Palestinians in Lebanon: Refugees Living with Long-term Displacement 9780755610525

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To my friends in Lebanon

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FIGURES 14

70

97 106

122 131 156

160 166

Chapter 1 Figure 1: Adapted Capacities and Vulnerabilities Analysis Framework Chapter 4 Figure 2: Map of Lebanon Chapter 5 Figure 3: Official UNRWA Camps in Lebanon Figure 4: UNRWA Socio-economic Indicators, June 2008 Chapter 6 Figure 5: Bourj al-Barajneh: Capacities and Vulnerabilities Analysis Figure 6: Average Monthly Incomes Figure 7: A Comparison of Capacities and Vulnerabilities in Three Camps Chapter 7 Figure 8: Factors Influencing Coping Mechanisms Figure 9: Governance in Bourj al-Barajneh Camp in 2001

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TERMS AND ACRONYMS Amal

Shi’a party; acronym from the Arabic meaning ‘Battalions of Lebanese Resistance’; in Arabic ‘Amal’ means hope

CBO

community-based organization

CSO

camp services officer (UNRWA post)

CVA

capacities and vulnerabilities analysis

Fatah

Movement of Palestinian National Liberation; founded and led by Yasser Arafat

Fatah Intifada

faction opposed to Arafat’s Fatah, established in 1983 with Syrian backing; supported in camps in Lebanon except the three near Tyre

Fatah al-Islam

militant Islamic group

GUPW

General Union of Palestinian Women

Hizbollah

Party of God, Shi’a party, appeared in Lebanon in 1982, initially backed by Iran, today supported by Iran and Syria

IDF

Israeli Defense Forces

IDP

internally displaced person

NGO

non-governmental organization

NSF

National Salvation Front, umbrella organization for anti-Fatah Palestinian factions supported by Syria; still exists in a revised form but has been superseded by other Syrian-backed coalitions

Phalange

Maronite right-wing nationalist party, established in 1936; also known as the Kata’ib

PHRO

Palestinian Human Rights Organization

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PLO

Palestinian Liberation Organization

PRCS

Palestinian Red Crescent Society

SLA

South Lebanese Army, established by Israel as a proxy army, disbanded May 2000

sūq

Arabic for market

UN

United Nations

UNCCP

United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine

UNDP

United Nations Development Programme

UNGA

United Nations General Assembly

UNHCR

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

UNICEF

United Nations International Children’s Fund

UNIFIL

United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

UNRWA

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East

USCR

United States Committee for Refugees

USCRI

United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants

wāsta

Arabic term referring to the necessity of having connections to enable an individual to succeed in all aspects of life from the mundane to the extraordinary; pervades all social strata

zakāt

almsgiving, one of the five pillars of Islam

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS My interest in Palestinian refugees in Lebanon was initially motivated by visits to Bourj al-Barajneh Palestinian refugee camp in 1996. I was overwhelmed by the warmth and friendship I experienced, and the resilience and resolve of the camp inhabitants despite their difficult circumstances. This book draws on research for a doctoral thesis that sought to understand how Palestinian refugees in Lebanon cope with everyday life. While the motivation to explore the daily lives of refugees was distinctly personal, I could not have completed my academic studies, or this book, without the help and support of others. There is not space here to mention all the individuals and organizations to whom I am indebted, but I use this opportunity to draw attention to those whom I owe particular gratitude. The research process is often lonely and rarely straightforward. Without feedback and comments from others, I could not have pulled together all my ideas or completed this book. Thanks go to Sultan Barakat for his help and encouragement which gave me the confidence to embark on this research, and to Roger Mac Ginty and Alp Özerdem for their support throughout the process. I would also like to thank Sari Hanifi, Muhammad Ali Khalidi and Rosemary Sayigh for the interest they have shown in my work over the years. Financial support was provided by the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut, Lebanon; Shaml: Palestinian Refugee and Diaspora Centre in the West Bank; and the Department of Politics at the University of York. I would like to thank these organizations for their generosity and the faith they showed in me. I hope this book goes some way towards repaying their investment. I am also grateful for the cooperation of UNRWA and Palestinian NGO staff, without which I could not have conducted field research. Particular thanks go to the ‘Adawi family, the Assad family and Nawal Yousef, for their kindness and hospitality during my visits to Lebanon. I would also like to mention four women from the camps in Lebanon, Halimeh, Olfat, Kholoud and Hala, whose strength, love and determination will remain a source of inspiration for the rest of my life. Finally, I would like to thank the many friends who have encouraged me in my endeavours, and my family for their constant love and support.

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1 INTRODUCTION: PALESTINIAN REFUGEES IN LEBANON

Becoming a refugee is a frightening and disorientating experience that not only strips people of their property and belongings but also limits their ability to control events and act independently. Refugee situations that remain unresolved for an extended period of time create ‘protracted’ or ‘warehoused’ refugee groups for whom the initial experience of becoming a refugee develops into a way of life. Groups of people find themselves in a state of limbo subject to conditions over which they have little or no control and with few resources or rights to act independently to change their circumstances. As part of the oldest refugee group, Palestinians in Lebanon provide an insight into how refugees cope in protracted situations. The number of protracted refugee groups is increasing, yet responses to refugee situations are still driven by the assumption that they are short-term. The mechanisms to protect and assist refugees need to be changed to provide effective long-term support that is sustainable and promotes development, returns dignity and self-respect to refugees groups, and is acceptable to the host community. This can be done only if it is recognized that refugees have coping mechanisms and assistance is tailored to them. Understanding refugee coping mechanisms is also important for stability in the Middle East. The Palestine–Israeli conflict is at the centre

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of regional tensions and along with the fate of Jerusalem, the future of Palestinian refugees has proved to be the most intractable aspect of peace talks between the Palestinians and Israelis. In addition to the legal and political issues that need to be resolved there is, perhaps more importantly, the need to ensure that any peace deal provides a just solution for the refugees. To do this, it is necessary to understand how they have coped, what capacities they have developed, and what factors enhance or undermine these capacities. Without a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem it is doubtful that there will be peace in the Middle East: One cannot overstate the centrality of the refugee issue to the resolution of the broader question underlying the Israeli– Palestinian conflict (UNRWA Commissioner-General Karen AbuZayd, York, UK, 6 November 2009). Although I hope this book contributes to knowledge about refugee coping mechanisms, and informs efforts to provide effective assistance to and a durable solution for Palestinian refugees, the motivation to write a book comes from my personal experiences of living and working with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. My first introduction to Palestinians in Lebanon was through teaching English to Palestinian children from the camps during the summer of 1996. I was overwhelmed by the hospitality and warmth of the camp inhabitants, who despite the economic and physical hardships seemed happy and able to conduct a normal daily life. People appeared to cope with life in the camps and I wanted to understand how they managed to survive and maintain an apparently positive outlook. In 2000 and 2001, I undertook extensive research to identify camp inhabitants’ coping mechanisms. The case studies in this book draw primarily on material collected at this time but findings have been combined with information gathered during numerous other visits to Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon between 1996 and 2006. Although the research findings have enabled me to understand how the camp inhabitants cope with daily life, and to recognize the importance of the external support that is available from the UN and NGOs, I have come to the conclusion that it is determination and informal social support networks that are the key to Palestinian survival in Lebanon. I have enduring respect for such self-reliance and want to highlight the resourcefulness of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and the plight of protracted refugee groups.

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Using the experiences of Palestinians in refugee camps in Lebanon as an example, this book examines the impact of protracted refugee status on coping mechanisms. It explores how assistance to refugees, the attitudes of the host community and the passage of time interact with the capacities and vulnerabilities of the individual, the family and the community, affecting their ability to improve their quality of life or future. To provide a context for the case study and an overview of the issues surrounding refugees, the political, legal and humanitarian frameworks that direct assistance to Palestinians, and shape the refugee experience and refugee-host relationship, are compared with those of other refugee groups. This first chapter provides an introduction to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the history of Palestinian refugees, their protracted refugee status and the assistance they receive. There is also a brief description of the methods used for data collection and an outline of the structure of the book. ‘The Forgotten People’ The Palestinian refugees in camps in Lebanon refer to themselves as ‘the forgotten people’ because they live in a hostile environment, are denied basic human rights, including the right to work, and have no effective means of representation or protection. After 60 years, tens of thousands of Palestinians still live in temporary shelters in overcrowded, unsanitary camps where unemployment and poverty levels are high. Yet they are neglected by the humanitarian community, marginalized from regional peace processes, ignored by the international media and overlooked by the academic world. Moreover, the situation for the Palestinians in Lebanon continues to deteriorate and many claim that their lives are more difficult now than at any time in the last 60 years.1 The Lebanese government regularly restricts the activities and rights of Palestinians, preventing them from ameliorating their situation. Income-generating opportunities are limited because Palestinians are excluded from working legally in 20 professions including medicine, law, engineering and journalism, and those that work illegally are subject to poor pay and conditions. Legal employment opportunities such as casual labour in agriculture or construction are decreasing because of competition from cheaper migrant workers and the end of the post-civil-war building boom. The remittances, upon which so many Palestinians in Lebanon are thought to have survived, have been decreasing since the end of the civil war because opportunities for emigration to the West are fewer, and

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the PLO’s support for Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War led to the expulsion of Palestinian workers from the Gulf. Some Palestinians have since returned to the Gulf but the economic crisis, which first became apparent in 2008, could jeopardize the livelihoods of Palestinian economic migrants. Any economic reserves camp Palestinians had managed to save were spent during the 2006 Hizbollah–Israeli war to flee to safety or cover the inflated costs of food and water. Since the early 1980s, the Palestinians in Lebanon have felt increasingly forgotten by their own leadership.2 Following its withdrawal from Lebanon in 1982, the PLO has systematically closed its institutions used to support and accommodate refugees and stopped most financial assistance (PHRO, 2002). The Palestinian leadership has engaged in peace talks without consulting the Palestinians in Lebanon. Camp inhabitants fear that the Palestinian leadership might compromise on the right of return and that any peace deal would effectively exclude a solution allowing Palestinians in Lebanon to take up citizenship in a future Palestinian state. Palestinians in Lebanon feel alienated from the Palestinian struggle. They follow events closely in Gaza and the West Bank through the media and are deeply affected by the civil unrest and violence. To show solidarity, Palestinians in Lebanon strike and organize demonstrations, but it is apparent that they feel powerless and more like observers than active participants in what they consider to be the struggle for their future. The international media largely overlooks the Palestinians in Lebanon, preferring instead to focus on the West Bank and Gaza and the developments in the Palestine–Israel conflict. Despite extensive academic work about Palestine, Palestinians and the Palestinian diaspora, the socio-economic conditions of the Palestinian community in Lebanon have been largely neglected. This is partly a result of the civil war which impeded access to information for almost 20 years, and partly because the political and military aspects of the Palestinian experience in Lebanon have overshadowed other issues. Consequently, although Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are experiencing increasingly difficult conditions, because they have been marginalized by the Lebanese, the Palestinian leadership, regional politics and the international media, they are under-researched and little is known about how their camp communities continue to survive. Not only are the Palestinians in Lebanon under-researched but the Palestinian population in general and its refugee status has been marginalized from refugee issues as a whole. Although the political

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aspects of the Palestinian problem have a high profile, and their resolution is regarded as a key element to achieving stability in the Middle East, because Palestinians are identified first as a political issue, they are seldom considered as a humanitarian issue or examined in a refugee context. In part, this is because the legal framework that surrounds Palestinian refugees sets them apart from all other refugee groups. Palestinians have their own dedicated UN agency, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), to provide assistance: all other refugees come under the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The solution to the Palestinian refugee problem is embodied in United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 which resolves that all Palestinians who wish to do so should be allowed to return home, and those who do not should be suitably compensated.3 This differs from the durable solutions – voluntary repatriation, assimilation, or resettlement in a third country – provided for other refugee groups under international law. Legal frameworks, UN mandates and the nature of their durable solution have resulted in the isolation of Palestinians from other refugee groups. Studies of refugees that focus on humanitarian and socioeconomic issues tend to be confined to those under UNHCR. Palestinian studies have evolved in parallel with refugee studies: as a result, interaction between the disciplines is limited. The humanitarian and socio-economic aspects of Palestinian refugee lives are nearly always subsumed by political concerns so Palestinians are rarely considered simply as refugees and examined at the community level. The lack of attention given to Palestinian refugees’ humanitarian and socio-economic status is surprising because, as the oldest and single largest refugee group in the world (USCRI, 2004: 47), the Palestinians’ plight provides vital insights into how people cope with the refugee experience. In addition, protracted refugee groups are increasingly a cause for concern. They are denied their rights and kept in conditions of ‘restricted mobility, enforced idleness, and dependency’ (USCRI, 2004: 38). The Palestinians living in camps represent a protracted refugee group, and those in Lebanon live in particularly difficult conditions. UNHCR argues that ‘[d]espite the gravity of the problem’ – the wasted lives, drain on resources and threats to security that result from people subsisting in a state of limbo – ‘protracted refugees situations have yet to feature prominently on the international political agenda’ (UNHCR, 2006: 106).

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Background to the Palestinians in Lebanon The United Nations responded to the creation of the Palestinian refugee problem in 1948 by establishing UNRWA. The agency, which began operating in 1950, is mandated to provide assistance to Palestinians: whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict (UNRWA, 2000a: 12). Any Palestinian who lives in one of UNRWA’s five fields of operations, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza, and fulfils the above criteria, or is the direct descendant of such a Palestinian, is entitled to register with UNRWA, is referred to as a registered refugee and receives assistance. UNRWA is the largest UN agency and employs over 29,000 people, almost all of whom are Palestinian (UN, 2008: 1). The existence of UNRWA excludes most Palestinians from receiving any assistance from UNHCR. Despite its size, UNRWA’s power is limited as it has no political voice or power and operates only with the permission of the host country. The agency’s ability to undertake long-term planning is impeded by its mandate, which has to be renewed every three years, its reliance on voluntary donations to fund operations, and its chronic financial crisis. Despite widespread criticism of UNRWA from the international community, host governments and Palestinian refugees, its chronic financial crisis and austerity measures, the agency has had successes: in 2000 it was reported that ‘Palestinian refugees have average life expectancy, literacy rates, and infant mortality rates that place them in the top one-quarter of developing countries, ahead of such countries as Egypt, Morocco, and Brazil, as well as almost all of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa’ (Brynen, 2000: 5). However, Palestinians argue that the quality of UNRWA services has declined since the agency began operating, although in Lebanon it is believed that the Palestinians have better access to services than many poor Lebanese.4 In 2006 the agency acknowledged that its schools were overcrowded and under-resourced and its doctors overstretched (UNRWA, 2006: 8). Around a third of registered refugees throughout the five fields of operation live in one of UNRWA’s 58 official camps.5 The agency undertakes some service provision in the camps, such as maintenance of

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the roads and sewers, refuse collection and ensuring water supplies. In addition, UNRWA provides education, healthcare, and welfare assistance to the most needy. A camp services officer (CSO) is appointed in each camp to act as UNRWA’s representative. It is the job of the CSO to liaise between the camp inhabitants and the agency. UNRWA is also responsible for maintaining records of the Palestinian population but their accuracy depends upon Palestinians volunteering information. For various reasons, largely beyond the agency’s control, the records of the Palestinian population contain discrepancies. The situation in Lebanon is no different, and estimates of the number of Palestinians in the country can range from 200,000 to over 400,000. For this book, most statistics are drawn from official UNRWA data or based on estimates gathered during field research. Of the 4.6 million Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA, around 400,000 live in Lebanon and just over half of these inhabit twelve official camps scattered throughout the country (UNRWA, 2008). As a result of the government policies that discriminate against Palestinians in Lebanon, UNRWA claims that Lebanon has ‘the highest percentage of Palestine refugees who are living in abject poverty and who are registered with the Agency’s “special hardship” programme’ of all its five areas of operation.6 The experience of Palestinians in Lebanon differs from that of Palestinians in Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza who have been able to access a wider range of human rights and receive assistance from the host government or authority (IPS, 1998; Shiblak, 1996; UNRWA, 2008; USCR, 1999).7 The status of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza varies and in recent years, particularly since the election of Hamas in January 2006, conditions have deteriorated (UNRWA, 2008). Palestinians in Lebanon are denied basic human and social rights, including the right to work and the right to own land or property, and are restricted in their travel options because they do not have proper travel documents. Consequently, they are heavily reliant on UNRWA for assistance. However, despite the deteriorating situation, and UNRWA’s recognition that Palestinians in Lebanon are among the most disadvantaged Palestinians in the region and heavily dependent on humanitarian assistance, the level of support they receive per capita is decreasing.8 In 2006 UNRWA experienced a $71.5 million deficit (UN, 2006: vi). This is partly because funding has not increased to match natural population growth and inflation, but also because the region is

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volatile so there are many competing and often unexpected demands on international donors. Since 2000, UNRWA has responded to numerous emergencies including the second intifada, a Hizbollah–Israeli war, increased fighting between Israelis and Palestinians in the occupied Palestinian territory, clashes among Palestinian factions, and fighting between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the militant group Fatah alIslam, which resulted in the destruction of a refugee camp in Lebanon and the displacement of the population. These emergencies divert funds from ongoing and planned programmes. The on–off peace talks between Israel and the Palestinians give some, albeit limited, hope that a political solution to the Palestinian problem can be found. The result is that development efforts tend to be concentrated in the West Bank and Gaza, rather than other fields of UNRWA operations, because it is these areas that would form a future Palestinian entity. The focus on development activities in the West Bank and Gaza, in particular following the 1996 Oslo Accords, affects the Palestinians in Lebanon more than in Syria and Jordan where conditions for Palestinians are significantly better, and a larger percentage of the Palestinian refugee population is integrated into the host population.9 UNRWA’s services in Lebanon are supplemented by a large number of ideologically diverse Palestinian NGOs motivated by a variety of humanitarian, political and religious principles. Many have been established since the end of the Lebanese civil war to bridge the gap in UNRWA services. Inhabitants talk about the period from the mid-1990s onwards as the rule of NGOs in the camps as the NGOs are the most powerful single group among the Palestinian camp communities. Because the NGOs are able to respond to the needs of the people they have more credibility and legitimacy with many of the Palestinians than the political factions, which tend to have little money so are unable to support the people in their daily lives. The Lebanese government regards the Palestinians as a destabilizing factor in an already unstable country and pursues anti-Palestinian policies. It has gained popular support for its stance by concentrating the blame for the civil war on the Palestinians. The battle between Fatah alIslam and the Lebanese Armed Forces has confirmed the view of many Lebanese that the Palestinians and their camps represent a security threat to the country.10 As Palestinians have no political voice and no official political representation to express dissent, under the guise of protecting the internal stability of Lebanon, the government is able to pass laws

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that have a detrimental effect on the Palestinians. In addition to being viewed as an overt destabilizing threat, the presence of Palestinians and the possibility of their obtaining citizenship are seen by many Lebanese as a threat to the country’s delicate sectarian balance. The Lebanese population is highly divided along sectarian lines. The three major groups – Sunni, Shi’a and Christian – which represent roughly a third each of the population, vie for power. Most Palestinians are Sunni Muslim and have been unable to obtain citizenship because if they did, arguably, the Sunni population of Lebanon would be in the majority. However, the minority of Palestinians who were Christian were offered Lebanese citizenship on arrival. Any changes to the population structure pose a significant threat to Lebanon’s stability. However, without citizenship, in the current climate, Palestinians in Lebanon are unable to claim their rights and have few opportunities to improve their situation. The populations of the twelve official camps in Lebanon vary from a few hundred to tens of thousands. With the exception of Dbayyeh camp which is home to Christian Palestinians, and Shatila camp which has a population of around 12,000, only half of whom are Palestinian, the camps are composed predominantly of Sunni Muslim Palestinians. The Lebanese restrictions on land for Palestinians have led to severe overcrowding in the camps. There is a lack of privacy and natural light, the conditions are unsanitary and the housing and infrastructure inadequate. The political dynamics in the camps are complicated and fluid and change regularly according to events. Following the start of the second intifada in September 2000, Arafat regained some support among the camp inhabitants in Lebanon. His death in 2004 also evoked an increase in his popularity. However, apart from the three camps in the south which openly support Arafat, the others are dominated by pro-Syrian factions. Ein al-Hilweh camp in Saida is an exception because the community is divided between pro-Arafat and pro-Syrian factions. Since about 2000 Hamas has been establishing a presence in the Palestinian camps by providing support through its welfare wing. The level of political support for Hamas is unclear, although some camp inhabitants are critical of Hamas, saying that it is an Islamic extremist organization. It is not known whether any Palestinians are members of Hizbollah but the group has a following among some camp inhabitants, particularly following what is widely regarded by many in Lebanon as a victory over Israel in 2006.11

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Apart from Dbayyeh camp, each camp has a popular committee of between ten and twenty members that is composed of the dominant political factions in the camp and acts as the representative body of the camp inhabitants. The committees are not democratically elected but are the only authority in the camps. Conflict between the different Palestinian factions can lead to violence. UNRWA operates in the camps with permission from the inhabitants and can be asked to leave temporarily if there is a disagreement between the agency and the Palestinians. Although the relationship between the Palestinians and UNRWA is often strained, the situation seldom deteriorates to the level where the agency withdraws from a camp. The political environment surrounding each camp is different. The Lebanese exercise no direct control in any of the camps. In Beirut, although laws concerning Palestinians are imposed, the Lebanese army does not operate around the camps or attempt to monitor Palestinian movements. In the south, the government maintains tight control over the camps, monitors all Palestinian activities, forbids building materials entering the camps freely, and strictly imposes all laws referring to Palestinians. The camps in southern Lebanon are dominated by proFatah factions, which the Lebanese government regards as a threat. Until the 2007 battle between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese authorities, relations between the Palestinians in the camps in the north and the host community had been better than in other areas of Lebanon. The Lebanese had made little attempt to regulate life in the camps and many of the laws restricting Palestinian activities were not imposed in the north of the country. The repercussions of events in Nahr al-Barid camp remain to be seen. Research Methodology and Challenges To identify camp inhabitants’ coping mechanisms, research was conducted during numerous extended visits to Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon between 1996 and 2006. A range of qualitative techniques was used to ensure that the research was rigorous and that the results could be triangulated. The use of multiple sources and data-gathering techniques has ensured that research findings are as accurate as possible. Data were collected through semi-structured interviews with key informants, participatory workshops with camp inhabitants, and household studies. As I lived with families in the camps it was also possible to collect information informally through observation and

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chance conversations. Living with families provided a privileged insight into domestic life and access to a wider social network, offering many opportunities to conduct research informally. It also helped to establish trust, which improved access to information in formal and informal settings. I speak some Arabic so was able to conduct workshops and interviews in Arabic myself. When my language skills were insufficient camp inhabitants who speak good English acted as translators. Naturally there were challenges to the way the research could be conducted that affected how and what type of data could be collected. The many political factions in the camps can easily become suspicious of foreigners entering, particularly those asking questions, so it was important to ensure that the popular committees and other significant actors were invited to participate in the research and kept informed of my plans. The humanitarian and socio-economic focus of the research was not regarded as controversial, and in fact many inhabitants were anxious to express their views on these issues as they wanted the outside world to know more about their plight. The camp communities are tolerant of foreigners but it was still important to behave in a culturally sensitive manner. As a single woman, living with a family in the camp made my presence more socially acceptable and gave me greater credibility and legitimacy. Most importantly, though, research should not endanger any camp inhabitants. Adopting an open approach and ensuring that inhabitants were aware of the research protected those who participated. Using workshops to gather information also helped because views were expressed in front of others. However, because no one is quite sure who has influence in the camp and what the agendas of different groups inside and outside the camps might be, views may not have been expressed as fully as they might have been. Questions about political issues had to be phrased carefully and sometimes it was not possible to touch on issues that might be construed as controversial. What seemed like an innocuous question about the role of the camps’ popular committees in regulating utilities to households caused offence and I was concerned that there would be repercussions for a Palestinian friend who had accompanied me to see the head of a popular committee. Some popular committees also objected to my taking photographs. For the purposes of my study, which focused on socio-economic conditions of camp inhabitants, discussion of political dynamics was limited to the areas where they affect the daily lives and environment of the Palestinians in Lebanon.

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Baseline data provided by key informants was collected from all twelve camps to produce a profile of the different camps in Lebanon. Three camps, Bourj al-Barajneh, Bourj al-Shamali and Nahr al-Barid, were studied in detail using key informant interviews, participatory workshops and household studies of families from different income brackets. Care was taken to avoid preconceptions about what capacities and vulnerabilities may mean to protracted refugees affecting research findings. Questions and workshop activities were open-ended to limit the influence an outside researcher would have on findings and to allow respondents to express their ideas as freely as possible. Fieldwork findings have been supplemented with a review of academic articles, reports from the UN and NGOs, and newspaper articles. Accurate baseline data is limited because the question of the Palestinian refugees in general is heavily politicized, and the presence of Palestinians in Lebanon highly emotive. Either collecting or publicizing accurate data could be inflammatory, or different interests and agendas drive what data might be collected or how data might be presented to support a particular viewpoint. In addition, gathering accurate data about refugee populations is challenging (see chapter 2 for details). Many statistics presented in this book are drawn from UNRWA data and supplemented with information from other sources. The most recent statistics concerning Palestinian refugees that could be sourced have been quoted, although in some cases this data is ten years old or more. Research was conducted and findings organized by adapting the capacity and vulnerabilities analysis framework developed by Anderson and Woodrow (1989). The term ‘capacities’ ‘describes the existing strengths of individuals and social groups . . . Capacities are built over time and determine people’s ability to cope with a crisis and recover from it . . . Vulnerabilities are long-term factors which weaken people’s ability to cope with the sudden onset of disaster, or with drawn-out emergencies’ (March et al., 1999: 79). Anderson and Woodrow recognized that humanitarian aid that satisfies only the immediate needs of those it is intended to help not only fails to strengthen people against future crises, but may ultimately increase their vulnerabilities to such crises. Therefore, ‘[t]o avoid increasing vulnerabilities, it is necessary to identify capacities in order to know what strengths exist within a society’ (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989: 10–11). Such an approach would enable emergency aid to be linked to long-term development. In response, a simple ‘but not simplistic’ framework to analyse capacities and vulnera-

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bilities was developed (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989: 9). The capacities and vulnerabilities analysis framework (CVA) ‘was designed to help outside agencies plan aid in emergencies, in such a way that interventions meet immediate needs, and at the same time build on the strengths of people and their effort to achieve long-term social and economic development’ (March et al., 1999: 78). Although designed for use in emergencies and able to provide only a snapshot of the situation, CVA can also be used to provide analytical data about ‘communities in vulnerable areas or those affected by chronic crisis’ (March et al., 1999: 89). According to Anderson and Woodrow, capacities and vulnerabilities can be classified as physical/material, social/organizational and motivational/attitudinal. ! Physical/material ‘includes land, climate and environment, people’s health, their skills and labour, infrastructure, food, housing, capital, and physical technologies’. ! Social/organizational refers to formal and informal systems including political structures and social units such as family and community ‘through which people get things done . . . ‘Divisions according to race, religion, ethnicity, language, class, or caste’ can weaken the social fabric to such an extent that people are more vulnerable to crisis.’ ! Motivational/attitudinal includes people’s beliefs and motivations and how these have been affected by the disaster and how the community views ‘its ability to create change’ (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989: 12–14). For the purpose of this study, the classifications of capacities and vulnerabilities have been subdivided to fit the findings from the camps in Lebanon. Physical/material has become physical, economic, education and health; social/organizational is informal social structure and formal social structure; and motivational/attitudinal is psychological. The CVA framework uses dotted lines to remind users that capacities and vulnerabilities are dynamic and ‘the categories overlap, and there is constant interaction among them’ (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989: 13).

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PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON Capacities

Vulnerabilities

Physical Economic Education Health Informal social structure Formal social structure Psychological Figure 1: Adapted Capacities and Vulnerabilities Analysis Framework

Book Structure Following this chapter, which sets the scene for the book, the second chapter examines the political and legal frameworks surrounding refugees. It provides a historical perspective on the development of refugee law to explain how and why Palestinians have been isolated from other refugee groups. It also sets Palestinian refugees in the context of protracted refugee groups and discusses some of the issues surrounding protracted refugees. The third chapter focuses on the structural and conceptual constraints affecting humanitarian assistance to refugees, including the artificial boundaries between relief and development, the uncertainty and fluidity of a refugee situation, the failure of agencies to follow accepted development good practice, donor conditionality, and the difficulty of maintaining political neutrality in a political environment. It analyses the advantages and disadvantages of refugee camps and examines the perceptions of refugees as helpless victims rather than as resourceful survivors. This impression not only influences the nature of the assistance and the attitude of agency staff towards refugees, but forces refugees to behave according to the popular image in order to receive help. Chapter 4 provides a historical perspective of the Palestinian– Lebanese relationship. It analyses the state of Lebanon identifying the population’s confessional divisions which are at the root of the host community’s hostility towards the Palestinians. It traces the course of events from the late 1940s to the first decade of the twenty-first century that have strained the host-refugee relationship, looks at the role of the Palestinians in the Lebanese civil war, discusses the ‘state’ that the Palestinians managed to create in Lebanon under Arafat, and how the

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Ta’if Accords, which ended the war, affected the status of Palestinians in the country. The fifth chapter examines the difficulties in determining the size of the Palestinian refugee population and discusses the legal and political framework surrounding the Palestinians in Lebanon. It concludes that the Lebanese government’s increasingly harsh restrictions aim to demonstrate to the outside world that the Palestinians will never be allowed to settle permanently in the country and to persuade as many Palestinians as possible who are able to leave to do so. This chapter also provides a profile of the Palestinian camp communities in Lebanon by describing the size and nature of the population, discussing the assistance available from UNRWA and other NGOs, and analyzing the local political dynamics, and the relationship between the Palestinians and the surrounding host community. It gives an overview of the conditions in the camps in Lebanon and discusses the relationship between the inhabitants, UNRWA, the political factions and the popular committee. In chapter 6 the capacities and vulnerabilities of Bourj al-Barajneh camp inhabitants are described and compared with the capacities and vulnerabilities of inhabitants of Nahr al-Barid camp near Tripoli in the north and Bourj al-Shamali camp near Tyre in the south. The discussion is organized thematically around the following capacities and vulnerabilities: physical, economic, educational, health, informal social structures, formal social structures and psychological attitude. The complex nature of capacities and vulnerabilities and the factors influencing them are discussed. It concludes that informal social networks and a resilient psychological attitude are the main factors contributing to the survival of the Palestinian community in Lebanon. The most significant vulnerabilities are the lack of governance in the camps and the poor relationship with the host government. Using the Palestinians as a case study, chapter 7 analyses the external factors that influence protracted refugee groups’ abilities to cope. It discusses the impact of assistance, lack of governance, the strained refugee-host relationship and the passage of time on protracted refugee coping mechanisms, and recommends areas that should be addressed to improve the international response to refugee and host community needs. The final chapter summarizes the main issues presented throughout the book by identifying how Palestinian refugees represent a protracted

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refugee group, comparing them with other refugee groups and describing their coping mechanisms. The appendix provides a short profile of all the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, drawing attention to the similarities between the camps but also highlighting the details that give each of them their individual character.

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2 CONTRADICTORY DYNAMICS: POLITICAL AND LEGAL REFUGEE FRAMEWORKS

The simple question ‘Who is a refugee?’ does not have a simple answer. Applying the political and legal frameworks which govern assistance and protection to refugees in international law is not straightforward. There are many anomalies, inconsistencies and gaps that leave groups who may reasonably be considered refugees without support. For example, not all Palestinians who have lost their homes and now live in a different country qualify as refugees. The ambiguities about who is a refugee create national and international political tensions, and ultimately intractable problems with no clear or universally acceptable solution. Refugee status for many groups is becoming protracted because durable solutions cannot be found. The ambiguity of refugee status and the uncertainty about the future have an impact on the ability of refugees to cope with their situation and to work towards improving their prospects. The capacities and vulnerabilities of refugees can only be appreciated by examining how external legal and political factors, over which they have no control, affect their lives. To understand the context in which refugees have to survive and try to work towards a better future, this chapter provides an introduction to refugee law and some of the political and practical constraints that affect the implementation of refugee law and the provision of protection and assistance to refugees. It highlights the difficulties in determining who qualifies for refugee

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status and the size of the refugee population. It compares the legal and political situation of Palestinian refugees with other refugee groups to explain how Palestinians have been marginalized from refugee studies and become a political rather than a humanitarian issue. The chapter also discusses the politics of the refugee–host relationship, provides an overview of issues surrounding protracted refugee status, and examines the political and legal frameworks surrounding the oldest protracted refugee population – the Palestinians (UNHCR, 2006: 112). Who Are the Refugees? Throughout history, groups of people have fled their homes in search of safety, but it was not until after the First World War that attempts were made to define a refugee in legal terms and to establish international standards for the treatment of and assistance to refugees (UNHCR, 2000: 2). Early intergovernmental organizations focused on European refugees displaced in Europe by the First and Second World Wars. At this time, there was no concern for refugee movements in the developing world (Chimni, 2000: 210–12). The first attempt to define a refugee in international law, the 1951 Geneva Convention, was shaped by the European experience of the two World Wars. The mandate of the convention extends to any person who: as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear or for reasons other than personal convenience, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence ... is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it (Article 1, Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees). The 1951 convention forms the core of the mandate for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which was established to assist refugees in Europe and began operating on 1 January 1951. The convention was intended to define who qualified as a refugee and was eligible for assistance, and determine the rights of refugees and the obligations of states towards refugees. However, the

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convention proved inadequate and was modified by the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The protocol removed the time and geographic constraints of the 1951 convention and enabled UNHCR to assist refugees displaced post-1951 and outside Europe. However, applying the 1951 convention and 1967 protocol in practice can be controversial, and determining who qualifies as a refugee and is entitled to assistance from UNHCR is open to legal interpretation and vulnerable to the prevailing political climate. ‘The legal definition derived from the 1951 Convention is and has been mutable: open to change and reordering as required by the international political order’ (Weighill, 1996: 3). For example, persecution as it is understood legally in the terms of the 1951 convention does not necessarily include groups fleeing natural disaster, war, or political or economic turmoil (Chimni, 2000: 8). It is widely accepted that the failure to define ‘persecution’ was deliberate because it was felt impossible to ‘enumerate in advance the myriad forms it might assume’ (Chimni, 2000:4). ‘But this omission gives states a large measure of discretion, resulting in the absence of a “coherent or consistent jurisprudence”‘ (Goodman-Gill, 1996: 67 cited in Chimni, 2000: 4). The legal status of refugee is applied only to individuals who have crossed an international border. Individuals who have been displaced in their own country are referred to as internally displaced persons (IDPs) (Chimni, 2000: 390). The legal position of IDPs is unclear and there are disagreements about whether IDPs should be recognized under the same legal framework as refugees, or be given a separate legal status (Chimni, 2000: 391). The ambiguity means that IDPs are not guaranteed assistance and protection under UNHCR and international law defined by the 1951 convention and the 1967 protocol and that the international community is not under the same obligation to help IDPs as it is refugees. Outside the United Nations and the international legal framework, other more inclusive definitions of refugees and IDPs have been developed. In 1969 the Organization of African Unity adopted a definition of refugees which includes those forced ‘to leave their place of habitual residence because of external aggression, occupation, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order’ (USCR, 2002a: 1). Therefore those fleeing violence such as war or threats to civilian life such as natural disasters would be legally defined as refugees. The 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees developed in Central America,

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Mexico and Panama reaffirms the convention and protocol but expands the definition of who qualifies as a refugee to take account of a wider range of root causes of flight such as conflict and human rights abuses. Since UNHCR began operating, patterns of migration have become increasingly complicated. Population flows can be composed of individuals fleeing danger and others seeking economic opportunities. At the same time the populations and governments have become less willing to act as hosts to displaced communities. In response, UNHCR has extended its operations to assist a wider range of displaced groups including some IDP populations. In January 2005, just over 19 million people were considered to be ‘of concern’ to UNHCR. In addition to 9.2 million refugees, this number was composed of asylum seekers, returned refugees, IDPs and returned IDPs, and stateless populations (UNHCR, 2006: 10).1 Although some IDP groups number among UNHCR’s ‘population of concern’; others do not, for example, 250,000 IDPs in Cyprus do not receive assistance from UNHCR (USCR, 2002a: 1). Despite an extended mandate, groups still find themselves excluded from UNHCR operations. The United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) claims that most of the world’s refugees are not accorded refugee status under the 1951 convention (USCRI, 2007: 2). As UNHCR is the leading provider of assistance to refugees, those excluded from its mandate often face serious legal, political, social and economic problems. For example, Sierra Leonians working in Liberia were excluded from UNHCR assistance by legal technicalities. The Sierra Leonians, who had Liberian identity papers but not Liberian nationality, were forced to flee Liberia in 1991 and 1992 because of the fighting. UNHCR recognized only those of Liberian nationality as eligible for assistance despite the fact that those from Sierra Leone, who had settled and worked in Liberia but had retained their original nationality, had suffered the same fate as the Liberian nationals (Leach, 1992: 8). Palestinians are probably the most notable refugee group that does not fall under the UNHCR mandate. Palestinians, considered to be the oldest and often the single largest refugee group, form a unique refugee population. For historical and political reasons Palestinians have become separated from other refugee groups in international law and in terms of the assistance and protection they receive. They are the only population to have been deprived of their nationality and the territory of their former state (Akram, 2000: 5). They are also the only refugee community not covered by the 1951 convention or the 1967 protocol and to have their own UN agency.

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The United Nations created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in December 1949. It became operational in May of the following year. UNRWA’s mandate defines a Palestinian refugee as one: whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict (UNRWA, 2000a: 12). Any Palestinian who lives in one of UNRWA’s five fields of operations, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, West Bank and Gaza, and fulfils the above criteria, or is the direct descendant of such a Palestinian, is entitled to register with UNRWA to receive assistance and is referred to as a registered refugee. However, in common with the UNHCR refugee definition, when applied in practice, the UNRWA definition excludes certain groups even though their situation is similar to those Palestinians able to register as refugees (Zureik, 1996: 9–10). Those groups who have been unable to register with UNRWA include: ! Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war who settled in places outside UNRWA’s area of operation (UNRWA operates only in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon and the Gaza Strip and West Bank); ! internally displaced Palestinians, who remained in the area that became Israel; ! residents from Gaza and the West Bank and their descendants, who were displaced for the first time in the 1967 war; ! individuals who, after 1967, were deported by the Israeli occupation authorities from the West Bank and Gaza; ! ‘latecomers’, who left the occupied territories, whose Israeliissued residency permits expired and who are prevented by Israel from returning to their homes; ! Palestinians who were outside British Mandatory Palestine when the 1948 war broke out, or those who were outside the territories when the 1967 war broke out and were prevented from returning by the Israelis; ! wealthy Palestinians who sought refuge in 1948 but did not register with UNRWA (Zureik, 1996: 10).

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In addition, there are those who have experienced similar loss and hardship to other Palestinian refugees but in a technical sense would not be regarded as refugees. Among these groups are Palestinian Bedouin ‘who were forcibly removed from their grazing lands within the State of Israel, as well as those who were induced to abandon the West Bank and to relocate to Jordan’ (Zureik, 1996: 10). Others who have been ignored by the UNRWA definition of a Palestinian refugee are those from ‘border villages’ who lost their agricultural land and therefore their source of livelihood but remained in their villages (Zureik, 1996: 10). Counting Refugees: the practical and political challenges As there is no single agreed definition of a refugee, estimates of the total number of refugees vary. In 2002, UNHCR claimed that almost 20 million people came under its mandate (UNHCR, 2003). Yet Human Rights Watch estimates for the same period suggest that worldwide there were 14.9 million refugees and at least 22 million IDPs. According to USCRI, in 2005 the world’s population of refugees and asylum seekers in need of protection totalled 12 million (USCRI, 2007), whereas UNHCR states that 19 million people were of concern to the organization at the beginning of 2005. The disparity between the figures highlights the ambiguity of terms such as refugee, and the different criteria used for determining refugee status. Even the two leading producers of refugee statistics, UNHCR and USCRI often produce different figures (Crisp, 1999: 2). For example, UNHCR statistics exclude Palestinians because they come under the UNRWA mandate, or all groups of IDPs; USCRI lists as refugees only those who are ‘in need of protection and/or assistance’ but includes the Palestinians registered with UNRWA (Crisp, 1999: 5).2 Again, because different definitions are applied, and also because some demographic surveys include the entire population and not just the displaced or those registered as refugees, estimates of the Palestinian refugee population vary. For example, at the end of 2002 UNRWA had registered just over 4 million refugees under its mandate (UNRWA, 2002). The Palestinian Authority’s Bureau of Statistics claimed that there were over 9 million Palestinians worldwide (Haaretz, 2003; Jerusalem Post, 2003), while Badil, a Palestinian resource centre, believed that the population of Palestinian refugees and displaced totalled 6 million (Badil, 2002a).3 It is not only the use of different definitions that produces diverse

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figures for refugee populations, there are also practical operational challenges and competing political interests that impede the collection of reliable data. Consequently, ‘counting refugees is at best an approximate science’ (US Department of State, 1991: 85 in Crisp, 1999: 4), and ‘much of the information available on refugees and persons in need of protection is tentative at best’ (Bilsborrow et al., 1997: 227 in Crisp, 1999: 4). It is expensive in time and resources to compile and maintain accurate demographic data. Few developed states are able to ‘provide a comprehensive statistical picture of refugees on their territory’ so it is unsurprising that less developed countries struggle to monitor refugee populations (Crisp, 1999: 7). Refugee communities are mobile, often crossing vast open spaces and state borders, and dynamic – people die, new babies are born, and families are collected and discarded en route (Crisp, 1999: 8). Political agendas can also result in refugee figures being inflated or deflated. The countries of origin of refugee groups are sometimes reluctant to acknowledge political failure creating mass migration and often underestimate refugee figures and accuse host countries of deliberately inflating their numbers. However, if the refugees originate from a friendly country, to maintain good diplomatic relations, host countries might reduce the figures. Similarly, numbers of returnees might be exaggerated because a returning population marks the end of a crisis and a political success (Crisp, 1999: 9–10). Host countries may overestimate the number of refugees to secure external assistance. In some cases this is simply dishonest, but in the face of large-scale migration tensions are high and governments are merely adopting measures to mitigate against civil unrest (Crisp, 1999: 10–13). The states hosting the largest numbers of refugees often have large poor populations of their own. In fact, there is a link between poverty and refugee situations (Gorman, 1993a: 4). Overestimates of refugee flows ensure extra assistance which might benefit the host community. Officials know that food aid does not arrive immediately so they double the number of refugees received assuming that once assistance arrives the refugee population will have increased and initial overestimates can help to reduce fatalities (Crisp, 1999: 15). Western states in particular increase refugee figures to argue that they are unable to host any more, and donor countries prefer to limit the stated number of refugees or prematurely declare a situation resolved to legitimize reductions to donations. Conversely, refugee movements can also be used for political

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ends to provide an excuse to intervene, as in the case of Kosovo Albanians fleeing to Macedonia and Montenegro (Crisp, 1999: 13). As there are practical and political impediments worldwide to gathering accurate statistical information about the number of refugees, it becomes clear why population statistics for Palestinian refugees are so diverse. In 1948 there was an exodus of several hundred thousand Palestinians. The situation was chaotic, families were mobile and crossing and recrossing borders. Many people did not stay in official camps but made their own arrangements and were not recorded as refugees (Roberts, 2000: 119–23). Authorities lacked the capacity to record accurately the refugee population. Estimates of the number of refugees created in 1948 vary although the UNRWA figure of 750,000 is the one most often cited. Zureik has compared other estimates from 1948, which include: official British estimate 810,000, official US estimate 875,000, official Israeli estimate 520,000, and Palestinian estimate 849,186 (Zureik, 1996: 17). Since 1948 the situation in the region has been volatile; there have been further Arab–Israeli clashes and civil wars and consequently largescale displacement. There has also been natural population growth and emigration to Western countries and Gulf states. Therefore, maintaining accurate records has been difficult. In addition to the practical challenges, it is in the interest of all the key actors to manipulate the number of Palestinian refugees. Host countries exaggerate the figures to show either that the presence of such a large refugee population is destabilizing or to ensure that they receive adequate credit and financial compensation for their efforts. Israel refuses to accept that Palestinians are refugees. Officially it insists that those who fled the country left voluntarily (E. Said, 2003: 32): ‘the Arab refugee problem began in the war in 1948 in large part because the Arabs . . . chose to leave as part of a tactical manoeuvre’ (Hertberg, 1973 cited in Chomsky, 2003: 138). Furthermore, Israel does not recognize the Palestinians as a group distinct from other Arabs. Golda Meir, the former Israeli Prime Minister, declared: It is not as though there was a Palestinian people in Palestine considering itself as a Palestinian people and we came and threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist (Israeli Prime Minister, Golda Meir, 1969 quoted in Chomsky, 2003: 19).

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The Legal Framework for Refugees Within refugee law, Palestinians are unique because they are excluded from UNHCR assistance and subject to different laws, levels of assistance and protection from other refugees groups. UNHCR was established after UNRWA, and its mandate stipulates that it can help only those refugees who are not in receipt of assistance from any other agency; this applies only to the Palestinians. Therefore, the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1967 Refugee Protocol which underpin the UNHCR mandate are interpreted by most states and international bodies as inapplicable to Palestinians. Consequently, Palestinian refugees are regarded as ineligible for the ‘most basic protection rights guaranteed under international law’ to other refugee groups, ‘further eroding the precarious international legal guarantees that international human rights and humanitarian law’ currently offer refugees (Akram, 2000: 1). The marginalizing of Palestinians from the international legal framework for refugees affects their right to protection and ability to assert their human rights, their access to fora to voice these rights and to an entity to represent them on the international stage. Palestinians’ right to protection has been sidelined because UNRWA is mandated to provide only assistance to meet the daily needs of food, clothing and shelter. In contrast, UNHCR’s mandate offers protection and empowers the agency to represent the refugees and to intervene on their behalf (Akram, 2000: 1–2). UNRWA is considered a guest of the host governments, functioning only with their approval, and as such has no political power and is not the political representative of the Palestinians.4 There is uncertainty about whether individual Palestinians can assert their individual human rights protected under international law if they collide with collective rights also protected under international law (Akram, 2000: 1). The complex issue of individual rights versus collective rights arises because of United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 194, which: Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for the loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible (UNGA 194 III, 1948).

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Resolution 194 conflicts with later Resolutions 242 and 338 which focus on the collective right of self-determination.5 Precedents have been set in Bosnia and Kosovo allowing collective and individual rights to be pursued (Akram, 2000: 6), but it is unlikely that the Israeli state would willingly accept such a solution. At Camp David II, the then Israeli Prime Minister, Ehud Barak, wanted Arafat to agree to end individual Palestinian claims, which would prevent ‘attempts to seek compensation or restitution for their property which was confiscated when the state of Israel was born in 1948’ (Hishmeh, 2000). It can be argued that the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) forfeited Resolution 194 when it signed Oslo I and II in September 1993 and September 1995 respectively (W. Said, 2000: 2). However, Resolution 194 still exists in international law, which Said claims should take precedence over the Oslo Accords (W. Said, 2000: 2). Akram argues that Resolution 194 was not negated but reserved for the final status negotiations (originally scheduled for May 1996 but never held) in which the future of Palestinian refugees was to be one of the main issues (Susan Akram quoted in Hishmeh, 2000). Resolution 194 has been affirmed by UNGA every year since it was passed in 1948 and ‘represents the strongest claim under international law for the inalienable rights of repatriation available to the Palestinian refugees’ (W. Said, 2000: 1). The existence of Resolutions 194, 242 and 338 means that the solutions to the Palestinian refugee problem differ under international law from the potential solutions for other refugee groups. At the time Resolution 194 was agreed, resettlement in a third country was the preferred solution for refugees, yet Palestinians were treated differently. There was complete consensus by all states except Israel that a solution to the Palestinian refugee problem should be based on compensation and repatriation by all states except Israel (Akram, 2000: 3). For refugees falling under the UNHCR mandate, there are three possible durable solutions – voluntary repatriation, integration into the host country, or resettlement in a third country. Today, voluntary repatriation is often the international community’s preferred solution (UNHCR, 2006: 130). Whether Palestinians pursue their individual or collective rights or both, the existing UN resolutions do not allow assimilation or settlement in a third country as a durable solution to the Palestinian refugee problem. The recognition of the Palestinian right to return is upheld in international law through the right of Palestinians to accept citizenship in another country without forfeiting their refugee status (USCR, 1999:

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7). No other refugee group can do this. Once refugees have accepted citizenship outside their own state, they are no longer considered refugees, no longer come under the UNHCR mandate, and no longer have the right to seek return to their country of origin. The potential solutions to refugee problems also influence the period for which assistance is provided. The UNHCR mandate expires once one of the three durable solutions can be implemented. UNRWA on the other hand is mandated to provide assistance until either individual Palestinians can pursue Resolution 194, or until a collective right of return has been agreed with the Israeli state. The failure, Akram argues, of the international community to provide adequate protection and representation for Palestinian refugees is not the fault of actions in the years immediately following 1948, but the result of subsequent misinterpretations of the laws and resolutions pertaining to the Palestinian problem. Akram claims that because of the failed United Nations plan to partition Palestine in accordance with UNGA Resolution 181, the international community felt responsible for the plight of the Palestinians. Therefore, two agencies were created: UNRWA to provide assistance, and the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP) to provide protection and ‘to “take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them” – specifically, according to UNGA Res 194 (III), to ensure repatriation and compensation’ (Akram, 2000: 2). Therefore, UNCCP was mandated to provide protection in the same way as UNHCR, but with the additional role to pursue a solution for the Palestinian problem according to the specific terms laid down by UNGA resolutions. However, UNCCP failed to mediate between the Arabs and Palestinians who are demanding full repatriation and Israel’s refusal of any refugee repatriation, and rapidly fell into obscurity. By the 1950s, UNCCP was virtually defunct (Jabri, 2003). In effect, the Palestinians are not provided with protection, only with assistance from UNRWA, so, Akram argues, they are entitled to protection from UNHCR in accordance with Article 1D of the Refugee Convention (Akram, 2000: 2): When such protection or assistance has ceased for any reason, without the position of such persons being definitively settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations, these persons shall ipso facto be entitled to the benefits of this Convention.

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UNHCR has revised its interpretation of international laws governing its role towards Palestinian refugees because to qualify for UNRWA assistance Palestinians have to be living in areas of UNRWA operations. Therefore, stateless Palestinians living beyond that area are entitled under the terms of the 1951 UN Refugee Convention to assistance and protection from UNHCR (UNHCR, 2006: 113). For example, at the end of 2001, a total of 349,100 Palestinians living outside UNRWA areas of operation in countries such as Iraq and Libya were considered ‘to be of concern to UNHCR’ (UNHCR, 2002: 3). Although additional groups of Palestinians are now considered eligible for assistance, there is still no clear declaration of protection for Palestinians to complement the assistance they receive from UNRWA. Furthermore, there is no explicit acknowledgement in UNHCR statements offering ‘assistance and protection’ to certain groups of Palestinians that UNRWA is unable to offer protection to Palestinian refugees under its mandate. There are still Palestinians not registered with UNRWA but living in an area of UNRWA operations who are unlikely to receive assistance from UNRWA or UNHCR (UNHCR, 2006: 113). There is recognition at the UN that the Palestinians do not receive adequate protection, but although some measures have been introduced to provide protection through UNRWA, it is not full legal protection, and Palestinians remain vulnerable. Jabri argues that it is obvious that the UNRWA mandate is inadequate to enable the agency to provide protection and that the mandate should have been revised many years ago to provide Palestinians with protection (Jabri, 2003). As a result of the ambiguities surrounding the legal reinterpretation, Palestinians remain in a weak position to assert their rights and seek protection (Badil, 2002b). Host Country Attitudes to Refugees The impact of displacement not only affects those who have been made homeless, it also affects those who host the displaced. ‘Refugees are perceived as a problem rather than people with problems’ so are rarely genuinely welcomed by the host country (McSpadden, 1993: 63). Refugees are invariably regarded as an economic burden, an additional drain on natural resources and already overstretched local services, and a potential threat to political and social stability. The fact that refugee communities are unwelcome can pose problems for the agencies attempting to provide assistance and limit the scope of their operations. The influence of the refugee–host relationship on assistance to refugees

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highlights the weakness of refugee law and the methods available to enforce it. As the assistance to and protection for refugees is always, to some extent, dependent on the cooperation of the host government, there can be no uniformity in level of assistance or protection afforded different refugee groups. Furthermore, not all countries are signatories of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol which outline refugee rights (UNHCR, 2002: 2). In addition, the help provided by the international community is dependent on its relationships with the refugee country of origin. Most funding to assist refugees comes from developed countries but it is developing countries that host most refugees (USCRI, 2007: 13). Developing countries tend to have limited and already overstretched resources and are often heavily dependent on external assistance, so the presence of a refugee community is an additional burden (UNHCR, 2006: 114). By the end of 2004, relative to the size of the national population, UNHCR listed the main host countries as Armenia, Chad, Serbia and Montenegro, Djibouti and Congo (UNHCR, 2006: 224). There is evidence to suggest that poorer host communities can be hurt by refugee influxes. At the start of a refugee emergency, the condition of the host community should be assessed to determine assistance required by that community as well as that required by the refugee population (Chambers, 1993: 42–43). Many governments take action to prevent the development of a refugee community within their borders. For example, the Thai government, ‘faced with the prospect of a growing permanent refugee population’, discouraged new arrivals of Hmong from Laos and Cambodia and made ‘life in the camps more difficult and threatened to repatriate those remaining’ (Long, 1993: 51). The Turkish government adopted a stronger position at the end of the Gulf War in 1991 and refused to open its southern borders to the Kurds trying to flee Iraq. Palestinian refugees, in common with other refugee groups, find that their relationship with the different host countries varies because of the inconsistencies in legal interpretation and enforcement. One of the main obstacles to establishing civil rights of the Palestinian refugees in host Arab states is the absence of clear and well-defined legislation regulating their status. Palestinian affairs are governed by ministerial decrees or administrative orders, which allow differing interpretations and abuses of power and can easily be reversed in response to changing political conditions (Shiblak, 1996: 39).

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It is generally accepted that for much of the time following 1948, Palestinians in Lebanon have had a worse position than those in any of the other UNRWA fields. In Jordan, the majority of Palestinians are entitled to full citizenship and therefore enjoy the same rights as Jordanian citizens. Palestinians who came from the Gaza Strip in 1967 have only temporary passports. The Jordanian state has, for most of the last 60 years, sustained reasonable relations with the Palestinians. Only 18 per cent of the almost 1.9 million Palestinian refugees in Jordan live in camps (UNRWA, 2007). Although the security situation in the camps is closely monitored, the Syrian state has also maintained reasonable relations with the approximately 450,000 Palestinians living there (UNRWA, 2007). The Palestinians have the same rights as Syrian citizens except they have laissez passez documents rather than passports, and are unable to vote in state elections. Despite the fact that the West Bank and Gaza Strip, home to over 730,000 and one million Palestinian refugees respectively, have endured extended periods of Israeli attacks, the Palestinians in these two fields have had employment opportunities in Israel and have also benefited from state services such as health and education. Therefore, the prevailing conditions of the refugees in Gaza and the West Bank, for much of the time, are considered to have been better than those faced by the 416,000 Palestinians in Lebanon.6 However, the security situation in the West Bank and Gaza has deteriorated significantly since the start of the second intifada in 2000, and the restrictions on movement, trade, employment and escalations in violence, particularly in Gaza, have led to widespread poverty and hardship. The situation in Gaza worsened again after Hamas’ election victory in early 2006 and led to Israeli air and ground attacks on Gaza at the end of 2008. Unlike other host governments, the Lebanese government does not provide any services to the camps, such as refuse collection, sewage disposal, drinking water or electricity. Between July 1999 and June 2002, the Jordanian government reported spending $380.4 million on behalf of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons on education, rent and utilities, subsidies and rations, camp services, healthcare, public security and social services. For the same period, the Syrian government spent $58.8 million on Palestinian refugees and provided education, social services, healthcare, housing and utilities, and security (UN, 2000: paragraphs 14–16). This means that the Palestinians in Lebanon, unless they can find their own solutions, are reliant on UNRWA and NGOs for

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services. Hizbollah and Hamas also provide support for the refugees, and a limited number of social activities, particularly in the camps in the south of the country, are supported by the PLO. The different conditions the Palestinian refugees experience in their respective host countries demonstrate UNRWA’s inability to provide a uniform level of service because of its guest status and the requirement that it cooperates with the various host governments. Funding levels for the different UNRWA fields also vary. The Palestinians in Jordan and Syria receive less per capita from UNRWA because the host governments provide services and the Palestinians have the right to work. Following the 1993 Oslo Accords, UNRWA concentrated its funds in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in an effort to support the creation of a Palestinian state. This is despite the fact that at the time Palestinians in Lebanon were only marginally better off than those in the Gaza Strip, and the Lebanese governments appeared to be less willing to cooperate with UNRWA than the Israeli governments (UNRWA data 1999).7 Being able to provide a consistent quality of service is dependent on regular and reliable funding. UNRWA relies on voluntary donations and has suffered from a severe shortage of funding since the 1970s. This means that developments elsewhere can attract funding from donor governments that may otherwise have been given to UNRWA. For example, from the beginning of the Iraq crisis in 2003, UNRWA noticed a drop in funding as attention was focused on Iraq (UNRWA, 2003). Throughout its existence UNRWA has experienced one emergency after another. This not only means that funds are diverted from planned operations to respond to a crisis but that the relationship between the host government and the Palestinians can deteriorate. UNRWA has also found itself embroiled in the political tensions between the host and refugee community. The agency has been accused by host governments on numerous occasions of supporting Palestinian activities that threaten security, such as allowing UNRWA facilities to be used by militias for training (Schiff, 1995; Viorst, 1989). Protracted Refugee Status The failure of the international community to provide effective protection for refugees and durable solutions to their plight is evident in the growing number of protracted refugee situations. Protracted refugee situations represent a challenge to human rights and at the same time

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their presence raises political and security concerns for host countries and other states in the region. The current legal framework for displaced populations was designed for temporary situations and is therefore inadequate to deal with protracted situations. Assistance to refugees concentrates on emergencies rather than ongoing situations in which people’s needs are very different. Despite the pressing nature of the problem, and the lack of any effective legal or humanitarian framework to address the needs of protracted refugee groups, the issue has yet to attract the attention of the international community (UNHCR, 2006: 105–06). There is no universally accepted definition of a protracted refugee situation. UNHCR has defined protracted refugee groups as those with populations of ‘25,000 . . . or more who have been in exile in developing countries for 5 years or more’ (UNHCR, 2004: 2). The United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI) prefers the term ‘warehousing’ instead of protracted refugee status. The committee’s definition for warehoused refugee populations is ‘Populations of 10,000 or more restricted to camps or segregated settlements or otherwise deprived of rights, to freedom of movement or livelihoods in situations lasting five years or more’ (USCRI, 2007). Both UNHCR and USCRI recognize the Palestinians as the oldest and largest protracted refugee group. At the end of 2003, UNHCR stated that, excluding Palestinian refugees which come under UNRWA’s mandate, there were 38 different protracted refugee situations in the world (UNHCR, 2004: 2). ‘[P]rotracted refugee situations now account for the vast majority of the world’s refugee population’ (UNHCR, 2006: 108). According to USCRI, in 2007 there were 8.8 million warehoused refugees. In common with all displaced groups, the exact number of refugees in protracted situations is unknown for a variety of reasons. UNHCR admits that there are significant-sized refugee groups who number less than 25,000 that the agency would also consider to be protracted refugee groups. Refugees who could reasonably be considered to belong to a protracted refugee group can live for years in urban areas under the radar of the authorities and assistance organizations. Many who find themselves in protracted refugee situations seek solutions themselves so although the population of a protracted situation may remain stable the composition of the population often changes. Political factors can also influence the use of ‘protracted’ to define a

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refugee group. UNHCR states that defining a refugee situation as protracted is a matter of perception depending on whether there are any prospects of a solution (UNHCR, 2006: 106–08). Acknowledging that a refugee group is protracted is admitting to failure but also indicates that efforts to find a durable solution are unlikely to succeed in the near future. This puts pressure on the international community to continue to provide funding for the refugees but also adds to any pre-existing political tensions among the host country, country of origin and refugee population. UNHCR claims that in the past, following the Second World War, during the Cold War or in the face of large numbers of refugees from South-East Asia and Central America, the international community developed comprehensive plans that drew on all the three durable solutions and successfully resolved these refugee crises. However, since the early 1990s, the high number of refugee emergencies has meant that the initial focus tended to be on providing emergency assistance. Solutions were found but they tended to be centred on one of the durable solutions rather than on developing more complex and possibly time-consuming comprehensive solutions to protracted refugee situations (UNHCR, 2006: 105–20). Since the beginning of the twenty-first century concern has been increasing about failure to solve protracted refugee situations effectively. The consequences of protracted refugee situations include ‘wasted lives, squandered resources and increased threats to security’ (UNHCR, 2004: 2). ‘Protracted refugee situations endure because of ongoing problems in the country of origin and stagnate and become protracted as a result of responses to refugee inflows, typically involving restrictions on refugee movement and employment and confinement to camps’ (UNHCR, 2004: 1–2). The presence of protracted refugee groups can contribute to conflict and continued instability, obstruct peace and impede economic development. Camps can become militarized or involved in activities such as ‘[a]rms trafficking, trafficking in women and children, and the recruitment of child soldiers and mercenaries’. Protracted refugee situations can place a strain on relations between the host country and the country of origin (UNHCR, 2006: 116–18). Support to protracted refugees is a recurrent expense and not an investment in the future (UNHCR, 2004: 3). Declining donor support for protracted refugee situations poses a threat to security as refugee and host populations compete for scarce resources. The lack of external

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funding increases the burden of protracted refugee groups on the host country and can mean that in the light of limited international support, host governments, concerned about the burden on their own resources, are reluctant to find local solutions for protracted refugee groups (UNHCR, 2006: 114). UNHCR argues that countries of origin, host countries and the international community are all complicit in the causes of protracted refugee situations (UNHCR, 2006: 106). ‘[I]t is clear that resolving refugee situations must be a central part of any solution to long-standing regional conflicts’ (UNHCR, 2006: 109). The failure to consolidate peace can lead to recurrent protracted refugee situations. For example, Liberians returned to their country in 1997 and subsequently left again in 1999 and 2000 following renewed conflict (UNHCR, 2006: 113). To tackle protracted refugee situations effectively there needs to be a systematic and comprehensive approach that includes a broad range of actors (UNHCR, 2006: 121). Unfortunately, such a comprehensive approach demands political will of innumerable actors, but in many protracted refugee cases that political will is not there. Without a solution, protracted refugees live their ‘lives on indefinite hold – in violation of their basic rights under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention’ (USCRI, 2004: 38). It is the violation of human rights and the permanent state of limbo that is of greatest concern to actors involved in assistance to refugees, rather than the duration of the refugee situation (UNHCR, 2004: 2). Indeed, USCRI prefers the term ‘warehoused’ rather than ‘protracted’ because it refers to the humanitarian and socio-economic conditions as well as the passage of time. ‘Warehousing is the practice of keeping refugees in protracted situations of restricted mobility, enforced idleness and dependency’ (USCRI, 2004: 38). Host governments usually require protracted refugee groups to live in camps and restrict their movements so that they cannot leave the camps for education or employment (UNHCR, 2006: 115). Requiring protracted refugee groups to live in camps has led to the violation of a number of rights under the 1951 convention including the right to seek wage-earning employment, the right to practise a profession after obtaining the necessary qualifications, the right to freedom of movement, the right to access public services such as healthcare and education, the right to access courts and live without discrimination, and the right to travel documents (USCR, 2004). As a result, refugees in a

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protracted situation are ‘often unable to break free from enforced reliance on external assistance’ (UNHCR, 2006: 106). Refugees in protracted situations have moved beyond emergency life-saving assistance but the prospects of a durable solution are remote (UNHCR, 2006: 106). UNHCR argues that to respond effectively to protracted refugee situations it is important to focus on refugee wellbeing and to recognize that there is a difference between basic needs and minimum standards and benefits from enhancing refugees’ own coping mechanisms (UNHCR, 2006: 121). In terms of the passage of time and the humanitarian conditions in which they find themselves, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon can be defined as protracted refugees and warehoused refugees. The rights of the Palestinians in Lebanon are severely restricted, limiting their ability to work or travel. There are restrictions on the land available for the camps, which, because of the natural population growth and the loss of camps destroyed during the civil war, are becoming increasingly overcrowded. Fifty-three per cent of the Palestinians in Lebanon live in camps, which is the largest proportion of refugees in camps in UNRWA’s five fields of operation (UNRWA, 2008). The proportion of refugees in camps in Lebanon is an indication of the high level of poverty caused by the restrictions on employment. Since the end of the civil war, inflation has been high, exacerbating the level of poverty experienced by the refugees. The Palestinians are also forbidden from owning property (PHRO, 2005: 18), and few can afford to live outside the camps because of the high rents charged by landlords.8 The attitudes of the Lebanese government and population became increasingly hostile towards the Palestinians after the end of the civil war, with many Lebanese blaming the war on the Palestinians (Zeine, 1994 in R. Sayigh, 1995: 33). Following the Syrian withdrawal in April 2005 and before the Hizbollah–Israeli war in the summer of 2006, the Lebanese authorities tentatively began to ease some restrictions on the Palestinian refugee population (M. Khalidi & Riskedahl, 2007: 32). Nevertheless, the plight of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon represents a failure of the Israeli and Lebanese governments, neighbouring states and the international community to respect and protect the rights of the Palestinians in Lebanon and to find a durable and just solution to their situation (Amnesty International, 2007: 6). As a result, Palestinians have been living in a state of limbo in refugee camps in Lebanon for six decades with few opportunities to help themselves. Furthermore, few of those who fled their homes in Palestine in the late

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1940s are still alive, and most of the camps’ current inhabitants were born and have lived in the camps all their lives: for most, being a refugee and living in a camp is a way of life. Conclusion This chapter has presented the legal and political frameworks surrounding refugees to show that what might be considered simple questions – who is a refugee? what is the size of the global refugee population? – are anything but simple and therefore who is entitled to assistance and protection as a refugee is unclear. To be legally defined as a refugee, specific criteria must be fulfilled, yet the existing legal frameworks are ineffective as groups who might reasonably be assumed to be refugees are excluded and there is no agreed mechanism for enforcing refugee law. Determining the size of a refugee population is problematic as refugee groups are dynamic and mobile, they flee in different directions, make their journey in stages, cross and recross borders, and the threat or perceived threat from which they are trying to escape can change. The ambiguities in refugee law allow individual states and organizations to interpret them in their own way so there is no uniformity of assistance or protection offered to refugees. Therefore politics play a fundamental role in the assistance and protection afforded refugee groups. The basis of refugee law was established after the Second World War and drew on experiences with refugees in Europe. Yet today the majority of refugees come from the developing world and a very different background from post-war Europe. To provide adequate protection for refugees and ensure a similar level of assistance throughout the world, refugee law needs to be reformed. Unfortunately, the increasing hostility towards refugees and the reluctance of the international community and individual states to accept responsibility for refugee groups is not an environment favourable for a comprehensive review of refugee law, or one that puts the needs of refugees first over the political aspirations, security concerns and economic ambitions of those with the power to change the status quo. For legal reasons Palestinians have been separated from other refugee groups, and as a result tend to be discussed separately. Palestinian refugees are afforded less protection than other refugees. In addition, the international community and UNRWA have committed themselves uniquely to a right of return for Palestinian refugees. There-

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fore, in legal terms, at least until 1993 if not after, the international community has been committed to assisting the Palestinians until they could return to Palestine. No other refugee group is guaranteed international assistance until they are able to return to their homeland. Mistakenly, refugee situations are assumed to be temporary, when in fact many are protracted. Consequently, the methods to assist and protect refugees are inadequate because they fail to address the complex reality and are designed to manage a temporary situation. This means that people are not only stateless for extended periods but are often confined to camps, have limited mobility and limited access to their human rights. Palestinians can be considered the longest-protracted refugee group in the world. Despite the seriousness of the protracted refugee problem for the refugee group, the host country and the international community, little has yet been done to respond to the needs of the increasing number of protracted refugee groups. This not only has a profound affect on refugee legal status and right to protection but, as discussed in the following chapter, on refugee access to appropriate assistance and their ability to move beyond a refugee situation.

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3 ASSISTANCE TO REFUGEES: THE LOGIC, DILEMMAS AND ANOMALIES

UNHCR is ‘the world’s leading refugee organization’ (UNHCR, 2000) and UNRWA is the main source of assistance to Palestinian refugees and one of the largest UN programmes (UN, 2008). UNHCR aims ‘to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees’.1 The agency coordinates the provision of basic needs, healthcare and education, manages or helps to manage camps, and seeks to find durable solutions for refugee groups (UNHCR, 2007: 21). Although it has a separate mandate, and has continued to serve the same refugee group for 60 years, many of UNRWA’s objectives are the same as UNHCR’s. UNRWA aims to provide education, healthcare, and welfare to the most vulnerable Palestinian refugees. It operates schools, clinics and community centres in or near official and unofficial camps, and is responsible for some service provision in the official camps, such as maintenance of the roads and sewers, refuse collection and water supply. Both UNHCR and UNRWA, in common with other organizations providing humanitarian assistance to refugees, find that their activities are affected by political and economic factors, misconceptions of refugees’ needs and abilities, and artificial constructs surrounding humanitarian assistance. UNHCR’s activities are limited by its mandate, international law and practical considerations. Despite being one of the largest UN bodies, employing over 29,000 staff (UN, 2008: 1), UNRWA’s

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power is limited as it has no political voice or power and operates only with the permission of the host community. The agency’s ability to undertake long-term planning is impeded by its mandate, which has to be renewed every three years, its reliance on voluntary donations to fund operations, and its chronic financial crisis. This chapter complements the preceding discussion on the political and legal framework surrounding refugees by focusing on the humanitarian, socio-economic and psychological aspects of refugee status. It examines the structural and conceptual constraints and the assumptions underpinning efforts to provide assistance that affect how assistance is delivered. It looks at how the attitudes of refugees and those working to assist refugees influence the effectiveness of the assistance. In addition, the chapter examines the effect of long-term assistance on protracted refugees, particularly the provision of assistance in refugee camps. Structural and Conceptual Constraints Poorly conceived humanitarian interventions can do more harm than good and, rather than alleviating problems, can exacerbate them or create new ones (Anderson, 1999). It is recognized that humanitarian assistance should provide a foundation for sustainable development, be appropriate and culturally sensitive, and, wherever possible, actively involve the target group in the planning, implementation and management processes. Unfortunately, for reasons outlined in the previous chapter, humanitarian considerations are not always a priority and compromises are made to satisfy economic, political or practical requirements. Humanitarian agencies also make mistakes because they misjudge situations, target assistance badly or employ underqualified staff. Consequently, the delivery of assistance in reality differs from what is regarded as good practice. The Relief–Development Gap There are artificial boundaries, in theory and practice, between relief and development assistance despite a long-held belief that relief assistance should be developmental or provide a basis for development programmes. The ‘relief–development gap’ exists because funding targets either relief or development; agencies provide relief or development assistance. Until recently ‘refugees and development were still perceived as two distinct issues, with relatively little bearing upon

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each other’ (Crisp, 2001: 1). The international community treated ‘the refugee problem as distinct from the larger economic development crisis of the Third World. Separate institutions within the UN system grew up to cope with these seemingly discrete problems’ (Gorman, 1993a: 1). Certain situations are considered temporary so the need is for relief and not development programmes. Refugee situations are seen as temporary, and consequently refugees fall into the relief–development gap. Yet in 2007, 8.8 million people were estimated to have been refugees for five years or more (USCRI, 2007). Despite the protracted nature of many refugee situations, organizations that assist refugees have tended to focus on relief because refugee crises are considered emergencies. Consequently, these agencies have a ‘relief mentality’ and lack the skills and experience to undertake long-term planning (Jacobsen, 2005: 70). For example, while UNHCR attempted to implement a permanent shelter programme in Rwanda it continued to function as an emergencydriven organization and failed to foresee potential long-term limitations of its programme and opportunities for establishing related incomegeneration development projects (UNHCR, 1999). Concerted efforts to bridge the relief–development gap can have limited results and may be motivated by political and economic concerns. For example, donors may suspect that host governments are keen to permit development programmes for refugees because more international assistance will be forthcoming that could benefit the host state and not just the refugee population (Crisp, 2001: 4). At the same time though, host governments may worry that development assistance is intended to integrate refugees permanently into the host country (Stein, 1994 in Crisp, 2001: 4). Refugees can be equally suspicious of such development programmes, fearing that integration into the host economy is an underhand way of withdrawing assistance and implementing a durable solution that they may find unacceptable. When UNRWA was initially conceived there were attempts to integrate refugee programmes with large-scale regional development projects. These projects, advocated by the United States, the largest single UNRWA donor, included agricultural irrigation and hydroelectric schemes. UNRWA also experimented with other smaller-scale works projects to reintegrate the refugees into the regional economy. These ranged from voluntary resettlement in Libya and Iraq, and financial and practical assistance to help individuals establish small businesses, to host government projects that were funded by UNRWA and employed

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refugees. By the late 1950s, UNRWA had abandoned such works projects in favour of health, education and relief assistance. The economic approach failed because the host and refugee communities were suspicious of the agency’s motives, and the schemes were expensive because host governments wanted to exploit UNRWA resources and the results were unsustainable (Schiff, 1995). Cycles of Emergencies Another factor contributing to the failure of UNRWA’s works programme was the changing environment. Refugee situations are volatile and fluid so it is difficult to plan assistance (Gorman, 1993b: 150). UNRWA’s experiences illustrate the challenges organizations assisting refugees can face. After the creation of the Palestinian refugee population in the late 1940s, numerous events in the Middle East have disrupted UNRWA services, requiring the agency to refocus its efforts and divert resources from one programme to another at short notice. The list includes the 1956 Suez Crisis, 1967 Six-Day War, 1970 Black September, 1973 Yom Kippur War, the 1978 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the protracted Lebanese civil war, the first intifada, the 1991 Gulf War, the failed peace process initiated by the Madrid Conference and signing of the Oslo Accords, the 1996 Israeli aerial bombing of Lebanon known as Grapes of Wrath, the second intifada, the 2003 Gulf War, the roadmap to peace, 2006 Hizbollah–Israeli war, 2007 destruction of Nahr al-Barid camp in Lebanon and fighting between Fatah and Hamas, and the 2008 conflict between Hamas and Israel. As assistance to refugees is often a form of crisis management in which agencies concentrate on humanitarian assistance, there is little time to consider how the assistance can be sustainable and move from relief to development. Humanitarian staff acknowledge that ‘We are so busy saving lives at the beginning that by the time we have time to think we have made too many mistakes’ (Harrell-Bond, 1986: 155). Anderson and Woodrow argue that opportunities are missed because ‘relief work should be held to development standards’ and form a basis for longterm development (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989: 96). An emergency should be seen as an opportunity to promote development (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989: 85) and an ‘opportunity for the host government to strengthen its capacity to manage its own programme after the humanitarians leave’ (Harrell-Bond, 1986: 67).

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Despite concerns about the failure to link relief and development assistance and how to design relief aid to provide a basis for sustainable development, some humanitarian assistance can be developmental. The differences between relief and development assistance are ‘essentially theoretical’, and relief programmes implemented during crisis situations may have a developmental impact (Payne, 1996: viii). For example, a vaccination or basic education programme in an emergency refugee camp contributes to community development. Grassroots Participation Sustainable development requires grassroots participation (Allen, 1996: 5). Participatory programmes and community development projects have existed since the 1970s, and advocate a holistic, bottom-up approach intended to encourage self-reliance and independence to promote sustainable development rather than a dependency culture.2 Using participatory research methods with the target community to create development projects helps to establish programmes that are more likely to meet needs effectively. By involving people in the decision-making process, they learn valuable skills that can be applied in the future. Many consider that active participation in the process of the project is as important as the project itself (Basok, 1993; ODA, 1995). ‘This philosophy of a “people-based” development “from below” assumes that participation is not only an end in itself but also a fundamental pre-condition for and a tool of any successful development strategy’ (Oakley & Marsden, 1984: 10). The indiscriminate use of popular development words such as ‘empowerment’, ‘self-sufficiency’ and ‘participation’ to describe assistance programmes for refugees has rendered them meaningless because their spirit has not been applied in practice. For example, some refugees are encouraged to be ‘self-sufficient’ but are not given enough land to cultivate to feed themselves; some refugees are required to ‘participate’ by offering their labour for free when non-refugees are receiving payment for the same work (James, 1999: 25). Agencies fail to meet the needs of refugees because their perception of what is needed differs from what refugees want. Sometimes humanitarian responses can undermine the efforts of the refugees to help themselves. Among Burmese refugees an initial lack of aid encouraged refugee initiatives. Unfortunately, NGOs overlooked these achievements and in doing so failed ‘to recognize what a community has achieved or has the potential

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to achieve’ (Caouette, 1991: 9). Paternalistic treatment of refugees can lead to a lack of commitment from the refugees to participate in projects and assistance can continue to undermine the independence of refugees by excluding them from the decision-making process (Bromley, 1985: 115). Funding Political and economic factors affect how much funding is available and how quickly it can be made available. Some refugee groups attract more attention and receive a higher level of assistance than others. Consequently, relief and development programmes are rarely driven by the needs of the refugee community, but by the needs of other political and financial actors such as the host government, the donors, and organizations assisting refugees. Conditions are often attached to donations that limit the types of projects that can be funded. In an effort to compete for funding assistance, organizations become rivals rather than allies with similar objectives. Funding is wasted because projects are duplicated and information is not shared. It is usually easier to obtain donations for humanitarian assistance than for development projects. Donors often prefer to fund prestige projects or self-contained finite projects that can be funded by an individual donor from beginning to end, rather than contribute to ongoing, open-ended development projects.3 Agencies may continue to provide assistance longer than required because they have funds remaining and have to fulfil the terms of the agreements made with the donor. Conversely, funding can be withdrawn or be reduced dramatically. This can happen because political relations between the host and donor countries change, the economic situation in the donor country deteriorates, it is believed that the refugee problem has been solved4 or what is known as ‘compassion fatigue’ occurs and donors stop giving (Kibreab, 1993: 328). The global financial crisis that began in 2008 could lead to a reduction of up to a third or more in humanitarian and development aid.5 Fluctuating financial resources, whatever the causes of the disruption, inevitably influence the types of programmes agencies are prepared to undertake and their effectiveness. The relationship between donors and humanitarian agencies marginalizes the needs and voices of refugees. ‘Humanitarian assistance to refugees is characterised by hierarchical power structures and minimal representation’ (Weighill, 1996: 4). Agencies and humanitarian workers

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are answerable to donors and not to beneficiaries (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 14). Therefore, the nature of the assistance is governed by the donor and funding continues only if the donor is satisfied. UNRWA’s activities are dictated by donors’ wishes and the amount of funding they are willing to give. This puts a strain on the agency’s relations with the refugees, who have been suspicious of UNRWA’s intentions since its early works programmes that sought to solve the Palestinian refugee problem through integration in host countries rather than by implementing the right of return (Schiff, 1995). Political Dynamics Humanitarian agencies such as UNHCR and UNRWA have an ambiguous role because they are meant to be apolitical but operate in a highly political environment. Until the 1990s, UNHCR had to be ‘reactive’ and could act only when a refugee emergency had been declared. The agency was unable to anticipate refugee movements and prepare for a possible humanitarian emergency because this was regarded as a political judgement (UNHCR, 1995: 30). UNHCR and UNRWA can operate only with the cooperation of the host government (UNHCR, 1982: 2; Schiff, 1995: 276), and durable solutions to refugee problems are regarded as the responsibility of the politicians. ‘The search for long-term solutions to the problem of human displacement is essentially a political issue, and must fall therefore to the individual governments and the international community as a whole’ (UNHCR, 1995: 233). Schiff notes that UNRWA is ‘officially non-political but unavoidably political’ (1995: xi). Despite having no direct control of the Palestinian refugee populations, UNRWA has regularly been accused of being ‘too pro-Palestinian’ (Schiff, 1995: 5), colluding with Palestinian factions and allowing political activities to take place inside the camps and UNRWA centres.6 Refugee situations occur as a result of insecurity and violence, yet UNHCR is limited in what it can do to offer physical protection to refugees and UNRWA is mandated only to provide assistance to Palestinian refugees. Violence severely impedes assistance and puts refugees at risk. Refugee groups, particularly in Africa where tribal associations do not recognize political boundaries, are often highly mobile, moving between states regularly to avoid the latest outbreaks of violence. Provision of assistance, however, requires some stability but

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remaining in one place makes refugees more vulnerable. For example, Oxfam’s efforts to create semi-permanent settlements for the Sudanese refugees in Uganda failed because rival militia groups, still active in Sudan, launched cross-border attacks on the refugee settlements. Consequently, the refugees were reluctant to forfeit their weapons, a precondition for gaining access to the settlements (Payne, 1996). The Host–Refugee Relationship The host–refugee relationship has a significant impact on humanitarian assistance for refugees. Host countries are often poor, grappling with their own socio-economic problems, and would prefer a refugee population, regarded as a burden as well as a security threat, to be repatriated as soon as possible (UNHCR, 1995: 34). Refugees increase the competition in the job market and host communities usually resent the attention and aid given to refugee communities (Harrell-Bond, 1986; Mushemeza, 1992; Weighill, 1996). The immediate host community may be poor but rarely receives additional assistance because chronic problems fail to attract the same high levels of international concern as crisis situations. As a result of the environment in the host country, assistance becomes a ‘political tool’ and ‘decisions and policies of the “host” government have a fundamental effect on the kinds of programming that are possible with refugees’ (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989: 69). A refugee community cannot be seen to be enjoying greater privileges than the host community, and in developing countries ‘benefits that accrue to one community are [often] seen as being enjoyed at the expense of other communities’ (Weighill, 1996: 5). Attempts to provide development assistance can fail because host governments, in an effort to deter permanent resettlement of the refugees, will not cooperate. For example, when UNHCR planned to create a more stable environment for Urduk refugees in Ethiopia by establishing what it called ‘semi-permanent settlements’ rather than camps, the Ethiopian authorities objected because it suggested a permanent arrangement. Semi-permanent settlements would have required a more formal allocation of land and it was feared that the refugees would be reluctant to return home when that eventually became possible (James, 1999: 20–27). However, in Uganda, the government was persuaded to permit small settlements of Sudanese refugees to form, rather than the traditional refugee camps, because it would benefit the host communities. It was argued that refugees would integrate into and

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improve the local economy, and that any infrastructural improvements made because of the presence of the refugees would also benefit the local community (Payne, 1998). UNRWA’s activities have been opposed by host governments fearing that they would lead to the permanent settlement of Palestinians in their countries (Schiff, 1995). The situation in Lebanon has been most marked as the country’s rejection of permanent settlement has led the government to ‘oppose all policies and actions that could be construed as facilitating or accepting Palestinian integration’ (USCR, 2002b). This stance has severely limited the programmes UNRWA is able to undertake. Refugee Attitude The attitude of refugees affects the assistance they receive. Refugees distrust institutions offering help partly because of their refusal to override any external political restrictions on their operations to put the needs of the refugees first. Urduk refugees in Ethiopia were aware that if the political situation changed, UNHCR might be unable to protect them (James, 1999). Refugees also regard their plight as temporary and expect either to return home or to be permanently resettled. Consequently, their commitment to a camp or settlement can be limited. Oxfam experienced problems in Uganda when it tried to establish semipermanent settlements for Sudanese refugees. The aim was to build small settlements that resembled traditional village structures where refugees could rebuild their communities in exile and enjoy greater control over their own lives than they would in a conventional refugee camp. However, the refugees wanted to return home and felt little allegiance to the settlements, which ultimately failed (Payne, 1996). Refugee Camps: the advantages and disadvantages The term ‘refugee camp’ ‘is used to describe human settlements which vary enormously in size, socio-economic structure and political character’ (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 27). They are usually ‘enclosed areas, restricted to refugees and those assisting them, where protection and assistance is provided’. Refugee camps were established in Europe following the Second World War and continue to be used in the developing world until durable solutions are found. The use of camps increased during the 1980s, precipitated by ‘vast refugee flows in Africa’. Large camps began to be established replacing the ‘practice of allowing

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refugees to settle amongst the local population’ (UNHCR, 2000: 108). There is nothing in refugee law that indicates what the size and location of a refugee camp should be, although UNHCR recognizes that ‘high density camps with very large populations are the worst possible for refugee accommodation . . . camps over 20,000 should be avoided’ (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 28). In 2003, UNHCR’s demographic data showed that 36 per cent of the population of concern to the organization was located in camps. In Africa about half the population under UNHCR’s mandate was living in a camp (UNHCR, 2006: 22). Refugee communities confined to camps are rarely self-supporting (UNHCR, 2000: 108). Protracted refugee groups in particular can find themselves confined to camps for decades (UNHCR, 2006: 22). UNRWA reports that in 2008, 30 per cent of registered Palestinian refugees were living in camps throughout its five fields of operation (UNRWA, 2008). ‘[C]amps have become almost synonymous with the refugee experience’ (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 1) yet they are surrounded by controversy. Some argue that although undesirable, refugee camps are sometimes the only practical way to assist refugee groups (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998; Dualeh, 1995). Others maintain that there are almost always viable alternatives to camps such as self-settlement (Black, 1998a and 1998b; Harrell-Bond, 2000). Opponents of refugee camps believe that there is ‘evidence that refugee camps are not good for anyone’ (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 1). Research ‘has demonstrated how, for social, economic, environmental and health reasons the consequences of placing refugees in camps are often negative’ (Black, 1998a: 4). Others argue that there is little empirical evidence to prove that self-settlement is better for refugees than an organized camp (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 28). ‘General assumptions about better conditions for refugees outside camps have not been adequately substantiated by empirical research. It is by no means certain that self-settled refugees are generally safer or better off than those in camps’ (UNHCR, 2000: 108). Yet evidence of ‘successful’ self-settlement exists but examples are dismissed as ‘unique’ or ‘unrepresentative’ (Black, 1998b: 31). There appear to be ‘advantages’ to being self-settled but ‘studies of self-settled refugees are fewer than those of camp-settled refugees’ (Ager, 1999: 9). This is because ‘situations of spontaneous settlement are notoriously difficult to study’ (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 27). Although up to 80 per cent of refugees could be self-settled, little is known about these communities (FMRS, 2003).

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Critics of refugee camps claim that ‘[r]efugee policy in the South has been largely driven by demands of donors and humanitarian organizations’ (Harrell-Bond, 1998: 22) and that camps are preferred by the host governments and international assistance organizations (Black, 1998a: 4). UNHCR and other international and non-governmental relief organizations are accused of preferring refugee camps to self-settlement because it is easier to manage refugees in camps and to facilitate repatriation from them (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 28; UNHCR, 2000: 108). Some regard these criticisms as simplistic because they fail to consider the complex circumstances surrounding refugee crises and factors influencing the nature of humanitarian assistance to refugees (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 4; Dualeh, 1995). ‘In most situations the relief effort takes place within a framework of local and international restrictions and constraints’ (Van der Borght & Philips, 1995: 908). UNHCR claims that its ‘official policy is to avoid the establishment of camps if viable alternatives are available’ (UNHCR, 2000: 109). Why then, despite a ‘growing consensus against camps’ (Black, 1998a: 7), and in the absence of positive support for them except when viable alternatives are unavailable (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998; UNHCR, 2000), are refugee camps still established? Refugee Camps: host government preference? ‘[T]hose who oppose camps fail to concede the full significance of the role of host governments in determining refugee policies . . . In most situations it is the host government that insists on the establishment of camps’ (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 28). This is because host governments fail to recognize the harm camps cause to the host and refugee communities, and the potential benefits to both communities from selfsettlement (Black, 1998b: 31). Host governments advocate the use of camps because refugees are perceived as a security threat, repatriation of refugees is easier to organize from camps, and camps help to attract assistance because they are visible to donors (Jacobsen, 2005: 6; UNHCR, 2000: 109). Legally host governments have the right to accommodate refugees in camps (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 28; UNHCR, 2000: 108). Some cast doubt on the claims that it is host governments rather than humanitarian agencies that promote the use of camps. Host governments have been forced into accepting refugee camps as a means to secure external assistance (Harrell-Bond et al., 1992 in Harrell-Bond, 1998: 22). As the majority of refugees are self-settled,

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the argument that refugees must be confined to camps for security reasons is unsustainable. It also seems strange that host governments in Africa are willing to accept the presence of refugee camps, which involves relinquishing sovereignty over areas of land, when governments are usually ‘protective of their sovereignty’ (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 5). Security: enhanced or compromised by refugee camps? Much of the fear of refugee populations stems from an assumption that they provoke political violence (Kenyon Lischer, 2000: 4). Host governments believe that they can reduce the threat to security posed by refugees, control refugee communities and protect their own population by establishing camps. Some countries use the police force or army to patrol the camps (Hyndman, 1996 cited in Harrell-Bond, 1999: 138). However, political violence is not endemic to refugee groups and ‘roughly a dozen receiving states and refugee groups account for over 95 per cent of all refugee political violence. Around a hundred states receive refugees every year, yet only about one fifth of those states report refugee related violence’ (Kenyon Lischer, 2000: 17). Refugee camps can increase rather than reduce levels of violence and security threats (Black, 1998a: 6; Harrell-Bond, 2000: 5). Camps can become militarized and provide a base for combatants (Payne, 1998; UNHCR, 2000: 248–49). Warring factions use camps as safe havens in which combatants can recover and regroup before embarking on another round of fighting (Luttwak, 1999: 43). There are many instances of camp inhabitants being intimidated by militia groups and relief efforts impeded by the hostilities (Black, 1998a; Payne, 1998). In camps, refugees are more visible and vulnerable to attacks by hostile groups from the host country or country of origin (Payne, 1998). Refugee camps are often established near borders to facilitate repatriation, which has made them easy targets for cross-border attacks (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 7). For the host community the camps are visible reminders of the refugee presence and may arouse resentment against them (Long, 1993: 192–93). Israeli governments regard Palestinian refugee camps as a security threat and are accused of using security concerns as an excuse to demolish refugee shelters to break up and eventually eliminate refugee camps from the occupied territories (Badil, 2000: 3). Refugees themselves may view camps as a safer and more secure option than self-settlement (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 28; UNHCR, 2000: 108). Refugee groups are known to gather spontaneously to form

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camplike settlements before outside assistance arrives (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 28). Shatila and Bourj al-Barajneh Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon were established through processes of ingathering initiated by individual Palestinians (R. Sayigh, 1994) and informal communications by word of mouth between the refugees (Roberts, 2000) and not through the work of the humanitarian community. Refugees can benefit from being in a camp because they have more immediate access to assistance and have the social support network provided by other refugees. However, camp opponents stress that those refugees who can, leave the camps as soon as possible, which is ‘why there are almost always more refugees living among their hosts outside of camps’ (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 1). Others warn that self-settlement is not always possible and ‘wishful thinking of easy integration can be dangerously naive’ (Van der Borght and Philips, 1995: 908). Integration or Repatriation? Camps are often preferred by host governments to prevent ‘the local integration of exiled populations’ (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 28). In Lebanon, for example, where Palestinians and Lebanese share the same ethnic roots, language, religion and culture, the creation of camps is the only way to ensure that the Palestinian refugee population remains visible and distinct from the host community. Host governments also argue that camps facilitate ‘the early and organized repatriation of refugees’ (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 28). Voluntary repatriation is the preferred durable solution to refugee crises and it is claimed that ‘the majority of refugees prefer to and do return home as soon as circumstances permit’ (UNHCR, 2002). Yet repatriation can take many years to implement (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 4; Van Damme, 1995: 360, 361) and is frequently destabilizing to the country of origin (Harrell-Bond, 1998: 22). Whose interests repatriation serves can be questionable; it is often political and financial considerations that motivate repatriation and not the well-being of refugees (Harrell-Bond, 1986: 183–200). Refugee camps are established on the understanding that they are a short-term measure. Camps are regarded as temporary and help to create and maintain the illusion to host communities that repatriation will occur soon. Yet in 1995 it was stated that since 1972 all major refugee crises had lasted more than ten years (Van Damme, 1995: 361), and in 2007 8.8 million people had been refugees for ten years or more (USCRI, 2007). Nevertheless host

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communities perceive camps as a temporary measure and accept the solution more willingly than alternative methods of self-settlement, which appear to be long-term. Preservation and Distribution of Resources It is argued that camps enable host communities to preserve resources for themselves. If these are shared with a large influx of refugees, the host community can suffer (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 28). Refugee flows can cause serious environmental degradation including deforestation, soil erosion and water pollution (Payne, 1998: 1). As refugees are often struggling to survive, worrying about the long-term impact of their actions on the environment is not a priority. ‘[I]n Africa and elsewhere, huge influxes of refugees can completely overwhelm the capacity of the local population and the infrastructures, wreaking havoc on the environment and socio-economic system . . . local authorities sometimes have no choice but to seek separate sites for the refugees’ (Dualeh, 1995: 1369). However, counter-arguments state that congregating refugees in camps can put a greater strain on local resources and the environment than dispersed refugee populations (Black, 1994). Indeed, one of the most severe outcomes of camps is environmental degradation (Zetter, 1995: 49). Sometimes the urgency and scale of a refugee movement means that the most rapid form of assistance is to organize camps. Over four days one million Rwandan refugees arrived in the small, isolated town of Goma in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The area had no infrastructure so there was little choice but to establish camps (Dualeh, 1995: 1370). Tragically, the influx of people was so large that the international aid community was unable to cope. Cholera broke out and in the overcrowded conditions spread rapidly; an estimated 50,000 refugees died of cholera and dehydration (Van Damme, 1995: 360). In terms of service delivery accountability, identification of individuals, physical access, cost-effectiveness and monitoring there are practical advantages to camps (Van der Borght and Philips, 1995: 908). There is a danger that refugees outside camps may become excluded from assistance or ignored because assistance is focused on refugees in camps (USCRI, 2004). This could be overcome if refugees could selfsettle in areas concentrated around points of aid delivery (Black, 1998a: 5). During UNHCR operations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia ‘the vast majority of more than 3.6 million beneficiaries’ stayed in towns

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and villages with host families and in public buildings (Dualeh, 1995: 1369). Camps do not necessarily help agencies to identify individuals and distribute aid. From 1994 to 1996 in Zaire and Tanzania, camps fell under the control of those responsible for the genocide in Rwanda who continued to intimidate the camp inhabitants. Poor roads made it difficult for agency staff to access the camps and aid was diverted to militia groups (Black, 1998a: 5). Alternative Approaches Most experts agree that there are alternatives to refugee camps. The disagreement lies in how often these alternatives are a viable option, the level of autonomy alternatives give refugees, and the rapidity with which alternatives can be established. Some argue that despite receiving little or no external assistance and being vulnerable to the authorities because they are not formally registered as refugees with any agency, self-settled refugees have better opportunities to engage in income-generation activities, integrate with the host population, and develop a greater sense of belonging and independence (Ager, 1999: 9). Self-settlement is seldom spontaneous and the absence of camps does not mean the absence of outside assistance. Although dispersed settlements have been achieved in parts of Africa such as Uganda and Malawi, they were not spontaneous and often involved negotiations with local leaders, refugees, the government and international agencies (Black, 1998a: 5). In some cases, it is possible to create settlements that allow refugees greater independence than in traditional camp-style settlements. Such organized settlements were established on the Thailand–Burma border until 1995. They were ‘modest in size, village-like in atmosphere and [enabled] refugees to retain a substantial degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency’ (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 27). ‘The consequences of placing refugees in camps are often negative, not only for the refugees themselves, but also frequently for the national populations and governments of receiving states’ (Black, 1998a: 4). Alternative approaches to refugee camps that integrate assistance to host and refugee communities can benefit both populations (UNHCR, 2006: chapter 6). In Guinea, the government supported villages that had accepted refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone. Rather than establish parallel healthcare facilities, the refugees were permitted to use the Guinean medical services. UNHCR supplemented these facilities by paying the same fee-for-service charged to Guineans. The existing

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Guinean facilities improved because of the increased funding available, the cases of communicable diseases usually associated with camps were reduced, and the cost of medical care for UNHCR was less per capita than it would have been had parallel services been established (Van Damme, 1995: 361). ‘In cases where host governments have maintained control of refugee policy, using international aid to expand their economies as a whole, it has benefited both refugees and local populations’ (Zetter, 1992 in Harrell-Bond, 1998: 22). Cyprus is an example of a country that used a disaster as an opportunity. It took the money available for humanitarian assistance from international sources, and borrowed more to employ refugees to build their own permanent houses. With the pay they received, the refugees bought their own food, thereby stimulating local food production (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 11). UNHCR claims that humanitarian agencies have recognized the positive impact assistance to refugees can have on the immediate host community and, as a result, have begun to channel their programmes to include both the refugee and host communities (UNHCR, 2000: 109). The Consequences of Protracted Camp Life Few doubt that the refugee experience is disorientating and dehumanizing, stripping individuals and communities of their identity and independence, but opinion is divided on whether the camp environment reinforces or alleviates the refugee experience. Opponents argue that camp life is authoritarian, restricts movement, activity and autonomy, and resembles life in prisons and mental hospitals (HarrellBond, 2000: 1, 6). Others claim that once camps are established, refugees are permitted to leave and re-enter the camps to take advantage of economic opportunities or visit their homeland and in fact may have greater freedom of movement than with self-settlement (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 3; UNHCR, 2000: 109). However, the camp is a constant reminder of refugee status; the food has foreign labels, the flag flying above the camp belongs to UNHCR or another agency, and the inhabitants are subject to the rules and regulations of the aid agencies (Harrell-Bond, 1986: 90–91). Harrell-Bond argues that all humanitarian work with refugees, inside and outside camps, can be inhumane. Living in a camp has a profound effect on refugees’ social, mental and physical well-being. She highlights the creation of an ‘asymmetric’ power structure between humanitarian

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workers and the refugees that ‘disempowers’ refugees (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 15, 17). Dependency and loss of dignity disrupts family life and traditional power structures. Parental authority is weakened because to ‘feed their children, parents are dependent on hand-outs from strangers . . . their roles as carers and breadwinners are undermined by their dependence on a system over which they have no control’ (HarrellBond, 2000: 7). The lack of parental control over their children contributes to delinquent behaviour in camps (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 9). Camps emasculate men because they can no longer support their families whereas women can still perform their traditional roles of wife, mother and homemaker (Christensen, 1982: 44). In some instances, women find that the refugee experience forces them to become more independent and resourceful. In refugee camps, at the household level, women become central to the survival of the family (Christensen, 1982: 38). The destruction of traditional family roles and social hierarchy means that ‘[d]omestic violence always increases in refugee situations and family breakdown is common’ (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 7). Programmes need to be aimed at men to prevent their feeling ‘redundant’ (Christensen, 1982: 44), and methods need to be identified to tackle antisocial and criminal behaviour. To date, there are no known established programmes that reduce the serious problems of delinquency in camps. ‘Roving bands and idle groups pose a threat to social life at all levels in the camps. UNHCR has recognized that it is individuals in this age group which are most likely to be the perpetrators of sexual violence. Prostitutes and drug abusers are also common in camps and their numbers include youth’ (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 9). In terms of physical health, there is ‘no doubt that refugees are better off living outside camps, as disease transmission is greatest in overcrowded settings’ (Dualeh, 1995: 1370). Large, overcrowded camps also pose a health risk to the host community (Van Damme, 1995: 360). Nutrition-related diseases in camps are common because of the poor quality of food aid (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 6; Zetter & Henry, 1992 in Van Damme, 1995: 361). For example, ‘the normal prevalence of acute malnutrition in various African countries is said to be between three per cent and five per cent. In nine camps in Sudan, the Centre for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia, found the acute malnutrition of children under five varied between 20 per cent and 70 per cent!’ (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 1). Yet UNHCR argues that ‘refugees in camps receive significantly better healthcare, education, and other services than people in the surrounding areas’ (UNHCR, 2000: 109).

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Health problems in camps could be reduced by prioritizing health issues, but the ‘public health aspect is secondary to security and administrative concerns’ when choosing a camp site (Van der Borght & Philips, 1995: 907). Therefore, simple precautions such as establishing camps near a clean water supply and limiting the population size are ignored as other issues take precedence. Becoming a refugee results in a loss of dignity, self-respect and selfdetermination: being confined to a camp can restrict freedoms further and expose inhabitants to security risks. Although life in camps adversely affects the mental health of already traumatized people, it is seldom considered in the initial camp planning stage (Caouette, 1991: 9). Camp inhabitants frequently exhibit despair and helplessness at their long-term prospects and the combination of confinement and dependency encourages them to abandon social responsibilities (Clark, 1985 in Harrell-Bond, 1998: 22). ‘The manner in which camps are administered encourages passivity; the lack of autonomy engenders hopelessness’ (Van Damme, 1995: 361). UNRWA has been accused of breeding passivity among Palestinian refugees and senior agency staff have admitted that some of its programmes contributed to a dependency culture.8 However, at the outbreak of the first intifada, these accusations evaporated (Schiff, 1995: 11). Subsequent events – the second intifada, suicide bombings, inter-factional fighting and political demonstrations – raise doubts about the level of passivity that exists in the UNRWA camps. The high levels of attempted suicide, domestic violence, apathy, hopelessness and depression have been linked to the camp conditions in long-term refugee camps on the Thailand–Cambodia border (Mollica et al., 1993 in Ager, 1999: 10). Camp inhabitants are cut off, sometimes drastically, ‘from normal social existence’ (Dualeh, 1995: 1369). Camps facilitate learned helplessness among refugees (Seligman, 1975 in Ager, 1999: 10) and significantly increase the likelihood of depression (Chan & Loveridge, 1987 in Ager, 1999: 10). Refugee children can be described as ‘passive, dependent, mendacious and unquestioning’ (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 8). In a camp, refugees become institutionalized, used to poverty and accepting assistance, which can lead to the creation of a dependency culture. The ‘authoritarian structure’ of refugee camps has an impact on the coping mechanisms of the inhabitants (Hyndman, 1996 in HarrellBond, 1999: 138). Refugees can become marginalized from economic,

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social and political life and subject to a total institution (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 1). If repatriation becomes possible, it is unlikely that they will be able to return without ‘enormous investment in their rehabilitation’ (Sepulveda, 1994 in Harrell-Bond, 1998: 22). Is there a Future for Refugee Camps? Refugee camps are an unsatisfactory means of assisting refugees, particularly for extended periods, but political and practical constraints impede integration of refugee populations with the host community. Therefore, some argue that ‘the real question . . . is not whether . . . there should be camps, but how to ensure that camps meet the highest possible standards and provide refugees with optimal living conditions in situations where their establishment is unavoidable’ (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 27). Others argue that camps are no longer a viable solution because they are expensive, become long-term rather than temporary measures and have profound negative consequences for the inhabitants. ‘Refugees are becoming such an overwhelming problem in sub-Saharan Africa that we can not continue just building and maintaining more and more giant camps for refugees to await repatriation that often will not occur in the foreseeable future’ (Van Damme, 1995: 360). Refugee camps are expensive: ‘[i]t has been said that the money spent on assistance to Rwandan refugees after 1994 was more than all the development aid which had been invested in Rwanda since its independence’ (HarrellBond, 2000: 5). Between 1949 and 2004 it has been calculated that UNRWA alone has spent $16.3 billion on Palestinian refugees (USCRI, 2004: 47). Camp-based relief programmes are expensive and, after the refugees have left, the infrastructure is often destroyed rather than utilized in a way to benefit the local community (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 4). UNHCR believes that it is misguided to talk about two distinct categories of refugees – those in camps and those who are self-settled – as the situation is usually fluid and refugees move in and out of camps to return home, to engage in economic activity or to seek assistance (UNHCR, 2000: 109). There is a strong fear that as ‘refugee policies are being formulated in a climate of increasing hostility towards people who are seeking asylum, both in the industrialized and developing regions of the world’, too much criticism of refugee camps could lead to further restrictions on refugees (Crisp and Jacobsen, 1998: 30).

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Refugees: survivors or passive recipients of aid? It is not only the assistance or the way in which assistance is delivered that can disempower refugees; the way in which they are perceived and the effect that perception has on them can undermine refugees’ abilities to cope and help themselves. ‘Too often refugees are treated as a problem of international charity – not as a political and social group capable of articulating its rights and aspirations’ (Bernard, 1986: 617–36 in Mushemeza, 1992: 1). Refugees are popularly perceived as helpless and dependent on external aid (Christensen, 1982: 42). The image of refugees as passive victims is reinforced by the pictures of homeless or starving refugees used to arouse the compassion of the general public and potential donors (Harrell-Bond, 1999: 149). ‘The image of helpless refugees, desperately in need, reinforces the view that outsiders are needed to help them’ (Harrell-Bond, 1986: 150). Perceptions of Dependency One challenge in providing assistance is to meet the needs of refugees without undermining their independence and creating a dependency culture. The problem is the kind of help refugees receive, the way help is provided and ‘the role which they are forced to assume to get it’ (Harrell-Bond, 1999: 140). ‘Too little support may be useless, too much may be patronizing and may create permanent dependence, and poorly designed and badly delivered support may be counter-productive’ (Basok, 1993: 99). Determining the appropriate level of assistance is complicated by the psychological trauma of being a refugee and the loss of self-esteem and confidence. It is often presumed that people who have recently become refugees are suffering from trauma and need relief aid, at least initially, because they lack ‘the motivation and energy to take their own initiatives’ (Kibreab, 1993: 326). Yet the trauma of becoming a refugee is exacerbated by the need to rely on assistance (Harrell-Bond, 1999: 143). A failure to understand the psychological trauma of refugee status creates unsympathetic attitudes towards refugees and the accusation that they are happy to rely on external assistance rather than try to help themselves. However, the experience of being a refugee means that, initially at least, individuals are relieved of all their responsibilities and are expected to cooperate with the relief operations and adopt a subordinate position to the relief workers. Indeed, they are forced to

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cooperate and be subordinate to receive the assistance that they need to survive. ‘The so-called “dependency syndrome” is not created by refugee groups, but by the processes used by assistance agencies, even with the best of intentions, in trying to reduce suffering’ (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989: 276). The manner in which assistance is provided can convince refugees that they are helpless because to qualify for help they are encouraged to ‘represent themselves as victims’ (Hyndman, 1996 in Harrell-Bond, 1999: 150). From the beginning, refugees are not recognized as having any responsibility for their own affairs, and are forced to depend on the aid agency to the extent that they become completely dependent and incapable of thinking for themselves (Harrell-Bond, 1986: 300). The perception of refugees as helpless can lead to a situation where they are prevented from taking any role in their survival. ‘All human beings are dependent on others to a greater or lesser extent; the issue is not being “helped” per se, but the relative powerlessness of the recipient vis-à-vis the help’ (Harrell-Bond, 1999: 139). The structure of aid provision creates unequal power relations because it imposes rules that recipients must follow to receive assistance (Harrell-Bond, 2000). Refugees who do not show appreciation are considered ungrateful. Yet the treatment of refugees is inconsistent (Hyndman, 1996 in Harrell-Bond, 1999: 153). They are treated as helpless, in need of assistance and incapable of looking after themselves, at the same time as being screened to confirm that they are eligible for assistance and accused of failing to make the effort to help themselves. Refugees are often accused of lying and are described in negative terms such as ‘bogus’ and ‘scroungers’ (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 19). The inconsistent treatment and abuse reinforce the unequal power relations because they demonstrate that those providing assistance lack respect for the refugees. Conversely, refugees feel obliged to show respect for the agencies. In Sudan refugees composed songs about UNHCR and referred to the agency as their ‘father and mother’ (Harrell-Bond, 1999: 152). Refugees have to accept the assistance they are offered, whether or not it meets their needs. They are rarely consulted about what they want or asked in what ways assistance might be improved. There are no mechanisms for determining consumer satisfaction and agencies are usually more concerned with satisfying donors than the refugees

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(Harrell-Bond, 2000: 14). Such treatment reminds refugees of their status, excludes them from participating in the processes that directly affect them, and contributes to the development of a dependency culture. ‘The Helper’ ‘A major problem facing refugees is their helpers’ (Harrell-Bond, 1999: 140). Agencies are invariable overstretched and staff can be poorly trained (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 28) and ill-equipped psychologically and emotionally to cope with large-scale suffering (De Waal, 1988: 1 in Harrell-Bond, 2000: 21). Consequently, staff may release their frustration on refugees: violence and inhumane treatment by aid workers against refugees has been recorded (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 22–25). Refugees complain that helpers are patronizing and condescending and often fail to understand their needs or give them credit for their achievements (Harrell-Bond, 1999: 142). For example, Burmese refugees established their own school and asked if any NGOs would supply a blackboard and some chalk. NGO staff were horrified by the basic nature of the school and insisted that proper educational materials were supplied. The NGO workers ignored the achievement of the Burmese refugees in establishing their own school and forgot that the educational facilities in their home country were poor and that such resources would not be available once they stopped being refugees (Caouette, 1991: 3). ‘Consider us not only as we are but as we were’ (female refugees quoted in Moussa, 1989: 156). It is forgotten that most people before becoming refugees were leading normal lives in their own countries, going to work, farming their land, raising a family and socializing with their neighbours. Becoming a refugee does not mean that individuals have lost their abilities (Harrell-Bond, 1986: 12). ‘Refugees are, by definition, survivors’ (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989: 72). Yet this is rarely acknowledged, and consequently assistance is often inappropriate, ineffective, or does harm rather than good. Refugee Self-Reliance? The assumption that refugees are helpless victims incapable of helping themselves is a common misconception. A study of Somali refugees discusses how ‘erroneous perceptions’ were formed about refugee dependency and how factors outside the refugee community shaped and limited the assistance provided for the refugees. Refugee behaviour is

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often misunderstood. The ‘reluctance and unwillingness [of the Somali refugees] to accept relocation to organized settlements and the unrealistic desire to stick to their ration cards without any sense of guilt . . . was taken as evidence of dependency’. In fact, it is claimed that the refugees believed that they had to accept aid to survive, but at the same time were engaged in other activities to improve their lifestyles. ‘Free food distribution in the camps, far from eliminating the refugees’ desire to work, seemed to have facilitated and encouraged engagement in diverse economic activities’ (Kibreab, 1993: 329–30). ‘To maximise access to scarce resources, individual family members shift between camps, falsely register household members, assume more than one identity and, very frequently, conceal deaths’ (Harrell-Bond, 2000: 20). Based on research among Ethiopian refugees in Somalia (1982) and Afghan refugees in Pakistan (1983), Christensen observes that refugees do not become dependent on assistance but use it to improve daily life and work towards returning to their traditional lives. Both the Somali and Pakistani host governments had adopted the attitude that their refugee populations were temporary and had made no provision (at that time) for integration or sustainable development projects. The Ethiopian refugees had begun selling some of their surplus food that they received as aid. In this way they were able to improve their diets and some managed to purchase livestock in an effort to return to their traditional nomadic lifestyle. Some refugees were involved in income-generating projects, and where possible children attended school. The Afghan refugees exchanged surplus food and established gardens to supplement their diets. The Ethiopian and Afghan refugees had the capacities and motivation to engage in long-term development activities in an attempt to return to their previous lives and used, rather than relied on, assistance to enable them to do so (Christensen, 1987: 199–205). In his study of Mozambican refugees in Malawi, Zetter observed that ‘[l]ike most refugees, the Mozambicans displayed remarkable resourcefulness and enterprise under extremely unpropitious circumstances’ (Zetter, 1996: 216). UNHCR’s attempts to implement developmental projects failed because a proper assessment of the local economic environment and the refugees’ culture and their needs and capacities was not made (Zetter, 1996). UNHCR’s projects did not attempt to build on or reinforce refugees’ achievements or take into account the type of projects that would appeal or be acceptable to the refugees. For example, the refugees were not interested in participating

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in projects that required training because they needed an immediate return on any investment of time. Initially, the refugees survived because of the support they received from the local community and by engaging in many diverse economic activities. As a result, the refugees were able to meet their needs and go beyond subsistence living. ‘[N]o niche in the labour market appeared to be unexploited by refugee labour’ (Zetter, 1996: 216). Coping Mechanisms, Capacities and Vulnerabilities It is evident that refugees, like many other groups facing extreme situations such as war and natural disaster, draw on practical and emotional resources to survive (Winchester, 1992: 57). These are often referred to as coping mechanisms (Cuny, 1983).9 Individuals and groups of people develop coping mechanisms to ensure long-term survival. Coping mechanisms can be categorized as internal and external. For example, ‘[i]nternal mechanisms would be those that are on-going and established within the geographical and cultural limitations of a town. External mechanisms are those which have their foundations in sources external to the community’ (Kieffer, 1977: 3). Internal coping mechanisms include social units, religious institutions, political organizations and economic systems. In times of crisis, social networks play a major role in helping individuals cope. Initially, emotional and practical support is provided by the immediate and extended family, but relationships with neighbours and other members of the community also offer mutual support. Religious institutions, such as the local church and mosque and affiliated organizations, provide spiritual and practical support and may be involved in the distribution of aid or provision of shelter. Local political parties, government offices and traditional village hierarchies oversee or coordinate the provision of assistance to the survivors and the subsequent reconstruction programmes. During the reconstruction phase, financial help is needed which may be provided informally through family members or friends, through a form of patronage, or through the creation or use of an existing co-operative or mutual aid group (Cuny, 1983: 80–84). External coping mechanisms are ‘controlled principally by individuals external to the […] community’ (Kieffer, 1977: 3). External mechanisms also include social organizations, church-related groups and political organizations, as well as social and economic national and international development organizations, and the national government.

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These institutions may become involved at any stage of the disaster, either in their own right or by channelling assistance, practical or financial, through one of the local institutions (Cuny, 1983: 84). Contrary to what might be expected, disasters do not destroy civilization or coping mechanisms. In fact, during crises, most people tend to behave in a calm and rational manner (Barton, 1969: 329; Cuny, 1983: 86). However, it is important to recognize that coping mechanisms are fluid and dynamic and vary according to ‘religion, community and social group, household, gender, age, season and time in history’ (Chambers, 1989: 3). Communities are not homogenous and individuals have different capacities. The same individual may cope differently at a different time depending on the context (Winchester, 1992: 45). Coping mechanisms are limited, fluid and dynamic, so their effectiveness can change over time. They are complex and interlinked with many other factors people encounter in their daily lives. People tend to use both problem-solving and emotion-focused coping mechanisms, although the choice depends on the individual and the nature of the crises. Problem-solving coping mechanisms are generally used in potentially controllable situations whereas emotion-focused coping mechanisms are used when the problem is perceived as less controllable. For example, most people generally consider work- or family-related problems as controllable but feel that they have less power to address physical health problems (MacArthur & MacArthur, 1998: 1). Communities have coping mechanisms that help them to survive and recover from a disaster or conflict. Before humanitarian aid is brought into a community from the outside, these coping mechanisms need to be recognized and incorporated into the relief strategy so that ‘individualism and behaviour’ are respected and assistance can be tailored to meet the needs of a specific group (Seitz, 1998: 88). However, ‘Strong external influence may act, often inadvertently, to break up internal coping mechanisms and their effectiveness’ (Kieffer, 1977 in Cuny, 1983: 84). People have inherent strengths that enable them to cope in difficult situations and humanitarian aid is effective when it is understood ‘how the victims of civil violence respond themselves when their economic and social networks are strong’ (Curtis, 1995: 72). It is argued that most refugees develop survival strategies before external assistance appears (Zetter, 1996: 216). Coping mechanisms among displaced communities can be deeply entwined with traditional cultures. The Aeta were forced to move from their traditional habitat,

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Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines, to other rural areas or adopt a new way of life in the towns after the volcano erupted: traditional attitudes and behavioural patterns, still strongly stamped by their original hunter–gatherer existence, continue to influence their survival strategies and guide them in the exploitation of old resources as well as the development of new ones (Seitz, 1998: 89). Inherent social strengths enable communities to develop coping strategies (Ogden, 2000). For example, throughout all phases of the conflict in Kosovo, the cultural tradition of sharing was an important coping mechanism, and despite lack of external assistance until the later stages of the conflict, people managed to survive. As restrictions on supply and movement intensified in the lead-up to the conflict, informal strategies were adopted that involved borrowing from friends and family members, some of whom had been able to travel abroad, and purchasing on credit from local shops. When the conflict began, the coping mechanisms had already been developed. Ogden claims that because ‘effective coping mechanisms were in place’ despite the lack of humanitarian aid, malnutrition did not increase significantly (Ogden, 2000: 121). ‘The long-term objective of [coping] strategies is for the household to maintain its economic and social viability after the crisis has passed’ (emphasis original, Curtis, 1995: 69). Coping mechanisms can be explored by examining vulnerabilities. In the social sciences ‘vulnerability’ is often used to refer to ‘disadvantaged conditions’ (Cardona, 2003). The field of social work identifies certain groups as vulnerable, such as children who come into contact with alcoholism or drug addiction or are abused by an adult (Burton, 1968). The elderly and disabled are often considered vulnerable because they do not have the same abilities as able-bodied or younger people (Cardona, 2003; Sen, 1999). Healthcare literature might define vulnerable individuals as those who are ‘predisposed to illness, harm, or negative outcome. This predisposition can be genetic, biological, or psychological.’10 In development discourse, vulnerabilities are considered to be any areas of weakness that leave individuals and communities exposed to dangers. Disaster mitigation is an area where the concept of vulnerability has been explored extensively and many different types of methods developed to analyse and quantify vulnerability (Twigg, 1998: 5).

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When individuals or communities are described as vulnerable, it is necessary to ask, ‘Vulnerable to what?’ Communities cannot be described as vulnerable if they are not threatened, and cannot be threatened if they are not vulnerable. Vulnerability does not occur on its own: there has to be a hazard and this hazard has to expose vulnerabilities. A community’s inability to respond effectively to a hazard, and the extent of this failure, is their level of vulnerability. The level of damage from a hazard is determined by the level of vulnerability and not the severity of the phenomenon (Cardona, 2003). Relationships and structure within society determine why certain groups of people are more vulnerable to disasters than others (Cardona, 2003; Twigg, 1998: 3). For example, poor communities tend to live in more hazard-prone areas because they cannot afford to live elsewhere. Many societies are dependent upon technology to function, the more developed the country, the greater the dependency. Therefore, societies are more vulnerable today when the infrastructure is damaged than they would have been several decades ago. Vulnerability is complex and has economic, social, political and psychological dimensions (Twigg, 1998: 6). Unfortunately, situations are often oversimplified, conceptualized in terms of physical vulnerabilities, which means that the causes of the physical vulnerability, social, economic, cultural and educational factors, are often overlooked (Cardona, 2003). Vulnerabilities are cumulative (Cardona, 2003), dynamic, and differ within countries and regions and between different socio-economic groups (Twigg, 1998: 7). What are perceived as vulnerabilities vary according to personal circumstances: for example, to a poor household, a small loan is often of greater concern than to a wealthier household who would have less difficulty repaying it and worry less about the stigma of being in debt (Winchester, 1992: 61). Vulnerabilities are not the same as needs, and relief and development assistance should distinguish between the two (Anderson & Woodrow, 1991: 48). Vulnerability should not be used as a synonym for poverty. ‘It means not lack of want, but defencelessness and inability to cope with risk, shocks and stress’ (Chambers, 1989: 1). Although poverty and vulnerability are often related there is no direct correlation (Blaikie et al., 1994: 10). Poverty should be considered a factor of vulnerability (Cardona, 2003). Research conducted on families from two villages in Gujarat demonstrates that people do not judge their security in purely economic terms. Despite the fact that the average income had declined

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in real terms by 5 per cent in the last 20 years, households considered themselves, on average, ‘better off on 37 of their own 38 criteria of wellbeing’ (research by N. Jodha cited in Chambers, 1989: 2). Sen also argues that there is a link between poverty and capacity but stresses that it is important to distinguish between poverty as capability inadequacy and poverty as lowness of income (Sen, 1999: 90). According to Anderson and Woodrow, ‘[d]ependency is a form of vulnerability’ (1989: 54). ‘Dependency . . . can be understood in two ways. First, it refers to the incapability of achieving economic selfsufficiency, resulting in indefinite reliance on assistance from outside. Second, it implies the lack of capability to function independently and to take initiatives in order to attain short and long-term self-sufficiency even in the presence of enabling interventions or when the opportunity to earn an income exists’ (emphasis original, Kibreab, 1993: 330). Meeting people’s daily needs may keep them alive but it can lead to the creation of a dependency culture that leaves people unable to cope on their own. Reliance on outsiders for help means that a community is insecure, exposed to risks, and therefore vulnerable. Signs that development projects are increasing vulnerabilities include local staff relying on income from the project, lack of realistic employment opportunities outside the project and locals relying on project staff to make decisions (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989: 57). ‘Vulnerability cannot be defined or measured without reference to the capacity of the population to absorb, respond, and recover from the impact of the event’ (Westgate & O’Keefe, 1976 in Cardona, 2003). Identifying and defining capacities is as problematic as dealing with vulnerabilities. Sen believes that capacities are options for action and therefore require an individual to have a choice (Crocker, 1991: 137). Although the effect of a certain situation may be the same, the capacities can be different. Sen elaborates this view by comparing a hunger striker with an individual in a famine: both are starving, but one chooses to do so, while the other is forced to do so (Sen, 1999). Therefore, Sen associates capacities with freedom of choice and the freedom of the individual to pursue opportunities that have valuable outcomes to benefit the individual and the rest of the population (Sen, 1999: 18). Blaikie et al. use the term ‘coping’ instead of ‘capacities’ to explain the manner in which people act within the existing resources and range of expectations of a situation to achieve various ends (1994: 62). Capacities include labour power and the ability to use it effectively (Chambers,

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1989: 4). Capacities can also be understood in terms of different capitals. Sustainable livelihoods analysis identifies five types of capital: human – skills, ability to labour and good health; social – family and friendship networks, and resource sharing; natural – resources such as land and water; physical – infrastructure including transport, shelter and access to information; and financial – savings, credit and income flow (DFID, 1999). Like vulnerabilities, capacities are considered to be dynamic and interdependent so that enhancing one capacity can enhance another (Sen, 1999: 40). Conversely, enhancing the capacity of one group may increase the vulnerabilities of another. For example, laws designed to protect children at school may increase the vulnerabilities of teachers because they feel they have no powers to exercise discipline in the classroom. Various models have been developed to try to understand coping mechanisms or capacities and vulnerabilities.11 One of these is capacities and vulnerabilities analysis (CVA), which was designed to improve the links between relief and development interventions though processes that reduce vulnerabilities and enhance capacities. It is a simple framework to identify a community’s different capacities and vulnerabilities in three areas: physical/material, social/organizational and motivational/attitudinal (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989). It has been argued that sustainable development is successful when the community is actively involved and forms the basis for the project. Anderson and Woodrow believe that ‘development is the process by which vulnerabilities are reduced and capacities increased’ (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989: 12). ‘[E]very disaster response should be based in an appreciation of local capacities and should be designed to support and increase these’ (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989: 96). Conclusion There are a variety of factors, including the legal and political frameworks discussed in the previous chapter, and the assumption that a refugee situation is temporary, that limit the effectiveness of assistance to refugees. In addition, the impact of agencies offering assistance is limited by external political and economic factors, and internal flaws such as poorly prepared staff and failures to implement programmes in accordance with accepted good practice. Furthermore, assistance to refugees can often be inappropriate, poorly targeted and harmful because refugees and their needs are regularly misunderstood and their

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abilities underestimated. Assistance is designed on a short-term basis and is frequently aimed exclusively at the refugee population and not integrated with other development projects occurring in the host community. Refugees are habitually regarded as helpless so efforts to assist them are imposed rather than designed to be participatory and build on refugee capacities. Consequently, humanitarian and development interventions can undermine existing coping mechanisms, worsening rather than improving a situation. It is evident that despite the failings of the international community to provide effective assistance to refugees, refugees continue to survive by developing coping mechanisms. ‘It is impossible to understand needs with any accuracy without also assessing the ability of people themselves to meet their needs through the capacities they have’ (Anderson & Woodrow, 1991: 48). An increasing number of refugee groups are becoming protracted for an increasing period of time. Therefore the inadequacies of refugee law and assistance are magnified and the potential damage caused by these inadequacies amplified. As a protracted refugee group, the Palestinians in Lebanon have been warehoused, with over 50 per cent of the population confined to official refugee camps and deprived of access to their human rights. Such confinement has an impact on the health and psychological well-being of camp inhabitants, and the forced reliance on assistance can lead to a dependency syndrome developing among some. The separation of refugee and host populations contributes to mutual feelings of mistrust and insecurity; it prevents integration, and limits the contributions the refugee population might be able to make to the economy. Despite the shortcomings of refugee law and assistance, the financial costs to the international humanitarian community are still high. With the increase in the number of protracted refugee groups, the costs of assistance will increase. Therefore, it is necessary ‘to reconsider the wisdom of using scarce international resources to feed, shelter and generally “warehouse” refugees who are deliberately prevented from establishing livelihoods and becoming self-sufficient . . . refugees should enjoy productive lives and contribute to the development of the areas where they have settled’ (Crisp, 2001: 19).

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4 THE PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON: A VOLATILE REFUGEE–HOST RELATIONSHIP

This chapter presents a history of the Palestinians in Lebanon from the late 1940s to 2007. It highlights factors and significant events that help to explain the current tensions between the refugee and host communities and discusses the current political and legal status of the Palestinians in Lebanon. The 15-year civil war was extremely complicated, involving numerous actors and phases, so the details here are confined to those that involved or affected the Palestinians in Lebanon. It is important to understand the context in Lebanon that has shaped the attitudes and policies towards the Palestinian population and resulted in their becoming what is known as a ‘protracted’ or ‘warehoused’ refugee population. That is a population that has lived as refugees for an extended period of time and is denied access to basic rights. Most of the Palestinians in Lebanon were either born refugees or became refugees six decades ago. They have been denied access to their basic rights including the right to work, and many are confined to camps and dependent on external assistance. The experience of the Palestinians in Lebanon is a symptom of the host country’s inability to deal effectively with problems among its own population. The root cause of the hostility between the Palestinian and Lebanese populations lies in the multi-confessional structure of Lebanon and the

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deliberate division of power along sectarian lines designed to maintain peace and stability. The Palestinian presence threatens the precarious demographic balance and further complicates sectarian Lebanese politics. ‘A “normal” more “natural” state could have coped with the Palestinian presence and its external ramifications’ (Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe, 2001: 62).

Figure 2: Map of Lebanon 2

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Lebanon: State without a Nation1 In an area of the world that is predominantly Muslim, Lebanon was created in the aftermath of the First World War to be a Christian state allied to the West. France, which for many years through the French Catholic Church had championed the cause of the Lebanese Maronite Christians, was given the mandate for Lebanon. However, the borders of mandate Lebanon contained ‘sizeable Sunni and Shi’a Muslim’ as well as Christian populations (Russell, 1985: 17). Within these three main religious groups are numerous sects, 17 of which are officially recognized by the state.3 The National Pact, based on the 1926 French-designed constitution, was an unwritten agreement reached in 1943 between the country’s ‘powerful Maronite and Sunni families’ aimed at placating the different groups by distributing power within parliament and the civil service on a ratio that reflected the demographic structure (Russell, 1985: 17). Therefore, the positions in the ruling troika have been allocated accordingly: the post of president is reserved for a Maronite, the Prime Minister is a Sunni and the Speaker of the House is a Shi’a. Parliamentary and government posts were distributed 6:5 in favour of the Maronite community. Since the end of the civil war and the signing of the Ta’if Accord in 1989, representation in parliament has been divided equally between the Christians and Muslims, and executive power has moved from the president to the Prime Minister and the cabinet or Council of Ministers (EIU, 2006: 9). However, the distribution of power is not necessarily representative of the population: there has not been a full census since 1932 and it is claimed that there is unlikely to be one in the near future because the process of collecting and publicizing the data would be destabilizing. The 1932 census found the Christians to have a majority of 52 per cent ‘but it has long been recognized that the 1932 census is profoundly misleading’ (Deegan, 1993: 105–06);4 ‘the apparent Christian majority in Lebanon was a heavily politicized majority based on the questionable exclusion of considerable numbers of residents on Lebanese territories and the debateable inclusion of significant numbers of emigrants’ (Maktabi, 1999: 240). Current figures for the total population and religious composition are based on estimates extrapolated from the 1932 census. These estimates are influenced by political agendas. The variation in the estimates also indicates the level of ignorance about the size of the Lebanese population. In 2000 the Lebanese

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government estimated the population to be 4.3 million5 but at the same time the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) estimated it at only 3.3 million (2000: 10). In 2001 the CIA figure for the population of Lebanon was 3.6 million,6 yet only a year later the World Bank figure was 4.3 million.7 Credible figures detailing the size of the Muslim and Christian Lebanese populations are difficult to find. However, Muslims form a majority comprising around 60 per cent of the population. The Shi’a, estimated to number more than 1 million by the EIU in 2000 (EIU, 2000: 8, 10), are considered to be the largest and fastest-growing single community (EIU, 2006: 10). The complex religious composition and confessional affiliations in Lebanon have dictated the nature of the political system, influenced the state–citizen relationship and social interaction, and affected the position of Palestinians. Before the First World War, the area of modern Lebanon had formed part of the Ottoman Empire and was populated by different religious communities that enjoyed autonomy and lived independently of each other. The creation of the Lebanese state brought these communities together, for the first time, under a single government. The National Pact was intended to distribute power among the different religious groups in a manner acceptable to all (Zahar, 2002: 568). Arend Lijphart refers to such power-sharing as ‘consociational democracy’, meaning to share in an alliance (Lijphart cited in Sisk, 1997: 5). The system is intended to ‘provide every significant identity group or segment in a society representation and decision making abilities on common issues and a degree of autonomy over issues of importance to the group’ (Sisk, 1997: 5). The resulting political framework enables the different groups to reach compromises to manage the state from day to day without having to address the most contentious issues and tackle the wider conflicts. Therefore, consociationalism has proved divisive and impeded the development of a Lebanese nation and ‘further institutionalized confessionalism’ (Zahar, 2002: 568). There has been an inability to agree an identity for Lebanon as the Maronites emphasize the ‘uniqueness’ and ‘distinctiveness’ of the Lebanese people, while the Sunnis identify themselves and the country as part of ‘the larger Arab and Muslim world’ (Zahar, 2002: 568). As a result, Lebanon, ‘although a recognized state, had not, even by the end of the civil war in 1990, developed the attributes of nationhood’ (Stoten cited in Milton-Edwards and Hinchciffe, 2001: 58). In Lebanon, the consociational system means that the different

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communities meet at the centre, which becomes a point of conflict with the potential to create or exacerbate social cleavages between the communities (Horowitz, 1985: 40–41). At the same time, because the ‘[s]ectarian balance [is] reflected in each constituency . . . to achieve control in that constituency a political group [has] to ensure crossconfessional support and field candidates for the seats reserved for the different confessions’ (McDowall, 1996: 12). Such coalitions, which also occur in parliament when deputies share a common interest, channel conflict into ‘intra-ethnic directions’ (Horowitz, 1985: 651). Elite political families have emerged to monopolize the formal political arena, operating in an ‘amorphous network of power and influence’ (Leenders, 2002: 31), inaccessible to the majority of Lebanese. Politics has become hereditary and political ideologies have not developed (McDowall, 1996: 12). Therefore, in addition to being excluded from the political scene, the populace votes according to confessional alliances, not only out of loyalty but because of the absence of an alternative. Without ideologies to unite the population across confessional boundaries, Lebanon remains ‘a confederation of sects rather than a nation’ (el-Solh, 1994: 231). The consociational system has prevented the development of a unified Lebanese identity because it encourages individuals to identify first with their religion. ‘Religion is not a matter of faith but a given, an integral part of their identity’ (Horowitz, 1985: 51). Under the Ottomans religion became institutionalized, so it is unsurprising that the importance of religion persists today; it continues to dominate social and economic life, cutting across wealth and social status (McDowall, 1996: 7). Zahar argues that the president, Prime Minister and Leader of the House still perceive themselves as representatives of their communities and, as such, engage in attempts to strengthen their power over the others rather than to provide shape and direction to a unified state policy (Zahar, 2002: 586). The problems caused by the lack of a unified identity and the failures to develop political ideologies have been multiplied by the reliance of the different communities on external support to maintain or improve their power in relation to other groups. The resulting link between domestic politics and regional conflicts has subjected Lebanon to violence and instability as other powers conduct their battles inside Lebanon (Zahar, 2002: 568). The laissez-faire economic approach, which has resulted in little state provision of services and welfare, has further weakened the state–citizen

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and social relationships and reinforced the sectarian divide. For services and assistance, the Lebanese turn to their religious communities rather than the state and ‘each sect thinks of its own interests. The lack of common loyalty and political cohesion militates against the development of a fully fledged pluralistic society’ (Deegan, 1993: 107). For example, at least 60 per cent of Lebanese children are educated privately, predominantly at schools with religious affiliations (EIU, 2006: 15). Consequently, few children, during the course of their education, meet those from other sects, an experience repeated at university because many universities serve a particular community and promote a particular ideology (McDowall, 1996: 8).8 Without a state-operated education system catering for the majority of the population, the current, predominantly religious education provision maintains sectarian divisions and hinders integration. ‘[B]y the mid sixties most Lebanese recognized that the fine confessional balance in politics was based on myth’ and ‘it was inevitable that those who felt disadvantaged by the myth’ should want a change in the system to provide fairer opportunities (McDowall, 1996: 12). A multitude of social, political and economic factors converged to create discontent which degenerated into civil unrest and eventually war. Since independence, Lebanon had experienced rapid social and economic change. Estimates suggest that the population grew from just over 1 million in 1943 to around 2.6 million by 1975. During this period there had been significant rural-to-urban migration which created a large number of disaffected youths in urban areas, and economic disparities among all ethnic groups (McDowall, 1996: 12–13). Unemployment was high among the lower socio-economic groups, most companies were owned by a few wealthy families, and Lebanon’s famous banking industry was largely owned by outside investors who took the huge profits abroad. The confessional political system maintained the distribution of power between the sects and between a few privileged families. Those who were discontented with the Lebanese economy but outside the ruling elite had no access to power to challenge the status quo. The electoral practice that required individuals to return to their place of birth to vote in local and national elections meant that voters failed to understand the formal political system of their place of residence or their place of birth. Political ties and knowledge of political ideologies were weak and promoted the practice of voting according to religious

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affiliations (McDowall, 1996: 13). ‘Dissatisfaction with the Christiandominated power-sharing was a major cause of the Lebanese civil war’ (Zahar, 2002: 568). As the poorer Lebanese began to call for an end to what they regarded as ‘the massive social inequalities and corrupt aspects of political life’ (McDowall, 1996: 14), civil unrest mounted. Tensions were exacerbated by Israeli military attacks on Lebanon, a result of escalating cross-border violence between the Palestinians and the Israelis. The Lebanese state was heavily criticized for failing to curb Palestinian military activity. Hostility towards the Palestinians increased as a consequence of mounting Israeli attacks, particularly from rightwing Christians, and sporadic fighting broke out between the two groups. Among Lebanese intellectuals, many of whom were Christian, there was support for the poor Lebanese and the plight of the Palestinians, but as the situation deteriorated, despite the broad spectrum of views cutting across sectarian boundaries, the majority of individuals became drawn into the conflict according to their religious affiliations. A variety of political groups and militias developed which included left-wing groups who were able to draw on large numbers of unemployed Lebanese disaffected by the elitist confessional regime and poor economic climate, and right-wing groups threatened by the growing discontent and anxious to maintain the status quo and their privileged economic and political position (Sluglett & Farouk-Sluglett, 1993: 149–50). Many Muslims who resented the power of the Christians saw the Palestinians as a mechanism to change the balance of power (EIU, 2006: 4). In the years leading up to the outbreak of civil war, violence erupted regularly between the various militias, particularly between the right-wing Maronite Phalangists and Palestinians. The violence escalated and fullscale war broke out in April 1975. Despite the Ta’if Accords and the passage of time, tensions within Lebanese society remain. The Lebanese government argues that the presence of the Palestinians threatens the stability of the state and that to grant them citizenship would upset the fragile demographic structure. UNRWA figures suggest that the Palestinians in Lebanon, the majority of whom are Sunni, account for 11.4 per cent of Lebanon’s total population (UNRWA, 2002),9 and if they were given citizenship the ratios between the confessional groups would change. Without citizenship, despite their 60-year presence in the state, Palestinians have few rights and little opportunity to improve their situation. In the

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interests of peace in Lebanon, the government will continue to deny the Palestinians citizenship. The Palestinians have become the scapegoat for the civil war, which has helped to diffuse some of the tension between the Lebanese (Fisk, 1992: 77; R. Sayigh, 1995). The ‘implicit basis’ of the Ta’if Accords was the agreement of ‘all the major Lebanese political forces’ to blame ‘the civil war on the Palestinian factor’ (R. Sayigh, 1995: 32). ‘A broad interconfessional consensus on the Palestinian issue [has] developed in post-Ta’if Lebanon’ that opposes ‘extensive Palestinian freedom of action’ in the country (Zahar, 2002: 579). The refusal to grant citizenship is also linked to the fear that the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, confirming the Palestinian right of return, will never be enforced. By denying Palestinians citizenship and rights, it seems that Lebanese governments hope to force the international community to honour the right of return. The Early Years: 1948–58 The first Arab–Israeli war in 1948 created around 1 million Palestinian refugees who fled to neighbouring Arab countries. Approximately 100,000 Palestinians fled from northern Palestine to Lebanon (IPS, 1998: 1; Gorokhoff, 1984: 314).10 With the help of the Red Cross and religious authorities, the Lebanese government initiated measures to assist the Palestinians until financial and practical help was made available by the United Nations. Al-Buss and Rashidieh camps, built in the 1930s for Armenian refugees near the southern coastal town of Tyre, were offered to the first influxes of Palestinians. When their capacity was exceeded, the Red Cross formed a third camp from tents nearby in Bourj al-Shamali (Gorokhoff, 1984: 314). The empty French army barracks in the Beqa’a, Wavel, Anjar and Gourand, were also used to house Palestinians. Christian institutions offered their land to shelter Christian Palestinians and five further camps were established at Dbayyeh, Mar Elias, Tel alZa’atar and Jisr al-Basha in Beirut and Nabatiyyeh in the south of the country (Gorokhoff, 1984: 315; Nasrallah, 1996: 4). In 1948 and 1949, the Red Cross also established Shatila and Bourj al-Barajneh camps in Beirut, Nahr al-Barid camp in the north near Tripoli, and Ein al-Hilweh in Saida (UN, 2000). Bourj al-Shamali was established in 1948 near Tyre for refugees from Hawla and Tiberias (Kjaer, 1990: 23). In the mid-1950s, to reduce overcrowding, UNRWA established Beddawi camp near Tripoli and Mieh Mieh camp on the outskirts of

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Saida (UN, 2000; Kjaer, 1990: 31). Anjar and Gourand army barracks were reoccupied by the French so the inhabitants of Anjar were moved to Bourj al-Shamali (Kjaer, 1990: 23), and those from Gourand were moved to UNRWA purpose-built housing in Rashidieh in 1963 (UN, 2000; Yusef, 1992: 3). By the mid-1950s in Lebanon there were 17 official UNRWA camps and numerous unofficial camps, such as Sabra.11 Until UNRWA formally assumed responsibility for the camps, which in some cases was as late as 1956, they were administered by a variety of organizations. The status of the land on which the Palestinian camps are located is ambiguous; some plots are rented from the government for periods of up to 99 years, others are on indefinite loan from religious institutions or private families.12 The ambiguity over ownership weakens Palestinian and UNRWA claims to the land and makes the camps vulnerable to threats by the government to reclaim the land. Illegal settlements are particularly vulnerable and some have already been destroyed by the government. However, the legality or illegality is not always clear. A further complication to land ownership has occurred where official camps have sprawled beyond their authorized boundaries and occupy adjacent land that is regarded by all Palestinian inhabitants as part of the camp and is in receipt of many UNRWA services. In some instances, Palestinian families claim that they have bought land adjacent to the camp from private landowners, despite being legally prohibited to own land.13 Not all Palestinians settled in camps immediately. Many received help from ordinary Lebanese until organized humanitarian assistance became available (Roberts, 2000: 121). Wealthier Palestinians or those with family or friends in Lebanon made their own private arrangements, and many less affluent Palestinians chose to settle in Lebanese communities and find work to support their families. However, after a few years, many of these families found it necessary for their survival to move to the camps (Gorokhoff, 1984: 316). Although the Palestinians were initially welcomed by the Lebanese government and people, early official policies and humanitarian assistance were influenced by sectarian divides and security concerns (R. Sayigh, 1988: 14). It has been suggested that the refugees were allowed to flow freely across the border into Lebanon and offered assistance because President Khouri (1943–52), a Maronite, wanted to improve his standing with the Lebanese Muslim community (R. Khalidi quoted in R. Sayigh, 1988: 15). Assistance from religious organizations was provided

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on a confessional basis; Muslim organizations assisted Muslim Palestinians and Christian organizations assisted Christian Palestinians (R. Sayigh, 1988: 14). While the Palestinians in Lebanon enjoyed ‘a relatively acceptable level of freedom of expression and political activity’ during this period (Suleiman, 1999: 67) and initially ‘little overt hostility’ was expressed towards the Palestinians (R. Sayigh, 1988: 14), government policies aimed to monitor and control refugee activity. A Central Committee for Refugee Affairs was established in 1950 and upgraded to a Directorate in 1959. The establishment of official camps allowed the Lebanese to develop a system of state control in the camps which was rigorously imposed between 1958 and 1969. The deliberate location of camps away from the Lebanon–Israeli border also allowed the Lebanese army to secure the border and disperse the refugees into smaller, more easily controlled scattered groups. Camps were established in predominantly Muslim quarters in urban centres away from Beirut, and in agricultural areas to provide a cheap source of labour for landowners (R. Sayigh, 1994: 24). However, many Palestinians, despite the restrictions on movement, travelled to Beirut to take advantage of employment opportunities in construction and manufacturing, again supplying businesses with cheap labour (R. Sayigh, 1994: 24). Rights to citizenship were also decided on sectarian grounds. Christian Palestinians were offered citizenship on arrival but 80 per cent of Palestinians were Sunni Muslim and unable to obtain citizenship unless they could prove Lebanese ancestry through the patrimonial family line (R. Sayigh, 1988: 16). In 1994 the Lebanese government allowed Palestinians born of Lebanese mothers and, under pressure from Shi’a parties, Palestinians from seven Shi’a villages occupying disputed territory pre-1948 to claim citizenship.14 This has increased the size of the Shi’a vote in Lebanon. Not all Palestinians entitled claimed citizenship15 but those who have may lose it if a request by the Maronite League to rescind the 1994 law is ever granted (PHRO, 2005: 170). An estimated 23,000 Palestinians would be affected (Jerusalem Times, 2003). The introduction of policies marginalizing the Palestinian community began as early as 1951 and coincided with the beginning of UNRWA’s operations, which were seen as ‘obliterating any possibility of an early return of Palestinians to their homeland’ (Tanmiya, 1998: 6). The continued Palestinian presence was regarded as a threat to Lebanon’s demographic balance and subsequent policies aimed to

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exclude Palestinians from social, political and economic life and to encourage them to leave the country. UNRWA was now considered responsible for providing all social, educational and health services for the Palestinians in Lebanon (Tanmiya, 1998: 6). Legally, the Palestinians would be regarded and treated as foreigners and have to seek permission to work, travel and, later, own land and property, and would be exempt from receiving any Lebanese public services. The situation has not changed significantly, and in 2007 a report by Amnesty International concluded that Palestinians in Lebanon were still denied many of their basic rights (Amnesty International, 2007).16 Lebanese Rule in the Camps: 1958–69 From 1958 to 1969, the Lebanese government exercised strict control over the Palestinian camps. The intensification of Lebanese security in the camps was precipitated by Lebanese government crises and violence (R. Sayigh, 1979: 134). President Khouri was deposed by parliament in 1952 and replaced by President Camille Chamoun (1952–58), who was faced with an Arab nationalist rebellion in support of Colonel Gamel Abdul Nasser (Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe, 2001: 60). During the 1950s and 1960s, Nasser’s form of Arab nationalism, which symbolized ‘anti-imperialism, nonalignment, pan-Arabism, republicanism, social justice and . . . state-socialism’, was popular throughout the Middle East (Sluglett & Farouk-Sluglett, 1993: 32). It represented the antithesis of the Lebanese state ideology. The urban masses ‘resented and were ashamed of their Christian politicians’ attempt to hold Lebanon aloof from the main stream of Arab politics’ (Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe, 2001: 60–61). The Nationalists challenged Chamoun for maintaining relations with Britain and France throughout the Suez Crisis despite internal pressure, attempting to manipulate the 1957 election and amend the constitution to remain in office, and requesting United States intervention to quell the unrest. The struggle between the nationalists and Chamoun lasted from 1956 to 1958 and is known as the first Lebanese civil war. Chamoun was replaced as president by General Fuad Chebab (1958–64), the Maronite army commander who had refused to lead the army in support of Chamoun. Chebab introduced measures to control the Palestinian camps and the increasingly politicized Muslim masses. His policies were a reaction to the prevailing popular ideology of Nasserist Pan-Arabism and its power to destabilize the previous regime

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and potential to unite the lower socio-economic groups, including the Palestinians, to challenge Maronite hegemony (Sluglett & FaroukSluglett, 1993: 148). Under Chebab, the right-wing Maronite party, the Phalange, entered the Lebanese political arena. Formed in 1936, the Phalange, a Maronite nationalist party with Zionist sympathies, perceived the Palestinian presence in Lebanon as a threat to the country’s stability and Maronite power. The Phalange attitude towards the Palestinians influenced the course of the civil war and has shaped Lebanese opinion towards the Palestinians (R. Sayigh, 1994: 26). In the camps, the responsibilities of the Directorate of Refugee Affairs were undertaken by a branch of army intelligence known as the Deuxième Bureau which installed soldiers in the camps and recruited Palestinian informers (R. Sayigh, 1994: 70). Its aim was to control opposition groups, and weaken the traditional leadership which had been used by Chamoun and UNRWA to liaise with camp populations. Refugee movements, particularly those of the politically active, were monitored, and organizations were prevented from operating in the camps. The Deuxième Bureau introduced regulations that allowed it to maintain close surveillance inside the camps and in private houses belonging to camp inhabitants (R. Sayigh, 1994: 68–71). Refugees attempted to circumvent the rules by paying bribes or exchanging information (R. Sayigh, 1979: 132, 135). The Bureau interfered with UNRWA appointments to prevent politically outspoken Palestinians from obtaining employment (R. Sayigh, 1994: 68–71). The close proximity of three events – the Six-Day War, the Cairo Accords and Black September – between June 1967 and September 1970 had a profound effect on the status of the Palestinians in Lebanon. Until the 1967 Six-Day War, the dominant ideology among all Palestinians had been Nasser’s Pan-Arabism and the belief that the solution to their problem lay in unified action with other Arab states or organizations against Israel (Beker & Oordt, 1991: 11). With the failure of the front-line Arab states to counter the Israeli attacks and the loss of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinians became disillusioned with Pan-Arabism and turned to their own resistance movements which had been developing since the 1950s. The Palestinian National Liberation Movement, Fatah,17 had been formed in the mid-1950s by Yasser Arafat, Salah Khalaf and Khalil al-Wazir. The first Palestinian National Council in May 1964 established the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO),

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an umbrella group for Palestinian institutions that was given the mandate to represent the Palestinian population. From January 1965, for two and a half years, Fatah claimed responsibility for 175 military operations inside Israel (Brynen, 1990: 21). Neighbouring Arab countries, under threat from Israeli reprisals, attempted to control Palestinian military operations by arresting the resistance fighters. However, these militia operations provoked the Israeli attacks of the 1967 war which displaced 20,000 Palestinians, some of whom fled to Lebanon (R. Sayigh, 1994: 19). The Six-Day War, disappointment with Pan-Arabism, the PLO’s escalating military activities, the development of other resistance movements and the arrival of newly displaced Palestinians precipitated an increase in guerrilla action in Lebanon. Until then, the Lebanese authorities had been more successful than the other host nations in minimizing Palestinian military activity and patrolling its shared border with Israel to prevent attacks being launched from its soil. With the loss of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinian militias turned to southern Lebanon for a base, and from 1968 launched regular attacks on Israel. The Palestinians received support from other Arab countries and the Lebanese were unable to curb the military activities (Beker & Oordt, 1991: 11). Consequently, Lebanon was subject to Israeli reprisals so the government responded by attempting to tighten its control over the camps. The assertion of control was met with resistance from the Palestinians and their Lebanese supporters. Violent confrontations between the Lebanese army and Palestinians ensued and the Lebanese were forced out of the camps. This eventually led to the signing of the 1969 Cairo Accords between the PLO and the Lebanese government. Through the accords, the PLO agreed to recognize Lebanese sovereignty over Lebanon and the Lebanese allowed the Palestinians autonomy in the camps and urban areas populated by Palestinians. The PLO was also granted permission to establish military bases in southern Lebanon from which to launch attacks on Israel although such attacks were supposed to be coordinated by the Lebanese High Command (Beker & Oordt, 1991: 12). The Palestinians secured greater freedom of movement for their guerrilla activities in Lebanon than in any of the other front-line states (Wallach & Wallach, 1997: 220), which distinguishes the Palestinian experience in Lebanon from that in other Arab countries, and from the experience of other refugee groups. However, the Cairo Accords did not prevent further clashes taking place between the PLO and the Lebanese;

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for example, in 1973 the Lebanese air force attacked Bourj al-Barajneh camp in Beirut (IPS, 1998: 3). The development of the Palestinian resistance movement in Lebanon was boosted by the clashes in Jordan between the government and the PLO in 1970 and 1971. The conflict was provoked by the PLO’s increasingly aggressive attitude in Jordan towards the government and king, and attacks the PLO launched from Jordan on kibbutzim just over the border (Wallach & Wallach, 1997: 29). The Israelis retaliated but were successfully repelled by the PLO and Jordanian troops. The Jordanian government, recognizing the threat posed by the PLO to internal and external security, expelled Yasser Arafat, the PLO and its resistance fighters in a series of battles in 1970 and 1971 that have become known as Black September. The PLO then settled in Lebanon, establishing military and social organizations among the Palestinian populations. The PLO in Lebanon: 1969–82 ‘From 1968 to 1982 . . . the Palestinians in Lebanon enjoyed a higher degree of autonomous control over their own affairs than any of their compatriots [Palestinians elsewhere] have since the beginning of the British mandate in Palestine. During this 14 year period, they developed social and cultural institutions, organs of self-government and security, and a powerful economic presence’ (R. Khalidi, 1984: 255). ‘By the late 1970s, the PLO “state” administered its own schools, hospitals and other institutions, making up about 15 per cent of the Lebanese GDP’ [gross domestic product] (Rathmell, 1994: 178). ‘[T]here was a definite although never fully articulated feeling by PLO leaders themselves that the entire PLO infrastructure being maintained and expanded in Lebanon could be more or less transplanted wholesale from Lebanon to form the basis of the administration of a new Palestinian state’ (Cobban, 1984: 4 cited in Beker & Oordt, 1991: 23). During the 1970s, the PLO established itself on the world stage. In 1974 the Arab League officially recognized the PLO as the ‘sole and legitimate’ representative of the Palestinian people, and the UN admitted the PLO as an observer. The PLO was now officially recognized by more states than Israel and there was strengthening international opinion that the PLO should be involved in negotiations to resolve the Palestine– Israel question. Israel, threatened by the consolidation of PLO power and support, and under regular military attack from southern Lebanon, ‘sought any pretext for war in order to destroy the PLO’ (Hagopian,

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1985: 2). From the late 1960s, in response to PLO attacks, Israel was regularly attacking Lebanon from the air. Between 1968 and 1974, the Lebanese authorities claim that the Israelis launched 3,000 air attacks on Lebanon and killed 880 Lebanese and Palestinian civilians. An attack in 1974 destroyed Nabatiyyeh camp in the south of the country (IPS, 1998: 4). From 1974, Israel launched what it called ‘pre-emptive raids’ which were unprovoked attacks against Palestinian targets (Fisk, 1992: 75). Throughout the early 1970s, there was serious civil unrest in Lebanon. Fisk argues that it was a violent dispute over fishing rights in Saida that ‘ignited the fire’ (1992: 78). However, it was the Phalangist massacre of 27 Palestinians on a bus in April 1975 that is most often cited as the catalyst to the civil war in Lebanon (Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe, 2001: 61; Zahar, 2002: 569). Radical Palestinian factions sided with left-wing Muslim militias against right-wing groups led by the Phalangists. Palestinian camps and communities were deliberately attacked and camps in East Beirut were besieged. During the siege at Tel al-Za’atar camp, many women were killed while attempting to collect water for their dehydrated children and hundreds were slaughtered when the camp was overrun (Peteet, 1991: 37). Some sources claimed that the death toll from the Tel al-Za’atar massacre was as high as 3,000 (IPS, 1998: 4). Until this date, Arafat had tried to keep his Fatah forces from becoming involved in the fighting. After the massacres in refugee camps, Arafat allowed his fighters to join the leftist Lebanese assault on the Christian community in Damour (Fisk, 1992: 17). In 1976, Syria entered the war in support of the leftist factions. Iraq intervened on behalf of the Christian Lebanese, and in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution Hizbollah was formed and began operations against the Israeli occupying forces in southern Lebanon in 1980. The Israeli Invasion and PLO Withdrawal: 1982–85 Lebanon is strategically important to both Syria and Israel. Neither wanted the security threat of an unstable neighbour and neither wanted Lebanon to form an alliance with the other. As a result, Syria and Israel were actively involved throughout the civil war (Zahar, 2002: 569, 575). Israel increased its military activity in Lebanon and by late 1976 had helped to establish a breakaway Lebanese army, later to become known as the South Lebanese Army (SLA), to fight against Palestinians in the south (Rathmell, 1994: 178). The cross-border fighting between Israel and the Palestinians strained relations between the Palestinians and the

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predominantly Shi’a population in the south. In March 1978 the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a major offensive and occupied southern Lebanon up to the Litani River with the aim of destroying the civilian and military infrastructure of the PLO.18 Under international pressure, the IDF withdrew to a 5-to-10-km-wide strip along the border, leaving southern Lebanon under the control of its proxy army. To prevent escalation along the Lebanon–Israeli border, the UN established the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), a multinational force with limited ability to enforce peace (Fisk, 1992: 135–36). In June 1982, the IDF launched a second attack and reached Beirut. Again, the aim was to destroy the PLO and install a friendly Maronite government. In the months that followed, an estimated 19,000 Lebanese and Palestinians, over half of whom were civilians, were killed and a further 30,000 injured (Lebanese police estimates cited in Brynen, 1990: 180). Destruction was widespread: the three camps in the Tyre area were severely damaged, 70 per cent of homes in Rashidieh camp were destroyed, Ein el-Hilweh camp was completely demolished (IPS, 1998: 5) and the nearby camp of Mieh Mieh suffered regular attacks. The PLO lost between 1,000 and 2,000 fighters and between 2,000 and 4,000 fighters were held in Israeli detention camps (Y. Sayigh cited in Brynen, 1990: 180). Camps had sustained severe damage, the PLO infrastructure had been destroyed, and southern Lebanon was under Israeli control. Under a United States-brokered ceasefire the PLO agreed to withdraw from Beirut with its 4,000 fighters (Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe, 2001: 63); the Israelis pledged not to enter West Beirut and guaranteed the safety of the Palestinian civilians remaining in the camps. As part of the ceasefire agreement, the US agreed to ensure the safe conduct of PLO troops and to protect Palestinian civilians left behind (McDowall, 1998: 11). On 11 September 1982, US forces withdrew from West Beirut ten days ahead of schedule. On 15 September, Bashir al-Jumayyil, elected president in August, was assassinated by a bomb in East Beirut near his Phalange headquarters. The following day the IDF, breaking the ceasefire agreement, entered West Beirut and on 17 September allowed Phalangist forces to enter Sabra and Shatila in search of Palestinian ‘terrorists’. The civilians remaining in the camp after the PLO militia had left in accordance with the ceasefire agreement had no means of protecting themselves. Two days of slaughter ensued and around 2,400 Palestinians were killed.19 After the massacre the IDF arrested large numbers of

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Palestinians, many of whom were never seen again, alive or dead. Amin al-Jamayyil, brother of the assassinated Bashir al-Jamayyil, was elected president and reasserted his power over the Palestinians by bulldozing illegal settlements and rounding up Palestinians lacking official documentation. Palestinians abroad with Lebanese refugee travel documents were allowed to renew them only if they pledged never to return to Lebanon. Palestinians made refugees in 1948 are the only group of Palestinians legally permitted to remain in Lebanon. By 1985, the IDF and its proxy army, the SLA, had withdrawn to a self-declared ‘security zone’ in the south. Following the end of the civil war, low-level fighting continued between the IDF, SLA and Hizbollah. This led to the two-week 1996 Israeli Grapes of Wrath invasion which undermined Lebanese confidence in the reconstruction process and helped to precipitate a recession (EIU, 2006: 5). The occupation of southern Lebanon ended in May 2000, when Israel and the SLA withdrew.20 UNIFIL troop numbers were reduced but increased again and its mandate strengthened following the 2006 Hizbollah–Israeli war. It was authorized to deploy up to 15,000 troops and at the end of 2007 had 13,000 on the Lebanon–Israeli border (ICG, 2007: 2). The Camp Wars: 1985–91 The 1982 Israeli invasion destroyed the infrastructure of the Palestinian quasi-state, caused severe physical damage throughout Lebanon, and brought socio-economic hardship to both Palestinians and Lebanese. An estimated 30,000 civilian Lebanese and Palestinians were killed and a further 90,000 injured. Nine thousand Palestinians and thousands of Lebanese were held prisoners for several years in the Israeli concentration camp of Ansar (Tanmiya, 1998: 7). The aftermath of the Israeli invasion had a dramatic impact on the political dynamics of all the communities in Lebanon. The Israeli failure to establish Maronite hegemony contributed to the rise of Shi’a and Druze factions (Hagopian, 1985: 3), and for the Palestinians marked the beginning of internecine fighting and sieges of the camps by the Shi’a group Amal. For many years, to safeguard its security and enhance its power regionally, Syria had wanted to be the principal representative of the Palestinians. After the PLO withdrawal from Lebanon, Syria began to exploit the divisions that had emerged among the remaining Palestinians (Hagopian, 1985: 2). The 1976 Syrian invasion into Lebanon had been supported by Amal and endorsed by the United States. The Riyadh

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conference later in the year legitimized the presence of Syrian troops by establishing the Arab Deterrent Force which was composed predominantly of Syrians (Zahar, 2002: 569). As Israel withdrew to southern Lebanon in the mid-1980s, most of the country fell under Syrian control. On 9 May 1983, Abu Musa, backed by Syria, led a breakaway Fatah faction, which became known as Fatah Intifada (Wallach & Wallach, 1997: 237).21 It engaged in fighting against loyalist Fatah members allied with Iraq, ‘Syria’s historical regional rival’, which remained in the north, Beqa’a and Beirut (Zahar, 2002: 578). Confrontations ended with the defeat of the loyalists, who retreated to Saida and the south. The Fatah dissidents, with Syrian support, built the Damascus-based National Salvation Front (NSF) and established themselves in the Syrian-held areas of Beirut and Tripoli (Suleiman, 1999: 68). While clashes between Fatah loyalists and dissidents took place, from mid-1985 to early 1988, Amal besieged Palestinian camps in Beirut and southern Lebanon. Syria was backing both the Palestinian opposition and Amal and eventually pressured Amal to end the sieges. Amal attempted to limit press coverage of the sieges, which were intended to last only a few days but in fact lasted several weeks or months, and tried to justify them by arguing the need to disarm the camps (Abukhalil, 1985: 16). The Palestinians remaining in the camps were heavily outnumbered and had only light weaponry, in contrast to the well-armed Amal militia. Between 19 May and 17 June 1985, 3,500 Amal backed by 1,500 Lebanese army soldiers launched attacks on Sabra, Shatila and Bourj al-Barajneh. UNRWA estimated that 40,000 Palestinians were trapped in the camps during the sieges and claimed that civilian centres such as hospitals and schools were targeted (Abukhalil, 1985: 17). There was further fighting between Amal and the Palestinians later that year in September, again in May and June the following year and from October 1987 to January 1988 (Brynen, 1990: 190–91). From 1985 to 1987, over 3,500 people, most of whom were Palestinian, died during the Wars of the Camps. However, the conflict helped Palestinians to reconstruct their military strength around Tyre and Saida by smuggling weapons into the country (Rathmell, 1994: 179). The fighting also temporarily reunited the various factions (Brynen, 1990: 191). By the late 1980s, as the Palestinian factions were rearmed and working in greater cooperation, Amal was weakened by the sieges and the civil war had developed into a three-way struggle between the

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Palestinians and the two competing Shi’a militias: Amal backed by Syria and Hizbollah backed by Iran, both of which wanted to lead the Shi’a community (Brynen, 1990: 190). The office of President al-Jumayyil had come to an end, but he did not want to relinquish power; he could not be re-elected because the conditions under which he succeeded had stipulated a single term only but no process to elect a new president had been agreed. Parliament was unable to resolve the problem, and for a time there were two different governments trying to rule the country (Sluglett & Farouk-Sluglett, 1993: 157). Syria was now anxious to stop the fighting: its two allies, Fatah Intifada and Amal were fighting each other; relations with its ally Iran had become strained because of the fighting between Amal and Hizbollah; Islamism and Islamic extremism were gaining popularity in Lebanon, partly as a consequence of Syria’s success in eliminating it from its own soil in the 1982 Hama Massacre; and Syria wanted to establish control over its neighbour before any of the warring factions became powerful enough to do so on their own. The End of the Civil War In October 1989 Lebanese leaders and Arab governments agreed to the Ta’if Accord, a peace plan for Lebanon, which in effect established Syrian hegemony over Lebanon. Syria was allowed to consolidate its power in Beirut with military force after it allied with the West following Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 (Fisk, 1992: 646). Zahar argues that the Ta’if Accords reflected Syria’s concerns rather than the needs of Lebanon, and confirmed Syria as the external implementer of the agreement (Zahar, 2002: 577). Among other things, the Ta’if Accords redistributed authority within parliament by changing the balance of power between the legislature and the executive, sharing parliamentary seats equally between Christians and Muslims, and redrawing constituency boundaries (Nasrallah, 1994: 133). As part of the post-war settlement thousands of Shi’a and Druze were hired in the public sector which before the war had been dominated by Christians and Sunni Muslims (EIU, 2000: 17). In the past, the Shi’a had complained that they were under-represented in the civil service although the numbers employed were proportional to their share of university graduates (Horowitz, 1985: 669). The size of the civil service is hugely inflated and has contributed to the economic crises but no government, for fear of provoking a violent reaction, has dared to reduce the number of employees (EIU, 2006: 20). The militias were

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disarmed and the Lebanese army was deployed throughout most of the country. However, Syria retained its large military presence, and Israel and the SLA continued to occupy southern Lebanon. In the aftermath of the civil war there were no attempts to disarm Hizbollah (Rathmell, 1994: 179). Syria was anxious to use Hizbollah against Israel and the disarming of the Shi’a militia was tied to the withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon in accordance with UN Resolution 425 (Zahar, 2002: 578). Since the civil war the power of Hizbollah has increased significantly and the party has entered mainstream politics. The eventual withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon in May 2000 and the subsequent disintegration of the SLA are considered Hizbollah victories, and as a consequence the party gained widespread popularity among Lebanese and Palestinian communities.22 It has been argued that Hizbollah has become ‘the most effective and efficient political party in the country’ (Norton, 1998: 148 cited in Zahar, 2002: 588). The 2006 war in which Hizbollah claims victory over Israel has confirmed Hizbollah as a significant military power in the region and the group continues to refuse to disarm. By July 1991 the Lebanese military had re-established control over the Palestinian camps, and since then the Lebanese authorities have been tightening their grip on all aspects of Palestinian life. However, the Lebanese government had limited control and was unable to exercise power and implement policies effectively throughout the country. Despite its withdrawal from Beirut in May 2001, the Syrian army still had around 20,000 troops stationed in the country.23 Syrian interference in Lebanese politics was causing increasing resentment and in October 2004, supported by the United States and France, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1559 which called for a withdrawal of Syrian troops and an end to its interference in Lebanese affairs. The assassination of Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in February 2005 led to antiSyrian demonstrations and accusations that Syria was behind the killing. Under significant international pressure, Syria withdrew its troops in April 2005. Since Hariri’s assassination, the political crisis has deepened; there has been increasing instability, widespread damage and suffering caused by the Hizbollah–Israeli war, the destruction of Nahr al-Barid Palestinian refugee camp, and widespread fears that the tensions would lead to another civil war.

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Warehousing of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon Lebanese government policies towards the Palestinians since the end of the civil war have two main aims: first, to impress upon the international community that the Palestinians can never be settled permanently in Lebanon because they threaten internal stability,24 and second, to reduce the size of the population through imposing restrictions that impede daily life to the extent that Palestinians are compelled to leave Lebanon.25 These policies have led to a warehousing of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon which means that they are denied basic rights including freedom of movement and the right to work, forcing many to rely on external assistance for survival. On the international stage, the Lebanese government argues that the Palestinian presence poses a security threat and that their permanent settlement in Lebanon, as part of a regional peace agreement, would ‘undermine the principle of sectarian balance in Lebanon’ (al-Murr, Lebanese Interior Minister, interviewed by al-Qulaybi, 2001). In 2000, President Emile Lahud claimed that if Palestinian refugees in Lebanon were not given the right to return home, they would become ‘a time bomb’ (Haddad, 2000: 1).26 At his inaugural speech in May 2008, President Michel Suleiman reaffirmed Lebanon’s position, stating that the country would not accept the permanent settlement of Palestinians (ICG, 2009: 13). Lebanon, in line with many other Arab states, holds the international community responsible for the Palestinian refugee problem and does not believe it should compromise its security or socioeconomic welfare to help the West solve a problem it created. There is a belief that while the Palestinians remain refugees, it is the international community’s responsibility to provide assistance. In 1998 Hariri argued that if Palestinians were integrated then Lebanon would be taking on the work of the international agency created to support the Palestinians (Haddad, 2000). The Lebanese government, according to President Suleiman in 2008, blames the international community for the Palestinians having been unable to return to their homeland (ICG, 2009: 13). To justify their policies to the Palestinians, the Lebanese authorities argue that their restrictions on the community, and their public rejection of permanent Palestinian settlement, support the Palestinian right of return; if Palestinians are seen to be living comfortably in Lebanon, enjoying full citizenship and civil rights, the international community is less likely to pursue the implementation of UN Resolution 194, which

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would in turn ‘create a precedent for the imposition of Israeli solutions’, rather than those favoured by Arab states (al-Murr, Lebanese Interior Minister, interviewed by al-Qulaybi, 2001). This is perhaps true, but there is little doubt that because of the sectarian demographic dynamics and the belief that the Palestinians pose a significant threat to the country’s stability and security, there is widespread opposition to the permanent settlement of the Palestinians in Lebanon (ICG, 2009: 13). Post-war governments’ hard-line attitudes towards the Palestinians, and public rejection of their permanent settlement, means the possibility that Palestinians might be settled permanently in Lebanon has been ignored, and that there has been a failure to examine how the situation, should it arise, would be managed. Foreign diplomats and experts expect that in the event of a regional peace deal, only a token number of Palestinians from the diaspora would be allowed to return to Palestine.27 It is likely that most of this token number would be composed of Palestinians from Lebanon because their situation is worse than that of Palestinians elsewhere in the region (UN, 2000: para 15), and because the continuing presence of large numbers of Palestinians is more problematic to Lebanon than other Arab states. To persuade the Lebanese government to accept the permanent settlement of the Palestinians, it is thought that financial compensation would be provided to help clear the public debt which in 2009 was 64,349 billion Lebanese Lira.28 In August 2000, President Emile Lahoud claimed Lebanon had refused an offer from ‘international parties’ of $20 billion to help clear its national debt, if it agreed to allow the Palestinians to remain in the country (Jerusalem Post, 2000). It is not just a financial argument though; the settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon, most of whom are Sunni, would be perceived as a threat by the Christians and the Shi’a and could exacerbate the tensions between the Sunni and Shi’a populations (ICG, 2009: 15). Conclusion The Palestinians in Lebanon add another dimension to the country’s already complex sectarian balance. The Palestinian involvement in the civil war and their powerful ‘state within a state’ under the PLO mean that their continued presence in Lebanon is perceived as a threat, and that they provide a useful explanation for the country’s financial, social and political problems. Hizbollah operates freely outside the control of the government, and has significant influence in parliament and the

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government, Syria continues to exert influence, and the economy is weak. These factors undermine the strength and legitimacy of the Lebanese government and add to the instability. The Palestinians feel vulnerable. The protection afforded by the presence of Syrian troops has gone and they continue to be blamed for ongoing security and political problems by the government and the Lebanese people. The Palestinians in Lebanon have no official representation or access to power and few supporters among the Lebanese. The fate of the Palestinians in Lebanon is linked to a regional peace settlement, and until an agreement is reached between the Palestinians and the Israelis that satisfies the front-line Arab states and the international community, their situation is unlikely to improve.

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5 LONG-TERM REFUGEE CAMPS: TEMPORARY SETTLEMENT OR PERMANENT HOME?

Refugee camps are intended to provide temporary shelter in emergencies for those fleeing their homes, but many camps are inhabited for extended periods. Protracted refugee groups find themselves confined to camps with restricted mobility so they are effectively warehoused in these settlements. Initially most official camps are anonymous lines of tents inhabited by families who have been able to bring only a few personal possessions. Assistance may be provided by humanitarian organizations or, in some cases, private individuals. Over time, families improve their shelters to make them more comfortable and durable and acquire additional possessions to make life easier. Some refugees engage in income-generating activities by opening small businesses to cater to the needs of camp inhabitants or passers-by; others try to find work. Eventually, these camps become settlements with a life and character of their own. Differences develop between camps, even if they are home to the same refugee groups. Differences also appear within the same camp between the inhabitants, either because of their different socioeconomic status when they arrived, or because some inhabitants cope more effectively than others. The nature of these settlements, although apparently physically isolated, is influenced by the inhabitants but also by the relationship between the refugee and host communities, events in the host country and country of origin, and regional dynamics.

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This chapter describes the official Palestinian refugee camps and the legal status of Palestinians in Lebanon.1 It looks at the camp population, the living conditions, socio-economic status, the assistance provided by the United Nations, international and Palestinian NGOs, and the Palestinian and Lebanese politics. It examines the factors that have shaped life in the camps so that each has developed its own character and moved from being a temporary settlement to a permanent home for its inhabitants, despite the restrictive environment and limited resources. How Many Palestinians Live in Lebanon? Despite the rejection of permanent Palestinian settlement in Lebanon by the authorities and general public, ostensibly based on the argument that citizenship for Palestinians would upset the sectarian balance, the size of the Palestinian population in Lebanon is unknown.2 The lack of accurate data has made this controversial issue subject to interpretation according to political agendas. The United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA), which might be expected to have an accurate picture of the Palestinian population in Lebanon, does not for a number of reasons which include the status of different Palestinian refugee groups in the country, the accuracy of information provided by the Palestinians themselves, and the disruption caused by years of turmoil and conflict. There are three groups of Palestinians in Lebanon: registered refugees, non-registered refugees and non-identified refugees. Registered refugees are registered with UNRWA and the Lebanese authorities. In 2008, UNRWA statistics showed 416,608 registered refugees in Lebanon; this group is entitled to UNRWA services (UNRWA, 2008). Non-registered refugees, who number around 35,000, are those registered only with the Lebanese authorities and not with UNRWA; they are able to access some UNRWA services. Non-identified refugees number around 5,000. They are in the country illegally and are not entitled to UNRWA services and receive no assistance from the government (PHRO, 2005: 10).3 This group is composed of Palestinians who were displaced in the 1967 Six-Day War, and those fleeing from Jordan in 1970. The agency relies on the Palestinians to volunteer demographic data, so UNRWA records reflect the information Palestinians provide. For a variety of reasons Palestinians may choose to falsify or withhold information. In addition, records show only those who have chosen to register with UNRWA in Lebanon or who are eligible to register. Not all

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Palestinians made refugees in 1948 registered with UNRWA, and those who arrived after 1948 as the result of later wars are ineligible to register. However, some late arrivals have falsified identification to enable them to register with UNRWA. For example, unregistered refugees marrying into a registered family may be offered by that family the identification papers of a deceased relative whose death has never been reported.4 Other inaccuracies in the register can arise because to secure UNRWA assistance for children of unregistered refugees, friends or relatives registered with UNRWA will claim the child as their own when the birth is recorded. The register continues to include Palestinians who have left Lebanon to live abroad for extended periods or who have emigrated permanently, unless those individuals inform UNRWA that they are living outside Lebanon. Even if families believe that they are unlikely to return to Lebanon there are incentives to maintain their UNRWA registration. For example, Palestinian families with citizenship in other countries register the births of their children so that if they return to Lebanon their children will be entitled to attend an UNRWA school. Palestinians also believe that if a peace settlement is reached and compensation is offered for land and property lost in 1948, UNRWA records would be used to determine who is eligible to receive it: failing to register children with UNRWA, although the family has no intention of returning to Lebanon, may forfeit their right to compensation in the future.5 Finally, the years of turmoil in Lebanon have added to the difficulties of maintaining accurate records. Many Palestinians have emigrated, been displaced in Lebanon temporarily and permanently, or moved between camps to marry or in search of work. The presence of Lebanese, Syrians, and Sri Lankan workers living in the camps because accommodation is cheaper than elsewhere adds to the difficulty of assessing the size of the camp populations accurately. International organizations tend to argue that the Palestinian population is smaller than the official UNRWA figures because so many have now settled abroad. For example, the Economist Intelligence Unit suggests that there are around 200,000 Palestinians in Lebanon (EIU, 2006: 3), Amnesty International quotes a higher figure of 300,000 (Amnesty International, 2007), and the United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants opts for 270,000 (USCRI, 2008). Such disparate figures from groups that would claim impartiality demonstrate the lack of accurate knowledge about the true size of the Palestinian

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population in Lebanon. During my own research, for example, in 2001 informed sources would usually estimate the Palestinian population in Lebanon as 200,000, while by 2006 the most commonly quoted figure had become 300,000.6 Outside the international community, estimates of the Palestinian population size have varied more wildly. In 2000 the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine suggested that there may be as few as 133,000 Palestinians (Fisk, 2000). Lebanese politicians such as Michel Eddé when Minister of Culture have claimed that the UNRWA figure of around 400,000 Palestinians is too low, and that the figure is nearer 700,000 (Eddé, quoted by Majed, 1995: 11). The lack of accurate figures has enabled Lebanese politicians to claim that there are large numbers of Palestinians living in Lebanon. Therefore, because of the demographic sensitivities it would be impossible for the government to accept the settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon. In August 2001, however, after foreign officials and diplomats claimed that there were only around 180,000 Palestinians in Lebanon, Lebanese officials acknowledged that there may only be 360,000 Palestinians registered in Lebanon, and that only 180,000 may currently reside there with the rest ‘living and working in Gulf countries’ (Daily Star, 2001b). The 12 official Palestinian refugee camps, serviced by UNRWA, are located throughout Lebanon. UNRWA has divided Lebanon into five areas of operation – Tripoli, Beka’a, Saida, Tyre and Beirut. Each area contains official and unofficial camps, but the focus here is on the official camps: Nahr al-Barid and al-Beddawi near Tripoli, Wavel in the Beka’a, Ein al-Hilweh and Mieh Mieh in Saida, al-Buss, Rashedieh and Bourj al-Shamali near Tyre, and Bourj al-Barajneh, Mar Elias, Shatila and Dbayyeh in and around Beirut. According to UNRWA statistics from 2008, the 12 official camps vary in size from a few hundred to almost 50,000.8 With the exception of Dbayyeh camp which is home to Christian Palestinians and Shatila camp whose population is believed to include 50 per cent non-Palestinians, the camps’ populations are predominantly Sunni Muslim Palestinians. Most camps contain some non-Palestinian families but they generally make up only a small fraction of the population. In the past, all the camps had a number of Christian Palestinian inhabitants, but, entitled to Lebanese citizenship, the majority have left, able to work legally and earn enough to live outside the camps. The departure of Christians from the camps is said to have accelerated during the civil war.

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Figure 3: Official UNRWA Camps in Lebanon 7

According to official UNRWA figures, in June 2008 there were 416,808 Palestinians in Lebanon who fulfilled the agency’s criteria to register as refugees, 53 per cent of whom lived in the twelve official camps scattered throughout the country (UNRWA, 2008).9 The exact number of people living in each camp is unknown and UNRWA figures and inhabitants’ estimates for the camp population often differ. This can

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be, for example, because inhabitants include non-Palestinians or nonregistered refugees in their estimates. Sometimes the differences can be quite marked: in 1999 UNRWA recorded the population of Nahr alBarid as 26,792 while in 2001 inhabitants estimated the camp population at 35,000. The reason for this discrepancy could be because Nahr alBarid had expanded beyond its official boundaries and inhabitants included those living in this area as part of the camp population whereas UNRWA might not. The UNRWA population figure for Wavel in 1999 was 7,078 but in 2000 the camp services officer estimated the population at only 3,073. This difference is probably because large numbers of inhabitants had left the camp in search of work so were no longer living permanently in Wavel.10 Lebanese Attitudes towards the Palestinians Despite not being a signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention on refugees or the 1967 protocol, Lebanon expressly denies rights to Palestinians accorded by the convention and protocol even though it extends many of them to other refugee groups (USCR, 2004: 2). The Lebanese government has promulgated laws to disempower and marginalize the Palestinian community. In addition, politicians have exploited existing fears and prejudices among the Lebanese against the Palestinians by portraying them as inhuman, violent and a threat to Lebanon’s stability. In 2001 the Lebanese Interior Minister, Elias al-Murr is reported to have said, ‘We all remember that the main cause of the civil war in Lebanon in 1975 was the Palestinian–Lebanese fighting, which created a certain atmosphere between the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples in Lebanon’ (interviewed by al-Qulaybi, 2001). The camps are regarded as lawless places and are referred to by politicians as ‘security islands’ (M. Khalidi & Riskedahl, 2007: 27) inhabited by ‘human garbage’ (Fattush, quoted in M. Khalidi, 1995: 28). The confrontation between the Lebanese Armed Forces and Fatah al-Islam in Nahr al-Barid camp has led to a clampdown on the Palestinians and reinvigorated the argument that Palestinians are a cause of tensions in Lebanon and are a threat to security (M. Khalidi & Riskedahl, 2007: 33). Although many camps are located in urban areas, the communities live separately and few Lebanese ever enter the camps. The Lebanese suspicion of the Palestinians is deep-rooted and often has little bearing on reality. For example, a Lebanese woman walking near Bourj alBarajneh camp blamed one of Beirut’s ever-present traffic jams on

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fighting inside the camp.11 She had no evidence that there was fighting in the camp and congested roads are a chronic problem in Beirut. Such negative attitudes are perpetuated by concentrating the blame for the civil war on the Palestinians and stressing the security threat posed by the continued existence of the Palestinian camps. Media stories reinforce the threat posed by the camps with stories of fighting, insecurity and militias.12 However, attitudes towards the Palestinians are becoming more nuanced. Rather than regarding them as inherently violent and lawless and therefore a threat, there is increasing recognition that the Palestinian socio-economic status and lack of political voice are root causes of insecurity (Klaushofer, 2005; ICG, 2009). The Lebanese authorities have deliberately excluded Palestinians from politics – ‘a central binding agreement of the Ta’if Accords’ (R. Sayigh, 1995: 32). After the PLO withdrawal from Beirut in 1982, the Palestinians have lacked any form of unified representation or leadership and UNRWA has no political power and is not mandated to represent the Palestinians’ political views.13 Without a legitimate political voice and access to power, the Palestinians are unable to express publicly their views on any issues affecting their living conditions and legal status in Lebanon, or on their fate in the event of a regional peace deal. Since 2005 and the withdrawal of Syria, the political dynamics among the Palestinian groups and between the Palestinian and Lebanese authorities have shifted. There was an opportunity for the PLO to reassert its presence in Lebanon, challenging the power of some of the Syrianbacked Palestinian factions. There were also opportunities to improve Palestinian–Lebanese relations through the Lebanese–Palestinian Dialogue Committee (ICG, 2009). Between the 2005 Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon and the 2006 war there was a brief period when the Lebanese government seemed to be relaxing its stance towards the Palestinians. However, the Hizbollah–Israel war followed closely by fighting between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese army in Nahr al-Barid camp in 2007 may have damaged efforts to improve Palestinian– Lebanese relations. In the face of the Nahr al-Barid crisis, the PLO representative appeared weak and the reassertion of PLO authority in Lebanon may have to wait (M. Khalidi & Riskedahl, 2007: 31). Palestinian Legal Status The lack of strong representation and the perceived threat from the Palestinians means that the Lebanese government has been able to pass

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laws that have a detrimental effect on the Palestinians under the guise of protecting the internal stability of Lebanon. Such laws are intended to encourage Palestinians to leave and include refusing citizenship, restricting the right to work, refusing to provide land for Palestinian camps to accommodate the growing population (ongoing), preventing Palestinians with residency rights in Lebanon from re-entering the country (1995–2000), and denying Palestinians the right to own property (from 2002). Residency Rights A law promulgated in 1995 illustrates the types of measures the Lebanese government is willing to undertake to reduce the Palestinian population. In that year Libya expelled its foreign workers, 5,000 of whom were Palestinian refugees from Lebanon.14 Deliberately timed to coincide with Qadhafi’s actions, the Lebanese government introduced a law that meant that no Palestinian was allowed to re-enter the country unless he or she had obtained a re-entry visa as well as an exit visa before leaving. Those Palestinians who had left before the law was introduced did not have a re-entry visa and were unable to obtain one outside Lebanon. Thousands of Palestinians, not only those who had been working in Libya, were unable to return to Lebanon. Although the law was rescinded five years later, el-Natour estimates that 75,000 Palestinians have lost their residency rights in Lebanon because those stranded outside the country were able to apply for citizenship elsewhere and were eventually joined by their families.15 Citizenship and the Right to Work Despite having lived in Lebanon for 60 years, or having been born there, most Palestinians have been unable to obtain citizenship. Without citizenship, Palestinians are considered foreigners, and as such have been barred from 72 professions. In 2005 the rules were relaxed and so Palestinians were barred from only 20 professions which still included engineering, medicine and law. In theory Palestinians can apply for work permits but these are expensive and almost impossible to obtain. According to UNRWA, unemployment among the Palestinians in camps in 2008 exceeded 60 per cent (Richard Cook cited in ICG, 2009: 17). Suhail Natour argues that if the number of Palestinians in Lebanon is as low as 200,000 as some estimates suggest (EIU, 2006: 3), of whom around 60 per cent are 12 years old or younger, there are a maximum 70–80,000 Palestinians of working age (Natour, 2005).

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As Lebanon has high unemployment, restricting the Palestinians’ right to work is regarded as justified by many Lebanese. However, Palestinians argue that there is little effort to regulate the number of guest workers in Lebanon who come mainly from Syria but also from Egypt, Turkey, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. As workers’ families remain in their home countries where the cost of living is considerably less than in Lebanon, foreign workers are able to accept lower wages than those who are resident in the country. Therefore, guest workers are believed to deprive Palestinians and Lebanese of employment opportunities, although some observers argue that the Lebanese are not prepared to undertake the work foreign labourers are employed to do and that many Palestinians are developing similar attitudes.16 Unlike guest workers in Lebanon, a study published in 2009 by Najdeh, a Palestinian NGO, suggests that despite limited work opportunities, Palestinians contribute to the economy because they represent 10 per cent of all private consumption. Although few Palestinians can contribute legally to the economy, refugee households spend earnings on food, healthcare and rent. They also invigorate areas around their camps by creating ‘low-cost markets for low-income and other marginalized communities in Lebanon’. The study concludes that relaxing restrictions on Palestinians’ right to work contributes to the Lebanese economy (Mahdawi, 2009). Property Law The 2002 property law was promulgated to enable foreigners to own property; however, this law excludes Palestinians (Daily Star, 2001c). ‘The current legislation forbids the acquisition of property in Lebanon by all non-Lebanese people “who do not possess citizenship issued by a state recognised by” Beirut.’17 Without explicit reference to the Palestinians, the law effectively prevents Palestinians from owning property. Furthermore, it forbids those Palestinians who already own their own homes from passing the property to their next of kin when they die (Abouzeid, 2003; Fisk, 2001). The law has divided the Lebanese Parliament between the Christians and some of the Shi’a MPs, who supported it, and Jumblat’s and Hariri’s blocs as well as Hizbollah, who opposed it (Nakhoul, 2001). The Palestinian Human Rights Organization claims that the law breaches a ‘United Nations anti-discrimination treaty Lebanon signed on December 21, 1965 that banned any UN member state from discriminating against

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anybody living on its territory with respect to human rights and general freedoms’ (Daily Star, 2001d). The Lebanese government claims that because Palestinians are unable to own property they cannot be resettled by force in Lebanon, and therefore Lebanese government policies are supporting and upholding the Palestinian right of return (Amnesty International, 2007: 17). El-Natour argues that the restrictions on property ownership will encourage more Palestinians to leave Lebanon as property ownership no longer offers security. He claims that Palestinians, who in the past have succeeded in saving money to invest in a home so that they could leave the camps, will choose to emigrate or educate one of their children abroad in the hope that they will obtain citizenship elsewhere after completing their studies.18 Some Palestinians have purchased property in the name of a trusted family member who has obtained Lebanese citizenship through marriage or through trusted Lebanese friends.19 This arrangement may work well for some people but there is always a risk that friendships break down or cannot be maintained from one generation to the next. Restrictions on Building Materials The living conditions in the 12 official camps are poor, which has a detrimental affect on the physical and mental health of the inhabitants. The camps are becoming increasingly overcrowded and the government has refused to provide more land. Before the civil war, there were 16 camps in Lebanon; there are now 12, one of which is Nahr al-Barid which was partially destroyed during fighting in 2007 and many inhabitants remain displaced. Most of the camps received extensive damage during the civil war and the government has forbidden certain areas of these camps to be rebuilt, meaning that the total area a camp occupies has been reduced. In some camps, taking building materials inside has been prohibited so families have been unable to repair their homes. Restrictions on taking building materials into the camps have been eased: since 2004 it has been possible to obtain permits to enter the camps with such materials. However, no law has been passed to lift the restriction on building materials permanently, so permission could be revoked (Amnesty International, 2007: 13–14). Furthermore, housing repairs have been forcibly neglected for many years so the cost and time needed for repairs can be a significant drain on the resources of camp inhabitants.

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Access to Education Palestinians cannot easily access Lebanese state education and Lebanon is the only country in which UNRWA runs secondary schools because Palestinians are unable to attend state secondary schools. Lebanon succumbed to external pressure and agreed to exempt Palestinians from a law that requires all foreigners to pay university tuition fees almost four times as high as those paid by Lebanese students. As the Lebanese state defines Palestinians as foreigners, this law was applied to them, but it was amended following efforts by members of the European Parliament to allow Palestinian students to pay the same fees as their Lebanese counterparts (PHRO, 2002). Freedom of Movement Palestinian refugees in Lebanon do not enjoy freedom of movement. They are prohibited from living in the border areas in the south and cannot approach a border crossing without permission from Lebanese military intelligence (PHRO, 2005: 16). There is a heavy military presence around camps in the south and inhabitants have to show their identity documents when leaving and re-entering the camps (Amnesty International, 2007: 4). Foreigners who want to visit the camps in the south, even for social reasons, need to obtain permission from Lebanese military intelligence.20 The Palestinian Human Rights Organization argues that the restrictions on freedom of movement in Lebanon apply only to Palestinian refugees and not to other refugee groups (PHRO, 2005: 16). Camp Living Conditions The legal status of the Palestinians in Lebanon has profoundly affected the living conditions in the camps and the quality of life for the inhabitants. The living conditions in all the camps are poor; there is severe overcrowding, a lack of privacy and natural light, unsanitary conditions and inadequate housing and infrastructure. In areas of some camps, UNRWA has erected concrete housing blocks in straight rows, but in general inhabitants have been left to their own devices. Government restrictions on the amount of land allocated to the camps have forced Palestinians to add additional floors to accommodate growing families. The result is an unorganized jumble of houses, often three or four storeys high, crowded together along narrow twisting alleyways. There are few open spaces for recreational activities and

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access to the camps by car is limited. In the most crowded areas, alleyways are barely wide enough for individuals to walk along. Many camp inhabitants try to earn a living by establishing small businesses selling groceries and domestic goods or providing services such as hairdressing, medical care and plumbing. Where possible, businesses are located at the edge of the camp or on a main route through the camp to benefit from passing trade. Some areas of the camps are visibly poorer than others. These tend to be occupied by latecomers who did not move into a camp in the immediate aftermath of 1948, families from camps destroyed during the civil war, and those registered as UNRWA special hardship cases and entitled to additional assistance from the agency. The houses belonging to the poorest are often a single storey with corrugated iron roofs held down by tyres and large stones; the floors might be compressed earth rather than concrete. Inside the houses are dark, poorly furnished, and regularly lack a proper water supply and sewerage system. Such houses are often located on the outskirts of the camps, on land that may not officially be part of the camp. Each camp has an UNRWA sanitation unit that regularly cleans the streets, collects the refuse, controls pests and maintains the sewerage system. Refuse is taken from the camps to a municipal dump either by private refuse collectors contracted by UNRWA or by the agency itself. The quality and supply of water in the camps is monitored by UNRWA and most houses in the camps have piped water. In the Beirut camps, because it is not possible to drink the water from the tap, potable water can be purchased for a small fee. Outside Beirut, inhabitants claim that although the UNRWA camp water supplies are supposed to be potable the water can be unpleasant because it is heavily chlorinated and sometimes contaminated. Designed several decades ago to serve much smaller populations, the sewerage systems in the camps have become inadequate. Now with larger populations the sewers become blocked and regularly overflow, covering the streets in a foul-smelling black sludge. Half of the camps have some open sewers and septic tanks. An alternative to septic tanks is needed for the most crowded camps because the equipment to empty the tanks is too large to navigate the narrow alleyways and there is no room to dig additional tanks. Electricity supplies to the camps are poor, although electricity supplies throughout Lebanon are erratic because of damage sustained during the civil war and subsequent damage to power supplies by Israeli

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air attacks.21 Originally the camps did not have official electricity supplies so inhabitants illegally tapped into mains supplies outside the camps. The Lebanese authorities, unable to curb this practice, began charging households a nominal fee in the mid-1990s. A few households have meters and pay for the amount of electricity used. However, because of poor administration, many households never pay for legal electricity supplies and others continue to connect to the mains illegally for as little as $100 for several kilometres of cable, a cost that can be shared between several households. As the demand for electricity in Beirut exceeds supply, different areas of the city have electricity at different times. Camp households may have two or three electricity lines to draw electricity from different areas, which means that a household can have electricity for more of the time. The ‘free’ electricity also enables families to use electrical heaters during the winter, which would otherwise be too expensive.22 Although UNRWA serves all the official camps and there are many NGOs that also work with Palestinian refugees, it is immediately apparent that the larger camps and those nearer the large cities have greater access to UNRWA and NGO services than the smaller and more isolated camps. UNRWA has concentrated services in areas that can be accessed relatively easily by as many people as possible. Although the larger NGOs tend to operate centres in each camp, there are more NGOs working in the larger camps, providing a greater range of services. NGOs also have centres in cities for camp inhabitants. Most large NGOs have offices in Beirut and access to assistance is easier in the capital than elsewhere in Lebanon. Access to other services such as education and medical care is also better than in other parts of the country. Socio-economic Profile Palestinian refugees in Lebanon face specific problems. They do not have social and civil rights, and have very limited access to the government’s public health or educational facilities and no access to public services. The majority rely entirely on UNRWA as the sole provider of education, health and relief and social services (Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles, UNRWA, www.un.org/ unrwa/refugees/lebanon.html – 12 December 2008).

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Of the five fields of UNRWA operations, Lebanon has the highest percentage of its Palestinian refugee population living in camps and the highest percentage of special hardship cases. The legal restrictions limiting employment opportunities for Palestinians mean that their socio-economic integration in Lebanon is low, which UNRWA argues has led to the high level of special hardship cases. The agency attributes the small percentage of special hardship cases in Jordan to the relatively high socio-economic integration of Palestinians with the host community. Lebanon Jordan Registered refugees 416,608 Proportion 53% in camps Proportion of special hardship 12% cases

Syria

West Bank Gaza Strip

1,930,703 456,983

754,263

1,059,584

17%

27%

25%

47%

3%

7%

4%

9%

Figure 4: UNRWA Socio-economic Indicators, as of June 2008 (UNRWA, 2008)

Since the end of the civil war, employment opportunities for the Palestinians in Lebanon, both inside and outside the country, have been unreliable and decreasing. Many Palestinians lost their jobs in the Gulf as a result of Arafat’s support for Saddam Hussein during the 1991 Gulf War. In the 1970s when the Gulf states’ economies were developing there was a shortage of educated labour. At that time Palestinians were available to work and possessed the necessary skills. They had the advantage over educated Arabs in other countries because they spoke English, rather than French, as a second language.23 Those who have since returned to the Gulf, particularly to construction sites, face redundancy as the global economic crisis hits the region’s building boom. In Lebanon there is increased competition for casual labour from guest workers, although since Syria withdrew its troops in 2005 the number of Syrians thought to be working in Lebanon has significantly reduced.24 However, estimates suggest that as much as 75 per cent of construction workers in 2008 were from Syria, which has implications for the Palestinians when construction offers one of their main sources of employment.25 Opportunities have also declined since the end of Lebanon’s post-war building boom and its general economic slowdown. Employment restrictions force Palestinians to look for casual labour,

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which is legal, but irregular and badly paid. Palestinians who choose to practise their profession illegally are obliged to accept poor wages and conditions, and those who restrict their work to the camps, which is legal, have a limited market and poor customers. The lack of employment opportunities forces some Palestinians to undertake dangerous work. For example, in the aftermath of the Hizbollah–Israeli war, some Palestinians cleared unexploded cluster munitions for $5 per bomblet from farmland in the south. This was not part of the official clearance programme and Palestinians who undertook such work had no training or protective clothing.26 Throughout Lebanon, socio-economic conditions for the camp inhabitants are hard and employment difficult to find although there are regional variations. For Palestinians living in or near the capital the cost of living is significantly higher than other areas of Lebanon. It is arguable that there are more employment opportunities in Beirut than other parts of the country, but there is also greater competition from migrant workers who, because they do not have families to support in Lebanon, can afford to accept lower wages than the Palestinians. In the north of the country, because the refugee–host relationship has generally been better than elsewhere, it is thought that there have been more job opportunities than in other parts of the country.27 The Beka’a is one of the more deprived areas of Lebanon, offering few employment opportunities for the Palestinians or Lebanese. In the south, Palestinians have more casual employment opportunities as agricultural labourers than elsewhere, but this is seasonal and work in the winter is limited. It has commonly been assumed that camp inhabitants in Lebanon benefit from substantial remittances on which they rely to survive. Research in 2000 and 2001 found that few households would admit to receiving remittances, perhaps through shame or embarrassment, or fear that any assistance from NGOs or UNRWA might be withdrawn if the existence of remittances was revealed.28 Wealthier families denied that they needed remittances, claiming that money goes from the camp to relatives abroad to help them establish themselves in a new country or pay their education fees. Other inhabitants argued that life for their relatives abroad is expensive so they are unable to provide substantial support to their families in Lebanon. A study published in 1997 concluded that the impact of remittances ‘was hardly visible for the large majority of families’ (Zakharia & Tabari, 1997: 424). While there is broad agreement that the expulsion of Palestinians from the Gulf following

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the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to a sudden decrease in remittances being sent to Lebanon (Amnesty International, 2007), there is little agreement on the levels or importance of remittances. It is unclear whether remittances have ever resumed their pre-1991 levels, but an article in 2005 stated that remittances from family members abroad were the most important source of income (Natour, 2005), and research published in 2009 claimed that over 50 per cent of households surveyed relied on remittances from family abroad (Mahdawi, 2009). Assistance The poor socio-economic conditions and income-generating opportunities mean that camp inhabitants are heavily reliant on assistance. Although numerous NGOs offer assistance, UNRWA is the main provider. During its early years UNRWA embarked on works projects to improve the refugees’ economic conditions until a peace settlement could be implemented (Schiff, 1995: 4). Over time UNRWA services have evolved to concentrate on providing routine education, healthcare, social services, and relief assistance to the most vulnerable. UNRWA Education Services UNRWA provides education for all registered children between the ages of 6 and 14. Unlike the other fields of UNRWA operations, the agency has opened secondary schools in Lebanon because of the difficulty of enrolling Palestinian children at government schools. The first, established in 1993, 1997 and 1998, were located in the Beirut, Saida and Tyre areas (UNRWA, 2000b: 5). Until October 2000, there were no UNRWA secondary schools in Tripoli or the Beka’a. Children wanting to pursue their education had to attend Lebanese schools nearby, which meant that parents had to find money for fees and transport costs. A demonstration in September 2000 at the UNRWA field office in Lebanon by pupils wishing to pursue secondary education succeeded, and UNRWA opened two more secondary schools, one in Tripoli and the other in the Beka’a.29 UNRWA insisted that it did not have the financial resources in its ordinary budget to fund these two schools, so the PLO agreed to cover the costs for the first year. In 2009 UNRWA opened a new secondary school funded by the European Union and continued to operate secondary schools in Lebanon.30 As far as possible, UNRWA follows the syllabus of the host country, and claims that its pupils have achieved higher grades in state

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examinations than pupils enrolled at government schools.31 In Lebanon, according to UNRWA statistics, the pass rate among agency pupils in July 1999 for the national Brevet examination was 54 per cent, compared with 44 per cent in Lebanese government schools. In the secondary examinations, agency pupils also performed better than pupils at government and private schools, achieving a pass rate of 84 per cent in comparison with 60 per cent (UN, 2000). However, the UNRWA pass rate is proportional to the number of pupils who sit the examination: enrolment statistics suggest that as many as half the pupils eligible do not take national examinations (UNRWA, 2000b), therefore the pass rate may not be as impressive as first appears. In the 2000s UNRWA has acknowledged a decline in the success rate of its pupils in comparison with pupils at Lebanese state schools (UN, 2004). ‘The education levels of Palestinian children is not comparable to that of Lebanese children or even to Palestinian children living in neighbouring Arab hosting countries’ (UN/CRC, 2005: 127). In 2006, European Union funding launched a new education initiative in Lebanon to improve the quantity and quality of UNRWA education, with the explicit aim of improving performance in the state examinations to bring it back to the level of the Lebanese success rate (EU/UNRWA, 2006). Despite the restrictions in Lebanon, the initiative was also intended to improve employment prospects for Palestinians because the European Union believed that there were opportunities abroad for Palestinians particularly in the Gulf (Byrns, 2009). Financial constraints have forced UNRWA to increase the pupil-toteacher ratio and have led to 77 per cent of schools operating a doubleshift system because the agency is unable to build new schools (UN, 2004). According to camp inhabitants, most UNRWA schools have classes of 40–50 pupils so teachers are unable to meet the individual needs of each student. The overstretched teachers are criticized for failing to plan lessons and mark homework and also for setting work at too high a level. This discourages children, many of whom are unable to keep up so either drop out voluntarily or fail to graduate to the next year. In addition to a lack of financial resources, UNRWA has struggled to secure permission from the Lebanese government to build new schools or rent existing buildings to use as schools.32 Violence in Lebanon and in the region often results in school closure because of immediate physical threats or schools being called out on strike to show solidarity with the Palestinian cause. The disruption means that children can miss many days of schooling during an academic year.33

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Although the tuition is free, not all Palestinian children attend UNRWA schools. Some play truant, perhaps because they have to work, and a small minority, if parents can afford it, enrol in fee-paying schools. NGOs claim that large numbers of children sacrifice their education to contribute to the family income. A 2005 report states that the drop-out rate for Palestinian pupils is 39 per cent, ten times higher than that for Lebanese pupils (UN/CRC, 2005). There are no accurate statistics, however, to indicate how many Palestinian children from the camps attend UNRWA schools. Wealthier parents who choose to send their children to non-UNRWA schools may not inform UNRWA of their decision, and so these children are also counted among those who have dropped out. Attendance records are compiled by the agency based on how many children enrol for school at the beginning of the academic year (UN, 2000). The drop-out rate is calculated by subtracting the number of children currently enrolled from the number enrolled for the previous academic year. No record is kept of those children who attend only for a few days or weeks and then drop out and may enrol again at the beginning of the following academic year. A headmaster of an UNRWA school admitted that a large number of children enrol but fail to attend regularly. He felt that many children were unable to attend because their parents could not afford to purchase the necessary textbooks and exercise books that UNRWA does not provide. The UNRWA education department states that the drop-out rate in Lebanon is the highest of all the fields because of the poor socio-economic conditions that force children to leave school and work to contribute to the family income.34 As children below the age of 16 would be working in the informal sector there is no statistical data to indicate how many children this would include. It was generally agreed among respondents that only the older generation who had been born in Palestine was likely to be illiterate because they had less access to formal education. However, many of the NGOs in Lebanon run literacy classes for children of school age and adults, particularly women. NGOs offer these courses because there is a demand. During the civil war many had their education disrupted, which explains the need for some adult literacy classes. However, the need for literacy classes for children of school age demonstrates that either the education UNRWA provides is inadequate, or children are not attending school. Several Palestinian families expressed the view that education was a waste of time because of the difficulty of finding employment

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legally in Lebanon. This attitude seems to have emerged since the civil war as Palestinians have previously emphasized the importance of education, believing it the only way in which they might improve their future prospects. Not all camp inhabitants believe that education is a waste of time because many parents make significant sacrifices to send their children to university.35 After graduating from school, some Palestinians attend university. Most universities are located in Beirut, some of which maintain smaller campuses in other areas, although some universities are based in Saida and Tripoli.36 Palestinians who do not live near a university must travel daily or move nearer the university. Many Palestinians attend the Arab University or Lebanese University, which are relatively cheap at around $2,400 a year.37 In addition to the fees, parents have to cover the costs of transport and books as well as living costs, and survive without contributions to the household income from their children. UNRWA provides a number of scholarships for university education. In Lebanon, during the 2006/2007 academic year, 189 scholarships were awarded (Amnesty International, 2007: 26). UNRWA offers 850 places at its only vocational training centre in Lebanon based at Siblen, in Saida (Amnesty International, 2007: 26). Palestinians complain that there are too few places to meet demand and that the quality of the courses available at Siblen is poor because of a lack of resources.38 NGOs also offer vocational training but many of those who complete courses fail to find employment. NGOs tend to offer similar courses, in particular, training in IT, office and business administration, hairdressing and tailoring, so the market is flooded with potential employees possessing the same skills. One Palestinian NGO reported that 41 per cent of graduates from its vocational courses in 2000 successfully found employment. The lack of employment opportunities and low course fees mean that people enrol in one course after another because they are unable to find work.39 Although the low fees mean that courses are accessible to a large number of people, commitment can be low, and absenteeism and failure to complete high. UNRWA Healthcare UNRWA operates primary and preventative healthcare clinics in all five areas of Lebanon, inside and outside camps. A number of specialists such as cardiologists, ophthalmologists and dentists visit the clinics several times each week. There are specialist clinics for mothers and

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young children. Limited financial assistance is available for hospital treatment through contractual arrangements with the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) in Lebanon. Treatment of chronic illness and complicated medical procedures are unlikely to be funded by UNRWA. In all the official camps, environmental services are also provided as part of UNRWA’s preventative healthcare activities. These include sewage systems and maintenance, refuse collection, pest control, piped water for washing, and portable water either piped to individual shelters or from standpipes in the camps. Most camp inhabitants are openly critical of UNRWA medical services and families with little disposable income will pay for private treatment. Palestinians complain that when they visit an UNRWA clinic they may be given a prescription without having seen the doctor. Many of those who see the doctor claim that they are treated rudely and not given any explanation about their illness or the treatment prescribed. Some of the medicines do not have instructions in Arabic or any European languages with which some Palestinians are familiar, so patients do not understand how to use the medication they are given. Prescribed medication is free if it is available at the UNRWA pharmacy, otherwise patients must purchase the drugs from private pharmacies. UNRWA pharmacies stock only a limited number of drugs and if a particular drug is unavailable, a patient must do without or purchase it elsewhere. UNRWA mother-and-child healthcare clinics are perceived by agency staff and many camp inhabitants to be successful. Infant mortality rates among Palestinians in Lebanon are relatively low at 19.2 per 1,000 live births (UNRWA, 2005). One of the explanations for the low infant mortality rate is the fact that the majority of women choose to give birth in hospital even though most, unless they are considered to be at risk, have to cover their own hospital costs. The most common health problem from which babies and young children suffer is diarrhoea and vomiting, often caused by poor food hygiene and environmental health, and water-borne diseases. UNRWA operates a UNICEF-funded child vaccination programme which is coordinated with the Lebanese vaccination programme. Many children and women of childbearing age are anaemic because of poor diet and the short time between pregnancies. UNRWA provides iron tablets to help combat this problem. The agency also operates a family planning service, although educated and informed camp inhabitants claim that medical staff fail to check

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whether their advice has been properly understood.40 Nevertheless, there is a general consensus that young couples are having fewer children than their parents, and that there is a greater acceptance of family planning advice,41 although this may be the result of various factors, including socio-economic pressures, rather than a direct effect of the UNRWA family planning programme. UNRWA terminated its dedicated health education programme, claiming it was no longer needed. The programme provided information about good domestic health and hygiene practices, safety in the home, and basic medical knowledge to treat minor injuries and common minor illnesses. The agency asserts that it will continue to provide health education on an individual basis on specific issues that arise during medical consultations. Health education is now integrated into other agency activities and materials promoting health education are distributed (UNRWA, 2005: 51). Given the time pressure under which UNRWA medical staff work, this does not appear to be a satisfactory arrangement. Medical professionals argue that camp inhabitants would benefit from a comprehensive health education programme and that UNRWA abolished the programme to reduce costs. In addition to UNRWA healthcare provisions, many NGOs offer health education courses or provide information on health education through some of their other programmes, such as children’s activities.42 Ongoing funding shortfalls mean that UNRWA covers only a percentage of the costs incurred for hospital treatment. UNRWA does not operate its own hospitals but has contracts with the PRCS and several private hospitals. Most UNRWA staff recognize that this arrangement is unsatisfactory and explained that the hospitals contracted by UNRWA are incapable of performing sophisticated medical procedures. In the past, UNRWA had a contract with the American University Hospital in Beirut, which is considered the best hospital in the country. The contract between UNRWA and the PRCS has been operating since February 1999. The PRCS claims that it has helped UNRWA to reduce the number of patients waiting for medical treatment. However, UNRWA’s reimbursement does not cover the full costs of the contracted beds and there have been complaints that the agency has failed to pay for medical services on time.43 Outside UNRWA and PRCS healthcare, Palestinians have to fund the full costs of their medical treatment. Financial help to cover costs may be available through informal arrangements with family and friends

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and collections made at the mosque after Friday prayers. Islamic organizations and NGOs sometimes provide financial assistance for medical treatment. Help is sometimes available from the PLO operating in Ein el-Hilweh camp near Saida and the three camps near Tyre. UNRWA Relief and Social Services Until the 1980s UNRWA provided food rations for all Palestinians; today relief services are aimed at the most vulnerable. In 2008, 12 per cent of registered refugees in Lebanon were considered special hardship cases (UNRWA, 2008). Special hardship cases receive basic rations four times a year, and a small amount of cash once a year to spend in any way they choose. This assistance is intended for those who have no other income although some may receive additional help from NGOs. The agency may also provide cash assistance in other circumstances, but this is usually for specific purposes. There is a programme for shelter rehabilitation which had limited reach, particularly in the south, until restrictions on building materials entering the camps were relaxed in 2004. To qualify as a special hardship case or for shelter rehabilitation, refugees must apply officially and be visited by an agency social worker to ensure that they fulfil the criteria. For example, any household with a male member over eighteen and fit to work cannot register as a special hardship case. UNRWA recognizes that some of its past activities have encouraged a dependency culture among certain groups of Palestinians. In an effort to develop sustainable programmes that refugees can manage themselves, the agency has been helping to establish community-based organizations (CBOs).44 When the CBOs are established, the agency withdraws its funding and expertise and hands over the management to the committees composed of camp inhabitants. The CBOs include centres for women, youth activities and rehabilitation for the disabled. The women’s centres were established: to enable women to acquire skills to generate income and improve their economic conditions; to raise awareness on legal, social and gender issues; to enhance their capacities to cope effectively with family and social problems; to provide support services for working women; and to promote cultural and recreational activities45

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In 1992 UNRWA initiated a micro-credit programme in Lebanon to create jobs and to assist refugees to earn a regular income by providing a loan to establish a new business or improve an existing one. Loans for individuals or groups are available and are repaid over various periods of time according to the type and size of loan.46 NGO Services UNRWA services are supplemented by numerous local and international NGOs. For the most part, the international NGO operations tend to be implemented in partnership with local Palestinian NGOs. The Palestinian NGOs are a recognizable force in the camps. They are well connected with the community and often heavily politicized, helping to organize demonstrations and protests which reflect the mood of the people. Many are able to respond rapidly in times of crisis. For example, during the Hizbollah–Israeli war, NGOs based in Bourj al-Barajneh camp provided food, hygiene kits and shelter for camp inhabitants and Lebanese families who sought refuge in the camp.47 Today, the Palestinian NGOs are well established, acting as an important safety net for the most vulnerable Palestinian refugees, supporting community development, and providing additional healthcare, educational and welfare services. Before 1982 there were few Palestinian NGOs in Lebanon, but the Israeli invasion precipitated the creation of NGOs to meet the increasingly pressing needs of the camp communities (Welfare Association/NPA, 2000: 3). Towards the end of the Lebanese civil war, the amount of international assistance to Lebanon decreased (Bennet, 1995: 125). International attention continued to be focused elsewhere as the resolution to the Palestinian problem promised by the Oslo Accords channelled funding to the West Bank and Gaza. As the Oslo Accords failed, the second intifada broke out which again resulted in funds being concentrated on Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. To compensate, local NGOs have had to expand their services, and efforts have been made to improve coordination and cooperation. To access foreign aid, local NGOs have discovered that they have to conform to Western working practices, adopt the latest development terminology and fulfil demanding reporting conditions. All this places pressure on small local NGOs with little experience of working practices outside the camps. The NGOs provide a range of services. In addition to welfare assistance and pensions, several have income-generation programmes.

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Education is seen as important and many supplement UNRWA education services by running kindergartens and following the Lebanese kindergarten syllabus. As UNRWA does not have its own kindergartens, NGO kindergartens are important, particularly as pre-school education is required by law in Lebanon. NGOs also offer adult literacy courses and include education in their after-school and summer activity programmes for children. Other NGOs provide vocational training, usually for a small fee. Several NGOs concentrate on helping vulnerable groups such as women and the disabled. Some groups in the camp receive little specific assistance; these include the elderly and young adults, particularly men. It is not because these groups do not need assistance; they do, but it is difficult to secure funding for them. Local NGOs complain that donors seem to prefer to fund programmes which support women or children rather than other marginalized groups such as the elderly and young adults. Alongside traditional NGOs are other organizations providing assistance to camp inhabitants. In addition to its contract work for UNRWA, the Palestinian Red Crescent Society is a major provider of healthcare and is active in most camps and able to provide a range of treatments for a nominal fee. There are also numerous private clinics in the camps, some of which operate on a charitable basis. Hizbollah has medical facilities throughout Lebanon which can be accessed by anyone and are cheaper than private hospitals. Palestinians receive little assistance directly from political factions although some factions such as Hamas have welfare branches. Fatah offers limited financial assistance and some of the branches of the General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW) offer childcare services. In some of the camps, the popular committee takes responsibility for pumping water to individual households and collecting money for the payment of electricity bills. There is little formal coordination between UNRWA and the NGOs, although UNRWA works with some NGOs if there are shared common goals. For example, the agency has provided financial assistance to some NGOs operating kindergarten.48 The NGOs do not always coordinate among themselves, and compete over resources and ideologies. In the highly politicized camp environment the NGOs are often not only politically active but politicized themselves and aligned with political factions.

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Camp Politics The Palestinian political dynamics in Lebanon are complex, vary in different parts of the country, and change in response to events. Rooftops in the camps are festooned with Palestinian flags and the walls are decorated with posters, political symbols and murals to show solidarity with the Palestinian cause and allegiance to particular factions. There are numerous Palestinian factions: some are loyal to Fatah and the late Yasser Arafat, others are pro-Syrian and others, more recently, look to Hamas. The pro-Fatah factions are dominant in the southern camps. The Fatah representative in Lebanon, Sultan Abu Aynan, lives in Rashidieh camp. The pro-Syrian factions are dominant in all other camps except in Ein al-Hilweh, near Saida, where there is an ongoing power struggle between the two sides. This distribution of power originated in the civil war: the pro-Syrian factions were able to operate in the areas under the control of the Syrian army, and the pro-Fatah factions operated in the south under Israeli control. Attitudes towards Arafat vary, although he has tended to be unpopular among Palestinians in Lebanon because they believe he and the PLO he headed deserted them. In 1982, in an American-brokered agreement, Arafat agreed to withdraw from Lebanon with his resistance fighters, in the early 1990s he withdrew funding from the PLO civil institutions remaining in Lebanon, and in 1993 he signed the Oslo Accords which excluded Palestinians in Lebanon from the peace process until the final status negotiations originally scheduled for 1996 but never held. The second intifada, the stand-off with Sharon who blockaded Arafat into his West Bank headquarters, and then Arafat’s death in 2004 seem to have reinvigorated his popularity among Palestinians in Lebanon. Pictures of Arafat, which were once only seen publicly in the camps in the south, can be seen in other camps in Lebanon, even those dominated by Syrian factions. With the exception of Dbayyeh camp, the dominant political factions in each camp have formed a popular committee of between ten and twenty members to act as a representative body for the inhabitants. Members of the committee are appointed from within the political factions without consulting camp inhabitants, who rarely know the identity of committee members. The committee’s role is ill-defined and regulates few aspects of life, but, although not democratically elected, the popular committee is the only recognizable Palestinian authority operating at the camp level. It is the popular committees, and not

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UNRWA, that have authority in the camps, and UNRWA staff members are the guests of the camp inhabitants and the popular committee. Disputes between camp inhabitants and UNRWA can lead to the popular committee suspending relations with UNRWA and the agency’s offices in the camps being closed. Theoretically, the popular committees are responsible for calling for political action such as protests and demonstrations, but in practice it appears that they often take their lead for such activities from the camp inhabitants and NGOs. Palestinian NGOs for example regularly organize events and protests to show solidarity with Palestinians elsewhere, such as those fighting in the second intifada or those in Gaza under attack from Israel in 2008 and 2009. The political environment surrounding each camp is determined by the religion of the local population, the dominant military power, and the shared history of the refugee and host communities. Largely as a consequence of events during the civil war, Lebanese Sunnis and Druze tend to be more accepting of the Palestinian presence than the Shi’a and Christian communities (Haddad, 2000). Since the withdrawal of Syrian troops from parts of Beirut in 2001 and then from Lebanon in 2005, the Lebanese authorities have reasserted their power in the areas surrounding the camps, and increased their military presence. Although the Lebanese authorities exercise no direct control in any of the camps, the Lebanese army operates checkpoints around some of them to monitor who and what enters and leaves. Previously, particularly in Beirut, Syrian forces, which the Palestinians regarded as a benign authority, occupied the areas around the camps. The nature of the relationships between the Palestinians and the different powers and religious groups has created four distinct environments in and around Tripoli, Beirut, Saida and Tyre. Below is a brief description of the prevailing conditions since the end of the civil war. Relations between the Palestinians in the camps near Tripoli and the host community have been better than in other areas of Lebanon. The authorities have made little attempt to regulate life in the camps and many of the laws restricting Palestinian activities have not been enforced. The Lebanese population is predominantly Sunni rather than Shi’a or Christian, although the political forces inside and outside the camps are pro-Syrian and the Shi’a group Hizbollah operates in the area. The relatively good local refugee–host relationship may have been jeopardized by the 2007 conflict between the Lebanese army and the

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militant group Fatah al-Islam, which took refuge in Nahr al-Barid camp. In Beirut, although laws concerning Palestinians are imposed, the Lebanese army did not operate around the camps or attempt to monitor Palestinian movements. Until June 2001, the Syrian army operated checkpoints outside the camps in Beirut and acted as an intermediary for communications between the popular committees and the Lebanese authorities. Since the Syrian withdrawal Lebanese troops operate in the area, although the southern suburbs of Beirut are controlled by Hizbollah. The population of Saida is predominantly Sunni Muslim and the central square is regularly covered with pro-Palestinian banners. Despite apparent local popular support, the Lebanese army patrols checkpoints at camp entrances and is involved in regular violent confrontations with armed groups operating in Ein al-Hilweh camp. Ein al-Hilweh ‘is known for its lawlessness and feuding between rival Palestinian factions’ (Blanford, 2007). To enter and exit Ein al-Hilweh and the other camps in the Saida and Tyre areas, Palestinians must show identification documents. Foreigners who want to visit these camps must obtain permission from Lebanese military intelligence (PHRO, 2005; Amnesty International, 2007). The south of Lebanon has a predominantly Shi’a population and is a Hizbollah stronghold. Hizbollah is active in southern Lebanon and this area is the focus of much political and military activity. Hizbollah’s resistance of Israeli military forces in 2006 demonstrated the sophistication and strength of the organization’s military capacity, but despite Hizbollah’s dominance in the south, the government maintains tight control over all three camps in the area. Lebanese forces monitor all Palestinian activities and strictly impose laws regulating daily life. The Lebanese government regards the dominant pro-Fatah factions in the southern camps as a threat, particularly because cross-border activity could precipitate Israeli attacks. Conclusion Over six decades the Palestinian camps in Lebanon have evolved from being temporary shelters to permanent homes. The size of the Palestinian population in Lebanon and in each camp is unknown, which means that population estimates can differ widely depending on what political view the statistics are being used to support. There are various laws restricting the ability of Palestinians to access their rights and

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ameliorate their circumstances. Although camp inhabitants experience similar living conditions and have similar access to education, health and social services, camps, influenced by the local environment, have developed their own characteristics. In Beirut, camp inhabitants can access services more easily and possibly have more employment opportunities than Palestinians living in other areas of Lebanon. In the north, relations with the local community are considered to have been better than elsewhere in Lebanon. Camp inhabitants have traded with the host community and believe that laws and regulations restricting their rights have been less strictly imposed than in other parts of the country. In the south, the camps are more isolated and strictly regulated, so mobility and access to employment and services are limited. An important factor affecting how each camp has evolved is the political dynamics inside and outside the camps, which differ throughout the country and have been heavily influenced by the composition of the local Lebanese population and events during the civil war. Having explored various aspects of the Palestinian experience in Lebanon it is clear to me that despite being physically separated from the local population, and despite the national legislation controlling how camp inhabitants interact with the host community, the immediate environment plays a significant role in shaping the character of a camp. Inside the camps, superficially at least, there is the semblance of ‘normality’ as inhabitants go about their daily lives. Sadly the camps have become a permanent home for them, many not knowing any other life. But although the camps are home, life for camp inhabitants in Lebanon is difficult. The next chapter explores how they cope. For a brief description of each camp which draws attention to how they differ from each other, see the appendix.

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6 HOW DO PROTRACTED REFUGEES COPE?

People in acute and chronic crisis situations develop mechanisms to survive and those with additional capacities are able to develop mechanisms to invest in the future. This chapter summarizes the views of protracted refugees from three different Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in 2001 about their coping mechanisms. It is supplemented by information from UNRWA and NGO staff, local political faction members and camp inhabitants collected between 1996 and 2006. The focus here is on the internal aspects of camp life although the various issues are set in the context of the Palestinians’ experiences in Lebanon. The inhabitants of the three camps – Bourj al-Barajneh in Beirut, Nahr al-Barid near Tripoli and Bourj al-Shamali near Tyre – have had different experiences and opportunities in Lebanon so as a consequence their capacities and vulnerabilities differ. These differences are compared, but where there are close similarities, Bourj al-Barajneh camp is used to illustrate a particular issue for all three camps. It should be noted that Nahr al-Barid has been destroyed since the research for this book was conducted. The chapter is structured around the capacities and vulnerabilities analysis produced by Bourj al-Barajneh camp inhabitants, who identified physical surroundings, economic and educational factors, health, informal and formal social networks, and psychological attitude as important aspects of life that affected their coping mechanisms. Further

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details of educational and health capacities and vulnerabilities can be found in chapter 5. Inhabitants also divided the camp population into different socio-economic groups and, although vulnerability and poverty should not be considered interchangeable, in general identified the poorest as the most vulnerable. Physical

Economic

Capacities Climate, countryside and culture of Lebanon similar to Palestine Lebanon and Palestine are adjacent

Vulnerabilities Isolated from city/host community Camp unhealthy and overcrowded Vermin Poor infrastructure and facilities No play areas, gardens or farmland

Some employment opportunities Work in the black economy

Few legal employment prospects Professionals cannot practise Competition from guest workers High unemployment No social security or pension Families struggle to send remittance Little work in Gulf since 1991 Failing Lebanese economy Financial aid can create dependency

Financial assistance from relatives Savings collectives Interest-free loans Financial assistance available

Education

Inhabitants educated and skilled Free education available Private tutors among camp residents Adult literacy and after-school classes supplement formal education Vocational training available Access to foreign and Palestinian media has raised awareness

Educational and vocational qualifications no guarantee of work Private education is expensive UNRWA classes large, resources poor and teachers underqualified Poor literacy among some adults Ignorance of rights, health, politics

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Health

Informal social structure

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Capacities Free or low-cost health services Good domestic hygiene standards

Vulnerabilities UNRWA lacks qualified staff, medication and equipment and does not treat complex conditions Healthcare can be expensive Poor environmental health Chronic illness and depression No counselling available Little health education

Mutual support within the family Strong social networks and community cooperation Women have an active role at home, work and in the community Active village committees, influential families and individuals

Large families increase financial pressure and work for parents Disrespectful attitudes to women Vulnerable groups in the camp – children, elderly, disabled Emigration divides families and distorts the male/female ratio

Traditional culture and beliefs

Loss of traditional culture and beliefs Formal social structure

UNRWA, NGOs, political factions, religious groups and the popular committee all exercise authority UNRWA services NGO services Assistance from Islamic groups Aid from political organizations

Psychological Current situation temporary attitude Palestinians self-dependent, resilient, able to bear pain Refugees have low expectations Reliance on Islamic faith

Distribution and parameters of power unclear Little coordination between actors Few formal procedures, wāsta limits access to assistance Decline in the availability and quality of UNRWA services Decrease in international funding Needs poorly identified Current situation temporary Uncertainty about future Poor refugee–host relations Confused political dynamics Reliance on Islamic faith Being ‘the forgotten people’

Figure 5: Bourj al-Barajneh: Capacities and Vulnerabilities Analysis

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Physical Capacities and Vulnerabilities Location and Infrastructure Bourj al-Barajneh was one of the first Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, and the first in the Beirut area. According to UNRWA, the League of Red Cross Societies established the camp in 1948, while Gorokhoff and elderly camp inhabitants claim that residents of Tarshiha village in northern Palestine initially set up the camp (Gorokhoff, 1984; Roberts, 2000).1 It is located on the main road near Beirut’s international airport and occupies 104,200 square metres of what was originally unwanted wasteland (UNRWA, 1998). It is believed that the location was permitted because the inhabitants provided a labour force to construct the airport. When Palestinians first began arriving in Bourj al-Barajneh it was a barren area of sand dunes and cacti. Flat empty land surrounded the camp, and in the distance inhabitants could see the airport in one direction and the central areas of Beirut in the other. Over time, the value of the area has risen as the city’s sprawling suburbs have surrounded the camp. Following the civil war the neighbourhood was targeted for post-war reconstruction: the government planned to route a new road to the airport through Bourj al-Barajneh camp which would have divided the community and destroyed 600 households (UNRWA, 1998). Financial shortfall halted the project for several years. When it was resumed, plans were revised to build the road around the camp perimeter. Since the end of the civil war the area adjacent to the camp, Dahyeh, has become a Hizbollah stronghold, and the power and influence of Hizbollah in Lebanon has increased significantly. Although the camp was not directly hit, buildings were damaged by shrapnel and others by vibrations from air attacks when Israel bombed Dahyeh during its war with Hizbollah in July and August 2006. In 2001 inhabitants estimated the population of Bourj al-Barajneh at 17,000, a marginal difference from the official UNRWA figure of 18,385 for 1999.2 Among the camp population, inhabitants identified 2,300 unregistered Palestinian refugees whose presence in Lebanon is technically illegal, and approximately 200 non-Palestinians who include Lebanese and Syrians, and a few families from the Indian sub-continent.3 By December 2006 the gap between the official UNRWA population figure for Bourj al-Barajneh and that of the inhabitants had grown. UNRWA data recorded 15,718 inhabitants and an NGO based in the camp estimated the population to be 20,000.4

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Although its physical appearance and infrastructure are superior to those of Bourj al-Shamali and Nahr al-Barid, Bourj al-Barajneh resembles most of the other camps in Lebanon. It is cramped and overcrowded: children play in the narrow alleyways and families grow small plants on roofs or balconies as few houses have gardens. There is little privacy and it is always noisy, even at night. Most houses have permanent concrete roofs and tiled floors although those belonging to poorer households have bare concrete floors and a few still have corrugated zinc roofs. Despite the efforts of UNRWA’s sanitation unit to collect refuse, undertake pest control, and maintain sewerage systems and water supplies, Bourj al-Barajneh is always dirty and home to many undernourished stray cats, oversized rats and cockroaches. Refuse left outside in plastic bags for collection is spread around the streets by the scavenging of rats and cats. The sewerage system, which was connected to the municipal network in the early 1990s, is inadequate, and regularly overflows covering the streets in untreated sewage. The water piped to the homes is for washing only and is heavily contaminated. A service charge for the water is collected each month by the popular committee. Drinking water is not supplied by UNRWA and has to be purchased from vendors in the camp. Although relatively cheap, drinking water is an additional cost for poor households and is still unsuitable for babies and the sick, who should drink bottled mineral water.5 Until the early 2000s inhabitants relied on illegal telephone landlines for national and international calls. These landlines were operated by ‘centrals’ based in the camp and inhabitants could either rent a line if they could afford it, or visit the central to make occasional calls. The system of landlines never recovered after the civil war, and as mobile telephones have become more affordable and reliable, many households prefer to invest in one of these. Mobile telephones are often given to camp families by relatives who have moved abroad and want to keep in touch. Cheap Internet calls have replaced many of the mobile calls. Inhabitants in Bourj al-Barajneh and other camps have opened Internet businesses and many operate in the area surrounding the camp. For camp inhabitants, like many other people, keeping in touch with friends and family around the world has become cheap and easy. In comparison with Bourj al-Barajneh, Bourj al-Shamali near Tyre is spacious; most of the camp is accessible by car and many houses have small gardens. Despite the space, natural light and good ventilation,

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houses tend to be small, dark and stuffy, and in a poor state of repair. In some cases this is because households lack money, and in others because the government has limited building materials to the camp. Many of the shelters have bare concrete floors and temporary zinc roofs held in place by large stones and tyres. In contrast, there are several houses of palatial appearance that are apparently occupied by large extended families that have relatives living abroad. These houses are several storeys high, have pillars and ornate windows and the concrete walls are faced with coloured tiles. The camp infrastructure is poor; roads are potholed and trenches at the sides of the roads act as open sewers. The water pipes that deliver potable water to the houses from three UNRWA-operated wells in the camp are also contained in the trenches and run through the sewage. The water pipes are old and in need of repair so sewage can contaminate the drinking water. Households unable to afford proper water tanks use old uncovered barrels to store water. According to UNRWA all shelters have electricity although the supply, as in other areas of Lebanon, is unreliable.6 Inhabitants estimated the Bourj al-Shamali population in 2001 at 17,000, close to the official UNRWA figure of 17,605 (UNRWA, 2000c).7 Among the camp inhabitants, around 14 families were of Lebanese origin and approximately 600 Palestinians, originating from the seven disputed Shi’a villages, had obtained Lebanese citizenship. Nahr al-Barid camp was located about 16 km north of Tripoli. The main road from Tripoli to the villages in the north of Lebanon bisected the camp, and was lined with shops and densely built up on both sides. The alleyways between the buildings were barely wide enough to walk along. The storeys added above ground level grew increasingly close together, obscuring natural light and creating humidity because air could not circulate. Many inhabitants had respiratory problems, which were blamed on the high level of humidity. Most of the houses in Nahr al-Barid were several storeys high with concrete roofs and bare concrete floors. At the beginning of the 2000s UNRWA was implementing a reconstruction programme to help poorer inhabitants repair their shelters and provide some with new accommodation in purpose-built blocks. This kind of construction work in the south was prohibited by the Lebanese authorities so UNRWA was prevented from implementing its shelter rehabilitation programme and improving the water supply and sewerage system in Bourj al-Shamali and also from building new schools in nearby Rashidieh and al-Buss camps.8

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In Nahr al-Barid, the poorer families lived in the centre of the camp and the wealthier families had moved to the edge, where they had purchased land, for fresher air and more space. It is unclear from whom the land was purchased and whether the practice was legal. In Bourj alBarajneh, poorer families tend to live on the edge of the camp in makeshift shelters, many because they have only recently moved to Beirut in search of work and could not find or afford to buy or rent accommodation in the city or in the centre of the camp. Although rarely identified by Bourj al-Barajneh inhabitants as an advantage, their location on the outskirts of the capital provides access to a wider variety of work than other camps in Lebanon. The household incomes in Bourj al-Barajneh are higher and the occupations of inhabitants more varied than in Bourj al-Shamali and Nahr al-Barid camps. There is more NGO activity in Beirut and many organizations have their headquarters in the capital. There is also greater access to health and education services outside the UNRWA system. Bourj alBarajneh inhabitants tend to be better educated and more politically aware than inhabitants of other camps, which could also be attributed to the camp’s location in a developed city.9 Nahr al-Barid and Bourj al-Shamali inhabitants do not have as good access to employment and health and education services as Bourj alBarajneh inhabitants, although those in Nahr al-Barid appeared to have better access to work and facilities, in Tripoli, than inhabitants of Bourj al-Shamali. Access to higher education and employment is difficult in Bourj al-Shamali. Tyre is a small city, so those wishing to continue their education beyond secondary school must travel to Saida or Beirut. Employment opportunities for men are limited mainly to agriculture and construction work. Some women also work in agriculture and as domestic cleaners. Local Refugee–Host Relations In general the refugee–host relationship in Lebanon has been strained, but the relationship has varied from one area of the country to another. Until June 2001, the Syrian army maintained checkpoints on the access roads to Bourj al-Barajneh camp, which limited the authority of the Lebanese government in that area. Serious crimes in the camp such as a murder were reported by the popular committee or the camp services officer to the Syrian army, which informed the Lebanese authorities. Camp inhabitants claimed that they felt safer living in a Syrian-controlled

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area and feared government action against the camp when the Syrian army withdrew from Beirut.10 After the withdrawal, pro-Syrian Palestinian resistance groups occupied the checkpoints but did not seem to adopt an active security role. Since withdrawing from areas of Beirut, Syria officially withdrew its troops from Lebanon completely in 2005. The withdrawal of Syrian troops does not seem to have significantly affected Bourj al-Barajneh inhabitants as the area surrounding the camp is controlled by Hizbollah. The Palestinians have good relations with Hizbollah, particularly as the organization provides welfare services to many vulnerable groups in Lebanon including Palestinians. Before the Syrian withdrawal, Hizbollah was already well established in Dahyeh, and believed to own many of the larger businesses and to have military installations and political offices there. Following the Syrian withdrawal, Hizbollah has asserted its power, and, as a result, Lebanese authorities are rarely seen near Bourj al-Barajneh. Hizbollah provides a secure and stable environment around the camp as it monitors security and maintains law and order. At the same time as providing domestic security, however, the Hizbollah stronghold of Dahyeh came under heavy attack from Israel during the 2006 war, threatening the safety of camp inhabitants. Some Palestinians express concern about Hizbollah’s political ambitions and that the organization’s presence places the camp in the Israeli firing line. In the south, the refugee–host relationship has been shaped by the 22-year Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, which ended in May 2000, and Lebanese fears of the security threat posed by Palestinian factions and Israeli aggression. Outbreaks of fighting with Israel have regularly displaced the Lebanese as well as Palestinians from the south of the country. Lebanese security measures in the south include maintaining army checkpoints and military hardware along the main coastal road from Saida to Tyre, and on occasions creating a military cordon around the camps to prevent inhabitants from entering or leaving. The Lebanese army daily and actively monitors the main access road to Bourj alShamali. (After the war, the Lebanese authorities blocked the other three camp entrances so they are accessible only by pedestrians.)11 Lebanese soldiers inspect inhabitants’ and visitors’ identification documents and examine all vehicles entering the camp. Fatah, the dominant political faction in Bourj al-Shamali, operates its own checkpoint immediately inside the camp, repeating the process undertaken by the Lebanese army. The population in north Lebanon is predominately Sunni, which has

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eased the relationship between the Lebanese and Palestinians living in Nahr al-Barid and neighbouring al-Beddawi camp. The Palestinian legal status in northern Lebanon has been comparatively permissive so it was possible for camp inhabitants to find employment and establish small businesses more easily than elsewhere in the country.12 However, the fighting in 2007 between the militia group Fatah al-Islam, which had fled to Nahr al-Barid camp, and the Lebanese Armed Forces is likely to affect refugee–host relations in the north and the rest of Lebanon. Economic Capacities and Vulnerabilities Income-generating Activities Inhabitants in Bourj al-Barajneh, Nahr al-Barid and Bourj al-Shamali cite similar economic problems, particularly the restrictive Lebanese employment laws that prevent most Palestinians from working legally. There are limited legal employment opportunities in the camps or in construction and agriculture and more unusual professions such as filmmaking which a few camp inhabitants pursued successfully. The informal economy offers additional employment opportunities, but fewer than during the war. It is possible to work illegally in any profession if an employer is willing to employ Palestinians. For example, some camp inhabitants work as teachers, although they are paid less than their Lebanese counterparts. In Bourj al-Barajneh, some families have opened small shops and workshops in an effort to generate an income. There is a large fresh fruit and vegetable market in which individual storeholders rent tables. Small outlets sell traditional food or offer hairdressing and tailoring services. There are a number of private medical practices, electricians and plumbers based in the camp. Although it is possible to purchase most goods and services in the camp, and some are cheaper there than in the city, because the outlets are small, they are unable to make economies of scale, and are often undercut by businesses outside the camps. The more successful shops and services are located on the main routes through the camp or are immediately accessible from the airport road. Often opening a shop is a last resort for those who have failed to find other work and custom regularly comes from relatives who are offered credit. The camp economy relies heavily on credit. Goods for the shops can also be bought on credit directly from the factory or from wholesalers, two of which are located in the camp.13

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Similarly, there are small shops in Bourj al-Shamali, which might do better than those in Bourj al-Barajneh as there is less competition near the camp. The main difference between the three camp economies was the sūq in Nahr al-Barid which meant that the camp inhabitants traded with the local community. Some of the businesses were large and provided goods wholesale; others specialized in luxury goods such as jewellery and perfume. It is claimed that some inhabitants were involved in smuggling goods to and from Syria. Despite the apparent high level of economic activity, the wealth of the camp inhabitants is disputed. Other Palestinian camp communities believed that those in Nahr al-Barid were rich, while Nahr al-Barid inhabitants insisted that only a few inhabitants were wealthy and that there was a significant disparity in income levels among camp inhabitants. Sources of Financial Assistance UNRWA and NGOs offer financial welfare assistance to the poorest households in the form of cash that does not have to be repaid, and interest-free loans. NGOs have special programmes of financial assistance for orphaned children and individuals with chronic or serious health problems. UNRWA and NGOs also operate various types of income-generation loans with no or low interest rates. Many NGOs deliberately targeted Bourj al-Shamali inhabitants because they are believed to have the worst employment prospects. One project provided small loans to help people develop existing businesses. The project has been considered a success although the increased income may only be modest. Some participants took second loans once the first had been repaid. In this way, small investments could be made to improve the business without the burden of large debts. As an alternative to borrowing money, camp inhabitants have formed savings collectives. These are a group of about twenty people who agree to save a certain amount of money each week or month which is collected together. Payments vary from one group to another, from as little as $5 a week to $150 a month. Each time the money is collected a different person is entitled to take the entire sum. This method of saving enables people to purchase expensive items that they would otherwise struggle to afford. Although the savings collectives are an effective method for some families to save, many are too poor, or their income too irregular to participate in such a scheme. People will only agree to join a group if they trust all the members and believe that they can make the required payments.

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There is some doubt over the importance and level of remittances (see chapter 5). In 2001 Bourj al-Barajneh inhabitants believed that up to 40 per cent of the camp community received remittances and inhabitants of Nahr al-Barid and Bourj al-Shamali also thought that some households in their camps received remittances. However, inhabitants from all three camps thought that remittances were too low to support a household without other income sources, or to make a significant contribution to the camp economies. Undoubtedly inhabitants lack money for their daily needs. Many Palestinians in Bourj al-Barajneh rely on credit with storeholders, particularly pharmacies, in the camp. The director of a kindergarten in the camp acknowledges that parents are often unable to pay their children’s fees. Many households meet income shortfalls through informal arrangements with friends, who will lend money one month knowing that the following month they may need the favour returned. Household Living Standards Despite the shared camp experiences and prevailing economic conditions in Lebanon, camp households have very different income levels. Figure 6 summarizes information from participatory workshops held with inhabitants in each camp in 2001. Workshop participants determined the income brackets, proportion of inhabitants to be found in each bracket, and defined each bracket using terms such as ‘good’, ‘fair’ and ‘poor’. Participants stressed that households considered prosperous were prosperous only in the context of the camp communities. The table presents the information as it was collected from the workshops to show how inhabitants describe socio-economic status in their camp. Although different scales have been used, figure 6 demonstrates the range of monthly income levels and allows comparisons among the camps.

Good Fair Poor Very poor

Bourj al-Barajneh House Income -holds 3% $1,000+ 37% approx. $500 60% less than $200

Bourj al-Shamali* House Income -holds 4 HH 10% $333–466 70% $130–200 20% $100+

Nahr al-Barid House Income -holds 5% $1,000+ 15% $300–450 60% $100–120 20% $50–60

Figure 6: Average Monthly Incomes (HH is Household) * Figures originally given in Lebanese pounds and converted to US$ for comparison

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There are a range of factors that affect household income level. The poorest families tend to be without a father, or without one who is well enough to work, so the main source of potential income is lost. Some mothers work but they are usually in low-skilled employment or work for NGOs which tend to pay low wages. Palestinians argue that employers have started to employ women because it is acceptable to pay them lower wages than men. This has the effect of simultaneously reducing the employment opportunities for men, and reducing the household income when it becomes dependent on the woman’s lower wage for the same work. Inhabitants also claim that in general poorer families have more children, increasing the costs of running the household. However, whether family size is an indicator or a symptom of poverty is unclear as there are also wealthy families that are large and poor families that are small. To be among the wealthier in the camps, households must have a regular source of income at a reasonable level which, if possible, is supplemented by other regular and irregular income sources. However, families can have a regular source of income and still be poor. This can be the case if a family member is chronically ill and there are substantial medical costs or if there is a large household to maintain. For example, a widow in Nahr al-Barid had to provide for a household of 14, most of whom were schoolchildren, on two regular monthly incomes producing a combined total of $200. In desperation, some of the poorest families arrange loans with wealthier members of the camp, although some of these loans incur interest charges of up to 30 per cent. Families in all income brackets have loans or use credit, although poorer families borrow money to survive from day to day, whereas wealthier families borrow money to invest in their future in some way, such as paying for university education. Educational Capacities and Vulnerabilities Palestinians in Bourj al-Barajneh consider the camp community to be well educated and to possess professional skills. Inhabitants have access to free education provided by UNRWA and free or low-cost education provided by the NGOs. The NGOs offer adult literacy classes and afterschool and holiday tutoring programmes. A number of camp inhabitants work as private teachers to supplement their income and at the same time provide a service that some families in the camp can afford. UNRWA offers a limited number of places for vocational training.

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NGOs also provide vocational courses for which most charge a nominal fee but some can cost several hundred dollars. Camp inhabitants also believe that access to foreign, Arab and Palestinian television, and other media has improved awareness of current affairs. UNRWA is the main education provider in Bourj al-Shamali and Nahr al-Barid. Pupils in these camps do not perform as well at school as those from Bourj al-Barajneh.14 Three UNRWA elementary/preparatory schools are located in Bourj al-Shamali camp and the secondary school is nearby in Rashidieh camp. Nahr al-Barid had six elementary/ preparatory schools, and a secondary school was opened in the neighbouring al-Beddawi camp in October 2000. English is taught in all UNRWA schools but those attending the agency schools in Beirut are more proficient in the language. This may be a result of better-quality teaching or the increased contact with English, which is used widely in the capital. However, inhabitants argue that these educational opportunities are undermined by several factors. Although UNRWA provides free education for all school-aged children, it is claimed that the quality of this service suffers because class sizes are large, and some of the UNRWA teachers are underqualified. The lack of space and privacy in the camp means that children have nowhere to study quietly. In addition, time for study can be reduced because older children, particularly girls, are often required to help in the home. Choice is generally limited to schooling or training provided by UNRWA or NGOs because other options are expensive. Furthermore, education and vocational training do not guarantee work. However, despite the availability of free education, and claims to the contrary, there seem to be large numbers of adults with poor literacy who are ignorant of their rights, local and regional politics, and personal and environmental health issues. Palestinians are critical of UNRWA education, which, based on anecdotal evidence and the limited statistical indicators available, seems to have deteriorated over the years of the agency’s operation. The number of NGOs offering adult literacy courses indicates that a significant proportion of Palestinians are not receiving an adequate education from UNRWA. Some of the factors contributing to adult illiteracy are beyond the agency’s control. Education was disrupted during the civil war because children were unable to travel to school. Consequently, at a young age, many men joined the militia and many women married, partly to relieve the economic burden at home and

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partly because, having effectively completed their education, marriage was the next step. After the war, the men and women who had been forced to abandon their education had their own children and there was neither time nor money to resume education. The NGO activities fill the gaps in UNRWA education services by providing adult literacy classes, vocational training and additional school tutoring. Camp inhabitants recognize the importance of these NGO programmes; however, the training offered by the NGOs has limited benefits because of the lack of employment opportunities. As employment prospects are low and many of the courses are relatively cheap to attend, commitment to complete the training successfully can be low. Many Palestinians, but not all, regard education as important and one of the few ways in which they might improve their situation. Lack of education does not necessarily reflect negative attitudes towards it. Financial constraints prevent individuals from pursuing their education. Some children may abandon school to work and contribute to the family income. There are no figures available to indicate the extent of this problem, but inhabitants in Bourj al-Barajneh believe that because UNRWA education is free, and the wages children earn are paltry, most children complete at least their elementary education. Until the 1990s, UNRWA did not provide secondary school education and few places were available for Palestinians to study in Lebanese government schools. If parents could not afford to pay for their children to attend a private secondary school, they had to abandon their education. Places at UNRWA secondary schools are limited and reserved for the most talented pupils. The places are also more likely to be taken by children of wealthier households who do not need to work to contribute to the family income. Some families cannot afford to forfeit this additional income. Many young adults are unable to proceed to university because of the financial costs incurred and the number of UNRWA scholarships for university is limited (UN, 2007: 14). Even though some universities charge only modest fees, parents still have to support their child for the three or four years of the degree course, during which time the child is generating little or no income. Families from the higher income groups tend to be better educated than those from the poorer sectors of the community, although there are wealthy people in the camps who are not well educated. For example, the owner of a telephone exchange in Bourj al-Barajneh is not well educated

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but is considered one of the wealthiest inhabitants and has investments in property on the Lebanese coast. An elderly couple in Nahr al-Barid owned a successful building supplies business but have no formal schooling. Equally, being well educated does not guarantee financial security. A family in Bourj al-Shamali is headed by a couple who are both blind. Educated at a time when there was more funding, UNRWA paid for both individuals to attend a special school for the blind to secondary level. However, their disability limits employment opportunities, and the couple are rarely able to find work. Health Capacities and Vulnerabilities Bourj al-Barajneh inhabitants have access to free or subsidized healthcare provided by UNRWA and the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS) in the camp. UNRWA operates a clinic, pharmacy, laboratory for testing samples and a dental surgery, and the PRCS Haifa Hospital, unlike the UNRWA clinic, is open 24 hours a day. The UNICEF-funded vaccination programme ensures that the majority of children are vaccinated. A local NGO provides community nursing for those too ill to leave their homes. Several Palestinian doctors have established private clinics and some Islamic groups provide low-cost treatment at centres in and around the camp. UNRWA covers only a percentage of costs incurred for hospital treatment so the patient must fund the remainder. The agency does not offer complex medical treatment and the PRCS, which subsidizes the cost of healthcare, is limited in the types of treatment it can offer. Outside UNRWA and the PRCS, medical treatment is expensive and beyond the means of inhabitants unless financial assistance is available. There are complaints that UNRWA healthcare professionals are underqualified and overstretched, the medication the agency makes freely available is restricted to the most basic drugs, and there is no health education or counselling service available. Many people suffer from chronic diseases and depression. Environmental health is poor and the water supply and sewerage system cause health problems. At the Bourj al-Barajneh clinic, there might be one or two doctors who see at least 150 patients each day. It is impossible for the doctor to treat patients properly and some patients are prescribed medication without an examination.15 Families that can afford it often seek private medical advice because they mistrust the UNRWA doctors. Although UNRWA healthcare is overstretched and underfunded, it is likely that Palestinians have better access to healthcare than poor Lebanese.

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Despite the belief among inhabitants that their domestic hygiene and basic medical knowledge is good, medical practitioners claim that many camp inhabitants do not practise good health and hygiene. The lack of adequate health education means that the camp community is more vulnerable to health problems than is necessary. There is a lack of basic medical knowledge so people do not know how to keep themselves healthy. Babies and young children suffer malnutrition, sometimes because the family lacks food, but often because the parents do not understand the dietary requirements of their children. For example, mothers do not realize the importance of adhering to the instructions when mixing formula for their babies. They will often deliberately make the formula stronger than recommended believing that they are giving their babies more of the goodness that they need.16 Vomiting and diarrhoea caused by poor environmental conditions and hygiene standards are a major health problem, particularly among the young and elderly. Poor water quality is often blamed although, because of unreliable electricity, food stored in the refrigerators also poses a health risk. Many inhabitants are also injured by preventable accidents in the home because health and safety are overlooked.17 Inhabitants break bones because stairs and alleyways are obstructed and children are burned or scalded because they are left unsupervised in the kitchen.18 Significant numbers of people experience minor ailments continually, perhaps due to the poor quality of life and environmental conditions. However, there are also many people who suffer from serious chronic illnesses which, it is usually argued, are caused by stress. Such illnesses include diabetes, cancer, hypertension and heart disease. All these diseases incur long-term medical costs, many of which are not covered by UNRWA, so place a significant financial burden and worry on the individual and their family. Bourj al-Shamali and Nahr al-Barid inhabitants appear to experience greater environmental health problems than Bourj al-Barajneh inhabitants and do not have such good access to healthcare. As there are no PRCS services in the camp, Bourj al-Shamali inhabitants have to rely on the UNRWA camp clinic, travel to the PRCS hospital in Rashidieh or use private facilities in Tyre or Saida. In Nahr al-Barid there were a number of private clinics providing affordable health services and free or low-cost healthcare to the most vulnerable. Local NGO staff claim that there is a high rate of thalassaemia in Bourj al-Shamali, which has been attributed to high levels of intermarriage.19 Thalassaemia is a

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hereditary blood disorder that, even in its mildest form, requires regular transfusions. UNRWA noted that in comparison with other camps, Nahr al-Barid had a large number of inhabitants with physical and mental disabilities.20 Illness and disability place significant financial and emotional burdens on families. Bourj al-Barajneh inhabitants link health problems with income level. Chronic illness reduces income because individuals are unable to work and medical treatment is a drain on financial resources. Poorer families tend to be in ill health because they are unable to meet their physical needs, have less knowledge about how to care for themselves, and experience psychological problems because of their difficulties. Informal Social Capacities and Vulnerabilities The Importance of Family and Friendship Networks Bourj al-Barajneh camp inhabitants believe that there is a strong sense of community in the camp supported by extensive informal social networks. These networks are essential to the survival and well-being of individuals and their families and include immediate and extended family and friends living in the camp. Many camp inhabitants also have wider social circles that include friends and family living outside the camp or abroad. Religious beliefs and cultural practices help to underpin the social structure, although some inhabitants expressed fears that these are disappearing, undermining the community and weakening the Palestinian identity. The nuclear and extended family represent stability and continuity and are important sources of practical and emotional support.21 Generally, men and women expect to marry and to adopt the traditional roles of breadwinner and homemaker, although, in addition to domestic and family responsibilities, some women work and play an active role in the community. Couples want and expect to have children and invest a great deal of pride, effort and money in them. The prospect of marriage and children is a goal that inhabitants share and that offers some certainty in a life where the future is otherwise so uncertain. Families pool resources to ease the financial burden; the women prepare meals together for all family members and share the responsibility of childcare so that others can go out to work or concentrate on other household chores. This means that it is possible to undertake time-consuming processes such as preserving foods, baking

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home-made bread or altering clothes to save money. Families try to have more than one income so income from the main earner may be supplemented irregularly by other family members. For example, teenage sons undertake casual labouring work, elderly men work as caretakers, teenagers tutor schoolchildren and women work from home making clothes. It is evident that wealthier families have a larger social network and relatives living abroad. Poorer families may have relatives abroad, but fewer than the wealthier families. It appears that if both parents originate from the camp, families tend to be more prosperous. This could be because there is a larger extended family in the camp and so financial and practical responsibilities can be shared. Many extended families are willing to help other branches of the family in difficult times by sharing food and lending money. Having a large extended family can help when there is an elderly relative needing medical care. One of the wealthier nuclear families in the camp contributes, along with three other branches of the extended family, for medical care for both chronically ill and immobile parents. The expense is significant, but because it is shared by several families, the financial burden is manageable. Some of the poorest households in the camp were those where one family member or one nuclear family was caring for an elderly relative. Poorer families have a smaller network of friends and tend to socialize mainly with people in the immediate vicinity. Poorer families are also less likely to have contact with Lebanese, unless they have friends in Lebanese families living in poor areas of the camp. In general, the wealthier the family, the larger and more geographically widespread the network of friends; wealthier families have members who work or go to university, and have the opportunity to meet people outside the camp. Poorer families know few people outside the camp because they have little reason to leave it and often cannot afford to. The poorest families are reluctant to socialize because it is an additional expense. When people visit friends, they take small gifts and, in return, are given drinks and perhaps something to eat. Reciprocating hospitality is an important aspect of the culture: the ability to afford to socialize plays a significant role in its prosperity. Once a family is poor they have fewer potential sources of support to draw on so the prospects of improving living standards are limited. Networks within the camp community are important, so those with fewer community connections become marginalized. Friendship

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networks have developed among neighbours, which is necessary, given the lack of space and privacy. Those that work in the camp have additional friendship networks through their colleagues. There are also social networks based on village origin in Palestine but these are no longer as important as when Bourj al-Barajneh camp was originally established (Roberts, 2000: 130). Some villages have formed committees that aim to assist members of their village in times of need. The shared experience of being a Palestinian refugee in a camp in Lebanon has helped to create a sense of community and provides emotional support. Inhabitants cooperate to overcome practical difficulties, work together to keep public spaces clean, and are prepared to share resources such as electricity lines and water supplies. Another aspect of camp social life is wāsta, an Arabic term referring to the social connections that help people to succeed. It pervades all aspects of life and is found among all social groups. Having wāsta means that support is available to do certain things, such as completing official paperwork, gaining access to officials or securing a child’s place at school. Poorer families usually have limited access to wāsta and therefore struggle to take steps to enhance their lives. Social Problems and Tensions Despite the strong sense of community, there are social and domestic problems in the camps which inhabitants are reluctant to discuss. Some of these problems stem from the need to maintain or to be seen to maintain a lifestyle that is deemed socially acceptable. There is a tension between preserving what are regarded as traditional values that provide continuity and stability and the need to adapt traditional values to survive in modern-day Lebanon. Among the social problems highlighted by Bourj al-Barajneh inhabitants is sexual harassment. Women are regularly sexually harassed by youths who congregate in the streets. Although the women are angry, they believe it is beyond their control to change the situation. Women (and men) take defensive, rather than offensive, measures to protect their daughters. From an early age, girls are prevented from leaving the house unaccompanied and some girls are prevented from going to school because their parents are afraid they will be sexually harassed. It is important to protect a daughter’s reputation because if there is any suspicion, however slight, that she is sexually immoral, she will be unable to marry and will bring shame on the family. The extent to which

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daughters’ activities are regulated depends on the family, and some girls, usually from the higher social groups in the camp, are allowed to socialize outside the house and mix with boys their own age. Married women have more freedom than single women because their status protects them from accusations of immorality. The level of freedom a woman enjoys depends on her husband: some women need permission to leave the house to conduct daily chores such as shopping; others do not ask for permission or provide their husbands with any explanations of what they have been doing during the day. During the war it is argued that the women played active political and military roles, but since the end of the war, these roles have been eroded.22 Educated women from liberal families in Bourj al-Barajneh claim that there has been a decline in women’s autonomy and attribute much of it to a resurgence of Islam and a return to what are generally considered traditional values, such as the emphasis on the woman’s role as homemaker and increased personal devotion. At the same time, though, there appear to be a larger number of women working, but it is unclear whether this indicates progressive attitudes or economic need. The public promotion of traditional values could also be a way to compensate for behaviour changes that have allowed more women to work. Although most women in the camp want to marry, it is becoming increasingly difficult because single men are emigrating. It is generally agreed that emigration presents opportunities, but it distorts the social structure and male-to-female ratio leaving many women single. This problem has been exacerbated by families abroad wanting their daughters to marry Palestinian men from Lebanon. Men seize the opportunity to leave Lebanon and willingly marry Palestinian women who live abroad and have obtained citizenship in a Western country. Some of these men claim that they intend to divorce their wives once they have obtained citizenship themselves. Camp inhabitants claim that men who emigrate are less likely to return to their camp in Lebanon to find a spouse than women who emigrate. Some inhabitants are concerned that an increasing number of marriages are being made for convenience as an opportunity to improve the position of either spouse or his or her family. Marriages may be made to obtain a visa, to further business arrangements, or alleviate financial difficulties as once a daughter is married she becomes the financial responsibility of her husband.

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Research by Aziza Khalidi concluded that there is a high level of domestic violence among Palestinian communities in Lebanon (A. Khalidi, 2000). Although the extent of the problem is unknown, some inhabitants believe that domestic violence against women and children is common.23 Some women argue that men have a right to hit their wives, especially if the wife has disobeyed her husband. Other women, who have not experienced domestic violence, claim to be shocked by suggestions that it exists in the camps and believe that it must be a minor problem. The lack of knowledge about the extent of domestic violence indicates that it has not been widely discussed, although by the mid2000s NGOs were beginning to initiate research and discussions about domestic violence. Other issues that inhabitants are reluctant to discuss are prostitution and addiction. Out of economic necessity both men and women in Bourj al-Barajneh work as prostitutes.24 During the war, child soldiers used drugs, solvents and alcohol to help them cope, which has led to widespread addiction, particularly among young men.25 Youths sniff glue, drink alcohol or use drugs out of boredom and a sense of hopelessness for the future. Drugs are expensive so camp inhabitants look for cheaper alternatives; one of these is aspirin mixed with tobacco and smoked in a nārgileh (water pipe), which people believe makes them high. Various groups are recognized by inhabitants as vulnerable including children, the elderly, disabled and youth. However, assistance is not targeted equitably among the vulnerable groups. The community identifies children as a vulnerable group but does not articulate in what ways other than the lack of places to play. In reality more time and money is devoted to children than other vulnerable members of the community. Young men in particular are a vulnerable group although few people seem to recognize them as such. Employment prospects are becoming worse for Palestinians in Lebanon and it is recognized that it is the young who have the greatest difficulty in finding work. Apart from providing vocational training, there is limited UNRWA and NGO assistance aimed at this group. It is argued that it is difficult to obtain funding from international donors for programmes targeted at youths. Although a lot of assistance is aimed specifically at women, they are regarded as vulnerable because they lack independence, seem to be disrespected, and some have the double burden of domestic work and paid employment.

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The elderly and disabled also form vulnerable groups that receive little assistance and support. Many elderly, particularly those who are ill, are isolated from the community and have few opportunities to socialize. For the over-sixties, healthcare provided by UNRWA is limited. There is little support available to mentally and physically disabled Palestinians and their families, who are often ignorant of the basic needs of a disabled relative. Palestinians do not have access to care offered to disabled Lebanese, and lack of funding limits UNRWA services to Palestinians who are disabled. The narrow camp streets are full of physical obstacles hindering the mobility of the disabled and elderly and therefore their ability to participate fully in community life. Camp inhabitants often fail to understand the needs of the disabled, and can be unsympathetic. Disabled children may be considered to bring shame to their families and therefore do not enjoy the same parental love and care as their siblings. Parents will discuss their disabled children in derogatory terms while they are present.26 Disabled children also pose a serious long-term financial burden and parents are often unable to disguise the strain a disabled child puts on their lives. If there are serious social divisions in Bourj al-Barajneh, they are well hidden and not discussed. It is claimed that there are no long-running disputes between important families or members of different villages. There are disputes between individuals and families which are usually dealt with by those involved or in some cases a respected member of the community might be asked to mediate. Some individuals and well established families have a higher profile than others and can be influential, although their power is personal, informal and based on respect rather than political and organized. Different political ideologies and religious beliefs cause social tension and are used by some to create conflict. However, as most inhabitants avoid becoming actively involved in political and religious organizations, and organizations lack broad power and influence, the damage caused by divisions emerging from politics and religion has been limited. Inhabitants of Bourj al-Shamali and Nahr al-Barid reiterated views expressed in Bourj al-Barajneh about the importance of the family and the strong sense of community and acknowledged social problems among inhabitants. Despite greater provision of services for the youth in Bourj al-Shamali than other camps, inhabitants attributed problems among the young to the lack of activities. They claimed that camp youth were disaffected and tempted by alcohol and smoking, and disinclined to

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work or study. This could be a result of the camp’s isolation which limits study, work and leisure activities more than in some of the other camps. Publicly, sexual relationships outside marriage are condemned as unacceptable but senior UNRWA staff in Nahr al-Barid suggested that couples were consummating their relationships before marriage because economic difficulties were forcing many weddings to be postponed for several years. Formal Social Capacities and Vulnerabilities The formal social structures in Bourj al-Barajneh include UNRWA, the NGOs, religious organizations, political factions and the popular committee. Collectively, these organizations compete with each other and exert limited control over some aspects of camp life. Individually, all these organizations contribute to the capacities and vulnerabilities of the camp community. Sources of Assistance In 2001 UNRWA operated a clinic and a women’s centre in Bourj alBarajneh camp and schools in the surrounding area. The agency’s services were supplemented by 18 NGOs providing healthcare, welfare, vocational training and childcare. There were several organizations, often with Islamic ideologies, concentrating on providing financial assistance. Other organizations provided vocational training and two focused on helping women. There were eight kindergartens operated by different NGOs, and NGOs offering activity programmes for children during the holidays and after-school sessions for older children. Bourj al-Barajneh inhabitants acknowledge that UNRWA provides education and vocational training, healthcare, environmental healthcare, welfare and piped water. The agency also provides employment for some camp inhabitants. Without this assistance Palestinians in Lebanon would struggle to survive, although few willingly admit it. Inhabitants are invariably critical of the agency because services are considered inadequate and are being reduced, and there is no formal coordination of assistance with the NGOs. UNRWA is perceived as corrupt and, like many other institutions in Lebanon, thought to be influenced by political factions. Allegations of corruption were investigated by the UN Office for International Oversight Services but, because of a lack of evidence, the findings were inconclusive (USCR, 1999: 19). Camp inhabitants also claimed that although access to UNRWA assistance should be based on need, wāsta is necessary to obtain assistance from the agency.

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Palestinians’ dislike for UNRWA stems from several factors. Despite its humanitarian mandate and lack of power in Lebanon or over the Palestinians, UNRWA’s position as an officially apolitical organization operating in a political environment is ambiguous and impossible to reconcile effectively. Its mandate has always been interpreted by the Palestinians as political because Palestinian refugee status can only be claimed legitimately in international law if an individual is able to register with UNRWA. Therefore, Palestinians link their UNRWA registration with political rights to Palestine and the right of return (al-Husseini, 2000: 52). The perception of UNRWA as a political organization and representative of the Palestinian diaspora has been reinforced in Lebanon because Palestinians are excluded from Lebanese politics and do not have their own leadership. Palestinians in Lebanon have come to regard UNRWA as a ‘quasi government’ (Weighill, 1996: 4). However, Palestinians believe that UNRWA fails to meet their needs and accuse it of poor governance, being dictatorial rather than democratic, inaccessible and not accountable to its people. Furthermore, Palestinians believe that UNRWA should support them against the Lebanese government and pressure the international community to implement the right of return. Although UNRWA’s mandate does not allow it to engage in politics or act as the political voice of the Palestinians, this perceived failure of UNRWA as a political representative creates tensions with the Palestinian community. There is a lack of trust between UNRWA and the Palestinians. For example, the attempt to establish community-based organizations (CBO) is thought to indicate the imminent termination of UNRWA services as more programmes are managed by the camp communities. UNRWA salaries, which are relatively high in comparison with what most camp inhabitants can earn, are another source of tension, not least because it is publicly acknowledged that the agency has chronic financial problems. Communication between UNRWA and camp inhabitants is limited. Beneficiaries have little access to senior staff members and must make requests for assistance and ask questions through the camp services officer (CSO), who has little autonomy and power. Responses, without detailed explanation, are relayed through the CSO, so the inhabitant rarely meets in person the official who has made the decision or supplied information. UNRWA’s lack of senior-level engagement with the camps

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angers inhabitants who argue that they have a right to access UNRWA and its staff, which exist to assist Palestinian refugees. Understanding between the agency staff and camp inhabitants can be limited. Although the majority of UNRWA employees in Lebanon is Palestinian, the daily experience of UNRWA employees and nonUNRWA-employees is different.27 Working for UNRWA is one of the few legal employment opportunities for Palestinians in Lebanon. UNRWA employees not only receive relatively good wages in comparison with other Palestinians, they have pensions and the employees and their families have private healthcare insurance so do not use the UNRWA health services provided for other Palestinians. As a result of the good wages, the majority of UNRWA employees can afford to live outside the camp, and do not share the daily experiences of the camp communities. UNRWA staff expressed disbelief that poor Palestinian families were building houses illegally on the outskirts of Shatila camp rather than trying to find legal accommodation. There was no understanding that these families had little choice.28 Camp inhabitants recognize that NGOs play an important role in bridging the gap in UNRWA services. There are several large Palestinian NGOs with centres throughout Lebanon, inside and outside the camps, which provide a range of services. However, most of the NGOs are relatively small, and operate only a few centres that tend to be inside the camp. Camp inhabitants also recognize that fluctuations in the level of funding for NGOs can increase the vulnerabilities of the community the NGOs aim to assist. For example, international donors mistakenly considered that the signing of the Oslo Accords solved the Palestinian refugee problem. Funding was reduced or concentrated in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Events such as the second intifada or the Gaza War divert funding away from Palestinians in Lebanon. Uncertainty about funding makes planning difficult and is a constant worry. There is competition between the NGOs, often stemming from political affiliation, which has a negative affect on the provision of services. The coordination forum for Palestinian NGOs is not inclusive so can not facilitate coordinated and long-term planning. NGOs excluded from the forum argue that they lack the legitimacy of those belonging to it and have to work harder to obtain international donor funding. The relationship between the NGOs and UNRWA also tends to be poor so they do not always cooperate closely in the services they provide. The lack of coordination, cooperation and, in some cases,

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organization means that needs are not always correctly identified and targeted. The NGOs offer new job opportunities to people in the camp. The majority of employees tend to be women because of the nature of the work – childcare and nursing – caring professions that are usually regarded as women’s work, and because the wages are too low for the main breadwinner. NGO wages are modest but are important to the camp economy and to individual households. As the work is usually based in the camp, husbands who had previously objected to their wives working accept NGO employment, and because many NGOs operate during school hours, mothers are also able to work. Camp inhabitants perceive some NGOs to be corrupt and claim that wāsta is necessary to secure assistance. Many NGOs have political affiliations, which can mean that UNRWA is reluctant to liaise with them closely. While recognizing the value of NGOs, camp inhabitants realize their existence has contributed to the creation of a dependency culture among some inhabitants. NGO staff complain that some Palestinians’ demands for assistance are unreasonable and that others are always critical of the assistance available. As the political factions in Bourj al-Barajneh are predominantly antiPLO there are no PLO services in the camp. Before the PLO left Lebanon in 1982, it oversaw activities in the camp and provided a central authority, operated a wide range of services and employed large numbers of people. It continued to offer some of these services until further reductions in 1991, and then a complete withdrawal of all assistance, apart from payment of pensions, in 1993. Since 2000, the PLO has recommenced provision of certain services but has concentrated its efforts in the camps in southern Lebanon, where it has retained strong support. Since the early 2000s, Islamic organizations, such as the welfare wing of Hamas, and the Society of Islamic Philanthropic Projects, established by the Ahbāsh movement, have been operating in the camps, offering assistance in the form of zakāt (almsgiving). It is unclear whether religious organizations restrict assistance to those who subscribe to the same religious ideology. However, the Ahbāsh, because of their distinct religious beliefs originating in Sūfism, are more easily identifiable in the community, and other inhabitants tend to view them with suspicion. Most Palestinians in Bourj al-Barajneh regard their religious beliefs and practices as personal, and to date, religion has not played a large role in

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camp politics; this may change, especially as Hamas has made a dramatic impact throughout the camps in Lebanon in a relatively short time. The Ahbāsh ‘reject violence and politicization of Islam’ and in their literature ‘make no reference to jihād or the use of force against Israel’ (Hamzeh et al., 1996: 224). Ahbāsh views contrast sharply with those of Hamas, and with popular secular Palestinian views. Therefore, the appearance of ideologically diverse Islamic organizations, and the increased integration of Islam into politics and assistance, in a society used to observing religion according to private conscience, is a potential source of tension and adds to the proliferation of the groups attempting to exercise authority in the camp. The other religious organization in the camp is the mosque committee. It appears to have a low-key role and be responsible for maintaining the mosque and organizing collections on Fridays for those in need. The mosque acts as an information service as news and announcements are relayed through the loudspeakers used for the call to prayer. Doctors regularly use the speakers to request donations of a particular blood type for a transfusion. In Bourj al-Shamali, UNRWA operates a clinic, women’s centre and schools. The NGO activities in the camp are similar to those in Bourj alBarajneh except that the PLO funds some of this assistance, operates a kindergarten and youth centre, and offers financial support to those in need. Islamic organizations, such as Khiriya, offering welfare assistance, have a higher profile in Bourj al-Shamali than Bourj al-Barajneh, perhaps because there are fewer other sources of assistance. The UNRWA services in Nahr al-Barid resembled those in Bourj alBarajneh and Bourj al-Shamali although unlike the other two camps, UNRWA had also established community-based organizations for the disabled and young people. Community self-help activities in the camp appeared to be strong. The inhabitants had created a fund to cover medical costs for individuals with cardiac problems. There were many NGOs providing welfare, education and healthcare, and several private clinics that provided healthcare cheaply for those in financial difficulties, and it was reported that Hamas began welfare provision in Nahr al-Barid in summer 2001. The Popular Committee The popular committee is the official authority in Bourj al-Barajneh although its role is ill-defined and it regulates few aspects of camp life.

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The committee is composed of ten members, eight of whom are drawn from the dominant political groups in the camp and two from among the camp inhabitants. The criteria used to make this choice were not disclosed, but camp inhabitants are not consulted and are usually ignorant of the committee’s composition. The popular committee is influenced by political factions outside the camp. The dominant political factions are pro-Syrian, belong to the Palestinian National League and claim to pursue similar policies.29 Smaller political groups are not part of the popular committee and often have few supporters in the camps. The wages of political faction members and of the popular committee are paid by the political organizations. In Bourj al-Barajneh, the political factions and popular committee provide no financial assistance to the camp community. The committee is responsible for collecting money from households to pay electricity charges, and for ensuring that water is pumped regularly to domestic storage tanks. NonPalestinians entering Bourj al-Barajneh or spending time in the camp should register their presence with the committee.30 The popular committee operates the security committee, which deals with minor crimes and domestic problems. Serious crimes are referred to the Lebanese authorities, and social problems are often tackled informally by respected members of the community. Privately camp inhabitants are critical of the popular committee’s failure to provide effective systems of law and order, and complain that the political factions demand money from inhabitants without providing anything in return. In Bourj al-Shamali, Fatah controls the popular committee. Six of the twelve committee members belong to Fatah and pro-PLO groups, and the others are from groups outside the PLO such as the Palestinian Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Unlike in other camps, Fatah seems to be a major provider of assistance and social services. In 2000 an estimated 85 per cent of the camp inhabitants belonged to Fatah but some of the more powerful NGOs in the camp belonged to the proSyrian Palestinian factions.31 These factional divisions can create tensions in the camp and strain relations with UNRWA if the agency is perceived to be favouring one political group over another. In the early 2000s, inside and outside Nahr al-Barid, pro-Syrian parties appeared to be dominant. It was unclear which factions controlled the popular committee but its role appeared to be minimal. With the exception of demonstrations in autumn 2000 to persuade

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UNRWA to provide secondary school education in the area, there were no obvious political activities among inhabitants. It is perhaps this lack of active Palestinian factions that enabled Fatah al-Islam to enter the camp and establish itself in Nahr al-Barid. Camp Governance Bourj al-Barajneh inhabitants complain that there is a lack of structure to camp life. There is no organization, coordination among the different institutions, established procedure or timekeeping, so it is difficult and time-consuming to arrange work or events.32 Inhabitants also complain about social problems, such as sexual harassment, verbal abuse, youths driving scooters dangerously through the camp’s narrow streets, littering and loitering, and the fact that no authority in the camp attempts to deal with these problems. The murder of a 15-year-old girl in the camp in May 2001 shocked the community and several NGOs approached the popular committee to demand that it provide some sort of law and order. The NGOs wanted to form a group drawn from different sectors of the community to look at ways in which this might be done. It is unknown whether any progress was made. However, camp inhabitants recognize that what might be referred to as a lack of governance seriously undermines their ability to make improvements, however minor, to their lives. In fact, the problems camp inhabitants identify as stemming from lack of governance extend further, and have a negative impact on the unity of the camp community and create an environment of fear and suspicion. As the popular committee is weak and there are numerous NGOs and UNRWA centres and staff in the camp, power is diffused among the various bodies. No single body has control, there is no coordination between them, but at times some may exercise more power than others. Since the end of the civil war and the growth of NGOs and their activities, it is acknowledged by the factions and the NGOs that power rests with the NGOs. However, because of the rivalry between the organizations, this power is not uniform and different NGOs influence different sectors of the community and different aspects of daily life. Inhabitants claim that in private they are careful about what they say in case it is misinterpreted and reported to one of the political factions. It is unclear whether there are individuals in the camp who act as spies, or whether some people, for personal gain, are willing to report others

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to one of the groups in the camp. As the balance of power is continually shifting among the various camp bodies, inhabitants are unsure who holds the power and whom they should trust. Much of the information about the formal social structure in Bourj al-Barajneh was gathered informally and it was not possible to obtain the same detailed information from Bourj al-Shamali and Nahr al-Barid. However, it seems likely that aspects such as the competition between the NGOs, the lack of trust between UNRWA and the Palestinians, the influence of politics on assistance and the perception of corruption among assistance providers would be similar in other camps. The differences would be in the degree of influence exercised by each organization and the level of antagonism among the various actors. This will be affected by the nature of the local political dynamics, inside and outside the camps, and the strength of key individuals such as the CSO, head of the popular committee and prominent NGO staff members. For example, from visits to Ein al-Hilweh camp, it was clear that the CSO was respected and able to exercise influence on issues that fell outside his official UNRWA role. Psychological Attitude The inhabitants recognize that their self-dependence, resilience, ability to bear pain and to adapt are important factors in their survival. These capacities have developed over time and enable the community to cope with daily hardships, the anti-Palestinian policies of the Lebanese government and extreme circumstances. However, there is a negative side. Although such strengths allow the Palestinians to cope, it means that they accept many difficult aspects of their lives, even violent events, as normal. For example, a few months after a demonstration on the Lebanese–Israeli border had resulted in the death of a young man and many people from the camp being injured, Palestinians attached little importance to this event because ‘it is normal’.33 It was simply another violent event and insignificant when compared with the experiences of the civil war. Nostalgia for Palestine Palestinians in Bourj al-Barajneh discuss the right of return daily and claim that if necessary, they will wait another sixty years to return to Palestine. Simultaneously, they talk about returning to Palestine the following year. All generations know about and discuss the right of

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return. Although the thought of returning to Palestine brings hope and helps people to cope because they believe that their refugee status is temporary, it prevents planning for the future. Lebanese policies have put camp inhabitants in a physical state of limbo; the Palestinians, longing for the right of return, have created their own mental state of limbo. Such feelings can lead to a ‘nostalgia fixation and then to nervous depression and a failure to adapt, or a wilful resistance to adapting to new surroundings’ (Needham, 1995: 64). Although the camp inhabitants have the ability to adapt, it rarely includes the recognition that it is unlikely they will ever return, despite the evidence of the last sixty years. However, life in the camp is grim, the situation for the Palestinians in Lebanon is becoming increasingly difficult, and except for the thought of returning to Palestine there is little hope for the future. As a result, myths about Palestine have been created that bear little resemblance to Palestine as it was sixty years ago or now. The inhabitants of Bourj al-Barajneh talk about returning to their villages, many of which no longer exist or are inhabited by Israelis. The myths have become more important than reality with the result that many in the camp have little idea of the basic facts, such as the geographical location and climate of Palestine, and confuse what happened in Palestine in 1948 with other events such as the bombing of Hiroshima.34 The inhabitants of Bourj al-Barajneh believe that the location of their camp in Lebanon is a capacity; the climate, countryside and culture of Lebanon are similar to Palestine and the two countries are adjacent. It is impossible for an outsider to know how important it is for the Palestinians in Lebanon to live near and in a country similar to Palestine. Although few camp inhabitants have much experience of living elsewhere in Lebanon or abroad, the geographical location of the camp obviously provides comfort. However, inhabitants claim that they suffer because they do not have any land to farm. The complaint about lack of farmland reflects the nostalgia to return to Palestine to farm the land as Palestinians did before 1948, even though few inhabitants of Bourj alBarajneh have any agricultural experience. Physical Isolation Palestinians cling to the right of return because they see no future in Lebanon, a fact demonstrated by the large numbers seeking to emigrate to North America and Western Europe. The host community does not

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disguise its animosity towards the Palestinians. This creates a feeling of isolation among the Palestinians in camps and some prefer to remain in the camps for long periods because they fear for their safety outside. Consequently, many are ignorant of life outside the camp and have little idea about how to travel to different parts of the country. The fear of the outside world only increases feelings of isolation and means that many are incapable of conducting necessary business outside the camps independently. This is particularly true of the women, who are less likely to work outside the camp so have fewer reasons to leave it than the men. The camps are isolated not only from the host community but from each other. Inhabitants of Bourj al-Barajneh and Shatila camps, which are located near each other in Beirut, have little idea about the other camp.35 Inhabitants will often identify with their camp and will be prejudiced against Palestinians from other camps.36 Despite this, Palestinian communities in Lebanon usually speak warmly of each other and are sympathetic about the specific difficulties experienced in each camp. Yet the inhabitants of Nahr al-Barid have often been viewed with suspicion and regarded as insular, miserly, apolitical, and culturally and religiously conservative. Palestinians with relatives in Nahr al-Barid complained that they did not enjoy visiting the camp and received poor hospitality when they went. Nahr al-Barid inhabitants were noticeably less outgoing than Palestinians in other camps, and apparently less politicized. However, they were less suspicious of strangers than inhabitants of other camps, perhaps because they were accustomed to outsiders visiting to shop at the sūq. Political Isolation The isolation, fear of life outside Bourj al-Barajneh camp, and worries about the future fuel speculation among inhabitants about possible permanent solutions to their situation. These solutions include settlement in the West Bank or Gaza, settlement in Iraq or areas of the Gulf, and entry visas for Western countries. The solution regarded as the most likely among inhabitants depends very much on the contemporary situation. Many fear, perhaps rightly, that decisions will be made about their future without their knowledge or consent. Such rumours create tension and are indicative of the state of political flux in which the Palestinians live and the influence of external politics on their lives. Events influence whether camp inhabitants are hopeful or hopeless about the right of return. For example, many camp inhabitants make

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plans, whether realistic or not, to emigrate to the West. With the beginning of the second intifada, this changed, and many Palestinians in Lebanon felt that they should be more active in pushing for the right of return and the interest in emigrating subsided. As the intifada continued, the call for the right of return decreased and individuals began again to make plans to emigrate. Palestinians in Lebanon are aware that the Oslo Accords, signed by Arafat, marginalized their interests and failed to address their right of return. The second intifada changed the attitude of many Palestinians in Lebanon towards the PLO because the organization seemed, finally, to be opposing the Israelis. The late Yasser Arafat is now a symbol of the Palestinian struggle but, given the feelings of betrayal and disappointment, the PLO has failed to regain credibility among Palestinians in Lebanon. Religious Faith Many inhabitants argue that Islam is an important aspect of life in the camp. It is a factor common to all but a minority of inhabitants and provides a sense of continuity. Religious celebrations are important highlights to what can otherwise be a monotonous existence. Some individuals claim that Allah is their only source of support, and are reluctant to speculate about the future because ‘only Allah knows’.37 They also believe that their fate is Allah’s will so they do not have the right to question or challenge their predicament. ‘It [predestination] sustains people in terrible hardship and gives them fortitude in adversity because they believe that their sufferings are sent by God’ (Guillaume, 1956: 134). This belief is comforting but can lead to inertia because individuals believe that they are powerless to effect change. Palestinians who have a career and live outside the camps have a different view from camp inhabitants because they are better integrated and less fearful of the Lebanese. They can be wary of entering the camps and may never have visited any of them. Some claim that they would be prepared to stay in Lebanon if they enjoyed the same rights as Lebanese citizens.38 Although many Palestinians living outside camps express a desire to go to Palestine, they do not describe it as paradise and are able to plan for a future that does not include the right of return. Helplessness As a result of receiving aid for six decades, a dependency culture has developed among some camp inhabitants, who believe that UNRWA

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and NGOs should meet all their basic needs. Camp inhabitants also have little control over their lives because they are subject, without consultation, to outside authorities – the Lebanese government, UNRWA, NGOs – and feel that past efforts to improve their situation have failed. Again, these feelings lead to apathy or what psychologists might refer to as ‘learned helplessness’, ‘a belief that there is no contingency between acts and outcomes and so no point in trying’ (Gleitman et al., 1999: 147). ‘Apathy is a behaviour pattern often found in refugees’ (Needham, 1995: 65). It is argued that learned helplessness can contribute to depression, a condition that is prevalent in the camps (Gleitman et al., 1999: 787–88). Palestinians in Lebanon call themselves ‘the forgotten people’. Most feel forgotten by their own leaders and political parties. There is hostility from the host community, they have few opportunities to move abroad legally and because of the restrictions imposed on their daily lives are prevented from trying to improve their situation. They worry that assistance will cease because the international community will forget about them, and they fear that any resolution to the Palestinian problem will overlook the Palestinians in Lebanon and that they will remain in a state of limbo. Feeling ‘forgotten’ and not being consulted about issues that impact on their lives compounds the feelings of helplessness and underlines the inability they have to determine the course of their lives. The violent history of the Palestinians in Lebanon and the poor camp environments also contribute to psychological problems. ‘Life event studies generally show that people experiencing a high number of negative life events suffer from higher morbidity rates’ (FAFO, 1993 cited in Manasra, 1999: 3). Overcrowding and poor services in camps in the West Bank and Gaza have contributed to social and psychological problems such as domestic violence, incest, high levels of divorce, marginalization of the vulnerable, depression and anxiety (Farah, 2000: 2). Inhabitants of Bourj al-Shamali and Nahr al-Barid also stressed the resilience of Palestinians and their ability to adapt and cope with difficult circumstances. However, their expression of political views was not as strong as in Bourj al-Barajneh and inhabitants placed more emphasis on domestic issues such as poor housing and providing for their children. This may indicate the difference in political awareness between Palestinians living in the capital and elsewhere, or may demonstrate that daily survival is more difficult in the camps outside Beirut.

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Conclusion The Palestinian camp populations in Lebanon have dynamic and interrelated capacities and vulnerabilities. There are similarities in capacities and vulnerabilities among all the camps. All have poor infrastructures, which has a detrimental effect on health and welfare, and the economic situation is poor and deteriorating for the Palestinian camp population, making it difficult for inhabitants to improve their situation. Despite complaints about the quality and the limitations of UNRWA education and health services, camp inhabitants have benefited from them. They also benefit from the services offered by NGOs and other political and Islamic organizations offering welfare and support. However, the range of organizations in the camp has diffused power so that there is no clear leadership, division of labour or distribution of authority. This lack of governance can be frustrating because it can be difficult to get things done, and it can also add to the fears of living in Lebanon as political agendas are unclear. The informal social structure and resilient psychological attitude are the most important coping mechanisms for the Palestinian camp communities. The extent of a family’s social network plays a significant role in the level of its success. However, the strong social networks and determination to cope feed into the hostile refugee–host relationship by reducing the need for the Palestinians to mix with the Lebanese. Within their camps, the Palestinians have been able to create self-contained communities. The differences in the capacities and vulnerabilities of the camps can be attributed to location, which affects access to education, healthcare, services and employment opportunities. Each location is subject to different levels of Lebanese control which dictate how the communities are able to conduct their daily lives and what measures they can take to survive. Some of the differences in attitude and levels of awareness can also be explained by location. For example, those in Bourj al-Barajneh live in a Westernized cosmopolitan capital with access to information and insights into different ways of life. Nahr al-Barid is in the countryside, and although there is contact with the local community through the sūq and work in Tripoli, the Western influence is not as strong in the north. The civil war had less impact on the northern camps so there was little contact with Western soldiers and less violent disruption to their lives. This figure summarizes the main differences between the capacities and vulnerabilities of the three case study camps.

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PALESTINIANS IN LEBANON Bourj al-Shamali Spacious but housing and infrastructure poor Isolated from urban centres, little access to education, healthcare and facilities outside UNRWA Strict control of Palestinians in the area Building materials prohibited in the camp

Nahr al-Barid Extremely crowded Isolated but some access to education and health facilities outside UNRWA Palestinian employment, property ownership laws etc. not rigorously imposed Comparatively little Lebanese regulation of Palestinians’ activity

Economic More employment opportunities in Beirut Little trading between camp and local Lebanese communities

Limited employment opportunities Little trading between camp and local Lebanese communities

Greater employment opportunities than Bourj al-Shamali Trading between camp and local Lebanese communities

Education Pupils in Beirut area perform better in UNRWA schools than those in other areas

Pupils in Tyre area perform worse in UNRWA schools than those in other areas

Pupils in Tripoli area perform comparatively badly in UNRWA schools Affordable private healthcare available High levels of mental and physical illness, possibly caused by intermarriage

Physical

Bourj al-Barajneh Better infrastructure and housing but crowded Access to education, healthcare and facilities outside UNRWA More NGO activities Lebanese have no control in camp but Palestinian employment, property ownership laws etc. enforced

Health

Private healthcare available

Little alternative to UNRWA healthcare More thalassaemia sufferers than other camps, often linked to intermarriage

Informal social structure

Less conservative, and more Westernized than other camps

Less Westernized Conservative and than Bourj alinsular in comparison Barajneh but tolerant with other camps population

Formal social structure

Popular committee controlled by proSyrian Palestinian factions Political parties have a moderate impact

Popular committee controlled by proFatah Palestinian factions Political parties have a high profile

Little evidence of overt political activity

Figure 7: A Comparison of Capacities and Vulnerabilities in Three Camps

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The biggest difference in coping mechanisms, though, is seen not between the camps but between the different socio-economic groups in the camps. Over 60 per cent of the camp population in Lebanon is considered poor and mostly hidden from outside observers. In addition to income level, the main difference between these groups is the size of their social networks. The wealthier families are usually better educated and have better homes than those in the lower socio-economic group. There was not enough data to determine whether family size and health were influenced by socio-economic level and there were no perceptible differences in psychological attitude. It is true that some of the poorest families expressed negative views, but many families who were better off were also pessimistic. In addition to socio-economic differences there are demographic differences. The elderly and young are generally considered vulnerable groups, although the youth are also vulnerable because they have poor prospects, little work and few facilities. The traditional role of men as the breadwinner has been undermined because many are unemployed, unable to provide for their families and are probably experiencing forms of depression. Despite the problems men face, there is no assistance aimed specifically at them. On the other hand, women – who retain their traditional role, some of whom also work and play an active part in the community, and who are not generally considered by inhabitants, male or female, to be vulnerable – have access to a range of assistance. The isolation of the camp communities, powerlessness, lack of representation, and prolonged dependence on assistance has created a sense of apathy among some inhabitants, who believe that they are unable to help themselves: a common phenomenon among refugees. However, the more visible members of the camp communities are the more able and their ability to cope has hidden many of the difficulties experienced by camp inhabitants from outsiders. The extent of the difficulties camp populations face should not be underestimated; they have learned to cope in very difficult circumstances. Unfortunately, these coping mechanisms often go unrecognized by external actors instead of being used to inform policy development and programme design so that assistance to the camp communities is effective and appropriate. The following chapter focuses on four factors that seem to have the greatest impact on refugee coping mechanisms. These are assistance, the poor refugee–host relations and restrictive policies towards the Palestinians, the lack of organization or governance at a formal level, and

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the protracted nature of refugee status, which has left people in a state of limbo and uncertainty.

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7 COPING MECHANISMS: THE IMPLICATIONS FOR ASSISTANCE TO PROTRACTED REFUGEES

How has protracted refugee status affected coping mechanisms? What aspects of the protracted refugee experience have the greatest impact on coping mechanisms? From the discussion in the previous chapter of Palestinian refugees’ capacities and vulnerabilities, it can be concluded that there are four main external factors that have had an impact on their coping mechanisms: assistance, lack of governance, the strained refugee–host relationship and the passage of time. This chapter analyses how these factors have interacted with camp inhabitants’ coping mechanisms and whether there are lessons that can be learned to improve future responses to refugee groups so that they meet the needs of the refugee and host communities more effectively. The Impact of External Factors The four factors to be examined here, assistance, lack of governance, refugee–host relations and the passage of time, are being described as external because, for the most part, they are beyond the control of Palestinian refugees. However, these factors are not external to the lives of camp inhabitants who interact with them daily, but are powerless to address any of them in a meaningful way. Therefore, these factors present physical and temporal barriers that have to be negotiated and determine how refugee capacities and vulnerabilities develop and in turn, how well refugees are able to cope with their situation.

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Capacities and Assistance Vulnerabilities

Lack of governance

Refugee/ Passage host relations of time

Negative No coordinated efforts to improve camp environment

Negative Restricted access to land, building materials, services and amenities

Negative Physical conditions have deteriorated

Negative Economic situation has deteriorated

Physical

Positive Better access to services than unofficial camps and poor Lebanese

Economic

Positive Negative Some Wāsta affects employment opportunities opportunities Incomegeneration projects Financial help

Negative Restricted employment opportunities

Education

Positive Negative Improved Wāsta affects educational opportunities levels Vocational training Standards compare favourably with Lebanon and developing countries

Negative Positive Restricted Improved access to state education

Health

Positive Negative Improved life Wāsta affects expectancy opportunities and infant mortality Decreased rates of communicable diseases Standards compare favourably with Lebanon and developing countries

Negative Positive Indirect Improved impact on health through restrictions elsewhere

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Lack of governance

Refugee/ Passage host relations of time

Informal social structure

Negative Created separate social groups – assistance providers and recipients Lack of assistance for vulnerable

Negative Distrust among neighbours, fear of spying

Positive Communities have strengthened against hostility

Positive/ negative A strong sense of community has developed, isolating camp inhabitants Negative from the Host relations outside world deteriorated

Formal social structure

Negative Created hierarchy but not provided leadership in the camps

Negative No trust, procedures, transparency

Negative Excluded from all formal aspects of social, economic and political life in Lebanon

Negative In reaction to contemporary circumstances a complex ineffective governance system evolved

Psychological

Negative Ambiguous relations between UNRWA, NGOs and Palestinians Dependency culture among some

Negative Camp inhabitants fear the consequences of their words or actions

Negative Palestinians feel vulnerable and have an increased desire to return to Palestine

Negative Gap between reality and idealized image of Palestine increased

Figure 8: Factors Influencing Coping Mechanisms

Figure 8 is an adaptation of the capacities and vulnerabilities analysis framework and summarizes and compares what effect assistance, lack of governance, refugee–host relations and the passage of time have had on the coping mechanisms of Palestinian refugees in camps in Lebanon. Assistance Since becoming refugees in Lebanon the Palestinians have received assistance from UNRWA and numerous NGOs. The assistance provided by UNRWA and the NGOs enhances physical capacities including camp living conditions, economic opportunities, and access to

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education and health services but undermines many informal and formal social capacities, and psychological capacities. Although the infrastructure of the camps is poor and there is severe overcrowding, the services UNRWA provides mean that the environment is better than it would be if the agency were not active in the camps. Observation and discussions with UNRWA and NGO staff and members of the Palestinian community revealed that there are few services inside the unofficial Palestinian camps and little external assistance available to poor Lebanese communities. The illegal settlements that have developed in areas adjacent to camps such as Sabra and the outskirts of Ein al-Hilweh, which have no proper water sanitation or roads, show what the camps would be like without UNRWA. Although the quality of UNRWA services may have deteriorated over its years of operation, the health and education of camp communities have improved over the last 60 years. The health and education standards that have been achieved are generally better than those available to poor Lebanese and compare favourably with other developing countries (Brynen, 2000: 5). The services have helped to create stability and have a positive long-term impact on many Palestinians. Economic capacities have been enhanced through vocational training, income-generating projects and some employment opportunities with the agency, but the effect of the projects is limited by Lebanese government restrictions. There are employment opportunities with UNRWA, which has a Palestinian staff of 2,950 in Lebanon (UNRWA, 2008), although they represent a small percentage of the Palestinian population. Nevertheless, UNRWA wages are comparatively good, allowing employees to support an extended family and to benefit the camp economy if they continue to live in the camp. However, once UNRWA employees achieve a reasonable position, they can become alienated from and unable to empathize with the camp communities. Many are able to move outside the camps and forget what daily life in the camp is like. This can lead to inadequate needs assessments and poorly targeted assistance. The division that develops between UNRWA staff and camp Palestinians is exacerbated by the benefits for UNRWA staff. In addition to a regular guaranteed income, agency employees receive a pension when they retire and medical insurance for themselves and their families to help them access nonUNRWA medical services. These benefits create a two-tier system and

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are regarded as unfair by non-UNRWA employees. The situation increases the tension and mistrust between UNRWA and the Palestinians and has led to allegations of corruption because the benefits are seen as a misuse of funds. UNRWA’s programmes have undermined social and psychological capacities. Just as social divides have developed between UNRWA staff and camp inhabitants, camp life has divided the Palestinian community in Lebanon by isolating one camp population from another and from Palestinians who live outside camps. It is arguable that once the camps, both official and unofficial, had been created, because of restrictions imposed by host governments, UNRWA had little option but to assist Palestinians through camps. However, the perpetuation of the camps and the provision of assistance via the camps have physically isolated the Palestinians from each other and from the Lebanese. On an organizational level, UNRWA occupies an awkward undefined position. It operates as a guest of the camp inhabitants and has little power to interfere in camp life beyond service provision. However, in the absence of another authority, by default, UNRWA fulfils a number of political roles. Over the years, the agency has established itself as a quasi-state institution, taking on responsibilities traditionally assigned to national governments in the fields of education, health, and social services (al-Husseini, 2000: 51). Consequently, in the camps, UNRWA neither enforces authority directly nor is directly answerable to an authority. There may be disagreements between UNRWA and camp inhabitants but neither can function without the cooperation of the other. UNRWA’s ambiguous status means that its relationship with camp inhabitants is dynamic and varies from day to day as political events unfold or Palestinians require a service. The inability to define UNRWA’s role and determine the extent of its powers adds to the uncertainty of the refugees’ position. The number of NGOs in the camps has increased and the services they provide expanded since the end of the civil war, which enhances the camp communities’ capacities by supplementing UNRWA services. As many of the NGOs operate at a grassroots level staffed by camp inhabitants, they are able to identify needs and target assistance more

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easily than UNRWA. NGOs are also smaller and bound by fewer rules and regulations than UNRWA so are able to respond more quickly to changing circumstances and the specific needs of individuals. However, assistance from UNRWA and NGOs is unevenly distributed among the camps and the camp inhabitants. Larger camps and those nearer cities have access to a wider variety of assistance, and there is a greater provision of services for women and children than other demographics. The youth, elderly and unemployed tend to be neglected and there appear to be no services aimed at men. UNRWA and the NGOs argue that it is easier to obtain money for projects aimed at women and children. Yet the neglect of other social groups increases vulnerabilities. For example: the elderly become a burden on the time and income of a household; the youth in the camps are often already disillusioned, have few productive ways of spending their time so become a public nuisance; the numbers of unemployed are high and without meaningful activity some individuals fall into depression; the traditional role of men is often undermined by the refugee camp experience and they struggle to come to terms with their status; the destruction of the traditional male role in refugee camps leads to an increase in domestic violence. The specific problems faced and caused by particular social groups are widely recognized by the assistance community and the camp inhabitants but there are few programmes designed to alleviate them. Cooperation and coordination among UNRWA and the NGOs is generally poor, which means that assistance is duplicated and gaps in assistance cannot be filled. There is little formal coordination of services because many Palestinian NGOs have political and religious affiliations that conflict with UNRWA’s aim to be apolitical. NGOs also fail to cooperate with each other. For example, in 2001 the NGO forum, said to be controlled by the pro-Syrian faction Fatah Intifada, excluded all but about 15 of the tens of Palestinian NGOs. In 2009, NGO workers claimed there were only about seven members of the NGO forum.1 Those excluded insist that membership is dictated by political affiliation. Exclusion from the forum can make obtaining funding difficult because donors have used it to help to identify legitimate NGOs. The competition among the NGOs is fierce and can undermine the camps’ social structures. Individuals or families receiving assistance from or working for one NGO find it difficult or impossible to associate with another NGO without being accused of disloyalty by the first. The

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repercussions are serious and can result in the loss of vital assistance or employment. Since the end of the civil war, NGOs are generally considered to control the camps, and in many ways they do. They provide a strong support network and through various programmes attempt to raise awareness about human rights and good citizenship. However, they have no legitimate authority, their spheres of influence are limited to those working for or participating in NGO programmes, they engage in negative competition and are open to criticism because of suspected corruption and lack of accountability. The rivalry between the NGOs has resulted in different NGOs assisting and having influence over different sectors of the community. Governance Contemporary Palestinian communities in camps in Lebanon exist without a formal system of governance. The lack of governance has negative effects on all aspects of camp life, and threatens the daily lives of the vast majority of camp inhabitants whose primary concerns are domestic. Governance refers to the existence of recognized and accepted institutions that exercise authority and control within agreed spheres of public and private life and are accountable to civil society. International bodies such as the World Bank (1994) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2006) argue that sustainable development and stability cannot be achieved without good governance and that ‘good governance provides significant benefits’ to civil society (Kaufmann et al., 2000). Good governance is responsive to the community and provides accountability, transparency and a rule of law (UNDP, 1998). Both local as well as state-level governance are ‘necessary for sustainable people focused development’ (UNDP, 1998). The organizations involved in providing assistance bear a large amount of responsibility for the lack of governance in the camps. Figure 9 illustrates the organizational structure in Bourj al-Barajneh camp. It is not a comprehensive diagram and is subject to change but it shows the complexity of power relations in the camps and the difficulty camp inhabitants face in trying to navigate the political dynamics. The arrows show the main directions of influence and the size of the boxes indicates the relative strengths of the various actors. Marginalized by the hostile policies of the Lebanese government, the Palestinians in camps live in isolation without a centralized authority,

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established procedures or universally accepted rules. Without forms of regulation and organization, camp communities are unable to implement measures to improve aspects of their lives. UNRWA and NGOs provide assistance and a limited social framework. However, the camps are host to numerous ideologically disparate political factions that vie for power between themselves. Although the political factions have limited authority over certain aspects of camp life, they have created an environment of fear because they are self-appointed, use informers, have access to arms and are controlled by powerful groups outside the

International community

Regional politics

Syria

Lebanese government

Host community

Donors

PLO

UNRWA Political groups

NGOs

Popular committee

Camp inhabitants

Figure 9: Governance in Bourj al-Barajneh Camp in 2001

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camps. The political factions do not operate openly or democratically so ordinary inhabitants are often unaware which of them occupies the position of power at any particular time. Inhabitants are inhibited in their daily lives because they fear punishment from the factions if any of their actions or views is interpreted as a criticism or threat. Despite informal social regulation, the lack of governance has resulted in a lack of law and order. There is little or no means of tackling activities deemed antisocial or serious criminal acts. The lack of governance undermines the impact of assistance because there is no effective means to coordinate, plan or identify beneficiaries. Access to assistance is often governed by wāsta. Social capacities have been undermined as the population has been stratified by allegiances to political parties, NGOs, religious groups or possibly even UNRWA. Psychological capacities are undermined because efforts to improve camp life are thwarted by the lack of a central authority or established procedures; psychological capacities are threatened because inhabitants are unable to relax, not knowing who holds the power, what is the agenda or whether their activities are being monitored. Internal and external factors have prevented systems of governance being established in the camps. The position of the Palestinians in Lebanon and their exclusion from all formal political, social and economic activity has negated the necessity of formal institutions to represent the people in any area of public life. Exclusion from peace processes has further isolated and disempowered the Palestinian communities in Lebanon. The ambiguous position of UNRWA, which delivers many of the services a government might provide but without being answerable to or representative of the people, has, because of its existence, discouraged the formation of other institutions. When other institutions such as the NGOs have been established, in an attempt to maintain an apolitical status, UNRWA has avoided close contact with them. The resulting limited coordination between the agency and the NGOs has reduced their role and influence in the community. The activities of the political factions outside the camp undermine the social structure and erode trust. These factions also impede the activities of NGOs by politicizing their work. The political factions have created fear among camp inhabitants, making many unwilling to adopt a public role and confront the social problems. The protracted civil war in Lebanon caused physical damage to the camps and emotional and psychological damage to the inhabitants. The shared struggle strengthened community

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ties but disrupted the usual social activities. There were military and medical structures but few formal social structures to provide a framework for daily life. The NGOs have begun to rebuild these, but, because of political fears as well as feelings of helplessness, struggle to involve the camp communities in activities designed to strengthen and improve social structures and social life. Factors inside the camp can also be identified for the failure to establish effective methods of governance. When the camps were first established, traditional village structures regulated camp life. These were marginalized while the PLO was active in Lebanon from 1968 to 1982. The PLO controlled the camps and other areas, operating ‘a state within a state’. The security forces the Lebanese had placed in the camps were removed, and the signing of the 1969 Cairo Agreement permitted the Palestinians to create bases in Lebanon from which to attack Israel, which led to the creation of a de facto Palestinian state in Lebanon. The PLO provided a system of governance, education, scholarships, healthcare, welfare and employment. Before entering the camps, UNRWA had to seek permission from the PLO representative appointed to liaise with the agency.2 The achievements of the PLO were largely destroyed in 1982 when it left Lebanon. Its funding to Lebanon was dramatically reduced, and, with few exceptions, had been completely withdrawn by the early 1990s. However, the legacy of the PLO ‘state within a state’ has shaped current Lebanese policies towards the Palestinians and the attitudes of the Palestinians. The Lebanese are anxious not to experience a similar loss of sovereignty to the Palestinians again, and to avoid Israeli military strikes in retaliation to Palestinian activity from within Lebanon. The Palestinians in Lebanon felt betrayed by Arafat and resented the loss of power, security and relative economic affluence enjoyed while the PLO was based in Lebanon. Following the civil war, the number of Palestinian NGOs increased to meet the needs of those abandoned by the PLO, and to tackle the effects of the civil war and gaps in UNRWA services. Although the NGOs have become essential to the survival of many Palestinians, the competition between the NGOs, the interference of political factions, and lack of accountability add to the problems of governance in the camps. The camp inhabitants are also responsible for the lack of institutions to provide governance in the camps. It is likely that it is the most able who have left the camps. Those involved in politics tend to be the least

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well educated because they do not have other employment opportunities and joining a political faction is their only option.3 Many of those who remain in the camps have developed a dependency culture and expect UNRWA and the NGOs to provide. Some camp inhabitants do not believe that it is their responsibility to tackle work left undone by the humanitarian agencies and criticize UNRWA and the NGOs for failing to meet all needs and solve all problems. Encouraging a change in behaviour is not a simple matter; many inhabitants have depression and feelings of apathy, they lack the ability to analyse their problems and identify solutions and feel powerless to change their situation. The passage of time has also contributed to issues surrounding governance. For over 60 years the Lebanese and Palestinians have shared a violent history and have come to distrust one another. To unite the country after the war, the Palestinians have been cited as the common enemy. Institutions such as UNRWA are no longer suited to the role for which they were created. UNRWA was a temporary organization created to address what was expected to be a temporary situation. The terms of UNRWA’s mandate prevent it from operating effectively in the long term, yet the political situation in the region, particularly in Lebanon, means that hundreds of thousands of Palestinians are still forced to rely on its services. The regional political situation has become more complicated since 1948 and is subject to many external pressures. The Palestinian political factions are no longer purely Palestinian and operating a pro-Palestinian agenda; many have links with Syria and receive support and training from Hizbollah. The factions established to fight for the Palestinian cause now fight each other or concentrate on controlling Palestinian behaviour. The volatile nature of the Palestinian experience in Lebanon and the uncertainty have discouraged camp members from tackling the community problems and attempting to regulate life and implement universally recognized forms of law and order. Many do not feel that they have a stake in the community as they do not have any forum through which to voice their opinions, and there is an expectation that UNRWA, the NGOs or political parties should provide the formal organization in the camp. Sources of power in the camp are confused and difficult to untangle. Many organizations are the product of a specific time and have attempted to evolve as times have changed. Consequently they may no longer fulfil the role for which they were designed or have clear goals. This is the case of the political factions,

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whose role has been eroded since the end of the civil war, and UNRWA, whose role was intended to be temporary. The ambiguity of the distribution of power also serves the interests of the different institutions. Service providers cannot be held accountable if their role in service provision is unclear, and the confusion also provides anonymity for any bodies or individuals operating outside legal boundaries but who exercise significant control. Refugee–Host Relations The poor, sometimes hostile refugee–host relationship has a detrimental effect on most camp communities’ coping mechanisms. Restrictions imposed on service provision, refugee activities, employment opportunities and human rights undermine physical, economic, educational and health capacities. Restrictions on access to land and building materials have created poor living conditions and left little opportunity to improve the camp environments. The difficulty of finding legal employment is the main negative impact on the economic capacities of the camp communities. Palestinians are forced to work illegally, which places them in a vulnerable position, or to pursue more radical options such as illegal emigration to another country. Without effective means of income generation, Palestinians are unable to improve their situation and are forced to rely on assistance. Restricted access to Lebanese state healthcare and education has been mitigated by UNRWA and NGOs, although before the establishment of UNRWA secondary schools, families had to make significant sacrifices to pay for their children’s secondary education. It could be argued that Palestinians have benefited from being denied Lebanese state education and healthcare, which are generally considered poor. However, the creation of parallel services has helped to reinforce the divisions between the Palestinian camp inhabitants and Lebanese. The negative effects of state policy on health and education stem primarily from the unsanitary camp conditions and employment restrictions that limit capacity to buy additional services, rather than the lack of access to state healthcare and education. In reaction to the hostile environment in Lebanon, the Palestinians have developed strong informal social networks, which has furthered the rifts between the refugee and host communities, exacerbating the vulnerabilities of the camp communities. This situation shows the complex relationship between capacities and vulnerabilities. To counter

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the hostility of the host community, the Palestinians look to each other for support, yet in doing so they reinforce their distance from the host community. The exclusion of the Palestinians from formal organizational structures in Lebanon has led to the development of a convoluted, ambiguous and unaccountable system within the camps. The parallel systems maintain the distance between the two communities. Without access to Lebanese networks, Palestinians are excluded from economic, political and social aspects of life in Lebanon. The marginalization increases the sense of isolation, prevents integration, limits the ability of Palestinians to compete with Lebanese inside formal structures, and keeps Palestinians in a vulnerable position that is impossible to overcome through existing systems. To improve their situation, Palestinians have to resort to other mechanisms, such as demonstrations and illegal activities. The development of formal Palestinian structures, however amorphous and incoherent, increases the host community’s perception of the Palestinians’ threat because organizations beyond Lebanese control are being established. The exclusion of the Palestinians from formal state structures highlights their refugee status and precludes the development of feelings of loyalty or belonging to Lebanon which, in a more inclusive environment, might have developed over the 60 years. The host community’s deliberate attempts to alienate the Palestinians have raised the potential threat they pose to Lebanon’s stability. The perception of Palestinian threat stems from Lebanon’s own precarious political make-up and the need to blame the country’s instability on outsiders. This has been reinforced by the PLO’s ‘state within a state’, Israeli attacks on Lebanon in retaliation to Palestinian attacks, unrest in some of the camps, and the confrontation between Lebanese forces and the militant group Fatah al-Islam in Nahr al-Barid. The continued presence of Palestinians is useful because they can be blamed for outbreaks of instability and, it is argued, could also be used by different Lebanese actors in their struggles against each other (M. Khalidi & Riskedahl, 2007: 28). The so-called ‘security islands’, which is how the Lebanese authorities refer to the camps, arguing that they ensure Lebanon’s security, have led to the warehousing of Palestinian refugees. Ironically, it is this warehousing that generates Palestinian hostility towards the Lebanese and increases the potential threat they pose to security.

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The poor refugee–host relationship has also negatively affected the Palestinian psychological coping mechanisms. The Palestinians regard the Lebanese as Arab and the majority as Muslim and therefore often feel betrayed that they are unable to rely on them for support, although there are occasions when Palestinians and Lebanese unite in a common cause. For example, the Israeli withdrawal from southern Lebanon was celebrated by both Palestinians and Lebanese, and at the beginning of the second intifada many Lebanese joined in public demonstrations of solidarity. Unfortunately for the Palestinians in Lebanon, such events are rare and the camp communities live in fear of the future and their powerlessness to counter the next Lebanese regulation or action against them. The fear and inhospitable circumstances in Lebanon increase the Palestinians’ dependency on beliefs and myths: the belief that they will return to Palestine, the belief that their current situation is God’s will, and the myth that life in Palestine before 1948 was paradise and could be recreated if they returned. Although religious faith and taking comfort in an idealized past are sources of strength, they can also inhibit Palestinian efforts to improve life in the camps. The weakness of refugee law, UNRWA’s limited mandate and the fact that it operates as a guest of the host government, and the lack of any clear legislation in the Arab world regarding Palestinian rights and status, mean that, even if there is political will, it is difficult for actors to intervene on behalf of the Palestinians in Lebanon to change their legal status or improve access to human rights. Consequently, not only are the Palestinians powerless to improve their position unless there are changes to legislation, a comprehensive regional peace settlement or a shift in political agendas, outside help for the Palestinians will either not be forthcoming or have only a limited impact. Passage of Time Palestinians have been refugees since 1948. That means that the majority of refugees living in camps in Lebanon were born there or have spent most of their lives there and that their refugee status is a way of life. The passage of time has had a negative impact on most of the Palestinian coping mechanisms and interacted with and exacerbated the other factors that have affected coping mechanisms. Most significant is the state of limbo which Palestinians in Lebanon have experienced. A situation lasting six decades cannot be described as temporary; yet the status of the Palestinian camp communities offers little sense of stability

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or sustainability. The restrictions imposed on the Palestinians limit their ability to make provision for the future because their activities are controlled and their situation is determined by the Lebanese state, regional politics and the international community. The recognized psychological distress caused by being a refugee, dependent on assistance and unable to control events is exacerbated in the case of the Palestinians by their prolonged state of limbo and powerlessness. Many Palestinians in the camps lack a sense of time: one day follows another with little to distinguish them from each other. Nothing of significance happens; there are few deadlines to meet, especially for those without regular employment. Therefore, it can be difficult to achieve anything as many have the attitude that tasks can always be delayed until tomorrow. Camp inhabitants say that they have been waiting for 60 years for their situation to change, and if necessary they will wait another 60 years. They have developed the capacity to wait, helping them to cope with the status quo, but as a result have less energy and motivation to work towards improving their contemporary situation. In the early days after the camps were established living conditions improved as shelters replaced tents and basic services such as water and sanitation were provided. Over time, however, the physical conditions in the camps have deteriorated as the populations have grown and increased the pressure on space and services designed for short-term use and fewer people. The environment around the camps has changed. Many have been absorbed into urban areas, resulting in dirty, noisy surroundings. The camps hinder urban development, which adds to the refugee–host tensions. Camps established on wasteland now occupy valuable land in areas that without the camps could be developed. By the 2000s employment opportunities for the Palestinians had become poor. Following 1948 and the aftermath of the Second World War, there were employment opportunities, emigration was easier and, in the early years, labour markets in Lebanon were accessible to the Palestinians. The development of the oil industry in the Gulf states provided employment for many Palestinians and a secure source of remittances for those who remained in Lebanon. During the PLO’s period of power in Lebanon, the organization provided employment, services and financial support. The ability to generate income enabled Palestinians to leave the camps, invest in a home, education, healthcare and other assets that had long-term benefits for the household. During this time financial help and employment opportunities were also provided by UNRWA and NGOs.

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The expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon marked the turning point in Palestinian economic fortunes. There is little financial support from the PLO, opportunities in the Gulf were significantly reduced after the PLO’s support for Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War, the post-war building boom in Lebanon has ended and the economic downturn has reduced employment opportunities in Lebanon and the region. Levels of international assistance are not guaranteed, affected by numerous factors including regional politics, emergencies that divert funding to relief from development assistance, or currency fluctuations. Furthermore, there is an increasing recognition that the international community has been providing assistance to the Palestinians since 1948 and that this situation is unsustainable, particularly in the face of economic crises such as the one that hit the global economy in 2008. Donor fatigue could threaten services to the Palestinians in Lebanon: the amount of money pledged annually does not keep pace with inflation or the growing Palestinian population.4 UNRWA struggles to maintain its services, has been operating austerity measures for many years, and faces one crisis after another which pose constant strains on its financial resources. The length of time that Palestinians have spent in the camps, often sharing difficult experiences, has led to the development of strong social networks. However, over time, Palestinians have begun to identify with their own camp, which has created divisions between the different camp communities in Lebanon and with Palestinians elsewhere in the diaspora. Competition has developed between the camps and political rivalries create structural and ideological barriers. Palestinians who die in the struggle against Israel are claimed by their camp community as martyrs and their camp’s sacrifice to the ongoing conflict.5 Camps have developed images that have led to the inhabitants being stereotyped. For example, those from Ein el-Hilweh are regarded as lawless, and those from Nahr al-Barid are conservative and miserly. The Palestinians do not seem to recognize this development or to understand that it weakens their collective power. Time has not helped to develop a stable system universally recognized by the camp inhabitants. Uncertainty and lack of control have made it difficult to develop appropriate structures because there are no obvious goals for which to plan. The formal social structures in the camps have developed organically in reaction to contemporary concerns and are in a constant state of flux influenced by external powers and events.

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The passage of time has led to the creation of many different types of Palestinian communities in the diaspora shaped by their environment and experiences. The hardships of the Palestinian community in Lebanon mean that they tend to idealize the unity within the Palestinian diaspora, which they like to believe has cut across six decades and thousands of miles. They are unwilling to acknowledge the differences that exist between the various Palestinian communities. The belief that Palestine is a paradise is easier to sustain as time pushes the experiences of Palestine further away and the first generation of Palestinian refugees dies. The oral descriptions of life in Palestine can become more selective and focus on the most positive aspects. Many find comfort in the temporary nature of their refugee status but its uncertainty weakens the resolve of some individuals to invest practically and emotionally in the future. UNRWA: creating conditions for protracted refugees Has the existence of UNRWA contributed to the Palestinians’ protracted refugee status? The agency has allowed the Palestinians to continue to be refugees and to be classed legally as refugees in the eyes of the international community. The presence of UNRWA is a reminder to the host communities that they are accommodating, on a long-term basis, a large refugee population. UNRWA services have taken away the responsibility of the host communities to support the Palestinians and allowed a dependency culture to develop. There are Palestinians who never registered with UNRWA or received UNRWA assistance and others who receive very little assistance from UNRWA. This indicates that it was possible, at least initially, for some Palestinians to become independent very quickly and suggests that if help had been limited to short-term relief assistance, many Palestinians might have managed to support themselves. Instead, assistance was developed that included rations, schools, healthcare and camps, overriding the need for Palestinians to seek their own solutions to survive. UNRWA registered the Palestinians as refugees, and continues to record births and deaths, and fulfil many of the roles of a government. The development of such a large structure emphasizes the Palestinians’ refugee status and inhibits integration with the host community. It also constructs a physical and psychological barrier for the Palestinians, who see and experience constant reminders of their status. It is the creation

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of the refugee camps, more than any other aspect of UNRWA services, which has helped to perpetuate the Palestinian refugee problem. The construction of the camps helps to keep the two communities apart and propagate mutual fears. The inhabitants become institutionalized and the status of being a refugee is internalized. If humanitarian assistance had been offered to Palestinians only in the initial aftermath of 1948, six decades on, the situation might be very different: the Palestinians would have developed their own methods of survival and have integrated with the host community. Such speculation is, however, controversial, as many would regard it as an underhand way of solving the problem to the satisfaction of the West and Israel at the cost of betraying the Palestinians. With hindsight it is easy to criticize the decisions made over 60 years ago, and speculate how the situation might have been resolved if different action had been taken. The biggest mistake the international community made was in linking the fate of UNRWA to the fate of the Palestinian refugees: the provision of assistance has been inextricably linked with the highly political question of Palestinian refugees. Even if it is considered that UNRWA has become part of the problem and that dismantling the organization, restructuring it or replacing it would be desirable, the nature of the UNRWA mandate and UN resolutions surrounding the agency make it very difficult to do so.6 Thus, although there are positive aspects of UNRWA’s role, it could be argued that the existence of UNRWA has helped to create a protracted refugee situation and perpetuated a refugee status that is the root cause of all their vulnerabilities. Targeting Assistance to Enhance Coping Mechanisms Unfortunately, there will always be obstacles to refugee assistance such as donor conditionality, cycles of emergencies, political flux and insecurity. Many of these obstacles are universal and impede assistance to Palestinians in Lebanon and other refugee groups elsewhere. Some obstacles to assistance are specific to a particular situation; in Lebanon specific obstacles would include the legal status of Palestinians and UNRWA’s mandate. Although UNRWA’s education and health programmes have had positive impacts, there are many elements that restrict the agency’s ability to provide developmental assistance. UNRWA has an uncertain future and operates in an uncertain world. Its mandate is renewed every three

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years and its budget depends on voluntary donations. The size of its budget and the demands on it vary according to the status of the latest peace process and the stability of the regional political environment. UNRWA has no legal or political power and is unable to provide protection to Palestinian refugees. It is a large organization – the largest agency within the UN – so it is difficult to change its practices, implement new kinds of programmes and introduce a new ideology among its staff. The agency’s five fields of operation are very different and a uniform approach may be inappropriate. However, the sensitive circumstances in which the agency operates can make it difficult to adapt programmes to individual fields, so arousing suspicions among the host and Palestinian communities. The attitude of the refugees also hinders developmental assistance. The mistrust between UNRWA and the Palestinians means that any changes in UNRWA activities are viewed with suspicion and a move to more developmentally orientated assistance might suggest to many that UNRWA is about to cease operating or is using development programmes as a method to reduce the cost of assistance. The dependency culture among some Palestinians means that some feel they have a right to UNRWA assistance and regard development programmes as inferior to relief programmes. The restrictive policies of the host government mean that there are few opportunities for spontaneous development to evolve from Palestinian activities. The lack of governance is also a barrier to development because assistance is poorly coordinated, there are no unifying organizational structures, procedures or systems, and power relations are ambiguous and fluid, creating a highly politicized environment and suspicion among the camp communities. To maximize the benefits of assistance in the face of these various obstacles it must be carefully targeted to enhance capacities and reduce vulnerabilities. This means that the coping mechanisms of the target group have to be identified and understood. Chapter 6 describes the resources that exist among the Palestinian camp communities in Lebanon. In broad terms, the capacities and vulnerabilities of each camp community are the same, although it is important that programmes are adapted to the specific context of each camp. However, the main differences are not between the different camp communities but between the different socio-economic groups in each camp. In any community, there will always be more advanced and less advanced

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members (Constantino-David, 1982: 198). The poorest members of the community, despite forming the majority of the camp population, are often hidden from outside observers so it can be difficult to identify their resources and particular needs. To adopt a more developmental approach and target assistance more effectively, UNRWA needs to establish better relations with the camp communities. There needs to be greater transparency to establish trust and communication between the agency and the Palestinians so that, at the very least, the potential target group is consulted. Targeting of assistance could be improved through needs assessment, to ensure that all groups are assisted, particularly the most vulnerable such as the elderly, disabled, youth and unemployed, who often fall outside UNRWA and NGO activities. It should be recognized that assisting these groups has a positive impact on the rest of the camp community. Improved coordination between the agency and the NGOs would help to achieve a more even distribution of assistance among the camps and socioeconomic groups and reduce duplication of and gaps in assistance. Efforts could be made to improve governance in the camps by establishing procedures and defining roles. Although such restructuring would probably have to take place outside the political parties, UNRWA could initiate a grassroots process through collaboration with campbased NGOs. It has been argued that the NGOs are currently the most powerful organizations in the camps, so even without the support of the political factions it should be possible to introduce some changes. Any systems that are established must be inclusive, transparent and accessible to ordinary camp inhabitants. They should enable Palestinians to express their views about the type of assistance they feel they need and to participate actively in the design, implementation and management of programmes. ‘[C]ommunity organization is widely held to be the most effective means through which people’s participation in their own development can be achieved’ (Constantino-David, 1982: 191). UNRWA health services have had a positive impact on development but there is evidence to suggest that many health problems in the camps are caused by lack of knowledge about hygiene and safety. Rather than curtailing its health education activities, UNRWA should be expanding them, in an effort to prevent health problems rather than focusing on curing them. UNRWA cannot expect Palestinians to make a financial contribution to services because of high unemployment and poor wages. Refugee–host relations could be improved by implementing

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programmes that are aimed at both communities. Although not an approach usually adopted by UNRWA, it initiated a micro-credit programme in Syria in 2003 targeted at the host and refugee communities.7 Unfortunately, all of the above suggestions to improve assistance would have only a limited effect because they have been formulated to work within the restrictions imposed by Lebanese authorities. For real improvements to be possible for the Palestinians, the Lebanese government would have to lift many of its restrictions, particularly on the right to work. The power of the political factions needs to be limited to reduce their ability to manipulate and spread fear among the camp communities. UNRWA should be restructured to increase transparency and efficiency, and it also needs enough resources to manage its operations properly. Funding could be reduced if Palestinians were capable of paying for services, but this would only happen if they had free access to employment opportunities. The Palestinians should be encouraged to adopt a change in attitude to look to the future and plan long-term. However, without a dramatic improvement in their situation, most Palestinians will struggle to develop a more positive psychological outlook. Unfortunately, in the current climate, it is inevitable that many Palestinians will remain reliant on UNRWA and a dependency culture will exist among some until the situation in Lebanon becomes more hospitable and the Palestinians are given the opportunity to provide for their own needs. The changes suggested to enhance capacities and reduce vulnerabilities through assistance that encourages development are not just desirable, they are becoming an imperative. The current situation is unsustainable financially, politically, socially and psychologically. The political and social environment in Lebanon is volatile and easily destabilized by regional tensions and conflicts, and the continued warehousing of Palestinian refugees could add to Lebanon’s security problems. Through the provision of international assistance, it has been possible to perpetuate this abnormal situation. The development processes that are possible among the camp communities are limited and the current situation forces many Palestinians to rely on assistance. Refugees who spend prolonged time in camps become institutionalized and the existence of the camps and assistance has ensured that the refugee and host communities have remained separate and distrust each other.

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Minimizing the Impact of Protracted Refugee Status Given that the length of time groups spend as refugees is increasing, that the number of protracted refugee groups is growing, that states are becoming more reluctant to host refugees and that international assistance is overstretched and prone to donor fatigue, it is important that legal frameworks concerning refugees, attitudes towards them and the types of assistance they are offered are reviewed. Although the Palestinians are a unique refugee group because of their legal status, their population size and the length of time they have been refugees, lessons can be learned from the Palestinian situation to improve assistance to refugees. ! International refugee law needs to be revised to remove the ambiguities and ensure that it includes all vulnerable groups who are forced to leave their homes to survive. The implementation of refugee law globally needs to be standardized and mechanisms developed to protect refugees and uphold their human rights. ! Appropriate humanitarian interventions at an earlier stage in an emerging crisis situation could help to stem refugee flows and may be preferable to allowing a refugee situation to develop. ! The international community should recognize that few refugee situations are short-term. Interventions have to be planned with long-term strategies so that they encourage sustainable development. They should be culturally appropriate and aim to build on the refugee capacities. Humanitarian-driven agencies have to consider the potential consequences of assistance, which may not always become apparent during the agencies’ period of operation. ! Camps are not a solution except in the very short term because they perpetuate the refugee problem, and physically separate the refugee and host populations, institutionalize refugees and undermine their capacities. Camps lead to the warehousing of refugees, restricting mobility and access to human rights, creating a frustrated refugee population and turning them into a potential security threat.

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! Assistance is expensive, distorts markets, creates dependency and is unsustainable. Assistance should be confined to a limited time after the refugee population has been created and extended after an initial period only for the most vulnerable sectors of the population. ! Durable solutions for each refugee group should be explored, identified and implemented as soon as possible. There should be international recognition that it is in no one’s interests – not the assistance community, the host government, the host population or the refugee group – to perpetuate the refugee situation. Appropriate assistance must be provided to help implement the solution. ! Being a refugee should not become a way of life, or an identity. The experience should be kept to a minimum to enable individuals to return to a normal life quickly. ! Assistance should not be linked to a political solution. Refugee rights should be protected and refugees should remain a political concern until a durable solution is found. However, refugees may not need humanitarian assistance continuously or for all the time they are refugees. As far as possible, the provision of assistance should be separated from the political aspects of refugee situations. ! There is evidence that refugees improve the local economy and increase the availability of labour. Host communities need to adopt policies that exploit the resources refugees bring to benefit both the host and refugee communities. ! Evidence suggests that greater integration and less restrictive host policies create better refugee–host relations than hostile host environments. For example, the experience of the Palestinians in Jordan and Syria has been very different from that of those in Lebanon and the refugee–host relations are less tense and the situation stable. ! Assistance should target host and refugee communities jointly to increase the capacity of the host community to cope with the

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influx of people, reduce resentment from the host community towards the refugees, and avoid creating a parallel system for the refugees that is expensive, inefficient, prevents integration and is probably unsustainable in the long term. It should be noted that refugee groups are hosted mainly in developing countries and often among the poorest members of the host population. ! Refugees should be consulted and when possible involved actively in development programmes so that they develop ownership and responsibility for projects and do not develop a dependency syndrome. Refugees have to be involved from the start because a later introduction of such programmes is treated with suspicion. For example, the Palestinians in Lebanon regard participatory programmes as a reduction in services, an attempt at permanent settlement and an attempt to revoke the right of return. ! Efforts are needed to ensure that trust develops between refugees and the organizations providing assistance, which should be transparent and accountable. ! Refugees have capacities and these should be identified before any large-scale interventions take place to avoid undermining them. Interventions should aim to enhance capacities and reduce vulnerabilities. Conclusion Assistance, lack of governance, refugee–host relations and the passage of time are the most significant factors affecting the capacities and vulnerabilities of Palestinian camp populations in Lebanon. Lack of governance and refugee–host relations have had a negative impact on the camp inhabitants’ coping mechanisms; with the exception of the improvement of refugee health and education levels over time, the passage of time has led to a deterioration of the camp conditions, and many aspects of the refugee situation have become entrenched. The strong social networks and community spirit that have evolved, although a capacity, are a reaction to the difficult situation for the Palestinians in Lebanon and have deepened the divide between the two communities.

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Despite widespread criticism, UNRWA services have had benefits for the Palestinian community. However, UNRWA has had negative effects on the social structures in the camps and on inhabitants’ psychological well-being, and is one of the actors responsible for the lack of effective governance in the camps. It is arguable that, although established to assist Palestinian refugees, the continued existence of the humanitarian organization has helped to preserve the Palestinians in a state of limbo, and that rather than being an asset to the Palestinians, UNRWA has become a weakness. However, with such poor refugee– host relations, Palestinians in Lebanon could not survive without UNRWA. There are some opportunities to improve the prospects for Palestinians in Lebanon, but unless the Lebanese government relaxes restrictions on the Palestinians, initiatives to promote development have to be small-scale and concentrate on improving the situation in the camps. Reducing the power of the political parties, restructuring UNRWA and improving its accountability and encouraging Palestinians to plan for the future would also improve prospects for development. Whether or not a solution to the Palestinian problem is found in the near future, the position of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has to be addressed because the present situation is unsustainable. Drawing on the experiences of the Palestinians in Lebanon could inform future assistance to refugees. Interventions should be planned with the long term in mind, relief assistance should be withdrawn as soon as possible, and development activities aimed at re-establishing a more normal life for the refugees and host community should be initiated when necessary. Assistance should be flexible and reactive to each individual refugee situation and should not be tied to political processes. Before assistance is provided the needs of the refugees must be understood so that their vulnerabilities are reduced and their capacities enhanced. It is important that the international community learns from its past experiences of providing assistance to refugees because it is likely that the twenty-first century will continue to see large-scale movements of people fleeing to safety. Well designed and appropriate interventions can help to reduce the potential humanitarian crises, restore stability and enable refugee groups to become self-reliant again.

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8 PALESTINIANS AS PROTRACTED REFUGEES

Too often the humanitarian issues surrounding Palestinian refugees are overshadowed by the political aspects of the Palestine–Israeli conflict and the key role this conflict plays in Middle East politics and relations between Western and Islamic states. The political dimensions to the Palestinian refugee problem and the existence of a separate UN body to provide assistance to Palestinian refugees mean that they are rarely studied as refugees and compared with other refugee groups. In an effort to redress the balance, this book examines Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, one of the more neglected and worse-off Palestinian refugee groups in the region, from a humanitarian rather than political perspective, and within the context of international refugee law and assistance to refugees. Despite the hostile environment, Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have continued to survive, but the focus on political issues and Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza has meant that little is known about their domestic lives and the coping mechanisms they have developed. Palestinians are central to the politics of the Middle East, yet for 60 years they have lived in uncertainty while events unfold rapidly around them. Palestinians in Lebanon in particular find themselves observers rather than participants in events that affect them. Despite the changing political dynamics and the episodes or acts of violence, daily life for the Palestinians in camps in Lebanon has changed little. Camp

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inhabitants may argue that their circumstances have deteriorated, but essentially they are still living in camps with limited access to their rights, and relying on inadequate assistance and their own resourcefulness to survive. Any solution to the Palestinian problem that is just and acceptable to the refugees themselves and meets their needs effectively must be informed by the camp experience and the mechanisms inhabitants developed to survive. This book also aims to highlight the increasing problem of protracted or warehoused refugees. These are refugee groups that find themselves in a state of limbo, often confined to camps, with little access to their human rights. Palestinian refugees, despite being the oldest refugee group in the world, are rarely discussed in terms of their protracted refugee status. Palestinian refugees in camps in Lebanon can shed light on how protracted refugees cope and the factors that affected their capacities and vulnerabilities. To understand how a refugee group can become protracted and what factors affect their coping mechanisms it is necessary to understand the legal framework surrounding refugees, the international, regional and local political dynamics, the refugee–host relationship, the theory and practice of delivering assistance, and the attitudes of the refugees themselves and the resources on which they can draw to cope. The following summarizes why Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are a protracted refugee group and the mechanisms they have developed to cope with their situation. The Refugee Context in Lebanon The history of the Palestinians in Lebanon explains the political context and how this has created a hostile environment for the Palestinian community. The population of Lebanon is composed of three major religious groups – the Sunnis, the Shi’a and the Christians – and each of these can be subdivided into various sects. Political power is shared along confessional lines in a ratio that is supposed to reflect the size of each religious community. The political system has reinforced the different religious identities and sectarian divisions in Lebanese society, which in turn has prevented the creation of a national identity, and the development of political ideologies and systems of governance to satisfy the needs of the population. Palestinians are predominantly Sunni Muslim, and denied citizenship because their inclusion in the Lebanese population would upset the sectarian balance. The presence of the Palestinians in Lebanon

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exacerbates an already unstable situation and ensures that regional political dynamics have a significant impact on events in Lebanon. Lebanese governments, to divert attention from their country’s divided society and their failure to address the tensions between the different confessional groups, have blamed Palestinians for the civil war and portrayed them as a threat to the stability of the state. Such an image is convincing given the Lebanese experience of the Palestinian ‘state within a state’ that existed in the 1970s under the PLO and provided relative autonomy for the Palestinian community, and the Israeli aerial attacks over Lebanon aimed at wiping out the Palestinian resistance. However, whether the Palestinians pose a real threat to the Lebanese state following the civil war is less clear. There are militarized Palestinian factions and inter-factional conflicts in the camps. Fatah al-Islam, a nonPalestinian militia, sought refuge in Nahr al-Barid camp, which led to fighting between the militant group and the Lebanese army. There is also antisocial behaviour and domestic violence, but it would be wrong to think of the camps as lawless; in general they are calm, and inhabitants are not interested in violence, only in their daily lives. The perceived threat of the Palestinians in Lebanon allows the government to implement restrictive laws that deny Palestinians their human rights and the right to work. Without Lebanese citizenship, Palestinians must obtain a permit before being allowed to undertake paid work; such a permit is almost impossible to obtain. The government also restricts Palestinian freedom of movement, the right to own land and property, access to state schools and medical facilities, and the access of camps to state-regulated services such as refuse collection and sewage disposal. As a result, the Palestinians in Lebanon are considered to be in a worse situation and more reliant on UNRWA services than those living in other areas of UNRWA operations. At the same time, UNRWA’s relationship with the Lebanese government is not as productive as with the Syrian and Jordanian governments. In addition, Israeli governments have provided services to refugee camps in Gaza and the West Bank whereas the Lebanese authorities do not freely supply services to any of the camps. The Palestinians as Refugees Palestinians form a unique refugee group because they come under the mandate of UNRWA, rather than falling under the UNHCR mandate

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along with other refugee groups. Although unique and rarely compared with other refugee groups, the factors affecting their status and daily lives are similar to those affecting other refugee groups. Three main issues have an impact on refugees: the legal and political framework created by agreements and political environments at the international, regional and national levels, the challenges to providing assistance, and the perceptions of refugees as either helpless victims or resourceful survivors. There are similarities between the political and legal status of Palestinian refugees and other refugee groups. Both the UNRWA and UNHCR mandates exclude certain groups they might reasonably be expected to include. When the mandates and refugee laws were agreed they seemed logical and fulfilled the requirements of the various actors and appeared to meet the needs of refugees. However, as political dynamics and agendas have changed, and aspects of refugee law adapted and developed, the mechanisms for addressing refugee issues have become inadequate, and in some instances hinder rather than facilitate humanitarian assistance to refugees, and exclude some groups who in reality, if not legally, are refugees. Refugee situations are regarded as temporary, so the systems to assist them are designed for short-term use. Both UNRWA and UNHCR were established to function on a short-term basis, making it difficult for the two UN bodies to implement long-term sustainable strategies. Unfortunately, many refugee situations become protracted – in the case of the Palestinians, for six decades – and mechanisms implemented at the beginning of the refugee situation become inappropriate. For legal and political reasons, the situations become entrenched and inflexible, and interventions are rarely adapted to keep pace adequately with the changing refugee situations. Palestinians differ from other refugee groups in two major legal respects. As they are excluded from the UNHCR mandate, there is no organization to provide protection and promote civil rights. In addition, there is no comprehensive agreement regarding Palestinians’ rights in the Arab world, placing them in a vulnerable position without the means to challenge the status quo. The position of the Palestinians in Lebanon illustrates the negative effects of the failure to provide protection and safeguard rights. The second issue that distinguishes the Palestinians from other refugees is UN Resolution 194 which states the international

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commitment to the Palestinian right of return. Since the 1993 Oslo Accords and subsequent events, the status of Resolution 194 is unclear, but from the earliest days of the Palestinian refugee problem the resolution stated publicly and legally the intent of the international community to implement the Palestinians’ right of return as the durable solution. Other refugee groups have been treated differently and three potential durable solutions exist within refugee law: voluntary return, integration in the host country or resettlement in a third country. Any of these options is regarded by the international community as an acceptable solution and once implemented ends refugee status. It has been argued that Palestinians remain refugees even after accepting citizenship elsewhere and that Palestinian refugee status ends only with the implementation of 194. UNRWA’s attempts to initiate more development-oriented projects have been thwarted by regional politics, hostility from the host government, resistance from the refugee population, the challenges of new emergencies, and the inability to secure adequate funding and support from the international community. NGOs attempting to initiate development-orientated programmes also experience similar problems. It is true that the camps have provided the Palestinian refugees easy access to services that are denied them by the host government. It is also true that many Palestinians believe that the camps offer protection and feel secure among members of the camp community. However, the camps in Lebanon are surrounded by the same problems as camps elsewhere. The camps maintain a physical barrier between the Palestinians and Lebanese which has contributed to the mutual mistrust. During the civil war the camps became militarized, and they continue to host Palestinian political factions. These factions have few resources to make any positive contribution to camp life, and although not respected by the majority of the camp inhabitants, are still feared. The Lebanese use the camps to prevent the Palestinians from integrating with the population because they fear the political repercussions if that occurs. The camps also serve as a reminder to the outside world of the continued presence of the refugees in the country who need assistance, and as a reminder that the Palestinian refugee problem has not been solved. The Palestinians are also motivated to maintain the camps because they believe that their continued existence keeps their plight on the international political agenda. Successive Lebanese governments have argued that by keeping Palestinians in

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camps, the threat the Palestinians pose to the state is reduced. Expert opinion is divided on whether refugee camp populations affect a country’s stability, but in Lebanon, where the prevailing social and political environment among its citizens is unstable, the existence of such a politicized issue as Palestinian refugees can only add to the country’s problems. Although it is possible to argue that the camps have brought the Palestinians some material benefits and that many have survived the experience, it is hard to argue that camps should be used for anything other than an emergency when their creation appears to have contributed to the perpetuation of a refugee situation for six decades. The Palestinian camp communities are not homogenous, but a disparate population, composed of individuals with different resources and attitudes who have reacted in different ways to the camp experience. Undoubtedly some of the camp inhabitants in Lebanon have become institutionalized and passive while others have remained active and sought to improve their lives. The political demonstrations in which many participate to mark key political events are displays of resistance to their situation and continued hope that they will return to Palestine. Refugees are often considered passive recipients of aid, reliant on external assistance to survive. Yet refugees are survivors, and like other groups faced with life-threatening situations, develop mechanisms to cope. Too often, international assistance fails to recognize these strengths, and efforts to help refugees instead undermine their coping mechanisms and can lead to the development of a dependency culture. The methods used to deliver aid can be restrictive, and can require individuals to conform and behave according to preconceived ideas about refugees and their inability to help themselves. Consequently, refugee helplessness can be learned through efforts to help them rather than as a result of the situation that created the refugee group. Among the Palestinians in Lebanon, only a minority seemed to believe that they were dependent on assistance, although many believed that UNRWA and the NGOs should assume responsibility for solving their legal and political problems. Although UNRWA and the NGOs have contributed to the development of a dependency culture because there is little consultation, transparency or accountability, and a lack of empathy between many of the more senior UNRWA employees and the camp inhabitants, after such a protracted refugee experience, it is inevitable that a dependency culture should evolve.

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The Dynamics of Coping Mechanisms The coping mechanisms of Palestinian refugees in camps in Lebanon have enabled them to survive but also have hidden problems from outside observers. The most important coping mechanisms are psychological resilience and the informal social structures through which family and friends provide practical and moral support to one another. The informal social structures are well developed and their importance should not be underestimated. Although the communities have developed strong mechanisms of mutual support that benefit the Palestinian refugees and are undoubtedly central to the survival of the community, they are a reaction to the situation and not a solution, and also hide many of the problems the camp communities experience from outsiders. The resilience of the Palestinian population has been fundamental to its survival in Lebanon. However, much of their psychological strength is based on nostalgia for Palestine, a belief that the right of return is imminent, and an acceptance of the current situation as God’s will. Nostalgia for Palestine and the right of return provide hope for the future, and the belief that the situation is God’s will helps the camp communities to cope with their daily lives. Conversely, though, these psychological capacities can act as vulnerabilities when they prevent individuals from developing longer-term strategies and adopting initiatives to improve their lives. The main vulnerabilities are the lack of governance in the camps, which reduces the effects of many of the informal capacities, and the restrictions imposed by the Lebanese government, particularly concerning the right to work. The absence of governance undermines social capacities because there are no established or transparent procedures to obtain permission to undertake certain activities, and the lack of any kind of regulation allows rumours and fears to take hold which destabilize the social support networks. As a result of Lebanese employment law, those Palestinians who are educated, skilled, fit and capable of work cannot easily do so legally. Consequently, any efforts aimed at improving their situation have a limited impact, and some Palestinians are deterred from investing time and money in enhancing capacities through education and skills training. UNRWA and the NGOs have a greater provision of services for women and children than other sectors of the population because, they argue, it is easier to obtain money for projects aimed at women and

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children. The youth, elderly, unemployed and men tend to be neglected. Those from the neglected groups risk becoming a financial and emotional burden on their families, and may suffer from depression or become violent and engage in antisocial behaviour. The difficulty in obtaining funding to assist certain social groups also affects the success of programmes designed to help other camp inhabitants. Coping mechanisms vary among different households and the different socio-economic levels in the camps. The most significant factor influencing well-being seems to be the size of the social network – the larger the network the more successful the household. The other important factor is whether the father is alive and fit to work – the poorest families are without a male head of household, or without one capable of working. The more income earners each household contains also affects the standard of living, even if some of the contributions come from irregular work, although the most successful families had at least one regular source of income. It has not been possible to establish a firm link between education level and household prosperity, but in general, the better educated are better off. Poor health is a major drain on household financial resources, but again there was not enough data to confirm the views of many inhabitants that the poorest households are in the poorest health. There are differences in income level between the capital and other urban areas in Lebanon which reflected the different costs of living. Interestingly, the household studies also revealed different concerns and aspirations between the three camp communities which may reflect their different experiences and the influences of their geographical locations. In the capital in Bourj al-Barajneh, people tended to express political concerns, while those from the Bourj al-Shamali and Nahr al-Barid camps focused more on domestic issues. What is not always clear, and deserves further research to improve the understanding of how refugee communities survive, is the direction of influence between standard of living and differentiating factors. For example, does a household develop a large social network because it is successful, or does it need that social network to become successful? Does a family need to be relatively affluent before it can educate members, or is it the educating of individuals that enables a household to become more successful? It is important to understand these causal relationships otherwise the obstacles to ameliorating the standard of living at the household level cannot be tackled.

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Many of the vulnerabilities experienced by Palestinians in Lebanon are a result of external factors and are beyond the means of the camp populations to tackle. The major shortcomings of UNRWA assistance are the result of local, regional and international political, legal and economic issues. Many of the NGOs are subject to similar challenges. Palestinians have few means to improve relations with the host community, and the lack of governance in the camps is a result of the exclusion of the camp communities from Lebanese organizational structures, the huge numbers of diverse actors in the camps, and external political pressures from elsewhere in the region through the various factions. These vulnerabilities undermine camp population coping mechanisms and severely reduce the space for development. Given all the negative factors, the situation for the Palestinians in Lebanon is becoming increasingly difficult to improve without major changes taking place on the political level, either in Lebanon or in the international arena. The inhospitable environment the Lebanese government has created for the Palestinian refugees, in part it is argued to improve security in Lebanon, could have the opposite effect as the Palestinians have little to lose from rebelling against the state. Vulnerabilities have changed over time, reducing the effectiveness of camp population capacities. Financial shortfall has forced UNRWA to implement austerity measures. Employment opportunities have been reduced. Refugee–host relationships have deteriorated and the Lebanese government is increasingly introducing regulations that infringe upon Palestinian human rights. Palestinian politics has become increasingly fractured and the sources of power influencing the camp more distant and less accountable. Furthering Knowledge and Understanding This book aims to provide insights into issues surrounding protracted refugee status through a case study of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. It is not an exhaustive study of Palestinian refugees or other protracted refugee groups. Assistance to refugees and other communities forced to migrate could be improved and warehousing avoided if refugee coping mechanisms were better understood and political factors influencing the treatment of refugees tackled more effectively. The knowledge to improve the treatment of refugees and to improve refugee–host relations can only be gathered through further study. For example, the extent of UNRWA’s impact on coping mechanisms in the official refugee

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camps could be examined by drawing comparisons with the unofficial Palestinian camps in Lebanon which receive little or no servicing from UNRWA and whose inhabitants often have to travel to official camps or urban centres to access UNRWA facilities. Another refugee group that deserves further attention is those who are self-settled. There is little available literature on self-settled refugees in general and self-settled Palestinian refugees in Lebanon in particular. The situation of selfsettled Palestinian refugees in Lebanon could be compared with that of those living in official UNRWA camps to explore the differences between the coping mechanisms developed by Palestinians inside and outside refugee camps. The impact of different host community policies on refugee coping mechanisms and the refugee–host relationship could be examined by looking at Palestinian refugees in Syria and Jordan. Given that the relationship between the Palestinians and the authorities and civil society in Jordan and Syria is very different from the refugee–host relationship in Lebanon, it would be useful to see how the coping mechanisms of the Palestinians in camps in these two countries have developed and what the impact of assistance on these coping mechanisms has been. Further research is also needed to understand coping mechanisms developed to deal with chronic crises. Coping mechanisms are often discussed in the context of sudden or temporary crisis situations; there has been less research focusing on long-term coping mechanisms. Such research is particularly important to understand protracted refugee coping mechanisms and how such mechanisms are developed, modified and adapted over time to respond to changing circumstances. It is apparent that there are many contested views and ambiguities surrounding communities forced to migrate. There is a need for a clearer definition for refugees and a consensus about whether this should include IDPs. The international community needs to develop better mechanisms for protecting refugees. Examination of different refugee group experiences would highlight the gaps in assistance and protection afforded by refugee law, and provide a starting point to strengthen the legal framework for refugees. It is evident that many experts question the conventional methods of assisting refugees and that alternative approaches need to be developed. Research to identify more innovative methods of assistance and assessment of their success rate could help to improve interventions to assist refugees and might limit some of the problems current approaches cause.

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Conclusion Palestinians have managed to survive in Lebanon despite the difficult conditions because they have developed coping mechanisms, the most important being the strong social networks and resilient psychological attitude. The coping mechanisms have hidden many problems from outside observers, who have often failed to recognize that the available space for Palestinians to exploit in order to survive is becoming smaller. The importance of the coping mechanisms should not be underestimated, but equally their existence should not be used to justify inaction to try to improve the conditions for the Palestinians in Lebanon. Rather, the coping mechanisms should be used as a starting point to see whether they can be enhanced to promote sustainable development. However, without significant changes in Lebanese government policy and the internal political dynamics of the camps, little space exists for a radical change in the assistance available. As the Palestinians form a unique refugee group that is normally regarded solely in political rather than humanitarian terms, they are rarely considered alongside other refugees or analysed from a socio-economic perspective. This book has sought to redress the balance by presenting an in-depth study of Palestinian refugees in camps in Lebanon and comparing them with other refugee groups. It has revealed that the camp communities have developed many coping mechanisms to help them survive but that these are undermined by vulnerabilities, many of which are caused by external factors beyond the reach of the Palestinian population. Although there is some space to enhance these capacities and reduce the vulnerabilities, the present situation prevents radical action to improve the lives of the Palestinian camp inhabitants in Lebanon. Even though the conclusions here are pessimistic about the possibilities of ameliorating the Palestinian refugee experience, this book highlights the need to calculate more carefully assistance to refugees from the earliest stages. It reveals that interventions have the potential to build on the capacities of refugees, but that unintentionally, for a variety of reasons, assistance can also create or exacerbate vulnerabilities. It also highlights the complexity of the environment surrounding the camps and the other important factors, lack of governance and the poor refugee–host relationship, that seriously undermine the camp inhabitants’ capacities. Consequently, it is not enough for the humanitarian community to consider the potential impact of its

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programmes and monitor their success: it is necessary to adopt a holistic approach and maintain up-to-date knowledge of each refugee situation. Unquestionably, the highly politicized nature of the Palestinian refugee problem and the regular regional crises have presented a serious challenge to the provision of assistance, and it is perhaps these cycles of emergencies that have prevented a serious rethink about the best way to provide assistance to long-term refugees. However, the continued openended provision of unsustainable relief-orientated assistance should not be allowed to continue for another 60 years. Despite the deteriorating situation, the Palestinians in camps in Lebanon have succeeded in developing coping mechanisms to survive and can provide valuable information about refugee capacities and vulnerabilities and how future assistance providers can avoid making the same mistakes with other refugee groups. Palestinian camp populations in Lebanon prove that refugees are resourceful and able to adapt and respond to difficult circumstances. The Palestinian experience in Lebanon reveals that although important, assistance is only one element affecting the capacities and vulnerabilities of camp inhabitants and that the prolonged existence of an institution to provide assistance can contribute to the creation of an intractable refugee problem. Despite the ability of the camp communities in Lebanon to develop coping mechanisms, in the current climate, there is little space to enhance these through assistance, and few openings remain for the population to explore to improve its own position. Indeed, unless the situation for Palestinians in Lebanon changes dramatically in the near future, their vulnerabilities will be increased and their capacities reduced: a sad reflection of the inadequacy of current mechanisms to protect refugees and their rights, promote their humanitarian needs, and identify and implement a durable solution.

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APPENDIX: CAMP PROFILES The camp history, local political dynamics, socio-economic environment and availability of assistance and services have influenced the development of each camp and contributed to the creation of settlements that to some extent resemble permanent ones. Households have personalized and, where possible, improved their shelters, UNRWA through provision of services has assumed the role of a government, and Palestinian political and civil society organizations have developed. Although the prevailing conditions in the camps are similar, they vary in size and political outlook. Some camp inhabitants have easier access to assistance, services and employment opportunities than others. Over six decades the camps have ceased to be temporary settlements and act as permanent homes for the inhabitants, who have adapted themselves to the local situation to make a home and a way of life. This process and the factors that influence the immediate camp environments have created camps with individual characteristics. Below is a brief description of each camp based on research conducted between 1996 and 2006, which highlights aspects that differentiate them from each other. Nahr al-Barid Nahr al-Barid, established in 1949, occupied 192 square kilometres of land north of Tripoli in countryside near the Syrian–Lebanese border. The camp was largely unaffected by the civil war although there was factional fighting during the early 1980s (Kjaer, 1990: 31). Nahr al-Barid was the second-largest camp in Lebanon and the most densely populated; the lanes were narrow, inaccessible by car and had little natural light. A few inhabitants crossed the border seeking cheaper goods and medical treatment in Syria. Unlike camp communities in Beirut and the south, few people knew English despite it being taught in UNRWA schools.1 Palestinians elsewhere in Lebanon perceive the inhabitants of the northern camps, particularly Nahr al-Barid, as conservative. Nahr al-

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Barid inhabitants were considered wealthier than those living in other camps because of the large sūq and the many shops lining the main street. Local Lebanese en route to and from Tripoli shopped in Nahr alBarid because it was convenient and relatively cheap. Inhabitants recognized the economic benefits from passing trade, but argue that only those directly involved profited. The fighting in 2007 between Fatah al-Islam and the Lebanese Armed Forces killed 222 members of Fatah al-Islam and over 200 Lebanese soldiers and civilians. Nahr al-Barid camp was destroyed and 33,000 Palestinian refugees were displaced, mainly to nearby al-Beddawi camp (UN, 2008: 3). A major reconstruction process is under way but two years on progress is slow and former inhabitants fear that the camp will not be rebuilt (Middle East Online, 2009). Al-Beddawi Near Nahr al-Barid is the smaller and more spacious camp of alBeddawi. Some of its streets are arranged in a grid formation, most of these can accommodate two lanes of traffic. The highly organized structure, rarely found in other camps, probably reflects the fact that it was not established until 1955 so streets and houses could be planned. The popular committee and political factions claim to concentrate on social rather than political activities and the regulation of camp security. The poorest area of the camp is occupied by families from Tel al-Za’atar, a camp in East Beirut that was destroyed during the civil war. Wavel Named after a French army general, Wavel camp was originally a French army barracks built in the 1930s. In 1952 UNRWA assumed control of the camp, which occupies 42,300 square kilometres and is still surrounded by the original barrack walls. Most Palestinians refer to Wavel as Ba’albek camp after the historical site a few kilometres away. Located on the main road of the modern town of Ba’albek, Wavel is a small camp and the only one in Lebanon with a declining population, which is attributed to the lack of work in the area. Many of those registered with UNRWA as living in Wavel have either left or are rarely there. Unlike most of the other camps, Wavel is clean, spacious and has fresh, relatively unpolluted air. However, conditions inside the houses, particularly those in the original army barracks buildings, are poor.

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Families of eight or nine are often confined to one poorly ventilated room and shared kitchen and toilet facilities. The Beka’a winter is severe and lasts from November to May. Temperatures can drop to -6ºC and the cost of running a paraffin heater could be prohibitive. Palestinians living in other camps believed that Wavel inhabitants are wealthy because they received generous remittances, but observations suggest that is not the case. In fact, in 2000, a UNRWA camp official thought that 70 per cent of inhabitants were dependent on remittances merely to survive.2 To save money camp inhabitants travel to Syria for shopping and healthcare. As a way to generate income inhabitants have opened small shops, but there are too many for the camp population to support. Most inhabitants shop in the cheaper, twice-weekly street market outside the camp. Significant numbers of children drop out of school, disillusioned by the poor employment prospects, and around 30 per cent of girls left school in their early teens to help in the home.3 The inhabitants seem uninterested in political activities. The offices of the pro-Syrian, anti-Fatah factions are closed and the popular committee is said to focus on social issues. Bourj al-Barajneh Bourj al-Barajneh, located on the main road between the airport and central Beirut, is the largest camp in the capital. Some inhabitants near the main camp entrance have taken advantage of the location on the airport road and opened vehicle repair garages. The population is predominantly Palestinian, although a few Lebanese, Syrian, Egyptian and Bangladeshi families live in the camp.4 The political factions and those controlling the popular committee are pro-Syrian, anti-PLO. During the civil war, large areas of the camp were destroyed and it was besieged three times by Amal militia. Most buildings have been rebuilt but some areas still lie in ruins, riddled with bullet and shell holes. Bourj al-Barajneh inhabitants have long been considered to be broad-minded and the best educated of the camp communities in Lebanon.5 Women dress more liberally than those from other camps and it is estimated that 40 per cent of them work outside the home – more than in other camps. Although the number of women in employment may indicate a progressive attitude, it could also indicate that there are greater job opportunities for women in the capital than elsewhere, or that because living in Beirut is relatively expensive, the additional income from a female member of the household is needed.

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Shatila Outside Lebanon, Shatila is probably the best known of all the Palestinian camps because of the 1982 massacre in which an estimated 2,400 people were killed.6 The camp is located in a poor area of Beirut that was badly damaged during the civil war. Much of the camp and surrounding area are still in ruins, making it difficult to identify the official camp boundaries. Some of the shelters in and around Shatila appear to be worse than any found in the other official camps in Lebanon. These small shelters constructed from slabs of concrete, pieces of cardboard, corrugated iron and plastic sheets appear temporary although people have lived in them for many years. There are market stalls on the edge of the camp and a large market in Sabra, an area adjacent to the camp occupied by many Palestinians. However, most of these stalls are owned by Syrians, and therefore not, as it might be assumed, a significant source of income for the Palestinian community of Shatila.7 Since at least the mid-1990s it has been recognized that only about half the population of Shatila is Palestinian; the rest are from other Arab countries, mainly Syria and Lebanon. However Shatila has become an important symbol to Palestinians, who mark the anniversary of the massacre every year; withdrawal of UNRWA services to the camp would be unacceptable to the Palestinian population.8 Mar Elias Located close to the centre of Beirut in a relatively affluent area immediately accessible from a main road, Mar Elias is a small camp occupying an area of 5,400 square metres. Established in 1952 by the Mar Elias Convent to accommodate mainly Christian families, by 2000 the majority of the 240 families in the camp was Muslim. Compared with Shatila and Bourj al-Barajneh, Mar Elias is clean, quiet and relatively spacious. Inhabitants have access to UNRWA and NGO facilities in the camp which are also available to people from outside the camp. The international NGO Norwegian People’s Aid has established its main physical rehabilitation centre in Mar Elias to assist people from all over Lebanon, not just Palestinians. Although Mar Elias does not have a reputation for political activity inside the camp, all the main Palestinian political factions have offices there. Consequently, it has been argued by some international observers that Mar Elias is not really a camp, but a home to political factions.9 In

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2000 camp inhabitants divulged little information about the popular committee, but said that it was composed of pro-Syrian factions, organized political rallies, monitored the provision of water and collected money for the electricity supply.10 Dbayyeh Dbayyeh camp, established in 1956 in a Christian area, is located 20 km north of Beirut, on a hill overlooking the main road to Jounieh. The population is Christian, but many are thought to be of Lebanese origin rather than Palestinians registered with UNRWA. It is claimed that the number of Lebanese families has been declining and that Palestinians who left during the war were returning to the camp.11 In 2000 inhabitants estimated the camp population at 2,500 although UNRWA recorded a population of 4,184.12 The disparity could be caused by the large numbers who left during the war, which would not be reflected in UNRWA figures unless people had informed the agency. In general few Palestinians in other camps seem to be aware of Dbayyeh, possibly because its inhabitants are Christian or Lebanese so there are fewer social links, or because it is small and isolated. However, in 2006 one of the local NGOs based in Bourj al-Barajneh claimed to be developing social links with Dbayyeh inhabitants.13 In comparison with other camps, Dbayyeh is orderly, spacious and quiet. The four parallel roads are lined with UNRWA-built houses one or two storeys high. There are few NGOs active in the camp, no active popular committee, and no UNRWA educational or medical services. Inhabitants have to pay transport costs to access UNRWA services in Beirut. The only authority and organization present in the camp for an extended period has been a convent run by three European nuns belonging to the Little Sisters of Nazareth. They provide first aid and organize activities in the summer for the children. Ein al-Hilweh Ein al-Hilweh, the largest camp in Lebanon, has a fluctuating population somewhere between 40,000 and 100,000. In November 1999 the official UNRWA population figure for Ein al-Hilweh was 42,369 but many informed camp inhabitants, including UNRWA and NGO staff, believed the camp population to be considerably higher. The disparity between these figures is indicative of the fluid population structure. Many people, mainly Lebanese, flee to Palestinian camps from the south of Lebanon

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when Israeli attacks become intense. Ein al-Hilweh has been a popular place of refuge, possibly because it was the nearest place considered safe from attack with access to Saida. After the Israeli Grapes of Wrath attack on Lebanon in 1996, a large area of the camp became home to displaced Lebanese living in makeshift shelters.14 Other factors confusing the population figures are the presence of Lebanese and Syrian workers and unregistered Palestinians who fled to Lebanon in 1967 and belong to the camp militias. Ein al-Hilweh is the most volatile and politicized of the camps and experiences regular domestic and political disturbances. Propaganda covers the camp walls and pathways are painted with the Star of David for inhabitants to walk over to demonstrate hostility towards Israel. The camp is split between pro-Fatah and pro-Syrian factions, which often disagree about the composition of the popular committee and form rival committees that vie for power. Numerous domestic disputes also undermine the stability of the camp.15 Inhabitants interact with the outside community more than most other camps because Ein al-Hilweh is in Saida, and has a large, competitively priced sūq that attracts Lebanese shoppers. The main roads through the camp are busy and congested so members of the political factions direct traffic. For administrative purposes, UNRWA has divided the camp into ten sectors, said to have similar characteristics. Although the main roads through the camp are wide and give the impression of space, the alleyways branching off from the main roads are narrow and run between houses several storeys high. To extend their houses people have built onto the pavement, reducing the space between the houses. As Ein al-Hilweh is the largest camp in Lebanon, many NGOs are active in the camp and Saida. There are also various Islamic organizations and a PRCS hospital in the camp. Mieh Mieh Mieh Mieh, established in 1954 on a hill 4 km east of Saida, is a spacious and clean camp of around 5,000 inhabitants. Fatah has been the main faction in the camp and controls the popular committee. The committee deals with domestic problems and liaised with UNRWA, organizing protests when services were considered unsatisfactory. UNRWA provides primary and elementary schooling in the camp but there is a significant drop-out rate.16 Children attend the secondary school in Ein

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al-Hilweh and, in October 2000, there were places for every child who had successfully graduated from elementary school. UNRWA also operates clinics in the camp which are open several days a week. The GUPW and an Islamic organization each run a kindergarten. However, to benefit fully from UNRWA and NGO services, Mieh Mieh inhabitants go to Ein al-Hilweh. In comparison with Ein al-Hilweh, Mieh Mieh has been calm but tensions between Fatah and Islamist organizations in the camp have been reported. Clashes between factions killed 12 people in 2008 (Zaatari, 2009). Al-Buss Al-Buss was established for Armenian refugees in 1935. Palestinians began moving into the camp while the Armenians were still there. Many of the Palestinians were Christian although most of these, like the Armenian refugees, have left. The camp is located on the main north–south coastal road next to the village of al-Buss. Many buses and shared taxis operate along this route using an area adjacent to al-Buss camp as a main pick-up and drop-off point. There are shops and garages on the edge of the camp along the main road but it is thought that many of these are owned by Lebanese. Al-Buss camp is small, relatively spacious, and clean although there are some open sewers. Most of the houses are no more than two storeys high. The roads are wide enough for cars but most of the camp entrances were partially blocked by the Lebanese in 1990, preventing vehicles from entering freely. The UNRWA population figure for 1999 is 9,498, although the camp services officer in 2000 estimated that the number of inhabitants was closer to 5,000, with about 8,500 registered refugees living in the surrounding area. For several reasons the camp is said to have achieved better integration with the local population than other camps: al-Buss is next to the village with immediate access from the main road; the Palestinian Christian families in the camp attend the same church as local Lebanese families; the Lebanese government hospital, which was built when the camp was established in 1935, is still used by the Lebanese; some NGOs in the camp actively aim to provide services for both Palestinians and Lebanese, which increases opportunities for the two communities to interact.

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Bourj al-Shamali Bourj al-Shamali camp, administered by UNRWA since 1955, is located 3 km east of the coastal town of Tyre next to Bourj al-Shamali village. In 1982 a massacre occurred when the Israelis, failing to invade the camp with ground troops, decided to mount an aerial attack with phosphorus bombs. One of the bombs hit a shelter, killing 99 people, and burning many more. A memorial has been erected to those killed.17 Bourj al-Shamali, occupying an area of 13 square kilometres, is more spacious than other camps but has a poorer infrastructure; the roads are in disrepair and much of the camp is still served by open sewers. It was thought that approximately one-third of the camp population had Lebanese citizenship and was able to access both UNRWA and Lebanese services.18 There were tensions in the camp apparently caused by rivalry between political groups and disagreements with UNRWA.19 Bourj al-Shamali appears to be the only camp receiving large amounts of capital from the PLO, which has funded the construction of a large community centre containing a well-resourced youth centre and kindergarten. Before the restrictions on building materials entering the camps were relaxed in 2004, the law could be circumvented with incentives and a good contact network. The facilities for young people in Bourj al-Shamali are superior to those in other camps. In addition to the PLO centre, there are six other centres for young people offering various educational and extra-curricular activities. Bait Atfal Assmoud, a Palestinian NGO, had a computer room and was home to the first Across Borders project in Lebanon, which uses the Web and email to contact Palestinian communities in the diaspora and Palestine. Rashidieh In 2000 there were approximately 23,000 people in Rashidieh, which is divided into three areas known as the entrance, the new camp and the old camp. The old camp was originally built next to the Lebanese Christian village of Rashidieh by the French government in 1938 for Armenian refugees. The two village churches, both partially destroyed during the civil war and now used for storage, were incorporated into the camp. From 1950, Rashidieh camp was used to house Palestinian refugees. In 1963 UNRWA extended the camp by building more shelters – this area became known as the new camp. The Armenians have since left and so have any Christian Palestinians who initially settled in Rashidieh. Unlike the other camps in Lebanon, which house some non-

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Palestinian and Christian families, it is thought that Rashidieh was populated entirely by Muslim Palestinians. Rashidieh is pro-Fatah, like the other camps in the south of Lebanon, and home to Sultan Abu Ainayn, the commander of Fatah in Lebanon. He was sentenced to death in 1999 in absentia by the Lebanese authorities for inciting armed rebellion and damaging the property of the Lebanese state (Aasheim, 2000: 25).

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NOTES Notes to Chapter 1 Personal communications with inhabitants of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon during extended visits, 1996–2006. 2 Palestinians in Lebanon regularly expressed hostility towards the late Yasser Arafat, the PLO and Fatah. Personal communications with inhabitants of Palestinian refugee camps during extended visits, 1996–2006. 3 For the text and further discussion of Resolution 194, see chapter 2. 4 UNRWA, NGOs and Palestinians generally recognized that state services available to Lebanese are poor. Personal communications during extended visits to Lebanon, 1996–2006. 5 As of 30 June 2008 there were 4,618,141 refugees registered with UNRWA, 1,363,469 of whom lived in one of UNRWA’s 58 official refugee camps (UNRWA, 2008). 6 Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles, UNRWA, www.un.org/unrwa/ refugees/lebanon.html (1 December 2008). 7 For further comparisons of the conditions of Palestinians in UNRWA’s five fields of operation, see chapters 2 and 3. 8 Personal communications with inhabitants of Palestinian refugee camps and development actors during extended visits to Lebanon, 1996–2006. 9 As of 30 June 2008 17 per cent of registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan and 27 per cent of registered Palestinian refugees in Syria lived in official UNRWA camps (UNRWA, 2008). 10 For example, see Marc J. Sirois, Helping the Camps would Help Lebanon, Daily Star (Beirut), 16 December 2008. 11 Personal communications, Beirut, Lebanon, November 2006. 1

1

Notes to Chapter 2 In January 2005 the total population of concern to UNHCR was 19,185,350. This figure included 9,236,000 refugees, 838,000 asylum seekers, 1,495,090 returned refugees, 5,428,000 IDPs, 146,000 returned IDPs, 1,455,260 stateless and 597,000 others (UNHCR, 2006: 10).

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8

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At the time of Crisp’s publication the USCRI was known as the United States Committee for Refugees (USCR). At the end of 2007, the United Nations estimated the Palestinian population to be 4.56 million (UN, 2008: 4). In a statement in 2007 by NGOs to the 58th Executive Committee of the High Commissioner’s Programme an estimated population of 7 million Palestinian refugees was given. More recent figures for comparison from Badil or the Palestinian Bureau of Statistics could not be sourced. Author interview, senior UNRWA official, Beirut, September 1996. UNGA Resolution 242 calls upon Israel to withdraw from the territories occupied in the 1967 war and for a fair settlement for the Palestinian refugees. UNGA Resolution 338 calls for the implementation of 242 in the wake of the 1973 Arab–Israeli war ceasefire. Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles, UNRWA, www.un.org/unrwa/ refugees/lebanon.html (1 December 2008). That the Israeli state has cooperated with UNRWA may reflect the fact that if UNRWA did not provide assistance to the Palestinian refugees, under international law, Israel would be responsible for them. Arab nations argue that although they host Palestinian refugee groups, because the refugee problem was not of their making, the international community and not the host Arab nations is responsible for the well-being of Palestinian refugees until a solution is agreed. Observations during extended fieldwork visits to Lebanon, 1996–2006. Notes to Chapter 3 UNHCR, Basic Facts, www.unhcr.org/basics.html (10 January 2009). The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) has been involved in participatory development since the 1970s and the LINK-COD programme in the Philippines from the early 1980s (Constantino-David, 1982: 190). Author interview, senior UNRWA official, UNRWA field office, Lebanon, summer 1996. Many NGOs assisting Palestinian refugees experienced a fall in funding after the signing of the 1993 Oslo Accords because donor organizations believed that the Palestinian refugee problem had been

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solved. The targeting of large-scale funding to Palestinian refugees was diverted to projects in what would be Palestinian Authoritycontrolled areas. 5 Global: Financial crisis could cut official aid by 30%, ReliefWeb, 6 November 2008, www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/LSGZ7L5D2K?OpenDocument (20 December 2008). 6 It is claimed that UNRWA’s vocational training centre at Siblen was a military training ground for the PLO (Viorst, 1989: 69). The following headlines are examples of allegations linking UNRWA with terrorism: Israel accuses UNRWA of ignoring terrorism in Palestinian refugee camps, Haaretz, 28 June 2002; US Congressman Tom Lantos lashed out at UNRWA this week accusing the organization of being directly or indirectly complicit in terrorism, Jerusalem Post, 17 May 2002. In April 2003, UNRWA publicly denied allegations made by the Simon Wiesenthal Center that it was complicit in terrorism: Setting the Record Straight, www.un.org/ unrwa/allegations/index.html (10 December 2008). The UNRWA education system has been accused of perpetuating terrorism: see How UNRWA Became a Barrier to Peace, Jerusalem Post, 28 May 2008, www.jpost.com (10 December 2008). 7 UNHCR data excludes self-settled refugees and includes only IDPs that are of concern to the UN agency (UNHCR, 2006: 22). In 2004 the USCR claimed that 75 per cent of Africa’s 3 million refugee population was living in camps (USCR, 2004: 2). 8 Author interview, senior UNRWA official, UNRWA field office, Lebanon, June 2001. 9 Coping mechanisms are also known as coping strategies (Chambers, 1989; Curtis, 1995; MacArthur & MacArthur, 1998; Ogden, 2000; Seitz, 1998), survival strategies (Zetter, 1996), capabilities (Sen, 1999) and capacities, which are examined in conjunction with vulnerabilities (Anderson & Woodrow, 1989). 10 Health Canada, 1996, www.uoguelph.ca/~jford01/Vulnerability/ Vuln_defintions.pdf (4 August 2004). 11 It is beyond the scope of this book to examine different analytical approaches used to study capacities and vulnerabilities, which include, for example, sustainable livelihoods analysis (DFID, 1999), victim security matrix (Twigg, 2001), the access model and pressure and release model (Blaikie et al., 1994). Like any model, CVA has its advantages and disadvantages. For more information see IFRC, 1999; March et al., 1999; Twigg, 2001.

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Notes to Chapter 4 Title from Milton-Edwards & Hinchcliffe (2001: 54). Based on map from the following source: ReliefWeb, www.reliefweb.int/ rw/rwb.nsf/db.900SID/SKAR-64GDR5?OpenDocument&rc=3&cc =lbn (20 January 2009). 3 The Christian sects include Maronite, Armenian Catholic, Roman Catholic, Greek Catholic, Syrian Catholic, Assyrian Catholic, Chaldean Catholic, Armenian Orthodox, Greek Orthodox, Syrian Orthodox, Protestant. The Muslim community is composed of Sunni, Shi’a, Druze, Isma’ili and Alawi. There are also small numbers of Baha’is and Jews (McDowall, 1996: 7; www.cia.gov (20 January 2009); Deegan, 1993: 105). 4 1932 census results for Lebanon: 52% population Christian, 45.5% Muslim, 1% Jewish. Maronite 30%, Greek Orthodox 10%, Greek Catholic 6%, Armenian 4%, other Christians 2%; 21% Sunni, 18% Shi’a, 6.5% Druze. 5 www.lebanonembassyus.org (20 January 2009). 6 www.cia.gov (12 June 2002). In July 2008 the CIA estimated the Lebanese population at almost 4 million (accessed 20 January 2009). 7 www.worldbank.org (10 June 2002). The UN estimated the Lebanese population at 4.2 million in 2009, cited in BBC, Country Profile: Lebanon, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/country_ profiles/791071.stm (20 April 2010). Amnesty International USA in its 2008 Annual Report for Lebanon estimated the population at 3.7 million: www.amnestyusa.org/annualreport.php?id=ar&yr+2008+ LBN (20 January 2009). 8 According to McDowall the Maronite Saint Joseph and Kaslite Universities are both francophone and Western in outlook, the American University of Beirut is anglophone and adopts Western Protestant traditions, and the Arab University of Beirut promotes a Pan-Arab/Muslim ideology (1996: 8). An article from 2007 suggests that politically, if not religiously, views held by students within an individual university are becoming more diverse (Wimmen, 2007). 9 UNRWA appears to have stopped publishing what percentage of the population of Lebanon is made up of Palestinians in 2002. 10 Estimates of the number of Palestinians who fled to Lebanon in 1948 vary: 104,000 (Beker & Oordt, 1991: 1), 110,000 (R. Sayigh, 1994: 17), 120,000 (Russell, 1985: 17) and 150,000 (el-Natour, 1993: 41). A further 5,000 Palestinians arrived in Lebanon after the Suez 1 2

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12 13 14

15 16 17

18 19

20

21 22 23

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Crisis in 1956 and another 5,000 after the Six-Day War in 1967 and Black September in 1970 (el-Natour, 1993: 41). There are discrepancies among the sources about the dates and order in which camps in Lebanon were established. The discrepancies may exist because of the difficulty of establishing when camps were first recognized as official. Sabra has never been an official Palestinian camp. Author interviews, Lebanon, September–November 2000. Personal communications with inhabitants, Nahr al-Barid camp, Tripoli, June 2001. There are competing Lebanese and Palestinian claims to the seven villages based on 1948 borders, although el-Natour argues that in 1922 a joint British–French referendum revealed that the inhabitants of these villages wanted to be located in Palestine and not Lebanon. Author interview, Beirut, June 2001. Personal communications with Palestinians living in camps who have not claimed their rights to citizenship, autumn 2000 and spring 2001. The host governments of Jordan, Syria and Israel allow Palestinians access to state-operated services: www.unrwa.org (June 2002). ‘Fatah’ is derived from reversing the initial letters of the Arabic ‘Haraket al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filestini’ – which translates as the Palestinian National Liberation Movement. The Litani River is considered by some Zionist and ultra-Orthodox Jews to be the historic northern border of Israel. Official Red Cross figures announced on 22 September 1982, cited in Chai, 1989: 72. Brynen quotes a lower death toll figure of 1,000: see Brynen, 1990: 181. The disputed Sheba farm area claimed by the Lebanese, Syrians and Hizbollah to be part of Lebanon, and by the Israelis to be part of Syria, remains (at the time of writing, May 2009) under Israeli control. Fatah Intifada is also known as Fatah Provisional Command. Personal communications and observations, autumn 2000 and spring 2001. Estimates for the number of Syrian troops in Lebanon vary. In the Guardian newspaper in March 2003, Brian Whitaker claimed that there were around 21,000 Syrian troops and secret police in Lebanon: www.guardian.co.uk (5 December 2003). In December 2003 the UK government’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office estimated that there were only 15,000 Syrian troops in Lebanon: www.fco.gov.uk (5 December 2003).

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24 Lebanese politicians have made public statements to the international community refusing to settle the Palestinians permanently in Lebanon. For example, at a news conference in Oman in January 2001, Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri said, ‘Lebanon refuse their [the Palestinians’] settlement. The solution lies in the return of the Palestinians to their homes’. In September 2008, President Michel Suleiman told US President George Bush that the future for Palestinians was in their homeland and not in Lebanon: Lebanese President to Bush: Palestinian refugees’ future in their homeland not in Lebanon, Reuters, 25 September 2008, www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1024555.html (10 February 2009). 25 Author interview, Palestinian lawyer, Beirut, 12 June 2001. 26 Interior Minister Elias Murr made a similar statement at the 18th conference of Arab interior ministers in Tunis in January 2001, claiming that if Palestinians are settled in Lebanon it would be ‘a time bomb waiting to explode’ (Daily Star, 2001a). 27 Personal communications during extended visits to Lebanon, 1996–2006. 28 Figure from Banque du Liban, Economic and Financial Data, www.bdl.gov.lb/edata/elements.asp?Table+t531-4 (20 March 2009).

1 2

3

4 5 6 7

8

Notes to Chapter 5 Unless otherwise stated, information in this chapter has been gathered during visits to Lebanon between 1996 and 2006. Meeting with UNRWA official, UNRWA headquarters, Amman, April 2001. See also paragraph 2, UNRWA Annual Report of the Department of Health, 2005. A report by Amnesty International in 2007 cites figures from different sources with estimates of non-registered refugees ranging from 10,000 to 40,000 and non-ID Palestinians ranging from 3,000 to 5,000 (Amnesty International, 2007: 9). Personal communication, local NGO worker, Beirut, July 1998. Personal communication, international NGO worker, Beirut, July 1998. Personal communications, Lebanon, 2001 and 2006. Based on map from the following source: Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles, UNRWA, www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/lebanon.html (12 December 2008). Total Registered Camp Population as of 30 June 2008, UNRWA, www.un.org/unrwa (7 June 2009).

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11 12

13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20 21

22

23

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See chapter 2 for details of the criteria an individual must fulfil to register as a refugee. UNRWA figures are for 30 November 1999: www.un.org/unrwa (11 November 2000). Respondents’ estimates were recorded in autumn 2000 and spring 2001. Personal communication, Bourj al-Barajneh, Beirut, October 2000. For example: Bomb kills one at Lebanon Palestinian refugee camp, Reuters, December 2001; Ain al-Hilweh leaders take steps to contain recent violence, Daily Star (Beirut), June 2002; Lebanon camps under pressure: pressure has been mounting on Lebanon’s Palestinian militias to disarm, Alex Klaushofer, BBC, Beirut, October 2005; Siniora: Syria is sending arms to Palestinian camps across border, Reuters, June 2007; Egyptian Embassy ‘at risk’ of attack by new Palestinian group: fears due to Cairo’s stance in Gaza war, Andrew Wander and Mariam Saab, Daily Star (Beirut), February 2009. Author interview, senior UNRWA official, UNRWA field office, Lebanon, summer 1996. Author interview, Palestinian lawyer, Beirut, June 2001. Author interview, Palestinian lawyer, Beirut, June 2001. Personal communications with informed national and international observers, Lebanon, autumn 2000 and spring 2001. Palestinians Campaign for Lebanon Property, Al Jazeera, 2 October 2003, http://English.aljazeera.net/Articles/News/ArabWorld? Palestinians+campaign+for+Lebanon+property.htm (10 October 2003). Author interview, Palestinian lawyer, Beirut, June 2001. Personal communication, director of a local NGO, Beirut, November 2006. Personal experience and communications, November 2006. There have been numerous Israeli attacks damaging power supplies in Lebanon. Some of the most high-profile have occurred in April 1996, June 1999, February 2000 and July 2006. Outside the camps, because of poor administration and oversight, the situation is similar; people steal electricity or find that they are never charged for their legal supplies. The state-owned electricity company, Electricité Du Liban, fails to collect all its revenue and requires regular financial support from the government to continue operations (EIU, 2006: 18). Personal communication, senior UNRWA official, Beirut, September 2000.

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24 There are no official figures for the number of Syrian workers in Lebanon. Before the Syrian withdrawal in 2005 many estimates were around 1 million (Gambill, 2003). Since the Syrian withdrawal, Syrian media organizations suggest that there are around 400,000 Syrian workers in Lebanon (see Syrian Workers are the victims of Lebanon– Syrian relations, IWPR, 21 May 2008, www.yaliban.com/site/ archives/2008/05/Syrian_workers_1.php (10 February 2009)). 25 Syrian labourers bear brunt of Lebanon’s political divide, AFP, 14 March 2008, www.afp.google.com/article/ALegM5hH2gHEap6xu G33yOTDpL-VeBZ6w (2 February 2009). 26 Personal telephone communication, mine action expert based in southern Lebanon, May 2007. Clearance activities were not limited to the Palestinians; poor Lebanese in the area also participated in unofficial clearance. 27 Personal communications, national and international observers, Lebanon, autumn 2000 and spring 2001. 28 Research conducted by the author with UN and NGO staff and inhabitants from all the camps in Lebanon in 2000 and 2001. 29 Some of the pupils of Nahr al-Barid, al-Beddawi and Wavel camps staged a hunger strike outside the UNRWA field office in Lebanon in an attempt to persuade the agency to open secondary schools in the north of the country: personal observation, Lebanon, 2000. 30 Lebanon: UNRWA and the European Union inaugurate a new secondary school in Taalabaya, 12 February 2009, www.reliefweb.int/ rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/JBRN-7PBJA9?OpenDocument (20 February 2009). 31 Elementary Preparatory Education, UNRWA, www.un.org/unrwa/ programmes/education/basic.html (12 December 2008). 32 Personal communication, senior UNRWA official, Lebanon, 2001. 33 Observation and personal communications with parents of schoolaged children, 1996–2006. 34 Education 1998–99 at www.un.org/unrwa (17 November 2001). 35 Personal communications, camp inhabitants, 1996–2006. A 2007 report by Amnesty International quotes Palestinians who say that investing time and money in education is a waste given the poor employment prospects in Lebanon (Amnesty International, 2007). 36 For example, University of Balamand and al-Jinan University are both based in Tripoli, and the Lebanese University and Saint Joseph University each maintain branches in three areas outside the capital in addition to their Beirut campuses.

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37 Figure for academic year 2008/9: personal telephone communication, camp inhabitant, Beirut, March 2009. 38 Personal communications, Lebanon, 1996–2006. 39 UNRWA official based in Bourj al-Barajneh camp, July 2001. 40 Personal communications, Bourj al-Barajneh camp, summer 1996, 1998, autumn 2000. 41 UNRWA reports confirm the anecdotal evidence: between 1995 and 1999 there was an increase in family planning accepters (www.un.org/unrwa (17 November 2001)), and between 1995 and 2005 mean family size decreased from 5.33 to 4.93 (UNRWA, 2005: 3). 42 Personal communications, Lebanon, autumn 2000. 43 Personal communication, health professional, Beirut, November 2000; PRCS – Lebanon Branch, About us, 2006, www.prcslebanon.org/prcs/aboutus.aspx?lg=en (10 June 2009). 44 Author interview, senior UNRWA official, UNRWA field office, Lebanon, June 2001. 45 Women’s Programme, UNRWA informational literature, 1998. 46 Personal communication, senior UNRWA official, Beirut, July 2001. 47 Author interviews, NGO staff and Bourj al-Barajneh inhabitants, Beirut, 2006. 48 Personal communication, senior UNRWA official, Beirut, July 2001.

1 2 3 4

5

6

Notes to Chapter 6 Bourj al-Barajneh Camp, www.un.org/unrwa (29 August 2001). UNRWA figures are for 30 November 1999: www.un.org/unrwa (11 November 2000). Data from Bourj al-Barajneh workshop, 2001. Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles, UNRWA, www.un.org/unrwa/ refugees/lebanon.html (10 January 2009); Women’s Humanitarian Organization, Our Response to the 2006 War in Lebanon, December 2006 (unpublished). In 2009 households paid LL 2,000 ($1.3) for each water pipe to the home, 20 litres of potable water cost LL 500 ($0.3) and a 1.5-litre bottle of mineral water LL 750–1,000 ($0.5–$0.6). Personal telephone communication, Bourj al-Barajneh inhabitant, March 2009. Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles, UNRWA, www.un.org/unrwa/ refugees/lebanon.html (9 June 2009).

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7

8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

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In 2006 UNRWA recorded a population of 19,074 for Bourj alShamali camp: Lebanon Refugee Camp Profiles, UNRWA, www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/lebanon.html (10 December 2009). Senior UNRWA official, Lebanon, June 2001. Based on author observations, Lebanon, 1996–2006. Personal communications with camp inhabitants speculating on the consequences of a Syrian troop withdrawal, Lebanon, 1996–2001. The Lebanese government has also blocked entrances to al-Buss and Rashidieh camps near Tyre. Personal communications with informed sources, 2000 and 2001. Personal communications with shop owners in Bourj al-Barajneh, 2001. Senior UNRWA official, Lebanon, June 2001. UNRWA healthcare professional, Beirut, May 2001. UNRWA healthcare professional, Bourj al-Barajneh, July 2001. Medical practitioner, Beirut, July 2001. Personal communications during extended visits to Lebanon, 1996–2006. Director of Palestinian NGO, Beirut, November 2000. Figures from 30 June 2000, www.un.org/unrwa (10 July 2001). Farah (2000) also notes the importance of the family among West Bank and Gaza Palestinians. Senior UNRWA official, UNRWA field office, Lebanon, November 2000. Personal communications, Lebanon, spring 2001. Personal communication, Bourj al-Barajneh inhabitants, autumn 2000 and spring 2001. Personal communication, senior official of Palestinian NGO, summer 1996. Observations and personal communications with NGO staff, Lebanon, 1996–2006. In 2008 UNRWA employed 2,950 Palestinian and 6 international staff (UNRWA, 2008). Personal communication, senior UNRWA staff, Beirut, 2000. The head of the popular committee refused to identify the dominant political factions in the camp: author interview, Bourj al-Barajneh, July 2001. While staying in the camp I have to register with the popular committee and obtain permission to conduct research.

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31 Estimate of UNRWA staff member based in Bourj al-Shamali in 2000. 32 The experience of trying to organize fieldwork exposed all these problems. 33 On 7 October 2000, during a Palestinian demonstration in support of the intifada at the Lebanese–Israeli border, two men were shot dead and tens of people were injured by Israeli fire. 34 Personal communications, camp inhabitants and staff from Palestinian NGOs during extended visits to Lebanon, 1996–2006. 35 Personal communication, director of a Palestinian NGO, Beirut, 2001. 36 Personal experience of working with Palestinians from different camps in Lebanon, summer 1996; personal communications with camp inhabitants during extended visits to Lebanon, 1996–2006. 37 Raija-Leena Punamaki (1988 cited in Manasra, 1999) notes that Palestinian women under Israeli occupation with a strong faith enjoyed better mental health than those who were only moderately religious. However, secular women were also more content than the moderately religious. 38 Views expressed by Palestinians in professional employment, personal communications during extended visits to Lebanon, 1996–2006.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7

1 2

Notes to Chapter 7 Personal email communication, NGO staff based in Lebanon, April 2009. Senior UNRWA official, Lebanon, autumn 2000. Views of Palestinian camp inhabitants in Lebanon expressed between 1996 and 2006. Senior UNRWA official, Lebanon, June 2001. Personal observation of events in Lebanon, 7 October 2000. Personal communication, diplomat, Beirut, spring 2001. UNRWA press release, April 2003, www.un.org/unrwa (6 June 2003). Notes to Appendix Palestinians in north Lebanon may prefer to learn French as the educational institutions in the area tend to be francophone. Personal communication, Wavel camp services officer, autumn 2000.

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Personal communication, Wavel camp services officer, autumn 2000. Workshop participants in 2001 estimated that 3 per cent of the Bourj al-Barajneh camp population were non-Palestinians. The view of Bourj al-Barajneh inhabitants and Palestinians from other camps in Lebanon, author interviews, 2000 and 2001. Official Red Cross figure for the numbers killed in Shatila announced on 22 September 1982, in Chai, 1989: 72. Personal communication, director of a Palestinian NGO, Lebanon, 2001. Personal communication, senior UNRWA official, September 1996. Personal communication, informed international source, September 1996. Views reiterated by non-Palestinian sources, autumn 2000. Author interviews with Mar Elias inhabitants, autumn 2000. Author interview, Little Sisters of Nazareth, Dbayyeh camp, September 2000. UNRWA data, 30 November 1999, www.un.org/unrwa (11 November 2000). Personal communication, local NGO staff based in Bourj alBarajneh camp, November 2006. Personal observation, summer 1996. I have visited Ein al-Hilweh several times between 1996 and 2006. Each time my movement in the camp has been restricted or my visit curtailed because of violent incidents. Author interview, UNRWA official, Lebanon, autumn 2000. Personal communication, camp inhabitants, spring 2001. Author interviews, Palestinian lawyer and inhabitant of Rashidieh camp, spring 2001. For example, in 2001 UNRWA offered financial assistance to some of the NGOs operating in Bourj al-Shamali. UNRWA claimed that the NGOs that best fulfilled certain predetermined criteria received assistance. However, UNRWA was accused of supporting only proPLO NGOs, and in protest, the anti-PLO NGOs that had not received any help closed the agency’s facilities and expelled staff from the camp for several days.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Aasheim, Petter (2000) The Palestinian Refugees and the Right to Work in Lebanon, Graduate Thesis, Faculty of Law, University of Lund Abouzeid, Rania (2003) No Property Rights for Lebanon’s Refugees, Al Jazeera, 1 November 2003, http://english.aljazeera.net (15 December 2003) Abukhalil, As’ad (1985) Shi’ites and Palestinians: underlying causes of the Amal–Palestinian conflict, in Elaine Hagopian (ed.) Amal and the Palestinians; understanding the Battle of the Camps, Arab World Issues, no. 9, Association of Arab–American University Graduates Ager, Alistair (1999) Perspectives on the Refugee Experience, in Alistair Ager (ed.) Refugees: perspectives on the experience of forced migration, London & New York: Cassell Akram, Susan M. (2000) Reinterpreting Palestinian Refugee Rights Under International Law, and a Framework for Durable Solutions, paper presented at The Right of Return: Palestinian Refugees and the prospects for a Durable Peace, international conference, Boston, 8 April 2000 Al Jazeera (2003) Palestinians Campaign for Lebanon Property, Al Jazeera, 2 October 2003, http://english.aljazeera.net/Articles/ News/ArabWorld?Palestinians+campaign+for+Lebanon+ property.htm (10 October 2003) Allen, Tim (ed.) (1996) In Search of Cool Ground: war, flight and homemaking in northeast Africa, London & Trenton, NJ: James Curry/Africa World Press Amnesty International (2007) Exile and Suffering: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, Amnesty International, www.amnesty.org/en/library/ asset/MDE18/010/2007/en/34373bc5-d367-11dd-a3292f46302a8cc6/ mde180102007en.pdf (29 November 2009) Anderson, Mary (1999) Do no Harm: how aid can support peace – or war, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Anderson, Mary & Woodrow, Peter J. (1989) Rising from the Ashes: development strategies in times of disaster, Boulder & San Francisco: Westview Press

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Anderson, Mary B. & Woodrow, Peter J. (1991) Reducing Vulnerability to Drought and Famine: Developmental Approaches to Relief, Disasters, 15:1 Badil (2000) What Role UNRWA? Opportunities and Constraints: a Durable Solution to the Palestinian Refugee Issue, paper presented at The PRRN Workshop on the Future of UNRWA, Minister Lovell, UK 19–20 February 2000 Badil (2002a) Refugee Rights are Human Rights, Badil, www.badil.org (10 December 2002) Badil (2002b) More International Protection for Palestinian Refugees?, Badil, www.badil.org (24 November 2002) Barton, Allen H. (1969) Communities in Disaster: a sociological analysis of collective stress situations, London: Ward Lock Educational Basok, Tanya (1993) Too Much or Too Little: urban employment projects for Salvadorean Refugees in Costa Rica, in Peter W. Vann Arsdale (ed.) Refugee Empowerment and Organizational Change: a systems perspective, Arlington, VA: Committee on Refugee Issues, American Anthropological Association Beker, Michiel & Oordt, Roemer van (1991) The Palestinians in Lebanon: Contradictions of State-Formation in Exile, Occasional Paper No. 10, Amsterdam: Middle East Research Associates Bennet, Jon (1995) Lebanon: the Lebanese NGO Forum and the Reconstruction of Civil Society, in Jon Bennet Meeting Needs: NGO co-ordination and practice, London: Earthscan Publication Bernard, Cheryl (1986) Politics and the Refugee Experience, Political Science Quarterly, 101:4 Bilsborrow, R et al. (1997) International Migration Statistics: Guidelines for Improving Data Collection Systems, Geneva: ILO Black, Richard (1994) Livelihoods under Stress: A Case Study of Refugee Vulnerability in Greece, Journal of Refugee Studies, 7:4 Black, Richard (1998a) Putting Refugees in Camps, Forced Migration Review, 2, August 1998 Black, Richard (1998b) Refugee Camps not Really Reconsidered: a reply to Crisp and Jacobsen, Forced Migration Review, 3, December 1998 Blaikie, Piers, Cannon, Terry, David, Ian & Wisner, Ben (1994) At Risk: natural hazards, people’s vulnerability and disasters, London & New York: Routledge Blanford, Nicolas (2007) More clashes as a second radical group joins attacks in Lebanon, Times Online, 5 June 2007, www.times

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online.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article1884389.ece (12 December 2008) Bromley, Ray (ed.) (1985) Introduction to Planning for Small Enterprises in Third World Cities, New York: Pergamon Press Brynen, Rex (1990) Sanctuary and Survival: The PLO in Lebanon, Boulder: Westview Press Brynen, Rex (2000) The Future of UNRWA: an agenda for policy research, Palestinian Refugee ResearchNet, www.arts.mcgill.ca/MEPP/PRRN (12 July 2002) Burton, L. (1968) Vulnerable Children: three studies of children in conflict, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Byrns, Karen (2009) UNRWA opens first of six new school buildings to accommodate overflow of Palestinian students, Daily Star (Beirut), 14 February 2009, www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id+ 1&categ_id=1&article_id=99342, (20 February 2009) Caouette, Therese M. (1991) Community Empowerment with Burmese Refugees, paper presented at Refugee and Displaced Persons Congress, World Federation for Mental Health, 1991 World Conference, Mexico City, Mexico, August 1991 Cardona, Omar D. (2003) The Need for Rethinking the Concepts and Vulnerability and Risk from a Holistic Perspective: a necessary review and criticism for effective risk management, in G. Bankoff, G. Frerks & D. Hilhorst (ed.) Mapping Vulnerability: Disasters, Development and People, London: Earthscan Publishers Chai, Ang Swee (1989) From Beirut to Jerusalem, Singapore: Times Books International Chambers, Robert (1989) Editorial Introduction: Vulnerability, Coping, and Policy, IDS Bulletin, 20 Chambers, Robert (1993) Hidden Losers? The Impact of Rural Refugees and Refuge Programs on Poorer Hosts, in R. F. Gorman (ed.) Refugee Aid and Development: Theory and Practice, Westport, CT & London: Greenwood Press Chan, K.B. & Loveridge, D. (1987) Refugees in Transit: Vietnamese in a Refugee Camp in Hong Kong, International Migration Review, 21 Chimni, B. S. (ed.) (2000) International Refugee Law: a reader, New Delhi, Thousand Oaks, London: Sage Publications Chomsky, Noam (2003) Middle East Illusions, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Christensen, Hanne (1982) Survival Strategies for and by Camp Refugees: report

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on a six week exploratory sociological field study into the flood situation of refugees in camps in Somalia, Geneva: UNRISD Christensen, Hanne (1987) Spontaneous Development Efforts by Rural Refugees in Somalia and Pakistan, in John R. Rogge (ed.) Refugees: a Third World Dilemma, Totowa: Rowmann and Littlefield Clark, Lance (1985) The Refugee Dependency Syndrome: physician heal thyself, Washington DC: Refugee Policy Group Constantino-David, Karins (1982) Issues in community organization, Community Development Journal, 17:3 Cobban, Helena (1984) The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: people, power, and politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Crisp, Jeff (1999) Who Has Counted the Refugees? UNHCR and the Politics of Numbers, Working Paper No. 12, New Issues in Refugee Research, Geneva: UNHCR Crisp, Jeff (2001) Mind the Gap! UNHCR Humanitarian Assistance and the Development Process, Working Paper No. 43, New Issues in Refugee Studies, Geneva: UNHCR Crisp, Jeff & Jacobsen, Karen (1998) Refugee Camps Reconsidered, Forced Migration Review, 3, December 1998 Crocker, David (1991) Functioning and Capability: the foundation of Sen’s Development Ethic, in Kenneth Aman (ed.) Ethical principles for Development: needs, capacities, or rights?, Proceedings of the IDEA/Montclair Conference, December 1991, Upper Montclair, NJ: Institute of Critical Thinking Cuny, Frederick C. (1983) Disasters and Development, New York & Oxford: Oxford University Press Curtis, Patrice (1995) Urban Household Coping Strategies During War: Bosnia-Hercegovina, Disaster, 19:1 Daily Star (2001a) Lebanese News: Murr warns of refugee ‘time bomb’, Daily Star (Beirut), 30 January 2001 Daily Star (2001b) Lebanese News: Half registered Palestinians in the Gulf, Daily Star (Beirut), 21 August 2001 Daily Star (2001c) Qabbani: Let Palestinians own land, Daily Star (Beirut), 7 April 2001 Daily Star (2001d) Palestinians want land law changed, Daily Star (Beirut), 10 April 2001 Deegan, Heather (1993) The Middle East and the Problems of Democracy, Buckingham: Open University Press DFID (1999) Sustainable Livelihoods Guidance Sheets, London: DFID

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amendment to allow more refugees access to employment, AlMajdal, 27, autumn 2005, Badil, www.badil.org/al-majdal/2005/ Autumn/report6.htm (12 December 2008) Needham, Robin (1995) Refugee Participation, The Courier, 150, March–April 1995 Norton, Augustus Richard (1998) Hizballah: from radicalism to pragmatism, Middle East Policy, January 1998 Oakley, Peter & Marsden, David (1984) Approaches to Participation in Rural Development, ACC Task Force on Rural Development, Geneva: International Labour Office Ogden, Kate (2000) Coping Strategies Developed as a result of Social Structure and Conflict in the 1990s, Disasters, 24:2 Overseas Development Administration (ODA) (1995) A Guide to Social Analysis for Projects in Developing Countries, London: HMSO Publications Centre Palestinian Human Rights Organization (PHRO) (2002) The EU–Lebanon Association Agreement: Palestinian Refugees Start Reaping the Benefits as Lebanon Succumbs to External Pressure, press release, PHRO, 18 December 2002 Palestinian Human Rights Organization (PHRO) (2005) The Palestinian Refugees Situations in Lebanon, Advocacy Mission, Netherlands, European Union, and United Nations, 19–29 June 2005 Payne, Lina (1996) Rebuilding Communities in a Refugee Settlement: a casebook from Uganda, London: Oxfam Payne, Lina (1998) Coping Mechanisms and Vulnerability in Situations of Food Insecurity, Gender and Development, 6:1 Peteet, Julie (1991) Gender in Crisis: women and the Palestinian resistance movement, New York: Columbia University Press Peteet, Julie (1996) From Refugees to Minority: Palestinians in post-war Lebanon, Middle East Report, 200, July–September 1996 Al-Qulaybi, Muhammad Ali (2001) Interview with Elias al-Murr: Lebanese Interior Minister Views Refugee Settlement, Al-Sharq alAwsat (London), 15 February 2001 (in Arabic) Rathmell, Andrew (1994) The War in South Lebanon, Jane’s Intelligence Review – Middle East, April 1994 Reuters (2001) Bomb kills one at Lebanon Palestinian refugee camp, Reuters, 29 December 2001 Reuters (2007) Siniora: Syria is sending arms to Palestinian camps across border, Reuters, June 2007

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Roberts, Rebecca (2000) Bourj al-Barajneh: the significance of village origin in a Palestinian refugee camp, Majallat al-Dirāsāt al-Filastīnīyah, 44, autumn 2000 (in Arabic) Russell, Tom (1985) A Lebanon Primer, Merip Reports, June 1985 Said, Edward (2003) Culture and Resistance: conversations with Edward Said, London: Pluto Press Said, Wadie (2000) The Palestinian Refugees’ Right of Return Under International Law, information brief from Centre for Policy Analysis on Palestine based on The Palestinians in Lebanon: The Rights of the Victims of the Palestinian–Israeli Peace Process, Colombia Human Rights Law Review, 30:2, spring 1999 Sayigh, Rosemary (1979) Palestinians: from peasants to revolutionaries, London: Zed Books Sayigh, Rosemary (1988) Palestinians in Lebanon: status ambiguity, insecurity and flux, Race and Class, 30:1, July–September 1988 Sayigh, Rosemary (1994) Too Many Enemies: The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon, London: Zed Books Sayigh, Rosemary (1995) Palestinians in Lebanon: (dis)solution of the refugee problem, Race and Class, 37:2 Sayigh, Yezid (1982) Israel’s Military Performance in Lebanon, Journal of Palestine Studies, 13: 1, autumn, 1982 Schiff, Benjamin N. (1995) Refugees unto the Third Generation: UN Aid to Palestinians, New York: Syracuse University Press Seitz, Stephen (1998) Coping Strategies in an Ethnic Minority Group: The Aeta of Mount Pinatubo, Disasters, 22:1 Sen, Amartya (1999) Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press Sepulveda, D. C. (1994) Challenging the Assumptions of Reputation: is it the most desirable solution? RSP Shiblak, Abbas (1996) Residency Status and the Civil Rights of Palestinian Refugees in Arab Countries, Journal of Palestine Studies, XXV:3, spring 1996 Sisk, Timothy D. (1997) Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflict, Washington: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict and United States Institute of Peace Press Seligman M. R. E. P. (1975) Helplessness: on depression, development and death, San Francisco: Freeman Sluglett, Peter & Farouk-Sluglett, Marion (1993) Lebanon, in Peter Sluglett & Marion Farouk-Sluglett (ed.) The Times Guide to the Middle

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East: the Arab world and its neighbours, second edition, London: Times Books El-Solh, Raghid (1994) Religious Identity and Citizenship: overview of perspectives, in Deirdre Collings (ed.) Peace for Lebanon? from war to reconstruction, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Stein, Barry (1994) Returnee Aid and Development, Geneva: UNHCR Stoten, D. (1992) A State without a Nation, Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, Durham University Suleiman, Jaber (1999) The Current Political, Organizational, and Security Situation in the Palestinian Refuge Camps of Lebanon, Journal of Palestine Studies, XXIX:1, autumn 1999 Tanmiya (1998) Socio-Economic Focus: Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, Tanmiya, April 1998 Twigg, John (1998) Understanding Vulnerability – an introduction, in John Twigg & Mihir R. Bhatt (ed.) Understanding Vulnerability: South Asian perspectives, Guildford: Biddles & Co. Twigg, John (2001) Sustainable Livelihoods, and Vulnerability to Disasters, Benfield Greig Hazard Research Centre, for the Disaster Mitigation Institute (DMI), University College, London, Disaster Management Working Paper 2/2001 UN (2000) Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 January–31 December 2000, New York: United Nations UN (2004) Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 2003–30 June 2004, New York: United Nations UN (2006) Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 January–31 December, New York: United Nations UN (2007) Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 January–31 December 2006, New York: United Nations UN (2008) Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, 1 January–31 December 2007, New York: United Nations UN/CRC (2005) Conventions on the Rights of the Child, Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 44 of the Convention, third periodic reports of states parties due in 2003, Lebanon, CRC/C/129/Add. 7 UNDP (1998) Factors to Consider in Designing Decentralized Governance

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USCR (1999) Trapped on All Sides: the Marginalization of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, Immigration and Refugee Services of America USCR (2002a) Worldwide Refugee Information, www.refugees.org (8 March 2002) USCR (2002b) Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon Hardest Hit by Middle East Impasse, www.refugees.org (29 June 2002) USCR (2004) Refugee Warehousing Issue, Refugee Reports, 24:3, May 2004 USCRI (2004) World Refugee Survey 2004, www.refugees.org (1 December 2008) USCRI (2007) World Refugee Survey 2007, www.refugees.org (1 December 2008) USCRI (2008) World Refugee Survey 2008 – Lebanon, www.unhcr.org/ refworld/topic,4565,22526,465462862,485f50c076,0.html (20 January 2009) Van Damme, Wim (1995) Do Refugees Belong in Camps? Experiences from Goma and Guinea, The Lancet, 346 Van der Borght, Stefan & Philips, Mit (1995) Do Refugees belong in camps (letter), The Lancet, 364 Viorst, Milton (1989) Reaching for the Olive Branch: UNRWA and Peace in the Middle East, Washington: Middle East Institute Wallach, Janet & Wallach, John (1997) Arafat: In the Eyes of the Beholder, Toronto: Carol Publishing Group Wander, Andrew & Saab, Mariam (2009) Egyptian Embassy ‘at risk’ of attack by new Palestinian Group: fears due to Cairo’s stance in Gaza war, Daily Star (Beirut), 2 February 2009 Weighill, Marie-Louise (1996) The Politics of Assistance: the Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon, paper presented at Palestinians in Lebanon conference, Centre for Lebanese Studies/Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford, September 1996 Welfare Association & Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) (2000) Guide to Non-Governmental Organizations Active in Palestinian Camps in Lebanon, Beirut: Welfare Association & Norwegian People’s Aid Westgate, K. N. & O’Keefe, P. (1976) Some Definitions of Disaster, Bradford: Disaster Research Unit Occasional Paper No. 4 Wimmen, Heiko (2007) Rallying Round the Renegade, Merip, 27 August 2007, www.merip.org/mero/mero082707.html (1 February 2008) Winchester, Peter (1992) Power, Choice and Vulnerability: a Case Study in Disaster Mismanagement in South India, 1977–1988, London: James and James Science Publishing Ltd

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World Bank (1994) Governance: The World Bank’s Experience, Washington: World Bank Yusef, Jamil (1992) Effect of Overcrowding on Health Status: a household survey at UNRWA Wavel camp – Beqa’a, Lebanon (unpublished?) Zaatari, Mohammad (2009) Senior PLO Official Killed in South Lebanon Bombing, Daily Star (Beirut), 24 March 2009, www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id= 2&article_id=100796 (28 April 2009) Zahar, Marie-Joélle (2002) Peace by Unconventional Means: Lebanon’s Ta’if Agreement, in John Stedman et al. (ed.) Ending Civil Wars: the Implementation of Peace Agreements, Boulder & London: Lynne Rienner Publishers Zakharia, Leila & Tabari, Samia (1997) Health Work Opportunities and Attitudes, Journal of Refugee Studies, 10:3 Zetter, Roger (1992) Refugees and Forced Migrants as developed resources: the Greek Cypriot refugees from 1974, Cyprus Review 4:1 Zetter, Roger (1995) Shelter Provision and Settlement Policies for Refugees: a state of the art review, Sweden: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet Zetter, Roger (1996) Refugee Survival and NGO Project Assistance for Mozambican Refugees in Malawi, Community Development Journal, 31:3 Zetter, Roger & Henry, C. J. K. (1992) Editorial Introduction, Journal of Refugee Studies, 5:3/4zetter 1992 Zureik, Elia (1996) Palestinian Refugees and the Peace Process, Washington: Institute of Palestine Studies

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INDEX Amal, 85–7, 199 Arafat, Yasser, 9, 14, 26, 80, 82–3, 106, 117, 153, 168 Assistance, 39–68 development, 40–1, 43, 46, 65, 174 humanitarian, 7, 14, 39, 40, 42–3, 44, 46, 49, 54, 77, 176, 181, 188 Beirut, 10, 70, 76, 78, 82, 84, 86, 87–8, 96, 97, 98–9, 101, 104–5, 107, 108, 111, 113, 118–9, 120, 121, 124, 127, 128, 133, 152, 154, 156, 197–201 East, 83, 198 West, 84 Cairo Accords, 80–1 Capacities, 2, 12, 14, 61, 63, 66–8, 114, 121–3, 150, 161–3, 167, 170, 177, 179–80, 182–3, 191, 193, 195–6 and vulnerabilities, 3, 12–5, 17, 62, 67, 121–3, 124, 129, 132, 135, 137, 143, 155–6, 159–161, 170, 177, 182, 186, 196 and vulnerabilities analysis (CVA), 13–4, 67, 121–3, 161 Central Committee for Refugee Affairs, 78

Civil war, 24, 88 first Lebanese (1956–8), 79 Lebanese (1975–90), 3–4, 8, 14, 35, 42, 69, 71–2, 75–6, 80, 83, 85–6, 89–90, 96, 98–9, 102, 104, 106, 110–1, 115, 117–8, 120, 125, 133, 149–150, 155, 163, 165, 167–8, 170, 187, 189, 197–200, 204 the end of the, 87 Confessionalism, 72 Consociationalism, 72 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Geneva Convention), 1951, 18 Coping mechanisms (strategies), 1–3, 10, 15–6, 35, 62–4, 67, 68, 121, 157, 159–183, 190, 191–6 economic, 56, 62–4, 121, 157, 170, 177–8, 191–3 education, 121, 157, 170, 182, 192 external, 62 health, 62–4, 121, 170, 182, 192 internal, 62–3 physical, 56, 62–4, 121, 157, 170, 172–3, 182, 194 psychological, 56, 62–4, 121, 155, 161, 170, 172–3, 183, 191, 195

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Coping mechanisms, continued social networks, formal, 62–4, 121, 157, 161, 170, 173, 182–3, 186, 192–4 social networks, informal, 62–4, 121, 155, 157, 161, 182, 191–2, 195 Deuxième Bureau, 80 Directorate of Refugee Affairs, 80 Education, access to (host state provision), 7, 34, 39, 55, 103, 108–11 Jordan, 30 Lebanon, 74, 79, 103, 105, 107, 108–11, 116, 120, 122, 127, 132–4, 143, 147, 149, 155–6, 160–3, 168, 170, 176, 182, 191–2, 201, 204 Syria, 30 West Bank and Gaza, 30 Fatah, 10, 42, 80–1, 83, 86, 116, 117, 119, 128, 148, 156, 199, 202–3, 205 Fatah al-Islam, 8, 10, 98–9, 119, 129, 149, 171, 187, 198 Fatah Intifada, 86–7, 164 Financial assistance, 4, 112, 114, 116, 122, 130–1, 135, 143, 148 ‘Forgotten people’, 3–5, 123, 154 Funding, 29, 33–4, 40, 44–5, 54 to Palestinian refugees, 7, 31, 45, 109, 113–7, 123, 135, 141–2, 145, 164, 168, 174, 179, 189, 192

Gaza War, 145 General Union of Palestinian Women (GUPW), 116 Governance, 149, 165–9, 178, 186 good, 165 lack of, 15, 149, 155, 157, 159–161, 165, 167, 177, 182–3, 191, 193, 195 poor, 144, 161 Gulf War, 4, 29, 42, 106, 174 Hamas, 7, 9, 30, 42, 117, 147 welfare assistance, 9, 31, 116, 146–7 Hariri, Rafiq, 88, 89, 101 Healthcare, 34, 53, 64, 101, 115, 123, 136, 143, 145, 147, 155–6, 173, 175 Jordanian state, 30 Lebanese state, 170 PLO, 168 PRCS, 113, 116, 135 Syrian state, 30, 199 UNHCR, 39, 55 UNRWA, 7, 39, 108, 111–3, 135, 142–3, 145, 156 Hizbollah, Hizbollah–Israeli war, 4, 8, 35, 42, 85, 88, 99, 107, 115 political, 9, 83, 85, 87–8, 90, 101, 118–9, 124, 128, 169 welfare assistance, 31, 116, 128 Host community, 1, 3, 23, 29, 40, 46, 50, 52, 54, 55, 57, 68, 181–2, 183 Gaza Strip, 106 Jordan, 106, 194

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Lebanon, 10, 14–5, 51, 106, 118, 120, 122, 151–2, 154, 166, 171, 175–6, 193 Syria, 106, 194 West Bank, 106 Infrastructure, 9, 13, 52, 57, 65, 67, 85, 103, 122, 124–6, 155, 156, 162, 204 PLO, 82, 84, Internally displaced person (IDP), 19–20, 22, 194 legal status, 19–20 Intifada, first, 42, 56 Intifada, second, 8–9, 30, 42, 56, 115, 117–8, 145, 153, 172 Iraq, 28, 41, 86, 108, 152 Gulf War, first, 29 second, 31 Lebanese civil war, 83 Israel, 9, 21–2, 24, 26–7, 30–1, 70, 78, 80–6, 88, 90, 97, 115, 117, 119, 147, 150–1, 153, 172, 174, 176, 202 Arab–Israeli clashes, 24, 76 attacks on Israel, 81–3, 168 attacks on Lebanon, 30, 42, 75, 80–5, 104, 118–9, 124, 128, 168, 171, 187, 202, 204 Hizbollah–Israeli war, 4, 8, 35, 42, 85, 88, 99, 107, 115 Israeli–Palestinian conflict, 1–2, 4, 185 Palestinian refugees (attitude towards), 21–2, 24, 26–7, 35, 50, 84, 91, 187 peace process, 2, 8, 82

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Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), 84–5 Lebanese civil war, see Civil war Legal status of IDPs, 19 refugees, 19, 37, 180, 188 Lebanon, 69, 94, 99, 103, 129, 172, 176 Maronite, 71–2, 75, 77–80, 84, 85 National Pact, 71–2 Non-governmental organization (NGO), 43, 60 in Lebanon assistance, 2, 8, 12, 15, 30, 94, 101, 105, 107, 108, 115–6, 118, 121, 123, 124, 132, 141, 145–7, 149, 154, 155, 156, 161–170, 178, 189–191, 193, 200–4 coordination, 105, 111, 115–6, 143, 145, 149–150, 164–5, 178 education, 105, 110–1, 113, 115–6, 132–4, 143, 147, 162, 170 adult literacy, 110, 116, 132–4 after school care, 116, 132, 143 kindergarten, 116, 143 financial support, 143, 146, 161, 164, 173 loans, 130 relief, 114, 115–6, 130, 132

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NGO in Lebanon, continued health education, 113, 143 financial support, 114, 130 treatment, 105, 114, 115–6, 135–6, 143, 147, 162, 170 political ideologies/ allegiances, 8, 94, 101, 114, 115–6, 118, 127, 143, 145–6, 148–150, 155, 164, 168, 193, 201, 203 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), 4, 26, 31, 80–5, 90, 99, 108, 114, 117, 146–8, 153, 166, 168, 171, 173–4, 187, 199, 204 Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS), 112–3, 116, 135–6, 202 Palestinian refugees, 2–3, 6, 12, 15, 193, 195 assistance to, 3, 6, 30–1, 39–68, 105, 115, 145, 159, 161, 176–7, 179, 183, 189 diaspora, 4, 90, 144, 174–5, 204 durable solutions, 2, 5, 17, 26–7, 31, 33, 35, 39, 41, 45, 47, 51, 181, 189, 196 ‘forgotten people’ see ‘Forgotten people’ legal status, 3, 4–5, 14, 18, 21, 24, 25–32, 36, 89, 100, 103, 124, 185–6, 188–9, 193

origins, 3, 5, 22, 32, 76, 175, 186 population, 7, 12, 22, 24, 30, 35, 48, 76, 89, 100, 124, 197–205 protracted see Protracted refugees self-settled, 48, 49, 53, 57, 194 warehoused see Warehoused refugees Participation, 178 grassroots, 43 Peace process, 3, 42, 167, 177 final status negotiations, 26, 117 Oslo Accords, 26, 42, 115, 117, 145, 153 Oslo I, 26, 31, 189 Oslo II, 8, 26 roadmap, 42 Phalange, 80, 84 Popular committee, 10, 11, 15, 116, 117–9, 123, 125, 127, 143, 147–8, 149–150, 156, 166, 198–9, 201–2 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 1967, 19 Protracted refugees, 5, 12, 14, 33–5, 40, 121, 175, 185 Refugee assistance to, 2–3, 6–7, 14, 17, 18, 20, 25, 28–9, 32, 34, 39–68, 108, 116, 130, 146, 148, 157, 159–183, 185, 188, 190, 193, 195–6 definition, 19–22, 32, 194 dependency, 5, 34, 43, 55–6, 58–61, 66, 68, 114, 122,

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146, 153, 161, 169, 172, 175, 177–9, 181–2, 190 helplessness, 56, 153–4, 168, 190 host community (relation with), 1, 3, 10, 14–5, 29, 40, 46, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 57, 68, 69, 93, 106, 118, 120, 122, 151–2, 154, 166, 170–1, 175–6, 179, 181–3, 193, 194 legal status, 19, 37, 69, 94, 99, 103, 129, 172, 176, 180, 188 population, 4, 7–9, 12, 15, 18, 20, 22–4, 29, 32–5, 36, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51–4, 56, 57, 61, 66, 68–9, 71–5, 80–2, 89–90, 94–8, 100, 104, 106, 118–120, 122, 124–6, 129, 155–7, 162–3, 167, 173–5, 178, 180–2, 186, 189–191, 193, 195–6, 198–204 self-settled, 48, 49, 53, 57, 194 survival, 2, 15, 43, 55, 59–64, 77, 89, 137, 150, 154, 168, 176, 191 (see also Capacities, Coping mechanisms) Refugee camps, 2–3, 8, 10, 14, 16, 35, 47–57, 93–120, 121, 124, 164, 194 and host community, 3, 10, 15, 46–7, 49–53, 57, 68, 93, 118, 120, 122, 151–2, 166, 175–6, 193–4 assistance, 1–7, 14–5, 21–3, 25, 27–9, 39–68, 74, 93–5,

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104, 107, 108–16, 122–3, 130–1, 141–2, 143–7, 148, 150, 153, 157, 159–183, 185–6, 188–90, 193–6, 197, 200 environmental impact, 48, 52, 112, 135 security, 8, 30–3, 36, 49–51, 56, 79, 89–91, 98–9, 128, 168, 171, 179, 180, 190, 198 Refugee camps in Lebanon al-Beddawi, 96–7, 129, 133, 198 al-Buss, 76, 96–7, 127, 203 Anjar, 76–7 Bourj al-Barajneh, 12, 15, 51, 76, 82, 86, 96–8, 115, 121, 123–5, 127–143, 146–156, 165–6, 192, 199–201 Bourj al-Shamali, 12, 15, 76–7, 96–7, 121, 125–136, 142, 147–8, 150, 154, 156, 192, 204 Dbayyeh, 9–10, 76, 96–7, 117, 201 Ein al-Hilweh, 9, 76, 96–7, 117, 119, 150, 162, 201–3 Gourand, 76–7 Jisr al-Basha, 76 Mar Elias, 76, 96–7, 200 Mieh Mieh, 76, 84, 96–7, 202–3 Nahr al-Barid, 10, 12, 15, 42, 76, 88, 96–9, 102, 119, 121, 125–137, 142–3, 147–156, 171, 174, 187, 192, 197–8 Rashidieh, 76–7, 84, 97, 117, 127, 133, 136, 204–5

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Refugee camps in Lebanon, continued Shatila, 9, 51, 76, 84, 86, 96–7, 145, 152, 200 Tel al-Za’atar, 76, 83, 198 Wavel, 76, 96–8, 198–9 Registered refugee, 6, 21, 94, 106, 114, 203 non-, 94, 98 un-, 95 ‘Resolution 194’, 5, 25–7, 76, 89, 188–9 ‘Resolution 425’, 88 ‘Resolution 1559’, 88 Right of return, 4, 27, 36, 45, 76, 89, 102, 144, 150–3, 182, 189, 191 Saddam Hussein, 4, 87, 106, 174 Saida, 9, 70, 76–7, 83, 86, 96–7, 108, 111, 114, 117–9, 127–8, 136, 202 Security committee, 148 Shi’a, 9, 71–2, 78, 84–5, 87–8, 90, 101, 118–9, 126, 186 South Lebanese Army (SLA), 83, 85, 88 Sunni, 9, 71–2, 75, 78, 87, 90, 96, 118–9, 129, 186 Syria, 70, 97, 130 civil war, 35, 83, 85–7, 87–8 immigrant workers, 101, 106, 202 Palestinian refugees in, 6–8, 21, 30–1, 106, 179, 181, 187, 194, 197, 199 political influence, 9, 83, 85–7, 87–8, 91, 99, 117, 118–9, 127–8, 148, 156,

164, 166, 169, 199, 201, 202 role in Lebanon, 35, 83, 85–8, 91, 95, 99, 117, 118–9, 124, 127–8, 166, 199, 200 Ta’if Accords, 15, 75–6, 87, 99 Tripoli, 15, 70, 76, 86, 96–7, 108, 111, 118, 121, 126–7, 155–6, 197–8 Tyre, 15, 70, 76, 84, 86, 96–7, 108, 114, 118–9, 121, 125, 127–8, 136, 156, 204 United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), 27 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 5, 18–21, 22, 25, 28–9, 39, 41, 45, 48–9, 52–5, 57, 59, 61–2 assistance, 6, 19–21, 25, 28, 33–5, 39, 46, 54–5 mandate, 5, 18–21, 22, 25–7, 39, 48, 187–8 protection, 25, 27–8, 45, 47 protracted refugees, 5, 32–5 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 70, 84–5 United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) areas of operation Gaza, 6–8, 21, 30–1, 106, 187 Jordan, 6–8, 21–2, 30–1, 94, 106, 187, 194

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Lebanon, 6–16, 21, 30–1, 35, 42, 47, 51, 75, 77, 94–116, 121, 124–6, 141–5, 155–63, 167, 169, 174, 176–9, 183, 187, 190, 193–4, 197–204 Syria, 6–8, 21, 30–1, 106, 166, 181, 187, 194 West Bank, 6–8, 21–2, 30–1, 106, 187 UNRWA assistance education kindergarten, 116, 131, 143, 147, 203, 204 primary school, 133–4, 202–3 scholarships, 7, 111, 134 secondary school, 103, 108–9, 127, 133–5, 149, 170, 202 university, 111, 134 vocational training, 111, 122, 132–4, 141, 143, 160, 162 health chronic illness, 112–3, 116, 123, 135–7 drugs (prescription), 112, 135 health education, 113, 123, 135–6, 178 hospital, 112–3, 135–6 mother and child, 111–2 primary healthcare, 111 water and sanitation, 7, 30, 39, 104, 112, 116, 125–7, 162, 173, 135–6, 143

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relief and social services community based organizations (CBO), 114, 144, 147 financial support, 7–8, 31, 114, 115–6, 130 micro-credit, 115, 179 rations, 30, 114, 175 shelter rehabilitation, 114, 126 special hardship cases, 7, 104, 106, 114 UNRWA mandate, 22, 28, 176 UNRWA staff, 56, 112–3, 118, 121, 123, 143–5, 149, 162–3, 177, 201 United States Committee for Refugees (USCR), 7, 19–20, 26, 34, 47, 98, 143 United States Committee for Refugees and Immigrants (USCRI), 5, 20, 22, 29, 32, 34, 41, 51–2, 57, 95 Vulnerability, 64–6, 122 Warehoused refugees, 32, 35, 186