Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy: Volume 2 9780198718468, 9780198718475, 0198718462

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OXFORD STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY VOLUME 2

ADVISORY BOARD Marilyn McCord Adams, Rutgers University & Australian Catholic University Peter Adamson, Ludwig-Maximilians University, Munich Peter King, University of Toronto Henrik Lagerlund, University of Western Ontario John Marenbon, Trinity College, Cambridge Calvin Normore, University of California, Los Angeles Dominik Perler, Humboldt University, Berlin Eleonore Stump, St. Louis University Editorial Assistant Joseph Stenberg, University of Colorado

Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy Volume 2 Edited by

ROBERT PASNAU

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Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP, United Kingdom Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries # the several contributors 2014 The moral rights of the authors have been asserted First Edition published in 2014 Impression: 1 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by licence, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Control Number: 2014932174 ISBN 978–0–19–871846–8 (hbk) 978–0–19–871847–5 (pbk) As printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials contained in any third party website referenced in this work.

Contents Articles Explaining Exact Resemblance: Gilbert of Poitiers’s Conformitas Theory Reconsidered Christophe Erismann I See Dead People: Disembodied Souls and Aquinas’s Two-Person Problem Christina Van Dyke Aquinas and Scotus on the Source of Contingency Gloria Frost Peter John Olivi and Peter Auriol on Conceptual Thought Han Thomas Adriaenssen

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Discussion Aquinas on Spiritual Change Paul Hoffman

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Text Pseudo-Joscelin: Treatise on Genera and Species Peter King

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Critical Notice Critical Study of Fabrizio Amerini’s Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life Patrick Toner

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Briefly Noted Friedman – Weijers and Calma – Aertsen – Oresme – al-Kindı¯ – Wyclif

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Notes for Contributors Index of Names

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Explaining Exact Resemblance Gilbert of Poitiers’s Conformitas Theory Reconsidered Christophe Erismann

We probably all agree that one of our most frequent mental acts is that of making a comparison. Such comparisons can lead us to notice differences or similarities between things or their properties. When we notice that two things—say, two red apples—are similar, two explanations are available to us: either these two apples have one or more properties in common—in this case the properties of being an apple and that of being red, which involves commitment to realism about universals—or else the two apples are merely similar in some respects—this being the solution favoured by someone who does not believe that universal entities exist. While the first answer requires an explanation of how the same property can exist at the same time in several spatio-temporally different individuals, the second raises the challenge of explaining the numerous similarities that can be observed among things in the world; for example, between individuals of the same species. Many medieval philosophers discussed this issue. One of them did so by defending a radically original solution, which is in strong contrast with all earlier doctrines. This philosopher is Gilbert of Poitiers,1 who wrote

1 Gilbert was born in Poitiers shortly after 1085. At Chartres, he followed the teaching of Bernard of Chartres and studied the liberal arts—in particular grammar, dialectic (nowadays logic), and rhetoric—and the Platonic thought of the Timaeus as interpreted by Calcidius. He continued his theological training in Laon. He then became a master at Chartres, from 1124 at the latest, and at the cathedral school of Paris sometime between 1137 and 1141; at that time, he had John of Salisbury among his students. He ended his teaching in Paris in 1142, when he was promoted to the position of Bishop of Poitiers. His rational and philosophical approach to theology earned him an accusation of heresy by Bernard of Clairvaux, who also persecuted Peter Abelard. His metaphysical thought was criticised at the consistory of Reims in 1148 for his supposedly

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around the middle of the twelfth century. Gilbert belongs to the group of philosophers who do not think that the very same property—the same entity—can exist at the same time in several different individuals.2 According to him, everything that exists is particular. However, he assigned great importance to resemblance in his ontology. He tackles the issue by introducing the concept of conformity (conformitas) in order to express the idea of exact resemblance or strict similarity; this notion will prove central to his solution to the problem of universals. I will begin by presenting the main lines of Gilbert’s ontology such as they appear in his commentaries to Boethius’ Opuscula sacra—the only extant texts of Gilbert’s philosophical work,3 the exegetical set of texts which led him to be considered by thirteenth-century scholastic thinkers as the commentator of Boethius par excellence, like Averroes for Aristotle. The aim of this section is to prove 1) that Gilbert is not a realist, as is often unorthodox distinction between deus and divinitas (see N. M. Haering, “Notes on the Council and the Consistory of Reims,” Mediaeval Studies 28 (1966), 39–59). He defended himself of this accusation in front of the Pope in 1147 and in 1148, and emerged from the trial without being formally condemned. He died in Poitiers in 1154. 2 On the ontology of Gilbert, see Jean Jolivet, “Trois variations me´die´vales sur l’universel et l’individu: Roscelin, Abe´lard, Gilbert de la Porre´e,” Revue de me´taphysique et de morale 97 (1992), 111–55; L. M. de Rijk, “Semantics and Metaphysics in Gilbert of Poitiers: A Chapter of Twelfth-Century Platonism,” Vivarium 26 (1988), 73–122 and 27 (1989), 1–35; L. M. de Rijk, “Gilbert de Poitiers, ses vues se´mantiques et me´taphysiques,” in J. Jolivet, and A. de Libera (eds.), Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: Aux origines de la Logica modernorum, Actes du septie`me symposium europe´en d’histoire de la logique et de la se´mantique me´die´vales, Poitiers 17–22 Juin 1985 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987), 147–71; Bruno Maioli, Gilberto Porretano: Dalla grammatica speculativa alla metafisica del concreto (Rome: Bulzoni, 1979) 179–364; John Marenbon, “Gilbert of Poitiers,” in P. Dronke (ed.), A History of Twelfth-Century Western Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 328–52; Luisa Valente, “Gilbert of Poitiers,” in H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012) 409–17; Lauge O. Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Porreta’s Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the Period 1130–1180 (Leiden: Brill, 1982), 47–86; H. C. Van Elswijk, Gilbert Porreta, sa vie, son œuvre, sa pense´e (Leuven: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1966), 153–203; Klaus Jacobi, “Einzelnes—Individuum— Person. Gilbert von Poitiers’ Philosophie des Individuellen,” in J. A. Aertsen and A. Speer (eds.), Individuum und Individualita¨t im Mittelalter (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1996) 3– 21; Richard J. Westley, “A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete: The Constitution of Creatures according to Gilbert de la Porre´e,” Modern Schoolman 37 (1959–60), 257–86. 3 The so-called Liber sex principiorum, which was attributed to Gilbert, in particular by Albert the Great, is certainly not by him; see P. Osmund Lewry, “The Liber sex principiorum, a Supposedly Porretanean Work. A Study in Ascription,” in J. Jolivet and A. de Libera (eds.), Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains, Aux origines de la Logica modernorum, Actes du septie`me symposium europe´en d’histoire de la logique et de la se´mantique me´die´vales, Poitiers 17–22 Juin 1985 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987), 251–78.

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stated in the secondary literature,4 but an advocate of ontological particularism, and 2) that Gilbert is to be classified as a trope theorist. I will then concentrate on Gilbert’s understanding of exact resemblance through the concept of conformitas. This concept expresses a relation of strict similarity that holds between properties which are necessarily particular and which belong either to individuals of the same species or genus, such as the particular rationality of Socrates and the particular rationality of Plato, or to individuals that possess similar accidental properties. The purpose of this section is to show that the theory of exact resemblance is the central element of Gilbert’s ontology. I intend to demonstrate that Gilbert’s ontology is founded upon three theses: 1) No entity E can exist in two spatio-temporally different individuals. 2) A formally causal property F can be the cause of the being of just one individual. 3) The relation that exists between two essential properties of the same kind (for example, rationality) that belong to two co-specific individuals is the relation of exact resemblance. This combination excludes the ontological possibility of the existence of immanent universals and avoids the theoretical need for them. I will conclude with a discussion on the issue of whether resemblance is primitive according to Gilbert, or whether it can be explained by other parts of his metaphysics, notably by the Platonic aspect of his thought and his doctrine of the pre-eminence of real forms understood as divine ideas. My point here is that even if, on the basis of external testimonies, we attributed to Gilbert the thesis according to which divine ideas explain resemblance, this would not be in contradiction with the main lines of his ontology as I reconstruct it. I will occasionally refer to texts by disciples of Gilbert, when such texts contain a terminological explanation or a more determined thesis—for Gilbert inspired a school of thought, the so-called Porretan School. This current of thought—a secta in the expression of the time—is constituted by 4 For such a reading, see, for example, Anthony Kenny: “Gilbert of Poitiers sponsored a moderate version of realism,” Medieval Philosophy: A New History of Western Philosophy, Volume 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 48; Armand Maurer, who attributes to Gilbert a “mitigated form of realism”: “William of Ockham (b. c.1285; d. 1347)” in J. Gracia (ed.), Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the CounterReformation (1150–1650) (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 376; Heinrich Fichtenau: “Gilbert might have considered a ‘realistic’ solution to the problem of universals correct,” Heretics and Scholars in the High Middle Ages, 1000–1200 (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 308.

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members who claim to follow his thought5 and seek to defend him from the various accusations of heresy which were stated against him.

1 . G I L B E R T ’S O N T O LO G Y Gilbert’s main ontological preoccupation is that of understanding the relation between a natural thing and its various components. His ontology is a constituent one; real objects are constituted by their properties. Gilbert formulates his ontology in the context of the exegesis of Boethius’ theological treatises (Opuscula sacra). In consequence, he uses Boethian vocabulary, and not that of Aristotle’s Categories—the reference-text for logical–ontological thought at the time. As a result, his ontology combines lexical and doctrinal elements drawn from Boethius, which are interpreted according to his own perspective. Gilbert uses a very distinctive language—proper to him and the Porretans—which may seem surprising to the modern reader. Gilbert’s ontology is founded upon the distinction between id quod est and id quo, between ‘that which is’ and ‘that through which a particular thing is’—that is, roughly, the distinction between an individual and an essential property.6 An id quod est is an independent individual, such as Peter, my cat Felix, or this apple. Gilbert uses an alternative terminology: an id quod est, an individual, is also called a subsistens, a subsisting entity. An id quo —that is, an essential property—is also called subsistentia, a particular essential property or substantial form determining the being of just one individual. Each individual, or subsistens, is constituted of several subsistentiae. All these subsistentiae taken together constitute the essence of an individual, which Gilbert calls tota substantia. The interest and originality of Gilbert’s position lie in the fact that each of these subsistentiae is particular. As Chris Martin and John Marenbon have convincingly argued in the case of Abelard, and Claude Panaccio in that of William of Ockham, it is relevant to use the concept of trope (that is, particular property), drawn from contemporary thought on the problem of universals, to qualify the position of some medieval philosophers. Gilbert of Poitiers, too, should certainly be classified as a trope theorist. Trope theories are particularist, and Gilbert certainly agrees with this point. According to him, a universal is a collection, but this collection has no 5 On the Porretans, see Luigi Catalani, I Porretani: una scuola di pensiero, tra alto e basso medioevo (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009). 6 It was the application to God of this distinction between id quod est and quo est— and thus, the postulation of a distinction between a divine quod est (deus) and a divine quo est (divinitas)—that led Gilbert’s theology to be discredited.

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ontological reality as such. It is the product of the process of abstraction that the mind undergoes on the basis of the resemblance between properties of individuals. In this section I shall consider in turn the five main tenets of Gilbert’s ontology: 1) the distinction between subsistens and subsistentia; 2) the primitive fact that everything that exists is necessarily particular; 3) the metaphysical constitution of a given individual or subsistens as an ordered bundling/accommodation of properties, which Gilbert calls concretio; 4) the resemblance of some given subsistentiae or properties (resemblance does in fact not hold between individuals, but between properties of individuals); and 5) the understanding of universals as sets (collectiones).

1.1 Two kinds of substantial being: subsistens and subsistentia Among the main elements drawn from Boethius’ Opuscula sacra, two are fundamental for Gilbert’s theory: the concept of subsistentia, which comes from the Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, and the emblematic thesis of the difference between being (esse) and that which is (id quod est), from the De hebdomadibus. The concept of subsistentia allows Gilbert to state the distinction between a concrete object and an essential property of this object or, in Gilbert’s terms (yet again derived from Boethius), the distinction between ‘that which is’ (quod est) and ‘that through which a particular thing is’ (quo est). A quod est, also called subsistens, is an individual, a concrete object; whereas the quo est is the property by which the individual is and is what it is. In his effort to systematize Boethius’ thought, Gilbert reformulates the thesis from the De hebdomadibus by importing the concept of subsistentia from the Contra Eutychen et Nestorium into it, thus merging the two distinct Boethian inquiries into one. A passage from his commentary to the De hebdomadibus provides an illustration of this dichotomy: being, that is, the essential property (subsistentia) which is in an individual on the one hand, and that which is, the individual (subsistens) in which the essential property is, on the other, are two different things; just like, for example, corporality and a body, or humanity and a man [are different things].7

7 In De Hebd. 194: 90–2. All the references to the Latin text are given according to the edition of Nikolaus Haering, The Commentaries on Boethius by Gilbert of Poitiers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1966). In the footnotes I use the following abbreviations: In De Trin. for Gilbert’s commentary on Boethius’ De Trinitate, In De Hebd. for his commentary to the De Hebdomadibus, and In Contra Eut. for his commentary of the Contra Eutychen et Nestorium.

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Just as they are diverse, they are also necessarily complementary: they can only exist together.8 Gilbert proves his thesis with the example of body (corpus) and corporality (corporalitas): in act, corporality is nothing if it is not in a body, and a body is nothing if corporality, which is its being, is not in it (in ipso). These are the two kinds of substantial things that are taken to exist in the world.9 Subsistens and subsistentia are both substances, but in different senses.10 The criterion according to which a property is said to be substantial (to be a subsistentia) is a variation on the argument of suppression: property F is a subsistentia if and only if, when individual a possesses F, the suppression of F entails the suppression of a. A subsistentia may be either simple, if it is general or differential, or composed, if it is a specific subsistentia which is made up of the general and the differential subsistentiae. Thus rationality is simple, while humanity is compound: humanitas is composed of corporeitas, animalitas, and rationalitas. This distinction expresses the fact that a subsistentia may be either all the substance of an individual—if it is a specific substantia—or only part of it—if it is general or differential. Gilbert transposes into the ontological structure of things the logical structure of their essence (species ¼ genus þ differentiae). To these two types of substantial entity he adds two other, accidental, types of entity. Gilbert divides accidental properties into two groups: accidents proper (that is, quantitative and qualitative properties) and extrinsic properties that he calls, following Boethius,11 ‘circumstances’ (rei circumstantiae); that is, the properties belonging to the seven remaining categories.

A formal note is needed here in order to understand Gilbert’s way of proceeding: he quotes sentences or phrases (the lemmas) from the texts by Boethius upon which he is commenting; often, when he intervenes in the commented text in order to make it say something more or less slightly different, he states ‘id est’ before his intervention. 8 See In Contra Eut. 278: 8–279: 12; in particular “Quia nanque et esse et id, quod est, cuiusdam consortii ratione sine se esse non possunt” at 278: 8–9. 9 The Compedium Logicae Porretanum—an anonymous handbook of Porretan philosophy—states this clearly (eds. S. Ebbesen, K. M. Fredborg, L. O. Nielsen, Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Aˆge grec et latin 46 (1983), 39: 2–4): “duo genera rerum, unum subsistentium et aliud subsistentiarum, omne autem subjectum subsistens dicitur omnis vero forma subsistentia appellatur.” 10 In Contra Eut. 243: 27: “subsistens et subsistentia dicuntur ‘substantie’. ” See also In De Trin. 116: 36–9, where Gilbert states that the name ‘substance’ is assigned both to the subsistentiae and to the subsistents. 11 The expression appears in Boethius’ De Trinitate, chapter 4 (ed. Moreschini 177: 271).

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1.2 Ontological particularism Ontological particularism is probably the most remarkable trait of Gilbert’s ontology. It is in strong contrast with the spirit of the time,12 which was far more given to realism, but demonstrates faithfulness to the thought of Peter Abelard. Anything that subsists is a particular thing. This is true of individuals, but also of every subsistentia, every quality and quantity, every accident. Every human being is a human being through his/her own humanity; every white thing is white through its own whiteness. There are as many humanities as there are men, as many whitenesses as there are white things. The central principle of Gilbert’s ontology is: “That which is in one thing cannot at the same time be in another.”13 This principle is directly drawn from Boethius (“everything which is in a singular is itself singular”)14 and forbids the notion of sharing or commonness. For example, no quo est—that is, none of Plato’s essential properties— can be found in Cicero, despite the fact that they are both men. Gilbert writes: “Plato differs from Cicero in such a way that [1] neither of them is by any of the constituents by which the other is and [2] there is nothing at all which owes its being to the respective collections of constituents of these two.”15 Considered in the subsistens–subsistentiae framework that underlies Porretan ontology, the plurality of individuals—which can be easily and undeniably observed—presupposes an equivalent plurality of subsistentiae; Gilbert states: “the natures [the essences] of those that are distinct in number [the individuals] are distinct in number.”16 A subsistentia can be the cause of the being of only one subsistent. The humanity of Plato is proper to him, exists only in him, and informs only him. One text by

12 As testified by the criticisms addressed to Gilbert by Thierry of Chartres and Clarembald of Arras. Not un-metaphorically, Thierry warns his readers to beware of the poison of Gilbert’s ontological particularism as to essential properties, Lectiones in Boethii librum de Trinitate, in Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School, ed. N. Haering (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1971) 175: 2–5; see also 166: 14–22. 13 “Nihil quod sit in uno est in alio.” For this formulation, see Ebbesen, Fredborg, and Nielsen, Compedium Logicae Porretanum, 41: 57. 14 When Alan of Lille, a disciple of Gilbert, speaks of the impossibility of a shared or common entity, he joins the Porretan and Boethian formula into the following thesis: “Non enim dicitur communis aliqua proprietas quia comunicetur pluribus; nichil enim quod sit in uno est in alio; quicquid enim in singulari est, singulare est,” Summa Quoniam Homines, ed. Glorieux, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litte´raire du Moyen A^ge 20 (1953), 172. 15 16 In De Trin. 146: 14–16. In De Trin. 72: 52–3.

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Gilbert is particularly important on this point; in this passage, Gilbert states the two basic rules of his ontological particularism: Proper characteristics of natural things are: [1] the fact that just as the properties of [individuals] which are distinct in number are distinct, in the same way, the essential properties (subsistentiae) are distinct in number, and [2] the fact that one singular essential property (subsistentia) can produce just one individual.17

No subsistentia is common to two or more subsistents, for that would make it a common entity. Forms, or subsistentiae, have to be particular properties—that is to say, contemporary philosophers’ tropes (or, to use a different terminology, ‘abstract particulars’). Gilbert must clearly be added to the list of the upholders of trope theory. He must be considered as defending non-transferable tropes, even in a weak version of transferability. And this, not because tropes are individuated by standing in a relation with (usually of being part of) an object, but for a reason proper to Gilbert’s ontology. The principle mentioned earlier, according to which one singular subsistentia can produce just one subsistent, excludes the possibility for a trope to be transferable. As for the case of accidental tropes, the conception of accidents Gilbert develops—that is, that an accidental property necessarily adheres to a precise subsistentia (see Section 1.3)—makes the transferability impossible. According to Marenbon, weak transferability of tropes implies that “it must at least be conceptually possible that, for instance, the trope of hardness, h1, which accounts for my wine glass being hard might have been, rather, the trope which accounted for your wine glass being hard.”18 This possibility seems to be rejected by Gilbert, even only conceptually; as we shall see, according to Gilbert, an individual possesses, actually or potentially, all its past, present, future, and possibly future properties.

1.3 The metaphysical constitution of an individual Every individual, or subsistent in Gilbert’s terminology, has several subsistentiae, that is, it possesses (Gilbert would say ‘participates in’) many properties. Any individual being is multiform, in that it is constituted by a plurality of formal determinations. We have seen that these properties are

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In De Trin. 58: 42–5. J. Marenbon, “Was Abelard a Trope Theorist?” in C. Erismann and A. Schniewind (eds), Comple´ments de substance: E´tudes sur les proprie´te´s accidentelles offertes a` Alain de Libera (Paris: Vrin, 2008), 87. 18

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all particular. An individual is the sum, the collection of all its essential subsistentiae and particular accidental properties. In contemporary terms: an individual is the sum of its concurrent/co-present tropes. The idea of sum or complete group is important; Gilbert insists on the fact that an individual is only complete, and therefore only becomes an individual, when this sum is constituted. Gilbert retains the traditional idea, which originates in Porphyry, of an individual as a bundle of properties.19 But he modifies this pattern quite deeply. First, the properties of the bundle are taken to be particular; for Porphyry, it seems that only the bundle is unique and particular, whereas the properties that compose it are universal. According to Gilbert, each of the forms that compose the bundle is particular; in addition, the bundle is more than just a bundle insofar as the co-present properties are organised in a hierarchy, an idea to which the notion of bundle does not seem to do justice. The different properties that are simultaneously present in an individual do not constitute a disordered aggregate, but are organised by fixed relations with regard to one another. Each property (also called form) is accompanied by a ‘co-accidental unity’ (unitas coaccidens)20 which makes possible the unity of the individual in which it takes place. There exist two kinds of particular properties in an individual: those that are responsible for its being, on the one hand, and for its accidental determinations, on the other. This means that many properties are simultaneously present, or inherent, in an individual. The essential properties are prior (in nature, not in time), while the others are posterior; this explains the ordered organisation of the properties. This accommodation of properties to each other within the same subsistent is what Gilbert calls concretion. The properties—the particular forms—of an individual are said to concrescere, a verb composed of cum and cresco, whose meaning is something like ‘to grow together by aggregation,’ ‘to harden,’ ‘to thicken,’ ‘to condense,’ ‘to congeal,’ ‘to curdle.’ The verb is well chosen, also in the material metaphor it suggests. The process of aggregation begins with the most generic forms, first and foremost the one Gilbert calls generalissima subsistentia21 (probably substance as the most general genus), then descends gradually into the structure of Porphyry’s tree through the intermediate genera and the differences with increasing determinateness. The more general forms cause the bundling of the more determinate forms according 19 In the Isagoge (ed. Busse, CAG IV, 1 [Berlin: G. Reimer, 1887], 7: 19–27), Porphyry states that its unique bundle of properties (athroisma idioteˆtoˆn) makes one individual distinct from other individuals of the same species. 20 In De Trin. II [In Utrum Pater] 176: 15–19. 21 In De Hebd. 209: 70.

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to what Gilbert calls an order of consequence in the aggregation process.22 Concretion accommodates properties to one another, and especially those that are posterior to those that are prior.23 This ontological order of priority follows not only the order of logical priority from the most general genus to the most specific species, but also respects the priority of essential properties over accidental ones. Concretion is a necessary natural phenomenon: Gilbert considers the fact that all natural things are the result of concretion as a law of nature.24 An individual can only subsist because of the concretion of different subsistentiae: “every subsistent exists thanks to the concretion of its many properties, that is of its genera, differentiae, and accidents.”25 Concretion is an ordered arrangement of properties, which first form a nucleus,26 which comprises essential subsistentiae, to which are added accidental properties and finally circumstances or ‘circumstantial features.’ Inside the nucleus—Gilbert’s substantia tota—the subsistentiae are ordered from the most general to the most specific according to a descent which is that of Porphyry’s tree. The relation between accidents and essential properties is that of foundational relatedness; an accident must be attached to an essential subsistentia. Gilbert insists on the fact that, in order to be a part of the bundle of properties which the individual or subject is, an accident must first be attached to an essential property: “For colour adheres (adest) to corporality in order that it might inhere in a body.”27 So an accident adheres to a subsistentia; but an accident cannot adhere to just any subsistence; it must adhere to the subsistence which causes it, for it is the only one which can cause it. This theory is interesting in that it seems to solve the problem of the substratum in a fairly elegant manner. This accommodation of properties following their ontological importance—beginning with those that are responsible for essential being, followed by those that cause accidental determinations—avoids positing a disordered bundle while also avoiding the need to refer to a substratum. It appears reasonable to conclude that, for Gilbert, the individual is nothing over and above the collection of all its properties. 22

In De Trin. 119: 19–20: “complexionis consequentia.” In De Trin. 84: 55–6: “Concretio uero eidem subsistencie naturas posterioris rationis accomodat ut, cui cum illa insunt, simplex non sit.” 24 In De Hebd. 199: 19–20: “Nam omnia naturalia non modo creata sed etiam concreta sunt.” 25 In De Trin. 144: 79–81. 26 The term ‘nucleus’ is not used by Gilbert; I borrow this expression from Peter Simons, “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1994), 553–75. 27 In Contra Eut. 280: 45–8. 23

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We have seen that Gilbert distinguishes two types of accidental property: the accidents proper, which belong to the categories of quantity and quality, and the circumstantial properties. This distinction corresponds to two different ontological relations in the structure of the individual. The real accidents inhere in the concretion (intrinsecus concretionis habitus), and the circumstances are just apposed (extrinsecus cuiuslibet appositionis habitus).28 According to Gilbert, an individual is ontologically structured as follows: an individual is an organised whole of particular, essential, accidental, and extrinsic properties. At its centre is a substantial nucleus, in which essential properties (the subsistentiae) are ordered from the most general to the most determined. To these essential properties adhere quantitative and qualitative accidents, and to this set of properties are added extrinsically the circumstances of the individual under consideration; that is, its relational, temporal, spatial, and so on, properties. In addition, Gilbert offers a very interesting theoretical tool for the consideration of an individual seen over a whole lifetime. He probably pursues the doctrinal aim of ensuring personal identity across time and of avoiding that an individual undergoing qualitative or quantitative change becomes a different individual. Gilbert introduces the concept of forma tota to refer to the set of all the properties that might be true of a given subject, including also those that will never be actualized. The sum of the essential properties and accidents thus constitutes the forma tota of the individual; the sum of the characteristics of Socrates is called Socrateitas and the sum of those of Plato, Platonitas. According to Gilbert, the tota forma of an individual—for example, Plato’s Platonitas—includes all its subsistences (its substantia tota) but also its quantitative and qualitative accidents—not only those it possesses actually (actu), but also those it possessed in the past and those it will or could possess in future according to the potentiality of its own nature.29 Expressed as bundle, the forma tota could be understood as the most comprehensive possible bundle. 28

In De Trin. 129: 14–15. See In De Trin. 144: 77–8: “ut ex omnibus, que et actu et natura fuerunt uel sunt uel futura sunt Platonis, collecta platonitas” and In Contra Eut. 274: 81, where Gilbert states that the complete set of the properties of an individual includes those which it has had, those it has and those it will or could have, in act or potentially: “que actu uel potestate fuerunt uel sunt uel futura sunt.” This point grounds the qualification S. Knuuttila gives of Gilbert’s explanation of individuality as ‘modal’; see Simo Knuuttila, Modalities in Medieval Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1993), 75–82. It is important to note that, according to Gilbert, an individual is this individual through his particular essence; therefore individuality does not depend on accidents. The fact that Socrates has, actually or potentially, all the accidents a human being can possess does not imply that he is not different from Plato. They are different because each of them is a man by his own humanity. 29

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This total form belongs to just one concrete being. The individuality of a concrete being or, in Gilbert’s words, its numerical diversity, is caused by the particularity of its essential properties and rendered manifest by the fact that it possesses its own total form. An anonymous Porretan treatise is explicit when it speaks of the case of the individual Peter. The form which is composed of all the various properties, both essential and accidental, which are in Peter, and which make Peter different from all the other men, is called petritas. This form is particular, and explains how Peter is a being discrete from all other men.30

1.4 Resemblance Before considering the nature of resemblance, we can define its extension according to Gilbert. Resemblance only really holds between properties. So, strictly speaking, resemblance is relevant to the properties of an individual and not to that individual itself. Exact resemblance—which Gilbert calls conformitas—only holds between essential properties; that is, subsistentiae. Conformitas expresses the fact that a given essential property resembles exactly, in act or potentially, other properties. An individual as such is necessarily unique and, as an individual—that is, according to its forma tota, the sum of its substantial and accidental properties—it cannot resemble another: All the simple [properties] are conform either in act or by nature [potentially]. Therefore none of them is an individual by true reason of dissimilarity . . . It remains therefore that those alone are individuals which are compounded from all [the properties] and cannot be conform to any others in everything: as for example the collected Platonity of all which in act and by nature have been, are, and will be Plato’s.31

It is therefore inappropriate to say that Plato resembles Socrates if this means that Platonity—the sum of the determinations of Plato—resembles Socrateity—the sum of the determinations of Socrates. However, we can say that Plato resembles Socrates as to rationality; for Plato’s particular rationality is conform to Socrates’ particular rationality. 30 Inuisibilia Dei, ed. N. M. Haering, “The Treatise Inuisibilia dei in MS Arras, Bibl. mun. 981 (399),” Recherches de the´ologie ancienne et me´die´vale 40 (1973), 132: §74: “Est itaque indiuiduum quedam forma ex omnibus formis tam substantialibus quam accidentalibus conpacta que sunt in Petro que ita facit Petrum aliis esse dissimilem ut nulli patiatur esse similem. Que forma appellatur propria qualitas a gramaticis, indiuiduum uero a dialeticis. Hec igitur forma que ex omnibus proprietatibus que in Petro sunt composita est petritas uocatur. Que quia ab omnibus formis discreta est, uere indiuidua et personalis dicitur. Et quia uere indiuidua et personalis est, Petro per se unum esse et personam esse confert. Eius namque participatione Petrus ab omnibus aliis discretus est.” 31 In De Trin. 144: 71–8.

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Conformity is thus the exact resemblance between two (or several) particular properties of two (or more) given individuals, such as the exact resemblance that holds between the two particular humanities of two men. Conformity is natural—that is, it is related to the nature of things (naturalis conformitas) because, according to Gilbert, it expresses a ‘substantial similarity’ (substantialis similitudo).32 Each man is a man through his own human form. Since this form makes him a man—that is, the member of a class of individuals which present a similar specific characteristic—the form of each man is the form of his resemblance to other men, or, to express it better, the cause of his resemblance to other men. We shall see that conformitas grounds abstraction which is needed by the intellect in order to think the universal. This thesis is clearly stated in the Summa Zwettlensis, an anonymous text by a disciple of Gilbert, which reproduces accurately his thought: “The conformity of singular natures is the full resemblance according to which Socrates and Plato are said to be naturally similar to each other through the singular humanities which make them conform to each other.”33 Conformity indeed expresses the exact resemblance of particular properties. The ontological structure of each individual—that is, the properties which it possesses and which constitute its being—causes its possible resemblance (and, in a second stage, its ‘reunion’) to other individuals which possess similar ontological structure. There is no universal form shared by many individuals, but in each individual there really exists that which unites it conceptually to others. Conformity is very different from instantiating or sharing the same form. Two conform individuals do not have the same form, but forms that are similar. Their human form is always the form of this man and not of that man. Gilbert’s forms can be put in strong contrast with those of his realist contemporaries, according to whom a form is entirely present in several individuals at the same time. Socrates’ humanity is not the humanity in Socrates, as it would be for realists;34 it is 32

See In De Hebd. 204: 37–44. Die Zwettler Summe: Einleitung und Text, ed. N. M. Haering (Mu¨nster: Aschendorff 1977 [Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters N.F. 15]), § XXVII, 33: “Conformitas autem naturarum singularium est plena similitudo qualiter Socrates et Plato dicuntur naturaliter similes singularibus suis humanitatibus eos similiter conformantibus.” This formulation is literally reproduced by Alain of Lille in his Rules of Theology (Regulae caelestis iuris) as the rule 130: “conformitas est singularium naturarum plena similitude.” 34 See, for example, Thierry of Chartres, who insists on the oneness of humanity for all men, who are different from each other only through their accidental properties: Lectiones in Boethii librum De Trinitate, 175: 11–17: “[ . . . ] una omnino humanitas omnium hominum. Licet enim sint plures homines non sunt tamen plures humanitates. Accidentia enim ex quibus pluralitas et numerus contingit et que uariant subiecta non faciunt formarum sed subiectorum pluralitatem, manente una forma.” 33

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this humanity—a particular humanity completed by particular accidental characteristics. On the other hand, it is difficult to think of a more objective foundation for resemblance. Conventionalism is not admitted. Conformity is exact resemblance and nothing less; no degrees of resemblance are admitted. This is certainly a sign of fidelity to Aristotle who, in the Categories (2b22–8 and 3b33–4a9), rejects the idea that more and less apply to the category of substance. The theory of conformitas reaches its limits when we try to analyse statements involving degrees such as “Orange is more similar to red than it is to green.” This theory aims at providing ontological grounds for the resemblance between two co-specific objects and at justifying the fact that they both fall under the same concept F, and therefore at justifying the use of the same predicate ‘F’ in both cases. As this implies addressing a different aspect of Gilbert’s metaphysics and mentioning external testimonies, we will raise the issue of the primitiveness of resemblance in the last section of this paper. Despite the importance of resemblance in Gilbert’s ontology, I do not think he took the step of going from a constituent ontology to a relational ontology (which would assume that concrete particulars have no ontological structure but just mereological structure), and this for two reasons. Gilbert believes in an intrinsic ontological constitution of individuals. This seems confirmed by his use of the notion of concretio; friends of relational ontologies are committed to understanding objects as ‘blobs,’ devoid of ontological structure. Secondly, according to Gilbert, it is not the relation that causes the being of the thing, in this case of the particular properties; on the contrary, the being of the properties causes the resemblance. Properties (subsistentiae) are indeed the constituents of individuals.

1.5 Gilbert’s theory of universals Gilbert’s theory of universals is first and foremost antirealist. His ontological particularism excludes universals understood as common or shared entities. Universals are sets or, to remain close to the Latin word, collections.35 The text of Boethius on which Gilbert comments contains several statements which seem to call for a realist reading, and therefore involves problems for him. While Boethius says that genera and species subsist,

35

In Contra Eut. 312: 7–12: “Genus uero nichil aliud putandum est nisi subsistentiarum secundum totam earum proprietatem ex rebus secundum species suas differentibus similitudine comparata collectio. Qua similitudinis comparatione omnes ille subsistentie dicuntur ‘unum uniuersale unum diuiduum unum commune unum genus una eademque natura.’ ”

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Gilbert seeks to cut short any possible realist consequences. He intervenes in the text—starting with an ‘id est,’ as every time he modifies or corrects Boethius—with the aim of reducing the universals Boethius mentions to essential generic and specific properties. Let us have a closer look at Gilbert’s intervention. Boethius is speaking of genera and species, and Gilbert adds “id est generales et speciales subsistentie.”36 A subsistentia is necessarily particular according to Gilbert. So that which subsists in reality according to him is not genera and species—that is, entities which can be common to several individuals—but essential properties which are, as properties, necessarily particular. A probably realist Boethian thesis about universals is thus reformulated by Gilbert in terms of essential particularism. For Gilbert, a universal is a collection of properties on the basis of resemblance. His theory is based upon the notion of conformitas. There are many subsistentiae of a given kind, the number of which is the same as that of the subsistents of which they are the being (this thesis is summarized clearly by the author of the Compendium Logicae Porretanum in the formula “there are as many humanities as there are men”),37 and their natural conformity causes their generic or specific union. Gilbert notes that universals are “collected from particulars by the intellect.”38 The intellect is able to abstract on the basis of conformitas, which is naturally given and may be observed through the manifest resemblance that exists between things in the sensible world. The universal is the union of subsistentiae in virtue of their conformity—union, but not unity. The subsistentiae are only called universals, but they are not really so since they do not constitute one res (in consequence, it is important not to assimilate Gilbert’s position with the ‘realist’ theory of collectio, the collective realism criticized by Abelard). The universal is not a unique nature, but a union of several subsistentiae on the basis of their resemblance. The unity of a species or a genus is not ontologically given, but is only the result of abstraction. The unity of the genus only exists in language; the entities gathered by the conformity of their various (that is, diverse in number, and therefore particular) natures are said to be one in genus or species.39 We can speak of one genus, but strictly speaking it does not exist, or only exists in the form of many particular subsistentiae that conform to each other. 36

In Contra Eut. 280: 56–7. Ebbesen, Fredborg, and Nielsen, Compedium Logicae Porretanum, 41: 67–8: “Quot ergo homines, tot humanitates.” 38 In Contra Eut. 279: 18–19. 39 See In De Trin. 76: 75–6: “Et altera sicut illa, que diuersarum naturarum adunat conformitas, genere uel specie unum dicuntur.” 37

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Universality is attributed to a set (collectio) of forms through an act of abstraction of the intellect, which gathers entities on the basis of the similarity of the effects they produce in beings as particular conform forms. The notion of effect is important here, for conformity is manifest in effects. The conformity of two particular subsistentiae or forms is acknowledged on the basis of the resemblance between two individuals or subsistents to which they have given being, or such-and-such a determination. Properties which have similar effects are collected as a universal. Take the example of whiteness. The “principal and proper effect” of whiteness is to make an object white, and its second effect is to make it similar to others. All (particular) whitenesses constitute a universal because they have the same effect: they all make the individual they inform white, and they make it similar to other white things.40

2. A PLATONIC DOCTRINE? Gilbert’s theory relies on the notion of conformitas; that is, on the exact resemblance that holds between subsistentiae of the same species or genus. We may now consider whether Gilbert further explains this resemblance, or whether he considers it as primitive. We can easily exclude the hypothesis according to which resemblance is conventional, because this goes against several passages in which Gilbert states that resemblance is natural and ontologically founded.41 Given Gilbert’s ontological particularism, we can also exclude the hypothesis according to which the resemblance of two objects is explained by the fact that they share the same property. Ontological particularism entails that there are no properties common to several spatio-temporally different individuals. So we are left with the alternative between primitive resemblance and resemblance which has a cause that is not an in re universal—an immanent property common to several particulars. In the first case, resemblance would be an internal relation, the existence of which is entailed by the nature of the subsistentiae themselves. It would be because of their intrinsic nature that two particular subsistentiae are conform—exactly similar. Exact 40 Ebbesen, Fredborg, and Nielsen, Compedium Logicae Porretanum, 50: 49–52: “Sicut enim homines colliguntur in unum populum quia eodem iure vivunt, et milites sub uno duce militantes exercitus, sic singularia sunt unum universale ratione suorum effectum simul collecta.” 41 See In De Hebd. 204: 37–47, where Gilbert distinguishes between the ‘similitudo substantialis’ (the conformitas), the ‘imaginaria similitudo’ (the resemblance between a real man and a man painted on a wall), and ‘imitatio’; see also In De Trin. 75: 28–31.

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resemblance could be said to supervene on the two subsistentiae. Gilbert’s texts do not provide a definitive answer, and we therefore have to rely on texts which are not by Gilbert himself. Both positions can be argued for, and justified by reference to different parts of the Porretan corpus. If we consider the Compendium Logicae Porretanum, which provides a good presentation of Gilbert’s theory and more generally of his ontology, we can only acknowledge the fact that this text does not provide an explanation of resemblance. One may then conclude, following Chris Martin,42 that resemblance is primitive for the author of the Compendium. However, the lack of explanation in the Compendium does not necessarily mean that Gilbert himself did not have one: it can also be explained by the mostly logical and semantic interests of its author, who might have chosen not to consider too deeply purely metaphysical or theological aspects of the theory. The Compendium is the only work of Porretan origin which is not, at least in part, a work of theology. God is not mentioned in it. This is certainly the result of a deliberate choice to keep to logical, semantic, and ontological issues. The question of divine ideas might well have been considered by the author of the Compendium as pertaining to theology and not to ontology. A different reading of Gilbert’s theory can be given. Following a seminal article by E´tienne Gilson,43 we may choose to emphasize a testimony on Gilbert provided by John of Salisbury, and to give importance to Gilbert’s intellectual closeness to his master, Bernard of Chartres. We may argue that Gilbert was sensitive to the Platonic trend that permeated the School of Chartres. This leads us to consider more closely the role of divine ideas, or exemplars, in Gilbert’s ontology. In this reading, the particular subsistentiae which are in conformity to each other (those of individuals of the same species or genus) are so because they are copies or reflections of the same divine idea. Plato’s and Socrates’ particular rationalities are conform— similar—because they are copies of the divine idea of rationality. The exemplarity of ideas is the cause of the conformity of particular essential or accidental subsistentiae. This interpretation can be solidly grounded in a passage from John of Salisbury’s Metalogicon: Still another [in addition to Bernard of Chartres], in his attempt to explain Aristotle, attributes universality to the ‘native forms,’ as does Gilbert, Bishop of Poitiers, who seeks to prove their conformity (in earum conformitate laborat). 42 C. Martin, “The Compendium Logicae Porretanum: A Survey of Philosophical Logic from the School of Gilbert of Poitiers,” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen Aˆge grec et latin 46 (1983), XLII: “Similarity like completeness is primitive in this theory.” 43 ´ E. Gilson, “Le platonisme de Bernard de Chartres,” Revue ne´o-scolastique de philosophie 97 (1923) 5–19.

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A ‘native form’ is an example of an original [exemplar]. It [the native form, unlike the original] inheres in created things, instead of subsisting in the divine mind. In Greek it is called the idos [eidos], since it stands in relation to the idea as the example does to its exemplar. The native form is sensible in things that are perceptible by the senses; but insensible as conceived in the mind. It is singular [particular] in individuals, but universal in all [of a kind].44

Three reasons can be given in favour of taking seriously this passage by John of Salisbury: first, John’s general reliability in his description of the intellectual milieu of the Parisian schools of logic during the twelfth century; second, the fact that he is known to have been close to the Chartres milieu and that he knew Gilbert personally; and finally, the reference to the concept of conformitas which, while it appears to be rather sarcastic, testifies to John’s knowledge of Gilbert’s central doctrine. In a terminological medley, this passage attributes to Gilbert so-called native forms (which are also called idos; that is, the Greek word eidos). John characterizes this position in a few words: the native forms exist in individuals; they stand in a copy-to-model relation with divine ideas; they are said to be ‘singular’—that is, here, particular—and can be gathered to form a universal (probably by abstraction, though the text does not say so); these forms stand in a relation of conformity; that is, resemblance (this does not seem to convince John). Gilbert does not use the phrase ‘native forms’; its presence in John’s text can be explained by the mention of Bernard of Chartres in the lines preceding the passage about Gilbert. The term ‘nativum’ was introduced by Calcidius in his Latin translation of the passage of Timaeus 52A. The theory of the copy-to-model relation, which was formulated, following in particular Seneca,45 in terms of idea and eidos (the idos of our passage) can be found in several twelfth-century authors,46 and would therefore not be

44 John of Salisbury, Metalogicon II, 17, eds. J. B. Hall, K. S. B. Keats-Rohan (Turnhout: Brepols [Corpus Christianorum Continuatio Mediaevalis 98] 1991), 83. English translation by D. MacGarry, in The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: A TwelfthCentury Defence of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium (Berkeley: University of California Press, 19822) 115; the translation has been altered. 45 Seneca, Epistulae morales 58, 21, ed. Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), 157: 29–158: 7: “Quid intersit quaeris? Alterum exemplar est, alterum forma ab exemplari sumpta et operi inposita; alteram artifex imitatur, alteram facit. Habet aliquam faciem statua: haec est idos. Habet aliquam faciem exemplar ipsum quod intuens opifex statuam figuravit: haec idea est. Etiamnunc si aliam desideras distinctionem, idos in opere est, idea extra opus, nec tantum extra opus est, sed ante opus.” See also Epistula 65, 7; 176: 28–177: 10. 46 For the general context, see I. Caiazzo, “Sur la distinction se´ne´chienne idea/idos au XIIe sie`cle,” Choˆra: Revue d’e´tudes anciennes et me´die´vales 3–4 (2005–6) 91–116.

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peculiar to Gilbert. Thierry of Chartres and Clarembald of Arras, who oppose Gilbert on the issue of ontological particularism, both accept this scheme of true forms in the divine mind and immanent forms that are just degenerate copies of prototypical forms. According to Clarembald, they descend (descendunt) from the purissimae substantiae—the real forms in God’s mind—by a kind of fall or degeneration (degeneraverunt). This theory does not appear to imply a position about whether the immanent forms are particular or universal: some philosophers include it in a particularist ontology and others in a universalist ontology. Note that this interpretation agrees with one of the texts on which Gilbert commented, a passage in which Boethius states the following: “For from forms that are without matter come the forms that are in matter and produce bodies. For it is to speak improperly (abutimur) to call forms those that are in bodies, since they are images.”47 The interpretation that Gilbert gives of this brief passage points in the same direction. The forms inherent in matter inform bodies according to the copy/model scheme.48 This passage is somewhat short to determine our interpretation of Gilbert’s thought. Gilbert is commenting on Boethius, and therefore he must do with Boethius’ text. However, on various occasions—for example, as we have seen, when Boethius speaks of specific unity or of the role of accidents in constituting individuals—Gilbert does not hesitate to take distance from Boethius; the fact that he does not intervene in the text could mean that he agrees with what it states. But it could also indicate that it was possibly more acceptable to correct Boethius on ontological issues about the sensible world than on the topic of divine ideas, of central importance to Christian theology. If we decide to take Boethius’ passage as stating a theory that Gilbert held, how does this theory take place in Gilbert’s ontology? The ‘forms that are in matter’ in Boethius’ expression are the subsistentiae of Gilbert’s ontology—the forms of individuals. These subsistentiae would then be images of exemplars, the result of the process of conformative deduction (conformativa deductio). The resemblance that some subsistentiae have to each other would then be explained in a first stage through their being, and, in a second stage, by the fact that they are the copies or images of the same exemplar. The conformity of co-specific subsistences would then be 47 Boethius, De Trinitate, ed. C. Moreschini, in Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, Opuscula theologica (Leipzig: Teubner, 2000), 171: 113–16. 48 In De Trin. 100: 17–20: “ISTE FORME QUE SUNT IN MATERIA ET ei, quod est esse materie, aduenientes CORPUS EFFICIUNT quadam exempli ab exemplari suo conformatiua deductione UENERUNT. Ac per hoc ille sincere idee i.e. exemplares et uero nomine ‘forme’ uocantur.”

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founded in the fact that they all have the same model; that is, the corresponding divine idea. Their exact resemblance would not be primitive, but caused by the fact that they were created according to the same paradigm. The question remains of whether this position is compatible with the ontology of the sensible world which is outlined in the first part of this article, or whether taking up the exemplarist theory would place Gilbert in a contradiction. I do not see anything in the acceptance of ante rem universals (understood here as divine ideas) that would entail a contradiction with Gilbert’s ontological particularism. The thesis in contradiction with ontological particularism is the acceptance of in re universals; that is, the position that holds the existence of common, multiply instantiated entities—entities which may be present at the same time in several spatially different individuals. The theory of ante rem universals does not entail the acceptance of such entities. It can be held that the models—divine ideas— are particular (it even seems difficult to argue that they are not), and that each of their effects—that is, each of their copies—is also particular (which seems to agree with John of Salisbury’s qualification “singularis quoque in singulis”). According to a particular model, several particular copies are created, which are similar because they have been created according to the same model; the ‘universality’ (if this word has to be used) at work here is just causal and exemplarist, not ontological. What Gilbert rejects is multiple instantiation—the idea that the very same thing can be in several discrete individuals at the same time; no such thing is implied by the exemplarist theory. The divine idea is not actually in the individuals; the exemplarist model has the theoretical advantage (for a friend of particularism) of not postulating the realization of the universal in the individual; a copy of the original is created—a new entity—not an instantiation of the universal. So, while in re universals imply an explanation of similarities between individuals in terms of identity—two instances of a universal make the same universal exist—the exemplarist position only requires resemblance, as there is no identity between the model and the copy. The copies are similar to the model and are similar to each other. There is no need to postulate shared entities. Whereas the central idea of in re universals is that they actually are in the different individuals (and their existence is simultaneous to that of the individuals), an exemplarist theory postulates the existence of the model outside and before the individuals. Gilbert’s ontology is founded on the idea that everything is particular, but not on the idea that everything is concrete (in the contemporary sense of the word, that is, opposed to abstract). However, only this last thesis would be a problem for a friend of exemplarism. Gilbert does not deny the

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existence of abstract entities; on the contrary, his distinction between esse and id quod est is a way of distinguishing abstract and concrete entities, while accepting both. Gilbert’s solution, if we accept that it involves exemplarism, can be criticized on two levels: from a methodological point of view, and from a doctrinal point of view. From a methodological point of view we may note that while his theory is coherent, it is not particularly parsimonious; he does not make much use of the idea that one should not multiply entities or kinds of entity unnecessarily. If we accept primitive resemblance as an adequate solution (which is debatable), then Gilbert is ontologically far too generous. For if the being of the concrete entities can be explained without the abstract entities (the divine ideas), why postulate them? The principle which is held by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra,49 according to which one should not postulate, if possible, entities for which there is no independent evidence—that is, entities for the existence of which the only evidence available is that they satisfactorily perform a certain theoretical role—seems very sound. The doctrinal criticism is internal to Gilbert’s metaphysics. The addition of the exemplarist thesis weakens the concept of subsistentia. In Boethius’ text, and in the work of several of his twelfth-century exegetes, the theory of the model in God’s mind and of the copies in the sensible world entails a Platonic metaphysical principle according to which the ‘forms’ in the sensible world (the immanent properties) are not real forms but only images of real forms. If we pursue our Platonic reasoning, this thesis gives less ontological reality to the image, and thus establishes two ontological levels: that of the real forms, and the lower one of images. However, much of Gilbert’s ontological thought aims at putting together a strong concept of subsistentia. Is he not weakening it by reducing it to an image? It can perhaps be argued that Gilbert is entitled to use part of the theory without having to accept all its Platonic consequences and background. The theoretical advantage it gives—founding resemblance and thereby providing a stable grounding for our concepts—may have appeared to him to be worth the disadvantages. Additional explanations are perhaps not needed in order for the conformitas theory to be viable. The explanation through primitiveness is sufficient, or if it is not, it is less unsatisfactory than the need to add a new type of entity. But if the native forms theory was really Gilbert’s position, and if we accept that the exemplars and native forms are particular

49 See G. Rodriguez-Pereyra, Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), 210–16.

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entities, his metaphysics are even more original than trope particularism. The position becomes a combination of ontological particularism and Platonism, which could be called, following C. S. Peirce’s expression, a Platonistic nominalism.50 University of Lausanne

BIBLIOGRAPHY Alan of Lille. Summa Quoniam homines, ed. P. Glorieux, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litte´raire du Moyen A^ge 20 (1953), 113–364. Alain of Lille. Regulae caelestis iuris, ed. N. M. Haering, Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litte´raire du Moyen A^ge 48 (1981), 97–226. Anonymous. Compedium Logicae Porretanum, ed. S. Ebbesen, K. M. Fredborg, and L. O. Nielsen, Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen A^ge grec et latin 46 (1983), 1–93. Anonymous. Inuisibilia Dei, in N. M. Haering (ed.), “The Treatise Inuisibilia dei in MS Arras, Bibl. mun. 981 (399),” Recherches de the´ologie ancienne et me´die´vale 40 (1973), 104–46. Anonymous. Die Zwettler Summe: Einleitung und Text, ed. N. M. Haering (Mu¨nster: Aschendorff, 1977). Boethius. De Trinitate, in C. Moreschini (ed.), De consolatione philosophiae, Opuscula theologica (Leipzig: Teubner, 2000). Caiazzo, Irene. “Sur la distinction se´ne´chienne idea/idos au XIIe sie`cle,” Choˆra: Revue d’ ´etudes anciennes et me´die´vales 3–4 (2005–06), 91–116. Catalani, Luigi. I Porretani: Una scuola di pensiero, tra alto e basso medioevo (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009). de Rijk, L. M. “Semantics and Metaphysics in Gilbert of Poitiers: A Chapter of Twelfth-Century Platonism,” Vivarium 26 (1988), 73–122, and 27 (1989), 1–35. de Rijk, L. M. “Gilbert de Poitiers, ses vues se´mantiques et me´taphysiques,” in J. Jolivet and A. de Libera (eds.), Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: Aux origines de la Logica modernorum, Actes du septie`me symposium europe´en d’histoire de la logique et de la se´mantique me´die´vales, Poitiers 17–22 Juin 1985 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987), 147–71. Fichtenau, Heinrich. Heretics and Scholars in the High Middle Ages, 1000–1200 (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000). Gilbert of Poitiers. The Commentaries on Boethius, ed. N. Haering (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1966).

50 An earlier version of this paper was delivered at the Cornell Summer Colloquium in Medieval Philosophy. I would like to express my gratitude to the participants for the thought-provoking discussion we had there. I would also like to thank the two anonymous OSMP reviewers for their very useful comments on this article.

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Gilson, E´tienne. “Le platonisme de Bernard de Chartres,” Revue ne´o-scolastique de philosophie 97 (1923), 5–19. Haering, N. M. “Notes on the Council and the Consistory of Reims,” Mediaeval Studies 28 (1966), 39–59. Jacobi, Klaus. “Einzelnes—Individuum—Person. Gilbert von Poitiers’ Philosophie des Individuellen,” in J. Aertsen and A. Speer (eds), Individuum und Individualita¨t im Mittelalter (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1996), 3–21. John of Salisbury. Metalogicon, ed. J. B. Hall and K. S. B. Keats-Rohan (Turnhout: Brepols [Corpus Christianorum, Continuatio Mediaevalis 98], 1991). John of Salisbury. The Metalogicon of John of Salisbury: A Twelfth-Century Defence of the Verbal and Logical Arts of the Trivium, tr. D. MacGarry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982). Jolivet, Jean. “Trois variations me´die´vales sur l’universel et l’individu: Roscelin, Abe´lard, Gilbert de la Porre´e,” Revue de me´taphysique et de morale 97 (1992), 111–55. Kenny, Anthony. Medieval Philosophy: A New History of Western Philosophy, Volume 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). Knuuttila, Simo. Modalities in Medieval Philosophy (London: Routledge,1993). Lewry, Patrick Osmund. “The Liber sex principiorum, a Supposedly Porretanean Work: A Study in Ascription,” in J. Jolivet and A. de Libera (eds.), Gilbert de Poitiers et ses contemporains: Aux origines de la Logica modernorum, Actes du septie`me symposium europe´en d’histoire de la logique et de la se´mantique me´die´vales, Poitiers 17–22 Juin 1985 (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987), 251–78. Maioli, Bruno. Gilberto Porretano: Dalla grammatica speculativa alla metafisica del concreto (Rome: Bulzoni, 1979). Marenbon, John. “Was Abelard a Trope Theorist?” in C. Erismann and A. Schniewind (eds.), Comple´ments de substance: E´tudes sur les proprie´te´s accidentelles offertes a` Alain de Libera (Paris: Vrin, 2008), 85–101. Marenbon, John. “Gilbert of Poitiers,” in P. Dronke (ed.), A History of TwelfthCentury Western Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 328–52. Martin, Christopher J. “The Compendium Logicae Porretanum: A Survey of Philosophical Logic from the School of Gilbert of Poitiers,” Cahiers de l’Institut du Moyen A^ge grec et latin 46 (1983), XVIII–XLVI. Maurer, Armand. “William of Ockham (b. c.1285, d. 1347),” in J. Gracia (ed.), Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation (1150–1650) (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 373–96. Nielsen, Lauge O. Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert Porreta’s Thinking and the Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during the Period 1130–1180 (Leiden: Brill, 1982). Porphyry. Isagoge, ed. A. Busse (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1887). Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002). Seneca. Ad Lucilium epistulae morales, ed. L. D. Reynolds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965).

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Simons, Peter. “Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (1994), 553–75. Thierry of Chartres. Lectiones in Boethii librum de Trinitate, in N. Haering (ed.), Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1971). Valente, Luisa. “Gilbert of Poitiers,” in H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Medieval Philosophy: Philosophy between 500 and 1500 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), 409–17. Van Elswiik, H. C. Gilbert Porreta, sa vie, son œuvre, sa pense´e (Leuven: Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, 1966). Westley, Richard J. “A Philosophy of the Concreted and the Concrete: The Constitution of Creatures according to Gilbert de la Porre´e,” Modern Schoolman 37 (1959–60), 257–86.

I See Dead People Disembodied Souls and Aquinas’s Two-Person Problem Christina Van Dyke

Aquinas’s account of the human soul is the key to his theory of human nature. The soul’s nature as the substantial form of the human body appears at times to be in tension with its nature as immaterial intellect, however, and nowhere is this tension more evident than in Aquinas’s discussion of the ‘separated’ soul. In this paper I use the Biblical story of the rich man and Lazarus (which Aquinas took to involve actual separated souls) to highlight what I will call the Two-Person Problem facing his account of human identity through death and the bodily resurrection.1 Here, in short, is the problem: Aquinas explicitly claims that the rational soul is neither the human being nor the human person.2 When the rich man’s soul says “I am in agony,” then, what is the referent of “I?” It appears to be the soul. If the rich man’s separated soul is not identical to the rich man, however, how could the human being that Aquinas claims is resurrected at the final judgment be numerically identical to the original rich man (commonly referred to as ‘Dives’ in medieval discussions)?3 It appears 1 The problem initially appears similar to the “Too Many Thinkers” problem that Patrick Toner addresses in “St Thomas Aquinas on the Problem of Too Many Thinkers,” in The Modern Schoolman 89 (2012), 209–22. They are actually distinct issues, however. Toner addresses the general problem that on Aquinas’s account of human nature, both the human being and the human soul seem able to think. (This is one of the central motivations for animalism as a metaphysical view on personal identity, and Toner advocates a modified animalist response on Aquinas’s behalf.) In this paper, my goal is to address a more specific problem—one raised for post-mortem identity by Aquinas’s account of the separated soul. 2 See, for example, Summa theologiae Ia.75.4.co, and ST Ia.29.1.ad5; I discuss both passages in some detail in Section 4. 3 See SCG IV.81 for Aquinas’s most extensive series of arguments in favor of the resurrected human person’s being numerically identical to the original, earthly person.

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that there is a human person, ‘Dives,’ who is replaced at Dives’s death by the person ‘Dives’s soul,’ who is in turn replaced at the bodily resurrection by ‘Dives,’ whom Aquinas claims is numerically identical to the original person. But this seems hopeless as a genuinely identity-preserving account of human nature. Contemporary readers, whose intuitions about personal identity have been honed on Parfit and Unger, might well respond, “And so . . ?” For Aquinas, however, as well as virtually all medieval and early modern thinkers and the majority of theists, this is an issue of the utmost importance. The theological claim is that you will continue to exist after your death, and that it is you who will experience the consequences of decisions you made in this life. For someone else to be praised or blamed for the rest of eternity for something you did seems unjust, to put it mildly. The Two-Person Problem is, thus, a pressing issue for Aquinas, and it has received a great deal of attention in Thomistic studies. After laying out the problem in more detail, I will consider two particularly promising solutions (offered, respectively, by Robert Pasnau and Eleonore Stump), both of which argue that there is a relevant sense in which the human person does not cease to exist at death. Unfortunately, neither of these proposals adequately solves the Two-Person Problem. In fact, I believe that Aquinas’s account of human nature does not, as it stands, possess the resources with which to overcome this difficulty; I conclude that reconstructing a(n otherwise) Thomistic account that involves immediate bodily resurrection, although a radical approach, is the one best suited to preserving the most essential features of Aquinas’s theory.4

1 . T H E R I C H M A N A N D L A Z AR US At first glance, it might not be clear why the story of the rich man and Lazarus, found only in the gospel of Luke (16:19–31), should shed any light on Aquinas’s account of the separated soul. Placed at the end of a series of four parables (including the Prodigal Son and the Shrewd Manager), the story today is often understood as itself a parable. General opinion in the 4 In this paper I shall be focusing primarily on Aquinas’s later discussions of the separated soul in an effort to avoid familiar concerns about the development of his views. (For a clear discussion of this concern, see Anton Pegis’s “The Separated Soul and Its Nature in St Thomas,” in A Maurer (ed.), St Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974). Because Aquinas’s later claims about the cognitive capacities of the separated soul are more modest than his earlier claims, it will be enough to show that the difficulty I am concerned with arises even from those later, weaker claims.

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thirteenth century, however, held that this story described actual events involving separated souls; as such, it was taken to shed light on disembodied existence after death and prior to the final judgment.5 Aquinas himself mentions the story of the rich man and Lazarus in every single one of his discussions of the separated soul (barring the discussion in Summa contra gentiles [SCG] II—an omission which is hardly surprising, since Aquinas there carefully refrains from appealing to special revelation). To summarize the relevant details of the story Jesus tells, Lazarus is a beggar who is laid at the gates of an unnamed rich man (often called “Dives”—the Latin for “rich man”—in later commentaries); when both men die, Lazarus is brought to stand by Abraham himself, while the rich man suffers the torments of hell. The rich man sees Lazarus standing by the Patriarch and calls out: “Father Abraham, have pity on me and send Lazarus to dip the tip of his finger in water and cool my tongue, because I am in agony in this fire.” Abraham refuses the request, telling him to “Remember that in your lifetime you received your good things.” “Then send Lazarus to my father’s house,” the rich man begs, “For I have five brothers. Let him warn them, so that they will not also come to this place of torment.” Abraham again refuses the rich man’s request, telling him that if his brothers have not believed Moses and the prophets, they will not believe even someone risen from the dead. This passage raises a host of issues, not least among which is how to separate what is meant to be metaphorical in this story from what is meant to be taken literally. Aquinas himself walks a cautious line in this respect. In Disputed Questions on the Soul (QDA), for instance, a question is raised about how a soul separated from matter could suffer thirst, or see and hear the souls of Abraham and Lazarus. In response, Aquinas claims that There is no reason why in an account of things that happened something cannot be said metaphorically. For although what is said in the Gospel about Lazarus and the rich man is something which took place, still it is by way of metaphor that Lazarus is said to have seen and heard; just as it is also said metaphorically that he had a tongue. (QDA 19.ad11)6

5 A participant in Aquinas’s eighteenth disputed question on the soul, for instance, states matter-of-factly that: “As Gregory says [in his commentary on Luke], what is related in Luke 16 about Lazarus and the rich man is not a parable but something which happened; this is clear because the person involved is given his proper name” (sc10). In the next question, Aquinas himself agrees, stating that “what is said in the Gospel about Lazarus and the rich man is something which took place.” 6 All translations are my own. The relevant Latin texts can all be found at .

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Here Aquinas both affirms the literal reading of the basic events reported and gives a metaphorical gloss on some of the descriptions. The passage reports actual events: the souls of the rich man, Abraham, and Lazarus can communicate and can even suffer in separation from matter. The story describes these events in metaphorical (physical) terms, however, simply for ease of understanding.

2 . H U M A N AC T I V I T I ES AN D T H E R A T I O N A L S O U L Indeed, it is not the physical metaphors but the robust agency of the separated soul that seems inconsistent with claims Aquinas makes elsewhere about the fundamental unity of body and soul—a unity that lies at the very heart of Aquinas’s account of human nature. In this section I look at Aquinas’s general claims about the possibility of disembodied cognition and argue that the real problem facing Aquinas’s account of the separated soul is not the mode of its cognition (that is, how it thinks apart from the body), but the mere fact of its cognition. Aquinas repeatedly argues for an intimate connection between body and soul, explicitly reacting against the early-thirteenth-century trend of emphasizing the nobility of the soul by stressing its independence from the body.7 One of the main implications of Aquinas’s hylomorphic commitments (as well as his adherence to the unicity of substantial form) is his belief that all the operations or activities of the human soul naturally involve the body. Nutrition, growth, sensing, locomotion . . . all of these operations of the rational soul rely on union with matter. In fact, Aquinas even uses the body’s role in human sense perception to support his claim that the human being is not merely a soul: “Since sensing is an action of a human being (albeit not the proper action), it is clear that a human being is not only a soul, but is something composed of soul and body” (ST Ia.75.4). Even the rational capacities of human beings typically require the body for their actualization. Although the human intellect’s operation transcends matter in abstract thought, for instance, it still needs access to powers (such as imagination and sense) which themselves require physical organs. The activity of intellection itself does not require matter (since otherwise God and the angels would not be able to think), but the human intellect does require union with matter in order to have something to think about. As Aquinas puts it, “It is necessary that [the soul] receives intelligible species 7 See Richard C. Dales’ The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1995) for an excellent, extensive discussion of these issues.

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from external things through the mediation of the sensory powers, which cannot carry out their proper operations apart from bodily organs” (QDA 8). Other intellects receive intelligible species (abstract, universal concepts) directly from higher intellects, but human intellects are the very weakest sort of intellect, and so they need to be united with matter in order to acquire objects of cognition.8 What is more, Aquinas argues that the human intellect must revert to phantasms (essentially, mental ‘pictures’ of the things we are thinking about) every time it makes use of those intelligible species: “the soul, while joined to a body, cannot understand something without turning itself to phantasms” (ST Ia.89.1.co). The body is naturally involved in human cognition, then— a fact he uses to support the integral body/soul unity of the human being: “Since the human soul’s act of understanding needs powers—namely, imagination and sense—which function through bodily organs, this itself shows that the soul is naturally united to the body in order to complete the human species” (SCG II.68). In short, on Aquinas’s account, human beings aren not souls forced to inhabit the physical world, but rather integrated composites in which the body plays an essential role.

3 . T H E C O G N I T I O N O F T HE S E P A R A T E D S O U L The body is integrally involved with the cognitive process, then, but Aquinas takes pains to argue that this involvement does not entail that the soul depends on matter for its characteristic activity of intellection. Intellection itself is an activity that transcends matter, and for this reason Aquinas believes the soul both can and will continue to exist in separation from matter.9 Moreover, he claims that the soul can—and does—cognize in separation from matter. Taken as describing actual events, the story of the rich man and Lazarus clearly seems to demonstrate this fact. Suffering the torments of hell, the soul of the rich man displays rational activity first in seeking a way to ease its 8 See, for example, QDA 7.co: “In its own nature, a soul does not possess the perfection of intelligible objects but is in potentiality to intelligible objects, just as prime matter is with respect to sensible forms. For this reason, for its proper operation, a soul needs to be actualized by intelligible forms, acquiring them from external things through sensory powers. And since the operation of the senses takes place through bodily organs, it is appropriate (because of this condition of its nature) that the soul be united to a body and that it be part of the species ‘human being,’ not being complete in species in itself.” 9 See, for example, ST Ia.75.2.

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agony (“Send Lazarus to dip the tip of his finger in water and cool my tongue”) and then immediately determining another way in which Lazarus might prove useful (“Send Lazarus to my brothers to warn them about this place of torment”). Without reference to sensory powers and also the intellective powers (such as imagination and sensory memory) that depend on them, however, how can the rich man’s soul perform such intellectual feats? As Aquinas himself points out, “It is hard to see the way in which [the separated soul] understands . . . since it is quite clear that it can understand now only if it turns to phantasms, and these will not remain in any way after death” (QDV 19.1.co). Unlike intelligible species, the building blocks of abstract thought, phantasms (the images from which the active intellect abstracts intelligible species) cannot exist apart from physical organs.10 Aquinas’s solution is to claim that while the fundamental nature of the human soul remains the same in separation from matter, the nature of its cognition changes significantly, becoming like that of other immaterial intellects (like angels). In his words, “Once separated from its body, the soul will have a different mode of cognition, like that of other substances that are separate from bodies” (ST Ia.75.6.ad3, added emphasis). Other intellective creatures never require phantasms for their cognitive processes, because they do not need to begin with sense perception, generate phantasms from sense information, and then abstract intelligible species from phantasms. Instead, they rely entirely on intelligible species that they receive from higher immaterial substances. Aquinas claims that in separation from matter, our souls, like the angels, “will be able more fully to perceive an influx [of intelligible species] from higher substances.” In particular, “through an influx of this kind the soul will be able to understand without phantasms, something it cannot do at present” (QDA 15). Such understanding will strain our cognitive abilities, and will be inferior in certain ways to what we are capable of when embodied.11 Nevertheless, our separated souls will receive the intelligible species they requires from a higher power, and so they can in this way continue to cognize even apart from the body.12 10 See ST Ia.85.1 for a discussion of this process, especially ad3, where Aquinas states: “Phantasms are the images of individual things, and exist in corporeal organs.” 11 “But an influx of this kind will not cause knowledge which is as perfect and as determinate with respect to singulars as the knowledge which we acquire in this life through our senses.” 12 There is some confusion in Aquinas’s own corpus as to the exact source of the illumination of separated souls—some passages (most crucially ST Ia.89) suggest that God himself directly illumines them, whereas other passages (for example, QDA 15–20 and SCG II.81) clearly leave the task of illumination to the angels. For our immediate purposes, this ambiguity proves unimportant; I do think, though, that the prospect of

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This explanation might appear a bit ad hoc initially: a sort of explanatory stop-gap. Ultimately, however, this is exactly what we should expect him to say. Human souls—the substantial forms of human beings—are created in union with their bodies, and they exist in a highly unnatural state in separation from matter, but their disembodied mode of cognition is just an extension of the natural order of things. On a Thomistic view of the universe, God constantly illumines all of creation. When joined to bodies, human souls are illuminated through the natural move from sense perception to phantasms to intelligible species. When separated from matter, human souls are able to receive illumination from a source that, although new to them, has always been available. In earthly life, our intellects do not need this sort of influx of intelligible species, and are (almost) never in a position to receive it properly, but they can still naturally participate in this influx when removed from their natural source of objects of cognition. 4 . H U M AN B E I N G S , P E R S O N S, A N D M E Aquinas does have an explanation for the cognition of separated souls, then. Unfortunately, the real difficulty facing Aquinas’s account of the separated soul does not stem from his claims about the mode of the separated soul’s cognition. It arises from the separated soul’s mere status as a thinking thing. For Aquinas explicitly denies that the rational soul is identical to the human being, to the human person, and to me (at the same time that he argues for the identity of the human being with the human person and with me).13 This appears to entail that when the separated soul is thinking, the agent doing that thinking is something distinct from any of those things. Even in his early Sentences Commentary, Aquinas states plainly that “The soul of Abraham is not Abraham himself, properly speaking, but is part of him; and so for all the others. So Abraham’s soul’s having life would not suffice for Abraham’s being alive” (SC IV.43.1.1.1.ad2). This idea—that a human being is identical to the composite of soul and body, and not simply to her soul—appears repeatedly throughout Aquinas’s corpus, and is something he sees as central to his account of human nature.14 When he angelic illumination of separated souls fits more smoothly with Aquinas’s general account of the cognition of separated substances, according to which there is a natural hierarchy of illumination, with lower intellects generally being assisted by slightly higher ones. 13 See my “The End of (Human) Life as We Know It: Thomas Aquinas on Bodies, Persons, and Death,” The Modern Schoolman 89 (2012), 243–57 (special issue: “Theological Themes in Medieval Philosophy”) for a fuller discussion of these claims and their implications for Aquinas’s account of human nature. 14 See, for example, SCG II.61, ST Ia.75, QDA 1.

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discusses the unique status of the human soul as the form of a material body that can persist in absence of the body it informs, Aquinas consistently claims that the rational soul is something subsistent but not something that is complete in species. It is part of the human species, but the human being is something composed of soul and body. (As we saw above, “It is clear that a human being is not only a soul, but is something composed of soul and body” (ST Ia.75.4); also, “It is appropriate . . . that the soul be united to a body and that it be part of the species ‘human being,’ not being complete in species in itself” (QDA 7.co).) Aquinas also flatly denies that the rational soul is the human person. In fact, relying on the standard medieval definition of ‘person’ as “an individual substance with a rational nature,”15 he denies that the soul is a person at all. As he puts it, appealing again to the idea that only the soul/body composite meets the criteria for being a member of the human species: . . . the soul is part of the human species; for this reason, since it is still by nature unitable [to a body] even when it is separated, it cannot be the sort of individual substance which is called a “hypostasis” or “first substance” any more than a hand or any other part of a human being can. And so neither the name nor the definition of “person” belongs to the rational soul. (ST Ia.29.1.ad5)

Even in separation from the body, then, Aquinas believes that the rational soul does not meet the criteria for personhood (understood in the medieval sense). It is a central component of a natural kind (‘human being’), not a natural kind itself. He makes much the same point in Quaestiones disputatae de potentia, claiming that “the separated soul is part of [something with] a rational nature, namely, human [nature], but it is not the whole rational human nature, and therefore it is not a person” (9.2.ad14). For our purposes, what is important about these claims is that Aquinas denies that the soul is a person, considered on its own, on the grounds that the soul is only one part (albeit the most important part) of the human person. Aquinas thus denies that the soul is either the human being or the human person; he also explicitly rules out the possibility that I am my soul. “Since the soul is part of the human body, it is not the whole human being,” he claims, “and I am not my soul; for this reason, although the soul might achieve salvation in another life, it nevertheless does not follow that I or any other human being has salvation in another life” (in I Corinthios 15).16 In other words, not only am I not my soul, but my soul’s glorification 15

See, for example, ST Ia.29.1 and QDP 9.2. Consider also the Sentences Commentary passage quoted above, which makes the same point about the life of Abraham’s soul not entailing that Abraham himself lives. 16

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would not be enough to count as my own glorification.17 In his gloss on Job’s famous claim that “In my flesh shall I see God,” Aquinas draws the same distinction between ‘me’ and ‘my soul,’ writing: “Job says, ‘whom I myself shall see’ as if to say ‘not only my soul, but I myself, who subsist from soul and body, will see God” (In Job, Lectio 2). Even if my separated soul were to see God, Aquinas holds that such an event would not constitute my seeing God. In the story of the rich man and Lazarus, Lazarus’s soul is enjoying a blessed state with Abraham’s soul, awaiting the final judgment. But this is not enough, then, according to the passages we have seen, for Lazarus to be seeing God, or enjoying glorification. In the same vein, the suffering and the pleading of the rich man’s soul is not equivalent to the suffering or the pleading of the rich man himself.

5 . T H E R I C H M A N ( ’ S SO U L ) A N D T HE PROBLEM OF SELF-REFERENCE Aquinas is clear that the rational soul is the substantial form of the human body. As such, my soul makes me both actually exist and exist as a member of the human species; my soul organizes and animates my body in a way that makes me uniquely me. And yet, Aquinas seems quite clear that— although my soul is now part of me and will be part me again after the bodily resurrection—my separated soul itself is not me.18 What, then, is it? The obvious option appears to be that my separated soul (which thinks, believes, anticipates, and so on) is a person. Thus, the Two Person Problem emerges: during earthly life I exist as a human person; after death and 17 See Aquinas’s Treatise on Happiness (ST IaIIae.1–5) for a fuller discussion of what is required for our happiness. As I have argued in “Aquinas’s Shiny Happy People: Perfect Happiness and the Limits of Human Nature,” Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (vol. 6, forthcoming), there is some tension between what Aquinas claims in this passage and the role the body plays in his account of perfect happiness, which consists in cognizing God’s essence. 18 There are scholars who argue that Aquinas does believe that my separated soul is me—a position sometimes called ‘survivalism.’ See, for example, Jason Eberl, “Do Human Persons Persist between Death and Resurrection,” in K. Timpe (ed.), Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump (London: Routledge, 2009); and Jim Madden, “Thomistic Hylomorphism and Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Religion,” Philosophy Compass 8 (2013), 664–76. Eleonore Stump is often portrayed as advocating a version of this view as well, but I will consider her view separately, since what she actually claims is that my soul is not identical to me, but rather that it constitutes me in the period between death and the bodily resurrection. I will not address the full-on survivalist views in this paper, because it seems so clear (on the grounds of matters which I have already discussed) that their position cannot be Aquinas’s own.

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prior to the bodily resurrection my soul exists as a person who is nonidentical to me. The Two-Person Problem, of course, assumes that there is a clear sense in which the separated soul is a person. And we have already seen Aquinas deny that it is. The problem does not get off the ground, then, one might think: the separated soul cannot be a person, and so there are not two persons in the picture, and, hence, no Two-Person Problem.19 This seems to me, however, too easy a resolution. The problem posed by the separated soul’s actions is that it functions as a person in the modern sense of the term—as does the human being. The real force of Aquinas’s denial of the claim that the rational soul is a person is to point out that the soul’s persistence is not sufficient to count as the persistence of the human being of which that soul is the substantial form. That is, what claim he is interested in establishing is that the human soul and the human person (which is identical to the human being and to me) are two separate things . . . things both of which appear to meet contemporary criteria of personhood. This is all it takes to get the Two-Person Problem off the ground: the human being is clearly a person (in both the modern and the medieval sense), and the rational soul appears to be a person (in the modern sense, if not the medieval). But Aquinas denies that they are identical. It should be clear why the human being counts as a person, but why think that the separated soul counts as a person in the modern sense? There are at least two main reasons, both of which can be seen clearly in the context of the story of the rich man and Lazarus. First, as we have seen from the description of the story, the rich man’s soul appears to have intentional states, discursive thought, desires, and so on; as such, it meets virtually every contemporary standard for personhood.20 Second, the rich man’s soul uses first-person reference in a way that cannot apply to the rich man himself. Indeed, if we look closely at the story, there appear to be two different sorts of self-referential claim made by the rich man’s soul. The first is demonstrated by the rich man’s statement, “I have five brothers.” In this utterance, the referent of ‘I’ seems to be the previously existing human being, ‘Dives,’ who has five brothers. But Dives is not identical to his soul. 19 Patrick Toner is definitely tempted toward this view; see his “St Thomas Aquinas and the Too Many Thinkers Problem” cited above. 20 Even accounts of personal identity which rely on bodily rather than psychological criteria generally take such capacities to indicate the presence of a person; see, for example, chapter 6 of Eric Olson’s The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); Judith Jarvis Thomson’s “People and Their Bodies” in J. Darcy (ed.), Reading Parfit (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997); and Hud Hudson’s A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001).

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Thus, it seems that the separated soul really means something like “The human being of which this was the substantial form had five brothers.” In the same way, if Lazarus’s separated soul were to say, “I am going to enjoy the new creation,” we could take that as properly referring to the resurrected human being. Even if we can account for the rich man’s soul’s claim, “I have five brothers,” by holding that it refers to the rich man, however, there is a still a second sort of self-referential claim Dives’s soul makes, as when it cries out, “Send Lazarus to cool my tongue, for I am in agony in these flames!” Clearly, in this case, the referent of ‘I’ is the separated soul itself, not the composite human being. At the time of the story, there is no union of matter and form suffering the agony of hell—there is only the rich man’s disembodied soul. The rich man’s soul appears to have a variety of experiences, desires, and thoughts, then, which the rich man does not share. In short, there appears to be one person, Dives, who is replaced at his death by another person (Dives’s soul), who is in turn replaced at the bodily resurrection by the human person Dives*—whom Aquinas claims is numerically identical to the original Dives.21 Aquinas himself seems uncharacteristically tentative about how best to handle the question of referring to the disembodied soul. In a brief passage on petitionary prayer in ST IIaIIae, for instance, Aquinas considers the issue of praying to the saints. Since this request occurs after their deaths and before the final judgment, Aquinas takes it that our requests are directed at the separated souls of the saints; does this, then, count as praying to the saint ? As the fifth objection to this article puts it, “The soul of Peter is not Peter. Therefore, if the souls of the saints pray for us while they are separated from bodies, we should not ask (interpellare) saint Peter to pray for us, but his soul” (83.11.obj5). In response, Aquinas claims neither that we should pray to Peter’s soul nor that we refer to Peter when we pray. Instead, he writes simply: “Since the saints earned the right to pray for us while they were living, we invoke them using the names by which they were called here, and also by which they are better known to us. And, also, in order to indicate belief in the resurrection.” That is, Aquinas seems to say, we can fairly refer to Peter’s soul as “Peter” during the period in which Peter, properly speaking, does not exist, both because it was Peter who earned the right to pray for us (rather than his soul, which used to be part of Peter), and because that soul will be part of Peter again after the resurrection. This is, of course, not at all the same as claiming that Peter’s soul is Peter. Aquinas does not even appeal to the 21 Again, see SCG IV.81 for a series of arguments in favor of the resurrected human person’s being numerically identical to the original, earthly person.

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continuity of Peter’s intellect and will—the two central components of human psychology on his account—to argue that enough of Peter remains for us to call him by that name. It is entirely Peter’s past and future relation to the soul that persists that allows us to continue to pray to Peter. So where does this leave us? Elsewhere, I have argued that the persistence of the rational soul in the interim state could be sufficient to account for the identity of the original human being with the resurrected human being because it maintains the right sort of immanent causal connections.22 That is, although the soul itself is not the human being (or the human person or me), the central role the soul plays in human identity means that its persistence guarantees the persistence of ‘what counts’ for identitypreserving purposes. Aquinas’s commitment to the sort of agency attributed to Dives’s soul in the story of the rich man and Lazarus, however, appears to block this possibility. For what is important in the causal story is that the right sort of immanent causal relations be preserved between the original Dives and the resurrected Dives: that is, that the resurrected Dives be the way he is because the original Dives was the way he was. If the soul that is meant to preserve such connections acts as an agent in its own right in the period during which it is not Dives, however, it becomes difficult (if not impossible) to see how it can simultaneously preserve the right sort of causal connections. One might well think, for instance, that part of what it would take for the resurrected Dives to be identical to the original Dives would be for the resurrected Dives to have certain mental/intentional/volitional states because of states the original Dives possessed. In this case, the existence of an interim period during which the sustainer of those states (which is not identical to Dives) exhibited its own mental/intentional/volitional states would seem to irreparably interrupt the appropriate causal connections.

6 . P A R T I A L ID E N T I T Y AN D C O N S T I T U T I O N The problematic status of the disembodied soul for Aquinas’s account of identity has hardly gone unnoticed (although I think the seriousness of the problem has often been underestimated). The challenge for defenders of 22 See my “Human Identity, Immanent Causal Relations, and the Principle of NonRepeatability: Thomas Aquinas on the Bodily Resurrection,” Religious Studies 43 (2007), 373–94. In it, I draw on the model of the role immanent causal connections play in Dean Zimmerman’s “The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival: the ‘Falling Elevator’ Model,” Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999), 194–212, who is responding to seminal concerns raised by Peter van Inwagen in his The Possibility of Resurrection and Other Essays in Christian Apologetics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998).

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Thomistic anthropology who have agreed with me to this point is to explain how—although the rich man’s soul is not, properly or strictly speaking, identical to the rich man—his separated soul can nevertheless function in a way that preserves Dives’s identity. I have just explained why I no longer believe that a solution I proposed earlier can work; in the remainder of this paper I examine two other attempts to defend Aquinas’s account: Robert Pasnau’s partial identity account and Eleonore Stump’s constitution account. I argue that, despite their attractions, neither attempt is ultimately successful. First, in Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature, Robert Pasnau seeks to solve the Two-Person Problem by taking a Parfitian line, claiming that the soulperson is not an entirely separate person at all, but, rather a person who is mostly or partially me, and that the soul-person’s persistence is sufficient for my partially continuing to exist in a way that preserves personal identity. As he writes: When [Aquinas] says “my soul is not I,” we should take this to mean that a person’s soul is not entirely that person. If then asked who or what a separated soul becomes, Aquinas should say that it does not become anyone, or anything at all: it stays what it was, a part of a person. So when I die, I cease to exist, as a whole, but part of me continues to exist, and hence I partly continue to exist. (388)23

In other words, since my soul is part of me, its continued existence entails that I continue to exist—just partly, rather than fully. On this Parfitian reading, survival is not simply an all-or-nothing proposition. According to Pasnau: [My] separated soul is not anyone other than I, and in a sense it is I, but it is not fully I, not I in the strictest sense. The soul’s survival is a necessary condition for personal identity, not a sufficient condition . . . The core of who I am is my soul, but that is not all of who I am. (389)

Dives’s soul is not exactly Dives, then, but it is not really anyone else either. It is a sort of partial-Dives, or ‘Dives-lite.’ I agree with Pasnau that, for Aquinas, my soul is the core of who I am without being the whole of who I am. At the same time, it seems to me that trying to cash out Aquinas’s claims about the separated soul in terms of partial identity is a non-starter on both philosophical and textual grounds. Philosophically, Aquinas’s essentialism seems incompatible with an account of partial identity. Parfit’s original introduction of the notion of partial identity, after all, followed on his belief that personal identity is “not 23 Robert Pasnau. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa Theologiae Ia 75–89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

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what matters”—that is, that focusing on our own, individual, continued existence is in an important sense misguided.24 Given Aquinas’s interest in the strict numerical identity of the resurrected human being with the earthly human being (especially for the purpose of just reward and punishment), it seems highly unlikely that Aquinas would agree that personal identity is not what matters. Furthermore, in two of the passages we have already seen, Aquinas seems to hold that my soul does not count as me in separation from matter precisely because it is part of me. In the I Corinthians commentary, for instance, he states explicitly that my soul’s salvation does not entail my salvation because my soul is part of me and not the whole of me; in his Sentences commentary, he claims that Abraham’s soul’s having life does not suffice for Abraham’s being alive, again because it is only part of him. Whatever partial sense in which I might continue to exist on Pasnau’s line, then, will not count as my existence in any way relevant to Aquinas’s theory of identity. Rather than being “partly me” after death, my soul seems at most something with the interesting historical property “having been part of me.” If the soul’s survival is, for Aquinas, a necessary and not a sufficient condition for personal identity (and I agree with Pasnau that it is), then its survival alone does not yield direct continuity in personal identity.25 If, for example, lightning strikes a tree and half of it breaks off and falls to the ground, where it quietly decays, it does not seem to me that the right thing to say about the remaining half of the tree is that, because part of it continues to exist, it partly continues to exist. Rather, I think the tree wholly continues to exist in a diminished state. Analogously, in the case of separated souls, I think the right thing to say is that I wholly cease to exist at death, although something interestingly related to me persists.26 24 See chapter 12 of Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 245–80, for Parfit’s discussion of “Why our identity is not what matters”; he discusses the possibility of partial survival on pp. 298–302. 25 In SCG II.81, Aquinas appears to endorse an account of diachronic identity which incorporates a temporal gap in human existence between death and the bodily resurrection—a gap which the separated soul “fills” in such a way as to guarantee that the resurrected person is numerically identical to the original person (without the soul’s being identical to the person). What I am arguing in this paper is that the agency of the separated soul threatens the philosophical effectiveness of this position. 26 In fact, the extent to which understanding Aquinas’s account in terms of partial identity appears at all attractive stems from the fact that it is the soul that continues to exist in this case. That is, the plausibility of this view comes not from the theory of partial identity itself, but from the fact that my soul’s continued existence seem “close enough” to stand in for me until the bodily resurrection. To use another notion from the contemporary debate about personal identity, the intuition that Pasnau here tries to

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Eleonore Stump presents a second way of solving the Two-Person Problem. In Aquinas, Stump agrees that the soul is one part of a human person, and not the human person itself.27 She, however, denies Pasnau’s claim that the soul’s existence is a merely necessary condition for the persistence of the human person, arguing instead that the soul’s existence is a sufficient condition for a human person’s persistence. Combining a non-orthodox constitution account with an ontology of metaphysical parts, Stump claims that the persistence of one metaphysical part (namely, the soul) can guarantee the persistence of the whole even in the absence of another part (namely, the body). In her own words: A human person is not identical to his soul; rather, a human person is identical to a particular in the species rational animal. A particular of that sort is normally, naturally, constituted of an array of bodily parts and is composed of form and matter. Because constitution is not identity for Aquinas, however, a particular can exist with less than the normal, natural complement of constituents. It can, for example, exist when it is constituted only by one of its main metaphysical parts, namely, the soul. And so although a person is not identical to his soul, the existence of the soul is sufficient for the existence of a person . . . [A] human being is capable of existing when she is composed of nothing more than a metaphysical part, without its being the case that she is identical to that metaphysical part (53).

This interpretation offers Aquinas a way to solve the central problem facing his account of separated souls without committing him to the drawbacks entailed by interpreting Aquinas’s account in terms of partial identity. Stump’s view, however, appears problematic on independent grounds. First, the constitution relation is meant to solve the problem of what appear to be two co-located physical objects: a lump of clay, for example, and a statue made entirely from that lump of clay. It is not at all clear that an immaterial soul can constitute a human being in the way that a lump of clay can constitute a statue or a piece of paper can constitute monetary currency. According to Aquinas, living human bodies are constituted by matter without being identical to that matter—a human body, for example, can survive changes in the bits of matter that constitute it at any one time.28 capture with partial identity might better be cashed out in terms of the separated soul’s being the human person’s “closest continuer”—my soul is the next best candidate for being me, given the absence of the original person. Unfortunately, Aquinas’s theory does not appear to fare any better on this understanding. 27 Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003). 28 See, for example, ST Ia.119.1.ad2: “if by ‘flesh’ we mean the matter of which something is composed, that does not remain, but little by little it is taken away and restored,” and SCG IV.81: “In the body of a human being, while that human being lives, there are not always the same parts with respect to matter, but only according to species, for with respect to matter parts come and go” (ed. Marietti, par. 4157).

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(It might even be plausible to claim that Aquinas holds that the human being is constituted by the body without being identical to that body.29) It thus seems right to say, as Stump does, that a human being is constituted of a certain array of bodily parts. Nevertheless, this is quite different from saying that a human being is constituted by form and matter, or that a human being could be constituted by her substantial form in separation from matter. To see this more clearly, it helps to consider that the constitution relation is typically explained in terms of differing modal properties possessed by the constitutor and the constitutee, where these differing modal properties entail different persistence conditions for the constitutor and the constitutee. Someone who claims that a flag is constituted by (but not identical to) a piece of cloth, for example, holds that flags and pieces of cloth possess different modal properties and correspondingly different persistence conditions. That is, she believes that a flag can survive changes that the piece of cloth cannot—for example, the replacement of a large section with a fresh piece of material. In the same way, that same piece of cloth could exist in a world in which the nation whose flag it is in ours does not exist; in that case, the cloth exists, but it does not constitute a flag. On Stump’s proposed understanding of the relation between the rational soul and the human person, however, soul and person do not appear to possess modal properties that allow for differing persistence conditions. If the soul constitutes the human person without being identical to it, and if “the existence of the soul is sufficient for the existence of a person” (where that is taken to refer to the human person), there appears to be no possible world in which a rational soul exists in the absence of a human being, or in which a human being exists in the absence of a soul. Contrast this with Aquinas’s example in Summa theologiae Ia.119.1.ad2 of the case of human flesh; there, Aquinas points out that the human body persists throughout fluctuation in bits of matter. The bits of matter that constitute a human body at any given time and the body which is constituted by them possesses very different persistence conditions. That exact arrangement of matter could exist without constituting a human body—if, for example, those bits of matter constituted a corpse—and that same human body could exist without being constituted by those particular bits of matter. For Aquinas, a human body is straightforwardly constituted by matter without being identical to that matter. It is much harder to see 29 I have argued elsewhere, however, that the unicity of substantial form does not leave Aquinas with the conceptual space to draw this sort of distinction between human being and human body. (See “Not Properly a Person: the Rational Soul and ‘Thomistic Substance Dualism,’ ” Faith and Philosophy 26:2 (2009), 186–204.)

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how a human being can be constituted by an immaterial soul without being identical to that soul, however, given that on Stump’s view the persistence conditions for human souls and human persons cannot come apart. Stump’s argument for the coherence of Aquinas’s claims concerning human identity and the separated soul does not rest entirely on the constitution relation, however. Her primary concern is to argue that a human being can survive the loss of one of her metaphysical parts—namely, the body—without ceasing to exist and without being identical to the remaining metaphysical part, and it is possible to make this case without appealing to constitution. Stump appeals, for instance, to Eric Olson’s The Human Animal, writing: Some contemporary philosophers suppose that a human being is identical to a living biological organism; but they also hold that, although this organism is ordinarily composed of a complete human body, it is capable of persisting even when the body has been reduced to nothing more than a living brain or part of a brain. On this view, a human being is capable of existing when she is composed only of a brain part, but she is not identical to the brain part that composes her in that unusual condition. (53)

The parallel claim for Aquinas’s account, of course, would be that the human being is capable of existing when she is composed only of a soul, although she is not identical to that soul. Olson himself, however, does not claim that the detached living brain composes the human being without being identical to it. Instead, when he considers such a possibility in the case of the unfortunate Tim, he writes: “Tim’s detached head is a debilitated but living animal, I say, even though it cannot remain alive for more than a few minutes without a heart–lung machine” (133). That is, in this unusual state, Tim’s detached head does not compose but is identical to the living animal, Tim. Olson is willing to make this claim because on his account, what is crucial for Tim’s continued identity is the organism’s capacity for continued functioning. As he puts it: “Part of what makes something a living organism . . . is its capacity to coordinate and regulate its metabolic and other vital functions. A living organism may be prevented from carrying out those functions . . . Nevertheless, [in this case] the control and coordination mechanisms are intact” (133–4). Tim himself—the living organism—continues to exist (however briefly), on Olson’s account, even in the absence of the organs that could actualize that capacity. On Aquinas’s view, the separated soul is responsible for exactly the sort of coordinating and regulating capacities that Olson attributes here to Tim’s detached head. This is also, however, where Aquinas’s account runs into difficulty. Olson’s account does not give us any reason to believe that a human being can exist when composed of nothing more than one of her metaphysical parts, without its being the case that she is identical to

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that part. Rather, it seems to support the intuition that if I continue to exist when whittled down to only one of my metaphysical parts, I am at that point actually identical to that part. But this is exactly the position— namely, that I am identical to my separated soul—that we have seen Aquinas so carefully deny. Thus, although Stump holds that, for Aquinas, “the existence of a human soul is sufficient for the existence of a human being” (52), it seems to me that Pasnau is right in claiming that the existence of the human soul is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the existence of the human person. In his Quodlibetal Questions, for instance, Aquinas states that “what is essential to any given individual is what belongs to its definition (ratio), just as matter and form are essential principles of any material thing” (QQ 11.6.1). ‘Human being’ is defined as ‘rational animal,’ however, and Aquinas believes that the essential principles of a human being include both form and matter.30 If matter is an essential component of a human being, though, it would seem that matter as well as form is a necessary (although not sufficient) condition for the existence of a human being. A soul existing in separation from matter lacks one of the essential principles of a human being; in the absence of matter, a human being does not exist, even if the soul persists.

7. IMMEDIATE RESURRECTION At this point, what options remain for salvaging a Thomistic account of human nature, particularly one that can accommodate the resurrection of the body? One possibility would be to reconstruct his view such that, in separation from matter, the separated soul does not cognize at all. In this case, the rich man’s soul would think no thoughts after death and prior to the resurrection. In the face of the lack of access to its proper objects of thought, the separated soul would simply remain in a sort of “holding pattern” similar to a deep sleep or a coma-like state, serving as a ‘placeholder’ for the resurrected human being to come, while remaining entirely inactive. On this view, the soul could cognize if it were joined to matter, and it will cognize again when it receives a new body at the general resurrection, but it in no way functions as a person apart from a body. Unfortunately, this option does not deliver the hoped-for results. Not only does it come with a theological cost (insofar as it makes purgatory and prayer to the saints problematic), but it also does not fit well with other 30

See, for example, De ente et essentia 2.

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aspects of Aquinas’s larger metaphysical system. I have shown previously, for instance, that Aquinas’s explanation of the separated soul’s mode of cognition is just a natural extension of his general theory of the cognition of immaterial substances. For the separated soul to remain completely inactive would require the influx of intelligible species it would otherwise naturally receive from higher intellectual substances being intentionally blocked somehow—a prospect that seems highly counter-intuitive, to say the least. In addition, Aquinas’s main argument for the soul’s immortality is that the soul has an operation it continues to carry out in separation from the body.31 Using a ‘frozen’ separated soul as a stand-in for the pre-mortem person until the bodily resurrection does not offer enough advantages to overcome the costs it comes with. Perhaps the best option remaining (and one already advocated in some form by Thomists such as Montague Brown and James Ross) is to modify and reconstruct Aquinas’s account of human nature . . . without the separated soul.32 On this revised account, at the very moment a human being ceases to exist at death and her soul separates from her body, God reunites it with matter at the final judgment. A Thomistic account of an “immediate resurrection” would solve the Two-Person Problem decisively, since the soul would never exist apart from matter (and, therefore, would never cognize or have other intentional states in separation from matter). The soul would persist through death and resurrection, but it would never exist as separated. I admit that such an option is not particularly appealing. Among other disadvantages, it requires us to jettison a rather large chunk of things to which Aquinas himself was clearly committed. Aquinas believes that human souls exist in separation from matter at death—in fact, his central argument for the immortality of the soul depends on the soul’s ability to exist apart from matter.33 Nevertheless, I think the only other plausible alternative is to argue that the separated soul is, in fact, identical to the human person (despite Aquinas’s claims to the contrary). This strikes me as an even less attractive option than arguing against the existence of the separated soul: it leaves his account of the relation between body and soul

31

See, for example, ST Ia.75.6. See Brown’s “Aquinas on the Resurrection of the Body,” Thomist 56 (1992), 165– 207; and Ross’s 2001 Presidential Address to the American Catholic Philosophical Association: “Together with the Body I Love,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75 (2001), 1–18. 33 Note that the prospect of immediate resurrection does not interfere with this ability: the soul would still be able to survive in separation from matter. God would just ensure that it never actually was in this state. 32

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looking much more like Platonic and Cartesian substance dualism than he intends, and it weakens the hylomorphic unity of form and matter central to Aquinas’s metaphysics of human beings. In the absence of a solution to the Two-Person Problem, I believe removing the separated soul from Aquinas’s account constitutes the best move in preserving a generally defensible, largely Thomistic account of human nature.34 Calvin College

BIBLIOGRAPHY Brown, Montague. “Aquinas on the Resurrection of the Body,” Thomist 56 (1992), 165–207. Dales, Richard C. The Problem of the Rational Soul in the Thirteenth Century (Leiden: Brill, 1995). Eberl, Jason. “Do Human Persons Persist between Death and Resurrection,” in K. Timpe (ed.), Metaphysics and God: Essays in Honor of Eleonore Stump (London: Routledge, 2009), 188–205. Hudson, Hud. A Materialist Metaphysics of the Human Person (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001). Madden, Jim. “Thomistic Hylomorphism and Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of Religion,” Philosophy Compass 8 (2013), 664–76. Olson, Eric. The Human Animal: Personal Identity without Psychology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997). Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). Pasnau, Robert. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa theologiae Ia 75–89 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Pegis, Anton. “The Separated Soul and Its Nature in St Thomas,” in A. Maurer (ed.), St Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), I:131–59. Ross, James F. “Together with the Body I Love,” in M. Bauer (ed.), Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75 (2001), 1–18. Stump, Eleonore. Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003). Thomas Aquinas. Compendium theologiae (Textum Taurini, 1954) . Thomas Aquinas. De ente et essentia. (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1976) . 34 Many thanks to Hud Hudson, Scott MacDonald, Bob Pasnau, and Eleonore Stump for useful conversations on this topic, to the philosophy department at Calvin College for their comments on a much earlier draft of this paper, and to audiences at St Louis University’s April 2003 conference “Aquinas’s Ethics: Metaphysical Foundations, Moral Theory, and Theological Context.”

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Thomas Aquinas. Quaestines disputatae de anima (Textum Taurini, 1953) . Thomas Aquinas. Quaestiones disputatae de veritate (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1970) . Thomas Aquinas. Quaestiones de quolibet (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1996). . Thomas Aquinas. Scriptum super Sententiis (Textum Parmae, 1856) . Thomas Aquinas. Summa contra Gentiles (Rome: Marietti, 1961–67) . Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1888) . Thomson, Judith Jarvis. “People and Their Bodies,” in J. Darcy (ed.), Reading Parfit (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 203–29. Toner, Patrick. “St Thomas Aquinas on the Problem of Too Many Thinkers,” The Modern Schoolman 89 (2012), 209–22. Van Dyke, Christina. “Aquinas’s Shiny Happy People: Perfect Happiness and the Limits of Human Nature,” Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion 6 (forthcoming). Van Dyke, Christina. “The End of (Human) Life as We Know It: Thomas Aquinas on Bodies, Persons, and Death,” The Modern Schoolman 89 (2012), 243–57. Van Dyke, Christina. “Not Properly a Person: the Rational Soul and ‘Thomistic Substance Dualism,’ ” Faith and Philosophy 26 (2009), 186–204. Van Dyke, Christina. “Human Identity, Immanent Causal Relations, and the Principle of Non-Repeatability: Thomas Aquinas on the Bodily Resurrection,” Religious Studies 43 (2007), 373–94. van Inwagen, Peter. The Possibility of Resurrection and Other Essays in Christian Apologetics (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998). Wippel, John. The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to Uncreated Being (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 2000). Zimmerman, Dean. “The Compatibility of Materialism and Survival: the ‘Falling Elevator’ Model,” Faith and Philosophy 16 (1999), 194–212.

Aquinas and Scotus on the Source of Contingency Gloria Frost

Later medieval Christian thinkers were committed to the view that there were aspects of the created world that could have been otherwise. They believed that if everything in the world were necessary, the absurd consequence would follow that it is useless to deliberate about action. Their belief that certain aspects of the created world could have possibly not been, however, seemed to pose a difficulty for some of their deeply held theological beliefs: namely, that God has knowledge of all future states of the created world and that God’s infallible causality extends to all things which exist. The first thesis implies that if God believes that an event e will happen at a future time t, then it is not possible for e not to obtain at t. The second thesis implies that if God wills some state of affairs x, then it is not possible for x not to obtain. Accordingly, the question arose of whether any created effects could have a contingent modality given that all created effects are known and willed by God and contingency requires the possibility of non-existence. The prominent thinkers of the later medieval period addressed this difficulty head on by developing various accounts of how God’s foreknowledge and infallible causation could be rendered compatible with the existence of contingent effects in creation. In the context of developing such accounts, two very influential medieval thinkers, Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus, each discussed a separate question, which is deserving of attention in its own right: namely, the question of what is the ultimate cause for why a created effect is contingent. Put differently the question can be phrased as: What explains why aspects of the created world are such that they could have not existed? Both thought that identifying the ontological source of contingency would help in understanding how God’s infallible knowledge and willing could be reconciled with the contingent existence of that which is known and willed. Although contemporary scholarship has given much attention to their

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respective accounts of how God’s infallible beliefs and causation can be rendered compatible with contingency,1 as well as their respective thought on the nature of contingency itself,2 there has yet to be a contemporary exploration and comparison of Aquinas’s and Scotus’s views regarding the source of contingency. The main purpose of this paper is to fill this gap. Thinkers in the late scholastic and early modern period considered the question of the “root of contingency” to be an important and interesting philosophical issue, as well as a point of fundamental disagreement between Aquinas and Scotus. According to Leibniz, “The root of contingency for Scotus is in the will of God as free . . . but for Thomas it is in the will of God as efficacious.”3 The later scholastic thinker Cajetan similarly claimed that Aquinas traces contingency in creation back to the efficacy of God’s will, 1 In addition to many articles, there have been fairly recent monographs on this topic in both Aquinas’s and Scotus’s thought. See, for example, Harm J. M. J. Goris, Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas on God’s Infallible Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will (Leuven: Peeters, 1996); and Joachim Roland So¨der, Kontingenz und Wissen: Die Lehre von den futura contingentia bei Johannes Duns Scotus (Mu¨nster: Aschendorff, 1999). 2 Discussion of Aquinas’s theory of contingency has revolved around the question of whether he held a synchronic or diachronic conception of contingency. For an argument that he held a diachronic model of modality, see Simo Knuuttila, “The ‘Statistical’ Interpretation of Modality in Averroes and Thomas Aquinas,” Ajatus 37 (1978), 79–98. Knuutila’s thesis has been challenged by Klaus Jacobi in his “Statements about Events: Modal and Tense Analysis in Medieval Logic,” Vivarium 21 (1983), 85–107. Discussions of Scotus’s modal theory have focused on the historical and conceptual importance of his synchronic conception of contingency. See Calvin Normore’s “Scotus, Modality, Instants of Nature,” in M. Dreyer and R. Wood (eds.), John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 161–74, and “Duns Scotus’s Modal Theory,” in T. Williams (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 129–60; and Simo Knuuttila’s “Duns Scotus’ Criticism of the ‘Statistical’ Interpretation of Modality,” in J. Beckmann et al. (eds.), Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1981), 441–50, “Interpreting Scotus’s Theory of Modality: Three Critical Remarks,” in L. Sileo (ed.), Via Scoti: Methodologia ad Mentem Joannis Duns Scoti, (Rome: Edizioni Antonianum, 1995), 1:295–303, and “Duns Scotus and the Foundations of Logical Modalities,” in John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics, 127–43. On the historical origin of Scotus’s theory, see Stephen D. Dumont, “The Origin of Scotus’s Theory of Synchronic Contingency,” Modern Schoolman 72 (1994), 149–67. For an argument that Scotus’s notion of contingency has a central role in his philosophy, see Antonie Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006). 3 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Textes ine´dits, ed. G. Grua, (New York, Garland: 1985), 348: “Radix contingentiae apud Scotum in voluntate Dei quatenus libera ( þ sed hoc circulus þ ), sed in voluntate Dei quatenus efficax Thomas þ Contingentia in ipsa natura veritatis, seu objiecti, ut possibilitatis, ut existentiae.” See also p. 353: “Scotus quaerit radicem contingentiae in divinae voluntatis libertate þ Est circulus þ Thomas in divinae voluntatis efficacia þ Non est ratio formalis. þ ” For discussion of the interpretive debates surrounding Leibniz’s own views, see Robert Merrihew Adams, “Leibniz’s Theories of Contingency,” in M. Hooker (ed.), Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 243–83.

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while Scotus traces it to the divine will’s free or contingent mode of causation.4 This is to say that for Scotus, created objects are such that they could have possibly not existed because their cause, which is God’s will, could have possibly not caused them, whereas for Aquinas, objects have this modality because God wills them to have it and nothing that God wills can fail to be as he wills it. There are passages in both Aquinas’s and Scotus’s works that appear to support straightforwardly this reading of their respective views. In his Summa theologiae, Aquinas claims explicitly that effects are contingent because God wills them to be contingent when he writes the following: And therefore it must be said that this happens [that there are contingent effects] on account of the efficacy of the divine will . . . Since therefore the divine will is the most efficacious cause, it not only follows that the things which God wills happen, but also that they happen in the manner that God wills them to happen. God wills certain things to happen necessarily and certain things to happen contingently, so that there is an order in things for the perfection of the universe.5

Scotus appears to support the view that he thinks contingency arises in created effects from the contingent mode of God’s causation when he writes in his Lectura: “From this it appears why there is contingency in the effect . . . the divine will . . . is capable, in the same instant of eternity and at that very same instant of eternity, of willing and of not willing something, and so it is able to produce and able not to produce it.”6 Not only did Cajetan and Leibniz note the fundamental incompatibility between Aquinas’s and Scotus’s apparent positions on how contingency arises in creation, but they also raised various objections to the views themselves. Against Scotus, for example, Cajetan charged that if the contingent modality of created effects originates in God’s mode of causation, it simply follows from God’s willing of an effect that it is contingent, and thus contingency cannot be considered as an aspect of creation that is intentionally chosen by God.7 Against Aquinas, however, Leibniz charged that the efficacy of the divine will cannot be the origin of an object’s contingent modality since contingency is a necessary property of that which contingently exists. Since God’s will is contingently related to that 4 See Cajetan, Commentaria in Summam theologiae St Thomae, ST Ia.19.8, n. 11 (ed. Leonina 4: 246): “Credit enim quod prima radix contingentiae sit quidem conditione divinae voluntatis, et in hoc concordat nobiscum: sed nos dicimus quod illa condition est summa efficacia illius; ipse autem dicit quod est contingentia illius. Et quantum ad propositum spectat, nomine contingentiae in divina voluntate, intendit libertatem illius: ita quod imaginatur quod, quia Deus libere vult et causat, ideo est contingentia in universe.” 5 Aquinas, ST Ia.19.8, co. (ed. Leonina 4: 246). Translations are my own. 6 Scotus, Lectura, I. 39, q. 1–5, n. 54 (ed. Vat. 17: 497). 7 Cajetan, Commentaria in Summam theologiae, ST Ia.19.8, n.14 (ed. Leonina 4: 246).

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which it wills, God’s willing cannot be the explanation for why an object has its necessary features.8 My main aims in this paper are to reconstruct and compare Aquinas’s and Scotus’s thinking on the ontological cause of contingency in creation and to respond to these objections. My reconstruction will challenge Cajetan and Leibniz’s analysis of their positions. While their interpretation of Aquinas’s and Scotus’s views appears to rest on firm textual grounds, it fails because it does not take into account the fact that both thinkers are not addressing the same type of contingency when they make claims about its source. When the passages in which Aquinas and Scotus explicitly discuss the origin of contingency in creation are read in context with attention to the kind of contingency each is discussing, similarities between their views can be identified and the objections raised against their respective views can be solved. In the first section of the paper I will introduce a distinction between two senses of contingency and then in the subsequent section, I will apply it to Aquinas’s texts to clarify his position and address Leibniz’s objection to his view. Next, I will turn to Scotus’s texts. I will clarify his position and show how it compares with Aquinas’s view. Finally, I will address the difficulty that Cajetan raises to his view.

1. CONTINGENTLY EXISTING VERSUS C O N T I N G E N T L Y C A U S E D E F F E C T S AN D T H E I R A C C O M PA N Y I N G T H E O L O GI C A L D I F F I C U L T I E S The core meaning of the modal term “contingent” is “able to be otherwise” or “possible not to be.” Since there are a variety of ways in which something can be “otherwise,” there are several analogous meanings that are signified by the term “contingent.”9 I will focus on two senses of this modal predicate that are particularly relevant to interpreting Aquinas’s and Scotus’s views on the origins of contingency. An effect is contingent with respect to existence, or contingently existing, if it is such that the effect considered in itself could have possibly not existed. An effect is contingently caused if it is such that its proximate cause has the power to elicit or to not elicit the operation through which the effect is caused. Contingently caused effects are contrasted with the effects of necessarily operating causes—that is, natural causes—which are such that they lack the power to refrain from causing their operations. Accordingly, 8

Leibniz, Textes ine´dits, 348, 353. These texts are quoted in note 3. Aquinas explicitly claims that “necessity” is said in many ways since there are a variety of ways in which something “must be.” See ST Ia.82.1 co. 9

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the predicate of being contingently caused characterizes an effect in virtue of its being produced by a cause with a particular kind of nature.10 It is not said of an effect in virtue of its own nature. All contingently caused effects exist contingently. If an effect’s proximate cause has the power not to cause the operation through which the effect is caused, then it is possible for the effect not be caused, and thus, not to exist. Not all contingently existing effects are contingently caused. There are many effects brought about by causes that operate according to natural necessity—that is, causes that lack the power to refrain from producing their operations—which nevertheless exist contingently. Although the naturally operating cause itself lacks the power to refrain from producing its operation, it might be such that an external cause can impede its operation. Fire, for instance, lacks the power to refrain from burning flammable objects, but it might not cause burning in a flammable object if a person removes the object from its proximity. The possible impediment of the necessarily operating cause’s operation makes it possible for its effect not to exist.11 Some necessarily operating causes are such that their operations cannot be impeded by other causes, but the effects of these operations are contingently existing because the cause itself could have possibly not existed. There are some theists, for example, who hold that God freely created a physically determined universe, which is to say that every physical event is entailed by the laws of nature and the physical state of the world. On this view, although physical events necessarily follow from their proximate causes, they exist contingently because God could have created no world at all or perhaps a world with different initial conditions and so, any particular physical event could have not been simpliciter. Later medieval Christians were committed to the view that the entire set of created objects was contingently existing, as well as to the view that a subset of these objects, containing the voluntary actions of intellectual creatures, were contingently caused. This sub-set was distinguished from another sub-set of objects that were necessarily caused; that is, caused by causes that operate according to natural necessity.12 The medievals recognized that 10 On Aquinas’s and Scotus’s views on the distinction between necessarily and contingently operating causes, as well as the historical and conceptual background to their views, see Timothy Noone, “Nature, Freedom, and Will: Sources of Philosophical Reflection,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81 (2007), 1–23. On Scotus, see also Tobias Hoffmann, “The Distinction between Nature and Will in Duns Scotus,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litte´raire du Moyen A^ge 66 (1999), 189–224. 11 For Aquinas’s discussion of this point, see for instance, ScG II.30. 12 Effects that followed from their causes with absolute necessity comprise an even smaller sub-set within the set of effects that were caused by necessarily operating secondary causes. As noted previously, the operations of many naturally operating causes could fail to obtain based on circumstances external to the cause.

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maintaining the existence of contingently existing effects and the existence of contingently caused effects each presented unique challenges to upholding God’s infallibility. Regarding contingently caused effects, the thesis that some effects had causes with the power to refrain from causing their operations seemed to be incompatible with the thesis that these very same effects were infallibly willed to exist by God. If, for instance, God infallibly wills that I choose y in circumstance x how can it be in my power to not cause y in x? Regarding contingency with respect to existence, which characterizes all created effects, the worry arose of how God could derive infallible beliefs about whether a contingently existing object actually exists. Knowledge of this sort could not be derived from knowing the essence of the object because the object considered in itself does not include existence or non-existence. Moreover, God could not derive this knowledge from knowing his own essence. God’s essence was thought to be unchangeable, and so the content of God’s essence did not vary according to which contingently existing objects were actually willed to exist by God. Because of their strong view of God’s aseity, later medieval thinkers held that God’s intellect could not depend on actual created objects to acquire knowledge about creation. So God could not know which contingently existing objects actually existed in virtue of his acquaintance with the objects themselves. It was in the context of addressing worries such as these that Aquinas and Scotus discussed the question of what was the ultimate source for why created effects were contingent. Both appeared to think that a preliminary step to reconciling the contingency of created effects with God’s infallible willing and knowing of these objects was identifying the ontological cause in virtue of which created objects were contingent. In their discussions of this matter, however, they do not explicitly specify whether they are discussing the contingent mode of existence that belongs to all created effects or the property of being contingently caused that belongs to a relatively small subset of created effects. We are only able to know which sense of contingency was under discussion by giving attention to the context in which these discussions occur.

2 . AQ U I N A S O N T H E C A US E O F C O N T I N G E N C Y IN CR E A T I O N Aquinas’s explicit claims about the ultimate foundation for why created objects are contingent occur in the context of addressing the question of whether God’s will imposes necessity on the objects which it wills. It is in answering this question that Aquinas makes the claim that objects are contingent because God infallibly wills them to be such. Examining the

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context which precedes Aquinas’s treatment of this question will help to clarify whether Aquinas understood God’s infallible willing of an object’s contingency to explain why the object was such that, considered in itself, it had a contingent mode of existence or whether God’s infallible willing explained why an object was such that it was contingently caused by its proximate cause. Aquinas devotes a separate article to the question of whether God’s will imposes necessity on the objects which it wills in both his De veritate and his Summa Theologiae. The article occurs in both works within the question on the divine will, and in both it is preceded by the question of whether God necessarily wills whatever he wills.13 The main points that Aquinas makes in this earlier article provide an important context for interpreting the claims he subsequently makes about the source of contingency in creation in the later article on whether God’s will imposes necessity on the objects which it wills. For Aquinas, the question of whether God necessarily wills whatever he wills pertains to God’s willing of particular objects, asking whether God’s will is necessarily related to any of the particular objects which it wills. The main conclusion that Aquinas tries to establish is that God’s will is only contingently related to each of the created objects that God wills. Aquinas claims that the divine will is naturally ordered to willing God’s own goodness, just as the human will is naturally ordered to willing the human being’s happiness.14 The natural order of God’s will to the willing of God’s goodness implies two conditions on divine willing: first, God cannot possibly will himself not to be good or to lack any absolute perfection, and second, everything that God wills is willed insofar as it is ordered to God’s goodness. Aquinas reasons that “since the goodness of God is perfect, and can exist without other things, since no perfection can be added to it by other things, it follows that his willing of things other than himself is not absolutely necessary.”15 Aquinas’s point is that since the particular objects that God wills are only willed insofar as they are related to God’s goodness and no created object is necessary for God’s goodness, no created object is necessarily willed.

13 De ver. 23.4 (ed. Leonina 22.3: 660): “utrum Deus de necessitate velit quidquid vult” and De ver. 23.5 (ed. Leonina 22.3: 665): “utrum divina voluntas rebus volitis necessitatem imponat”; ST I.19.3 (ed. Leonina 4: 234): “utrum quidquid Deus vult, ex necessitate velit” and ST I.19.8 (ed. Leonina 4: 244): “utrum voluntas Dei necessitatem rebus volitis imponat.” 14 For this claim on the human will and its relation to happiness, see, for example, ST I-II.10.2 co. 15 ST I.19.3 co. (ed. Leonina 4: 235).

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From Aquinas’s discussion of the modal relationship between the divine will and created objects two points follow regarding the causal origin of the contingent mode of existence that belongs to all created objects. First, the proximate reason for why every created object is such that it could have possibly not existed is the contingent mode of the divine will’s causation with regard to created objects; that is, the fact that the divine will can possibly not cause every possible created object.16 Second, the reason for why God is able to refrain from causing any possible creature is the fact that creatures are only contingently related to God’s goodness, and it is only the divine goodness (and whatever is necessary for it) that God must will of necessity. Thus, the ultimate reason for why creatures have a contingent mode of existence is their contingent relation to the divine goodness which arises because of the divine goodness’s completeness. The freedom of God’s will to not will created objects depends on the divine goodness’s being such that it does not require any created object for its perfection. This preceding context is important for interpreting Aquinas’s explicit claims about the ultimate foundation for why created objects are contingent which occur in the later article on whether the divine will imposes necessity on whatever it wills. In this later article, when Aquinas asks whether the divine will imposes necessity on willed objects and in response gives an account of what the ontological source for why created objects are contingent, he takes himself to have already demonstrated in the preceding article on whether God necessarily wills whatever he wills, that no created object is necessarily willed by God. Since he has already established that every created object exists contingently, it follows that in this later article on the issue of whether God’s will imposes necessity, he must be talking about a sense of necessity and contingency other than necessity and contingency with respect to existence. The objections that lead up to the body of the article make clear that Aquinas is worried about the difficulty of maintaining that there is a secondary distinction between necessarily and contingently caused effects within the world of contingently existing effects. The objections suggest 16 Norman Kretzmann has argued that Aquinas fails in establishing that God has the freedom not to create. See his The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), chs. 6–7. For a response, see John F. Wippel, “Norman Kretzmann on Aquinas’s Attribution of Will and of Freedom to Create to God,” Religious Studies 39 (2003), 287–98. Kretzmann thinks that Aquinas, based on his thoughts about God’s goodness, should have concluded that God must necessarily create something. The view that God must necessarily create something can be consistently held with the view that the freedom of God’s will grounds the absolute contingency of every creature. Even if God must necessarily create something, God’s freedom to choose which creatures to create would explain why any particular creature is absolutely contingent.

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that it follows from the fact that ‘God’s will cannot be impeded from realizing its effect’ that every created effect follows necessarily from its proximate causes, i.e. that every effect is necessarily caused. To the objectors it seems that God’s infallible willing of an effect x implies that it is not possible for x’s proximate cause not to elicit the operation that causes x since x is unable not to be if God wills it. In the body of the text, Aquinas responds to this worry by claiming that the mode of the operation which brings about the effect is itself willed by God. Accordingly, God’s infallible causation of every effect does not threaten contingent causation because an effect’s coming to be through a contingent mode of causation is itself infallibly willed by God. In the De veritate, Aquinas writes: It is accordingly necessary to assign a different principal reason for the contingency in things, to which the previously assigned cause [secondary causes] will be subordinated . . . Now the divine will is a most powerful agent. Hence its effect must be made like it in all respects. Not only that which God wills happens, but it also happens in the mode in which God wills it, as necessarily or contingently . . . And the divine will preordains the mode of things from the order of his wisdom. According to how it disposes some things to happen in this way or that way, it adapts causes for them in the mode which it disposes. It is able to nevertheless introduce the mode in things even without the mediating causes. And so we do not say that some of God’s effects are contingent only on account of the contingency of secondary causes, but rather on account of the disposition of the divine will which provides such an order for things.17

In this passage, Aquinas explains that the fact that an object has a contingently operating secondary cause is not the ultimate reason for why that object is contingently caused. The ultimate reason for why it has this modality is because God infallibly willed for it to have it. Aquinas explains that since God wills for particular objects to be contingently caused, he chooses contingently operating secondary causes to cause them.18 Thus, 17 De ver. 23.5, co. (ed. Leonina 22.3: 666). See also ST I.19.8, co.; De Int. I.14. For a discussion of chronological development in Aquinas’s thought in the texts cited, see Bernard McGinn, “The Development of the Thought of Thomas Aquinas on the Reconciliation of Divine Providence and Contingent Action,” The Thomist 39 (1975), 741–52. 18 It is outside the scope of this paper to evaluate whether Aquinas’s solution adequately addresses the difficulty of reconciling God’s infallible causation of an effect with its proximate cause’s contingent production of it. None of what Aquinas says in the quoted passage explains how it is possible for a secondary cause to retain the power not to cause x on the condition that God infallibly wills x. If God infallibly wills x, then it is not possible for x not to obtain. So it is difficult to see how it would be logically possible for the cause of x to retain the power not to produce x on the condition that God willed x if it were not possible for x not to obtain on this condition. It seems that Aquinas thinks that

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the ultimate reason for why an effect is contingently caused is not the fact that it has a contingently operating secondary cause. Rather, the ultimate cause for why it is contingently caused is God’s willing that it is contingently caused and consequently choosing a contingently operating secondary cause for it. In the penultimate line of the text quoted previously, Aquinas adds a very interesting qualification to this account. He states that God need not rely on mediating secondary causes to bring it about that an effect in creation is caused according to the mode that God wills for it. It is difficult to interpret what Aquinas might have meant by this. It seems that he is saying that God could immediately produce effects that are both necessarily and contingently caused without producing these effects through mediating created causes. It is clear that God could immediately produce a contingently caused effect since God is himself a contingently operating cause. It does not seem possible, however, for God to immediately produce a necessarily caused effect, since we have seen that Aquinas thinks that any created effect that God wills is willed by God contingently. Thus, it seems that God himself could not necessarily cause a creature to exist if necessarily causing an effect entails causing it by an operation which is not in one’s power not to elicit.19 Aquinas did not seem to be very committed to the idea that God could immediately produce effects caused according to both modalities, since he does not mention this idea in his other discussions of the origin of contingent causation in creation.20 The preceding and immediate context make clear that when Aquinas claims that the efficacy of God’s will is the ultimate foundation for why created effects are contingent, he is referring to the property of being contingently caused that applies to a subset of created effects. As we have

the fact that the cause has the power not to produce x absolutely–that is, abstracting from the condition of God’s willing x—is sufficient to secure that the cause produces x contingently. 19 Aquinas did think that necessity of supposition applied to some of God’s effects. This is to say that if God freely willed to cause a certain kind of being, this free choice would entail the production of that which is necessary for that being to exist. See, for instance, De pot. 3.16 co. 20 See ST Ia.19.8 co. and De Int. I.14. In ScG II. 30, Aquinas addresses the worry of how there can be necessary things in creation if all created objects proceed from God’s contingent causality. Aquinas explains that God is able to produce two kinds of creature: ones that have an inherent potency for non-being, and those which lack such a potency. He refers to the latter as ‘necessary beings.’ This discussion, however, is not ultimately helpful for allowing us to see how God could immediately produce a necessarily caused being, since those which lack a potency for non-being would still be contingently caused beings given that they are freely produced by God.

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seen, in the article preceding this claim, Aquinas established that no creature is necessarily willed by God, and thus, all creatures exist contingently. Accordingly, it would be redundant, as well as contradictory, to then subsequently invoke the efficacy of the divine will to explain creature’s contingent mode of existence. Moreover, when Aquinas claims that effects are contingent because God efficaciously wills them to be such, he explains further that in most cases God executes his will that there is contingency in an effect by willing a contingently operating cause for the effect. This makes clear that Aquinas was referring to the contingent mode of causation through which some created effects are brought about when he claimed that the divine will’s efficacy is the source of contingency in created effects. Now that Aquinas’s claim that ‘the efficacy of God’s will is the ultimate foundation for contingency’ has been examined in its context, we can move on to consider Leibniz’s objection to Aquinas’s position. Leibniz argued that God’s efficacious will cannot explain why a particular object is necessary or contingent because an object’s particular modality is essential to it. God’s will cannot be the explanation for why an object possesses an essential feature because whatever God wills is willed by God contingently and essential features are necessary features of objects. Applied to the case of an object’s contingency, Leibniz’s point is this: God’s willing that a created object is contingent cannot be the reason for why it is contingent because this has the problematic implication that the created object could have possibly not been contingent since God could have possibly not willed this proposition given his freedom. It is clear from this objection that the sense of contingency that Leibniz has in mind is contingency with respect to existence. The mode of existence that an object has is essential to it. If a being exists necessarily its essence implies that it exists, and if an object exists contingently it is such that its essence does not imply existence. Although Aquinas would have agreed with the premises of Leibniz’s argument, the argument fails as an objection to Aquinas. We have seen when Aquinas claims that contingency in creation is ultimately caused by the efficacy of God’s will, he is referring to the fact that certain created effects are contingently caused, and not the fact that all created objects have a contingent mode of existence. While the contingent mode of existence that belongs to created objects is quite clearly an essential feature of these objects, it is not obviously the case that the property of being produced by a contingently operating proximate cause is essential to the effects that are brought about by such causes. The medievals thought that being caused by necessarily operating cause was not essential to any created effect, since they held that God was able to cause immediately any effect that could be caused by a creature; for example, God could produce

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burning in cotton without relying on fire.21 Thus, any effect of a necessarily operating cause could have possibly been caused by a contingently operating cause: that is, God alone. Regarding contingently produced created effects, it seems that many of these effects could have possibly been produced by necessarily operating causes. Many movements of the human body, for instance, which are brought about by the command of the will could possibly be brought about by necessarily operating causes within the body itself. The acts of the will itself, as opposed to the acts of other powers that are commanded by the will, raise a difficult case. It seems that it might be essential to acts of will that they are contingently caused, and thus God’s willing that they come about contingently could not explain why there are contingently caused. Even if there are some created effects that are exceptional in being such that it belongs to their essence to be brought about by a contingently operating cause, the efficacy of God’s will provides an adequate account for why the effects that are indifferent to originating from a contingently or necessarily operating cause arise from a particular mode of causation. Thus, Leibniz’s objection does not prevail against Aquinas’s position on the origin of contingency when the sense of contingency that is at stake is correctly interpreted and it is understood as a general theory, which applies for the most part. In sum, for Aquinas the proximate reason for why an effect is contingently caused is the fact that it was produced by a contingently operating secondary cause. The ultimate reason, however, for why the effect was contingently caused is the efficacy of God’s will which willed for the effect to come about through a contingent mode of causation, and thus willed a contingent cause for it. Regarding the contingent mode of existence that belongs to all created effects, Aquinas says that the proximate reason for why every created effect is contingently existing is the fact that God freely causes every created effect. The reason for why God has the power to not will the existence of any possible creature that God can cause, is the fact that the existence of no creature is necessary for God’s perfect goodness. Accordingly, for Aquinas the ultimate reason for why every creature exists contingently is the self-sufficiency and complete perfection of God’s goodness. We can now analyze Scotus’s position and go on to compare it with Aquinas’s to see if the two are in fact in fundamental disagreement about the origin of contingency in creation. 21 The 1277 Parisian condemnations, for instance, censured the position that God was unable to produce the effects of secondary causes himself. See David Piche´, La condamnation parisienne de 1277: Texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire (Paris: Vrin, 1999), 100: prop. 63 (69): “Quod deus non potest in efectum cause secundarie sine ipsa causa secundaria.”

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Scotus explicitly discusses the question of the source of contingency in creation in each of his discussions of God’s knowledge of contingents, and his answer to this question is straightforward and unwavering throughout his career.22 In the early Lectura discussion he wrote: From this it appears why there is contingency in the effect . . . the divine will . . . is capable, in the same instant of eternity and at that very same instant of eternity, of willing and of not willing something, and so it is able to produce and able not to produce it.23

In the later Reportatio IA, the same basic answer is given, though it is expressed differently: [I]t is manifest that the divine will is contingently related to whatever it is immediately related, and in this very relation is the ultimate source of contingency.24

For Scotus the cause that explains why created effects are contingent is the divine will’s capacity to refrain from causing whatever it causes. It is clear that Scotus is here giving an account of why created effects have a contingent mode of existence, rather than an account of why some effects are contingently caused by their proximate causes. He believed that God was an immediate productive cause of all existing things, so it would follow that the contingency caused by God’s will is the contingency that belongs to all created objects: that is, a contingent mode of existence. For Scotus, all created objects exist contingently because all created objects are brought about through the divine will’s contingent mode of causation. 22 For the Lectura account, see the Vatican edition 17: 481–510. The Ordinatio account can be found in Appendix A of Vatican edition 6: 410–44. This text has been relegated to the appendix because of questions surrounding its authenticity. The Vatican edition editors think that the text that we have is a compilation inserted by later followers of Scotus to fill the lacuna that he left (see ed. Vat. 6: 26*–30*). Against this view, Timothy Noone claims that while the manuscript evidence shows that Scotus intended to strike this text from the final publication version of the Ordinatio, the text should still be considered as authored by him at an earlier date. Noone holds this position on the basis of citations of this text he has found in William Alnwick’s Determinationes, as well as the fact that all manuscripts used to reconstruct the Ordinatio copy it. Noone has not yet published on this issue, but Joachim Roland So¨der prints Noone’s findings in Kontingenz und Wissen, 8–10. A critical edition of the Reportatio text on God’s knowledge of contingents can be found in the appendix to So¨der, 225–65. I cite the Reportatio from this text. 23 Lec. I.39.1–5, n. 54 (ed. Vat. 17: 497). 24 Rep. IA, d. 39–40, n. 35 (So¨der, p. 249).

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Scotus goes on to explain that God is able to know which contingently existing effects obtain in the actual world in virtue of knowing the causal determinations of the divine will.25 The question with which Scotus was preoccupied was how God is able to derive knowledge of whether objects with a contingent mode of existence actually exist if God cannot derive this knowledge in virtue of knowing his own essence and ideas or actual created objects. This is different from the problem in which Aquinas was interested when he discussed the origins of contingency. Recall that Aquinas was interested in giving an account of how God’s infallible willing of an effect was compatible with the effect’s being contingently caused by its proximate causes. Thus, Aquinas and Scotus were addressing problems that pertained to different senses of contingency in created objects, when they each explicitly made claims about the causal origin of contingency. In his Reportatio discussion of the origins of contingency, there is further evidence that Scotus did not think that the divine will’s contingent mode of causation was the source of the distinction between necessarily and contingently caused created effects. Scotus explicitly notes that a subset of created effects have a secondary contingency in virtue of being contingently caused by their proximate causes. Scotus writes: But something is able to be said contingent in two respects on account of its causes, just as the act of my will has a two-fold cause of contingency, one from the part of the divine will as first cause and another from my will as from its second cause. Another thing is contingent only with respect to the first cause and necessary insofar as it is from the second and proximate cause, as those things which are able to be impeded by the divine will, such as those which happen from their causes in the natural world.26

Here Scotus notes that all created effects are contingently caused by God— even the effects of natural causes. However, God’s contingent mode of causation does not account for why some effects are contingently, rather than necessarily, caused by their proximate causes. According to Scotus, 25 Rep. IA, d. 38, q. 1–2, n. 37 (So¨der, 234): “Et ideo veritate causata in complexione talium terminorum determinata per actum voluntatis, intellectus divinus tunc primo novit unam partem contradictionis contingentium esse veram.” See also Lec. I, d. 39, q. 1–5, n. 62 (ed. Vat. 17:500), and Ord. I, d. 38–9, q. 1–5, n. 23–4 (ed. Vat. 6:428–9). 26 Rep. IA, d. 39–40, n. 36–7, (Soder, 249). Scotus explains further how certain natural effects are contingently caused by God and necessarily caused by their proximate causes in Ord. I.8 pars 2 q. unica, n. 306 (ed. Vat. 4: 328): “Secunda pars, scilicet de necessitate secundum quid, patet, quia multae causae naturales, quantum est ex parte earum, non possunt non causare effectus, et ideo necessitas est secundum quid— quantum scilicet est ex parte earum—et non simpliciter: sicut ignis, quantum est ex parte sui, non potest non calefacere, tamen potest absolute non calefacere, Deo non cooperante, sicut apparet, et apparuit de tribus pueris in camino.”

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contingently operating secondary causes are themselves the sources of the secondary contingency in their effects.27 Unlike Aquinas, Scotus does not explicitly offer an account of the ultimate reason for why a particular effect is produced by a contingently operating secondary cause. Recall that for Aquinas the efficacy of the divine will was the ultimate explanation for why a created effect was contingently caused by its proximate cause because God efficaciously willed for the effect to be contingent and therefore, to have a particular kind of cause. Although Scotus does not explicitly make such a claim, I think he would have agreed with Aquinas’s position on this matter. In his discussion of God’s knowledge of contingents, Scotus asserts that God infallibly wills the truth-value of every contingent proposition about creation. Insofar as it is a contingent fact that an effect x is produced by a contingently operating secondary cause y, Scotus would similarly trace the fact that x was caused by a contingently operating secondary cause back to the efficacy of the divine will in willing that x is caused by a contingently operating secondary cause and more specifically that y causes x.28 27 While Scotus does not think that the contingent mode of God’s causation entails that secondary causes operate contingently, he does think that the contingent operation of any secondary cause entails that God causes contingently. Throughout Scotus’s works, he argues that it would not be possible for any secondary cause to operate contingently if God did not also operate contingently. See, for example, De primo principio 4.3 (ed. Roche, 82): “Aliquid causatur contingenter; ergo Prima Causa contingenter causat . . . Probatio prima consequentiae: Quaelibet causa secunda causat inquantum movetur a Prima; ergo si Prima necessario movet, quaelibet necessario movetur et quidlibet necessario causatur.” This argument also occurs in Lec. I.39.1–5 n. 35 (ed. Vat. 17: 489); Ord. I.39 1–5 n. 12 (ed. Vat. 6: 412–13); Ord. I.8 pars 2, q. unica, n. 281 (ed. Vat. 4: 313). 28 Toward the end of his career, Scotus’s thoughts regarding God’s willing of the truth-values of all contingent propositions about the created world began to waiver. There are texts in which he claims that there are some contingently true propositions that did not have their truth-values in virtue of the divine will. See, for instance, Reportatio IA, ¨ sterreichische Nationalbibliothek 1453, f. 125rb–va) and d. 46, q. 2 (MS Vienna, O Reportatio IB, d. 46, q. 2 (MS Worcester, Cathedral Library F.69, f. 63rb–63v). I quote and discuss these passages in Gloria Frost, “John Duns Scotus on God’s Knowledge of Sins: A Test-Case for God’s Knowledge of Contingents,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010), 15–34. The most important among these propositions that did not have their truth-value in virtue of God’s willing were those about creaturely sins; for example, creature x causes sin y. Even if God does not will the truth of creature x causes sin y, it still seems that Scotus could think that the ultimate cause of why sin y was caused contingently (rather than necessarily) is the efficacy of the divine will. Even if it is denied that God wills that sin y comes about contingently (since this would imply that God wills that sin y obtains), it is still the case that God wills that creature x, with its contingent mode of causation, exists, and that creature x has what is necessary for its operation. God’s willing of creatures with contingent modes of causation (and the conditions necessary for their operation) implies that there will be contingently caused effects. Had God willed the existence of only necessarily operating causes, there would be no contingent secondary causation in creation.

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In contrast with Aquinas, Scotus would have rejected the further idea that God is able to bring about the modal differences between created effects that are necessarily and contingently caused by created causes without relying on created causes. Recall that Aquinas claimed in the De veritate that God could bring about these modes in effects without mediating causes. For Scotus, God alone could not even introduce the contingency that contingently operating secondary causes introduce into their effects. We saw above that Scotus notes that the effects of contingently operating secondary causes differ from those of necessarily operating secondary causes because they are caused by two contingently operating causes. Thus, these effects have a two-fold possibility for non-existence in virtue of the fact that both the divine and created cause of their existence have the power to refrain from causing them. Accordingly, God alone cannot bring about an effect that has the modal properties of those effects that are caused by contingently operating secondary causes. Any effect that is produced by God alone will have merely a single possibility for non-existence based on God’s single power to not cause that effect. Perhaps Aquinas was led to assert that God alone can cause the modal properties that secondary causes introduce into their effects because he was thinking that the distinguishing feature of the effects of contingently operating secondary causes was the fact that they follow from a contingently operating proximate cause. Thus, since God operates contingently, it seems that he can alone produce an effect that follows from a contingently operating proximate cause. Scotus, however, thinks that although the effects produced by God alone and those produced by both God and contingently operating secondary causes both follow from contingently operating proximate causes, they are fundamentally different in their modal features. The former effects have a single potency for non-existence, while the latter have double possibility for nonexistence. Thus, in Scotus’s view, contingently operating secondary causes are a necessary condition for God to introduce into creation a secondary contingency, which adds an additional layer of indeterminacy to the contingent mode of existence which all creatures enjoy. Regarding the ultimate origin of the contingent mode of existence that belongs to all creatures, there is agreement in Aquinas’s and Scotus’s thinking. We saw that Scotus identified the divine will’s power to cause or to not cause the existence of any possible creature as the reason for why creatures have a contingent mode of existence. Aquinas’s discussion of the question of whether God wills whatever he wills necessarily revealed that he thought that there was a further cause for why God’s causation with respect to creatures is through a contingent mode, and thus a further cause for why creatures exist contingently. For Aquinas the further cause was the selfsufficiency and complete perfection of the divine goodness. Because God

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necessarily wills only his own goodness and no creature is necessary for God’s goodness, God does not necessarily will any creature. Scotus does not provide any further account in his discussion of the origin of contingency for why God’s causation of creatures occurs according to a contingent mode, and thus, creatures exist contingently. Yet, there is evidence that he would have agreed with Aquinas’s further points. In his De primo principio, Scotus writes: Nothing is willed necessarily except that which is necessary for the existence of that which is willed regarding the end. God loves Himself as end and whatever about Himself as end He loves can exist, even if nothing other than Him exists, because what is necessary of itself depends on no other. Therefore by his volition, he wills nothing else necessarily. Accordingly, he causes nothing necessarily.29

Scotus’s point is that God necessarily wills only those things that are necessary for what God loves in himself (that is, his goodness). Thus, no creature is willed necessarily, since what is lovable in God does not require any creature for its existence. Like Aquinas, Scotus thought that God’s freedom not to create stemmed from the self-sufficiency and completeness of what is good, and therefore lovable, in God himself. If God’s contingent mode of causation with respect to creatures is traced to the self-sufficiency of the divine goodness, then the contingent mode of existence that belongs to creatures will similarly have this as its ultimate foundation. In sum, when Scotus identified God’s contingent mode of causation as the source of the contingency of creatures, he was referring to the contingent mode of existence that belongs to all creatures. Like Aquinas, he thought that the capacity of the divine will to cause creatures contingently was founded on the fact that the divine will only necessarily wills the divine goodness, which is complete and self-sufficient. Similarly, Scotus would have agreed with Aquinas’s position that effects are contingently caused by their proximate causes because of the efficacy of the divine will which chooses which kind of causes exist in creation. Although Scotus does not explicitly make this claim, it follows from his view that the divine will efficaciously determines the truth-values of contingent propositions about creation. Now we can consider how Scotus’s thought stands up to the objection that Cajetan raised to his position. Recall that Cajetan argued that Scotus’s view that the contingency of created objects followed from the divine will’s contingent mode of causation implied that contingency in creation is not intentionally chosen by God. Since the divine will does not freely choose to operate according to a contingent mode of causation with respect to

29

De primo principio (ed. Roche, 88–90). I have modified Roche’s translation.

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creatures, the properties that follow from this mode of causation would not be intentionally chosen by God. Cajetan finds it problematic that contingency in creation would not be something that was freely and intentionally willed by God, since God is supposed to have complete sovereignty and providence over creation. This requires that every aspect of creation is intentional and chosen by God. It is clear that Cajetan’s objection raises a genuine problem if the contingency in question is the contingent causation of certain effects by their proximate causes. If it followed from God’s contingent mode of causation that effects in creation were contingently caused by their proximate causes, then it would follow that it is a necessary fact that created effects are caused by contingently operating secondary causes. Thus, the world’s being such that effects are brought about by contingently operating causes would not be an aspect of the creation that is intentionally willed by God because it would be a necessary feature of any world that included secondary causes. Cajetan seems to find this view problematic because it limits the scope of God’s freedom in creation. But the view also seems problematic because it makes necessarily operating created causes impossible. If God’s contingent mode of causation is necessary and it entails that creatures cause contingently, then it would follow that necessarily creatures cause contingently. We have seen, however, that Scotus does not identify God’s contingent mode of causation as the causal source for why created effects are contingently caused by their proximate causes. For Scotus, God’s contingent mode of causation is the proximate reason for why creatures exist contingently. God’s contingent causation explains the contingent mode of existence that belongs to creatures that are produced by both contingently and necessarily operating created causes. We have already seen in analyzing Leibniz’s objection to Aquinas that it is a necessary feature of creatures that they have a contingent mode of existence. It is essential to creatures that they do not exist in virtue of their own essences. Thus, there is no difficulty if the contingent mode of creatures existence follows from a necessary feature of God; that is, God’s contingent mode of causation. Cajetan’s objection to Scotus rests on the assumption that Scotus was referring to the contingent operation of secondary causes when he argued that God’s contingent mode of causation was the source of this contingency. In fact, Cajetan raises this objection to Scotus in the context of commenting on Aquinas’s claim that the efficacy of God’s will is the source of contingency, and we have seen that Aquinas was here referring to contingent secondary causation. Cajetan’s mistake was to assume that Scotus was referring to the same kind of contingency when stating that God’s contingent mode of causation was the source of contingency.

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Both Cajetan and Leibniz held that Aquinas and Scotus were in fundamental disagreement about what gives rise to contingency in creation, each positing a different aspect of the divine will; that is, its contingent mode of causation versus its efficacy. In this paper I have shown that this assessment of their views fails to take into account the distinction between two different kinds of contingency in creation and the fact that each thinker was not talking about the same one when making explicit assertions about how contingency is caused in creation. When Aquinas claimed that the efficacy of God’s will is the source of contingency, he was referring to the contingent causation through which some created effects are produced. When Scotus identified the contingent causality of the divine will as the source of contingency, he was referring to the contingent mode of existence that belongs to all created objects. Although Aquinas and Scotus each explicitly discussed the question of the origin of contingency with different senses of contingency in mind, I have reconstructed their respective views regarding both types of contingency to highlight the similarities between their positions. Both thinkers would agree that the efficacy of God’s will explains why there are effects in creation that are contingently caused by secondary causes and that the contingent mode of God’s causation explains why all created effects have a contingent mode of existence. Not only did Cajetan and Leibniz err in thinking that Aquinas’s and Scotus’s views were in opposition, but they also failed to refute these views because their objections presupposed misinterpretations. Contra Cajetan’s objection to Scotus: since a contingent mode of existence is necessary to creatures, there is no difficulty in claiming that this mode originates from a necessary feature about the divine will; namely, its contingent mode of causation. Contra Leibniz’s objection to Aquinas: since being contingently caused by its proximate cause is a contingent property of created effects, there is no difficulty in locating the ultimate explanation for why some effects have this property in God’s efficacious, but contingent, willing of it.30 University of St. Thomas (St. Paul, MN) 30

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the University of Western Ontario’s 2012 Colloquium on ‘Modality and Modal Logic in Medieval Philosophy’ and at the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy’s 2012 Eastern APA session. I am grateful to both audiences for helpful discussions, and to Tobias Hoffmann and an anonymous referee for insightful written comments on earlier drafts. I would also like to thank the John Templeton Foundation and the Notre Dame Center for Philosophy of Religion for a research fellowship that supported me during work on this paper.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Adams, Robert Merrihew. “Leibniz’s Theories of Contingency,” in M. Hooker (ed.), Leibniz: Critical and Interpretive Essays (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 243–83. Cajetan. Commentaria in Summam Theologiae St Thomae (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1882–). Dumont, Stephen. “The Origin of Scotus’s Theory of Synchronic Contingency,” Modern Schoolman 72 (1994), 149–67. Frost, Gloria. “John Duns Scotus on God’s Knowledge of Sins: A Test-Case for God’s Knowledge of Contingents,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010), 15–34. Goris, Harm J. M. J. Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas on God’s Infallible Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will (Leuven: Peeters, 1996). Hoffmann, Tobias. “The Distinction between Nature and Will in Duns Scotus,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litte´raire du Moyen A^ge 66 (1999), 189–224. Jacobi, Klaus. “Statements about Events: Modal and Tense Analysis in Medieval Logic,” Vivarium 21 (1983), 85–107. John Duns Scotus. Opera omnia, ed. C. Balic et al. (Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950–). John Duns Scotus. De primo principio, ed. E. Roche (St Bonaventure: Franciscan Institute, 1949). ¨ sterreichische Nationalbibliothek, John Duns Scotus. Reportatio IA, MS Vienna, O 1453. John Duns Scotus. Reportatio IB, MS Worcester, Cathedral Library F. 69. Knuuttila, Simo. “The ‘Statistical’ Interpretation of Modality in Averroes and Thomas Aquinas,” Ajatus 37 (1978), 79–98. Knuuttila, Simo. “Duns Scotus’ Criticism of the ‘Statistical’ Interpretation of Modality,” in J. Beckmann et al. (eds.), Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter, Miscellanea Medievalia 13, vol. 1, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1981), 441–50. Knuuttila, Simo. “Interpreting Scotus’s Theory of Modality: Three Critical Remarks,” in L. Sileo (ed.), Via Scoti: Methodologia ad Mentem Joannis Duns Scoti (Rome: Edizioni Antonianum, 1995), 1:295–303. Knuuttila, Simo. “Duns Scotus and the Foundations of Logical Modalities,” in M. Dreyer and R. Wood (eds.), John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics, (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 127–43. Kretzmann, Norman. The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas’s Natural Theology in Summa contra gentiles I (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997). Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. Textes ine´dits, ed. G. Grua (New York: Garland, 1985). McGinn, Bernard. “The Development of the Thought of Thomas Aquinas on the Reconciliation of Divine Providence and Contingent Action,” The Thomist 39 (1975), 741–52.

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Noone, Timothy. “Nature, Freedom, and Will: Sources of Philosophical Reflection,” Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 81 (2007), 1–23. Normore, Calvin. “Scotus, Modality, Instants of Nature,” in M. Dreyer and R. Wood (eds.), John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 161–74. Normore, Calvin. “Duns Scotus’s Modal Theory,” in T. Williams (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 129–60. Piche´, David. La condamnation parisienne de 1277: Texte latin, traduction, introduction et commentaire (Paris: Vrin, 1999). So¨der, Joachim Roland. Kontingenz und Wissen: Die Lehre von den futura contingentia bei Johannes Duns Scotus (Mu¨nster: Aschendorff, 1999). Thomas Aquinas. Opera omnia (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1882–). Vos, Antonie. The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006). Wippel, John F. “Norman Kretzmann on Aquinas’s Attribution of Will and of Freedom to Create to God,” Religious Studies 39 (2003), 287–98.

Peter John Olivi and Peter Auriol on Conceptual Thought Han Thomas Adriaenssen

In this paper I investigate the accounts of conceptual thought of Peter John Olivi (1248–98) and Peter Auriol (1280–1322). While not as widely studied as such near contemporaries as Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham, Olivi and Auriol were important voices in scholastic discussions of cognition and representation. In these discussions, both Franciscans emphasized the activity rather than passivity of our cognitive powers.1 Both stressed that cognizing the world is not simply a question of taking in data from without. Also, as commentators have pointed out, both were critical of indirect-realist accounts of perception, according to which the immediate objects of perception are inner representations. Thus, Faustino Prezioso has presented Auriol’s critique of such accounts as a “development” of Olivi’s.2 More recently, Hans Kraml has written that the problems surrounding indirect-realist theories of perception were the “basis of the criticism of Peter John Olivi on the one hand, and the starting point for Peter Auriol’s conception” of human cognition on the other.3 In like spirit, John Marenbon has underscored the similarities between Olivi’s and Auriol’s efforts to develop a direct-realist account of perceptual cognition: an account according to which we have direct cognitive access to external objects.4 1 See Katherine Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 50. On Olivi, see also Jose´ Silva and Juhana Toivanen, “The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter Olivi,” Vivarium 48 (2010), 260–77. 2 Faustino Prezioso, La ‘species’ medievale e i prodromi del fenomenismo moderno (Milan: CEDAM, 1963), 81–4. See also Faustino Prezioso, “L’attivita` del soggetto pensante nella gnoseologia di Matteo d’Acquasparta e di Ruggiero Marston,” Antonianum 25 (1950), 318. 3 Hans Kraml, “Why did Ockham Reject Species?” in M. Pacheco and J. Meirinhos (eds.), Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), 1548. 4 John Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy: an Historical and Philosophical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2007), 295.

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While the direct realism of Olivi and Auriol may look attractive as an account of perceptual cognition, it is less clear that direct realism is equally attractive as a theory of conceptual thought.5 After all, what is the direct object of my thought of human nature? And what exactly is it that I am thinking about when I think of redness in general? A Platonist might say that this is an easy question. He might say that conceptual thought is not so different from sense-perception after all. Just as in sense-perception our perceptual powers are directed at external objects and their sensory qualities, in conceptual thoughts our intellects are directed at Ideas or Forms. For a philosopher who rejects Platonism, however, it is more difficult to account for conceptual cognition within a direct-realist framework. For such a thinker, indeed, it may well be tempting to make a concession to indirect realism. While perceptual acts immediately reach out to external reality, our conceptual thoughts are directed at inner objects of cognition that represent the kind-specific or generic features of external objects. Now, both Olivi and Auriol reject Platonism.6 In fact, both thinkers believe that external reality is fundamentally built up of singulars. So the question emerges how Olivi and Auriol accommodate conceptual thought in their accounts of human cognition. More specifically, the question arises whether they are prepared to compromise their direct realism to account for conceptual cognition. It is this question that will be addressed in this paper. I will argue that, despite their shared direct-realist commitments on the level of sense-perception, Olivi and Auriol part ways when it comes to analysing conceptual thought. Olivi’s stance vis-a`-vis direct realism differs more from Auriol’s than scholars have recognized. I will proceed as follows. In Section 1, I discuss Olivi’s theory of conceptual thought. This theory has been interpreted as an extension of Olivi’s direct-realist account of perceptual cognition.7 I will argue that this picture needs nuancing. In describing the mechanisms at work in conceptual cognition, Olivi sees an important role for inner objects of cognition. 5

See Robert Pasnau, Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 276. 6 For Olivi, see II Sent. q. 13 (I, 246–7). References are to the volumes of Jansen’s edition of the Quaestiones in secundum librum sententiarum (Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1922–6). For Auriol, see Scriptum super primum sententiarum d. 27 q. 2, a. 2 (ES, ll. 494–5). ES for Electronic Scriptum (ed. Friedman, Schabel and Nielsen) on . 7 Robert Pasnau, “Petri Iohannis Olivi Tractatus de Verbo,” Franciscan Studies 53 (1993), 129–30; Pasnau, Theories, 276; Dominik Perler, Theorien der Intentionalita¨t im Mittelalter (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2004), 138; and Robert Pasnau and Juhana Toivanen, “Peter John Olivi,” in E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (summer 2013 edition), §6. See also Claude Panaccio, Le discours inte´rieur de Platon a` Guillaume d’Ockham (Paris: Seuil, 1999), 192.

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This marks a concession to the indirect-realist theory of conceptual thought. As we shall see in Section 2, however, Auriol explains conceptual thought within a consistently direct-realist framework.

1. OLIVI Olivi’s direct-realist commitments come to the fore most clearly in his discussion of the so-called “species theory” of perceptual representation. According to this theory as Olivi understands it, external objects are represented to our senses by species: image-like devices that function as the primary objects of cognition.8 On this view, external objects are the secondary objects of cognition, which are accessed by the mediation of species. As is well known, Olivi rejects this theory.9 Such an intermediary species “would veil the object, and it would impede rather than contribute to its being seen in itself as present.”10 Moreover, he argues that proponents of the species theory must face a choice: When a power attends to a species, its attention either moves on so that the thing be seen or not.11

According to Olivi, to say that a perceptual power does not “move on” from a species to the thing it represents is to say that the latter is only seen in an image. And Olivi claims that this means that the thing is not genuinely perceived. At most, it is remembered or imagined: if the perceptual power “does not move on, then the power does not presentially see the object, except in that way in which we are said to see a thing when we think of it as absent.” Consequently, our experience of the object “will be more like a recollection or imagination of an absent thing than like vision.”12 But if the power does move on from a species to the thing it represents, “then after the grasp of the species it will inspect the object in itself, and thus it will see 8

See II Sent. q. 58 (II, 467–9). For Olivi’s critique of the species theory of perceptual representation, see Juhana Toivanen, Animal Consciousness: Peter Olivi on the Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul ( Jyva¨skyla¨: University of Jyva¨skyla¨, 2009), 60–73. 10 II Sent. q. 58 (II, 469). 11 II Sent. q. 58 (II, 469). 12 II Sent, q. 58 (II, 469–70). Perler claims that if the cognitive power does not move on from a species, there will be “keinen kognitiven Zugang zum a¨ußeren Gegenstand” (Perler, Theorien, 123). But this is too strong. To imagine or to remember an object is to have some kind of epistemic access to it. 9

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the object in two ways.”13 And this, Olivi believes, “seems too much at odds with the phenomenal feel of perception to be a serious possibility.”14 The proponents of the species theory, then, are caught in a dilemma. And the only way out is to give up the idea that reality is represented by imagelike species that are the primary objects of cognition. Olivi’s alternative is not to deny the basic idea that reality is represented to our senses. Rather, Olivi holds that it is our perceptual acts themselves that represent external objects. It is because my current perceptual act is internally structured or “configured” in a certain way that it pertains to, say, Peter.15 There is no need to invoke intermediary images to account for perceptual representation. In Olivi’s own words, “the act of cognition is the actual cognitive representation.”16 This is the nucleus of Olivi’s direct realism. But does he believe that it can also be sustained at the level of conceptual cognition? In order to answer that question we must turn to Olivi’s Tractatus de Verbo, which occurs at the beginning of his commentary on the Gospel of John. While the setting of the Tractatus is thus theological, Claude Panaccio has written that “the essentials of Olivi’s discussion are properly philosophical.”17 Indeed, the treatment of concepts in the Tractatus has been described as an integral part of Olivi’s critique of indirect realism.18 Again, the account of concepts that Olivi develops in the Tractatus has been cast as “a direct realist theory of intellectual cognition.”19 In the remainder of this section I offer a discussion of the Tractatus that qualifies this interpretation of Olivi. In Section 1.1, I outline the way in which Olivi criticizes a certain indirect-realist theory of conceptual thought in the Tractatus. In Section 1.2, I turn to Olivi’s alternative to that theory. While there is a clearly direct-realist tenor to this alternative, I argue in Section 1.3 that, nevertheless, Olivi retains significant elements of indirect realism. In the Tractatus, Olivi’s first concern is not so much the philosophical idea that conceptual thought involves representations that function as inner objects of cognition. Rather, it is theological considerations that for the most part drive his critique of the indirect realism laid out in the Tractatus. 13

II Sent. q. 58 (II, 469). Pasnau, Theories, 244–5. See also Toivanen, Animal Consciousness, 70. “ . . . ipsum etiam obiectum se ipsum praesentat [ . . . ] et per actum sibi configuratum est quaedam repraesentatio eius.” II Sent. q. 72 (III, 35–6). 16 II Sent. q. 74 (III, 130). 17 Panaccio, Le discours inte´rieur, 191. 18 See Perler, Theorien, 138–46. 19 Pasnau and Toivanen, “Peter John Olivi,” §6. See also Panaccio, Le discours inte´rieur, 192. 14 15

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1.1 Olivi’s Tractatus At one point in his Sentences-commentary, Olivi discusses an indirectrealist theory according to which conceptual thoughts are directed at “concepts” or “words” that function as the primary objects of conceptual cognition: Some say that by an act of abstraction, investigation or invention, some kind of concept or word is formed, in which real objects are understood as in a mirror. For they say that this is the first thing understood and the immediate object, and it is a kind of intention and conception and characterization of things.20

Suppose that abstraction leads me to insight into human nature in general: it leads me to grasp that human beings are universally rational, for instance. According to the theory that Olivi describes, the abstractive act that leads me to this insight is productive of “a concept or word.” It is in this concept or word that I contemplate the universally human features that I have abstracted. I grasp human nature in this concept or word “as in a mirror.” Olivi does not name the “some” he has in mind, but commentators have pointed out that his formulations suggest that he is thinking of Aquinas in laying out the theory sketched above.21 As he makes clear in the Tractatus, Olivi recognizes two versions of this theory. According to the first, the concept or word is the primary object of the very act that produced it. Thus, the abstractive act that led me to see that humans are universally rational produces a concept, which is the object to which that act is primarily directed.22 According to the second version of the theory, the offspring of my abstractive act is meant to function as the primary object of subsequent intellectual acts.23 To see how this works, suppose that a process of abstraction has just led me to discover that humans are universally rational. This is a result that I can call to mind any time after the initial process of abstraction has been completed. It is not necessary that I engage in an abstractive process anew any time that I want to think of human nature in general. The best explanation of this, according to the theory that Olivi is describing, is that my initial act of abstraction produced a representational device to which I can turn my mind’s eye any

20

II Sent. q. 74 (III, 120–1). See Pasnau, Theories, 271–2; Panaccio, Le discours inte´rieur, 190; and Perler, Theorien, 140. 22 See “Tractatus.” 146: “[verbum] dicit primum obiectum eiusdem considerationis a qua efficitur et formatur.” 23 See “Tractatus,” 141: “ipsi ponunt quod verbum serviat de primo obiecto non cogitationi illi per quam formatur, sed potius cuidam alteri quae illi primae succedit.” 21

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time afterwards. Thus, the concept theory under discussion in the Tractatus comes in two versions: A Abstractive acts produce concepts or words, which concepts or words are the principal objects of those very abstractive acts. B Abstractive acts produce concepts or words, which concepts or words are the principal objects of subsequent acts of thought. Olivi has little patience with (A). He finds it hard to see how one concept or word can both be the offspring and the immediate object of one and the same thought.24 Moreover, he explains that our capacity to retain concepts over time was the principal motivation for his opponents to embrace their indirect-realist theory of the concept or word: When we abstract and form the universal characteristics of individuals that we have seen or imagined, we conceive and form these characteristics in ourselves, and we return to them when we want to contemplate these universals.25

Similarly, his opponents’ indirect-realist account of the concept is suggested by our capacity to store and recall propositional concepts. When through an act of “investigation or invention,” we have come to understand an argument, we form concepts of both its premises and its conclusion. It is to these concepts that we turn when we later want to call to mind the argument in question, “as if we wanted to contemplate the truth of such propositions as in mirrors.”26 Olivi offers four main reasons to reject (A) and (B). Discussing these arguments in some detail will help to see the extent to which Olivi’s opposition to the theories from the Tractatus is theologically motivated. That is, it will help to put philosophical readings of the Tractatus in the right perspective. Olivi’s first argument against theories that identify concepts with objects of cognition that result from acts of thought is that they contradict authorities such as Augustine. The latter, indeed, “says in several places that our verbum is our actual act of cognition and vice versa.”27 In terms of the above example, this means that the very abstractive act that provides me with insight in human nature is to be identified as the verbum. The word or concept is not something over and above that act of thought. 24

25 See “Tractatus,” 146. “Tractatus,” 144. “ . . . nos in nobis experimur nos in mente nostra formare novos conceptus et plurium propositionum et conclusionum, qui conceptus in nobis postmodum manent et ad ipsos redimus cum talium propositionum volumus recordari, acsi in ipsis tanquam in speculis veritates huiusmodi propositionum speculari velimus.” (“Tractatus,” 144.) 27 “Tractatus,” 138. 26

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Secondly, Olivi argues that according to version (B), the verbum is identified with what Augustine had called a memory-species. On Augustine’s account, a memory-species is a representational device that allows us to call to mind previous acts of thought and their objects.28 Such a memory-species, as Augustine understands it, serves as an inner terminus of cognition: “Augustine has it that when we think of something that is absent, the intellect is turned to a species that is in the memory as if to its primary object.”29 But then, this is precisely the function that theory (B) assigns to the verbum. On this theory, indeed, the verbum “appears to be nothing but a memory-species that is retained in memory after an act of cognition. But it is absurd to call this a verbum.”30 Olivi’s third objection regards the relation between (A) and (B) on the one hand and Trinitarian theology on the other. For Olivi as for many of his contemporaries, Trinitarian theology and human psychology were intimately intertwined. The reliance on psychological theories to come to grips with Trinitarian questions goes back as far as Augustine. But, as Russell Friedman has shown, Henry of Ghent in the thirteenth century took the psychological approach to the Trinity a step farther. More than previous authors had done, Henry emphasized that the production of the Son was an intellectual emanation, whereas the Holy Spirit emanated from the divine will. On his view, then, the Son of God can literally be seen as a kind of concept or word that springs from the divine intellect. Consequently, Henry’s “strong use” of philosophical psychology in Trinitarian contexts demanded that concept theory be somehow “directly applicable to the study of the Son in the Trinity.”31 To be sure, authors after Henry continued to harken back to more traditional approaches to Trinitarian questions. Yet, as Friedman points out, Henry’s view of concept theory and Trinitarian theology as intimately intertwined was to become an important constituent of much Franciscan Trinitarian thought.32

28 “ . . . experimur quod aliquid remanet in nobis per quod actus praetereuntis et sui obiecti possumus recordari. Et hoc vocat Augustinus species memoriales.” (“Tractatus,” 145.) For Augustine on memory, see Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (London: Duckworth, 1987), 131–51. 29 30 “Tractatus,” 142. “Tractatus,” 141. 31 Russell Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: the Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 36 and 256–7. 32 See Friedman, Intellectual Traditions, 275. For discussion of the way in which Franciscans such as Richard of Mediavilla drew on more traditional accounts of the Trinity, see Friedman, Intellectual Traditions, 301–14.

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In order to situate Olivi in the complex Trinitarian discussions of his time, one would ideally be able to rely on critical editions of all texts where Olivi deals with God’s Triune nature. But even lacking such editions,33 one finds ideas and themes in Olivi’s writings that appear to align him with such proponents of the strong use of psychology in Trinitarian theology as Henry of Ghent and John Duns Scotus.34 Thus, Olivi stresses that the generation of the Son is an intellectual production.35 Moreover, Olivi is clearly committed to the idea that concept theory can serve to cast light on Trinitarian mysteries. Thus, he explains that the Son is rightly called a Word because “in divine matters, it is easier to be brought to the proper notion of the Son via the common notion of a word.”36 Since “the common notion of a word” extends not only to spoken and written words but also to mental words or concepts, this means that the proper notion of the Son can be approached via a better understanding of the concept. It is against this background that we should understand Olivi’s third objection. According to this objection, an application of concept theory to Trinitarian theology is hampered by the concept theory under discussion in the Tractatus. After all, the Word of God the Father is not generated from the Father as some kind of mirror and some kind of first object in which and by means of which the Father contemplates the things that he understands.37

To embrace the concept theory under discussion in the Tractatus, then, is to jeopardize the parallelism between human verbum and divine Word. In order to better understand why Olivi thinks that accounts like (A) and (B) are unfit to be applied to a Triune God, I will briefly turn to Olivi’s question “whether there is a personal production and plurality in God.”38 There, he explains that to safeguard the real union of the divine persons, certain views on how the divine intellect works must be rejected. One of them goes as follows: The highest intelligence [summa intelligentia] apprehends its essence either by means of what is identical with it, or by means of that which is its object. It does 33 There is as yet no edition question 6 of book I of Olivi’s Sentences-commentary. See J. Koch, “Der Sentenzkommentar des Petrus Johannis Olivi,” Recherches de the´ologie ancienne et me´die´vale 2 (1930) 290–310, esp. 296–8. 34 For Olivi as a forerunner of Scotus, see Friedman, Intellectual Traditions, 352. 35 “Erat enim hic sui propositi astruere quod persona Verbi erat coaeterna et intrinseca Deo Patri, et ab ipso intellectualiter genita.” (“Tractatus,” 137.) 36 37 “Tractatus,” 137. “Tractatus,” 145. 38 I Sent. q. 5, in M. Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterscheide zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus. II. Teil: die trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen (Mu¨nster: Aschendorff, 1930), 143*–228*.

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not apprehend its essence in the first way [ . . . ] If, therefore, it understands itself by means of that which is its object (that is, in virtue of the fact it is turned and bent towards itself as to its object), then either from such a turn to itself some cognition or some kind of other thing is begotten for the intelligence itself, or not. If not, then it does not cognize itself in this way. If it is, then there is some kind of cognition here that originated or something that has been produced.39

Thus, if God is to know himself, he must turn to himself “as to an object.” If this turn to himself as to an object is to result in divine self-knowledge, something must result from it; namely, “some cognition or some kind of other thing.” Hence, God’s turn to himself results in the generation of a cognition, or in the production of something else. On the account that Olivi describes, it is this residue of God’s intellectual turn to himself that is the divine Word.40 But such a view, Olivi submits, is “heretical, and exterminates God’s entire unity and perfection.”41 For the residue of God’s turn to himself would be something that can only be understood as produced, “in such a way that it cannot be without the characteristic of having been originated or without a relation to its origin.” But to postulate something of this kind in God is to postulate “an essential diversity in God.”42 Also, something of this kind would essentially be dependent on God’s intellectual turn to himself. But then, relations of dependence can “in no way” be in God without compromising his unity.43 Hence, Olivi concludes, all that is needed for divine self-cognition to occur is for God to intellectually turn to himself. Nothing that is essentially produced by and dependent on this turn must be postulated. In fact, to think of God’s self-cognition as a product of his intellectual turn to himself is conceptually flawed. For God to intellectually turn to himself as to an object simply is for God to cognize himself. Divine self-cognition is not something different from and essentially produced by God’s turn to himself

39

I Sent. q. 5, in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, 169*–70*. I Sent. q. 5, in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, 171*. 41 I Sent. q. 5, in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, 172*. 42 “Quicumque [ . . . ] in Deo ponit aliquid essentiale absolute et universaliter acceptum esse productum vel principiatum, ita quod nullo modo sit ipsum dare nisi cum ratione principiati et cum relatione ad suum principium, ponit in Deo essentialem diversitatem.” I Sent. q. 5, in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, 172*. 43 “Ponit etiam aliquod essentiale, inquantum tale, vere dependens ab alio.” But then, “in divinis dependentia nullo modo esse potest, quoniam dicit disparitatem essentiae et per consequens diversitatem.” I Sent. q. 5, in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, 172* and 212*. 40

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as to an object.44 On a general note, indeed, “God does not cognize anything by means of something that is like a productive principle.”45 We can now see more clearly why Olivi should say that (A) and (B) cannot successfully be applied to the Triune God. Applying these views to God would yield that when God thinks of himself, his thought is productive of a further concept of himself. But this comes very close to saying that from God’s turn to himself, “some cognition or some kind of other thing is begotten.” But as we have seen, Olivi believes that this idea “exterminates God’s entire unity.” Moreover, both (A) and (B) hold that intellectual acts produce concepts that are dependent upon these acts. The dependence of concepts on acts is perhaps most clear in the case of (B), which casts memory-species as mental words. For according to Olivi, memory-species depend on cognitive acts in the way in which figures imprinted in a piece of wax depend on the impression of a signet ring.46 Hence, an application of (B) or (A) to God would probably yield that from God’s cognitive turn to himself, something dependent upon that turn must ensue. As a result, there would be relations of dependence in God. And, as we have seen, Olivi thinks that to postulate such relations in God is to hazard his Triune nature. So far, we have come across three objections. First, (A) and (B) fly in the face of Augustine’s authority. Second, it is absurd to speak of memoryspecies as concepts or mental words. Third, (A) and (B) sit uneasily with Trinitarian theology. In Section 1.2 I turn to Olivi’s fourth objection. According to Olivi’s fourth objection, another, more parsimonious account of conceptual cognition can be given. While Olivi’s direct-realist commitments are certainly recognizable in his discussion of that alternative account, we shall see in Section 1.3 that Olivi is prepared to make a number of concessions to indirect realism in order to account for conceptual thought. Also, we shall see that Olivi’s philosophical disagreement with

44 According to Olivi’s opponents, “conversio divini intellectus et voluntatis super sua obiecta aliquo modo realiter distinguatur ab actuali notitia et delectatione.” In this, they are mistaken. I Sent. q. 5, in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, 171*. For Olivi on human self-knowledge, see Christian Rode, “Peter of John Olivi on Representation and Self-Representation,” Quaestio 10 (2010) 155–66; and Susan Brower-Toland, “Olivi on Consciousness and Self-Knowledge, the Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of the Mind’s Reflexivity,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 1 (2013), 136–71. 45 I Sent. q. 5, in Schmaus, Der Liber Propugnatorius, 172*. 46 “ . . . omnis species memorialis generatur per aliquam actualem cognitionem obiecti, sicut sigillaris figura cerae fuit genita per actualem impressionem cerae in sigillo vel sigilli in cera.” II Sent. q. 74 (III, 116). For Olivi on memory, see Juhana Toivanen, Perception and the Internal Senses: Peter of John Olivi on the Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 309–25.

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(B) is minimal. His objections to (B)—to which Olivi dedicates rather more attention than to (A)—are ultimately theological.

1.2 Olivi’s alternative According to Olivi, concepts or words are not products of intellectual acts. A concept is nothing but the act by means of which the intellect selectively attends to the kind-specific characteristics of an object, ignoring whatever individuating features it might have. In Olivi’s own words: The first abstraction of universal characteristics occurs in the mere act of abstractive consideration of the real ratio of a common or specific nature without attending or considering the ratio of its individuation. But nothing objective that is different from the foresaid act of consideration is really abstracted or formed from this.47

It is my intellectual act itself that represents the kind-specific characteristics of an object. In Olivi’s own words, when I selectively attend to the kindspecific characteristics of an object, these come to exist “intentionally or representatively in the act itself.”48 Clearly, this is in line with Olivi’s analysis of sense-perception. Acts are internally structured according to their objects, and this is what makes the former representative of the latter. The production of a further object in which universals would be contemplated as if in a mirror is unnecessary. In fact, such an inner mirror “would rather be an impediment” to our comprehension of, say, human nature, or redness in general.49 Thus far, Olivi has resisted the temptation of postulating anything but external objects and inner acts of cognition in order to account for conceptual thought. But the previous passage raises at least one problem. For according to Olivi, “in no way does anything exist outside of the intellect that is not particular.”50 So what is this “real ratio of a common or specific nature” that the intellect allegedly has access to? As Pasnau has critically remarked, Olivi speaks “as if he has an unproblematic account of the intellect’s relationship to the outside world.”51 Yet, in question 13 of his Sentences-commentary’s second book, Olivi does try to clarify what he means when he speaks of the “real ratio of a common or specific nature” of a thing. In that question, Olivi argues that, even though the world is fundamentally composed of singulars, general concepts do have some footing in reality. He thinks that individual human beings such as John have at least two different rationes or “aspects.” Viewed 47 49 51

48 “Tractatus,” 145. “Tractatus,” 145. 50 “Tractatus,” 144. II Sent. q. 13 (I, 234). Pasnau, “Tractatus,” 130. See also Pasnau, Theories, 276.

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under one aspect, John is this individual human being. Viewed under another, he is a member of the human species. These aspects are not things that we project upon John. John’s individuality and his specific human nature are not in the eye of the beholder. Even so, John’s individuality and his humanity are not two separable parts of him. Olivi says that there is “no real distinction” between John’s individuality and his humanity. Rather, they are distinct in the way in which God qua origin of the Son is different from God qua origin of the Holy Spirit.52 Olivi’s concept of rationes, then, is an attempt to strike a compromise between his anti-realism and the idea that our general concepts are somehow grounded in external reality. It marks Olivi’s effort to tie together his beliefs that whatever exists is singular and that, yet, external things have kind-specific features that we can access intellectually by selectively attending to them. The success of Olivi’s compromise is debatable. For one, if John’s kindspecific human ratio is not really distinct from his individuality, how can selectively attending to it give me a truly general concept of human nature—one that pertains to more than the particular human nature of John? Further discussion of the problems surrounding Olivi’s concept of rationes is beyond the scope of this paper.53 For now, it is important to note that, so far, Olivi’s account of conceptual thought eschews inner objects of cognition. As in his account of sense-perception, cognitive representations are acts, not objects of cognition. Indeed, it appears that Olivi is willing to have a direct-realist account of conceptual thought even at the cost of a difficult ontology. It is not surprising, then, that Olivi’s discussion in the Tractatus has been understood as an attempt to extend his direct-realist theory of perception to the domain of conceptual thought.54 Nevertheless, as I will point out in

52 “ . . . inter duas rationes quae in re nullam habent distinctionem, licet utraque veraciter sit in re, sicut in Deo distinguit rationem intellectus a ratione voluntatis et in Patre rationem productivam Filii a ratione productive Spiritus Sancti [ . . . ] intellectus potest distinguere inter rationem essentiae et inter rationem individuationis suae” II Sent. q. 13 (I, 248–9). Olivi’s views on the kind of distinction that obtains between John’s individuality and his human nature are reminiscent of the formal distinction that Scotus sees between haecceitas and quidditas. For a discussion of the way in which Olivi’s distinction between rationes relates to Henry of Ghent’s intentional distinction and Scotus’ formal distinction, see Efrem Bettoni, Le dottrine filosofiche di Pier di Giovanni Olivi (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1959), 237–43. See also Bernhard Jansen, “Beitra¨ge zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Distinctio formalis,” Zeitschrift fu¨r katholische Theologie 53 (1929), 317–44 and 517–44, esp. 519, 528. 53 For a critical evaluation of Olivi’s position, see Efrem Bettoni, “Il realismo moderato di Pier di Giovanni Olivi e` autentico?” Rivista di filosofia neo-scholastica 48 (1956), 231–51; and Bettoni, Le dottrine filosofiche, 215–35. 54 See the references at note 7 above.

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Section 1.3, Olivi’s account of conceptual cognition features significant concessions to indirect realism.

1.3 Concessions to indirect realism These concessions come to the fore most clearly by looking at his explanation of how we recall to mind a concept that was abstracted earlier. As we have seen above, Olivi believes that cognitive acts leave species in our memory just as signet rings leave their imprints on a piece of wax. For example, when I engage in a thought of John’s human aspect exclusively, a memory-species pertaining to John’s human aspect is generated and subsequently stored in intellectual memory. When, after John has disappeared, I want to think of his humanity again (rather than of his individuality), I, as it were, return to this memory-species. In Olivi’s own words, my initial thought of John’s human nature causes “some species in memory, which afterwards remains in us after the act of thought has ceased to be, and we return to it when afterwards we want to recall the things that we first intellectually considered as present in their absence.”55 As Pasnau has pointed out, Olivi’s allowance of memory-species marks “something of a concession to the object-theory, inasmuch as it puts Olivi in agreement that conceptual thought produces some internal representations.” Nevertheless, the concession really is a minor one, Pasnau argues. For according to indirect realism, the mental word “becomes a kind of object of intellectual thought.” By contrast, Olivi’s memory-species plays no such role: memory-species “explain our ability to retain concepts over time, but they fulfill this role without themselves being the objects of intellect.”56 But this view must be qualified. For like Augustine, Olivi does treat memory-species as image-like devices that are objects of cognition. Indeed, Olivi makes it clear that memory-species are not simply forms that actualize a certain cognitive power: “the memory-species does not inform the gaze of a power, so that by means of such a form a cognitive act flows out and is produced.” Such forms after all, do not function as the “extrinsic termini of their acts and of attention.” The memory-species, by contrast, “is required as the extrinsic terminus of attention and of an act.”57 Memory-species, then, are objects of cognition:

55 56 57

“Tractatus,” 145. Pasnau, “Tractatus,” 127. Also Pasnau, Theories, 273. II Sent. q. 74 (III, 116).

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Now, the similitudes of things that exist in the cognitive powers are either cognitive acts or the principles of such acts, or memory-species, which take the place of an object, and which do not contribute to an act of cognition, unless a cognitive power is actually turned to them and looks at them and is directed to them.58

Or again, “memory-species only serve as an object that terminates the act and the attention of a power and which represents an absent object to them.”59 Olivi further specifies the claim that memory-species are objects of cognition as follows. A memory-species must be cognized “insofar as it is representative of the absent object, rather than insofar as it is in itself an essence quite different from the absent object.”60 Only when it is cognized thus do we manage to cognize a past object in a memory-species. Should a memory-species be cognized only “insofar as it is in itself an essence quite different from the absent object,” acts that are directed at memory-species could never pertain to anything but intramental entities. Also, Olivi specifies that a memory-species “takes the place of an immediate object.”61 Hence, when I recall to mind a concept, a memory-species stored in intellectual memory is the primary object of my intellect’s activity. This, then, is Olivi’s first concession to indirect realism. This concession is rooted in a more general claim that Olivi makes about cognitive acts that pertain to absent or non-existent entities. All such acts, Olivi believes, are directed at inner species. While this retreat from direct realism may look surprising in light of Olivi’s views on perception, I do not think that there is a genuine conflict here. In fact, when Olivi says that for a perceptual act to stop at a species (to grasp an object in its image) is more like remembering or imagining the object than like seeing it, he seems to be implicitly relying on an indirect-realist account of recollection and imagination. And when Olivi claims that access to a species is always inferior to access to the object itself, he need not be disqualifying species as objects of either recollection or imagination. Instead, he may just be pointing to a real qualitative difference between imagining or remembering an object on the one hand and perceiving it on the other.62 More importantly, throughout his discussions of the different sorts of cognitive activity, Olivi seems to be committed to the idea that for every cognitive act, there is something at which it is directed.63 In ordinary sense-perception, external objects fulfill 58

59 II Sent. q. 72 (III, 26). II Sent. q. 74 (III, 119). II Sent. q. 74 (III, 115–16). 61 II Sent. q. 76 (III, 149). For memory-species as “similitudines,” see q. 72 (III, 26). 62 See II Sent. q. 58 (II, 468): “nulla species ita repraesentat obiectum sicut ipsummet obiectum repraesentat se ipsum.” 63 See Toivanen, Perception and the Internal Senses, 294–5: “According to Olivi, the cognitive acts of the soul are structured in the following way: (1) a power which is the subject of the cognitive act brings about (2) an act that is intentionally directed at (3) an object.” 60

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this role, and no inner objects are needed. But this changes when I think of something that does not exist. In this case, some kind of inner proxy is needed for my thought to be directed at. Similarly, Olivi finds it hard to see how an act of cognition can be directed at something that is absent. Therefore, when I cognize an absent object, my cognitive act is directed at an inner representation of that object.64 Against this background, it is important to observe that Olivi sees an important role for the imagination in conceptual thought. This comes to the fore when Olivi discusses the way in which intellect is dependent on the inner senses for its activities. In this discussion we are told that in order for the intellect to recall material objects, it must collaborate with the inner senses: “thus, the memory-species of the intellect itself cannot sufficiently represent something sensible to the intellect, unless it is undergirded and assisted by an act of the imagination.”65 Consequently, when I recall a general concept that pertains to something sensible, it is necessary that I also imagine an individual falling under that concept, albeit in a vague and unspecified way: Thus, the intellect cannot cognize the universal species of sensible objects, unless it cognizes some vague or designated particular that is presented to it by an act of the imagination.66

For example, whenever I recall the concept “man,” it is necessary that I at the same time imagine a man in at least a vague and unspecified way. How does this work? As Juhana Toivanen has explained, Olivi believes that the imagination draws on memory-species that are stored in the sensory memory.67 Olivi characterizes such species as “images” of their objects.68 Hence, he appears to be saying that recalling the concept “man” at a minimum involves scrutinizing a coarse-grained, low-resolution memory-image of a particular human being. 64 “ . . . quod scilicet ad cognitionem vel cogitationem absentium sit necessaria aliqua species pro obiecto, probatur primo, quia omnis aspectus ad obiectum directus terminatur necessario in aliquo, non enim potest aspicere nihil nec terminari in nihilo. Oportet etiam quod illud in quo terminatur sit sibi praesens, ita quod virtualiter attingatur ab ipso aspectu. Sed cum cogitamus aliquam rem quae non est actu, aut si est, non est nostro aspectui praesens: tunc aspectus non potest figi et terminari in illa. Ergo oportet quod aliqua rei imago obiciatur tunc aspectui et terminet ipsum” (II Sent. q. 74 [III, 115]). 65 II Sent. q. 74; III, 117. The imagination is not a faculty over and above the common sense for Olivi. Rather, it is a function of the common sense. See II Sent. q. 63 (II, 596–602). For discussion, see Toivanen, Perception and the Internal Senses, 296–300. 66 II Sent. q. 74; II, 117. Olivi’s position here is reminiscent of Aquinas’. See Summa theologiae, pars prima, q. 84, a. 7. 67 See Toivanen, Perception and the Internal Senses, 293–5. 68 For instance, II Sent. q. 36 (I, 653).

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Thus, in analysing conceptual recollection, Olivi makes at least two concessions to indirect realism. (1) For the intellect to recall an object is for it to directly cognize a species that is stored in intellectual memory. (2) In order for such conceptual recollection to take place, it is also required that my intellect scrutinize a (low-resolution) image that is presented to it by the imagination. Olivi’s formulations sometimes suggest that he makes a third concession: namely, (3) that (low-resolution) images are necessary for all sorts of conceptual cognition.69 This would mean that such images are needed even when selective attention to John’s human nature causes me to form the general concept “man” for the first time. What (3) suggests, indeed, is that the intellect can concentrate successfully on the kind-specific features of John only if it simultaneously cognizes a (coarse-grained) image of a man. These concessions cast new light on what exactly is at stake between Olivi and his opponents in the Tractatus. According to the proponents of (A), newly acquired concepts are both the products and the immediate objects of abstractive acts. Olivi denies this, and holds that it is the abstractive acts of the intellect themselves that deserve to be called concepts or verba. If (3) is correct, however, Olivi does not deny that the acquisition of a concept involves the intellect’s turning to some kind of inner object at some level. While this may look like a modest concession to indirect realism, there is more substantial agreement between Olivi and the proponents of (B). As (2) makes clear, Olivi believes that conceptual recollection also involves the mind’s turning to images presented to it by the imagination. But moreover, (1) says that we recall concepts by turning our intellects to inner representations stored in intellectual memory. And this is much like what (B) says. According to (B), after all, conceptual recollection is a matter of turning to inner objects of cognition that are somehow stored in the intellect. The main difference between Olivi’s theory of conceptual recollection and (B), it seems, is that whereas Olivi’s opponents refer to the primary objects of conceptual recollection as verba, Olivi calls them “memory-species” and maintains that it is “absurd” to speak of memoryspecies as if they were verba. The rationale behind this latter claim may very well be theological. For as we have seen, Olivi stresses that the divine Word is not “some kind of first object in which and by means of which the Father contemplates the things that he understands.” But then, memory-species as Olivi understands them are precisely immediate objects in which and by means of which things are 69 Continuing the passage at note 66: “Nec mirum, quia nec aliquod universale rerum intellectualium potest intelligere, nisi simul cogitet aliquod particulare vagum vel signatum illius universalis” (II Sent. q. 74 [III, 117]).

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grasped. So if the parallelism between our word and the divine Word is to be maintained, it would be absurd indeed to identify our words with memory-species. Moreover, the generation of memory-species can be understood along the lines of the way in which figures in wax are imprinted by signet-rings. But arguably, the same cannot be said of the divine Word without introducing relations of dependence in God. So if the mental word is to be the equivalent of the divine Word, the mental word must not be cast as a kind of memory-species.70 What this suggests is that, in the end, what is in dispute between Olivi and the proponents of (B) is not the philosophical claim that the recollection of a concept somehow involves the intellect’s turning to an inner object. Rather, what is in dispute is the theological claim that this object deserves to be called a verbum. Since, as we have seen, Olivi saw (B) as the most important theory to take issue with in the Tractatus, it appears that for Olivi the Tractatus was about theology rather than philosophy. This makes it problematic to say that “the essentials of Olivi’s discussion are properly philosophical.”71 Again, the Tractatus has been cast as an extension of Olivi’s direct-realist theory of perception to the domain of perceptual thought. But such readings underestimate the concessions that Olivi is willing to make to indirect realism. In the end, the Tractatus was about safeguarding the Trinity rather than about extending direct realism from the domain of sense-perception to that of conceptual thought. In Section 2, I turn to Auriol’s account of conceptual thought. As we shall see, Auriol does not make the kind of concessions to indirect realism that Olivi did. Despite the points of agreement between the two authors that we shall also come across, then, their stances vis-a`-vis indirect realism diverge more than scholars have recognized.

2 . A U R I O L A N D IN D I R E C T R E A L I S M According to Auriol, we all experience that something “meets the mind’s eye” in conceptual cognition.72 At several junctures of his Sentencescommentary, Auriol points out that philosophers have been prone to say that what meets the mind’s eye in conceptual thought is some kind of inner representation. While these representations come in different sorts, Auriol 70

See the discussion around note 46. Repeated from note 17. 72 See Scriptum super primum sententiarum d. 3, sectio 14, ed. E. M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1956), 713. 71

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typically portrays indirect realism as saying that intellectual species are the objects of conceptual cognition: representational devices that represent the kind-specific features of an object to the intellect. In what follows, therefore, I shall discuss Auriol’s critique of object-theories mainly in terms of species. What are the problems that Auriol sees for indirect realism? Auriol’s principal epistemological critique of indirect realism most clearly comes to the fore in a dilemma that he sets up for his opponents. It is on the way in which he develops this dilemma, then, that I shall concentrate in this section.73 This will also allow me to draw attention to a number of parallels and differences between Auriol and Olivi. Auriol introduces his dilemma by confronting the proponents of indirect realism with a choice. Either the intellect “stops at” scrutinizing an inner object that represents, say, human nature, or it “moves on” from beholding such a representation to conceiving of human nature as it extramentally exists in individual men. In his own words: If this be before the intellect and be seen by it, the intellect either stops here [ . . . ] or the intuition of the intellect does not stop at this species, but protrudes to the thing through its mediation.74

As Auriol will go on to argue, both options are undesirable for the proponents of indirect realism. The choice that he presents to his opponents, then, amounts to a dilemma. The only way out is to reject the indirect-realist theory of conceptual thought. Auriol’s line of argument here is reminiscent of one of Olivi’s arguments against the species theory of perceptual representation.75 As we have seen, Olivi presented the proponents of that theory with the following choice: either the perceptual power moves on from a species to a thing, or it does not. Neither option is open to the proponent of the species theory, so he must drop the assumption that perceptual acts take species as their primary objects. Auriol’s critique of the indirect-realist theory of conceptual thought here appears to run parallel to Olivi’s critique of the species theory 73 Auriol’s theory of cognition has been the focus of much scholarly discussion, but his critique of indirect realism has received less attention. An exception here is is Prezioso, La species medievale, 81–4. Spruit also emphasizes Auriol’s criticism of species, but does not offer a detailed discussion of Auriol’s arguments. See Leen Spruit, Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge (Leiden: Brill, 1994), vol. 1, 286–90. 74 Scriptum, d. 3, sectio 14, q. 3 (Buytaert, 713). The same dilemma is presented in Scriptum d. 9, q. 1, a. 1 (ES, ll. 282–91) and d. 27, q. 2, a. 2 (ES, ll. 469–89). 75 Given the similarity between Olivi’s and Auriol’s formulations, it is tempting to assume that Auriol was influenced by Olivi in wording his dilemma. I cannot here substantiate that assumption.

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of perceptual representation, then. Neither Prezioso nor Kraml or Marenbon have compared the ways in which Olivi and Auriol confront their opponents with a dilemma. Yet, Olivi’s and Auriol’s usage of dilemmas to target indirect realist theories clearly makes it tempting to see Auriol as picking things up where Olivi left them, so to speak. While Olivi criticized indirect-realist accounts of perception by presenting them with a dilemma, Auriol reused that same dilemma to target indirect-realist theories of conceptual cognition. It is in the light of passages such as the above, then, that it becomes tempting to cast Olivi and Auriol as like-minded foes of inner cognitive objects. But this picture needs nuancing. Firstly, as we will see in Section 2.1, Auriol’s presentation and development of the dilemma are somewhat different from Olivi’s. Secondly and more importantly, Auriol’s own account of conceptual cognition does not feature the kind of concessions to indirect realism that Olivi’s account did. I turn to Auriol’s own theory in Section 2.2.

2.1 Auriol’s dilemma As we have seen above, Olivi thought that if the perceptual power does not move on from a species to a thing, the latter will not really be seen. At most, it will be remembered or imagined. According to Auriol, for the intellect to stop at an inner representation has a more radical consequence. To stop at an inner representation is to view that representation as an autonomous object of cognition rather than as a device that somehow points to another object. Consequently, when our intellects stop at an inner representation, they have no kind of cognitive engagement whatsoever with anything but the representation itself. Hence, an intellect that stops at inner representations does not form judgments about external reality. It only judges of the cognitive objects that are internal to it, and consequently that is all it has knowledge about: If [the intellect] is stopped here, we never speak or have knowledge of external things, and we are blind with respect to them.76

Thus, when I stop at, say, the species of a rose, I am caused to think of a species, not of externally existent roses. Similarly, stopping at the species that represents the genus flower, I am not led to think of real flowers, but only of an accident that informs my intellect: the species itself.

76

Scriptum d. 27, q. 2, a. 2 (ES, ll. 480–3).

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Consequently, when my intellect connects the two aforementioned species by means of the copula “is,” this does not cause me to judge that a rose is a flower, but rather that the species of a rose is the species of a flower. And this judgment will be false. For Auriol believes that propositions of the form S is P are true only if “it is truly the same thing that is posited in the subject and in the predicate.”77 But then, the species of a rose and the species of the genus flower are not “truly the same thing.” In Auriol’s own words: The conception whereby we internally intuit that roses are flowers would be false, if the rose and flower that we experience as present were intelligible species [ . . . ] For the one would not be the other.78

Clearly, this is too high a price to pay for indirect realism (or indeed for any theory). So what about the dilemma’s second horn, according to which the intellect does not stop at intellectual species, but rather moves on to scrutinizing general natures as they exist in external reality? We have seen that, for Olivi, to say that a perceptual power moves on from a species to a thing is to say that the latter is cognized twice, which Olivi deemed phenomenologically implausible. Auriol makes much the same argument. To opt for the dilemma’s second horn “is against experience: we do not experience that we look at the form of a rose and are subsequently carried farther to the rose.”79 But Auriol goes farther. If the intellect were to move on from beholding the species of a rose to the nature of roses as it is realized in externally existent roses, access to the latter would be indirect. In Auriol’s own terms, the “first” object of cognition would always be a species. Consequently, the intellect would only grasp the nature of roses “as in a mirror.” In Auriol’s own words: Second, because then the first object of the intellect would be something that exists within the intellect, not the external thing. And in the same way, the first object of a scientific habit and its act [knowing, that is] would be some accidental form in which things are seen as in a mirror.80

77 II Sent. d. 9, q. 2, a. 1 (105bF–106aA). References to the second book of Auriol’s Sentences-commentary are to the Commentaria in secundum, tertium, et quartum librum sententiarum (Rome, 1605). On this view in Auriol, see extensively Russell Friedman, “Peter Auriol on Intentions and Essential Predication,” in S. Ebbesen and R. Friedman (eds.), Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition (Copenhagen: Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, 1999), 415–30. 78 Scriptum d. 27 (ES, ll. 470–4). See also Scriptum d. 3, sectio 14, Buytaert, 714. 79 Scriptum d. 9, q. 1, a.1 (ES, ll. 286–7). 80 Scriptum I, d. 9, q. 1, a.1 (ES, ll. 287–90).

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In distinction 11 of book II of his Sentences-commentary, Auriol puts forth a related argument. If we would access the nature of roses by first contemplating the species of a rose, our understanding of the former would become discursive: The intellect, when it cognizes a rose, either stops at the species of the rose, or it moves on from the species to the thing. But if the first is said, it follows that the intellect has no cognition with respect to things; if the second is said, it follows that every act of the intellect regarding things is discursive. Neither of these is the case.81

Two remarks about the context of this passage are in order. First, the context makes it clear that when Auriol speaks of “cognizing a rose,” he means “cognizing a rose simpliciter.”82 And for Auriol, to cognize something simpliciter is to cognize it in general.83 Second, the above passage stems from Auriol’s article “whether in the angelic intellect, a species is really distinct from the act of thought itself.” But Auriol makes it clear that his conclusions regard the angelic and the human intellect alike.84 Hence, the argument that Auriol makes in the above passage may be reconstructed as follows. (a) If the human intellect must move on from species to the nature of roses, it cognizes the latter in a discursive way. But (b) that is not the case.85 Therefore (c), the human intellect need not move on from a species to the nature of roses in order to cognize the latter. In sum, it initially seemed as if the proponent of the indirect-realist theory of conceptual thought could say either that the intellect stops at inner species or that it moves on from species to externally existent natures. On closer inspection, however, neither option turns out to be truly available. The indirect-realist theory of conceptual thought must therefore be given up. What meets the mind’s eye in conceptual thought, in other words, is not an inner representational device such as a species. But this is not an unproblematic claim for Auriol to make. For, like Olivi, Auriol is committed to a lean ontology, according to which “everything, 81

II Sent., d. 11, q. 3, a. 1 (129aC). See II Sent., d. 11, q. 3, a. 1 (129aB). 83 As stipulated in Reportatio super I Sententiarum, d. 2, p. 1, q. 3. In Stephen Brown, “Petrus Aurioli: De unitate conceptus entis (Reportatio Parisiensis in I Sententiarum, dist. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–3 et p. 2, qq. 1–2),” Traditio 50 (1995), 229: “quando dico ‘rosa simpliciter,’ ‘simpliciter’ additum ‘rosae’ non dat unitatem aliam alicuius rationis, sed dat carentiam distinctionis quam ponit ‘haec rosa.’ ” 84 “ . . . pono Propositionem intentam, quod species et intellectio tam in nobis, quam in Angelis, est realiter idem quod actus intelligendi.” II Sent. d. 11, q. 3, a. 1 (127bF). 85 See II Sent., d. 11, q. 4, a. 2 (144aF): “ . . . universale namque intelligit per se, et intuitive [ . . . ]; singulare vero arguitive.” On the discursive cognition of singulars, see Russell Friedman, “Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition of Singulars,” Vivarium 38 (2000), 177–93. 82

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insofar as it exists, exists as a singular.”86 So what exactly is it that the intellect directly has access to when it grasps, say, the nature of roses or when it thinks of humanity in general, if not an inner representation? This question will be addressed in Section 2.2, where I outline Auriol’s own account of conceptual thought.

2.2 Auriol’s alternative Although he denies that universals exist external to the intellect, Auriol wants to maintain that our general concepts have some fundament in reality.87 Using language that is reminiscent of Olivi, Auriol explains that objects have several aspects or indeed rationes. Thus, there is an individual aspect to John, but also a more generally human aspect. These aspects, Auriol believes, are not in the eye of the beholder: “the difference between rationes is grounded in the object.”88 What this means is that John is naturally apt to be conceived of in different ways.89 It is due to John that I can conceive of him either qua individual or qua man. For Auriol, to conceive of John qua man is to conceive of John as similar to other men.90 Thus, Auriol thinks that John is naturally apt to be conceived of as similar to his fellow human beings. This similarity, then, is not something that I project upon him, but rather something that is genuinely rooted in John and his fellow men. This is not to say that there is a human essence that is somehow instantiated in all human beings. According to Auriol, indeed, things can be “highly similar” to each other without literally sharing a property: “there is nothing in me that is in you, and yet there is nothing in me that cannot be highly similar to something that exists in you.”91 The claim that the similarity between John and his fellow men is rooted in external reality does not compromise Auriol’s anti-realism. Thus, the following picture of Auriol on conceptual thought begins to emerge. When I look at John qua man rather than qua individual, John 86

II Sent. d. 9, q. 3, a. 3 (114aF). See Friedman, “Peter Auriol on Intentions.” 88 Reportatio super I Sententiarum, d. 2, p. 2, q. 3, in Brown, “Petrus Aurioli,” 236. 89 Auriol defines a ratio as “id quod est conceptibile.” Scriptum, d. 2, sectio 10 (Buytaert, 929). Elsewhere, he writes: “ . . . loquendo de re in ordine ad intellectum, qui cognoscit eandem rem alio et alio conceptu, cum accipit Sortem, ut Sortem, et ut hominem; quaelibet enim res singularis nata est facere de se alium conceptum.” II Sent. d. 9, q. 2, a. 1 (105bF–106aA). 90 “ . . . eadem res potest concipi sub duplici conceptu, uno quidem rei, ut res est absolute, et alio similitudinario et qualitativo [ . . . ] Sed conceptus specificus est de re, ut simillima alteri rei; conceptus autem individui est de re absolute in se.” II Sent. d. 9, q. 2, a. 3 (114bF–115aA). 91 II Sent. d. 9, q. 1, a. 3 (115aF). 87

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appears to my intellect insofar as he is similar to other human beings. This appearance is not mediated by species or other representative devices that become objects of cognition. What appears to the mind’s eye, then, is John’s similarity to Peter, Mary, and all other human beings. It is not some special representational device. Of course, this picture needs to be further fleshed out. Specifically, we need to ask how Auriol analyses John’s appearance to me as similar to his fellow men. According to Auriol, John’s similarity to his fellow men is represented to me by the very act by means of which I first grasp that similarity: “the cognitive act is that by means of which the universal is represented.”92 Auriol characterizes this act as a “similitude” that pertains to the humanity of John, Peter, and all other men.93 This much is reminiscent of Olivi. But contrary to Olivi, Auriol refuses to say of intellectual acts that they are concepts.94 But then, what are concepts for Auriol? Auriol believes that when my intellect is informed or configured by a similitude that pertains to the humanity of John and his fellow men, the similarity between John and other human beings appears to me. And he maintains that when something appears to a human cognizer, what appears acquires a special mode of being. When, say, a tree appears to me, the tree acquires the being of what appears: apparent being.95 Auriol also says that when the tree is an object of my perceptual activity, it acquires the being of an object of cognition: objective being. Thus, when I see a tree, the tree is generated in objective or apparent being by my perceptual act.96 This analysis applies to intellectual cognition as well. When I think of John, John begets apparent being by an act of my intellect.97 According to Auriol, John in apparent being is at the same time product and object of an intellectual act.98 Contrary to Olivi, then, Auriol is not bothered by the idea that one entity is both product and object of a single thought.

92

Scriptum d. 35, q.1, a.1 (ES, ll. 611–12). For the characterization of intellectual acts as “similitudes,” see Scriptum d. 35, q. 1, a. 1 (ES, ll. 635–42) and II Sent. d. 11, q. 3, a. 1 (128aE). 94 “ . . . per conceptum non intelligo actum intellectus.” Reportatio super I Sententiarum, d. 2, p. 1, q. 1. In Brown, “Petrus Aurioli,” 210. 95 For discussion, see Dallas Denery, “The Appearance of Reality: Peter Auriol and the Experience of Perceptual Error,” Franciscan Studies 55 (1998), 27–52. 96 See Scriptum, d. 3, sectio 14 (Buytaert, 696): “actus exterioris sensus ponit rem in esse intentionali.” 97 “ . . . in omni intellectione necesse est quod res emanet in esse intentionali.” Scriptum, d. 9, q. 1, a. 1 (ES, l. 324). 98 “Actus autem iste habet duplicem habitudinem ad rem postam in tali esse. Habet enim habitudinem ut quo ponitur productive et habitudinem ut cui obicitur obiective.” Scriptum, d. 3, sectio 14 (Buytaert 709). 93

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If John in apparent being is an object of thought, it is nothing like a “veil” (pallium) between me and John.99 Rather, John in apparent being is John himself, albeit in a special mode of being. Auriol identifies John in apparent being with the intellect’s concept of John. Thus, he identifies the concept of John with John himself in objective being. As Friedman elegantly puts it: “Auriol has made the concept invisible by identifying it with the thing understood.”100 In the same vein, when John appears as similar to other men he begets apparent being according to his kind-specific ratio. And the concept “man” is nothing but John in apparent being according to his human ratio. This is to say that the concept “man” is nothing but John himself, albeit according to a specific aspect of him and in a special mode of being. For Auriol, this account of the concept provides the key to understanding the divine Word too. If concepts can be identified with the things understood through them, a concept or Word of God just is God himself. And thus “everything that is said of the Word can be sustained.”101 Other theories of the concept jeopardize the unity of God. This also goes for theories that, like Olivi’s, identify concepts and intellectual acts, “for an act of the intellect is something that inheres and which is really different from the thing of which it is.”102 A divine thought inheres in God, and does not coincide with him. Hence, if his concept or Word were an act of thought, God and the Word would fail to coincide, thus introducing diversity within the Triune God.103 On the basis of the foregoing, we can already draw some conclusions about Olivi’s and Auriol’s accounts of conceptual cognition. Firstly, both thinkers practice what has been called a “back-to-the-thing” approach.104 But while Olivi goes “back to the thing” by identifying newly acquired concepts with acts of abstraction, Auriol refuses to identify concepts and intellectual acts. For him, a concept is the offspring of an act. This offspring does not come in between subject and object of cognition. On the contrary, concept and object are identical. Secondly, both Franciscans use concept

99

See Scriptum, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2 (ES, 598–9). Also d. 3, sectio 14 (Buytaert, 698). Friedman, Intellectual Traditions, 585. “Sed si emanet ut Deus positus in esse obiectivo et terminativo ac apparenti, salvantur omnia quae dicuntur de Verbo.” Scriptum, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2 (ES, ll. 865–6). 102 Scriptum, d. 27, q. 2, a. 2 (ES, l. 872). 103 For extensive discussion of the relation between Auriol’s theory of conceptformation and his Trinitarian theology, see Friedman, Intellectual Traditions, 579–93. See also Tiziana Sua´rez-Nani, “ ‘Apparentia’ und ‘Egressus.’ Ein Versuch u¨ber den Geist als Bild des trinitarischen Gottes nach Petrus Aurioli,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 93 (1986), 39–60. 104 Friedman, Intellectual Traditions, 580. 100 101

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theory to better understand the Trinity. But while Olivi thinks that God’s Triune nature can only be saved by identifying concepts with intellectual acts, Auriol thinks that this approach is detrimental to God’s unity. In at least two respects, then, Olivi and Auriol seek to obtain the same goals through opposite means. In Section 1 we found that Olivi’s theory of the concept went hand in hand with a number of concessions to indirect realism. These came to the fore in his analyses of conceptual recollection and the collaboration between intellect and imagination in conceptual thought. Thus, the question arises of whether Auriol thinks similarly of the role played by the imagination in conceptual thought. Auriol’s views on recollection and the role that he sees for the imagination in conceptual cognition will be taken up in Section 2.3.

2.3 Auriol on recollection and imagination Auriol’s analysis of recollection eschews inner images or species. Auriol believes that after I have abstracted the concept “man,” my intellect remains informed or configured by the initial similitude that made human nature appear to me. This does not mean, however, that once I have abstracted the concept “man” I will think ceaselessly of human nature for the rest of my life. While my intellect remains configured by the similitude through which human nature first appeared to me, it does not always “make use” of that similitude. That is, the similitude does not permanently reproduce human nature in apparent being. But like a dormant volcano that can suddenly erupt, a temporarily inert similitude can at a certain moment of time reproduce the appearance of human nature. This, indeed, is what happens when I recollect the concept “man.” As Auriol formulates the point: And thus, after such an appearance, the intellect remains informed by the similitude, but it is not said to actually consider something, because it does not make use of that similitude so that the same object is formed or posited in apparent being and the same conception is formed. And thus Augustine says in book XIV.6 of De trinitate that what is known by him who is versed in many disciplines is contained in his memory.105

Thus, Auriol’s analysis of recollection involves no intermediary species or images between me and the object of my mnemonic act. When I recall to mind my concept of human nature, it is human nature itself that appears to me, not a representational device that somehow pertains to it. In a nutshell, 105 Scriptum d. 35, q. 1, a. 1 (ES, ll. 640–5). Also Scriptum d. 3, sectio 14 (Buytaert, 708) and Scriptum d. 27, q. 2, a. 2 (ES, ll. 696–705).

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then, Auriol’s analysis of recollection does not involve the kind of concession to indirect realism that we found in Olivi. But, like Olivi, Auriol believes that I cannot recall the concept “man” without some assistance from my imagination: “the recollection of universals does not take place without the assistance of the sensitive powers, which present a particular intention that falls under that universal.”106 Indeed, Auriol attaches particular importance to the collaboration between intellect and imagination, which he believes to be emblematic of the unity between body and soul:107 The body and the soul come to some kind of single undividedness in a special and ultimate perfection, which is the act of the understanding, which results from the imagination and the intellect, both of which concur in an undivided way in that operation.108

Or as he puts it elsewhere: “we do not understand anything that we do not actually imagine.”109 Part of what this means is that we cannot think of a universal without at the same time imagining something falling under that universal.110 For instance, it is possible to simply engage with the concept “line in general.” When thinking of the concept “line in general,” we always imagine simultaneously some particular line with specific spatial dimensions.111 But how does this work? As we have seen above, Olivi believed that to imagine something was to process an image-like species of it. But Auriol explicitly rejects such a view. Auriol draws a distinction between “intuitive” and “abstractive” cognition.112 Intuitive cognitions are perception-like cognitions through which objects appear to me as present and existent. 106

Scriptum d. 3, sectio 14, Buytaert, 706–7. On this, see William Duba, “The Souls after Vienne: Franciscan Theologians’ Views on the Plurality of Forms and the Plurality of Souls, ca. 1315–1330,” in P. Bakker (ed.), Psychology and the other Disciplines: A Case of Cross-Disciplinary Interaction (1250– 1750) (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 203. 108 II Sent, d. 16, q. 1, a. 1 (221bE). 109 II Sent. d. 11, q. 3, a. 3 (139bD). See also II Sent. d. 11, q. 3, a. 1 (130bB): “in omni intellectione oportet recurrere ad fantasiata.” Again, one is reminded of Aquinas here. See the reference at note 66 above. 110 See II Sent. d. 16, q. 1, a. 1 (222aA): “qui enim necessario intelligit universale, necessario intelligit illud in particulari aliquo.” 111 “ . . . non intelligimus lineam simpliciter, nisi materiata pedali.” II Sent. d. 11, q. 3, a. 1 (130aF). Also d. 16, q. 1, a. 1 (222aB). For discussion, see also Michael Renemann, Gedanken als Wirkursachen: Francisco Sua´rez zur geistigen Hervorbringung (Amsterdam: B.R. Gru¨ner, 2010), 32. 112 For discussion, see Philotheus Boehner, “Notitia Intuitiva of Non Existents According to Peter Aurioli, O.F.M. (1322),” Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica 41 (1949), 289–307. 107

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To abstractively cognize an object, however, is more like imagining it, and abstractive cognitions do not present their objects as either existent or present. Now, according to Auriol, the exact same object that is now intuited can be imagined later on: intuitive and abstractive cognition “do not differ anyhow as regards their object.”113 On this ground, Auriol rejects a way of distinguishing between intuitive and abstractive cognition that he ascribes to Gerard of Bologna.114 On the account that Auriol finds in Gerard, an intuition is “a cognition, by means of which a thing is cognized in a totally direct way, without the mediation of a species and an exemplary image,” while abstractive cognition falls short of such directness.115 This account would have my perception of Rome terminate at the city of Rome itself but my imagination of Rome at an inner image or species. But, Auriol objects, that means that when I imagine Rome, the object of my cognition is not the same object as when I sense-perceive Rome, which goes against his claim that intuition and abstraction “do not differ anyhow as regards their object.” Thus, Auriol writes: [Imagination] does not occur via any kind of exemplar, or image, or any other object that someone who imagines beholds when cognizing. Otherwise the Rome that is imagined by the founder of Rome would not be Rome itself, but some image of it.116

On Auriol’s own account, when I imagine, say, my father, the object of that act is my father himself, even though he is present to me in intentional or apparent being only: “the father who is imagined by me is the man himself posited in intentional being, not, indeed, a species, because then the imagination would not pertain to the thing, but to a species only.”117 Thus, Auriol criticizes species-theories of the imagination and proposes his own account in terms of apparent being in order to rescue direct cognitive access to external reality even for cognitions that pertain to absent objects. Even imagination reaches out to the external world. It is not confined to an inner realm of species or images.

113

Scriptum, prooemium, sectio 2, Buytaert, 204. David Piche´, “L’intuition du non-existant selon Ge´rard de Bologne et Herve´ de Ne´dellec,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litte´raire du Moyen Aˆge 77 (2010), 97 challenges the correctness of this ascription. 115 Scriptum, prooemium, sectio 2 (Buytaert, 206). 116 Scriptum, prooemium, sectio 2 (Buytaert, 206). 117 Scriptum, d. 3, sectio 14 (Buytaert, 697–8). Note, however, that Olivi would probably not accept this conclusion without further qualification. As we have seen previously, Olivi believed that if a species is looked at precisely qua representation (and not “insofar as it is in itself an essence quite different from the absent object”), contemplating a species allows for some kind of cognitive access to reality. See note 60. 114

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Consequently, when Auriol says that the grasp of a universal concept always involves imagining an object falling under it, he does not mean that universal cognition always involves processing an image-like species. Again, his analysis of conceptual cognition is significantly different from Olivi’s.

3. CONCLUSIONS Direct realism is plausible as an account of sense-perception, but it seems more difficult to maintain at the level of conceptual thought. This makes it interesting to see how thinkers with direct-realist commitments such as Olivi and Auriol deal with such thought. Do they extend their direct-realist analyses of perception to the realm of conceptual cognition, or are inner objects of cognition needed to account for conceptual thought? In this paper we have encountered a number of similarities between Olivi and Auriol. Firstly and most obviously, both thinkers defend direct realism at the level of sense-perception. Image-like species, indeed, would veil rather than reveal external reality. Secondly, both Franciscans believe that reality is fundamentally composed of singulars. At the same time, however, they want to maintain that our conceptual or abstract conceptions are somehow grounded in external reality. Both express this by saying that individuals have certain kind-specific rationes that our intellects can attend to, and which justify our usage of general concepts. Thirdly, we have seen that the dilemma that Auriol presents for the indirect-realist theory of conceptual thought is reminiscent of (though not identical with) one of Olivi’s most important arguments against the species theory of perceptual representation. Nevertheless, there are important differences between Olivi and Auriol. As we have seen in Section 1, Olivi is prepared to make a number of concessions to indirect realism. While commentators such as Perler, Pasnau, and Panaccio are certainly right to draw attention to the directrealist themes in Olivi’s Tractatus de Verbo, this work is ultimately about theology rather than about applying direct realism to the domain of conceptual thought. As Friedman has shown, Auriol was deeply committed to using concept theory in order to come to grips with Trinitarian theology too.118 But in Auriol, this goes hand in hand with an uncompromising stance towards indirect realism. In all sorts of conceptual thought it is external things themselves that appear to us according to their kind-specific rationes. And while Auriol, like Olivi, stresses the role of the imagination 118

Friedman, Intellectual Traditions, 563–94. See also note 103.

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even in conceptual thought, he does not believe that to imagine an object is to cognitively engage with an image or representation of it. Rather, when my imagination presents some individual man to me in order to enable an intellectual grasp of human nature, that man himself is present to me in objective being, not some image or species representative of him. Indeed, Auriol would object to Olivi’s account of the imagination, which, as Toivanen has evinced, relies crucially on inner images that function as objects of cognition. What this goes to show is that Olivi’s and Auriol’s attitudes towards indirect realism differ more than scholars have recognized. The two Franciscans concur in their rejection of indirect-realist accounts of perceptual cognition. To this extent, commentators such as Prezioso, Kraml, and Marenbon are right to see Auriol and Olivi as likeminded foes of indirect realism. But the two philosophers part ways as soon as it comes to analysing the workings of the imagination or indeed conceptual thought. University of Groningen

BIBLIOGRAPHY Bettoni, Efrem. Le dottrine filosofiche di Pier di Giovanni Olivi (Milan: Vita e pensiero, 1959). Bettoni, Efrem. “Il realismo moderato di Pier di Giovanni Olivi e` autentico?” Rivista di filosofia neo-scholastica 48 (1956), 231–51. Boehner, Philotheus. “Notitia Intuitiva of Non Existents According to Peter Aurioli, O.F.M. (1322),” Rivista di filosofia neo-scolastica 41 (1949), 289–307. Brower-Toland, Susan. “Olivi on Consciousness and Self-Knowledge: The Phenomenology, Metaphysics, and Epistemology of the Mind’s Reflexivity,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 1 (2013), 136–71. Brown, Stephen. “Petrus Aurioli: De unitate conceptus entis (Reportatio Parisiensis in I Sententiarum, dist. 2, p. 1, qq. 1–3 et p. 2, qq. 1–2),” Traditio 50 (1995), 199–248. Denery, Dallas. “The Appearance of Reality: Peter Auriol and the Experience of Perceptual Error,” Franciscan Studies 55 (1998), 27–52. Duba, William. “The Souls after Vienne: Franciscan Theologians’ Views on the Plurality of Forms and the Plurality of Souls, ca. 1315–1330,” in P. Bakker (ed.), Psychology and the other Disciplines: A Case of Cross-Disciplinary Interaction (1250–1750) (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 171–272. Friedman, Russell. “Peter Auriol on Intentions and Essential Predication,” in S. Ebbesen and R. Friedman (eds.), Medieval Analyses in Language and Cognition (Copenhagen: Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, 1999), 415–30. Friedman, Russell. “Peter Auriol on Intellectual Cognition of Singulars,” Vivarium 38 (2000), 177–93.

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Friedman, Russell. Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: the Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350 (Leiden: Brill, 2013). Jansen, Bernhard. “Beitra¨ge zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der Distinctio formalis,” Zeitschrift fu¨r katholische Theologie 53 (1929), 317–44, 517–44. Koch, Josef. “Der Sentenzenkommentar des Petrus Johannis Olivi,” Recherches de the´ologie ancienne et me´die´vale 2 (1930), 290–310. Kraml, Hans. “Why did Ockham Reject Species?” in M. Pacheco and J. Meirinhos (eds.), Intellect and Imagination in Medieval Philosophy (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006). Marenbon, John. Medieval Philosophy: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2007). O’Daly, Gerard. Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (London: Duckworth, 1987). Panaccio, Claude. Le discours inte´rieur de Platon a` Guillaume d’Ockham (Paris: Seuil, 1999). Pasnau, Robert. “Petri Iohannis Olivi Tractatus de Verbo,” Franciscan Studies 53 (1993), 121–53. Pasnau, Robert. Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). Pasnau, Robert and Juhana Toivanen. “Peter John Olivi,” in E. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Enclyclopedia of Philosophy (summer 2013 edition) . Perler, Dominik. Theorien der Intentionalita¨t im Mittelalter (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2004). Peter Auriol. Scriptum super primum sententiarum, in R. Friedman, C. Schabel and L. Nielsen (eds), The Electronic Scriptum . Peter Auriol. Scriptum super primum sententiarum, ed. E. M. Buytaert (St Bonaventure: The Franciscan Institute, 1956). Peter Auriol. Commentaria in secundum, tertium, et quartum librum sententiarum (Rome, 1605). Peter John Olivi. Quaestiones in secundum librum sententiarum, ed. B. Jansen (Florence: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 1922–6). Piche´, David. “L’intuition du non-existant selon Ge´rard de Bologne et Herve´ de Ne´dellec,” Archives d’histoire doctrinale et litte´raire du Moyen Aˆge 77 (2010), 87–105. Prezioso, Faustino. La ‘species’ medievale e i prodromi del fenomenismo moderno (Milan: CEDAM, 1963). Prezioso, Faustino. “L’attivita` del soggetto pensante nella gnoseologia di Matteo d’Acquasparta e di Ruggiero Marston,” Antonianum 25 (1950), 259–326. Renemann, Michael. Gedanken als Wirkursachen: Francisco Sua´rez zur geistigen Hervorbringung (Amsterdam: B.R. Gru¨ner, 2010). Rode, Christian. “Peter of John Olivi on Representation and Self-Representation,” Quaestio 10 (2010), 155–66. Schmaus, Michael. Der Liber Propugnatorius des Thomas Anglicus und die Lehrunterscheide zwischen Thomas von Aquin und Duns Scotus. II. Teil: die trinitarischen Lehrdifferenzen (Mu¨nster: Aschendorff, 1930).

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Silva, Jose´ and Juhana Toivanen. “The Active Nature of the Soul in Sense Perception: Robert Kilwardby and Peter Olivi,” Vivarium 48 (2010), 260–77. Spruit, Leen. Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge. Volume One: Classical Roots and Medieval Discussions (Leiden: Brill, 1994). Sua´rez-Nani, Tiziana. “ ‘Apparentia’ und ‘Egressus’. Ein Versuch u¨ber den Geist als Bild des trinitarischen Gottes nach Petrus Aurioli,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 93 (1986), 39–60. Tachau, Katherine. Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham (Leiden: Brill, 1988). Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologiae, ed. P. Caramello (Rome: Marietti, 1950–53). Toivanen, Juhana. Animal Consciousness: Peter Olivi on the Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul (Jyva¨skyla¨: University of Jyva¨skyla¨, 2009). Toivanen, Juhana. Perception and the Internal Senses: Peter of John Olivi on the Cognitive Functions of the Sensitive Soul (Leiden: Brill, 2013).

Aquinas on Spiritual Change Paul Hoffman

In “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A draft),” Myles Burnyeat challenged the functionalist interpretation of Aristotle by defending Aquinas’s understanding of Aristotle’s account of sensation.1 Richard Sorabji had argued that Aristotle takes the reception of sensible forms to be a physiological event,2 and Burnyeat compared this to the way functionalists have taken states of sensory awareness to be functional states constituted by or realized in states of the body.3 So, for example, Burnyeat took Sorabji as having asserted that Aristotle takes seeing red to be constituted by the eye jelly turning red. Burnyeat argued against this that Aquinas is correct in interpreting Aristotle as holding that sense perception does not consist in a physiological change, but rather in a spiritual change that has no material or physiological process underlying it.4 1 Myles Burnyeat. “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A draft),” in M. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 15–26. 2 Richard Sorabji, “Body and Soul in Aristotle” Philosophy 49 (1974), 74. 3 Burnyeat, “Is an Aristotelian,” 16, 18–19. Sorabji indicated in replying to Burnyeat that he would deny that Aristotle is reducing perception and thought to “physiology, behavior, or function.” See his “Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle’s Theory of Sense-Perception,” in M. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty, Essays, 208. 4 Burnyeat, “Is an Aristotelian,” 15–18; see also his “Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception” in D. Perler (ed.), Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 130. It is worth noting that Hilary Putnam and Martha Nussbaum’s objection to Burnyeat that Aquinas does in fact believe that there is “some concomitant necessary material change in that organ” when I become aware of red relies on a dubious translation and interpretation. They quote Aquinas as asserting that “But Aristotle insists that . . . sensing and the related operations of the sensitive soul evidently happen together with some change of the body, as in sensing the pupil is changed by the appearance of color” (in “Changing Aristotle’s Mind” in Nussbaum and Rorty, Essays, 53). There is nothing in the Latin answering to Putnam and Nussbaum’s ‘together.’ Thus it is much more likely that Aquinas’s point is that sensing itself is a change in the body, not that it is accompanied by a change in the body. Moreover, since Aquinas asserts that the pupil is changed by the species (rendered above as ‘appearance’), Putnam and Nussbaum have to be assuming that the change caused by the species is different from sensing itself, which is

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One might have thought that in contrasting spiritual changes with physiological changes, Burnyeat was contrasting spiritual changes with physical changes.5 So one might have expected Burnyeat to oppose not only Sorabji’s interpretation of Aristotle, but also Sheldon Cohen’s interpretation of Aquinas, since Cohen has argued that Aquinas takes the immaterial reception of sensible forms to be a physical event.6 Thus it may come as a bit of shock to find Burnyeat defending Cohen’s interpretation of Aquinas in “Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception.” Burnyeat asserts that he agrees with Cohen’s claim that the spiritual or immaterial reception of a sensible form is always a physical event.7 It is my contention that Burnyeat’s agreement with Cohen is largely nominal. What Burnyeat means by the term ‘physical’ differs in significant ways from what Cohen means by it. To the extent that there is substantive agreement between them, I will argue that Cohen and Burnyeat are mistaken in their interpretation of Aquinas. A crucial piece of evidence that Burnyeat is not using the term ‘physical’ to mean the same thing that Cohen means by it is provided by the fact that they disagree about the spiritual reception of intelligible forms. Cohen commits himself to the view that the spiritual reception of intelligible forms by the soul is not a physical event, and indeed, Burnyeat quotes him as asserting that Aquinas allows that in intellection there are acts of awareness that are not physical events.8 But Burnyeat defines what it is to be physical in such a way that the spiritual reception of intelligible forms counts as a physical event. Burnyeat stipulates that ‘physical’ means whatever comes within the scope of physics and proceeds to argue that form and matter are basic principles of Aristotelian physics.9 His conclusion is that since spiritual change involves form, it falls within the realm of physics: precisely what Burnyeat denies. Finally, and most decisively, Aquinas does not in this passage assert that the change in question is a material change, leaving it open to read Aquinas, as Burnyeat does, as holding that the change in question is a spiritual change taking place in the sense organ. Thus, even if one agrees with Putnam and Nussbaum against Burnyeat that Aquinas is referring not to sensing itself but to a change in the organ that accompanies sensing, there is no justification for their reading Aquinas as asserting that the change is a material change. Putnam and Nussbaum seem to be inferring that any change that takes place in the body is a material change—a fallacy which is similar to but worse than the fallacy, discussed here subsequently, that is committed by Burnyeat and Cohen. 5 Sorabji (“Intentionality,” 220) took Burnyeat to be arguing that Aristotle thought no physical change was needed in perception. 6 Sheldon M. Cohen, “St Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms,” The Philosophical Review 92 (1983), 193–209. 7 Burnyeat, “Aquinas on Spiritual Change,” 130, 143, 147, 149. 8 Burnyeat, “Aquinas on Spiritual Change,” 143. 9 Burnyeat, “Aquinas on Spiritual Change,” 147–9.

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Thus both natural and spiritual change fall within the realm of physics, because both involve form. The contrast between them is not that spiritual change is (wholly or partly) non-physical, but that it is a change of form alone. It is a physical, but not a material change.10

Cohen, or any other scholar, surely would not deny that the spiritual reception of intelligible forms involves form, so he would not deny that the immaterial reception of intelligible forms is physical in Burnyeat’s sense of the term. Thus when Cohen denies that the spiritual reception of intelligible forms is a physical event, he must mean something substantially different from Burnyeat. By the same token, when he asserts that the spiritual reception of forms is a physical event, he must also mean something substantially different from Burnyeat. Thus their agreement is not substantive, but merely nominal. What does Cohen mean? What Cohen means by calling an event physical is that it is corporeal. Since Burnyeat has denied that he himself equates the physical with the corporeal, there is further reason to conclude that his agreement with Cohen is merely nominal.11 What is the evidence that Cohen identifies the physical with the corporeal? The following passage is decisive. At Summa theologiae 1a 84.1 ad 1, Aquinas says the intellect knows bodies, but not by means of a body, nor through material and corporeal likeness, but through immaterial and intelligible species that can exist in the soul [quae per sui essentiam in anima esse possunt].

The contrast seems to be between the intellect and the senses, which know bodies by means of a body (sense-organ), and whose species are only potentially intelligible until they are made actually intelligible by the active intellect. If so, then Aquinas is saying that sense images are physical likenesses, and implying that they cannot exist in the soul.12 In this passage first Cohen translates Aquinas using the term ‘corporeal likeness.’ Then in explaining Aquinas’s remark he says that “Aquinas is saying that sense images are physical likenesses,” and furthermore, he contrasts saying with implying. The only possible conclusion is that Cohen is treating the term ‘physical’ as a synonym for the term ‘corporeal.’ So when Cohen denies that the spiritual reception of intelligible forms is a physical event, his point is that it is not corporeal. When he asserts that the spiritual reception of sensible forms is a physical event, his point is that it is corporeal. In contrast, when Burnyeat asserts that the spiritual reception of

10 11 12

Burnyeat, “Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception,” 149. Burnyeat, personal correspondence, 6 December 2002. Cohen, “Aquinas on the Immaterial,” 199.

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forms is a physical event, a claim that applies to the spiritual reception of both sensible and intelligible forms, he is implying neither that that event is corporeal nor that it cannot exist in the soul. Burnyeat’s defense of the claim that Aquinas thinks that the spiritual reception of forms is a physical event therefore provides no support whatsoever for Cohen’s claim that Aquinas thinks that the spiritual reception of sensible forms is a physical event. Considered independently of Cohen’s claim, Burnyeat’s claim has little philosophical interest. Yes, there is a legitimate sense of the term ‘physical’ according to which even the spiritual reception of intelligible forms is physical. We can all agree that it is a legitimate use of the term ‘physical’ to stipulate as Burnyeat does that it includes anything within the scope of physics, and we can all agree that form is a basic principle of Aristotelian physics. However, in defining the physical in such an inclusive way, we can no longer use that notion to help us understand the way in which the spiritual reception of intelligible forms differs from the spiritual reception of sensible forms. Cohen’s assertion that the spiritual reception of sensible forms is a physical event is much more interesting because he does not define the physical in such an all-inclusive way. What Cohen means is that the spiritual reception of sensible forms is a wholly corporeal event. This assertion has real teeth, especially since he holds that Aquinas thinks the spiritual reception of intelligible forms is not a physical event, by which he means that it is not a corporeal event. There is one important point of convergence between the views of Cohen and Burnyeat, reflected in the following passage: But Aquinas himself, as we have seen, happily insists that seeing red is (i) a purely spiritual change, nothing more, and (ii) a bodily change to the eye where the form of red is received without matter. And I take it that all parties—ancient, medieval, and modern—would agree that ‘bodily’ implies ‘physical.’13

Burnyeat is here agreeing with Cohen that is it a sufficient condition for an event to be physical that it be a “bodily change.” But the phrase ‘bodily change’ is ambiguous, and this ambiguity leads to a fallacy committed by both Burnyeat and Cohen. The phrase ‘bodily change’ can mean corporeal change, but it can also mean change in or of the body. Cohen fails to note this ambiguity and mistranslates Aquinas’s phrase “cum aliqua corporis immutatione” as “with some physical change” when it should be “with some change of the body.”14

13 14

Burnyeat, “Aquinas on Spiritual Change,” 147. Cohen, “Aquinas on the Immaterial,” 198.

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Now Burnyeat and Cohen are probably right that all changes in or of the body are physical events.15 We can also agree to a further claim that does not follow on Burnyeat’s use of the term ‘physical,’ that all changes in or of the body are corporeal events. But the fallacy is this. It does not follow, as Cohen mistakenly infers and Burnyeat endorses, at least nominally, that those changes are wholly physical. There is certainly conceptual space for the possibility that there are events taking place in the body which are physical to that extent, but which nevertheless are not wholly physical. In other words, there is conceptual space for the possibility that there are events taking place in the body that are corporeal because they take place in the body, but which are not wholly corporeal because there are further conditions on what is required for an event to be wholly corporeal. As I have argued at length elsewhere against Cohen, this is precisely the position adopted by Aquinas.16 Aquinas thinks that a wholly corporeal event requires that the change be natural and not spiritual. Thus he thinks that the sensible reception of sensible forms occupies a halfway state between the immaterial and material, between the corporeal and incorporeal. It is partly material and corporeal because it takes place in the body, but it is partly immaterial and incorporeal because it is not a natural change but rather a spiritual change.17 University of California, Riverside

BIBLIOGRAPHY Burnyeat, Myles. “Is an Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind Still Credible? (A draft),” in M. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 15–26. Burnyeat, Myles. “Aquinas on ‘Spiritual Change’ in Perception,” in D. Perler (ed), Ancient and Medieval Theories of Intentionality (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 129–53. Cohen, Sheldon M. “St Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms,” The Philosophical Review 92 (1983), 193–209. Hoffman, Paul. “St Thomas Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being,” The Philosophical Review 99 (1990), 73–92. 15 On Burnyeat’s understanding of the term ‘physical,’ this amounts to asserting that all changes in or of the body come within the scope of physics. I am inclined to think that this is an empirical claim and that it is true. 16 Paul Hoffman, “St Thomas Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being,” Philosophical Review 99 (1990), 73–92. 17 Paul Hoffman died in 2010. We give thanks to his family for permission to publish this essay posthumously, and to John Carriero, Scott MacDonald, and Andrews Reath, for their assistance.

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Nussbaum, Martha, and Hilary Putnam. “Changing Aristotle’s Mind,” in M. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 27–56. Sorabji, Richard. “Body and Soul in Aristotle,” Philosophy 49 (1974), 63–89. Sorabji, Richard. “Intentionality and Physiological Processes: Aristotle’s Theory of Sense-Perception,” in M. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty (eds.), Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), 195–225.

Pseudo-Joscelin Treatise on Genera and Species Peter King

The Tractatus de generibus et speciebus (Treatise on Genera and Species) [GS] is an anonymous philosophical treatise written in Paris in the first decades of the twelfth century. It presents a wholly original analysis of metaphysical problems, solving them in terms of parts and wholes—that is, mereologically. GS is arguably the first sustained treatment of mereological metaphysics ever written, and its philosophical sophistication is on a par with the contemporary work of Peter Abelard; indeed, in large measure GS seems to have been written in response to Abelard’s views. Historically, it gives us an unprecedented insight into the philosophical debates of the early twelfth century. Philosophically, we can appreciate how advanced and precise the debates were, displaying a high degree of intellectual creativity. GS survives in two manuscripts from the latter part of the twelfth century, the sole known witnesses to the text:1 1 The description of O by Charles Cuissard (Catalogue ge´ne´rale des manuscrits des bibliothe`ques en France. De´partements, 2nd series, vol. XII (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1889)) should be supplemented with the more detailed description given by Lorenzo MinioPaluello (Twelfth-Century Logic: Texts and Studies, Vol. II, Abaelardiana inedita (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1958)). The description of P by Le´opold Delisle (“Inventaire des manuscrits latins de St-Germain-des-Pre`s conserve´s a` la Bibliothe`que Impe´riale sous les nos. 11504–14231,” Bibliothe`que de l’E´cole des Chartes 29 (1868), 220–60) should be supplemented with the remarks given by Bernhard Geyer (Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 21: 4 (Mu¨nster: Aschendorff, 1933)), and by Mario Dal Pra (Pietro Abelardo: scritti di logica (Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 19692)). There is a close relationship between O and P; it is possible that P was copied from O. In general, O has more marginal corrections than P, and O has superior readings. That O does not depend on P is attested by the homoioteleuta found in P in §37, §59, §70, §87, §174, §175, §177, §178, and §206, all of which are absent from O. That P may depend on O is suggested by a common dittograph found in §149 and a dittograph in P but not in O in §99. However, there is no evidence to rule out the possibility that O and P are each indebted to an unknown faulty exemplar, and there seems to be a common homoioteleuton in §82. In each manuscript the text of GS begins a new folio page, in P with a change of hand as well.

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Orle´ans, Bibliothe`que Municipale lat. 266 (olim 222), 153a1–166a29 Paris, Bibliothe`que Nationale lat. 13368, 168ra1–179va21

In the nineteenth century, Victor Cousin published an inaccurate transcription, based solely on P, under the title Fragmentum Sangermanense de generibus et speciebus.2 He also attributed the work to Abelard, presumably on the basis of its appearance in a manuscript with other material that was also attributed to Abelard.3 Despite its manifest errors and shortcomings, this has been the only readily available version of GS;4 hence I present here a full critical edition of GS with accompanying translation. For the sake of convenience I call its anonymous author ‘Pseudo-Joscelin’—a name suggested by a remark made by John of Salisbury in his inventory of theories about genera and species given in the Metalogicon 2.17 (83.91–93 my emphasis): There is another person who, along with Joscelin the Bishop of Soissons, attributes universality to things collected into one, and denies it of single things.

The view that universals are collections (“Collective Realism”) is defended in GS §§86–146. Yet “Master Joscelin” is cited in §159, so he cannot be the author; hence the author is likely to be the otherwise unknown student or associate mentioned by John of Salisbury.5 Whoever he may have been, Pseudo-Joscelin was a philosopher of uncommon talent and ability. 2 Victor Cousin, Ouvrage inedits d’Abe´lard (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1836), 507– 50. Cousin’s transcription is marred by several systematic misreadings and errors. For instance, in §§149–156 Cousin mistakenly reads the manuscript transliteration ‘ule’ (for the Greek yž lh) as an abbreviation for uniuersale. The text is untitled in O and P; the first part of Cousin’s title, Fragmentum Sangermanense (“Fragment from a St-Germain Manuscript”) applies only to P, and I have therefore dropped it. The largest section of GS deals with genera and species, and the treatise as a whole is commonly referred to this way—metonymically, which seems appropriate. 3 There is no manuscript attribution in either O or P. Carl Prantl disagreed with Cousin on the grounds that the position taken by GS on universals was rejected by Abelard, and was furthermore ascribed to Joscelin (Goslenus) of Vierzy—otherwise known as Joscelin of Bourges, who was Bishop of Soissons 1126–1152 and a philosopher of some repute, according to Abelard in his Theologia christiana 4.79—by John of Salisbury; Prantl therefore attributed GS to Joscelin (Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande Bd. 2 (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1861), 142–4). But O makes this impossible, since it explicitly names “Master Joscelin.” The life of Joscelin is detailed in L. Jacquemin, “Annales de la vie de Joscelin de Vierzi, e´veˆque de Soissons (1126–1152)” in Quatrie`mes me´langes d’histoire du Moyen Age 20 (1905), 1–161. 4 I provided a rough edition from both O and P in my unpublished dissertation (Peter Abailard and the Problem of Universals (Princeton University, 1982)) on pp. 143*–85*, and an even rougher translation on pp. 186*–212*. 5 There is arguably another reference to Joscelin in §14, which has ‘m. G.’ (probably Magister Goslenus but just possibly Magister Guillelmus in keeping with the reference in §5). In O, the text of GS appears among many others from the milieu surrounding Joscelin, such as the Notulae de Divisionibus secundum Magistrum Goslenum (spelt fully) on 149a–151b. Properly, ‘Pseudo-Joscelin’ should apply only to an anonymous author

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The Tractatus de generibus et speciebus has six parts:6 [1] an initial discussion about whether a house should be classified as a discrete or a continuous whole, §§1–20; [2] a section entitled in O and P “The Destruction of Socrates” in which analogous difficulties about the sense in which Socrates is an integral whole are explored, §§21–31; [3] a lengthy and carefully structured treatment of the problem of universals, signaled in each manuscript by capitals but no separate title, §§32–147; [4] an investigation of how things can be composed of elements as well as of matter and form, §§148–157; [5] a section entitled in O “On Substantial Differentiae” (a small break is present in P) that explores the traditional question about what category substantial differentiae belong to, §§158–182; [6] a concluding discussion of whether matter counts as the most general genus in the category of Substance, §§183–208. There is no question that [3]–[6] belong together.7 Matters are less clear for grouping the initial sections [1] and [2] with the later sections.8 The

whose work was mistakenly attributed to Joscelin, but since the referent is entirely indeterminate it is harmless to use ‘Pseudo-Joscelin’—and overly cautious to insist on ‘Anonymous,’ as Andrew Arlig has recently done (“Some Twelfth-Century Reflections on Mereological Essentialism,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 1 (2013), 83–112). The attribution to a student or associate of Joscelin was first proposed more than a century ago by Josef Reiners (Der aristotelische Realismus in der Fru¨hscholastik (Bonn: J. Trapp, 1907)). 6 The division into six parts, while suggested by the manuscript divisions as noted, is mine. 7 The discussion of the problem of universals in [3] is tightly organized: three theories about genera and species are presented in [3.1]–[3.3], with arguments and supporting evidence, and then rejected by a series of objections; Pseudo-Joscelin then presents his own theory and defends it at length in [3.4]. The next section, [4], begins in §148 by referring to an objection lodged against the other theories of universals—stated in §47, §70, and §§85–87—and asking how it can be answered on his own theory as described in [3]. Likewise, [5] begins in §158 by taking up a problem not settled in the preceding discussion, with explicit mention of that discussion. Finally, [6] begins in §183 with the claim that his account to date still leaves “a great deal of work” to avoid what appear to be unwelcome consequences. Throughout [3]–[6] there are numerous cross-references that span different sections, as for example §89 in [3] refers to [4]; §122 in [3] refers inter alia to §§152–153 in [4]; §193 in [6] refers to §162 in [5]. 8 The transition between [1] and [2] is marked by an interlineal title, whereas [3] has no separate title but has the preceding line blank to the margin, followed by some extra space, then an initial majescule and capitals DE GENERIBUS. They further lack obvious cross-references to the rest of the treatise, and the abrupt transition to [3] has caused some to wonder whether they are part of the same work: see Andrew Arlig, “Some Twelfth-Century Reflections,” and also his “Early Medieval Solutions to Some Mereological Puzzles: The Content and Unity of De generibus et speciebus” (in I. Rosier-Catach (ed.), Arts du langage et the´ologie aux confins des XIe–XIIe sie`cles (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols, 2011), 485–508), where he raises the deeper challenge that at least [1]–[2] might not stem from a general concern with mereology.

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manuscript evidence supports taking [1]–[6] as a unity, but does not require it.9 The best reasons for seeing the initial sections as part of a unified larger whole, and indeed for thinking that the treatise has its source in systematic reflections on the nature of wholes, are internal, as will be made clear as we consider each part in turn.

1 . I N T E G R A L W H O L E S (§ § 1 – 20 ) GS opens abruptly with the distinction between discrete and continuous wholes, familiar from Aristotle, Categories 6 4b20–25, and then turns to problems that result from classifying a house as either continuous (§§3–16) or discrete (§§17–20). Some background will provide the missing context.10 Abelard begins his discussion of the relation between substances and their material parts in his Dialectica by asking which parts of a whole should be considered primary and which secondary. (Abelard and most philosophers of the twelfth century were not pure mereologists, since they thought there were privileged divisions of objects; a sentence, for example, is divided first into words, then each word into syllables, and finally each syllable into letters.) Abelard considers two schools of thought, known as “maximalists” and “destructivists”: the former holds that parts are principal if they are parts of a given whole but not parts of parts (that is, subparts) of that whole; the latter that parts are principal if their destruction causes the destruction of the whole of which they are parts. Abelard makes short work of the maximalists by pointing out that a whole can be divided in such a way to render any part either principal or secondary. Destructivism, though, is a more plausible position. Abelard begins by considering the case of a purely material artifact—namely, a house—and whether the removal of a pebble would destroy the house (550.12–17): Thus when this house exists, so does this pebble and all its other parts together. But if this house is the collection of them all together, surely this pebble must 9 The fact that [1] and [2] are grouped together with [3]–[6] in both manuscripts O and P, as well as starting new folio pages in each (see note 1), should not be underestimated. But it should not be overestimated either; it may be mere happenstance—the result of how the source material for O and P was originally compiled, and blindly copied by later scribes. 10 See also Desmond Paul Henry, That Most Subtle Question (Manchester University Press, 1984), 243–56; Peter King, “Metaphysics,” in J. Brower and K. Guilfoy (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Abelard (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 64–125; and Andrew Arlig, “Abelard’s Assault on Everyday Objects” in The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2007): 209–27 as well as his “Peter Abelard on Material Constitution” in Archiv fu¨r Geschichte der Philosophie 94 (2012), 119–46.

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then exist as well. If this pebble does not exist, the collection of them all does not exist, that is, of this pebble and the others together. Thus if this house exists, so too does this pebble. Accordingly, if this pebble does not exist, this house does not exist.

This is also Pseudo-Joscelin’s starting point in §4, with the selfsame argument presented by Abelard in applying the destructivist criterion. Pseudo-Joscelin mentions the opinion of Master William (of Champeaux?) that parts, but not necessarily subparts, follow upon the whole; he rejects that view and instead draws a distinction between parts that are essentially principal and those that are quantitatively principal, such that all and only the former follow upon the whole.11 While Pseudo-Joscelin expands on the distinction to try to resolve the difficulties, Abelard at this point distinguishes the case of artifacts from that of natural substances; the former consist solely in the arrangement of their material parts, according to Abelard, and so technically do not persist through change (Dialectica 550.18–28). But Abelard is less comfortable denying diachronic identity to natural substances, such as Socrates, where a more robust criterion of identity seems to be available (namely, the persistence of his soul). After he runs through the parallel sorites argument for the case of Socrates and Socrates-minus-his-fingernail, he declares that the parallel result—that Socrates consists solely in his material parts—is unacceptable (552.15– 21), having the absurd consequence that anyone who trims his fingernail “seems to have committed murder” (555.34–35).

11 This distinction, not present in Abelard’s writings, is found in the Introductiones Montani maiores (found in Paris, Bibliothe`que Nationale lat. 15141 47ra–104rb) on ff. 71va–72va: “The rule for the topic from an integral part is: When a part is destroyed, the whole is destroyed. If we were to hold this in general, for any given part, it is false. A man is not destroyed when his hand is destroyed. Accordingly, the rule should be understood regarding primary parts, whether the parts are essentially primary (as are some of the smallest parts that, when destroyed, result in the destruction of the whole, e.g. heart, brain) or quantitatively principal (e.g. wall, roof, and so on).” The same examples of essentially principal parts are given in GS §8. The Latin text has not been published: “Restat locus a parte integrali. Et datur regula: Destructa parte destruitur totum. Si sic dicamus generaliter de qualibet parte, falsum est, quia destructa manu non destruitur homo. Unde de principalibus est intelligendum, siue sint principales partes secundum essentiam, sicuti quaedam sunt partes minutissimae quae destructae destruitur totum, ut cor, cerebrum, etc.; siue sint principales secundum quantitatem, sicuti paries, tectum, etc.” The Introductiones Montani maiores then cites the views of Abelard (Magister P.) and Alberic of Paris (Magister Al.) in the analysis following this passage; Abelard is said to have held that the designation of a part as principal is merely verbal (non est relatio ad rem sed ad nomen tantum). The terminology is absent in the corresponding passage in the Introductiones Montani minores (see L. M. De Rijk, Logica modernorum II.2 57.21–58.3).

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2. T H E D E ST R UC T I O N O F SO C R A T E S ( § § 21 –3 1 ) Pseudo-Joscelin takes a different tack, arguably one inspired by his dissatisfaction with Abelard. Rather than treating artifacts and natural substances (or perhaps only human beings?) as separate cases, he instead abruptly shifts to analyzing the problem on the basis of the atomism he shares with Abelard about matter—roughly, the view that matter consists in atoms (indivisible units of stuff) which are adjoined by points (indivisible units of quantity), geometrically arranged into three-dimensional solids formed by the addition of points.12 After restating the puzzle about the relation between Socrates and Socrates-minus-his-fingernail in atomist terms (§§21–22)—the very same example used by Abelard—Pseudo-Joscelin offers two solutions. The first (§§23–26) maintains that the key question is whether a given assemblage of atoms constitutes a nature, specifically the “great nature” that is Socrates; he proposes that no sub-Socratic collection of atoms constitutes Socrates, though admittedly Socrates exists out of fewer parts when his fingernail has been trimmed than he did previously.13 He considers and replies to two objections (§§27–29), the first clarifying the sense in which a “new” object comes to be when Socrates trims his fingernail, the second having to do with the unity of an assemblage of atoms. The latter is the basis of his second solution (§30), in which he rejects the claim that any mere assemblage of atoms counts as something. After a brief and desultory discussion of two objections (§§30–31), PseudoJoscelin drops this line of thought, presumably on the grounds that the first solution is preferable, not least because it is well integrated with the underlying metaphysical framework of natures. 12 Categories 6 5a2–14 was understood as presenting the view that all threedimensional solids are composed of point, line, and surface—a thesis Boethius endorses explicitly in his Commentary on the “Categories” 204D–205B. The thesis that points “adjoin” bodies (they do not inhere in them) was seen as implicit in this discussion. Note that the two-pointed line discussed in §21 and thereafter was introduced in §5 of [1.1]. 13 This solution is similar to the proposal by David Lewis in his “Many but Almost One” (Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 166), who declares that plucking a hair from Tibbles the cat will turn Tibblesminus-the-hair “from a mere proper part of the cat Tibbles into the whole of a cat.” Nor do Tibbles and Tibbles-minus-the-hair “ever become identical simpliciter,” because their pasts differ, although Tibbles-minus-the-hair “becomes the whole of cat Tibbles” in the sense that its “post-plucking temporal part is identical with Tibbles’s post-plucking temporal part. So far, so good; except for those like Geach, who reject the idea of temporal parts.” (And, we might add, for those like Abelard, who rejects temporal parts as part of his presentism—the very next topic he turns to in his Dialectica!) Change Tibbles to Socrates and a hair to a fingernail, and the result is a fair summary of PseudoJoscelin’s solution to the problem in [2.2].

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In essence, Pseudo-Joscelin is proposing that we identify Socrates by way of his nature, which is constructed materially but is not merely a material assemblage. To make this proposal work, he needs to have an account of natures that does not reduce to some mere material assemblage of parts. This, in fact, is what the next several sections of GS provide—a strong reason for linking them to the earlier part of the treatise. In [3] PseudoJoscelin gives his account of the natures of things; he then turns in [4] to an investigation of how things can be composed of elements as well as of matter and form. Although the transition from [2] to [3] is abrupt, the discussion in [3]–[4] is a logical extension of the solution defended in [2].14

3. T H E P R O BL E M O F UN I V E R S A LS ( § § 32 – 14 7) Pseudo-Joscelin identifies three theories about the nature of genera and species (§§32–85), each well known in the early decades of the twelfth century: [3.1] Material Essence Realism, associated with William of Champeaux’s early view; [3.2] Indifference Realism, associated with William of Champeaux’s later view, also held by others such as Walter of Mortagne; and [3.3] the crude nominalism (or “vocalism”) associated with Roscelin of Compie`gne.15 After the presentation and critique of each position, PseudoJoscelin then puts forward his own view in [3.4], a version of Collective Realism. Material Essence Realism,16 described in §33 and subject to some eight objections in §§34–49, is clearly the same philosophical position described by Abelard in his Logica ‘ingredientibus’ [LI] I 10.17–11.9 (criticized in 11.10–13.17),17 Logica ‘nostrorum petitioni sociorum’ [LNPS] 515.14–31 14 Likewise, Pseudo-Joscelin regularly returns to the atomism described in [2]. There is a reference to the problem of diachronic identity through change in §116, and an extensive treatment of atomism and the elements beginning in §§149–156. 15 For general background about the problem of universals in the Middle Ages, see Claude Panaccio, “Universals” in J. Marenbon (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2012): 385–402. More specific studies that describe how the problem of universals was formulated in the twelfth century are given in Martin Tweedale, Abailard on Universals (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976) and in Peter King, “Metaphysics,” in J. Brower and K. Guilfoy (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Abelard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 66–72. 16 The name derives from Abelard’s discussion and was coined by Tweedale (Abailard on Universals 96). It should be pointed out that in the twelfth century the term ‘essentia’ often had the meaning of ‘(concrete) thing’—though in technical contexts it was also used for ‘essence.’ 17 Abelard’s discussion in LI has been translated by Paul Spade, Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company 1994), 26–56.

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(criticized in 515.42–518.8), and Historia calamitatum 65.80–66.100. In the last of these the view, and its subsequent repudiation, are attributed explicitly to William of Champeaux. Material Essence Realism is also described by Walter of Mortagne in his Tractatus de generali et speciali statu rerum uniuersalium [TGSS] §§3–8 (criticized in §§9–28). It is the theory above all others that would be recognized as a form of realism today, since it maintains that literally one and the same thing (res)—the “material essence”—is present in distinct individuals, or, more exactly, in anything lower than the essence: the generic essence is one in the species, the specific essence is one in its individuals; individuals are differentiated from one another by forms that are accidental to the material essence (though perhaps essential to that which they constitute), and species by their formal differentiae. Abelard famously charged this view with incoherence, arguing that from its premises it could be demonstrated that contradictory properties would be present in the same subject at the same time (LI I 11.25–12.14 and LNPS 517.23–41). Pseudo-Joscelin offers a version of Abelard’s objection in GS §39,18 further discussed in §§40–43, and revisited in §49 when he concludes his discussion of Material Essence Realism. Like Abelard, Pseudo-Joscelin offers the defender of Material Essence Realism the proposal that the simultaneous inherence of contradictories is not problematic at the level of the genus or species (§41); unlike Abelard, his refutation of this proposal is confined to the level of genus or species, showing that it is unworkable as it stands, whereas Abelard’s refutation tries to demonstrate that contradictories will also be present in the individual. Abelard summarizes his encounter with William of Champeaux as follows (Historia calamitatum 65.80–91): I then returned to [William of Champeaux] in order to attend his lectures on rhetoric; among the other enterprises of our disputations, I compelled him by the clearest reasons in the arguments to alter, or rather to destroy, his old theory of universals. What is more, in his theory about the commonness of universals he asserted that essentially the same thing as a whole is present at once in each of its individuals, of which, to be sure, there would be no diversity in essence, but only variety by means of the multiplicity of accidents. He thereafter corrected his own theory such that he said that things were the same not essentially, but indifferently . . .

Abelard claims to have been responsible for William’s shift to what we may call ‘Indifference Realism,’ in which the individual is somehow “common to many” in virtue of being indifferently the same as others of the same kind: Socrates is an entirely distinct thing (res) from Plato, but is nevertheless 18

Walter of Mortagne also presents Abelard’s objection in TGSS §23.

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indifferently the same as him qua human being. Abelard presents and criticizes the view in LI I 13.18–16.18 and LNPS 518.9–521.20; PseudoJoscelin presents it in §50 and criticizes it in §§51–73, arguing that it is contrary to authority (§§52–62) and to reason (§§63–72).19 Here too Pseudo-Joscelin gives some of the same objections as Abelard, most notably in the way each pursues the unhelpfulness of appealing to a ‘qua’-clause in spelling out how one particular is supposed to be (indifferently) the same as another. Both push the defender of an Indifference Theory to spell out its metaphysical basis. If the defenders claim that distinct individuals somehow have the same status—a status which is somehow a real feature of the world—have they not simply relapsed into a version of Material Essence Realism, already discredited?20 If not, then how are things meant to be the same in reality if they are really distinct and only called the same? The latter strategy—holding that things in the world are merely called the same—seems to be the motivation for the next position Pseudo-Joscelin takes up, a crude form of nominalism in which a bare utterance (uox) is identified as the universal (§74), a view that takes no more than a few objections to lay it to rest (§§75–85). The genus is said to be the matter of the species, for instance, but the utterance animal is not literally the matter for the utterance weasel (§81). Nor do utterances strictly speaking exist, since they are temporally extended and their parts never coexist (§80). These brief remarks are of a piece with Abelard’s criticisms of Roscelin. Yet we cannot be sure that Roscelin is the intended target; there may have been others holding nominalist theories, such as Garland/Lambert;21 furthermore, it is possible that this crude theory is merely a caricature by

19 A version of Indifference Realism is presented and defended by Walter of Mortagne, TGSS §§30–55. A very similar view is presented in the as yet unpublished Ars Meliduna. John of Salisbury mentions several types of Indifference Theory in Metalogicon 2.17, where the particular version found in Walter and the Ars Meliduna is described in his Policraticus 7.12.2. 20 The considerable overlap in formulating the position and objections to it in the case of both Material Essence Realism and Indifference Theories suggests that PseudoJoscelin is not only aware of Abelard’s discussion but is following it closely, the way he was tracking Abelard’s discussion of substances and their material parts in [1]–[2]. (If Abelard was indeed responsible for William’s altering his views, he is clearly the leader and Pseudo-Joscelin the follower, not conversely.) Pseudo-Joscelin does not consider Abelard’s discussion and rejection of Collective Realism here, reserving it for discussion later. 21 See the Dialectica—not to be confused with Abelard’s Dialectica—edited by L. M. De Rijk (Garlandus Compotista: Dialectica, Assen: Van Gorcum 1959), which is ascribed in one manuscript to Garland and in the other to Lambert. Whoever the author of this work may have been, he seems to have belonged to the nominalist circle in north-western France described in an entry for 1087 in the Historia francica: “In dialectic too there were

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unfriendly critics. Yet it is worth noting that Abelard himself endorses the view that utterances are universals in LI 16.19–22: “Having shown the reasons why things cannot be called universals in that they are predicated of many neither individually nor collectively, it remains that universality of this sort be ascribed to utterances (uoces) alone.” It is possible that PseudoJoscelin thought his attack applied to Abelard, perhaps even especially so. An additional reason for thinking so is that Abelard alters and refines his terminology in LNPS, declaring that utterances are not universals but that words (sermones), by contrast, are: 522.10–13. The distinction and terminology are absent from Pseudo-Joscelin, which is some reason to think that GS was written prior to LNPS.22 Pseudo-Joscelin then turns to an exposition (§§86–90) and lengthy defense (§§91–148) of the view he endorses; namely, Collective Realism—roughly, the view that a universal is some sort of collection of real objects.23 Individuals are composed of matter and form, each of which is itself individual and entirely different from one particular to the next. Indeed, according to Pseudo-Joscelin, an individual is the individual it is in virtue of an individualizing form: Socrates is what he is in virtue of

these powerful sophists: John, who maintained the same sophistical art [ ¼ dialectic] to be vocal; Robert of Paris, Roscelin of Compie`gne, Arnulf of Laon—these were John’s adherents (sectatores), who also had very many students” (translated from Franc¸ois Picavet, Roscelin (Paris: Alcan, 1911), 112). 22 Not that we know the date for LNPS! There are two reasonably plausible candidates: c.1123, when Abelard entered the monastery of St Denis, or the later 1130s, perhaps after his retreat to join Peter the Venerable, near the end of his life. In any event, since LNPS refers explicitly to LI, it is later than at least some versions of that work. 23 There are two authoritative sources for Collective Realism. In discussing the nature of species, Porphyry writes in his Isagoge: “The individual is contained under the species and the species under the genus; indeed, the genus is a given whole, the individual a part, the species both whole and part—but it is part of something else, whereas it is a whole not of something else but for others, since it is a whole by means of its parts” (Ar. lat. I.6– 7 14.7–11). Genera and species are wholes with respect to their contents: individuals are parts of species, species are parts of genera. The same impression is reinforced elsewhere in the Isagoge: “The species is collective of many objects into one nature, and the more so the genus” (Ar. lat. I.6–7 12.15–17). Porphyry is not articulating a theory, but his remarks are suggestive and capable of further elaboration. The same is true for Boethius, who, on the assumption that genera and species exist, put forward a dilemma whose horns are that a genus or a species is either single (unum) or a plurality (multiplex) of some sort (Greater Commentary on the “Isagoge” 1.10). The latter alternative, which Boethius rejects on the grounds of a third-man regress argument, might be taken to propose a version of Collective Realism; Abelard explicitly took it that way (LI I 31.23– 31 and LNPS 529.12–21). For further discussion of Boethius’s argument, see Peter King, “Boethius’s Anti-Realist Arguments” (Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 40 (2011), 381–401).

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Socrateity, a sui generis individual form.24 The species is the collection not of individualizing forms but of the individualized specific forms that make each individual to be the kind of thing it is, so that to construct the species human being we collect all the individualized forms of humanity from each human being: Socrates’s individual humanity, Plato’s distinct individual humanity, Aristotle’s yet further distinct humanity, and so on; likewise for higher-level genera. Pseudo-Joscelin is clear that these individualized forms taken together amount to a collective whole which is the species, a fact that allows him to distinguish extensionally equivalent collections.25 The position here is close to the one described by a work written by the later followers of Gilbert de la Porre´e, reported in the Compendium logicae 3.29 (50.41–52): Therefore, some forms are the cause of similarity, e.g. whiteness; other forms are the cause of dissimilarity, e.g. Plato’s proper quality . . . Accordingly, all whitenesses, since they have a similar effect in a subject, are called one universal—as if uniting the ‘universe’ [of all subjects] that participate in whitenesses. In the same way, all humanities are called one universal. For just as men are collected together into one people because they live under one law, and soldiers fighting under one commander one army, so too singular [forms] collected together are one universal by reason of the similarity of their effects.

Collective Realism in something like the form presented by PseudoJoscelin is also attested in the Ars Meliduna (219ra40–42):26 24 The notion of a unique individualizing form such as Socrateity seems to have been introduced by Boethius in his Greater Commentary on Aristotle’s “De interpretatione” 2.07 (Meiser 137.3–16). For further discussion, and for background on the problem of individuation in the Middle Ages generally, see Jorge Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1984); Peter King, “The Problem of Individuation in the Middle Ages,” Theoria 66 (2000), 159–84. 25 Abelard discusses a version of Collective Realism in LI I 14.18–15.22, but he is clear that the collection that counts as the universal is made up of the things that have the forms, not of the forms themselves. This too may be some reason to think that GS was designed to meet Abelard’s criticisms of an earlier version of Collective Realism— perhaps the one put forward by Joscelin of Soissons, since John of Salisbury ascribes to Joscelin the view that individuals (not individual forms) make up the universal (Metalogicon 2.17), although this could be mere carelessness or a lack of sympathy on his part. The Compendium logicae and Ars Meliduna recognize Pseudo-Joscelin’s point: see the citations immediately following in the main text. 26 The unpublished text: “Aliorum opinio est omne universale esse plura, ut illa singularia praeter quae nulla sub eo continentur; uerbi gratia hanc speciem ‘homo’ dicunt esse illas humanitates quae solae sunt, quarum hanc uocant Socratitatem illam vero Platonitatem, hoc genus ‘animal’ omnes animalitates, hoc accidens ‘album’ omnes albedines.” This account identifies Socrateity, rather than Socrates’s individualized humanity, as the item that is part of the collection constituting the species, however.

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Other philosophers have the view that every universal is many, such that those singulars beyond which there are no further singulars are contained under it. For example, they say that the species human being is those humanities that alone exist, of which they call this one ‘Socrateity’ and that one ‘Platonity’; the genus animal all the animalities; and the accident white all the whitenesses.

Pseudo-Joscelin develops his full account of Collective Realism in his defense of it against some thirteen objections in §§92–134. He begins with the obvious objection, mentioned also by Abelard (LI I 14.35–40), that the collective whole that is the species is not present as a whole in any individual (§92). But this is to beg the question. PseudoJoscelin is well aware that his project amounts to replacing the traditional universal–particular relation with the whole–part relation. He explicitly rejects Boethius’s criteria for the universal (§§136–138). Instead, he maintains, the species is “present” in the individual through the individualized specific form included in the collection. Pseudo-Joscelin offers a striking analogy. Humanity inheres in Socrates because one part of it is informed with Socrateity, the same way I am said to touch a wall—it is not that each of my parts is in contact with the wall (perhaps I only touch it with the tip of my finger), but in virtue of this contact I as a whole am said to be touching it (§96). According to Pseudo-Joscelin, it is Socrates’s individual humanity that is included in the collection that makes up the species human being. The ultimate explanation for why members of a species belong to the same species, however, is that they are “not of dissimilar creation” (§116), or more exactly, a nature (such as a species) consists in “whatever is of dissimilar creation from all those that are not either it or belonging to it” (§126).27 Roughly, the species is the collection of all the individual forms that produce things with similar origins—literally, things that come to be in ways that are not too dissimilar from one another. This notion has its natural home in the conception of a natural kind common in biology rather than metaphysics, where members of a species were once identified as those who share a common origin. (Nowadays the biological criterion for membership in the same species is cashed out as “functional interbreeding.”) Pseudo-Joscelin extends this biological idea of a common origin as the criterion of membership to metaphysical kinds generally. A key element of his characterization is that the species consists in all such forms, which is how he sidesteps the problem of subcollections (§126).28 Just as with 27 The negative formulation is to prevent a regress-argument on ‘sameness of causal origin.’ 28 Several versions of the problem of subcollections are raised by Abelard, LI I 15.1– 15. Given that Pseudo-Joscelin seems to have Abelard’s objections in mind, but that

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Socrates in [2], he insists that the complete collection of actual individual forms is what makes up a nature—which is why the nature does not change even when the members of the collection come into existence or pass away (§124). Although couched in the language of metaphysics, Pseudo-Joscelin’s conception of natural kinds locates the objects of study in collections of actual individuals out in the world, rather than in essences contemplated from the safe haven of the metaphysician’s armchair. The subversive core of his conception is that we look to individuals to ground claims about the natures of things. Natures are in some sense posterior to individuals according to Pseudo-Joscelin, for the nature depends on what individuals are collectively like. Collective Realism is a kind of realism because it takes objective truths about the world to explain why things belong to their kinds, but it need not, and in Pseudo-Joscelin’s hands does not, require any commitment to shared entities.

4 . T H E EL E M E N T S (§ § 14 8 –1 5 7) After presenting and defending Collective Realism, Pseudo-Joscelin turns to an objection he lodged against the other theories of universals in §47, §70, and §§85–87: namely, how it can be that a hylomorphic composite, made up of matter and form, can also be an integral whole made up of the elements.29 He offers a dual construction of an object such as Socrates (§156): beginning with atoms (here called essentiolae ¼ “little essences”) that are informed solely by their susceptibility to contraries, each of the individual forms that eventually constitutes Socrates advenes on and affects these atoms in logical steps. Some of the atoms are informed by corporeality, and so become bodies; of these, some are informed by animateness, and so become alive; and so on, until at the end the form Socrateity informs the whole essence of humanity to produce Socrates. This hylomorphic composition is mirrored by the differentiation of substance-atoms into types of bodies at the first stage: when corporeality advenes, some atoms are affected by heat and become fire, others by lightness and become air, and so on; at each subsequent stage the elements persist but are mixed together in the appropriate way. Hence “it is no more impossible that Socrates consists in Abelard criticizes a less sophisticated version of Collective Realism, it is plausible to think that GS was written after the debates represented in LI I. 29 Abelard too is an atomist about matter and holds that many objects in the world are hylomorphic compounds; he offers a similar but less detailed account of the genesis of objects in his Hexameron 9.7–17.9 (see also Dialectica 419.5–27).

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the four elements than that he consists in hands and feet.” Although Pseudo-Joscelin claims that these issues have not been “plausibly resolved by any of our Masters up till now” (§149), his hylomorphic atomism was not uncommon among the scholars associated with Chartres. But the accounts put forward by philosophers like William of Conches were physical in nature and not addressed to the metaphysical task of reconciling the two sorts of explanatory account, which is the problem Pseudo-Joscelin sets himself.

5 . SU B S T AN T I A L D I F F E R E N T I A E ( § § 15 8– 1 82 ) Pseudo-Joscelin assigns a key role to (substantial) differentiae in his metaphysics: they not only distinguish kinds, they individualize individuals, and, as he makes clear in [4], are central in the constitution of the world. But there is a traditional problem about the ontological status of differentiae. To what category do they belong? The obvious answer is that they belong to the category of Quality, since they specify how (qualis) something is (§162). But then where are the differentiae of the genera and species of Quality located? Pseudo-Joscelin argues that they cannot be put into the category of Quality (§§167–178), on pain of regress, or self-differentiation, or circularity. The conclusion he draws is that differentiae are not in any category at all, but are “simple forms” that are not themselves hylomorphic composites.

6 . S I M P L E M A T T E R A N D P UR E F O R M ( § § 18 3 –2 0 8) GS closes with questions about whether matter (in the category of Substance) is a most generic genus (§§184–186), and whether any “pure forms,” such as simple differentiae, are themselves species (§§187–202). Each question is answered in the negative. Regarding the first question, Pseudo-Joscelin distinguishes between being a constituent of something and being predicable of it; matter, or more exactly the “pure essence” described in [4], universally has the former feature but not the latter. The second question is resolved conversely: not every form is predicable of the matter in which it inheres. Simple forms may be themselves indecomposable, but the natures they collectively constitute, genera and species and differentiae, are made up of them; the forms are not themselves “instances” of the collective wholes, and so do not have all the properties that the collection has—such as being predicable of many, like the species.

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The final topic Pseudo-Joscelin addresses under this heading is how such simple individual forms can have different effects, as indeed they must, since one produces Socrates and another Plato (§§203–208). He argues in effect that these are primitive features that define what it is for a simple individualizing form to be the very form it is. At least, this is a feature of ordinary differentiae; it does not apply to the defining forms of each of the categories, which render the categories not merely different from one another but diverse—medieval jargon for not sharing any overarching feature in terms of which difference is specified.

7 . C O N C LU S I O N The above description of GS should show that it is firmly embedded in metaphysical debates in the early twelfth century. A more precise date cannot be determined, but an attractive hypothesis is to see Pseudo-Joscelin as writing GS in response to a conflict between Abelard and Joscelin, perhaps as early as 1115; we know that students often did the dialectical infighting on behalf of their Masters, as Abelard tells us in his Historia calamitatum, and if GS were written in the heat of combat (so to speak) it would explain its polemical character and tone. Yet apart from its historical importance, GS is above all a first-rate work of philosophy, interesting in its own right as the first sustained study of mereology in the history of metaphysics. From the paradox of increase to collections of objects, Pseudo-Joscelin offers a different way of thinking about traditional problems, and well repays close study. University of Toronto

BIBLIOGRAPHY Anonymous. Compendium logicae, ed. S. Ebbesen, K. Fredborg, and L. Nielsen, Cahiers de l’institut du moyen-aˆge latin et grec 46 (1983), 1–93. Arlig, Andrew. A Study in Early Medieval Mereology: Boethius, Abelard, and Pseudo-Joscelin (PhD dissertation, The Ohio State University, 2005). Arlig, Andrew. “Abelard’s Assault on Everyday Objects,” The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 81 (2007), 209–27. Arlig, Andrew. “Early Medieval Solutions to Some Mereological Puzzles: the Content and Unity of De generibus et speciebus,” in I. Rosier-Catach (ed.), Arts du langage et the´ologie aux confins des XIe-XIIe sie`cles: Textes, maitres, de´bats (Turnhout, Belgium: Brepols 2011), 485–508.

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Arlig, Andrew. “Is There a Medieval Mereology?” in M. Cameron and J. Marenbon (eds.), Methods and Methodologies: Aristotelian Logic East and West, 500–1500 (Leiden: Brill 2011), 161–89. Arlig, Andrew. “Parts, Wholes, and Identity,” in J. Marenbon (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 445–67. Arlig, Andrew. “Peter Abelard on Material Constitution,” Archiv fu¨r Geschichte der Philosophie 94 (2012), 119–46. Arlig, Andrew. “Some Twelfth-Century Reflections on Mereological Essentialism,” Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 1 (2013), 83–112. Cousin, Victor. Ouvrage inedits d’Abe´lard (Paris: Imprimerie Royale, 1836). Cuissard, Charles. Catalogue ge´ne´rale des manuscrits des bibliothe`ques en France. De´partements, 2nd series, vol. XII (Paris: Librairie Plon, 1889). Dal Pra, Mario. Pietro Abelardo: scritti di logica (Florence: La Nuova Italia Editrice, 19692). Delisle, Le´opold. “Inventaire des manuscrits latins de St-Germain-des-Pre`s conserve´s a` la Bibliothe`que Impe´riale sous les nos. 11504–14231,” Bibliothe`que de l’E´cole des Chartes 29 (1868), 220–60. Geyer, Bernhard. “Untersuchungen,” in Beitra¨ge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 21: 4 (Mu¨nster: Aschendorff, 1933). Gracia, Jorge J. E. Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1984). Henry, Desmond Paul. Medieval Logic and Metaphysics: A Modern Introduction (London: Hutchinson, 1972). Henry, Desmond Paul. That Most Subtle Question: The Metaphysical Bearing of Medieval and Contemporary Logic and Grammar (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984). Henry, Desmond Paul. Medieval Mereology (Bochumer Studien zu¨r Philosophie Bd. 16) (Amsterdam: B. R. Gru¨ner, 1991). Jacquemin, L. “Annales de la vie de Joscelin de Vierzi, e´veˆque de Soissons (1126–1152),” Quatrie`mes me´langes d’histoire du Moyen Aˆge 20 (1905), 1–161. John of Salisbury. Metalogicon, ed. J. B. Hall (Corpus Christianorum continuatio mediaevalis 98) (Turnholt: Brepols, 1991). King, Peter. Peter Abailard and the Problem of Universals (PhD dissertation, Princeton University, 1982). King, Peter. “The Problem of Individuation in the Middle Ages,” Theoria 66 (2000), 159–84. King, Peter. “Metaphysics,” in J. Brower and K. Guilfoy (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Abelard (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 64–125. King, Peter. “Boethius’s Anti-Realist Arguments,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 40 (2011), 381–401. Lewis, David. “Many but Almost One,” in Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 164–82. Martin, Christopher J. “The Logic of Growth: Twelfth-Century Nominalists and the Development of Theories of the Incarnation,” Medieval Philosophy and Theology 7 (1998), 1–15.

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Minio-Paluello, Lorenzo. Twelfth-Century Logic: Texts and Studies, 2 vols. (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1958). Panaccio, Claude. “Universals” in J. Marenbon (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Medieval Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 385–402. Picavet, Franc¸ois. Roscelin: philosophe et the´ologien (Paris: Alcan, 1911). Prantl, Carl (von). Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande, 4 vols. (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1855–1870). Reiners, Josef. Der aristotelische Realismus in der Fru¨hscholastik (Bonn: J. Trapp, 1907). Romano, Francesco. Una soluzione originale della questione degli universali nel XII secolo: Gualtiero di Mortagne, sulla stato di genere e di specie delle cose universale: testo, traduzione e note (Rome: Aracne, 2007). Tweedale, Martin. Abailard on Universals (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1976).

C O N SP EC T U S AB B R E V IAT IO N U M add. (+) om. rubr. con.

ante corr. post corr.

addidit omisit omisit rubricator conieci, coniecit emendaui ante correctionem post correctionem

lin. dist. mg. sup. lin. sup. col. ras. illeg. y...y

lineam distinxit in margine supra lineam supra columen rasura illegibile locus corruptus

O Orle´ans, Bibliothe`que Municipale lat. 266 (olim 222) 153a 1–166a 29 P Paris, Bibliothe`que Nationale lat. 13368 168ra 1–179va 21 Cousin Victor Cousin, Ouvrage inedits d’Abe´lard. Paris: Imprimerie Royale 1836, 507–550 I have used O as the basic text for the edition. Since the manuscripts O and P are so close I have noted even inversions of word order. The apparatus is negative; only variants are recorded.



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1 Totum integrum aliud continuum aliud disgregatum. 2 Possumus autem dicere domum uel disgregatum totum esse uel continuum. 3 Quod si continuum dicamus, quidam inde sic argumentantur: Si domus est, paries est; et si paries est, dimidius paries est; et si dimidius paries est, et dimidium dimidii est; et ita usque ad ultimum lapillum. Quare si haec domus est, et ultimus lapillus est. Si ergo nullus lapillus est, etiam nulla domus est. 4 Quod si sic accipiatur non est inconueniens; sed si de determinata domo argumentaremur sic: Si haec domus est, hic paries est; et si hic paries est, hic dimidius paries est; et ita usque ad hunc lapillum; et postea ita destruendo concluderemus: Si hic lapillus non est, haec domus non est—inconuenientem faceremus conclusionem. Contradicendum est igitur tali incongruae conclusioni. 5 Solebat autem opponere Magister Guillelmus huic argumentationi sic: Licet prima consequentia (id est “Si haec domus est, hic paries est”) uera sit, non tamen ideo illa quae sequitur (id est “Si hic paries est, hic dimidius paries est”) uera erit. Non enim uerum est complexionaliter quod si quaelibet pars sequitur ad suum totum, idcirco ad positionem eiusdem partis sequitur pars illius. Sequitur enim bipunctualem lineam pars eius, id est punctum; non tamen ad punctum pars eius sequitur quia nullam habet. 6 Et aliter determinandum est quod pars continui totius alia principalis alia secundaria. Principalis: alia principalis in essentia, alia principalis in quantitate, alia in utroque. 7 Pars principalis in essentia est quae destructa destruit suum totum, ut cor uel cerebrum Socratis destructum destruit Socratem. 8 Principalis pars in quantitate est inferior medietas Socratis uel superior; plus enim continet medietas Socratis de toto corpore quam pes uel manus. Non tamen destructo inferiori trunco destruitur Socrates, quia remanent in superiori parte cor et cerebrum quae sunt principales partes in essentia. 3 Totum] 153a O 168ra P rubr. OP 8 haec] sup. lin. OP 9 ultimus] mg. sin. O 10 si1] sic ante corr. O 10 inconueniens] non conueniens P 16 Guillelmus] Will’ OP 17 est3] + hic dimidies paries est del. P 18 id est] sup. lin. O 26 cor] corporalis P 29 manus] manorum P 30 Non] om. P

Treatise on Genera and Species [ 1 . I N T E G R A L W H O LE S ] 1 Some integral wholes are continuous whereas others are discrete. 2 We can say that a house is either a discrete or a continuous whole.

[1.1 Continuous Wholes] 3 If we call it continuous, some people then argue as follows: If a house exists, a wall exists; if a wall exists, half a wall exists; if half a wall exists, half of a half also exists; and so on, up to a least pebble. Accordingly, if this house exists, a least pebble also exists. Therefore, if there is no pebble, there is also no house. 4 Well, the argument isn’t unacceptable if taken this way, but if instead we were to argue about a determinate house like so: If this house exists, this wall exists; and if this wall exists, this half-wall exists; and so on, up to this pebble. and then we conclude by contraposition: If this pebble doesn’t exist, this house doesn’t exist we’d get an unacceptable result, which should thus be denied. 5 Now Master William1 used to object to this line of argument as follows. Although the first consequence [in §4] (namely “If this house exists, this wall exists”) may be true, the one that comes next (“If this wall exists, this half-wall exists”) won’t thereby be true. For it isn’t correct to infer that if any given part follows on its whole, then upon postulating the given part there follows a part of that given part. After all, upon postulating a line made of two points a part follows, that is, a point follows; but no part follows on the point, since points don’t have parts. 6 The question should be settled in another way.2 Some parts of a continuous whole are principal parts whereas others are secondary parts. Now some principal parts are essentially principal, others are quantitatively principal, others both. 7 An essentially principal part is one the destruction of which destroys its whole. For example, the heart or brain of Socrates, when destroyed, destroys Socrates. 8 Now Socrates’s lower or upper half is a quantitatively principal part, since half of Socrates contains more of his whole body than does his foot or hand. Yet Socrates is not destroyed when his lower half is destroyed, because his heart and his brain, which are his essentially principal parts, continue to exist in his upper part. 1 2

Perhaps William of Champeaux. That is, in some way other than by adopting William’s solution in §5.

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9 Non ergo sequitur ad positionem Socratis pars illa quae, licet principalis sit in quantitate, non tamen principalis est in essentia. Non enim sequitur: “Si Socrates est, et inferior medietas Socratis est.” Sed principalis in essentia tantum uel in utroque sequitur posito toto. Si enim et Socrates est, et cor eius est uel cerebrum uel superior medietas est in qua continentur cor et cerebrum. Quare si cor Socratis non est, nec Socrates est. 10 Similiter quaecumque pars partis est principalis in essentia ponitur ad positionem eius, et destructa destruit ipsam. 11 Si enim haec domus est, et hic paries est; et si hic paries est, et hoc lignum uel hic lapis huius parietis est, si talis sit pars quae destructa destruat parietem. Ponitur ergo pars illa quae est destructiua huius parietis ad positionem totius, id est huius domus, et destructa destruit hanc domum; et ita usque ad ultimum quaecumque particulae positiuae sunt uel destructiuae partium, etiam positiuae uel destructiuae totius. 12 Concedimus ergo consequentiam talem “Si haec domus est, et hic paries est” cum sit paries eius principalis in essentia. Sed eam quae est “Si hic paries est, hic dimidius paries est” non recipimus. Nescimus enim an hic dimidius paries sit pars essentialis ad hanc domum. Videmus namque multoties factis ostiis et fenestris et foraminibus plus quam dimidium partis subtrahi, nec tamen minus existere eumdem parietem qui prius fuerat (non eumdem dico in forma sed eumdem in essentia). 13 Duobus enim modis potest destrui hic dimidius paries: uno quidem modo ut ita adnihiletur quod nihil remaneat de ipso, et hoc modo destructus potest destruere suum totum; alio uero destrui potest ita ut non penitus tota illa massa auferatur sed ablatis quibusdam lignis uel lapidibus, factis ibi ostiis uel fenestris, forma, tantum remanentibus eius quibusdam partibus, mutetur, et hoc modo destructus hic dimidius paries non destruit hunc parietem. 14 Vel aliter secundum Magistrum Goslenum: Prius uidendum est quid dicant uoces istae “Si paries est, et hic dimidius paries.” Dicitur autem hic paries non compositum ex duobus lapidibus uel quattuor et forma, sed corpus infectum tali proprietate quae parietem faciat. Quotiens ergo in aliquo subiecto talem formam reperitur, siue augmentatur quantitas siue diminuatur, forma 5 uel1] 168rb P 22 hic] 153b O 2 principalis est] inv. P 5 medietas] medierum P 5 in qua] tamquam P 6 cor] sup. lin. O 6 Socratis] loco P 6 Socrates] + non P 9 haec] sup. lin. O om. P 9 est1] om. P 9 hic1] sup. lin. O om. P 9 hic2] sup. lin. O 10 quae] quod OP 13 partium] post corr. P 15 consequentiam] consequenter P 16 principalis in] principalem ante corr. O 19 ostiis] hostiis ante corr. O hostiis P 19 subtrahi] subtrahit P 23 quod] qui O 28 Goslenum] G. OP 29 Dicitur] post corr. O 32 reperitur] reperimus O 32 augmentatur] augmenittetur (?) O

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9 Therefore, a part which isn’t essentially principal does not follow upon postulating Socrates, despite its being quantitatively principal. For the consequence: If Socrates exists, the lower half of Socrates also exists doesn’t follow. Instead, only parts that are essentially principal (or essentially and quantitatively principal) follow when the whole is postulated. For if Socrates in fact exists, his heart also exists, and so does his brain and the upper half in which his heart and brain are contained. Accordingly, if Socrates’s heart does not exist, neither does Socrates. 10 Likewise, every essentially principal part that belongs to a given part is postulated upon its postulation,3 and, when destroyed, destroys it. 11 If this house exists, this wall also exists; and if this wall exists, this beam or this stone belonging to this wall also exists, should it be the sort of part that, when destroyed, would destroy the wall. Therefore, that part which is destructive of this wall is postulated upon the postulation of the whole (namely this house), and, when destroyed, destroys this house; and so forth, up to the last of all the subparts that are positive (or destructive) of parts,4 and furthermore are positive (or destructive) of the whole. 12 Therefore, we grant this kind of consequence: If this house exists, this wall also exists since the wall is an essentially principal part of the house. But we don’t allow this one: If this wall exists, this half-wall exists For we don’t know whether this half-wall is a part essential to this house. Many times we see more than half of that part taken away when the doors, windows, and passages are made, and yet the same wall that had existed before exists no less. (I mean the same in essence, not the same in form.) 13 This half-wall can be destroyed in two ways. (a) The half-wall is annihilated, so that nothing remains of it. When it is destroyed in this way, it can destroy its whole. (b) The half-wall can be destroyed in such a way that the whole mass isn’t completely removed. Instead, some beams or stones are taken away when doors or windows are made; its form is changed, since only certain parts of it continue to exist. This half-wall’s being destroyed in this way doesn’t destroy this wall. 14 Alternatively, according to Master Joscelin, we should first see that the words: If this wall exists, this half-wall also exists [in §12] mean that this wall is not composed out of two (or four) stones and the form, but that it is a body bearing the sort of property that makes it a wall. Therefore, whenever we find such a form in a subject, whether its quantity is increased or diminished, the form that had existed before still continues to 3 In brief: When a given part is postulated, every essentially principal part of it is also postulated. 4 The term ‘positive’ (positiva) is associated with the verb ‘to postulate’ (ponere). A part is ‘positive’ if it presupposes the existence of the whole of which it is a part; this makes ‘positive’ and ‘destructive’ coextensive.

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tamen quae prius fuerat remanet. Verbi gratia si alterum caput serpentis duo capita habentis amputetur, serpens tamen qui prius fuerat remanebit. 15 Reuertamur itaque ad hoc unde processimus: “Si haec domus est, hic paries est.” Hoc quidem recipitur, sed “Si hic paries est, hic dimidius paries est” contradicitur. Quod si quis sic probare uelit a destructione consequentis: Vere si hic paries est, et hic dimidius paries est; quia si hic dimidius paries non est, neque hic paries est—nec hoc sequitur. Posset enim, uelut iam dictum est, hic dimidius paries destrui. Non dico destrui omnino (quia tunc sequeretur) sed destrui, inquam, posset hic dimidius paries in forma, nec tamen minus remaneret hic paries in essentia. 16 Ponamus enim constare parietem ex quatuor lapidibus et sic uterque dimidius paries constabit ex duobus. Posset itaque destrui alter de duobus dimidiis, uno de duobus ablato lapide, non minus tamen in tribus lapidibus superexistente pariete. Concedimus autem in huiusmodi subtractione dimidii parietis ut paries tamen non destruatur; tantum subtrahi ut illud quod remanet sufficiat ad essentiam parietis. Si enim tantum subtrahatur ut illud quod residuum est non possit parietem facere, siue aliquid addatur siue non, paries idem non potest remanere. Si enim non remanet idem nullo apposito, nec idem esse poterit aliquo adiuncto. 17 Si autem dicamus hanc domum disgregatum totum esse, tunc quodlibet lignum sequitur ad positionem huius domus uel quilibet asser uel quaelibet particula, disgregata uel destructa destruit hanc domum. Sicut enim uerum est dicere “Si hic grex est, et haec ouis est” et intelligam hunc gregem determinate—centum oues uel quemlibet numerum determinatum—et ponam quamlibet ex illis centum ad positionem totius gregis, et sicut uerum est si quaelibet ex illis non est nec ille determinatus grex integer remanet, ita si haec domus accipiatur < ut > disgregata tota sub certo numero lapidum uel asserum, quaelibet ex ipsis disgregatis particulis ponetur ad positionem eius et destructa destruet ipsam. 18 Iterum sciendum est quod sicut quaelibet disgregata pars sequitur ad suum totum, ita etiam quaelibet pars essentialis cuiuslibet disgregatae partis sequitur ad illud idem. Si enim uerum est dicere “Si hic grex est, et haec 2 fuerat] 168va P 20 Si] par. OP 7 iam dictum est] Vide §12 supra. 9 sed] scilicet O 10 essentia] + Vacat usque ad finem lineae P 11 lapidibus] mg. dex. O om. P 11 uterque] + lapidibus P inseruit male 15 non destruatur] del. O 17 parietem] mg. dex. O 20 hanc] inter col. O 23 ouis] ouves ante corr. P 24 determinatum] post corr. P 25 uerum] uerus P 26 determinatus] ///// om. P 26 ita] + et P 27 haec] sup. lin. O 30 Iterum] fundamentum con. Cousin 31–32 partis] mg. dex. O 32 est1] sup. lin. O

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exist.5 For example, if one head of a two-headed snake were to be cut off, the snake that had existed before will still continue to exist. 15 Let us therefore return to our point of departure: If this house exists, this wall exists We accept this, but we deny: If this wall exists, this half-wall exists Yet if someone should want to prove by contraposition: If this wall really exists, this half-wall also exists, because if this half-wall doesn’t exist then neither does this wall this doesn’t follow. As we mentioned [in §12], this half-wall could be destroyed. I do not say “completely destroyed” [as in §13(a)], because then the consequence would follow; but this half-wall could, I say, be destroyed in form, and yet this wall would continue to exist no less in essence [as in §13(b)].

[1.2 Discrete Wholes] 16 Suppose that the wall is made of four stones, so each half-wall will be made of two stones. Then one of the two half-walls could be destroyed by removing one of its two stones, although the wall would continue to exist no less in three stones. Now we grant that the wall isn’t destroyed by taking away a half-wall in this way: an amount is taken away, but what remains is sufficient for the essence of the wall. For if an amount were taken away so that the remainder couldn’t make up a wall, whether anything be added or not, the same wall cannot continue to exist. If it doesn’t remain the same when nothing is added, it won’t be the same with something added on either. 17 If we say instead that this house is a discrete whole,6 then any given beam (or any given post or subpart) follows upon postulating this house, and, when separated or destroyed, destroys this house. For it is true to say: If this flock exists, this sheep also exists were I to understand ‘this flock’ determinately as a hundred sheep (or any given determinate number), and thereby postulate any one sheep out of those hundred upon postulating the whole flock. Then just as it’s true to say: If any of those sheep does not exist, then the determinate flock doesn’t continue to exist as a whole in the same way it’s true that if this house were taken as a discrete whole, with a definite number of stones or posts, then any of these given discrete subparts will be postulated upon postulating the house, and, when destroyed, will also destroy the house. 18 Again, note that just as any discrete part follows upon its whole, so too any part essential to a discrete part follows upon that same whole. For if it is true to say: If this flock exists, this sheep also exists then this consequence: 5 Master Joscelin’s claim is that as long as the property (“such a form”) that makes a thing what it is continues to exist, so does the thing, despite changes in its quantity. In §§12–13 Pseudo-Joscelin used ‘form’ of the stones in the wall to talk about their shape, or, more literally, their arrangement, but this cannot be what Master Joscelin has in mind; the shape of the wall changes when stones are removed, but it remains a wall, and so has some form (wallness?) that persists. 6 This is the other option listed in §2 above.

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ouis est” erit etiam “Si hic grex est, et cor huius ouis est.” Ergo si cor huius ouis non est, nec iste grex est. Similiter in domo quaecumque pars erit destructiua huius asseris uel cuiuslibet disgregatae partis, erit et huius domus pariter destructiua et ponetur ipsa posita. 5 19 Ex hac sententia quidam adhuc argumentantur: Si haec domus est, et quaelibet eius disgregata pars est; et ita hic asser est, cum sit eius disgregata pars; et si hic asser est, medietas huius asseris est; deinde dimidium dimidii; et sic usque ad punctum. Itaque si haec domus est, et hoc punctum huius asseris est. Quare si hoc punctum non est, nec ista domus est, quod est inconueniens. 10 20 Sed, ut ad superiora reuertamur, non sequitur: Si hic asser est, et medietas huius asseris est. Posset enim destrui medietas, quemadmodum iam dictum est, non quantum ad totam eius massam sed quantum ad formam, et tamen remanentibus eius aliquibus particulis non destrueretur hic asser, quoniam medietatis eius materia, forma tantum pereunte, tota non periret. Sed 15 nec etiam si tantum per uentum auferretur ex una parte, tota reliqua pars asseris ad positionem eius asseris sequeretur. Nam secundum eamdem rationem etiam ipsa magna pars posset destrui in forma, non tantum pereunte tota eius essentia.

D E D E S T R UC T I O N E S O C R A T I S 21 Si quaelibet duo puncta proxime iuncta faciunt bipunctualem lineam quae sit una creatura, tunc habebit unum fundamentum. Sed una atomus non erit eius fundamentum, iam enim esset bipunctualiter lineatum. Oportet ergo ut ex duabus constituatur atomis una creatura corporea in qua fundetur illa bipunctualis linea. Quod si cedatur, quaeritur si tertium punctum ad25 datur bipunctuali lineae, uere fiat una creatura, illud additum punctum cum illa bipunctuali linea. Quodsi tertium concedatur, oportet illam creaturam habere fundamentum. Aut ergo habebit illud fundamentum (illud ubi fundata est prior bipunctualis linea), aut aliud. Illud non habet, quia duo puncta in una esse contingeret atomo. Fit igitur aliud fundamentum, ex priori scil30 icet fundamento bipunctualis lineae et alia atomo superaddita, quod iterum conceditur.

20

2 quaecumque] 168vb P 10 Sed] 154a O

20 Si] init. litt. maiusc. O rubr. P

10 ad superiora] Vide §18 supra. 5 haec] sup. lin. O 7 pars] sup. lin. O 7 deinde] dein- P 9 inconueniens] inconuenetis OP 11 medietas] + non del. O + non P 15 una parte] mg. sin. O 16 asseris2] sup. lin. O 24 linea] lineatum ante corr. P 25 illud additum punctum] ille additus punctus OP 27 illud2] del. O + non habet del. P 31 conceditur] Cousin concederit OP

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If this flock exists, the heart of this sheep also exists will be true as well. Therefore, if the heart of this sheep doesn’t exist, this flock doesn’t exist either. Likewise in the case of the house: Any given part destructive of this post (or of any discrete part) will also be equally destructive of this house, and will be postulated when the house is postulated. 19 On the basis of this view some people argue still further: If this house exists, any discrete part of it exists; so this post, since it is a discrete part of it, exists; and if this post exists, the middle section of the post exists; and so half of this half; and so forth, all the way to a point. Therefore, if this house exists, this point belonging to this post exists as well. Accordingly, if this point doesn’t exist, neither does that house. This conclusion is unacceptable. 20 But to return to the matters above: If this post exists, the middle section of this post also exists doesn’t follow. For the middle section could be destroyed in the way already described [in §13(b)]—that is, not as regards its whole mass, but as regards the form—and yet while some of its subparts continue to exist this post would not be destroyed, since the matter of its middle section will not perish as a whole when only the form perishes. But even if a great amount were carried away from one part by the wind, the remaining part of the post would not follow as a whole upon the postulation of the post to which it belongs. For by the same reasoning even a great part could be destroyed in form, provided only that its essence as a whole does not perish.

2 . T H E D E S T R U C T IO N O F S O C R A T E S [2.1 The Puzzle] 21 If any two adjoining points produce a two-pointed line that is a single creation, then that two-pointed line will have a single foundation.7 However, a single atom won’t be its foundation, for then the single atom would already be something twopointed and linear. Therefore, the single corporeal creation in which that twopointed line is founded must be made up out of two atoms. But if this were allowed, a question arises. If a third point were added to the two-pointed line, would a single creation—namely, the added point along with the two-pointed line—genuinely come into being? Now if we grant the third point, that creation8 must have a foundation; and so it will have either (a) the foundation where the two-pointed line was founded before, or (b) a different foundation. Not (a), since it would then be the case that two points are in a single atom. Hence (b): a different foundation comes into being, namely from the previous foundation of the two-pointed line and from the atom that is further added, which once again we grant. 7 A line requires a foundation to exist, since lines (and planes and three-dimensional solids) are geometrical features that must be possessed by an underlying subject, namely a physical body, composed of atoms. 8 Namely, the ‘new’ three-pointed line.

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22 Sic itaque crescendo nouasque creaturas progressiue creando donec ad aliquam Socratis perueniatur particulam, utpote ad ungues, et habebis unam magnam naturam quae erit pars Socratis et non Socrates, quia in eius constitutione non est ungula, quae ungula pars est etiam Socratis cum illa magna parte. Hac autem ungula destructa destruitur illa natura cuius ungula pars est, quae natura est Socrates, et ita destruitur Socrates. Illa autem natura magna quae prius pars Socratis erat et non Socrates, destructa ungula, remanet Socrates, et ita quod prius non erat Socrates fit Socrates. 23 Ad hoc autem duas facimus solutiones. Et prior quidem talis est. Non concedimus ex quibuslibet atomis uicine iunctis fieri unam naturam nec ex quibuslibet punctis lineam. Sed dicimus tot atomos adunari quot sufficiant ad constitutionem unius membri, totque puncta componi quae sint satis ad magnae compositionem lineae quae competenter in eo membro debeat fundari. Quod ut apertius fiat dictae rationis exemplo pateat. In digito Socratis qui est unum eius membrum centum adunantur atomi ex quibus digitus integraliter componitur, et ex quibusdam illorum centum atomis infra digitum natura nulla componitur, sed omnis centum atomi per superuenientem formam in digitum redigitur. 24 Notandum autem quod sicut ex atomis centum unius digiti componitur natura, sic pariter ex centum punctis illis centum adiacentibus atomis una sic efficitur linea centenaria, ut ex paucioribus infra centum pars centenariae lineae nulla minor efficiatur linea. 25 Quod autem dictum est de digito, idem de palma et reliquis membris dicito. Sed notandum iterum quod ex digito et palma una natura non componitur, nec manus una natura esse reputetur, nec etiam ex palma et brachio aliquid componi ut una fiat natura dicatur; et sic de cæteris. Et quemadmodum ex digito < et palma > nihil componitur, sic ex linea digiti et palmae una non perficitur linea; sic in reliquis. Sed quemadmodum Socrates componitur ex totius partibus istis, sic totius Socratis magna linea ex omnibus istis componitur lineis. 26 Nunc tandem restat intueri qualiter praedictum inconueniens per ea quae praemisimus uerba ualeat uitari. Destructa una parte Socratis cæterae quae re1 projgressiue] 169ra P 5 Hac] init. litt. maiusc. O majgna] 154b O 31 intujeri] 169rb P

9 Ad] init. litt. maiusc. O 29

31 praedictum inconueniens] Vide §22 supra. 31–32 ea quae praemisimus uerba] Vide §§23–25 supra. 1 progressiue] progredere OP 2 ungues] post corr. P 3 Socratis] + paries(?) mg. sin. O 3–4 constitutione] constitutionem P 5 destruitur] + pars del. O + pars P 14 apertius] apertis P 15 integraliter] mg. sin. O 21 sic] sup. lin. O 22 efficiatur] efficitur ante corr. P 24 iterum] iter P 29 totius] totis P 31 Nunc] N + //// uacat P

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22 Therefore, by increasing in this way and creating new creations step-by-step until one arrives at some subpart of Socrates—say, at his fingernails — you will have (a) a great nature that will be part of Socrates and yet not Socrates, since there is no fingernail in its make-up; and (b) a fingernail which is still a part of Socrates, along with (a). When this fingernail is destroyed, the nature of which the fingernail is a part is destroyed: the nature is Socrates, and thus Socrates is destroyed. The great nature, (a), which before was a part of Socrates and yet not Socrates, continues on as Socrates once the fingernail is destroyed. Thus what was not Socrates before comes to be Socrates.

[2.2 First Solution] 23 We offer two solutions to this puzzle. The first is as follows. We do not concede that a single nature comes to exist out of any atoms whatsoever that are joined close to one another, nor that a line comes to exist out of any points whatsoever. Rather, we say that as many atoms are united into one as are sufficient to make up a single bodily member; likewise, as many points are put together as are sufficient to make up the great line9 that should correspondingly be founded in that bodily member. But let’s make this more accessible with an example of the account described here to clarify it. In Socrates’s finger, which is one of his bodily members, a hundred atoms are united into one. His finger is completely put together out of them; no nature lesser than his finger is put together out of only some of those hundred atoms, whereas all hundred atoms are collected into his finger through the form advening on them. 24 Note that just as the nature of a single finger is put together out of a hundred atoms, so equally a single hundred-pointed line is made from the hundred points adjacent to those hundred atoms, so that no shorter line that is part of the hundredpointed line is made from fewer than a hundred points. 25 Say the same thing about the palm of Socrates’s hand (and the rest of his bodily members) as we said about his finger. But note once again that a single nature isn’t put together out of his finger and his palm; nor is his hand reckoned as a single nature; nor is anything said to be put together out of his palm and forearm so as to make a single nature—and so on for the rest. What’s more, just as nothing is put together out of his finger and palm, so too a single line isn’t completed out of the line of his finger and palm, and likewise for the rest. But just as Socrates is put together out of the parts that belong to the whole, so too the great line belonging to Socrates as a whole is put together out of all those lines. 26 Now, finally, it remains for us to consider how the unacceptable result described [in §22] can be avoided by our remarks above [in §§23–25]. When one part of Socrates has been destroyed, the other parts that continue to exist do not become Socrates; rather, Socrates comes to be out of them. Hence we aren’t forced to say on this account that Socrates perishes, nor that what is not Socrates becomes Socrates. Instead, as long as the essence of Socrates is preserved, on the basis of these remarks we agree only to this: Socrates exists out of fewer parts. 9 The ‘great line’ mentioned here and in §25 is presumably analogous to the “great nature” described in §22.

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manent non fiunt Socrates, sed ex ipsis fit Socrates, et ita secundum hoc neque cogimur dicere quod Socrates pereat neque quod non-Socrates Socrates fiat, sed hoc tantum, salua essentia Socratis, consentimus ex istis ut Socrates ex paucioribus existat. 27 Huic sententiae quam de digito diximus opponi a quibusdam non ignoramus. Haec enim sententia medium digiti naturam unam esse negat. Sed si abscindatur creaturam esse nemo dubitat; aut ergo creatura erat in digito priusquam amputaretur aut post abscissionem creatur. 28 Solutio. Creantur ibi noua accidentia et efficitur nouum totum, sicut de mortuo etiam est intelligendum. 29 Item dictum est quod ex medietate punctorum quae faciunt lineam digiti aliqua linea non efficitur—quod ideo falsum uidetur esse quia dimidius digitus eo quod longus sit, lineam habere putatur. Sed nos dicimus quia nec lineam habet nec longum quid est, sed sunt particulae tali ordine dispositae. Unde nos sufficiens possumus exemplum proferre. Quamuis plures homines unus ante alium in longum ordinentur, non tamen ex illis una linea fieri mittatur. 30 Potest et aliter quod diximus solui si dicamus non ex quibuslibet punctis lineas fieri nec ex quibuslibet atomis aliquid creari. Sed tamen iterum opponitur: Ubi bipunctualis linea fundabitur cum nec in una atomo possit fundari nec ex duabus atomis una creatura in qua fundetur effici? Ad quod dicimus quod bipunctualis linea in Socrate fundabitur et de eodem Socrate praedicatur; ipse enim bipunctualiter lineatus secundum eam dicitur. 31 Vel possumus dicere quod ipsa bipunctualis linea fundatur in illis duabus atomis ut in subiectis, non in subiecto. Quod si opponatur illud Aristotelis “in subiecto esse dico etc.” haec autem linea non est in subiecto sed in subiectis, dicamus illam Aristotelis scripturam qua dicit “esse in subiecto etc.” ita debere intelligi ut per ‘esse in subiecto’ intelligamus tam ‘subiecto’ quam ‘subiectis.’ < DE GENERIBUS ET SPECIEBUS >

30

32 De generibus et speciebus diuersi diuersa sentiunt. Alii namque uoces solas genera et species uniuersales et singulares esse affirmant, in rebus uero 30 De] init. litt. maiusc. OP 11 dictum est] Vide §24 supra. 25 in . . . dico] ARISTOTELES, Cat. 2 1a24–25 (Ar. lat. I.1–5 ed. comp. 47.22–23): “In subiecto autem esse dico quod, cum in aliquo sit non sicut quaedam pars, impossibile est esse sine eo in quo est.” 7 abscindatur] abscidatur P 7 esse nemo] essentia P 8 amputaretur] putaretur P 13 putatur] mg. dex. P 15 nos] om. P 16 mittatur] putatur Cousin 21 fundabitur] mg. dex. O 26 scripturam] post corr. P

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27 We’re aware that some people oppose this view about Socrates’s finger we described [in §23]. After all, this view denies that the middle section of his finger is a single nature. Yet if it were to be excised, nobody doubts that it is a creation. Therefore, either the creation was in the finger before it was cut out or it is created after the excision. 28 The solution to the objection [in §27]: New accidents are created in that case and a new whole is produced, just as one should also understand with regard to a corpse.10 29 Again, it was said [in §24] that no line is produced by the intermediate points that make the line of Socrates’s finger. But this seems to be false; a half-finger, since it has length, is thought to have a line. We, however, maintain that the intermediate points have neither a line nor length but rather are subparts laid out in such an arrangement. Accordingly, we can supply an example to do the trick: Although many men may be arranged head-to-toe, we nevertheless do not report that a single line is made out of them.

[2.3

Second Solution]

30 What we said [in §23] can be resolved in a different way should we declare that lines are not made out of any points whatsoever, and that something is not created out of any atoms whatsoever.11 But nevertheless the objection is raised once more: Where will a two-pointed line be founded? For it cannot be founded in one atom, and a single creation in which it is founded cannot be made out of two atoms. To this we reply: the two-pointed line will be founded in Socrates, and it is predicated of the selfsame Socrates; indeed, he is called ‘two-pointedly linear’ due to it. 31 Alternatively, we can say that the two-pointed line is founded in those two atoms not as in a subject but as in subjects.12 Now if someone were to object by citing Aristotle: I call ‘being in a subject’ . . . whereas this line is not in a subject but in subjects, we would reply that the passage of Aristotle where he describes ‘being in a subject’ ought to be understood so that by “being in a subject” we understand ‘subjects’ as well as ‘a subject.’

[ 3 . T HE P R O B L E M O F U N I V E R SA L S] 32 Different philosophers hold different theories about genera and species. (a) Some assert that utterances alone are genera and species, universals and singulars, 10 When Socrates dies, his corpse is neither “in” Socrates before his death nor “created” upon his death; rather, as Pseudo-Joscelin says, “a new whole is produced”: Socrates becomes a corpse, clearly a new whole (since the corpse lacks Socrates’s soul) but equally clearly not a new creation from nothing; see §26. So too for the case of an excised middle section of his finger, and for all such changes in quantity. 11 This announces the second of the two solutions mentioned at the start of §23. The proposal here is meant to undercut the initial puzzle in §22 by giving a different account of lines and ‘creations’ than the one given at the end of §21. 12 This alternative reply to the objection raised in §30 is designed to block the inference in §21 from a two-pointed line having a single foundation to the legitimacy of asking about the addition of a third point. The first reply in §30 suggested that the foundation be Socrates as a whole rather than any intermediate object; this alternative proposes that a two-pointed line does not constitute something with a single foundation, but rather has a “plural foundation” in each of the atoms as its subjects.

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nihil horum adsignant. Alii uero res generales et speciales uniuersales et singulares esse dicunt. Sed et ipsi inter se dissentiunt. Quidam enim dicunt singularia indiuidua esse et species et genera subalterna et generalissima alio et alio modo attenta; alii uero quasdam essentias uniuersales fingunt quas in singulis indiuiduis totas essentialiter esse credunt. Harum ergo si qua rationabiliter stare possit, discutiamus. 33 Et primum hanc sententiam inquiramus cuius haec est positio: Homo quaedam species est, res una essentialiter cui adueniunt formae quaedam et efficiunt Socratem. Illam eamdem essentialiter eodem modo nunc informant formae facientes Platonem et cætera indiuidua hominis. Nec aliquid est in Socrate praeter illas formas informantes illam materiam ad faciendum Socratem, quin illud idem eodem tempore in Platone informatum sit formis Platonis. Et hoc intelligunt de singulis speciebus ad indiuidua et de generibus ad species. 34 Quod si ita est, quis potest soluere quin Socrates eodem tempore Romae sit et Athenis? Ubi enim Socrates est, etiam homo uniuersalis ibi est secundum totam suam quantitatem informatus Socratitate. Quicquid enim res uniuersalis suscipit, tota sui quantitate retinet. Si ergo res uniuersalis tota Socratitate affecta eodem tempore et Romae est in Platone tota, impossibile est quin ibi etiam eodem tempore sit Socratitas quae totam illam essentiam continebat. Ubicumque autem Socratitas est in homine, ibi Socrates est; Socrates enim homo Socraticus est. Quid contra hoc dicere possit rationabile ingenium non habet. 35 Amplius. Sanitas et languor in corpore animalis fundatur; albedo et nigredo simpliciter in corpore. Quod si animal totum existens in Socrate languore afficitur, et totum, quia quicquid suscipit tota sui quantitate suscipit, eodem et momento nusquam est sine languore. Est autem in Platone totum 1 res] 169va P 19 eodem] 155a O 24–25 sanitas . . . corpore] ARISTOTELES, Cat. 10 12a 4–11 (Ar. lat. I. 1–5 ed. comp. 70.10–18): “Ut languor et sanitas in corpore animalis naturam habet fieri, et necessarium est alterum esse in animalis corpore, uel languorem uel sanitatem; sed et par et impar de numero praedicatur, et necessarium est alterum in numero esse, aut abundans aut perfectum; et nihil est in medio horum, neque inter languorem et sanitatem, neque inter abundantem et perfectum. Quorum uero non est necessarium alterum inesse, eorum est aliquid medium; ut nigrum et album in corpore naturam habet fieri, et non est necessarium alterum horum esse in corpore . . . ” 2 et] sup. lin. O 2 se] + diuersa del. O + diversa P 2 dissentiunt] sentiunt ante corr. OP 3 esse] sup. lin. O 3 et1] sup. lin. P 5 totas] totes ante corr. P 7 sententiam] sententia P 7 positio] impositio ante corr. P 9 nunc] mg. dex. O om. P 10 Platonem] + non omnino del. P 11 illam] sup. lin. O 12 Socratem] Socrates ante corr. P 16 etiam] et P 17 quantitatem] del. O 19 est1] sup. lin. O

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assigning none of them to things. (b) Other philosophers say that things are generic and specific, universals and singulars, but even they disagree among themselves: (b1) some say that individual singulars, attended to in one way and another, are species and subalternate genera and most generic genera; (b2) others fancy that universals are certain essences, which they believe are in single individuals essentially as wholes. Therefore, we should discuss whether any of these theories can reasonably obtain.

[3.1 Material Essence Realism] [3.1.1 Statement Of Material Essence Realism] 33 Let’s first investigate this last theory [§32(b2)], whose main thesis is this: Man is a certain species, essentially a single thing on which some forms advene and produce Socrates; the forms producing Plato and other individual men essentially inform the same thing in the same way. Nor is there anything in Socrates, aside from those forms informing that matter in order to make Socrates, that isn’t also at the same time in Plato informed Plato’s forms. They understand this for each species with respect to individuals and for genera with respect to species.

[3.1.2 Arguments Against Material Essence Realism] 34 But if this is the case, who can solve the puzzle that Socrates would at the same time be in Rome and in Athens? For where Socrates is, there too is the universal man, informed with Socrateity13 in its whole quantity—for whatever the universal thing receives it retains in its whole quantity—and so if the whole universal thing that has been affected with Socrateity is as a whole at the same time also in Plato, who is in Rome, it is impossible that Socrateity, which contained that essence as a whole, not be there in Rome too at the same time. Wherever Socrateity is in man, Socrates is there; Socrates is Socratical man. A rational mind does not have anything that it can say against this! 35 What’s more, health and illness are founded in the body of an animal; whiteness and blackness are founded simply in body. But if the animal existing in Socrates as a whole is afflicted with illness, then, since whatever it receives it receives in its whole quantity, the whole at one and the same time is nowhere without illness.

13 Socrateity is the unique form the possession of which makes Socrates to be who he is, namely Socrates. See the Introduction.

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illud idem; ergo etiam ibi languet—sed ibi non languet. Idem de albedine et nigredine circa corpus. 36 Ad hoc enim non refugiant ut dicant ita Socratem languere, animal non languere. Si enim Socratem et animal concedunt in inferiori animali languere et non in uniuersalitate, attendant quid dicant cum negant animal in uniuersalitate languere quod in inferiori languet; non id intelligunt non languere in illo accidenti, idem enim possent dicere quia non languet in singularitate, quia si attendunt animal in uniuersalitate (id est animal uniuersale) non languere, falsi sunt dum langueat in inferiori, cum idem sit animal uniuersale et ipsum in inferiori. 37 Addunt: “Animal uniuersale languet sed non in quantum est uniuersale.” Utinam se uideant! Si enim id intelligant ‘animal non languet in quantum est uniuersale,’ id est hoc quod est uniuersale non confert illi languere, idem dicant ‘in quantum est singulare non languet’ quia hoc quod est singulare non confert. Si id dicant ‘in quantum est uniuersale non languet,’ id est hoc quod est uniuersale aufert, nunquam languet quia semper est uniuersale. Dico hoc quod est uniuersale aufert in quantum est uniuersale. Similiter dicant hoc quod est singulare aufert in quantum est singulare, quod nullum singulare languet in quantum est singulare, et ita bis habemus ‘in quantum’ ita: “in quantum est uniuersale non languet in quantum est uniuersale.” 38 Si ad status se transferant dicentes “Animal in quantum est uniuersale non languet in uniuersali statu,” respondeant de quo uelint agere per has uoces ‘in statu uniuersali,’ utrum de substantia an de accidenti. Si de accidente, concedimus nihil languere in illo accidenti. Si de substantia agitur, aut de animali aut de alia. Si de alia, et hoc concedimus quod animal in substantia alia a se non languet. Si de animali agitur, falsum est animal in uniuersali statu non languere, id est animal in se non habere languorem, cum habeat. Nec in hoc uideo illis refugium. 39 Item omnis differentia ueniens in proximum genus speciem facit, ut rationalitas in animali; illa ergo totum informat animal. Quicquid enim genus 9 injferiori] 169vb P 29 Item] par. O 1 sed . . . languet] mg. sin. P 3 languere] + non OP 4 languere1] langueat OP 4 et] etiam O 4 in] sup. lin. O 4 animali] animal OP 4 languere2] + quod inferiori languet non id intelligunt del. P 5 uniuersalitate] uniuersalitatem P 5–6 attendant . . . uniuersalitate] mg. sin. O 5 dicant] dicunt P 5–6 uniuersalitate] + languere del. O 7 languet] langueret ante corr. O 9 dum] cum O 11 Addunt] Ad post corr. O Addunt del. P 16–17 Dico . . . uniuersale] om. (hom.) P 17 dicant] mg. sin. O om. P 20 est2] sup. lin. O 20 in . . . uniuersale] inter col. O 22 respondeant] respondant P 23 uniuersali] uniuersalis ante corr. P 23 de2] om. P 25 hoc] + quo O + quo P 27 habere] hominem lect. dub. O + et P 27 in] enim ante corr. O enim P 28 hoc] sup. lin. O 28 illis] illud ante corr. O

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Now the same thing as a whole is also in Plato, and so there is illness there too—but there is no illness there. (The same holds for whiteness and blackness with respect to body). 36 They may not escape this objection [in §35] by saying that Socrates is ill but animal is not. For if they grant that Socrates and animal are ill in something falling under animal, but not in its universality, they need to pay attention to what they are saying when they deny that animal, which is ill in something falling under it, is ill in its universality! They don’t understand animal not to be ill in that accident,14 for they could make the same claim on the grounds that it is not ill in its singularity, since if they consider that animal in its universality (i.e. the universal animal) is not ill, they are wrong as long as something falling under it is ill, since the universal animal is the same as what is in something that falls under it. 37 They reply: the universal animal is ill, but not insofar as it is universal. If they could only see themselves! (a) If they should understand: Animal is not ill insofar as it is universal as “the fact that it is universal does not endow it with being ill,” they would be saying the same thing as “animal is not ill insofar as it is singular,” since the fact that it is singular doesn’t endow it either. (b) If they should express Insofar as it is universal it is not ill as “the fact that it is universal removes it,” then since it is always universal it is never ill. I say the fact that it is universal removes it insofar as it is universal. Likewise, they might say the fact that it is singular removes it insofar as it is singular, because nothing singular is ill insofar as it is singular. And then we have a double ‘insofar as’ in this way: Insofar as it is universal it is not ill insofar as it is universal 38 If they should change their ground to its status by saying: Animal insofar as it is universal is not ill in its status as universal they should tell us whether substance or accident is at stake in the phrase ‘in its status as universal.’ If accident, then we grant that nothing is ill in that accident. If substance, then either animal or another substance. If another, we also grant this, because animal is not ill in a substance other than itself. If animal, it is false that animal is not ill in its status as universal, i.e. that animal is not ill in itself, since it is. I don’t see this as a way out for them. 39 Again, every differentia entering into its proximate genus produces a species, as rationality does in animal. Therefore, it informs animal as a whole. Now whatever a

14

“In that accident”: presumably, in its universality.

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suscipit, tota sui quantitate suscipit. Sed eodem modo irrationalitas totum animal informat eodem tempore. Ita duo opposita sunt in eodem secundum idem. 40 Nec hoc dicant: “Non est inconueniens duo opposita esse in eodem uniuersali,” quia ad hoc reclamat Porphyrius, negans in eodem uniuersali esse opposita ibi: “Neque enim oppositas habet, nam in eodem simul habebit opposita . . . ” atque in solutione hac sic: “Neque ex his quae non sunt, aliquid fiet, nec opposita circa idem sunt” cum de genere loquitur. 41 Nec ad hoc refugiant ut dicant Porphyrium ibi non habere pro inconuenienti duo opposita esse in eodem nisi sint in actu constitutionis illius in quo sunt; alioquin non est inconueniens albedinem et nigredinem esse in eodem, quae nihil constituunt. Illud ergo maioris simplicitatis est quod dicunt quidam quia differentiae quidem adueniunt generi sed in generi non fundantur. Quam statim enim rationalitas illam naturam tangit, scilicet animal, tam statim species efficitur et in ea rationalitas fundatur. Unde et per se dicitur quia sibi ipsi facit subiectum. 42 Sed dico: Facta est species ex genere et substantiali differentia; et sicut in statua aes est materia, forma autem figura, similiter genus est materia speciei, forma autem differentia. Materia est quae suscipit formam. Ita genus in ipsa specie constituta formam sustinet. Nam et postquam constituta est ex materia et forma constat, id est ex genere et differentia. Et ita redimus ad idem quia ipsa differentia in genere fundatur. 43 Sed dicunt: “Rationalitas quidem fundatur in carne quae extra speciem genus est sed non in ipsa specie.” Et sic duo impossibilia concedunt. Al17 et1] 170ra P 22 fundatur] 155b O 6–7 Neque . . . opposita] PORPHYRIUS, Isag. 3 (Ar. lat. I.6–7 17.19–20): “Neque autem omnes oppositas habent, nam in eodem simul habebunt opposita.” 7–8 Neque . . . sunt] ibid. (18.1–2): “Neque ex his quae non sunt aliquid fit, neque opposita circa idem sunt.” 17–19 Facta . . . differentia] PORPHYRIUS, Isag. 3 (Ar. lat. I.6–7 18.9–15): “Rebus enim ex materia et forma constantibus uel ad similitudinem materiae specieique constitutionem habentibus (quemadmodum statua ex materia est aeris, forma autem figura), sic et homo communis et specialis ex materia quidem similiter consistit genere, ex forma autem differentia, totum autem hoc animal rationale mortale homo est quemadmodum illic statua.” 1 tota sui quantitate] totam sui quantitatem P 1 modo] + in eodem secundum del. P 2 opposita] + contraria del. O 2 sunt] + idem exp. P 2 in eodem secundum] mg. sin. O 6 ibi] sup. lin. O id est P 6 oppositas habet] opposita P 6 in] sup. lin. O 7 hac] lect. dub. O inter col. P 7 sic] post corr. O 9 refugiant] Cousin refugient O 11 inconueniens] inconueniente O 12 maioris] maiores ante corr. P 12 est] inter col. O om. P 14–15 Quam . . . fundatur] sub col. P 15 statim] + statim del. P 15 efficitur] post corr. P 19 in] sup. lin. O 23 dicunt] dat ante corr. P 23 carne] lect. dub. O

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genus receives it receives in the whole of its quantity. But, in the same way, irrationality informs animal as a whole at the same time. Therefore, two opposites are in the same thing in the same respect. 40 Nor may they say: It is not unacceptable for two opposites to be in the same universal When Porphyry talks about the genus he contradicts this claim, denying that there are opposites in the same universal: Nor does the genus have opposites, for then it will have opposites together in the same . . . and in his resolution: Neither will something come to be out of these that are not, nor are there opposites with respect to the same. 41 Nor may they find a way out in claiming that Porphyry in this passage holds it unacceptable for two opposites to be in the same thing only if they are in the actual make-up of that in which they are—otherwise, [they claim], it isn’t unacceptable for whiteness and blackness to be in the same thing they do not make up. Therefore, Porphyry’s remark, which some people offer, is really quite simple: differentiae in fact advene on the genus but are not founded in the genus. As soon as rationality touches the nature, animal, a species is produced at that very moment and rationality is founded in it. The differentia is accordingly said per se since it produces a subject for itself. 42 I reply [to §41] that the species is made out of the genus and the substantial differentia. Just as in a statue bronze is the matter and shape is the form, likewise the genus is the matter of the species and the differentia the form. The matter is what receives the form. Therefore, the genus in the make-up of the species itself sustains the form, for in fact after the species has been made up it then consists in matter and form, that is, in genus and differentia. Thus we return to the same point, since the differentia itself is founded in the genus. 43 But they claim that rationality is founded in the stuff15 that is the genus beyond the species, but not in the species itself. And thereby do they grant two

15 Rationality is found in carne beyond the species, literally “in the flesh” that is the genus beyond the species. Since the genus is matter for the species (§42), the body of the animal—flesh, blood, and bones—is literally the matter for rationality to make something a human being.

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terum quod genus extra speciem sit et eius indiuidua, cum dicat Boethius: “Specierum diuersarum similitudo quae nisi in speciebus et indiuiduis earum esse non potest efficit genus.” Alterum uero quia concedunt quiddam existens in specie esse illam rem quae eodem momento est genus extra speciem, et illud primum tantum non esse genus. 44 Item si forma fundatur in specie, fundatur in constituto ex se et genere, et ita ipsum constitutum est ei fundamentum. Unde et intellectu possunt disiungi fundamentum et forma. Animi enim potestas haec est et disiuncta coniungere et coniuncta disiungere. Sed quis animus rationalitatem disiungit ab homine, cum in homine claudatur rationalitas? 45 Item cum rationalitas aliquid sit sub aliquo membro aristotelicae diuisionis continebitur, huius scilicet “aut dicitur de subiecto et non est in subiecto etc.” Credo huic aptabit ‘quod dicitur de subiecto et est in subiecto.’ Nam rationalitas de subiecto dicitur hac rationalitate, in subiecto autem est in homine. Quod si est in homine ut etiam in subiecto, “non est ibi sicut quaedam pars” etc., sic enim definitur ibi idem esse in subiecto; sed hominis est pars formalis et sic est pars; quaerendum ergo est illi aliud subiectum cuius ipsa non sit pars. 46 Sed dicent: “Rationalitas est in homine ut in subiecto nec in eo est ut pars integralis,” quod solum negauit Aristoteles et hoc contradico. Animal in homine est ut in subiecto quia non est ibi sicut pars integralis. Quod si dicant quia ultima pars definitionis illi non conuenit: “Quod est impossibile est esse etc.” nam possibile est esse animal sine homine et sine aliis inferioribus (‘esse’ large, non actualiter)—sed idem dicas de rationalitate. Nam secundum eos etsi rationalitas non esset in aliquo, tamen in natura remanet. 2–3 Specierum . . . genus] BOETHIUS, In isag. maior I.11 (Brandt 166.12–14): “Specierum rursus diuersarum similitudo considerata quae nisi in ipsis speciebus aut in earum indiuiduis esse non potest efficit genus.” Cf. §147 infra. 8–9 potestas . . . disiungere] BOETHIUS, In isag. maior I.11 (Brandt 165.3–4): “At uero animus, cui potestas est et disiuncta componere et coniuncta disiungere . . . ” 12 aut . . . subiecto2] ARISTOTELES, Cat. 2 1a20–23 (Ar. lat. I. 1–5 ed. comp. 47.19–21): “Eorum quae sunt alia de subiecto quodam dicuntur, in subiecto uero nullo sunt, ut homo de subiecto quidem dicitur aliquo homine, in subiecto uero nullo est.” 15 non . . . pars] ARISTOTELES, Cat. 2 1a22 (Ar. lat. I.1–5 ed. comp. 47.22–23): “cum in aliquo sit non sicut quaedam pars.” 22 Quod . . . esse] ARISTOTELES, Cat. 2 1a21–23 (Ar. lat. I.5–7 ed. comp. 47.22–23): “quod . . . impossibile est esse sine eo in quo est.” 1 et eius] post corr. P 2 indiuiduis] post corr. O 3 quiddam] + esse P + esse del. O 8 enim] sup. lin. P 9 disiungere] post corr. O 11 aristotelicae] post corr. O aristolicae P 14 rationalitate] post corr. O 14 est] sup. lin. O 14 in2] sup. lin. P 17–18 quaerendum . . . pars] mg. dex. O 19–20 ut2 . . . Aristoteles] mg. sin. P 21 quia non] nec ante corr. O nec P 23 possibile] possibilis ante corr. P possibilis O 25 rationalitas] animalitas post corr. O 25 remanet] remanent P

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impossibilities: (a) that the genus is beyond its species and its individuals, although Boethius says: The likeness of different species—which cannot exist except in species and their individuals—brings about the genus. (b) They grant that something existing in the species is that thing which at the same moment is the genus beyond the species, and also above all is not a genus. 44 Again, if the form [that is the differentia] is founded in the species, it is founded in something made up out of itself and the genus, and so what is made up is itself the foundation for it. Accordingly, the foundation and the form may also be separated by the intellect. (For this is a power of the mind: both combining things that are separated and separating things that are combined.) But what mind separates rationality from man, since rationality is contained within man? 45 Again, since rationality is something, it will be contained under some member of the Aristotelian division: Either it is said of a subject and it is not in a subject, [or it is said of a subject and it is in a subject]. Now ‘what is said of a subject and is in a subject’ will, I believe, apply to rationality, because rationality is ‘said of a subject’ in virtue of this rationality,16 and it is also ‘in a subject’ in man. But if it is in man as in a subject, “it is not there as some part,” since ‘being in a subject’ is defined in this way. But rationality is a formal part of man, and so it is a part. Therefore, another subject of which rationality is not a part should be found for it. 46 But they will reply: Rationality is in man as in a subject, and it is not in it as an integral part. However, Aristotle denied this, and I also speak against it. Animal, [not rationality], is in man as in a subject, since it isn’t there as an integral part. But if they should reply that the final part of the definition [of ‘being in a subject’] —namely “what cannot be [apart from that in which it is]”—is not applicable to animal because it can be without man and without anything else subject to it that would fall under it (‘to be’ in the broad sense rather than actually), then you could say the same thing about rationality. For, according to them, even if rationality were not in something it would nevertheless continue to be in nature.

16 That is, we predicate rationality of something in virtue of the particular rationality it has.

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47 Item omne materiatum sufficienter constituitur ex sua materia et forma. Socratis autem materia est species homo, forma autem Socratitas, ex quibus sufficienter constituitur. Sed item ex elementis constat Socrates quia omne corpus ex quatuor elementis constat. Si soluant, ergo illi non possint dicere unde conueniant elementa in Socrate. Aut enim materia erit aut pars materiae, aut forma aut pars formae. Quod si neutrum est, qualiter ibi esse possit rationabile non uidet ingenium. Velut domus constituitur ex pariete et tecto et fundamento et forma, compositione eandem constare dicimus ex ligno et lapide. Quod idcirco esse potest quia lapis et lignum partium domus partes sunt. 48 Item genera et species aut creator sunt aut creatura. Si creatura sunt, ante fuit suus creator quam ipsa creatura. Ita ante fuit Deus quam iustitia et fortitudo quas quidam esse in Deo non dubitant et aliud a Deo. Itaque ante fuit Deus quam esset iustus uel fortis. Sunt autem qui negant illam diuisionem esse sufficientem “Quicquid est aut est creator aut creatura,” sed sic faciendam esse dicunt: “Quicquid est aut genitum est aut ingenitum.” Uniuersalia autem ingenita dicuntur et Deo coaeterna, et sic secundum eos qui hoc dicunt asinus (quod nefas est dictu!) in nullo est obnoxius Deo qui semper fuit cum Deo, nec ab alio incœpit. Nec Deus aliquorum factor est. Nam Socrates ex duobus Deo coaeternis coniunctus est. Noua ergo prima fuit coniunctio, non aliqua noua creatio. Nam aeque ut materia, ita et forma uniuersalis est et ita Deo coaeterna. Quod quantum a uero deuiet palam est. 49 Sed et illud occurit quod si eadem essentia est quae cum rationalitate facit hominem cum irrationalitate asinum, unde procedit quod talia duo contraria de una essentia faciunt duas? Neque enim si pateretur natura ut in eodem digito simul essent albedo et nigredo, non tamen de uno digito efficerentur duo digiti. Multa sunt quae hanc insaniam non patiuntur quae apponeremus nisi quae supradicta sufficere putamus. 50 Nunc itaque illam quae de indifferentia est sententiam perquiramus cuius haec est positio: Nihil omnino est praeter indiuiduum sed et illud aliter et

4 dicere] 170rb P 22 Quod] 156a O 29 Nunc] init. litt. maiusc. O rubr. P 11 Item . . . creatura] Cf. GUILLELMUS DE CONCHIS, Sup. Plat. §155 (Jeauneau 281.25–26): “Si iterum quaeritur utrum sit hyle creator an creatura . . . ” 1 sua] sup. lin. O 2 est species] inv. O species P 2 autem2] sup. lin. O 3 item] sup. lin. O 4 illi] om. O 6 pars] mg. dex. O 7 tecto] post corr. P 12 Deus] sup. lin. O 14 illam] mg. dex. O 17 dicuntur] sup. lin. P 17 et1] om. P 17 Deo] lect. dub. O 18 Deo] + ? del. P 19 incœpit] incipit P 20 fuit] fiat ante corr. O 22 a uero] sup. lin. O 23 est] sup. lin. O 28 nisi quae] et quia nisi P 28 quae] mg. sin. O 28 putamus] + Vacat usque ad finem lineae P 30 omnino] omninono O 30 et1] om. O

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47 Again, anything enmattered is made up entirely of its matter and form. The matter of Socrates is the species man and the form is Socrateity, out of which he is entirely made up. But again, Socrates also consists of the elements, since every body consists of the four elements. If these philosophers should find a way through this, they cannot then say where the elements in Socrates come from: it will be either (a) his matter or a part of his matter, or (b) his form or a part of his form. But if neither (a) nor (b), a rational mind does not see how the elements can be there at all. Just as a house is made up out of the wall and roof and foundation and form, we say that the same composite consists of wood and stone, which can be the case for the reason that boards and stone are parts of the parts of a house. 48 Again, genera and species are either the Creator or a creation. If they are a creation, then their Creator existed before the creation itself. Hence God existed before justice and courage, which some people do not doubt to be in God and other than God; therefore, God existed before He was just or courageous. However, there are those who deny that this division: Everything is either the Creator or a creation is adequate; they say that it should rather be made like so: Everything is either generated or ungenerated Furthermore, universals are called ‘ungenerated,’ and for that reason coeternal with God. Hence according to those who say this, ass—which always existed with God and did not arise from something else—is dependent on God in no respect. This is sheer blasphemy! Nor is God the Maker of anything whatsoever. For Socrates is compounded of two things that are coeternal with God; therefore, Socrates was first a new compound rather than some new creation, since form is just as universal as matter and thus coeternal with God. It is common knowledge how much this strays from the truth. 49 A further point arises. If it is the selfsame essence that with rationality produces man and with irrationality produces ass, on what grounds does it follow that two such contraries produce two essences from one? For it isn’t the case that if nature should permit whiteness and blackness to be in the same finger at once, two fingers would still be brought about from a single finger. Many considerations disallow this lunacy; we’d list them, except we think that what has been said above is enough.

[3.2 Indifference Realism] [3.2.1 Statement of Indifference Realism] 50 So let us now investigate the theory about indifference17 [in §32(b1)], whose main thesis is that there is absolutely nothing beyond the individual; instead, the 17

The term ‘indifferent’ is derived from its theological use to express the unity the Persons of the Trinity share while nevertheless not being the same as one another. This usage stems from Boethius, The Trinity 1 (Moreschini 167.40–42): “The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God, not three gods; the reason for this conjunction is indifference (indifferentia) . . . ” While ‘indifference’ is not explained, the term itself suggests that items will be indifferently the same if they lack positive differentiating qualities, whatever they may be. Pseudo-Joscelin often says “X is indifferent to Y ”: the meaning is that X and Y are indifferently the same, that is, there is no positive differentiating feature setting X and Y apart.

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aliter attentum species et genus et generalissimum est. Itaque Socrates in ea natura in qua subiectus est sensibus, scilicet secundum illam naturam quam significat de eo ‘Socrates,’ indiuiduum est, ideo quia tale est proprietas eius nunquam tota reperitur in alio. Est enim alter homo sed Socratitatem nullus habet praeter Socratem. De eodem Socrate quandoque habetur intellectus non concipiens quicquid notat haec uox ‘Socrates,’ sed Socratitatis oblitus id tantum perspicit de Socrate quod notat inde ‘homo,’ id est animal rationale mortale, et secundum hanc attentionem species est, est enim praedicabilis de pluribus in quid de eodem statu. Si intellectus postponat rationalitatem et mortalitatem et id tantum sibi subiciat quod notat haec uox ‘animal,’ in hoc statu genus est. Quod si relictis omnibus formis in hoc tantum consideremus Socratem quod notat inde ‘substantia,’ generalissimum est. Idem de Platone dicas per omnia. Quod si quis dicat proprietatem Socratis in eo quod est homo non magis esse in pluribus quam eiusdem Socratis in quantum est Socrates, aeque enim homo qui est Socratis in nullo alio est nisi in Socrate, sicut ipse Socrates, uerum quidem concedunt, ita tamen determinandum putant: Socrates in quantum est Socrates nullum prorsus indifferens habet quod in alio inueniatur sed in quantum est homo plura habet indifferentia quae in Platone et in aliis inueniuntur. Nam et Plato similiter homo est ut Socrates, quamuis non sit idem homo essentialiter qui est Socrates. Idem de animali et substantia. 51 Huic sententiae aeque auctoritas et ratio contradicunt. Et primum quibus auctoritatibus contraria sit uideamus. 52 Porphyrius dicit: “Decem quidem generalissima, specialissima in numero quodam non tamen indefinito, indiuidua uero infinitae sunt.” Positio uero huius sententiae hoc habet: Singula indiuidua substantiae in quantum sunt substantia generalissima esse. Itaque non potius indiuidua infinita sunt quam generalissima. 53 Soluunt tamen illi dicentes: Generalissima quidem infinita esse essentialiter sed per indifferentiam decem tantum, quot enim indiuidua substantiae tot etiam sunt generalissimae substantiae. Omnia tamen illa generalissima 9 postponat] 170va P 24–25 Decem . . . sunt] PORPHYRIUS, Isag. 2 (Ar. lat. I.6–7 12.7–9): “Decem quidem generalissima sunt, specialissima uero in numero quidem quodam sunt non tamen infinito, indiuidua autem quae sunt post specialissima infinita sunt.” 2 scilicet] om. P 3 ideo] et ut lect. dub. P 3 eius] cuius O post corr. P 11 tantum] post corr. P 16 quidem] quod P OP 18 habet] habent ante corr. P 23 uideamus] post corr. P P + quidem del. O 25 infinitae] infinita P 29 Soluunt] post tiae] mg. sin. P

7 inde] idem P 10 haec] 18 habet] Cousin habere 24 specialissima] + quidem corr. P 31 tot . . . substan-

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individual, attended to in one way and another, is the species and the genus and the most generic genus. Hence Socrates, in the nature in which he is subject to the senses (namely the nature which ‘Socrates’ signifies with respect to him), is an individual, for this reason: because his distinctive property is such that it is never found as a whole in another. There are other men, but no one except Socrates has Socrateity. Now sometimes an understanding is had of this selfsame Socrates that doesn’t conceive whatever the utterance ‘Socrates’ marks out. Rather, unmindful of Socrateity, it observes of Socrates only what this term ‘man’ marks out there, namely rational mortal animal. According to this attention he is a species, for it is predicable of many in quid as regards the same status. If the understanding should pass over rationality and mortality and take as its subject only what the utterance ‘animal’ marks out, in this status he is a genus. But if we were to consider Socrates only in what ‘substance’ marks out there, putting all forms aside, then he is a most generic genus. (You may say the same thing about Plato at all points.) But if anyone should say that the distinctive property belonging to Socrates in that he is a man is no more in many than the distinctive property belonging to the selfsame Socrates insofar as he is Socrates, just as man belonging to Socrates is in no other but Socrates (like Socrates himself ), what they grant is true. Nevertheless, they think it should be spelled out as follows: Socrates insofar as he is Socrates has absolutely nothing indifferent that is found in another, but insofar as he is man he has many indifferences18 that are found in Plato and in other men. For Plato is likewise man, as Socrates is, although he is not essentially the same man who is Socrates. The same holds for animal and substance. 51 Authority and reason equally contradict this theory [in §50]. First, let’s look at the authorities to which it is contrary [§§52–62].

[3.2.2 Authorities Against Indifference Realism] 52 Porphyry says: There are ten most generic genera;19 most specific species in some definite number; individuals, however, are infinite. Yet this theory maintains the position that single individual substances, insofar as they are substance, are most generic genera. Therefore, individuals are no more infinite than the most generic genera. 53 They get around the difficulty [in §52] by saying that the most generic genera are infinite essentially but only ten through indifference. For there are as many most generic genera of substance as there are individual substances. Nevertheless, all those

18

Perhaps “many features that, in respect of indifference, are found in Plato . . . ” The ten most generic genera are identified with the ten Aristotelian categories: Substance, Quantity, Quality, and so on. 19

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generalissimum unum dicuntur quia indifferentia sunt. Socrates enim in eo quod est substantia indifferens est cum qualibet substantia in eo statu quod substantia est. 54 Item paulo post dicit Porphyrius: “Collectiuum enim multorum in unam naturam species est et magis id quod genus est.” Quod de Socrate rationabiliter dici non potest. Neque enim Socrates aliquam naturam quam habeat Platoni communicat quia neque homo qui Socrates est neque animal in aliquo extra Socratem est. 55 Ipsi tamen ad indifferentiam currentes dicunt quia Socrates in eo quod est homo colligit Platonem et singulos homines; proinde quia indifferens essentia homini qui est Socrates est Plato. 56 Item Porphyrius: “Genus est quod praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in eo quod quid sit, species quod de pluribus differentibus numero.” Si ergo Socrates in statu animalis genus est, pluribus differentibus speciebus inhaeret; si in statu hominis species est, pluribus differentibus numero. Quod minime est uerum. Neque enim uel animal uel homo qui Socrates est, alii quam Socrati inest. 57 Sed et hi dicunt: Socrates in nullo statu alicui inhaeret nisi sibi essentialiter, sed in statu hominis pluribus dicitur inhaerere quia alii sibi indifferentes inhaerent; eodem modo in statu animalis. 58 Boethius quoque huic sententiae multis refragatur locis. In secundo commentario super Porphyrium sic ait: “Nihilque aliud species putanda est nisi cogitatio collecta ex indiuiduorum dissimilium numero substantiali similitudine, genus uero est collecta cogitatio ex specierum similitudine.” Quod in hac sententia non conuenit in qua Socrates in quantum homo est species est, qui tamen nullo modo de pluribus colligitur quia in pluribus non est.

4 Item] par. O rubr. P 11 est] 156b O

26 nullo] 170vb P

4–5 Collectiuum . . . est] PORPHYRIUS, Isag. 2 (Ar. lat. I.6–7 12.15–17): “Collectiuum enim multorum in unam naturam species est, et magis id quod genus est.” Cf. §147 infra. 12–13 Genus . . . numero] PORPHYRIUS, Isag. 1–2 (Ar. lat. I.6–7 6.26–7.2, 9.6–7): “Adsignauerunt genus esse dicentes quod de pluribus et differentibus specie in eo quod quid sit praedicatur . . . Species est quod de pluribus et differentibus numero in eo quod quid sit praedicatur.” 22–24 Nihilque . . . similitudine] BOETHIUS, In isag. maior I.11 (Brandt 166.16–18): “Nihilque aliud species esse putanda est nisi cogitatio collecta ex indiuiduorum dissimilium numero substantiali similitudine, genus uero cogitatio collecta ex specierum similitudine.” Cf. §75, §88, §147 infra. 3 est] + Vacat usque ad finem lineae P 11 qui est] quia P 16 uel2] + ani exp. O 19 dicitur] + esse del. P 21 refragatur] Cousin refrangitur OP 25 qua] quan- ante corr. O

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most generic genera are called a single most generic genus because they are indifferent. Indeed, Socrates in that he is substance is indifferent to any given substance in his status as substance. 54 Again, Porphyry says a little afterwards: A species is collective of many into one nature, and more so that which is a genus. This can’t reasonably be said about Socrates. It isn’t the case that Socrates shares with Plato any nature that he may have, since neither the man nor the animal that is Socrates is in anything outside Socrates. 55 Nevertheless, resorting to indifference, they reply [to §54] that Socrates in that he is man ‘collects’ Plato and each man to the extent that Plato is an essence indifference to the man Socrates. 56 Again, Porphyry: The genus is what is predicated in quid 20 of many things differing in species, and the species of many differing in number. Therefore, if Socrates in his status as animal is a genus, he inheres in many different species; if in his status as man he is a species, he inheres in many things differing in number—which isn’t true at all! It is not the case that the animal or the man which is Socrates is in anything other than Socrates. 57 But [to §56] they reply: Socrates in no status inheres in anything other than himself essentially. But in his status as man he is said to inhere in many, because as indifferent they inhere in one another. They reply in the same way in the case of his status as animal. 58 Boethius also opposes their theory in many places. He says: The species should be held to be nothing other than the thought collected from the substantial likeness of numerically dissimilar individuals, and the genus the thought collected from the likeness of its species. Boethius’s remark doesn’t agree with this theory, in which Socrates insofar as he is man is a species, yet he is not collected from many in any way, since he is not in many.

20 If
is predicated in quid of a subject, then
declares what the subject is—the ‘what-it-is-to-be’ of the subject, its essence.

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59 Quod tamen ipsi ad indifferentiam referentes dicunt ita: Socrates in quantum est homo colligitur de Platone et cæteris quia unumquodque indiuiduum in quantum est homo de se colligitur. 60 Quod quam ridiculum sit inde patet quod eodem modo dici potest de quolibet quod ipse est etiam homo, quia quoddam indifferens illi est ibi. 61 Item in commentario super Categorias Boethius: “Genera et species non ex uno singulo intellecta sunt sed omnibus singulis, mentis ratione collecta uel concepta est.” Hic plane confirmat Boethius unam essentiam sicut hominem non ex solo Socrate collectum sed quod ex omnibus colligitur. Qui uero Socratem in eo quod est homo esse speciem dicit ex solo indiuiduo colligit speciem. 62 Omnes apponere auctoritates quae hanc sententiam abnuunt, grauaremur. 63 Sed nunc utrum rationi sit consentanea uideamus. Unumquodque indiuiduum hominis in quantum est homo speciem esse haec sententia adserit ut uere possit dici de Socrate “Hic homo est species.” Sed “Socrates est hic homo” uere dicitur. Itaque secundum modum primae figurae rationabiliter concluditur “Socrates est species.” Si enim aliquid praedicatur de aliquo et aliud subiciatur subiecto, subiectum subiecti subicitur praedicato praedicati; hoc nemo rationabiliter denegabit. Procedo. Si Socrates est species, Socrates est uniuersale; et si est uniuersale, non est singulare; unde sequitur non est Socrates. 64 Negant hanc consequentiam “Si est uniuersale, non est singulare.” Nam in positione suae sententiae habetur: Omne uniuersale est singulare et omne singulare est uniuersale diuersis respectibus. 65 At contra: Cum dicitur: “Substantia alia uniuersalis alia singularis,” talem diuisionem credo nemo negat esse secundum accidens. Sed ut dicit Boethius in libro Diuisionum: “Harum commune est praeceptum, quicquid eorum 6 Item] par. OP 6–8 Genera . . . concepta] BOETHIUS, In cat. 183C (PL 64): “Genera namque et species non ex uno singulo intellecta sunt sed ex omnibus singulis indiuiduis, mentis ratione concepta.” Cf. §147 infra. 26 Substantia . . . singularis] ARISTOTELES, De int. 7 17a 39–40 (Ar. lat. II.1–2 9.21–10.1): “Quoniam autem sunt haec quidem rerum uniuersalia, illa uero singillatim . . . ” Cf. §77 infra. 14.28–15.1 Harum . . . segregari] BOETHIUS, De diu. (Magee 48.16–17): “Harum autem commune praeceptum est, quicquid ipsorum diuiditur in opposita disgregari.” 1 Socrates] + in quantum est quodque indiuiduum del. P 2–3 colligitur . . . homo] om. (hom.) P 5 etiam homo] in furno O lect. dub. sup. lin. P 5 ibi] + Vacat usque ad finem lineae O 8 est] om. O 14 utrum] post corr. P 14 uideamus] bis P 16 dici] sup. lin. O 18 enim] + est species del. P 28 est] sup. lin. O

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59 Still, reverting to indifference, they reply [to §58] as follows: Socrates insofar as he is man is collected from Plato and the rest, since any given individual, insofar as he is man, is collected from himself. 60 It’s clear how ridiculous their reply [in §59] is, because in the same way it can be said about anything that it too is man, since something indifferent to it is present there.21 61 Again, Boethius: Genera and species are not understood from one singular, but from all the singulars that are collected or conceived by the mind’s reason. Boethius here plainly confirms that one essence such as man is not collected from Socrates alone—rather, that it is collected from all. But whoever calls Socrates a species, insofar as he is man, ‘collects’ a species from an individual alone. 62 It would be a heavy burden for us to list all the authorities who repudiate this theory.

[3.2.3 Arguments Against Indifference Realism] 63 Now let’s see whether it is consistent with reason [§§63–73]. This theory holds that any individual man insofar as he is man is a species. Accordingly: This man is a species may be said of Socrates truly; but: Socrates is this man is said truly. Therefore: Socrates is a species is inferred syllogistically. For if one thing is predicated of another, and something else is put as the subject of the subject, then the subject of the subject is put as the subject of the predicate of the predicate.22 Nobody will rationally deny this. I proceed: if Socrates is a species, Socrates is universal; and if he is universal, he is not singular; accordingly, it follows that he is not Socrates! 64 They deny this consequence: If Socrates is universal, he is not singular. In putting forward their theory they maintain that every universal is singular, and that every singular is universal, in diverse respects. 65 Well, on the contrary, when one says: Some substances are universal and others singular nobody, I believe, denies this sort of division to be according to accident. Rather, as Boethius says: There is a general rule for accidental divisions, that anything that is divided is separated into opposites. 21 The compressed line of argument in §60 seems to be that if we grant the explanation offered in §59, we could also say that a dog is a human being, because a dog is indifferently the same as any human in being an animal, and, since the nature is “collected” from everything to which it is indifferent, a dog is a human being. 22 If P is predicated of M, and S is put as the subject of the subject (namely M), then S is also the subject of P.

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diuiditur in opposita segregari”; ut si subiectum in accidentia separemus, non dicamus ‘Corporum alia sunt alba alia dulcia’ (quae non opposita sunt), sed ‘Corporum alia sunt alba alia nigra alia neutra.’ Ecce eodem modo negare possumus hanc non esse diuisionem secundum accidens—‘Substantia alia uniuersalis alia singularis’—nec enim magis opposita sunt, uniuersale et singulare, quam album et dulce. Dicunt illi non esse dictum de omnibus diuisionibus secundum accidens sed de regularibus. Si quaeras quae sunt regulares, aiunt: “Quibus illud conuenit.” 66 Videte quantae impudicitiae sint! Quod tam plane dicit auctoritas cum de diuisionibus secundum accidens loqueretur “Harum omnium commune praeceptum est etc.” non dictum uniuersaliter, mentiuntur. Sed et in hoc non consistent. Nam de his specialiter, id est uniuersali et singulari, negat auctoritas: Nullum uniuersale est singulare et nullum singulare est uniuersale. Boethius enim in commentario super Categorias cum de hac diuisione loqueretur, ‘Substantia alia uniuersalis alia singularis,’ ait: “Ut autem accidens in naturam substantiae transeat esse non potest uel ut substantia in natura accidentis transeat haberi non potest. At uero nec particularitas nec uniuersalitas in se transeunt. Namque uniuersalitas potest praedicari de particularitate, ut animal de Socrate uel Platone, et particularitas suscipit praedicationem uniuersalitatis sed non ut uniuersalitas sit particularitas, nec quod particulare est uniuersalitas fiat.” ‘Uniuersalitas’ et ‘particularitas’ haec nomina pro uniuersali et particulari accipi notant exempla, ut animal de Socrate. Contra hoc rationabiliter nihil dici potest. 67 Illi tamen non quiescunt sed dicunt: Nullum singulare in quantum est singulare est uniuersale et econuerso, et tamen uniuersale est singulare. 68 Contra quod dico uerba ista “Nullum singulare in quantum est singulare, etc.” hunc sensum uidentur habere: “Nullum singulare manens singulare est uniuersale manens uniuersale”—quod utique falsum est. Nam Socrates manens Socrates est homo manens homo. 7 secundum] 157a O 18 in] 171ra P 15–21 ut . . . fiat] BOETHIUS, In cat. 170C–D (PL 64): “Ut autem accidens in substantiae naturam transeat uel substantia in accidens fieri nullo modo potest . . . At uero nec particularitas nec uniuersalitas in se transeunt. Namque uniuersalitas potest de particularitate praedicari, ut animal de Socrate uel Platone, et particularitas suscipiet uniuersalitatis praedicationem sed non ut uniuersalitas sit particularitas, nec rursus ut quod particulare est uniuersalitas fiat.” 1 opposita] apposita ante corr. P 1 non] nom OP 2 alba] post corr. P 7–8 regulares] regularibus ante corr. P 9 impudicitiae] impudiciae P 11 et] sup. lin. O om. P 20 particulare] par P 21 fiat] sup. lin. O 22 exempla] post corr. P 24 non] mg. sin. O 25 singulare] mg. sin. + econuerso del. O + est uniuersale et econuerso P 27 etc] + ut del. P 28 quod] quae P

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For example, if we were to separate a subject into accidents we wouldn’t say ‘some bodies are white and others are sweet’ (which are not opposites), but ‘some bodies are white, some are black, and others are neither.’ You see, [just as they deny the consequence in §64], in the same way we can deny that ‘some substances are universal and others singular’ is a division according to accident; ‘universal’ and ‘singular’ are no more opposites than ‘white’ and ‘sweet.’ They say that the rule does not apply to all divisions according to accident, but rather to ‘regular’ divisions. If you should ask which are regular, they reply: “the divisions to which the rule is suitable.” 66 See how shameless they are! They give the false impression that what Boethius says so plainly isn’t stated universally, though he said of divisions according to accident “there is a general rule for them . . . ” But they won’t even pause over this, for Boethius specifically denies their claims about universal and singular: no universal is a singular and no singular is a universal. Indeed, when Boethius discussed this division ‘some substances are universal and others are singular,’ he says: Furthermore, it cannot happen that an accident goes over into the nature of a substance; nor can it be held that a substance goes over into the nature of an accident. But in truth neither universality nor particularity go over into each other. Surely universality can be predicated of particularity, as animal of Socrates and Plato, and particularity receives the predication of universality— but not with the result that universality is particularity, nor that what is particular becomes universality. (The names ‘universality’ and ‘particularity’ in place of the universal and the particular indicate examples to be given, such as animal of Socrates.) Nothing can rationally be said against this. 67 Yet they don’t stop! Instead, they reply that no singular insofar as it is singular is universal, and conversely; and yet the universal is singular. 68 Against the claim [in §67], I say that these words: No singular insofar as it is singular [is universal] seem to have this sense: ‘no singular remaining singular is a universal remaining universal’—which is surely false, since Socrates remaining Socrates is man remaining man.

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69 Item hunc sensum habere possent: “Nulli singulari confert hoc quod est singulare esse uniuersale” uel “Homini singulari aufert hoc quod est singulare esse uniuersale,” quod totum fallit inter Socratem et hominem. Nam in Socrate hoc quod est Socrates exigit hominem et nulli singulari aufert aliquid esse uniuersale nam secundum eos omne singulare est uniuersale. 70 Item si dicant: Socrates in quantum est Socrates, id est in tota illa proprietate in qua notatur ab hac uoce quae est ‘Socrates,’ non est homo in quantum est homo, id est in illa proprietate in qua notatur ab hac uoce ‘homo’— hoc quoque falsum est. Nam ‘Socrates’ notat hominem Socraticum in quo et hominem, quod scilicet notat ‘homo.’ Quod si dicant: Socrates in tota illa proprietate in qua notatur a ‘Socrates’ non est id tantum quod notat ‘homo,’ uerum est secundum eos nam nihil est id tantum quod notat ‘homo’; quid ultra dicere possint? Videat alius si fieri possit. 71 Amplius. Speciem ex genere et substantiali differentia constare, ut statua ex aere et figura, auctore Porphyrio, constat. Itaque pars est speciei materia et similiter differentia. Ipsa uero species est totum definitiuum eorum. Unde ad inuicem sunt relatiua et ita inter se opposita, et sicut nullus pater sui ipsius est pater sed alterius ita nullum totum sui ipsius est totum sed alterius. Similiter et de parte. Unde hoc totum sui ipsius non est, est autem sui ipsius pars. Sed idem est homo et animal, eius materia, ut autem aliquid totum sit et sui ipsius et alterius; magis est impossibile. 72 Amplius. Si idem est homo species et animal suum genus, cum omne genus suae speciei inhaereat idem sibi ipsi inhaeret, quod esse non potest testante Boethio super Topica Tulii in commentario in primo libro sic: “Quod nec intelligi quidem potest quemadmodum in ipso haerere possit quod ipsum est, cum nihil sibi inhaereat.” 73 Et de hac hactenus. 74 Nunc illam sententiam quae uoces solas genera et species uniuersales et particulares praedicatas et subiectas adserit et non res insistamus. 28 Nunc] init. litt. maiusc. O init. litt. maiusc. rubr. P 28 et1] 157b O 14–15 Speciem . . . constat] PORPHYRIUS, Isag. 3 (Ar. lat. I.6–7 18.9–15): “Rebus enim ex materia et forma constantibus uel ad similitudinem materiae specieique constitutionem habentibus (quemadmodum statua ex materia est aeris, forma autem figura), sic et homo communis et specialis ex materia quidem similiter consistit genere, ex forma autem differentia, totum autem hoc animal rationale mortale homo est quemadmodum illic statua.” Cf. §159 infra. 24–26 Quod . . . inhaereat] BOETHIUS, In top. Cic. 1057A (PL 64): “Quod ne intelligi quidem potest quemadmodum in ipso haerere possit quod ipsum est, cum nihil sibi haereat.” 1 possent] possunt P 1 Nulli singulari] Nullum singulare ante corr. OP 8 ‘homo’] + est P 12 uerum . . . ‘homo’] om. (hom.) P 14 genere] post corr. P 19 hoc] post corr. O 25 haerere] post corr. OP 27 hac] sup. lin. O his P

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69 Again, these words could have this sense: ‘the fact that it is singular does not bestow upon any singular that it be universal’ or ‘the fact that a man is singular removes from him that he be universal’—but this whole expression is deceptive as between Socrates and man. For in the case of Socrates, the fact that he is Socrates requires man, and it does not remove from any singular that something is universal, since according to them every singular is universal. 70 Again, if they were to reply [to §68] that Socrates insofar as he is Socrates (i.e. in the entire distinctive property the term ‘Socrates’ marks out) is not man insofar as he is man (i.e. in that distinctive property the term ‘man’ marks out)—this too is false. For ‘Socrates’ marks out Socratical man, and, in this, man, that is, what ‘man’ marks out. But if they were to reply that Socrates in the entire distinctive property which ‘Socrates’ marks out is not only what ‘man’ marks out, this is true, according to them, because nothing is “only what ‘man’ marks out.” What more could they say? Let someone else see if it could happen. 71 Besides, it’s clear on Porphyry’s authority that the species consists in the genus and the substantial differentia, just as the statue consists in bronze and its shape. Thus matter is part of the species, and likewise the differentia. But the species is their definitive whole. Accordingly, they are relative to each other and opposites among themselves; just as no father is the father of himself but rather of another, so too no whole is the whole of itself but rather of another. (Likewise for ‘part.’) Accordingly, it is not the whole of itself; however, it is part of itself. But the man is the same as animal (which is its matter), with the result that something is the whole both of itself and of another. It’s quite impossible. 72 Besides, if the species man is the same as its genus animal, then the same will inhere in itself, since every genus inheres in its species. This can’t be the case, as Boethius remarks: How anything could inhere in the very thing that it is cannot even be understood, since nothing inheres in itself. 73 And that’s enough of these matters.

[3.3 Nominalism] [3.3.1 Statement of Nominalism] 74 Let us now press on to the theory [in §32(a)] that asserts universals and particulars, genera and species, and subjects and predicates to be utterances alone and not things.

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75 Res quidem genera et species esse auctoritas affirmat. Et Boethius quidem in secundo commentario super Porphyrium: “Nihil aliud species esse putanda est nisi cogitatio collecta ex indiuiduorum dissimilium numero substantiali similitudine, genus uero collecta cogitatio ex specierum similitudine.” Quod autem has similitudines res appellet paulo superius aperte demonstrat: “Sunt igitur huiusmodi res in corporalibus atque in sensibilibus, intelliguntur autem praeter sensibilia.” 76 Item idem Boethius in commentario super Categorias dicit: “Dicendum quoniam rerum decem genera sunt prima necesse fuit decem quoque esse simplices uoces quae de simplicibus rebus dicerentur.” Hi tamen exponunt ‘genera,’ id est manerias. 77 Quid autem res uniuersales sint ait Aristoteles in Perihermeneias: “Rerum aliae sunt uniuersales aliae sunt singulares.” Hi tamen exponunt ‘rerum,’ id est uocum. 78 Boethius quoque in commentario super Categorias: “Cum dico ‘animal’ talem substantiam significo quae de pluribus praedicatur.” Haec auctoritas res esse uniuersales adserit cum dicat de pluribus praedicari, quae est definitio uniuersalis, et praedicari cum dicat “de pluribus praedicatur.” Quod autem res et praedicatae et subiectae sint dicit Boethius in Hypotheticis his uerbis: “Itaque predicatiua propositio rem quam subicit praedicatae rei nomen suscipere declarat.”

2 aliud] 171rb P 2–4 Nihil . . . similitudine] BOETHIUS, In isag. maior I.11 (Brandt 166.16–18): “Nihilque aliud species esse putanda est nisi cogitatio collecta ex indiuiduorum dissimilium numero substantiali similitudine, genus uero cogitatio collecta ex specierum similitudine.” Cf. §58 supra, §88 et §147 infra. 6–7 Sunt . . . sensibilia] BOETHIUS, In isag. maior I.11 (Brandt 166.6–7): “Sunt igitur huiusmodi res in corporalibus atque in sensibilibus, intelleguntur autem praeter sensibilia.” 8–10 Dicendum . . . dicerentur] BOETHIUS, In cat. 162D (PL 64): “Dicendumque est quoniam rerum prima decem genera sunt, necesse fuit decem quoque esse simplices uoces, quae de subiectis rebus dicerentur.” 12–13 Rerum . . . singulares] ARISTOTELES, De int. 7 17a39–40 (Ar. lat. II.1–2 9.21–10.1): “Quoniam autem sunt haec quidem rerum uniuersalia, illa uero singillatim . . . ” Cf. §65 supra. 15–16 Cum . . . praedicatur] BOETHIUS, In cat. 194A (PL 64): “Nam cum dico ‘animal’ talem substantiam significo quae de pluribus speciebus dicatur.” 20–21 itaque . . . declarat] BOETHIUS, Syll. hyp. 1.2.2 (Obertello 210): “Itaque praedicatiua propositio rem quam subicit praedicatae rei suscipere nomen declarat.” 1–2 quidem] qui (quod ante corr.) O 5 has] post corr. P 8 dicit] om. O 8 Dicendum] Dicit nondum P 10–11 tamen exponunt] tantum exponit post corr. P 16 de] sup. lin. P 17–18 praedicari . . . praedicatur] mg. dex. O 18 uniuersalis] post corr. P

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[3.3.2 Authorities Against Nominalism] 75 Authority affirms that genera and species are things. Boethius: The species should be held to be nothing other than the thought collected from the substantial likeness of numerically dissimilar individuals, and the genus the thought collected from the likeness of its species. Furthermore, Boethius explicitly shows that he calls these likenesses ‘things’ a little earlier: Therefore, things of this sort are in corporeal objects and in sensible objects, but they are understood beyond sensible objects. 76 Again, Boethius says: It should be stated that since there are ten primary genera of things, there also had to be ten simple utterances that were said of things as subjects. Yet they analyze ‘genera’ in this passage as ways.23 77 Aristotle says what universal things are: Of the things there are, some are universals and others are singulars. Yet they analyze ‘things’ in this passage as utterances. 78 Boethius too: When I say ‘animal’ I signify the sort of substance that is predicated of many. He is asserting things [rather than utterances] to be universals, since he says that ‘being predicated of many’ (which is the definition of the universal) is also predicated [of substance]. Boethius says that things are subjects and predicates in these words: A predicative proposition, therefore, declares that the thing that is put as subject receives the name of the thing that is predicated.

23 ‘Ways’: maneriae, a contemporary neologism introduced to describe the division of Quality into four kinds, sometimes used as a first-declension noun and sometimes as a fifth-declension noun. Its sense was unclear enough to prompt an acid comment from John of Salisbury: “There is another philosopher who escapes to the shelter of a new language, since he doesn’t have sufficient command of Latin; when he hears ‘genus’ or ‘species’ he says at one time that they should be understood as universal things and at another time interprets them as the ways (maneries) things are—I don’t know in which of the authorities he has found this word or this distinction, except perhaps in a list of abstruse and obsolete words, or in the jargon of present-day doctors” (Metalogicon 2.17.29).

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79 His autem tam apertis auctoritatibus rationabiliter obuiare non ualentes aut dicunt auctoritates mentiri aut exponere laborantes quia excoriare nesciunt pellem incidunt. 80 Item uoces nec genera sunt nec species, nec uniuersales nec singulares, nec praedicatae nec subiectae, quia omnino non sunt. Nam ex his quae per successionem fiunt nullum omnino totum constare ipsi qui hanc sententiam tenent nobiscum credunt. Si ergo non sunt, nec genera nec species, nec uniuersales nec singulares, nec praedicatae nec subiectae, et in omnibus his dicunt auctoritatem mentitam sed non deceptam esse. 81 Amplius. Quemadmodum statua constat ex aere materia, forma autem figura, sic species ex genera materia, forma autem differentia. Quod adsignare in uocibus impossibile est. Nam cum animal genus sit hominis, uox uocis nullo modo est altera alterius materia nam neque in qua sit neque de qua sit. Nam de hac uoce ‘animal’ non fit haec uox ‘homo’ neque in ea. 82 Sed aiunt figuratiuam esse locutionem “Genus est materia speciei,” id est significatum generis esse materiam significati speciei. Sed neque hoc secundum eos stabile est. Nam cum habeat eorum sententia nihil esse praeter indiuidua, et haec tamen significari a uocibus tam uniuersalibus quam singularibus, idem prorsus significabit ‘animal’ et ‘homo.’ Unde econuerso uere dici potest: Significatum speciei esse materiam significati generis. 83 Quod si ipsi concedant (cum rationabiliter negare non possint), laeduntur a Boethio in Diuisionibus qui in hoc ostendit differentiam diuisionis generis et totius quod genus materia est speciebus, totius uero materia sunt partes. Quod si aeque ut partes totius ita species sunt materia generum, non utique in hoc differunt immo conueniunt. 84 Amplius. Significatum generis significati speciei materia esse non potest cum prorsus idem sint, sicut in sententia quod indifferentia dictum est. Nam idem formam non suscipit ad se ipsum constituendum sed ait Boethius: “Genus accepta differentia transit in speciem.” Nec idem est pars sui ipsius. Nam si idem sibi esset totum et pars, idem esset sibi oppositum. 25 in] 158a O

171va P

22–24 differentiam . . . partes] BOETHIUS, De diu. (Magee 14.5–8): “Amplius quoque genus speciebus materia est, nam sicut aes accepta forma transit in statuam ita genus accepta differentia transit in speciem; totius uero partium multitudo materia est.” 28–29 genus . . . speciem] ibid. 5 praedicatae] praedicantae ante corr. P 6 hanc] hac P 11 sic] sicut ante corr. O sicut P 16 esse materiam significati] significatum OP Vide infra ll. 20, 26 16 neque] mg. dex. O om. P 17 stabile] stabilie P 17 sententia] sententiae ante corr. P 19 econuerso] haec conuerso P 27 sicut] mg. sin. O om. P

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79 Not being able to obviate such plain remarks rationally, they either say that the authorities are misleading, or, laboring to explain it, they cut the skin because they don’t know how to strip it off.

[3.3.3 Arguments Against Nominalism] 80 Again, utterances are neither genera nor species, nor universals nor singulars, nor even subjects nor predicates, since they do not exist at all. That is, those who hold this theory believe, as do we, that absolutely no whole consists of what comes to be through succession.24 If, therefore, utterances don’t exist, they are neither genera nor species, nor universals nor singulars, nor predicates nor subjects, and they say in all these cases that authority made a false impression but is not itself deceived. 81 What is more, just as a statue consists in bronze as matter and its shape as form, so too the species consists in the genus as matter and its differentia as form. But it’s impossible to assign this in the case of utterances. For although animal is the genus of man, one utterance is not the matter of another utterance in any way, since it is neither that in which it exists nor that from which it exists. For this utterance ‘man’ is neither made from this utterance ‘animal’ nor is in it. 82 They say that the expression: The genus is the matter of the species is figurative, i.e. what is signified by the genus is the matter of what is signified by the species. But this doesn’t stand up, even according to them. For although their theory has it that there is nothing aside from individuals, individuals are nevertheless signified by universal utterances as well as by singular utterances; ‘animal’ and ‘man’ will signify exactly the same thing. Accordingly, the converse: What is signified by the species is the matter of what is signified by the genus can also be stated truly. 83 But were they to concede this (since they can’t rationally deny it), they are vexed by Boethius, who points out the difference between the division of a genus and of a whole, namely that the genus is the matter for its species, whereas parts are the matter for the whole. But if species are the matter for genera as parts are for the whole, then [the division of a genus and the division of a whole] surely don’t differ in this regard—rather, they agree. 84 Furthermore, what is signified by the genus can’t be the matter of what is signified by the species, since they are exactly the same thing, just as they are on the theory that is called the ‘indifference theory’ [§§70–72]. For one and the same thing doesn’t receive a form so as to constitute itself; rather, as Boethius says: Once the differentia is received, the genus goes over into a species. Nor is one and the same thing a part of itself, since if it were a whole and a part of itself, the same thing would be opposite to itself. 24 Utterances are physical objects that do not exist at a single instant as things do; each part exists at an instant, and the parts never exist all at once.

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85 Et de his hactenus. 86 Quoniam supradictas sententias rationibus et auctoritatibus confutauimus, quid nobis potius tenendum uideatur de his, Deo adnuente, amodo ostendemus. 87 Unumquodque indiuiduum ex materia et forma compositum est, ut Socrates ex homine materia et Socratitate forma, sic Plato ex simili materia (scilicet homine) et forma diuersa (scilicet Platonitate) componitur, sic et singuli homines. Et sicut Socratitas quae formaliter constituit Socratem nusquam est extra Socratem, sic illa hominis essentia quae Socratitatem sustinet in Socrate nusquam est nisi in Socrate. Ita de singulis. Speciem igitur dico esse non illam essentiam hominis solum quae est in Socrate uel quae est in aliquo alio indiuiduorum sed totam illam collectionem ex singulis illis materiis factam, id est unum quasi gregem de essentia hominis quam Socrates sustinet, et singulis aliis huius naturae coniunctum. Quae tota collectio, quamuis essentialiter multa sit, ab auctoritatibus tamen ‘una species’ ‘unum uniuersale’ ‘una natura’ appellatur, sicut populus (quamuis ex multis personis collectus sit) unus dicitur. Item unaquaeque essentia huius collectionis quae humanitas appellatur ex materia et forma constat, scilicet ex animali materia, forma autem non una sed pluribus: rationalitate et mortalitate et bipedalitate, et si quae sunt ei aliae substantiales. Et sicut de homine dictum est, scilicet quod illud hominis quod sustinet Socratitatem, illud non essentialiter sustinet Platonitatem, ita de animali. Nam illud animal quod formas humanitatis quae in me est sustinet, illud essentialiter alibi non est sed illi indifferens est in singulis materiis singulorum indiuiduorum animalis. Hanc itaque multitudinem essentiarum animalis quae singularum specierum animalis formas sustinet genus appellandum esse dico: quae in hoc diuersa est ab illa multitudine quae speciem facit. Illa enim ex solis illis essentiis quae indiuiduorum formas sustinent collecta est, ista uero quae genus est ex his quae diuersarum specierum substantiales differentias recipiunt. 88 Et hoc est quod uoluit Boethius in secundo commentario super Porphyrium his uerbis: “Nihil aliud species esse putanda est,” etc. 89 Item ut usque ad primum principium perducatur, sciendum est quod singulae essentiae illius multitudinis quae animal genus dicitur ex materia aliqua essentia corporis et formis substantialibus (animatione et sensibilitate) 31 Nihil . . . est] BOETHIUS, In isag. maior I.11 (Brandt 166.16–18): “Nihilque aliud species esse putanda est nisi cogitatio collecta ex indiuiduorum dissimilium numero substantiali similitudine, genus uero cogitatio collecta ex specierum similitudine.” Cf. §58 et §75 supra, §147 infra. 2 et] sup. lin. O 12–13 illis . . . singulis] mg. sin. O om. (hom.) P 13 quam] quae O 21 non essentialiter] inv. P 28 quae2] om. P 32 Item . . . perducatur] mg. sin. P

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85 That’s enough of these matters.

[3.4 Collective Realism] 86 Since we have refuted the theories described [in §32] by reasons and authorities, let’s see what we ourselves should rather hold about these matters. If God approves, we’ll set it forth now.

[3.4.1 Statement of Collective Realism] 87 Any given individual is composed out of matter and form. For example, Socrates is composed out of man as his matter and Socrateity as his form; Plato is also composed out of similar matter (namely man) and a different form (namely Platonity); and so on for each man. Just as Socrateity, which formally constitutes Socrates, exists nowhere outside of Socrates, so too the essence man, which sustains Socrateity in Socrates, exists nowhere except in Socrates; and so it is for each. Hence I say that the species isn’t solely the essence man that is in Socrates, or that is in some other individual, but rather it is the whole collection produced from them as its material. That is, the species is one thing—a ‘flock’ as it were—conjoined from the essence man that Socrates sustains, along with each of the other essences of this nature.25 This whole collection, even though it is essentially many, is neverthe-less called ‘one species’ and ‘one universal’ and ‘one nature’ by the authorities, just as the populace is called ‘one’ even though it is collected from many persons. Again, any given essence belonging to this collection (which is called ‘humanity’) consists in matter and form, namely in animal as its matter, and not in one form but in many—rationality, mortality, two-leggedness, and any other forms that are substantial to it. And what we said regarding man, namely that the element belonging to a man which sustains Socrateity does not essentially sustain Platonity, also holds for animal. For the animal that sustains the form of humanity that is in me is essentially not anywhere else. Rather, there is something indifferent to this form in the respective material belonging to each individual animal. Therefore, I say that the multiplicity of essences of animal, which sustains the forms of each of the species of animal, ought to be called the genus. This multiplicity differs from the former that produces the species; the former is collected solely from those essences that sustain the forms belonging to individuals, whereas the latter, which is the genus, is collected from these essences that receive the substantial differentiae belonging to diverse species. 88 This is what Boethius meant by his words: The species should be held to be nothing other than the thought collected from the substantial likeness of numerically dissimilar individuals, and the genus the thought collected from the likeness of its species. 89 So that one may be led up to the first principle, it should be known that each of the essences of the multiplicity that is called the genus animal consists in (a) some essence belonging to body as matter, and (b) the substantial forms animateness and 25

The species of humanity is thus composed of the individualized forms of humanity possessed by every human being.

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constant quae, sicut de animali dictum est, nusquam alibi essentialiter sunt sed illis indifferentes formas sustinent omnium specierum corporis. Et haec talium corporis essentiarum multitudo genus dicitur illius naturae quam ex multitudine essentiarum animalis confectam diximus. Et singulae corporis quod genus est essentiae ex materia (scilicet aliqua essentia substantiae) et forma (corporeitate) constant. Quibus indifferentes essentiae in corporeitate quae forma est species sustinent, et illa talium essentiarum multitudo substantia generalissimum dicitur. Quae tamen nondum est simplex sed ex materia mera essentia, ut ita dicam, et susceptibilitate contrariorum forma constat. Quae mera essentia an genus sit et quare non sit postea discutietur. 90 Quod autem in substantia dictum est, simile in aliis praedicamentis intelligatur. 91 Nunc quid ratio siue auctoritas de hac sententia iudicet uideamus. 92 Speciem dicimus esse multitudinem essentiarum inter se similium, ut hominem. Species autem hominis est materia suorum indiuiduorum. Itaque tota illa multitudo quae humanitas dicitur materia est Socratis et singulorum. Materia autem est quae suscipit formam. Itaque homo species Socratitatem suscipit—quod minime uerum est quia, ut iam supra dictum est, illud tantum humanitatis informatur Socratitate quod in Socrate est. Ipsum autem species non est sed illud quod ex ipsa et cæteris similibus essentiis conficitur. 93 Attende! Materia est omnis species sui indiuidui et eius formam suscipit, non ita scilicet quod singulae essentiae illius speciei informentur illa forma sed una tantum, quae tamen quia similis est compositionis, prorsus cum omnibus aliis eiusdem naturae essentiis, quod ipsa suscipit compactum ex ipsa et cæteris suscipere auctores uoluerunt. Neque enim diuersum iudicauerunt unam essentiam illius collectionis a tota collectione sed idem, non quod hoc esset illud sed quia similis creationis in materia et forma hoc erat cum illo. 94 Sic autem esse etiam usus loquendi approbat. Nam massam aliquam ferream de qua faciendi sunt cultellus et stylus uidentes dicimus: hoc futurum est materia cultelli et styli, cum tamen nunquam tota suscipiat formam alterutrius sed pars styli pars cultelli.

7 multitudo] 158b O 10 non] 171vb P 10 postea discutietur] Vide §§148–157 infra. 18 supra dictum est] Vide §87 supra. 1 constant] constat OP 6 forma] formae ante corr. O 6 corporeitate] corporeitatem P 14 dicimus esse] inv. P 14 multitudinem] + et materia mg. dex. O 18 uerum] + ? mg. dex. O 26 collectionis] concollectionis (?) P 28 loquendi] sup. lin. O 28 aliquam] aliqua O

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sensibility. As noted [in §87] with regard to animal, they are essentially nowhere else; rather, they sustain the forms belonging to all the species of body, indifferent to them. The multiplicity of such essences of body is called the genus of the nature that we said is made up out of the multiplicity of essences of animal. Now each of the essences of body (which is the genus) consists in matter (i.e. some essence of substance) and form (i.e. corporeity). The essences that are indifferent to them in corporeity, which is the form, sustain its various species. The multiplicity of such essences is called the most generic genus, Substance. Yet it still isn’t simple, but rather consists in ‘pure essence’ (as I might call it) as matter and ‘susceptibility to contraries’ as form. (Whether this ‘pure essence’ is a genus, and the reason it isn’t, will be discussed [in §§148–157].) 90 Let what has been said about substance likewise be understood for the other categories. 91 Now let’s see what reason and authority may judge about this theory.

[3.4.2 Objections to Collective Realism] 92 [An objection is raised]: We say that the species is a multiplicity of essences similar among themselves, e.g. man. Furthermore, the species man is the matter of its individuals. Therefore, the whole multiplicity that is called humanity is the matter of Socrates and of each man. Now matter is what receives form; therefore, the species man receives Socrateity. But this isn’t true at all. Only the element belonging to humanity that is in Socrates is informed by Socrateity (as stated [in §87]). However, that element is not the species; rather, the species is what is made up out of it and other essences that are similar. 93 Pay attention! Every species is the matter of an individual belonging to it, and receives its form—not in such a way that each of the essences belonging to the species is informed by that form, clearly, but only one is. Yet since this one is exactly similar in composition to all the other essences belonging to the same nature, the authorities meant that whatever it receives, so too the aggregate of it and the rest receives. For they didn’t judge the one essence belonging to the collection to be diverse from the whole collection, but rather to be the same—not because the one is the other, but because the one is of similar creation with the other in matter and form. 94 Furthermore, ordinary usage also confirms this to be the case. Seeing some iron lump from which a knife and a stylus are to be made, we say: “This is going to be the matter of the knife and the stylus.” However, the whole lump never receives the form of either of them. Instead, part of the lump receives the form of the stylus, part the form of the knife.

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95 Item species est quae de pluribus in quid praedicatur. Praedicari autem est inhaerere; sed illa multitudo Socrati non inhaeret; Socratem enim non tangit nisi una essentia illius multitudinis. 96 Audi et attende! Praedicari quidem inhaerere dicunt. Usus quidem hoc habet sed ex auctoritate non inueni; concedo tamen: inhaerere autem dico humanitatem Socrati, non quod tota consumatur in Socrate sed una tantum eius pars Socratitate informatur. Sic enim dicor tangere parietem, non quod singulae partes mei parieti haereant sed forsitan sola summitas digiti qua haerente dicor tangere. Eodem quoque modo exercitus aliquis dicitur haerere muro uel alicui loco, non quod singulae personae exercitus illi haereant sed aliquis de exercitu. Similiter de specie quamuis maior sit identitas alicuius essentiae illius collectionis ad totum quam alicuius personae ad exercitum, illud enim idem est cum suo toto, hoc uero diuersum. 97 Item species in quid praedicatur de indiuiduo. Praedicari autem in quid, ut aiunt, est praedicari in essentia; praedicari autem in essentia est hoc esse illud. Cum ergo dicitur “Socrates est homo,” cum hic species praedicetur de Socrate in essentia, hic est sensus: Socrates est illae multae essentiae—quod plane falsum est. Et habebimus illud idem inconueniens quod in aliis sententiis, scilicet singulare est uniuersale. Nam Socrates est homo; illa multitudo homo autem species; quare singulare est uniuersale. 98 Audi uigilanter! Praedicari in quid est praedicari in essentia. Hoc consentio; praedicari in essentia dicere hoc esse illud, nego. Nam praedicari in substantia dicit Boethius idem esse cum praedicari de subiecto, praedicari autem de subiecto dici de inferiori cuius sit essentia. 99 Hoc commune est generibus et speciebus et substantialibus differentiis respectu illorum quibus conferunt essentiam. Nam et homo et rationalitas aeque praedicantur de Socrate, ut de subiecto et in substantia. Nec tamen dicitur “Socrates est rationalitas” sed “Socrates est rationalis,” id est res in qua est rationalitas. Eodem modo homo species praedicatur de Socrate in substantia, nec tamen dicitur “Socrates est homo illa species” sed “Socrates est unum de his quibus inhaeret illa species.” 25 et2] 159a O

29 praedicatur] 172ra P

22–24 Nam . . . essentia] BOETHIUS, In cat. 176A (PL 64): “De subiecto uero praedicari est, quoties altera res de altera in ipsa substantia praedicatur, ut animal de homine; nam quoniam animal et substantia est et genus hominis, idcirco in eo quod quid sit de homine praedicatur. Quare illa sola de subiecto praedicari dicuntur quaecumque in cuiuslibet rei substantia et in definitione ponuntur.” 9 dicor] post corr. P 11 aliquis] aliquid O 11 identitas] post corr. P 19 uniuersale] + Audi uigilanter exp. O 19 homo] sup. lin. P 20 singulare est uniuersale] etc. P 21 in quid ] inquit OP 24 subiecto] + potest del. O 29 Socrate] + est rationalis id est res in qua est rationalitas (dittogr.) P

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95 [An objection is raised]: The species is that which is predicated in quid of many. Now to be predicated is to inhere. Yet the multiplicity doesn’t inhere in Socrates, for only one essence belonging to the multiplicity touches upon Socrates. 96 Listen and pay attention! They say [in §95] that to be predicated is to inhere. Common usage holds this, but I haven’t found it in an authority. Nevertheless, I concede the point. But I say that humanity does inhere in Socrates: not that the whole is used up in Socrates; rather, only one part of it is informed with Socrateity. This is how I am said to touch a wall. It isn’t that each of my parts is in contact with the wall. Maybe only the tip of my finger is. But by this contact I am said to be touching it. In the same way, too, some army is said to occupy a city wall or some place: not that each person in the army stays there, but that someone in the army does. Likewise for the species, though an essence from the collection has a greater identity to the whole collection than does any one soldier to the army; the former is the same as its whole, whereas the latter is different. 97 [An objection is raised]: The species is predicated in quid of the individual. To be predicated in quid is, as they say, to be predicated in essence; to be predicated in essence is for this to be that. Thus when we say: Socrates is a man since the species is predicated of Socrates in essence here, the sense is: ‘Socrates is those many essences’—which is clearly false, and we’ll have the same unacceptable result as in the other theories, namely that the singular is universal. For Socrates is a man; the multiplicity man is the species; accordingly, the singular is universal. 98 Listen carefully! Being predicated in quid is indeed being predicated in essence. I agree with this, but I deny that being predicated in essence asserts this to be that. Boethius says that being predicated in substance is the same as being predicated of a subject, whereas being predicated of a subject is being said of something falling under that of which it is the essence.26 99 This point [in §98] is common to genera and species and substantial differentiae as regards the things on which they bestow essence. For ‘man’ and ‘rationality’ are equally predicated of Socrates, as of a subject and in substance. Yet we don’t say: Socrates is rationality but rather: Socrates is rational That is, a thing in which there is rationality. In the same way, the species man is predicated of Socrates in substance, yet we don’t say: Socrates is the species man but rather: Socrates is one of the objects in which the species inheres 26 The claim put forward in §98 is that being predicated in quid or in essence is not to assert that one thing is another. Instead, it is a matter of being predicated in substance (or in quality or quantity . . . ), and such cases declare that a subject is characterized by the predicate, or, equivalently, that it falls under the predicate.

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100 Sed dicunt: Similitudo non procedit nam ‘rationale’ alterius nomen est pro impositione, scilicet animalis, et aliud est quod principaliter significat, scilicet rationalitas, quam praedicat et subicit; ‘homo’ uero nihil aliud uel nominat uel significat quam illam speciem. 101 Absit hoc! Immo sicut ‘rationale’ et ‘homo’ sic et quodlibet aliud uniuersale substantiuum alterius nomen est per impositionem, quidem eius quod principaliter significat. Verbi gratia ‘rationale’ uel ‘album’ impositum fuit Socrati uel alicui sensibilium ad nominandum propter formas, id est rationalitatem et albedinem, quas principaliter significant. Eodem modo ‘homo’ impositum fuit cuilibet materialiter constituto ex homine ad nominandum propter eorum materiam, scilicet speciem, quam principaliter significaret. 102 Itaque cum dicitur “Socrates est homo” hic est sensus: Socrates est unus de materialiter constitutis ab homine; uel, ut ita dicam, Socrates est unus de humanatis. Sicut cum dicitur “Socrates est rationalis” non iste est sensus: Res subiecta est res praedicata, sed: Socrates est unus de subiectis huic formae quae est rationalitas. 103 Quod autem ‘homo’ impositum sit his quae materialiter constituuntur ab homine, id est indiuiduis, et non speciei dicit Boethius in commentario super Categorias his uerbis: “Qui enim primus hominem dixit, non illum qui ex singulis conficitur in mente habuit sed hunc indiuiduum atque singularem cui nomen hominis imponeret.” 104 Et nota quod nomina illa tantum dicuntur substantiua quae imponuntur ad nominandum aliquem propter eius materiam, ut ‘homo’ et cætera uniuersalia substantiua, uel propter expressam essentiam, ut ‘Socrates’; idem enim nominat et significat, scilicet compositum ex humanitate et Socratitate. Adiectiua uero illa dicuntur quae imponuntur alicui propter formam quam principaliter significant, ut ‘rationale’ et ‘album’ res illas nominant in quibus inueniuntur rationalitas et albedo. 105 Nam quod dici solet, adiectiuum esse quod significat accidens secundum quod adiacet et substantiuum quod significat essentiam ut essentiam, ridiculum est uel sine intellectu. Nam cum dicunt ‘album’ esse adiectiuum quia significat albedinem ut adiacentem, aut iste est sensus ‘albedinem quae

19–21 Qui . . . imponeret] BOETHIUS, In cat. 183D (PL 64): “Qui enim primus hominem dixit, non illum qui ex singulis hominibus conficitur concepit sed animo quemdam singularem atque indiuiduum cui hominis nomen imponeret.” Cf. §147 infra. 6 est] sup. lin. O 8 sensibilium] sensilium OP 8 id est] scilicet sup. lin. O 10 cuilibet] post corr. P 13 ita] Vix legi potest sup. lin. O 14 humanatis] post corr. P 14 rationalis] + animal exp. O sup. lin. P 15 sed] scilicet P 22 quod] quia O 27 significant] significat OP 27 nominant] nominat P

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100 Yet they reply that the analogy [in §99] doesn’t work, for ‘rational’ is the name of something further by imposition,27 namely animal, and what it principally signifies, namely rationality, is something other than what it predicates and puts as subject, whereas ‘man’ neither refers to nor signifies anything other than the species. 101 Away with this reply! Rather, as with ‘man’ and ‘rational,’ so too any other universal substantive is the name of something further by imposition— indeed, the name of what it principally signifies. For example, ‘rational’ and ‘white’ were imposed on Socrates, or on anything sensible, in order to refer according to the forms that they principally signify (namely rationality and whiteness). In the same way, ‘man’ was imposed on anything materially constituted out of man in order to refer to men according to their matter, namely the species, which it principally signified. 102 Therefore, when we say: Socrates is a man the sense is ‘Socrates is one of the objects materially constituted by man,’ or, as I might put it, ‘Socrates is one of the objects made human’—just as when we say: Socrates is rational the sense isn’t ‘the thing predicated is the thing put as the subject’ but rather ‘Socrates is one of the objects subject to the form of rationality.’ 103 That ‘man’ is imposed on objects materially constituted by man, that is, on individuals and not the species, is furthermore something Boethius says: Whoever first said ‘man’ did not have in mind that which is made up out of each of them, but rather this individual singular on whom he imposed the name ‘man.’ 104 Note that only those names are called substantives that are imposed in order to refer to someone either according to his matter, such as ‘man’ and other universal substantives, or expressly according to his essence, such as ‘Socrates’—for it refers to and signifies the selfsame object, namely what is composed out of man and Socrateity. And names are called adjectives that are imposed on something according to the form they principally signify, as ‘rational’ and ‘white’ refer to objects in which rationality and whiteness are found. 105 What is usually said—that an adjective is what signifies an accident in that it is adjacent, a substantive is what signifies the essence as essence—is ridiculous and incomprehensible.28 When they say that ‘white’ is an adjective because it signifies whiteness as adjacent, the sense is either (a) ‘whiteness that is adjacent,’ and the same

27 A name is said to be “imposed” on its bearer, usually in something like a case of baptism, the reason for the imposition (causa impositionis) of the name was often thought to be part of the name’s meaning, or at least to determine its extension. 28 An adjective such as ‘white’ is imposed to signify whiteness principally, as noted in §104; when it is used in combination with a substantive noun such as ‘weasel’ it signifies that whiteness (the form) inheres in the weasel as an accidental form, the technical term for which is ‘adjacence.’ Substantive terms, by contrast, signify what something is.

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adiacet’ et idem potest dici quod albedo, aut ‘albedinem ita quod adiacentiam,’ circa ipsam idem inquiretur utrum adiacentiam ut adiacentiam est aut alio modo. Neutrum rationabiliter concedetur. 106 Sed opponetur: Si ‘homo’ tantum sensibilium nomen est, his tamen uocibus consignificatur quae de materiatis ab homine agere possunt. Coagit autem huic uoci quae est ‘species’ uel ‘uniuersale,’ quae nominibus indiuiduorum non consignificatur. 107 Sciendum est ergo quia uocabula quae imposita sunt rebus propter aliud significandum, id est principaliter circa ea, quandoque transferuntur ad agendum de principali significatione. Ut cum ‘rationale’ impositum sit substantiis ad nominandum, et ‘album’ similiter, translatiue tamen dicitur “Rationale est differentia” et “Album est species coloris,” nihil aliud intelligo quam rationalitas et albedo. Sic et ‘homo’ transfertur ad agendum de natura quam principaliter significat cum dicitur “Homo est species.” 108 Quaeretur an aequiuocum sit ‘homo’ cum transfertur ad speciem. Translationum enim duo genera sunt, alterum commoditate alterum necessitate. 109 Commoditate quidem ad rem habentem nomen, nomen alterius rei transferimus; ut cum nauis gubernator suo nomine ‘nauta’ appelletur per quamdam officii similitudinem ‘auriga’ dicitur, et talis tamen translatio non facit aequiuocationem. 110 Necessitate fit translatio cum nomine alicuius rei rem nomen non habentem significamus, ut cum pictura ‘homo’ dicitur, et sic aequiuoce hoc nomen ‘homo’ dicitur. Quod si sic est, aequiuocum esse uidetur cum ‘homo’ ad speciem transfertur, nec enim ad rem habentem nomen fit translatio. 111 Non est autem aequiuocatio. Est enim ut ait Boethius sophisma uniuocationis: “Homo comedit” “Homo non comedit” si in una agitur de indiuiduo in alia de specie. Concedimus itaque hanc translationem necessitate fieri sed non omnem quae necessitate fit facere aequiuocationem, nisi per impositionem stabile ei illud nomen imponatur. Ait enim Boethius in com12 et] 172rb P 19 et] 159b O 25–27 ut . . . specie] BOETHIUS, In per. maior II.6 (Meiser II 133.2–8): “Positis ergo secundum uniuocationem terminis utrasque simul et affirmationem et negationem ueras esse contingit, ut si quis dicat ‘Homo ambulat’ ‘Homo non ambulat’ affirmatio de quodam homine uera est, negatio de speciali uera. Sed specialis homo et particularis uniuoca sunt: quocirca sumptis uniuocis contradictio non fit.” 2 est] om. O 4 sensibilium] sensilium OP 5 consignificatur] consignificat OP 7 consignificatur] consignificat OP 8 est] sup. lin. O 8 quia] om. P 9 id est] om. P 9 ea] eas ante corr. O eas P 10 significatione] + omne exp. O 16 necessitate] necessitaO post corr. P 17 quidem] + causa curialitatis (?) OP 17 nomen2] + al- O 23 aequiuocum] aequiuoce O

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thing can be said for ‘whiteness,’ or (b) ‘whiteness as adjacent,’ about which the same question can be raised, namely whether it is adjacent as adjacent or in some other way.29 Neither (a) nor (b) will be granted rationally. 106 But an objection will be raised: If ‘man’ is the name only of sensible objects, it is nevertheless co-signified by terms that can deal with what is enmattered by man. This also applies to the term ‘species’ (or ‘universal’), which isn’t co-signified by names of individuals. 107 Thus it should be known that terms imposed on things for the sake of signifying something further, i.e. principally in respect of them, are sometimes transferred in order to deal with their principal signification. For example, although ‘rational’ is imposed on substances in order to refer [to them], and likewise ‘white,’ nevertheless when we say: Rational is a differentia White is a species of color by transference I understand nothing other than rationality and whiteness. So too when we say: Man is a species ‘man’ is transferred so as to deal with the nature it principally signifies. 108 The question will arise whether ‘man’ is equivocal when it is transferred to the species. For there are two kinds of transference: one for convenience, the other by necessity. 109 We transfer the name of one thing to another for convenience when it already has a name. For example, although the captain of a ship is called by his own name ‘sailor,’ he is also called its ‘driver’ due to a certain similarity of function. This sort of transference doesn’t produce equivocation. 110 Transference comes about by necessity when we signify a thing that doesn’t have a name by the name of something else. For example, when a painting is called a man, the name ‘man’ is used equivocally in this way. But if so, when ‘man’ is transferred to the species it seems to be equivocal, for the transference doesn’t come about to a thing having a name. 111 However, there is no equivocation. As Boethius says, there is a sophism of univocation: Man eats Man does not eat if the individual is meant in one and the species in the other. Therefore, we grant that the transference comes about by necessity, but not every transference that arises by necessity produces equivocation—only if a fixed name were imposed on it by imposition. Boethius says: 29 The argument here is extremely compressed. Suppose that ‘white’ signifies the whiteness that adjoins a subject, i.e. that accidentally inheres in it. Then ‘white’ signifies either (a) whiteness simpliciter, regardless of its adjoining a subject, and then it is no different from the substantive ‘whiteness’; or (b) whiteness-as-adjacent, which then either is instantiated, i.e. obtains in some subject, or not, and in either case no gain has been made.

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mentario super Categorias: “Neque enim uocabula aequiuoca sunt nisi res subiectae propriis et immutabilibus uocabulis appellentur.” Hic autem forsitan nulla fuit impositio sed ita tantum usus habuit. Ut in alia translatione nemo nautae imposuit ‘auriga’ sed quidem iniunxit “Auriga regit nauim” pro similitudine offici, uidens in tali contextu per aurigam nautam posse intelligi. 112 Item opponitur: Si ‘homo,’ cum nomen sit inferiorum, principaliter significat speciem, species autem nihil aliud sit quam illa essentiarum collectio, ‘homo’ autem illam multitudinem significat, et sic anima alicuius audiens hanc uocem ‘homo’ concipiendo operatur in illa multitudine, et ita uel unam tantum essentiam illius collectionis uel plures uel omnes concipit. Quae singula falsa sunt, audiens enim ‘homo’ in nullam essentiam illius collectionis auditor per hoc nomen descendit. 113 Verum quidem istud concedo nam saepe intellectum habemus de aliqua hominum multitudine quam a longe uidemus cuius forte nullum cognoscimus, et neque tamen in unum uel in plures uel in omnes cogitatione descendimus, et tamen in tota multitudine cogitando laboramus. Idem et de aliquo aceruo quem aliquando uidemus, neque tamen ad aliquam essentiam illius acerui animum dirigimus. 114 Hoc autem uoluisse mihi plane uidetur Boethius in secundo commentario super Perihermeneias his uerbis: “Cum enim tale aliquid animo speculamur, non in unamquamque personam mentis cogitatione deducimur per hoc nomen quod est ‘homo’ sed in homines quicumque definitione humanitatis participant.” Et alibi: “Humanitas ex singulorum hominum collecta naturis in unam quodammodo redigitur intelligentiam atque naturam.” 115 Item contra dicitur: Si nihil aliud est species quam illud quod conficitur ex multis essentiis, quotiens et illud mutabitur, mutabitur etiam species. Illud autem singulis horis mutatur. Verbi gratia ponamus humanitatem constare tantum ex decem essentiis, in momento nascetur aliquis homo, et iam 17 aceruo] 172va P 1–2 Neque . . . appellentur] BOETHIUS, In cat. 166D (PL 64): “Quare secundum translationem aequiuoca nunquam sunt, nisi propriis et immutabilibus subiectae res uocabulis appellentur.” 20–23 Cum . . . participant] BOETHIUS, In per. maior II.7 (Meiser II 136.25–28): “Quotienscumque enim aliquid tale animo speculamur; non in unam quamcumque personam per nomen hoc mentis cogitatione deducimur sed in omnes eos quicumque humanitatis definitione participant.” Cf. §119 et §147 infra. 23–24 Humanitas . . . naturam] BOETHIUS, In per. maior II.7 (Meiser II 139.6–9): “Namque humanitas ex singulorum hominum collecta naturis in unam quodammodo redigitur intellegentiam atque naturam.” Cf. §147 infra. 4 quidem iniunxit] quae coniunxit O 14 uidemus] uidimus ante corr. O 17 uidemus] uidimus ante corr. O 21 cogitatione] cogitationem P 21 deducimur] + sed OP 22 homines] lect. dub. O

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Terms are not equivocal unless the things that are subject to them are named by unchangeable proper terms. Perhaps there was no imposition in this case, but only usage had it in this way. For example, in the other case of transference, [in §109], nobody imposed ‘driver’ on a sailor, but rather declared: The driver governs the ship due to the similarity of function, seeing that a sailor can be understood by ‘driver’ in this kind of context. 112 An objection is raised: If ‘man’ principally signifies the species even though it is a name of things that fall under it, and the species is nothing other than the collection of essences, then ‘man’ signifies that multiplicity. Hence the soul of someone hearing the utterance ‘man’ is engaged in conceiving of that multiplicity, and so conceives either only one essence belonging to that collection, or several, or all—but each is false; hearing ‘man,’ the listener does not descend to any essence belonging to that collection by this name. 113 I grant that the point raised [in §112] is true. For we often have an understanding of some multiplicity of men that we see from a distance of whom we perhaps we know none, and yet we don’t descend in thought to one or to several or to all of them, and nevertheless we work at thinking of the multiplicity as a whole. The same point holds for some heap we see occasionally: we don’t direct the mind to any essence belonging to the heap. 114 Boethius seems to me to clearly have held this view with his words: When we speculate on something of the sort with our mind, we are not led by our mind’s thought to any one given person through the name ‘man,’ but rather to all those who participate in the definition of humanity. Elsewhere: Humanity, collected from the natures of each man, is somehow reduced to a single understanding and nature. 115 An objection is raised: If the species is nothing but what is made up out of many essences, then as often as the latter is changed so too the species will be changed. But the collection is changed every hour! For example, suppose that humanity consists in only ten essences, and in a moment some man will be born;

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conficietur alia humanitas. Non est idem aceruus constans ex undecim essentiis et decem. Et ut plus dicam, singulae essentiae humanitatis quae illam speciem confecerunt ante mille annos modo prorsus perierunt, et nouae subcreuerunt quae humanitatem quae hodie species est conficiunt. Itaque nisi singulis momentis significatio huius uocis ‘homo’ mutetur non potest uere dici bis “Socrates est homo.” Nam cum iterum dixeris “Socrates est homo” si dicas esse de humanitate quam prius dixeris, falsum est nam illa iam non est. 116 Attende! Verum est quidem quod illa humanitas quae ante mille annos fuit uel quae heri, non est illa quae hodie est. Sed tamen est eadem cum illa, id est creationis non dissimilis. Non enim quicquid idem est cum alio idem est illud, homo enim et asinus idem sunt in genere nec tamen hoc est illud. Socrates quoque ex pluribus atomis constat uir quam puer, et tamen idem est. Vocis quoque significatio non mutatur quamuis hoc non sit illud, ut patet in hac uoce ‘Cæsar’ quae idem significat, mortuo Cæsare, quamuis non sit uerum dicere “Cæsar est Cæsar.” Cum enim dicitur hodie “Cæsar uicit Pompeium” de eadem re habetur intellectus de qua uiuente Cæsare, hodie tamen Cæsar non est Cæsar. Similiter ‘homo’ nominat aliquid materiatum ab homine, scilicet humanitate, sed non ex uocis significatione est utrum ex humanitate constante ex decem siue ex amplioribus. Tamdiu ergo uerum est dicere “Socrates est homo” quamdiu est materiatum ab humanitate ex quantislibet essentiis humanitatis constante. 117 Amplius. Species est quae de pluribus differentibus numero in eo quod quid est praedicatur, id est quae pluribus inhaeret materialiter. Quod si uerum est econuerso dicere quod omne quod sic praedicatur sit species, non una tantum erit species humanitas sed multae. Ponamus enim decem tantum essentias esse humanitatis quae illam speciem conficiunt. Dico quod quinque illarum erunt una species et quinque alia. Nam illud confectum ex quinque praedicatur (hoc est inhaeret materialiter) pluribus, id est quinque indiuiduis ab eis materialiter constitutis, et eodem modo illud quod ex aliis quinque efficitur. 118 Nosse debes quod nusquam quid sit praedicari plane dicit auctoritas. Nam quid solet dici, quod praedicari est inhaerere, usus est ex nulla auctoritate procedens. Mihi autem uidetur quod praedicari est principaliter significari per uocem praedicatam, subici uero significari principaliter per uocem subiectam. Et hoc quodammodo uideor habere a Prisciano qui in tractatu orationis ante nomen dicit praepositiones et coniunctiones ıªŒÆŪæÆÆ, 12 et] 160a O 32 ex] 172vb P 3 prorsus] mg. dex. O 10 illa] illis O 10 id est] sup. lin. OP 21 humanitatis] mg. sin. O 22 quae] quod OP 24 econuerso] post corr. P 26 humanitatis] humanitas ante corr. O

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then another humanity will be made up. It is not the same group that consists in eleven essences and in ten essences. Let me say more: each of the essences of humanity that made up that species a thousand years ago have now perished, and new ones have grown up as replacements that make up the humanity that is the species today. Therefore, unless the signification of the term ‘man’ were to be changed at every moment, Socrates is a man cannot be said truly twice. For once you say “Socrates is a man” for the second time, were you to mean that he is of the humanity of which you previously spoke, this is false, because it no longer exists. 116 Pay attention! It’s true that the humanity that existed a thousand years ago, or yesterday, isn’t what exists today. But it is nevertheless the same as the latter, that is, not of dissimilar creation. For it isn’t the case that whatever is the same as another is the selfsame object. A man and an ass are the same in genus, yet the one isn’t the other. Socrates too consists in many more atoms as a man than he did as a boy, and yet he is the same. Also, the signification of a term is not changed because this isn’t that, as is clear in the case of the term ‘Caesar,’ which signifies the same thing once Caesar has died, even though it isn’t true to say: Caesar is Caesar. When one says: Caesar overcame Pompey today the understanding considers the same thing as when Caesar is alive; yet Caesar is not Caesar today. Likewise, ‘man’ refers to something that is enmattered by man, i.e. by humanity, but it isn’t in virtue of the signification of the term whether humanity consists in ten men or in more. Therefore, it is true to say: Socrates is a man just as long as he is enmattered by humanity, consisting in any number of essences of humanity. 117 What’s more, the species is that which is predicated of many numerically different things in quid, that is, what materially inheres in many. But if it’s true to say, conversely, that anything predicated in this way is a species, there will not only be one species of humanity but many. Let’s suppose that there are ten essences of humanity that make up the species. I say that five of them will be one species and five another. For that which is made up out of five essences is predicated (i.e. materially inheres) in many—that is, in those five individuals materially consituted by them. The same for that which is produced out of the other five. 118 You should know that authority doesn’t clearly state anywhere what it is to be predicated. For what is usually said, that to be predicated is to inhere, is a usage that doesn’t proceed from any authority. Furthermore, it seems to me that being predicated is being principally signified by the predicate-term, and being put as the subject is being signified by the subject-term. I seem somehow to have this from Priscian, who calls prepositions and conjunctions ‘ıªŒÆŪæÆÆ,’ i.e. co-

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id est consignificantia. Scimus autem ı- apud Graecos cum praepositionem significare, ŒÆŪæ Ø autem praedicari (unde categoriae ‘praedicamenta’ dicuntur). Si ergo idem est categoremata quod significantia, idem erit praedicari quod significari principaliter, scilicet quam solam significationem recepit Aristoteles iuxta illud: “ ‘Album’ nil significat nisi qualitatem.” Cum enim ‘album’ etiam subiectum albedinis nominando significet, illam solam significationem notauit Aristoteles in qua intellectus constituitur per uocem. 119 Reuertamur ergo et uideamus an illud constitutum tantum ex quinque essentiis praedicetur in quid de pluribus, ut dictum est. Cum enim dicitur “Socrates est homo” non praedicatur nisi quod ex singulis humanitatis essentiis constituitur. Neque enim principaliter aliud significatur per hoc nomen quod est ‘homo’ quam tota multitudo, nec aliqua una essentia nec aliquid constitutum ex pluribus essentiis illius multitudinis, iuxta illud Boethii quod dictum est (“Humanitas” etc.), utique actualiter significatur. 120 Nec ita accipiendum est in definitione speciei ‘praedicari’ actualiter, alioquin omnibus tacentibus nulla species esset nam nil significaretur sed ‘aptum ad praedicandum,’ id est ad principaliter significandum per uocem praedicatam, quod conuenit collectioni ex quinque essentiis. 121 Possent enim duo nomina poni quorum alterum daret intellectum de uno collecto et alterum de altero. 122 Hoc falsum est. Per nullum enim nomen haberetur intellectus de illo coniuncto discernens ab alio coniuncto. Non enim conciperet uel diuersam materiam uel diuersam formam uel res diuersorum effectuum, quod quale sit post dicetur, sed sicut ‘ensis’ et ‘gladius’ eumdem generant intellectum ita illa duo nomina facerent. 123 Item opponi potest: Illud constitutum ex quinque essentiis aptum est praedicari de pluribus, quia cras forsan praedicabitur per hoc nomen ‘homo.’ Contingere enim potest ut humanitas quae hodie ex decem essentiis constat ex quinque tantum essentiis cras constituatur. 21 haberetur] 160b O 25.36–26.1 praepositiones . . . consignificantia] PRISCIANUS, Inst. gramm. II.15 (Keil 54.7): “Alias autem partes ‘syncatoremata,’ hoc est consignificantia, [dialectici] appellabant.” 5 ‘Album’ . . . qualitatem] ARISTOTELES, Cat. 5 3b 19–20 (Ar. lat. I.1–5 ed. comp. 52.11–12): “Nihil enim aliud significat album quam qualitatem.” 9 ut dictum est] Vide §117 supra. 14 dictum est] Vide §114 supra. 24 post dicetur] Vide §§123–124, §126, §133, §§152–153 infra. 6 etiam] sup. lin. O om. P 6 solam] inter col. O 8 quinque] post corr. P 9 essentiis] + constituitur. Neque enim exp. O 11 nomen] + ‘homo’ exp. O + ‘homo’ P 14 Humanitas] Humanitatis P 14 actualiter] + non OP 16 nam] sup. lin. O 25 facerent] faceretur OP

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significant. We know that ‘ı-’ in Greek signifies the preposition ‘co-’ while ŒÆŪæ Ø signifies ‘to be predicated’ (and accordingly the categories are also called the ‘praedicaments’). Therefore, if categoremata are the same as significant terms, being predicated will be the same as being principally signified. This is the only signification accepted by Aristotle, in line with his remark: ‘White’ signifies nothing except quality. Since ‘white’ signifies the subject of whiteness by referring, Aristotle marked out only the signification in which an understanding is constituted by the term. 119 Let’s return [to §115], then, and see whether the collection made up out of only five essences is predicated in quid of many, as stated. When we say: Socrates is a man only what is made up out of each of the essences of humanity is predicated. Nor is anything but the whole multiplicity principally signified by the name ‘man’: surely neither some one essence, nor something made up out of many essences belonging to that multiplicity, is actually signified (in line with Boethius’s remark [cited at the end of §114]). 120 Nor should ‘is predicated’ in the definition of the species be taken as ‘is actually predicated.’ Otherwise, if everyone were silent there would be no species, for nothing would be signified. Rather, it should be taken as ‘is apt to be predicated,’ i.e. to principally signify what is predicated by the term, which is appropriate to the collection of five essences. 121 [An objection is raised]: Two names could be given, one of which generated an understanding of one collection and the other of the other. 122 This is false. There is no name through which an understanding discriminates one collection from the other, for it wouldn’t conceive their different matter or different form or things with different effects. (How this is so will be discussed [in §§123–124, §126, §132, and §152–153].) Instead, just as ‘sword’ and ‘blade’ generate the same understanding, so too would those two names. 123 Again, the objection can be raised that what is made up out of five essences is apt to be predicated of many, because perhaps tomorrow it will be predicated by this name ‘man.’ For it can happen that humanity, which today consists in ten essences, would be made up out of only five tomorrow.

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124 Falsum est. Illud constitutum ex quinque essentiis, dum sit in constitutione humanitatis constitutae ex amplioribus, non est aptum ut de ea habeatur intellectus, quamuis paulo post habebitur, cum ad numerum quinque essentiarum humanitas redigetur. Sicut enim uox aliqua ante impositionem potest quidem significare sed tamen non est apta ad significandum (licet post impositionem significet), et sicut penna potens est ut per eam scribatur ante inscisionem nec tamen apta est, sic illud constitutum ex quinque essentiis, dum manet pars humanitatis ex pluribus constitutae, potens quidem est significari per uocem sed non est aptum dum sit pars humanitatis ex pluribus constitutae. 125 Quod si praedicari quidem pro inhaerere accipiatur, quod et nos concedimus (neque enim bonum usum abolere uolumus), sic dicendum est: Omnis natura quae pluribus inhaeret indiuiduis materialiter species est. 126 Quod si quis opponat: Ergo constitutum ex quinque essentiis species est, ipsum enim pluribus inhaeret materialiter—responde modo: Nil ad rem quia non est natura, hic autem tantum agitur de naturis. Si autem quaeras: Quid appellent naturam? Audi: Naturam dico quicquid dissimilis creationis est ab omnibus quae non sunt uel illud uel de illo, siue una essentia sit siue plures, ut Socrates dissimilis creationis ab omnibus quae non sunt Socrates. Similiter et homo species est dissimilis creationis ab omnibus rebus quae non sunt illa species uel aliqua essentia illius speciei, quod non conuenit cuilibet collecto ex aliquot essentiis humanitatis. Nam illud non est dissimilis creationis a reliquis essentiis quae in illa specie sunt. 127 Amplius. Quaeritur utrum omni speciei conueniat “praedicari in quid etc.” Quod si concedatur, dicunt quod conuenit phoenici quae ex pluribus essentiis collecta non est sed una tantum est essentia, sed ista nec pluribus est apta inhaerere nec principaliter significari, pluribus existentibus subiectis quorum sit materia quia, cum una indiuisibilis essentia sit, in pluribus eodem tempore esse non potest. 128 Respondemus: Boethius hanc facit oppositionem et soluit, quia illa definitio non conuenit omni speciei sed pro maiori parte data est. 129 Sed aliter soluit. Multa dicuntur secundum naturam quae non sunt secundum actum; ita phoenix, quamuis actualiter non praedicetur de pluribus, apta est tamen praedicari. Quod qualiter uerum sit non uideo nisi dicatur: Illa materia quae sustinet formam huius phoenicis potest illam amittere et, 11 Quod] 173ra P 7 sic] sicut P 11 quidem] quod OP 12 sic] sicut P 17 Audi] Exaudi lect. dub. P 23 specie] species P 26 tantum] tamen P 28 in] om. P 33 de] quidem P 34 sit] + uideamus exp. OP

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124 This is false. What is made up out of those five essences, as long as it is contained in the make-up of a humanity itself made up out of many more, isn’t apt for an understanding to be had of it—even though slightly later, when humanity will be reduced to five essences in number, an understanding will be had of it. Just as some utterance is able to signify before its imposition but is not apt to signify even though after its imposition it does signify, and just as a pen is able to be written with before its nib is split but it is not yet apt for this purpose—well, so too what is made up out of five essences, as long as part of humanity that is made up out of many continues to exist, is able to be signified by an utterance, yet isn’t apt to do so while it is a part of humanity made up out of many more. 125 Now if being predicated were to be taken as inhering—and for our part we allow this, for we don’t want to get rid of a good usage—then it should be said that every nature materially inhering in many individuals is a species. 126 If someone were to object [to §125] that what is made up out of five essences is therefore a species, for it materially inheres in many, reply as follows: This doesn’t matter, for the subcollection isn’t a nature, and only natures are in question here. If you ask what a nature is, listen: I call ‘nature’ whatever is of dissimilar creation from all those that are not either it or belonging to it, whether it be one essence or several. For example, Socrates is of dissimilar creation from all those who are not Socrates. Likewise, the species man is of dissimilar creation from all things that are not that species or some essence belonging to that species. And this is not suitable for any given subcollection of essences of humanity, since it is not of dissimilar creation from the other essences that are in the species. 127 Still, they ask whether ‘being predicated in quid ’ is suitable to every species. If this were granted, then they object that it is suitable to phoenix, which is not collected out of many essences but out of only one essence, yet it is neither apt to inhere in many nor to be principally signified, there being many subjects whose matter it is, since it cannot be in many at the same time because it is one indivisible essence.30 128 We reply that Boethius offers the objection [in §127] and also resolves it, for the definition isn’t suitable to every species but is given for the most part. 129 Now the objection [in §127] is replied to in another way: Many things are said according to nature that don’t hold in actuality; thus ‘phoenix,’ although it is not actually predicated of many, is nevertheless apt to be so predicated. Yet I don’t see how this claim is true unless we were to say that the matter sustaining the form of

30 According to medieval lore, each phoenix is born from the ashes of the preceding phoenix, so that only one ever exists at a time.

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alia accepta forma, aliud indiuiduum constituere. Et sic eadem materia quae species est diuersis temporibus et non eodem pluribus potest inhaerere. Ita ergo intelligenda est definitio: Species est illa natura quae de pluribus apta est praedicari etc., siue eodem tempore siue diuerso. 130 Forsitan dicetur: Cum una tantum essentia sit phoenicis materia, poterit uere dici “Haec phoenix est phoenix sua materia” quod non poterit dici inter indiuidua hominis et speciem (hominem scilicet), neque Socrates est illae multae essentiae quae sunt species. 131 Hoc negamus, alioquin haberemus inconueniens quod singulare est uniuersale, hoc modo: Haec phoenix est phoenix sua materia, sed illa est uniuersale; ergo haec phoenix est uniuersalis. Generaliter autem dicimus omnem materiam oppositam esse suo materiato, ita scilicet ut hoc non sit illud. 132 Amplius. Opponetur: Illa essentia hominis quae in me est aliquid est aut nihil; si aliquid est, aut substantia aut accidens; si substantia, aut prima aut secunda; si prima, indiuiduum est; si secunda, aut genus aut species. 133 Respondemus tali essentiae nullum nomen esse datum, nec per impositionem nec per translationem. Neque enim auctores dederunt nomina nisi naturis, hanc autem ostensum est non esse naturam. Itaque nec aliquid nec substantia potest appellari proprie. 134 Quod si absurdum uideatur, concedimus aliquid uel substantiam esse. Sed hanc non concedimus: “Si est substantia, uel prima uel secunda.” Haec diuisio non est facta nisi de naturis. Quam si concederemus, duceremur in artum, scilicet ut uel indiuiduum esset uel genus uel species. Secundae enim substantiae sunt species et earum genera, ut ait Aristoteles. Nec cui mirum uideatur nos concedere non esse omnem substantiam uel primam uel secundam. Hoc idem alii faciunt, concedunt enim hominem album esse substantiam, nec tamen primam uel secundam.

5 Cum] 161a O 22 non] 173rb P 24–25 Secundae . . . genera] ARISTOTELES, Cat. 5 2a 13–17 (Ar. lat. I.1–5 ed. comp. 49.1–5): “Secundae autem substantiae dicuntur species, in quibus speciebus illae quae principaliter substantiae dicuntur insunt, hae et harum specierum genera; ut aliquis homo in specie quidem est in homine, genus uero speciei animal est; secundae ergo substantiae dicuntur, ut est homo atque animal.” 6 est phoenix] om. P 6 est] + haec exp. O 8 quae] sup. lin. P 9 haberemus] post corr. P 9 inconueniens] sup. col. O 10 Haec] del. O 11 uniuersalis] uniuersales ante corr. P 14 hominis] mg. sin. O 17 nec] ne OP 26 uideatur] uidetur ante corr. O 28 secundam] + Vacat usque ad finem lineae P

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this phoenix can lose that form and, taking on another form, make up another individual, and thus the same matter that is the species can inhere in many at different times (though not at the same time). Therefore, the definition should be understood as follows: a species is a nature that is apt to be predicated of many numerically different individuals in quid, whether at the same time or at a different time. 130 Perhaps it will be objected that since only one essence is the matter of phoenix, then: This phoenix is phoenix in virtue of its matter will be able to be said truly. But this won’t be able to be said in the case of individual men and the species man, for Socrates is not the many essences that are the species. 131 We deny this; otherwise, we would have the unacceptable result that the singular is universal, as follows: This phoenix is phoenix in virtue of its matter; but it is universal; therefore, this phoenix is universal. We state generally that any matter is opposite to what is enmattered out of it, so that the one isn’t the other. 132 Furthermore, the objection will be raised: The essence of man that is in me is either something or nothing; if something, it’s either substance or accident; if substance, it’s either primary or secondary; if primary it’s an individual, and if secondary it’s either a genus or a species. 133 We reply [to §132] that no name has been given to this sort of essence, neither by imposition nor by transference. For the authorities gave names only to natures, whereas it has been established [in §126] that this isn’t a nature. Therefore, it can’t properly be called ‘substance’ or ‘something.’ 134 Yet if my reply [in §133] should seem absurd, we grant that it is something or substance. Yet we don’t concede this: If substance, it’s either primary or secondary. This division has only been made for natures. If we should allow it, we’d be led into a difficult situation, namely that [the essence of man that is in me] would be either an individual or a species or a genus; as Aristotle says, secondary substances are species and their genera. Let it not seem surprising to anyone that we concede that not all substance is either primary or secondary; others do the same—for they grant that a white man is a substance, yet neither a primary nor a secondary substance.

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135 Hae sunt auctoritates. Quoniam omnia quae rationabile ingenium contra nostram sententiam opponere poterat, resecuisse nos putamus, iam eas auctoritates quae illi contradicere uiderentur insistamus. 136 Boethius in secundo commentario super Porphyrium dicit: “Quantaecumque enim sint species in omnibus genus unum est, non quod de eo singulae species quasi partes aliquas carpant sed quod singulae uno tempore totum genus habent.” Hic plane uidetur negare quod dicimus. Hoc enim habet nostra sententia quod pars essentiarum animalis quae illud genus faciunt informatur rationalitate ad faciendum hominem, pars uero irrationalitate ad faciendum asinum; et nunquam illa tota quantitas in aliqua specierum est. Boethius autem e contra dicit nunquam partem sed totum esse in singulis. 137 Hoc soluimus. Boethius dicit hoc in eo tractatu ubi probat genera et species non esse, quod sinon sophismate probari non poterat. Dicimus ergo illud esse falsum quod dicit. Nec est inconueniens si dum sophisma facit falsum interserit, inconueniens enim nisi per falsum probari non potest. 138 Potest et aliter dici: Cum negat Boethius species partes generis carpere, non de essentiis illam multitudinem coniungentibus agebat sed de partibus definitiuis. Verbi gratia animal genus ex corpore constat materia, ex sensibilitate forma. Cum ergo per partes suae quantitatis transit in species, non arripit una de speciebus materiam et non formam, et alia formam et non materiam, sed in singulis speciebus materia et forma generis est. 139 Item in tractatu differentiae super hunc locum ‘Differentia est qua abundat species a genere’ sic ait Boethius: “Neque enim sicut in corpore solet esse alia pars alba alia nigra, ita fieri in genere potest; genus enim per se consideratum partes non habet nisi ad species referatur. Quicquid igitur habet, non partibus sed tota sui magnitudine retinebit.” Et hoc esse contra nos uidetur.

1 Hae] init. litt. maiusc. OP rubr. P 22 Item] 160b O 4–7 Quantaecumque . . . habent] BOETHIUS, In isag. maior I.10 (Brandt 161.20–22): “Quantaecumque enim sunt species in omnibus genus unum est, non quod de eo singulae species quasi partes aliquas carpant sed singulae uno tempore totum genus habent.” 22–23 Differentia . . . genere] PORPHYRIUS, Isag. 3 (Ar. lat. I.6–7 17.16): “Differentia est qua abundat species a genere.” 23–26 Neque . . . retinebit] BOETHIUS, In isag. maior IV.9 (Brandt 263.22–24): “Neque enim sicut in corpore solet esse alia pars alba alia nigra, ita fieri in genere potest; genus enim per se consideratum partes non habet nisi ad species referatur. Quicquid igitur habet, non partibus sed tota sui magnitudine retinebit.” 3 uiderentur] uideretur P 11 dicit] mg. sin. O 12 hoc] om. O 15 probari] probam ante corr. O 20 alia . . . materiam] alia materiam et non formam OP 21 est] sub col. O 22 hunc] sup. lin. illum ante corr. O 22 qua] quae P 23 sic] sicut P 25 ad] sup. lin. P 26 magnitudine] mg. dex. quantitate ante corr. O + quantitate P 26 hoc] hic O

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[3.4.3 Authorities Against Collective Realism] 135 The authorities are next. Since we think that we’ve put a stop to everything that rational ingenuity was able to object to our theory, let’s now turn to the authorities who seem to contradict it. 136 Boethius says: However many species there are, the genus is one in them all – not that each of the species carries off some parts, as it were, but that each of them has the genus as a whole at one time. In this passage he seems clearly to deny what we say. Our theory holds that part of the essences of animal, which produce that genus, is informed by rationality in order to produce man, and part by irrationality in order to produce ass, and the whole quantity is never as a whole in any of the species. Boethius, on the contrary, says that it is the whole, never the part, in each. 137 We solve the difficulty as follows. Boethius makes this remark in the discussion where he proves that genera and species don’t exist, which was only able to be proved sophistically. Therefore, we reply that what he says is false. Nor is it out of place if he inserts a falsehood while producing a sophism; it is only out of place if the sophism can’t be established by the falsehood. 138 The difficulty posed [in §136] can also be solved in another way. When Boethius denies that the species carries off parts of the genus, he wasn’t dealing with the essences joining together as the multiplicity, but rather with parts of the definition. For example, the genus animal consists in body as matter and in sensibility as form. Therefore, when it goes over into a species by the parts of its quantity, it’s not that one of the species grabs hold of the matter and not the form while the other grabs hold of the form and not the matter; instead, the matter and the form of the genus is in each of the species. 139 Again, in discussing Porphyry’s remark “The differentia is that by which the species is brought forth from the genus,” Boethius says: It cannot come about in the genus as it typically does in a body, one part white and another black. For the genus considered on its own has no parts except as taken with regard to the species; therefore, whatever it has, it will retain not in parts but in its whole magnitude.

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Hoc enim habet nostra sententia quod animal illud genus in parte sui suscipit rationalitatem et in parte irrationalitatem. Nec aliquo modo pars illa quae rationalitate tangitur irrationalitate afficitur uel econuerso. Hoc est enim per quod uitamus duo opposita non esse in eodem, quod scilicet inconueniens effugere non possunt qui grandis asini sententiam tenent. 140 Soluimus hic: Hoc dicit Boethius in eo loco in quo probat aut differentias nil esse aut duo opposita esse in eodem, quod utique falsum est nec sinon sophismate probari potest; in hac ergo probatione falsum hoc interserit. Et tamen non fallitur, sciebat enim falsum esse; interseruit tamen ut ad finem suum sophisma perduceret. 141 Vel dicas eum quantitatem appellare non illam quae essentiis genus illud coniungentibus conficitur, sed illam quae est ex definitiuis partibus, ut secundum hoc dici possit “Unaquaeque essentia illius generis quantitatem generis habet.” Quod autem dicitur genus et speciem ex partibus integralibus non constare, plane falsum esse dicimus nisi hoc concedamus quia auctores partes integrales non appellauerunt nisi essent dissimilis creationis; unde essentias genus uel speciem conficientes recte partes appellare non potuerunt, ipsae enim sunt similis prorsus creationis. 142 Item in eodem commentario dicit Boethius: “Quemadmodum eadem linea curua et caua est, ita et uniuersalitati et particularitati idem subiectum est.” Hic uidetur Boethius uoluisse singulare esse uniuersale. 143 Sed nulla est oppositio, tantum uide quod dixerit. Non enim accepit ‘particulare’ pro singulari, ut aestimant, sed pro specie. Dixit enim: “Generibus et speciebus, id est uniuersalitati et particularitati, idem subiectum est.” Per uniuersalitatem genus et particularitatem speciem generis. Sic ergo intelligendum est: Quemadmodum cauitati et curuitati eadem linea subiecta est ut accidentibus, sic idem ut Socrates generi et speciei, scilicet homini et animali, subiectum est ut praedicatis. 144 Vel aliter: Materia huius phoenicis et ipsum indiuiduum idem sunt, id est non substantialiter differunt. Materia uero subiecta est uniuersalitati, 15 falsum] 173va P 19–21 Quemadmodum . . . est] BOETHIUS, In isag. maior I.11 (Brandt 167.3–5): “Eadem enim linea caua, eadem curua est; ita quoque generibus et speciebus, id est singularitati et uniuersalitati, unum quidem subiectum est.” 23–24 Generibus . . . est] ibid. 3 rationalitate] mg. dex. rationale ante corr. O post corr. P 3 irrationalitate] mg. dex. irrationale ante corr. O irrationale P 3 est] om. P 14 speciem] species OP 15 auctores] auctoritates ante corr. O 16 appellauerunt] post corr. O 17 speciem] species OP 17 partes] post corr. P 21 uoluisse] + esse del. P 23 singulari] singulare O singulare ante corr. P 25 generis] mg. dex. significationis ante corr. O 27 sic idem] post corr. P 27 ut] om. P

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This seems to be against us. Our theory holds that the genus animal receives in part of itself rationality and in part irrationality. Nor is the part that involves rationality affected in any way by irrationality, or conversely. (This is how we avoid two opposites being in the same subject, an embarrassment that those who hold the theory of a great ass can’t get around.31) 140 We solve the difficulty [in §139] as follows: Boethius makes this comment in the passage in which he proves that either differentiae are nothing or two opposites are in the same subject—which surely is false, and can only be proved sophistically; he therefore inserts this falsehood into his proof. Nevertheless, Boethius isn’t fooled; he knew it to be false, yet he inserted it so that the sophism should achieve its goal. 141 Alternatively, you could reply to the difficulty [in §139] that Boethius calls ‘quantity’ not what is made up by the essences joining together as the genus, but rather what is made up out of the parts of the definition, [as in §138], so that on this interpretation we could assert: Any given essence belonging to the genus has the quantity of the genus. We say that the claim [in §138]—that genera and species don’t consist in integral parts—is clearly false, unless we should allow it because the authorities didn’t call parts ‘integral’ unless they were of dissimilar creation, and on these grounds they weren’t able to call the essences making up the genus or the species ‘parts’ correctly, for they are of exactly similar creation. 142 Again, Boethius says: Just as the same line is concave and convex, so too there is the selfsame subject for universality and particularity. In this passage, Boethius seems to have held that the singular is universal. 143 Yet the passage [in §142] is no objection. Just look at what he said! Boethius doesn’t take ‘particular’ for ‘singular,’ as they claim, but rather for ‘species.’ He said that there is the selfsame subject for genera and species, i.e. for universality and particularity: by ‘universality’ the genus, by ‘particularity’ the species belonging to the genus. Therefore, the passage should be understood as follows: just as the same line is subject to concavity and convexity as accidents, in the same way, too, Socrates is subject to genus and species (i.e. man and animal) as predicates. 144 Alternatively: The matter of this phoenix and the individual phoenix itself are the same, i.e. they do not differ substantially, but the matter is the subject for

31 A straightforward insult to defenders of Material Essence Realism (see §39, §§40– 43, and §49 above).

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indiuiduum singularitati subiectum est. Nec tamen singulare est uniuersale, quamuis hoc sit idem cum illo, sicut supra dictum est. 145 Et hae quidem sunt auctoritates quas maxime huic sententiae nostrae uident contrarias. 146 Illas autem omnes enumerare grauaremur quae ipsi firmamentum conferunt. Dicamus modo aliquas de multis quae hanc confirmant. 147 Porphyrius dicit: “Collectiuum in unam naturam species est et magis id quod genus”; collectionem uero in alia sententia non reperies. Boethius in secundo commentario super Porphyrium: “Cum genera et species cogitantur, tunc ex singulis in quibus sunt eorum similitudo colligitur, ut ex singulis hominibus inter se dissimilibus humanitatis similitudo, quae similitudo cogitata animo ueraciterque perspecta fit species; quarum specierum diuersarum rursus similitudo considerata, quae nisi in ipsis in speciebus aut earum indiuiduis esse non potest, efficit genus. Nihilque aliud species esse putanda est nisi cogitatio collecta de indiuiduorum dissimilium numero similitudine substantiali, genus uero collecta cogitatio ex specierum similitudine.” Item in commentario super Categorias: “Genera et species non ex uno singulo intellecta sunt sed ex omnibus singulis mentis ratione concepta.” Hoc plane est contra sententiam de indifferentia. Item in eodem: “Qui primus hominem dixit, non illum qui ex singulis conficitur in mente habuit sed hunc indiuiduum atque 7 Porphyrius] 162a O 2 supra] Vide §93 et §116 supra. 7–8 Collectiuum . . . genus] PORPHYRIUS, Isag. 2 (Ar. lat. I.6–7 12.15–17): “Collectiuum enim multorum in unam naturam species est, et magis id quod genus est.” Cf. §54 supra. 9–16 Cum . . . similitudine] BOETHIUS, In isag. maior I.11 (Brandt 166.8–18): “Quocirca cum genera et species cogitantur, tunc ex singulis in quibus sunt eorum similitudo colligitur, ut ex singulis hominibus inter se dissimilibus humanitatis similitudo, quae similitudo cogitata animo ueraciterque perspecta fit species; quarum specierum rursus diuersarum similitudo considerata, quae nisi in ipsis speciebus aut in earum indiuiduis esse non potest, efficit genus. Itaque haec sunt quidem in singularibus, cogitantur uero uniuersalia. Nihilque aliud species esse putanda est nisi cogitatio collecta ex indiuiduorum dissimilium numero substantiali similitudine, genus uero cogitatio collecta ex specierum similitudine.” Cf. §43, §58, §75, et §88 supra. 17–18 Genera . . . concepta] BOETHIUS, In cat. 183C (PL 64): “Genera namque et species non ex uno singulo intellecta sunt sed ex omnibus singulis indiuiduis, mentis ratione concepta.” Cf. §61 supra. 31.19–32.1 Qui . . . imponeret] BOETHIUS, In cat. 183D (PL 64): “Qui enim primus hominem dixit, non illum qui ex singulis hominibus conficitur concepit sed animo quemdam singularem atque indiuiduum cui hominis nomen imponeret.” Cf. §103 infra. 4 uident contrarias] sup. lin. aduersari cognoscuntur ante corr. O uidentur contrariae P 5 grauaremur] mg. sin. P 6 modo] mg. dex. O 6 de . . . confirmant] sup. lin. ne quasi nullas habes (?) ante corr. O 6 confirmant] + Videamur sub col. O Videamur P 12 ueraciterque] post corr. P 12 fit] sup. lin. est ante corr. O 12 species] + est del. O 13 in ipsis] mg. sin. O om. P 15 de] quod P 17 sunt] sit ante corr. P

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universality, the individual is the subject for singularity. Yet the singular is not universal, although the singular is the same as the universal, as noted [in §93]. 145 These are the authorities whom they see as especially opposed to our theory.

[3.4.4 Authorities Supporting Collective Realism] 146 It would be a heavy burden to list all the authorities in firm agreement with our theory. Let’s just state some of the many passages that confirm it. 147 Porphyry says: A species is collective of many into one nature, and more so that which is a genus. You won’t find a collection in any theory other than ours! Boethius: When genera and species are thought, their likeness is then collected from each of the objects in which they exist. For example, the likeness of humanity is collected from single men, among themselves dissimilar. This likeness, thought by the mind and inspected truly, becomes a species. Again, considering the likeness of these different species—which can only exist in the species themselves or in their individuals—brings about the genus . . . The species should be held to be nothing other than the thought collected from the substantial likeness of numerically dissimilar individuals, and the genus the thought collected from the likeness of its species. Again: Genera and species are not understood from one singular but are conceived by the mind’s reason from all the singulars. This is clearly against the theory of indifference [discussed in §§50–73 above]. In the same commentary: Whoever first said ‘man’ did not have in mind what is made up out of each, but rather the individual singular on whom he imposed the name ‘man.’

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singularem cui nomen hominis imponeret”; aliquem uoluit confici ex singulis. Item in secundo commentario super Perihermeneias: “Cum tale aliquid animo speculamur, non in unamquamque personam mentis cogitatione deducimur per hoc nomen quod est ‘homo’ sed in omnes eos quicumque hu5 manitatis definitione participant.” Item in commentario eodem: “Humanitas ex singulorum hominum collecta naturis in unam quodammodo reducitur intelligentiam atque naturam.” Vix numero comprehendi poterunt firmamenta sententiae huius quae diligens logicorum scriptorum inquisitor inueniet. < D E EL EM EN T IS > 148 Post omnium tam rationum quam auctoritatum nobis aduersantium solutionem, restare uidetur illa oppositio de elementis quam in aliis sententiis fecimus, scilicet cum quaelibet res sufficienter constet ex materia et forma sicut quodlibet indiuiduum substantiae ex specialissima specie et forma propria, species uero ex genere et forma differentia, unde procedant elementa de 15 quibus constant corporales substantiae? Dicit enim Aristotles in Categoriis: “Ignis enim et aqua ex quibus ipsum animal constat prius est quam animal.” 149 Dura est haec prouincia nec ab ullo magistrorum nostrorum antehac, ut intellexi, dissoluta rationabiliter. Tamen quod mihi uerius uidetur hoc est: Physici, rerum naturas inuestigantes, uisibiles res quas subiectas sensi20 bus habebant primitius inquisierunt. Eorum uero naturam utpote integraliter compositorum cognoscere non poterant plane, nisi ipsorum componentium proprietatem cognouissent. Institerunt ergo ipsas partes componentes subdiuidendo, usque dum ad illam partem minutissimam intellectu uenirent, quae in partes integrales diuidi non poterat. Integralium uero partium de25 ficiente diuisione, inuestigare cœperunt an talis essentiola ex materia con10

6 unam] 173vb P 2–5 Cum . . . participant] BOETHIUS, In per. maior II.7 (Meiser II 136.25–28): “Quotienscumque enim aliquid tale animo speculamur, non in unam quamcumque personam per nomen hoc mentis cogitatione deducimur sed in omnes eos quicumque humanitatis definitione participant.” Cf. §114 supra.

5–7 Humanitas . . . naturam] BOETHIUS, In per. maior II.7 (Meiser II 139.6–9): “Namque humanitas ex singulorum hominum collecta naturis in unam quodammodo redigitur intellegentiam atque naturam.” Cf. §114 et §119 supra. 16 Ignis . . . animal] ARISTOTELES, Cat. 7 8a 9–10 (Ar. lat. I.5–7 ed. comp. 61.27–28): “Ignis enim et aqua et alia huiusmodi, ex quibus ipsum animal constat ante sunt quam animal sit omnino uel sensus . . . ” Cf. §157 infra. 4 eos] om. OP 5 definitione] mg. sin. O 5 Humanitas] Humanitatis ante corr. O 7 firmamenta] firmata ante corr. O 10 auctoritatum] auctoritatem ante corr. OP 12 constet] del. O om. P 18 uidetur] + mihi lect. dub. O in P 19 subiectas] post corr. O 21 plane] post corr. O 24 poterat] poterant OP 32.25–33.1 constaret] constare OP

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Boethius holds that something is put together out of singulars. Again: When we speculate on something of the sort with the mind, we are not led by the mind’s thought to any one given person through the name ‘man,’ but rather to all those who participate in the definition of humanity. Again, in the same commentary: Humanity, collected from the natures of each man, is somehow reduced to a single understanding and nature. There are almost a countless number of passages supporting this theory that the diligent student of logical writings will find!

[4. T HE ELEMEN TS] 148 After the resolution of all the arguments as well as the authorities set against us, the objection about the elements we put to the other theories32 seems to remain: since any given thing entirely consists in matter and form—just as any given individual substance consists in its most specific species and its proper form, and the species in its genus and its formal differentia—where do the elements out of which corporeal substances consist come from? For Aristotle says: The fire and water in which an animal consists existed before the animal. 149 This is a difficult area. Nor has it been plausibly resolved by any of our Masters up till now, as I have understood it. Nevertheless, this is what seems more true to me. Physicists, investigating the natures of things, initially examined visible things, which were subject to their senses. Yet these physicists clearly had not been able to entirely know the nature of these composites, as one might expect, were they not to have known the distinctive property belonging to the components themselves. Therefore, they pressed on by subdividing those component parts, all the way until they should come by the understanding to the smallest part that was unable to be divided into integral parts. When the division into integral parts came to an end, they began to investigate whether this sort of little essence33 would consist in matter and form, or be completely simple. Thus the argument discovered a body to be hot or cold or of another form. Items of this sort, I think, were called ‘pure elements’ by

32

See §47, §70, and §§85–87. “Little essence”: essentiola, repeated in §156 below, seems to be a coinage by Pseudo-Joscelin; it is not found elsewhere, to the best of my knowledge. (It is clearly deliberate: in §156 the scribe of one of the manuscripts has corrected the reading from essentialis to essentiolis.) All we know of the sense of the term is contained in Pseudo-Joscelin’s description here: an indivisible minimal thing (essentia). 33

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staret et forma an omnino simplex esset. Inuenit itaque ratio illa corpus esse calidum uel frigidum uel alterius formae. Huiusmodi enim puto a Platone appellata esse ‘pura elementa.’ Relicta itaque forma considerauit materiam an et illa simplex esset. Inuenit eam corpus, et ita constare ex corporeitate et substantia. Sed et ipsam inuenit constare ex susceptibilitate contrariorum forma, materia autem mera essentia. Quam item materiam undique speculantes simplicem omnino inuenerunt, nec omnino ex aliqua materia uel forma constantem. Hanc itaque meram essentiam cum aliis quae essentialiter rerum sensibilium formas sustinebant oºÅ appelauit, id est informe, non scilicet quod formas non sustinet sed quia ex formis non constaret. 150 Sed dices: Constabit itaque anima ex oºÅ. Si enim materialiter constat ex substantia quae materialiter constat ex mera essentia, quae oºÅ appellatur, ex oºÅ constare necesse est. Quicquid enim materialiter constat ex materiato et ex eius materia, ut animal, quia materialiter constat ex corpore et ex substantia. 151 At contra: Qui sic opponit non intellexit quod dixeram. Neque enim oºÅ appellata est tota illa collectio essentiarum omnium quae, susceptibilitate contrariorum informata, partim distribuitur in corpus partim in spiritum, sed illud tantum de illa multitudine quod susceptibilitate contrariorum informante essentialiter sustinet corporeitatem, in quo essentia non communicat spiritus. 152 Nec adhuc cessat oppositio. Dicetur enim: Impossibile est parti illius multitudinis impositum esse nomen et non alii parti quae ei indifferens est, sicut supra in speciem dictum est. 153 Sed contra: Verum quidem est nullum dari illi nomen dans intellectum rem dissimilis creationis concipientem ab illa quae illi est indifferens. Hoc autem dictum est in tractatu speciei. Illud uero nemo poterit cogere huius uocabuli impositionem aeque in animo habuisse essentias quae informantur in spiritum, ut illas quae informandae erant in corpus. Neque enim ab insensibilibus ascendit ad intellectualia sed a sensibilibus tantum. 6 essentia] 162b O 25 ab] 174ra P 2–3 a Platone appellata] locum non inueni 23 supra . . . dictum est] Vide §122 supra. 26 dictum est] Vide §122 supra. 5 substantia] + Relicta itaque forma considerauit materiam OP 5 ipsam] ipsum P 9 sensibilium] sensilium O 9 formas] om. P 10 quia] post corr. O quod P 11 Constabit] Constabat ante corr. O Constabat P 11 oºÅ] + ///////////// O 12 ex1 . . . constat] sup. lin. P 12 essentia] + uel exp. P 12–13 quae2 . . . ex1] mg. dex. O 14 constat] sup. lin. O 17 susceptibilitate] susceptabilitate ante corr. P 19 informante] informatem O 20 essentia] mg. dex. O 23 in speciem] mg. dex. O 27 informantur] + de e . . . eo(?) non potest legi ex defectu manuscripti mg. dex. O

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Plato. Then, leaving the form aside, Plato considered whether the matter too was simple. He found it to be a body, and so to consist in corporeity and substance. But he also discovered substance to consist in ‘susceptibility to contraries’ as form and pure essence as matter. This matter, again, these thinkers found in all respects to be completely simple, not consisting in any matter or form at all. Therefore, Plato called this pure essence, along with others that essentially sustained the forms of sensible things, oºÅ34—i.e. something unformed: not that it does not sustain forms, but that it did not consist in forms. 150 But you will object: The soul will then consist in oºÅ. For if it materially consists in substance, which materially consists in pure essence (which is called oºÅ), then it must consist in oºÅ. For whatever materially consists in what is enmattered also consists in its matter, e.g. animal, since it materially consists in both body and substance. 151 On the contrary: Whoever objects as [in §150] hasn’t understood what I had said [in §119–126]. For it isn’t the case that the collection of all essences as a whole—which, when informed with the susceptibility to contraries, is partly distributed into body and partly into spirit—is called oºÅ, but only the part belonging to the multiplicity that, when informed with the susceptibility to contraries, sustains corporeity. Spirit does not share any essence with this part. 152 The opposition doesn’t stop at this point. The objection will be raised that it is impossible for a name to be imposed on part of that multiplicity and not on another part that is indifferent to it (as mentioned in the case of species [in §122]). 153 On the contrary: It is indeed true that no name is given that produces an understanding which conceives a thing of dissimilar creation from what is indifferent to it. Furthermore, this was stated [in §122] in the discussion of species. Yet nobody will be able to force the imposition of this term to have had in mind the essences that are informed so as to produce spirit as well as those that should have been informed so as to produce body. For one does not rise to intellectual things from non-sensible things, but only from sensible things.

The term oºÅ (hyle) is the technical Greek term for matter. Pseudo-Joscelin reserves it for something like prime matter, that is, the substrate that underlies the four basic elements (or more exactly the constitutive properties that make up the elements). 34

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154 Illae ergo materiae tantum quam essentialiter offendit cogitatio means a sensibilibus ad intellectualia physicus nomen imposuit et non cuilibet quod erat indifferens cum illa quod forsan uel non cogitauit uel non curauit. Neque enim officium eius est simulare uel dissimulare, ut dialectici, unde et Plato de hac ante tempus suum nullum egisse dicit. 155 Ut igitur clare appareat qualiter in corporalium rerum constitutione suboriantur elementa, quamuis omnia ex generali et speciali constent materia uel forma, sic attende. Unumquodque indiuiduum corporis quantum est tantum in se habet frustum ºÆØ. Formae enim superuenientes quantitatem non auxerunt sed aliam naturam fecerunt. 156 Ponamus ergo Socratem nobis in exemplum ut quod in eo ratio inueniet in aliis quoque idem esse non dubitet. Est igitur in Socrate quaedam pars merae essentiae quae oºÅ appellatur, quae integraliter ex essentiolis constat quae in se quoque partes ºÆØ sunt. Haec non est substantia sed susceptibilitas contrariorum eam informat et ex his constituitur quaedam essentia substantiae. Hoc autem sciendum quod sicut illi toti aduenit susceptibilitas contrariorum, ita singulis particulis illius essentiae; sed et illud constitutum ex mera essentia quae in Socrate est et susceptibilitate contrariorum et corporeitate afficitur et ex his quaedam essentia corporis efficitur. Sed quam statim corporeitas illud totum afficit tam statim suae corporeitates singulas illius totius particulas afficiunt et faciunt corporeas essentias. Illi toti aduenit animatio et facit quamdam essentiam animati corporis. Sed non iam aliquibus partibus illius totius aduenit animatio, sed contrarium illius, inanimatio; cum enim totum animatum sit, singulae particulae illius inanimatae sunt. Item toti aduenit sensibilitas et facit essentiam quamdam animalis, partibus uero eius aliae formae quae faciunt aliquas essentias specierum inanimati quarum nomina in promptu non habeo. Item toti aduenit perceptibilitas disciplinae et facit hominem, singulis uero particulis adueniunt quaedam formae et faciunt alias essentias in animatis. Tandem Socratitas totam illam essentiam humanitatis informat et Socratem facit. Tam statim uero alias atomos illius essentiae humanitatis afficit calor, et formae ignis et ignem faciunt, alias formae aquae et aquam faciunt, alias formae ae¨ris et ae¨ra faciunt, alias terrae et terram faciunt, et sic singulae particulae uel ignis sunt uel aqua uel ae¨r uel terra. Ita non plus est impossibile Socratem constare ex quatuor elementis quam constare

23 sed] 163a O 1 cogitatio] post corr. P 9 frustum] fructum ante corr. O fructum P 9 superuenientes] susuperuenientes O 9 quantitatem] quantitates ante corr. O quantitates P 13 essentiolis] essentialis ante corr. P 19 essentia] essentiis ante corr. P 21 essentias] + habet mg. dex. O + habet P 24 inanimatae] post corr. OP 26–29 quarum . . . animatis] sup. col. O 27 promptu] post corr. P 27–28 disciplinae . . . formae] sub col. P 28 quaedam formae] inv. P

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154 Therefore, the physicist imposed a name on only the matter that thinking essentially encounters in passing from sensible things to intellectual things, and not on anything indifferent to it, which he perhaps neither knew nor cared about. It isn’t his job to dissemble or conceal, as dialecticians do. Accordingly, Plato says that before his time nobody dealt with this issue. 155 So that it might be clearly apparent how the elements emerge in the make-up of corporeal things, even though everything consists in (generic and specific) matter or form, pay attention! Any individual body whatsoever exists inasmuch as it has in itself a small amount of oºÅ. Forms further advening upon quantity did not increase it but rather produced another nature. 156 Therefore, let’s put Socrates into an example, so that one should have no doubt that what reason finds in his case also holds for other cases. So in Socrates there is some part of pure essence called oºÅ, which integrally consists in the little essences (essentiolae) that are also parts of oºÅ in themselves. This isn’t substance, but the susceptibility to contraries informs it, and some essence of substance is made up out of them. Note that just as the susceptibility to contraries advenes on the whole, so too it advenes on each of the subparts of that essence. Now what is made up out of the pure essence that is in Socrates is affected by both the susceptibility to contraries and corporeity, and out of these a certain essence of body is produced. Now as soon as corporeity affects the whole, its corporeities immediately affect each of the subparts of that whole, and produce corporeal essences. Animateness advenes on the whole, and produces some essence of animate body. Yet animateness does not advene on some parts of the given whole at that time, but rather its contrary, inanimateness. For although the whole is animate, each of its subparts are inanimate. Again, sensibility then advenes on the whole, and produces some essence of animal, while other forms advene on other parts of it, which produce some essences of species of the inanimate (the names of which I don’t have at hand). Again, the capacity to acquire knowledge advenes on the whole and produces man, while certain forms advene on each of the subparts and produce other essences in animate things. Finally, Socrateity informs that whole essence of humanity and produces Socrates. Now as soon as heat affects some atoms of this essence of humanity, the forms of fire then produce fire; for others the forms of water then produce water, for yet others the forms of air then produce air; for still others those of earth then produce earth . . . and so each of the subparts is either fire or water or air or earth. Hence it is no more impossible that Socrates consists in the four elements than that he consists in hands and feet; just as the latter are component parts, so too are the

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ex manibus et pedibus, sicut enim sunt partes componentes, ita et illa quae nota. Quia hic ortum elementorum adsignauimus in ortu indiuiduorum, ne absurdum uideatur generales et speciales essentias ex elementis constare. 157 Quod tamen si diceretur, quam statim animatio afficit corpus tam sta5 tim singulas essentias illius corporis informari formis elementorum, uel saltem quam cito sensibilitas afficit animatum corpus tam cito singulas partes illius effici elementa, non multum male diceretur. Cum dicit Aristoteles: “Ignis enim et aqua et alia huiusmodi ex quibus ipsum animal constat ante sunt quam animal omnino.” Et nota quod dicit Plato ex oºÅ prius fieri elementa 10 et ex elementis cætera. Nos autem econuerso uidemur fecisse. Alia uia incedit quod dicit Plato: “Generalis est regula simplicia priora esse compositis.” Unde Plato prius considerauit compositionem simplicium quibus coniunctis res corporeas subiectas sensibus constantes dixit. Et haec hactenus. D E S U B S T A N T I A L I BU S D I F F E R E N T I I S 158 Supradictis prout rationabilius potuimus pertractatis restat nunc de differentiis, an aliquo praedicamento sint adscribendae an omnino a praedicamentis remouendae iustius uideantur. 159 Dicit Magister Goslenus: Omnes quidem species ex genere et differentia constare. Confirmat auctoritas Porphyrii dicentis: “Nihil igitur superfluum 20 continet neque minus generis dicta descriptio ‘Omne genus praedicatur de pluribus’ etc.” Boethius uero exponit ‘de differentibus specie,’ id est speciali qualitate; unde habemus quod omnes species differunt speciali qualitate cum omne genus de talibus praedicetur. Alibi Porphyrius: “Quemadmodum

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9 quam] 174rb P 14 De . . . differentiis] om. P 15 Supradictis] init. litt. maiusc. rubr. P 7–9 Ignis . . . omnino] ARISTOTELES, Cat. 7 8a9–10 (Ar. lat. I.5–7 ed. comp. 61.27–28): “Ignis enim et aqua et alia huiusmodi ex quibus ipsum animal constat ante sunt quam animal sit omnino uel sensus . . . ” Cf. §148 supra. 9 dicit Plato] locum non inueni 11 Generalis . . . compositis] Vide BOETHIUS, In cat. 161C (PL 64): “Nam quoniam res simplices compositis natura priores sunt, quae enim composita sunt, ex simplicibus componuntur.” 19–21 Nihil . . . etc.] PORPHYRIUS, Isag. 1 (Ar. lat. I.6–7 8.15–16): “Nihil igitur superfluum neque minus continet generis dicta descriptio.” 35.23–36.2 Quemadmodum . . . differentia] PORPHYRIUS, Isag. 3 (Ar. lat. I.6–7 18.11–15): “Quemadmodum statua ex materia est aeris, forma autem figura, sic et homo communis et specialis ex materia quidem similiter consistit genere, ex forma autem differentia, totum autem hoc animal rationale mortale homo est quemadmodum illic statua.” Cf. §71 supra. 1–2 quae nota] sup. lin. O 2 ne] non ante corr. O 9 quod dicit Plato] sup. lin. O 9 Plato] sup. lin. P 12 Plato] sup. lin. P 12 compositionem] compositione P 13 constantes] sup. lin. O 13 hactenus] + Vacat usque ad finem lineae P 15 rationabilius] rationalibus ante corr. P 15 de] sup. lin. P 16 omnino] omnia ante corr. P 16 a] an O 18 Magister Goslenus] inter col. O 18 Goslenus] Gos. O om. P 19 dicentis] dicit O 21 specie] speciebus ante corr. P

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former. Here we have even given the origin of the elements by the origin of individuals, so that it might not seem absurd that generic and specific essences consist in the elements. 157 Yet if it were said that as soon as animateness affects a body, each of the essences of that body is immediately informed with the forms of the elements —or at least, as soon as sensibility affects an animate body, each of its parts is made an element—the claim wouldn’t be out of place. As Aristotle says: Fire, water, and anything else of the sort in which an animal itself consists, existed before the animal. Note that Plato says that the elements first came from oºÅ and the rest from the elements. However, we ourselves seem to have been made the other way around. Plato also took another route: There is a general rule that simples are prior to composites. Accordingly, Plato first considered the composition of simples; once these were joined together, he said that there exist corporeal things subject to the senses. And that’s enough of these matters.

5. SUBSTANTIAL DIFFERENTIAE 158 Since we have examined these topics as rationally as we were able, it now remains to consider whether differentiae should be assigned to some category, or whether it seems that they should more properly be completely excluded from the categories. 159 Master Joscelin says that every species consists in genus and differentia. Porphyry’s authority confirms this, when he says: The stated description of the genus, ‘Every genus is predicated of many’ etc., contains nothing superfluous and does not lack anything. Boethius analyzes ‘differing in species’ as ‘in a specific quality’; from which we have it that all species differ in a specific quality, since every genus is predicated of such. Elsewhere, Porphyry says: Just as a statue consists in bronze as its matter and the shape as its form, so too the species consists in the genus as matter and differentia as form.

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statua constat ex aere materia, forma autem figura, ita species constat ex genere materia, forma autem differentia”; et hic uult plane omnem speciem ex differentia constare. Aristoteles in Categoriis: “Diuersorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diuersae sunt species et differentiae.” Boethii quoque auctoritas hoc adserit quod diligens inquisitor in plerisque locis inue-niet. 160 Sunt tamen qui solum praedicamentum substantiae differentias habere dicunt, et cum qualitas diuidatur in duas proximas species dicunt illas non diuersificari a genere per aliquas differentias sed sicut illa essentia hominis quae est in me non est illa quae est in altero et tamen dissimili forma non differunt, eodem modo albedo non est nigredo nec tamen aliqua forma suae essentiae differt ab ea sed utraque mera est essentia et tamen sunt species coloris, quamuis non sit simplicior color quam albedo. 161 Contra hoc agere in uentum uile pugnare. Neque uidet rationabile ingenium quomodo color genus sit albedinis, cum nihil diuersum offendat intellectus concipiens albedinem et colorem, cum aeque utraque sit simplex et eiusdem naturae. 162 Illam ergo sententiam quam authentici recipiunt uiri insistamus. Concedunt omnes species ex differentiis constare. Concedunt itaque in aliquo uel aliquibus praedicamentis eas esse, quicquid enim est in aliquo praedicamento est. Dicunt omnes differentias esse in qualitate, omnes enim praedicantur in quale. Porphyrius dicit: “Qualis est homo? Est rationalis.” Boethius quoque in secundo commentario super Porphyrium: “Quae praedicantur alia in quid 19 ex] 163b O 3–4 Diuersorum . . . differentiae] ARISTOTELES, Cat. 3 1b 16–17 (Ar. lat. I.1–5 ed. comp. 48.13–14): “Diuersorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diuersae secundum speciem et differentiae sunt.” Cf. §176 infra. 22 Qualis . . . rationalis] PORPHYRIUS, Isag. 3 (Ar. lat. I.6–7 8.3–4): “Interrogati enim ‘Qualis est homo?’ dicimus ‘Rationalis.’ ” 36.23–37.1 Quae . . . accidentaliter] BOETHIUS, In isag. maior II.5 (Brandt 186.12–187.1): “Fieri autem potuit commodior diuisio hoc modo. Eorum quae dicuntur, alia quidem ad singularitatem praedicantur, alia ad pluralitatem, eorum uero quae de pluribus praedicantur, alia secundum substantiam praedicantur, alia secundum accidens. Eorum quae secundum substantiam praedicantur, alia in eo quod quid sit dicuntur, alia in eo quod quale sit, in eo quod quid sit quidem, genus ac species, in eo quod quale sit, differentia. Item eorum quae in eo quod quid sit praedicantur, alia de speciebus praedicantur pluribus, alia minime; de speciebus pluribus praedicantur genera, de nullis uero species. Eorum autem quae secundum accidens praedicantur, alia quidem sunt quae de pluribus praedicantur, ut accidentia, alia quae de uno tantum, ut propria.” 2 plane] sup. lin. O 5 auctoritas] post corr. P 5 inquisitor] inquisitorum ante corr. P 9 diuersificari] diuersari ante corr. O 10 est2] + quae P 14 in uentum uile pugnare] del. O uile (uille ante corr.) est P 14 uile] sup. lin. O 16 cum] et ante corr. O

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In this passage, he clearly holds that every species consists in the differentia. Aristotle: The species and differentiae of different genera that are not subalternately ordered are different. The authority of Boethius also asserts this, which the diligent student will find in many passages. 160 Yet there are some who claim that only the category of Substance has differentiae. Although quality is divided into two proximate species, they say that these species aren’t diversified from the genus through some differentiae. Instead, just as the essence of man that is in me isn’t the one that is in another, and yet they don’t differ by dissimilar form, well, in the same way whiteness is not blackness, and yet they do not differ from it35 by some form belonging to their essence; rather, each is pure essence, and still they are species of color, although color is no simpler than whiteness. 161 Fighting against the view [in §160] is completely futile. Rational ingenuity does not see how color is the genus of whiteness, since the understanding conceiving whiteness and color encounters nothing different, for each of them is equally simple and of the same nature. 162 Therefore, let’s turn to the theory that the textual sources [in §159] accept. They grant that all species consist in differentiae. Therefore, they grant that differentiae are in some category or categories, for whatever exists is in some category. They say that all differentiae are in Quality, for they are all are predicated in quale.36 Porphyry says: How (qualis) is man? He is rational. Boethius too: Some things are predicated in quid and others in quale; some of those predicated in quale are substantially predicated and others accidentally predicated.

35

That is, they do not differ from their genus, color. To be predicated in quale is to say not what something is but rather how it is (blue, angry, fluent in French). 36

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alia in quale. Quae in quale, alia substantialiter alia accidentaliter.” Quae praedicantur in quale substantialiter dicit esse differentias. 163 Quod si omnes differentiae in qualitate tenentur, differentiae specierum qualitatis in eodem praedicamento annumerandae sunt. Quod qualiter stare possit uideamus. 164 Praeceptum est Boethii in libro Diuisionum: “Omne genus per duas proximas species sufficienter naturaliter diuidi.” Duae ergo species sunt sub qualitate generalissima, in quas ipsum generalissimum sufficienter distribuitur. Hae per aduentum differentiarum in genus constituuntur, quo differentiae qualitates sunt si omnes differentiae praedicamento qualitatis annumerandae sunt. 165 Quod si est, aut erunt ipsum generalissimum aut ipsae species diuidentes aut sub ipsis speciebus proximis continebuntur. 166 Ipsum generalissimum sui ipsius forma non est, ut ex his constituatur species. Nam si idem materia esset se ipsum ut formam essentialiter suscipiens, inde sine se ipso esse posset. 167 Item ipsae differentiae species non sunt quae ab ipsis constituuntur. Et ut clarius appareat quod dicimus, ponamus diuidi qualitatem per species quibus sint nomina a et b. Dico quod a et b non possunt esse differentiae aduenientes ipsi generi ut ex ipsis constituantur, ipsae scilicet a et b. 168 Praetereo quod solet dici—quod idem prius esset et posterius respectu sui et quod aliquid prius constitueret aliquid quam ipsum intelligeretur constitui—ad id accedo quod natura non patitur. Si enim a informat qualitatem ut ipsum constituatur, idem in tota sui proprietate pars est essentiae sui ipsius, quod ratio non patitur. 169 Quod si dicas: a informans qualitatem se ipsum non constituit a sed potius b, et econuerso b ueniens in qualitatem genus non constituit b sed potius a, aeque habebis impossibile. Nam si a substantialis forma est b, b continet a ut partem suae essentiae et praeter a qualitatem suam materiam; quo concesso impossibile b formam substantialem esse a. Nam si esset a utique cum 10 annumerandae] 174va P 6–7 Omne . . . diuidi] BOETHIUS, De diu. (Magee 28.26–28): “Definitio namque diuisionis est generis in species proximas distributio.” 8 generalissima] generalissimo O 13 ipsis] illis ante corr. O illis ipsis P 14 ex] + ipsis exp. O 16 inde] om. P 16 sine se ipso esse] sume ipso esset ipso ante corr. P 16 se] sup. lin. O 18 ponamus] ponimus ante corr. O 20 ipsi generi] generi ipsi ante corr. O generi ipsi P 20 ipsis] hipsis ante corr. O 21 Praetereo] del. O 22 intelligeretur] intelligerentur ante corr. P 24 sui] + in P 26 ipsum] post corr. O ipsam P 26 constituit a] sup. lin. O constituiat post corr. P 28 habebis] habebit ante corr. O habebit P

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He says that the things that are substantially predicated in quale are differen-tiae. 163 Yet if all differentiae are confined to Quality, the differentiae of the species of quality should also be counted in the same category. Let’s see how this can hold. 164 Boethius’s rule is that every genus is adequately and naturally divided by two proximate species. Therefore, there are two species under the most generic genus Quality into which the most generic genus is itself adequately distributed. They are constituted by the advent of differentiae into the genus, with regard to which the differentiae are qualities, if all differentiae ought to be counted in the category Quality. 165 But if so, the differentiae will be either (i ) the most generic genus itself; (ii ) the very species dividing it; or (iii ) contained under the proximate species. 166 The most generic genus is not the form of itself, so that the species is constituted out of them. For if matter were to receive itself as form essentially, it could thereby exist without it. 167 Again, the differentiae themselves are not the species that are constituted by them. And in order that what we say might be more clearly apparent, suppose that Quality is divided by species, for which there are the names a and b. I say that a and b cannot be differentiae advening on the genus itself such that they (i.e. a and b themselves) are constituted out of them. 168 I pass over what is usually said, namely that (i ) the same object would be prior and posterior with respect to itself, and (ii ) some object would constitute another before it were understood to be constituted. I go along with what nature doesn’t permit. For if a informs Quality so that it is itself constituted, then the same object, in the entire distinctive property belonging to it, is part of the essence of itself – which reason does not permit. 169 But if you were to object that a’s informing Quality doesn’t constitute a itself but rather b, and conversely b’s entering into the genus Quality doesn’t constitute b but rather a, then you will have an equally impossible claim. For if a is the substantial form of b, then b contains a as a part of its essence, and, aside from a, Quality as its matter. But if this be granted, it is impossible that b is the substantial

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genere qualitate, b ut partem formalem suae essentiae contineret, quod scilicet b prius totum definitiuum erat, in parte suae essentiae a continens. Natura autem non recipit ut idem quod compositum est ex aliquo in compositione sui componentis secundum se totum sit. 170 Sed neque species a et b possunt esse ipsorum differentiae, et species quidem a non est differentia a. Omnis enim differentia uniuersaliter est in specie quam constituit, et ita species a prorsus continet ipsum a; quod idcirco esse non potest quia, cum sit species a, cum sua opposita diuidit ipsum a, et ita a prorsus continet illam speciem quae est sibi differentia, et excedit illam in opposita in oppositione. Quod si eam excedit, ab ea prorsus non continetur. 171 Ne quaerat aliquis ad quantitatem et ad unitatem ut dicat: Quamuis quantitas genus sit unitatis, tamen omnis quantitas est una. Ut enim hoc concedamus quod minime tamen recepimus de unitate speciei quantitatis, nemo poterit hoc ostendere ut tot sint unitates quot quantitates. Nam cum omnis linea sit quantitas et omnis unitas sit quantitas, nemo potest ostendere quod plura non sint indiuidua quantitatis quam unitatis, cum plura indiuidua sint lineae et unitatis similis quam solius unitatis. Idem inconueniens habebis si dicas speciem b ipsius esse substantialem differentiam. 172 Forsitan dicetur: Species a est substantialis b et species b est substantialis a. 173 Hoc esse non potest. Si enim species a est substantialis b ut de b praedicetur et prorsus continet illud ut quantumcumque extendatur b, ibi etiam sit aliqua essentia suae differentiae. Nusquam enim aliquid est sinon sua essentia. Quod si species a prorsus continet b, non potest prorsus contineri ab aliqua specie b. Quod si nulla species b potest aequari cuidam speciei a, impossibile est quod prorsus contineat a genus illius speciei, cum omne genus excedat suam speciem. 174 Fortasse dicent aliqui effugium quaerentes: Qualitas sicut diuiditur per a et per b proximas species sufficienter, ita in alia diuisione per alias species sufficienter diuiditur c et d; ita in alias species diuiditur. Et duae unius diuisionis erunt substantiales duarum alterius diuisionis et econuerso. Quasi diceretur cum diuidatur animal per rationale et irrationale, et item per mortale et immortale, rationale et irrationale sunt substantiales differentiae mortalis et immortalis animalis et econuerso. 8 sua] 164a O 1 contineret] post corr. P 10 in oppositione] mg. sin. O 11 Ne quaerat] Nec erat corr. O 12–13 concedamus] concedimus ante corr. O 16 plura] + non sint del. P Fortasse] + aliquid del. P 29 ita . . . species] sup. lin. (hom.) P 30 ita . . . diuiditur] O mg. sin. P 31–32 diceretur] dicentur P 32 diuidatur] diuiduatur ante corr. OP 34 et immortalis] mg. sin. O exp. P

ante 28 om. 33–

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form of a. For if a were at least in the genus Quality, then it would contain b as a formal part of its essence—but b was previously the definitional whole containing a in part of its essence. Nature doesn’t permit the selfsame object that is composed out of something to be in itself a whole in the composition of its component. 170 Furthermore, the species a and b cannot be their own differentiae. And indeed the species a is not the differentia of a. For any differentia is universally in the species that it constitutes, and so the species a would completely contain a itself. This can’t be the case because, although it is the species a, along with its opposite it divides a itself. Thus a completely contains the species that is its differentia, and it exceeds the latter in its opposite, in opposition. But if it exceeds it, it isn’t completely contained by it. 171 Nor let anyone turn to quantity and to unity so as to object that although quantity is the genus of unity, nevertheless every quantity is one. If we were to concede this (which we do not accept at all!) regarding the unity of the species quantity, nobody will be able to prove that there are as many unities as there are quantities. For although every line is a quantity and every unity is a quantity, nobody can prove that there are not more individual quantities than unities, for there are more individuals similar to a line and to unity than to unity alone. (You will have the same unacceptable result if you were to say that the species b is the substantial differentia of itself.) 172 Perhaps it will be claimed that the species a is the substantial differentia of b and the species b is the substantial differentia of a. 173 But this can’t be the case. If the species a is the substantial differentia of b such that it is predicated of b, then a completely contains b, so that no matter how far b is extended, some essence of its differentia is also there. No thing is anywhere without its essence. But if the species a completely contains b, then it cannot be completely contained by any species b. And if no species b can be made equal to a given species a, then it’s impossible that it completely contain a as genus of that species, since every genus exceeds its species. 174 Perhaps some people, looking for a way out, will say that just as Quality is adequately divided by a and by b as proximate species, so too in some other division it is adequately divided by other species c and d as proximate species. The pair of one division will be the substantial differentiae of the pair of the other division, and conversely. It is as if one were to say that since animal is divided by rational and irrational, and also by mortal and immortal, then rational and irrational are the substantial differentiae of mortal animal and immortal animal, and conversely.

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175 Hoc dicimus gratia exempli sed hoc quoque stare non potest. Nam si c est substantialis differentia a, et d b, non potest habere econuerso quod a sit substantialis differentia c, nec b d, propter supradictum inconueniens, scilicet quod res illa quae in parte suae essentiae aliquid habet sic composita transiret in partem formalem illius quod est pars in compositione sui. Sed neque hoc patitur ratio ut, cum c sit differentia a et d b, quod b sit substantiale c quod erat substantiale a, et a d, quod erat substantiale b. Si enim b cum sit compositum ex qualitate materia et d forma, est substantiale quod erat substantiale a, simplicius erit b quam c quod constituitur ex b; et ita simplicius est quam a quod constituitur ex c. Quod si b simplicius est quam a, quaelibet pars componens essentiam b simplicior erit quam a. Unde nulla pars b potest habere in parte suae essentiae a, quia necessario simpliciora esset a eo quod componeret, cum concessum sit illud magis compositum esse. 176 Variis argumentis hoc stare non posse probaremus nisi quia his quae posuimus rationabiliter posse responderi non uidemus. Est tamen unum quod et praetermissis omnibus aliis hoc esse errorem et non sententiam esse ostendit, scilicet quod differentiae in qualitate tenentur. Nam quocumque modo diuidas qualitatem, nulla species qualitatis erit quam non sit necesse differentiam esse alicuius speciei qualitatis. Quod si uerum est, nullius speciei alterius praedicamenti poterunt esse differentiae. Dicit enim Aristoteles: “Diuersorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diuersae sunt species et differentiae.” Ita cum omnibus speciebus uoluimus adsignare differentias nullae habebunt differentias nisi illae quae sunt predicamenti qualitatis. 177 Si grauatus in hoc aliquis uelit ad hoc refugere ut dicat differentias aliorum esse in qualitate, differentias autem specierum qualitatis in aliquo alio praedicamento, nec hoc modo effugiet. 178 Nam eodem modo necessarium erit illa duo praedicamenta tantum habere differentias. Nam si species actionis substantiales differentiae specierum qualitatis sunt, prorsus continent eas. Unde earum substantiales differentiae esse non possunt illae qualitates quae minus contineant quam illae. 3 propter] 174vb P 14 non] 164b O 3 supradictum inconueniens] Vide §169 supra. 20–22 Diuersorum . . . differentiae] ARISTOTELES, Cat. 3 1b 16–17 (Ar. lat. I.1–5 ed. comp. 48.13–14): “Diuersorum generum et non subalternatim positorum diuersae secundum speciem et differentiae sunt.” Cf. §159 supra. 3 sit] sup. lin. O 3 differentia] sup. lin. O 5 partem] forma ante corr. O post corr. P 8–9 quod erat substantiale] mg. sin. O 9 substantiale] om. P 10 quod . . . a2] om. (hom.) P 15 posse] mg. dex. O om. P 15 quod] + cum exp. P 17 in qualitate] sup. lin. O 17 qualitate] sup. lin. P 18 erit] erat ante corr. P 20–22 Dicit . . . differentiae] mg. sin. O 24 refugere] resurgere ante corr. P 24–25 aliorum . . . differentias] om. (hom.) P

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175 We offer this as an example, but it too can’t hold. For if c is the substantial differentia of a and d of b, then one cannot hold conversely that a is the subtantial differentia of c, nor that b of d, due to the unacceptable result mentioned [in §169]—namely that one object having another in part of its essence would then, composed in this way, go over into a formal part of that which is a part in its composition. Reason also does permit that, although c is the substantial differentia of a and d of b, b is the substantial differentia of c (which was the substantial differentia of a), and a of d (which was the substantial differentia of b). If b, since it is composed out of quality as matter and d as form, is the substantial differentia that was the substantial differentia of a, then b will be more simple than c (which is constituted out of b), and thus it will be more simple than a (which is constituted out of c). But if b is more simple than a, then any given part compounding the essence of b will be more simple than a. Accordingly, no part of b can have a in part of its essence, since necessarily b is more simple than a, even though it has been granted that it is more composite than a. 176 We might establish by various arguments that this can’t hold, except that we don’t see how the ones we have put forward are answered rationally. Still, there is one argument that, putting all others to one side, establishes that the claim [in §164], namely that differentiae are confined to Quality, is an error and not a theory. For however you may divide Quality, there will be no species of Quality that is not necessarily the differentia of some other species of Quality. Well, if this is true, there will not be able to be differentiae of any species belonging to another category. For Aristotle says: The species and differentiae of different genera that are not subalternately ordered are different. Thus, although we intended to assign differentiae to all species, only those belonging to the category Quality will have differentiae. 177 If someone annoyed at this result [in §176] should want to avoid it by saying that the differentiae of the rest are in Quality, whereas the differentiae of the species of Quality are in some other category, he will not get around it in this way. 178 For in the same way it will of necessity be the case that only those two categories have differentiae. For if the species of Action are the substantial differentiae of the species of Quality, they completely contain them. Accordingly, their substantial differentiae can’t be qualities that contain less than they do. Thus

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Ita cum primarum specierum qualitatis differentiae in actione uel aliquo alio praedicamento sint, non possunt aliqua inferiora specierum qualitatis esse substantiales differentiae earum specierum quae sunt differentiae primarum specierum qualitatis, cum non possint illis aequari. Aut ergo illas quas constituunt habebunt differentias et relabimur in antiquum inconueniens, aut differentias in praedicamento qualitatis habere non possunt. Quo amplius refugere possit huius erroris defensor non habet. 179 Propter ut ostensum est insolubiles rationes, uidetur mihi substantiales differentias in nullo praedicamento esse sed simplices formas tantum esse nec aliquo modo ex materia et forma constare, ipsas autem in subiectam materiam uenientes naturam aliquam constituere quamuis a nullo constituantur. 180 Ad hoc autem concedendum non ducor sola ratione, uerum etiam Boethius in commentario super Categorias patentissima confirmat auctoritate ita dicens: “Cum tres substantiae sint, materia, species, et quae ex utrisque conficitur, scilicet undique compacta et composita substantia, hic neque de sola specie neque de sola materia, sed de utrisque mixtis compositisque posuit. Partes autem substantiae incompositae et simplices sunt ex quibus substantiis ipsam conficitur quas per transitum nominat dicens: secundarum substantiarum partes et ipsas esse substantias.” Ecce hic apertissime dicit Boethius substantialem formam in praedicamento non esse. Speciem enim quam hic nominat aliud quam formam constitutiuam alicuius essentiae significare non potest. Simplicem uero materiam et incompositam nihil aliud appellare potest quam illam meram essentiam quae formas generalissimarum naturarum sustinet, uelut illam naturam quae sustentat susceptibilitatem contrariorum. 181 Cum igitur dicat Boethius Aristotelem hoc non egisse in praedicamentis, nil uere aliud potest intelligi nisi quod illae praedicamentales essentiae non sunt, alioquin in praedicamento substantiae de differentiis tractauit dicens: “Non est proprium substantiae quod in subiecto non est.” Iste ergo

14–19 Cum . . . substantias] BOETHIUS, In cat. 184A–B (PL 64): “Cum autem tres substantia sint, materia, species, et quae ex utriusque conficitur undique composita et compacta substantia, hic neque de sola specie, neque de sola materia sed de utrisque mistis compositisque proposuit. Partes autem substantiae incompositae et simplices sunt ex quibus ipsa substantia conficitur, species et materia, quas post per transitum nominat, dicens substantiarum partes et ipsa esse substantias.” 29 Non . . . est2] ARISTOTELES, Cat. 5 3a20–21 (Ar. lat. I.1–5 ed. comp. 51.10–12): “Ergo non erit substantia horum quae in subiecto sunt. Non est autem hoc substantiae proprium.” 2–3 qualitatis . . . specierum] om. (hom.) P 15–16 conficitur . . . utrisque] mg. dex. O 18 ipsam] ipsa P 26–27 praedicamentis] post corr. O

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although the differentiae of the primary species of Quality are in Action (or some other category), some lower species of Quality can’t be the substantial differentiae of the species that are the differentiae of those primary species of Quality, since they can’t be made equal to them. Therefore, they either will have differentiae that they constitute, and we’ll be stuck with the old unacceptable result, or they can’t have differentiae in the category Quality. The defender of this error has nothing more by which he might escape. 179 Due to these unanswerable arguments, it seems to me that, as has been shown, substantial differentiae are in no category, but are only simple forms. Nor do they consist in matter and form in any way. However, entering into a material subject they constitute some nature, although they are constituted by none. 180 However, I am not led to endorse the view [in §179] by reason alone. Boethius also confirms it with the clearest authority: Since there are three substances, namely matter, species, and what is made up out of each (i.e. the aggregated composite substance), here Aristotle deals with neither the species alone, nor the matter alone, but with each mixed and compounded together. Furthermore, the parts of substance, out of which substance itself is made up, are incomposite and simple—which Aristotle names by transference, saying that ‘parts of secondary substances are themselves substances.’ You see, Boethius quite explicitly says in this passage that substantial form isn’t in a category. For what he names ‘species’ here can’t signify anything but the constitutive form of some essence, and he can call ‘simple incomposite matter’ nothing but the pure essence that sustains the forms of the most generic natures, e.g. that nature that supports ‘susceptibility to contraries.’ 181 Therefore, since Boethius says that Aristotle didn’t deal with this in the Categories, nothing else can be correctly understood but that they aren’t categorial essences. Aristotle dealt with differentiae in the category Substance elsewhere, saying that it isn’t proper to substance that it not be in a subject. Therefore, the sense is that

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sensus est quod res ex materia et forma compositae in praedicamentis sunt, res uero simplices in praedicamento non sunt. 182 Quod si forte inuenias auctoritatem quae uideatur adserere omnes res esse in praedicamento, de compositis dici intelligas illamque diuisionem quae est “Quicquid est aut est substantia aut accidens” de compositis factam esse dicimus. Simplices enim formas accidentia non appellamus nisi ‘accidens’ large dicatur quicquid per aliud existit; hoc uero concesso, non omne accidens in praedicamento esse dicimus. 183 Nunc restat grandis labor uitare ne concedere cogamur et materiam substantiae generalissimi esse genus, et susceptibilitatem contrariorum et quaslibet simplices formas esse species. 184 Et materia quidem substantiae idcirco genus esse uidetur quia praedicatur de pluribus differentibus specie in quid, quocumque modo ‘praedicari’ exponas. Nam et pluribus speciebus inhaeret quarum est materia et de ea potest haberi intellectus pluribus speciebus existentibus subiectis quorum est materia. 185 Hic respondendum est quod in definitione generis intelligendum est id quod genus est debere praedicari de pluribus speciebus proxime sibi suppositis, quod, quia deest illi materiae, idcirco non est genus. Neque enim illi aliquae species supponuntur proxime sed corpus et species quae primae species sunt in praedicamento substantiae substantiae generalissimae proxime supponuntur quae constituta est ex mera essentia et susceptibilitate contrariorum. 186 Possumus etiam dicere quia illa mera essentia ad interrogationem factam per ‘quid’ conuenienter non respondetur. Neque id respondere debemus interroganti quod ille qui interrogat se scire demonstrat. Cum enim interrogatur de aliquo “Quid est?” certum se demonstrat qui quaerit quod sit, praeteriit enim priorem quaestionem quae est “An sit?” Si ergo quaeritur “Quid est substantia?” respondeamus “Est.” Neque enim potest responderi per nomen “Substantia,” namque non est nomen nisi materiatorum a substantia uel ipsius substantiae per translationem; superuacue responderi manifestum est. 187 Item dicetur: Si susceptibilitas contrariorum sustinetur ab illa mera esssentia, praedicatur de illa ut possit dici “Mera essentia est susceptibilis contrariorum.” Quod si est, erit substantia et ita in praedicamento substantiae. Si

1 compositae] 175ra P 3 omnes] 165a O 5 Quicquid est] sup. lin. O 5 aut est] om. P 6 enim] om. O 12 materia] materiam P 13 in quid] inquit OP 14 quarum] quartum ante corr. P 15 potest] post corr. O 19 deest] post corr. P 20 sed] scilicet P 25 interroganti] interrogati OP 25 enim] uero ante corr. O 28 respondeamus] respondemus ante corr. O 31 susceptibilitas] susceptibili O

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things composed of matter and form are in the categories, whereas simple things aren’t in a category. 182 But if you were perhaps to find an authority who seems to assert that all things are in a category, you should understand this to be said with regard to composites. We state that the division: Everything is either substance or accident has been made for composites. We don’t call simple forms accidents, unless whatever exists through another is loosely called an accident; but if this usage be allowed, then we say that not every accident is in a category.

[6. SIMPLE MATTER AND PURE FORM] 183 There now remains a great deal of work to avoid being forced to grant that (a) the matter of substance is a most generic genus, and (b) the susceptibility to contraries, and any other simple forms whatsoever, are species.

[6.1 Simple Matter] 184 [As regards §183(a)]: The matter of substance seems to be a genus for the reason that it is predicated in quid of many things differing in species (however you may analyze ‘being predicated’). For it inheres in the many species whose matter it is, and an understanding of it can be grasped with many species being the subjects whose matter it is. 185 We should reply [to §184] that in the definition of the genus one must understand that what the genus is ought to be predicated of the many species that proximately fall under it. Since its matter fails this requirement, it consequently is not a genus. For it isn’t the case that any species proximately fall under matter. Rather, body and the species that are the primary species in the category Substance proximately fall under the most generic genus Substance, which is constituted out of the pure essence and the susceptibility to contraries. 186 We can also say that the pure essence isn’t given as an appropriate response to a question formulated with ‘what.’ Nor should we give in response to the person asking the question that which he shows he already knows. For when we ask “What is it?” about something, the person asking the question shows that he is already certain that it exists, since he passes over the prior question, namely “Does it exist?” Therefore, to the question “What is substance?” let us answer: “It exists.” For we can’t answer with the name ‘substance,’ which is surely the name only of objects enmattered by substance (or of substance itself by transference); it’s clear that the answer is trivial.

[6.2 Pure Form] 187 Again, [as regards §183(b)]: It will be said that if ‘susceptibility to contraries’ is sustained by the pure essence, then it’s predicated of it, so that we can say: The pure essence is susceptible to contraries.

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enim erit ipsa substantia, erit generalissimum; si uero erit inferius substantiae, erit corporea uel incorporea; utrumlibet horum sit erit in praedicamento. 188 Attende ergo: Illud non concedimus quod quaelibet forma praedicetur de ea materia in qua est, ut per uocem subiectam agatur de materia; ut cum rationalitas in animali sit materia, non tamen uerum est ipsum animal esse rationale, teste Porphyrio: “Animal enim nihil horum est” id est < neque > rationale neque mortale. Si enim animal ipsum rationale est, uel homo uel Deus; si homo, uel Socrates uel Plato. Quod si uerum est, obiit nostra sententia quae nullum uniuersale esse singulare recipit. Concedimus autem praedicari de ipso animali si de inferioribus agatur: quoddam animal est rationale. 189 Item dicetur: Animal ipsum est rationale quia est fundamentum rationalitatis. 190 Quod minime concedimus. ‘Rationale’ enim non est nomen subiecti rationalitatis sed rei quae a rationalitate constituitur, quae non est ipsum animal. Dicimus quoque meram essentiam non esse susceptibile contrariorum, quamuis in ea fiat susceptibilitas contrariorum. ‘Susceptibile’ enim nomen non est nisi compositorum a susceptibilitate contrariorum. 191 Sed dices: Si susceptibile est de essentia substantiae, quare igitur non est substantialis differentia sicut corporeitas? 192 Nomen hoc illi non concedimus, nam substantialis differentia non appellatur nisi quae diuidit genus et constituit speciem quod susceptibili non conuenit. Sed concedimus eam conferre aeque essentiam substantiae, sicut corporeitatem corpori. Idem dicemus de Socratitate. 193 Amodo ea quae simplices formas cogere uidentur esse species insistamus. Et primum ad id respondeamus quod supra dictum est, idcirco differentias esse qualitates quia praedicantur in quale. 194 Qualitas uero est secundum quam quales dicimur. Scias ergo ‘praedicari in quale’ large et stricte accipi. Large acceptum tantum ualet praedicari in quale quantum praedicari ut forma, quod solum qualitatibus non conuenit sed etiam quantitatibus, et sic accipiendum est ‘praedicari in quale’ cum dicitur “Differentia praedicatur in quale.” Stricte uero acceptum ‘praedicari in 27 Scias] 165b O 6 Animal . . . est] PORPHYRIUS, Isag. 3 (Ar. lat. I.6–7 17.17–18): “Animal enim neque ipsum nihil horum est.” 25 supra dictum est] Vide §162 supra. 2 corporea] corpora P 2 horum] post corr. P 4 de ea] dea P 6 Porphyrio] post corr. P 16 in ea fiat] mg. sin. O 24 ea] inter col. O 24 uidentur] + non del. O 29 ut] sup. lin. in ante corr. O in P

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Yet if it is, it will be substance, and so in the category Substance. If it is substance itself, it will be the most generic genus; but if it falls under substance, it will be corporeal or incorporeal, and whichever of these it is it will be in the category. 188 Pay attention, then! We don’t concede that any form whatsoever is predicated of the matter in which it is, so that the subject-term deals with the matter. For example, although rationality is in animal, it is nevertheless not true that animal itself is rational; as Porphyry remarks: Animal is none of these. That is, animal is neither rational nor mortal. For if animal itself is rational, it is either man or God; if man, either Socrates or Plato. But if this is true, our theory, which holds that no universal is singular, has been done away with. (We grant that rationality is predicated of animal itself if we’re dealing with things falling under it: some animal is rational.) 189 Again, the objection will be raised that animal itself is rational, since it is the foundation of rationality. 190 We don’t grant this at all. ‘Rational’ isn’t the name of what is subject to rationality, but rather of a thing that is constituted by rationality, which is not animal itself. We also say that the pure essence is not susceptible to contraries, although the susceptibility to contraries does arise in it; ‘susceptible to contraries’ is the name only of objects put together from the susceptibility to contraries. 191 But you will object that if ‘susceptible to contraries’ pertains to the essence of substance, why is it not thereby a substantial differentia, like corporeity? 192 We don’t grant it the name ‘substantial differentia,’ for only those things that divide the genus and constitute the species are so-called, which isn’t appropriate to ‘susceptible to contraries.’ Yet we do grant that it equally bestows essence upon substance as corporeity does upon body. (We’ll say the same about Socrateity.) 193 Let’s now turn to arguments that seem to prove conclusively that simple forms are species. First of all, let’s reply to what was said [in §162], namely that differentiae are qualities because they are predicated in quale. 194 Quality is that according to which it is said how (quales) we are. Hence you should know that ‘being predicated in quale’ is taken loosely and strictly. Taken loosely, ‘being predicated in quale’ has the sense ‘being predicated as a form.’ This is appropriate not only to qualities but to quantities as well. Hence ‘being predicated in quale’ should be taken in this way when we say:

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quale’ est praedicari rem praedicamenti qualitatis, ut rationalitas, quod ut in una exemplicemus, idcirco species esse uidetur quia praedicatur de pluribus differentibus numero in quid. Inhaeret enim ut materia huic et huic rationalitati quae numero solo a se differunt, non etiam substantiali differentia. Hic Aristotelis: “Rationalitas uel quaelibet simplex forma, sicut sui nullam habet materiam, ita ipsa nullius est materia; unde nullum est ut materia.” 195 Sed dices: Illud rationalitatis quod in me est non est illud quod in te est, et haec uidetur esse indiuidua rationalitatis. 196 At contra: Illud humanitatis quod in me est non est illud humanitatis quod in te est, et tamen illud humanitatis quod in me est non est uel genus uel species uel indiuiduum humanitatis sed una tantum de essentiis ex quibus colligitur humanitas quae est species. Eodem modo illud rationalitatis quod in me est nil aliud est nisi una de essentiis de quibus conficitur rationalitas quae differentia est. Homo est autem aliquid quod materialiter constituatur ex rationalitate et sit eius indiuiduum, quemadmodum ex humanitate Socrates. 197 Amplius. Dices: Boethius dicit differentias praedicari de subiecto, praedicari autem de subiecto est praedicari in quid. 198 At contra: Particulariter est uerum quod quaedam quae praedicantur de subiecto praedicantur in quid sed non uniuersaliter est uerum nisi ‘praedicari in quid’ large accipiatur. Aeque enim concedo rationalitatem praedicari de homine in substantia, ut animal, sed illud ut formalem essentiam, aliud uero ut materialem. Uniuersaliter autem assero nullam simplicem formam de alio praedicari substantia quam de his quae formaliter constituit. 199 Amplius. Dices: Vera est haec propositio “Socrates est hoc rationale” ubi indiuiduum rationalitatis praedicatur. 200 At contra: Si intendas Socratem suppositum indiuiduo rationalitatis, falsa est. Potest tamen uera esse si materialiter omnes praedices agendo de certo supposito ipsius. Velut cum dicitur “Ego lego” de certo supposito lectionis agitur et tamen lectio uniuersaliter praedicatur. 201 Tandem dices: Danda est notitia quas appellemus simplices formas, ut certum sit nobis quas a praedicamentis remouere debeamus. 1 quale] 175rb P 5–6 Rationalitas . . . materia] locum non inueni 1 est] cum dicitur P 1 rem] re O 1 qualitatis] + acceptum P 1 ut] et P 2 exemplicemus] post corr. O 8 uidetur] uideretur P 12 humanitas] humanitatis ante corr. OP 14 Homo] Non O 16 Dices] + /// ras. O 17 de subiecto] om. P 19 praedicantur] post corr. P 24 Vera] Uniuersaliter P 27 falsa] falsus OP 27 omnes] sup. lin. O omne P 29 uniuersaliter] om. P 30 appellemus] appellamus ante corr. O

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The differentia is predicated in quale. But taken strictly, ‘being predicated in quale’ is for a thing belonging to the category Quality to be predicated. For example, rationality—to give a single example—seems to be a species for the reason that it is predicated of many numerically different things in quid. Indeed, rationality inheres as matter in this rationality and in that rationality, which differ from each other only numerically, not also by a substantial differentia. Aristotle remarks: Just as rationality (or any simple form whatsoever) has no matter of its own, so too it is not the matter of anything; accordingly, it is nothing as matter. 195 But you will object that the rationality that is in me isn’t the rationality that is in you, and it seems to be an individual rationality. 196 On the contrary: The humanity in me isn’t the humanity in you, and yet the humanity in me is neither genus nor species nor an individual humanity, but only one of the essences out of which the humanity that is the species is collected. Likewise, the rationality in me is nothing other than one of the essences out of which the rationality that is the differentia is made up. However, man is something that is materially constituted out of rationality and is an individual instance, as Socrates is out of humanity. 197 You will further object that Boethius says differentiae are predicated of a subject, and being predicated of a subject is being predicated in quid. 198 On the contrary: It is true in particular cases that some items predicated of a subject are predicated in quid, but it isn’t true in every case, unless we take ‘being predicated in quid’ loosely. Equally, I grant that rationality is predicated of man in substance, as is animal, yet it is predicated of the one as its formal essence and of the other as its material. Futhermore, I assert in every case that no simple form is predicated in substance of anything other than that which it formally constitutes. 199 You will further object that the proposition: Socrates is this rational thing (where an individual rationality is predicated) is true. 200 On the contrary: If you meant Socrates as the underlying subject of an individual rationality, the proposition is false. Nevertheless, it can be true if you were to predicate them all materially by having a definite subject for it at stake. For example, when we say: I read a definite subject for reading is at stake, although reading is predicated universally. 201 You will object yet again that we should supply some notion for what we are to call simple forms, so that we be certain which ought to be removed from the categories.

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202 Ad hoc: Illas dico simplices et non esse in praedicamento quae naturas faciunt, ut susceptibilitas corporei Socrati. Album et linea et quaelibet praedicamentalis forma uenientes ad subiectum nullam naturam creant, ut nata albedine in Socrate non fit tertia natura diuersa a Socrate et albedine. Nam ut dicit auctoritas, ex substantia et accidenti nil efficitur, ‘accidens’ hic stricte accipiens. Nam ex Socratitate quae large est accepta, id est res quae per aliud existit, et homine fit Socrates, natura diuersa ab utroque componente; unde Socrates dicitur albus; materia autem non dicitur Socrates. 203 Amplius. Quaeris: Si ita sunt simplices formae et incompositae de quibus agis, idem sunt non diuersae; quemadmodum singulae essentiae humanitatis idem sunt quia non sunt diuersae creationis. 204 At contra: Res quae in materia et forma suae creationis non differunt, in effectibus differre possunt, quod habent huiusmodi simplices formae, ut rationalitas, cum in materia et forma suae creationis non differat ab irrationalitate (quia nullam habet) sed alium facit effectum. Est enim forma per quam ratiocinamur quod non habet irrationalitas. 205 Sed dices: Eodem modo illae essentiae quae rationalitatem suscipiunt alium effectum faciunt, scilicet hominem, et alium illae quae irrationalitate informantur, scilicet asinum, et ita non sunt idem. 206 At contra: Non est diuersus effectus materiarum immo formarum. Si enim contingeret ut rationalitas informaret illas essentias quae nunc sustinent irrationalitatem et irrationalitas quae nunc sustinent rationalitatem, aeque rationalitas cum illis faceret hominem et irrationalitas cum aliis asinum. Unde apparet quod ille effectus sequitur formas et non materiam; sicut uides quod eadem essentia corporis quae cum animatione modo constituit animatum, quandoque cum inanimatione constituet inanimatum. 207 Ita ergo materiae quae eosdem effectus cum diuersis formis aptae sunt ad faciendum, idem dicuntur; diuersae uero formae simplices minime dicuntur idem quia hoc non habent. 208 Eamdem diuersitatem effectuum inuenies in meris essentiis generalissimorum. Verbi gratia si fieri posset ut mera essentia quae est materia qualitatis generalissimae mutaret facere quale cum illa mera essentia quae est materia generalissimae substantiae et eius formam susciperet, nunquam ex materia substantiae cum tali forma fieret uel substantia uel qualitas; nec 17 Eodem] 166a O 20 immo] 175va P 2 Album] Albae autem O Albae autem ante corr. P 3 praedicamentalis] praedicamenta talis O 6 stricte] large ante corr. O 13 differre] sup. lin. diuersae ante corr. O differte ante corr. P 13 possunt] om. P 13 quod] + non OP 22 irrationalitatem . . . sustinent] om. (hom.) P 23 cum aliis] mg. sin. O 24 sequitur] sup. lin. O 30 effectuum] effectum OP 32 quale cum] illeg. P

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202 To this, I call those forms simple and not in a category which produce natures, as the susceptibility for being corporeal does for Socrates. White, line, and any type of categorial form entering into a subject create no nature, so that when whiteness arises in Socrates no third nature, different from Socrates and whiteness, comes into being. For as authority says, nothing is produced out of substance and accident (taking ‘accident’ here strictly). For Socrates comes to be out of Socrateity (which is taken loosely as a thing that exists through another) and man; he is a nature that is distinct from each of these components. Accordingly, Socrates is called ‘white’ whereas his matter is not called ‘Socrates.’ 203 You raise the further question: If forms are simple and incomposite in the way you deal with them, they are the same rather than different, just as each of the essences of humanity are the same because they are not of diverse creation. 204 On the contrary: Things that do not differ in the matter and form of their creation can differ in their effects, which is a feature simple forms of this sort have. For example, although rationality doesn’t differ in the matter and form of its creation from irrationality (because it has none),37 it does however produce a different effect. For it is the form through which we reason, and irrationality doesn’t have this effect. 205 But you will object: In the same way as [in §204], the essences receiving rationality produce one effect (namely man) and those informed by irrationality another (namely ass), and so they aren’t the same. 206 On the contrary: This isn’t a different effect of ther matters, but rather of their forms. For if it were to happen that rationality inform the essences that now sustain irrationality and irrationality those that now sustain rationality, then rationality along with these would equally produce man and irrationality with the others ass. Accordingly, it’s apparent that the effect follows upon the forms and not the matter. For example, you see that the same essence of body that on the one hand, along with animateness, makes up an animate body, will on the other hand, along with inanimateness, make up an inanimate body. 207 Therefore, matters that are apt to produce the same effects with different forms are called the same. But different simple forms are hardly called the same, since they don’t have this feature. 208 You won’t find the same diversity of effects in the pure essences of the most generic genera. For example, if it could happen that (a) the pure essence that is the matter of the most generic genus Quality were to change its producing how things are, with (b) the pure essence that is the matter of the most generic genus Substance, and (c) were to receive its form,38 then neither substance nor quality would ever come into being out of the matter of substance along with a form of this sort. Conversely, neither would substance or quality ever come into being out of the matter of quality and 37 Rationality is a simple form, and therefore is not itself a composite of matter and form (“it has none”). 38 The hypothesis described here is that the matter of Quality, which normally has the power to determine how things are (i.e. what qualities they have), exchanges this power for the power that the matter of Substance usually has, namely being susceptible to contraries—in which case, as Pseudo-Joscelin goes on to say, neither

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econuerso ex materia qualitatis et susceptibilitate contrariorum fieret uel substantia uel qualitas, quemadmodum ex illa eadem essentia substantiae quae incorporeitate constituit spiritum et fieret corpus, suscepta corporeitate, et ex illa quae modo corpus constituit fieret spiritus incorporeitate informante.

3 et] om. P 4 spiritus] Cousin corpus OP

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susceptibility to contraries, the way body would come into being out of the selfsame essence of substance that makes up spirit through incorporeity if it received corporeity instead, and spirit would come to be out of what now makes up body if incorporeity were to inform it instead.

substance nor quality would result from the hybrid matter-of-Quality informed by the power-of-Substance.

Critical Study of Fabrizio Amerini’s Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life Patrick Toner

Amerini’s book, as its title suggests, covers various issues surrounding the moral and metaphysical status of the human embryo. It also, though to a much lesser extent, discusses human death. This book pushes deeply into the thought of St Thomas, and I expect that any serious reader of the book will find himself or herself grappling anew with many of the issues it covers. Amerini presents a thorough survey of what seem to me the most important texts in St Thomas on these matters, coupled with careful exegesis of those texts. He engages in lengthy and detailed attempts to reconcile the apparently not-always-internally-consistent texts from St Thomas, in a genuinely constructive spirit. He offers firm but generous and respectful criticisms of the work of some philosophers seeking to apply Thomistic insights to contemporary problems. Anybody interested in the metaphysical or bioethical views of St Thomas will profit from studying this work. I wish to make very clear here, at the outset, my admiration for the book and for its author, because in what follows I will be relentlessly and sometimes pointedly critical. It is a humbling thing to spend many pages pointing out what one takes to be problems—even serious problems—in a work that is far more significant and worthwhile than anything one has produced oneself.

1. S U M M A R Y The book’s purpose is “to offer a philosophical reconstruction of Thomas Aquinas’s teaching on embryology and an assessment of its possible

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bioethical implications” (xi).1 The opening chapter provides metaphysical background by briefly explaining St Thomas’s views on substantial generation and substantial form. Chapter 2 moves from substantial form in general to the human soul specifically. It gives a helpful though very brief survey of the thomistic doctrine of the soul, and concludes with a few pages that cover some standard objections to, or puzzles about, the thomistic soul. In chapter 3 Amerini discusses the origin and development of the embryo, and focuses particularly on the point that (as all the parties to the medieval discussion about these matters agreed) the embryo performs vital operations (58). What—if anything—follows from that point? Apparently, St Thomas recognizes two general possibilities. First, it is possible that the embryo performs these functions due solely to the influence of some external principle. This possibility can be subdivided further, based on where its defender places the external cause: the two main options would be to place it in the father, or in the mother. Second, it is possible that the embryo performs these functions in virtue of having an internal principle. This possibility can be multiply subdivided, but the details of those subdivisions need not detain us here. The upshot is that St Thomas rejects the first possibility and embraces the second. His distinctive way of cashing out that second possibility leads him to posit his thesis of delayed hominization, according to which the embryo passes through various types of ensoulment, beginning with the vegetative, moving to the sensitive, and finally ending with the rational. Chapter 4 covers a few of the worries that St Thomas’s embryological doctrine raises: for example, the issue of the creation of the human soul. Chapter 5—“The Identity of the Embryo”—is the real heart of the book. It spans more than sixty pages (of a book that is only 240 pages long), and attempts in that space to explain how it is, or is not, the case that the embryo persists through the process of generation and becomes a human being. Amerini has done a wonderful job of setting up for this chapter: he has explained in the first two chapters the role of substantial form in nailing down the identity of the substance, and the soul’s status as the substantial form of the organism. In the third chapter he has explained St Thomas’s doctrine of delayed hominization. The problem, then, is glaring: how could it possibly be the case that the embryo that is conceived is numerically identical to the child that is born? I will have a little bit more to say about this later. For now, I will simply say that Amerini’s solution here is to say: it is not, but that nevertheless it is the same subject. 1 All parenthetical page references in this paper are from Fabrizio Amerini, Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life, tr. M. Henninger, SJ (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). This work was originally published in Italian as Tommaso d’Aquino: origine e fine della vita umana (Pisa: Edizione ETS, 2009).

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Starting in chapter 6, with the metaphysics and biology behind us, we move to bioethics. St Thomas holds that the early embryo is not rationally ensouled. Does that mean that he thinks it is morally permissible to abort an early embryo? St Thomas had a fairly nuanced position on the matter, and this chapter does a fine job of explaining his approach. It also adds some distinctions of its own. For example, Amerini distinguishes a properties-based approach to these questions from a subject-based approach. On the former, the having of certain properties is what makes something fully human, thus conveying moral status to the bearer. On the latter, the continuity of subjecthood with something fully human conveys a kind of moral status to the subject. (Remember that Amerini interprets St Thomas as holding that the embryo is the same subject as the later human being: on the subject-based approach to bioethics, this would have moral import.) Chapter 7 covers some puzzles about the beginning and end of human life. Given the material that has come before, we might ask about the status of, for example, a human baby that does not have a brain. The thoughts that have pushed St Thomas to deny a rational soul to the early embryo would seem to push him to deny a rational soul to this infant. Similarly, if an adult human being is irreversibly damaged such that he is no longer capable of any sort of human thought, it might seem that St Thomas would be committed to denying that he has a rational soul, either. And, in fact, there is a text from the Commentary on the Book of Causes where St Thomas seems to say something of the sort (regarding the latter case). Amerini offers some interesting thoughts about these matters. In chapter 8, Amerini turns to current philosophical discussions about delayed hominization. It is virtually beyond dispute that St Thomas himself held to delayed hominization. But many philosophers have argued that if St Thomas were aware of contemporary embryological science, he would have rejected delayed hominization. These philosophers argue, in other words, that St Thomas’s philosophical views, coupled with our contemporary knowledge of embryological development, would entail immediate hominization: the human embryo is rationally ensouled from the moment of conception. Amerini disagrees. My interest in this book leans heavily in the direction of this material, and I will focus a great deal of my discussion on it. But first, I shall have at least a few things to say about the more straightforwardly historical material. In the following section I will mainly discuss Amerini’s account of St Thomas. I will raise a few doubts along interpretive lines, and also mention a few points that I think Amerini overlooked, to the detriment of his overall discussion.

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2 . E X E GE T I C A L M A T T E R S Let us begin with a brief account of what St Thomas actually thinks about the origin of the embryo. He thinks that the embryo comes about through a union of sperm and menstrual fluid. The semen is “what remains from the final stages of the food’s digestion by the father, and as such is not absorbed by the father” (14). Hence, it is neither a complete species, nor is it a part of the human organism; it is an inanimate thing, directed in its work by a corporeal power given to it by the father at the moment of its detachment from him. But it operates not in itself, but by way of a formative power. This formative power remains present during the whole process of generation, until the coming of the rational soul. This power operates on the menstrual fluid, ultimately forming it so that it is appropriately disposed to receive first the sensitive soul, and last the rational soul. You might note that I did not mention the vegetative soul: that is because there is apparently some ambiguity in St Thomas himself regarding the status of the vegetative soul: at times, he seems to say that the menstrual fluid is already vegetatively ensouled prior to the coming of the semen, though it does not operate accordingly. On this view, the semen’s first job is to bring out the operations of the vegetative soul.2 This complication shows up around pages 97–9 in chapter 4: the discussion of embryology in chapter 1 does not give us any hint of this issue. Indeed, in chapter 1 we hear what I had expected to hear: namely, that the embryo receives a vegetative soul at conception (16)—a point Amerini repeats at various other places in the book. At any rate, complications aside, the story of the embryo’s development continues with the embryo itself beginning to carry out its own vegetative functions, but with the formative power remaining present and guiding the embryo’s formation of organs that will become suitable for future ensoulments. Think of it this way: the vegetative embryo has nothing in it 2 “In perfect animals, generated by coition, the active force is in the semen of the male, as the Philosopher says (De Gener. Animal. ii, 3); but the foetal matter is provided by the female. In this matter, the vegetative soul exists from the very beginning, not as to the second act, but as to the first act, as the sensitive soul is in one who sleeps. But as soon as it begins to attract nourishment, then it already operates in act. This matter therefore is transmuted by the power which is in the semen of the male, until it is actually informed by the sensitive soul . . . ” ST I, 118, 1 ad 4. I am not here interested in attempting my own exegesis of this text. I am simply reporting Amerini’s. I would be inclined to wonder about the force of the “from the very beginning,” but as I say, that is not my concern here. The Latin of the key sentence is: In qua quidem materia statim a principio est anima vegetabilis, non quidem secundum actum secundum, sed secundum actum primum, sicut anima sensitiva est in dormientibus. From the beginning of what?

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directing it to become an animal. The vegetative soul has the job of running the vegetative functions, none of which have anything to do with growing little sensory organs. So something has to explain the embryo’s motion towards its next form of ensoulment—and that something is the formative power. The sperm apparently does not become a material part of the embryo (as we learn on page 98), and so its formative power remains as a kind of force working on the embryo from without. Once the embryo receives its sensitive soul, it becomes able to perform sensitive functions, but as before, of course, none of those functions have anything to do with making organs suitable for cooperating fully with rational activity, so we still need the formative power to dispose the matter appropriately. Once the matter is just right, God sends the rational soul, and the human being comes to be. At this point, the formative power’s work is done, since the new human being can now direct its own continuing development without need of an extrinsic agent: the process of human generation is now complete. Embedded in the brief summary I have just given are repeated references to two principles at work in the process of generation: an internal principle, and an external principle. The souls are the internal principles, governing the organic operations of the embryo; the formative power is the extrinsic principle, guiding its movement towards its next mode of being. I have noted above that Amerini’s exposition struck me as unclear in the way it buried complications. Amerini speaks of the vacillations of St Thomas on various points in his embryology—I would suggest that the explanation for this is that the empirical data was so limited and crude that he recognized that he was, to some extent, just taking his best guesses at some of the details of the process. But whatever the explanation for the ambiguity, vacillation, vagueness, or whatever, I think the exposition could have been more clear. Here is another example of unclarity. He gives a list of four principles that govern St Thomas’s account of human generation. One of these principles is (G3) “Natural generation is a process and as such requires an external principle of activation and an internal principle of development.” The need for the internal principle is not, to my mind, adequately developed. Here is what Amerini says about it: “once any process of generation begins to be actualized, it proceeds on its own, fed by an internal principle of development. In fact, what distinguishes a living organism from an inanimate entity is its possessing an internal principle of movement” (27). I concede the point made in the second sentence, but I find it irrelevant to the issue at hand. Think about the generation of a plant. As soon as the plant comes to be at all, its generation is complete—there is no further end to which it is ordered: no new soul which it will someday receive. The external principle brings about the generation of the plant: the internal principle—the vegetative soul—is not present at all until the plant is present,

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which is to say, at the end of the process of generation. Which is to say that there is no internal principle on the scene in this act of generation. At least, not the sort that we have been led to expect by Amerini’s discussion. Now, it might be said that the vegetative soul is present before the plant comes to exist in act. As we saw earlier, St Thomas apparently sometimes thinks (at least when he is speaking of perfect animals) that the vegetative soul is already present in the menstrual fluid, despite its being inactive. If we could generalize that notion—that the vegetative soul is there at the beginning of the process of generation—then it could serve as the internal principle. But it is hard not to see that as a straight self-contradiction. If the (final) soul is already present, then the process of generation cannot be just beginning—it must be over. Interestingly, this feature of the process of generation is a crucial weapon in Amerini’s overall argumentative arsenal: again, once the final soul is present, the process of generation is complete. Hence, if the final soul were present at the moment of conception, there would be no process of generation—it would be ended just as it began. Partly for this reason, Amerini thinks that St Thomas’s philosophical views cannot be reconciled with any sort of immediate hominization theory, no matter what the empirical embryology looks like—ours or St Thomas’s. Given the centrality of this issue to Amerini’s argument, the discussion of the metaphysical foundation needed significantly more care. More on this later. We have been talking about Amerini’s account of substantial generation. Amerini gives us a separate set of theses about the substantial form itself. Consider the first such thesis, (F1): “Substantial form informs prime matter instantly and immediately” (29). This thesis seems indubitable. But it is put to use in a way that I find unsettling. As I said above, Amerini insists that St Thomas could not have accepted the idea of the human embryo being rationally ensouled from conception. Amerini presents an argument for this claim, and then tells us that the argument is “nothing other than an application of the thesis (F1) . . . ” (68). The argument, very roughly, goes like this. If the rational soul is present from the moment of conception, then it must either be (a) present in the semen in a complete and perfect way prior to conception, or it must be (b) present in the semen either actually but imperfectly, or else entirely potentially. Now, if it were correct that the reasoning here were really just an application of (F1), then it would be game over as far as any conflict about delayed hominization goes. But it is not at all clear to me either (1) how the argument in question really is just an application of (F1), or (2) that the argument is really as persuasive as Amerini takes it to be. Begin with (1): why think the argument is just an application of (F1)? I am not sure. Amerini rejects the possibilities labeled previously as (a) and

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(b) on the grounds that the primary organs of the body must already be formed before the soul arrives. Since St Thomas thinks, says Amerini, that the “living body becomes human when and only when it has an organic structure that is able to support all the functions of the soul,” it follows that the semen—which manifestly lacks all such organic structure—cannot be rationally ensouled. But St Thomas also thinks that the early embryo obviously lacks such structures, and hence cannot be rationally ensouled, either. Now, what we should think of any of this as an interpretation of St Thomas’s doctrines I will address in a moment. Here, I am talking about the previous item (1), which has to do with the claim that this argument is an application of (F1). I do not see that at all. It appears to be more of a set of claims about St Thomas’s views about the material conditions required for ensoulment—which makes sense, since it is an argument about ensoulment. Again, I am not complaining here about the argument itself, but about the implication that if we have worries about this argument, it must be because we are shaky on (F1). I feel wholly firm on (F1). Nevertheless, I still have worries about Amerini’s take on St Thomas’s argument. So, turning to (2): is this argument a good one? It could be assessed on multiple grounds—accuracy in its account of St Thomas’s thought, or philosophical merits independent of whether it has St Thomas correct, or what have you—and here I am principally interested in the philosophical merit. First, notice that the crucial move in the argument is the claim that the primary organs of the body must be formed before the soul arrives. Here is how Amerini puts it: “if one takes literally the Aristotelian characterization of the soul as the form of an organic physical body that has life potentially, one finds oneself having to admit that the primary organs of the body must be already formed before the coming of the soul” (66). This claim is derived from (or, perhaps, simply is a slight embellishment upon) another claim, which Amerini has presented earlier on: “metaphysically human ensoulment can be portrayed as the substantial form of a physical body endowed with organs” (52). The trouble is that this second quotation is supposed to be simply recapitulating something that Amerini had already explained elsewhere. And I cannot find where it was explained. Its appearance on page 52 as a firmly established conclusion was somewhat surprising to me. And since this bit is used to ground a really important argument of Amerini’s, that seems a significant weakness. A second problem with the argument is that so much turns on the issue of potentiality, but potentiality itself is never treated with sufficient thoroughness and clarity. Go back to this claim: “a living body becomes human when and only when it has an organic structure that is able to support all the functions of the soul.” The crucial word is ‘able.’ Whether some matter

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is suitably disposed for ensoulment of one kind or another has to do with the potentialities of the matter. Like (F1), I take this to be indubitably the doctrine of St Thomas. Even God in his Absolute Power cannot simply slap a rational soul onto any matter whatever and have a rational being result. Or rather, he can, but he must miraculously and instantaneously order the matter so that it is suitable for ensoulment—this ordering is an operation logically prior to ensoulment, and in all but the miraculous case of the Incarnation, St Thomas thinks it is temporally prior to ensoulment, as well.3 But the suitability of the matter, again, is an issue of its potentialities. The matter is suitable when it is able to support all the functions of the soul: what is the force of this notion of potentiality? This is a difficult question, but it is one that Amerini is painfully quiet about. In pages 66–7 we find a very brief discussion of the notion, which introduces such ideas as the distinction between first and second act and so on. But given the importance of potentiality in the disputes about delayed hominization, I would have expected a crystal clear and vividly detailed discussion of potentiality, with specific references to the recent literature where this doctrine has been so discussed. But we do not find such a discussion in Amerini. It just is not there. (The issue arises once again in the chapter on delayed hominization, but once again it is inadequate: I shall talk about this in the next section.) Still, I think there is little reason to doubt that Amerini has St Thomas more or less right on the central textual matters at issue here. That is, I think it is very clear that St Thomas rejected the idea that the rational soul pre-existed in any way at all in the semen, and I think it is equally clear that St Thomas rejected the idea that the embryo was rationally ensouled at conception. These points seem established decisively as far as St Thomas goes. And Amerini’s text has the merit of providing a fairly exhaustive survey of St Thomas’s writings on the issue. Potentiality is not the only important metaphysical notion to get short shrift. For example, when we think about the status of the embryo, we nowadays almost invariably start asking about its personhood. Is the embryo a person or not? It does not take a great deal of familiarity with St Thomas’s thinking, it seems to me, to recognize that if he thinks the embryo is not rationally ensouled, then it is not a person. That is not because all persons must be rationally ensouled. (Angels, for example, are not rationally ensouled, at least not in the literal sense in which we human beings are.) It is because if the thing is ensouled, but only at a vegetative or sensitive level, then it is not rational, and hence does not meet the conditions for personhood. So I do not think there is a great mystery here regarding St Thomas’s 3

See, for example, ST III, 33, 1.

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views on the personhood of the non-rationally ensouled human embryo. And perhaps this explains why Amerini simply ignores the issue of personhood. But given Amerini’s interest in speaking to contemporary bioethical issues, personhood seems a crucial matter to cover. Similarly, and more worrisome, we do not get anything like a thorough account of St Thomas’s doctrine of substance. The idea is introduced, to be sure, but not in a thorough way. These objections might seem pedantic, but in fact there were many places in the book where Amerini’s discussion begged for the judicious application of precisely these metaphysical categories, and did not receive them. One example: throughout the book, I thought the metaphysical status of the embryo was left dangling (despite the extremely lengthy chapter 5). I mean here: is the embryo a substance? If so, is it a complete substance, or an incomplete substance?4 Given the connection between substantiality and personhood, and the connection between personhood and bioethical theorizing in the contemporary literature, I think this book would have been much more useful if Amerini had helped walk the reader through some of these metaphysical matters.

3. DELAYED HOMINIZATION TODAY By the time we arrive at the chapter on the contemporary debate over delayed hominization, we have crashed through many pages of exegesis of St Thomas’s views on embryology, reading about how the semen is not materially absorbed into the embryo, and its formative power remains present, working from the outside on the embryo, and how the menstrual fluid plays no formal role in the production of the embryo, and on and on and on. This embryology, to say the least, is completely bogus. I do not blame St Thomas. Amerini actually brings out the fact that on these matters St Thomas was reasonably well informed regarding the hot embryological science of his day, and he seems to have worked very hard to impose some philosophical sense on the “data.” As I mentioned earlier, it seems quite reasonable to infer that some of the reason for the vagueness and/or inconsistency in St Thomas’s embryology is simply that he recognized much of it for the speculation it was. Our embryology today is likely to be refined in the years to come, but I do expect that the main lines will probably remain more or less as they are. 4 On these notions, see, for example, ST I, 75, 2 ad. 1; and Disputed Questions on the Soul, I ad 1.

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The sperm and egg merge, forming a new cell that over a little time joins together the partial genetic codes carried by each gamete, forging a new thing with its own internal mechanism to guide its development. (So to speak—this is not intended to be a primer on embryology, and I do not mean for anything to hang on my decidedly non-technical account!) It is clearly false that the maternal contributor plays no formal role in the process. It is clearly false that the semen’s matter does not become a material part of the embryo. It is clearly false that the formative power leading to the development of the lovely new little organs and so forth operates from the outside. St Thomas’s views on embryology are wrong on all these counts and more. And so, the debate over delayed hominization turns on the question: given what we now know about embryology, would St Thomas still hold to delayed hominization? Amerini says yes. We have already seen his basic argument. In order for the rational soul to inform the embryo, the embryo’s matter must already be properly disposed to receive the rational soul. This is the “decisive argument,” he says: “if one agrees in describing the soul as ‘the act or form of an organic, physical body that has life potentially,’ the lack of formed organs could be a good reason for rejecting the moment of conception as that in which the rational ensoulment of the embryo takes place” (80–81). This ties into the potentiality point (of course): without the formed organs in place, it is false that the embryo can carry out all of the operations proper to human beings. If, for example, it lacks a nervous system, then it simply cannot carry out rational activities. But the decisiveness is mere appearance. As I pointed out previously, not only does the argument rest on an assertion that is not adequately defended, but it also relies on a notion of potentiality which—as I say again—is not fully explained. The best discussion of potentiality occurs when Amerini is trying to explain the difference between a very early embryo and a later human being—say, an 8-month-old fetus—who through some congenital problem has failed to develop an upper brain. The anencephalic infant appears unable to carry out all of the operations proper to human beings: it simply lacks the organs necessary (for human beings) for thought. But Amerini argues the anencephalic infant should have a brain, and would have had a brain if something had not gone wrong. Whereas the early embryo has not arrived at that point at which it would have had a brain: it lacks a brain, you might say, not because something has gone wrong, but because so far everything is going right (195–8). But I am still left wondering just why the actual presence of these organs is such a decisive matter. Alternatively: what organs are necessary to guarantee that the embryo really can carry out all the activities proper to human beings? Amerini helpfully says:

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Thomas is of the opinion that one must not start from any description of the matter to establish when the rational soul arrives, but, vice versa, one must start from a given definition of the rational soul and from there move to specify the conditions under which the matter can be considered in near potency to being rationally ensouled. (217)

This seems quite correct. And as we have seen, Amerini himself believes that for St Thomas, that condition involves the presence of the proper sorts of organs. Must one reject such a claim while endorsing immediate hominization? I would say no. The organs in question, in this case, are the organs that will—unless prevented—bring about the presence of the whole human nervous system: that is to say, the many various cells and/or cell parts that make up the early embryo. These are not organs in quite the robust way that brains and eyes are, but they are nevertheless remarkably differentiated and specialized and complex. Let us take a moment to read a fairly long passage from St Thomas on the need for organs in the subject of ensoulment. It should help make clear the weakness of Amerini’s application of St Thomas’s thought to the contemporary understanding of the embryo. Next, when Aristotle says But anything with organs is of this sort, etc., he explores a portion of the definition that has to do with the subject. And because he said that soul is the actuality of a physical body potentially having life, he also says that every body with organs is of this sort. Here “body with organs” refers to what has a variety of organs. This variety of organs is necessary in a body being given life because of the variety of the soul’s operations. For soul, since it is the most complete form among the forms of bodily things, is the source of a variety of operations. Thus the thing it completes requires a variety of organs. But the forms of things that are without souls, because of their incompleteness, are the sources of fewer operations, and so the things they complete do not need a variety of organs. Now the soul of plants is recognized as the least complete among souls. Thus there is less of a variety of organs in plants than there is in animals. So in order to show that every body being given life has organs, he chooses an argument based on plants: in them there is less of a variety of organs. That is why he says that even the parts of plants are various organs, although the parts of plants are quite simple—i.e., homogeneous. For there is no such variety in them as there is in the parts of animals. An animal’s foot is composed of various parts (flesh, sinew, bones, and so forth), but the organs of plants do not have such a variety of parts out of which they are composed.5

It is easy to see why St Thomas would have thought the menstrual fluid was plantlike in this sense. It appears very undifferentiated, very simple, very uniform. We now know that blood cells contain extraordinary and 5 A Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, tr. R. Pasnau (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 126. This is from Bk II, lecture 1, par. 230–1.

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splendid differentiation within themselves, but St Thomas would have had no way of knowing this. Of course, we also know that the maternal contribution to the embryo is not menstrual fluid, but the equally highly organized and splendid egg. We know that St Thomas thought an undifferentiated collection of menstrual fluid cannot be viewed as complex or differentiated enough to receive rational ensoulment, but we simply cannot take for granted that his thought process is applicable to the early embryo as we now know it. On St Thomas’s embryology, then, the early embryo is some menstrual fluid that has a vegetative soul (and hence is capable of the roughest forms of self-movement), and is being operated on from without by the formative power in order to bring about new structures that will, when they become present, allow for sensitive ensoulment. On such a view, it seems reasonable to say that the embryo does not have the organs that are necessary to carry out all properly human activities. There is nothing intrinsic to the embryo that directs it to the production of the human brain and sense organs and so forth—that is the whole point of the formative power. (Its ordering to the rational soul is purely passive.) But on our contemporary understanding of embryology, the early embryo is a stunningly complex entity, absolutely chock full of “organs” right from the start, and its development is guided wholly intrinsically. True, the early embryo cannot (let us suppose) actually engage in high level human thought. But neither can the normal human infant or college sophomore. But whether it can actually engage in high level human thought is not the decisive factor, as Amerini concedes the case of anencephalic infants shows. The question is: does the early embryo have the right sort of potentiality so that St Thomas’s philosophical thought would, when combined with modern embryology, lead him to think that the early embryo is capable of rational ensoulment? I see nothing in Amerini that gives me any reason to think not. To be sure, he has a great deal to say. For example, by way of trying to fend off the kind of point I have been making above regarding the tremendous complexity of the early embryo, Amerini notes (quite rightly) that there is no particular material organization which can in itself give rise to human rational activities anyway. That is, human rational activities have the immaterial human soul as their subject. From this, Amerini reasons: If no material and bodily organization, however highly specialized, can give an account of itself of rationality, the genetic code of the embryo or the fusion of the parents’ genetic codes in the zygote cannot be taken as a criterion for fixing the human, or typically human, identity of the embryo. If being a human being depends on having a rational soul infused by God, the presence of the genetic code in the zygote does not prove or help to prove that the zygote has the property of

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“being a human being,” for otherwise the infusion of the soul would play no role in identifying the embryo as a human being. (217)

The trouble with this passage, as Amerini himself immediately recognizes, is that it simply misses the point. The defender of immediate hominization, says Amerini, might “reply that the presence of the genetic code . . . is not of itself responsible for the embryo being a human being . . . but furnishes all the necessary and sufficient conditions so that the embryo can be a human being—that is, receive a human soul from God.” I am not so hung up on the genetic code thing myself. Some of Amerini’s largely unspecified opponents apparently find genetics extremely interesting, though, so he seems to think that the genetic code is the crucial weapon in the armory of the defender of immediate hominization.6 At any rate, this reply seems telling with respect to the argument in the previous long quotation. Amerini retorts: But even with this response, the admission that the moment of conception is the occasion that God awaits to infuse the human soul seems equally indefensible. For if one assumes that the occasion is given by conception as such, such a choice seems completely arbitrary on the part of God and entirely detached from any possibility we have of explaining it rationally. From this standpoint, nothing stops one from adopting as the absolute starting point of the embryo’s hominization (and more coherently with the embryology of Thomas) the moment when the semen is detached from the father. (217)

Now, at first I found this passage wholly inexplicable. Various defenders of immediate hominization, Patrick Lee perhaps most prominently among them, have explained with admirable clarity exactly why the moment of conception provides a very bright line.7 I was puzzled to find that Amerini did not take any of their arguments into account. But I came to see that the reason Amerini denies that conception can serve as such a bright line is that he is importing into his discussion here St Thomas’s views on the role of the semen. In other words, as long as we keep hold of St Thomas’s account of 6 This is a little surprising, actually, since it was Robert Pasnau—a foe of immediate hominization—who pushed for the DNA to serve a role analogous to the role played by the formative power, and it was Pat Lee and John Haldane—defenders of immediate hominization—who rejected that parallel, pointing out that DNA is more properly understood as an organ of the embryo. John Haldane and Patrick Lee, “Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, Abortion and the Value of Life,” Philosophy 78 (2003), 255–78. 7 For example, see Lee’s Abortion and Unborn Human Life (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996). This is not a study of St Thomas’s thought, but the application is fairly self-evident. See also Lee’s “The Pro-life Argument From Substantial Identity: A Defense,” Bioethics 18 (2004), 249–63; and his “Substantial Identity and the Right to Life: a Rejoinder to Dean Stretton,” Bioethics 21 (2007), 93–7.

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how the semen operates, then it makes no sense to think of conception as the point at which God infuses the soul. (There is no doubt about this: St Thomas clearly thinks that if we push rational ensoulment to conception, then we ought to push it to the detachment of the sperm from the father.) But the whole argument, at this point of the book, is over whether our contemporary notions of embryology would force St Thomas to say the same thing. And the answer to that is clearly “no.” Without keeping constant St Thomas’s views on the semen, the argument that conception cannot serve as a bright line has exactly zero force. (Note that I am not claiming here that today’s embryology would force St Thomas to accept conception as the moment of rational ensoulment. I am claiming that today’s embryology would not underwrite the argument that if we try to push rational ensoulment to the moment of conception, then we should keep pushing back to the detachment of the sperm from the father. Again, given St Thomas’s embryology, particularly his views on the sperm, that conclusion would clearly follow. Given contemporary embryology, it simply would not.) Amerini gets this wrong, I think, not out of carelessness, but out of a certain confusion regarding which parts of St Thomas should be rejected on the basis of contemporary embryology. That is, Amerini and I disagree about what counts as the empirical embryology which should be rejected, and what counts as the philosophy of St Thomas, which the participants in this debate wish to preserve. For example, Amerini twice refers to “philosophical intuitions” of St Thomas regarding points of embryology. The first is that “there is already present in the semen the formal continuant of the generative process, whether it is the vegetative soul itself or the formative power” (62). The second is that “the female matter just fertilized by the male semen is already the embryonic matter” (215). These do not strike me as philosophical intuitions. They strike me as tenuous suppositions drawn from (as we now know) false empirical claims about embryogenesis.8

8 Amerini also says: “An enrichment of these data [namely, what science tells us about embryogenesis] of itself does not falsify a philosophical explanation, which turns upon the identification of certain macroscopic connections existing among the observed phenomena, or at least the scientific enrichment does not bring about a redefinition of the very phenomena observed. To be more specific, the genetic code could yet be paraphrased and handled with the Aristotelian conceptual apparatus. From this viewpoint, contemporary biology could not significantly support or deny the embryological account of Thomas for the simple fact that Thomas is not engaged in developing a strictly biological account of the phenomena of human generation” (216). So I take it that Amerini just divides up the territory between the empirical data and the philosophical theorizing significantly differently than I do. But I also think his way of dividing it up is not just different from my (admittedly merely intuitive) approach, but worse, since it

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I suspect that because Amerini treats them as philosophical intuitions, though, he fails to adequately grasp the seriousness of the case that has been made in favor of immediate hominization. If the above two “intuitions” remain doctrines of St Thomas, then it really does seem to follow that pushing ensoulment back to conception would lead us just as promptly to push it back to the detachment of the semen from the father.9 But I simply cannot believe that these two “intuitions” remain acceptable, given what we now know of embryology. They deny that the sperm’s matter becomes part of the embryo. They deny any formal role to the mother’s contribution. They are just mistakes. Reject them, and it can no longer be maintained on Thomistic grounds that if we are inclined to push rational ensoulment back to conception, we might as well push it back to detachment of the semen. Instead of slipping back to a misguided account of St Thomas’s embryology, just at the crucial point, Amerini might have posed a new model for embryogenesis that really did try to take into account the new scientific data. Such an account would clearly not include the two “philosophical intuitions” we spoke of above. There is another reason why someone might wish to develop a new thomistic model of embryogenesis: namely, one might be convinced by Amerini that St Thomas’s own view of the development of the embryo does not really rise to the level of full coherence. As I said earlier, Amerini spends the lengthy fifth chapter trying to get clear on the status of the embryo. Amerini contends that it is essential that there is one single subject that persists through the changes of embryogenesis and becomes a human being. But the trouble is in saying how to achieve this result, given the metaphysics of St Thomas. By this point in the book, Amerini has shown that St Thomas does not believe the embryo begins its life with rational ensoulment: it begins with vegetative ensoulment, and then proceeds through sensitive ensoulment to rational ensoulment. Each of these souls is, of course, a substantial form. So it follows straightaway that we do not have strict identity here: the embryo is not numerically identical with the human being who replaces it in the womb. But Amerini argues that matter receives its identity from its substantial yields such extraordinary results as this: “The claim that the rational soul is infused by God at the moment of conception conflicts with the empirical datum that that act of infusion does not transform the mother’s menstrual blood into an organic matter” (221). I ask myself: who has made such an observation? How? And note that page 221 is squarely within the chapter on the contemporary debate, where contemporary embryology is supposed to be on the table, so we are not talking about what medieval doctors may or may not have observed, but what our current embryology entails. 9 Amerini treats this issue on p. 80ff. His discussion depends crucially on a text from the De Potentia, which Amerini discusses at 56ff.

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form, so there are problems with simply asserting that the embryo has material continuity with the human being. Amerini works long and hard to explain various senses of identity and continuity, and after extensive discussion suggests that the required continuity can be found in what he calls formal-material continuity, which has to do with the notions of site and of the matter’s indeterminate dimensions (156). It strikes me as a helpful and careful account of these notions. But then, after all, it turns out that “only the existential continuity of the embryo seems to guarantee and enable us to ascertain the identity of subject of the embryo” (162). In other words, it appears that after sixty pages of work, and after having offered a clever solution to his problem, Amerini admits that there is just no way that St Thomas’s metaphysics actually allow there to be the kind of continuity he has been looking for. This is somewhat deflating. Perhaps I ought to be deflated—perhaps Amerini has St Thomas dead right here, and St Thomas’s own philosophical theory about the embryo has some significant problems, just as his empirical account of the embryo has some significant problems. If that is so, then someone sympathetic to the thought of St Thomas—someone who thinks St Thomas might be largely right about a lot of things—would have reason to try to improve upon these broken elements. Indeed, there is already a model in St Thomas that comes reasonably close, at least in certain respects, to what we now think of as how embryogenesis happens. That model is the formation of mixed body from elements. I will give only the very roughest and briefest approximation of how this story goes. Consider some elements that come together to form a mixed body. (For simplicity’s sake, pretend there are just two such elements, and pretend that prior to this conjunction, each existed independently.) Neither element can survive this process of mixture as such, because if the elements survive as such you do not really have a mixed body, but rather a mixture to the senses: an accidental unity. But the elements must survive in some sense, or else you do not have a mixed body at all—a third thing. For many reasons it would be an obvious error to consider conception as happening on precisely this model. But conception is not wholly different from this. In conception, two things come together to form a third. Some of the powers of the gametes are preserved in the new mixture, but they are preserved in a new form: to some extent, the powers blend. The substantial forms of the gametes (if they are substances, which I suppose they must be) surely do not remain present in the conceptus, on pain of the conceptus being a mere mixture to the senses. The matters of the gametes are mixed. A new thing comes to be. Now, imagine a metaphysical model of conception worked out with real care and precision. Imagine an account of the status of the early embryo along these lines. If Amerini had given us such an account, and had then

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treated the arguments of today’s defenders of immediate hominization in detail, and with reference to the metaphysics as we can best work it out, then his chapter on immediate hominization could have been a really fine contribution to that debate. But he did not. He treated his opponents mostly without naming them, and without dealing in any real detail with any of their proposals or arguments. And as he did so, he slipped back and forth between remembering that we have discharged St Thomas’s embryology, and forgetting that. I think these problems render the chapter by far the weakest part of the book, and, to be frank, simply unhelpful. With respect to the debate about delayed hominization, I have to say that the central literature on the subject remains the debate between Pasnau and Lee/Haldane. Amerini’s discussion is not sufficiently fine-grained. Perhaps the reader should know that I speak as a wholehearted advocate of the immediate hominization view, and a former student of Lee’s to boot. That said, I came to this book hoping for a really compelling discussion of the matter, and I did not find it.

4 . C O N C LU S I O N I have said some negative things about Amerini’s book here, but I close with a reminder of the Introduction, where I praised the work. I appreciated Amerini’s tone, I appreciated his scholarly work, and I appreciated his evident desire to serve as a kind of referee in an argument that has been sometimes unfortunately unedifying. I think there is a lot to like about his work. One last thing I like about it is the translation. The translator, Mark Henninger, SJ, seems to have done a really excellent job. I do not read Italian, so I can say nothing about whether the translation is accurate, but I do find the English generally both very readable and very clear. The only criticism I have about the translation (and I doubt the fault here lies with Father Henninger) is that the Latin in the footnotes is untranslated. Now, in a scholarly book on St Thomas’s philosophy it might seem normal to leave the Latin untranslated. But Amerini wishes the book to be accessible to those not familiar with medieval philosophy (xxi). And while many readers unfamiliar with medieval philosophy might nevertheless be familiar with Latin, I doubt that that is true of the majority. So, leaving the Latin untranslated, especially in cases where no English translations exist, is unfortunate. Wake Forest University

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BIBLIOGRAPHY Amerini, Fabrizio. Aquinas on the Beginning and End of Human Life, tr. M. Henninger, SJ (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013). Amerini, Fabrizio. Tommaso d’Aquino: origine e fine della vita umana (Pisa: Edizione ETS, 2009). Haldane, John and Patrick Lee. “Aquinas on Human Ensoulment, Abortion and the Value of Life,” Philosophy 78 (2003), 255–78. Lee, Patrick. Abortion and Unborn Human Life (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1996). Lee, Patrick. “The Pro-life Argument From Substantial Identity: A Defense,” Bioethics 18 (2004), 249–63. Lee, Patrick. “Substantial Identity and the Right to Life: A Rejoinder to Dean Stretton,” Bioethics 21 (2007), 93–7. Pasnau, Robert. Thomas Aquinas on Human Nature: A Philosophical Study of Summa theologiae 1a 75–89 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Thomas Aquinas. A Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima, tr. R. Pasnau (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999). Thomas Aquinas. On the Power of God, tr. L. Shapcote (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1932–34). Thomas Aquinas. Questions on the Soul. tr. J. H. Robb (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1984). Thomas Aquinas. Summa theologiae, tr. L. Shapcote (New York: Benzinger, 1947–48).

Briefly Noted Russell L. Friedman, Intellectual Traditions at the Medieval University: The Use of Philosophical Psychology in Trinitarian Theology among the Franciscans and Dominicans, 1250–1350 (Brill, 2013), 2 volumes. Weighing in at 1,006 pages, this is the culmination of a project that began in Iowa City, as Friedman’s PhD dissertation. (The first words of volume 1 are “Back in 1992 . . . ”) Even the title is outsized, and serves to advertise the book’s tripartite ambitions. It is the work of an intellectual historian attempting to understand the culture of medieval academia, and it is the work of a philosopher interested in mind and epistemology, and it is a study of the theology of the Trinity. Really, it is the last of these. Although the book sometimes enters into philosophical terrain, and occasionally weighs in on university traditions, these ambitions serve for the most part just to palliate the reality that what we have here is that most unfashionable of things: a work of historical theology. But what a history it is. Friedman knows about everyone and everything that came up for discussion regarding the Trinity, over the century he investigates. In addition to the predictable big names, he has done groundbreaking research, often from the manuscripts, on dozens of minor figures, each of whose views come in for detailed discussion. The depth of research here sets a new standard for latemedieval scholarship, against which all work to date inevitably pales. The data he collects allow him to reach original and authoritative conclusions about the main currents of Trinitarian thought in the later Middle Ages. Given the importance of this theological question to so many areas of philosophical discussion, this is material from which historians of philosophy will benefit for years to come. Olga Weijers and Monica B. Calma, Le travail intellectuel a` la Faculte´ des arts de Paris: Textes et maıˆtres (ca. 1200–1500) IX. Re´pertoire des noms commenc¸ant par S–Z (Brepols, 2012). This is the ninth and final installment in a project that Olga Weijers began in 1994. Weijers (collaborating with Calma on recent volumes) aims to describe in detail every known master on the arts faculty in Paris from 1200 to 1500 whose work has survived, as well as every figure from those three centuries whose work influenced the Paris arts faculty. How many names is that? In addition to eight outside sources, Volume IX describes thirteen masters, running from Siger of Brabant to a certain Vericus, whose quodlibetal questions survive in manuscript. The whole project, therefore, offers comprehensive information about hundreds of figures, most quite obscure. How comprehensive? The average entry runs for around four pages, offering a brief biography, a detailed bibliography, and a list of all known surviving works, together with details about manuscripts and editions. Although obviously intended as a reference work, it is worth perusing these volumes just to get a sense of how much we know about “le travail intellectual” in Paris through these centuries. Weijers remarks in this final volume that they hope to post “une re´vision finale” of this work online in the near future. That will be most welcome. But can there ever be a final revision of something so useful?

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Jan A. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought: From Philip the Chancellor to Francisco Sua´rez (Brill, 2012). For most of his professional career, Jan Aertsen has championed the theory of the transcendentals as a central topic in medieval philosophy. This is the crowning achievement of that research: a comprehensive history of the topic from its origins in antiquity all the way to late scholasticism. The significance of the four transcendentals—being, one, true, good—can scarcely be overestimated, inasmuch as these are the foundational concepts for the main branches of philosophical inquiry. Aertsen’s special interest, however, is rather narrower: he wants to understand these concepts as transcendentals— that is, as both the first and the most general objects of intellect. Nicole Oresme. Questiones super Physicam (Books I–VII), ed. Stefano Caroti, Jean Celeyrette, Stefan Kirschner, and Edmond Mazet (Brill, 2013). This is the first publication of this major fourteenth-century treatise—one that survives in just a single manuscript, and that was entirely unknown until around fifty years ago. The manuscript does not extend to Book VIII, and is quite error-ridden throughout, but the editors have labored mightily to produce an intelligible text. At over 800 pages and more than a hundred questions, this wide-ranging work captures Oresme in his early, adventuresome, pre-1347 stage, when it still appeared as if scholastic philosophy might be allowed to make the great leap forward from real accidents to modi rerum. al-Kindı¯. The Philosophical Works of al-Kindı¯, tr. Peter Adamson and Peter E. Pormann (Oxford University Press, 2012). Here in one volume is everything philosophical that survives of al-Kindı¯, the first of the great Islamic philosophers. Aficionados of Arabic thought, as well as those who would like to know more, have reason to celebrate. Not only do we have all of this material in a single volume— much of it never published before in English—but we have it in masterful form. The translators supply detailed but accessible introductions, both to the volume as a whole and to each individual work. The translations are clear and idiomatic, and every work has been translated anew. Detailed scholarly endnotes accompany each translation. The pagination of the Arabic edition is supplied in the margin. There is a comprehensive index and bibliography. In short, everything is done just as it ought to be, to the highest professional standards. John Wyclif, Trialogus, tr. Stephen E. Lahey (Cambridge University Press, 2013). The slow march of Wyclif scholarship should be galvanized by the translation of this work, which offers a wide-ranging, accessible synopsis of his philosophical and theological views. Composed in the early 1380s, the Trialogus is organized according to the four-part structure of a Sentences commentary, but written for a broader, non-scholarly audience, as a conversation between three characters. The discussion is still very intricate, but the wide-ranging subject matter—God, man, angels, virtue, vice, sacraments, Last Judgment, plus a lengthy discussion of the mendicant friars—should make this volume useful not just to philosophers, but to anyone interested in English culture in the later fourteenth century.

Notes for Contributors OSMP welcomes submissions in all areas of medieval philosophy. Papers received will be evaluated in a timely manner, and an effort to provide significant feedback will be made in every case. To the fullest extent possible, all papers will be refereed according to a triple-blind process, so that neither editor nor referee will know the identity of the author, nor will the author know the identity of the referee. In addition to articles, we welcome editions of texts and brief critical discussions of recently published articles (both in OSMP and elsewhere). Book reviews, however, will be published only when solicited. Submissions should be in English, without author’s name or any other information that would impede blind refereeing. Papers may be of any length, and in particular we welcome the submission of longer works that fall outside the parameters of most journals. Contributors should bear in mind, however, that the lengthier the work, the higher the standard for acceptance. Papers should be submitted as either .pdf or Word-compatible files. The formatting of the initial submission is immaterial, but accepted papers will ultimately need to adhere to OSMP style, as on display in this present volume. All submissions, as well as queries, should be addressed to [email protected].

Index of Names Alan of Lille 7 n14 Albert the Great 2 n3 Aristotle 2, 4, 14, 17, 98–9, 107, 132, 133, 134 n24–25, 140, 141, 154, 155, 176, 177, 184, 185, 190–3, 198–201, 206, 207, 222 Arnulf of Laon 113 n21 Augustine 72–3, 79 Averroes 2

Lambert 112 Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 47, 48–9, 56–7, 63, 64

Bernard of Chartres 1 n1, 17, 18 Bernard of Clairvaux 1 n1 Boethius 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 14–15, 19, 21, 113 n23, 114 n24, 115, 140, 141, 146–51, 154–9, 162–9, 174, 175, 178–85, 190–5, 200, 201 206, 207

Peter Abelard 1 n1, 4, 7, 15, 104, 105, 107–9, 110–13, 115, 116 n28, 118 Peter Auriol 67–9, 83–95 Peter John Olivi 67–95 Peter the Venerable 113 n22 Plato 188–91 Porphyry 9, 10, 113 n23, 138, 139, 144–7, 152–5, 158, 159, 178, 179, 182, 183, 190–3, 204, 205 Pseudo–Joscelin 104–18, 121–211

Cajetan 47–8, 49, 62–4 Calcidius 1 n1, 18 Clarembald of Arras 7 n12, 19

Robert of Paris 113 n21 Roscelin of Compie`gne 110, 112, 113 n21

Garland 112 Gerard of Bologna 93 Gilbert of Poitiers 1–22 Gilbert de la Porre´e 114

Seneca 18 Thierry of Chartres 7 n12, 13 n34, 19 Thomas Aquinas 25–44, 46–57, 59, 60–2, 63, 64, 67, 71, 98–102, 212–228

Henry of Ghent 73, 74 John Duns Scotus 46–51, 57–64, 74 John of Salisbury 1 n1, 17–18, 20, 105 Joscelin 105, 118, 124, 125, 127 n5, 190, 191

Walter of Mortagne 110–11 William of Champeaux 110–12, 122, 123 William of Conches 117 William of Ockham 4, 67