kingdom, Hungary, and Italy, which refused to participate. The summary of these proposals has been submitted to the heads of state and government at the European Council on December 14, 2018 (Guitton, 2018). Following this, EuropaNova created WeEuropeans. Between December 2018 and May 2019, through an online consultation, European citizens were able to propose their solutions for reinventing Europe in concrete terms and vote on those of others. The proposals approved in each country were translated in 10 languages and put to 11 million votes. Among the most frequent requests made on the digital platform, we can read: –– Set up a European-wide recycling program. Raw materials should be reused and not destroyed. –– Ban those who have committed crimes (e.g., tax evasion) from working in public sectors or running for elected positions in Europe. –– Protect all forests with good management and we need to rebuild deciduous forest. We need to plant five trees for each one felled. –– Stop tax breaks for multinational corporations. Taxes should be paid in the country where the profits are generated. –– Invest in education and research. –– Protect workers’ rights in all EU countries. –– Coordinate the chemical restrictions, especially in the food industry. –– Support renewable energy projects in cities. –– Clear and transparent information about all the projects and agreements in the European Union. –– Ensure that every EU citizen can get medical care in any EU country with a European Health Card. In other words, citizens express their desire to make sense of the Green Deal and the rule of law. Moreover, they are imagining a social and a health Europe, even before the pandemic crisis. Unfortunately, the virus decided otherwise, and although the outpouring of enthusiasm at the face-to-face citizens’ meetings may have led us to believe that there was an impetus toward another form of participatory democracy, we soon realized that this impetus could not be encouraged solely by means of digital platforms.

3 2020–2021, Exclusively Online Consultations Leading to a Decline in Participation In 2020, while the new European Commission behaves like a common market executive and is struggling to get established and is stalling front of the cacophony of the mask drama and health coordination, EuropaNova launches the “European agenda

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for my region” a series of citizen platforms more focused on territories. Here again, ecology is a priority, although it will vary according to the territory. As an example, the question of the use of snow cannons in Grenoble does not arise in the Breton fishing zone. The link between ecology and health is clear in all the consultations: the use of pesticides and watercourses, road network, and air quality are at the top of citizens’ concerns. Migration and employment issues follow. Finally, cross-border cooperation in border regions is a recurring theme (EuropaNova, 2021). The aim, at this moment, is to provide a launch pad for the so-called Conference on the Future of Europe that has been very slow in coming into being. The platforms are multiplying; the actions are diffuse and uncoordinated between the various structures of civil society. The conclusion is easily drawn: the Internet is a public space for debate, cherished by some but decried by others. The virulence of the former discourages the latter, and the number of participants is undoubtedly decreasing. However, the subjects that mobilize participants are the same, with a clear advance in health issues in Europe and many waiting for a sign from Brussels. At the beginning of 2021, the credibility of the European Union is at stake. Everyone understands that further delay of the Conference on the Future of Europe would be misunderstood by the citizens and would have the opposite effect, by eroding confidence in the European Union’s ability to act. The inter-institutional discussions began in 2020 but are stalled on two points: the steering of the Conference, in particular the respective representation arrangements for the Council and the European Parliament, and the timetable. In its informal exchanges with the Commission and the German and then Portuguese presidencies, the European Parliament asked that the seven political groups be represented on the Conference’s executive committee. This position was unanimously reiterated at the Conference of Presidents of the EP political groups on February 11, 2021. Another difficulty was the timetable: the duration of the Conference on the Future of Europe, which was initially planned for a period of 2 years, was still under discussion, given that the launch was constantly postponed. France argued for the Conference to be finalized under the FPEU, and Portugal hoped a declaration can be signed under its presidency of the Council in order to launch the work of the Conference (Gaudot, 2021). The European Council finally delivered its conclusions on the long-awaited Conference on the Future of Europe. The joint proposal by the Commission, the Council, and the Parliament aims to reflect on the future of the of the European Union in the medium and long term, through an ambitious and inclusive process involving, as directly and widely as possible, European citizens (European Council, 2022). At this moment, civil society stakeholders are still waiting for a clear mandate to engage citizens in digital democratic participation. Unfortunately, on reading the five pages presenting the principles, objectives, and governance that will structure the EU’s next democratic high point, we all felt a sense of disbelief. In its current form, the Conference lacks both momentum and spirit. The discrepancy between

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the outcome and the lofty intentions to revive the European project set out in the significant speeches in Athens and Aachen (Elysée, 2019)  – or at the Sorbonne (Macron, 2017b)  – is blatantly obvious. Although the list of contemporary challenges, noticed from our side, ranging from the Green Deal (European Commission, 2019) to fighting inequality meets all the expectations perceived in previous years, it does not really manage to make sense of the exercise.

4 Conclusion Hence, the advent of “event-driven politics,” where improvisation and ad hoc solutions are becoming the new norm and the new tools developed the 4 last years, represents an interesting outcome. Indeed, the Conference on the Future of Europe could provide the conditions for collectively addressing the issues that have been raised over the past decade. With its ambition to involve citizens directly, at all levels of governance, it could potentially pave the way for a public sphere of governance, of continental dimension. The technical details of how and where European citizens will be invited to speak and express their views are not always clear. Furthermore, we regret that the establishment of a methodology for improving the democratic exercise is not even considered at this stage. However, several places where European citizens are invited to speak out and express their wishes, aspirations, and suggestions for the Union had been established. And we look forward that digital platform created and managed by a supranational institution will be more effective to share desires and disappointments than on social networks created by private American companies. But it is imperative that they are backed up by face-to-face meetings of all sizes, at all levels and in small communities in particular. Debates in schools and in companies also seem to us to need to be developed.

References Elysée. (2019). Signature du traité franco-allemend d’Aix-la-Chappelle. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-­macron/2019/01/22/ signature-­du-­traite-­franco-­allemand-­d-­aix-­la-­chapelle EuropaNova. (2021). Agenda européen pour ma région – Rapport. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https://www.europanova.eu/actualites/agenda-­europeen-­pour-­ma-­region-­rapport-­europanova European Commission. (2019). Un pacte vert pour l’Europe. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https://ec.europa.eu/info/strategy/priorities-­2019-­2024/european-­green-­deal_fr European Council. (2022). Conference on the future of Europe. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/conference-­on-­the-­future-­of-­europe/ Evans, M. (2019). Coalition government as a reflection of a nation’s politics and society. Taylor & Francis.

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France Diplomacy. (2022). The French Presidency of the Council of European Union. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-­foreign-­policy/europe/ the-­french-­presidency-­of-­the-­council-­of-­the-­european-­union/ Garzia, D. (2013). Changing parties, changing partisans: The personalization of partisan attachments in Western Europe. Political Psychology, 34(1), 67–89. Gaudot, E. (2021). Mettre la démocratie au cœur de la nouvelle légitimité du projet européen. Europanova. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https://www.europanova.eu/actualites/ mettre-­la-­democratie-­au-­coeur-­de-­la-­nouvelle-­legitimite-­du-­projet-­europeen Guitton, M. (2018, December). Consultations citoyennes, la synthèse européenne est publiée. Toute l’Europe. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https://www.touteleurope.eu/fonctionnement-­de-­l-­ue/ consultations-­citoyennes-­la-­synthese-­europeenne-­est-­publiee/ IFOP. (2021, December 25). Le regard des Français, Italiens et Allemands sur la fierté d’appartenance à leur pays. Le Journal du Dimanche. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https:// www.lejdd.fr/International/UE/sondage-­29-­des-­francais-­veulent-­une-­europe-­plus-­integree-­ contre-­50-­des-­italiens-­et-­43-­des-­allemands-­4084610 Macron, E. (2017a). Discours à la Pnyx, Athènes, le jeudi 7 septembre 2017. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-­macron/2017/09/11/discours-­du-­president-­de-­la-­ republique-­emmanuel-­macron-­a-­la-­pnyx-­athenes-­le-­jeudi-­7-­septembre-­2017 Macron, E. (2017b, September 26). Initiative pour l’Europe. Discours pour une Europe souveraine, unie, démocratique. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https://www.elysee.fr/ emmanuel-­macron/2017/09/26/initiative-­pour-­l-­europe-­discours-­d-­emmanuel-­macron-­pour-­ une-­europe-­souveraine-­unie-­democratique Représentation permanente. (2018, December 4). Consultations citoyennes: Remise officielle du rapport final. La France dans l’UE. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https://ue.delegfrance.org/ consultations-­citoyennes-­remise Schmidt, V. A. (2020). Europe’s crisis of legitimacy. Governing by rules and ruling by numbers in the Eurozone. Oxford University Press. Thiebault, J.-L. (2006). Les périls du régime présidentiel. Revue internationale de politique comparée, 13(1), 95–113.

(Dis)empowering Citizens at the Local Level in Bulgaria: Digitalization, Local Democracy, and Participatory Practices Before and Post-COVID-19 Daniela Bozhinova and Petia Gueorguieva

1 Introduction The chapter aims to analyze the understudied dynamics of participatory practices and use of digital tools as an enabler of citizens’ involvement at the local level in Bulgaria before and post-COVID-19. At the time of the COVID-19 outbreak, the legal framework allowed for quite limited offline citizens’ participation and almost no digital forms such as e-voting, e-initiatives, e-public deliberation, and e-assemblies at both the national and local level. The COVID-19 pandemic has been chosen as a watershed to approach the evolution of rules and practices for digital citizens’ participation at the local level in Bulgaria. The scope of the study encompasses the period before and post-COVID-19 outbreak. Burgeoning multidisciplinary studies analyze the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on the rule of law, democracy, elections, civic rights and freedoms, public policies, health systems, etc. The COVID-19 is perceived as a “turning point” or as a catalyst for changes in different fields of policies. In a vast range of activities, the pandemic has fostered the digitalization and encouraged the shift to online or blended forms of working, teaching, and participation. The main research questions of the study are related to the digital participation and to the issues of the state of democracy in Bulgaria. Have lockdowns and physical distancing provided a window of opportunity for the advancement of digital participation in the pandemic? Or has participation overall been disadvantaged and worsened due to general democratic backsliding in Bulgaria? To what extent does the current state of citizens’ participation in Bulgaria D. Bozhinova Democracy International, Burgas, Bulgaria P. Gueorguieva (*) New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Rouet, T. Côme (eds.), Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20943-7_10

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empower citizens at the local level and what part do digital tools play in facilitating it? What part do digital tools play in facilitating citizens’ participation at the local level in Bulgaria? Did the COVID-19 pandemic cause a substantial shift from the conventional offline arenas to the digital ones for the citizens’ participation at the local level? On the eve of COVID-19 pandemic, Bulgarian citizens didn’t have access to institutionally designed and opened digital tools for effective participation at local level. Though, curiously for a decade, Bulgaria has been a part of the multinational initiative Open Government Partnership (OGP) (2022) aimed to promote transparency and to empower citizens, the current results of country’s commitments are quite limited. Despite all commitments, it did not improve access to information on public consultations opportunities, nor did it improve the ability of citizens to took part in decision-making offline or through digital platforms (Anguelov, 2019). Experts’ assessment of the digitalization in Bulgaria points out that the country lags the rest of Europe in the adoption of digital technologies. Several factors explain this situation: “poor digital literacy and skills, low levels of investment in research and development, and incomplete digitalization of public services are holding the country back” (Aridi & Querejazu, 2022). In 2019, only 30% of adults had basic or above-basic digital skills compared with the EU average of 60%, while almost one quarter have never used the Internet. The COVID-19 pandemic has further uncovered shortcomings in Bulgaria’s digital readiness. Regarding the e-government, Bulgaria is a characterized by low performances in both digitalization and penetration (European Commission, 2021). The level of digitalization is 11 percentage points below European average, and on the penetration  – 31 percentage points below EU average. The country is included in the group of not fully exploiting ICT opportunities (Idem). The study addresses the local level, and it is important to remind that Bulgaria has for a long time been the poorest country of the EU, suffering from depopulation and severe demographic crisis. The North-Western region in Bulgaria is the poorest in the entire EU. In 2020, 48.8% of Bulgarian citizens living in the rural areas and more than 30% of those living in towns and suburbs were at risk of poverty or of social exclusion (Eurostat, 2021). The quality of still semi-consolidated Bulgarian democracy has worsened during the last decade. There are recurring political crises and parliamentary and governmental instability. From 2013 to the end of 2021, six national legislative elections were held, three of which in the sole 2021. The weakening and the fragmentation of political parties, the frequent appearance and disappearance of antisystem political actors go along with falling voting turnouts, apathy, and a downward trend of conventional form of participation, such as membership in parties and trade unions. The mass protest cycle and unrest that exploded in June 2013 has showed that in the absence of effective institutionalized channels for participation between elections, citizens occupy squares to save democracy, to fight corruption assuming the role of the ineffective and weak parliamentary opposition (Gueorguieva & Krasteva, 2013). These protests used the social media, the e-Street, for mobilizing protesters and for sharing information. New mass citizens’ mobilization against

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oligarchs, government, and corruption started in July 2020, and in the absence of a variety of tools and channels – off- or online – for citizens’ participation, the most effective action remain the mass street protests. Again, the “e-Street” – the social media  – played an important part in the mobilization and protest’ organization. Our hypotheses are the following: Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the regulated forms of citizen participation at the local level are limited, and there weren’t institutionalized digital tools provided. That is why one can suppose that the extraordinary situation would have led to: New digital tools, provided by institutions and authorities to citizens, as an additional arena for the implementation of the existing forms of political participation at the local level. The usages of digital tools and platforms expanded as additional, non-­ institutionalized forms of citizen participation, extra-parliamentary activities, and civic engagement.

2 COVID-19 Has Been a Catalyst for the Shift from Offline to Online Forms of Participation at the Local Level Our approach draws on the concepts of participatory democracy and citizens’ participation and understands the digital participation as a hybrid form that combines diverse tools and activities, including the Internet and the social media and platforms. The research methods include analysis of legislative acts, decisions of local authorities, documents, discourses, and case studies. The study is structured in four parts. The first part reminds the main concepts and findings on participatory and digital democracy. The second part analyzes the legal framework, regulations, and practices of citizen participation both at the national and at the local levels before the COVID-19 pandemic. The third part is focused on the post-COVID-19 context of digital citizen participation. The fourth part presents and discusses three different cases of digital participation at the local level during the pandemic.

3 Theoretical Framework For assessing the state of participation and digital participation of Bulgarian citizens before and post-COVID-19, we will remind some seminal concepts and approaches to these issues. Participatory democrats stand for the direct political participation of citizens in the regulation of key institutions, including the spheres of community, and advocate citizen participation as the principal political practice (Elstub, 2018). The republican model of citizenship gives citizens and civic organizations an important role for self-management and collective responsibility for the development of

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local communities through their participation in democratic decision-making process (Boje, 2021, p. 123). Pateman has listed the most important elements of participatory democratic theory: “The capacities, skills and characteristics of individuals are interrelated with forms of authority structures. Individuals learn to participate by participating. Thus, individuals need to interact with democratic authority structures that make participation possible. The argument is about changes that will provide opportunities for individuals to participate in decision-making in everyday life and in the political system. Participatory theory is about democratizing democracy. The changes required are structural and necessitate reform of undemocratic authority structures” (Pateman, 2012, p. 10).

3.1 Citizen Participation Political participation encompasses citizens’ activities “that attempt to influence the structure of government, the selection of government officials, or the polices of government” (Conway, 1999, p.  3). We will refer here to definitions of political participation summarizing decades of research and multiple approaches. Theocharis and van Deth sum up the following characteristics: “First, political participation refers to people in their role as citizens and not as politicians and civil servants. Second, with exceptions, political participation is understood as political activity. Third, the activities of citizens, defined as political participation should be voluntary and not ordered by a ruling class or obliged under some law or decree. Finally, political participation concerns government and politics in a broad sense of these words (political system) and it is neither restricted to specific phases nor to specific levels or areas” (Theocharis, 2018, p. 47). Political participation refers also to citizen’s engagement on digital media dealing with social or political issues: posting or sharing links to political stories, commenting on social or political issues on social media, and encouraging other people to take action on political or social issues using social media (Theocharis, 2018, p. 48). Ekman and Amna made a distinction between political participation and civic engagement on the ground of their typology of latent and manifest forms of participation (Ekman & Amna, 2012). Latent forms of political participation include involvement and civic engagement (activities based on personal interest and attention to politics and societal issues, voluntary work for improving conditions in the local community, etc.) (Ekman & Amna, 2012, p.  292). Manifest political participation refers to individual or collective forms, formal participation, and activism or extra-parliamentary participation (Idem). Analyzing the process of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Piper claims that “the participation is about the direct involvement of citizens or members of affected community in the decision making-process” (Piper, 2014, p. 53). The direct participation of citizens in the decision-making process at the local level enlarges the representation at the municipal level. He has noted that Porto Alegre participatory budgeting, generally defined as a participatory institution, implements direct

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democracy and that its systemic effect was the broadening of representation of marginalized groups, ensuring greater access, louder voices, and more impact on decisions that are then implemented by the politicians (Piper, 2014, p. 64). Purposes of political engagement cover “a vast spectrum facilitating citizen voice to decision-makers, developing individual political efficacy, mobilizing community groups or fundamentally changing the values of society and politics […]. The ubiquity of social media in the everyday lives of citizens fosters the development of digital citizenship” (Vromen, 2017, p. 3). “One key element of participatory democratic citizenship is the ideal of the citizen as active agent involved in decision-making about how society is constituted and develops; locally, regionally and nationally” (Boje, 2021, p. 123). Boje affirms that participatory forms of direct democracy can empower citizens and involve them in  local decision-making. However, he noted that “The evidence suggests that endeavors to create counterpoint to the economic and political elite by providing democratic channels for ordinary citizens to take part in decision making are often temporary in nature, unless an organized institutional counterpoint is built up. Therefore popular mobilization and civil actions require institutional structures to provide a sustained and powerful form of participatory democracy over times” (p.  173). In his study of local democracy and citizenship, Heilnelt noted that “Participation at the local level means that those that could be affected by a policy have to be involved in its implementation” (Heilnelt, 2012, p. 238). Participatory governance arrangements would contribute to improving the quality of decision-­ making and to legitimize decision-making. Altman argues that the citizen-initiated mechanisms of direct democracy such as popular initiatives or referendums “offer a means to invigorate current democratic regimes because they maintain democracies’ normative foundations of freedom and equity, which are particularly at risk in the context of unequal societies” (Altman, 2019, p. 206).

3.2 E-Democracy and E-Participation While analyzing digital politics, Coleman and Freelon noticed that citizens can use digital tools “as entry points to collective - or connective - action that reduces communicative inequalities between the poorest and traditional power elites” (Coleman and Freelon, 2015, p. 3.) Digital networks can put pressure on governments, amplify citizens’ voices and connect to others with similar values. However, if the social media can be a tool for emancipation and liberalization by democratizing the information, and for enabling mobilization, there are also examples of how authoritarian regimes can use internet platforms against democracy (Gagné and Mahé, 2020, p. 10). There are numerous definitions and approaches of digital democracy. Budge has emphasized that “the new challenge for direct democracy lies in the fact that is now technically possible,” thanks to the spreading new technologies allowing discussion and voting on public policy by everyone who is linked to the Internet (Budge, 1996, p.  1). For him, the major institutional changes related to direct

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demultiplex democracy would take place in the media and above all the digital tools because “electronic communication would be the main channel for mass debate and voting” (Budge, 1996, p. 182). The more quoted definition of van Dijk understands digital democracy “as the pursuit and the practice of democracy in whatever view using digital media in online and offline political communication. The online-offline distinction should be added because political activities are not only happening on the Internet but also in physical meetings where mobile digital media are used for assistance” (van Dijk, 2012, p. 51). Other specialists define “e-democracy as the practice of democracy with the support of digital media in political communication and participation. E-participation encompasses all forms of political participation, making use of digital media, including both formally institutionalized mechanisms and informal civic engagement” (Lindner & Aichholzer, 2020, p. 18). According to another definition, “digital participatory democracy is the usage of digital technology for citizen’ acts. The digital technology means the mobilization of portable computer applications (available from any device). Citizens acts are all the transactions that which a citizen has with his community, whether transactions of goods or services or exchanges of co-construction” (Autissier et al., 2019, p. 127). The e-participation, according to van Dijk, refers to the relationship of citizens with governments and public administrations and  is  “the use of digital media to mediate and transform the relations of citizens to governments and to public administrations in the direction of more participation by citizens” (van Dijk, 2012, p.56 ). The e-participation is related to public service issues that shape the day-to-day relationships between citizens and the state at large. Lindner and Aichholzer (2020, p. 23) have elaborated an operational typology of functions, types, and tools of e-participation facilitating comparative and case studies (presented in Table 1). They distinguish three main types of e-participation. The first type is related to monitoring function and includes e-information, e-­deliberation, Table 1  Functions, types, and tools of e-participation Function of citizen involvement Monitoring

Agenda setting

Decision-making

Type of e-participation E-information E-deliberation E-complaints E-petitions E-initiatives E-complaints E-consultations E-participatory budgeting E-voting

Source: Lindner and Aichholzer (2020, p. 23)

Tools Tools for monitoring, questioning, and advising political representatives Citizen initiatives E-petition Crowdsourcing for law proposals Crowdsourcing for policy-making Internet consultations, collaborative decision-­ making within political parties Consultative participatory budgeting Participatory budgeting E-voting

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and e-complaints. The second type, linked to agenda-setting function, comprises e-petitions, e-initiatives, and e-complaints. The third type, with function of decision-­ making, encompasses e-consultations, e-participatory budgeting, and e-voting. Some forms of online activity are “the continuation of traditional participation by other means, while other forms of online activism represent new opportunities and may draw other citizens into the political arena” (Dalton, 2017, p.  128). Research findings show that new capacities offered by the digital in the everyday functioning of democracy would not be a substitution to the face-to-face functioning and the physical participation will always be necessary (Metais-Wiersch, 2019; Lindner & Aichholzer, 2020). Metais-Wiersch distinguishes two types of hybridizations between digital participation and the participation in presence. The first type are digital tools used to reinforce traditional forms, allowing for a larger engagement and participation. The second refers to digital tools which appear outside the existing mechanisms but benefit forms in presence (Metais-Wiersch, 2019, p. 72). There is a conceptual vagueness in the term “online deliberation” which can refer to all kinds of discussions online (Strandberg & Grönlund, 2018, p.  365). There is a consensus that, following the deliberative theory, the discussions should be inclusive, rational-critical, reciprocal, and respectful (p.  366). Strandberg and Grönlund sum up two types of preconditions on online deliberation. The first is related to the characteristics and capacity of citizens who participate in deliberation; the second type is related to institutional design of deliberation settings. While online discussions are abundant, they often consist of “discussions in enclaves among like-minded citizens, which can have negative effects, for instance in the form of opinion formation and polarization” (p. 374). Assessing the impact of e-democracy on the democratic governance is complex and inconclusive. Smith has pointed out that while ICT marks a new age for democracy with new possibilities for citizens’ participation in politics, at the same time, it increases the surveillance by the state and commercial actors and favors the marginalization, the fragmentation, and the personalization of politics (Smith, 2010, pp. 142–161). There are “sceptics” who consider that the democratic possibilities of the web have been exaggerated and “enthusiasts” who point out the horizontal, civil society character of the Internet and its open and participatory affordance (Dahlgren, 2015, pp. 25–26). The Internet is viewed as a space of interaction of civil society activity and the public sphere communication and as a space that empowers citizens and broadens the spectrum of the public sphere. Geissel observes that “E-Democracy have raised lofty hopes in 1990s. It has expected to make political communication and participation easier, faster and more equal. However, real-life experiences have revealed the limited benefits. New technologies…do not necessarily improve democracy  – and sometimes even have opposing impacts. Involvement and participation, for example, often did not become more inclusive, but even more biased. The term ‘digital divide’ illustrates this bias” (Geissel, 2013, p. 13). Geissel proposes five dimensions for the evaluation of participatory innovations: inclusive and meaningful participation, legitimacy, deliberation, effectiveness, and enlightened citizens (p. 16). She concludes that e-democracy does not necessarily make participation more inclusive or meaningful and seems to

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have little impacts on citizens’ enlightenment or improvement of skills. “E-democracy provides novel channels for information exchange, participation and communication, but its potential for improving the quality of democracy is low” (p. 28). There is also the issue of digital divide, a “multidimensional phenomenon tapping many social cleavages,” where differences of resource are among the most important factor of it (Norris, 2001, p. 77). Studies reveal that they are still digital divides inside online deliberation, such as differences in computer skills which impact on how likely citizens engage in online deliberation. Another factor is the lack of motivation to take part in online deliberation (Strandberg & Grönlund, 2018, p.  366). For Dalton (2017), new forms of online activism can further widen the participation gap. People with greater skills and resources are more likely to expand their participation to online tools, while the less educated are hardly involved in either offline or online methods. “This means that the expansion of political participation to online methods can produce even greater inequality of voice between higher- and lower -social-status individuals” (Dalton, 2017, p. 139). It is worth noting that  Latin America, the region, defined as a  “laboratory of new forms of e-­participation and digital institutions design” prove that “decreasing levels of digital exclusion have been enabling higher levels of political inclusion” (Pogrebinschi, 2017). We will now turn to the existing regulations for citizen engagement and political participation in Bulgaria.

4 Legal Framework and Practice of Citizens’ Participation at the Local Level in Bulgaria 2009–2021 Before entering into the descriptions and analytical aspects of citizens’ local participation in Bulgaria, we first take a brief look at the sub-national institutional development and the degree of local autonomy which affects the ability of citizens to participate and influence local policy-making.

4.1 The Local Political Context in Bulgaria The local level of policy-making in Bulgaria became of relevance only after the downfall of the centralized totalitarian state in 1989. Local self-government was reestablished with the Constitution (1991) and the Act on Local Self-Government and Local Administration.

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The sub-national self-government consists of a single tier  – the municipal 1, comprising 264 municipalities1 with directly elected mayors and municipal councils. Studying citizens’ participation at a local level in Bulgaria is important because the self-government is laid down by the Constitution at the local municipal level (Art. 136.1). This is also the closest to the citizens’ level of decision-making. Municipal council (obshtinski savet), directly elected for 4 years, is the main deliberative body and locus of the self-government (Constitution, Art. 138). The law on self-government provides that “Local self-government shall be expressed in the right and actual opportunity of citizens and their elective bodies to resolve on their own all issues of local importance that the law has empowered them to resolve” (Art 17.1). The competences of municipalities are limited to the areas of municipal properties, taxes, finances, and administration; the planning and development of the territory; the education, health, and culture; the public works and utilities; the services of social welfare; the protection of environment; the maintenance and conservation of cultural and historical monuments; and the developments of sport, tourism, and the protection from disaster (Bulgaria Republic, 1991). In fact, the legal framework doesn’t allow for large self-government, and active inclusion of citizens in the decision-making is limited. Stefanova has pointed out the weaknesses of the legislation which gives local authorities the right to decide on matters of local importance but at the same time doesn’t provide a clear definition of what exactly are matters of local importance (Stefanova, 2021, p. 85). The municipalities have acquired administrative competence and some financial autonomy. The process of fiscal decentralization, however, has been slow, and Bulgaria continues to be quite centralized. Responsibilities transferred to the local level for the provision of public services are not fully compliant with the existing level of fiscal autonomy of sub-national government units. Local governments remain largely dependent on the central government for revenues and hence are politically vulnerable for fear of budgetary constraints. There are broader governance structural issues and legislative gaps that bring about some confusion of powers, national and local, and often hinder the municipal exercise of authority. Infrastructure projects and distribution of European Union funding are entirely in the purview of the central government. All the above implies a low efficacy of citizens’ participation (or at least of its government-sponsored forms), as participation only occurs within the domain of local competences if not even in a much-restricted space.

 Within the municipalities, there are 5267 smaller towns and villages. There is a regional level of government comprising 28 administrative districts (“oblast”) with appointed governors. Actually, these represent deconcentrated administrations of the central government. 1

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4.2 Mode and Instruments for Citizens’ Participation at the Local Level The right to democratic participation is enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Bulgaria and a number of legal acts concerning land use and urban planning, local rule-making, budgeting and loan-taking by the municipalities, strategic local and regional planning, environmental impact assessment of projects and investments, and some other minor fields of local governance. The country is a signatory to the European Charter of Local Self-Government and its Additional Protocol on the right to participate in the affairs of a local authority which explicitly spells out “the right of citizens to participate in the conduct of public affairs.” The partnership approach and stakeholders’ consultation are a horizontal principle and requirement when investing funds provided by operational programs and institutions of the European Union. Legal rights, however, are not so easily and willingly translated into lived rights. A precondition and sine qua non for the exercise of the right to participate is the availability of public information – provided proactively by the local authorities, as well as provided at the request of citizens (irrespective of the reasons for the request). The Access to Public Information Act (2000) introduced the obligation to inform. This obligation was taken, at first, by the local authorities as a nuisance, but over the years, it has more or less become the norm. Further amendments to the Act have expanded the legal obligation for proactive disclosure over a considerable number of fields and activities of local government. Electronic requests have become the preferred mode of accessing and receiving public information, and the re-use of information is facilitated more and more, in line with Directive 2013/37/EU on the Re-use of Public Sector Information. The intensive use of the Access to Public Information Act by NGOs, citizens, and media and the legal developments of the last 20 years have brought about notable advances on the road to accountability and transparency of local government. As the information access landscape continues to develop, it can be assumed that the right to participate in local policy-making is increasingly facilitated. Forms and instruments for local public participation in Bulgaria, other than voting in elections, include public consultations, public hearings/discussions, citizen advisory committees, petitions, questionnaires, opinion polls, citizens’ initiatives, referendums, and general assemblies of the residents. With regard to the policy-making cycle, the abovementioned forms can be placed predominantly in the policy formulation and planning phase. Modes for exerting direct citizens’ control are underdeveloped legally. As for decision-making, the instruments of initiative, referendum, and assembly made available to the citizens through the Act on Direct Participation in State and Local Government have proven rather inefficient in design and overall incapable to ensure and sustain the citizens’ role as a final decision-maker (except for a few breakthroughs). Nevertheless, modes of direct participation, when successfully applied, are of the most intense impact and influence.

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4.3 Local Direct Participation The Congress of Local and Regional Authorities has observed in its session in 2021 that “referendums have increasingly been used as a tool of direct democratic involvement for resolving issues which are of fundamental importance for peoples’ lives” (Council of Europe, 2021). Bulgarians are no exception to this general trend, and in recent years, there has been a growing demand for more direct democracy in the country. While public support for direct participation in policy-making has been significant, the practice of initiatives and referendums in the country has been overall lamentable and frustrating. This is mainly due to a highly restrictive and ambiguous legal framework which effectively invalidates the right of the Bulgarian citizens to directly decide on issues, which right is, otherwise, enshrined in the national Constitution (art.1). According to Peicheva, the direct democracy de jure is equal in legal strength to representative democracy, but the legislation is deliberately formulated to restrict this equality (Peicheva, 2018, p. 66). “The conditions in Bulgaria are not conductive to promoting equal status between instruments of direct democracy, the referendum in particular and between representative democracy” (p. 66). What is more, there is a lack of uniform register of local initiatives and referendums even though municipalities are required to register referendums held in their territory (Peicheva, 2018; Stefanova, 2019). There is no exhaustive general information of all local referendums, especially on the number of these initiated by the citizens, which creates difficulties for research and analysis. In 30 years of democratic development following the collapse of totalitarianism in Bulgaria (1989), not a single national referendum and only few of approximately 200 local votes and initiatives have been able to overcome the high thresholds set by the Act on Direct Participation of the Citizens in the State and Local Government (ADPCSLG). Local direct political participation is allowed within the range of powers of local self-government in Bulgaria but cannot deal with financial issues such as taxes and municipal budgets. Three forms of sub-national direct participation are envisaged in the ADPCSLG: the local referendum, the local citizens’ initiative, and the general assembly of the residents/citizens. There are no regional channels for direct citizens’ participation (no provisions of a regional referendum or initiative). The word “referendum” in the Bulgarian legislation (and colloquially) is used in the very broad meaning of any direct popular vote on an issue, regardless of whether it is a legislative proposal or a broadly formulated question or a veto vote on a piece of legislation and regardless of who made the proposal  – a citizens’ group from below or the elected councilmen/mayor (parliament – for the national referendum) from above, etc. Conversely, the “initiative” is understood in the narrow sense of agenda initiative – a citizens’ proposal (not necessarily a legislative one) submitted to the city

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council (national parliament for the national initiative) for consideration and decision-making. All instruments of direct participation are facultative. Only one type of referendum is mandatory – the territorial referendum – which is part of the legal procedure for the formation, change, closure, and merging of municipalities. The territorial referendums represent the prevailing share of all local referendums held or launched in the country. All forms of direct participation in Bulgaria are offline. There is no specific regulation providing for online signatures’ collection to call a local referendum nor for online campaigning. The COVID-19 pandemic and sanitary measures implemented such as social distancing and limitation of public meetings and contacts were not a sufficient factor for authorities to offer a digital arena for citizens’ activities related to the exercise of the direct democracy at a local level. The only online direct mode of participation is the European Citizens’ Initiative, which is an instrument for addressing the supranational level – the European Commission – along with citizens of other member countries. There is no recall election mechanism in the Bulgarian realm of local direct democracy.

4.4 Use of Direct Participation Instruments Referendums (facultative) have been used mainly to contest local, but predominantly central, government decisions, affecting a certain locality. The local facultative referendum has been employed as an elite-challenging tool for defending community interests, very much in line with the Progressive Era concept of direct democracy as “the gun behind the door.”2 The subject matter in most of these referendums has been health and environment related (voting most often on mining sites, waste disposal facilities, or urban greenery). “Local communities take up protest actions and organize signatures’ collection for referendums on the occasion of ill-considered, unlawful and contradictory to local goals of development projects for public or private investment landfills, incinerators, quarries, mines and others” (Bozhinova, 2016, p. 17). Notably, the first local votes that drew national attention and had serious political impact were those against the construction of a crude oil pipeline3 which jeopardized both a nature preserve and the hospitality industry in the Black Sea region of Bulgaria (Table 2). Only few of the citizens-initiated local votes have been successful legally. Two key factors have been at play for the success or failure of a local citizens-­ driven referendum:

 The phrase is attributed to Woodrow Wilson, President of the USA 1913–1921.  The Burgas-Alexandroupolis crude oil pipeline project as per agreement between Russia, Greece, and Bulgaria (2007). 2 3

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Table 2  Notable local initiatives/referendums in Bulgaria Year Locality 2021 Sinitovo

Population Issue 1700 Waste depot

Official result YES

2017 Trun 2017 Stara Zagora 2017 General Toshevo 2015 Samokov

3900 150,000

Gold mine City park

16,000 35,000

Gas exploration Waste depot

YES NO Insuff. turnout YES

2014 Varna

340,000

City park

2013 Kaspichan 7300 2012 Gorna Malina 2011 Dobrich

7200

2009 Pomorie 2008 Sozopol 2008 Burgas

28,000 14,000 215,000

101,000

Waste incinerator Stone quarry Shale gas exploration BA oil pipeline BA oil pipeline BA oil pipeline

Policy impact None. Challenged in court, ongoing Cancelled mine Stopped urbanization on park territory Stopped project

Petition did not qualify Petition challenged in court, ongoing YES

None

YES

Cancelled project

Petition did not qualify YES NO NO

Moratorium shale gas exploration Cancelled project

Development permit freezed Cancelled project

Source: Authors

The size of the locality – the smaller the number of residents, the more achievable the quota of signatures (10%), as well as the turnout threshold.4 The attitude of the local authority – a hostile local government would be able to kill the petition -drive by taking advantage of the porous provisions of the law. Overall, local referendums in Bulgaria have been blocked and mostly inefficient for the following legal drawbacks and pitfalls: There is a high degree of institutional and procedural uncertainty with regard to (a) the referendum question (it can be edited by the city council or dismissed as not adhering to the competences of local government, which, as mentioned earlier, are marred with ambiguities and legal gaps); (b) the quota and verification of signatures; and (c) the campaign financing, access to media, and other components of the referendum process. The excessive personal data required from petition signatories discourages support and makes signature collection especially hard. The time for signature collection is very limited  – 3  months. Adding up to these hurdles is an excessive unprecedented administrative burden  – a legal requirement for redoing the

 Turnout threshold was originally 50% of the electors and then changed to “at least as many as have participated in the preceding local election of mayor and council” and is currently fixed at 40% of the electorate. 4

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completed paper petition in a MS Excel table, line by line, for the needs of the verification authority in the same 3-month time frame. The very high thresholds for calling and winning a local referendum are greatly discouraging for both launching a petition and voting in a referendum and are favoring pro-status-quo interest groups. The (agenda) initiative is used very seldom. In the limited occurrences of local initiatives, they, unlike the referendum, have been employed for some developmental goals, e.g., citizen groups have submitted proposals for the renovation of school buildings (Burgas, 2016), restoring a public spa facility (Provadia, 2017), launch of a municipal greenery production unit (Asenovgrad, 2018), etc., in most cases to no avail. General assemblies of the residents have been called incidentally by local governments in some smaller municipalities so as to legitimize a decision, already made, like the decision for allocating municipal land for a wind farm in the municipality of Karnobat (2009), or to decide on a very divisive issue such as the water and sewerage problem in the municipality of Kresna (2016). To conclude, the experience of local referendums, initiatives, and assemblies has demonstrated so far that local direct decision-making in Bulgaria, except for a few breakthroughs, has mostly failed to serve as an institutional channel for citizens’ empowerment and participation. Stefanova has pointed out three observations on the practice of local referendums in Bulgaria: (1) the interests to the local referendums are growing during the last decade; (2) the vagueness of the definition of the term “issue of local interest” and the citizens’ lack of knowledge of the local self-­ government competences hinder the initiation of referendums conforming to the law; and (3) there is a risk that the direct democracy is used manipulatively to serve parties and private or corporate interests which could result in discouraging citizens to use the local referendums (Stefanova, 2019, p. 136). As mentioned earlier, no recall election mechanism is envisaged in the Bulgarian legislation. But it is worth mentioning a peculiar use of one of the referendum types – the territorial one – as a substitute of the recall (“crypto-recall”). In a plethora of cases, the reason for petitioning for a territorial referendum has been the utmost dissatisfaction of some local communities (villages, small towns) with the distributive policies or services or some abuse of power by the municipal authorities. These communities try to “flee” from the municipality they administratively belong to, so as to start their own municipality or join a neighboring one. Perhaps it would be more correct to say that these communities have been trying to use the territorial referendum so as to recall themselves out of the mismanaged municipality instead of recalling the elected mayor/councilman as there is no recall election mechanism that would have allowed the lawful removal of a grossly incompetent, negligent, or corrupt elected official.

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5 Citizens’ Participation at a Local Level in Times of Pandemic Studies of COVID-19 pandemic and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe focus on actions of governments and potential attempts to reinforce illiberal trends but also the resistances of civil society and citizens (Guasti, 2020; Brucker & Perottino, 2021; Löblová et al., 2021; Gueorguieva, 2022). As many others, at the beginning of the pandemic, the Bulgarian government has introduced a state of emergency, accompanied by strict sanitary measures, limitation of contacts and public gatherings, and further centralization of powers in the executive power at national level (Greer et  al., 2022). Thus, the local level in Bulgaria was further weakened even though in the consecutive phases of COVID-19, certain decentralization of crisis management was implemented. Bulgarian citizens and civil society started mass protests in the summer of 2020 against the government and the corruption. The 2021 electoral year in Bulgaria is marked by the unprecedented three parliamentary elections held on April 4, July 11, and November 14, 2021. Early elections were held two times because of the lack of agreement among parliamentary parties to form a majority and to elect a government. The main opposition was between the established parties and the anti-establishment opposition, composed of new political formations (Todorov, 2021). The COVID-19 pandemic seemed to be an unexpected ally of the ruling parties for the first elections in April (Todorov, 2021). Downgrading voting turnouts, shrinking support for established parties confirmed the trends of decreasing of the formal political participation and the lack of confidence in parties and institutions. Extra-parliamentary opposition coalition Democratic Bulgaria and citizens’ mobilizations pushed without success for the introduction of the e-voting in the time of pandemic. For the elections in July, the revision of the election code introduced the mandatory machine voting in all electoral sections with more than 300 registered voters. It seems that the machine voting has dissuaded several voters to cast their votes because of lack of knowledge how to proceed with machines and is a cause for the lower turnouts in July and in November. Some scholars define it as “digital disenfranchisement” and “digital discrimination” because voters lacking skills were excluded from the electoral process in July and November’s elections (Kolarova, 2021, p. 41). In the post-COVID-19 period, there are some digital innovations implemented in a few of municipalities. We will present three case studies of digital citizen participation during the pandemic.

6 Case Studies Three case studies of three different forms of digital citizen participation at the local level are presented and discussed. The first and the third cases – participatory budgeting and online consultations – provide examples of digital innovations, involving

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citizens, set up by local authorities. The second case illustrates the citizen engagement on social media.

6.1 Case Study: Pilot Participation Budget in Sofia in COVID-19 Times A pilot participatory budgeting process was implemented in the capital city of Sofia which coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic. This innovation was introduced at the initiative of an NGO coalition “Citizens for Citizens’ Budget of Sofia.” They have been pressing Sofia local authorities for quite some time to “join the 1300 plus cities throughout Europe which have been already using this democratic mechanism of policy-making.” The campaign “Sofia Chooses” started on September 17, 2020, and lasted about 3 months. Citizen’s participation could take the form of submission of projects and ideas, commenting on projects and ideas, and voting for or against the published citizens’ proposals. These activities have been implemented predominantly online, the most massive of them being the online discussion which involved about 900 citizens. The city of Sofia designated BGN 1.5 million (about 770,000 €) of their annual budget as a “citizens’ budget.” Over 80 projects and ideas have been submitted by NGOs and citizens groups, of which 39 have been approved by the public via online voting. At the end of the process, one project – the one with the most votes – was awarded the whole amount of the “citizens’ budget 2021” as it was decided by the city council that the proposal addressed a crucial need: the need for renovation of school toilets. To disburse the funds, a call for applications from schools of the metropolitan area has been convened at the completion of the participatory budgeting activities. A school could apply for toilet renovations and other urgent repairs at the maximum cost of 50,000 BGN (about EUR 26,000) per applicant. Regardless of many faults and critiques of each stage of this first participatory budgeting process, the effort was widely supported by the public, as the polls showed. The citizens’ budget was replicated in Sofia for fiscal year 2022 with a program focus on public greenery and climate policy, but this time unfortunately with less public money – BGN 1 million and 40 project submissions. The citizens’ budget in the city of Sofia sets a precedent in Bulgaria for applying this instrument of citizens’ participation. Regardless of the many flaws of the first employment of participatory budgeting technique in the country, the Sofia citizens’ budget 2021 opens the way to involving local residents in the financial and capital investment planning of the city, improving transparency in public spending, and making cities more inclusive.

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6.2 Case Study: Citizens’ Engagement on Facebook – The Municipality Vratsa Municipality Vratsa provides on its site a link allowing citizens to send a written signal, complaint, or proposal.5 However, it is not clear what happens thereafter with them, because the deadline or the ways of the municipality’s answer are not explained. Additionally, at least five different public Facebook pages have been created and are active, aiming to discuss questions of every day local problems, related to citizens’ opinions, critics, state of the infrastructure, environment, cleanliness and pollution, social issues, and others in the competences of the municipality of the city Vratsa. Two public Facebook pages are officially administered by the municipality: “Municipality Vratsa”  – “official page of the municipality of Vratsa for current news, signals, and proposals” with 23,000 registered members6 – and the FB group “Municipality Vratsa – signals and proposals”7 with 8000 registered members. The group is a part of the official page of Municipality Vratsa. “Its main goal is to improve the communication with citizens. A team of the municipality will be looking for a timely solution of matters expressed and for ways to carry out the proposals.” The municipality has set strict rules for the usages of the group: “the signal must contain concrete question, location or picture; offensive expressions and qualifications are not admitted; the group is a non-partisan – its goal is to find solutions to citizens’ problems and to receive proposals; signaling in the group does not exclude to address the administration and to submit a complaint or proposal.” Other Facebook pages are administered by citizens. The first is the public group called “Tell the Mayor of Vratsa”8 with 10,500 registered members. The groups were created in August 2011 on the occasion of the local elections under the name “Choose a Mayor of Vratsa”; later, in October 2011, the name was changed to “Tell the mayor of Vratsa.” There is also a citizens-initiated public Facebook group called “Vratsa – Tell the Mayor and the Municipality”9 with 2100 registered members. Created on October 21, 2021, it declares being “genuinely non-partisan group for signals, opinions, proposals to the mayor and the administration of municipality Vratsa.” A public group, called “Save Vratsa,”10 was created at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic on April 14, 2020, with the goal: “Save Vratsa! Save Vratsa from waste and pollution! For a clean and ecological city where everyone to dream of living!”. The group has 5200 registered members.

 Cf. https://www.vratza.bg (06/06/2022).  Cf. https://www.facebook.com/obshtinavratsa (06/06/2022). 7  Cf. https://www.facebook.com/groups/1134723170278043/announceme (06/06/2022). 8  Cf. https://www.facebook.com/groups/kmeta (06/06/2022). 9  Cf. https://www.facebook.com/groups/834940917132993/about (06/06/2022). 10  Cf. https://www.facebook.com/groups/SpasiVratsa/about (06/06/2022). 5 6

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It is difficult to assess the real impact of the citizens’ discussions, comments, critics, and proposals addressed to the municipality and the mayor on Facebook. Most publications are reactive – the citizens complain or express their indignation of dirty streets, uncleaned areas, low quality or absence of social services, etc. Nevertheless, numerous Facebook pages show the need of more tools allowing citizens’ communication with local authorities and their participation in the decision-making.

6.3 Case Study: Digital Citizens’ Consultations There are two digital participatory innovations in 2021–2022, implemented after the COVID-19 pandemic in two Bulgarian municipalities. The very first digital platform for citizens’ consultations is launched by the municipality of Kardzhali in December 2021 under the project “Entrance for Citizens” in cooperation with two civil society organizations (CSO)  – the Forum Citizens’ Participation and the Bulgarian Center for Not-for-Profit Law. “In connection with the application of continuous consecutive measures to fight the COVID-19 pandemic, the municipality Kardzhali is addressing the citizens to enable them to express their opinion and to make proposals”.11 The online platform “Kardzhali with you”12 offers citizens the opportunity to participate in debates and voting and make proposals and a “collaborative legislation.” The digital deliberative platform is supported by the open-source software Consul application. The platform invites citizens to “decide how to shape the city you live in,” to “help about collaborative legislation,” and to participate in the debates on new regulations and strategies before their approval by the municipal council.13 The municipality of Targovishte became the second Bulgarian municipality that have launched similar digital platform for citizens’ consultations “Targovishte decides”.14 It provides the opportunity to participate in debates and voting and make proposals and a “collaborative legislation” and also for digital participatory budgeting.15 During the period 2019–2021, regulations on public consultations at a local level were adopted by several municipalities  – Kardzhali, Lovech, Targovishte, and Karlovo (Taralezhkova et al., 2021, p. 10).

 Citation, 06/06/2021, at https://www.kardjali.bg/?pid=2,2&id_news=8075 (05/06/2022).  Cf. https://zateb.kardjali.bg/ (05/06/2022). 13  Cf. https://zateb.kardjali.bg/legislation/processes?filter=past&locale=en&page=1 (05/06/2022). 14  https://reshavam.targovishte.bg/ 15  Cf. https://reshavam.targovishte.bg/ (05/06/2022). 11 12

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7 Conclusion The review of digital mechanisms for citizen participation at the local level in Bulgaria allows us to draw some concluding observations. Firstly, there is no institutional change in regulations to enlarge citizens’ participation at the local level during the COVID-19 pandemic. Secondly, a significative shift from offline to online forms of citizen participation at the local level for already existing activities didn’t happen. The Citizen Participation Index has noted that “There is lack of sufficient mechanisms for online participation and improving communication between citizens and institutions is still among the most important recommendations […] the institutions have used the COVID-19 pandemic to limit citizens’ access to them and therefore the opportunities for citizens’ participation and control” (Forum Citizen Participation, 2021). At the same time, the digital has continued to provide tools and platforms for alternative citizen activism and engagement. Effective forms of unformal participation are discussions, advocacy, request to access to public information, and letters to institutions.16 Citizens’ engagement through social networks is growing, but this form of participation is highly unregulated (Taralezhkova et al., 2021). Digital tools for citizens’ participation are limited to the use of social networks. Contrary to our preliminary hypothesis and expectations, the pandemic did not trigger an online enlargement of citizens’ participation neither at a national nor at a local arena of the decision-making. However, there are noticeable digital participatory innovations implemented in two municipalities Kardzhali and Targovishte which have launched digital platforms for citizens’ consultations. In both cases, this success is the result of efforts and cooperation with CSO. While it is too early to assess the quality of online consultations and citizens’ participation, this innovation came to fill the gap left by a missing national regulation and the raising citizens’ engagement and demands for participation. One can expect that it is only the beginning of a participatory change that will be followed by other municipalities.

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 Ibid.

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The Conditions of Social Learning in Formal Deliberative Settings: A Study of Municipal Councils in Brussels Mohamad-Amin Alomar, Mohammad Al Saleh, David Aubin, and Stéphane Moyson

1 Introduction Democracy is backsliding in large parts of the world, even in stable democracies. A growing disillusionment with democratic institutions, lower levels of support and trust in politicians and political institutions, a rise of authoritarianism and populism, and a growing gap between citizens and decision-makers are some important signs of democratic erosion (Lindell & Ehrström, 2020, p. 2; Landemore, 2017, p. 52). Deliberative democracy has grown in theory and practice in order to tackle these challenges. It is supposed to increase the legitimacy of democratic decision-making by empowering citizens and letting their voices be actually listened by decision-makers. Two main deliberative “tracks” can be distinguished, according to Habermas (1996): “the first kind of deliberation [is] meant to be formal and decision-oriented, taking place within the walls of Parliament. The other, taking place among the public, [is] decentralized, distributed, informal, and diffuse, with the assumed function of setting the agenda for Parliament” (Landemore, 2017, pp. 52–53). Not only are these two extremes of the same continuum – debates with citizens within the walls of parliament becoming increasingly common (e.g., Vrydagh et al., 2021) – but other forms of “institutional deliberation” (e.g., in governments, courts, policy processes) have also been recognized (Quirk et  al., 2018). In addition, they reinforce each other: while informal public deliberation plays a crucial role for empowering citizens and formulating policy recommendations, formal public deliberation remains fundamental to transform the outputs of informal deliberation into concrete decisions. M.-A. Alomar (*) · M. Al Saleh · D. Aubin · S. Moyson Université Catholique de Louvain, Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Rouet, T. Côme (eds.), Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20943-7_11

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Deliberation, in its Habermasian ideal-typical form, involves people with various understandings and interests openly expressing the “reasons” (1984) for their views toward a public problem and their preferences regarding the solutions to the problem. Likewise, they should listen to the reasons expressed by other participants (Mansbridge et al., 2012). This should at least lead – if not to a higher level of agreement among participants – to better knowledge of the problem and a greater awareness of the diversity of views. Parties standing too far apart and unwilling to compromise may bring democratic work to a standstill (Skoog & D. K., 2021). This can prove to be harmful insofar as it substitutes particular interests for the general interest, favors the balance of power often to the detriment of the weaker ones, and ultimately limits the collective intelligence of municipal deliberations. In other words, deliberating involves learning, the latter having a crucial role in the conditions and outcomes of the former. That said, social learning is not necessarily desirable per se and may be a lever for some deliberators to impose their views over the others’ opinions. Learning, in turn, may be defined as an individual and collective process involving the enduring acquisition or modification of cognitive constructs such as beliefs and preferences (Riche et  al., 2021; Gregorcic & Krašovec, 2016). Learning has been popularized in public administration and public policy research starting in the 1970s (Heclo, 1974), in order to understand how public decision-makers deal with societal problems characterized by uncertainty and improve governmental capacity to address them. Moreover, existing research demonstrates that effective learning accelerates the development of shared understandings and mutual agreements, transforms relationships among parties, and, ultimately, facilitates decision-making (Riche et al., 2021). Public deliberation can be considered a context of “social learning” (Dryzeck, 2007; Gregorcic & Krašovec, 2016). Social learning approaches focus on the cognitive and social mechanisms through which actors in a given institutional setting manage uncertainty and complex ideas to make policies (Heclo, 1974; Moyson & Scholten, 2018). Who learns what, in public deliberation settings? Consistent with social learning in policy processes, social learning in deliberative settings may concern two dimensions (Moyson, 2017). On the one hand, learning refers to the acquisition of information: the collection and treatment of this information, subject to various heuristics and biases, questions or reinforces the existing beliefs of individuals, or generates new ones. On the other hand, information acquisition can lead adjustments in individuals’ attitudes and behaviors. In addition, learning in deliberative settings is social because it concerns at least two individuals: the educator, who shares information, and the learner, who collects and treats information – and, potentially, the facilitator, who can model deliberation through (Prosser et al., 2018). However, in contrast with the classical learning setting of a classroom, the roles of educator and learner should not be stable over time, in a Habemarsian deliberative setting: each participant plays (or at least can play) these two roles. In this chapter, we are interested in the conditions of social learning in formal deliberative settings. On the one hand, while the role of learning in deliberative processes is crucial, it is not self-evident. Fundamental differences in interests,

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goals, and values, or even in ways of interpreting situations, almost invariably make such learning processes very challenging in formal deliberative settings (e.g., Eriksson et al., 2019). On the other hand, so far, few research on social learning in deliberative settings has been conducted in general and, especially, in formal deliberative settings. What are the conditions of social learning among participants in formal deliberative settings? To address this research question, we present the results of the thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews with municipal council presidents and general directors from 13 municipalities in the Brussels-Capital Region in Belgium. The next section provides details about the research context and methods before the presentation of the results. We conclude with a discussion of these results, with a particular focus on the potential role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT).

2 Research Context and Methods There are 19 municipal councils in the Brussels-Capital Region in Belgium. Within these councils, about 700 elected officials (or “councillors”) meet and deliberate together about various important issues of citizens’ lives, such as teaching, sport, mobility, social services, etc. The municipal councils are the parliaments of the municipalities in which the councillors are supposed to protect the public interest through several main roles such as making decisions on municipal issues; giving the executive (the “college” of Mayor and Deputy-Mayors or aldermen) the means to work by voting the budget; and controlling the action of the executive. In other words, councils are crucial arenas of politics and policies at the municipal level. The municipal councils meet almost monthly. The agenda and supporting documents are sent by the municipal administration to the municipal councillors 7 full days before each council meeting. In this context, municipal councillors are involved in social interactions with each other, as well as with various stakeholders such as civil servants, companies, associations, or citizens. These interactions about policy issues (e.g., sport) can help them to accumulate evidence (e.g., about sport needs in the municipality), which can lead to revise or strengthen their policy beliefs and preferences (e.g., to build or not to build a new sport hall). Given this, in theory, municipal councils could be the place for social learning per excellence. In practice, however, during municipal councils’ deliberations, the political groups and their members would play frozen roles. The majority group would most often support the college, value its action, and explain how well their vision of the world has been implemented. The minority group, in contrast, would express another vision of the world, propose alternative proposals to the projects of the college, and control the college of the mayor and aldermen (De Beer de Laer, 2012; van Haute et al., 2018). In other words, elected officials would attend council meetings with the main objective of defending their positions, like in company boards

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(Dinsart, 2019). This suggests that municipal council deliberations, as such, do not foster social learning. That said, there are steps preceding monthly council meetings and providing councillors with other opportunities to interact, in addition to informal talks among councillors: • Committee meetings involve some members of all political groups and principally aim at discussing the technicalities of the issues on the agenda of the next council meeting. Experts internal or external to the municipal administration may be invited to answer councillors’ questions. • Group meetings are commonly organized before council meetings for the members of each political group to define positions and to assign missions regarding the next council meeting (who speaks about what). Most often, majority groups meet together, whereas opposition groups meet per group. To address the research question, semi-structured interviews were conducted with municipal council presidents (MCP, i.e., elected officials) and general directors (GD, i.e., civil servants) in 13 municipalities (see Table 1) between May 2020 and October 2020. This is, at the same time, a strength and a limitation of the research design. On the one hand, municipal council presidents and general directors are among the most experienced and committed members of municipal councils, with a detailed knowledge of the council procedures and dynamics. On the other hand, the other councillors were not directly interviewed, which means that some reports on learning dynamics are only indirect. The duration of each interview, conducted on site or online, varies between 45 and 70  minutes: 212 pages of qualitative data resulted from the transcription of the recordings.

Table 1  List of interviews (MCP, municipal council president; GD, general director) Municipality Brussels City Schaerbeek Ixelles Uccle Woluwe-Saint-Lambert Jette Saint-Gilles Etterbeek Woluwe-Saint-Pierre Auderghem Watermael-Boitsfort Ganshoren Koekelberg Source: Authors

Date of the interview October 2020 October 2020 October 2020 October 2020 October 2020 June 2020 October 2020 October 2020 October 2020 October 2020 October 2020 October 2020 May 2020

Interviewee(s) GD MCP GD and MCP GD GD and MCP GD GD GD GD GD GD and MCP GD GD and 1st Alderman

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As far as social learning is concerned, questions about information acquisition and sharing as well as attitudinal and behavioral adaptations were asked. The questions concerned the meetings of the committees, the groups, and the council itself. As far as the conditions of social learning are concerned, we conducted a thematic analysis of qualitative data (Paillé & Mucchielli, 2016), using the NVivo software version 11. We aimed to allow research findings to emerge from the frequent, dominant, or significant themes inherent to the raw data (Thomas, 2006). We decomposed the received data in “themes” and sometimes in “sub-themes.” To do so, we read the full text of each interview at least two times. Each quote related to social learning and its conditions – i.e., conditions that lead councillors to play the role of educator or learner through interactions among them – and a new theme was created on NVivo.

3 Conditions of Social Learning in Municipal Council Deliberations in Brussels: Results of the Thematic Analytics Various conditions of social learning in the context of municipal council deliberations have been identified. They have been organized by level of analysis – micro, meso, and macro – and consistently presented in this section.

3.1 Micro-level Conditions of Social Learning The micro-level conditions of social learning in council meetings refer to the motivation of the individual councillors, their personal and professional background, as well as their political and legal experience. All councillors are not equal to address the multiple and complex issues on the agenda of municipal councils. First of all, they are not equally motivated. You might think that people are easily putted on electoral lists…. That is not true. It is not interesting for people to be in the municipal council for 4, 5 or even 6 hours sometimes if they do not have the possibility to have an active role…. Then, once the people are elected, they must keep them motivated

The personal interest and motivation of councillors to engage in discussions about municipal issues have been mentioned multiple times by our interviewees as a reason for which the discussions will be constructive. For example, discussions within the preparatory committees would be more constructive than the public sessions of the council because, generally, the councillors who attend these committees participate, either at the request of their political group because they are competent in the topics being discussed or because they are personally interested in them. In addition, the (gross) fees are limited: between 75€ and 200€ per committee and council

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meeting, according to the regional law – a fee that does clearly not compensate for the preparatory work and meetings. In most municipalities, it is closer to 75€ than to 200€. This means that, unlike for the regional and federal representatives and senators, politics may not be – and is not – a full-time job, for the “simple” municipal councillors who do not cumulate that mandate with one or more other ones. In this context, engaging in long-term public deliberation and demanding social learning processes on municipal issues requires a lot of motivation. Second, the councillors have different personal characteristics as well as various social, economic, and cultural profiles. As a result, their tendency to speak and, perhaps, their ability to understand each aspect of the issues, at the preparatory meetings and at the council meetings, are different. There are people who are not easy with public speaking. […] There can also be shyness. It is the socio-economic level, I mean by that, the level of education…. We have some of our councillors who have difficulty reading or speaking in French or Dutch. And it is not them who we will hear most often of course.

Third, the political and legal experience of councillors can influence their participation to social learning dynamics within council meetings. I think those who have a good political experience, whatever in local, regional or national level, are much more at ease to speak in public and will intervene more rapidly and effectively

For example, municipal affairs are complicated and interconnected with competences at regional or federal levels. A lack of political and legal experience can limit the ability of the municipal councillor to understand what falls within municipal competence or not, what he or she can or cannot do. You may have been elected because you are popular and active in the field of sport, and find yourself in a town council not knowing the limits of what you can do or not. A municipal councillor, individually, is someone who works most of the time in the private sector and is rarely confronted with the logic of public service and municipal authority as we know it. We are often in a situation where it is necessary to explain municipal councillors that it is not because a given street is on the municipal territory that is the municipality is responsible for its maintenance and cleaning. There are streets through which the tram passes, those ones are maintained and cleaned by the Brussels-Capital region…not by the municipality.

Some interviewees even suggested that the new councillors, in order to be able to participate effectively in municipal affairs, should undergo specialized training on the functioning and skills of municipal councils. These training courses are usually organized by non-profit organizations such as Brulocalis, the Association of the Cities and Municipalities of the Brussels-Capital Region. … A new councillor really needs training to understand properly […] there is specific training that is organized, for example, by Brulocalis for all new municipal councillors to understand the framework, the overall functioning of a municipal council…. I think such trainings can provide new elected representatives with a minimal baggage.

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That said, interestingly, some interviewees underlined that the municipal councillors with legal background, like lawyers, often focus on formal issues and on procedures rather than on the content of the discussion. [The councillors who have a legal background] participate more but, from my experience, they focus on questions of form rather than on questions of substance, of content. …. Where a councillor who does not have this legal background, will rather talk about the substance of a problem.

3.2 Meso-level Conditions of Social Learning The meso-level conditions refer to the relationships among them. Prior relationships among municipal councillors allow them to meet together informally and to discuss municipal issues, which creates more trust and cordiality among them and thus facilitates interactions that can lead to social learning, especially in small-sized municipalities: If we look at thirty items on the council’s agenda, we usually have twenty to twenty-five items which are adopted unanimously. Here, we have a reality: everyone is talking to each other. I mean, we’re all at the market on Sundays, we talk to each other, we know each other.

Beyond relationships, cordiality in the discussion between councillors has been pointed out by multiple interviewees as condition for social learning to occur, especially in municipalities in which such cordiality seems to be missing. In a democratic system, it is usual to disagree with the ideas of others. However, lack of respect freezes communication among participants. The way in which the person expresses his or her disagreement is essential in creating a positive environment for communication based on mutual understanding and respect. Cordiality is a fundamental element. We may not agree, but there are ways to say it when we do not agree…We may not share the same opinion but, at the least, we owe the respect.

Cordiality opens the doors for social learning as it enhances the receptiveness of the councillors to new information produced by the other parties during the council meetings or the preparatory meetings, which can lead to correcting minor errors, to redrafting some parts of decision projects, or even to more radically changing the original decision projects. One might think that it is inevitably majority against opposition. However, we can be surprised because sometimes we can see a radical change during the session, where the opposition raises a point, and at the end, that changed completely. During the discussions within municipal councils, there is an exchange of ideas, of counter-proposals, and that the alderman may say: “Ok, it’s a good idea to take this into account”. […] Yes, that could happen. The municipal administration prepares a draft of deliberation. If the councillors decide in session to modify it, they have the right. But they should have a majority to do that. If the minority achieves to convince the majority to add something, we can add it. So, it’s not automatically that the points pass like that, not at all… we could be wrong, we may have forgotten something, we can improve the project.

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However, municipal politics is as it is, and other interviewees argue that the impact of relationships and cordiality, though real, remains rather marginal: Change happens… but it’s rare ... the majority / opposition divide stays quite respected.

3.3 Macro-level Conditions of Social Learning The macro-level conditions of social learning in council meetings are mainly political and procedural. We also discuss the role of ICT in council meetings. Municipal politics is generally understood by municipal councillors as a game closer to rivalry and conflict than to collaboration. Each political family has its vision of the public interest and its political convictions and beliefs which are generally based on sound theories in political, economic, social science, etc. Disagreement with others does not necessarily mean that his point of view is not legitimate, but, quite simply, it is not “mine.” Right-wing economic policy, for example, is a supply-side policy. Left-wing, socialist economic policy is a demand-side policy. As a socialist, even if supply-side politics has its legitimacy and is reflected in some states, I will not lead a politics of supply overnight as a socialist. It would be contrary to my commitment, it would be contrary to my convictions and, although I hear that there are other beliefs and other ways of doing things, but they are not mine.

The nature of the political game implies that the political parties that are in power and were elected on the basis of a municipal program will carry it out despite disagreement of the others. … If what the other defend represents their vision of the general interest that I do not share with him…. I make sure that my vision prevails, because it is me who was elected, it is me who is in the majority and thus, it is me who decide… therefore it is my vision of society that I’ll implement.

Practically speaking, following each election, the political groups forming together the majority negotiate and publish a document, called “the majority agreement,” presenting the overall program and roadmap which will guide the action of the college until the next election. The opposition, which does not participate to these negotiations, is not prompted to share its good ideas with the majority during the legislature. It will not be a natural reflex if, systematically, someone from the opposition share his/her good idea with the majority or the mayor and ask them to put it themselves on the agenda.

Such a majority-minority politics of domination confirms the idea that councillors play frozen roles, in the context of council deliberations. On one side, the opposition groups are not tempted to share counterarguments or good ideas with majority groups during committee meetings, in order to improve decision projects of the majority. They keep their best ideas for council meetings.

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On the other side, the majority groups often rely on their political power to impose their projects without looking for the support of the opposition groups: they are not encouraged to produce information in order to convince the opposition groups. Within the majority groups, the councillors are always most often involved in a dynamic of “political” support, even if they do not, individually, quite agree. I think the councillor of the majority, he’s in a situation where it’s very difficult to stay motivated. Because, even if he does not agree with what is done, he is always in a dynamic of majority. On the other side, on the opposition side, most councillors have a role or take a role... Actually, we often say that the worst role in a municipal council is to be a councillor of the majority. Because they really have nothing to do.

At the end of the day, information exchange and acquisition are limited during council meetings, especially on issues that are politically divisive. In addition, political parties at the local level tend to remain consistent with the position of their political family, even if the political group at the local level does not quite agree That said, the interviews reveal that opportunities for social learning are more numerous than suggested by classical depictions of formal council meetings: discussions between majority and minority councillors generate actual learning dynamics on most municipal issues in informal talks, in group meetings, and, mostly, in committee meetings. In the latter ones, experts internal or external to the municipal administration are commonly invited to share their knowledge which is considered to be more “neutral” and, anyway, fosters learning too. Certain procedures of the municipal councils can influence the possibilities of social learning among councillors. At the informal level, the tasks are distributed among councillors, within political groups. Indeed, given the considerable number and complexity of items that are on the agenda of the municipal councils, as well as the short amount of time available to do that, it is not possible for each councillor to prepare and speak about each of them. In this context, the political groups, more particularly the group leaders, try to distribute the work among its members, taking into account the specialty and skills of each member before each municipal council. Upon receipt of the agenda, the group leader says: Well here you are, we’ll share the work. Do you want to take a look at the public construction contracts? Do you want to examine the budget etc. […] In this way, it becomes usual to see the same persons intervening on the same points all the time?

In terms of social learning, those routines have several implications. On the one hand, they suggest that the items on the council agenda are addressed by councillors who hold some sort of expertise, capable of producing and understanding relevant ideas about it. On the other hand, they mean that each municipal issue is actually prepared by a small number of similar councillors, which limits the variety of positions discussed in the meetings as well as the chances to be questioned or reinforced in the light of new information. At the formal level, first, public access (or not) to the discussion of councillors plays a decisive role in social learning among them. While council meetings are public, committee meetings and group meetings or informal talks are not. Discussions between municipal councillors which are not accessible to the general

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public are much more conducive to social learning. Committee meetings, in particular, were underlined by the interviewees as important moments for fairly constructive discussions between political groups. They allow the majority groups, in particular, to listen to the suggestions of the minority groups and to actually integrate them in the decision projects. Similarly, they have more room to ask annoying questions to the members of the college or to criticize their action. I would say, as long as you are not in public mode, as long as there is no public audience watching or who is likely to watch, collaboration is much easier. In discussions, at all levels of power, in the shelter of a castle without journalists, you forge better deals than when the press is there. It is the theatrical aspect, the aspect “the public looks at me…I will put the college in difficulty”. I think that in committee discussions, it is much easier to achieve consensus, to have constructive discussions than in public sessions.

Second, two types of voting procedures may be distinguished, within council meetings. Both of them discourage social learning. On the one hand, collective votes or by group involve that the group leader acts as spokesperson and votes on behalf of all group members, which hampers social learning, certainly during council meetings themselves but also during preparatory meetings depending on the social dynamics within and between groups, for example, if the group leader does not tend to listen to new information provided group members form group positions. Similarly, the latter are not tempted to provide information to the former anymore. On the other hand, in nominal or individual votes, each councillor votes personally, which can foster social learning. In fact, there was a voting system by which voting was done by group. So, it was the group leader who said: “Green, okay.” PS, okay… it was usually the group leaders who voted on behalf of their group. After few years, it was M. xxx, who said: “listen, we have agreed this mode of operation, but ... I no longer want this system of vote because, even though I am the chef of the group, I don’t have to impose my vision on my own group to the point where they vote like me”. On this basis, the municipal council changed the voting system. Now, everyone votes personally, there is no spokesperson who says: “Ecolo Group, we are seven, ok”…Which is, in my opinion, very democratic. It’s democracy in the group…

That said, individual votes cannot guarantee a full freedom to share or to acquire information nor to adapt and express his or he own policy preferences accordingly. As mentioned above, there is an actual group pressure, especially in the majority supporting the college, on individual councillors as far as individual votes are not anonymous but nominal. [The individual vote] does not mean that the group leader after the public session can say: “Well my friend, you voted against whereas I had suggested”.

Overall, both informal and formal procedures in municipal councils have been pointed out as obstacles to social learning, with the exception of the political specialization of some councillors in some municipal issues resulting from the repartition of tasks within their respective groups. The main software used to support the work of the Municipal Councils is “BO Secretariat” (BOS). BOS has been developed by the Brussels Regional Informatics

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Centre: a regional public agency offering ICT services related to the competences of the Brussels-Capital region, including municipal issues. BOS facilitates the electronic management of the secretarial work of assemblies, such as municipal councils. With the exceptions of Brussels-City and Schaerbeek, BOS is used by all municipalities of the Brussels-Capital Region and seems to be positively perceived. I experienced both before and after BOS…. BOS has changed my life positively for several reasons, first I have a system that is secure, starting from the moment when an agent puts the point in BOS I get tracing of the process, the complete history of modifications etc. And then, when we make a modification during the session, whether during the College or Council meetings, I can immediately check whether it is in order and I know that this is the version that will go to the tutelage.

BOS has not been developed to foster discussions and social learning among councillors as such. Yet, BOS facilitates the access of municipal councillors to the files related to the Council agenda, which gives them more time to examine them. Elected officials have passive access ... But it is not between them, they do not have the possibility to communicate with each other via BOS. Within the period of seven full days, not only do [the councillors] receive the agenda but all the proposals for deliberation which will be submitted for their approval and all the appendices as well. They have access to all the annexes, all the documents that will enable them to clarify their knowledge of the case.

Beyond BOS, ICT are barely present, and their contribution to social learning is limited. Still, the interviewees mentioned email correspondence and, sometimes, WhatsApp groups which mainly bring together the municipal councillors of one given political group, but never all the municipal councillors of the majority and the opposition.

4 Conclusion Public deliberation involves people with various understandings and interests openly expressing the “reasons” (Habermas, 1984) for their views toward a public problem and their preferences regarding the solutions to the problem. Public deliberations, in this Habermasian (1996) form, suppose social learning, defined as an individual and collective process involving the enduring acquisition or modification of cognitive constructs such as beliefs and preferences (Dryzeck, 2007; Gregorcic & Krašovec, 2016). In this chapter, we have looked at the conditions of social learning in formal deliberative settings based on the thematic analysis of semi-structured interviews with municipal council presidents and general directors of 13 out of the 19 municipalities of the Brussels-Capital Region in Belgium. Overall, our findings confirm but strongly qualify the classical view on municipal councillors as playing “frozen” roles at council meetings (De Beer de Laer, 2012; van Haute et al., 2018). Admittedly, all councillors are not equally equipped to engage in discussions leading to social learning about municipal issues, depending on their personal and professional background as well as their legal and political

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experience. Despite relationships that can be characterized by cordiality, municipal politics in general, as well as the elaboration and implementation of the majority agreement against and without the minority groups in particular, do not drive councillors to learn from each other. Similarly, formal voting procedures and public access to the council meetings can cultivate democracy but also the pressure from municipal and regional/federal parties on individual councillors and can discourage them to express themselves as well as to adjust their attitudes and behaviors according to the new information shared by the other councillors or by experts and citizens. Last but not least, a limited number of councillors remain actually motivated to engage in cognitively and socially demanding processes of discussion about municipal issues over time. This is especially true in the majority groups, in which the councillors are strongly expected to support the action of the college. Furthermore, the issues on the agenda of the municipal councils tend to be divided among the same councillors over time, according to their knowledge and motivation. As a result, the council meetings are often closer to discussions between insiders defending constant positions, than to Habermasian deliberations eliciting social learning. Yet, the group meetings and the committee meetings have been highlighted on multiple occasions as venues where, beyond council meetings as such, learning actually occurs among councillors. Most often restricted to a limited number of interested councillors, they allow actual dynamics of social learning on decision projects within and between minority and majority groups. In the same vein, our interviewees have tended to pinpoint the obstacles to social learning in municipal councils. They are real, of course, but we hypothesize that they are, most often, the photographic negative of what can happen in other municipalities. For example, cordiality may be lacking here, but not there. Similarly, group pressure may be higher in some municipalities and lower in other ones. In other words, the qualitative data point to a diversity of conditions to social learning, but they do not quantify their presence or absence nor their actual effect on learning dynamics. Finally, the conditions of social learning in municipal councils are strongly related to each other. For example, some group leaders are well aware that the motivation of the individual councillors needs to be cultivated: according to our interviewees, they can take this into account to share the work within the group. These findings suggest several implications. First, future research on formal deliberative settings should embrace a processual approach (see, e.g., Rick & Liu, 2018) that includes not only the formal steps of the process but also the informal ones. In municipal policymaking in Brussels, what happens at some points of the process, e.g., at the council meetings, is not what happens at the other ones, e.g., at the preparatory meetings. Social learning is probably stronger in informal meetings than in formal ones. Second, with some exceptions (e.g., Delwit, 2005; de Maesschalk, 2009), empirical research about municipal councillors in Brussels remains scarce. Future research on social learning in municipal councils should be conducted on larger sets of councillors and municipalities. How much motivated, experienced, or cordial are municipal councillors in Brussels? Is municipal politics an obstacle to social

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learning in all municipalities? How is the work actually organized within and between political groups? Ultimately, what is the actual effect of these conditions on social learning? The results presented in this chapter are based on interviews only with municipal council presidents and general directors from only 13 out of the 19 municipalities in Brussels. Quantitative research would certainly be adequate to address these questions more precisely. Generally speaking, given their number and their importance in politics and policy, more research about municipal councillors is needed. Third, this chapter focused on the conditions of social learning, perhaps at the cost of a finer operationalization of learning itself. What kind of information is actually shared, during council meetings? To what extent do the councillors adjust their beliefs and preferences to this information? Following the exploratory study presented in this chapter, addressing these questions requires new research methodologies. For example, direct observations or the analysis of meetings’ transcripts would certainly facilitate the analysis of information exchanges (e.g., Schatz, 2013; Dooley, 2020). Longitudinal analyses of councillors’ positions could be helpful to assess learning more precisely (e.g., Neale, 2020; Moyson et al., 2022). Fourth, future research could address some contextual conditions of learning in municipal councils which have been overlooked in this chapter. For example, some interviewees suggested that social learning is easier in smaller municipalities  – where most councillors know each other  – than in bigger ones  – where it is not always the case. Similarly, the role of municipal council presidents and general directors as facilitators (Prosser et al., 2018) of council discussions has not been clearly addressed in this research, whereas existing research suggests that their impact on social learning could be important (Riche et al., 2021). Last but not least, we did not engage in wider, ethical questions such as whether or not political red lines against parties considered as too extreme are desirable. But, strictly speaking, social learning in municipal councils can suffer from decisions not to debate with the councillors from these parties. Practically speaking, these findings suggest that municipal councillors and officials are not without recourse to model social learning in councils. For example, majority agreements could be designed in such a way to involve minority groups. This way, the political project implemented by the college would be the result of a deliberation eliciting more social learning among members of the majority groups as well as the minority groups. To do so, solutions to recognize the contributions of the minority groups to the municipal projects should be found. Similarly, the study has pinpointed that the participation of the councillors from the majority groups to the decisional processes is, sometimes, limited. In other words, their potential for contributing to the dynamic of social learning can be underexploited. To address this issue, informal procedures promote actual discussion between the members of the college and the councillors from the majority groups. At the formal level, some rules could be designed to compel the latter to express their opinions, either during the preparatory meetings or during the council meeting themselves. Elections could be complicated for those who do not apply those rules, e.g., with reports on how

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much they took the floor during the policymaking process, inspired by the statistics about parliamentary activities already existing at the regional and federal levels. At the end of the day, what could be the role of ICTs in social learning within municipal councils in Brussels? Several studies have confirmed that the use of ICT can help to improve interactions and knowledge acquisition by participants in deliberative settings (e.g., Velasquez & González, 2010; Wyss & Beste, 2017). As far as municipal councils in Brussels are concerned, we suggest that a two-step software could be designed according to the Delphi technique (Fink-Hafner et al., 2019). In a first step, a councillor, e.g., a group leader, would submit a given municipal issue to other councillors, e.g., to the other group members, to the other members of the minority/majority group, or to all other councillors. Several open questions would be asked to each councillor. These questions could be structured around a conceptual framework for policy analysis, e.g., the multiple streams framework (Zahiariadis, 2019): What is the public problem? What should be the policy solutions? Are they feasible? Etc. The anonymous answers to these questions would be examined by a policy analyst, and, in a second step, several closed questions would be asked again to the participants to assess the degree of consensus on some perceptions of the problem and of its solutions. The result of this survey would be the basis for discussions in preparatory meetings and council meetings, especially when the decisional process is long term enough. In other words, this software would not be intended to replace classical council meetings but just to support them. Of course, such a solution would have some drawbacks. First, the solution is digital, whereas the interviews revealed that municipal councillors’ experience with computers is highly variable. Second, as far as the solution does not replace the face-to-face meetings, engaging with the software involves more work, especially for the most committed councillors, whereas the research has pinpointed that cultivating councillor motivation is already difficult. Yet, we believe that the software would effectively address the obstacles to social learning. Most importantly, the anonymity of the participation would remove some group pressure on individual councillors, allowing the emergence of opinions that would not be expressed in face-to-face settings. Similarly, some councillors are, perhaps, more comfortable with expressing their opinions online than aloud. As a result of the Delphi approach, some solutions could reveal more (or less) consensual than they seem to be in classical meetings, revealing the actual level of agreement or disagreement among councillors, which would suggest more extensive discussions about them. Overall, we believe that ICT could push deliberators to express their “reasons” more openly, not only in the municipal councils of Brussels but also in other formal deliberative settings. Acknowledgments  This work was supported by the Brussels-Capital Region – Innoviris, grant 2019-PRB-34.

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Could Facebook Save Cities? The Case of “Save Sofia” Ildiko Otova

1 Introduction In parallel to the development of the information and communication technologies, there has been developing interest in them on behalf of the – generally speaking – public sciences. Moreover, Cardon has noted rather fairly that seldom has the concept of any technology engaged in politics so much as the concept of the Internet (Cardon, 2010). Interpretations of the connection between the new technologies, Internet, social networks, and democracy vary from enthusiasm to pessimism. The present text suggests viewing the subject with realism. Positioned within the social space of the city, it poses the provocative question: could Facebook save cities? Of course, Facebook is used as an example of one of the many dimensions of the digital, being the most popular social network in Bulgaria, whose national context encloses the case under examination, and what is meant by “saving” is the revitalization of democracy and overcoming the crisis of legitimacy and representativeness, proceeding from the understanding that social cohesion is a key factor for the sustainable city development and the urban democracy (Otova, 2021).

2 Digital Realism The early years of development of the new technologies and Internet involved enormous enthusiasm. Smilova in an analysis from 2011 has aptly called this period “the honeymoon of the new technologies and democracy” (Smilova, 2011, p. 259). The I. Otova (*) New Bulgarian University, Sofia, Bulgaria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Rouet, T. Côme (eds.), Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20943-7_12

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positive expectations can be summarized in two directions. One is about democratization: the opening of authoritarian regimes toward the democratic world, about guaranteed access to information for their citizens, about the establishment of active anti-authoritarian civil society, and about rendering support to democratic reforms (Smilova, 2011). The second one concerns the improvement of the quality of democracy in advanced democracies, in which apathy and disillusionment are in evidence or as summarized by Smilova: “the new technologies should have aided the democratic participation of broad social groups, the easier, faster and cheaper mobilization of participation-and-pressure groups, greater involvement in policy making of groups outside the elite, more possibilities for discussions and achieving consensus on the basis of broad deliberation between broadest circles, including marginalized; collecting political information, more possibilities of democratic control  – through intercepting deception and checking facts, quick feedback, more transparency and openness of politics toward citizens, etc.” (Smilova, 2011, p. 259). The text by Smilova (2011), although written in Bulgarian, makes an extraordinarily good critical reading of the debate on the subject grounded in English-­ language literature, by systemizing it in the three key directions of democracy – information, discussion, and participation: “Quality democracy cannot be conceived without informed citizens taking part in public discussions and ready to engage in political actions” (Smilova, 2011, p. 263). Thus, especially with the entrance of the social networks in the daily and political communication in the following years, there continued to appear various analyses and researches concerned with the extent to which these networks were able to improve the participation of citizens, to overcome the lack of representativeness, and ultimately to revitalize democracy. The processes, related to the Arab Spring and the new “new social movements,”1 have given impetus to a number of mostly positive interpretations and expectations. Informational communication technologies, the Internet, Twitter, and Facebook, the new channels of communication were understood as an instrument, stimulating grassroots civil initiatives. At the same time, politicians from various points of the world have demonstrated how these same technologies can be used successfully. From the very outset of the mass advent of the Internet and the new technologies in the life and politics, however, there was no lack of more skeptical opinions. I shall synthesize the criticisms here in several directions without exhausting the entire register of possibilities. The first relates to the so-called digital divide – the differences in accessibilities and the proficiencies in the use of technologies and the Internet among different age groups, between rich and poor, educated,and uneducated, and elites and broad societal masses. In other words, as it turns out, the Internet has the potential to reproduce social stratifications and inequality and not to aid their overcoming or to work for higher levels of cohesion. The second criticism adds to the first another degree of stratification, even polarization. It is related to the  With the intensity of the 2011 protests, scientific attention was riveted to the social movements, which in this period were seen in the context of emerging digital technologies and social networks on the Internet. 1

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so-called echo chamber effect – shutting inside the digital of groups already formed by some ideological or other trait. In this sense, Cass Sunstein asserts that the possibilities for choice provided by the new media would result in people consuming mostly information which corroborates their original political convictions and interacting mostly with other people who are of the same persuasions. This, in the course of time, could result in intensifying political polarization within society (Sunstein, 2001). Later, this understanding is elaborated further with the concept of filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011). Thus, in practice, we can see the negative effects in all three dimensions of democracy cited above: information, discussion, and participation. Recent years, however, have seen the establishment of something, which is more appropriately called “digital reality” or “digitalization of reality,” and for that reason it is legitimate to speak about “digital realism.”2 Actually, as early as 1985, Kranzberg formulated his famous Kranzberg’s First Law, which reads as follows: “Technology is neither good nor bad, nor is it neutral” (Kranzberg, 1985, p. 50). Hindman, for his part, reminds that one of the reasons for Internet skepticism relates to the fact that “Internet may have little impact on politics – or [may] even change politics for the worse. Some have proposed that the movement of traditional actors and political interests online means that cyber politics will mirror traditional patterns – that, as Michael Margolis and David Resnick put it, online politics is simply ‘politics as usual’ (2000; see also Davis 1998)” (Hindman, 2009, p. 23). Spassov writes that in social terms technology cannot be separated from the specific context of its application, that social networks merge technological and community factors, and that these factors are difficult to view in isolation (Spassov, 2011). Moreover, nowadays we cannot conceive the social and political field apart from their digital dimension. In this sense, it is not just that we cannot regard technologies in optimistic or pessimistic perspective, but it is necessary to view them as a reality that is neither good nor bad. At the same time, neither this is a neutral reality, to the extent that it has transformed both the social and political fields into a concrete and specific context. Thus, to name Bulgaria as one example and to contextualize the example to be examined in this analysis, one should regard the virtual or digital turn within the frame of the processes taking place in the post-1989 period, related to the democratization and the transition from communist to post-communist society – institution building, the transition to market economy, and the formation of the civil society. I am about to outline two tendencies, which bear relevance to this analysis. The first is related to the development of the civil society. The second one relates to the turning of populism into a dominant of the political process. Each one has a digital dimension of its own. In the initial years following the transition to democracy, the civil society is seen as a “sine qua non condition for democracy” (Todorov, 2009, p. 24), as a “training ground for ‘grooming’ citizens, preparing them for civic participation and political  Ivanyi (2017), for example, talks about the “digital realist” – balanced approaches to examine and validate optimistic digital arguments about the hypothetical causal relationship between the cyberspace and community engagement. 2

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engagement” (Dahlgren, 2006). Krasteva writes that the non-governmental organizations represent the “translation” of the post-communist civil society (Kraseteva, 2009). Paradoxically, however, it turns out that, in order to promote civil society, it is structures rather than activities, and organizations rather than citizens, that have received greater support (Krasteva, 2012). This has caused some distortions in the civic sector, which can be summarized into two negative trends – institutionalization and professionalization (Otova, 2013). These initial years were marked by the domination of the non-governmental organizations (Otova & Staykova, 2018). The digital turn coincided with the emergence of a new, civilly engaged generation, while ecological mobilizations became an emblematic example of this dual approach. “Technology has become socially condensed and acquired [certain] meaning only by becoming implicated in political transformation,” writes Krasteva, who believes that the “digital citizen” is the political project of the Internet (2013). An interesting observation is made by Ditchev, namely, that “the digital turn – along with the neoliberal course toward privatization of the public domain – has led to the deinstitutionalization of the social world: in the place of law-abiding organizations, which function according to objectively regulated procedures, there come groups of friends and sympathizers, which congregate and disperse on particular occasions, often driven by emotional impulses” (2011, p. 17). It is precisely to the infirmities of the democracy transition that the second tendency relates. How populism becomes a norm in Bulgaria’s political life is a complex question requiring multi-layered analysis. Here I shall offer a rather short reading, which bears relevance to the present text. There are several key factors relating to this process. One relates to the formation of the party system, the exhaustion of the transition cleavages, and the transformation of party politics into symbolic politics. The other relates to how the market economy was built in the country, with merging of economy and state, the disintegration of social systems, and the distances of the citizens from the institutions and the political overall (Otova & Staykova, 2021). These factors largely relate to the crisis of confidence or of legitimacy and to societal attitudes leading to the wish of the citizens for replacing the political with non-political. Under these conditions, however, of course it is the non-political talk which is being reaffirmed as a paradoxical form of the political and that primarily through the digital medium (Ditchev & Spassov, 2011). The third factor is related precisely to the role of the media and the digital turn3 (Otova & Staykova, 2021). Cardon calls to mind a long-standing debate in regard to the conception of the public (2010). In the political theory, the concept of public sphere is characterized

 In 2018, 80.8% of the economically active employed population in the country used the Internet regularly (NSI, 2019a). For students, this percentage reached 98.6%. The proportion of active Internet people increases the younger the age. People aged 16–24 are the most active on the Internet (92.2%), followed by those aged 25–34 (86.9%), 35–44 years (80.4%), and so on decreasing. If the country’s regions are compared, [the levels of] digital coverage and digital activity are highest for the region with Sofia as central city – the Southwest region (in 2018, 75.3% of households with Internet access, 69.2% of regular Internet users’ activity) (Hadjitchoneva, 2020, p. 91). 3

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by the fact that public discourses (modes of talk) correspond to specific criteria which invest them with a common interest (Cardon, 2010). Habermas writes that publicity of civil society exists or fails thanks to the general and inclusive access principle and publicity is guaranteed when economic and social conditions ensure equal chance for everybody to satisfy the access criteria (Habermas, 1996). In this sense the access to the public sphere ought to be guaranteed for everyone. Actually, the interaction between citizens, the civil society, and the authorities communicated through the public sphere is what guarantees that the balance between stability and social change will be maintained in the governance of public affairs (Castells, 2008). If this balance is disrupted, societies fall into what Habermas calls legitimacy crisis (Habermas, 1976), since citizens lose their sense of belonging to the system. Digital, on the one hand, and as we have seen in the beginning of this text, has the potential to create conditions for overcoming, but also it might intensify or exacerbate existing crises. These tendencies can be observed at a national level, but they also have their urban dimensions. In this analysis, on the basis of a particular example at urban level, I am attempting to demonstrate that not every initiative which originated online is necessarily democracy-improving, but on the contrary, rather often it is politics as usual, that is, it reproduces the political objectivities of the political environment wherein it has originated.

3 Urban Democracy Urbanist sociology has developed a spatial approach to the public – public is what is visible and accessible to everyone (Cardon, 2010). The present analysis is positioned within the social space of the city, inscribed in the Lefebvrian spatial theory (Lefebvre, 1974) and in its assumption that the space is a social product made of power relations (Angelucci, 2019). This space can be examined in several relations – the real space wherein people encounter each other in their daily life and wherein their social interactions are being affected; a kind of conceptual framework, wherein the dominating narratives and notions of society are being enacted and sustained; and the space of the people contending to (re)possess the city against the dominant concepts (Angelucci, 2019). This understanding of the city is especially important in the sense and for the understanding of urban citizenship and for the quality of democracy in urban context. Staykova emphasizes that what is necessary for the “sound” or “qualitative” urban democracy is the active participation of citizens in the public sphere, in the political process, and in the policy-making process (2020). On the one hand, this is feasible by means of devising mechanisms for inclusion of citizens. However, more often it is carried out through initiatives of the horizontal type, which come from below and are possible on account of the engagement and enterprise of the citizens themselves, where they are often mobile and do not fit within the formal and traditional conception of citizenship. These initiatives can be of a different order, and occasionally, with legitimacy crisis already in evidence, they can take the form of

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protests or resistance against authority (Otova, 2021). In the conditions of digital reality and/or realism, one has to conceive of the social space of the city as extended to the Internet and urban citizenship and democracy – through the lens of the digital. Not a small part of the studies, as well as the expectations, of the future of the urban are associated with the development of smart cities. The smart city concept has various renditions, but they have a unifying point embodied by the digital technologies or more generally – innovations as enablers of changes toward the smart city attainments in all aspects of city planning and living (Hadjitchoneva, 2020). Hadjitchoneva summarizes the various aspects wherein actions directed toward the formation of smart city are necessary: (i) economy aligned with innovative spirit, entrepreneurship, productivity, and labor market regulations; (ii) people, their qualification, competences, and openness; (iii) governance and its capacity for being transparent, participative, and friendly service deliverer; (iv) mobility related to information and communication technologies and transport infrastructure; (v) environment, relating to nature, resource management, pollution, and protection; and (vi) living the context and conditions of health, education, safety, housing, culture, and social inclusion, all of them smart (Giffinger et al., 2007), SMELTS framework for smart city initiative (Joshi et  al., 2016), or similar (Mundula & Auci, 2016; Hadjitchoneva, 2020). This concept is undeniably important, but to a very high degree, it comes from above and approximates a more technocratic, even corporate vision and understanding. Naturally, all cited sectors are exceptionally essential to citizens, but they fall short of overcoming directly the democratic deficit and the legitimacy crisis. For that reason, the present analysis focuses on one example, which at least declaratively originates from below, making its start in the digital, and attempts to understand whether in this sense, to recall the Lefebvrian spatial theory, it fits in the dimension of countermanding of the hegemonic notion of the city and in the dominated political order in general or controverts them. The example is integral to the described national context, but the validity of the conclusions can be extended beyond it. Before presenting the example proper, I shall brief the reader on the context of the economic, social, and political profile of the Bulgarian capital. Sofia is also the largest city of Bulgaria as well as the largest industrial and commercial center. Its economic activity is estimated at 40% of the GDP of the country, concentrating investments and businesses in ferrous metallurgy, printing industry, electrical and electronics industry, chemical industry, textile, construction, food industry, and others (Hadjitchoneva, 2020). Since 2002, the growth rate of Sofia’s population in proportion to the total population of the country has been continuously increasing. While 15.22% of the total population of the country in 2002 lived in the capital, in 2018 the figure remained at 18.97% (NSI, 2019b), with expectation of increase (Hadjitchoneva, 2020). The city has the highest income level for the country, thus, for example, for 2016 the income was 7349 leva per capita, while the average income for the country for the same year is BGN 5167 (Todorov, 2020). Of the citizens 85% live in their own homes or in cost-free (gratuitous) dwellings (Todorov, 2020). The only city in

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Bulgaria with metropolitan and comparatively dense public transportation network (trams, trolleybuses etc.) Sofia is also a national cultural center. As summarized by Todorov, “a paradoxical city, a centre of wealth and poverty, a city of diversity and inequality, in which social success and social exclusion exist concurrently” (Todorov, 2020, p. 114). After 1990, Sofia has been administrated only by right-wing parties. The Socialist party, successor of the Bulgarian Communist Party, has never succeeded to win the mayor office. Currently the city is being governed by the relatively designated as center-right GERB party in the person of Yordanka Fandakova. Before her, Boyko Borisov was incumbent of the office,4 elected mayor for the first time in 2005. Thus, the GERB has practically been administrating the city already for 17 years, with corruption scandals being an indivisible part of this administration. In this sense, what was said above with respect to the processes in Bulgarian society after 1989 at a national level can be transferred to the local level, in the capital city – a crisis of representativeness and legitimacy, legitimate civil demands for overcoming of corruption practices and binding together business and government. Let us see, however, whether one of the most successful initiatives in practice has furthered the improvement of the quality of democracy and surmounting these problems.

4 “Save Sofia” or “Save Sofia from ‘Save Sofia’” “Save Sofia” has come into existence as a civil initiative and afterward as an organization founded and led by a young migrant, who had returned to Bulgaria after obtaining education abroad. In the beginning he started an initiative in relation to the construction of the Sofia metropolitan – one of the emblematic projects of the majority which had been in power in the Sofia Municipality for decades. As stated on the initiative’s own Internet site, “The metro of Sofia City is the main focus of the campaigns and the work of the Civil Internet Initiative ‘Save the Metro.’” It is also the main theme and prism through which the initiative formulates its positions on the issues it poses before the Sofia Municipality and other institutions, dealing with the exploitation of the city transportation (transit) system.”5 Even upon its very inception, the initiative has asserted its exceptionally categorical presence in the virtual domain and the social networks, primarily on Facebook.6 In  Leader of the GERB, who held the office of Prime Minister between 2009 and 2021  Cf. 6  In 2010 Bulgarian Facebook users are estimated at 1.2 million (a growth of 10 times for 1 year), registered Twitter users amount to 4500, while active bloggers are around 2500. Mobile phones for their own part have gained wide currency: the propagation of mobile services amounts to 142% in the end of 2009. Eighty-four percent of Internet users possess mobile telephones – a fact, which indicates the doubled communicative abilities of the technologically active Bulgarians (Spassov, 2011). 4 5

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reality, it exists mainly on account of and because of its virtual nature and gains visibility, popularity, and support on the Internet, the reason often being in the esthetical, apt, and catchy visual representation of the messages. Gradually, to the original idea of proposing an alternative route of the metro-­ lines under construction, there are new ideas added relating to the organization of the city transportation system, while the Internet platform has grown into a civil initiative and organization. Here is its mission statement as featured on its site: “Spasi Sofia (translated ‘Save Sofia’) is a Bulgarian watchdog organization striving to identify the problems of Bulgaria’s capital Sofia and to propose adequate solutions and alternatives. We believe that Sofia can quickly become a [well-­ ordered], modern, green, innovative and [humane] city. We are [guided] by the idea that the civil society [should play a considerably more substantial] part in  local [governance] not only by providing well-presented ideas but also by being the [much] needed local watchdog. […] We are young, motivated, curious and [determined] to continue [with] [more] successful steps. Support us and help us to improve our city in the best way possible! The action is in our hands – for a better Sofia!”.7 In these years “Save Sofia” and one of its emblematic figures – Mr. Boris Bonev – have continued to gain popularity through their exceptional involvement in the social networks, where their activity is often featured on sponsored postings. The presence of the organization in the digital domain is comparable to a well-made commercial company marketing campaign and is much more resembling of an advertisement, aiming at the attraction of more clients than of authentic civil activity. Moreover, in no manner does it relate to an actual debate, opinion exchange, engagement of users and/or citizens, or the creation of public sphere in the sense employed by Habermas – that is, domain for deliberation. This is hardly a surprise, since  – as we have seen  – Habermas himself stated in the early years of digital enthusiasm that the Internet fragments the political debate by contributing to the creation of a great amount of isolated, focused on a single cause, audiences (Habermas, 2006). At the same time, Ditchev aptly describes the way Internet generates conditions for sub-politics: “Sub-politics is a privatized politics in the sense that causes, strategies, messages and mobilizations are the work of ever smaller and non-representative self-proclaimed citizens. The difference between them and corporate interest is rather subtle – the difference is in place as long as we believe that they stand up not for egotistic, mercenary but moral, universally valid causes” (Ditchev, 2011, p. 19). The case of Save Sofia fits precisely in this understanding of sub-politics by presenting a self-proclaimed representative of the citizens upholding allegedly universally valid causes but approximating the corporate in what might be a dangerous propinquity for democracy. In 2019 Boris Bonev and “Save Sofia” decided to enter the real politics and took part in the local elections in the Bulgarian capital. Researchers have called this “a new phenomenon for the Bulgarian reality”  – an independent candidate from a

 Cf.

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non-­ governmental civic organization (Staykova, 2021). Bonev and Borisov  – another participant in the initiative – entered the competition for the positions of mayor and municipal councillor in Sofia and have achieved an enviable result. Bonev became fourth in the mayor race but left behind him political players of experience and popularity. Staykova writes on the occasion that this might be due to the “exceptionally good reputation and popularity of the organization, but it might also relate to the weakening of party-mindedness and the necessity of the citizens to have independent candidates” (Staykova, 2020). One should add to this valid observation also his enormous visibility and activity on the social networks, as well as ability to fit in the described understanding of digital populism. Bonev has been identified as an alternative to the status quo with his staunch discourse of contraposition against the corrupt elite of a morally sound and honest representative of the genuine citizens. This desire for change has largely transpired in the demographic profile of the people who had voted for him. After Gallup data, “Predominantly young people have supported Boris Bonev – apparently in his person they have discovered a possibility for a protest vote against the status-quo. One third of the vote for Bonev has come from the group of the 18-to-30-year-old. For a comparison the average share of this group totally on the Sofia vote is only about 14%” (Gallup, 2019). In addition, one should point out that these are predominantly economically active people with a high level of education (Gallup, 2019). Boris Bonev has garnered 42,759 votes with 6600 votes necessary to become a municipal councillor. Since independent candidates do not have municipal lists, his over 36 thousand extra votes have been redistributed to other parties, and in reality, a total of 7 councillors were installed. According to Staykova, “This means that the will of the voters has been replaced. For example, votes of Bonev supporters are used to ensure the entrance of councillors from the GERB list. This specific electoral defect is not unique to the local elections. Similar reshuffling of votes took place on the European elections earlier in 2019” (Staykova, 2021, p.  226). And media analyses comment on the situation in the following manner: Most likely driven by his wish not to be considered a [conventional] politician, Boris Bonev and his organization “Save Sofia” did not register a list of municipal councillors (only political parties can do this). Thus, “Save Sofia” has registered only two independent candidates for municipal councillors – Boris Bonev and Gergin Borisov. Based on the votes they have received on the first round, “Save Sofia” could have got eight councillors onto the Municipal Council, if they had an adequate list, but eventually only one was able to get [on the council] – Bonev himself. The votes cast for him and Gergin Borisov were redistributed to the advantage of the rest of the political forces in the Municipal Council of Sofia, and the greatest winner is GERB who have “won” three additional aldermen (Mediapool, 2019).

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It should be added that doubts are afloat of arrangements between Bonev and GERB,8 and arguments in this respect can be found at the very onset of his tenure at the Municipal Council at the vote for the election of a chairman. Although the vote was secret, political mathematics indicates that this young non-politician has supported the choice of the chairman of the GERB candidate. After broad media coverage, he responded as expected with a Facebook posting,9 in which one can discover the elements of what I call, for the purposes of this analysis, digital populism. Thus, in practice, “Save Sofia” has left the virtual domain with claim of making a stand against the status quo while in actuality reproducing the status quo. As a municipal councillor, Bonev joined the Planning, Architecture and Housing Committee, the Committee on Transport and Road Safety, and the Committee under the Law on Combating Corruption and Confiscation of Illegally Acquired Assets. His main activity, however, remained limited to Facebook, where he has retained extraordinary activity in sharing ideas for the development of the city. Very few of them actually result in real action, and some of those that have come to realization were met with everything but enthusiasm by the citizens. The series of actions and activities against ideas of “Save Sofia” have gained currency under the designation Save Sofia from “Save Sofia.” In the wake of recent scandals associated with his activity come attempts for halting the repair works on a theater in the capital because of corruption suspicions. Interestingly, the reaction came from an actor from the theater and was also posted on the Facebook. A company member wrote a long text on his private account, wherein he not just explained the necessity of the repairs but also accused “Save

 Media publications and other data indicate common sponsors and sources of financing between the two formations; they however are not an object of this academic analysis. 9  “As a person who is novice in the political mores, I have realized that I do not wish to adopt some of them. For example, after two-and-a-half months of campaigns, profusely garnished with invective and friendly fire, all of a sudden, the proposition arose that I should be the compromise candidate at the ballotage. It sounded extravagantly and, of course, impossible. This is the case because resolutions of this kind should be made at political negotiations and should not occur as midnight whims because of circumstances that are already a fact (that is, after the ballotage). For that reason, I did not pay much attention. The day before there was election for the chairman of the Municipal Council. As it turned out everyone knew that Elen Gerdzhikov was to be elected but it was very important to go on record with taking part in the game with a suggestion of their own. And, according to the political folklore of the Sofia Municipal Council, there are two votes, on which one should take opposition stand – the chairman and the budget election. But here the same thing happened – whenever someone wishes the opposition to have a hold on the Municipal Council, again political negotiations are held, that is, the Socialist Party, Democratic Bulgaria, Save Sofia and whoever else should wish, achieve an agreement and majority to enforce their own candidate. There were no such actions. But everyone was surprised and preoccupied with whom did I vote for in a predetermined vote. I refuse to take part on political theatre – I find this hypocritical. I like to engage in political action and solutions of the real problems of the people. And I shall still continue to prove and demonstrate this. Everything else I leave in the hands of the conspiracy theorists and their leisure time in Facebook” 8

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Sofia” and Bonev in political games and intrigue.10 Even more interestingly, although the position had gained certain popularity, contrary to expectations that a civil society organization like “Save Sofia” would be open to debate, no such debate was held. This confirms the allegation of echo chambers or bubbles, in which messages for certain audience are being reproduced, rather than creating a platform for dialogue, open to deliberativeness. The case is similar to the one about the transformation into pedestrian zone of a street in downtown Sofia, with citizens residing or running businesses in the area mounting a series of protests displeased with the decision and with the lack of dialogue with them, as well as with the manner in which the decision was made without preliminary consultations and deliberations. Media interest was pitched by a photograph of Bonev posing in front of a bar in the capital, whose legitimacy he had questioned in an extensive posting. Surprisingly,

 “I am really at loss how the people from ‘Save Sofia’ as well as Mr. Boris Bonev’s followers can have a plan for Sofia. People, who have NEVER set their foot in the Theatre Sofia, who have no idea that this is the second building in the capital which was built [for the purpose] of a THEATRE. These nice people have never set foot in the audience hall, let alone the stage or backstage, they have never entered the dress rooms or the premises beneath the stage, they have absolutely no knowledge of the mechanization of the theatre, of the scenic devices and their problems, of the lightning and sound systems. These same people do not have the least idea where and how the thousands of costumes are stored, some of which are unique, designed by wonderful stage and costume designers. So, it is these same people who have decided to ‘save’, let me say it again, the second building in Sofia which was built expressly for a THEATRE, from the so necessary and awaited for decades renovation works. They have suspended the procedure with some arguments. They say they were concerned, you see, about the stone tiling. But, my dear sweet ‘saviours’, I do not know your political games and fights, but the theatre where you have not seen one single performance, crumbles and falls apart on the inside and the outside. You may keep the tiling you hold so dear with repairs and internal insulation, which after five years, hopefully they are no less than five, will again be in need of repairs because of leakages, dampness, mould, etcetera, etcetera. Your political intrigues are pathetic and ridiculous. Instead of helping carry out this repair and being simultaneously a monitoring corrective, you, sweet little mice, have halted a project with expiring deadline and the EU money will be lost without being utilized. We are aware that art is of no importance to you and that it has never been your priority. Just barking and spitting will never effect any change to good, and sadly it is just what we increasingly keep hearing from you. Under everything written I stand with my own name and I do not claim that this is an official opinion of my colleagues or the administration of the Theatre Sofia, which you have never attended and where you have not seen even one performance. But in the night, you have managed to adorn it with your unsightly banners. In the dark, like the veritable rats that you are, slithering out of holes to soil the scenery. The whole story stinks and sucks. And if someday the repair does not take place, I shall know that it is you who stand behind all this, pursuing power and political career. And some day, the second building in Sofia built expressly to house a theatre, may follow the fate of the theatres in Silistra, Dobrich and many more places where municipalities have washed their hands and Melpomene’s shrines are coming to pieces, and acting is being done in adjusted buildings, in small rooms, because to you culture never meant anything.” In utmost disgust of your deed: Rossen Belov, actor in the Theatre Sofia Company 10

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the district mayor also answered on the Facebook,11 explaining that Bonev had learned of the problem from him and that action had already been taken. Thus, a great part of the actions of the municipal councillor Bonev relate to “exposing” the status quo, but in reality, they seldom have any relevance to the actual improvement of the quality of life in the city, and even less to ensuring of greater inclusiveness of citizens in decision-making and policy-making process, to representativeness or improvement of the quality of democracy. They are irrelevant to guarantees of higher-quality social cohesion. Also, it should be emphasized that although they may challenge the status quo and its actions, they by no means pose a challenge to the hegemonic understanding of the city neither are in reality representative of those citizens whose interests have received no representation.

5 Conclusion In the end of this text, I should like to return to the three dimensions of democracy, which were proposed in its beginning in reference to the interpretation of Smilova – information, discussion, and participation. Using the example of the “Save Sofia” initiative, it has become clear that this digital civil platform, which at a later stage has made its entry into the real politics, does not contribute drastically to none of the cited dimensions. Although one of its main purposes is to expose the defects in the administration of Sofia, the information often reaches a limited circle of people and is reproduced among users/citizens who already share some interest in the topic and similarity of ideas. It also failed to produce the environment required for discussion and deliberativeness, with a great part of the conversation remaining closed within the group and protests against the organization’s propositions showing that in the absence of possibilities for conversation available to citizens outside the platform they have to resort to expressing position in similar forms. The conclusions on the improvement of participation are in a similar vein. All this does not come to show that initiatives like “Save Sofia” are harmful or that they cannot or should not be part of the social and political life. What it shows, however, is that such initiatives are neither panacea nor something extrinsic to the  I shall begin this text with a request, mayor Traykov writes. “Upon learning from me that certain problem is already solved, there is no point of taking your picture striking a posture of anger in front of it and to announce victory three days later (as ‘Save Sofia’ did when they learned that an order was enforced to remove the bar in front of the National Theatre). In a separate posting I shall write in what way you can help indeed, if you happen to be a municipal councillor (to avoid making this one too long), but simple correctness will suffice for a start. Nevertheless, yesterday (the post is from the evening of December 20) there was indeed some positive development in the topic: the owners have lifted voluntarily the tents, tables, chairs and umbrellas, but not the drink bar – which leaves the main part of the removal order still unexecuted. The term for voluntary execution is one month, after the order issued by the Chief Architect of the Capital Municipality was handed in on December 13 and the order can be appealed within the period up to December 27. If nothing happened by that time, we shall proceed with enforced removal […].” 11

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system. On the contrary, the digital civic platforms are reflection of the national or urban context wherein they originate. In this sense, if I should return to the question “Can Facebook save the cities,” the answer is no. Urban democracy, and democracy on principle, is not contingent on the instrument, that is, the technology, which, as I have shown, is indivisible from reality, but in the enhancement of the mechanisms for authentic civil participation, challenging the hegemonic notions of the environment, and the enhancement of the representativeness.

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Digital Transformation in Local Municipalities: Theory Versus Practice Katarína Vitálišová, Katarína Sýkorová, Samuel Koróny, Peter Laco, Anna Vaňová, and Kamila Borseková

1 Introduction The digital transformation of public administration at the local level is in line with the technological progress oriented to the adaption of organizational structures and the underlying processes of public service delivery (Pittaway & Montazemi, 2020). It also opens new possibilities of cultivating the participation and interactions of local government with all relevant stakeholders on regular and multichannel communication including the virtual space (Huaxiong, 2021; Vitálišová et  al., 2022). Many organizations view digital transformation primarily as the implementation of IT systems (Greenhalgh et al., 2009; Wachter, 2016; Turečková, 2016; Benjamin & Potts, 2018). However, the important precondition to be successful in digital transformation is a change in the way of working, organizing, or managing in terms of meeting the needs of all residents, including those who do not use information and communication technologies (ICTs) intensively. At the local level, cities with the technological infrastructure, resources, vision, and the political leadership are viewing digital technology as a key facilitator and an infrastructural enabler to addressing the rising challenges of urbanization, population growth, and environmental and fiscal pressures. The use of ICTs is the enablers of a “smart” transformation of the city (Salem, 2016). The smart transformation is realized by smart government with interaction to a large number of different stakeholders that are involved in local policy decision-making processes, based on the knowledge of behavioral economics and traditional tools of local policy in combination with the IT technologies. But also, in this approach, innovative technologies K. Vitálišová (*) · K. Sýkorová · S. Koróny · P. Laco · A. Vaňová · K. Borseková Matej Bel University, Faculty of Economics, Banská Bystrica, Slovakia e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 G. Rouet, T. Côme (eds.), Participatory and Digital Democracy at the Local Level, Contributions to Political Science, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-20943-7_13

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are just a medium that helps to obtain effective governance processes and administration, as well as achieving improved urban outcomes (Díaz-Díaz & Pérez-­ González, 2016; Pereira et al., 2017; Kleinhans et al., 2015; Castelnovo et al., 2015; Khan et al., 2015; Navarro-Galera et al., 2016; Huaxiong, 2021). The paper deals with the smart local governance and its tools from the theoretical point of view supported by the research conducted among experts from all over the world using the Delphi method and compares these findings with the situation in the cities of the Slovak Republic based on the research results of the questionnaire survey among city representatives. Based on the comparison of research findings, the present paper identifies the key challenges of further development of digital local governance. The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 is theoretically oriented, with a focus on the specifics of smart local governance as a result of digital transformation. Section 3 describes the methodology and methods used, namely, the Delhi method among experts in the fields of regional development, strategic planning, and public administration from academia and practice from different countries in the second half of 2020 and the questionnaire survey among representatives of Slovak cities. The third section is devoted to the presentation of the research results and their critical analysis. To conclude the paper, we summarize the main challenges of further development in local governance.

2 Transformation of Local Governance to Digital Local Governance The word “transformation” in public administration can be explained as the transition from analog to digital processes evolving toward a more holistic transformative approach to digital government (Barrutia & Echebarria, 2021). The driver of this transformation, in the case of the local level, is mainly urban innovations (Mora et al., 2019). Urban innovation based on technological progress that fosters the sustainability of the cities has opened up new possibilities to address cities’ goals and challenges (Schaffers et al., 2011; Komninos, 2011). This movement refers to the concepts known as smart city, digital city, intelligent city, etc. The smart city is a socio-technical system in which ICTs serve public interests (Mora et  al., 2019). Thanks to the innovation of digital technology, in the smart city, a new and integrated design process is implemented aimed at a new modulation of urban functions (both the traditional and the new ones appearing in everyday life). It is a city model on which governments are betting to provide a balanced urban development (Sansaverino et al., 2014; Borseková et al., 2016; Turečková & Nevima, 2019). This development is realized through two main functions of local municipalities: local policy-making (including informing and involving stakeholders) and co-­ creation and co-production of public services provided by the city. The mix of traditional and digital tools in  local policy-making spreads the possibilities of

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stakeholder participation and contributes to openness, transparency, accountability of local authority, and thus the quality of relations between stakeholders and local governments. By ICTs government collects and shares data and information and uses this knowledge to support evidence-based decision-making that enables governments to make tailored decisions improving the effectiveness of public policies and programs (Castelnovo et al., 2015; Vitálišová et al., 2020). Co-creation of smart city services can help increase the city’s competitiveness and citizens’ quality of life (Lee & Lee, 2014). The outcome of digital transformation efforts focuses on the satisfaction of user needs, new forms of service delivery, and the expansion of the user base (Turečková, 2015; Mergel et al., 2019). Therefore, the public value in the digital transformation efforts in the local municipality can be labeled as the implementation of “citizens expectations” (Twizeyimana & Andersson, 2019). Referring to literature review, this innovative approach to local governance  – smart governance – is one of the key dimensions of smart city. Numerous studies were conducted researching the key principles, actors, and preconditions of its implementation (Gil-Garcia et  al., 2014; Scholl & Alawadhi, 2016; Estevez & Janowski, 2013; Janowski et al., 2012; Gil-Garcia et al., 2016; Pereira et al., 2018; Ruhland, 2018). Smart governance in a city is an interactive managerial approach based on the participation of diverse set of stakeholders, equipped with different roles and responsibilities, in a specific organizational structure (formal and unformal), driven by technology and data realized in the respective legal environment and policies for the purpose of achieving either substantive outputs for cities or procedural changes. Gil-Garcia et al. (2016) declare that smartness in local governance is based on integration, innovation, evidence-based decisions, citizen orientation, sustainability, creativity, efficiency, effectiveness, equality, entrepreneurship, citizen engagement, openness, resilience, and technological capabilities. The important factor in building smart governance is the considerable support of politicians and city management to engage and empower stakeholders in the city and co-implement common solutions through relevant tools and methods in local policy decision-making (Vaňová, 2021; Lee & Lee, 2014; Lombardi et al., 2011). Moreover, this long-term process requires financial and human investment, which government must commit to. That is why a common understanding of the smart governance concept, vision, strategy, and sharing of responsibilities is an essential part of success (Vitálišová et al., 2022). The level of smart governance can then be assessed on the basis of transparency in urban management, the participation of social partners, the level of public services, and the implementation of development strategies (Kumar, 2017; Zanella et al., 2014; Caragliu et al., 2011). Based on literature review (Savoldelli et al., 2014; Castelnovo et al., 2015; Osella et  al., 2016; Navío-Marco & Anand, 2018; Guenduez et  al., 2018; Pereira et  al., 2017; Tomor et  al., 2019; Toan & Nhu, 2020) and our own previous research (Vitálišová et al., 2020), we identified a set of 16 potential benefits of local governance in comparison with the traditional local policy implementation (see more in Sect. 4). They can be divided into three main areas. The first area includes the

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impacts on the quality of life in cities (better social and economic conditions, value creation, social justice, city performance, sustainability, resilience, etc.). The second area relates to the local municipality and its management by the local authority (e.g., administrative efficiency, interoperability, effectiveness of public polices, etc.), and the last one is more oriented on stakeholders and their empowerment in local policy (e.g., increasing participation of stakeholders, equality in their role in local policy). Tools that use the smart governance approach combine traditional and digital ones. From the traditional ones, there are legal forms of participation of stakeholders in the local policy decision-making process as a symbol of democracy. In digital form, they include electronic e-voting, e-petition, e-referendum, e-panel, and others. Another group of tools of smart governance strengths the transparency in local policy process and management (e.g., providing information, open data, sharing databases, etc.). As we already mentioned, an important aspect of digital transformation is a utilization of data for co-creation and co-production of public services. In practice, the cities use various forms of these tools based on active engagement of relevant stakeholders, e.g., participative planning, participative budgeting, surveys, crowdsourcing, crowdfunding, living labs, etc. The development of ICTs influences significantly the forms of communication; except the traditional ones, many new forms are implemented as websites, social media, blogs, mobile and web applications, etc. (Castelnovo et  al., 2015; Estevez & Janowski, 2013; Chourabi et al., 2012; Wijnhoven et al., 2015; Gil-Garcia et al., 2015; Johannessen & Berntzen, 2018; Simonofski et al., 2019; De Guimarães et al., 2020; Vaňová, 2021). The digital transformation in cities has accelerated during the last 2 years due to the unexpected COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic showed that it is never enough to possess the best apps and technologies and a great need of inclusive policies, ground-up initiatives, and effective leadership (Baharudin, 2020; Zhang & Savage, 2020; Das & Zhang, 2020).

3 Material and Methods The present paper aims to compare the theoretical and academic framework of modern (smart) local governance and its tools with the state of the art in Slovak cities based on primary research conducted among experts from all over the world by deploying the Delphi method and the research results of the questionnaire survey among representatives of Slovak cities. Research on the smart governance framework from the theoretical point of view was done by using the Delphi method among 33 experts during the second half of 2020 in two rounds. The second part of the research, the questionnaire survey, was carried out in the first half of 2021 among representatives of Slovak cities. The aim of the research was to define the content and principles of smart governance and the preconditions of its implementation, tools, benefits, and obstacles (Fig. 1).

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Fig. 1  The structure of experts involved in the research according to country. (Source: authors)

The experts involved in the research sample were identified by the authors’ analysis of the academic papers and strategic documents of municipalities in Slovakia. In the first round, 278 experts were invited to participate. We received responses from 33 experts who were involved in the next steps of research. That is why we assume that they are perfectly oriented in the topic and that their knowledge covers the research problem in a complex way. The experts who participated in the research were mainly from the fields of regional development (39.39%), strategic planning (27.27%), and public administration (15.15%), politics (6.06%), and others (3.03%). They come from academia (85%) and from practice (15%). Of the experts 49% came from Slovakia, 18% from Poland, 9% from Italy, as well as from the Czech Republic. Other experts come from Hungary, Belgium, Finland, and Japan. The second part of the primary research was oriented toward Slovak cities. The research was carried out as a questionnaire survey among the city representatives. We addressed all 141 Slovak cities, and we received responses from 67 cities. In terms of results of the chi-squared test, we consider our research sample to be representative according to size categories. The structure of the cities involved is the following: 33% of the cities are in the size category 5000–9999 inhabitants, followed by 22% in the size category 10,000–19,999 inhabitants and 2% in the size category 20,000–49,999 inhabitants. 15% of cities are in size category 0–4999 inhabitants, 7% of cities are in size category 50,000–99,999 inhabitants, and 2% of the involved cities are in size category more than 100,000 inhabitants. For details see Fig. 2. The city representatives were mayors (35.8%), deputies of mayors (31.3%), and head of the municipal office (32.8%). Sixty-four respondents (95.5%) were university graduates and 3 respondents with secondary education. By age, 3% of the respondents belong to the category 18–30  years; 22.4% belong to 31–40  years;

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Fig. 2  The structure of Slovak cities involved in the research according to size categories

31.3% of the respondents came from the category 41–50 and 51–60  years; and 11.9% of the respondents belong to the age category 61+ years. The aim of the questionnaire survey was to identify the level of smart governance implemented in Slovak cities. We focused specifically on the main characteristics of current local governance and factors of modern local governance, including benefits and obstacles and tools of local governance. To process the data, we use Excel and IBM SPSS 25 statistical software. From the statistical methods of correlation analysis, we applied the Friedman test and Kendall correlation coefficients, as well as descriptive statistics.

4 Research Findings and Discussion To meet the aim of the chapter, in the presentation of research findings, we focus on two selected aspects of our research. The first area is a definition of the benefits of smart governance in cities. The second part is devoted to the tools of smart governance and their interactions with the potential benefits.

4.1 Benefits of Local Smart Governance The benefits of local smart governance were identified based on the literature review and our previous research (see Sect. 2). The identified benefits were evaluated by experts as well as representatives of Slovak cities. Each research group evaluated all

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Table 1  Potential benefits of local governance Evaluation by the experts Maximizing the socio-economic and ecological 4.03 performance of city Improving the quality of life in cities 4.27 Promoting social justice 4.27 Strengthening equal possibilities to be involved 3.64 in decision-making process Combining social and economic value creation 3.91 Knowledge-based and innovation-oriented 4.09 economic development Sustainability and resilience 4.06 Enabling stakeholders to become more 4.21 knowledgeable and more skilled Increasing participation of other stakeholders 4.12 in public life Increasing participation of citizens in public 4.00 life Increasing citizen centricity (transparency and 2.52 trust) Changing in government organization and its 3.36 position to the stakeholders Improving the effectiveness of public policies 4.09 and programs Improving services 4.18 Increasing openness and accountability 3.76 Increasing administrative efficiency and 4.27 interoperability

Evaluation by the city representatives 3.89 4.30 3.79 3.72 3.95 4.11 3.89 3.96 3.97 4.06 4.19 3.65 4.12 4.27 4.18 4.27

Source: authors

potential benefits with a score from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The comparison of the average evaluation of each benefit is presented in Table 1. City representatives (mark 4.30) and experts (mark 4.27) chose a benefit “improving the quality of life in cities” followed by “increasing administrative efficiency and interoperability” (both groups mark 4.27) as the main benefits of local governance. In the third place, there is “improving services” (mark of city representatives 4.27; experts mark 4.18). On the fourth place with very little difference, there is “improving the effectiveness of public policies and programs” (city representatives mark 4.12; experts mark 4.09) together with “knowledge-based and innovation-­ oriented economic development” (city representatives mark 4.11; experts mark 4.09). The lowest mark from both research groups scored “strengthening equal possibilities to be involved in the decision-making process” (city representatives 3.72; experts 3.64) and “changing in government organization and its position to stakeholders” (city representatives 3.65 and experts 3.36).

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There are few differences in evaluating the benefits of local governance between the opinion of experts and the opinion of the representatives of the Slovak cities. We identified a significant difference only in the case of “increasing citizen-centricity (transparency and trust).” According to experts, this benefit scored only mark 2.52, but according to city representatives, this benefit scored 4.19. To conclude, there are no significant differences between the evaluation of experts and representatives of Slovak cities. Based on the literature review, we cover all potential benefits. The research results confirm the priority of the concept to improve the quality of life in the city. It is possible only if the good organization structure and process are established that contributes to administrative efficiency, interoperability, and better quality of services. All these aspects also affect the implementation of public policies and programs. But what should be stated is the fact that the local policy decisions must be made with the participation of citizens and other relevant stakeholders.

4.2 Tools of Local Governance According to in-depth literature review and empirical research, a list of 28 traditional, digital, or combined local governance tools was defined. We divided tools into four groups: the tools that strongly support the transparency; tools by which citizens become democratic participants in the city’s decision-making process; and tools oriented on co-production of public service and communication tools. Table 2 presents the importance of local governance tools according to experts’ opinion, as well as the level of their utilization in Slovak cities. Experts were asked to indicate the importance of each of the 28 smart governance tools using a mark from 1 (the least important) to 5 (the most important). The level of utilization of governance tools was set based on answers from Slovak city representatives using the Friedman test. From the results of the Friedman test, we arrange the order of tools used. According to experts’ opinion, there are very small differences between surveyed tools. To the most important tools belong the group of tools supporting transparency, i.e., open data portal on local government issues (score 4.61) and database for sharing information within the municipal office and smart city strategy (score 4.55). It is followed by tools of co-creation of public services (score 4.59) and co-­ production of public services (score 4.47) and participatory planning (score 4.47). Tools from the group supporting democracy citizenship scored from 4.31 to 4.00. In the group of tools oriented on communication, there is the biggest difference between tool with highest mark and lowest mark from the surveyed group of local governance tools. The online feedback system from stakeholders reached score 4.39, and discussion forums with representatives of stakeholders reached score 4.33. Public discussions (hearings), online communication via mobile phone, or

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Digital Transformation in Local Municipalities: Theory Versus Practice Table 2  The importance of smart governance tools Importance (5, most important; 1, least important) evaluated by experts

Traditional and digital tools Transparency 4.61 (1) Open data portal on local government issues (online and offline) 4.55 (3) Database for sharing information within the municipal office Smart governance strategy/ 4.55 (3) smart city strategy Shared architecture of data 4.30 (10) systems for multi-level go Integrated security system 4.15 Electronic identity 3.97 3D map system 3.70 Cloud storage for sharing 3.48 documents information Tools supporting democracy citizenship 4.31 (9) Electronic tools of e-democracy (electronic voting, petitions, etc.) Participation of stakeholders in 4.24 working group Educational activities oriented 4.00 to stakeholders Co-production of public services Co-creation of public services 4.59 (2) Co-production of public 4.47 (4) services Participatory planning (online 4.44 (5) and offline) Electronic public services/ 4.38 (7) digital services 4.18 Cross-city management for knowledge/experience exchange Participatory budgeting (online 3.90 and offline) Communication tools Online feedback system from 4.39 (6) stakeholders Discussion forum with 4.33 (8) representatives of stakeholders

Level of utilization The order of in cities (Friedman used tools in cities test) 16.10

11

19.14

3

11.36

20

8.06

26

12.36 11.14 9.49 11.58

15 21 23 19

8.75

24

16.19

10

9.99

22

6.43

27

11.78

18

16.29

7

15.31

12

12.20

16

13.19

14

16.20

9 (continued)

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Table 2 (continued) Importance (5, most important; 1, least important) evaluated by experts Traditional and digital tools Public discussions (hearings) 4.06 Online communication via web 4.03 applications of the municipality 4.03 Online communication via mobile phone applications of the municipality Online communication via 4.00 social networks Website of the city 3.91 Hackathons and competitions 3.73 for stakeholders Organizing events 3.59 Questionnaire survey 3.48 Contacting stakeholders by 2.88 post, e-mail, etc.

Level of utilization in cities (Friedman test) 16.25 17.98

The order of used tools in cities 8 6

15.19

13

21.55

2

23.57 8.32

1 25

18.44 12.00 19.10

5 17 4

Source: authors

web applications of the municipality scored from 4.06 to 4.03. The lowest score only 2.88 reached contacting stakeholders by post, e-mail, etc. as the less important tool from all the tools surveyed. It is important to mention that up to 19 tools reached the score 4 or more, which means that according to experts the importance of almost all identified tools is relatively high. On the other hand, the successful implementation of most of them requires well developed IT infrastructure, integrated operational system, and interoperability of the collected data. By the comparison of tools of evaluation, the significant difference in importance of tools is evident. The experts, the same as the theoretical framework, stress the role of tools that initiate the co-production of public services and various forms of digital tools oriented on engaging the wide spectrum of stakeholders. Moreover, the research findings from the Slovak cities point out that they more prefer the traditional tools instead of digital tools and tools oriented on co-production. The reason for this state could lay in the fact the Slovak cities do not fully understand the benefits of using digital tools. To identify the relationships between the smart governance toolkit and benefits, we used the Kendall correlation coefficients. We testified the correlations of each evaluated tool with each indicated benefit (see Tables 3, 4, and 5) from the perspective of experts. We present just those, where the relationship was evaluated as statistically important. The bold numbers in Tables 3, 4, and 5 present that the relationships

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Table 3 Kendall correlation coefficients between benefits and traditional tools in local governance – experts’ point of view

Toolkits/benefits Open data portal on local government issues (online and offline) Database for sharing information within the municipal office Shared architecture of data systems for multi-level go Educational activities oriented to stakeholders Participatory planning (online and offline) Co-creation of public services Cross-city management for knowledge/experience exchange Public discussions hearings Discussion forum with representatives of stakeholders’ groups Contacting stakeholders by post, e-mail, etc. Website of the city Online communication via social networks Online communication via web application of the municipality Hackathons and competitions for stakeholders Source: authors *p