Ottoman Diplomacy: Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers, 1878-1888 9781463229962

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Ottoman Diplomacy

Publications of the Center for Ottoman Diplomatic History 7

A co-publication with The Isis Press, Istanbul, the series consists of collections of thematic essays focused on Ottoman diplomatic history from the late eighteenth century until the early twentieth century.

Ottoman Diplomacy

Abdülhamid II and the Great Powers, 1878-1888

F.A.K. Yasamee

-äk

1

gorgias press 2011

Gorgias Press LLC, 954 River Road, Piscataway, NJ, 08854, USA www.gorgiaspress.com Copyright© 2011 by Gorgias Press LLC Originally published in 1996 All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC.

1 ISBN 978-1-61143-124-7 Reprinted from the 1996 Istanbul edition.

Printed in the United States of America

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. Vffl. IX. X. XI. XII. XIII. XIV. XV. XVI. XVII. XVIII.

Acknowledgements Preface Notes on Transcription, Toponymy and Calendars

VII IX X

The Decline of the Ottoman Empire Abdiilhamid II and his Regime Abdiilhamid II and Foreign Policy San Stefano, Berlin and the Cyprus Convention The Approach to Germany The Egyptian Crisis Detente with Russia The Sudan The Hasan Fehmi Mission The Penjdeh Crisis The Drummond Wolff Mission The Eastern Rumelian Crisis The Eastern Rumelian Settlement Batum, the Straits and Egypt The Bulgarian Crisis The Mediterranean Agreement, the Triple Alliance and the Egyptian Convention Ferdinand of Bulgaria Conclusion

1 19 41 53 73 87 101 Ill 119 131 141 153 171 179 197 215 239 255

Bibliography Index

261 273

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I owe numerous debts oi' gratitude, in particular, to successive Directors and staffs of the Ba§bakanlik Ar§ivi, Istanbul, for their unfailing assistance and advice. 1 owe similar debts to the directors and staffs of the Drzavni Arhiv Saveznog Sekretariata Inostranih Poslova, Belgrade, the Archiv Socialisticke Republike Crne Gore, Cetinje, the Haus- Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna, the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, the National Library, Sofia, and the Public Record Office, Kew. I am grateful to the present Lord Salisbury for permission to examine and cite the papers of the 3rd Marquis of Salisbury. The present work has its distant origins in a PhD thesis completed at London University under the supervision of Dr. C. J. Heywood. I have benefitted greatly from conversations with Professor Selim Deringil, Dr. Bozidar Samardzicv and Dr. David Steele. Helpful comments on the manuscript were offered by Dr. Eleanor Breuning, Dr. Roy Bridge, Dr. Leslie Collins and Dr. Keith Wilson. It goes without saying that the responsibility for the completed work is entirely my own. F. A. K. Yasamee

PREFACE

T h e present work is offered as a contribution to the history

of

international relations in the nineteenth century, and also to the history o f the late Ottoman Empire. On the one hand, it seeks to demonstrate that the Ottoman Empire under Abdiilhamid II possessed an independent foreign policy worthy o f the name, that this foreign policy encompassed deliberate choices which have to be explained in terms o f the calculations, perceptions, and psychology o f Ottoman decision-makers, and that these choices materially affected the interests and ambitions of the European Great Powers. In so doing, it offers opportunities to reevaluate conventional analyses o f the 'Eastern Question', and o f the policies towards the Ottoman Empire pursued by the various European Great Powers. At the same time, this cannot be a purely diplomatic history. T h e late Ottoman Empire was not a territorial sovereign state in the full sense, still less a consolidated nation-state; it was subject to foreign interference and influences in its internal affairs, dependent upon foreign loans and technical assistance, and vulnerable to foreign-backed subversion. Distinctions between 'foreign' and 'domestic' policies were hard to draw: choices in the one sphere implied choices in the other. Abdiilhamid's foreign policy cannot be considered in isolation from his regime as a whole. T h e present study is based upon a range o f archival sources, among which pride of place must go to the surviving records o f the Ottoman central government. T h e s e records are copious, detailed, and present few technical problems o f interpretation. Consisting in large part of reports, memoranda, and protocols o f ministerial meetings, they are a particularly rich source for the analysis o f policy debate. It is to be hoped that other historians may be encouraged to use them. T w o qualifications should, however, be appended. First, the archives o f the Ottoman government are not yet fully available to researchers; I am conscious that there arc gaps in my account, and points where I would wish to know more. Second, the official record is rarely the whole story, and the absencc or non-availability of private letters and diaries left by Ottoman officials leaves the historian o f the Ottoman E m p i r e less wellinformed than his colleagues in the fields of western and central European history. Despite these qualifications, however, I am satisfied that my account is substantially accurate and complete. University o f Manchester, 1996

NOTE ON TRANSCRIPTION

Ottoman Turkish names, titles and expressions have been transcribed in accordance with the modern Turkish alphabet. One modification has been introduced: the letters b, d, have not been softened to p, t, where they occur in c o n s o n a n t clusters or at the ends of w o r d s . T h u s , Abdulhamid,

not

Aptiilhamit. Readers u n f a m i l i a r with the Turkish alphabet may be assisted by the following approximate and non-technical guide to the pronunciation of certain letters: c - j as in jilt. ç - ch as in chink. g - unvoiced; s o m e t i m e s has the effect of lengthening a preceding vowel. l - a vowel peculiar to Turkish; s o m e w h a t resembles the unwritten vow el in the second syllable of table. j - s as in

pleasure.

ô - as in German. § - sh as in ship. ii - as in German. Bulgarian and Serbian names have been transcribed in accordance with the standard systems employed in the United Kingdom. NO r'fi O N T O P O N Y M Y Ottoman Turkish usage has been followed, except in cases where this might lead to unnecessary obscurity. In such cases, preference has been accorded to the f o r m s most c o m m o n l y accepted by late nineteenth-century English speakers, and consequently by diplomatic historians. Thus, Filibe is replaced by Philippopolis,

not by

Plovdiv. NOTR O N C A L E N D A R S

The Ottoman Empire employed three official calendars: Hicrt (Islamic), Malt (Financial), and Efremi

( ' P r a n k i s h ' , or Gregorian). A s a rule, internal

g o v e r n m e n t d o c u m e n t s were double-dated according to the Islamic and Financial calendars, use of the European calendar being restricted to diplomatic correspondance conducted in French. Where documents are cited in references, the Islamic date has been given together with its Gregorian equivalent. Thus, 7 Safer 302/26 November 1884.

CHAPTER ONE THE DECLINE OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

I The decline of the Ottoman Empire was an event of some importance in modern history. From the

sixteenth to the twentieth centuries, the

Ottoman Empire was one of the largest states in the world, controlling extensive territories in the three continents of Europe, Asia and Africa, and ruling over a multitude of peoples: Moslem Turks, Arabs, Albanians, Kurds and Bosnians, Orthodox Christian Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs and Rumanians, Gregorian and Catholic Armenians, Catholic Maronites and Croats, and Spanish-speaking and Arabic-speaking J e w s , to name only the larger communities. The decline and eventual demise of this state inevitably had major consequences, and not only for its own peoples, to whom the Empire's downfall variously represented the hope of liberation or the threat of annihilation. A l s o affected were the Empire's neighbours, who during the period of decline included a majority of the world's most powerful states — the European Great Powers, as they were conventionally known. For these Great Powers, the decline of the Ottoman Empire was more than an ordinary opportunity for individual gain or loss: it threatened the stability of the international system upon which the prosperity and security of all depended, and, as such, was of considerably greater moment than the preceding declines of Venice and Poland. This was the essence of the celebrated Eastern Question. The Ottoman Empire experienced decline primarily as an international phenomenon: from the late eighteenth century onwards it faced a series of unsuccessful foreign wars, with consequent losses of territory, prestige and diplomatic independence, to the point where by the second half of the nineteenth century foreign states were able to exercise a humiliating degree of interference in the Empire's internal affairs. The Empire suffered no internal collapse, despite frequent predictions that it must; it did face internal rebellions, almost all of which depended upon foreign support; but to the end, the Ottoman government continued to function, and to exercise an effective authority over its territories and subjects. For many authors, however, it

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remains axiomatic that the fundamental causes of the Empire's decline must have been internal 1 . They point variously to an apparent deterioration in the quality of the ruling Sultans, to the progressive abandonment of a supposedly 'classical' system of military and provincial administration f r o m the late sixteenth century o n w a r d s , to the Empire's failure to participate in the scientific and industrial revolutions, and to the allegedly stultifying affects of its religiously-based culture. The Empire declined because it betrayed its roots, or else because it failed to betray t h e m . In either case, decline w a s synonymous with a form of decadence. It would be idle to deny that 'backwardness' conditioned the Empire's international decline, but this c a n n o t be the w h o l e story. P o w e r is a relationship, not a possession 2 . It consists in the ability to impose one's will upon others, and more generally, to lay down the terms upon which others may act: not just to win the game, but also to determine its rules. It follows that the decline of any particular state is inextricably bound up with the rise of others, and that a given state's economic, technical, military and cultural resources a m o u n t to no more than a potential for power: it is external circumstances, and relations with other states, which determined how far that potential may be realised. The Ottoman decline is a striking case in point: f r o m the 1830s through to the First World War, the Empire's international standing was actually less than might have been suggested by its domestic resources, and, in particular, by its still considerable military resources. T o the end, the Empire could win battles, and even, occasionally, wars, but its military strength was not a source of power or even of effective security. The solution to this paradox does not lie in 'backwardness': modern weaponry and military methods could be and were imported. Rather, it lay in a strategic vulnerability deriving from two factors of an entirely different order: the Empire's geographical position, and the number and location of its potential enemies. The point may be extended. The problem of decline was not that the Empire had become a second-class international power, but that it remained a lapsed G r e a t Power, burdened with e x t e n s i v e territories, large s u b j e c t populations and domestic political arrangements which had been a source of strength in more prosperous times, but which proved to be serious liabilities in a period of decline. Revolutions in w a r f a r e and transport converted a territorial

position

of strategic a d v a n t a g e

into o n e of

considerable

vulnerability. The Empire's substantial Christian p o p u l a t i o n s , f o r m e r l y an economic and financial asset, became a potential weapon in the hands of foreign powers. A

tradition of chcap and flexible provincial

government

^For representative statements of this point of view, see Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey, M. A. Cook (ed.), A History of the Ottoman Empire to 1730, and M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question 1774 -1923. A Study in International Relations. ^This formulation is borrowed from David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled. British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century, (London, 1991). p. 5.

THE

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rendered the Empire vulnerable to the Powers' imperialist techniques of 'peaceful penetration', enabling them to subvert the domestic authority of the Ottoman government. The commercial privileges known as the Capitulations, originally granted as a means of facilitating foreign trade, were exploited by the Powers in a fashion which seriously constrained the Empire's commercial and fiscal freedom of action. In a sense, the Empire faccd a problem of 'imperial overstretch'; this, however, was a consequence of decline, rather than its causc.

II An alternative set of explanations does at least recognise that the problem of Ottoman decline must be placed in an international context. These are the various economic theories grouped under the slogan 'semi-colony', which seek to account for the decline in terms of the Empire's growing commercial and financial dependence upon the industrialising countries of western and central Europe 1 . The evidence of economic dependence need not be disputed; but this approach faces difficulties of its own. In the first place, it overlooks the problem of Russia, arguably the principal author and beneficiary of the Ottoman Empire's political and military decline, but a Power with which it traded relatively little and f r o m which it received negligible investment. In the second, it ignores chronology: the great expansion of European trade and investment in the Ottoman Empire commenced in the middle decades of the nineteenth century, by which stage the Empire's political and military decline was already well-established. Finally, it assumes, but fails to prove, a direct connection between economic and political dependence. This is not to deny the possibility of such a connection: the Ottoman government's dependence upon European loans did constitute a threat to its political independence, not least because its ability to repay such loans was always doubtful. But the Empire's rulers were aware of the danger, and took effective steps to avert it: the consequence was that in 1914, the Empire was free to go to war with its major foreign trading partner, Britain, and its major source of investment, France. To raise these objections is not to dispute the fact that the Empire fell prey to European imperialism. T he Great Powers conceived of their relations with the Empire in substantially imperialist terms: they spoke of 'influence' and of 'peaceful penetration', and pursued a range of diplomatic, commercial, financial and cultural strategies designed to give these notions practical effect. But their success was limited. No Power managed to place its relations with the Empire upon a purely imperialist footing: no permanent 'zones of influence' could be established, and the Empire's ruling institutions were never

^For representative statements of this point of view, see Orhan Kurmuf, Emperyalizmin Turkiye'ye Giri.fi, and §evket Pamuk, The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism 1820-1913.

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decisively penetrated. T o this extent, the term 'semi-colony' is a reflection of the Powers' failure, and of the Empire's strengths, as well as its weaknesses. Put another way, by implicitly assimilating the Ottoman experience to that of other Asian and African states confronted by European imperialism, the 'semicolonial' school overlooks a number of factors which made the Ottoman ease special. For one thing, the Ottoman Empire was inescapably involved with all the European Great Powers: the typical colonial victim faced one, or, at most, two. For another, the Empire contained large Christian subject peoples, to whom particular European Powers were bound by ties of interest or sentiment: the resulting problems were unparalleled elsewhere in Asia or Africa. For a third, despite its relative backwardness and external weakness, the Ottoman Empire remained a significant military power, able to compete at a technical level with its E u r o p e a n

n e i g h b o u r s : P l e v n a was not Tel e l - K e b i r or

O m d u r m a n . Finally, to the end of its existence the Empire counted as a European power in its own right, a m e m b e r of the system of European states and an important factor in the balance between the Great P o w e r s within Europe. Together, these factors ensured that the process of Ottoman decline proved uniquely complex and uniquely problematical for all concerned: neither China nor Madagascar knew the equivalent of an Eastern Question.

Ill T h e decline of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e has been m i s d a t e d . It is conventionally treated as a protracted process, commencing as early as the late sixteenth century, and at the very latest with the Empire's first serious military defeats and losses of European territory at the Peace of Carlowitz in 1699; the decline is then said to have continued until the Empire's final demise in the aftermath of the First World War. This approach confuses events with their alleged causes and their putative consequences. It would be truer to say that the Empire's decline was relatively swift, being concentrated in the period between 1768 and 1839, with the decisive loss of power occurring in the 1820s and 1830s. The period before 1699 saw no convincing evidence of international decline, only manifestations of its alleged internal causes; the period between 1699 and 1768 was one of stasis, in which the E m p i r e ' s international standing, though weakened, remained stable; the period after 1839 saw the consequences of a decline which had already occurred. In its heyday in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the Ottoman E m p i r e had been a genuine first-class Power, c a p a b l e of resisting all comers, and dependent upon no permanent alliances or balance of power for its security. It saw no need to maintain permanent embassies abroad. That said, the n u m b e r of potential e n e m i e s it f a c e d was limited. In the west, it confronted the Austrian Habsburgs and the Venetians, and in the east, the Iranian Safavids. But to the north, it was protected by a chain of buffer states,

THE

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while in the south, its frontiers were co-terminous with the natural barriers of the Sahara desert and the Indian Ocean. Even after its ejection from Hungary by the Habsburgs at the end of the seventeenth century, the Empire remained a significant Power, capable of recouping at least some of its losses; the sole change was that its security in the west now depended upon a balance of power in Eastern Europe, a balance assured by the existence of Poland and underpinned by an informal alliance between the Ottoman Empire and France. In one quarter, the Empire even gained: the definitive collapse of Iran as a serious military Power during the course of the eighteenth century relieved it of a traditional threat in the east. The decisive phase of decline began only in the later eighteenth century, and is to be attributed less to the Empire's increasingly apparent backwardness in comparison with the industrial economies of western Europe than to a series of adverse changes in its nearer strategic environment 1 . Russia emerged as a Great Power, and absorbed the Crimean and Caucasian buffer states which had hitherto guaranteed Ottoman security in the north; the partition of Poland destroyed the balance of power in Eastern Europe, and with it, the Empire's continental partnership with France; the establishment of a British state in India turned the eastern Mediterranean into a theatre of AngloFrench rivalry, and the whole of western Asia into the arena for the AngloRussian Great Game. The effects of these adverse shifts were first revealed in a series of unsuccessful wars which the Empire fought between 1768 and 1829 against Russia, a Power with which it had had little previous contact and which it had fought but occasionally before. The wars gave Russia possession of the Caucasus and the northern Black Sea coast, together with a substantial measure of military and political influence in the dependent Ottoman Principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, to the north of the Danube; the consequence was to leave the Empire permanently exposed to a militarily more powerful neighbour along its entire northern flank, both in Europe and in Asia. These protracted and costly wars also had important internal consequences: they exposed the rudimentary Ottoman system of provincial administration to unprecedented strain, e n a b l i n g a variety of self-made strongmen to extend their local authority at the expense of central government, and furnishing two of the Empire's subject peoples with opportunities for successful revolt. The Orthodox Serbs escaped into a form of autonomy in the province of Belgrade, and the Orthodox Greeks won independence in the Peloponnese, setting ominous examples to the Empire's other non-Moslem communities, and encouraging Russia to look to the Ottoman Orthodox as a convenient fifth column. The most dangerous revolt

For background, see Anderson, op. cit., chs. ii-iii, passim., and two works by Edward Ingram, Commitment to Empire: Prophecies of the Creat Game in Asia 1797-1800 and The Beginning of the Great Game in Asia, 1828-1834.

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of all, however, was that launched by one of the Empire's Moslem subjects: Mehmed Ali Pa§a, the Governor-General of Egypt, who in 1831 forciblyseized control of the neighbouring Ottoman provinces in Syria, and in 1832 carried out an invasion of Anatolia which brought the Empire to the brink of collapse. The Empire faced a new enemy to the south, as well as to the north. The struggle with Mehmed Ali Pa§a was to prove decisive for the Empire's future relations with the European Great Powers 1 . In 1832, faced with the threat of an Egyptian advance upon his capital, the reigning Sultan Mahmud II made an unprecedented appeal to these Powers for military assistance. The British refused, as did the French, who were sympathetic to Mehmed Ali Pa§a; reluctantly, the Ottoman government turned to Russia, and in April 1833 Russian forces were sent to defend Istanbul. Against this background, it did prove possible to reach an accommodation with Mehmed Ali Pa§a, who agreed to withdraw from Anatolia in return for the possession of Syria. The Russian troops were recalled, but Russia gained her reward at the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelcssi, which established a Russo-Ottoman defensive alliance, to last for seven years, and bound the Sultan to refuse foreign warships passage of the Straits of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus from the Mediterranean into the Black Sea. The latter was no more than the confirmation of an established Ottoman rule, but in the circumstances, the treaty could not but suggest that the Ottoman Empire was on its way to becoming a de facto Russian protectorate, and that Russia herself was seeking military control of the Straits. To the British, as lo the French and the Austrians, such an extension of Russian power into the Near East and the Mediterranean was unacceptable: it threatened to undermine the balance of power throughout Europe and western Asia. Equally unacceptable, in Britain's eyes, was the accompanying threat of a revolutionary extension of Egypt's power into the Fertile Crescent and Arabia: this could undermine the security of British India. The upshot was that when a fresh armed conflict broke out between Mahmud II and Mehmed Ali in 1839, Britain, France and Austria intervened to impose a settlement by force. Mehmed Ali was obliged to surrender Syria to the Sultan, and to accept a permanent limitation on the size of Egypt's armed forces; in return, Egypt was recognised as an autonomous Ottoman province, whose government was conferred upon Mehmed Ali and his descendants in perpetuity. Egypt had been contained, and the expiry of the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi in 1841 furnished a parallel opportunity to contain Russia: the British took the lead in inducing her to accede to a Straits Convention which obliged the Ottoman Empire to close the Bosphorus and Dardanelles to all foreign warships, except in the case of a war in which the Empire was itself engaged, and bound all the Powers to respect this obligation. The essentials of the Eastern Question had been

'See Ingram, The Beginning oj the Great Game, passim.

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defined: the threat of an Ottoman collapse; the Powers' fear that the international conscquences would be revolutionary; and their corresponding decision to prop up the Empire, not for its own sake, but as a necessary means of preserving international stability.

Ill The Ottoman Empire's rulers were not slow to grasp the significance of their successive defeats at the hands of Russia and Mehmed Ali Pa§a, nor of the rescue they had enjoyed at the hands of the other Powers. Their independent power was gone: henceforth they would survive, if at all, on terms laid down by others. They responded with two major changes of policy. The first, already inaugurated in the 1820s, was a programme of domestic reforms, which came to be known as the TanzimatK These reforms encompassed a variety of objectives: the modernisation of the central bureaucracy and the armed forces, to be accomplished through the selective importation of European technology, institutions and education; the strengthening of government control in the provinces, to be achieved through measures of administrative and military centralisation, and through a reduction of the independent power traditionally wielded by provincial landowners, tribal chiefs and other local notables; and the pacification of the Empire's nonMoslem communities, to be effected by the removal of traditional disabilities and the offer of a measure of civil equality with Moslems. These reforms marked an unprecedented break with Ottoman tradition, and put an end to the Empire's self-imposed cultural isolation from Europe. But their ultimate objectives remained conservative. They did not envisage a fundamental transformation of Ottoman society, or even, at bottom, of the state; rather, they sought to stabilise the existing state, and to equip it for survival in a radically altered external environment. The second change was the inauguration of a new type of foreign policy, which frankly acknowledged the Empire's dependence upon the European Great Powers 2 . The problem was to define acceptable terms of dependence. The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi had pointed to the danger that the Empire might fall into a position of exclusive dependence upon Russia, and an important faction in the Ottoman leadership believed that the best means of warding off this danger would be to conclude a close alliance with Britain, the Power which was rapidly emerging as Russia's chief opponent in the Near East and Asia. The British, however, proved cautious. They were determined that the Empire must not fall into Russia's hands: otherwise, this would imperil their own position in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, and ultimately in India. But they were reluctant to extend their commitments to

'The reforms are surveyed in Lewis, op. cit., ch. iv, passim. ^There exists no comprehensive survey of Tanzimat foreign policy. Ann Pottinger Saab, The Origins of the Crimean Alliance, is a useful introduction.

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the point of a c c e p t i n g the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as a military ally. R a t h e r , t h e y envisaged the O t t o m a n Empire's f u t u r e as a b u f f e r state, in w h i c h all P o w e r s might pursue their legitimate c o m m e r c i a l , religious or cultural interests, but w h e r e a mutual s t r u g g l e for political a n d military p r e d o m i n a n c e m u s t be a v o i d e d . Practically, this m e a n t that O t t o m a n i n d e p e n d e n c e a n d territorial integrity must be r e s p e c t e d , a n d that the Sultan m u s t be e n c o u r a g e d

to

stabilise his E m p i r e t h r o u g h r e f o r m , the better to fulfil his allotted role as b u f f e r between the Great Powers. T h e difficulty with the b u f f e r policy w a s that it required all P o w e r s to exercise restraint in O t t o m a n affairs. D u r i n g the 1840s they by and large did so — though it is a r g u a b l e that Britain h e r s e l f , in h e r s o l i c i t u d c f o r t h e policy, c a m e close to e x e r c i s i n g an i n f o r m a l protectorate o v e r t h e O t t o m a n Empire. However,

in

1853 R u s s i a b r o k e r a n k s . S h e s e i z e d

upon

an

ecclesiastical d i s p u t e in P a l e s t i n e as a p r e t e x t to d e m a n d that the S u l t a n a c k n o w l e d g e her right to protect all t h e O r t h o d o x Christian s u b j e c t s of t h e Ottoman Empire; given that the O r t h o d o x a c c o u n t e d f o r more than a quarter of the E m p i r e ' s total p o p u l a t i o n , this a m o u n t e d to a d e m a n d f o r a political p r o t e c t o r a t e over the O t t o m a n E m p i r e as a w h o l e . W h e n her d e m a n d w a s r e f u s e d , R u s s i a o c c u p i e d M o l d a v i a and W a l l a c h i a , and in July 1853 t h e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t r e s p o n d e d by d e c l a r i n g war. T h i s e f f e c t i v e l y tied the hands of Britain and t h e other Western P o w e r s : they could not allow R u s s i a a military or political victory on these t e r m s , a n d w h e n d i p l o m a t i c m e d i a t i o n failed, Britain, France and Sardinia also declared w a r on Russia. T h e e n s u i n g C r i m e a n W a r led to a c l e a r military v i c t o r y f o r t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e and its western allies. T h e c o n f l i c t w a s e n d e d by the 1856 Treaty of Paris, which obliged Russia to c e d e European and Asiatic territory to the O t t o m a n Empire, and f o r b a d e her to maintain a fleet or fortifications on the B l a c k Sea — in short, Russia w a s required to leave herself p e r m a n e n t l y v u l n e r a b l e to attack by the O t t o m a n E m p i r e a n d its w e s t e r n a l l i e s , as a g u a r a n t e e of her f u t u r e good b e h a v i o u r . T h e Treaty w e n t f u r t h e r , f o r m a l l y admitting the O t t o m a n

E m p i r e t o t h e C o n c e r t of E u r o p e , p l a c i n g

its

independence and territorial integrity under the collective guarantee of the Great P o w e r s , and a c k n o w l e d g i n g the rights w h i c h the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t had f r e e l y granted to its non M o s l e m s u b j e c t s u n d e r the Tanzimat

reforms. The

E m p i r e h a d gained a firm g u a r a n t e e of its security, or s o it s e e m e d : t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n of the O t t o m a n b u f f e r h a d b e e n e s t a b l i s h e d as a E u r o p e a n principle, f o r which Britain and France had s h o w n that they w o u l d fight, and the P o w e r s had f o r m a l l y proclaimed their c o n f i d e n c e in the f u t u r e of a stable, reformed Ottoman Empire.

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IV

Victory in the Crimean War gave the Ottoman Empire's rulers twenty years of external peace, which they used to further develop the Tanzimat reforms 1 . After 1856 the legal equality of all Ottoman subjects was formally recognised, and an attempt was made to promote an official doctrine of 'Ottomanism': of common citizenship regardless of confessional differences. Non-Moslems were granted access to careers in government service, and reforms were introduced into the millet organisations through which they had traditionally enjoyed a measure of self-government. The modernisation of the apparatus of government continued, with new ministries, fresh legal reforms, a Vilayet Law to regulate provincial government, and an expanding telegraph network which served as a potent agent of centralisation. In addition, by the 1870s the Empire had built up a well-equipped army of three-quarters of a million men and the third largest battle fleet in Europe. Attempts were also made to foster economic development through new systems of commercial and land law, through the granting of concessions to foreigners, and through improvements in communications, including the inception of a railway network. The greatest economic impact, however, was made by the Empire's growing trade with western and central Europe, facilitated by highly concessive commercial treaties concluded with the Great Powers. This stimulated the production of crops and raw materials for export, but spelled at least partial ruin for those Ottoman handicrafts which were exposed to competition from imported European manufactures. The Ottoman government appears to have regarded this as a price worth paying: it was anxious to give the Powers an economic stake in the Empire's future. The reforms were a clear statement of the Empire's recognition that it must adapt to survive, but they could not be expected to bear fruit immediately. Time was needed to impose and develop the new institutions, to train officials capable of mastering them, and to accustom the population at large to the new ways. In the meantime, however, the reforms threw up fresh problems of their own. Most obviously, they cost a great deal of money. The progressive centralisation of the Empire's administrative and political structures was producing an impressive increase in government revenues, but expenditures rose even faster. From 1854 onwards, the resulting deficits had to be covered by loans raised on European money markets, and over time the Empire's foreign indebtedness came to assume alarming proportions: by 1875 it stood at over two hundred million pounds sterling, and payments of interest and principal were consuming some forty per cent of the Ottoman government's annual budget.

'The post-1856 reforms are surveyed in Tanzimat I: Yüziincü Yüzyili Miinasebetile, and in R. H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856-1876.

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N o r could the f o r m a l granting of equal rights guarantee a solution to the p r o b l e m p o s e d by the E m p i r e ' s substantial n o n - M o s l e m c o m m u n i t i e s . T h e problem was complicated by e c o n o m i c and social changes within the nonM o s l e m c o m m u n i t i e s t h e m s e l v e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y in r e g i o n s like t h e B a l k a n peninsula, which w e r e e x p o s e d to increasing c o m m e r c i a l and cultural c o n t a c t with Europe. T h e growth of foreign and d o m e s t i c trade was throwing up a n e w n o n - M o s l e m m i d d l e class c o m p o s e d of urban m e r c h a n t s and artisans, w h o s e wealth w a s f i n a n c i n g a substantial e x p a n s i o n of popular e d u c a t i o n f o r their c o r e l i g i o n i s t s , and w h o s e o u t l o o k and life-style w e r e b e g i n n i n g to r e f l e c t E u r o p e a n cultural i n f l u e n c e s , at least to s o m e degree. T h i s n e w m i d d l e class did not threaten O t t o m a n rule directly: prosperous merchants and artisan guilds could be a c c o m m o d a t e d within the existing system, through o f f e r s of a share in local g o v e r n m e n t , of millet r e f o r m , a n d , in the e x t r e m e c a s e of the B u l g a r i a n s , t h r o u g h the c r e a t i o n of a n e w n a t i o n a l c h u r c h a n d millet organisation. M o r e problematical w e r e the s c h o o l m a s t e r s , m i n o r priests and clerks w h o had been e x p o s e d to s o m e e l e m e n t s of a m o d e r n e d u c a t i o n , but w h o s e social and cultural aspirations could not be a c c o m m o d a t e d within the established order: they w e r e receptive to revolutionary ideas, and in particular, to the n e w imported European doctrine of ethnic nationalism. T h o u g h f e w in n u m b e r , they w e r e a f r u s t r a t e d group, w h o c o u l d b e c o m e d a n g e r o u s should they s u c c e e d in h a r n e s s i n g their o w n g r i e v a n c e s to those of b r o a d e r social strata: f o r e x a m p l e , t h e grievances of Bulgarian peasants against the M o s l e m Circassian i m m i g r a n t s w h o entered the E m p i r e f r o m Russia after the C r i m e a n War. T h e p r o b l e m had a n o t h e r side: in the longer t e r m , t h e social a n d e c o n o m i c p r o g r e s s m a d e by the n o n - M o s l e m c o m m u n i t i e s m i g h t t h r e a t e n M o s l e m political s u p r e m a c y . For a variety of reasons, M o s l e m s p r o v e d less able to b e n e f i t f r o m the new opportunities created by e x p a n d i n g c o m m e r c i a l and cultural c o n t a c t s with E u r o p e . T h e y w e r e h a m p e r e d by their inherited social p r e j u d i c e s , by their lack of a tradition of s e l f - h e l p a n d c o m m u n a l organisation independent of the state, and by the Tanzimat reformers' failure to d e v e l o p a s y s t e m of p o p u l a r M o s l e m e d u c a t i o n . M o s l e m s c o n t i n u e d to m o n o p o l i s e t h e a r m e d f o r c e s , to p r e d o m i n a t e in the b u r e a u c r a c y , and to control m u c h agricultural land, but they w e r e c o n s p i c u o u s by their a b s e n c e f r o m much of the e x p a n d i n g commercial sector, and f r o m the n e w e r trades and p r o f e s s i o n s — they were c o m i n g to be seen as a backward e l e m e n t in society, w h o s e political s u p r e m a c y w a s d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e to their real e c o n o m i c a n d educational standing. A g r o w i n g sense of social and e c o n o m i c d i s a d v a n t a g e h e l p e d to f u e l M o s l e m resentment against the Tanzimat r e f o r m s , and led to occasional antiChristian o u t b r e a k s like the D a m a s c u s m a s s a c r e of 1860. O b s e r v e r s w e r e a g r e e d that t h e m a s s ol M o s l e m s r e m a i n e d c o n s e r v a t i v e in o u t l o o k , a n d inclined t o v i e w i n n o v a t i o n s like e q u a l i t y f o r n o n - M o s l e m s as d e v i a t i o n s f r o m a religiously-sanctioned order. Their reservations were reinforced by the

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grievances of those Moslems whose material interests were threatened by the reforms: provincial notables who had lost power to an encroaching central government, communities of nomads and mountain-dwellers subjected for the first time to taxation, and peasants faced with conscription for the army. None of these discontents seriously threatened the authority of central government: open resistance to the reforms was rare after the 1840s, and easily suppressed. But they indicated that the Tanzimat regime faced a latent problem of legitimacy in the eyes of its Moslem subjects. Not all Moslem opposition was traditionalist: from the 1860s onwards a small group of advanced thinkers began to criticise what they saw as the despotic tendencies of the Tanzimat regime, and to argue that an increasingly powerful but irresponsible bureaucracy should be brought under popular control: they called for the establishment of a constitution and parliament. The initial impact of these 'Young Ottomans' was limited, but with time their ideas began to gain some sympathy among senior officials who had doubts of their own about administrative centralisation and were inclined to favour some devolution of authority to the provinces. This high-level sympathy grew markedly after 1871, when the reigning Sultan Abdiilaziz elbowed aside his Ministers and senior officials, and embarked upon a period of personal rule through his own favourites: not only the central bureaucracy, it seemed, but also the throne itself stood in need of institutional checks and balances.

V None of these underlying problems proved that the Tanzimat programme was fundamentally misconceived, or that a major catastrophe was inevitable sooner or later; but they were clear evidence that the Empire's internal stability remained fragile. Abroad, too, the security offered by the Crimean settlement was not absolute'. On paper, the Treaty of Paris placed the Empire's independence and territorial integrity under the collective guarantee of the European Powers; in reality, it thrust the Empire into the role of helping to keep the balance of power weighted against Russia, a role justified neither by its independent strength nor by the guarantees furnished by its erstwhile Crimean allies. On the one hand, it was clear that Russia would work to redress the balance; at the very least, she would seek the removal of those provisions of the Treaty of Paris which had left her defenceless in the Black Sea. Equally worryingly, it was soon apparent that she could not be prevented from continuing her efforts to undermine Ottoman independence through the cultivation of an Orthodox fifth column. Only her methods

^For background, see Anderson, op. cit., eh. vi, passim., Muhimme-ì Siyasiyye, I.

and Ali Fuad Tiirkgeldi,

Mesail-i

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changed: she began to extend her patronage to the awakening national aspirations of the Slavs of the Ottoman Balkans: the Serbs and the Bulgarians. In one respect, the Treat;, of Paris assisted her: by placing the Tanzimat reforms under the colleclive guarantee of the Powers, it furnished her with a legal pretext for interference on behalf on her Orthodox clients. By the 1860s, Russian diplomats were openly suggesting that the Ottoman Empire's future should be that of a loose federation of autonomous provinces based upon the principle of nationality, with the clear implication that those provinces dominated by Orthodox nationalities would owe practical loyalty to St. Petersburg rather than to Istanbul. On the other hand, it was still not clear that Britain and France had definitively committed themselves to support the Ottoman Empire as an equal military and political partner in the balance of power, a barrier rather than a mere buffer, and a ally which must be strong as well as stable. After 1856, they showed themselves quite willing to endorse or even assist in the curtailment of Ottoman authority wherever they believed that such curtailment was compatible with broader regional stability: in the unification of Moldavia and Wallachia to form an embryonic Rumanian state, in the withdrawal of the last Ottoman garrisons from Serbia, and in the granting of forms of autonomy to Crete and Mount Lebanon. As much as the Russians, too, the British and French strove to promote their own particular influence among groups of Ottoman subjects, to the detriment of the authority of the Sultan's government: the French cultivated their links with the Catholics of Syria, and with some of the Moslems there, while the British extended their influence in Iraq and Arabia. Many factors facilitated this version of the 'imperialism of free trade': the Empire's expanding commercial links with western Europe and British India; the capitulatory privileges which enabled the Powers to confer their own citizenship upon Ottoman subjects; the Powers' enormous prestige; and the continuing weakness of an Ottoman provincial administration which was as yet only half-reformed. It was not that the British and French harboured territorial designs upon the Empire, or that they wished to subvert its government; but the processes of peaceful penetration threatened to place them in a position where they might pursue either of these objectives with ease. All these were long-term dangers, but by the early 1870s the Empire faced a more pressing external problem: the balance of power which had produced the Crimean settlement was undermined by the wars of Italian and German unification. The Franco-Prussian war of 1870 temporarily knocked out France as a Great Power, and left her permanently vulnerable to her new neighbour Germany. One consequence was British isolation in the Near East, and Russia was quick to lake advantage, securing the abrogation of the Black Sea clauses of the Trea'.y of Paris in 1871. Meanwhile Austria had been forcibly ejected from Italy and Germany; recast as Austria-Hungary, she looked south-east for compensation, and, in particular, to the Ottoman frontier

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provinces of Bosnia and Herccgovina. In 1872 she joined Russia and Germany in the League of the Three Emperors, further isolating Britain, and indirectly increasing Russia's scope for diplomatic manœuvre and self-assertion. A revolution had occurred in the European and Near Eastern balances of power, and if the Ottoman Empire was not immediately threatened, it was undoubtedly left exposed. Reasonably enough, Sultan Abdiilaziz strove to mend his fences with Russia after 1870, but his association with the Empire's traditional enemy could not but alarm sections of Ottoman opinion, and furnish fresh ammunition to critics of his personal rule.

VI The underlying fragility of the Empire's position was dramatically exposed by the great Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878 — a runaway series of provincial revolts, power struggles at the centre of government, financial breakdowns and foreign wars which was to destroy much of the Crimean settlement and to leave the Empire externally weaker than at any time since the 1830s 1 . The crisis was above all moral: it was driven less by events than by the expectations which they aroused. In a purely physical sense, the Empire proved able to cope with most of the problems thrown up by the crisis: the provincial revolts collapsed or petered out; the power struggles at the centre did not compromise the authority of governement over the population at large; a bankrupt treasury did not paralyse civil or military administration; and of the three wars fought, only one ended in clear defeat. What did prove fatal was the withdrawal of the Powers' collective confidence and goodwill, and of their willingness to tolerate the Empire as a weak but necessary state. The crisis began in a small way in July 1875, with the outbreak of a rebellion among the Serb inhabitants of the frontier province of Hercegovina. By August, however, the revolt had spread into the neighbouring province of Bosnia, while September saw an abortive attempt to organise a similar uprising among the Bulgarians in the east of the Balkan peninsula. Sultan Abdiilaziz's government responded with offers of reform and the remission of taxes, but to no avail; worse, its concessions helped to precipitate a major financial crisis in October, forcing the treasury to partially suspend the service of its foreign debt, and to curtail the payment of official salaries. The Powers intervened with an offer to mediate with the Bosnian and Hercegovinan rebels. Initially at least, all Powers assumed that the crisis could be resolved without prejudice to the Near Eastern status quo, and their immediate concern was to

^Various aspects of the Eastern Crisis are surveyed in B. H. Sumner, Russia and the Balkans 1870-1880-, R. Millman, Britain and the Eastern Question ¡875-1878-, D. MacKenzic, The Serbs and Russian Pan-Slavism 1875-1878; Mahmud Celaleddin Pa§a, Mirat-i Hakikat, I-III; Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., II; D. C. Blaisdell, European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire.

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forestall any possibility of intervention by Serbia and Montenegro: though nominally Ottoman vassals, these two Slav statelets were making no secret of their sympathy for the rebels, with w h o m they had close ties of religion, nationality and culture. That said, the Powers' unity was not absolute. Russia and Austria-Hungary were not blind to the opportunities which the crisis might eventually throw up: for Russia, a chance to advance her programme of South Slav a u t o n o m y , and f o r A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , the chance to obtain a measure of control over Bosnia and Hercegovina. But nor were these two Powers blind to the diplomatic dangers involved in a premature attempt to reopen the Eastern Question: they preferred to wait on events, and not to separate themselves from the other Powers. The Powers' mediation failed to impress the rebels, however, and at the end of 1875 Russia and Austria-Hungary c a m e forward with the so-called 'Andrassy Note', which envisaged a programme of administrative reforms for Bosnia and Hercegovina. Once again, the basis was the status quo, but a small door was opened to the possibility of conferring a special status upon the r e b e l l i o u s p r o v i n c e s . T h e other P o w e r s a c c e p t e d the note, as, with reservations, did the Ottoman government. However, Sultan Abdiilaziz had failed to reckon with Moslem opinion: his apparent weakness in the f a c e of foreign interference, and inability to cope with non-Moslem rebellion and with bankruptcy, were fuelling a popular discontent which played directly into the hands of his political opponents. T h e publication of a constitutionalist 'Manifesto of Moslem Patriots' in March was followed by demonstrations in the capital, and on 30 May a junta of senior civilian, military and religious officials deposed Abdula/.iz in favour of his nephew Murad. Five days later Abdiilaziz was found dead, apparently by his own hand. The new regime's hopes of a fresh start in foreign affairs were swiftly disappointed. The palace coup of May 30 was immediately overshadowed by a popular Bulgarian uprising in the neighbourhood of Philippopolis; though the uprising soon collapsed, the brutality with which it was in places suppressed had a disastrous effect upon European public opinion, particularly in Britain and Russia. Equally damaging was the effect upon European official opinion: by significantly extending the area of disorder, the uprising cast doubt upon the possibility of sustaining Ottoman authority in any part of the Balkan peninsula. The international confidence and goodwill which had sustained the Crimean settlement were manifestly beginning to ebb: Austria-Hungary and Russia privately discussed the possibility of the Empire's early break-up, and pressed the other Powers to assume a more interventionist stance. For the time being, Britain held them back, but she could not hold back Serbia and Montenegro. The two South Slav statelets sensed that great changes might be in prospect, and believed that their own military intervention could force the pace of events: they enjoyed the backing of an aroused Russian public, which was already sending them contributions of money and volunteers, and they

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gambled that official Russian support would follow. At the end of June Serbia and Montenegro declared war on their Ottoman suzerain. Nor had the new Ottoman regime brought the Empire much closer to a solution of its domestic problems. Its financial crisis was deepening: by July the partial suspension of debt service had become total, and the government had been reduced to the inflationary expedient of issuing unbacked paper money to covcr salaries and other current obligations. Just as important was a serious crisis of authority within the new regime. Sultan Murad had suffered an incapacitating nervous breakdown within days of his accession, leaving real power in the hands of the ministerial junta which had installed him. However, the junta's members were deeply divided over the question of introducing a constitution. The timely assassination of the anti-constitutionalist War Minister who had served as the junta's original 'strong man' removed one obstacle to agreement, but not until the late summer did the constitutionalist faction led by the ex-Grarid Vizier Midhat Pa§a finally gain the upper hand. By then it was clear that Murad's health would not permit him to continue, and on 31 August his Ministers deposed him in favour of his thirty-four year old brother Abdtilhamid. Abdiilhamid had given a prior pledge to introduce a constitution, though it was plain that both he and some of his advisers had doubts: not until October did the work of drafting a constitution begin. Meanwhile the new Sultan had to cope with an international situation which was fast assuming critical proportions. The military campaigns against Montenegro and Serbia had gone almost too well: by October the Montenegrins had been held, and the Serbs had been spectacularly routed. The consequence was a direct confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and Russia. Thus far Russia's conduct had been restrained by her fear of provoking the other Powers, and by a hope that Serbia and Montenegro would undermine the status quo for her. But neither Russia's credibility as a Near Eastern Power, nor the pressure of her own domestic opinion, would permit her to countenance the military humiliation of her South Slav proxies, and on 30 October she gave the Ottoman government an ultimatum demanding a cease-fire within forty-eight hours. The Porte promptly complied, but Russia chose to reinforce her military pressure: on 13 November the l'sar ordered a partial mobilisation of the Russian army. The Ottoman government responded in kind. The prospect of a Russo-Ottoman war prompted Britain to seize the initiative. Though generally regarded as the Ottoman Empire's patron and protector, she had maintained a careful reserve since the beginning of the crisis in 1875. Beaconsfield's Conservative cabinet was fearful of diplomatic isolation, acutely conscious that it lacked military allies, and under strong pressure at home from the anti-Turkish 'Bulgarian agitation' conducted by the opposition leader Gladstone. Just as important, however, was the fact that the

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C o n s e r v a t i v e Ministers t h e m s e l v e s w e r e losing f a i t h in the

Crimean

settlement: the lengthy chain of revolts, financial crises and palace revolutions had convinced many that the Ottoman Empire was past saving, at least in the Balkan peninsula, and that s o m e t h i n g akin to Russia's p r o g r a m m e of autonomies was the only realistic option. T h a t said, they continued to set great store by Britain's own Near Eastern

interests and position, and were

anxious that Russia should not impose a unilateral solution, whether through war or through diplomatic dictation. T o this end, the British government proposed that the P o w e r s and the Sultan's g o v e r n m e n t should meet in a conference in the Ottoman capital, and reach agreement upon a programme of reforms, to include some form of autonomy for Bosnia, Hercegovina, and the provinces inhabited by Bulgarians. The Porte promptly expressed reservations, but was in no position to oppose: all the Powers accepted the British proposal. The so-called Constantinople Conference assembled on 23 D e c e m b e r 1876, c o i n c i d e n t a l l y , the day upon which Sultan A b d i i l h a m i d p r o c l a i m e d a constitution and a n n o u n c e d the Ottoman Empire's first ever parliament. The Powers were unimpressed, and it was soon apparent that the Empire could count upon little diplomatic support from Britain: her delegate Jx>rd Salisbury warned the Sultan that he must accept whatever terms the Conference might offer, and that Britain would afford him no military assistance in the event of war with Russia. T h e C o n f e r e n c e put f o r w a r d its definitive terms on 15 J a n u a r y 1877. An a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y a u t o n o m o u s p r o v i n c e of B o s n i a Hercegovina was to be established, with a governor-general approved by the Powers; two similarly autonomous Bulgarian provinces were to be established in the eastern half of the Balkan peninsula; in all three provinces, control commissions in which the Powers would be represented would supervise the implementation of special reforms. By clear implication, direct Ottoman rule in Europe would in future be confined to Albania, the Aegean littoral, and the immediate neighbourhood of Istanbul. This was the last gasp of the old buffer policy. The independence and territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire were to be upheld, but only on paper; to all practical intents and purposes, the Sultan's authority in the Balkans was to be dismantled. The Ottoman government rejected these terms as incompatible with its own independence and sovereignty, and in so doing, called the Powers' bluff. Even R u s s i a was not ready to f i g h t f o r the C o n s t a n t i n o p l e C o n f e r e n c e recommendations, and the Powers eventually indicated that they would seek to draw up an alternative programme. This offered the Empire a breathing space, and enabled Sultan Abdulhamid to take a first step towards the consolidation of his personal authority by r e m o v i n g Midhat Pa§a and other radical constitutionalists before the new Parliament assembled on 19 March. H e also initiated independent moves towards a diplomatic solution, opening peace talks with Serbia and Montenegro. Peace with Serbia was restored on

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1 March, but negotiations with Montenegro were impeded by the lattcr's demand for substantial territorial concessions. Meanwhile the Powers reached agreement on an alternative programme of reforms, which they recorded in the London Protocol of 31 March. Superficially at least, the protocol represented a considerable retreat from the terms specified by the Constantinople Conference. It made no explicit reference to the creation of autonomous provinces or to the appointment of control commissions; instead, it vaguely alluded to necessary reforms in Bulgaria and in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and asked that the Powers be kept informed of the steps taken to secure their implementation. It also called upon the Ottoman Empire to demobilise its armed forces. In a separate statement, Russia warned that the London Protocol represented the limit of her concessions: rejection would mean war. She added that she would postpone her own demobilisation until the Porte had concluded peace with Montenegro, and taken serious steps to implement the requested reforms. The Ottoman government rejected these terms as categorically as it had those of the Constantinople Conference, and did so in the clear knowledge that the consequence would be war. The responsibility for this decision remains contested. Abdiilhamid subsequently claimed that his hand had been forced by the new Parliament, and in particular, by the refusal of Bosnian deputies to contemplate territorial concessions to Montenegro. However, other sources suggest that the Sultan's mind was already made up. Be that as it may, it is possible to identify two further considerations which influenced the Ottoman decision for war. The first was the vagueness of the Powers' new terms, and, in particular, the absence of any credible guarantee of Russian demobilisation: this conjured up fears that an Ottoman demobilisation would simply enable St. Petersburg to bring forward fresh demands exceeding those in the London Protocol. The second consideration was an underlying conviction that, despite all warnings to the contrary, the British must offer the Empire material support once fighting started: it was inconceivable that Britain's imperial interests would permit an Ottoman defeat. Russia declared war on 24 April. In the Balkans, thanks to a timely alliance with the Ottoman tributary-state Rumania, her forces were able to cross the Danube in late June; meanwhile they overran the important Ottoman fortress of Ardahan in the Caucasus. By late July, however, their advances had been checked: in the Balkans, by Gazi Osman Pa§a's defence of Plevna, and in the Caucasus, by Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pa§a's relief of Kars. The Ottoman Empire fought on, less in anticipation of outright military victory than in the hope that the military stalemate would eventually force Russia to terms, and also in the continuing hope, informally encouraged by the British Prime Minister, Beaconsfield, that Britain might yet be persuaded to offer material assistance. Both of these expectations proved false. Towards the end of the year Russia finally secured decisive break-throughs on the Caucasian front, where

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she captured Kars and threatened Erzurum, and in the Balkans where the fall of Plevna enabled her forces to commence a rapid advance upon the Ottoman capital. With victory clearly in sight, Serbia and Montenegro joined in on Russia's side, as, belated!}, did Greece. An armistice was concluded at Hdirne on 31 January 1878, and with her armies camped outside Istanbul, Russia dictated terms of peace at San Stefano on 3 March. Her terms were draconian. Not only was the Sultan compelled to cede substantial territories to Russia and her allies, but he had also to accede to the creation of a Russian-dominated Principality of Bulgaria, to be nominally an Ottoman vassal, and with an extensive territory embracing the eastern half of the Balkan peninsula and lying within easy striking range of Istanbul and the Straits. This finally forced the British to intervene, and with the backing of the other Powers, they compelled Russia to agree to a substantial revision of her San Stefano proposals. The terms of a definitive settlement were registered in the Treaty of Berlin, concluded between the Sultan and the Powers on 13 July 1878: Russia and her allies saw their territorial awards diminished, and the size of the proposed Bulgarian principality was much reduced, but these gains to the Ottoman Empire were offset by the transfer of Bosnia-Hercegovina to Austro-Hungarian administration, and by far-reaching reform proposals which threatened to undermine the Sultan's practical sovereignty in large parts of the Balkans and Asia Minor. Meanwhile Britain helped herself to Cyprus, and put forward claims to a de facto protectorate over Ottoman Asia. The Eastern Crisis was over, but it had utterly destroyed the Tanzimat vision of a revived and reformed Ottoman Empire whose existence would be guaranteed by the goodwill and support of the European Great Powers. Sultan Abdiilhamid was left to pick up the pieces, and to determine what future, if any, his weakened and reduced Empire might be able to carve out for itself.

CHAPTER TWO: ABDÜLHAMIDII AND HIS REGIME

I

Abdiilhamid's personality was central to his style and system of government. He was a complex and in some ways contradictory character 1 . His most obvious feature was a morbid strain of insecurity and suspiciousmindedness which under pressure tended to express itself in persecutory ideas. The origins of this condition arc as obscure as Abdiilhamid's own youth; it is generally agreed that it was aggravated by the semi-revolutionary circumstances of his accession and early reign, and that it worsened with age. On a daily basis, it manifested itself in a constant preoccupation with personal safety and a fear of assassination, in an all-pervading mistrust and the encouragement of informers and denunciations, in an insistence upon personal control of affairs and a reluctance to delegate authority, and in a pronounced tendency to view domestic and international politics in terms of conspiracy. More trivially, it manifested itself in a fear of poisoning, a refusal to submit to surgical operations, the carrying of a revolver at all times, and a mild superstition about unlucky dates. When more seriously aroused — and on occasion mere verbal association would suffice — the pathological strain secured an overpowering grip upon the Sultan's mind, rendering him at once both suggestible and obsessive, and causing him to become physically agitated and sleepless for days on end. States resembling breakdown were not unknown. It was not that the Sultan was a hopeless fantasist: even at their most extreme, his fears and suspicions focused upon conceivable possibilities. But he was chronically incapable of distinguishing threats which were probable from those which were merely possible: put simply, Abdiilhamid exhibited strong paranoid tendencies. The effects of this psychological instability were compounded by lack of a firm intellectual foundation. By his own admission, Abdiilhamid had

Information and informed accounts of Abdiilhamid's personal character are given in Mahmud Kemal Inal, Osmanh Devrinde Son Sadrazamlar, pp. 1264-306; Tahsin Pa§a, Abdiilhamit. Yildiz Hatiralari, especially pp. 9-18, 59-62, 155-8; Ismail Mii§tak Mayakon, Yildizda neler gördüm.; Sir Henry F. Woods, (Trans. Fahri £oker), TUrkiye Amlari, pp. 113-40; Arminius Vambery, The Story of My Struggles, HI, pp. 360-87; 'Sultan Abdulhamid', New Review, 2, (1890); cf., the notes made by the Grand Vizier Kämil Pa§a, in Hikmet Bayur, 'Yeni bulunmu§ bazi belgelerin l§igmda Kämil Pa§a'nm Siyasal Durumu', Belleten, 35: 137 (1971); see also Abdiilhamid'in Hatira Defteri.

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received little formal schooling, whether of a traditional or European type. His written Turkish was demotic, and erratic in spelling and syntax. He knew some French, and a little Albanian, but no other foreign language; he had been abroad but once, when in extreme youth he had accompanied Sultan Abdiilaziz on a ceremonial tour of European capitals. Otherwise he had never ventured outside Istanbul. He did not lack intellectual curiosity, and had a considerable appetite for information and discussion, but he remained a characteristic autodidact, prone to ideas fixes and eccentricities of judgement. The deficiencies were balanced by a number of compensating virtues. Abdiilhamid was endowed with a powerful native intelligence, and when not prey to obsessions and paranoid fears his assessments of men and affairs could be penetrating. He took his position and its duties seriously, and had a genuine sense of patriotism and responsibility for his subjects, albeit one couched in Islamic and dynastic terms. Despite his excitable imagination, he proved to be notably cautious in practice: he was never so easily dominated or manipulated as some feared and others hoped. He was also extremely hard-working — necessarily so, in view of his insistance upon maintaining absolute personal control of affairs of state. He strove to keep informed: he was an assiduous if undiscriminating student of the European press, an avid collector of photographs of his own Empire and the world, and made a point of receiving any foreign statesman who might pass through his capital. He was intellectually tolerant: as long as issues of loyalty were not aroused, he allowed his advisers to disagree with him and on occasion to change his mind. His personal tastes and habits were moderate, and his private expenditures restrained. His amusements were the theatre, European music, detective stories and carpentry. There is some justice in Vambcry's description of him as "the very personification of the roi bourgeois". Taken as a whole, he was a striking amalgam of determination and timidity, of insight and fantasy, held together by immense practical caution and an instinct for the fundamentals of power. He was frequently underestimated. Judged on his record, he was a formidable domestic politician and an effective diplomat.

n Abdiilhamid was not an ideological politician: he espoused no 'theory', believed in no earthly Utopias, and in general treated government as a practical art. This is not to say that he lacked beliefs, or that his conduct of government was devoid of principles. Howev er, these beliefs and principles were nowhere formally stated: they have to be inferred from a mass of statements uttered ad hoc and ad hominem in the thick of practical policy-making, and these in turn must be compared with his actual behaviour. On this basis, it is possible to identify four major elements in the Sultan's political outlook: autocracy, conservatism, reformism and Islam. These elements combined in a single

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emphasis upon consolidation, and a determination to forestall any resurgence of the disintegrative forces which had brought the Empire to the brink of final disaster between 1875 and 1878. Abdiilhamid's autocracy was most obviously demonstrated by his refusal to work with the Parliament established under the 1876 Constitution. The refusal was expressed in a celebrated outburst provoked by parliamentary criticism in 1878: I made a mistake when I wished to imitate my father Abdiilmecid, who sought reforms by permission and by liberal institutions. I shall follow in the footsteps of my grandfather Sultan Mahmud. Like him I now understand that it is only by force that one can move the people with whose protection God has entrusted me 1 . With hindsight, Abdiilhamid argued that the experiment of 1876-1878 had shown the Constitution to be "a dangerous and unsafe instrument": the parliamentary deputies were inexperienced, parochial in outlook and easily subverted. He also blamed Parliament for the war with Russia. Even so, the Constitution remained theoretically in force throughout his reign, and Parliament was merely suspended, not abolished. It is doubtful that Abdiilhamid ever seriously considered recalling Parliament, at least after 1880, but his objections were always pragmatic rather than principled: he pointed to his subjects' ignorance, to their conflicting ethnic and confessional loyalties, and to the lack of a moneyed class which, as in the constitutional regimes of Europe, could be trusted to identify its own interests with those of the State 2 . A similar pragmatism underlay a further aspect of the Sultan's autocracy: namely, his insistence upon rigid centralisation of government, and his rejection of any proposal for the devolution of authority to the provinces. The argument that such decentralisation might render Ottoman government more efficient and responsive to popular needs had occasionally been advanced during the Tanzimat era, and had had some influence on the constitutional movement. Abdiilhamid conceded that decentralised administration might work in other states, but insisted that it would prove disastrous for the Ottoman Empire: given the local preponderances enjoyed by ethnic and religious minorities, and the permanent risk of interference by foreign Powers, any system of decentralisation would tend towards provincial autonomy, and ultimately lead to the Empire's dissolution into small states. He wholeheartedly endorsed the opinion, famously expressed

^Robert Devereux, The First Ottoman Constitutional Period. A Study of the Midhat Constitution and Parliament, p. 244. 2 See,e.g„ inal, op. cit., pp. 678-80,1458-1465.

22

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by the f o r m e r Russian A m b a s s a d o r [gnatyev, that ' a u t o n o m y '

meant

'anatomy' 1 . He pointed to experience: Midhat Pa§a believed that the principle of devolving the administration in the provinces w as in accordance with the interest of the state, and as a prelude to generalising the principle, set up the Danubian vilayet. But it is natural that the benefits of devolved administration will accrue most to the nation which is in the majority in a given region, and although, in the said vilayet the reins of government were in the hands of the Moslems, it was the Bulgarians who benefited, with the harmful consequencc that at the end of the last war the vilayet took the name of Bulgaria; part of the Moslem population emigrated, part died in the course of war and migration, and it is clear that those w h o remain will soon be extinguished. It became obvious that the principle of devolved administration was damaging and destructive not only to the state, but also to the Moslem population 2 . Abdiilhamid's conservatism was explicit. In a memorandum despatched to his former Grand V b i e r Hayreddin Pa§a in 1881, he contrasted the two broad policies of liberalism (liberalizm) and conservatism (konservasyon), and assessed them as follows: The expression 'liberalism' means freedom, and freedom and liberty are religiously lawful and desirable matters. However when the expression is viewed from the standpoint of the various meanings which it has acquired among Europeans, and of the abuses which it has caused, and when it is compared with the provisions of the §eriat and with the nature and capacities of our people, far f r o m producing benefits, it will shake the administration and the Sultanate from their foundations and destroy them, and in a very short time — God forbid! — it will lead to the annihilation of the Empire. The expression 'conservatism' contains the sense of maintaining accepted principles, but without departing from the limits of moderation and the path of prudence, and thus repairing the mistakes made to date, reforming abuses and evils, and in particular acting in a fashion beneficial to the Sultanate and the State and in accordance with the needs of the country and the government, and thereby assuring the future and strengthening the Empire's progress on the path of prosperity and happiness... T o desire these things is a religious and patriotic obligation 3 . In practical terms, this conservatism encompassed an absolute refusal to tamper with the Empire's established political structures as defined by the

'A. Alâaddin Çetin and Rama/an Yildiz. Sultan II. Abdiilhamid Han. Devlet ve Memleket GiirUflerim, pp. 19-20,302. hbid., pp. 35-6. 3

inal, op. cit., pp. 930-1.

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supremacy of the Sultanate, the primacy of the Moslem millet, and the centralisation of government and administration. But it also implied a concern to accommodate government to the character and traditions of its subjects: Though a law may guarantee the life of the state and people in one country, the same law can destroy another country. For the law must accord with the religion, character, disposition and morals of the people 1 . Not that Abdiilhamid appears to have attributed any positive or creative role to popular habits and beliefs, with the single but important exception of religion. His conservatism was of a negative kind: it sprang from an acute sense of the limits of his own power and of the strength of his subjects' ingrained habits and loyalties. Most obviously, it led to some significant departures from the principle of centralisation: in areas such as Albania, eastern Anatolia and parts of Arabia, where the administrative authority of central government had traditionally been weak, the Sultan was prepared to accord a considerable degree of de facto autonomy to indigenous leaders, and to waive his rights to taxes and conscription 2 . This conservatism did not exclude a serious commitment to reform. Abdiilhamid believed in "material and moral progress", and regarded it as vital to his Empire's hopes of survival and eventual regeneration. He frankly acknowledged that territories like Bulgaria and Bosnia-Hercegovina had made significant material advances since their amputation from the Empire: he argued that these advances should be emulated 3 . That said, he was critical of some aspects of his predecessors' Tanzimat reforms, believing that they had wantonly exposed the Empire to foreign interference, and strengthened its nonMoslem communities at the expense of the Moslems upon whom it depended 4 . In his view, the reforms which the Empire needed were those which would "maintain and preserve the prosperity and security of the Ottoman territories and the Islamic millet, make our land wealthy, and give it power to resist the foreigner" 5 . Practically, this meant that Abdiilhamid firmly resisted all proposals for European-supervised reforms in favour of the Empire's non-Moslem subjects, including those stipulated in 1878 by the Treaty of Berlin and the

l^etin

an(j

Yildiz, op. tit., p. 160.

2

Engin Akarli, 'The Problems of External Pressures, Power Struggles, and Budgetary Deficits in Ottoman Politics under Abdiilhamid II (1876-1909): Origins and Solutions', typescript thesis,

(PhD, Princeton, 1976), p. 54; cf., Bayram Kodaman, Sultan II. Abdulhamid'in Dogu Anadolu Politikasr, §. Tufan Buzpinar, 'Abdiilhamid II, Islam and the Arabs: the Cases of Syria and the Hijaz (1878-1882)', typescript thesis, (PhD, Manchester, 1991). 3 £etin and Yildiz, op. cit., pp. 18-19. 4

lbid„ pp. 292-4.

5

Ibid., p. 42.

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Anglo-Ottoman Cyprus Convention. It also meant that he rejected all reforms which might tend towards provincial autonomy, or encroach upon his personal powers. Finally, it meant that the Sultan showed a certain wariness of foreign economic penetration, fearing that this could lead to political penetration as well. He was reluctant to resort to his predecessors' practice of raising European loans, or to sanction concessions for railways which were not linked to the capital 1 . But otherwise, his own reforms and innovations followed Tanzimat lines. Like his predecessors, he gave priority to the strengthening of central government, and of its twin pillars, the armed forces and the bureaucracy 2 . He expanded the army, supplied it with modern weapons and brought in German military instructors. He took a number of steps to increase the efficiency of the civil administration, and strengthened its grip on the country at large by extending the network of telegraphs and railways. He placed a particular emphasis upon education: his reign saw an unprecedented expansion in the number of state-supported primary and secondary schools for Moslems, the establishment of a number of specialised training institutions, including two provincial law schools, and eventually, in 1900, the opening of a university 3 .

Ill Abdiilhamid placed great emphasis upon his status as an Islamic ruler, and in this respect at least, he departed from the practice of his Tanzimat predecessors, who had sought to play down Moslem exclusiveness in favour of the newer doctrine of Ottomanism. We know little of Abdiilhamid's personal religious beliefs, though there is no reason to doubt his piety: all authorities agree that he took his religion and its duties seriously 4 . The place of Islam in his political \ ision and practice is more controversial 5 . For some, his reign represented a conservative religious reaction against the allegedly secularising tendencies of the Tanzimat; for others, it saw the initiation of a radical Islamic policy which rejected European political domination and European cultural influences; for a third group, the Sultan's public religiosity was no more than a cynical manipulation of popular sentiments in the service of his own despotism. None of these interpretations is satisfactory. Rather, Abdiilhamid's decision to re-emphasize Islam is best viewed as an aspect of his

' S e e , e.g., f e t i n and Yildiz, op. cit.. pp. 242-4, 296-7. 2

T h e military reforms are surveyed in H. A. von Albertall, Die türkische Wehrmacht und die Armeen der Balkanstaaten: Bulgarien, Griechenland, Rumänien, Serbien und Montenegro; H a u p t m a n n R a s k y , Die Wehrmacht der Türkei; ct., C. Freiher von der G o l t z P a s c h a , Denkwürdigkeiten, pp. 106-63, ^Educational policy is surveyed in Bayram Kodaman, AbdUlhamid Osman Ergin, Türkiye Maari/Turihi, III. 4

A l i Said, Sultan AbdUlhamid';n pp. 24-5.

Devrinde

Ejjitim Sistemi,

and

Huvati, p. 33; Mayakon, op. cit., pp. 66-71; Osmanoglu, op. cit.,

See, e.g., Niyazi Bcrkes, Tii'kiye'de Gergegi, p. 180ff.

(¿agdajlapna,

p. 3 3 I f f . ; O r h a n Kologlu,

AbdUlhamid

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25

general conservatism, and in particular, of his concern to stabilise the slate by governing in accordance with the nature and characteristics of his subjects. It embraced three fundamental elements: a view of the role of religion in Ottoman society; a view of the role of the Moslem community within the Ottoman state; and a view of the religious basis of the Sultan's own authority, symbolised by his possession of 'The Great Islamic Caliphate'. Abdiilhamid held that the first condition of any government was "religion, and in order to protect that religion, a little fanaticism". The other conditions were education, communal solidarity (milliyet), industry and wealth 1 . He regarded religion as a powerful social and political force, which the state must enlist in its own support. Religion was the source of group solidarity and political loyalties, the inspiration of the ideas of "love of country, patriotism and communal endeavour" 2 . Interestingly, Abdiilhamid did not regard these virtues as exclusive to Islam: for example, he attributed the greater educational and economic progress made by his non-Moslem subjects to the comparative strength of their religious convictions, which inspired them to acts of mutual solidarity and self-help 3 . But it was Islam which was the religion of the Ottoman state, and Islam which the stale must promote and protect. Abdiilhamid insisted that religious educations should occupy a prominent place in the curriculum of the slate schools: by inculcating "love of religion", he believed that he would inculcate "love of country and communal solidarity", and also inoculatc his subjects against subversive ideas 4 . He also strove to identify the State with Islam in the eyes of his subjects, through official participation in religious festivals, patronage of influential religious §eyhs, financial grants for the repair of mosques, and constant press propaganda 5 . It was therefore natural that Abdiilhamid should place a renewed emphasis upon the primacy of the Moslem community within the Ottoman empire. They were the majority; they were also the only community which could be trusted to identify with the Ottoman state 6 . Abdiilhamid betrayed no personal antipathy towards non-Moslems, but he regarded them as hopelessly corrupted by European influences, and he was unwilling to trust them en masse1. The Tanzimat doctrine of Ottomanism was tacitly downgraded, and while the rights of non-Moslems were left formally intact, Abdiilhamid gave practical priority to the interests of his Moslem subjects. He was above all anxious to raise the Moslems' educational and economic status. He recognised ^ e t i n and Yildiz, op. cit., p. 303.

2

Ibid„ p. 262. Ibid., pp. 28-9, 303. 4 lbid„ p. 258. 3

^Buzpinar, op. cit., pp. 24-5. ®Akarli, op. cit.. p. 55. 7 Cetin and Yildiz, op. cit., pp. 21-22.

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that they w e r e b a c k w a r d in c o m p a r i s o n with their n o n - M o s l e m c o m p a t r i o t s , and that this relative b a c k w a r d n e s s posed a serious threat to the E m p i r e ' s f u t u r e 1 . T h e r e w a s little the Sultan could d o directly to raise the e c o n o m i c standing of the M o s l e m s , t h o u g h it is worth noting that he concentrated state investment in railways and other public w o r k s in the p r e d o m i n a n t l y M o s l e m provinces of O t t o m a n A s i a 2 . H o w e v e r , as noted earlier, he was able to e x p a n d the state school network, and thereby to increase educational opportunities f o r M o s l e m s . In the short term, the schools were intended to strengthen the state, by p r o d u c i n g better-educated o f f i c i a l s and a r m y o f f i c i e r s ; but in the l o n g e r t e r m , t h e y a l s o c o n t r i b u t e d to the f o r m a t i o n of a M o s l e m m i d d l e c l a s s , c o m p o s e d of state e m p l o y e e s and m e m b e r s of the f r e e p r o f e s s i o n s , t h o u g h not, as yet, of businessmen. Paradoxically, it w a s this n e w middle class w h i c h was to overthrow Abdiilhamid's regime in 1908 3 . T h e state's Islamic identity w a s f u r t h e r e m p h a s i z e d by the p r o m i n e n c e given to t h e O t t o m a n c l a i m t o the C a l i p h a t e . T h i s c l a i m w a s not n e w . O t t o m a n S u l t a n s had styled t h e m s e l v e s C a l i p h s f o r c e n t u r i e s , and at least s i n c e the middle of the nineteenth century, had used the title in a sense which implied a u n i q u e and universal a u t h o r i t y , e x t e n d i n g in principle to all M o s l e m s — a d e v e l o p m e n t w h i c h a p p e a r s to h a v e coincided with increasing recognition of t h e O t t o m a n c l a i m a b r o a d , p a r t i c u l a r l y a m o n g M o s l e m p e o p l e s w h o had s u c c u m b c d to European rule 4 . It w a s in this sense that the title w a s recorded in the O t t o m a n Constitution of 1876: "The Exalted O t t o m a n Sultanate possesses the G r e a t I s l a m i c C a l i p h a t e , w h i c h is held by the e l d e s t m e m b e r of t h e O t t o m a n D y n a s t y in a c c o r d a n c e with a n c i e n t p r a c t i c e " 5 . T h a t said, t h e p r o m i n e n c e which Abdiilhamid g a v e to the title w a s u n p r e c e d e n t e d , a n d the u s e s w h i c h he m a d e of it w e r e p r i m a r i l y d o m e s t i c . B y e m p h a s i z i n g his C a l i p h a t e , h e s o u g h t to i n v e s t his p e r s o n a l a u t h o r i t y w i t h a r e l i g i o u s character, and to assert an unchallengeable claim to the loyalty of his M o s l e m s u b j e c t s : "as [the Sultan\ is the Caliph of Islam, to serve h i m is to serve all M o s l e m s " — a m e s s a g e driven h o m e in n u m e r o u s b o o k s , articles and s e r m o n s w h i c h preached the duty of u n c o n d i t i o n a l o b e d i e n c e to the S u l t a n Caliph6. T h e C a l i p h a t e w a s a l s o an i m p o r t a n t i n s t r u m e n t f o r M o s l e m unity. Abdiilhamid w a s the first O t t o m a n Sultan to face the possibility that

' i b i d . , p. 303. ^Akarii, op. cil., p. 62. 3

Ibid., p. 138 ff.

4

G o k h a n Çetinsaya 'II. Abdiilhamid Döneminin ilk Yillarinda "Islam Birligi" Hareketi (18761878)', typescript thesis ( M A . Ankara, 1988), pp. 1-13; M e h m e t Saray, Rus ¡¡gali Devrinde

Osmanli Devieti ile Tiirkìstari Hanliklari Arasindaki Siyasi Miinasebetler (1775-1875), p. 53ff; Azmi Ozcan, 'Indian Muslims and the Ottomans (1877-1914): A Study of Indo-Muslim Attitudes to Pan-Islamism and T u r k e y ' , typescript thesis, (PhD, London, 1990), p. 30ff. ^Buzpinar, op. cit., p. 41. 6

Ibid„

pp. 19-21; Çctin and Yildiz. op. cil., p. 199.

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sentiments of nationalism and ethnic separatism might take root among Moslems as well as non-Moslems. This danger first arose with the formation of the Albanian League of Prizren in 1878; though Abdiilhamid may initially have sympathised with the League's determination to resist the cession of Albanian Moslem territory to Christian states, he subsequently grew alarmed at its autonomist and nationalist tendencies, and in 1880 he suppressed it by force, backed by a propaganda which laid heavy emphasis upon Moslem solidarity and the duty of loyalty to the Caliphate 1 . The Sultan's fear of Arab separatism proved stronger and more abiding, partly because of his chronic suspicion that Britain wished to promote Arab independence, but partly, too, because of his conviction that any movement for Arab independence must lead to the establishment of a rival Arab Caliph at Mecca or Cairo, and strike a fatal blow at the foundations of his own domestic legitimacy 2 . The Arabs too were exposed to an intense Islamic propaganda, and, symbolically at least, an attempt was made to encourage their identification with the State: endless decorations were distributed to provincial Arab notables, and a number of Arab dignitaries were maintained as the Sultan's permanent guests at the Yildiz Palace 3 . Yet when all is said, it is necessary to stress the limitation of Abdiilhamid's 'return to Islam'. It was as much a matter of presentation as substance. It was in no sense radical, and was conservative in the sense that it represented a defence of the status quo, not a reaction against it. Abdiilhamid broke with the Tanzimat only on the issue of Ottomanism; but otherwise, he invoked Islam in defence of the centralised and modernising state which was the Tanzimat's most tengible legacy. He cultivated Islam as an influential body of popular sentiment; but he showed comparatively little interest in religious doctrine and institutions, and in their accredited guardians, the ulema. For all the Sultan's rhetorical invocations of the §eriat, the non-Islamic legal codes introduced during the Tanzimat continued to function, and in certain respects were developed further — notably through the far-reaching reform of the court system introduced in 18794. He occasionally spoke of reviving the medreses, the higher institutes of Islamic learning; but the schools in which he invested money were of the newer Tanzimat type, teaching European languages, and the natural as well as the religious sciences 5 . The new courts and the new schools remained substantially outside the orbit of the ulema, and the Sultan took no steps to increase the ulema's role within the state. On the contrary, the ulema were subjected to unprecedentedly close state control,

' s t a v r o Skendi, The Albanian National Awakening, 1878-1912, chs. i-iii passim.', Mehmct Hocaogu, Abdttlhamit Han'in Muhtiralan, pp. 199-205. 2 S e e below, especially chapter 6. •^Buzpinar, op. cit., pp. 29-34. ^Enver Ziya Karal, Osmanh Tarihi VIII: Birinci Me$rutiyet ve Istibdat Devirleri 1878-1909, p. 342ff. 5 For the Sultan's views on medrese reform, see £etin and Yildiz, op. cit., pp. 256-7, 261.

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with Imperial f a v o u r replacing traditional rules of precedence in senior appointments. The §eyhiilislam, the head of the ulema, was strictly watched 1 . In private, too, Abdiilhamid w a s strikingly tolerant in religious matters. He showed no particular bias towards the devout, or even towards Moslems, in his choice of Ministers and personal servants. Their loyalty was assured by other means: in the words of one of his Palace Secretaries, "what he wanted from his own men was not devoutness but devotion" 2 . A s long as the public proprieties were observed, he was quite willing to tolerate lax Moslems among his close entourage: notoriously, his Palace Chamberlain Ragib Bey was actively engaged in the liquor trade 3 . Nor did the Sultan betray any cultural hostility towards European influences, outside the narrow field of political ideas. His private tastes in music and literature, and the education he promoted in the state schools, were clear enough evidence of this, as was his patronage of writers like Ahmed Midhat Efendi, who can scarcely be described as traditionalist or obscurantist in o u t l o o k 4 . For Abdiilhamid, as f o r his Tanzimat predecessors, the standard of civilisation was contemporary Europe. A s he boasted in the mid-1890s, perhaps prematurely: "The achievements which have been made in education and public works are no secret to the fairminded; today the Ottoman Empire has secured a place among the Powers of Europe" 5 . There was also a practical limit to the Sultan's pursuit of Islamic unity at home. The Ottoman state remained an ethnically Turkish institution, with a predominantly Turkish bureaucracy and an overwhelmingly Turkish army, and Abdiilhamid himself appears to have recognised that in the final analysis, his power rested upon the Turkish element 6 . Turkish remained the language of administration and the medium of instruction in all state schools; it was also made a compulsory subject in private schools 7 . There is a story that at the beginning of his reign Abdiilhamid contemplated making Arabic the language of state, but that he was dissuaded by the argument that this would mean 'the end of T u r k i s h n e s s ' 8 . Proposals to give the Arabs a greater share in state appointments were not followed up®. Rather, he sought to m a n a g e Arabs, Kurds and Albanians through what his Principal Palace Secretary Tahsin Pa§a described as a 'colonial policy', based upon the cultivation of influential local

^Karal, up. cit., pp. 305-8: B e r l c s , op. cil., pp. 337-8. 2

M a y a k o n , op. cit., p. 69. Ibid.,

loc.

cit.

^Berkes, op. cit., pp. 363-9; Hilmi Ziya Ulken, Tiirkiye'de 5

£agda$

Dii^unce

Tarihi,

pp. 107-21.

£ e t i n and Yildiz, op. cit., p. 155.

6

Karal, op. cit., p. 544, for the bureaucracy; for the army, see FO 8 8 1 / 5 1 6 8 A , report by Capt. Hare, 31 October 1885. ^Kliment D£ambazovski, Kulturno-opStestvenite vek, p. 186. 8

Karal, op. cit., p. 403.

% o r one such proposal, see (nal. op. cit., p. 924.

vrski na Makedoncite

so Srbija

vo tekot na XIX

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chiefs and notables; but he had no wish to undermine existing balances and hierarchies 1 .

IV Despite the manifestly conservative thrust of Abdiilhamid's religious policies at home, many Europeans suspectcd that he harboured thoughts of a radical Islamic policy abroad, and of fomenting a Pan-Islamic movement which would unite the Moslem world under Ottoman leadership in the cause of resistance to European domination 2 . Pan-Islamic notions of Moslem unity and solidarity had gained some currency in the 1870s, largely as a response to European colonial expansion, and foreign Moslems had offered the Ottoman Empire some moral and financial support during the 1877 war with Russia 3 . Abdiilhamid certainly encouraged discussion of the Pan-Islamic idea in the press, and cultivated some contacts with Moslems abroad 4 . But it is by no means clear that this amounted to anything more than another means of reinforcing his prestige as Caliph, and perhaps of increasing his diplomatic leverage with European Powers. There is no evidence that he regarded revolutionary Pan-Islamism as practical politics, and assertions that Yildiz served as the headquarters of an Islamic International must be dismissed as speculative fantasy. The meagre record of proven activity suggests that Abdiilhamid's practical interest in Pan-Islamism was fitful, and to a degree opportunistic, and that it occupied no more than a peripheral place in his conception of the Ottoman Empire's external relations. The early part of his reign saw some scattered initiatives. In 1877, with British support, he made a vain bid to enlist the military assistance of Afghanistan against Russia, and in 1879 he spoke to the British Ambassador of his hopes for a future antiRussian alliance between Britain, the Ottoman Empire and Iran, though it is by no means clear that this was intended as a practical proposal 5 . In Moslem Africa, too, the Sultan made some attempts to expand his circle of contacts: he corresponded with the ruler of Zanzibar, and in 1880 he made an unsuccessful attempt to open diplomatic relations with M o r o c c o 6 . Within two years, however, the French occupation of Tunis and the British occupation of Egypt had placed Ottoman policy in Africa firmly on the defensive; thereafter Abdiilhamid's interest in Pan-Islamic foreign

^Tahsin Paça, op. cit., pp. 150-1. For varying assessments of Abdiilhamid's Pan-Islamism, see Lewis, op. cit., pp. 334-7; Gabriel Charmes, 'La situation en Turquie'. Revue des Deux Mondes, xlvii, (1881); V. Chirol, PanIslamism-, C. Snouck Hurgronje, Les confréries religieuses, la Mecque et le Panislamisme. ^Çetinsaya, op. cit., passim. ^Buzpinar, op. cit., passim.; Ôzcan op. cit., p. 162ff. 2

5 Cavid M. Baysun, '§irvani-zade Ahmed Hulûsi Efendi'nin Efganistan Elçiligine dair Bit Belge', Tarih Dergisi, xxxii, (1979); W. N. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After. A Diplomatic History of the Near Eastern Settlement ¡878-1880, pp. 301-4. 6 Cevdet Pa§a, Tezâkir 40 - Tetimme, pp. 195-6; Documents Diplomatiques Français, III, no. 264, Tissot to Barthélemey St. Hilaire, 29 September 1880.

30

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policy schemes appears 10 have lapsed, and not to have revived until the mid1890s 1 . Much of the speculation surrounding Abdulhamid's alleged Pan-Islamic ambitions derived from the presence at Yildiz of a number of religious dignitaries, predominantly Arabs, some of whom were connected with tarikat, or dervish orders, influential in Arabia and North Africa. Four dignitaries attracted particular publicity: §eyh Mehmed Zafir, a Medinan with Syrian and Tripolitanian connections who headed a subbranch of the §azili order; §eyh Ebu'lhiida cs-Sayyadi, a Syrian §eyh of the Rufai tarikat', Seyyid Ahmed Es'ad, an influential notable from Medina; and Seyyid Fazil, an adventurer from the Hadhramaut who appeared at Yildiz in 1879 after failing in a bid to establish himself as the ruler of Dhol'ar 2 . Together with similar figures, these four were occasionally consulted by Abdiilhamid on A r a b matters, employed as intermediaries, and used to make propaganda on behalf of the Ottoman Caliphate among their Arab followers. But there is no evidence that they exercised influence over government policy, and the claim that this quartet amounted to a standing council or directorate of Pan-lslamism remains utterly u n s u b s t a n t i a t e d 3 . There was nothing unprecedented or exceptional in Abdulhamid's employment of such persons as occasional advisers and emissaries, nor in his cultivation of representatives of influential tarikat4. It was of a piece with his "colonial policy' of controlling the Arabs through their indigenous notables and institutions, and as such, an aspect of his domestic rather than of his foreign policy. V Autocracy was the guiding principle of Abdulhamid's regime: autocracy within central government as well as without. He initiated and directed policy in detail: no decision of any consequence could be taken without his formal authorisation. He saw all major papers and many minor ones, and it is said that on occasion as man\ as 1200 documents were submitted for his inspection in a single day 5 . The consequence was an almost total loss of independence by his Ministers, and the transfer of effective executive authority from the Sublime Porte to the Yildiz Palace 6 . Abdulhamid's insistance upon absolute

' S e e , e.g., his project (dated 1896?) for a f o r m of confederation between the Ottoman Empire and Iran in Cretin and Yildiz, op. cit., p. 305ff. ^Buzpmar, op. cit., p. 84ff. 3

S n o u c k Hurgronje, op. cit., ; lahsin Pa§a, op. cit., pp. 134-6; Osman Nuri, op. cit., pp. 521-2.

^(Jayci, op. cit., pp. 25-7, for Ottoman use of tarikat in North Africa. 5

G o l t z Pascha, op. cit., p. 123.

^ E u r o p e a n s used the term ' S j b l i m e Porte' as a synonym for the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t as a whole. In stricter Ottoman usage it referred to the Sultan's Ministers and their respective departments. Their numbers and nomenclature varied slightly over the years, but for most of the period under review they consisted of the Grand Vizier, the §eyhulislam, the Ministers of the Interior, W a r (in 1882 he reverted to the title of Serasker), the Navy, Foreign A f f a i r s , Justice, Finance, T r a d e and Agriculture, Religious E n d o w m e n t s (Evkaf-i Humayun, alternatively translated as Pious Foundations). Education, and Public Works, and the President of the Council of State and the Marshal of the Imperial Arsenal ( T o p h a n e - i Amire Mu$iri, alternatively translated as Grand Master of 'he Artillery).

ABDÜI, H A M I D

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31

control reflected his preoccupation with personal security; it also represented a deliberate rejection of the constitutionalists' d e m a n d f o r cabinet g o v e r n m e n t based upon clear principles of ministerial responsibility 1 . A t first A b d u l h a m i d tolerated s o m e talk of ministerial responsibility: between 1878 and 1880 he e n c o u r a g e d the Porte to e x a m i n e the issue, and twice during this period he abolished the o f f i c e of Grand Vizier ( S a d r a z a m ) , and substituted the o f f i c e of Prime Minister (Bagvekil)2.

Nonetheless, by February 1881 A b d u l h a m i d had

reached the c o n c l u s i o n that the principle of ministerial responsibility w a s incompatible with his own authority: It means assuring the complete independence of the different branches of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , e s t a b l i s h i n g and s t r e n g t h e n i n g the l e a d e r s h i p a n d a u t o n o m y of the ... P r i m e M i n i s t e r o r G r a n d Vizier in all a f f a i r s , w o r k s and activities of state, and quite simply entrusting the sacred rights of t h e Sultanate to a n o t h e r person, thus shaking the pillars and f o u n d a t i o n of the State and of t h e S u l t a n a t e . T h i s in turn will necessitate the a c c e p t a n c e w i t h o u t d e m u r of w h a t e v e r m a t t e r s and proposals m a y b e submitted to His Imperial M a j e s t y by the S u b l i m e Porte ... Such an idea can in n o wise be reconciled with the ideas of the Sultanate 3 . This remained his definitive view 4 . T h e s u b o r d i n a t i o n of t h e P o r t e in p r a c t i c e had l o n g s i n c e b e e n accomplished. B y the end of 1878 A b d u l h a m i d had rid himself of all Ministers w h o w e r e in a n y w a y implicated in the constitutional m o v e m e n t a n d the deposition of A b d u l a z i z , and h e n c e f o r t h h e controlled the P o r t e t h r o u g h a c o m p l e x s y s t e m of d i v i d e and r u l e 5 . T h e Sultan a p p o i n t e d all M i n i s t e r s individually, and they r e m a i n e d i n d i v i d u a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e t o the t h r o n e ; a change at the Grand Vizierate necessitated n o changes at other Ministries. Even the rewards of office were distributed on an individual basis: specially favoured Ministers were granted supplementary salaries drawn upon the Sultan's private

^For Midhat Pa§a's advocacy of cabinet government see Devereux, op. cit., pp. 67-9. ^He also spoke of recalling Parliament. See inal, op. cit., p. 1312. For the discussions on ministerial responsibility see ibid., pp. 905-54passim., and Said Pa§a, Said Paga'nm Hatirati, I, pp. 83-4. On the abolition of the Grand Vizierate, which was definitively restored in November 1882, see Abdurrahman §eref, Tarih Musahebeleri, p. 264ff. 3 Inal, op. cit., pp. 929-30. ^fetin and Yildiz, op. cit., p. 160ff. ^Details of the sackings of Mehmed Riifdi, Sadik, Ingiliz Said and others in Inal, op. cit., pp. 126-32,781, 847, '002. For the trial, imprisonment and murder of Midhat Pa§a see the following three works by Ismail Hakki Uzun9ar§ili, Midhat ve Ru$tu Pagalann Tevkiflerine dair Vesikaiar, Midhat Pa$a ve Taif Mahkumlarv, Midhat Pa$a ve Yildiz Mahkemesi.

32

A B D U L H A M )

I)

II

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G R E A T

P O W E R S

treasury. The Council of Ministers continued to meet twice a week to discuss current, business and to submit collective advice to the Sultan; nonetheless, its functions as a quasi-cabinet were undermined by the Sultan's practice of referring sensitive issues to Committees of Ministers selected by himself. In similar fashion, the prerogatives of individual Ministers were usurped by ad hoc or standing Commissions: questions of army reform were handled by a Military Inspection Commission, a Public Works Commission dealt with all concessions, and budgetary problems were referred to a series of Finance Commissions. In any case, Abdiilhamid reserved the right to refer any topic or task to any official, regardless of formal status. He selected all senior diplomatic, provincial and military officers himself, and corresponded with them directly, by-passing their nominal superiors at the Porte. All these devices served to foster rivalries, and prevented any individual or group from monopolising the Sultan's channels of information and advice. It goes without saying that Ministers were subject to the strictest surveillance, and forbidden to meet one another without the Sultan's express permission 1 . All this said, Abdiilhamid recognised the need for intelligent advice and the efficient execution of his orders, and at least until 1891 his Grand Viziers were on the whole men of character and ability who enjoyed a certain freedom of opinion and exercised an occasionally decisive influence upon policy. Two figures dominated the first half of his reign: Kiiguk Mehmed Said Pa§a, who served as Prime Minister or Grand Vizier from October 1879 to September 1885, with three brief interruptions, and Kibrisli Mehmed Kamil Pa§a, who served as Grand Vizier continuously from September 1885 to September 1891 2 . Both were able and independent-minded, and both were Abdiilhamid's creation. Ku?uk Said was in some ways the stronger of the two. He had close personal connections with Abdiilhamid, having served as his Principal Palace Secretary and as Minister of the Privy Purse. He also shared something of the Sultan's outlook: he was a centraliser, an advocate of administrative rather than of political reform, a strong believer in education, a Moslem patriot and something of a Turkish patriot. In foreign affairs he inclined to a policy of non-commitment, preferring to maintain good relations with all Powers rather than to cultivate particular alliances. He was also wary of Buropean economic penetration, and had hopes of undermining the Capitulations.

^Said Pa$a, op. cit., pp. 14-7; Osman Nuri, op. cit., II, pp. 591-691; tnal, op. cit., pp. 1269-70; Tahsin Pa§a, op. cit., pp. 25-6, 42 4. 2 Ku?uk: Said served as Prime Minister October 1879-June 1880, September 1880-May 1882, J u l y - N o v e m b e r 1882; as Grand Vizier, D e c e m b e r 1882-September 1885. Details of his career in Inal, op. cit., p. 9 8 9 f f ; Hrcument K u r a n , 'Kiisiik Said Pa§a ( 1 8 4 0 - 1 9 1 4 ) as a T u r k i s h Modernist', Internal Journal of Middle East Studies, I: 1, (1970); Lewis, op. cit., p. 175ff; Said Pa§a, op. cit., vols. I-III passim. On Kamil Pa§a see Inal, op. cit., p 134ff; Hilmi Kamil Bayur, Sadrazam Kamil Pa$a. Siyasi Hayati; Kamil Pa§a, Hatirat-i Sadr-i Esbak Kamil Pa^a, I.

A B D Ü L H A M i D

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Ktifiik Said's m a j o r achievements lay in the fields of f i n a n c e and education. H e has a claim to be considered the author of the Empire's financial recovery f r o m the disasters of Abdiilaziz's reign and the war with Russia. He played a prominent part in the negotiations which led in 1881 to the debt settlement known as the Decree of M u h a r r e m , while his rigorous attitude towards expenditure assisted a steady improvement in the Empire's current finances throughout his tenure of officc. H e also introduced a number of useful reforms into the system of financial administration 1 . Kiiyiik Said's educational policy was distinguished by a new emphasis upon primary and secondary schooling, and by the introduction of an Education Tax to pay f o r it. By his own account, the period 1879-1885 saw the opening of over 130 state primary schools, and the inception of an ambitious p r o g a m m c to build secondary schools in the provinces. He also supported the establishment of institutions for the training of government officials, including a L a n g u a g e s School for diplomats 2 . Finance and education aside, Kii^iik Said could also claim credit for a n u m b e r of administrative and judicial innovations, including a pension f u n d for officials and the introduction of a system of public prosecutors. He made less of an impact on foreign policy, where his doubts about the wisdom of cultivating Germany and his advocacy of an understanding with Britain in the Egyptian question ran counter to Abdiilhamid's own inclinations. He was also disappointed in his hopes of a vigorous economic policy: plans for a revision of the Empire's trade treaties came to very little, and circumstances did not f a v o u r his wish for a major p r o g r a m m e of railways and public works in Anatolia 3 . Kamil Paga's views bore a more liberal stamps. H e was sceptical of the benefits of administrative centralisation, f a r less wary of foreign loans and investment, and a confirmed advocate of a British alliance 4 . It says something for Abdiilhamid's tolerance that Kamil survived as Grand Vizier f o r six years; it says more f o r the strength and security of the Sultan's control. Kamil's Grand Vizierate saw a number of important domestic departures, including the inception of the Anatolian railways s c h e m e and t h e f o u n d a t i o n of an Agricultural Bank; nonetheless, circumstances dictated that Kamil should make his greatest personal impact in the field of foreign policy 5 . Between 1885 and 1891 he strove unceasingly to reverse the trend of Hamidian diplomacy and to draw the Empire into alliance with Britain, and though these efforts proved ultimately unsuccessful, they undeniably influenced Ottoman policy in a range

'Said Pa§a, op. cit., I, p. 23ff., pp. 180-200; Donald C. Blaisdell, op. cit., p. 99ff; V. Caillard, 'The Truth about Turkish Finance', Fortnightly Review. 38: ccxxv (Sept. 1885); FO 78/3875, Thornton to Iddesleigh, no. 501, 7 October 1886. 2 Lewis, op. cit., pp. 177-9; Said Pa§a, op. cit., pp. 155-60. 3 Said Pa§a. op. cit., pp. 21-31, 136-45, 176-80, 200-20. ^Hilmi Kamil Bayur, op. cit., passim.; Hikmct Bayur, op. cit., passim.; Kamil Pa§a, op. cit., passim. ^Hilmi Kamil Bayur, op. cit., passim.; Hikmet Bayur, op. cit., passim.; Kamil Pa§a, op. cit., passim.

34

A B D U L H A M ID II

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of international issues. Kamil's pro-British view were grounded in admiration for Britain's historic success: England's friendship must be preserved and her enmity avoided. This extraordinary nation cannot be broken. She destroyed a ruler like Bonaparte and drove him to his end in exile'. Kamil spoke fluent English, and had visited England in his youth 2 . However, he based his case for a British alliance upon fear of Russia 3 . He regarded Russia as an expansionist Power bent upon world domination, whose first goal was the destruction of the Ottoman Empire: since this would imperil Britain's communications with India, it followed that Britain and the Empire had a common interest in resisting Russia, and that this should form the basis for a political and military alliance. Nonetheless, Kamil was realist enough to recognise that circumstances had changed since the Crimean War. Britain had lost confidence in the Ottoman Empire, and might be tempted to promote Armenian or Arab alternatives. This made it imperative that confidence be restored: The alienation of England from the Ottoman Empire is sufficient to destroy the peace of the country 4 . Kamil also recognised that Britain's practical ability to defend the Empire had been undermined by her breach with France over Egypt, and by the Three Emperors' Alliance which protected Russia's rear. He was therefore obliged to rest his hopes upon a revision of the European balance of power: later chapters will show how he believed this might be accomplished, and how he attempted to exploit the opportunities which arose between 1886 and 1888 5 . The Sultan's departmental Ministers carried far less weight, and generally functioned as simple executive officiers. The Foreign Ministry in particular suffered something of an eclipse. During the Tanzimat this ministry had enjoyed particular status, and Foreign Ministers had frequently changed places with Grand Viziers. After 1880 the pattern changed: Abdiilhamid's Foreign Ministers were technically competent but undistinguished figures, of no great influence or originality. Arifi Pa§a was generally deemed a lightweight: the malicious attributed his preferment to the Sultan's appreciation of his piano playing 6 . Asim Pa§a had little diplomatic experience, and an indifferent command of

^Hikmet Bayur, op. cit., pp. 68-9. ^Kamil Pa§a, 3

Tarih-i Siyasi-yi Itevkt-i Aliye-yi Osmaniye,

III, p. 228ff.

S e e the three reports quoted in Hilmi Kamil Bayur, op. cit., pp. 18-23, 5 1 - 3 , 7 9 - 9 1 .

^Hikmet Bayur, op. cit., p. 68. -'See below, especially chapters 12-16. 6

A r i f i served as Foreign Minister from December 1882 to April 1884; biographical details are given in tnal, op. cit., p. 9 6 I f f .

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French, the principal language of diplomatic communication 1 . Kurd Said Pa§a gave more evidence of character, and was known for his sharp wit, but there is no evidence that he exerted an independent influence upon policy 2 . In practice, Abdiilhamid preferred to reserve foreign policy for himself and the Grand Vizier; the Foreign Ministry was left to serve as a sorting-office for diplomatic mail. A handful of departmental Ministers enjoyed the Sultan's particular personal favour, and were occasionally encouraged to express their views on matters outside their formal areas of responsibility. Kamil Pa§a was so used before his elevation to the Grand Vizicrate, and similar favour was extended to the Interior Ministers Mahmud Nedim Pa§a and hdhern Pa§a, and to the Justice Ministers Hasan Fehmi Pa§a and Ahmed Cevdet Pa§a. Abdtilhamid's personal confidence was the key: the Ministers in question were united neither by their background nor by their views on particular issues, and were consulted on a strictly ad hoc basis 3 . The Ministers responsible for the armed forces stood slightly apart: they possessed separate channels of consultation and communication with the Sultan, and tended to be longer-serving than their civilian colleagues. Futhermore, all were serving military officers. Gazi Osman Pa§a, the Hero of Plevna, served as Serasker or War Minister from 1880 to 1885; he was succeeded by Ali Saib Pa§a, the Marshal of the Arsenal, who combined both ministerial posts until his death in 1891. Hasan Hiisnii Pa§a served as Navy Minister for over twenty-two years, from 1880 to 1903 4 . In contrast, the §eyhiilislam appears to have wielded no distinctive influence, despite his formal parity of rank with the Grand Vizier. Abdiilhamid is known to have sought religious legal opinion during the early discussions on ministerial responsibility, and there is a recorded instance of his consulting the §eyhiilislam as to the canonical legality of a proposal to send Ottoman troops to Egypt during the British occupation. These were isolated cases. There is no evidence that Abdiilhamid made a general point of referring political issues to the §eyhiilislam, and the record of ministerial discussions indicates that the §eyhiilislam's opinion was in no way distinguished from that of the average departmental Minister 5 .

'Asim served as Foreign Minister from September 1880 to May 1882 and from April 1884 to September 1885; his character is assessed in Ein Freund des Orients, 'Die neueren Phasen der türkischen Politik', Deutsche Rundschau, 72, (July-September 1892), p. 69ff. ^Kiird Said served as Foreign Minister from May to November 1882 and from September 1885 to November 1895; his character is assessed in ibid., op. cit. 3 F o r Mahmud Nedim and Edhem, see inal, op. cit., p. 306ff, p. 620ff; for Fehmi, Ibrahim Aläettin Gövsa, Türk Meghurlart Ansiklopedisi, p. 134; for Cevdet, Ebu ul-Ula Mardin, Medeni Hukuk Cephesinden Ahmet Cevdet Pa$a (1822-1895). 4 Govsa, op. cit., pp. 170, 297, 338-9. 5 inal, op. cit., pp. 909,10; Karal, op. cit., pp. 301-8; BBAr§, YEE, K39/2011/Z131/116, unsigned paper, n.d.

36

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VI One consequence of the eclipse of the Porte was a marked increase in the political influence wielded by Abdiilhamid's personal entourage: the Saray takimi or 'Palace set'. This influence was much discussed by contemporaries, but remains difficult to document. W e possess no significant Palace memoirs for the 1880s, and the paucity of relevant materials in the Yildiz archives suggests that much Palace business was conducted verbally 1 . Certain general observations may be made 2 . In the main it was Abdiilhamid who controlled his entourage, and not they w h o controlled him. H e had no p e r m a n e n t favourites, and no individual or clique succeeded in monopolising his ear 3 . Indeed, the 'Palace set' was a heterogeneous group, whose members were diverse in origin and function. S o m e were loyal retainers who had served Abdiilhamid before his accession. Others were talented young men of humble origin who were recruited direct f r o m the Civil Service School (Mekteb-i Mulkiye)-, still others were established figures who possessed some particular prestige or expertise. S o m e were simply favoured individuals, including a n u m b e r w h o were said to have gained the Sultan's c o n f i d e n c e through denunciations of alleged conspiracies. This diversity tended to forestall the emergence of any unified camarilla or kitchen cabinet; personal and political rivalries at Yildiz were intense, and lent themselves readily to Abdiilhamid's techniques of divide and rule. The Sultan used his entourage as a check upon his Ministers, a source of alternative advice, and a channel for confidential communications. It also provided him with access to views and opinions which were weakly represented at the Porte, and in particular, certain Islamic, absolutist — and in the specific field of foreign policy — pro-Russian views. The m a j o r i t y of p e r s o n s e m p l o y e d

at Y i l d i z w e r e

household

servants who played no political role 4 . Nor did the Sultan's children or o t h e r m e m b e r s of the Imperial and

f o r b i d d e n to m e d d l e

concentrated

f a m i l y : they w e r e closely

in a f f a i r s of

state5.

Real

in a small n u m b e r of o v e r t l y political

in the section of the Palace known as the Mabeyn

watched,

influence

was

offices located

(literally, ' i n - b e t w e e n ' ) .

F o r e m o s t a m o n g these were the eight P a l a c e C h a m b e r l a i n s , w h o had direct access to the Sultan's person and were used to carry verbal messages and

' A l i Said, op. cit., is the sole lirst-hand account of Yildiz in the 1880s. It is slight. Tahsin Pa^a, op. cit., and Mayakon, op. cit., are much more informative, but both deal with later periods. 2 T h e f o l l o w i n g account of the organisation and personalities of Y d d i z is based upon Tahsin Pa§a, op. cit., especially p. 18ff; O s m a n Nuri, op. cit., II, p. 4 8 6 f f . ; FO 7 8 / 3 9 9 8 , W h i t e to Salisbury, no. 158, 2 8 April 1887: FO 800/32, m e m o r a n d u m by Arminius Vambery, 2 8 August 1892. 3 F O 800/32, op. cit. ^Possible exceptions to this rule were the Chief Eunuch, H a f i z Behram Aga, and the Sultan's Greek physician, Mavroyeni Pa^a. T h e former is said to have interested himself in contracts and concessions, while the latter may have served as an intermediary with the Greek Patriarchate and the Phanariot community. See Osman Nuri, op. cit., II, pp. 497-8, 512-5. 5 Ibid„ p. 532ff; Tahsin Pa§a, op. cit., pp. 24. 101-3, 120-1.

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instructions 1 . The Principal Chamberlain, Osman Bey, and his deputy, Haci Ali Bey, were both old connections of Abdiilhamid's and were regarded as belonging to 'the old Turkish school' 2 . Their subordinates Ragib Bey and Emin Bey represented a newer type selected by Abdiilhamid for promotion: both had distinguished themselves at the Civil Service School, and were employed by the Sultan in sensitive political work. Ragib was actively proBritish in foreign policy questions; he was also corrupt, and amassed a considerable fortune from commissions paid by European contractors and arms manufacturers 3 . The work of the Chamberlains was paralleled by that of the Principal Palace Secretariat, which handled the Sultan's official correspondence with the Sublime Porte and the outside world. All major state papers passed through this department, and the post of Principal Palace Secretary was held to be an influential one 4 . From 1876 to 1878 it was occupied by Ku5iik Said Bey, a future Grand Vizier; and following the premature death of his successor Ali Fuad Bey in 1880 it was occupied by Ali Riza Pa§a, the son-in-law of Gazi Osman Pa§a; he was succeeded in 1885 by Siireyya Pa§a, an old connection of Abdiilhamid's and reputedly a man of judgement and integrity 5 . A half-dozen subordinate secretaries made up the department: they were carefully selected among graduates of the Civil Service School, and a number were entrusted with confidential missions and similar tasks. The Sultan also maintained two Private Secretaries, Re§id Bey and Ni§an El'endi. Resid was much used in diplomatic work, while Ni§an, an Armenian, had particular responsibility for monitoring the European press 6 . The Master of Ceremonies, Miinir Pa§a, also held the office of Imperial Dragoman, and interpreted for the Sultan at audiences with foreign ambassadors; he appears to have shunned any independent political role 7 . The Sultan's personal finances were supervised by the Minister of the Privy Purse, or Civil List. The post was an important one, and served as a stepping-stone to high office at the Porte for such figures as Kiicjiik Said Pa§a and Hasan Fchmi Pa§a. From 1880 onwards it was held by the Armenian Agop Pasa, who also served as Finance Minister in 1886 and 1887 s .

^Tahsin Pa§a, op. cit., pp. 20-1. Ibid„ pp. 35-9; FO 78/3998, op. cit.,; Gövsa, op. cit., p. 296. 3 For Ragib Bey, see FO 78/3998, op. cit.; Gövsa, op. cit., p. 311; Osman Nuri, op. cit., II, p. 500; Uzun§ar§ili, Midhat Pa$a ve YUdiz Mahkemesi, p. 360. For Emin Bey, see Osman Nuri, toe cit.; Gövsa, op. cit., p. 113; FO 800/32, memo, by Arminius Vambery, 28 August. ^Tahsin Pa§a op. cit., pp. 7-8, 19-20. 2

5

For Ali Fuad and Ali Riza, see the relevant entries in Mehmed Siireyya, Sicill-i Osmant yahud Tezkere-i Mejahir-i Osmaniye; for Siireyya, see FO 78/3998, loc. cit. ®For Re§id Bey see the relevant entry in Mehmed Siireyya, op. cit., cf., Josef Maria von Radowitz, Aufzeichnungen und Erinnerungen, II, p. 233. For Ni§an Efendi, see Tahsin Pasa op cit., pp. 22-3. 7

Gövsa, op. cit., p. 267; FO 78/3998, loc. cit. Osman Nuri, op. cit., II, p. 526; FO 800/32, 'General observations concerning the personal qualities and the rule of the present Sultan', n.d. 8

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A number of high-ranking military officers were attached to the Mabeyn, which was the official seat of the Military' Inspection Commission set up in 1880 to consider questions of army reorganisation and reform 1 . Gazi Osman Pa§a held the title of Marshal of the Palacc: the appointment entailed few duties beyond that of accompanying the Sultan at public ceremonies, and was generally interpreted as an attempt by Abdiilhamid to exploit Osman Pa§a's popularity as a war hero. It also enabled Osman Pa§a to advance his own views, which were hostile to military reform on German lines and somewhat pro-Russian in foreign policy 2 . Osman Pa§a was also numbered among the Sultan's twelve Aides-de-Camp, all officers of the rank of Marshal. As a group the Aides-de-Camp had no obvious function, though several were occasionally sent abroad on diplomatic or ceremonial missions. They included the Englishman Hobart Pa§a, who had served as Chief of the Ottoman Naval Staff 3 . Particular mention should be made of the Marshals Namik Pa§a, Nusret Pa§a and Dervi§ Pa§a: all three professed extreme conservative views of an Islamic type, and appear to have constituted a kind of 'Ultra' faction at Yildiz 4 . It also appears that Nusret and Dervi§ were occasionally consulted by the Sultan on Balkan affairs 5 . Also listed at the Mabeyn were a somewhat more numerous group of Honorary ADCs, and an even larger body of Military ADCs. Both these titles were entirely ceremonial: the Honorary ADCs included all the members of the German military mission, together with certain other foreigners in Ottoman service, while the Military ADCs were all serving officers 6 . Outside the Mabeyn the Sultan maintained a fluctuating group of 'permanent guests'. These included the 'Pan-Islamic' circle of §eyhs alluded to earlier, together with a number of other religious dignitaries and local notables of Arabian, North African, Central Asian, Indian and Bosnian origin. Very little is known about their activities, and their functions remain obscure. Some may have played an advisory role; others may have been cultivated as a means of ensuring the loyalty of their followers; equally some, like certain representatives of the §erifian families of Mecca, were possibly regarded as potential trouble-makers who were best kept out of their home areas 7 .

' R a s k y , op. cit., pp. 24-5; RitLit U^arol, Bir Osmanli Pagasi ve Donemi, Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pa$a, p. 154. 2 Tahsin Pa§a, op. cit., p. 19; Govsa, op. cit., p. 297; FO 364/2, memo, by Sandison on 'Turkish leading Ministers and Functionaries', 23 April 1885. 3 W o o d s Pa§a, op. cit., p. 199ff. "%or Namik Pa§a, see A. Nuri Sinaph. Mehmet Namik Pa$a; §ehabeddin Akalin, ' M e h m e d Namik P ^ a ' , Tarih Dergisi, iv: 7, (1952); Tarih-i Cevdet, XII, (Istanbul, 1309), pp. 191-4. For Nusret Pa§a, Berkes, Turkiye'de ^agdaglasma, p. 315ff. For Dervi§ Pa^a, Tahsin Pa§a, op. cit., p. 22; Osman Nuri, op. cit., p 528; Govsa, op. cit., p. 103. Dervi§ Pa§a had suppressed the League of Prizren in 1881, while Nusret Pa§a negotiated the 1883 Goksu convention with Montenegro. See Skendi, op. cit., p. 104ff.; Said Pa§a, op. cit., I,, p. 133. "Lists of Honorary and Military A D C s were published annually in the almanacs entitled Salname-i Devlet-i Aliye-yi Osmaniye. Cf., Tahsin Pa§a, op. cit., pp. 23-4. ^Tahsin Pa§a, op. cit., p. 31; Kin Freund des Orients, op. cit., pp. 60-4.

A B D Ü L H A M l D

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Certain Palace functionaries played an important diplomatic role as intermediaries between the Sultan and the Embassies of the European Powers. Communications with the British Embassy were occasionally entrusted to Hobart Pa§a, but the more usual channel was Artin Efendi, an Armenian who served for most of the 'eighties as Undersecretary at the Foreign Ministry. Artin had no formal position at Yildiz, but he undoubtedly had access there. He was corrupt, mendacious and widely mistrusted. Nonetheless, he succeeded in gaining the confidence of the British Embassy through periodic gifts of highly questionable 'inside information', and in April 1886 the British government awarded him a Secret Service pension. This did not increase his veracity 1 . Communications with the French Embassy were assured through Dreyssé Pa§a, a Frenchman who had entered Abdulhamid's personal service before his accession and held the rank of Honorary ADC. Dreyssé defended French interests in the Egyptian question, but gave impartial advice on broader issues of foreign policy and was said to have encouraged the Sultan's first overtures to Germany in 1880 2 . Communications with the German Embassy itself were entrusted to the Private Secretary, Re§id Bey. Re§id proved to be an efficient intermediary, and his relations with the German Ambassador, Radowitz, were uniformly smooth; nonetheless, it is by no means clear that he can be counted as an independent political influence 3 . One figure who undoubtedly carried weight was Yusuf Riza Bey, the Sultan's intermediary with the Russian Embassy. Yusuf Riza was formally president of the Refugees Commission, but rumoured to be in reality the head of the Sultan's personal security service. He had wide diplomatic experience, was French-educated and spoke several languages. He also professed Sufism, and had a number of odd religious connections: he was known to the circle of Arab §eyhs at Ytldtz, and is on record as a supporter of Pan-Islamism. He was also alleged to have converted to Shiism. His enemies charged that he was corrupt. He proved to be a forceful advocate of a Russian orientation in foreign policy, adept both in political argument and in Palace intrigue: even the British Ambassador, Sir William White, conceded that he was "a very shrewd man". Yusuf Riza was occasionally tipped as a future Grand Vizier or Foreign Minister; it is perhaps a tribute to Abdulhamid's own shrewdness that these predictions were not fulfilled 4 .

' f O 78/3873, Thornton to Rosebery, no. 386,3 August 1886; FO 933/117, Rosebery to Thornton 30 April 1886. ^Tahsin Pa§a, op. cit., p 228; Holborn, op. cit., pp. 10-1; Radowitz, op. cit., II, p. 221. 3 GFO, Aegypten 5, Radowitz to Hatzfeldt, 16 March 1885. 4 Ali Said, op. cit., p 58ff.; Said Pa§a, op. cit., I, pp. 167-8; Govsa, op. cit., p. 329; Osman Nuri, Istanbul Çehreminleri, pp. 160-4; Anon, (trans A. L. M. Nicolas), 'Controverses persanes', Revue du monde musulman, xxi, (1910); Sasani, op. cit., p. 207; FO 78/3998, loc. cit.

CHAPTER THREE: ABDÜLHAMID AND FOREIGN POLICY

I "Petty intrigue in aid of fantastic objects is his only idea of politics" 1 . This verdict of the British Ambassador, Lord Dufferin, touched upon two contrasting but widely accepted perceptions of Abdiilhamid's foreign policies: as a series of random manœuvres, executed for the most part in response to immediate external pressures, and as the pursuit of fanciful notions of PanIslamism, of anti-European leagues, and of a revived imperium in Asia and Africa. Both perceptions were false. Abdiilhamid was a reluctant diplomat. He had no desire to play an international role for its own sake, and no belief that great prizes awaited him beyond his Empire's frontiers. His foreign policy was essentially conceived as a holding operation, whose principal objective was to secure the external peace and security essential for the accomplishment of the internal reorganisation and regeneration upon which the Ottoman Empire's survival ultimately depended. As he expressed it, the object was to ensure that his Empire was delivered from foreign interference and harassment, so that "left to its own devices, the Empire will carry out the useful reforms required internally, and as the fruit of these reforms, it will gain in wealth and power" 2 . In intention at least, Abdiilhamid was a realist in foreign affairs: he judged international relations in terms of power, and assessed power chiefly in military terms. This obliged him to give priority to relations with the European Great Powers: it was their military preponderance in the Near East, Asia and North Africa which posed the greatest threat to the Ottoman Empire's security. Possession of the Caliphate might give the Sultan a certain moral influence among non-Ottoman Moslems in Asia and Africa, but this counted for little in terms of power: in Abdiilhamid's view, the Jihad was just a word 3 . Realism implied an acceptance of Ottoman weakness. The Sultan was no revisionist: however bitterly, he accepted the enormous territorial losses he had suffered as a result of the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877-1878 and the

'PRO 30/29/190, Dufferin to Granville, 22 September 1882. 'iCetin and Yildiz, op. cit., p. 53. Osmanoglu, op. cit., p. 231.

2

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subsequent Treaties of San Stefano and Berlin, and never entertained any serious hope of recouping them: it is alleged that as early as 1879 he considered inviting the Moslems of Bosnia and Hercegovina to re-settle within the Empire proper 1 . In similar fashion, he was prepared to write off autonomous provinces like Crete and Eastern Rumelia, and to accept the de facto loss of his dependencies of Tunis and Egypt: he would take no risks to defend an authority that was nominal. This realistic sense of the limitations of his own power sat uneasily with some gross misjudgments of the underlying intentions and ambitions of other Powers. The following extracts from a memorandum which Abdiilhamid probably dictated in the 1880s are characteristic: Germany pursues the goals of preventing the return of |Alsace and Lorraine] to France, of conquering at an appropriate moment the German-inhabited provinces of Russia and Austria, of seizing certain placcs in Africa and thus acquiring colonics for the expansion of her trade, and of increasing her power and prestige by bringing her naval forces to a state of perfection equivalent to that of her army... Turning to Austria, she knows that her German-inhabited provinces cannot be hers and must sooner or later be joined to Germany, and so, as a kind of compensation, she pursues the goal of definitively annexing Hercegovina and Bosnia at an appropriate opportunity, of advancing to Salonika and perhaps even conquering Istanbul, and thus gaining possession of a most broad route of trade and wealth... Russia has taken the testament of the famous Mad Peter \Peter the Great] as her guide, and made many efforts to conquer the Slav-inhabited regions of the European continent and thus form a great Slav union, and also to gain control of the Straits of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles and so become mistress of I he whole w o r l d . . . . Much of this was wrong, especially the assumptions that Bismarck and his successors wanted a Greater Germany, that Austria-Hungary sought a substantial extension of territory in the Balkan peninsula, and that the forged testament of Peter the Great offered a reliable guide to Russian policy. Such eccentricities of judgement could have serious practical effects: it is clear, for example, that Abdiilhamid's responses to a series of Egyptian problems in the 1880s were governed by a quite erroneous belief that Britain wished to establish an Arab state and an Arab Caliphate, and that both the Egyptian national movement of 1881 -2 and the subsequent Mahdist revolt in the Sudan were in some sense British creations. Part of the explanation for such misjudgments was psychological: they reflected Abdiilhamid's intense feelings of insecurity in the face of overwhelming European might, and his paranoiac suspicion of the Powers' hostile designs. But another part of the explanation was simple ignorance: they stemmed from the Sultan's indifferent education

' r . Mzali and J. Pignon, 'Documents sur Khéreddine', Revue Tunisienne, ^Çetin and Yildiz, op. cit., pp. 12 3.

xviii (1934), p. 222.

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and lack of first-hand foreign experience. He worked hard to overcome this: he was an assiduous student of the European press, questioned foreign visitors closely on their domestic politics, and showed an impressive willingness to listen to better-qualified advisers, even when he disagreed with their views. He deliberately exposed himself to a wide range of information and opinions, but this offered no guarantee of better judgment: more than one of Abdiilhamid's misconceptions had its origins in a European newspaper article. The Sultan's saving grace was his practical cast of mind: in the final analysis his own policies were shaped less by his view of other Powers' intentions than by his assessment of their capabilities, and in particular, of their military capabilities. In this respect his judgment was much better, and generally, though not always, worked to moderate the effects of his mistaken views of other Powers' ambitions. The accusation of frivolity does not hold; nor does the charge of aimlessness. True, Abdiilhamid himself was known to complain that his Empire's external policies lacked a sense of direction: It is natural that every state should have a fundamental goal and that it should act in all questions and circumstances, whether large or small, in conformity with a policy which accords with its circumstances and position, and with its fundamental goal: the expansion of its territory, or the recovery of lost territory and the restoration of its former power and strength, or the mere preservation of its territorial integrity, coupled with the establishment of colonies in order to expand its trade, and thus work for the prosperity and welfare of its subjects... But the Ottoman Empire has no definite and decided goal and policy: in every question the person in power acts in accordance with his own opinion, and in the event of failure successor blames predecessor and predecessor successor, and in the process the sacred interests of the state suffer 1 . For once, the Sultan did himself an injustice. The objectives which he attributed to other Powers were appropriate to expanding or rising states. A declining state like the Ottoman Empire could have no objective but security; but the lack of a more positive goal was not to preclude Abdiilhamid from taking a consistent view of his own situation and interests, and from pursuing a firm policy based on this view.

n Central to Abdiilhamid's approach to foreign affairs was a deep sense of the Ottoman Empire's vulnerability to the European Great Powers. His Tanzimat predecessors had assumed that all Powers but Russia were broadly in favour of the Empire's preservation, and that Britain in particular could be l

Ibid„ p. 31.

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relied upon to d e f e n d the Empire against Russian attack. By contrast, Abdiilhamid believed that all Powers but Germany were hostile, and that the British in particular were bent upon the Ottoman Empire's destruction. His pessimism was rooted in his experience of the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878, when, as he believed, the Empire had been deliberately abandoned by its erstwhile allies. The British, the French and the Austrians had combined with Russia at the 1876 Constantinople Conference to bring forward a programme of reforms intended to destroy the Empire f r o m within; when rebuffed, they had abandoned the Empire to an unequal war with Russia; in 1878, following the Empire's defeat, they had again c o m b i n e d with Russia to produce the Treaty of Berlin, despoiling the Empire of substantial European and Asiatic territories in what amounted to a form of preliminary partition. T h e Sultan could conceive of two explanations of this betrayal. The first was religious: as Christian states, the Powers felt a common antipathy to the Moslem Ottoman Empire, and this had overidden their mutual conflicts of interest. The second explanation was diplomatic: the unification of Germany had destroyed the Crimean balance of power, weakening France and Austria-Hungary, isolating Britain, and forcing the Powers which had hitherto protected the Empire to safeguard their own interests by attacking it. The two explanations were not mutually exclusive; together, they cast serious doubt upon the possibility of establishing any sccure relations with the Powers in the future. T h e fact that the E m p i r e was M o s l e m , and, bycontemporary European standards, not progressive, threatened to place it at a permanent moral disadvantage: the Empire faced the problem of survival in an international environment where its very right to existence was questioned. At the very least, the Sultan's more powerful European neighbours all doubted the possibility of the Ottoman Empire's survival, and developed their own policies towards it on the assumption that its final collapse must sooner or later occur — a prophecy which might in consequence prove self-fulfilling. Abdiilhamid was well aware of the problem, and complained repeatedly of the hostile and denigratory tone of foreign publications and press reports, attributing them to malevolence, ignorance and double standards: why should the Ottoman Empire be expected to accord its non-Moslems more privileges than the British granted their Indian subjects? But he could see no short-term solution: his only hope was that a long-term re\ival of Ottoman strength would force a change in European attitudes 1 . Equally, the demise of the Crimean balance of power and the defection of Britain had left the Empire with no obvious source of foreign support. Without friends, it faced the hazardous alternative of attempting to manœuvre between its enemies. The Treaty of Berlin had not resolved all the Powers' Near Eastern rivalries, and the Sultan might attempt to manipulate those

X

lbid., p. 166.

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which remained: the struggle between Britain and Russia for control of the Straits, and the contest between Russia and Austria-Hungary for domination of the Balkan peninsula. He might also seek to take advantage of broader trends in Great Power diplomacy, and, in particular, of the increasingly influential role assumed by Germany, who from 1879 onwards set out to establish her own diplomatic hegemony in Europe through the elaboration of an unprecedented network of peacetime military alliances with Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy. German hegemony might aid the Sultan indirectly, by reducing the relative power of Britain and Russia; it increased his room for diplomatic manœuvre, and held out some hope of a new and more reliable balance of power. But any security thereby gained was bound to remain precarious as long as no Great Power was willing to commit itself to the Ottoman Empire directly.

m The Sultan's sense of vulnerability was heightened by an acute awareness of his own Empire's weaknesses. The most obvious weakness was military. It had been the Ottoman Empire's inability to defend itself against Russian and Egyptian aggression which had first forced it into close dependence upon the Great Powers in the 1830s, and the outcome of the 18771878 war showed that the fundamentals of this problem remained unaltered. It was not that the military reforms of the Tanzimat era had failed: the army which Abdiilhamid inherited was a large and well-equipped fighting force, and its performance against a superior Russian enemy had been respectable. But this army could never be more than a deterrent; it could not ensure the actual defence of an Empire which stretched across three continents, and which faced the possibility of attack by five of the six Great Powers, four of the five Balkan states, and various minor powers in Asia and North Africa. The Empire's frontiers and coastlines were too long, and also too exposed — a problem considerably aggravated by the Treaty of Berlin, which left the Empire with almost no defensible frontiers in Europe, and a seriously weakened frontier in Asia. In the absence of a reliable Great Power ally, the Sultan had to assume that his Empire was militarily indefensible; only in exceptional circumstances could he employ force, or even the threat of force, as a tool of foreign policy 1 . A second major weakness was financial. The state which Abdiilhamid inherited was technically bankrupt, having defaulted on its foreign debts in 1875, and, in the aftermath of the Eastern Crisis, this conjured up fears that as in Egypt, the Powers might take formal control of the Empire's finances, and so effectively extinguish its political independence. Temporarily at least, this I f . A. K. Yasamee, 'Abdiilhamid II and the Ottoman Defence Problem', Diplomacy Statecraft, iv (1), (March 1993).

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danger was averted by the creation of a Public Debt Administration in 1881, on terms which managed to satisfy the Sultan's inherited creditors while leaving him in independent control of the bulk of his revenues. However, the underlying fiscal and financial problems which had led to the default of 1875 remained unresolved. Scope for increasing revenues was limited: some taxes could be increased, and the tax net cast wider, but the Empire remained seriously burdened by an inefficient system of revenue collection, and by an e c o n o m y w h o s e growth in the

1870s and

1880s w a s sluggish.

Not

surprisingly, Abdulhamid lived in perpetual fear of a second bankruptcy. In the short term, the only alternative to further foreign loans was retrenchment. This

reduced

the

scope

for

investment

in

administrative

reform,

communications and infrastructure, impeding progress towards a long-term solution of the Empire's financial problems'. Last and by no means least, the Empire remained vulnerable to foreignsupported subversion, and to the Great Powers' imperialist techniques of peaceful penetration. The Eastern Crisis had been a m a j o r blow to the Empire's domestic prestige, and an encouragement to movements for national independence. The Treaty of Berlin had conferred formal independence upon Serbia, M o n t e n e g r o and R u m a n i a , and established Bulgaria and Eastern Rumclia as autonomous provinces. Further, by demanding special reforms in Asia M i n o r and the Empire's remaining European provinces, the treaty appeared to hold out a prospect of similar autonomy for the Armenians of eastern Anatolia and the Bulgarians of Macedonia. T h e s e and other nonMoslem groups looked lo the Powers for support, as the Powers looked to them. Russia continued lo assert a religious protectorate over the Sultan's O r t h o d o x subjects, and France and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y asserted similar protectorates over the Catholics of the Levant and the Balkans respectively. Non-Moslems were not the only danger. T h e Eastern Crisis had shaken M o s l e m s ' faith in the Empire's future, leading some non-Turkish groups to consider the possibility of separation. 1878 saw the start of an agitation for a u t o n o m y a m o n g the Albanians, and there were disquieting r u m o u r s of revolutionary stirrings among the Arabs, particularly in Syria. T h e problem was c o m p o u n d e d by the fact that the centralising effects of the Tanzitnat reforms had not been fully felt in outlying regions, including Albania and the bulk of the Arab provinces: much local power remained in the hands of landowners, tribal chiefs, religious leaders and other ' m e n of influence', whose loyalty to the Ottoman state, and immunity f r o m foreign influence, could never be taken for granted. The Hejaz was a particularly sensitive case: on the one hand, it was the site of the Holy Cities of Mecca and Medina, the focus of the Moslem pilgrimage, and as such, crucial to the Sultan's religious prestige;

^Akarli, op. cil., p. 147ff.

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but on the other, it could be governed only with the cooperation of the indigenous Emirs of Mecca, who were regarded in Istanbul, with reason, as susceptible to British influence. All in all, the Powers appeared to be well-placcd to destroy the Ottoman Empire from within, whether through the establishment of exclusive 'zones of influence' and eventual partition, or through the promotion of provincial aspirations to autonomy and independence. The Sultan's means of self-dcfence were limited. Separatist tendencies among Moslems could be countered by appeals to Islamic unity and the authority of the Caliphate, and by the judicious cultivation of influential Albanian and Arab notables. The non-Moslems were a more difficult case: the Empire's moral hold over them was much weaker, and the rights to communal and cultural autonomy which they derived from the traditional millet system were practically untouchable, thanks to the diplomatic protection which they enjoyed from the Powers. Otherwise, the Sultan's best hope remained centralisation, and the slow percolation of the Taniimat reforms into outlying provinces. Improved communications with the capital were beginning to reduce the isolation of provincial officials, rendering them less vulnerable to pressure from European consuls. Their grasp of international affairs was improving, in consequence of rising educational standards and growing familiarity with European languages. But as yet these were tendencies only; their effectiveness in curbing further penetration remained to be tested 1 . None of the Empire's weaknesses was susceptible of an immediate remedy, and as long as they persisted, the Sultan would face a continuing threat of further erosions of his territory and independence, and a real risk of sudden catastrophe. Abdulhamid looked back to the Eastern Crisis of 18751878: he pointed to the ease with which hostile Powers had exploited the Empire's local weaknesses, to the rapidity with which the Ottoman government had lost control of events, and to the way in which seemingly minor mistakes had led to disaster. In the longer term, he was confident that his Empire's weaknesses could be overcome, thanks to his chosen policies of military and educational modernisation, administrative centralisation, and the promotion of the Moslem element; firm evidence of an Ottoman revival would eventually force the Powers to change their attitudes. Pending such a revival, however, he would have to rely upon diplomacy to keep the Powers at bay: it was essential that he formulate an effective foreign policy.

^See the comments of the French Ambassador Cambon in W. Ziirrer, Die Frankreichs und Russlands 1891-1898, pp. 68-70.

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IV A n c f f c c t i v c f o r e i g n policy w o u l d require t h e Sultan to m a i n t a i n a degree of diplomatic i n d e p e n d e n c e f r o m the Powers. T h i s was easier said than d o n e . Since the 1830s the E m p i r e had been d e p e n d e n t upon the G r e a t P o w e r s y s t e m . D e p e n d e n c e as such w a s not the problem: not e v e n the strongest of the G r e a t P o w e r s w a s diplomatically i n d e p e n d e n t in an a b s o l u t e sense. W h a t mattered was the terms of d e p e n d e n c e , and in the Empire's case these had been e s s e n t i a l l y d e f i n e d by t w o f a c t o r s : a tacit g u a r a n t e e of British

military

p r o t e c t i o n , and the P o w e r s ' collective w i l l i n g n e s s to treat the E m p i r e as a special case — a state which w a s politically and militarily w e a k , but w o r t h p r e s e r v i n g f o r the sake of the international order upon which all d e p e n d e d . D e p e n d e n c e of these t e r m s had enabled the E m p i r e to p r e s e r v e a s i g n i f i c a n t d i p l o m a t i c f r e e d o m , and to d e f e n d its o w n interests: it w a s n o b o d y ' s puppet. T h e subsequent withdrawal of British protection and of the Powers' collective g o o d w i l l d u r i n g the E a s t e r n Crisis had c h a n g e d the t e r m s of d e p e n d e n c e s h a r p l y f o r the w o r s e , t h r e a t e n i n g to d e p r i v e the E m p i r e of all d i p l o m a t i c f r e e d o m of manoeuvre, a n d placing its very existence at stake. T h e p r o b l e m facing Abdiilhamid was to find a means of re-defining his d e p e n d e n c e upon the Great P o w e r system, on terms which would restore his f r e e d o m of manoeuvre; the solution lay in the possibility of e x p l o i t i n g his r e m a i n i n g d i p l o m a t i c assets. Chief a m o n g these assets w a s his E m p i r e ' s geopolitical i m p o r t a n c e . W h e t h e r the Powers liked it or not, the E m p i r e r e m a i n e d a m a j o r constituent of the international order. It stood at the j u n c t i o n of t w o s y s t e m s of states, each dominated by c o m p e t i n g Great Powers: a European system dominated by Britain, F r a n c e , G e r m a n y , Italy, A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and R u s s i a ; and an Asiatic system d o m i n a t e d by Britain and R u s s i a . Potentially, t o o , the E m p i r e w a s a participant in t w o latent systems: a B a l k a n system w h i c h w o u l d c o m e into its o w n o n c e the n e w l y - i n d e p e n d e n t or e x p a n d e d states of R u m a n i a , Serbia, G r e e c e , B u l g a r i a and M o n t e n e g r o had built u p their political a n d military strength; and a system w hich we m a y call M i d d l e Eastern, w h i c h had been e f f e c t i v e l y s u p p r e s s e d s i n c e the E g y p t i a n s e t t l e m e n t in the 1 8 4 0 s and t h e s u b s e q u e n t imposition of a m e a s u r e of centralised O t t o m a n control in Iraq a n d A r a b i a . T h e Sultan c o u l d not c h o o s e b e t w e e n t h e s e s y s t e m s ; he w a s c o n d e m n e d to participate in all of t h e m . B u t it w a s essential that he find s o m e m e a n s of exploiting his position in the t w o s y s t e m s of greatest i m p o r t a n c e : the European and the Asiatic. In theory, the Sultan might a s p i r e to play a central role in both t h e s e s y s t e m s . By virtue of his p o s s e s s i o n of a large land a r m y w h i c h c o u l d be d e p l o y e d in the B a l k a n s and in eastern A n a t o l i a , the Sultan m i g h t intervene in a f u t u r e war between Russia and Austria-Hungary (and by extension, a w a r between Russia and G e r m a n y ) , and thus affect the E u r o p e a n balancc of p o w e r ;

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by virtue of his possession of the Straits, he could similarly effect the outcome of a conflict between Britain and Russia, and thus influence the balance of power in Asia. This potential for a decisive role could not compensate for the Empire's military and political weaknesses: the Sultan could not safely assume an active role in Great Power politics. But it might enable him to bluff: as long as the possibility that he might eventually take sides remained theoretically open, he would possess s o m e f r e e d o m of manœuvre, and a means of leverage in his dealings with the Powers. The bluff could be supported by measures to sustain his Empire's military strength, enhancing its strategic value in the eyes of the Powers. For all his financial caution, Abdiilhamid did not stint money on his armed forces: throughout his reign, military expenditures regularly accounted for some 4 0 % of the annual budget — more, if account is taken of improvements in communications which increased the armed f o r c e s ' mobility 1 . The Sultan entertained no illusions as to his ability to sustain a war with a Great Power, but he recognised that an element of military bluff was vital to his diplomatic credibility. The international influence of the Caliphate was also a potential asset, particularly in dealings with Powers who possessed Moslem colonial subjects. This too was a bluff, as Abdiilhamid knew: it counted only in so far as the Powers were prepared to believe in it. To some degree, all did so, but as a speculative quantity rather than a definite force: it afforded Abdiilhamid no direct diplomatic leverage, though its role as an occasional background influence upon the Powers' behaviour should not be overlooked. However, it proved to be a double-edged weapon, which the Powers could deploy against the Sultan. For one thing, the ' P a n - I s l a m i c ' bogey was a convenient justification for the Powers' own aggressions: the French employed it in Tunis, as did the British in Egypt. For another, the Powers eventually came to realise that Abdiilhamid's preoccupation with the Caliphate was as much a reflection of his domestic insecurities as of his international ambitions: the British, the French and the Russians all learned to play upon his fears of a rival Arab Caliph. In principle, the Powers' considerable economic interests in the Sultan's Empire were a further diplomatic asset, but it was an asset which he had the greatest difficulty in exploiting. In the matter of trade, his hands were tied by commercial treaties which effectively obliged him to grant equal privileges to all the Powers; he could not discriminate. In the matter of foreign investment, the bankruptcy of 1875 had cast a long shadow: not until the 1890s were European investors again willing to risk their capital in the Empire on any scale. Furthermore, foreign investment carried political dangers. In so far as it obliged the Ottoman government to contract loans, or to issue financial guarantees, it conjured up the spectre of another bankruptcy;

^Akarli, op. cit., pp. 190-1.

50

ABDUI.HAMi

D II

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GREAT

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in so f a r as it tended to c o n c e n t r a t e in particular p r o v i n c e s , it t h r e a t e n e d to bring European political interest in its train, and to facilitate the processes of p e a c e f u l penetration. T h i s left a r m a m e n t s p u r c h a s e s as the o n e area in w h i c h t h e Sultan m i g h t h o p e to e x e r t e c o n o m i c l e v e r a g e . F o r o b v i o u s f i n a n c i a l reasons, he avoided such purchases until the m i d - 1 8 8 0 s ; t h e r e a f t e r he placed the bulk of his a r m a m e n t s orders in G e r m a n y . Limited t h o u g h they were, these assets did o f f e r A b d i i l h a m i d s o m e scope for asserting his diplomatic independence. This independence could never be m o r e than c o n d i t i o n a l : it d e p e n d e d upon the state of the P o w e r s ' o w n m u t u a l relations, a n d upon their w i l l i n g n e s s to p u r s u e their N e a r E a s t e r n rivalries. T o o m u c h rivalry would be as d a n g e r o u s as too little. In the o n e case, the P o w e r s m i g h t unite against the Sultan, but in the other, they w o u l d force him to take sides; in either case his independence would disappear. But as l o n g as t h e s e e x t r e m e s w e r e a v o i d e d , he w o u l d e n j o y a m e a s u r e of real i n d e p e n d e n c e . The P o w e r s t h e m s e l v e s w e r e p r o n e to u n d e r e s t i m a t e t h e Sultan's independence, partly because their experience of the Tanzimat era had taught t h e m that O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t s m u s t a l w a y s s u b m i t to the g u i d a n c e of a G r e a t P o w e r p a t r o n , but partly, too, b e c a u s c of a c o n v i c t i o n that t h e Eastern Crisis of 1 8 7 5 - 1 8 7 8 had left the Sultan so w e a k e n e d at h o m e and abroad that a genuinely independent policy was impossible. T h e s e a s s u m p t i o n s e n c o u r a g e d not a f e w E u r o p e a n a m b a s s a d o r s to believe that they m i g h t gain control of the Sultan t h r o u g h ' i n f l u e n c e ' : that is, t h r o u g h t h e exercise of a kind of personal moral and intellectual a s c e n d a n c y . T h e belief w a s grossly mistaken, but it w a s to p r o v e r e m a r k a b l y persistent, and to lead to m u c h m i s r e a d i n g of t h e S u l t a n ' s m o t i v e s and i n t e n t i o n s , s o m e of it d a n g e r o u s . Lord D u f f e r i n w a s o n e of the f e w realists: "The truth is that no A m b a s s a d o r will ever succeed in putting the Sultan in his pocket" 1 .

V T h e problem w a s to identify a d i p l o m a t i c strategy which w o u l d e n a b l e t h e S u l t a n to e x p l o i t his residual assets. In t h e a f t e r m a t h of t h e E a s t e r n C r i s i s of 1 8 7 5 - 1 8 7 8 , p r o s p e c t s w e r e by n o m e a n s h o p e f u l . T h e c r i s i s h a d d i s c r e d i t e d t h e Tanzimat s t r a t e g y of r e l i a n c e u p o n t h e E u r o p e a n C o n c e r t a n d an i n f o r m a l B r i t i s h a l l i a n c e , b u t it h a d p o i n t e d to no o b v i o u s a l t e r n a t i v e s . W o r s e , it had d e m o n s t r a t e d that t h e P o w e r s w e r e c a p a b l e of uniting against the O t t o m a n E m p i r e : should they c o n t i n u e to d o so, t h e S u l t a n w o u l d lose all i n d e p e n d e n c e . N o t until t h e e n d of 1880 did the threat of a hostile C o n c e r t r e c e d e ; t h e r e a f t e r t h e P o w e r s d i v i d e d , but in w a y s w h i c h o f f e r e d the Sultan no positive d i p l o m a t i c o p p o r t u n i t i e s . B r i t a i n and R u s s i a r e m a i n e d rivals at t h e S t r a i t s a n d in A s i a , but t h e r e appeared to be no c o r r e s p o n d i n g possibility of balance in the B a l k a n s ,

' p o 7 8 / 3 5 1 4 , D u f f e r i n t o G r a n v i l l e , no. 6 7 9 , 14 D e c e m b e r 1883.

ABDULHAMlD

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51

w h e r e R u s s i a and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y w e r e allies f r o m 1881 o n w a r d s . In N o r t h A f r i c a , similarly, Britain and F r a n c e generally preferred mutual cooperation to c o m p e t i t i o n , at l e a s t until t h e e n d of

1 8 8 2 . In t h e s e

circumstances,

Abdiilhamid could identify n o overall b a l a n c e of p o w e r in the N e a r East, and, f r o m his o w n point of v i e w , it w a s f o r t u n a t e that the years b e t w e e n 1881 and 1885 w e r e relatively crisis-free. Only in N o r t h A f r i c a did he pay a direct price f o r the lack of overall balance: he was p o w e r l e s s t o resist the F r e n c h invasion of T u n i s in 1881, and the British occupation of E g y p t a year later. T h r o u g h o u t t h e f i r s t half of the 1880s, t h e E m p i r e a p p e a r e d to b e living o n b o r r o w e d time. I n d e e d , s o m e of Abdiilhamid's advisers seem to h a v e d e s p a i r e d of any i n d e p e n d e n t f u t u r e , and to h a v e privately believed that t h e E m p i r e ' s o n l y h o p e of survival w a s to a c c e p t a f o r e i g n p r o t e c t o r a t e , t h e o b v i o u s rivals f o r the role of p r o t e c t o r b e i n g Britain a n d R u s s i a , t h e t w o P o w e r s with the greatest established interests in t h e N e a r East, a n d the t w o g r e a t e s t military p o w e r s in the region. O t h e r s w e r e less p e s s i m i s t i c , but c o n c e d e d that there could be no f u t u r e in d i p l o m a t i c isolation: t h e y a d v i s e d A b d i i l h a m i d to c o n c l u d e a d e f e n s i v e alliance with one or other of the G r e a t P o w e r s , a r g u i n g t h a t this w o u l d n o t o n l y f u r n i s h t h e E m p i r e w i t h a d i p l o m a t i c a n d military protector, but a l s o e n a b l e the Sultan to e x p l o i t his s t r a t e g i c assets, a f f o r d i n g h i m a p o s i t i v e a n d p r o f i t a b l e r o l e in t h e N e a r Eastern b a l a n c e of p o w e r , and s a f e g u a r d i n g him against a r e c u r r e n c e of the hostile conccrt d i p l o m a c y which he had f a c e d during the Eastern Crisis. A b d i i l h a m i d r e j e c t e d a n y s u g g e s t i o n of a f o r e i g n p r o t e c t o r a t e o n r e l i g i o u s a n d p a t r i o t i c g r o u n d s 1 . H e w a s m o r e willing to e n t e r t a i n t h e a r g u m e n t s f o r a G r e a t P o w e r a l l i a n c e , at least in p r i n c i p l e ; the practical d i f f i c u l t y w a s to identify an a c c e p t a b l e ally. A b d i i l h a m i d w a s u n w i l l i n g to entrust himself to Britain or Russia. T h e Eastern Crisis had t a u g h t him that d e p e n d e n c e upon either of these t w o P o w e r s would simply e x p o s e the E m p i r e to despoliation by both: a British or R u s s i a n alliance w o u l d m e a n at best, a f o r m of p r o t e c t o r a t e ; at w o r s t , it w o u l d l e a d to w a r a n d p a r t i t i o n . Abdiilhamid's o w n p r e f e r e n c e w a s f o r alliance with G e r m a n y , a rising P o w e r with no e s t a b l i s h e d interests in the N e a r East. U n l i k e Britain and R u s s i a , G e r m a n y w a s t o o f a r a w a y to h e r s e l f t h r e a t e n t h e E m p i r e d i r e c t l y ; f u r t h e r m o r e , b y virtue of her central p o s i t i o n w i t h i n E u r o p e , she w a s in principle able to o f f e r the Sultan military o r diplomatic protection against all those P o w e r s w h i c h did threaten h i m directly, including Britain and R u s s i a ; a b o v e all, a G e r m a n alliance held out the prospect of an entirely n e w balance of p o w e r , in w h i c h a central bloc c o m p r i s i n g the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , G e r m a n y and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y would uphold the N e a r Eastern and E u r o p e a n status q u o against Britain, R u s s i a and F r a n c e — t h e potential a g g r e s s o r P o w e r s on the periphery. M u c h to Abdiilhamid's d i s a p p o i n t m e n t , h o w e v e r , t h e G e r m a n s

^.etin and Yildiz, op. cit., p. 297.

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were not interested in an Ottoman alliance: they rejected his overtures in 1881 and 1882. Having failed to secure a German alliance, the Sultan was left with no choice but to attempt to balance between all the Great Powers. The role was neither comfortable nor safe, and Abdiilhamid himself was for long doubtful that it could be sustained. Without the assurance of a clear balance of power to g u a r a n t e e his f r e e d o m of m a n œ u v r e , his only hope of p r e s e r v i n g his diplomatic independence was to avoid conflict. As his Grand Vizier Kiiçiik M e h m e d Said Pa§a expressed it, the art was "to give no party any justified pretext for quarrel, to refrain from actions which incite the mutual enmities of the Powers, and to preserve order and govern well at h o m e " ' . This entailed a passive and reactive sly le of diplomacy which was not without risks of its o w n . It created a m i s l e a d i n g i m p r e s s i o n of personal w e a k n e s s on Abdiilhamid's part, and encouraged ambitious European ambassadors to believe that they could rule him through 'influence'. Furthermore, a largely reactive diplomacy carried obvious risks of drift, which might lead to the very collisions which the Sultan most feared. Not surprisingly, Abdiilhamid placed much emphasis upon the need to mistrust appearences, to look ahead, and above all, to be guided at all times by firm assessments of the underlying ambitions and capabilities of each of the Great Powers. His own assessments were firm to the point of rigidity, and were by no means always accurate, but they did at least furnish him with a coherent intellectual f r a m e w o r k within which to shape policy. His assessments reflected his experience of the Eastern Crisis and its aftermath, ind were essentially formed between 1878 and 1882. T he proccss of their formation is one of the principal themes of the next three chapters.

' s a i d Pa§a, Hatirat, I, p. 428.

CHAPTER FOUR: SAN STEFANO, BERLIN AND THE CYPRUS CONVENTION (January 1878-April 1880)

I Abdiilhamid took personal charge of government in January 1878, in the disastrous concluding stages of his Empire's nine months' war with Russia. His first task was to deal with the consequences of military defeat. At home, he took immediate steps to consolidate his personal authority: he changed his Ministers, dismissed the Parliament, and withdrew permanently to the suburban security of the Yildiz Palace 1 . Abroad, he had no choice but to sue for peace. By the time an armistice was signed at Edirne on 31 January, Russia's armies had advanced across the Balkan peninsula to the £atalca lines, a mere twenty-five miles from Istanbul; in Asia, they had captured the strongpoints of Kars, Ardahan, Bayezid and Erzurum, overrunning the system of defences designed to protect the Ottoman Empire against invasion from the Caucasus 2 . Russia had achieved an overwhelming strategic superiority; the terms of peace which she dictated one month later at San Stefano demonstrated her intention to render this relationship pcrmament 3 . In Asia, she proposed to retain Kars, Ardahan, Bayezid and the Black Sea port of Batum; she also proposed that the Sultan cede the district of Kotur to Iran. In addition, she asserted her right to a form of protectorate over the Armenians of Asia Minor, requiring the Sultan to introduce reforms in their favour. In Europe, Russia demanded that the Sultan recognise the independence of her Balkan allies Serbia, Montenegro and Romania, and make substantial territorial awards to the first two; she herself would annex Southern Bessarabia and the Dobrudja. These were relatively minor losses; the nub of Russia's Balkan programme was her proposal to establish a large Bulgarian Principality in the eastern half of the Peninsula, with boundaries stretching from the Black Sea to the western confines of Macedonia, and from the Danube to the Aegean, thus bisecting the Sultan's European territories. Bulgaria would be nominally subject to

^Devereux, op. cit., ch. ix, passim; Mahmud Celaleddin Pa§a, op. cit., iii, pp. 22-3, 58-63. ^Strictly speaking, the fatalca lines and Erzurum were occupied by Russia as a result of the armistice. Details of the armistice negotiations and terms in Summer, op. cit., ch. xii, passim.-, Ali Fuad Türkgeldi, Mesäil-i Mühimme-i Siyäsiyye, ii, pp. 39-45. ^Details of the San Stefano negotiations and treaty in Sumner, op. cit., chs. xiii-xiv, passim; Türkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 45-56, 301-19.

54

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Ottoman suzerainty but practically free from Ottoman military and political control: the organisation of its government and armed forces would be entrusted to Russia. In addition the Sultan should accord a wide measure of autonomy to Bosnia and Hercegovina, and introduce substantial administrative reforms in those European regions remaining under his direct control, now effectively reduced to Eastern Thrace, Albania, Epirus and Thessaly. Finally, the Sultan was to pay war indemnities totalling LT 40,000,000, a sum sufficient to set back indefinitely any prospect of an Ottoman recovery. Abdiilhamid did at least resist a demand that the Straits should be opened to Russian warships, but this made little difference to the implications of Russia's programme. Henceforth the Ottoman Empire would live in the permanent shadow of a military threat from Russia's Bulgarian client-state in Europe, and from Russia herself in Asia: it would survive, if at all, as a de facto Russian dependency. Faced with the imminent threat of a Russian invasion of his capital, Abdiilhamid had no option but to accede to these terms, and the Treaty of San Stefano was duly signed on 3 March. The Sultan nurtured a vain hope that the Tsar might yet be persuaded to moderate his terms, and despatched a special envoy to St. Petersburg for the purpose: the Tsar replied by expressing his wish for friendly relations in the future, but warned that there could be no question of amending the treaty. By clear implication, friendly relations meant an acceptance of Russian domination 1 . Defeat had also placed a question mark over the Ottoman Empire's relations with Britain, hitherto regarded as its chief European protector. Since the 1830s it had been assumed that Britain had a vital interest in upholding the Ottoman Empire as a barrier against Russia in the Near East and western Asia, and the Ottoman government's decision to risk war with Russia in 1877 had been at least partially influenced by expectations of eventual British support; correspondingly, its decision to seek an armistice in the disastrous military situation at the beginning of 1878 had reflected a despairing recognition that these expectations were misplaced 2 . It was not that Britain had given the Empire any formal pledge of assistance; on the contrary, she had given the Sultan a clear prior warning that he would engage in hostilities with Russia at his own risk. But that said, since then the British government had spoken with two voices: while the Foreign Secretary, Derby had held firm to the line of non-intervention, the Prime Minister, Beaconsfield, had throughout the war dropped hints that British opinion might yet be won round to the idea of offering the Sultan material support 3 . To the Sultan and his Ministers, Britain's conduct appeared at best weak and vacillating; at worst, it gave rise to

^Details of Rauf Pa§a's mission to Si. Petersburg in Türkgeldi, op. cit., Mahmud Celaleddin Pa§a, op. cit.. iii, pp. 110-2. 2 Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 3-24. 278-87.

^Ibid.,

pp. 283-4; Millman,

op. it.,

chs. xiii-xiv,/M.s.vim.

ii, pp. 54-5, 319-26;

SAN STEFANO, BERLIN A N D THE C Y P R U S CONVENTION

55

a suspicion, frequently expressed by Abdiilhamid in later years, that Britain had deliberately lured the Ottoman Empire into war and defeat in the hope of gaining something for herself 1 . In only one respect had Britain taken a clear stand: at an early stage in the war she had confidentially warned Russia not to occupy Istanbul or the Straits, and following the collapse of the Sultan's Balkan armies in January 1878 she had backed her warning by despatching a fleet to the Aegean 2 . This move was to lead to a serious Anglo-Ottoman disagreement. On 8 February a rumour that Russian forces were continuing their advance towards Istanbul in violation of the armistice led Britain unilaterally to order her warships through the Dardanelles, ostensibly to protect British lives and property in the Ottoman capital. Abdiilhamid issued the strongest protest, and with reason, for Russia responded to the British move by announcing her intention of occupying Istanbul. This produced near-panic: Abdiilhamid and his Ministers were convinced that the loss of the capital would precipitate the collapse of the Empire, and there was desperate talk of a fighting last stand with the Sultan at the head of his troops. Calmer counsels suggested acceptance of a limited Russian military presence in the capital, but, in the event, the immediate danger receded: Britain agreed to halt her warships in the Sea of Marmara at Mudanya, and Russia indicated that she would advance no further than San Stefano, some seven miles from Istanbul 3 . This was not the end of the crisis, however, for Russia came forward with fresh demands: a harbour on the Bosphorus should be placed at her disposal to facilitate the eventual evacuation of her forces, and the Ottoman fleet must be surrendered. Abdiilhamid obdurately resisted both demands; the Russians finally gave way, and within a week of the signature of the peace treaty on 3 March it was clear that the danger of an occupation of the capital was passing 4 . Nonetheless, the episode made a deep and lasting impression on Abdiilhamid: he continued to refer to it years later 5 . Never again would the physical liquidation of his Empire appear so close, and the fact that that the crisis had been precipitated by a British action carried out in defiance of Ottoman wishes could not but reinforce the feeling that Britain was a dangerous friend, if friend indeed she was. Finally, defeat had placed a question mark over the Empire's relations with Austria-Hungary. The Ottoman government knew nothing of the secret ^See e.g., I. Hakki Uzun5ar§ili, 'Ikinci Abdiilhamid'in Ingiliz Siyasetine dair Muhtiralari'. Dergìsi, vii; 10, ( 1 9 5 4 ) . 2

M i l l m a n , op.cit.,

3

pp. 3 1 2 - 8 , 3 5 7 - 6 9 ; Sumner, op.cit.,

Tarili

pp. 3 1 8 - 9 .

M a h m u d Celaleddin Pa§a, op. cit., iii, pp. 6 6 - 7 5 ; Sumner, op. cit., eh. xiii, passim.; cit.. pp. 3 7 9 - 9 7 .

M i l l m a n , op.

^ M a h m u d C e l a l e d d i n Pa§a, op. cit., iii, pp. 1 0 7 - 9 ; S u m n e r , op. cit., pp. 3 9 1 - 4 0 8 ; Tiirkgeldi, cit., ii, pp. 4 6 - 8 . 5

H o c a o g l u , op. cit., [June 1890].

op.

pp. 16-7; B B A r § , Y E E . K 3 9 / 4 0 2 / Z 1 7 / 1 1 5 , m e m o r a n d u m by A b d i i l h a m i d

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and controversial negotiations which had taken place between Vienna and St. Petersburg b e f o r e the outbreak of war, and which had centered on the proposition that Austria-Hungary should receive compensation in the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia-Hercegovina should Russia succeed in changing the status quo in the eastern Balkans in her own f a v o u r 1 . That said, Austria-Hungary's interest in Bosnia-Herccgovina was well-known; since 1872 she and Germany had been partners with Russia in the League of the Three Rmperors; and throughout the course of the Eastern Crisis which had preceded the war she had acted in close diplomatic harmony with Russia 2 . In addition, Abdiilhamid had two specific grievances against Austria-Hungary. During the Herccgovina revolt of 1875-6 she had refused O t t o m a n troops passage through her Dalmatian ports, and thereby arguably contributed to the revolt and to the Eastern Crisis which stemmed from it. Later, too, her Ambassador, Zichy, had led Abdiilhamid to understand that she would position sufficient armed forces to deter Serbia f r o m intervening in the war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. This undertaking had not been kept, with the consequence that the Ottoman Empire had been obliged to divert troops which might otherwise have been employed against the Russians 3 . T o w a r d s Austria-Hungary as towards Britain, the Ottoman attitude was one of considerable uncertainty and no small suspicion. n The San S t e f a n o Treaty w a s a p r e l i m i n a r y peace: it entailed a substantial modification of the 1856 Treaty of Paris, and as such, required the sanction of all six Great Powers. A congress was quickly proposed, and Berlin nominated as the site, but it r e m a i n e d to be seen w h e t h e r the Powers would prove willing to overturn the San Stefano settlement, and what they might put in its place. Practically, all turned upon A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and Britain, the two Powers whose interests were most obviously menaced by Russia's gains, and the two best able to threaten Russia with force. A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y w a s h e s i t a n t : she w a s d e t e r m i n e d to r e s i s t t h e enormous extension of Russia's power in the Balkans envisaged by the San Stefano Treaty, but she was unsure whether to proceed in partnership with Britain, or to attempt to bargain direct with Russia. However, she did warn the Sultan that the price of her cooperation would be Bosnia-Hercegovina 4 . Britain proved more decisive: the O t t o m a n military collapse had finally concentrated minds in London, a process aided by the resignation of Derby and his replacement as Foreign Secretary by the former Secretary of State for

^Sumner, op. cit., pp. 172-6, 275-89; F. R. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo. of Austria-Hungary, 1866-1914. pp. 77-82. Bridge, op. cit., ch. iii, passim 3

The Foreign

Policy

B B A r § , Bulgaristan Irade, no 748, 22 Zilhicce 304/10 September 1887; £ e t i n and Yildiz, op. cit., p. 91. ^ M a h m u d Celaleddin Pa§a, op. it., iii. pp. 121-3; Bridge, op. cit., pp. 86-9.

SAN STEFANO, BERLIN AND THE CYPRUS CONVENTION

57

India Lord Salisbury. Salisbury had represented Britain at the abortive Constantinople Conference which preceded the war, and he held decided and radical views on the Eastern Question; the policy which was to shape Britain's relations with the Ottoman Empire over the next two years was substantially his 1 . Salisbury believed that the Ottoman Empire was irrevocably doomed to collapse, and that Britain's policy of supporting it as a barrier or buffer against Russian penetration in the Near East had been a mistake. He also believed that the Empire's latest defeat had put an end to its de facto independence: henceforth the Sultan would survive, if at all, as a client of one of the Great Powers. This loss of independence was not simply a product of changing strategic balances. Salisbury had an exaggerated notion of the importance of prestige in the government of oriental societies, and he was convinced that the Sultan's moral authority was now so destroyed that he would be unable to control his own subjects without the firm and public support of a foreign Power. The immediate danger was that Russia would assume this role: she would use the predominance she had acquired at San Stefano to reduce the Sultan to the status of a client, and thus place herself in a position to dictate the shape of the future Eastern settlement which would follow the Ottoman Empire's final collapse, to the detriment of Britain's interests at the Straits, in Asia and elsewhere. It followed that the San Stefano settlement must be undone; but it also followed that there could be no question of attempting to restore the Ottoman Empire as an independent power, or of reverting to a barrier or buffer policy. Ottoman rule must be replaced wherever there existed a politically acceptable alternative. In the Balkans, this could be achieved by bringing forward Austria-Hungary and Greece as counterweights to Russia and her Bulgarian, Serbian and Montenegrin clients. In Asia, however, there existed no acceptable alternatives, at least for the time being: here, Britain must put herself forward, and assume the responsibility f o r guiding and protecting the Ottoman Empire pending its eventual dissolution. By these means she might install herself in the position f r o m which she proposed to eject Russia, and secure for herself the role of future arbiter of the Eastern Question 2 . Such was Salisbury's broad conception. H e e m b a r k e d upon its implementation with three diplomatic moves designed to determine in advance the results of the forthcoming congress at Berlin. First, he threatened Russia with war unless she agreed to a substantial revision of the Treaty of San Stefano. Russia gave way: her victory had left her militarily and financially exhausted, and she was in no position to contemplate war with a Great Power. The principal terms of the revision were defined in a secret Anglo-Russian

^Millman, op. cit., pp. 372-416. ^The most recent account of the formulation of Salisbury's views is Millman, op. cit., cf. Lady Gwendolen Cecil, Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury, ii, chs. iv-vii, passim.; Medlicott, Congress of Berlin, pp. 17-9; Evangelos Kofos, Greece and the Eastern Crisis 1875-1878, pp. 208-25.

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agreement concluded on 30 May. Russia conceded that the "Big Bulgaria" proposed at San Stefano should be deprived of Macedonia and the Aegean coast, and then divided into two parts along the line of the Balkan range: the northern part would enjoy full political autonomy, the southern would be granted a more limited administrative autonomy only. In return, Britain concedcd that Russia should keep the bulk of her territorial gains in Asia 1 . Salisbury's second move was to square Austria-Hungary. In the short term, he needed the implied promise of her military support if Russia were to be held to the bargain she had struck over Bulgaria; in the longer term, he had hopes of promoting Austria-Hungary as a counter-weight to Russia in the Balkans, where Britain herself had little direct influence, and of eventually inducing her to offer the Sultan a general guarantee of his remaining European possessions. Austria-Hungary's price was twofold: she sought possession of Bosnia-Hercegovina, possibly in a form which would preserve the Sultan's nominal ownership, and she demanded guarantees for the security of BosniaHercegovina against its Slav neighbours Serbia and Montenegro. Salisbury raised no objections, and the Anglo-Austrian understanding was recorded in a secret 'gentlemen's agreement' on 6 June 2 . The third and final move was to gain control of the Sultan. The secret a r r a n g e m e n t s w h i c h S a l i s b u r y had c o n c l u d e d with V i e n n a a n d St. Petersburg had reduced ihc danger of Russian domination of the Balkans and the Straits, but they had left the Ottoman Empire seemingly vulnerable to Russian pressure in Asia. Salisbury had had no option but to acquiesce in Russia's Asiatic gains: unlike the Balkans, they were not a European interest, and Britain could count upon no allies should she attempt to challenge them. The military danger was that Russia's new bases at Kars and Ardahan had placed her within striking distance of Mosul, f r o m w h e n c e she might threaten the Persian Gulf or the Suez Canal, both areas of vital interest to Britain. The political danger — which Salisbury appears to have taken more seriously — was that Russia would use her newly-acquired position to subvert the populations of Asia Minor, and in particular the Armenians, to whom she had extended her protection under the San Stefano Treaty. Salisbury's answer w a s to o f f e r A b d i i l h a m i d a military alliance for the d e f e n c e of his Asiatic territories against future Russian aggression, on two conditions: first, the island of Cyprus must be placed under Britain's control, as a military base from which she could make good her pledge of assistance in the event of Russian attack; and second, the British and Ottoman governments must agree upon a joint p r o g r a m m e of r e f o r m s to ameliorate the conditions of the Sultan's Asiatic subjects, and especially of the A r m e n i a n s . T h e latter condition was the key. Various factors impelled Salisbury to take up the

' S u m n e r , op. cit., c h . x v i i , p a s s i m ; M i l l m a n , op. cit., c h s . x x - x x i , p a s s i m . 2

M i l l m a n , op. cit., pp. 4 3 9 - 4 0 . 4 4 7 - 8 ; B r i d g e , op. cit., pp. 8 9 - 9 2 .

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issue of reform: fear that the Armenians, and perhaps other groups, might be recruited by Russia as a fifth column; concern to render an Ottoman alliance palatable to anti-Turk opinion within Britain; and a conviction that the Sultan's prestige had been so shaken by defeat that he would be unable to uphold his authority over his own subjects without the support of a Great Power patron. But the underlying objective was control: British-supervised reforms implemented by European officials would effectively place the government of the Ottoman Empire in Britain's hands, and leave the Sultan with no more independence than that enjoyed by the ruler of an Indian princcly state 1 . The British offer was laid before the Sultan on 25 May. The proposals for a military alliance and the transfer of Cyprus were clearly stated, but the reforms required in Ottoman Asia were left unspecified: they were to be agreed by the British and Ottoman governments at a later date. The offer was backed by an ultimatum: failure to accept the proffered terms would oblige Britain to abandon the Sultan at the revising congress. H o w e v e r , the British Ambassador, Layard, assured the Sultan that acceptancc would ensure "a second Ottoman conquest of the Balkans". He also indicated that the proposed arrangement was of a provisional nature only, and would not take effect if the revising congress deprived Russia of the gains she had made in Ottoman Asia 2 . To this extent, the British offer was plainly misleading: the Sultan was told nothing of the secret understandings which Britain had concluded with Russia and Austria-Hungary. Salisbury had no qualms: he believed that the Sultan was too w e a k to argue, and in the short term, he was right. Abdiilhamid signed the Cyprus Convention establishing the alliance on 4 June. Nonetheless, it is clear that he acted with considerable misgivings. He had made a definite cession of Cyprus in return for imprecise pledges of diplomatic support at Berlin; he had committed himself to the implementation of an undefined p r o g r a m m e of r e f o r m s which might c o m p r o m i s e his sovereignty in his Asiatic provinces; finally, the fact that Britain had now joined Russia and Austria-Hungary in seeking Ottoman territory gave rise to a suspicion that his E m p i r e was being subjected to something like a compensation arrangement 3 . The actual course of the revising Congress at Berlin fully confirmed these suspicions. Scarcely had the Congress opened on 13 June 1878 than the terms of the Anglo-Russian agreement of 30 May were leaked to the press, and any remaining doubts about the existence of a compensation arrangement were swiftly dispelled when Britain's own delegates proposed that Austria-

^Cecil, op. cit., pp. 263-73; Millman, op. cit., pp. 440-451; for a detailed account of the origins of the Cyprus Convention see D. E. Lee, Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention. ^Rifat Ujarol, 1878 Kibns Sorunu ve Osmanli-Ingiliz Anla§masi (Ada'mn Ingiltere'ye Devri), pp. 42-7; Yulug Tekin Kurat, Henry Layard'm Istanbul Elgiligi 1877-1880, pp. 76-86; Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 93-101; Medlicott, Congress, p. 21. 3 U S arol, 1878 Kibns Sorunu, pp. 47-70.

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Hungary should be permitted to occupy Bosnia-Hercegovina 1 . The Ottoman delegates to the Congress were presented with a fait accompli, and Abdiilhamid despairingly predicted that the outcome would prove worse than San Stefano 2 . His fears were partly justified. The definitive Treaty of Berlin, concluded by the Congress on 13 July, confirmed Russia's San Stefano gains in Asia, with only two modifications: Bayczid w a s restored to the Sultan, and it was specified that Russia must maintain Batum as an "essentially commercial" free port — by implication, she was not to turn it into a naval base f r o m which to threaten the Straits. The cession of Kotur to Iran was likewise confirmed. In Europe, however, the San S t e f a n o treaty w a s subjected to three m a j o r revisions. T h e first was a drastic reduction in the size of the a u t o n o m o u s Principality of Bulgaria, which was confined between the Danube and the Balkan range. Macedonia was restored to the Sultan, but the area between the Balkan range and the Rodop mountains was given an entirely new status as the autonomous vilayet of Eastern Rumclia, to be administered by a Christian Governor-General appointed by the Powers. Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia would remain formally subject to the Sultan, but would possess their own armed forces; this left the Sultan without a defensible frontier in the eastern Balkans, a deficiency v\hich the Congress attempted to remedy with three provisions: all f o r t i f i c a t i o n s in B u l g a r i a must be d e m o l i s h e d ; O t t o m a n garrisons might be established along Eastern Rumelia's frontier with Bulgaria in the Balkan range; and the Sultan would e n j o y a right of military intervention in Eastern Rumelia in the event of rebellion or foreign invasion. The second revision was the placing of Bosnia-Hercegovina under AustriaHungary's temporary military occupation, "temporary" being understood to mean "indefinite". In addition, Austria-Hungary was e m p o w e r e d to install garrisons in the neighbouring Ottoman sancak of Novi Pazar, as security against f u t u r e aggression by Serbia and Montenegro. T h e details of the occupation and garrisoning were left for separate negotiation between the O t t o m a n and A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n g o v e r n m e n t s . The third revision w a s a r e c o m m e n d a t i o n that the Sultan m a k e a substantial territorial ccssion to Greece in Epirus and Thessaly. Greece had not participated in the war, except belatedly and farcically, and she had gained nothing at San Stefano, but Britain, France and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y were anxious to strengthen her as a counter-weight to Slav and Russian influence in the Balkans. The precise extent of her territorial award was reserved for separate negotiation between the Greek and Ottoman governments. Lesser revisions affected Russia's war-time allies: the territorial awards to Montenegro and Serbia were somewhat reduced in a c c o r d a n c e with Austria-Hungary's wishes; Russia retained S o u t h e r n Bessarabia, but granted the Dobrudja to Romania.

' l i u r a t , op. cil., p. 88; Medlicoll, Congress, 2

p. 82.

U $ a r o l , 1878 Kibris Sorunu, pp. 72-4; see also the report on the Congress of Berlin drawn up by Alexander Caratheodory Pasa, the chief Ottoman delegate, in M a h m u d Celaleddin Pa§a, op. cit., iii, pp. 171-229.

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In territorial terms, therefore, the Sultan regained Macedonia and a strip of territory in eastern Anatolia; but in return for this he was required to sacrifice Bosnia-Hercegovina and an unspecified portion of Epirus and Thessaly. Nor were these territorial losses all. The Treaty of Berlin also implied a n u m b e r of constraints upon the Sultan's i n d e p e n d e n c e and sovereignty. The San Stefano provisions for reforms in his remaining European territories, and in the Armenian-inhabited regions of Asia Minor, were confirmed; the sole difference was that the reforms were placed under the supervision of the Powers collectively, rather than of Russia alone. The Congress also touched on the question of the Sultan's rights at the Straits. Formally, it unanimously affirmed its support for the existing rule, most recently confirmed by the 1871 Treaty of London, which closed the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to foreign warships; however, the British delegates qualified their assent by suggesting first, that they regarded the principle of closure as a quid pro quo for Russia's demilitarisation of Balum, and second, that they viewed Britain's duty to respect this principle as no more than an obligation to respect the Sultan's independent decisions in so far as these conformed to existing treaties. In other words, Britain served notice that she would consider herself entitled to pass the Straits should she feel that the Sultan's independence and security had been undermined by Russia — an ominously vague proviso. The Russian delegates responded by declaring the closure of the Straits to be a European principle, to which all Powers and the Sultan were bound. Finally, the Congress took formal notice of the problem of the Ottoman Empire's foreign debts, outstanding since the bankruptcy of 1875, and proposed that the Powers should appoint a commission of experts to make recommendations to the Ottoman government. This posed no direct threat to the Sultan's independence, but it did leave open the possibility that the Powers might eventually impose some system of financial control over the Ottoman Empire, similar to the one they had already installed in Egypt 1 .

in Abdiilhamid's own verdict on the Treaty of Berlin could be summed up in a word: partition. He discerned something more sinister than a simple compensation arrangement: the Treaty amounted to a f o r m of preliminary partition, and one which clearly foreshadowed the Ottoman Empire's possible division among the European Great Powers 2 . In instructions to his Ministers, he went so far as to suggest that the Empire had been the victim of an international conspiracy, and that the series of disasters which had befallen it

Details of the Berlin Congress and Treaty in Medlicott, Congress, ch. ii, passim.-, Sumner, op. cit., ch. xviii, passim.; Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., ii, ch. iii, passim.; Mahmud Celaleddin Pa§a, op. cit. iii p. 154ff. 2

Abdiilhamid was not alone in this view. See, e.g., the statement by his future Grand Vizier Kiujilk Said Pa§a in Said Pa§a, Said Paga'mti Hatirati, i, pp. 228-9.

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since 1875 were the work of a "general foreign alliance", formed "some twenty years ago", after the Crimean War, for the purpose of partitioning the Hmpire, and including "all foreign p o w e r s with the exception of the A m e r i c a n Republic, the Empire of Brazil, and one or two minor kingdoms". The conspiracy was motivated by religion: it was directed against "the Ottoman Empire and the Islamic millet", and the participants had been brought together by their "religious unity", though it was also true that Iran, "which alleges Islamic brotherhood", was a party to the conspiracy'. The Sultan conceded that Russia had played the most prominent role in fomenting the series of rebellions and conflicts which had led to the recent war, and that she had been aided and abetted by her allies Germany and AustriaHungary. But these Powers had not acted alone: the League of the T h r e e Emperors was a mere cover for the general foreign alliance, and Russia had behaved throughout "in accordance with the secret instructions which she received f r o m the other Powers". The proof of the existence of a general alliance lay in the behaviour of those Powers which had allegedly been neutral. Germany had furnished Russia and Serbia with military supplies, and Austria-Hungary had covertly assisted the Hercegovina revolt and obstructed the Empire's attempts to suppress it. Britain had been implicated in the conspiracy throughout: she had supported Russia at the 1876 Constantinople Conference in the hope of procuring the Empire's peaceful partition, and when baulked of this objective, she had deliberately encouraged both Russia and the Empire to go to war, taking advantage of the Ottoman defeat to conclude the Cyprus Convention 2 . It therefore required little foresight to anticipate the Powers' next objectives. Britain's demand for Asiatic reforms masked a desire to establish her own power in Anatolia, from whence she could more easily defend her Indian possessions against future Russian expansion in Asia. She hoped to see the Ottoman Empire weak and dependent upon herself, and, as her support for the territorial claims of all and sundry at the Congress of Berlin had shown, "she is obliged to support the aims of those Powers which seek partition and also to take a share in this partition herself". In similar f a s h i o n , AustriaH u n g a r y aspired to reach the Aegean at Salonika, Italy had ambitions in Albania, while France was encouraging Greece to demand Ottoman territory and doubtless had ambitions of her o w n ' . T h e s e were not academic speculations. As yet, the Treaty of Berlin existed on paper only. The reality was that the Ottoman Empire continued to face a series of actual military threats in the Balkans. The most serious of

'cetin and Yildiz, op. cit., pp. 88-100. ^ibid., loc. cit. ibid., be. cit.

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these was the presence of a large Russian army of occupation in the eastern half of the peninsula. The Treaty of Berlin had specified that Russian forces might remain in occupation of Eastern Rumelia and Bulgaria for nine months, but Russia showed herself in no hurry to complete her preliminary evacuation from San Stefano to Eastern Rumelia. Instead, she unilaterally halted her forces at Edirne in September, and announced that the Sultan must first conclude a definitive peace treaty which would regulate certain technical questions concerning indemnities, prisoners of war, rebels and wartime collaborators. Russia's choice of such a pretext inevitably cast doubt upon her motives; the doubt increased when she brought forward terms which appeared to encroach upon the Treaty of Berlin. It was suggested that she might be seeking an opportunity to throw over the Treaty of Berlin, and perhaps to launch a fresh war 1 . At all events, she remained in a position to threaten the Ottoman capital. There was also a possible threat of invasion by Austria-Hungary. Despite the Sultan's pleas for delay, she had embarked upon her military occupation of Bosnia-Herccgovina as soon as the Treaty of Berlin was signed. In the process she had encountered fierce armed resistance from the local Moslem and Orthodox populations, which she did not finally overcome until October. In the meantime, with British support, she had demanded that the Sultan negotiate an agreement both to regularise her occupation, and to provide for the installation of her garrisons in the sancak of Novi Pazar. Abdiilhamid was hesitant: his military advisers pointed out that the sancak contained the Ragozna range, the last tenable line of defence against an invasion from the north, and he was by no means confident that AustriaHungary might not seize upon any local resistance in Novi Pazar as a pretext to continue her advance to the Aegean. He questioned whether the Empire would be able to maintain itself in Istanbul if a hostile Power were established at Salonika 2 . Finally, there were fears of attack by Greece, who was pressing for an early settlement of the territorial award made to her at the Congress of Berlin, and reported to be arming 3 . These external dangers were compounded by an outbreak of serious internal disorders in the Balkans. In June, the Moslem Albanians had organised themselves in a League at Prizren to resist any proposal by the Congress of Berlin to award Albanian-inhabited territories to neighbouring states. Initially they enjoyed official Ottoman support, but following the Congress's awards to Greece and Montenegro they showed themselves willing to act independently of central government, and if need be, to defy it: in August they assassinated a senior official sent to reason with them, and by

^Turkgeldi, op. cit., ii, p. 119; Sumner, op. cit., p. 563; Medlicott, Congress, pp. 153,172-6. ^Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 124-6, 343-9; Medlicott, Congress, ch. iv., passim. 3 Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 124-6, 170; Medlicott, Congress, pp. 147-8.

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S e p t e m b e r there were r u m o u r s of Italian intrigues a m o n g t h e m 1 . A t the time, t h e M o s l e m P o m a k s of the R o d o p m o u n t a i n s rose a g a i n s t the R u s s i a n military o c c u p a t i o n ; m e a n w h i l e the B u l g a r i a n s of M a c e d o n i a had started to agitate a g a i n s t t h e C o n g r e s s of Berlin's d e c i s i o n to return t h e m to d i r e c t O t t o m a n rule, and in N o v e m b e r , with m a n i f e s t R u s s i a n c o n n i v a n c e , an attempt w a s m a d e to launch an uprising in the region 2 . In the face of all these d a n g e r s , t h e r e w a s n o t h i n g u n r e a s o n a b l e in A b d i i l h a m i d ' s f e a r t h a t c o m p l i c a t i o n s m i g h t easily arise w h i c h w o u l d f u r n i s h R u s s i a o r A u s t r i a H u n g a r y with the o p p o r t u n i t y to launch a f r e s h war, and so precipitate the O t t o m a n Empire's final collapse and partition. H e d r e w parallels with the fate of Poland: T h e R u s s i a n a r m y will not w i t h d r a w to Hastern R u m e l i a a n d will r e m a i n at E d i r n e , similarly, w h e n A u s t r i a enters Novi P a z a r with a view to reaching her objective of Salonika, and should the G r e e k s then c o m m e n c e attacks f r o m the r e a r . . . then Italy will set a b o u t obtaining her share. G o d f o r b i d ! T h e s e e v e n t u a l i t i e s will bring forth Russia's l o n g - s t a n d i n g goal of partition, j u s t as she partitioned P o l a n d . . . and then — G o d f o r b i d ! — the O t t o m a n Empire's authority in the B a l k a n s will be restricted to the n e i g h b o u r h o o d of Istanbul, and the survival of the state will be placed in d a n g e r 3 . The position in O t t o m a n Asia was less immediately threatening: Russia evacuated E r z u r u m on schedule, the British o c c u p a t i o n of C y p r u s p a s s e d o f f w i t h o u t i n c i d e n t , a n d w h i l e t h e r e w a s n o lack of provincial disorders the_\ were relatively small-scale 4 . Even so, there remained t h e p r o b l e m of t h e u n s p e c i f i e d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e f o r m s t o w h i c h t h e Sultan had committed himself under the C y p r u s C o n v e n t i o n . T h e o u t c o m e of the Berlin C o n g r e s s had inevitably r e i n f o r c e d s u s p i c i o n s that Britain w a s a i m i n g at s o m e f o r m of protectorate, and in r a t i f y i n g the C o n v e n t i o n on 13 J u l y A b d u l h a m i d had a p p e n d e d a r e s e r v a t i o n to t h e e f f e c t t h a t his s o v e r e i g n rights m u s t not be i m p a i r e d 5 . L a y a r d ' s s u b s e q u e n t a t t e m p t s to i n d u c e h i m to w i t h d r a w this reservation only worried h i m , and the detailed r e f o r m proposals which Britain put f o r w a r d on 8 A u g u s t c o n f i r m e d his worst f e a r s . T h e p r o p o s a l s e n v i s a g e d that Britain s h o u l d e x e r c i s e a p e r m a n e n t s u p e r v i s i o n o v e r t h e S u l t a n ' s g o v e r n m e n t in A s i a , b y i n t r o d u c i n g E u r o p e a n officials into ev ery significant branch of the civil administration: the

' S t a v r o Skendi, op. cit., pp. 32-53; Peter Bart], Die albanischen Unabhängigkeitsbewegung (1X78-1912). pp. 115-29.

Muslime

zur Zeit der

nationalen

2

O n the Pomak rising in the Rodop mountains, see Tevfik Biyikoglu, Trakya'da Millt Mücadele, I, pp. 21-30. The Bulgarian Kresna-Razlog rising in M a c e d o n i a is described in Fikrct A d a m r , Die Makedonische Frage. Ihre Entstehung und Entwicklung bis 1908, pp. 86-8; cf., Khristo Silyanov, Osvoboditelnite borbi na Makedonien, I, pp. 15-7. •^Türkgeldi, op. cit., ii, p. 345. 4

l h e transfer of C y p r u s is c o v e r e d in U f a r o l , 1878 Kibris Sorunu, pp. 93-8. A r m e n i a n disturbances occurred during the autumn at Zeytin, near Aleppo: see Medlicott, Congress, p. 299, and Hilmi Kämil Bayur, Sadrazam Kämil Pa$a. Siyasi Hayati, pp. 60-74. 5 U s a r o l , 1878 Kibris Sorunu, pp. 84-92.

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judiciary was to be reorganised, and subordinated to European judges who would enjoy a right of veto over all court decisions; a new gendarmerie was to be established, and commanded by European officiers; the existing system of tax assessment and collection was to be reformed by European experts; finally, governors-general and other senior provincial officials were to be maintained in their appointments for a minimum of five years'. The Sultan's Ministers damned this as a protectorate in all but name, and predicted that the appointment of foreigners to senior positions would destroy the authority of the Ottoman government in the eyes of its own subjects. Abdiilhamid agreed: he warned his Ministers that Britain must be given no rights of interference, and emphasized that any reforms must be designed to strengthen his independent authority, not weaken it 2 . Finally, the Sultan was by no means secure in his own capital. Not only did he rule in the shadow of Russian armies and British warships, but he faced a continuing threat of revolution. Despite the dismissal of Parliament and the dispersal of the most prominent constitutionalists to the provinces or abroad, the constitutional movement was not dead: an attempted putsch had been narrowly averted in May, and a fresh conspiracy was uncovered in July 3 . Military defeat and its consequences had done nothing for the Sultan's prestige at home, and material conditions in the capital gave ample grounds for popular discontent: Istanbul was host to several hundred thousand Moslem refugees from the Balkans, the treasury was exhausted and official salaries heavily in arrears, and all classes suffered from severe price inflation resulting from the government's attempt to finance the war effort through the issue of unbacked paper money known as kaime4.

IV Abdiilhamid could entertain no hopes of avoiding his obligations under the Treaty of Berlin, at least not in respect of territory; but he was determined to proceed to its implementation in a fashion which would minimise the dangers of foreign war or internal collapse. This posed a delicate diplomatic task, and not least because the Sultan had to reckon with the additional threat to his political independence posed by the British reform programme. A s long as Russia

1 Ibid., pp. 102-7; Mcdlicott, Congress, pp. 292-4. ^Cevdet Kii^uk, Osmanli Diplomasisinde Ermeni Meseleslnin Ortaya Yildiz, op. cit., p. 42.

pp. 23-8; ( i t i n and

3 The Suavi putsch of May is covered in Mahmud Celaleddin Pa§a, op. cit., pp. 138-40; the Aziz Bey-Cleanthi Scalieri conspiracy to rescue the ex-Sultan Murad is detailed in t. Hakki Uzun^argili, 'V. Murad'i Tekrar Padi§ah Yapmak Isteyen K. Skalieri-Aziz Bey Komitesi', Belleten, viii: 30 (1944); cf., M. §iikrii Hanioglu, Osmanli ittihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti ve Jon Turkluk (1889-1902), I, pp. 76-9. ^Mcdlicott, Congress, pp. 301-3.

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r e m a i n e d in a position to renew the war, he had no c h o i c c but to a c c e p t B r i t a i n ' s political a n d military p r o t e c t i o n ; but he d a r e d not a l l o w this protection to d e v e l o p into a l o n g - t e r m protectorate. N o r , in the short t e r m , c o u l d he ignore the risk that his d e p e n d e n c e upon Britain m i g h t of itself p r o v o k e R u s s i a into a b a n d o n i n g the Berlin T r e a t y : R u s s i a w a s m a k i n g no secret of her belief that the C y p r u s C o n v e n t i o n a m o u n t e d to a British protectorate, and was warning the Sultan to guard his independence 1 . In effect, everything turned upon a Russian withdrawal f r o m the Balkan peninsula, and until this was secured, the Sultan's safest c o u r s e w a s to play f o r time. At the b e g i n n i n g of O c t o b e r he seized upon reports of A u s t r o H u n g a r i a n atrocities in B o s n i a - H e r c e g o v i n a as a p r e t e x t f o r s u s p e n d i n g n e g o t i a t i o n s with V i e n n a on the s u b j e c t of an a g r e e m e n t to r e g u l a r i s e the occupation. T h i s had the e f f e c t of p o s t p o n i n g the entry of A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n forces into the sancak of Novi Pazar, and thereby r e m o v e d o n e possible source of collapse or a r m e d conflict in the B a l k a n s 2 . T h i s in turn s o m e w h a t reduced the Sultan's vulnerability to pressure f r o m Britain, and on 2 4 O c t o b e r he asked her to m o d i f y her p r o p o s a l s f o r A s i a t i c r e f o r m s : E u r o p e a n s s h o u l d be e m p l o y e d in the O t t o m a n j u d i c i a r y as i n s p e c t o r s , but not as j u d g e s ; they should serve in the g e n d a r m e r i e as a d v i s e r s and instructors, rather than as c o m m a n d e r s ; they m i g h t also assist in a r e f o r m of the tax s y s t e m , to be initiated on an e x p e r i m e n t a l basis in o n e or t w o p r o v i n c e s ; but in all t h e s e c a s e s t h e i r e m p l o y m e n t s h o u l d not last l o n g e r t h a n w a s n e c e s s a r y t o i m p l e m e n t the a g r e e d r e f o r m s . T h e Sultan a d d e d that he w o u l d a c c e p t in p r i n c i p l e Britain's p r o p o s a l that p r o v i n c i a l o f f i c i a l s s h o u l d be g i v e n a m i n i m u m f i v e - y e a r t e n u r e of t h e i r p o s t s . S a l i s b u r y a c c e p t e d all t h e s e m o d i f i c a t i o n s , c h i e f l y b e c a u s e he b e l i e v e d t h e y w e r e of n o a c c o u n t : he c o n t i n u e d to place his faith in the Sultan's d o m e s t i c w e a k n e s s , and d o u b t e d that I'ormal restrictions upon the authority of European o f f i c i a l s w o u l d prevent t h e m f r o m a s s u m i n g a leading role in practice. T h e essential point w a s that the Sultan had committed himself to a specific p r o g r a m m e . In the s a m e spirit, Salisbury accepted the Sultan's plea f o r financial assistance in i m p l e m e n t i n g the r e f o r m s . T h i s s u g g e s t e d a f u r t h e r m e a n s of control, and f o r this reason Salisbury offered to explore the possibility of raising a loan 3 .

Temporarily at least, the Sultan had held A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y in c h e c k and satisfied Britain, t h e r e b ) gaining a b r e a t h i n g - s p a c e w h i c h lasted until early 1879. D u r i n g this period Britain w a s generally c o o p e r a t i v e . She a s s u r e d the Sultan of her military support should R u s s i a attempt to b a c k out of the Treaty of Berlin, or postpone evacuation indefinitely 4 . In similar f a s h i o n , she resisted

] B B A r § , Y E E , K14/88/4/Z88/i 2, memorandum by Nusret Pa?a, 27 September/9 October 1878, reporting conversation with Russian Ambassador. ^Medlicott, Congress, pp. 165-9. 3

Ibid„ pp. 296-8.

4

Ibid„ p. 180.

SAN STEFANO, BERLIN AND THE C Y P R U S CONVENTION

67

Russian attempts to encroach upon the letter of the treaty in the commissions appointed to supervise its implementation in respect of Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia and the Asiatic frontier, and discouraged the other Powers from pressing for an early demarcation of the Empire's new frontiers with Greece and Montenegro, where the Sultan was sensitive to the possibility of Albanian opposition 1 . In these ways she did at least help to ensure that the Sultan's problems grew no worse, but she could do little to alleviate them: in December Salisbury was forced to admit that there was no prospect that the British Parliament would accord the Ottoman Empire a loan 2 . Not until February 1879 was significant progress made, with the conclusion of the definitive peace treaty upon which Russia had insisted 3 . Russia thereupon withdrew her army of occupation behind the frontiers of the newly-established vilayet of Eastern Rumelia, and Britain responded by withdrawing her warships from the Sea of Marmara 4 . With the immediate military threat to his capital thus lifted, the Sultan could afford to be less circumspect, and later that month he reopened formal negotiations with Austria-Hungary on the subject of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Novi Pazar 5 . He continued to be apprehensive of an Austro-Hungarian advance to Salonika; nonetheless, after some hard bargaining he extracted a pledge from Vienna not to install garrisons on the strategic Ragozna range in the first instance, and to do so in future only with the Sultan's express agreement. On this basis, an Austro-Ottoman convention was concluded on 21 April 6 . The agreement with Austria-Hungary had an important side-effect: like the withdrawal of Russia's forces to Eastern Rumelia, it reduced Abdiilhamid's dependence upon Britain. This was not what the British intended: they saw an Austro-Ottoman rapprochement as an important contribution to their own anti-Russian strategy, and still had hopes that Austria-Hungary might be persuaded to offer the Sultan a general guarantee of his territories in Europe, to match the one they had given him in Asia under the Cyprus Convention 7 . Austria-Hungary was reluctant: she had obtained almost all she wanted in terms of territory and military security, and had no wish to extend her obligations. The most she conceded was a secret annexe to the agreement on Bosnia-Hercegovina and Novi Pazar, providing for joint Austro-Ottoman defence of the sancak only. Abdiilhamid was hardly impressed, and not a little concerned lest this annexe oblige him to use force against the Moslem population of Novi Pazar in the event of resistance to the entry of Austrial

Ibid„ pp. 180-3,202, 308-11, 352-3. Ibid„ pp. 298-303. ^The peace treaty was signed on 8 February: Turkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 115-123; Sumner, op. cit., pp. 563-4. 2

4

MedIieott, Congress, pp. 211, 228. Ibid., pp. 265-71.

5 6 7

Ibid„ pp. 271-280; Turkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 126-35,349-51. Medlicott, Congress, pp. 149-50, 280-1.

68

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Hungary's garrisons'. He preferred to use the occasion to ingratiate himself with R u s s i a . He a p p a r e n t l y

led the R u s s i a n A m b a s s a d o r ,

Lobanov-

Rostovskii, to understand that the secret annexe provided for a close alliance against Russia, and when Lobanov-Rostovskii protested, he insisted that the annexe be dropped 2 . This was not the Sultan's only concession to Russia. The withdrawal of Russia's forces f r o m Eastern Rumelia was scheduled to take place in May, and this automatically raised the question of implementing the Treaty of Berlin's provision for the installation of Ottoman garrisons on the Balkan range which m a r k e d Eastern Rumelia's border with the Principality of Bulgaria. Russia had made no secret of her hostility to this provision, and had used her period of occupation in Eastern Rumelia to develop a handy practical argument against its implementation by organising and arming a militia drawn from the local Bulgarian population 3 . T h e prospect that the entry of Ottoman garrisons would lead to an armed collision, and that this might o f f e r Russia a pretext to halt her withdrawal, could not but impress the other Powers, and the first months of 1879 saw some discussion of alternatives, including a temporary international occupation of Eastern Rumelia 4 . The Sultan remained cautious. He too was chiefly anxious to see an early Russian withdrawal, but, possibly influenced by his military advisers, he also evinced a deeper scepticism on the subject of his right of garrison: the occupation of a line whose rear was in the hands of a potentially hostile Eastern Rumelian administration would be a doubtful military asset and a serious political liability 5 . In the event the Tsar appealed to him directly: a special emissary requested him to defer the installation of his garrisons. Abdiilhamid graciously agreed to a temporary postponement; whether he already foresaw that the p o s t p o n e m e n t would prove permanent is unclear. Russian forces began evacuating Eastern Rumelia in M a y 6 . The British sensed that the Sultan was in danger of slipping f r o m their grasp: they had already suffered a minor scare in February, when France had m a d e an unsuccessful attempt to o f f e r Abdiilhamid a l o a n 7 . S a l i s b u r y responded by renewing his pressure in the question of Asiatic reforms: he continued to regard this issue as the key to Britain's future influence and control, and even without a loan, he was confident that reforms could be implemented 8 . So was Abdiilhamid, though his objectives were very different:

' f i i r k g e l d i , op. cit., ii, pp. 126 36. 2

M e d l i c o t t , Congress, pp. 28?. 3; P. A. Zaionchkovskii (ed.), Dnevnik D. A. Milyutina 18781882, III, p. 142. Mcdlicott, Congress, pp. 208-11; Elena Statelova, Iztochna Rumeliya 1879-1885, pp. 13-46.

3 4

Medlicott, Congress,

pp. 229-34: Statelova, op. cit., pp. 46-7; Turkgeldi, op. cit., pp. 193-6.

%iirkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 197 8; Medlicot, Congress, ^Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 198 202. ^Medlicott. Congress, 8

Ibid„ p. 304.

pp. 307-8

pp. 253-5.

SAN STEFANO, BERLIN AND THE CYPRUS CONVENTION

69

he calculated that his best hope of resisting British encroachments upon his independence lay in implementing reforms of his own 1 . In January the Porte promulgated regulations for a new gendarmerie, and indicated that it was willing to appoint a limited number of Europeans to positions of command; in February it announced its intention of sending two commissions to eastern Anatolia to investigate conditions and study reforms 2 . This gave Britain an opening, and in April Salisbury proposed that some half dozen British military consuls should be sent to assist the reform comissions in their work 3 . Abdiilhamid responded with delaying tactics: not until June did he sanction the appointment of the military consuls. In the same month, he promulgated a comprehensive judicial reform which established the independence of the courts from the executive, introduced public prosecutors, and instituted a system of appeals; but he made no provision for the appointment of European judicial inspectors 4 . Britain's sole concrete gain to date was the appointment of a handful of gendarmerie instructors, and by midJuly she felt justified in complaining at the Sultan's failure to implement the reforms to which he had agreed on 24 October 1878. She particularly pressed for the appointment of European judicial inspectors, and, as a test of the Sultan's good faith, she asked that command of the new gendarmerie be entrusted to Baker Pa§a, a British officer who had taken service in the Ottoman army. Abdiilhamid delayed again: he promised to consider an appointment for Baker, but took no early decision 5 . Meanwhile Layard had begun to take an active interest in the relations between the Sultan and his own Ministers. The British Ambassador suffered from a tendency to personalise issues, and had convinced himself that the major obstacle to Britain's plans was Abdiilhamid's subservience to advisers in the pay of Russia. He saw a potential saviour in the Grand Vizier Hayreddin Pasa 6 . Hayreddin was undeniably able and energetic, and since his appointment in December 1878 the Ottoman government had made real progress towards a solution of some of its internal problems, notably the questions of refugee settlement and the withdrawal of paper money. However, Hayreddin was a controversial figure at the Porte, where his high-handed manner and status as a newcomer from Tunis had won him many enemies among his ministerial colleagues; more important, he had clashed repeatedly with Abdiilhamid over the question of the respective powers of the Grand Vizierate and the throne 7 . Layard warned Abdiilhamid not to let Hayreddin fall, and when, in June 1879, Hayreddin effectively threatened to resign unless the Sultan recalled Parliament

'(Jetin and Yildiz, op. cit., p. 42. Medlicott, Congress, p. 302. 3 Ibid., pp. 305-6. 4 Ibid„ p. 311; Said Pa§a, op. cit., i, pp. 21-3. 5 Ku£uk, op. cit., pp. 42-3; Medlicott, Congress, pp. 322-3. 6 Medlicott, Congress, pp. 299-302. 7 Atilia (Jetin, Tunuslu Hayreddin Pa$a, pp. 192-218. 2

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and instituted a f o r m of cabinet g o v e r n m e n t , the A m b a s s a d o r gave him full official support 1 . It w a s scarcely to be e x p e c t e d that Abdiilhamid would b r o o k this kind of i n t e r f e r e n c e , especially as the issues w h i c h d i v i d e d him f r o m Hayreddin w e r e m a j o r matters of principle 2 . T h e upshot w a s that H a y r e d d i n fell f r o m o f f i c e at the end of J u l y ; he w a s replaced by t h e c o l o u r l e s s Arifi Pa§a, to w h o m A b d i i l h a m i d a c c o r d e d the n e w title of P r i m e Minister — an e m p t y gesture to the notion of cabinet g o v e r n m e n t 3 . In o t h e r a r e a s , t o o , t h e S u l t a n w a s f i n d i n g B r i t a i n ' s p r e t e n s i o n s increasingly irksome. In July she had j o i n e d with F r a n c e in forcing the Sultan to d e p o s e his E g y p t i a n vassal the K h e d i v e Ismail, ostensibly on a c c o u n t of Ismail's f a i l u r e to h o n o u r his international f i n a n c i a l o b l i g a t i o n s . T h e m o r e c o m p e l l i n g a r g u m e n t , h o w e v e r , w a s the implied threat that Britain and F r a n c e might d e p o s e the K h e d i v e unilaterally, and thus w e a k e n o n e of the principal legal ties which bound E g y p t to the O t t o m a n E m p i r e 4 . T h i s episode w a s f o l l o w e d by s o m e disturbing m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of British interest in other A r a b p r o v i n c e s of the Empire. Since San S t e f a n o there had been periodic signs of separatist activity in Syria, w h e r e the constitutionalist M i d h a t Pas a had been installed as G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l ; the o c c u p a t i o n of the n e i g h b o u r i n g island of C y p r u s had i n e v i t a b l y p r o v o k e d m u c h s p e c u l a t i o n as to p o s s i b l e B r i t i s h designs in the region, and w h e n l a y a r d himself paid a visit to Syria in A u g u s t 1879 there were widespread rumours that he and M i d h a t Pa§a had discussed the idea of an i n d e p e n d e n t Syrian state 5 . T o m a k e matters worse, upon his return Layard i n f o r m e d the Sultan that he had l e a r n e d of the e x i s t e n c e of a secret society in A r a b i a , w h i c h w a s plotting his o v e r t h r o w 6 . A t all e v e n t s , the s e c o n d half of 1879 a p p e a r s to h a v e m a r k e d an i m p o r t a n t s t a g e in t h e d e v e l o p m e n t of A b d u l h a m i d ' s suspicion of Britain's d e s i g n s u p o n his A r a b subjects. Equally important, Abdiilhamid felt increasingly able to resist British p r e s s u r e . A u g u s t 1879 saw the f i n a l w i t h d r a w a l of R u s s i a n f o r c e s from the Balkan peninsula, and in the following month A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ' s g a r r i s o n s w e r e i n s t a l l e d in N o v i P a z a r w i t h o u t incident. T h e Montenegrin and Greek border questions remained u n r e s o l v e d , a n d t h e r e r e m a i n e d t h e p r o b l e m of t h e A l b a n i a n L e a g u e , but the s p e c t r e of a f r e s h w a r w a s at last e x o r c i s e d 7 . I n t e r n a l l y , t o o , t h e E m p i r e w a s s h o w i n g signs of consolidation and recovery. By the a u t u m n of 1879 r e f u g e e settlement was well under w a y , the inflationary kaime had been

]

ibid„ pp. 218-220; Medlicott, Congress,

pp. 313-20.

2

A thorough and documented account of Abdulhamid's differences with Hayreddin Pa§a on constitutional and other issues ¡s given in f e t i n , op. tit., pp. 254-90. 3 ibid„ pp. 220-2. 4

ibid„ pp. 205-8; Medlicott, Congress, p. 318; Alexander Scholch, Egypt for the Egyptians! Socio-political Crisis in Egypt IH7H-IHH2, pp. 93-9. •'I. Hakki Uzun$ar§ili, Mekke 6

i Miikerreme

Emirleri,

The

p. 139.

F O 78/2959, Layard to Salisbury, no 882, 15 October.

^Medlicott, Congress, pp. 286, 359. T h e various attempts to negotiate a settlement of the Greek and Montenegrin frontiers since July 1878 are detailed in Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 136^10, 16877.

SAN STEFANO, BERLIN AND THE CYPRUS CONVENTION

71

withdrawn from circulation, and the reduction of the army to peace-time strength, coupled with a programme of tax increases and cuts in expenditure, was helping to restore the budget to some semblancc of health. In November the Porte succeeded in reaching a preliminary accommodation with its creditors on the subject of the debts outstanding since 1875, and no more was heard of the Empire's need for a foreign loan 1 . In these circumstances the Sultan could afford to show himself more independent. He continued to avoid the question of a gendarmerie appointment for Baker, and when he established a new system of financial inspectors in September he offered no more than two subordinate posts to Europeans 2 . A direct collision could not be long delayed, and duly came in mid-October, when Abdulhamid conferred ministerial office upon two figures w h o m Layard wrongly regarded as pro-Russian, but rightly regarded as hostile to the British reform programme: Kii^iik Said Pa§a became Prime Minister, and Mahmud Nedim Pa§a Minister of the Interior 3 . This prompted Britain to make an illj u d g e d attempt at intimidation. At the end of October she ordered her Mediterranean fleet to the Dardanelles, and demanded that the Sultan take prompt steps to implement the reforms agreed on 24 October 1878. She also revived her old demand that provincial governors-general be appointed for a minimum of five years, and put forward an entirely new demand that a Christian should be appointed Governor-General of Erzurum. Abdulhamid called Britain's bluff. H e warned that he would not submit to threats, that any attempt to enter the Dardanelles would be met with force, and that if need be he would turn to Russia for aid. Britain backed down: Salisbury knew that she possessed no real means of coercion, and the fleet was not sent 4 . An open b r e a c h was a v o i d e d : over t h e f o l l o w i n g w e e k s A b d u l h a m i d went out of his way to show himself a c c o m m o d a t i n g , giving Baker a gendarmerie command in Anatolia, offering to receive a British judicial inspector, and appointing the Roman Catholic Riistem Pa§a as Governor-General of Erzurum^. But the underlying Ottoman attitude was hardening. The Sultan's Ministers were more than ever determined to proceed to reforms independently, and to resist all British interference. They were especially concerned to forestall any measures which might confer a special status upon Armenian-inhabited regions. Layard had attempted to capitalise upon Riistem Pa§a's appointment by proposing that, as a rule, Christian-inhabited districts should be a d m i n i s t e r e d by Christian officials. This, coupled with his revived demand for five-year appointments for provincial officials, suggested that Britain's strategy might

' d . C. Blaisdell, European 2

Medlicott, Congress,

Financial

Control in the Ottoman Empire, pp. 87-9.

pp. 322-3.

3

lbid„

pp. 326-8.

4

lbid.,

pp. 328-31; K u 5 u k , op. cit., pp. 49-53.

-'Medlicott, Congress,

pp. 331-5.

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have changed, and that her objective now was to lay the foundations for an autonomous and ultimately independent Armenian buffer-state in eastern Anatolia 1 . In the event, the appointments of Riistem and the British judicial inspector were frustrated on technical pretexts, and while Baker did take up his command he was permitted to exercise little authority 2 . Britain had exhausted her political resources, and the near-collision in October had clearly demonstrated the risks of any attempt at military coercion. Salisbury chose to admit defeat: on 2 January 1880 he instructed Layard to "lie by", and desist from further pressure 3 . The failure of Britain's attempt to dominate the Ottoman Empire contained lessons for both sides. For Britain, the lesson was that she had underestimated the Sultan's will and ability to maintain his independence: military defeat had indeed weakened the Ottoman Empire, but not so drastically as to leave it with no choice but to entrust its destinies to a foreign protector. Salisbury proved unwilling to acknowledge this: he continued to insist that any independence which the Sultan might appear to have regained was a sham, and that the Ottoman Empire must sooner or later succumb to British or Russian tutelage. "Our greatest danger in the Eastern question", he confided to Layard, "is lest in the interval between the loss of independence (which has happened) and his entire loss of empire (which will happen) the Sultan should during the last period of his agony, which may be a long one, fall under the dominant influence of Russia" 4 . However, Salisbury could offer no alternative to the strategy of the Cyprus Convention, nor was he given the time to formulate one: Beaconsfield's Conservative cabinet fell from office in April 1880 5 . The lesson for the Sultan was different, and turned upon the relative strengths of Britain and Russia. Abdiilhamid had been forced into an unwelcome and dangerous partnership with Britain by the presence of a substantial Russian arrm of occupation in the Balkans, and by the implied threat that Russia might launch a fresh war. He had faced no comparable threat from Britain, at least not after the withdrawal of British warships from the Sea of Marmara. In the final analysis, Britain's ability to control him had depended upon the Russian army. Britain's threat was political only: she did not herself possess the means to give it military backing. This was a lesson which Abdiilhamid understood thoroughly, and it was to play a decisive role in shaping his future foreign policy.

'Kii^iik, op. cit., ^Medlicott, 3

pp. 5 3 - 5 ; Said Pa§a, op. cit.,

Congress,

lbid„ pp. 3 4 3 - 6 . Ibid„ p. 343. 5 Ibid., pp. 3 5 9 - 6 4 .

4

pp. 3 3 8 - 4 0 .

i, pp. 3 9 4 - 4 0 1 .

CHAPTER FIVE: THE APPROACH TO GERMANY (April 1880-May 1882)

I

A b d u l h a m i d h a d s u c c e s s f u l l y w a r d e d off t h e threat of British domination; but this did not reduce his need for external support. The Ottoman Empire remained militarily vulnerable to Russia in Asia, and to Russia and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y in the Balkans. It w a s also diplomatically exposed: the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin relating to the Greek and Montenegrin frontiers, to the introducting of reforms in Ottoman Europe and Europe and Asia, and to the settlement of the Empire's foreign debts all remained to be enforced. In addition Abdulhamid was anxious to press on with the internal reconstruction and overhaul of his Empire: the winter of 1879-80 saw his Ministers discuss plans for the reorganisation of the army, a possible reform of the Constitution, and the construction of roads, railways and other public w o r k s in O t t o m a n A s i a 1 . But it was plain that m u c h of the specialised knowledge and finance required would have to come from Europe. In the event A b d u l h a m i d turned to G e r m a n y . In April 1880 he asked the G e r m a n Chancellor, Bismarck, to furnish him with civilian and military advisers. T h e request was granted: the first of several civilian experts arrived in September, and a promise was given that military advisers would eventually follow 2 .

It is interesting to note that in February 1880, apparently as a part of this general exercise in policy planning, the Sultan asked the former Grand Viziers Safvet Pa§a and Hayreddin Pa§a to prepare reports on the causes and consequences of the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 and the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877. Neither Safvet nor Hayreddin made a specific policy recommendation, but the reports of both emphasized the key diplomatic role which Germany had assumed in Europe since 1870. Hayreddin's reports are found in BBAr§, YEE, K31/1480/Z97/80, and K31/1527/Z97/80; Safvet Papa's report in K.31/41Z1137/79. The ministerial discussions on constitutional reform are covered in Çetin, op. cit., pp. 233-4; Said Pa§a, Hatirat, I, pp. 83-4. The establishment of the Military Inspection Commission is covered in Uçarol, Bir Osmanh Paçasi, p. 154; Rasky, op. cit., pp. 24-5. Hasan Fehmi Pa§a's programme of public works in Asia, including a proposal for a Bagdad railway, is reproduced in Celâl Dincer, 'Osmanli Vezirlerinden Hasan Fehmi Pa§a'nm AnadoWmm Baymdirlik Içlerine dair Hazirladigi Lâyiha', Belgeier, 5-8, 9-12, (1968-71). 2 H a j o Hal born, op. cit., pp. 10-3; Kcmal Beydilli, 'II. Abdulhamid Devrinde Gelen Ilk Alman Askerî Heyeti Hakkinda', Tari h Dergisi, xxxii, (1979), pp. 485-8; Jehuda L. Wallach, Anatomie einer Militärhilfe. Die preussisch-deutschen Militärmissionen in der Türkei 1835-1919, pp. 34-7.

74

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The Sultan's decision to seek German support was both original and in some ways surprising. Germany had no tradition of interest in the Near East to compare with those of Britain, France, Russia and Austria-Hungary. Nor had she m a n i f e s t e d any particular s y m p a t h y f o r the O t t o m a n E m p i r e : Abdiilhamid himself had argued that the Russo-Ottoman war of 1877 had been facilitated by the League of the Three Emperors, which furnished Russia with German and Austro-Hungarian support, and neither at the Congress of Berlin nor subsequently had Bismarch afforded the Sultan any assistance 1 . However, Abdtilhamid saw deeper. He was much impressed by Germany's military might, and by the diplomatic skill which had won Bismarck the reputation of arbiter of Europe. He also discerned a d v a n t a g e s in G e r m a n y ' s lack of traditional interest in the Near East: she was the one European Power with no known designs on Ottoman territory, and with no established clients among the Sultan's non-Moslem subjects. Furthermore, the League of the T h r e e Emperors was dead. It had collapsed amidst mutual recriminations following the Congress of Berlin, and in October 1879 Bismarck had replaced it with the Dual Alliance between G e r m a n y and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y — s e e m i n g l y a deliberate decision to separate himself f r o m Russia. T h e consequence, as Abdiilhamid saw it, was that Germany was now "neutral" in the Near East: she was committed neither to Britain nor to Russia, and might therefore be used to protect the Empire against both of these Powers 2 . Others were less sure. T h e P r i m e Minister Kiifiik Said Pa§a was quick to formulate an alternative view of Germany's likely intentions in the Near East, one s u b s e q u e n t l y associated with the term " c o m p e n s a t i o n policy". Ku^iik Said conceded that Germany had no Near Eastern ambitions of her own, but he argued lhat this would not deter her f r o m encouraging the ambitions of others. Precisely because Germany's own vital interests and a m b i t i o n s were e x c l u s i v e l y E u r o p e a n , she w o u l d a t t e m p t to d i v e r t E u r o p e a n rivals by e n c o u r a g i n g t h e m to s e e k c o m p e n s a t i o n at O t t o m a n e x p e n s e . T h e P r i m e M i n i s t e r j u d g e d B i s m a r c k to be a P a n - G e r m a n , whose ultimate goal w a s the unification of all G e r m a n s within the boundaries of the Reich; since this could be achieved only at the territorial expense of Austria-Hungary and Russia, it followed that Bismarck would encourage these two Powers to seek compensation in the Near East: " The calculations of certain foreigners who say that Germany does not support Russia's interests are either mistaken or else reflect some other intention" 3 .

'Çetin and Yildiz, op. cit., pp. 88-90; Holborn, op. cit., pp. 3-7. 2

Çetin and Yildiz, op. cit., p 2l l ); Mahmud Muhtar Pa§a, Maziye bir Nazar, p. 41. It may also be noted that in his report on the Congress of Berlin Alexander Caratheodory Pa§a, the chief Ottoman delegate, had stressed Bismarck's lack of religious or other parti-pris in Near Eastern matters; Mahmud Celaleddin Pa§a, op. cit., iii, pp. 171-5. The break-up of the League of the Three Emperors and the conclusion of the Dual Alliance are covered in Bruce Waller, Bismarck at the Crossroads. The Reorientation of German Foreign Policy after the Congress of Berlin 1878-1880. J Said Pa§a, Hatirat, i, pp. 42b-~

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Interestingly enough, Abdiilhamid did not dispute Bismarck's Pan-German ambitions, but he argued that they were of no immediate relevance: [As to] the view that Germany, in order to annex the Germans who are under Austria's rule, to achieve German unification, and also to obtain Trieste, will offer favours to Austria, such as favouring her aggression towards Salonika... Germany's achievement of this goal will require at least fifty or sixty y e a r s ' . In retrospect, it is clear that both sides in this argument were right in part. Both were correct to argue that Germany had no ambitions in the Near East, but if KUfiik Said was mistaken in his characteristion of Bismarck as a P a n - G e r m a n , he w a s justified in suspecting that Germany might promote compensation policies as a way of buying off European rivals. Unbeknown to the Ottoman government, the German Chancellor had more than once invited France to annex the Ottoman d e p e n d e n c y of Tunis, and he had similarly advised Britain to take Egypt. Nor w a s B i s m a r c k in principle hostile to Russia; on the contrary, he regarded Russia's friendship as vital to Germany's own security, and he was quite willing to pay for this friendship by offering Russia support in the Near East. The Dual Alliance did not represent a choice for Austria-Hungary and against Russia; by the spring of 1880 the brief period of Russo-German acrimony was over, and Bismarck was actively convassing a Three Emperors' Alliance between G e r m a n y , Russia and Austria-Hungary. A n d yet Abdiilhamid was not entirely mistaken in his a s s u m p t i o n that Germany might have an interest in sustaining the Ottoman Empire. Bismarck had agreed to supply the Sultan with civil and military advisers, and had done so f o r t w o undeclared reasons. In the first place, he feared that the Sultan's recent disillusionment with Britain might lead him into too great a dependence upon Russia, and that this in turn might tempt Russia to dispense with the friendship of Germany and Austria-Hungary. In the second, he was not entirely confident that Russia could be converted to the cause of a Three Emperors' Alliance, or that her conversion, if obtained, would prove lasting; should Russia turn to France instead, Germany and Austria-Hungary might welcome the Sultan's military support. In other words, Bismarck proposed to keep Abdiilhamid available as a kind of insurance policy — a policy upon which he hoped never to make a claim, and for which he would pay the lowest premium possible 2 .

' ç e t i n and Yildiz, op. cit., p. 219. Holborn, op. cit., pussim.; W. N. Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone and the concert of Europe, pp. 37-52, 114-20; J. Windelband, Bismarck und die europäischen Grossmächte 1879 1885, pp. 170-2, 518-20. 2

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II A practical opportunity to test G e r m a n y ' s attitude arose a l m o s t immediately. April 1880 saw a change of government in Britain, and with it, a change in Britain's Near Hastern policy. Gladstone's Liberals assumed office with a c o m m i t m e n t to abandon the competitive politics of the balance of power, and to establish a Concert of Europe which would unite the Great Powers in defence of treaties and the "public law" of Europe. They proposed to begin by enforcing the outstanding provisions of the Treaty of Berlin in respect of the Greek and Montenegrin frontiers and of the administrative reforms intended to improve the lot of the A r m e n i a n s of Ottoman A s i a 1 . Abdiilhamid found this thoroughly alarming. It was not that he wished to evade his obligations under the Treaty of Berlin, at least not in respect of the Greek and Montenegrin frontiers. But he was apprehensive of a collision with the Albanian League, a body which had grown increasingly assertive since 1878, and which had already used the threat of armed resistance to frustrate one frontier compromise with Montenegro — the so-called Corti arrangement of April 1880 2 . The British government brushed these inhibitions aside, and went so far as to suggest that one possible solution might be the establishment of an a u t o n o m o u s Albania — a suggestion which could only c o n f i r m the Sultan's suspicion that Gladstone's interest in administrative reform masked a plan to dissolve the Ottoman Empire into a collection of weak states amenable to British influence 3 . Worse, Britain succeeded in rallying the other Powers to her Concert: Russia was sensitive to the interests of her protégé M o n t e n e g r o , AustriaHungary was reluctant to separate herself f r o m Britain, Germany chose to go along with Russia and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y for the sake of a f u t u r e T h r e e Emperors' Alliance, and France followed suit 4 . In June the Powers met in C o n f e r e n c e in Berlin, and specified the territorial awards to be made to M o n t e n e g r o and Greece Montenegro was to receive the Albanian-claimed Adriatic port of Dulcigno, and Greece was to receive a substantial part of Epirus and Thessaly, much of it claimed by the Albanians, and including the key strategic points of Janina and Metzovo. It was decided to enforce the M o n t e n e g r i n award first, and the Sultan w a s sent a collective ultimatum demanding the transfer of Dulcigno by 24 August. The Ottoman government o f f e r e d to cede D u l c i g n o if c o n c e s s i o n s were m a d e e l s e w h e r e on the M o n t e n e g r i n frontier; the P o w e r s resolved upon coercion, and in m i d September despatched naval units to undertake a joint demonstration off Dulcigno 5 .

'Medlicott, Bismarck,

Gladstmx,

chs. i-rn,

passim.

2

Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 136 42; Bartl, op. cit., pp. 121-45 passim.-, Skendi, op. cit., pp. 54-95 passim. Çetin and Yikliz op. cit., pp. 301-4; Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, p. 139. ^Medlicott, Bismarck, 5

lbid„

Gladstone,

pp. 52-70,

passim.

pp. 97-112, 135-50; Turkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 142-52, 178-80.

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The Sultan and his Ministers were unsure how to respond. The naval demonstration posed no direct military threat to the Empire, still less to the Albanian League: as the Foreign Minister Kurd Said Pa§a acidly noted, warships could not climb mountains 1 . But both the fact of the Concert and its willingness to resort to coercion were profoundly disturbing. The chief threat appeared to lie in the establishment of Anglo-Russian cooperation in the Near Hast, and for this reason some Ministers advised concession: the appeasement of Montenegro offered the best hope of splitting Russia away from the Concert. Others advised resistance: to submit to a naval demonstration would set a dangerous precedent, and encourage the Powers to resort to coercion in other pending questions — the Greek frontier, internal reforms, and the Empire's foreign debts 2 . Abdiilhamid put forward a third option: German mediation. Placing his faith in Germany's neutrality, he made a personal appeal to the German Emperor on 22 September, asking him to induce the other Powers to compromise and abandon their naval demonstration. Bismarck saw to it that the appeal was rejected: he would not separate himself from Russia and Austria-Hungary 3 . With Russian support, Britain proposed that the Concert proceed to more extreme measures of coercion: specifically, the occupation of izmir, the principal port of Anatolia and the Ottoman Empire's third city. Even if, as it seems, it was this threat which finally forced Abdiilhamid to back down, it was apparently also the case that the German Ambassador, Hatzfeldt, gave him an informal assurance that the cession of Dulcigno would terminate the Powers' policy of coercion 4 . This assurance proved well-founded. Austria-Hungary had been thoroughly alarmed byGladstone's talk of occupying Izmir, fearing that this would provoke disturbances which might precipitate the Ottoman Empire's collapse. This freed Bismarck's hands: the Sultan surrendered Dulcigno to Montenegro in November, and Germany and Austria-Hungary promptly withdrew their warships from the Powers' combined fleet, being shortly followed by France, Russia and Italy 5 . Britain's policy of coercion thus came to an end, and in a manner which appeared to vindicate Abdiilhamid's expectations of Germany. Nonetheless, the Concert remained formally in being, as did the Berlin Conference's generous territorial award to Greece. Following the cession of Dulcigno Abdiilhamid had finally steeled himself to suppress the Albanian league by force; however, he warned the Powers that there could be no question of his accepting the Greek frontier proposed at Berlin, and when Greece responded by mobilising

^Ein Freund des Orients, op. cit., p. 69. ^Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 142-57, 370-5. 3

Ibid„ pp. 157-9, 380-1; Windelband, op. cit., pp. 202-4.

^Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 159-62; Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, Bulgaristan trade, no. 744, 13 Zilhicce 304/1 September 1887. ^Türkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 162-8; Medlicott, Bismarck,

Gladstone,

pp. 157-64; B B A r s ,

pp. 167-9, 190-6.

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her army, he made it plain that he would resort to war if necessary 1 . T h e Powers privately accepted that the Berlin award was unenforceable, but were at a loss for an alternative. It was Bismarck who offered a way out: possibly inspired by Abdiilhamid himself, he proposed in January 1881 that the Ottoman Empire should offer Greece compensation in the form of Crete, an autonomous province in which the Sultan's authority was largely nominal. Abdiilhamid accepted the proposal, despite the misgiving of s o m e of his military advisers, w h o argued that control of Crete was vital to the security of the E m p i r e ' s sea c o m m u n i c a t i o n s in the A e g e a n and the eastern M e d i t e r r a n e a n 2 . In the event, Franco-British opposition killed the project; nonetheless, it served its purpose as a device enabling the Powers to retreat from the Berlin Conference award, and when final agreement on the new Greek f r o n t i e r was reached in M a y 1881 the terms proved to be much more f a v o u r a b l e to the Ottoman Empire. Greece obtained T h e s s a l y , but little Albanian territory in Epirus; Janina and Metzovo remained in Ottoman hands — the only occasion upon which the Treaty of Berlin gave the Sultan a militarily defensible frontier, and seemingly a f u r t h e r vindication of his German policy 3 .

Ill In reality the coincidence between Ottoman and German policies had been more apparent than real. Throughout the course of the Montenegrin and Greek frontier questions Bismarck's sights had been set upon the conclusion of a Three Emperors' Alliance: his immediate objective had been to convince A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and Russia that collaboration with Britain o f f e r e d n o worthwhile alternative, and it was for this reason that he had initially played along with Gladstone's Concert and then helped to sabotage it 4 . By January 1881 Vienna and St. Petersburg had taken the point; there f o l l o w e d five m o n t h s of hard bargaining which ended with the conclusion of a treaty establishing the Three Emperors' Alliance on 18 June. Its secret terms would have provided ample a m m u n i t i o n for those w h o suspected G e r m a n y of pursuing a compensation policy in the Near East. In effect, Bismarck obtained assurances that Russia w ould neither attack Austria-Hungary nor support a French attack upon Germany; in return he agreed that the Treaty of Berlin must eventually be revised to accommodate the Balkan ambitions of Russia and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y . T h e t i m i n g and t e r m s of this revision were not finally defined, though Bismarck would have been happy to endorse a clear division of the Balkan peninsula into agreed Russian and Austro-Hungarian spheres of influence. Nonetheless, certain definite pledges were made.

^Turkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 180-2; Medlicott, Bismarck, cit., pp. 135-9.

Gladstone,

^Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 182-5.404-15; Medlicott, Bismarck, 3

Gladstone,

Turkgeldi, op. cit., ii, pp. 185WI, 415-31; Medlicott, Bismarck,

^Medlicott, Bismarck.

Gladstone,

passim.;

pp. 197-208; Hocaoglu, op.

Windelband, op. cit.

Gladstone,

pp. 208-19. pp. 219-240.

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Russia was given an assurance that Germany and Austria-Hungary would support her in insisting that the Sultan must maintain the closure of the Straits, and in opposing any attempt by the Sultan to enforce his treaty right to garrison the Balkan range; subject to vague qualifications, she was also assured that Eastern Rumelia might eventually be united with the Principality of Bulgaria. For her part, Austria-Hungary obtained Russia's acquiescence in the development of her political influence in Rumania and Serbia, and an explicit promise that she might formally annex Bosnia and Hercegovina at a time of her own choosing 1 . Not that the Three Emperors' Alliance posed an immediate threat to the Sultan's Balkan security: the secret clauses relating to a revision of the Treaty of Berlin were conceived as provision against future contingencies, to be implemented as and when a change in local or international circumstances rendered the status quo untenable. Germany's real blow fell in another quarter altogether. Throughout the Three Empires' negotiations Bismarck had remained nervous lest Russia be tempted by the alternative of an anti-German combination with France; he resolved to divert France, and in February 1881 he revived his old suggestion that she should annex the Ottoman dependency of Tunis — a clear instance of the compensation policy in action*. France took the hint: in April she manufactured an incident on the Tunisian-Algerian frontier as a pretext for invasion, and by mid-May she had occupied Tunis and forced the ruling Bey to sign a treaty of protection 3 . The Ottoman Empire was taken completely by surprise and left powerless to do anything but protest: it had no armed forces in Tunis or the vicinity, and could not have made a military response even if it had wished to. Abdiilhamid made a bid for German support: he offered Germany naval facilities on the Tunisian coast at Bizerta. The offer was ignored: unique among the Powers, Germany joined France in denying the validity of the traditional Ottoman claim to sovereignty over Tunis 4 . Britain, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy were at least prepared to admit that the Sultan's rights had been violated; they held out no hope of practical assistance, however, and Abdiilhamid was left with no option but to accept the fait accompli in fact, while continuing to dispute its validity in law 5 . And yet the principal effect of the Tunis affair was to drive Abdiilhamid to seek even closer relations with Germany. His powerlcssness in the face of French aggression had sprung from his diplomatic isolation, and by the autumn of 1881 there were clear signs that continuing isolation would expose

^Medlicott, Bismarck, Gladstone, ch. ix, passim. Ibid„ pp. 119-23,228,306-11. •^Pierre Guillen, L'Expansion 1881-1898, (Paris, 1984), 4 Abdurrahman Çayci, La question tunisienne et la politique ottomane (1881-1913), Windelband, op. cit., pp. 263-4. 5 Çayci, op. cit., pp. 71-85. 2

pp. 24-71;

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the Empire to fresh perils. September 1881 saw the beginning of the Urabist disorders at Cairo: it took little foresight to imagine circumstances in which they might lead to Anglo-French intervention, and the loss of yet another North African dependency. At the same time, Britain was continuing to press her Concert policy in the question of Armenian reforms, and there were indications that Russia was ready to support her 1 . These dangers prompted Abdiilhamid to make a direct approach to Germany, and in December 1881 he despatched Marshal Ali Nizami Pa§a and his o w n Private Secretary, Re§id Bey, on a special mission to Berlin and Vienna, with instructions to propose an offensive and defensive military alliance between the Ottoman Empire, Germany and Austria-Hungary. He also instructed them to renew his original request for German military advisers, and to probe the willingness of German financiers to invest in a railway from Istanbul to Bagdad 2 . The initiative was hardly well-timed f r o m Bismarck's point of view. With the Three Emperors' Alliance barely six months old, he had no wish to arouse Russian suspicions; for this reason he had decided not to accede after all to the Sultan's request for military advisers. He also suspected that the Sultan's real purpose was to launch a war for the recovery of Tunis. He treated the two Ottoman envoys to a deal of friendly advice, confirmed his support for a strong Ottoman Empire, and stressed his particular anxiety to see better relations between Istanbul and Vienna; but he warned that there could be no question of a formal alliance, nor of the appointment of military advisers 3 . The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Kalnoky, was equally cautious: he emphasized his desire for good relations, particularly in the economic sphere, but he shied away from any suggestion of political or military commitments 4 . Nor did Ali Nizami and Regid succeed in interesting German capital in the idea of a Bagdad railway 5 . In short, their mission was a failure; but, for reasons best known to themselves, they chose not to reveal this fact to Abdiilhamid. Instead, they reported that the offer of alliance had been accepted in principle, and that Bismarck had advised that the Sultan should c o m m e n c e negotiatons with Austria-Hungary 6 . Duly encouraged, Abdiilhamid approached the AustroHungarian A m b a s s a d o r , Calice, on 10 January 1882, and asked to hear Vienna's proposals 7 .

'Medlicott, op. cit., pp. 313-4: Kii^iik, op. cit., pp. 88-91. 2

H o l b o r n , op. cit., pp. 21-3; Bejdilli, op. cit., p. 489; W. Taffs, Lord Odo Russell, pp. 329-333.

•'windelband, op. cit., pp. 329 337. 4

E r n s t R. Rutkowski, 'Die Bündnisverhandlungen zwischen der Türkei, Österreich-Ungarn and Deutschland 1881-1882', Mitteilungen des österreichischen Staatsarchivs, 10 (1957), pp. 367-9. 5 T a f f s , op. cit., pp. 329-333. 6

B e y d i l l i , o p . c i t „ pp. 489-91.

"^Rutkowski, op. cit., p. 370.

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The Sultan's confidence had been increased by the timely outbreak of a revolt in Hercegovina, directed against the attempts of the occupying AustroHungarian authorities to impose conscription. This gave him an opportunity to demonstrate to Kalnoky the value of his friendship: against the inclinations of some of his advisers, he gave strict instructions that the rebels were to rcccivc no assistance from the Ottoman side of the frontier. Kalnoky was in fact somewhat embarrassed: on the one hand he was grateful for the Sultan's cooperative attitude, but on the other he had no intention of accepting his offer of alliance. On Bismarck's advice, he decided to handle Abdiilhamid's offer in a dilatory fashion, with a view to eventual rejection; in the meantime Germany and Austria-Hungary would seek to assure the Sultan of their goodwill. At the beginning of February they supported the Sultan's protest against the latest piece of Anglo-French interference in Egypt, the so-called Joint Note of 8 January; in March Bismarck gave the British Government a warning not to agitate the Armenian question, and let the Sultan know that he had done so 1 . Abdiilhamid was not be diverted from his quest for an alliance, however, and having failed to induce Kalnoky to state his terms, he began, albeit cautiously, to hint at terms of his own. He first of all floated the idea of a German-Austrian-Ottoman defensive bloc stretching from the North Sea to the Mediterranean, and capable of guaranteeing the peace; he also emphasized his anxiety for an understanding based upon formal military guarantees. He then became more specific, pointing to the potential threat posed on the Ottoman Empire by its Balkan neighbours Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, Eastern Rumelia and Rumania; finally, he hinted at a partition of the Balkan Peninsula between Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, with the Balkan range to serve as the dividing line between their respective shares 2 . What was Abdiilhamid after? The best evidence of his intentions is contained in a memorandum which he drew up in February 1882, apparently in response to renewed criticism of his German policy from some of his Ministers 3 . The memorandum began by enumerating the various territorial spoliations to which the Ottoman Empire had been subjected since 1878, and proceeded to indicate the likely sources of future depredations: Anglo-French attempts to exploit the current disturbances in Egypt, Austria-Hungary's known designs upon Salonika, and Russia's readiness to encourage the ambitions of the small Balkan states: A clear and sure remedy for these [dangersJ has been sought. On the one hand, by studying the relations between the European Powers, by examining and comparing their intentions and goals, and by attempting hbid.,

pp. 374-6; Holborn,

op. cit.,

p. 35.

^Rutkowski, op. cit., pp. 374-7. 3 f e t i n and Yildiz, op. cit., pp. 47-55; Uzun$ar§ih, 'Ikinci Abdulhamid'in Ingiliz Siyasetine dair Muhtiralari', pp. 46-51.

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to extrapolate their future conduct from their past behaviour and their real ambitions, it appears that Germany has no directly hostile and aggressive intention towards the Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, it appears possible to somewhat weaken and modify Austria's aggressive ambitions, and thus change her anti-Ottoman views. By securing a rapprochement with these two Powers, and also with Italy, who is upset and angered by the French aggression in Tunis... a new and profitable policy may be adopted. Certain political benefits had already accrued. Germany and Austria-Hungary were currently opposing Anglo-French activity in Egypt and Britain's attempts to revive a form of Concert diplomacy in the Armenian question: One clear benefit of the policy adopted with Germany is the fact that the demands currently put forward by England and Russia, under the name of reform, with a view to the creation of an Armenia in Anatolia have been rendered a dead letter, so that the Ottoman government can implement, in accordance with its own wishes, genuine and beneficial reforms which will benefit it and secure its future, and especially forestall the formation of an Armenia. \England and Russia] dare not insist upon this point in the face of the policy \of alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary ]. However, Abdiilhamid placed the greatest emphasis upon another, and hitherto unbroachcd issue; namely, the need to secure the Ottoman Empire against the Balkan states and their patron Russia, a need aggravated by the military indefensibility of the Empire's new Balkan frontiers, and the consequent vulnerability of the capital. Istanbul: Russia \has\ for ivventy or thirty years, by tricks and provocations, turned the Balkan peninsula into a source of sedition and disturbance, then loosened the links between the central government and each of the provinces, and, by exploiting the results of various wars and uprisings, created there numerous small governments dependent upon and obedient to herself... These small governments always act in accordance with the orders and instructions they receive from their protector, and it is most obvious and probable that such events will recur now and in the future, just as in the past... A safe and defensible frontier was not established for the Empire after the last war, and as things like fields and streams can never take the place of a clear and safe frontier, fand as] in the event of a war the enemy will as always be fully supported by the said small governments, while the other Powers will simply look away... [the enemy ] will encounter no barrier up to the (^atalca fortifications, where the positions and defences he will face will not be able to hold out for more than one or two months... Here, Abdiilhamid had to deal with the obvious objection that AustriaHungary's own Balkan ambitions were hostile to the Empire:

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The fundamental objective in adopting this policy is to annihilate Austria's current and known ambition... and to turn Austria's interests in another direction, as if diverting the waters of a river... that is, to obstruct her inclination [to expandJ from Hercegovina and Bosnia towards Salonika, and her probable advance from the Balkans direct to Istanbul, and... to load Austria's weight upon the trouble-making small governments like Serbia and Rumania, and thereby to securc our legitimate interests and frontiers, and in sum, the f u t u r e of the Empire... If an end can thus be put to Austria's aggressions, and if, by strengthening the adopted policy, a gain of power and influence can be made, and if, through this power and influence, [our] interests can be secured in Anatolia and Arabia, foreign interference and harassment can be at once forestalled. Left to its own devices, the Empire will carry out the useful reforms required internally, and as the fruit of these reforms, it will gain in wealth and power; then other Powers will be grateful for its alliance... Interestingly enough, Abdtilhamid did not exclude the possibility that Britain might be among these Powers: Let it be reiterated that the Sultanate's new policy in no way spoils its friendly relations with England. It is natural that her advice will be implemented where it harmonises with our true interests; however harmful it would be for the Empire to ally itself with England and to implement all her wishes and ambitions in present circumstances, yet when, in the future, the Empire gains in power and influence as a result of this new policy, then it is natural that England's policy will be benevolent as in Re§id Papa's time, and there can be no doubt that then partnership between the Ottoman Empire and [ E n g l a n d ] will be beneficial. This, however, was long-term speculation. Reduced to essentials, the memorandum indicates that Abdiilhamid's immediate objectives were two: political guarantees against Britain in Asia and North Africa, and military guarantees against Russia in the Balkans. This was more than Germany and Austria-Hungary were prepared to offer. Within limits, they might grant him diplomatic support against Britain, but neither the Three Emperors' Alliance nor their own underlying sense of their interests would permit them to guarantee the Sultan militarily against Russia. It was not that they objected to extensions of their treaty engagements in principle: Bismarck and Kalnoky were already engaged in secret negotiations which would lead to the conclusion of the Triple Alliancc with Italy in May 1882. In addition, Austria-Hungary had already, in June 1881, concluded a secret treaty with King Milan of Serbia

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which gave her effectiv e control of Serbia's foreign policy 1 . But neither of these arrangements was explicitly directed against Russia: the Triple Alliance was an anti-French arrangement whose scope was limited to the European continent, while the Austro-Serbian treaty did not formally infringe the secret undertakings which Austria-Hungary had made to Russia under the terms of the Three Emperors' Alliance 2 . The Sultan was asking for the impossible, and once the full scope of his plans became obvious Kalnoky and Bismarck decided to terminate their discussions with him 3 . In the event, however, the Sultan's persistance did bring a small reward. Bismarck remained anxious lest too obvious a rebuff drive Abdiilhamid into the arms of Russia: the "Skobelev Affair" of February 1882 had been an uncomfortable reminder of the long-term uncertainty of Russia's attitude towards Germany and Austria-Hungary 4 . For this reason he decided in March 1882 to accede to the Sultan's request for military advisers, and a first group of four German officers led by Colonel Kaehler reached Istanbul in May; others followed at intervals over the next two years, including the General Staff Major von der Goltz, and a naval adviser, Captain Starcke 5 . Even so, Bismarck took care to minimise the official character of these officers' presence in the Ottoman Empire: formally, they did not constitute a German military mission, and they were not seconded but voluntarily transferred to the Sultan's service on private contracts 6 . Abdiilhamid responded in kind: the German officers were treated with every mark of ceremonial respect, and were paid large salaries, but they were sedulously excluded from anything resembling operational command of the Ottoman armed forces and were soon complaining that their reform plans were obstructed by the Serasker, Gazi Osman Pa§a7. In one sense, the new German-Ottoman intimacy which the presence of the military advisers appeared to symbolise was a convenient fraud at the expense of the other Powers. Bismarck gained a largely spurious reputation for 'influence' in Istanbul, and was to exploit this in his dealings with Britain and Russia; the Sultan, for his part, appeared less isolated and vulnerable, and could likewise exploit this in his dealings with Britain and Russia. But in another sense the intimacy was real, if limited in scope. Bismarck remained anxious to keep Abdiilhamid in play, and was prepared to offer him practical support wherever this could be done without prejudice to Germany's alliances: ^Holborn, op. cit., pp. 23-6; Bridge, op. cit., p. 128; Charles Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism. Russian influence in the internal affairs of Bulgaria and Serbia, 1879 1886, pp. 16273. ^Bridge, op. cit., pp. 121-3, 1 ' 0 3; W. N. Medlicott and Dorothy K. Coveney, Bismarck Europe, pp. 109-31. % u t k o » s k i , op. cit., pp. 377-83 ^Holborn, op. cit., pp. 25-6. 5

W a l l a c h , op. cit., pp. 42-4.

6

pp. 45-8, 58-61.

7

pp. 48-66

Ibid„ Ibid.,

passim.

and

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85

he continued to warn Gladstone off the A r m e n i a n issue, and discreetly encouraged his personal banker, Bleichroedcr, to d e v e l o p an interest in Ottoman financial q u e s t i o n s 1 . A b d u l h a m i d continued to seek Bismarck's advice at every diplomatic opportunity, and to treat Berlin, in the words of the Russian Ambassador, Nelidov,

as a "political observatory" f r o m which to

j u d g e the m o v e m e n t s of the European Great Powers 2 . He m a d e no further approaches for an alliance, but it seems unlikely that he had abandoned all hope: as he explained to the German A m b a s s a d o r , Radowitz, in N o v e m b e r 1883, he regarded the security of Germany and Austria-Hungary as vital to the Ottoman Empire's existence, and he would be ready to support them militarily if they were attacked by Russia and France, though in that case he must have confidence that he would not be attacked by Britain 3 .

' Hoi born, op. cit., pp. 42-3; Fritz Stern, Gold and Iron. Bismarck, Bleichröder and the Building of the German Empire, (London, 1977), pp. 419-20. ^A. S. Silin, Ekspansiya Germanii na Blizhnem Vostoke v kontse XIX veka, p. 103. 3 Holborn, op. cit., pp. 28-31.

CHAPTER SIX: THE EGYPTIAN CRISIS (September 1881-September 1882)

I Germany's friendship could offer the Sultan a measure of diplomatic protection in Asia, and perhaps, one day, a measure of military security in the Balkans; but, as Tunis had shown, it could offer him no protection in North Africa. Within four months of the French occupation of Tunis Abdulhamid was confronted by a major crisis in Egypt, where the authority of his vassal the Khedive Tevfik was challenged by an indigenous popular movement led by elements in the Egyptian army, with conscquences which were to lead within a year to the invasion and occupation of Egypt by Britain. The origins of the Egyptian crisis lay in events which antedated Abdulhamid's accession 1 . In 1875 the Khedive Ismail had defaulted on his foreign debts, the bulk of which were owed to private creditors in France and Britain. The British and French governments had jointly intervened to impose a system of supervision over Egypt's debts; this supervision had developed by degrees into financial control, with a debt commission or Caisse in charge of the Khedive's external obligations, and British and French Ministers installed in the Egyptian cabinet. In 1879 the Khedive Ismail made an attempt to shake off this foreign control: Britain and France responded by forcing Abdulhamid to depose him. Under ismail's successor Tevfik the Anglo-French financial condominium was restored, with British and French controllers overseeing the Egyptian government's revenues and expenditures: but the fiscal and budgetary stringencies imposed by what was effectively a foreign bondholders' regime progressively alienated important sections of the Egyptian population, and in September 1881 the Egyptian army broke out into open mutiny under the leadership of Colonel Ahmed Urabi. Abdulhamid's response to this crisis was widely misrepresented by his contemporaries, and their errors have been copied by later historians. Particularly in Britain and France, there was an assumption that Abdulhamid welcomed Urabi's rebellion as an opportunity to strengthen his own control

^For background to the Egyptian crisis see Scholch, op. citr, The Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt, I; Robinson and Gallaghar, op. cit., ch. iv.

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over Egypt; to replace the Khedive Tevfik by the latter's uncle Prince Halim, the heir-apparent who had been passed over when the rules of succession were changed in the 1860s; and to foster a revolutionary Pan-Islamic movement against European colonialism in North Africa 1 . The Ottoman documentary record tells a different story: Abdiilhamid regarded Urabi and his supporters as "vermin"; he mistrusted all members of the Khedival family equally and had no marked prel'erence for Halim over Tevfik; and, far f r o m wishing to dabble in revolutionary politics, his chief fear was that Britain was using Urabi f o r revolutionary purposes of her o w n 2 . Western misrepresentation of his aims was partly self-interested: by presenting Abdiilhamid as the disturber of the status quo, France and Britain could excuse their own infractions as defensive responses. But it also derived from a misunderstanding of his attitude towards the deposition of the Khedive ismail in 1879. The Sultan's then Grand Vizier Hayreddin Pa§a had argued that Ismail's removal could furnish an opportunity to install Prince Halim and to strengthen Ottoman control over Egypt, and these suggestions were mistakenly attributed to Abdiilhamid himself. In fact, Abdiilhamid had rejected Hayreddin's advice and agreed to depose ismail only after Britain and France had made it plain that they were prepared to proceed independently- 1 . His hesitations sprang not from any hope of extending his own authority, but from a desire to preserve the status quo from Anglo-French encroachment. Abdiilhamid's policies in 1881 reflected a similar c o m m i t m e n t to the status quo. This derived from three considerations. The first was Abdiilhamid's sense of the limitations of his own power. Egypt was only nominally a province of the Ottoman Empire; for more than two generations it had enjoyed most of the attributes of an independent state: its own hereditary rulers, system of administration and armed forces. The Sultan's rights there were strictly limited both b\ O t t o m a n F i r m a n s and by international treaties concluded with the Great Powers. He was entitled to receive an annual money tribute, and to call upon the Khedive's military assistance in wartime; he might also furnish the Khedive with military assistance against f o r e i g n aggression or domestic rebellion, but only if the Khedive should request it. In sum, Egypt was not so much a vassal as an allied state, and one in which the Sultan lacked any practical basis f o r intervention, interference or even i n f l u e n c e 4 . In the second place, the legal status q u o might o f f e r s o m e protection for the Sultan's interests against the encroachments of Britain and France. These two Powers, unlike the Ottoman Empire, enjoyed real influence

' S e e , e.g., Scholch, op. cit., p. ?.44ff; P. J. Vatikiotis, The Modern History of Egypt, p. 466. ^Selim Deringil, ' T h e Ottoman Response to the Egyptian Crisis of 1881-1882', Middle Eastern Studies, 24:i, (January 1988) ' T h e "Residual Imperial Mentality" and the 'Urabi Pa§a Uprising in Egypt: Ottoman Reactions to Arab Nationalism', Studies on Turkish-Arab Relations, I, (1986); cf. Hasan Adali, 'Documents pertaining to the Egyptian Question in the Yildiz Collection of the Ba^bakanlik Ar§ivi, Istanbul', in P. M. Holt (ed.), Political and Social Change in Modern Egypt. 3 f e t i n , o p dt., pp. 205-8. ^Scholch, op. cit., p. 11.

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in Egypt, and over the previous half-century had built up a considerable financial, political and strategic stake there. For France, Egypt was a vital link in the chain of her Mediterranean security, while for Britain, the safety of the Suez Canal was a major imperial interest. Together, these two Powers owned the bulk of Egypt's foreign debt, held the greatest share of its external trade, and since 1875 had effectively chosen its government. Furthermore, by virtue of their Mediterranean fleets, both were in a position to assert military control over Egypt, a country vulnerable to invasion from the sea 1 . Abdiilhamid never challenged the legitimacy of Britain's and France's interest in Egypt, but the steady increase in their political interference there since 1875, and his own lack of any effective means of resistance, could not but lead him to fear that Egypt might go the way of Tunis. His only practical defence was insistence upon respect for the legal status quo. The third and in some ways decisive consideration was Abdiilhamid's fear of the Egyptians themselves, and, in particular, his apprehension that Egypt might emerge as a rival Middle Eastern power, and challenge the Ottoman Empire for the control of its Arab provinces. Abdiilhamid had a powerful sense of precedent, and he had not forgotten Mehmed Ali Pa§a's successful conquest of Syria from Mahmud II in the 1830s 2 . The international settlement of the Egyptian question in 1839-1841 had put an end to the direct military threat from Egypt, by reducing the Egyptian army to 18,000 men 3 . Nonetheless, the possibility of a political threat remained: immediately after San Stefano there had been rumours that the Khedive Ismail would attempt to subvert the Arab population of Syria, and even after Ismail's deposition in 1879 there were rumours that his successor Tevfik was intriguing in the Hedjaz. In any case, the exiled ismail was soon sponsoring Arabic newspapers which called for independence for the Arabs and the transfer of the Caliphate to Cairo 4 . These apprehensions were reinforced by Abdiilhamid's more general fears of Arab separatism, and of a British-backed attempt to set up a rival Arab Caliphate. The suspicions which had first been aroused by Layard's visit to Midhat Pa§a at Damascus in September 1879 had continued to grow. In February 1880 Abdiilhamid had been seriously alarmed by reports that the Emir of Mecca, §erif Hiiseyin, had been in secret contact with Britain regarding the establishment of "an Arab government in opposition to the Caliphate": §erif Hiiseyin's assassination one month later by an obscure Afghan was possibly not a coincidence 5 . Further, from August 1880 until the middle of 1881, incidents involving the appearance of anti-Ottoman placards and handbills were reported from various centres in the Arab provinces, principally Beyrut and Damascus; among those suspected of perpetrating these

1 Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit., pp. 76-87; Guillen, op. cit., pp. 151-3. ^Deringil, 'The Ottoman Response', p. 9. ^Scholch, op. cit., p. 11. ^Buzpinar, op. cit., p. 5 Uzuni;ar§ili, Mekke-i Mukerreme Emirleri, p. 139.

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incidents were persons ivith known British connections 1 . As Abdiilhamid himself noted, support lor Arab independence was of a piece with the Gladstone government's general support for the Ottoman subject peoples and the principle of autonomy: [t is clear that England — God forbid! — is striving to dissolve the Ottoman Empire into statelets. It amounts not to autonomy but to anatomy, by creating, for example, an "Albania" \in\ Albania, an "Armenia" in the Armenian-inhabited places, an Arab government in all the places inhabited by Arabs, and a "Turkey" in the Turkishinhabited areas. And in addition [she wishes| to transfer the Great Caliphate from Istanbul to Jeddah in Arabia or to Egypt, and by using the Caliphate as a tool in her service, to rule all Moslems as she likes 2 . This emerging belief in a long-term British plan to detach the Arabs and promote a rival Caliphate reflected something more than Abdiilhamid's normal suspicious-mindcdness: it bore the hallmarks of a paranoid obsession. Few if any of the Sultan's Ministers shared the belief; but it was to prove remarkably resistant to argument, and resilient in the face of changing circumstances. All was grist to its mill, including the activities, real or alleged, of figures as diverse as the Khedives of Egypt, the Emirs of Mecca, Ahmed Urabi and the Sudanese Mahdi: all were denounced in identical terms as agents of a single British conspiracy. As long as the belief was focused upon domestic figures like the Emirs of Mecca, it counted for little, even in internal terms: it simply reinforced Abdiilhamid's concern to keep the Arabs loyal. But with the outbreak of the Egyptian crisis in 1881, it emerged for the first time as a major constraint upon the Sultan's foreign policy. It was to prove a lasting one. Such were the broad considerations which shaped Abdiilhamid's response to the Egyptian crisis of 1881-2. However, it must be emphasized that much of the detail of his conduct awaits clarification. The explorations of the Ottoman archives conducted by Deringil, Adah and others have turned up much valuable material, but we still possess no complete picture of the Sultan's day-to-day handling of the crisis, and, in particular, of the ways in which these broader considerations shaped his responses to certain particular events. The following, however, may be safely said.

n The immediate causc of the Egyptian crisis of 1881-1882 was the Khedive Tcvfik's loss of control over his own army. The reimposition of

' Buzpinar, op. cit., p. 2

(^etin and Yildiz, op. cit., p. 302.

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91

Anglo-French financial control which accompanied his accession had been greeted with hostility by many classes of Egyptians: by the I'urco-Circassian landowning elite, which feared for its traditional power and fiscal privileges; by lesser indigenous notables, who had fiscal grievances of their own; and by Moslem opinion in general, alarmed by what it saw as Christian domination 1 . But it was the junior army officers who played the decisive role in breaking the Khedive's power. Their immediate grievance was the programme of army cuts and redundancies imposed by Tevfik's Anglo-French financial advisers, a grievance aggravated by claims that the ethnically Turkish and Circassian higher command was implementing the cuts in a fashion which discriminated against native Arab officers. Officers' protests had begun in January 1881, and in February the Khedive had been forced to replace his Circassian War Minister by Mahmud Sami al-Barudi, a figure sympathetic to the junior officers; but matters did not assume critical proportions until early September, when Colonel Ahmed Urabi led the Cairo garrison into open mutiny and presented the Khedive with a programme of overtly political demands: he must replace his Prime Minister, restore the army to its full previous strength, and convene the Assembly of Delegates, a quasi-parliamentary body which had not met since 1879 2 . The Khedive promptly asked the Sultan to send troops to restore order; but then as promptly withdrew the request and conceded all the mutineers' demands. He appointed the moderate oppositionist §erif Pa§a to serve as Prime Minister, confirmed Mahmud Sami as War Minister, and assured the Sultan that matters were under control 3 . The Ottoman government maintained a prudent reserve; it feared that Britain and France might use the disturbances as a pretext for intervention, and it was anxious not to provoke them 4 . Inadvertently, however, it soon did so. In October Abdulhamid despatched a mission of investigation to Egypt under Marshal Ali Nizami Pa§a and Ali Fuad Bey; the details of their instructions remain obscure, but they appear to have done little more than inspect military barracks and warn Urabi and his supporters to remain loyal to the Sultan-Caliph and his representative the Khedive 5 . Even this was sufficient to lead Britain and France to suspect an Ottoman attempt to undermine Egypt's autonomy: within two weeks they had demanded that the mission be withdrawn, and backed their demand by despatching warships to Alexandria. The Sultan at once gave way, and the Anglo-French warships were recalled. Nonetheless, the willingness of Britain and France to resort to measures of forcible intervention had been clearly and alarmingly demonstrated; so had Abdiilhamid's lack of any independent means to counter them 6 .

^Scholch, op. cit., pp. 99-134. Ibid„ pp. 135-60. •'Said Pa§a, Hatirat, i, pp. 72-3. 4 Ibid., op. cit. 5 Ibid„ p. 73-4; Scholch, op. cit., pp. 172-6. 6 Cromer, op. cit., pp. 194-200; Guillen, op. cit., pp. 152-3. 2

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T h e Sultan's c o n c e r n w a s r e i n f o r c e d by the fragility of the political situation w i t h i n E g y p t . !jerif Pa§a r e p r e s e n t e d the m o d e r a t e w i n g of the E g y p t i a n opposition, but it w a s already c l e a r that real p o w e r lay with Urabi and his f e l l o w - o f f i c e r s , w h o s e a m b i t i o n s r e m a i n e d unclear. T h e K h e d i v e had already hinted that Urabi might be a tool of the pretender Prince H a l i m , and the Sultan can scarcely have been reassured by t w o petitions submitted to him at the end of N o v e m b e r by Urabi and the W a r Minister, M a h m u d S a m i , both of w h i c h plainly hinted at the d e s i r a b i l i t y of a c h a n g e of K h e d i v e : they employed abusive language to depict T e v f i k as the plaything of foreigners, and a c c u s e d h i m of s e e k i n g to p l a c e E g y p t u n d e r British rule. T h e S u l t a n c h a r a c t e r i s e d t h e s e petitions as i n s u b o r d i n a t e , and his a p p r e h e n s i o n s w e r e doubtless reinforced by a c h a n g e of g o v e r n m e n t which occurred in France in t h e s a m e m o n t h : the n e w P r i m e M i n i s t e r . G a m b e t t a , w a s k n o w n to be a friend and partisan of Prince H a l i m 1 . T h e Sultan decided that his best h o p e of containing Britain and F r a n c e lay in enlisting the s u p p o r t of the o t h e r P o w e r s , a n d , in particular, in his current application f o r an alliance with G e r m a n y . B i s m a r c k w a s cautions: he had litte direct interest in E g y p t , and had no wish to be manoeuvred into a c o n f r o n t a t i o n with Britain a n d F r a n c e . A s e v e r , his d e e p e r c o n c e r n s w e r e European: he feared that the A n g l o - F r e n c h partnership in Egypt might d e v e l o p into a solid entente which could tempt R u s s i a a w a y f r o m the T h r e e Emperors' Alliance. His secret hope w a s that Britain and France would eventually quarrel o v e r E g y p t , and he b e l i e v e d that t h e y w e r e m o r e likely to d o so if l e f t u n o p p o s e d . H e urged restraint u p o n R u s s i a and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , w h o w e r e i n c l i n e d to v i e w t h e p r o s p e c t of s e p a r a t e A n g l o - F r c n c h a c t i o n w i t h m i s g i v i n g s : they a r g u e d that it w o u l d violate the powers' collective right to supervise the N e a r Eastern status q u o . T o the Sultan, he o f f e r e d reassurance, w h i l e a v o i d i n g giving pledges of support: he s u g g e s t e d to Ali N i z a m i Pa§a and Re§id B e y that fears of an A n g l o - F r e n c h challenge to the Egyptian status q u o were e x a g g e r a t e d 2 . Nonetheless, the f a c t that the Sultan's e n v o y s c h o s e to report at this time that the O t t o m a n request for an alliance had been accepted must have raised Abdiilhamid's hopes. Bismarck's assurances w e r e partly j u s t i f i e d . Britain and F r a n c e had no i m m e d i a t e intention of intervening in Egypt. B o t h w e r e uneasily a w a r e that any attempt to tamper w ith the status q u o could upset the balance of their o w n interests, and j e o p a r d i s e their unity. T h e y w e r e also unsure as to the f o r m an e v e n t u a l military intervention s h o u l d take. Britain w a s inclined to f a v o u r O t t o m a n intervention as being m o s t c o n f o r m a b l e with t h e legal status q u o , p r o v i d e d that it was s u b j e c t to s a f e g u a r d s w h i c h w o u l d p r e v e n t t h e Sultan f r o m encroaching upon Egypt's a u t o n o m y . A g a i n s t this, France objected

^Deringil, ' T h e Ottoman Response', pp. 5-9, 2

Windelband, up. cit., pp. 304-18, 329-37.

passim.

that

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93

any Ottoman presence at Cairo would expose her to 'Pan-Islamic' threats in Tunis and Algeria: she insisted that any expedition should be Anglo-French. Both Powers preferred to treat the issue as academic: §erif Pa§a had assured them that he would pursue a policy of moderate political reform, but do nothing to compromise the financial condominium, and this gave hope that the Egyptians might yet achieve an acceptable political settlement unaided, and without prejudice to Anglo-French interests 1 . However, Gambetta's arrival in office at the end of November produced a change in France's attitude: he insisted that the movement against the Khedive's authority must be checked, and, from the start, he took the view that Anglo-French military intervention was both likely and desirable 2 . He was soon given an opportunity to press his views. The Egyptian Assembly of Delegates convened at Cairo in late December, and, under §erif Pa§a's guidance, began to consider a modest extension of its quasi-parliamentary powers. Gambetta objected that this would undermine the Khedive's authority, and thereby threaten Anglo-French political influence and the financial condominium. The British government declined to consider a military expedition, but conceded that diplomatic pressure might be exerted. The result was the Joint Note of 8 January 1882, in which Britain and France informed the Egyptian government of their determination to preserve the Khedive's established authority, and dropped an unmistakable hint at military intervention if it were impaired 3 . This time, it was the Sultan's turn to protest at illegal interference in Egypt's internal affairs: he feared that the Joint Note was intended as a prelude to military action. His protest was supported by Germany, Russia, Austria-Hungary and Italy: all saw the Joint Note as an unacceptable violation of the legal status quo, and of their own collective rights. Britain and France beat a hasty retreat, a process facilitated by Gambetta's fall from office at the end of January: they assured the Sultan that they would respect the status quo, and that they had no intention of proceeding to military intervention. Abdiilhamid believed that his faith in Germany had been vindicated 4 . The Sultan's diplomatic triumph proved short-lived. The Joint Note had done serious damage within Egypt: by appearing to place Britain and France in opposition to any political reform, and by presenting the Khedive as an Anglo-French puppet, it rendered §erif Pa§a's position untenable. The Assembly of Delegates moved into alliance with Urabi and his fellow-officers; at the beginning of February the Khedive was forced to dismiss §erif Pa§a, and to appoint a new cabinet with Mahmud Sami as Prime Minister and Urabi

1 Robinson, R., and Gallagher, J., Africa and the Victorians. The Official Mind of Imperialism, pp. 94-6; Guillen, op. cit., pp. 52-3; pp. 52-3; Cromer, op. cit., pp. 194^213. 2 Guillen, op. cit., p. 153. 3 Ibid., pp. 153-4; Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit., pp. 96-7; Cromer, op. cit., pp. 214-35. 4 £ e t i n and Yildiz, op. cit., p. 50; Windelband, op. cit., pp. 338-42.

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himself as Minister of War. The Assembly of Delegates proceeded to vote a substantial extension of its own powers, including the power to control the budget, thereby touching on the Anglo-French financial condominium. Meanwhile Urabi secured his grip upon Egypt's armed forces: he purged the entire higher command, a number of whose more prominent Turkish and Circassian members were arrested in March on conspiracy charges, and sent into internal exile. The Khedive had lost all independent authority: to all intents and purposes, Egypt had a revolutionary regime 1 . This forced the Ottoman government to consider a response. In the immediate aftermath of §erif Papa's downfall there had been hopes that the crisis might blow over. The Khedive's renewed request for Ottoman military interven-tion had been turned down, and a blind eye turned to the Assembly of Delegates' attempt to set up a form of constitutional regime 2 . However, the Sultan's attitude soon showed signs of hardening. In February he informally despatched his Palace §eyh Ahmed Esad Efendi to Cairo, where he had some contact with Urabi. Ahmed Esad's reports have not been traced, but are unlikely to have been positive. By April the Sultan's Ministers were expressing serious concern at Urabi's disrespect for the Khedive: they proposed that two warships and an investigating official be sent to Alexandria, and that consideration be given to more radical measures 3 . The arrests and trials of senior Circassian officers strengthened this mood of resolve at the Porte, and in addition furnished a legal pretext for intervention: the officers in question held their commissions from the Sultan directly. The difficulty, however, was that Britain and France were likely to object to an Ottoman naval demonstration, and might seize upon it as a pretext for similar action themselves. Abdiilhamid believed that the answer lay in securing Germany's support, but his diplomatic luck had run out: Bismarck declined to intervene, and urged the Sultan to consult Britain and Francc 4 . Britain and France warned the Sultan off. Both Powers had come to the conclusion that there remained little prospect of restoring the Khedive's authority by any means short of military intervention, and, albeit with great reluctance, France had accepted Britain's view that such intervention was best entrusted to the Sultan. However, Britain and Francc remained deeply suspicious of Abdiilhamid's own ambitions in the Egyptian question, and were determined that any Ottoman military expedition should be placed under the collective control of the Powers. In a bid to intimidate the Urabists into s u b m i s s i o n , they despatched a combined fleet to Alexandria on 15 May, whereupon the Khedive did indeed dismiss the Mahmud Sami cabinet on

'Scholch, op. cit., pp. 202-31. Deringil, T h e Ottoman Response', p. 4-5.

2

3

Ibid.. pp. 5-6. ^Said Pa§a, Hatirat, i, pp. 74-7.

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26 May. Within two days, however, pressure f r o m the army had forced him to reinstate Urabi as War Minister, and this failure obliged Britain and France to consider f u r t h e r measures. On 30 M a y they invited the P o w e r s and the Ottoman government to an ambassadorial conference in Istanbul, to discuss the terms and conditions upon which the Sultan might be mandated to send forces to restore order in Egypt. The other Powers expressed their approval of an o f f e r w h i c h placcd the Egyptian question upon a E u r o p e a n footing: Bismarck urged the Sultan to join the Conference, and to accept the proposal for an Ottoman expedition 1 . T o Abdiilhamid, however, the Anglo-French invitation was a source of considerable embarrassment. Not only did it implicitly restrict his established right of independent intervention, but, much more important, it coincided with a decisive shift in his own attitude away f r o m the notion of Ottoman military action. From the start, there had been a suspicion that IJrabi w a s in some sense an A r a b nationalist, and that the ultimate objective of his m o v e m e n t was the establishment of an "Arab g o v e r n m e n t " which could serve as an alternative focus for the loyalty of the Sultan's A r a b subjects. The suspicion had been voiced by Ali Nizami Pa§a and A h m e d Esad Efendi during their visits to Egypt; Urabi himself was aware of it, and had privately assured the Sultan of his c o m m i t m e n t to I s l a m i c unity. T h e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t w a s unimpressed: by J u n e the Sultan's Ministers were convinced that the root c a u s e of the Urabist m o v e m e n t w a s "the feeling of p r e s e r v a t i o n of n a t i o n a l i t y " 2 . A s viewed f r o m Yildiz, this raised the risks involved in an Ottoman expedition to an unacceptable level. In the first place, it suggested that Ottoman forces might encounter serious armed resistance; in the second, it aroused fears of an adverse reaction by Arab and Moslem opinion within the Empire, particularly if the Sultan were perceived to be fighting Urabi on behalf of the Christian Powers; in the third, it brought into play Abdulhamid's long-standing suspicions as to possible British designs u p o n his A r a b subjects, and led him to suggest that Britain might be secretly encouraging Urabi, and that her proposal for O t t o m a n military intervention was a trap designed to provoke a revolutionary upheaval within the Empire 3 . The suspicion was fantastic, and appears to have been regarded as such by the Sultan's o w n M i n i s t e r s ; but its grip on A b d i i l h a m i d p r o v e d unshakeable. The upshot was that he refused to joint the Conference, which opened without him on 23 J u n e 4 . Instead, Abdiilhamid had attempted to forestall the P o w e r s , by making an i n d e p e n d e n t bid to f i n d a political solution. At the beginning of J u n e he despatched Marshal Dervi§ Pa§a to Egypt, with instructions to use the Sultan's moral authority to support the Khedive, and to undermine Urabi. T o this was added a further instruction that

' Guillen, op. tit., pp. 54-5; Robinson and Gallagher, op. til., pp. 100-3; Scholch, op. cit DD

231-43.

> /

• IT

^Scholch, op. cit., p. 174; Deringil, 'The Ottoman Response', pp. 3-6, 10; Adah, op. cit., p. 55. 3 Deringil, 'The Ottoman Response', pp. 10-1, 17-20. 4 Windelband, op. cit., pp. 373-85.

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he induce Urabi to come to Istanbul as the Sultan's guest. He was specifically warned that there could be no question of an Ottoman military intervention, both because "we do not wish to fight the Arabs", and because "Britain and France will ensure that any intervention fails". He w a s also instructed to publish a proclamation r e m i n d i n g the Egyptians that nationalism

was

incompatible with Islam. In short, Dervi§ was to defuse the political crisis by getting Urabi out of Eg>pt, thus depriving Britain and France of any pretext for proposing military intervention. The mission was a forlorn hope. Dervi§ Pa§a could not coerce Urabi: he could only make appeals to religious solidarity, offer flattery and decorations, pull rank, and allude in vague but minatory terms to the Sultan's right of military intervention. All was to no avail: Urabi refused to leave Egypt, and the Urabist press threatened armed resistance if an Ottoman expedition were sent 1 . Meanwhile pressure for a military solution was increasing. 11 June had seen the 'Alexandria massacre', an anti-Christian riot in which fifty Europeans were killed and substantial d a m a g e w a s d o n e to E u r o p e a n property. Abdiilhamid believed that this was a deliberate provocation organised by U r a b i 2 . Shortly afterwards, Urabi began to strengthen the fortifications at Alexandria, and to install shore batteries overlooking the Anglo-French fleet. Britain was determined lo respond: Gladstone's cabinet feared that Urabi's d e f i a n c e of the P o w e r s would set a d a n g e r o u s example to other Moslem peoples in the region, and might conceivably imperil British India. France was more cautious: Freycinet's government faccd growing parliamentary hostility towards extra-European adventures, and at the beginning of July it withdrew its warships from Alexandria. This simply increased Britain's determination to act: she suspected that France might be preparing to settle with Urabi. On 10 July she issued an ultimatum demanding the cessation of all fortification work at Alexandria within twenty-four hours. Abdiilhamid urged Urabi to comply, and appealed to Britain to extend her ultimatum. He was too late: the bombardment took place on schedule on 11 July, and over the next few days British marines took control of Alexandria. This provoked a final breach between Urabi and the Khedive. On 13 July the Khedive fled to Alexandria and placed himself under British protection; one week later he formally dismissed his Urabist Ministers. Egypt now had two governments: that of the Khedive at Alexandria, and that of Urabi at Cairo 3 .

'Deringil, 'The Ottoman Response', pp. 8-15. 2

lbid„

3

p. 10.

S c h o l c h , op. cit., pp. 257-9; Cromer, op. cit., pp. 287-96; John S. Galbraith and A f a f Lutfi asSayyid-Marsot, ' T h e British Occupation of Egypt: A n o t h e r V i e w ' , International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9 (1978), p. 483ff.

T H E

E G Y P T I A N

C R I S I S

97

in

To all intents and purposes, British military intervention had begun; the only question was whether it might yet be stopped. Abdul hamid responded by recalling Dervig Pa§a, and on 20 July he instructed the Porte to join the Ambassadorial Conference 1 . However, it was soon apparent that the Sultan remained as determined as ever to resist the notion of an Ottoman expedition, the solution which the Conference had been convened to authorise. In the first place, the bombardment of Alexandria threatened to have a disastrous effcct upon domestic Ottoman opinion, elevating Urabi to the status of an Islamic hero resisting aggression by the Christian Powers; in the second, it coincided with alarming rumours of contacts between Urabi and the Emir of Mecca, §erif Abdiilmuttalib, and of plans for anti-Ottoman rising in Arabia and the Yemen 2 . In the third, the Sultan was more than ever convinced that the British were manipulating Urabi: there were reports of suspicious contacts between Urabi and the British consul-gencral at Cairo; the British Ambassador, DulTerin, had spoken openly of the possibility of an Arab government and a rival Caliph at Cairo; and the rumours from Arabia suggested that those who were planning an uprising had made contact with the imprisoned constitutionalist Midhat Pa§a at Taif, through the intermediation of the British consul at Jeddah 3 . The problem was that no Power would stand in Britain's way. France regarded unilateral British intervention as the least bad alternative, and certainly preferable to an Ottoman expedition 4 . Bismarck saw no reason to restrain Britain, though he remained careful of the Sultan's susceptibilities — partly for this reason, he indicated that the Conference should not offer Britain a European mandate, but should leave her to act on her own responsibility. Austria-Hungary and Italy fell into line, and only Russia showed signs of disquiet 5 . Britain was more than willing to act: she had lost all faith in the possibility of an Ottoman expedition, and had begun to assemble an expeditionary force at Malta. She regarded a European mandate, though not essential, as desirable, and for this reason asked the Conference on 24 July to sanction a joint Anglo-Franco-Italian expedition, to be limited initially to the protection of the Suez Canal. Abdiilhamid responded by announcing himself ready to despatch an Ottoman expedition to Cairo to restore order. This failed to impress the other Powers. France and Italy declined to join Britain's Canal expedition, Russia withdrew from the Conference as a mark of disapproval, and Germany refused to offer Britain a European mandate; but in reality the

'Deringil, ' T h e Ottoman Response', pp. 14-6. 2

B B A r § , Y E E , K15/1126/Z74/14, M e m o r a n d u m by M a h m u d Nedim Pa§a, 25 §aban/13 July; Michel F. Le Gall, 'Pa§as, Bedouins and Notables: O t t o m a n Administration in Tripoli and Bingazi 1881-1902', (unpublished PhD thesis, Princeton, 1986), p. 27. 3 B B A r § , ibid.,; FO 78/3378, D u f f e r i n to Granville, no. 547, 3 July; Sir A l f r e d Lyall, Marquess of Dufferin andAva, II, pp. 17-8. ^Guillen, op. cit., p. 156ff; Cromer, op. cit., pp. 304-6. 5

W i n d e l b a n d op. cit., p. 395ff.

The

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Powers gave Britain a free hand. On 14 August, despite the Sultan's protests, they accepted Britain's suggestion that the Conference should be adjourned indefinitely, and two davs later Britain started military operations to secure the Canal 1 . The Sultan's o n h remaining diplomatic resource w a s to negotiate directly with the British. They remained willing to discuss an O t t o m a n expedition to Cairo, hut. with their own forces controlling all access to Kgypt, they sought to impose conditions regarding the numbers, points of disembarkation and length of stay of any Ottoman troops which might be sent. The effect was to c o n f i r m all A b d u l h a m i d ' s worst fears. A s he subsequently recalled: It was proposed b> the English that the Empire should send troops — to number no more than f o u r thousand — to the harbour of Aboukir, where Napoleon once disembarked and which cannot be approached in a m o d e r a t e wind or in stormy weather. But a c c o r d i n g to reliable information..., if troops were sent by the Empire to Egypt, Urabi's supporters would confront them with Kurans in their hands, and would thereby dissuade the Imperial troops f r o m firing upon them. This would have been at the instigation of the English. And even had events not turned out thus, the Empire was unable to send m o r e than f o u r thousand troops, and even if they had fired upon Urabi, \the latter's forces] were more then twenty thousand, and victory would naturally have been theirs. Thus the Empire would have been defeated as it constantly sent troops to Egypt in batches of f o u r thousand. Not only would this have produced no benefit, but the strength of the Empire proper would have been progressively destroyed in Egypt. T h e fundamental goal in this was to have the Empire's land and sea forces sent to Egypt, to weaken thereby the centre of the Sultanate, and thus eventually open the door to a great political revolution 2 . Nonetheless, he permitted his Ministers to negotiate with Duffcrin, and on 18 August they initialled a draft convention authorising an Ottoman expedition. Abdtilhamid demanded emendations; he took particular exception to a proposal that he issue a proclamation branding Urabi a rebel, and argued that this would provoke Egyptian resistance 3 . The negotiations dragged on; meanwhile Britain continued her independent military operations. By the end of August she had secured the entire canal; tier forces then turned inland, routed Urabi's army at Tel el-Kebir on 13 S e p t e m b e r , and p r o m p t l y occupied C a i r o . On 18 September Britain announced that an Ottoman occupation was no longer required, and Dufferin broke off his negotiations with the Porte 4 .

^ C r o m e r , op. cit., pp. 3 0 7 - 1 3 : C a l b r a i t h and Marsot, op. cit., pp. 4 7 8 - 8 8 . ^ f e t i n and Y i l d i z , op. cit., pp. " 1 2. ^ C r o m e r , op. cit., pp. 3 1 0 - 3 ; Said Pa§a, Hatirat, ^ C r o m e r , op. cit., pp. 3 1 3 - 2 1 .

i, pp. 7 9 - 8 2 ; Dcringil, op. cit., pp. 16-7.

THE

EGYPTIAN

CRISIS

99

Britain had occupied Egypt, and Abdiilhamid had done nothing to prevent her. Probably he sensed there was nothing he could do. The negotiations with Dufferin had been a charade on both sides. Britain needed to reassure the other Powers of her continuing respect for Egypt's legal status as a dependency of the Ottoman Empire, even while she was invading it; the Sultan, for his part, needed to do something to assert his sovereign rights, and perhaps, too, to assure Moslem opinion that he was making every effort to forestall the British occupation. All the indications are that the Sultan's first priority was not to forestall the British invasion, a task he knew to be beyond him, but to limit its effects, and above all to prevent any spread of the disturbances into the Ottoman Empire proper. From the moment the British started their landings, the Porte imposed severe restrictions on the reporting of news from Egypt; even private telegrams were censored. Throughout Ottoman Asia, the provincial authorities were ordered to watch for Urabist agitators and Urabist propaganda; refugees from the fighting in Egypt were subjected to close surveillance, and encouraged to return home at the first opportunity 1 . In mid-September, while attention was diverted by military developments in Egypt, the Ottoman authorities in the Hcdjaz arrested Urabi's alleged confederate §erif Abdiilmuttalib, and deposed him as Emir of Mecca 2 . No further disorders followed Tel cl-Kebir, and by the end of the year the widelyreported agitation of Moslem opinion had subsided 3 . Abdiilhamid could scarcely be expected to welcome the British occupation, but, judged by his own assumptions and criteria, he had made the best of a bad job. The occupation had one important diplomatic consequencc. France had acquiesced in Britain's unilateral intervention on the tacit assumption that the occupation would be temporary, and that Britain would confine herself to two objectives: the restoration of the Khedive's domestic authority, and the preservation of the Anglo-French financial condominium. This assumption was soon shown to be misplaced. Britain was keen enough to emphasize that her occupation would be as brief as possible, and that she would withdraw as soon as she had set the Khedive back on his feet; but she moved quickly to abolish the financial condominium, removing the British and French financial controllers by the end of 1882. She justified the change on technical grounds, but her real motive was plain enough: she wished to open the way to new arrangements which would render her own influence in Egypt paramount, and ensure that it would outlast her military occupation. France remained Egypt's largest creditor, and continued to enjoy a powerful voice in the Caisse; but the foundations of her political influence had been destroyed. Henceforth France assumed an attitude of outright opposition to the British occupation. I x d by

' ß u z p i n a r , op. cit. ^Ismail Hakki Uzunçar§ih, 'Hicaz vali ve k u m a n d a m O s m a n Nuri Paça'nin uydurma bir irade ile M e k k e Emiri Çerif Abdiilmuttalib'i azletmesi', Belleten, x: 39, (July 1946). ^Buzpinar, op. cit.,

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G e r m a n y , the other Powers held back: Bismarck had achieved his secret ambition of an Anglo-French quarrel, and he had no wish to discourage it. The Egyptian question entered a new phase of diplomatic conflict between Britain and France; how far this would affect the Sultan's direct interests in Egypt, and, less directly, his position within the European and Asiatic balances of power, were questions for the future 1 .

^Guillen, op. cit., pp. 136-4; Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit., pp. 122-8.

CHAPTER SEVEN: DETENTE WITH RUSSIA (September 1882-September 1884)

I

The British invasion of Egypt was followed by a marked improvement in the Ottoman Empire's relations with Russia. Some saw this as cause and effect, suggesting that Abdiilhamid had turned to Russia out of disappointment at Germany's attitude during the Egyptian crisis 1 . The evidence suggests that the Sultan's calculations were deeper and more long-term. Abdiilhamid had a considerable respect for Russia's might and resources, and for the strategic preponderance which she had achieved over the Ottoman Empire as a result of her military victory in 1878. He also placed a high value upon her influence in the Balkan states, and in particular in Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia: "wherever there are Slavs and these belong to the Eastern Church Russian influence is always paramount and it will always be so" 2 . Possibly, too, he was influenced by the thought that Russia and the Ottoman Empire had common interests as autocracies — a suggestion sometimes urged upon him by Russian diplomats 3 . These general considerations were reinforced by more specific calculations. The experience of the Cyprus Convention had shown that poor relations with Russia rendered the Sultan vulnerable to other, no less threatening Powers, and primarily to Britain. Further, his failure to obtain a military alliance with Germany and Austria-Hungary had left him isolated and vulnerable, above all in the Balkans, where Russia exerted considerable political and military influence. As early as 1878, there had been signs that Abdiilhamid would welcome better relations with Russia; what had delayed a rapprochement was the series of quarrels arising out of the implementation of the Treaty of Berlin, and Russia's flirtation with Britain's Concert of Europe. By 1882 the Berlin settlement had been substantially implemented, the Gladstonian Concert was dead, and the conclusion in May of a convention regulating the Sultan's

'M. Kleine, Deutschland und die Ägyptische Frage, 1875-1890, p. 72ff.; Jomini-Onou Papers, Egeron 3174, Nelidov to Jomini, 25 October/6 November 1882. 2 F O 78/3755, White to Salisbury, no. 506, 15 November 1885. 3 See, e.g., Lobanov-Rostovskii's remarks in Said Pa§a, Hatirat, ii, p. 34.

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payment of a war indemnity resolved the last outstanding dispute 1 . Thereafter relations improved rapidly, and not least because Russia herself was anxious for an improvement 2 . Russian policy assumed that the final collapse of the Ottoman Empire could not be long delayed, and that Russia must consequently establish herself in a position to take advantage of its dissolution. In particular, Russia was determined to gain eventual control of the Straits — "the key of our house", or more precisely, the key to the military and economic security of the Caucasus and the Ukraine. The Treaty of San Stefano had been designed to secure these goals, and its supersession by the Treaty of Berlin had come as a double blow. In the first place, the Berlin Treaty had evicted Russia from a position of potential dominance at the Straits and in the Ottoman Empire as a whole; in the second, it had nonetheless left the Ottoman Empire much weakened, thus creating a power vacuum which might be exploited b} Powers hostile to Russia. Salisbury's Cyprus Convention policy had worried Russia, and for much the same reasons that it worried the Sultan: it threatened to turn the Ottoman Empire into a de facto British protectorate, and to establish Britain as the dominant Power at the Straits. As long as her own forces remained in occupation of the Balkans, Russia could do something to recoup her losses: she had consolidated her military and political influence in Bulgaria, and staved off the installation of Ottoman garrisons on the Balkan range. But once she had withdrawn she was forced to recognise that her best hope of protecting her existing and future interests in the Near East lay in cooperation with other Powers. Hence her decision to join Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Three Emperor's Alliance of June 1881: formally, this arrangement guaranteed her position in Bulgaria and the closure of the Straits to British warships; practically, it offered an assurance that Germany and Austria-Hungary would not join forces with Britain in an anti-Russian coalition. That said, the Three Emperors' arrangement could not offer Russia absolute security in the Near East. It did not entirely remove the danger that Britain might gain control of the Sultan, and through him, of the Straits. It also left Russia dependent upon the goodwill of Germany and Austria-Hungary, Powers with whom her long-term relations were unpredictable: in this respect, the new intimacy between the Ottoman Empire and Germany was disturbing to St. Petersburg. It followed that Russia must seek a direct rapprochement with the Sultan: the problem was to determine its scope. The predominant view in St. Petersburg, represented by the Foreign Minister, Giers, was that no specific commitments or formal arrangements were required, and that normal good relations should suffice to keep Abdiilhamid out of the hands of Russia's enemies in the short term; in the longer term, Russia must build up her Black

' M i c h a e l R. Milgrim, ' A n O e r l o o k e d Problem in Turkish-Russian Relations: T h e 1878 W a r Indemnity', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 9, (1978). ^For the evolution of Russian policy see S. Skazkin, Konets Avsro-Russko-Germanskogo Soyuza, i, especially p. 103ff; Silin, op. rit., p. 65ff.

D E T E N T E

W I T H

R U S S I A

103

Sea fleet, and place herself in a position to seize the Straits by force should an opportunity arise. The minority, less cautious view was that Russia must take early steps to sccure control of the Sultan, by offering him an alliance analogous to the 1833 Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi, to provide for joint defence of the Straits. This view enjoyed the support of some influential Russian figures, including A. I. Nelidov, Russian Ambassador to the Sultan from 1882 onwards. Nelidov placed his faith in "influence": the gaining of the Sultan's personal confidence and the manipulation of his personal fears would offer a political means of securing a military objective, namely, the control of the Straits 1 . Like Salisbury, Nelidov overestimated Abdtilhamid's weakness and malleability ; but his known ambitions at the Straits, and his unccasing efforts to build up his "influence", were to cause the British in particular some sleepless nights. He gained the confidence of a number of figures at Yildiz, he did his utmost to encourage the Sultan's suspicions of British policy, and he gave some support to Gazi Osman Pa§a and other opponents of the German military advisers 2 . By early 1884 his constant activity had fostered an impression of growing, or perhaps preponderant "influence": Nelidov himself knew better 3 . In any case, it seems unlikely that Nelidov's superiors in St. Petersburg placed any special value upon "influence" in Istanbul; their sole concern was to keep the Sultan friendly, or at least not hostile. They were prepared to pay for this: for example, from 1883 onwards they allowed the Ottoman government to fall into arrears in the payment of the War Indemnity^. From Abdiilhamid's point of view, however, the more important gain from Russia's friendly attitude was the prospect which it offered of a measure of security in the Balkans. The failure of his alliance overtures to Germany and Austria-Hungary had left him facing the problem of indefensible frontiers, the potentially hostile Balkan states and the Balkan ambitions of both Russia and Austria-Hungary. Having failed to combine with AustriaHungary against Russia, he had little option but to look to St. Petersburg, as the best hope of security against Austria-Hungary, and against Russia herself. Russia's political strength in the Balkans had traditionally derived from her role as the patron of the Orthodox, and more particularly of the South Slavs. That said, the position by 1882 was more complex. The schism which had led to the emergence of an independent Bulgarian Orthodox Church, the Exarchate, at the beginning of the 1870s had alienated the Greeks from Russia, while the terms of the Treaty of Berlin had led both Serbia and

Zapiska A. I. Nelidova v Nelidova v 1882g. o zanyatii prolivov', Krasny Arkhiv, xlvi, (1931); Jomini-Onou Papers, Egerton 3174, Nelidov to Jomini, 17/29 October 1882; 25 October/6 November. 2 Silin, op. cit., p. 67; GFO, Tuerkei 153, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 135, 4 September 1883; Tuerkei 148, Goltz to Waldersee, 19 December. •3 J Jomim-Onou Papers, Egerton 3174, Nelidov to Jomini, 20 February/3 March 1884. ^Milgrim, op. cit., p. 525.

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Rumania to gravitate towards Austria-Hungary. Russia retained her influence in the tiny principality of Montenegro, but this was of comparatively little significance; her real strength, in the Balkans, derived f r o m the position which she had carved out for herself in the newly-created Principality of Bulgaria 1 . T o all appearances, Russia's position in Bulgaria was exceptionally strong. She enjoyed great popularity a m o n g the Bulgarian population, who regarded her as their liberator; she had e n d o w e d the principality with a constitution designed in part at least to ensure the ascendancy of Russophile politicians; and it was effectively she who had chosen the German princeling Alexander Battenbcrg, a relative of the Tsar, to be Bulgaria's ruling Prince. Her military hold on the principality was still more impressive: the new Bulgarian army was organised and commanded by serving Russian officers; the post of Bulgarian W a r Minister was regularly occupied by a Russian General who reported to St. Petersburg; and Russia had used her diplomatic influence to frustrate the provision of the Treaty of Berlin which called f o r the demolition of all fortifications in Bulgaria. Bulgaria was thus more than an ordinary client-state; it served as Russia's military advance-post in the Balkans, and a base for any future offensive against the Ottoman Empire 2 . In addition, Russia had taken effective steps to safeguard her interests in Eastern Rumclia, the a u t o n o m o u s Ottoman vilayet which lay immediately to the south of Bulgaria. Although she enjoyed nothing like the degree of direct i n f l u e n c e and control there which she exercised in Bulgaria, she had nonetheless taken advantage of her military occupation of the vilayet in 18781879 to frustrate the British and Austro-Hungarian hope that Eastern Rumelia might serve as a barrier against future Bulgarian and Russian expansion. In the first place, she had ensured that the Bulgarian element in Eastern Rumelia's population would be politically and militarily dominant, not least through their preponderance in the militia which served as the vilayet's substitute for an a r m y ; in the second, she had ensured the appointment of her n o m i n e e Aleko Pa§a as Eastern Rumelia's first Governor-General; in the third, she had prevented the implementation of the provision of the Treaty of Berlin which specified that Ottoman garrisons should be installed on the Balkan range along Eastern Rumelia's frontier with B u l g a r i a 3 . By these means, Russia had removed all serious local obstacles to the eventual unification of Eastern Rumelia with Bulgaria, and to the consequent extension of her own political and military power s o u t h w a r d s t o w a r d s the Straits. The only remaining obstacles were diplomatic, and these too had been significantly reduced, at least in principle, by the terms of the T h r e e Emperors' Alliance between Russia, Austria-Hungary and Germany 4 .

' Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism,

pp. 1 -30.

^Ibid., ch. ii, passim. 3

Ibid., pp. 205-11. Developments in Eastern Rumelia are surveyed in Statelova, op. cit., Siileyman Oguz, Osmanli Vilavet ídaresi ve Dogu Rumeti Viláyeti (1878-1885). Skazkin, op. cit., p. 186ff.

4

and

DETENTE

WITH

RUSSIA

105

Neither Abdtilhamid nor his advisers had any doubt that Russia had the unification of Eastern R u m e l i a and Bulgaria as her long-term a m b i t i o n 1 . Equally worrying, this ambition clearly coincided with the aspirations of the Bulgarians themselves. If nothing else, the abortive Treaty of San Stefano had furnished Bulgarian nationalists with a programme and a goal: the realisation of a 'Big Bulgaria' incorporating Eastern Rumelia and large parts of Thrace and Macedonia. Within the Principality of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, this goal was constantly propagated through officially-tolerated press and political agitation, and through periodic incursions by a r m e d Bulgarian bands into M a c e d o n i a 2 . There was little the Ottoman government could do to prevent this. Within Macedonia and other regions under its direct control, it could take a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and police m e a s u r e s to restrain the B u l g a r i a n national m o v e m e n t , limiting the influence of the Bulgarian Orthodox C h u r c h and church schools, and favouring the religious and cultural propaganda of the Bulgarians' rivals, the Greeks. But apart from issuing ineffectual protests, the Sultan could do nothing to restrain his nominal vassals, the governments of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia 3 . Hence the value, in Abdiilhamid's eyes, of obtaining Russia's cooperation. In the longer term, she might be brought to see that her o w n N e a r Eastern security w a s best served by supporting a friendly Ottoman Empire as a bulwark against her rivals; in the shorter term, she might at least restrain the Bulgarians. In one important respect, events played into the Sultan's hands. Russia's relations with Prince Alexander of Bulgaria had never been entirely harmonious. The Prince's aspirations to independent authority sorted ill with Russia's pretensions to a f o r m of protectorate; in particular, the Prince complained that Bulgaria's Russian-imposed Constitution left him powerless in the f a c e of the elected National Assembly, a body dominated by radical politicians w h o professed devotion to Russia but displayed hostility to the throne. In 1881 Russia permitted the Prince to suspend the Constitution and establish a f o r m of authoritarian rule. Initially this appeared to strengthen Russia's position, as the Prince appointed Russian Generals to the posts of Prime Minister and Interior Minister as well as that of W a r Minister. Within two years, however, Prince Alexander had quarelled bitterly with his Russian Ministers, and in September 1883 he executed a volte-face: he restored the Constitution, rid himself of his Russian Ministers, and f o r m e d an alliance with his erstwhile domestic opponents. This provoked a lasting breach between Prince Alexander and the Tsar. Russia insisted upon retaining control of Bulgaria's War Ministry and officer corps, but she accepted that she had lost most of her influence in Bulgaria's civilian affairs, at least for the time being.

'See, e.g., Said Pa§a, Hatirat, i, p. 428.

9

Ivan Katard/icv, Serkiot

Okrug od Kresnenskoto

vostanie

nacionalno-politiCki borbi, p. 36ff. ; Adamr, op. cit., pp. 100-2. 3 Adanir, op. cit., pp. 102-4.

do Mladoturskata

revotucija:

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POWERS

Some Russian officials spoke privately of deposing Prince Alexander, or of placing Bulgaria under Russian occupation 1 . One consequence was that Russia moved the question of Eastern Rumelia's eventual unification with Bulgaria down the agenda. She remained committed to unification in principle, but had no wish to implement it for the benefit of Prince Alexander. From March 1884 onwards she made plain her disapproval of popular agitation for unification, whether conducted in Bulgaria or in Eastern Rumelia, and when the Three Emperors' Alliance was renewed in June 1884 she made no attempt to raise the issue with Germany and AustriaHungary 2 . Shortly afterwards she secured the removal of the Governor-General of Eastern Rumelia, Aleko Pa§a, who was sympathetic to the idea of early unification with Bulgaria; with the Sultan's assent, he was replaced by the more pliable Gavril Pa§a-\ In these circumstances, a measure of Russo-Ottoman détente was possible. However, Abdiilhamid had little confidence that Russia had been permanently converted to a status quo policy in the Balkans. For one thing, her diplomats continued to make unofficial allusions to the desirability of Bulgarian unification 4 . For another, they continued to give official support to the activities of the Bulgarian Exarchate in Macedonia 5 . Furthermore, Russia's partnership with Austria-Hungary in the Three Emperors' Alliance implied the possibility of an agreed partition of the Balkan peninsula. The meeting of the Three Emperors at Skiernewice in September 1884 provoked rumours of farreaching territorial agreements, driving Abdiilhamid to seek assurances from Berlin and St. Petersburg 6 . The assurances were freely given, but they were not guarantees. The Sultan had no real security against Russia in the Balkans; he could only hope that she would continue to show restraint.

II By 1883 the Ottoman Empire had achieved definite, if limited recovery from the disasters it had suffered between 1875 and 1878. Though reduced in territory, population, revenues and prestige, it had not succumbed to internal collapse; nor had it fallen under British or Russian domination. It faced no immediate threat to its independence or external security. All territorial provisions of the Treaty of Berlin had been implemented, and the provision for

' j e l a v i c h , Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism,

chs. iii-vi, passim.

2

J e l a v i c h , Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, pp. 159-60; Skazkin, op. cit., pp. 331-5; Windelband, op. cit., p. 566ff.; Bridge, op. cit., pp. 144-5. ^Statelova, op. cit., pp. 199-202; Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism,

pp. 210-4.

^Statelova, op. cit., p. 201. ^ M i k h a i l A r n a u d o v , Ekzarkh losif i Bdlgarskata Ekzarkhiyata (1870-1915), i, chs. 9-12 passim.

kulturna

borba

sled

^Windelband. op. cit., p. 609: Radowitz, op. cit., p. 242; cf.. Said Pa§a, Hatirat, 2.

sdzdavaneto

na

i, pp. 135-6, 470-

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reforms in the Empire's European provinces had been answered by new administrative regulations promulgated in early 1880 1 . The chief outstanding issue was the treaty's provision for reforms in Asia Minor; Britain alone pursued a fitful interest in the Armenian issue, and she could be ignored 2 . The problem of the Empire's external debts had been resolved by the financial arrangement of 1882 known as the Decree of Muharrem: this created a Public Debt Adminis-tration responsible to the Empire's private creditors, and with direct powers over approximately one quarter of the Ottoman government's revenues. The danger of a general foreign supervision of the Empire's finances was thus averted: the Sultan retained absolute authority over the remaining three quarters of his revenues 3 . At home, too, there were clear signs of improvement. The Sultan's grip on his Empire was stronger than at any point since his accession. The constitutionalist movement was dead: its most prominent spokesman, Midhat Pa§a, had been arrested in 1881 on a charge of murdering Sultan Abdiilaziz, and had been imprisoned for life in Taif, in Arabia 4 . The Armenians of Asia Minor and the Bulgarians of Macedonia were quiet; so were the Moslem Albanians, while the much-touted threat of an Arab independence movement had failed to materialise. The Empire's finances were stabilising: Abdiilhamid was able to avoid his predecessors' recourse to foreign loans, a start had been made on reducing arrears of salaries and the outstanding obligations which made up the floating debt, and it had proved possible to initiate some modest administrative and educational reforms, though not to pursue the ambitious project for a Bagdad railway 5 . In its external aspects, at least, this relatively favorable outcome reflected a new European balance of power. The key was the Three Emperors' Alliance of June 1881. This had the effect of isolating Britain from AustriaHungary and Russia, and thereby prevented her from reverting to a Cyprus Convention or Concert policy in the Near East. It also forestalled any open conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. An alliance designed by Bismarck to ward off the threat of anti-German coalitions had the incidental effect of forestalling most possible coalitions agains the Ottoman Empire: the one exception, as Abdiilhamid realised, was a revisionist coalition between Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. In these circumstances, the Sultan could safely assume a position on the periphery of Great Power politics, and pursue a policy of non-commitment: his own attitude was nowhere crucial to the balance of power in Europe. It remained crucial in Asia, at least in theory, but there were no grounds for apprehending an early British or Russian move against the Straits: Britain had no allies, and Russia had no Black Sea fleet. Yet there was no guarantee that this relatively favourable

' S a i d Pa§a, Hatirat, i, p. 83. 2

Kiiçuk, op. cit., pp. 88-97.

3

Blaisdell, op. cit., p. 90ff.

4

I s m a i l Hakki Uzunçarjili, Midhat Pa¡a ve Yildiz

5

S a i d Pa§a, Hatirat, i, pp. 136-219

passim.

Mahkemesi.

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situation would last, and a series of scares in the autumn of 1883 served as a reminder of the underlying precariousness of the Empire's security: Gladstone's visit to the Tsar at Copenhagen conjured up the spectre of a revived Concert, and rumours of a possible break-up of the Three Emperors' Alliance provoked fears of a Russo-German war in which the Sultan would come under pressure from both sides to abandon his neutrality 1 . The Sultan's Ministers conceded that there was no short-term solution: the only remedy was to develop the Empire's armed forces, in the hope that its military strength would eventually attract European allies 2 . By 1883, too, Abdiilhamid had formulated his own clear views as to the terms upon which his Empire must conduct its foreign relations. His starting point was the fact of the Ottoman Empire's political and military weakness, and the potential hostility of all the Great Powers except, possibly, Germany. This threatened the Empire's survival: the Powers might partition it among themselves, dissolve it into small nation-states, or allow one of their number to reduce it to a protectorate. The chief task of the Sultan's diplomacy was to deprive them of any opportunity for pursuing these options, and to identify and avoid situations in which such opportunities might arise. Like his predecessors, Abdiilhamid accepted that there could be no question of attempting to resist all the Powers indiscriminately: his best hope of security lay in exploiting their mutual rivalries, on the basis of a considered a s s e s s m e n t of each Power's capabilities and underlying a m b i t i o n s . Specifically, Abdiilhamid had identified the principal threats to his own security as Britain and Russia, along with Germany the only Powers capable of embarking upon independent aggression; he had similarly identified his own chief weaknesses as his military vulnerability to Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, and his political vulnerability to Britain in his Arab provinces. Ideally, the solution lo these problems lay in enlisting the support of a Great Power protector. The difficulty was that, of the three possible protectors, Britain and Russia were unacceptable to the Sultan, and Germany was not interested. The Sultan had failed to find a friend; but he had done the next best thing, and chosen his enemy. The choice lay between Britain and Russia: Abdiilhamid chose Britain, and thereby broke with the practice of successive Ottoman rulers since the 1830s. From the Cyprus Convention through to the occupation of Egypt, Abdiilhamid had accumulated an impressive stock of grievances against Britain; he had also formulated a deeply pessimistic, and, in some respects, paranoid view of Britain's ultimate intentions towards his Empire. But these were not the only considerations, nor necessarily decisive: Abdiilhamid had grievances against Russia, too, and little faith in her longterm intentions. In the final analysis, Abdiilhamid chose Britain because she

' H o l b o r n , op. cit., pp. 29-31. 41-2; G F O , Tuerkei 159, Radowitz to B i s m a r c k , no. 177, 2 4 N o v e m b e r 1883. 2

S a i d Paija, Hatirat, i, p. 219,4TS-80.

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was weaker: unlike Russia, she could not threaten him militarily, at least not directly, and the political threats she posed could be contained through diplomacy and measures against internal subversion. Britain w a s the safer enemy.

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE SUDAN (September 1883-October 1884)

From the start of the British occupation of Egypt, it had been clear that there could be no question of the Sultan's simply accepting the fait accompli under formal protest, as in the case of Tunis. True, the presence of a British army at Cairo posed no military threat to the remainder of the Ottoman Empire, and there is no record that Abdiilhamid ever suggested that it might. But it greatly increased the political dangers to which the Sultan might be exposed. The occupation constituted too serious a violation of his Empire's sovereign rights and territorial integrity; it threatened too many complications with other European Powers, at least in the longer term, and might encourage claims for compensation at Ottoman expense; it was also a serious blow to the Sultan's prestige in the eyes of his Moslem subjects; and it conjured up the danger that Britain might use Egypt as a base for the déstabilisation of the Empire's Arab provinces. It followed that the occupation must be terminated as soon as possible; the problem was how. The Sultan lacked the power to force the British out unaided; France was hostile to the occupation, thanks to Britain's abolition of the system of financial condominium, but neither she nor the more cautious Three Empires could offer a practical diplomatic lead 1 . Britain held the initiative. At the beginning of 1883 she announced her readiness to talk: in a Circular dated 3 January she assured the Sultan and the Powers that her occupation would be temporary, and that she would evacuate as soon as the Khedive had been restored to a position where he could stand on his own feet. Specifically, she proposed to undertake a substantial programme of administrative, military, judicial, financial and fiscal reforms; she also proposed the conclusion of an international arrangement to guarantee freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal. The Sultan's Ministers saw an opportunity to assert the Empire's rights and promptly drafted a detailed reply. Abdiilhamid held back: France rejected the British Circular, the other Powers

^Guillen, op. cit., pp. 163-5; Windelband, op. cit., p. 415ff.

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c o u l d see no point in talks without her, a n d the Porte's reply w a s not s e n t 1 . During the next m o n t h s Abdiilhamid m a d e periodic attempts to inducc F r a n c e or the Three E m p i r e s to m a k e a m o v e , but to n o avail 2 . T h e British kept the initiative. By the late s u m m e r of 1883 they w e r e c o n f i d e n t that the K h e d i v e ' s d o m e s t i c a u t h o r i t y w a s r e v i v i n g , a n d in O c t o b e r they a n n o u n c e d

their

intention of withdrawing their a r m y of o c c u p a t i o n f r o m C a i r o to A l e x a n d r i a , as a first step t o w a r d s a full e v a c u a t i o n of E g y p t . T h e S u l t a n ' s M i n i s t e r s r e s p o n d e d with relief: t h e y a d v i s e d A b d i i l h a m i d to d e s i s t f r o m f u r t h e r i n i t i a t i v e s , and to wait a n d see w h e t h e r Britain f u l f i l l e d h e r p l e d g e of preliminary evacuation to Alexandria 3 . H o p e s of an earl} solution were d a s h e d by the revolt of the S u d a n e s e M a h d i . This religious m o v e m e n t against Egyptian and O t t o m a n rule had been gathering strength in the r e m o t e west of t h e S u d a n f o r s o m e t w o years, but attracted little international attention b e f o r e A u g u s t 1883, w h e n O s m a n D i g n a carried the revolt into the eastern S u d a n 4 . In S e p t e m b e r the K h e d i v e sent the r e m n a n t s of his a r m y a g a i n s t the M a h d i ' s w e s t e r n s t r o n g h o l d ; in late N o v e m b e r c a m e n e w s that this Egyptian expedition had been annihilated, and that in c o n s e q u e n c e the entire Sudan w a s e x p o s e d to t h e M a h d i . T h e British g o v e r n m e n t p r o m p t l y c a n c e l l e d its p l a n s for a p r e l i m i n a r y w i t h d r a w a l to Alexandria; nonetheless, it f o r e s a w that any f u r t h e r attempt to hold on to the S u d a n w o u l d i n v o l v e Britain in c o s t l y m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s w h i c h m i g h t postpone her evacuation of E g y p t indefinitely, and it therefore decided that the K h e d i v e must a b a n d o n the entire Sudan, t o g e t h e r with his a d j a c e n t territories on the Red Sea and Somali coasts. T h e K h e d i v e protested in vain. In J a n u a r y 1884 General G o r d o n w a s sent to K h a r t o u m to supervise the evacuation of the E g y p t i a n administration, and in F e b r u a r y a f o r c e led by General G r a h a m w a s d e s p a t c h e d to the Red Sea port of S u a k i n with i n s t r u c t i o n s to forestall a Mahdist advance to the coast 5 . Abdiilhamid d e r i \ e d no satisfaction f r o m Britain's d i s c o m f i t u r e . S i n c e the late s u m m e r of 1883 he had o b s e r v e d t h e p r o g r e s s of the M a h d i s t revolt with m o u n t i n g disquiet, seeing in it a f r e s h m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the f o r c e s w h i c h had f u e l l e d Urabi's rebellion. This a s s e s s m e n t a p p e a r s to h a v e sprung f r o m

' R o b i n s o n and Gallagher, op. pp. 491-5.

11., pp. 127-30; Cromer, op. cit., pp. 340-1; Said Pa§a, Hatirat,

i,

^Documents diplomatiques français, 1ère série, v, no. 37, Noailles to Challemel-Lacour, 18 M a y ; BBAr§, Y EE, K 3 6 / 2 4 7 5 / Z 1 5 0 / X I , C o m m i t t e e of M i n i s t e r s R e p o r t s , 13 Z i l k a d e / 1 5 September, and 5 Muharrem 301/6 November; Windelband, op. cit., pp. 508-11. ^Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit., pp. 130-2; BBAr§, Y E E , K36/2475/Z150/XI, C o m m i t t e e of Ministers Report, 5 Muharrem/fi November. 4 P . M. Holt, The Mahdist State in the Sudan, 1881-1X98, chs. i-ii, passim.; F. A. K. Y a s a m e e , ' T h e Ottoman Empire, the Sudan and the Red Sea Coast 1883-1889', in Selim Deringil and Sinan Kuneralp (eds.), Studies on Ottoman Diplomatic History V; The Ottomans and Africa. ^ M e k k i Shibeika, British Policy in the Sudan, 1882-1902, ch. iv, passim.; R o b i n s o n and Gallagher, op. cit., pp. 132-40; S. G w y n n e and G. T u c k w e l l , The Life of the Right Hon. Sir Charles Dilke, Ran., M. P., II pp. 28-37; B. Mallet, Thomas George, Earl of Northbrook, pp. 174-5.

THE

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113

nothing more than suspicion, but it was a suspicion vigorously expressed: the Mahdi was a "second Urabi", whose followers were "vermin", and whose ultimate objectives must be the creation of an "Arab government" and a challenge to the Ottoman Caliphate — an apprehension reinforced by the possibility that Osman Digna might succeed in crossing the Red Sea and subverting the Hejaz. Nor did Abdulhamid conceal his suspicion that Britain must be giving the Mahdi support, just as — he believed — she had secretly supported Urabi 1 . The difficulty was to know what do do. As in 1882, the Sultan was legally entitled to send troops to support the Khedive's domestic authority; but the exercise of this right was dependent upon a request from the Khedive, and no such request was forthcoming 2 . Instead, the Khedive argued that he might yet retain the Sudan if he were furnished with a fresh army, and he suggested that the Sultan might assist by permitting him to recruit volunteers within the Ottoman Empire proper. Abdiilhamid's reaction showed that his objections to military intervention in Egypt had in no way abated since 1882: ... if permission is given for the troops which Egypt wishes to recruit, this will plainly mean they become a Turkish army in the service of the English. To outward appearances they will be despatched against [the Mahdi]; but in truth, as part of the intrigues adopted by the English, they will be united with the vermin gathered around \the Mahdi1, and we shall have caused all of them to be used against ourselves. It is manifest what degree of difficulties the Empire's position will suffer from a second Urabi problem 3 . This did not deter the Sultan's own Ministers from proposing military intervention. They did not credit the notion of foreign involvement in Mahdism and they were confident of the Empire's ability to protect the Hejaz against subversion: nonetheless, they feared that the Sudanese problem might seriously delay Britain's evacuation of Egypt, and they were alarmed by her unilateral decision to alienate the Sudan from Egypt — a clear violation of the legal status quo which underpinned the Empire's own rights in the Egyptian question 4 . At the beginning of 1884 there was some speculation that Britain might agree to place the Sudan under direct Ottoman control, and on 7 January the ministerial committee which discussed Egyptian affairs advised Abdulhamid to follow this possibility up by making a direct approach to the British government and proposing joint military measures against the Mahdi. As an alternative, the Grand Vizier, Kii^iik Said Pa§a, suggested that the Sultan might send a Special Ambassador to London, and offer to negotiate a

Wasamee, op. cit., pp. 90-1. B B A r j , YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Committee of Ministers Report, 20 Rebiiilevvel/19 January oJ1884. Yasamee, op. cit., p. 91. 4 ibid„ pp. 91-2; BBAr§, YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Committee of Ministers Report, 9 Rebililevvel/8 January. 2

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c o m p r e h e n s i v e settlement of the Egyptian q u e s t i o n , to include a f i r m date f o r British w i t h d r a w a l 1 . A b d u l h a m i d refused to intervene in the Sudan. He a r g u e d that the S u d a n e s e p r o b l e m was the result of Khcdival m i s g o v e r n m c n t and the British o c c u p a t i o n , a n d , as such, a b y - p r o d u c t of the E g y p t i a n q u e s t i o n ; h e m a d e it plain that he c o n t i n u e d to suspect that the British w e r e b a c k i n g "the second Urabi", and he declined to a s s u m e direct control in the Sudan except as part of a c o m p r e h e n s i v e a g r e e m e n t f o r the t e r m i n a t i o n of t h e

British

o c c u p a t i o n of E g y p t . He a l s o e x p r e s s e d d o u b t s a b o u t the G r a n d V i z i e r ' s alternative: he predicted that Britain w o u l d use a n y talks to m a n œ u v r e the E m p i r e into a r r a n g e m e n t s a n a l o g o u s to the C y p r u s C o n v e n t i o n , and he d r e w attention to a F r e n c h s u g g e s t i o n that Britain w a s p l a n n i n g to d e p o s e t h e K h e d i v e T e v f i k 2 . Left to himself, A b d u l h a m i d would doubtless have preferred to wait for Britain's intentions to b e c o m e clearer; in t h e event, his M i n i s t e r s won h i m o v e r with t h e a r g u m e n t that talks w o u l d f u r n i s h an o p p o r t u n i t y to p r o b e Britain's i n t e n t i o n s , and on 21 J a n u a r y M u s u r u s Paça, the O t t o m a n A m b a s s a d o r to L o n d o n , invited the Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville, to enter into "an e x c h a n g e of views" on a m e a n s of solving the Egyptian question 3 . Granville replied that the Porte m u s t d e f i n e a basis for negotiation. T h e Porte c o n s u l t e d M u s u r u s , but it c o u l d s c a r c e l y e n d o r s e his proposal f o r a j o i n t A n g l o - O t t o m a n r e c o n q u e s t of the S u d a n ; instead, it instructed M u s u r u s to state that the Sultan's sovereign authority a l o n e could restore order to the Sudan and Egypt, that the British occupation should t h e r e f o r e be replaced by an O t t o m a n military e x p e d i t i o n , but that t h e E m p i r e w a s also r e a d y to consider a solution without a military e x p e d i t i o n 4 . Granville dismissed this as i m p r a c t i c a l , but a d d e d that he w o u l d be w i l l i n g to c o m e to "a c o m p l e t e understanding" as soon as G r a h a m had c o m p l e t e d his operations at Suakin; he hinted that he w o u l d w e l c o m e the i m p o s i t i o n of direct O t t o m a n rule o v e r s o m e portion of the K h e d i v e ' s territories on t h e Red Sea coast, t o g e t h e r with an u n d e r s t a n d i n g on the f u t u r e g o v e r n m e n t of t h e S u d a n 5 . T h e S u l t a n ' s ministers took his reply as a positive gain a n d a p r o m i s e of better t h i n g s to c o m e 6 . A b d u l h a m i d w a s m o r e sceptical: he noted that the E m p i r e ' s o f f e r of talks had not a f f e c t e d Britain's d e t e r m i n a t i o n to p u r s u e a unilateral policy in the S u d a n . He also d r e w attention to a r u m o u r that the p u r p o s e of G r a h a m ' s expedition was to rescue Midhat Pa§a and his f e l l o w - c o n s p i r a t o r s f r o m their

hbid., Committee of Ministers Report, 8 Rebiiilevvel/7 January; Said Pa^a, Hatirat, i, pp. 495503. 2 B B A r § , Y E E , K9/2636/Z72/4. Sultan's instructions, n.d.; Misir irade, no. 1127 no. 1127, 1/13 January. 3

ibid„ Y E E , K39/84/7/Z84/124. Committee of Ministers Reports, 16 Rebiulevvcl/15 January and 20 RebiiilevveI/19 January; FO 78/3620, Granville to Dufferin, no. 24, 21 January. 4

B B A r , Y E E K 39/84/7/Z84/124, Committee of Ministers Reports, 25 Rebiiilevvel/24 January, 29 Rebiülevvel/28 January, and 20 Rebiulahir/18 February; Irades, 2 8 Rebiiilevvel/27 January, 30 Rebiiilevvel/29 January, and 20 Rebiulahir/19 February; K36/2475/Z150/XI, Committee of Ministers Report, 16 Rebiiilahir/14 February. 5

F O 78/3620, Granville to Dufferin, no. 61, 2 9 February.

6

B B A r § , YEE, K36/2475/Z150. XI, Committee of Ministers Report, 7 Cemaziuyevvel/5 March.

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imprisonment in Arabia 1 . He suggested inviting the other Powers to mediate, but informal approaches to France and Germany proved discouraging; the upshot was that the Porte made a fresh approach to Britain with an offer to negotiate on the basis of the British Circular of 3 January 1883. Granville replied that Britain stood by the terms of the Circular, but repeated that the time was not ripe for negotiations 2 . The truth was that Britain's interest in Ottoman cooperation was limited. She was wary of allowing Abdiilhamid a foothold in Egypt proper, and Musurus's unofficial and unauthorised suggestion that Ottoman forces might be sent to Cairo merely encouraged a suspicion that the Sultan was hoping to undermine the Khedive TevfikA Nor did Britain envisage a physical Ottoman presence in the Sudan: she was eager to obtain the Sultan's sovereign blessing for whatever arrangements she might choose to make there, but her preferred alternative to Egyptian rule was a local accommodation with indigenous Sudanese leaders 4 . The Red Sea was a special case: the Khedive's territories lay directly on Britain's line of communication with India, and France and Italy had long-established trading stations there. The danger was that Egypt's withdrawal would offer France an opportunity to expand her control, but if Granville was consequently eager to transfer a portion of the coast to the Sultan's control, he was unwilling to place himself entirely in Ottoman hands: he envisaged a separate understanding between Britain and the coastal tribes east of Zeyla, and he was sensitive to the need to retain Italy's cooperation 5 . Britain's position was weaker than it looked. The evacuation of the Sudan did not proceed smoothly: by April it was judged safe to withdraw Graham's expedition and to reduce Britain's commitment at Suakin to a small garrison, but in the meantime Gordon had been cut off and besieged by the Mahdists at Khartoum 6 . Of more immediate concern to the British government was a major crisis over Egypt's finances. At the end of March the Powers presented the Khedive with a collective demand for four and a half million pounds as compensation for losses suffered by their subjects in the Alexandria riots of 1882. The sum was beyond Egypt's ability to pay, and forced Britain

1ibid., Committee of Ministers Report, an Cemaziyiilevvel/28 February; Misir t r a d e , no. 1155, 8 Cemaziyiilevvel/6 March. 2 !'bid., Y EE, K36/2475//Z150/XI, Council of Ministers Report, 18 Cemaziyulevvel/l 3 March; FO 78/3620, Granville to Dufferin, no. 89, 18 March; no. 117A, 12 April; GFO, Aegypten 3, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 33, 10 March; Hatzfeldt to Radowitz, no. 129, 22 March; Documents diplomatiques français, 1ère série v, no. 205, Noailles to Freycinet, 20 February; no. 206, Freycinet to Noailles, 21 February. •^Shibeika, op. cit., pp. 121-34; Agatha Ramm (ed.), The Political Correpondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1876-1X86, ii, pp. 146-7, FO 78/3620, Franville to Dufferin, no. 52A, 20 February. 4 Shibeika, op. cit., pp. 155ff. ^Gwynne and Tuckwcll, op. cit., pp. 40-3; Ramm, 'Great Britain and the Planting of Italian Power', pp. 233-4. ^Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit., pp. 139-41; Shibeika, op. cit., ch. viii, passim.

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to propose that the P o w e r s meet in a c o n f e r e n c e to c o n s i d e r w a y s of alleviating the Khedive's financial burdens: specifically, she envisaged a reduction of the interest on Egypt's debts, the transfer of a proportion of the debt revenues to meet the Egyptian government's expenditures, and a fresh international loan. France responded with a demand for political concessions, and as Egypt's largest creditor she was in position to insist. Negotiations between Britain and France issued on 16 June 1884 in an agreement which stated that, subject to the Powers' acceptance of Britain's financial proposals, Britain would undertake to evacuate Egypt by 1 January 1888 if conditions permitted. France in turn promised not to occupy Egypt subsequently, and to join with Britain in guaranteeing Egypt's perpetual neutralisation along Belgian lines 1 . With this agreement in hand, Granville announced that the financial conference would convene in London on 28 July 2 . The Ottoman government played no part in these negotiations. It had little direct interest in the financial question, and was at first concerned lest a purely financial settlement strengthen Britain's political hold on Egypt. For this reason it vainly proposed that the conference should examine the Egyptian question as a whole, and consider replacing the British occupation by an Ottoman or international occupation^. T h e Porte gave the A n g l o - F r e n c h agreement a correspondingly warm welcome: the Council of Ministers stressed the unprecedented value of Britain's agreement to an evacuation date, however distant and however conditional, and expressed the hope that the L o n d o n C o n f e r e n c e would prov ide opportunities to tie Britain's h a n d s f u r t h e r 4 . Abdiilhamid was more critical, and accused France of letting him down: he c o m p l a i n e d that the A n g l o - F r e n c h a g r e e m e n t m a d e no mention of his sovereign rights, that the proposed evacuation date was excessively remote, and that Egypt's neutralisation would violate Ottoman sovereignty. It was with some reluctance that he agreed to Ottoman participation in the London Conference 5 . The London Conlerence proved a failure. France had second thoughts about her agreement with Britain; Bismarck encouraged her, foreseeing that the Egyptian issue could furnish a useful lever in Germany's current disputes with Britain over colonies in A f r i c a and the South Seas. This F r a n c o - G e r m a n entente frustrated all Britain's financial proposals, and on 2 August the London

^Robinson and Gallagher, op. rit., pp. 141-3; Documents no. 311, Wadd/ngton to Ferry, 17 June. ^Robinson and Gallagher, op. fit., p. 143. 3

diplomatiques

français,

1ère série v,

B B A r § , Y EE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, C o m m i t t e e of Ministers Reports, 8 R e c e b / 2 May a n d 2 8 §aban/22 June; Misir Irade, no. 1174, enclosing Council of Ministers Report, 18 §aban/12 June, and draft circular. 4 Ibid., no. 1176, enclosing Committee of Ministers Report, 2 8 §aban/22 June, and Council of Ministers Report, an Ramazan;25 June. 5 Ibid., no. 1173, 15 § a b a n / 9 June; no. 1176, 2 Ramazan/26 June; Documents diplomatiques français, 1ère série, v no. 316. Noailles to Freycinet, 22 June.

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Conference collapsed 1 . The British government responded with two interim measures: it despatched Lord Northbrook to Cairo to conduct an inquiry into the Khedive's finances, and it decided to send an expedition to relieve Gordon at Khartoum 2 . At the same time Britain invited the Sultan lo take immediate charge of the Red Sea ports of Zeyla and Tajoura. Granville emphasized that the matter was urgent: the withdrawal of the Egyptian administration was about to begin, and if the Sultan failed to act, Britain would herself occupy Zeyla 3 . The invitation caused the Porte some embarrasment. On the one hand, it had had hopes of something better: the British Ambassador, Dufferin, had dropped encouraging hints, and had spoken of the possible stationing of an Ottoman warship off Alexandria 4 . On the other hand, the Porte was divided over the wisdom of intervention in the Red Sea: certain Ministers had objected that the Fmpire might be drawn into the Sudanese imbroglio. Furthermore, the Porte had recently challenged Britain's refusal to rccognise the traditional Ottoman claim to sovereignty over the coast east of Zeyla; it did not wish acceptance of Britain's offer to be read as a waiver of this claim 5 . The Foreign Minister, Asim Pa§a, side-stepped: on 19 August he indicated that the Fmpire would prefer to discuss the Egyptian question as a whole, and, in particular, to reduce the evacuation period proposed by the Anglo-French agreement of 16 June 6 . Granville replied that the Anglo-French agreement had lapsed with the failure of the London Conference: he assured the Porte that Britain intended to evacuate Egypt as soon as practicable, but he refused to discuss a date 7 . The Council of Ministers decided by a majority to accept these terms, and to occupy Zeyla in the hope that an opportunity for broader talks with the British government would eventually arise 8 . Abdiilhamid did nothing: it was clear that his objections to military intervention in Egypt or the Sudan applied equally to the Red Sea coast 9 . British troops occupied Zeyla in midSeptember, though their presence was declared to be temporary and Granville's offer to the Sultan remained formally open 1 0 . The Porte did its best to keep the door to future negotiations open: it repeatedly pressed Abdiilhamid to occupy Zeyla, and it declined to associate itself with Franco-German protests against Northbrook's decision to suspend the transfer of Egyptian revenues to

Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit., pp. 143-4. 2

ibid„ pp. 144-5. F O 78/3620, Granville to Dufferin, no. 178, 29 May; FO 78/3629, Granville to Dufferin, tel. no. 30, 13 July; tel. no. 33, 1 August. 4 P R O 30/29/191, Dufferin to Granvile, 12 August; FO 78/3621, Dufferin to Granville, no. 282 23 August. ^Yasamee, op. cit., p. 93. 3

6

F O 407/62, no. 301, Asim Pa§a to Musurus Pa§a, 19 August. 7ibid., no 333, Granville to Musurus, 25 August. 8 BBAr§, YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Council of Ministers Report, 12 Ziikade/7 September. 9 G F O , Aegypten 5, Radovvitz to Bismarck, no. 114, 18 August; no. 115, 25 August; no. 118, 1 September; no. 121, 6 September. 10 Ramm, 'Great Britain and the Planting of Italian Power', pp. 230-1.

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debt s c r v i c e 1 . Abdiilhamid continued to hesitate. He had hopes that the meeting of the Three Emperors at Skiernevvice in September would lead to an initiative in the Egyptian question, but, in the event the T h r e e Empires indicated that they would wait for Britain to declare her intentions, and advised Abdiilhamid to d o the s a m e 2 . In the m e a n t i m e , the British and Ottoman government lost contact. Eight months of diplomatic effort had produced no tangible results, though they had incidentally forced the Ottoman leadership to define its choices: either the Empire must lead Britain to a comprehensive settlement based upon a definite evacuation date, as Abdiilhamid clearly preferred; or else, as his Ministers preferred, it must accept the role of j u n i o r political and military partner in the occupation, and hope that this would tic Britain's hands in the future. For the time being, the Sultan chose to wait.

^BBAr§, YEE, K 36/2475/Z150/XI, Council of Ministers Reports, 15 Zilhicce/5 October and 25 Zilhicce/15 October. 2 B B A r § , YEE, K 39/84/9/Z84/125, §akir Pa§a to Asim Pa§a, tel. no. 241, St. Petersburg, 1 October; Sadullah Pa§a to Asim Pa^a, tel. no. 312, 30 September; GFO, Aegypten 5, Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel. no. 77, 12 October.

CHAPTER NINE: THE HASAN FEHMÎ MISSION (December 1884-March 1885)

During the a u t u m n of 1884 the a f f a i r s of the N e a r East b e c a m e increasingly o v e r s h a d o w e d by d e v e l o p m e n t s in Central A s i a . Russia's annexation of the Khanate of Merv in February 1884 had brought her into potentially serious c o n f l i c t with Britain o v e r the northern f r o n t i e r s of Afghanistan — the key, in British eyes, to the military security of India 1 . The t w o sides had early agreed to a p p o i n t a j o i n t boundary

commission;

nonetheless, the setting up of the commission was repeatedly delayed, and by the autumn r u m o u r s of Russian incursions into the disputed region were encouraging speculation that Britain and Russia might eventually go to war. This immediately raised the question of the Sultan's attitude at the Straits. In theory, he possessed the ability to confer significant strategic advantages upon either side: the opening of the Straits would furnish Britain with her most obvious means of offensive action against Russia, while their closurc would leave Russia impregnable at her weakest point. Legally, the position w a s clear: a scries of international treaties forbade the Sultan to open the Straits to f o r e i g n warships except in the case of a war in which he w a s himself e n g a g e d 2 . This, however, left open the possibility that Britain might seek to enroll him as an ally in a war with Russia; it also left open the possibility that Russia might enroll him as an ally, and thus render herself sure of his attitude at the Straits. The latter possibility caused the British government some concern. From October 1884 onwards their chargé d'affaires, W y n d h a m , reported a stream of unofficial approaches f r o m serving or retired Ottoman officials, all either professing anxiety for a British alliance, or else warning of

'David Gillard, The Struggle for Asia, 1828-1914, pp. 143-5; Rose Greaves. Persia and the Defence of India, 1884-1892, pp. 53-69. ^The principal treaties in question were the 1856 Treaty of Paris and the 1871 Straits Convention. For background see Barbara Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, the Great Powers, and the Straits Question, 1870-1887, and Cemal Tukin, Osmanh imparatorlugunda Bogazlar Meselesi; cf., Hayri Mutluçag, 'Bogazlar konusunda Abdulhamid'e verilen Ôzcl Rapor', Belgelerle TUrk Tarih Dergisi, 3, (December 1967), pp. 15-22.

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Russian overtures to the Sultan 1 . The talk of Russian overtures was almost certainly groundless, but it was given some credibility by concurrent Russian requests that the Sultan open the Straits to troop-carrying merchant vessels of the Volunteer Fleet, and by the Tsar's award of a decoration to Abdiilhamid in November. By December the British government was sufficiently concerned to send the Sultan a formal reminder of his obligations at the Straits; in private, Gladstone and Granville wondered whether it might be possible to find some means of moderating Abdiilhamid's well-known antipathy towards Britain 2 . Against this, both the Russians and some of the Sultan's own advisers foresaw that Britain might be tempted to use her presence in Egypt to exercise leverage at the Straits: she could bribe Abdiilhamid with an offer of withdrawal, or threaten him with annexation- 5 . At least some of the Sultan's advisers hoped that she would: the various approaches which had been made to Wyndham were clear enough evidence of the presence of a pro-British faction in the Ottoman leadership, though the Grand Vizier was not among them. However, matters were complicated by an unusually bitter dispute between Kutfiik Said Pa§a and a number of his colleagues over the quite separate issue of the award of the concession for the Balkan Junction Railways. It had been anticipated that the concession would go to Baron Hirsch, the original promoter of the Balkan lines: Hirsch enjoyed British and Austro-Hungarian diplomatic support, and had assembled a large following at the Porte and at Yildiz by methods which allegedly included bribery. Kiigiik Said was opposed to Hirsch, however, and by the end of 1884 he had succeeded in eliciting a rival tender from a consortium based on the Parisian Comptoir d'Escompte. There ensued a protracted struggle at the Porte and at Yildiz, in the course of which Kiigiik Said's personal position came under repeated attack 4 . It is ' A m o n g W y n d h a m ' s informants were the t w o successive Foreign Ministry Under-Sccretaries Artin E f e n d i and Fahri Bey, the President of the Council of State Akif Pa§a, the f o r m e r Governor of the Lebanon (anil future A m b a s s a d o r to London) Riistem Pa§a, and the f o r m e r Governor-General of Eastern Rumelia Aleko Pa§a. See FO 78/3626, W y n d h a m to Granville, no. 330, 7 October; no. 395, 15 N o v e m b e r ; no. 415, 25 N o v e m b e r ; FO 78/3748, W y n d h a m to Granville, no. 61, 4 February; no. 62, 6 February; no. 70, 7 February; FO 195/1508, Sandison to W y n d h a m , 3 March and 12 March. 2

F O 78/4272, Granville to W y n d h a m , no. 369, 11 December; Ramm, Political Correspondence, ii, p. 289. T h e reports of Russian alliance overtures were dismissed by Radovvitz and Calice; a private letter written by Nelidov in N o v e m b e r surveys Russo-Ottoman relations but makes no allusion to the possibility of an alliance. See FO 78/3748, W y n d h a m to Granville, no. 31, 20 January; G F O , Tuerkci 156, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 48, 13 March 1885; no. 71, 30 March; T h i e l m a n n to Bismarck, no. 4 16 January; Schjeinitz to Bismarck, no. 18, St. Petersburg, 15 January; J o m i n i - O n o u Papers. Hgerton 3174, Nelidov to Jomini, 30 October/11 N o v e m b e r . Details of the Volunteer Fleet episode in Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, pp. 129-30, and of the award of the Order of St. Andrew in G F O . Tuerkei 153, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 120, 6 September; no. 141, 6 November. ^See below, footnotes 18 and I 1 '. 4

T h e b a c k g r o u n d to this affair lay in the ' C o n v e n t i o n 4 Q u a t r e ' concluded in M a y 1883 between the Ottoman Empire. Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Serbia, which provided f o r the completion of the unbuilt sections of the 1869 Balkan Railways project. Completion was due by mid-October 1884, but the P o n e had insisted upon a prior settlement of its outstanding disputes with Hirsch b e f o r e it would a w a r d the new c o n c e s s i o n . B a c k g r o u n d in K u r t Griinwald, Turkenhirsch, pp. 57-8; for the conflicts at the Porte, see G F O , Tuerkei 144, R a d o w i t z to Bismarck, no. 143, date illegible; no. 145, 14 N o v e m b e r ; no. illegible, 20 February 1885; F O 195/1469, Wyndham to Granville, no. 249 Comm., 12 November; no. 270 Comm., 3 December.

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noteworthy that among Hirsch's leading partisans were a number of figures known for their pro-British and anti-Russian sympathies: the Interior Minister, Edhem Pa§a, the Justice Minister, Hasan Fehmi Pa§a, the Foreign Ministry Undersecretary, Artin Efendi, and the Second Palace Chamberlain, Ragib Bey. It may also be significant that attempts were made to persuade Wyndham that Kii^iik Said was pro-Russian. At all events, there were expectations that a change of Grand Vizier would bring with it a pro-British shift in the Empire's foreign policy 1 . It was against this unpromising background that Abdiilhamid unexpectedly seized the initiative in the Egyptian question. On 25 November Kii^tik Said informed Wyndham that the Sultan wished to send a Special Ambassador to London to discuss the affairs of Egypt and the reforms needed there, together with the question of a date for Britain's evacuation 2 . Granville replied with his customary demand for a basis for negotiation; the Porte promptly drafted a ten-point programme and submitted it to Wyndham on 4 December. The programme proposed that all British forces should evacuate Egypt within eight months of the ratification of a Convention embodying the results of the Special Ambassador's mission; that the Egyptian government should set aside £300,000 to defray the costs of the occupation during these eight months; that in order to remove the need for British troops, the Egyptian army should be increased to the maximum of 18,000 men permitted by the Firmans, or to some lesser figure agreeable to the British and Ottoman governments; that after Britain's withdrawal, the Khedive should be permitted to employ British officers in his army on fixed-term contracts; that the Ottoman Government would permit Britain to decide whether or not other Powers should be admitted to the Control of Egypt's finances, but would in cither case demand to be represented in the Control; that the laws and judicial institutions of Egypt should be assimilated to those in force in the rest of the Ottoman Empire, and that proposals to this end should be formulated either by the Special Ambassador or by a joint commission of British and Ottoman jurists; that all innovations introduced into the administration of Egypt since the Khedive Tevfik's acccssion must be considered invalid until confirmed by decision of the Porte and by Imperial Firman; that Britain should refer any proposals for the regulation of the status of the Suez Canal to the Ottoman Government, which would decide whether to confirm them by Imperial Firman; that an act of neutralisation would be required in order to protect Egypt from foreign invasion after Britain's withdrawal, but neutralisation must not affect the Sultan's sovereign rights and the Khedive's privileges, nor

' f O 364/2, memorandum by Sir Alfred Sandison on 'Turkish leading Ministers and Functionaries', 23 April 1885; GFO, Aegypten 5, Radovvitz to Bismarck, no. 17, 11 February; no. 68, 30 March; Radovvitz to Hatzfeldt, 16 March. 2 FO 78/3627, Jyndham to Granville, no. 419, 25 November.

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impair the Sultan's established and exclusive right to send troops to Kgypt to protect the Khedive's government and preserve public order; and that although the Khedive Tevfik's Firman of Accession had forbidden him to contract loans, the Sultan was willing to authorise a single loan to liquidate the expenses and debts incurred in recent events'. It is not clear what had prompted A b d u l h a m i d to act. H e may have calculated that the threat of war with Russia over Afghanistan would render Britain more amenable in Kgypt. More likely, he sensed that the diplomatic standstill in the Egyptian question w a s ending, and that passivity might encourage Britain to settle with the other Powers behind the Empire's back. On 24 November Gladstone had announced that Britain would shortly inform the Powers of her intentions regarding Egypt, and France had recently taken advantage of the power vacuum in the Red Sea to occupy Tajoura, one of the ports which Granville had earlier proposed for Ottoman occupation 2 . The ten points of the Ottoman programme were modelled on the British Circular of 3 January 1883, and essentially recapitulated existing Ottoman positions: the demand for evacuation in eight months was an obvious bargaining ploy, and the one serious departure was the acceptance that Egypt should be neutralised. Otherwise, the points set forth the Empire's views on topics likely to arise between Britain and the other Powers, and confirmed that the Sultan's goal was the fullest possible restoration of the situation prior to 1882. T h e y also confirmed Abdiilhamid's preference for a comprehensive settlement, and his reluctance to countenance direct Ottoman intervention in Egypt: there was no mention of the Sudan, and none of the Red Sea coast — a striking omission in view of France's action at Tajoura and the Porte's continuing advocacy of an Ottoman occupation of Zeyla. But there was little evidence of fresh thinking- 5 . The offer of talks took the British government by surprise. It was still awaiting the outcome of the Khartoum relief expedition, and had just embarked upon a fresh discussion of Egypt's finances with France. It had also abandoned any h o p e of O t t o m a n cooperation in the Red Sea, and w a s privately encouraging Italy to occupy the port of M a s s o w a 4 . Granville could see no point in accepting the Sultan's offer, and it was left to Gladstone to point out that the Sultan's apparent willingness to concede the principle of Egypt's neutralisation might strengthen Britain's hand in any future negotiation with ' f O 78/3629, Granville to Wyndham, tel. no. 50, 27 November; BBAr§, Misir Irade, no. 1186, enclosing Council of Ministers' Report, 11 Safer/30 November, and irade, 14 Safer/3 December. ^Gladstone made his announcement on 24 November: see Hansard, Pari. Debs., H. ofC., ccxiv, 277-80; cf. BBAr§, Misir Irade. no. 1186. enclosing memorandum by Said Pa§a, n.d. The French occupation of Tajoura is covcied in Ramm, 'Great Britain and the Planting of Italian Power', pp. 231-2. Egypt's withdrawal from the Red Sea proceeded in stages. On 25 November the Khedive announced the abandonment of the Harar and the coast south of Massowa: BBAr§, YEE, K39/2130/Z129/118, Special Council of Ministers Report, 7 Safer/26 November. ^Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit„ pp. 147-50; Ramm, Correspondence, ii, pp. 291-2, 298, 302-3; Ramm, 'Great Britain and the Planting of Italian Power', pp. 233-6; Shibeika, op. cit., pp. 28797.

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France. For this essentially tactical reason, Granville agreed to rcceive a Special Ambassador; however, he warned the Porte that he could not accept the ten points in their entirety'. Abdiilhamid soon had second thoughts. Granville's refusal to accept the ten points in toto disturbed him: he feared that Britain intended to manœuvre the Empire into a one-sided agreement. Not until 22 December did he decide that negotiations should proceed: he appointed the Minister of Justice Hasan Fehmi Pa§a to serve as Extraordinary Ambassador to London, and furnished him with instructions which essentially recapitulated the ten points 2 . After further hesitation, he decided that Fehmi should travel via Berlin and Paris, and hold preliminary consultations with Bismarck and the French Prime Minister, Ferry. Fehmi finally set out on 10 January 1885 3 . He was shortly followed by the Sultan's British Aide-de-Camp, Admiral Hobart Pa§a. Hobart's business in London was private, but he was instructed by Abdiilhamid to use personal contacts and the press to effect an improvement in the atmosphere of AngloOttoman relations. He eventually published two articles advocating an AngloOttoman alliance against Russia, but he was to play no direct part in Fehmi's Egyptian negotiations 4 . International reaction to Fehmi's appointment was mixed. Little was known of his objectives: the Porte made out that his mission was a Palace affair of which it had been kept in ignorance 5 . France and Germany were anxious that the Sultan should do nothing to make Gladstone's position in Egypt easier. Russia was more anxious lest the Sultan be manoeuvred into military arrangements in Egypt which might compromise his neutrality at the Straits; she withdrew her opposition once reassured as to Fehmi's objectives, but this favourable attitude did not survive a further deterioration of AngloRussian relations over Afghanistan during February 6 . At the Porte, too, there were doubts, centring on the Sultan's choice of Hasan Fehmi Pa§a as Extraordinary Ambassador. Fehmi was known as a strong Anglophile, a partisan of Baron Hirsch and a personal rival of the Grand Vizier, and while Kiiçùk Said continued to support the principle of his mission he made little ^Ramm, Correspondence, ii, p. 292, pp. 295-6; FO 78/3629, Granville to Wyndham, tel. no 56, 5 December; FO 78/3621, Granville to Wyndham, no. 373, 15 December. ^BBAr§, Misir Irade, no. 1187, 28 Safer/17 December; no. 1191, enclosing Council of Ministers Report, 6 Rebiiilevvel/24 December. ^Ibid., no. 1186, enclosing note from Ali Riza, 19 Rebiülevvel/6 January; no. 1189, 13 Rebiülevvel/31 December; no. 1191, 20 Rebiiilevvel/7 January, with enclosures. 4 Ibid„ YEE, K36/139/20/Z139/XVIII Hobart Pa§a's instructions, 26 Rebiiilevvel/13 January; Hobart Pasha 'Turkey and England', Nineteenth Century, xcvii, (March 1885); 'An AngloTurkish Alliance', ibid., xcviii, (April 1885). 5 GFO, Aegypten 5, Thielmann to Bismarck, no. 2, 16 January; Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 14, 5 February; no. 44, 9 March; A. Meyendorff (ed.), Correspondance diplomatique de M. de Staat, I, nos 3 , 4 and 11. fyelavich, The Ottoman Empire, p. 135; GFO, Aegypten 5, Schjeinitz to Bismarck, no. 38, St. Petersburg, 28 January; BBArj, YEE K36/2475/Z150/XI, §akir Pa§a to Astm Passa, tel. no. 19, 31 January; tel. no. 20, 2 February.

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secret of his suspicion that Fehmi would attempt to manœuvre the Sultan into alliance with Britain agamst Russia 1 . Fchmi gave early evidence of high-handedness: he disobeyed his instructions to consult Bismarck and Ferry, and devoted his time in Paris to private discussions with Hirsch 2 . He commenced his talks with Granville on 19 January, but ran into immediate difficulties on the question of a date for the withdrawal of Britain's forces from Egypt. Granville was prepared to discuss all other issues, but insisted that there could be no question of an evacuation date. Fehmi dropped a plain hint that failure could drive the Sultan into the arms of Russia, but to no avail, and by the beginning of February the talks were deadlocked 3 . In his reports to Istanbul, Fehmi did his best to present his progress in a rosier lighl: he insisted that Granville was eager for an AngloOttoman agreement, and, while conceding that the question of an evacuation date was causing difficulties, he stressed that Gladstone's cabinet was determined to withdraw eventually, and drew attention to encouraging reports of defeats inflicted upon the Mahdi: "matters are strengthening the hope of being able to find a solution to the problem of freeing Egypt from the military occupation, which is the fundamental objective" 4 . Given the Grand Vizier's suspicions, it may also be significant that Fchmi chose to assure the Sultan privately of Britain's high regard for his regime: According to the sum of my impressions and investigations in London to date, England appears determined to preserve the Sultan's right in Egypt, and manifests exceeding special affection for his Imperial Majesty. Happiness is expressed at appropriate information furnished on the subject of the Empire's strength, and on the advances | m a d e by\ the country in respect of... justice, finance, education, the legal and civil schools, and of the armed forces, which have been produced solely by the special favour of His Imperial Majesty, and which are very little known in Europe 1 Circumstances soon turned against Fehmi. At the end of January and beginning of February the Ottoman government suffered a series of blows which threw into question the possibility of any Egyptian settlement with

'CiFO, Aegypten 5, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 17, 11 February; FO 78/3628, W y n d h a m to Granville, no. 246, 26 December. Ku?uk Said had originally proposed that the mission should b e entrusted not to Fehmi, but to Kamil Pa§a; BBAr§, Misir Irade, no. 1188, enclosing m e m o r a n d u m by Said Pa§a, 28 Safer/17 December. 2

BBAr§, YEE, K 36/139/20/Z139/XVIII, Fehmi to O s m a n Bey, tel., 15 January; GFO, Aegypten 5, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 14, 5 February; Busch to Radowitz, no. 20, 2 3 January. 3 F O 78/3745, Granville to W y n d h a m , no. 26, 19 January; no. 43, 26 January; no. 4 5 A , 2 8 January; no. 50A, 3 February. 4 B B A r ? , Y E E K 3 6 / / 2 4 7 5 / Z 1 5 0 / X I , Fehmi to Asim Pa§a, tel. no. 14, 31 January. 5

K36/139/20/Z139/XVIII, Fehmi to Osman Bey, tel., 2 8 January.

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Britain. The first and least of these setbacks came on 26 January, when Britain and France announced that they had agreed on a formula which would serve as a basis for the settlement of Egypt's financial problems. The other Powers promptly adhered to the formula, which proposed that the Khedive should be granted an internationally-guaranteed loan of £9,000,000, together with the temporary authority to tax his creditors; it also proposed that the Powers should conclude a treaty to safeguard freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal. One week later Francc circulated her own more detailed proposals: these envisaged that the Khedive's new loan should be regulated by an international convention, that the terms of the tax on his creditors should be registered in a Khcdival Dccrec, and that the Powers should appoint an International Commission to prepare proposals on the subject of the Suez Canal. She asked that Musurus Pa§a should be instructed to join the Powers' Ambassadors to Ixindon in discussing these proposals'. Neither the Anglo-French formula nor the French proposals posed a direct threat to Ottoman interests; even so, the Porte remained reluctant to separate the financial and political aspects of the Egyptian question, and rather than join the Powers' discussions in London it pressed Fehmi to bring his negotiations to a successful conclusion before a definitive financial settlement was reached. In the meantime it instructed Musurus to persuade Granville to agree that the Khedive's new loan must be sanctioned by Imperial Firman, and that the Ottoman government should be represented in the Egyptian Caisse alongside Britain, France, Italy and AustriaHungary 2 . A much more serious blow was the Italian occupation of Massowa. This was by no means unexpected. The Porte had known for some weeks that Italy was preparing a Red Sea expedition, and by the time the expedition sailed in mid-January it was clear that the objective was Massowa. It was also clear that Italy enjoyed Britain's tacit support: Granville denied the existence of any agreement, but Musurus warned that his tone was "generally favourable to Italy" 3 . The Council of Ministers repeatedly urged Abdiilhamid to open direct negotiations with Britain, and to occupy Zeyla immediately^. Russia spontaneously advised the Sultan to occupy Massowa, and expressed surprise at his failure to act earlier 5 . Abdiilhamid did nothing; news of the first Italian landings arrived on 4 February, and six days later the Khedive confirmed the

Livre Jaune: Affaires d'Egypte, ¡884-1893, no. 10, Waddington to Ferry, 22 January; no. 16, Ferry to Waddington, 26 January; no. 17, Ferry to Wismes, 26 January; no. 18, Ferry to Wismes, 1 February. 2 BBAr§, MVM, nos. 3 and 7, 11 Rebiiilahir/28 January; nos. 10 and 14, 15 Rebiiilahir/1 February; nos. 16, 17 and 18,18 Rebiulahir/4 February. 3 BBAr§, YEE, K39/2130/Z129/118, Khedive to Said Pa§a, no. 4, 20 Rebiulevvel/8 January; Asjm Paja to Rome Embassy, tel. no. 11, 10 January; Messina consulate to Asim Pa§a, tel., 20 January; Musurus Pa§a to Asnn Pa§a, tel. no. 16, 13 January; tel., 21 January. ^[bid., memoranda by Said Pa§a, 7 Rebiiilevvel/26 December and 16 Rebiulevvel/4 January; Special Council of Ministers Report, 8 Rebiulahir/25 January. 5

Ibid„ K36/2475/Z150/XI, §akir Pa§a to Asim Paga, tel. no. 19, 13 January; no. 20, 2 February.

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fall of M a s s o w a . T h e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t w a s p o w e r l e s s t o d o a n y t h i n g m o r e than issue a strong protest to the P o w e r s 1 . O t t o m a n c o n f i d e n c e in Britain's i n t e n t i o n s c o l l a p s e d . At t h e P o r t e , A s i m l'a§a linked M a s s o w a to the A n g l o - F r e n c h f i n a n c i a l p r o p o s a l s : he f o r e s a w a general Egyptian u n d e r s t a n d i n g between Britain, F r a n c e and Italy, which w o u l d put paid to any h o p e of securing the E m p i r e ' s o b j e c t i v e s — a possibility reinforced by reports that F r a n c e w a s planning to o c c u p y the Red Sea island of Sheikh Said 2 . At Yildiz, Abdiilhamid began to consider recalling F e h m i : o n 2 F e b r u a r y he t e l e g r a p h e d the E x t r a o r d i n a r y A m b a s s a d o r that Britain's plain collusion with Italy in the Red Sea "is scarcely facilitating the possibility of a s e t t l e m e n t of the E g y p t i a n q u e s t i o n ; on the c o n t r a r y , it is f a c i l i t a t i n g y o u r return to I s t a n b u l " . In a parallel m e s s a g e to H o b a r t , t h e Palace warned that "England's n e w policy has m u c h reduced o u r hope of a full a r r a n g e m e n t of the Egyptian question. H. 1. M. the Sultan f o r e s e e s with regret the obligation to c h a n g e the policy which he a s s u m e d with the intention of never abandoning it" 3 . In the midst of this crisis o v e r M a s s o w a c a m e the n e w s that K h a r t o u m had fallen to the M a h d i b e f o r e the British relief expedition could arrive. T h i s provoked immediate fears for the security of the H e d j a z , and cast d o u b t on any prospect of an early British withdrawal f r o m Egypt: it also led to speculation that Britain might invite Italian f o r c e s into the S u d a n . In the event Britain turned to the Ottoman Empire: on 7 February Granville a s k e d that the Sultan send troops to Suakin, arid w a r n e d that Britain m i g h t o t h e r w i s e be driven to c o n c l u d e "political a l l i a n c e s " w i t h A r a b t r i b e s h o s t i l e to t h e

Ottoman

Caliphate — a w a r n i n g which the Porte took as an allusion to the possibility of a direct understanding between Britain and the M a h d i 4 . The practical e f f e c t w a s to increase the Ottoman g o v e r n m e n t ' s c o n f u s i o n and sense of uncertainty, and w h e n the Sultan's M i n i s t e r s m e t o n 11 February they declined to d i s c u s s S u a k i n or any other a s p e c t of the E g y p t i a n question until t h e P o w e r s had replied to the Porte's protest over M a s s o w a 5 .

hbid., Misir trade, no. 1194, 14 Rebiiilahir/31 January; M V M , no. 3, 11 Rebiiilahir/28 January; Hataratina no. 15, n.d.; no. 20, 18 Rebiülahir/4 February; Said Pa§a, Said Pwja'nin Kämil Pa$a'nm Cevaplari, pp. 38-42: GFO, IABq 76, Asim Pa§a to Said Pa§a, 5 and 11 February. 2 B B A r s s , Y E E , K 3 6 / 2 4 7 5 / Z I 5 0 / X I , A s i m Pa§a t o F e h m i , tel. no. 14, 7 F e b r u a r y ; K39/2130/Z129/118, F.sad P a j a to Asim Pa§a, tel. no. 15, Paris, 19 January; M u s u r u s Pa§a to Asim Pa§a, tel. no. 28, 23 January; Special Council of Ministers Report, 8 Rebiülahir/25 January. ^ibid., K36/139/20/Z139/XV111. Osman Bey to Fehmi, tel., 21 January/2 February; O s m a n Bey to Hobart, tel., n.d. 4

ibid., M V M , no. 30, 25 Rebiülahir/11 February; no. 55, 17 C e m a z i ü l e v v e l / 4 M a r c h ; Misir trade, no. 1197, enclosing Fehmi to Asim Pa§a, tel., 11 February; G F O , IABq 76, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 19, 12 February; Aegypten 4, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 23, 15 February; FO 78/3745, Granville to Wyndtiarn, no. 5 9 A , 7 February; no. 66, 13 F e b r u a r y ; FO 78/3758, W y n d h a m to Granville, tel. no 18, 11 February. 5 B B A r § , M V M , no. 30, 25 Rebiulahir/11 February.

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Finally, and with near-decisive effect, Germany intervened against Fehmi. Bismarck was still locked in a series of colonial disputes with Britain; more immediately, he blamed Britain for the Khedive's recent refusal to admit German and Russian representatives to the Caisse. He resolved to retaliate in Istanbul, and on 5 February Radovvitz asked Abdulhamid to overrule the Khedive; as a bait, he suggested that the Powers might eventually agree to a permanent Ottoman military occupation of Egypt, and he advised the Sultan to keep a free hand in London, and to avoid being drawn away from the other Powers by any minor concessions which Fehmi might extract from Britain. Abdulhamid was seemingly impressed: five days later he told Radovvitz that it was his intention to recall Fehmi, "whose numerous and long telegrams were not worth the money spent on them", and he suggested that the best means of resolving the Egyptian question, at some future date, would be an international conference in Berlin 1 . Kii^iik Said urged restraint on the Sultan. He noted that Germany had given no guarantee that she either would or could terminate the British occupation of Egypt, and that without this, her talk of an Ottoman occupation was worthless; however, he conceded that Germany and her allies should be cultivated, and despite reservations, he advised the Sultan to instruct the Khedive to admit Germany and Russia to the Caisse2. The Grand Vizier carried his point: Fehmi was not recalled, and on 14 February the Council of Ministers drafted an appropriate telegram to the Khedive 3 . In the event, the telegram to the Khedive was delayed: a sudden crisis in the dispute over the Balkan Junction Railways nearly drove the Grand Vizier from office, and gave pro-British elements at the Porte an opportunity to gain control of the Empire's Egyptian policy. On 8 February the Council of Ministers had submitted its definitive report in favour of the Comptoir d'Escompte group; Abdulhamid declined to endorse it, and referred the issue to a commission headed by the Interior Minister, Edhem Pa§a, a known supporter of Baron Hirsch 4 . This prompted strong speculation that the Interior minister would shortly succeed to the Grand Vizierate, and on 17 February Edhem Pa§a unexpectedly visited Radovvitz, and stated that he had advised the Sultan to show "greater deference towards England" in Egyptian affairs; he added that the telegram instructing the Khedive to admit Germany and Russia to the Caisse had not been sent, since Fehmi's talks were continuing, and "one should meanwhile not offend the British government" 5 . The crisis ended three days later: after a personal interview with Kii§iik Said, Abdulhamid awarded the

'Grosse Politik, iv, no. 758, Bismarck to Münster, 25 January; GFO, Aegypten 5, Bismarck to Rackwitz, no. 2 9 , 2 8 January; Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 14, 5 February; no. 22, 12 February. BBAr§, YEE, K36/2475/Z150/X1, memorandum by Said Pa§a, 26 Rebiiilahir/12 February. ^ibid., Council of Ministers Report, 28 Rebiiilahir/14 February. 4 ibid., MVM, nos. 27 and 28, 22 Rebiiilahir/8 February; GFO, Tuerkci 144, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 25, 20 February; Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel. no. 21, 18 February. 5 GFO, Aegypten 7, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 26, 20 February. 2

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railway concession to the Comptoir d'Escompte group, and the telegram to the Khedive was finally sent 1 . Abdulhamid postponed a decision on the future of Fehmi's mission. He first wished to know whether the Empire's protests over Massowa would bring any result, and whether the fall of Khartoum would lead to any change in Britain's Sudanese policy: he discerned a perplexing contradiction between Granville's offer of Suakin and reports that Britain was planning to construct a railway from Suakin to the Sudanese interior 2 . Doubtless he was also influenced by reports that the loss of Khartoum might bring down Gladstone's government: it was no coincidence that he instructed Fehmi to convey his personal greetings to the Conservative opposition leader Lord Salisbury 3 . By early March it was clear that Gladstone's government would survive. It was also clear that the Empire could expect no assistance over Massowa: no Power had actually endorsed Italy's action, but none would advocate positive steps against her 4 . That said, it was evident that fears of a general Egyptian understanding between Britain, France and Italy had been exaggerated: Granville firmly denied any collusion with Italy over Massowa, and Radowitz revealed that the Three Empires had hopes of drawing France into alignment with themselves in Egyptian matters. For what it was worth, too, Italy stated that she would continue to respect Ottoman sovereignty at Massowa 5 . In the meantime Fehmi reported that Britain would stand by her original decision to abandon the Sudan, though her military operations there would continue for the time being: he explained the apparent contradiction by suggesting that Gladstone's cabinet was anxious for a prestige victory over the Mahdi which would enable it to withdraw from the Sudan with honour 6 . The Sultan's Ministers drew the conclusion that Fehmi's mission should continue, but sensed that they must adjust their objectives: there was little prospect that British would agree to a date for withdrawal from Egypt while her forces were engaged in the Sudan, and this implied that the search for a comprehensive settlement must be postponed. Fehmi put forward an alternative: his discussions with Granville had convinced him that Britain took an acceptable view of Egypt's future neutralisation, while in separate talks with Lord Northbrook, he had developed an entirely new proposal to the effect

' S a i d Pa§a, Hatirat,

i, pp. 177 8; BBAr§, Misir ¡rade, no. 1196, 4 Cemaziiilevvel/19 February;

G F O , Tuerkei 144, Radowitz. to Foreign Office, tel. no. 25, 20 February. 2 B B A R § , Misir Irade, no. 1197. 8 Cemaziiilevvel/23 February. 3

ibid„

YEE, K36/139/20/Z139 XVIII. Fehmi to Osman Bey, tel., 18 February; tel., n. d.

4

ibid„ O s m a n Bey to Fehmi, tel., 17 February/1 March; K36/2475/Z150/XI, R o m e E m b a s s y to Foreign Ministry, tel. no. 84, 8 March; Council of Ministers Report, 17 Cemaziillevvel/4 March. 5

ibid., Council of Ministers Report, 23 Cemaziiilevvel/10 M a r c h ; Rome E m b a s s y to Foreign Ministry, 2 4 February; Misir Irade, no. 1197, enclosing Council of Ministers Report, 2 9 Rebiülahir/15 February; Musurus Pa§a to Asim Pa§a, tel. no. 40, 10 February; tel. no. 50, 14 February; M V M , no. 41, 10 Ccmaziiilevvel/26 February. 6

B B A r § . Y E E , K36/2475/Z150/XI, Fehmi to Asim Pa§a, tel. no. 44, 4 M a r c h ; tel. no. 45, 5 March.

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that a senior Ottoman officer should be sent to Cairo to consult with the Khedive and the British commander on means of reconstituting the Egyptian a r m y 1 . The Council of Ministers agreed that the possibility of a limited agreement on these two issues was worth exploring, and on 12 March Asim Pa§a instructed Fehmi to give Granville a 'Preliminary Draft': this proposed that Egypt should be neutralised on the basis of the status quo defined by the Sultan's sovereign rights and the Firmans, that no Powers should occupy Egypt after Britain's eventual withdrawal, and that the Sultan alone should be entitled to send troops to Egypt should disorders break out there in the future; it also proposed that the reconstitution of the Egyptian army should be entrusted to the Khedive and an Ottoman Marshal, who would be assisted by a British military delegate; that the Khedive should determine the future size of his army, to the maximum of 18,000 men permitted by the Firmans; and that Britain should furnish the Khedive with contract officers if requested 2 . The Porte declined to waive its demand for an evacuation date until Granville had replied, but in a further departure from the principle of a comprehensive settlement, it also authorised Musurus to join the Powers' discussions on Egyptian finance3. This new flexibility did not extend to the possibility of Ottoman military intervention in the Red Sea or the Sudan. Abdiilhamid dismissed Granville's offer of Suakin as impossible, and the Porte warned Fehmi to say nothing which might be interpreted as a commitment 4 . Fehmi himself favoured acceptance of the offer, and had gone so far as to suggest to Granville that Ottoman troops and a Governor-General might take charge of the entire Sudan once Britain completed her military operations there, a suggestion which Granville had greeted with interest 5 . A small minority of the Sultan's Ministers considered the suggestion worth pursuing, but they were firmly overruled by the Grand Vizier and their colleagues: Fehmi was warned to say nothing further 6 . One reason for the Porte's flexibility was its sense that time was running out. The latter half of February had seen an ominous increase in tension on the Afghan frontier, and this had provoked a change in Russia's

X ibid„ MVM, No. 66, 21 Cemaziülevvel/8 March; FO 78/3745, Granville to Wyndham, no. 59A 7 February; no. 76, 23 February: no. 90, 4 March; PRO 30/29/140, Northbrook to Granville, 5 March. 2

BBAr§, K36/2475/Z150/X1, Fehmi to Asim Pa§a, tel. no. 48, 9 March; Asim Pa ? a to Fehmi, tel. no. 41, 12 March; MVM, no. 70, 24 Cemaziiilevvel/11 March.

^ibid., YEF, K39/2106/Z57/117, Musurus Pa§a to Asim Pa§a, 21 February, with enclosures; K36/2475/Z150/XI, Council of Ministers Report, 14 Cemaziiilevvel/l March; MVM, no. 31, 25 Rebiiilahir/l 1 February; no. 50, 14 Cemaziiilevvel/1 March; no. 53, enclosing Asim Pa^a to Esad Pa§a, tel. no. 41, 2 March. ^ibid., Misir trade, no. 1197, 8 Cemaziiilevvel/23 February. 5

ibid., YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Fehmi to Asim Pa§a, tel. no. 44, 4 March; no. 45, 5 March; memorandum, 18 Cemaziiilevvel/5 March; FO 78/3745, Granville to W y n d h a m , no. 89 5 March; PRO 30/29/140, Northbrook to Granville, 5 March. 6

BBAr§, YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Council of Ministers Report, 8 Cemaziulahir/25 March.

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attitude: Nelidov hinted that Fehmi should he recalled 1 . Abdiilhamid himself expressed unease at the Empire's diplomatic isolation, and suggested that Russia and her allies should be asked to intervene in London in support of Fehmi's mission. His Ministers m a n a g e d to ward off this

suggestion;

nonetheless, they instructed Fehmi on 13 March to impress upon Granville their anxiety for a prompt settlement 2 . Granville was not unresponsive. With the Afghan issue clearly approaching a crisis, he was anxious to o f f e r the Sultan a gesture of friendship, the more so as rumours of a Russo-Ottoman understanding at the Straits were again circulating. He assured Fehmi that agreement was possible on all points except an evacuation date, and as an additional bait, he threw out a laconic reference to the desirability of "reoccupation of the Red Sea ports by Turkey" 3 . Granville apparently had both Suakin and Zeyla in mind, but the Porte failed to catch the hint; in any case it continued to oppose any military commitment in the Red Sea 4 . Abdiilhamid was equally unimpressed, and in a private message to Fehmi on 20 March, he expressed the opinion that Britain was procrastinating: A considerable time has elapsed since Y o u r Excellency's arrival in London, yet the anticipated benefits have not accrued. Italy's illegal actions occurred after Your Excellcncy's arrival there and are increasing daily. The contents of the communications submitted to His Imperial Majesty by the Grand Vizierate do not settle the important question of evacuation and d o not d e f i n e the other heads of a g r e e m e n t in a categorical fashion, and as a result of these delays and confusions the Sublime Porte is unable to formulate the opinions and decisions which the Ottoman Empire must assume in this matter. England is exploiting these delays in order to gain time. Summer is approaching, and England will attempt to put off her evacuation on the pretext that it is necessary that her military operations last until the autumn''.

'Greaves, op. cit., pp. 75-7; G H ) , Aegypten 5, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 33, 1 March. 2

B B A r § , Y E E , K36/2475/Z150/XI, Council of Ministers' Report, 23 Cemaziiilevvel/10 M a r c h ; Asim Pa§a to Fehmi, tel. no. 42. 13 March. ^ibid., Fehmi to Asim Pa$a, tel. no. 55, 15 March; FO 78/3745, Granville to W y n d h a m , no. 8 5 , 1 4 March. F o r the b a c k g r o u n d to Granville's o f f e r see A . B. C o o k e and John Vincent, The Governing Passion, pp. 205-6, and A. B. Cooke and John Vincent, Lord Carlingford's Journal, p. 77. 4 B B A r § , Y E E , K36/2475/Z150'XI, Council of Ministers Report, 8 Cemaziiilahir/25 March. 5

ibid„ K36/139/20/Z139/XVril. Osman Bey to Fehmi, tel., 8/20 March.

CHAPTER TEN: THE PENJDEH CRISIS (March-June 1885)

The Afghan crisis broke towards the end of March. A series of frontier skirmishes between Russian and Afghan forces culminated in a major engagement on 30 March, when Russia forcibly occupied the Penjdeh oasis. Britain at once demanded that Russia withdraw from Penjdeh, and made preparations for war 1 . The Ottoman government was already alerted. On 24 March, as news of the first skirmishes came in, the Grand Vizier approached Radowitz and appealed for German support in safeguarding the Empire's neutrality. He denied all rumours of Anglo-Ottoman or Russo-Ottoman engagements, and stated that, as long as he personally had a voice, there would be no question of opening the Straits to the British fleet. He indicated that the Sultan was of the same opinion, but drew attention to the uncertainties of Abdulhamid's character, and warned that Germany must make her support for Ottoman neutrality known at Yildiz. Radowitz promised full support 2 . Kiifiik Said's chief concern was Britain. Despite the rumours which had reached the British Embassy, there is no evidence that Nelidov had asked for anything more than Ottoman neutrality. Against this, Britain's intentions were obscure, and, particularly given the fact of Fehmi's mission, the Grand Vizier was apprehensive lest she attempt to use Egypt as a lever at the Straits. This apprehension was suddenly increased when — as it seemed to the Porte — Britain deliberately chose this sensitive juncture to provoke a quarrel with the Empire over its failure to sign the new international agreement on Egyptian finance. The quarrel originated in a misunderstanding and some sharp practice by Musurus and Fehmi. Musurus had originally advised the Porte that it would not be obliged to join the Powers in signing the agreement, and that it

1 2

Greaves, op. cit., pp. 70-6. GFO, I. B. 10 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 71, 30 March.

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would suffice for the Sultan to promulgate a Firman authorising the Khedive's new loan 1 . He subsequently advised that signature was preferable, and, together with Fehmi, he gave Granville an unauthorised promise of signature. By 12 March the definitive texts of a Convention and an annexed Khcdival Decree and Declaration had been agreed by the Powers, and Musurus requested permission to sign them; the Porte expressed technical reservations about some of the Convention's terms, however, and decided to fall back upon what it mistakenly a s s u m e d to be the original understanding: namely, that a Firman would s u f f i c e 2 . Considerable surprise resulted when on 18 March telegrams f r o m Musurus and Fehmi announced that the Convention had been signed by the Powers' Ambassadors to London, and that their own failure to participate had created a bad impression- 1 . Asim Pa§a instructed the two e n v o y s to remind Granville of the understanding that a Firman would suffice: "The British government cannot misunderstand our refusal." Musurus and Fehmi replied that it was too late to do anything but sign, that further delay would imperil Fehmi's chances of reaching an Egyptian agreement, and that Granville had attributed the Porte's hesitancy "to the influence of sentiments but little friendly to England and especially to the present Cabinet" 4 . Fehmi asked to be recalled if the Porte persisted in its refusal to sign, and in separate telegrams to Yildiz he suggested that the Sultan might e m p o w e r him to sign without the Porte's approval. He also made his first explicit reference to the possibility of a British alliance: Since half a month this A f g h a n i s t a n problem has begun to give currency to statements in the newspapers and in the mouths of many important persons concerning the necessity for the conclusion of a general defensive and offensive treaty of alliance between the Ottoman Empire and England, and for the renewal of their ancient relations and amity, and the present government, too, has begun to take note of such popular opinions and newspaper articles. Lord Granville has repeatedly said that he has great hopes of a good result f r o m my mission and Gladstone too has expressed himself similarly... It is clear that they feel regret for their established policy to date, but do not dare to announce this at once 5 .

' B B A r § , M V M , no. 31, 25 Rcbiulahir/I1 February; Misir Irade, no. 1197, enclosing Musurus Pa§a to Asim Pa§a, tel. no. 40. 10 February, and covering note by Asim Pa§a, 27 Rebiiilahir/13 February; Y E E , K39/2106/Z57/117, Musurus Pa§a to A s i m Pa§a, 21 February; F o 78/3745, Granville to Wyndham, no. 113b. 26 March. 2

B B A r § , M V M , no. 64, 4 Oemaziulevvel/6 March; no. 79, an Cemaziiilahir/18 March; Y E F , K 3 6 / 2 1 0 6 / Z 5 7 / 1 1 7 . m e m o r a n d u m by A s i m Pa§a, 2 8 C e m a z i i i l e v v e l / 1 5 March; K36/2475/Z150/XI, Asim Pa$a to Musurus Pa$a, tel. no. 55, 18 March.

^ibid., Fehmi to Asim Pa§a, tc no. 60, 18 March; Musurus Pa§a to Asim Pa§a, tel. no. I l l , 18 March. 4 ibid., Asim Pa§a to Musurus Pa^a, tel. no. 57, 19 March; Fehmi to Asim Pa§a, tel. nos. 61 and 62, 19 March; tel. no. 64, 20 March; tel. no. 66, 22 March; Musurus P a j a to Asim Pa§a, tel. no. 112, 19 March; tel. no. 114, 20 March. 5

ibid„ K36/139/20/Z139/XVII1. Fehmi to Osman Bey, tels., n.d. and 26 March.

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T h e Sultan and his Ministers responded with b e w i l d e r m e n t . Bewilderment turned to shock on 24 March, when Granville announced that he would give Fehmi and Musurus their passports if the Convention were not signed within 24 hours. Granville was convinced that the Porte's decision to withhold signature was an act of bad faith, or worse, a product of Russian "influence", and he backed his ultimatum with a warning that in the event of a failure to sign "the course of political action which Her Majesty's Government would follow in future would tend to separate Egypt from Turkey instead of consolidating the present policy" 1 . The Sultan's Ministers questioned Britain's motives: they found it incredible that the issue of signature could provoke a threat to break off relations, and decided to consult the other Powers 2 . The contretemps was quickly resolved after discussions between Asim and Wyndham had clarified the original misunderstanding. Granville spontaneously extended his ultimatum, and agreed that the Empire might register its reservations on the subject of the Convention's terms. The other Powers advised the Porte to sign; Abdiilhamid recognised that the Afghan crisis made a prolonged dispute inadvisable, and signature took place on 30 March' 3 . Nonetheless, the episode had shaken Ottoman confidence in Britain's intentions, and Kii^iik Said was quick to discern a connexion with the Afghan crisis. He suggested to Nelidov and Radowitz that Granville's ultimatum had been a probe designed to test Abdtilhamid's susceptibility to threats, and to prepare the way for a further ultimatum demanding passage of the Straits: "just as England has compelled us to fulfil her demands by fixing a peremptory time-limit, so eventually in case of war she will seek to drive us to accept any other obligations through similar forcible means, and she will find an ally for this in Hasan Fehmi" 4 . Abdiilhamid shared this suspicion: he instructed his Ministers to consider the possibility that Granville's ultimatum "was based upon private suggestions by Musurus... and Hasan Fehmi Pa§a to the effect that should England make such a threat the Empire would be impressed and would at once agree to sign", and he suggested that in view of the Afghan crisis it might be safer to recall Fehmi f r o m London. Despite misgivings, however, the Council of Ministers preferred to leave Fehmi at his post, at

ibid., MVM, no. 83. 5 Cemaziiilahir/22 March; YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Asim Pa§a to Fehmi, tel. no. 50, 22 March; tel., 23 March; FO 78/3745, Granville to Wyndham, no. 109a, 24 March no. 106a, 20 March; FO 78/3750, Wyndham to Granville, no. 161, 25 March; FO 78/3758, Wyndham to Granville, tel. no. 47, 28 March. 2 BBAr§, MVM, no. 92, 8 Cemaziulahir/25 March; Misir fade, no. 1208, 10 Cemaziiilahir/27 March, with enclosures. 3 M , YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Council of Ministers Report, 11 Cemaziiilahir/28 March; Asim Pa§a to Musurus Pa^a, tel. no. 61, 28 March; Fo 78/3745, Granville to Wyndham, no. 113b, 26 March; FO 78/3750, Wyndham to Granville, no. 165, 28 March; FO 78/3793, Declarations by Musurus Pa§a, 38 March and 2 April. 4 GFO, I. B. 10 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 77, 6 April.

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least until it could be seen w h e t h e r the financial s e t t l e m e n t w o u l d facilitate a g r e e m e n t on other Egyptian issues 1 . The episode also galvanised Russia and the neutral P o w e r s . D u r i n g the first

w e e k of A p r i l N e l i d o v a n d R a d o w i t z i n t e r v e n e d at Y i l d i z to w a r n

A b d u l h a m i d that it w a s vital that he r e m a i n strictly neutral a n d c l o s e t h e Straits; they were j o i n e d by their A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n and French colleagues, as well as by the visiting King of S w e d e n , w h o took the opportunity of a d i n n e r at Y i l d i z to r e p e a t their r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s t o A b d i i l h a m i d

personally.

A b d i i l h a m i d replied with an a s s u r a n c e that he would r e m a i n neutral "to the very e n d " . N o n e t h e l e s s . Kiijiik Said w a r n e d the A m b a s s a d o r s that it w a s essential that their a d v i c e be r e p e a t e d in v i e w of the likelihood of c o u n t e r p r e s s u r e f r o m F e h m i 2 . Nelidov s u g g e s t e d that the Sultan m i g h t f o r m a l l y a n n o u n c e his neutrality in a d v a n c e , but Kii^iik Said saw the trap: an a d v a n c e declaration would a m o u n t to a de facto

modification of the rule of the Straits.

He replied that he w o u l d p r e f e r t h e neutral P o w e r s to m a k e s i m u l t a n e o u s declarations in L o n d o n and St. Petersburg in s u p p o r t of t h e Sultan's right to close the Straits^. The Grand V i z i e r s fears of British c o u n t e r - p r e s s u r e w e r e e x a g g e r a t e d . T r u e , Fehmi had m a d e no secret of his British sympathies in L o n d o n ; true too, the British cabinet had secretly e x a m i n e d the possibility of trading E g y p t f o r the passage of the Straits should w a r actually break out 4 . But G l a d s t o n e ' s and Granville's first priority was to avoid a war, and as long as there r e m a i n e d a c h a n c e of peace they had no intention of m a k i n g o f f e r s to the Sultan: their sole i m m e d i a t e concern was that he should not f a v o u r Russia with an a d v a n c e p l e d g e of neutrality 5 . Granville m a i n t a i n e d an a b s o l u t e reserve; t h e m o s t he would d o w a s to assure Fehmi that there w a s no truth in a r u m o u r that Britain w i s h e d to restore the e> Sultan M u r a d 6 . O n l y as the extent of R u s s i a n and neutral p r e s s u r e u p o n the Sultan g r e w c l e a r did G r a n v i l l e b e c o m e m o r e e x p l i c i t , and on 17 April he g a v e F e h m i and M u s u r u s the f i r s t of several w a r n i n g s against "hasty e n g a g e m e n t s " w h i c h m i g h t fetter the Porte's liberty of action. Stretching interpretation to its limits, F e h m i a s s u r e d the Sultan that this w a r n i n g showed that Britain had finally grasped the importance which the

^BBAr§, Y E E , K 3 9 / 2 2 6 0 / Z 1 2 1 / 1 2 1 , instructions to Said Pa§a, 11 Cema7.iiilahir/28 M a r c h ; K36/2475/Z150/XI, Council of Ministers Report, 15 Cemaziulahir/1 April. 2 J o m i n i - O n o u Papers, Egerton 3174, Nelidov to Jomini, 1/13 April; G F O , I. B. 10 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 79. 10 April; nos. 8 3 and 85, 13 April. ^ihid., no. 9 7 , 2 7 April; Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel. no. 4 5 , 1 2 April; tel. no. 51, 17 April. ^Arthur J. Marder, British Naval Policy 1880-1905. The Anatomy of British Sea Power, p. 152; Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, pp. 139-40. For expressions of support for Britain by Fehmi and Musurus, see P R O 30/29/192, Memorandum by Currie, 6 April; GFO, I. B. 10, secreta, Miinster to B i s m a r c k , no. 136, London, 9 M a y ; DADS1P, Izvestaji iz L o n d o n a 1885, Pov. No. 147, Mijatovicc to Garasanin, 9/21 March. ^Greaves, op. cit., pp. 72-3; R;unm, Correspondence, 6

II, pp. 3 5 7 - 6 4 p a s s i m .

B B A r § , Y E E , K 1 4 / 8 8 / 3 0 / Z 8 8 / 3 0 , M e m o r a n d u m by H a s a n F e h m i Pa§a, 10 A p r i l ; P R O 30/29/191, Wyndham to Granville, tel., 8 April; W y n d h a m to Sanderson, 18 April.

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Penjdeh crisis had conferred upon the Ottoman Empire, and the "senselessness" of her previous policy 1 . There is no evidence that Abdulhamid contemplated any course other than strict neutrality and the closure of the Straits. Nonetheless, he was inhibited from demonstrating this by the obscurity of Britain's intentions and his fear of taking steps which might be deemed provocative: even Granville's suggestion that he preserve his liberty of action seemed to him to be a threat 2 . On 13 April the Grand Vizier warned Radowitz that the Sultan was avoiding a decision, and had refused to sanction proposals to strengthen the Dardanelles defences against the danger of a surprise attack by the British fleet 3 . A week later Kiigiik Said seemed more confident of the Sultan's resolve, but the neutral Powers' own confidence was ebbing: independent reports of Fchmi's British sympathies had confirmed the Grand Vizier's earlier warnings, and when coupled with rumours that Britain had offered to receive Ottoman troops in Egypt, and that Ottoman forces on the Russian frontier had been increased, they gave rise to a suspicion that Abdulhamid was playing a double game. In the absence of concrete evidence of the Sultan's willingness to strengthen his defences at the Dardanelles, Germany, Austria-Hungary and France were increasingly inclined to accept the Russian thesis that private assurances were not enough, and that the Ottoman Empire must formally declare its intention to close the Straits. They also began to hint that Fehmi should be recalled 4 . In the meantime the Porte was fast losing confidence in Fehmi's ability to make any worthwhile progress towards an Egyptian settlement. Despite his confident predictions of early success, he had still received no reply to the 'Preliminary Draft' on neutralisation and army reform which he had given Granville in mid-March. Towards the middle of April Granville gave him two proposals: the first outlined the terms of an Ottoman Firman which would confirm Egypt's laws; the sccond envisaged that an Ottoman Commissioner should proceed to Cairo for consultations on the reform of the Egyptian army. The Porte reacted sceptically, noting that the Firman appeared substantially to enlarge the Khedive's power of independent legislation, and demanding a much closer definition of the objectives of the proposed army reform 5 . In the

' f O 78/3746, Granville to W y n d h a m , no. 138A, 17 A p r i l ; BBArg, YEE, K36/139/20/Z139/XVIII, Fehmi to Osman Bey, tel., 21 April; Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, p. 140. 2 BBAr§, YEE, K36/139/20/Z139/XVIII, Osman Bey to Fehmi, tel., 19 April. 3 GFO, I. B. 10 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, nos. 84 and 85, 13 April. bid., no. 88, 16 April; no. 91, 20 April; no. 92, 24 April; Bismarck to Radowitz, no. 116, 17 April; Jelavich, The Ottoman Empire, p. 144. 5 BBAr ? , YEE, K36/139/20/Z139/XV1II, Fehmi to Osman Bey, tel.. 2 April; tel., 7 April; K36/2475/Z150/XI, Fehmi to Asim Pa^a, tel. no. 80, 10 April; tel. no. 86, 16 April; tel. no. 95, 20 April; tel. nos. 101 and 102, 28 April; Asim Pa§a to Fehmi, tel. nos. 74 ad 75, 23 April; tel. no. 76, 27 April; MVM, no. 150, 7 Receb/22 April; FO 78/3745, Granville to Wyndham, no. 130A, 14 April; F0881/5142*, no. 47, Draft of Firman, 22 April.

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meantime Granville hao also repeated his suggestion that Ottoman troops should be sent to Suakin and Zeyla, and indicated that he would wish to negotiate a convention. Fehmi pressed the Porte to accept the o f f e r , and claimed that it would open the door to a total British evacuation of Egypt 1 . By now, however, the Sultan's Ministers were losing patience: on 22 April they roundly declared that "although nearly four months have elapsed since the said Pa§a went to London, the question has not advanced a single step; on the contrary, it has gone several steps back", and they advised Abdiilhamid to prepare for a final decision on the future of Fehmi's mission 2 . Matters c a m e to a head as relations between Britain and R u s s i a approached breaking-point. On 21 April Gladstone asked Parliament for a war credit, and Granville announced that Britain had decided to curtail her military operations in the Sudan in order to free resources for use against Russia 3 . Fehmi grasped at the opportunity: on 22 April he suggested to Granville that "any such even as war with Russia would facilitate an understanding between H. M. Govt, and the Porte as regards Egypt proper", and he hinted that Britain should invite the Sultan to take control of the Sudan. Granville replied that this was "most important", and asked for proposals. On the same day Fehmi informed Abdiilhamid that war was "ninety per cent" certain, and that "eighty per cent" of British opinion wanted war. Hobart echoed him: "The general opinion makes it appear that war is certain. England desires the alliance of the Ottoman government" 4 . Abdiilhamid appeared to waver. He invited Fehmi to furnish m o r e information on the prospects for war, and, in particular, he asked him to verify a r u m o u r that Britain had secretly reconnoitred the Dardanelles and w a s planning to force them by night 5 . He also referred this rumour to Radowitz, Calice and Noailles, and asked that their governments send warships to protect the Dardanelles. The request finally c o n f i r m e d the neutral Powers' doubts. They d e m a n d e d that the Sultan formally proclaim his neutrality and his intention of closing the Straits; they also demanded that he recall Fehmi f r o m London 6 . The Council of Ministers advised Abdiilhamid to compromise: they

'BBArç, YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Fehmi to Asim Pa§a, tel. no. 80, 10 April; tel. no. 85, 16 April; tel. no. 94, 19 April; Asim Pa§a to Fehmi, tel. no. 71, 20 April; MVM, no. 14«, 4 Receb/19 April. 2 ibid„ MVM, nos. 146 and 150 7 Receb/22 April. 3 C o o k e and Vincent, The Govt ruing Passion, pp. 210-22; Ramm, Correspondence, II, pp. 35462; Gwynne and Tuckwell, op. cit., pp. 116-9; Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit., pp. 154-5; Fitzmaurice, op. cit., p. 140. 4 B B A r s Y E E K36/2475/Z150/XI, Fehmi to Asim Paça, tel. no. 99, 23 April; Musurus Pa§a to Asim Paça, tel. no. 176, 25 April; K36/139/20/Z139/XVIII, Fehmi to Osman Bey, tel., 22 April; Hobart Pa§a to Osman Bey, tel.. 23 April; FO 78/3745, Granville to Wyndham, no. 140, 22 April. 5 BBAr?, YEE, K36/139/20/Z139/ XV111, Osman Bey to Fehmi, tel., 22 April. 6

ibid., Misir Irade, no. 1213. n. d.; GFO, I. B. 10 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 297, 27 April; Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel. no. 53, 23 April; tel. no. 56, 2 4 April; Bismarck to Radowitz, tel. no. 40, 24 April.

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warned that a public declaration of neutrality would set a dangerous precedent and possibly provoke a British attack, but they conceded that the neutral Powers should be given clear private assurances and information on the Dardanelles defences. They also agreed to sacrifice Fehmi: they dismissed his Egyptian achievements as nugatory, and they warned that as long as he remained in London it would be impossible to dispel the impression that the Empire was seeking a British alliance. Abdiilhamid agreed, and on 27 April Asim ordered Fehmi to return to Istanbul 1 . There was a final complication. On 28 April Granville gave Fehmi a note explaining Britain's views on the subject of a date for her evacuation of Egypt; the note essentially restated Britain's previous assurances, but Abdiilhamid took alarm at references to Britain's "protection" of Egypt and to the "political objectives" of her occupation, and he forbade Fehmi to leave London until these phrases had been removed. Granville eventually agreed to withdraw the note; Fehmi left London on 9 May 2 . The threat of war was already receding. On 1 May the British and Russian governments agreed to submit the Penjdeh dispute to arbitration, and, after further discussion, they decided to refer it back to their joint boundary commission 3 . The Sultan had survived a major Straits crisis: contrary to later British legend, he had not compromised his independence, and his real achievement was to have stood firm on his rights and the treaties, and to have resisted the combined pressure of the Three Empires and Franco for an advance declaration of neutrality. Yet the episode had clearly demonstrated the Empire's military vulnerability, and as long as the Afghan dispute remained unresolved the possibility of a further Straits crisis could not be ruled out. The consequence was that Abdiilhamid now embarked upon a serious programme of rearmament, his first since 1878. The defences of the Dardanelles were strengthened in accordance with the recommendations of a commission composed of senior Ottoman officers and members of the German militarymission; much to Russia's annoyance, these measures were extended to the Black Sea Straits as well. Substantial arms orders were placed in Germany; Krupp was contracted to supply heavy artillery for the Dardanelles, while contracts for mines and torpedo-boats were placed with other German firms. In addition, Goltz Pa§a was instructed to prepare a fresh plan for the mobilisation of Ottoman forces in wartime 4 . These were military measures only. There is no evidence that the Penjdeh crisis led Abdiilhamid to contemplate a change in foreign policy, or a definitive shift towards cither Britain or Russia. Both in Europe and in Asia, the balance of power remained substantially unchanged,

! BBAr§, Misir irade, no. 1211, 11 Receb/26 April; no. 1212, 13 Receb/28 April, with enclosures. 2 ibid., no. 1214, 15 Receb/30 April; no. 1215, 16 Receb/1 May; no. 1216, 19 Receb/4 May; FO 881/5142*, no. 47, Granville to Fehmi, 23 April; no. 59, 'Revised Draft Scheme for the Neutralisation of Egypt', May 1885. ^Greaves op. cit., pp. 76-7. 4

Silin, op. cit., pp. 86-95, 124-6; Goltz, Denkwiirdigkeiten, pp. 124-5; GFO, I. B. 10 secreta, Waldersee to Bismarck, no. 2362, 8 May, enclosing report from Goltz; no. 2593, 20 May, enclosing report from Goltz.

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and the Ottoman Empire's own security was best served by leaving it so, and hoping that Britain and Russia would reach a peaceful composition of their Afghan differences. The Egyptian issue was left in suspense. The continuing uncertainty over Afghanistan was one argument for caution; a further argument was the uncertain significance of Britain's decision to curtail her military operations in the Sudan. Equally important, the Sultan's Ministers were by no m e a n s unanimous in their assessment of Fehmi's overall achievement. On the one hand, he had failed to make any progress towards the comprehensive settlement envisaged in his instructions, but on the other, he did not return empty-handed: the British proposals for the reform of the Egyptian army and an Ottoman occupation of Suakin and Zeyla remained on the table, and Fchmi had also brought back a draft project which explained Granville's views on the subject of Egypt's future neutralisation. These various offers provoked the Sultan's Ministers into a f r e s h , but inconclusive debate on the possible terms of cooperation with Britain in Egypt. The only significant change was the Grand Vizier's assumption of Abdiilhamid's old standpoint that any agreement must contain definite guarantees f o r British evacuation. T h e first issue to be discussed was the British proposal that a senior Ottoman officcr be sent to Cairo for consultations on the reform of the Khedive's army. T h e proposal won some support when it was discussed in the Council of Ministers on 4 May: three Ministers, including Ethem Pa§a and the Navy Minister, Hasan Pa§a, argued that military reorganisation would guarantee Egypt's f u t u r e stability and so open the way to a British evacuation. Kiiijuk Said attacked the proposal head on: he pointed out thet there was no guarantee that the proposed consultations would produce an army strong enough to defend Egypt without British support, and that, in the worst case, reform on these terms might strengthen Britain's position in Egypt. H e carried his point: the Council of Ministers agreed to submit the proposal to detailed examination at the Porte, and it was not referred to again 1 .

Granville's proposal for an Ottoman occupation of Zeyla and Suakin proved even more contentious, and at a Council on 20 May Fehmi succeeded in winning the support of a majority of Ministers: he warned that Britain was resolved to abandon the ports, and that failure to act could lead to fresh incursions by France and Italy. He proposed that the Empire should occupy Suakin and Zeyla as soon as the British withdrew, and should invite Granville to n a m e a date. The Grand Vizier was left in a small minority with the Ministers of the Interior, the Nav y and the §eyhiilislam: they preferred to wait until Britain's intentions in Egypt b e c a m e clearer, and drew attention to a report f r o m Musurus which suggested that Britain might soon be prepared to hand over the entire Red Sea coast and to conclude an agreement for her

' B B A r ^ M V M , no. 179, 19 Rcceb/4 May.

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withdrawal from Egypt altogether. The minority carried the day, evidently with the Sultan's support: on 24 May it was decided to postpone any decision on the Red Sea until Britain's intentions bccame clearer 1 . This effectively concluded the debate, and the discussion of Granville's neutralisation project on 7 June proved to be something of a formality. Superficially, the project appeared to satisfy the Empire's demand for an international guarantee of the legal status quo ante in Egypt: it proposed that the Powers should declare Egypt to be neutralised in perpetuity, and that an international agreement should be reached on the size of Egypt's army and fortifications, but it also confirmed all the Sultan's established rights, including his right to send troops to protect the Khedive against external invasion or internal revolt. However, the Sultan's Ministers noted that the project would subject the exercise of this right to the approval of the Egyptian legislature as well as of the Khedive, and they took exception to the suggestion that the Powers should have a say in the size of Egypt's army and fortifications. They also noted that Granville had tied all aspects of the neutralisation issue to the assent of the other Powers, and that it was by no means clear that Britain would consider herself to be bound by any preliminary understanding with the Empire. They decided to submit the project to "deep examination" at the Porte, and to say nothing further to the British government in the meantime 2 . The British government, too, was losing interest. Thanks to the financial settlement of March, and to the April decision to curtail operations in the Sudan, Gladstone had substantially recovered the freedom of action which had eluded him since late 1883, and the tactical considerations which had induced him to receive Fehmi's mission had lost much of their force. "Is it not clear now that the Sultan means to do nothing in the matter of Hassan Fehmi's mission?", he wrote to Granville on 26 May. Granville prepared to look elsewhere. He gave Italy a confidential hint that Zeyla might shortly be on offer, and at the same time he indicated to the French government that he would welcome talks on Egypt's neutralisation. France responded favourably, but warned that she was anxious to reduce the Sultan's rights of military intervention in Egypt to a minimum. She was particularly anxious to avoid any suggestion that the Khedive's army might be reconstituted by a transfer of regular Ottoman forces to Cairo; she admitted that the events of 1881-1882 had shown that native Egyptian troops were unreliable, but suggested that the better alternative would be to recruit volunteer troops from among the Albanian, Circassian and other populations of the Ottoman Empire proper. Granville agreed that there could be no question of "simply handing Egypt back to the Turks" 3 . In the circumstances, it was perhaps fortunate for the

1 ibid„ no. 185, 25 Receb/10 May; YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Council of Ministers Reports 5 Saban/20 May and 9 §aban/ 24 May; Misir irade, no. 1218, 9 §aban/24 May. *ibid„ K36/2475/Z150/XI, Council of Ministers Report, 23 §aban/7 June. 3 Documents diplomatiques français, vi, no. 24, Waddington to Freycinet, 11 May; no. 33, 3 June; Ramm, Correspondence, II, no. 1646, memorandum by Gladstone, 6 May; no. 1658, Gladstone to Granville, 26 May; no. 1666, Granville to Gladstone, 27 May; no. 1668, Gladstone to Granville, 28 May; no. 1679, Granville to Gladstone, 2 June; no. 1681, Gladstone to Granville, 3 June.

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Ottoman government that Gladstone's days in office were numbered. On 8 June he suffered a parliamentary defeat on the Irish question, and four days later his cabinet resigned. He was succeeded on 2 4 June by Lord Salisbury, who formed a minority Conservative administration in which he assumed the twin posts of Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary'.

' C e c i l , op. cit., iii, p p . 132-43.

CHAPTER ELEVEN: THE DRUMMOND WOLFF MISSION (July-October 1885)

Salisbury's return to office in June 1885 brought with it a major, if unannounced change in Britain's policy towards the Ottoman Empire. The new British Prime Minister was determined to reverse what he saw as a dangerous decline in Britain's standing in the Near Rast, a decline which he attributed to his predecessors' wanton alienation of the Sultan and of Britain's natural Great Power partners 1 . The consequence had been diplomatic isolation, and the dangers to which this might lead had been clearly demonstrated during the Penjdeh crisis, when Germany, Austria-Hungary and France had joined Russia in urging Abdulhamid to close the Straits to the British fleet. Salisbury's fundamental assumptions about the Near East had not changed since 1880: the Ottoman Empire was irrevocably doomed, it no longer ranked as a trulyindependent state, and it must eventually fall under the domination of Britain or Russia. The great danger remained the possibility that Russia might succeed in gaining control of the Sultan: Abdiilhamid's conduct during the Penjdeh crisis suggested that this possibility had come several steps closer to realisation. The fact that the Afghan border negotiations were not yet concluded rendered Salisbury's concern more urgent: temporarily, at least, the possibility of a fresh Straits crisis could not be excluded. It followed that Britain must find some means of escaping from her European isolation, and of developing her influence in Istanbul. Two features of Salisbury's thinking were new. The first was his concern to establish a close working partnership with Germany. His view was that the Three Emperors' Alliance had furnished Russia with the European security which enabled her to pursue forward policies in the Near East and Central Asia. If Germany could be detached from Russia, Austria-Hungary would follow, and Russia would be left exposed in Europe and isolated in the Near East. In addition, Germany's recently-acquired influence in Istanbul would

^For Salisbury's views in general see Cecil, op. cit., iii, ch. viii, passim., and D. C. Weeks, T h e Egyptian Question in British Foreign Policy with special reference to 1885-1887', typescript thesis (Ph. D., London, 1952), pp. 1-60.

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be placcd at Britain's disposal. H o w e v e r , it w a s soon a p p a r e n t that there w a s little p r o s p e c t of an i m m e d i a t e b r e a k t h r o u g h . B i s m a r c k w a s w i l l i n g t o e n c o u r a g e and s u p p o r t a r a p p r o c h e m e n t b e t w e e n Britain a n d the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , but not to a b a n d o n the T h r e e E m p e r o r s ' Alliance: he a r g u e d that the c o n t a i n m e n t of R u s s i a in the N e a r East w a s a British, rather than a G e r m a n or A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n responsibility. S a l i s b u r y a c c e p t e d that t h e c u l t i v a t i o n of G e r m a n y would take time; but he also calculated that, sooner rather than later, the a g e d G e r m a n

E m p e r o r must be s u c c e e d c d by the strongly A n g l o p h i l e

C r o w n Prince Friedrich W i l h e l m 1 . T h e s e c o n d n e w f e a t u r e w a s Salisbury's interest in the possibility of o p e n i n g the Straits to British warships. T h e r e is m u c h a b o u t this aspect of his t h i n k i n g w h i c h r e m a i n s o b s c u r e , but it is clear that it reflected m o r e than a preoccupation with current Central Asian problems. Rather, Salisbury a p p e a r s to h a v e been guided by t w o l o n g - t e r m c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . In the first place, he needed to o f f e r Germany and Austria-Hungary military guarantees if they were to be turned against Russia, and the only practical m e a n s of d o i n g so w a s to o p e n the Black Sea to the British navy. In the s e c o n d , S a l i s b u r y d o u b t l e s s f o r e s a w that p a s s a g e of the Straits would give Britain e f f e c t i v e control of the O t t o m a n capital and the Sultan, and so establish her as the ultimate arbiter of the Eastern Question. In other w o r d s , the p a s s a g e of the Straits w o u l d play the role which Salisbury had assigned seven years earlier to t h e Asiatic r e f o r m s e n v i s a g e d u n d e r the C y p r u s C o n v e n t i o n . W h a t is less clear is h o w Salisbury p r o p o s e d to gain the p a s s a g e of the Straits, and the likelihood is that he had no i m m e d i a t e idea; rather, he put his faith in a long-term revival of Britain's "influence" in Istanbul, to be supported by a strengthening of her links with both G e r m a n y and Austria-Hungary 2 . S u c h w e r e the new British P r i m e Minister's o b j e c t i v e s , and they w e r e in no sense f a v o u r a b l e to O t t o m a n i n d e p e n d e n c e and security as c o n c e i v e d by A b d i i l h a m i d . N e e d l e s s to say, Abdtilhamid had no k n o w l e d g e of Salisbury's calculations. His own immediate concern was Egypt. He had for s o m e time suspected that Salisbury's Conservatives would prove m o r e yielding than

^ibid.; cf. Greaves, op. cil., pp 91-5, and especially pp. 237-54. 2

S e e The Oriental Question, 1840-1900: Files from the Royal Archives, Windsor Castle, Salisbury to the Queen, 19 December 1886: "The question of the Black Sea has preoccupied Lord Salisbury f o r many years. O n e of the last and worst acts of Lord Derby's F o r e i g n Secretaryship in 1877 was to pledge this country to uphold Turkey's right to close the Straits. It is consequently impossible to do anything at Berlin. As matters now stand, all w e can do is to try to prevent Turkey f r o m falling exclusively under the domination of Russia. If ever operations were necessary in the Black Sea it would be necessary first, at all hazards, to force the T u r k to be at least neutral: and for that purpose it might be necessary to attack him". Cf., ihid., White to Salisbury, 29 September 1885: "We must think seriously about Constantinople, but we must get first a clear insight into the v iews and aims of the Central Empires and our vision is not sufficiently clear yet". Cf., Salisbury Papers, A41, Salisbury to Wolff, 21 August 1885: "If you have a chance lead the Sultan to talk of what would happen to the Dardanelles in case of war with Russia. It is possible we may look in that direction for the price that he is to pay us for what we have done in Egypt."

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Gladstone's Liberals in that quarter; no doubt his hopes were further raised by the timely news of the death of the Sudanese Mahdi in June 1 . First soundings in London were encouraging. On 30 June Salisbury informed Musurus that he looked m o r e to an Anglo-Turkish understanding than to any other means to solve the Egyptian problem, and he hinted that he would welcome the presence of Ottoman forces in the Sudan, and perhaps eventually in E g y p t itself 2 . Abdiilhamid responded with a personal message which hinted at his readiness for talks, and towards the end of July Salisbury announced his intention of sending Sir H e n r y D r u m m o n d W o l f f to Istanbul f o r d i s c u s s i o n s as a preliminary to a mission of inquiry in Egypt. Abdiilhamid readily agreed to receive him 3 . Salisbury's decision to take up the Egyptian issue w a s natural. If Britain needed to draw closer to Germany and the Ottoman Empire, Egypt was the obvious place to start. Concessiveness in Egypt would remove one source of recent Anglo-German differences; it would also enable Britain to ingratiate herself with the Sultan. Salisbury did not exclude the possibility of using Egypt to drive an early bargain with Abdiilhamid at the Straits, should Central Asian circumstances require it, but he was reluctant to play the card of British evacuation too soon: he accepted that Britain must eventually withdraw f r o m Egypt, but not until she could be confident that her influence there would outlast her occupation, and not before she had made sure of her relations with Germany and the Sultan 4 . For the time being, Salisbury preferred to offer the Sultan a role as j u n i o r partner in the British occupation, and, to this end, he instructed Wolff to make three proposals: Ottoman troops should be sent to g a r r i s o n S u a k i n and E g y p t ' s f r o n t i e r with the S u d a n ; an O t t o m a n C o m m i s s i o n e r should be appointed to assist in the reform of the Khedive's administration; and, as France had earlier suggested, the Sultan should permit the Khedive to recruit volunteer troops f r o m Ottoman provinces other than E g y p t 5 . The British programme thus resembled a number of schemes which had been unsuccessfully floated by the Sultan's own Ministers, and shared their obvious weaknesses. In the first place, it avoided any c o m m i t m e n t on the subject of a British evacuation, a point upon which Abdiilhamid had hitherto been insistent. In the second place, it ignored Abdulhamid's rooted opposition to all forms of Ottoman military involvement in Egypt, including voluntary

^GFO, Tuerkei 154, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 135, 18 June; Aegypten 5, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 142, 3 July; cf., the personal message from Abdiilhamid to Salisbury earlier in the year, in BBAr§, YEE, K36/139/20/Z139/XV111, Hobart Pa§a's instructions, 26 Rebiiilevvel/13 January. The Mahdi died on 22 June: Holt, op. cil., p. 96. 2 FO 78/3746, Salisbury to White, no. 238, 30 June. 3 F O 78/3752, White to Salisbury, no. 316, 11 July; BBAr§, Misir irade, no. 1220, 17 §evval/29 July, enclosing Musurus Pa§a to Asim Pa§a, tel. no. 286,23 July, and tel. no. 293,27 July. 4 M . P. Hornik, The Special Mission of Sir Henry Drummond Wolff to Constantinople, 18851887', English Historical Review, lv, (Octobcr 1940), pp. 598-604. 5 F O 78/3821, Salisbury to Wolff, no. 1, 7 August; FO 78/3824, Salisbury to Wolff, tel. no. 3, 22 August; tel. no. 4 , 2 4 August; tel. no. 8 , 2 8 August.

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recruitment: news of the recent French proposal had in any case leaked out, and Abdiilhamid had already pronounced it to be unacceptable 1 . Wolff arrived in Istanbul on 22 August, in an atmosphere rendered tense by speculation that he would propose an anti-Russian alliance at the Straits 2 . His initial conversations with the Sultan and the Grand Vizier had a reassuring effect. Nonetheless, Abdiilhamid quickly made it plain that he would not send troops to the Sudanese frontier: "He thinks it would damage his prestige if his troops were seen in proximity to those w h o have taken so many Mussulman lives in the S u d a n " 3 . As an alternative, the Sultan suggested p e a c e f u l negotiations with the Sudanese: "Moral persuasion will do more to settle this question than military intervention." This w a s an original suggestion, and presumably prompted by the hope that the Mahdi's demise would render his followers more tractable. Otherwise, the Sultan's views were vague. In a confidential statement prepared for Wolff's guidance, he identified his own sovereignty and "the vast interest of E n g l a n d " as the "two p a r a m o u n t questions". He also made an allusion to A f g h a n i s t a n and the Caliphate: "Should war break out between Russia and England, and should the affairs of Egypt be settled in a manner satisfactory to himself, he would engage himself to use all his theocratical influence in favour of England." But he made no concrete proposals 4 . Elsewhere, W o l f f s mission evoked a generally negative response. France feared that Britain had thrown her over, a fear reinforced by the recent breakdown of international talks on the Suez Canal. She urged the Sultan to m a k e n o c o m m i t m e n t s , and p o i n t e d out t h a t S a l i s b u r y ' s c a r e t a k e r administration would shortly face a general election, which it was likely to lose 5 . Russia was more specifically concerned lest Abdiilhamid be inveigled into military arrangements in Egypt which might compromise his neutrality at the Straits; Germany endorsed her concern, and warned Britain that she would reserve her position until W o l f f ' s proposals became clearer 6 . Only Austria-Hungary was prepared to o f f e r Wolff a clear promise of support 7 . Matters were not helped by rumours, perhaps French-inspired, that Britain was preparing to declare Egypt a formal protectorate; nor by the backstairs intrigues of self-interested individuals: the Egyptian pretender Prince Halim

' g f O , A e g y p t e n 5, Thielmann to Bismarck, no. 149, 2 3 July. 2

ibid„ A e g y p t e n 3 N . 1, T h i e l m a n n to B i s m a r c k , no. 1 6 6 , 11 A u g u s t ; no. 170, 31 A u g u s t ; Documents diplomatiques français, vi, no. 5 2 , N o a i l l e s to Freycinet, 2 1 A u g u s t . ^Salisbury Papers, A 4 1 , W o l f f to Salisbury, 1 September. 4

ibid.,

A 4 1 , W o l f f to Salisbur, I September.

5

W e e k s , op. cit., pp. 7 4 - 7 .

6

G F O , Tuerkei 150, Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, no. 3 2 , 2 6 A u g u s t ; A e g y p t e n 3 Nr. 1, m e m o r a n d u m

by Herbert B i s m a r c k , 15 September. 7 W e e k s , op. cit., pp. 81-3.

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was active, as, allegedly, was the coteric of A r a b §eyhs at Yildiz, w h o were represented to Wolff as the spokesmen for a specifically A r a b interest in the Egyptian question 1 . The Sultan's own Ministers remained as divided as ever over Egyptian policy. T h e Grand Vizier Kii§uk Said had never shared Abdiilhamid's hopes of the Conservatives, and his reaction to W o l f f s appointment was cool: he agreed that it would be useful to receive the British envoy, but he gave no hint that he expected an a g r e e m e n t to result 2 . For reasons w h i c h remain obscure, however, Kiigiik Said had recently lost favour with Abdiilhamid, and he found himself excluded f r o m direct participation in the negotiations with W o l f f . Against his advice, Abdiilhamid appointed Asim Pa§a and the Minister of Religious E n d o w m e n t s , Kamil Pa§a, to serve as Plenipotentiaries in the negotiations, and a f t e r s o m e changes of mind, he rejected Kiiijuk Said's proposal that the two Plenipotentiaries should be instructed to keep protocols of their talks with Wolff. This left Asim and Kamil free to report what they liked, and enabled them to launch an intrigue whose evident purpose was to "bouncc" the Sultan into agreement with Britain on terms which neither he nor the Grand Vizier would ordinarily have accepted- 5 . K a m i l and A s i m met W o l f f i n f o r m a l l y on 3 S e p t e m b e r . W o l f f straightaway warned that he would be unable to consider any proposal for an evacuation date, and proceeded to outline his proposals for the appointment of an Ottoman Commissioner, the despatch of Ottoman forces to Suakin and the Sudanese frontier, and the reconstitution of the Egyptian army by means of a voluntary recruitment within the Ottoman Empire proper. Kamil and Asim repeated the Sultan's objections to any involvement of Ottoman forces in the Sudan, but hinted that they might agree to an exclusively Ottoman occupation of Suakin. They w e l c o m e d the proposal f o r an Ottoman C o m m i s s i o n e r to assist in the work of reform, and gave Wolff the impression that they regarded the idea of voluntary recruitment as "relieving them f r o m a difficulty". Kamil m a d e a reference to the Italian occupation of M a s s o w a , but Wolff merely offered to transmit any observations to Salisbury 4 . Kamil and Asim's report of this meeting told a different story. They admitted that Wolff had said that it would be "difficult" to fix an evacuation date, but not that he had refused to discuss the point. They made no mention of the idea of voluntary recruitment, but reported that Wolff had spoken of "a

^ B A r f , Misir irade, no. 1221, 9 Zilkade/20 August; no. 1223, 16 Zilkade/27 August- FO 195/1494, Currie to White, no. 307, 24 August; FO 78/3822, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 11, 23 August; no. 32, 22 September; GFO, Aegypten 3 Nr. 1, Thielmann to Bismarck, no. 178, 18 September. 2

BBAr§, Misir irade, no. 1220, enclosing memorandum by Said Pa§a, 17 §evval/29 July. hbid., no. 1225, 22 Zilkade/2 September; Said Pa§a, Hatirat, pp. 93-9; Said Pa§a, Cevabtari, pp. 4

F O 78/3822, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 2 1 , 4 September.

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remedy" for French objections to the presence of Ottoman forces in Egypt. They also claimed that Wolff had said that Britain might take "initiatives" in respect of Massovva. They proposed that the Council of Ministers should take an immediate decision for or against the despatch of Ottoman forces to Egypt and Suakin 1 . The Grand Vizier declined to be hurried, however, and evidently smelled a rat. He expressed surprise at the Plenipotentiaries' failure to probe Wolff's alleged "remedy", and he noted that Wolff's reported views on the subject of a British evacuation were ambiguous: his apparent willingness to admit Ottoman forces to Egypt might imply an early British withdrawal, but his reference to the need for f u r t h e r r e f o r m s suggested that the British occupation might be prolonged for a period of years. Kii§uk Said warned that there could be no question of agreement if the latter interpretation proved correct, and he declined to refer matters to the Council of Ministers until the Plenipotentiaries had something more definite to report 2 . Wolff held a second meeting with the Ottoman Plenipotentiaries on 5 September. He waived his proposal for the despatch of Ottoman forces to the Sudanese frontier, and, instead, he concentrated on the two issues of reform and voluntary recruitment, proposing that two Commissioners, one British and one Ottoman, should be sent to Egypt on a joint mission of investigation, and suggesting that a voluntary recruitment might open the way to a graduated British withdrawal f r o m Egypt, with each reconstituted Egyptian regiment replacing a British one. Kamil and A s i m were non-committal, doubtless because a protocol was taken at this meeting 3 . N o protocol was taken at the following meeting on 8 September, however, and Kamil and Asim promptly accepted Wolff's suggestion that the negotiations should be divided into two stages: current talks should be limited to the conclusion of a preliminary arrangement to cover the Commissioners' joint mission and the question of recruitment, and the terms of a definitive settlement and of Britain's withdrawal f r o m Egypt should be settled after the two Commissioners had reported. Kamil and Asim proposed that the preliminary arrangement should be recorded in a Convention, and urged Wolff to seek full powers f r o m Salisbury at once. They appear to have regarded the contents of the Convention as a secondary matter: by W o l f f s account, the remainder of that day's talks consisted of a general exchange of ideas on the terms of the Commissioners' mission. The one newpoint examined was Britain's desire for measures to suppress the Sudanese slave trade 4 .

^ B B A r | , YEE, K.36/2475/Z150/XI, report by Asim Pa§a and Kamil Pa§a, 23 Zilkade/3 September. ^ibid., memorandum by Said Pa§a, 23 Zilkade/3 September. 3 F O 78/3822, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 27, 15 September, enclosing Protocol no. 1. The issue of Suakin was likewise dropped after Salisbury had ruled out any exclusive occupation by Ottoman forces. Sec FO 78/3821, Salisbury to Wolff, no. 14, 6 September. 4 F O 78/3822, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 24, 8 September; no. 2 9 , 1 5 September, Inclosure no. 2.

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In e f f e c t , K a m i l and A s i m had c o n c e d e d all W o l f f ' s basic d e m a n d s . T o their o w n side, h o w e v e r , they reported that they had s u c c e s s f u l l y m o d i f i e d the British proposals, w h i c h n o w stood as follows: A C o m m i s s i o n e r will be sent by the O t t o m a n E m p i r e to E g y p t and will e x a m i n e the present slate of the Egyptian administration in concert with an English C o m m i s s i o n e r ; in consultation with the K h e d i v e , they will c i t h e r r a t i f y t h e p r e s e n t state of a f f a i r s , o r e l s e , s h o u l d t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the T r i b u n a l s be e x c e s s i v e or d e f i c i e n t , they will r e f o r m a n d r e o r g a n i s e t h e m . T h e y will a l s o m o d i f y a n d a r r a n g e the financial situation in such a way as to balance e x p e n d i t u r e and revenue. T h e O t t o m a n C o m m i s s i o n e r will seek the restoration of p e a c e in t h e S u d a n by p a c i f i c m e a n s and will i n f o r m the E n g l i s h C o m m i s s i o n e r of t h e steps a n d m e a s u r e s he will t a k e in this r e s p e c t ; a m o n g t h e s e m e a s u r e s will be t h e p r e s e r v a t i o n f r o m d i s r u p t i o n of the T r e a t y f o r b i d d i n g the Slave T r a d e . T h e O t t o m a n C o m m i s s i o n e r , together with t h e E n g l i s h C o m m i s s i o n e r , will l i k e w i s e r e o r g a n i s e t h e E g y p t i a n A r m y b y m e a n s of a r e c r u i t m e n t , w h e t h e r f r o m a m o n g t h e local p o p u l a t i o n , or, with H i s Imperial M a j e s t y ' s c o n s e n t , f r o m a m o n g the p o p u l a t i o n s of t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e ' s o t h e r territories. O n c e , t h r o u g h the i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of these measures and initiatives, Egypt's peace and public o r d e r and the security of E g y p t ' s frontiers f r o m S u d a n e s e attack have been established, the English a r m y will w i t h d r a w f r o m Egypt. All t h e a b o v e p r o p o s a l s will be c a r r i e d o u t u p o n the b a s i s of the sovereignty rights of His Imperial M a j e s t y 1 . This report artfully anticipated possible criticisms. While there was no m e n t i o n of an e v a c u a t i o n date, it was clearly implied that e v a c u a t i o n w o u l d f o l l o w a u t o m a t i c a l l y u p o n the c o m p l e t i o n of t h e C o m m i s s i o n e r s ' m i s s i o n , and that the C o m m i s s i o n e r s ' terms of r e f e r e n c e w o u l d a m o u n t to t e r m s f o r a British w i t h d r a w a l . T h e r e w a s a quite u n f o u n d e d suggestion that the K h e d i v e m i g h t r e c r u i t f r o m p u r e l y E g y p t i a n s o u r c e s , a n d a s i m i l a r c l a i m that the O t t o m a n C o m m i s s i o n e r w o u l d t a k e t h e lead in n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h t h e S u d a n e s e . F i n a l l y , t h e r e w a s n o r e f e r e n c e t o the K h e d i v e ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l obligations — a point u p o n which W o l f f had laid particular stress, and which set an implied limit t o the scope of separate A n g l o - O t t o m a n negotiations. O n c e again, however, the Plenipotentiaries were o u t m a n o e u v e r e d by the G r a n d Vizier. O n 10 S e p t e m b e r , evidently at Kiigtik Said's insistence, Kamil and A s i m s h o w e d W o l f f a French translation of their report, and asked him to sign it as a p r o t o c o l . W o l f f n a t u r a l l y r e f u s e d , but a g r e e d t o d r a w u p a s t a t e m e n t of his p r o p o s a l s in writing. T h i s t o o k t h e f o r m of a m e m o r a n d u m w h i c h he delivered to the Porte f o u r d a y s later. T h e m e m o r a n d u m set f o r t h Britain's proposals f o r r e f o r m and voluntary recruitment in u n a m b i g u o u s

lßBAr§, YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, report by Asim Pa§a and Kämil Pa § a, 29 Zilkade/9 September.

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fishion, while, in a covering note, Wolff warned that he would be unable to transmit to his government any proposal for an evacuation date; he also warned that his transport, the "Iris", was due at Besika, and that he would be unable to prolong his stay in Istanbul indefinitely. Astonishingly, Wolff had inserted the latter warning at the suggestion of Kamil and Asim 1 . T h e contents of W o l f f ' s m e m o r a n d u m appear to have c o m e as a considerable shock to Abdiilhamid, who complained that the British envoy "had come with soft words and professions, but that in substance his proposals were the same as those previously made". He also protested that the allusion to the "Iris" was an improper means of pressure 2 . Kamil and Asim could only claim that Wolff had gone back on his concessions, while Kii^iik Said took immediate steps to assert his own control over the negotiations. A Special Council of Ministers which met on 16 S e p t e m b e r r e c o m m e n d e d that a protocol be taken at all future talks between Wolff and the Plenipotentiaries, and drafted a reply to W o l f f s memorandum. This counter-proposal agreed to the a p p o i n t m e n t of British and O t t o m a n C o m m i s s i o n e r s , and to the implementation of measures to suppress the Sudanese slave trade. However, it rejected the idea of voluntary recruitment outright, and asserted that the Ottoman Commissioner and the Khedive must have exclusive charge of any negotiations with the Sudanese. It also proposed that the British and Ottoman governments should record that their objective was to restore Egypt to the status she had enjoyed before the British occupation, and suggested that a period of one year should suffice for the Commissioners to complete their joint mission of investigation; should the two Commissioners have failed to reach agreement by the end of this period, the Khedive would unilaterally declare that his army and administration were functioning satisfactorily, and Britain would then be obliged to withdraw her forces from Egypt within three months 3 . This amounted to a demand for an evacuation date by other means: it is difficult to see what agreement could have been reached on this basis. In the event, the negotiations were saved by the outbreak of the Eastern Rumelian revolt on 18 September. With a m a j o r Balkan crisis in prospect, neither Britain nor the Ottoman Empire could afford to be entangled in the Egyptian issue, and Abdiilhamid quickly recognised that the easiest course would be to accept Britain's offer of a limited and provisional agreement 4 . Matters were facilitated by the downfall of Kiifiik Said Pa§a on 24 September: Kamil Pa§a took over as Grand Vizier at the head of a substantially altered Council of

' F O 78/3822, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 29, 15 September, Inclosures nos. 6 and 7. ibid., no. 31,18 September. 3 BBAr§, YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, report by Asim Pa§a and Kamil Pa§a, 4 Zilhicce/14 September; Protocol of Council of Ministers, 6 Zilhicce/16 September; proposed amendments, n.d.; Special Council of Ministers Report, 6 Zilhicce/16 September. 4 F O 78/3822, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 41, 2 October. 2

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Ministers, and, f o r the first time in months, the Porte found itself united over Egyptian policy. Finally, the timely conclusion of a limited Anglo-Russian agreement on the Afghan border — the so-called Zulfikar arrangement of 10 September — dispelled the threat of a fresh Straits crisis and look some of the pressure off the negotiations. It also freed Germany to o f f e r Britain some support: Bismarck instructed R a d o w i t z to ensure that Wolff did not leave Istanbul empty-handed 1 . The new Council of Ministers quickly recommended that negotiations should be continued on the basis of W o l f f s memorandum of 14 September; its predecessor's draft counter-proposal was tacitly dropped. Abdiilhamid agreed, with two reservations: he categorically rejected W o l f f s proposal f o r voluntary recruitment on the grounds of "great and abundant dangers", and he declined to give an undertaking to suppress the Sudanese slave trade on the grounds that the Empire was already bound by anti-slavery agreements of long standing 2 . There ensued a series of meetings between W o l f f , Kamil Pa§a and the new Acting Foreign Minister, Arifi Pa§a, and by 10 October they had drafted a Convention defining the terms of a joint mission by British and Ottoman High Commissioners to Egypt. Kamil and Arifi conceded that the question of British evacuation should be postponed until the two High C o m m i s s i o n e r s had reported; Wolff conceded that the Ottoman High Commissioner and the Khedive should take the lead in negotiations with the Sudanese, and he offered to recast his anti-slavery proposal in a form which would protect the status of existing agreements. The issue of voluntary recruitment proved m o r e difficult, and Kamil and Arifi made an attempt to mislead both sides. Claiming that the Sultan was nervous of a public commitment, they persuaded Wolff to accept a general f o r m u l a stating that the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t would "accord the facilities which would be recognised as necessary", but assured him that these facilities would include voluntary recruitment within the O t t o m a n Empire proper. They gave Abdiilhamid the opposite assurance: they admitted that he would be obliged to transfer some regular officers to Egypt, but they claimed that voluntary recruitment would be restricted to Ottoman subjects resident in Egypt but not native to it 3 . Even this interpretation failed to o v e r c o m e Abdiilhamid's doubts: he objected that "it will cause great n u m b e r s of the Empire's population to go to Egypt in hordes and enlist, and f r o m this — God forbid! — there will be engendered terrible consequences as in the time of

GFO Aegypten 3 Nr. 1, Bismarck lo Thielmann, tel. no. 70, 15 September; tel. no. 82, 23 September; Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 188, 5 October. Details of the Anglo-Russian agreement in Greaves, op. cit., pp. 82-4. 2 BBAr§, YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Council of Ministers Report, 17 Zilhicce/29 September; irade, 25 Zilhiccc/5 October, For background to the slavery issue see Hamdi Atamer, 'Zend Ticaretinin Yasaklanmasi', Belgelerle Türk Tarih Dergisi, 3 (1967). 3 F O 78/3822, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 38, 28 September; no. 39, 29 September; no. 41, 2 October; no. 43, 4 October; no. 45, 5 October; no. 47, 9 October; no. 50, 12 October; BBAr§. YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Council of Ministers Report, an Muharrem/11 October.

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Mehmcd Ali". He also refused to accept any form of fresh undertaking to suppress the slave trade' The Sultan's ministers resorted to pressure. They warned Abdiilhamid that his objections would jeopardise the Convention in its entirety, and they stressed that the imminence of the British general election made a prompt settlement imperative. Kamil Pa§a privately advised Wolff to threaten to break off negotiations 2 . Abdiilhamid remained unmoved. He conceded that Wolff might be given a private assurance on the subject of the slave trade, but he insisted that the recruiting proposal was the gateway to revolution: It is very probable that much of the population of the other vilayets will pour to Egypt, and, as it cannot be doubted that the Imperial Egyptian Army will be composed, to a degree which may be called full, of Turkish soldiers, that such a substantial military force, composed of brave Turks and also lying under British influence, will then — God forbid! — engender in the future terrible consequences which will, by creating a great upset similar to the affairs of M e h m c d Ali Pa§a and ibrahim Pa§a — God forbid! — in a very little time be able to bring Arabia, Syria and especially the Islamic Caliphate into danger 3 . Kamil Pa§a advised Wolff to abandon the recruiting clause: for the first time, he gave him an inkling of the Sultan's true objections. Salisbury at first refused to give way, and Wolff threatened to break off the negotiations. R a d o w i t z m a d e repeated interventions at Yildiz on W o l f f ' s behalf, but eventually advised concession, and probably it w a s f e a r of j e o p a r d i s i n g Germany's cooperation that prompted Salisbury to give way: on 23 October he instructed Wolff to drop the points in dispute and sign the Convention immediately. Signature took place on the following day 4 . The Convention as finalised provided for the appointment of British and O t t o m a n High C o m m i s s i o n e r s and d e f i n e d their duties as f o l l o w s : in consultation with the Khedive, they would reorganise the Egyptian army, examine the Egyptian administration, and carry out reforms within the limits of the Imperial Firmans, the Ottoman High Commissioner and the Khedive would conduct negotiations with the Sudanese, but they would keep the British High Commissioner fully informed and take no decisions without his approval; once the two High Commissioners were satisfied with the state of

hbid., trade, 7 muharrem 303 17 October. ^•ibid., Committee of Ministers Report, 8 Muharrem/18 October; Salisbury Papers, A41, Wolff to Salisbury, tel., 15 October. 3 B B A r § , Y E E , K36/2475/ZI50/XI, bade, 9 Muharrem/19 October. 4

F O 78/3822, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 57. 20 Octobcr; FO 78/3824, Wolff to Salisbury, tel. no. 71, 20 October; Salisbury to W o l f f , tel. no. 38, 23 October; Salisbury Papers, A 4 1 , Salisbury to Wolff, tel., 20 October; Wolff to Salisbury, tel., 20 October; GFO, Aegypten 3 Nr. 1, Radowitz to Bismarck, 23 October.

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Egypt's frontiers and administration, they would submit their reports to their respective governments, who would then prepare an Ulterior Convention to regulate the evacuation of Britain's forces f r o m Egypt; an additional clause obliged the Sultan to confirm all previous international obligations contracted by the K h e d i v e , except in so far as they m i g h t contravene the existing Imperial Firmans 1 . Wolff was appointed British High Commissioner, and left for Cairo immediately; the Sultan appointed Marshal Gazi A h m e d Muhtar Pa§a to serve as Ottoman High Commissioner, but postponed his departure until late December 2 . T h e Convention was a limited achievement. It owed its existence to the Eastern Rumelian crisis, and was as m u c h a device for shelving the Egyptian question as for settling it. All major points of contention were deferred, and the t w o H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r s were given n o timetable and no order of priorities. Britain had failed to enlist the Sultan's military assistance, but, in the short run at least, she had s u c c e e d e d in associating h i m with her occupation, and thereby partially legitimised her presence in E g y p t 3 . In contrast, Abdiilhamid saw the C o n v e n t i o n as an opportunity to shorten Britain's occupation: with this end in view, he instructed Muhtar Pa§a to give priority to the reform of Egypt's army and the pacification of the S u d a n 4 . Abdiilhamid continued to display a profound mistrust of Britain's ambitions in Egypt, and to suspect her of intending to play the A r a b card against the Ottoman Caliphate: it was for this reason that he had insisted that the British H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r should not p a r t i c i p a t e directly in the p r o p o s e d negotiations with the Sudanese, and he specifically warned M u h t a r Pa§a to beware lest Wolff attempt to contact the Sudanese independently. H e also reminded Muhtar Pa§a of his old suspicion that the Sudanese rebels were former supporters of Urabi who had withdrawn into the interior, and whose goals included the elevation of Prince H a l i m to the K h e d i v a t e and the establishment of an independent Arab government in Egypt 5 . In broader diplomatic terms, the Convention counted f o r less than might have been anticipated three months earlier. France f o u n d its terms acceptably moderate, and responded by inviting Britain to re-open talks on the Suez C a n a l 6 . Russia had no grounds for complaint, thanks to Abdulhamid's rejection of all Britain's proposals f o r substantive military cooperation. Nor had Britain gained control of the Sultan. She had gained some Ottoman and G e r m a n d i p l o m a t i c c o o p e r a t i o n , but, as the Eastern R u m e l i a n crisis was already demonstrating, this counted for little outside Egypt. Salisbury was

'BBArf, YEE, K36/316/Z131/36, enclosing Turkish and French texts of the Convention. ^Hornik, op. cit., pp. 606-7; Uçarol, Bir Osmanli Paçast, pp. 172-81. 3

F O 78/3822, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 61, 24 October. Uçarol, op. cit., pp. 177-9. 5 ibid., loc. cil. 6 Documents diplomatiques français, vi, no. 101, Noailles to Freycinet, 20 October. 4

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willing to wait. The Zulfikar arrangement had rendered the Straits issue less urgent, and Salisbury had no wish to commit himself to the Sultan before he had made sure of Germany. At the beginning of October Kamil Pa§a had hinted to Wolff at his anxiety for a British alliance; Salisbury dismissed this overture with a general assurance of goodwill 1 . The Ottoman Kmpire remained u n c o m m i t t e d and u n c o m p r o m i s e d , and Abdiilhamid could balancc his collaboration with Britain in Egypt with a policy of cooperation with Russia in Hastern Rumelia.

' S a l i s b u r y Papers, A 3 9 , Wolff to Salisbury, 1 October; A 4 1 , W o l f f to Salisbury, tel., 5 October; F O 7 8 / 3 8 2 4 , Salisbury to W o l f f , tel. no. 2 4 , 6 October.

CHAPTER TWELVE: THE EASTERN RUMELIAN CRISIS (September-December 1885)

I During the night of 17/18 September 1885 Bulgarian revolutionaries executed a coup d'état in Philippopolis, the capital of the autonomous Ottoman vilayet of Eastern Rumelia: they arrested the Governor-General, Gavril Pa§a, and other Ottoman officials, and proclaimed the province's union with the Principality of Bulgaria. On the following day Prince Alexander of Bulgaria threw in his lot with the revolutionaries; proclaiming himself "Prince of Northern and Southern Bulgaria", he entered Rastern Rumelia with his army, and summoned the Bulgarian National Assembly to meet at Philippopolis on 22 September 1 . The Philippopolis coup took the Ottoman government completely by surprise. The Sultan and his Ministers had been aware for some months that unionist agitation was growing in Eastern Rumelia, but they had assumed that Russia would use her influence to prevent any upset. As recently as February 1885 Russia had assured the Sultan of her support for the Balkan status quo and the Treaty of Berlin, an assurance repeated following the Three Emperors' annual meeting at Kremsier in August 2 . These assurances had been backed by deeds: in May the Russian consul in Philippopolis had publicly disowned a demonstration in favour of Eastern Rumelia's union with Bulgaria, and there were suggestions that Russia had furnished the Ottoman authorities with advance intelligence of attempts to infiltrate Bulgarian bands into Macedonia in June. One consequence was that the coup of 18 September caught the Empire militarily unprepared. It had but a few thousand troops available at Edirne, the nearest garrison to Eastern

^For details of the coup and its background see Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, pp. 205-7; Simeon Radey, Stroitelite na Savremenna Bdlgariya, I, pp. 499-569; BBArs YEE K14/273/Z126/8, Report by Gavril Paja, Muharrem/16 October. 2 G F O , Tuerkei 156, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 28, 22 February; BBArg, MVM, no. 6, 11 Rebiiilahir/28 January; Sdedinenieto na Severna i Yuzhna Bdlgariya i Srdbsko-Bdlgarskata Voina. Diplomaticheski Dokumenti 1885-1886, no. 52, Vlangali to Nelidov, 4/16 September; Richard von Mach, Aus bewegter Balkanzeit, pp. 13-4.

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Rumelia, while forces in the Salonika military district had been diverted earlier in the month to deal with disturbances in Albania 1 . Equally surprising was the diplomatic crisis which followed the coup. Since 1878 Abdiilhamid had treated the Balkans as an area of interest to Russia and Austria-Hungary, and assumed that any threat to his own Balkan security would come from either or both of these Powers. Both had continued to enjoy a large measure of power over the Balkan states: Austria-Hungary exercised a virtual protectorate over Serbia through her protégé King Milan, while Russia e n j o y e d close ties with M o n t e n e g r o and c o n s i d e r a b l e i n f l u e n c e within Bulgaria. True, the Tsar's personal relations with Prince Alexander of Bulgaria had deteriorated steadily since 1883; nonetheless, Russia continued to control Bulgaria's W a r Ministry and o f f i c e r corps, and she was credited with a considerable moral influence among the Bulgarian population. Not that the possibility of a challenge to Russia's position was overlooked: since late 1884 the Sultan's agents at Sofia had reported that another Power was seeking to expand its influence. Unsurprisingly, that Power was Austria-Hungary 2 . In the event the Eastern Rumelian crisis of September-December 1885 proved to be not an Austro-Russian but an Anglo-Russian contest. Russia u n e x p e c t e d l y o p p o s e d Eastern R u m e l i a ' s union with Bulgaria: Britain r e s p o n d e d by supporting it, seeing an opportunity to weaken Russia's influence in Bulgaria, and ultimately to strengthen her own influence at the Straits. From the Sultan's point of view this British instrusion w a s profoundly unwelcome. In the first place, it was questionable whether he had any interest in reducing Russia's influence in Bulgaria. Since 1882 he had relied upon that influence to restrain Bulgaria's national aspirations, and with some appearance of success, at least until the Philippopolis coup. In the second place, there was no knowing how Russia would respond to Britain's challenge. For all his efforts to enlist Russia's cooperation in support of the Balkan status quo, Abdiilhamid remained suspicious of her long-term aims, and recognised that Eastern Rumelia's unification with Bulgaria was one of them. Nor had he ceased to be apprehensive of the partitionist implications of her partnership with Austria-Hungary in the Three Emperors' Alliance. If Russia were to be held to a status quo policy she must be assured that her regional interests would not be threatened; otherwise she would turn to a revolutionary policy, and make use of her considerable influence a m o n g the Balkan Slavs and her undoubted capacity for military intervention in the region. Abdiilhamid's response to the Eastern Rumelian crisis was therefore not quite what it seemed: superficially, he chose to collaborate with Russia and her allies in a polic\ of resistance to Britain; in reality he knew that

' j e l a v i c h , Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, p. 215; KatardZiev, op. cit., p. 5 2 ; G F O , Bulgarien 4 secreta, Thielmann to Foreign Office, tel. no. 102, 20 September. 2 Biyiklioglu, op. cit., pp. 47-8.

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Britain could nol threaten him directly in the Balkans and his underlying objective was the containment of Russia — a containment which he believed could be most effectively accomplished by Russia herself.

II Abdiilhamid's attention was focused upon Russia from the start. His immediate suspicion was that she had instigated the Philippopolis coup, probably with the prior approval of Germany and Austria-Hungary, and in instructions issued to his Ministers on 20 September he drew an explicit parallel with the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1876: The features of this business resemble the state of affairs produced by the Three Emperors' Alliance before that...crisis. Minor guerilla bands appeared in the Hercegovina region and the Empire attached no importance to them. The British cabinct of that time is again in office. There is no need to explain what consequences these facts engendered 1 . His Ministers split. The majority urged him to invade Eastern Rumelia forthwith. At a lengthy meeting on 20 September they agreed that the Empire was legally entitled to act: Article XVI of the Treaty of Berlin empowered the Sultan to occupy Eastern Rumelia in the event of any threat to the province's internal or external security. They argued that the Empire could not remain passive in the face of a challenge to its sovereignty, and they suggested that an immediate show of force would oblige Princc Alexander to back down. Two Ministers dissented: Kamil Pa§a and the Finance Minister, Zihni Pa§a, pointed to the possibility of Russian involvement, and questioned whether there were sufficient troops available to mount an immediate invasion. They argued that the safer course would be to appeal to the Powers to restore the legal status quo ante in Eastern Rumelia by diplomatic means; this would also give the Empire time to mobilise a substantial reserve army for eventual use if needed 2 . Abdiilhamid backed the minority. His military advisers confirmed that the maximum force which could be mobilised for immediate invasion was less than 40,000 men, significantly fewer than the 60-70,000 formed by the Bulgarian army and the Eastern Rumelian militia combined, and on 21 September he instructed the Porte to request the Powers' diplomatic intervention 3 . On the same day Prince Alexander announced his arrival at Philippopolis; the Council of Ministers acknowledged that this represented a

' s a i d Pa§a, Halirat, I, p. 231. ^Accounts of the Ministers' discussions are given in Said Pa§a, Hatirat, I, pp. 225-36; Said Pa$a'mn Kámil Pa¡a Hatiratma Cevablan, pp. 11-21; Kámil Pa§a, Hatirat, pp. 5-6; Kamil Pa^a'nm Ayan Reisi SaidPa§a'ya Cevablan, pp. 40-2,64-7; Pakalin, op. cit., v. p. 78.

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-Türkgeldi, op. cit., pp. 205-6.

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further argument against military intervention, and drafted a Circular which was issued to the Powers on 23 September. The Circular's tone was mild: it drew attention to the Empire's right of military intervention, but made no explicit threat to use it. and, instead, simply invited the Powers to recall Prince Alexander "to a respect for his true duties" 1 . The Sultan's hopes of a diplomatic solution were focused upon Russia. Contrary to the initial assumption, Russia had not backed the coup: on 21 September she formally condemned Prince Alexander's violation of the Treaty of Berlin, and underlined her condemnation by recalling all Russian officers serving with the Bulgarian army, including Bulgaria's War Minister, General Cantacuzene 2 . On the same day Germany spontaneously advised the Sultan to look to Russia for a solution, and the Ottoman Ambassador to Berlin, Kurd Said Pa§a, suggested that Abdiilhamid might ask the Tsar to use his moral influence to induce the Bulgarians to abandon the illegal union and restore the status quo ante3. Abdiilhamid found this suggestion attractive, but cautiously sought Germany's opinion first: by the time Bismarck expressed his approval the Porte had issued its Circular and the suggestion was allowed to drop 4 . Meanwhile Abdiilhamid changed his Ministers. On 24 September he dismissed KU§uk Said, Asim, Gazi Osman and a number of their colleagues. He appointed Kamil Pa§a Grand Vizier, Ali Saib Pa§a Serasker, and Kurd Said Pa§a Foreign Minister; ponding the lattcr's return from Berlin, the functions of Acting Foreign Minister were assumed by the President of the Council of State, Arifi Pa§a. There was also an important change at Yildiz, where Stireyya Pa§a replaced Gazi Osman's son-in-law Ali Riza Pa§a as Principal Palace Secretary. It is likely that Abdiilhamid had been meditating these changes for some time: ihe Fastern Rumelian outbreak was the occasion but not the chief cause 5 . Be that as it may, the new Ministers quickly affirmed their support for Abdulhamid's pacific approach to the Eastern Rumelian issue: they advised him to mobilise a substantial reserve army as a precaution, to take measures to forestall any agitation by the Bulgarians of Thrace and Macedonia, and to press the Powers to produce an early diplomatic solution 6 . These recommendations were rapidly implemented. Mobilisation was already under way, and Goltz Pasa predicted that by mid-October the Empire would

hbid., pp. 206-9; BBAr§, Bulsaristan ¡rade, no. 421, enclosing draft of circular with alterations desired by the Sultan. ^Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, pp. 218-9. ^ G F O , Bulgarien 4 secreta, m e m o r a n d u m by Herbert Bismarck, 2 3 September; T h i e l m a n n to Foreign Office, tel. no. 104, 22 September. ^ibid., Thielmann to Foreign Office, tel. no. 106, 24 September; Herbert Bismarck to Thielmann, tel. no. 81, 23 September. ^Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., p. 209. 6 ibid„ pp. 209-10.

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have some 60-70,000 troops facing Eastern Rumelia, backed by a further 44,000 elsewhere in the Balkans 1 . The provincial authorities in Macedonia were warned to afford no pretext for Bulgarian complaints, and specifically forbidden to arm the Moslem population or recruit irregulars; the Moslem Pomaks of Rastern Rumelia were urged to keep quiet 2 . Meanwhile the Powers indicated that they would respond to the Sultan's appeal for their diplomatic intervention: as a first step, they endorsed a Russian suggestion that their Ambassadors in Istanbul should examine the language to be held with the Ottoman and Bulgarian governments, "with a view to the avoidance of bloodshed" 3 . Fresh dangers were already appearing. Greece and Serbia both saw Bulgaria's acquisition of Rastern Rumelia as an indirect threat to their own hopes of future territorial expansion, and a pretext to demand compensation at Ottoman expenses; both states mobilised their armies, and secretly began to discuss an anti Ottoman alliance 4 . The Sultan can scarcely have been surprised: as the events of 1875-1876 had demonstrated, any Balkan crisis was likely to spread, and he had already predicted that the Philippopolis coup might lead to "future problems, grave consequences and a major war" 5 . At the very least, the military aspect of the crisis had changed for the worse: the Ottoman Empire now faced a threat of war on three fronts, or four if the Montenegrins joined in. The effect was to reinforce Abdtilhamid's anxiety for a quick diplomatic settlement. The Porte appealed to the Powers to restrain the Balkan states, and urged them to hasten their deliberations on Eastern Rumelia: "the necessity of arriving at a solution favourable to the Treaty of Berlin becomes daily more urgent and apparent" 6 . The Powers were not ready to propose a solution. All accepted that the Sultan was legally entitled to demand a straightforward reversal of Eastern Rumelia's union with Bulgaria and a full restoration of the status quo ante. But no Power was as yet prepared to embrace this as a practical basis for a settlement. Russia reserved her position: possibly she hoped that her forthright condemnation of the illegal union would bring down Prince Alexander's regime, and enable her to reassert her exclusive influence over Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia 7 . Certainly Austria-Hungary and Britain feared as much, and

^GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Waldersee to Bismarck, no. 4846, 9 October. BBAr§, MVM, no. 336, 17 Zilhicce/27 September; no. 360, 27 Zilhicce/7 October; no. 382, 8 Muharrem/14 Octobcr; Biyikhoglu, op. cit., pp. 54-5. N. Medlicott, 'The Powers and the Unification of the Two Bulgarias', English Historical Review, liv, (January-April 1929), p. 72 ff. 2

^Vojislav J. Vufkovic, Diplomatska Istorija Srpsko-Bugarskog Rata, pp. 13-27; E. Driault and M. L'Héritier, Histoire Diplomatique de la Grèce, IV, pp. 198-208; M. Lascaris, 'Greece and Serbia during the War of 1885', Slavonic and East European Review, xi:3, (July 1932), pp. 8899. 5

Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., p. 207. F O 78/3793, Ârifi Pa$a to Musurus Pa§a, 29 September; 1 October; 4 October. ^Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, pp. 219-23. 6

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were already inclined to the view that acceptance of the illegal union might be a price worth paying if it ensured the survival of an anti-Russian regime at Sofia. Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary was unwilling to commit herself at once: she remained loyal to the Three Emperors' Alliance, and had no wish to confront Russia directly. She was also anxious to explore the possibility of obtaining some compensation for Serbia should the status quo ante not be restored in Eastern Rumelia 1 . Britain had fewer inhibitions. Salisbury sensed that Russia had played into his hands: by condemning the coup, and by withdrawing her officers, she had reduced her political and military influence in Bulgaria to zero, and thereby seriously compromised her position in the Balkan peninsula. If this state of affairs could be prolonged, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman dependence upon Russia would decrease, and this in turn might enable Britain to develop her relations with Germany and to increase her influence in Istanbul. Bulgaria rather than Egypt might hold the keys to the Straits 2 . At all events, Salisbury had little to lose, and on 28 September he hinted to Musurus Pa§a that Britain was not disposed to favour a simple restoration of the status quo ante. He suggested that the better solution would be a "personal union": the Sultan should appoint Prince Alexander GovernorGeneral of Eastern Rumelia in place of the deposed Gavril Pa§a, but otherwise maintain the formal separation between the province and the Principality of Bulgaria-'. Abdiilhamid failed to catch the hint. He continued to see Russia as the key to a settlement, and at the end of September he made a personal appeal for the Tsar's cooperation. The Tsar replied with a fresh condemnation of the Philippopolis coup, an assurance of his support for the Treaty of Berlin, and a promise to safeguard the Sultan's sovereign rights 4 . This message erased lingering suspicions of Russia involvement in the coup. It also encouraged Abdiilhamid to broach the question of the Empire's own views on a settlement: he hinted to Radovvitz that he had hopes of a full restoration of the status quo ante in Eastern Rumelia 5 . His new Grand Vizier was more cautious. Kamil Pa§a suggested that the full status quo ante was irretrievable, and warned that the attitude of Greece and Serbia made circumspection essential; he proposed to set conditions for a settlement, rather than terms, and put forward a five-point programme: the Empire must sacrifice no territory outside Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia; the Bulgarian and Eastern Rumelian tributes must remain intact; the Empire must garrison the Balkan range, as provided by the Treaty of Berlin; all fortifications in Bulgaria must be demolished, again as provided by the Treaty of Berlin; the terms of the eventual settlement must

'Medlicott, T h e Powers', pp. 71 -9. 2

ibid., pp. 73-4; Colin L. Smith. The Embassy of Sir William White at Constantinople, pp. 15-29; Cecil, op. cit., Ill, pp. 239-42. *FO 78/3746, Salisbury to White, no. 343, 5 October.

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G F O , Bulgarien 4 secreta,

memorandum by Herbert Bismarck, 5 October.

-*ibid., Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 1 8 7 , 4 October.

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offer the Empire's neighbours no pretext for aggression. Abdiilhamid endorsed this programme, and gave orders that it should be communicated to the Powers; however, he radically altered its sense by appending a sixth condition: Prince Alexander must be deposed, both because he had been disloyal to his suzerain, and because "it is hoped that we will thereby gain yet further cooperation from Russia" 1 . The Sultan soon realised his mistake. On 4 October the Powers' Ambassadors met to consider the language to hold with the Ottoman and Bulgarian governments, and, as Abdiilhamid hoped, to propose a solution of the crisis. He was disappointed: the Ambassadors avoided anything which might prejudge a settlement, and instead drew up a draft declaration which did no more than condemn the presence of Bulgarian forces in Eastern Rumelia and express the hope that the Sultan would not resort to force 2 . Worse, the Sultan's intelligence indicated that the Ambassadors had divided: those of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary had supported a restoration of the status quo ante in Eastern Rumelia, but those of Britain, France and Italy had urged acceptance of the union. Abdiilhamid concluded that "Russia's interests require that at the present moment Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia should be administered separately, while England's interest is to support the opposite course". He decided that the Empire must reserve its position; he countermanded the issuing of the six-point programme, and instructed the Porte to press the Powers for a solution. He also rejected his Ministers' suggestion that Britain should be asked to send warships to overawe Greece: "Historical facts prove that the despatch by Britain of a fleet to Greek waters could not be free from considerable danger." 3 The Powers spent a full week discussing the terms of their Ambassadors' draft declaration. In the meantime Abdiilhamid's apprehensions deepened. Doubts about British policy were aggravated by a speech in which Salisbury announced that he would not be bound by the letter of the Treaty of Berlin 4 . Equally worrying were suggestions that Austria-Hungary must be encouraging Serbia's continuing demands for compensation — suggestions apparently based upon nothing more than rumour. Abdiilhamid spoke to the Montenegrin charge d'affaires of the desirability of overthrowing Serbia's King Milan 5 . With the Powers' unity in question, the idea of independent Ottoman

'liirkgeldi, op. cit., p. 210; Dokumenti za Bdlgarskata Istoriya, IV, no. 108, Sultan's instructions, 23 September/5 October. 2 Medlicott, The Powers', pp. 79-80. 3 BBAr§, Bulgaristan trade, no. 421, irade, 27 Zilhicce/7 October. speech was reported to Abdiilhamid in garbled form: Salisbury Papers, A41, Wolff to Salisbury, tels., 10, 13 and 19 October; Salisbury to Wolff, tels. 11 and 19 October. 5 GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 195, 9 October; Novica Rakofievic, 'Stav Crne Gore prema IJjedinjenju Bugarske i Srpsko-Bugarskom Ratu 1885. godine', Istorijski Zapisi, xviii: 4, (1961), pp. 626-8; Novak RaZnatovic, 'O Radu Radikalske Opozicije, Kneze Petra Karadjordjevica i Knjaza Nikole protiv Redima Kralja Milana u Srbiji 1883-1889. godine', IstorijskiZapisi, xxiii:!, (1966), pp. 72-3,85-7.

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action began to recover ground. Dreysse Pa§a advised the Sultan to seize the diplomatic initiative from the Powers, and offer to recognisc a personal union under Prince Alexander if certain Moslem districts of Eastern Rumelia were transferred to the vilayet of Edirne 1 . There was also talk of military action: the Empire would shortly have 105,000 troops available for action against the Bulgarians, and a "War Party" was said to be urging A b d u l h a m i d to send Prince Alexander an ultimatum demanding that he abandon Eastern Rumelia 2 . Kamil Pa§a advised the Sultan to leave matters to the Powers: any independent action could jeopardise their support, and so furnish Greece and Serbia with pretexts for attacking the Empire. He gave a similar answer to two Bulgarian envoys sent by Prince Alexander to plead for Ottoman recognition of the union 3 . In these circumstances the Powers' unanimous decision to endorse their Ambassadors' draft declaration came as something of a relief. The Declaration was officially c o m m u n i c a t e d to the Porte on 14 October. A b d u l h a m i d expressed particular gratitude to Russia, and congratulated his Ministers; he also took the opportunity to restate his opposition to any military solution 4 . Otherwise, he remained circumspect, and the Porte's official reply to the Declaration did little more than suggest that the Powers might invite Prince Alexander to demonstrate his respect for the Treaty of Berlin by withdrawing f r o m Eastern R u m e l i a 5 Kamil Pa§a warned the new British A m b a s s a d o r , White, that this suggestion had been m a d e on Russia's a d v i c e , but he emphasized that the Empire would leave the question of a solution to the Powers: "We prefer letting you fight it out among yourselves." 6

in The Powers did not resolve their differences. Instead, Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary came forward with a separate programme, and invited the Sultan to act as their mouthpiece. The Three Empires' initiative was prompted chiefly by fears for their own unity, and, in particular, by signs of divergence between Russia and Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary continued to fear that Russia meant to depose Prince Alexander; for her part, Russia refused to hear of compensation for Serbia. In the end the Three Empires agreed that the safest way to forestall mutual quarrels was to support the principle of a return to the

' b B A i ? , YEE, K31/2624/Z158/86, Memoranda from Dreysse Pa§a, 7 and 8 October. 2

G F O , Bulgarien 4 xecreta. Waldersce to Bismarck, no. 4981, 17 October; FO 78/3753, White to Salisbury, no. 426, 7 October; no. 428, 9 October. 3 B B A r § , YEE, K31/2624/Z158/86, M e m o r a n d u m by Kamil Pa$a, selh-i Zilhicce/10 October; Radev, op. cit., p. 592; K. Krachunov, Tsarigradskata Topkhanenska Konferentsiya, p. 13. ^Medlicott, "The Powers', pp. 265-6; Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., pp. 211-2; Dokumenti za Balgarskata lstoriya, no. 110, Sultan's instructions, 3/15 October. 5

F O 195/1519, Said Pa§a to White, 18 October.

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status quo ante in Eastern Rumelia 1 . Their joint programme envisaged that the Sultan should invite the Powers to join him in a Conference; that he should ask the Conference to summon Prince Alexander and his followers to withdraw from Eastern Rumelia; that he should also ask the Conference to sanction the appointment of an Ottoman Extraordinary Commissioner to administer the province pending a definitive solution; and that he should inform the Conference of his willingness to accept a limited measure of administrative, financial and customs union between Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia 2 . The existence of this programme was not at first revealed to the Ottoman government; the Three Empires wished to sound the other Powers, and they were nervous lest Abdiilhamid raise objections which might drive a wedge between Russia and Austria-Hungary. On 19 October their Ambassadors asked the Sultan to summon a Conference; only after Abdiilhamid had objected that the Conference might extend its competence to Egyptian or Armenian affairs did Radowitz allude to the existence of a wider programme, "whose whole tendency was directed towards protecting the interests and the rights of the Sultan". He gave no details, but he warned that Russia and AustriaHungary had been brought to agreement with difficulty, and that pressure for amendments might jeopardise their unity 3 . The Sultan gave no general promise to follow the Three Empires' advice, but on 21 October he invited the Powers to a Conference to discuss the affairs of Eastern Rumelia. All Powers accepted the invitation; even so, it was not until 30 October that the Three Empires finally revealed to Abdiilhamid the contents of their programme 4 . By then it was too late: Britain had made it plain that she would oppose the Three Empires' programme. Salisbury had taken particular exception to the proposal that the Conference should summon Prince Alexander to withdraw from Eastern Rumelia, seeing in it a trap designed to provoke the Prince's overthrow: if obeyed, the summons would destroy the Prince's popularity among the Bulgarians, and, if disobeyed, it would leave the Conference with little option but to invite the Sultan to use force. Salisbury did not hide his doubts from Musurus Pa§a, and, in accepting the Porte's invitation to a Conference, he warned that Britain would maintain her full liberty of action in the event of any proposal which might lead to coercive action against the Bulgarians 5 . Erance expressed a similar reservation: she argued that the

^Medlicott, The Powers', pp. 81-2, 263-6. ^GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 224, 30 October. 3 GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 208, 19 Octobcr; no. 209, 19 October. 4 ibid„ no. 224, 30 October; FC) 195/1519, Said Pa§a to White, 21 October. 5 Medlicott, 'The Powers', pp. 268-74; FO 78/3747, Salisbury to White, no. 390, 25 October.

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proposed summons was a matter for the Sultan rather than for the Conference, but added that she would oppose it in either case 1 . The Sultan faced the prospect of a divided Conference. This was bad enough; but much more alarming were the possible consequences. In the first place, Abdiilhamid feared that the Bulgarians would be encouraged to defy the Powers, and that the Three Empires would then ask him to proceed unilaterally, and to use armed force to secure a restoration of the status quo ante in Eastern Rumelia. The Three Empires' programme had made no explicit provision for the possibility of Bulgarian recalcitrance; nonetheless, Radowitz had admitted to Kurd Said that an appeal to Ottoman force was not excluded 2 . Nelidov was more explicit. He conceded that the Powers were divided, and that White was bound to ask how the Three Empires' programme could be enforced; he argued that the Sultan must respond by declaring himself ready to act unilaterally in defence of his sovereign rights: If the Ottoman government shows that it is determined to restore the status quo ante, the Bulgarians will lose confidence in their present courses; and in case of necessity, the entry of a single battalion of troops across the provincial frontier, with no need for any other action, will ensure that they withdraw and that the Prince ceases his revolt, and the despatch by the Ottoman Empire of a Commissioner will render possible the establishment of peace 3 . Abdiilhamid was less confident. Reports from Eastern Rumelia indicated that the Bulgarian army was making defensive preparations, and on 27 October Prince Alexander made a demonstrative return to Philippopolis after a brief absence in Sofia; the presence of a British consular official in his entourage aroused much comment 4 . In the second place, Abdiilhamid was convinced that any armed conflict would spread. His immediate concern was Serbia: together with Greece, she had refused all appeals for disarmament, and there were clear signs that she was preparing for early action. Since mid-October her ruler, King Milan, had been attempting to sound Abdiilhamid on the prospects for a joint Ottoman-Serbian invasion of Bulgaria: he disclaimed any territorial ambitions, and assured the Sultan that he sought no more than a restoration of the status quo ante in Eastern Rumelia and the re-establishment of a balance between the Balkan

' Livre Jaune: Affaires de Roumélie et de Grèce, 1885-1886, no. 151, Freycinet to Noailles, 22 October; no. 160, 26 October. 2 GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel. no. 159, 2 November. 3 Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., p. 220. 4 BBAr§, Bulgaristan trade, no. 434, 18 Muharrcm/28 October; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, no. 221, 2 November.

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states 1 . The Porte replied with a warning that Bulgaria was Ottoman territory, while Abdulhamid did not conceal his suspicion that King Milan's offer was a ruse, and that Serbia's real purpose was to engage the Ottoman army against Bulgaria, and then attack the Empire in the flank. He asked the Three Empires for guarantees, but in vain: Austria-Hungary insisted that King Milan's own assurances must suffice 2 . Last and by no means least, the Sultan's apprehensions were reinforced by an undercurrent of doubt about the reliability of the Three Empires: would their commitment to the Treaty of Berlin survive the outbreak of a Balkan war? From the start of the crisis, Abdiilhamid's conccrn to maintain the cooperation of the Three Empires had rested upon fear, and upon a belief that Russia and Austria-Hungary harboured Balkan ambitions which might easily undermine their professed commitment to Ottoman rights and the Treaty of Berlin. He had some grounds for suspicion. Austria-Hungary's complaisance in the face of Serbia's bellicosity was disturbing enough, but there were also indications that Russia's aims might exceed the bounds of the Three Empires' programme: Giers had warned the Porte that the Conference must necessarily examine the affairs of Bulgaria as well as those of Eastern Rumelia, and it appears that Nelidov had privately attempted to sound Abdulhamid on the prospects for Prince Alexander's deposition, and put forward Prince Petar Karadjordjevic and Prince Waldemar of Denmark as possible successors 3 . It is unclear whether Abdulhamid feared that Russia and Austria-Hungary would come to blows, or whether he feared that they would agree upon a partition of the Balkan peninsula. Probably he feared both. Doubtless his suspicions were much exaggerated. Indeed, the Three Empires' talk of Ottoman military action against Prince Alexander was largely bluff: they believed that the threat of force was essential if the Bulgarians were to be browbeaten into submission, and feared that, without it, Abdulhamid might slip from their grasp 4 . But he was not to know this, and he concluded that the risks of the Three Empires' programme were too great: If we follow Russia, then the Prince of Bulgaria and his followers, who are in any case encouraged by the English, will resist by force of arms, and as soon as the Serbs and Greeks observe this, they and the other small governments will intervene, and behind them, the Great

^Vuikovic, op.cit., pp. 33^t0; Slobodan Javonovi6, Vlada Milana Obrenovk'a, III, pp. 254-5. ^GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 234, 6 November. 3 BBAr§, MVM, no. 392, 15 Muharrem/25 October: GFO, Bulgarien Nr. 1 secreta, Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel. no. 158, 30 October. 4 F O 78/3754, White to Salisbury, no. 385, 8 November; Egon Corti, Alexander von Battenberg, Sein Kampf mit dem Zaren und Bismarck, p. 218; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, memorandum by Herbert Bismarck, 10 November; Reuss to Bismarck, no. 398, 10 November; HHStA, PA XV. 80, copy, Giers to Nelidov, 22 October/3 November; Medlicott, T h e Powers', pp. 269-70.

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Powers, and in all eases the Ottoman Empire will f a c e a m a j o r war with numerous enemies'. The difficulty was that the Sultan's suspicions placed him at the Three Empires' mercy: they could blackmail him by threatening to unleash Serbia and abandon the Treaty of Berlin. He attempted to play for time, but the Three Empires soon lost patience: on 2 November their Ambassadors warned that only the prompt opening of the C o n f e r e n c e could safeguard him against hostilities with Bulgaria. Greece and Serbia, and that, should other counsels prevail, the Three Empires might "see themselves obliged to consult only their own interests" 2 . The Sultan's only remaining hope w a s Britain. He convened the Conference on 5 November, but postponed bringing forward proposals consonant with the Three Empires' programme. Meanwhile Kamil Pa§a and Kiird Said Pa§a approached White, assuring him of their opposition to force and hinting at their willingness to accept a personal union as the eventual solution, but arguing that is was vital that Prince Alexander should be persuaded to withdraw f r o m Eastern Rumclia for the time being. T h e y warned that they dared not expose themselves to the risk of a collision with the "Three Empires, and they m a d e an attempt to sound White as to the possibilities of British military assistance should a collision occur. All was to no avail: White refused to entertain any formula which would require Prince Alexander to withdraw from Eastern Rumelia, even temporarily, and he suggested that the Conference should begin by consulting the wishes of Eastern Rumelia's inhabitants 3 . Matters came to a head on 9 N o v e m b e r , when Kiird Said made an attempt to broach the topic of c o m p r o m i s e at the C o n f e r e n c e itself. This simply provoked the Three Empires' Ambassadors to fresh threats: they drew the Sultan's attention to reports of Serbian a r m a m e n t , and warned that if further prevarication led to Serbian attack, or to "even graver complications", their governments would reject any responsibility for "the consequence to Turkey or for their common attitude towards her" 4 . Abdiilhamid had no option but to give way, and on 12 N o v e m b e r the Porte offered the C o n f e r e n c e a programme in conformity with the Three Empires' wishes. This proposed that the Conference should appoint a Delegate to summon Prince Alexander and his t r o o p s to withdraw from Eastern R u m e l i a ; that it s h o u l d a p p o i n t an Extraordinary Ottoman Commissioner to take charge of the province pending the appointment of a regular Governor-General; and that it should establish a Mixed Commission to consider reforms in the Organic Statute which served as ' l u r k g e l d i , op. cit., pp. 220-1. 2

G F O , Bulgarien 4 secreta,

Rudowitz to Bismarck, no. 228, 2 November.

3

F O 78/3745, White to Salisbury, no. 4 7 7 , 3 N o v e m b e r ; no. 481, 6 N o v e m b e r ; no. 486, 8 November. 4

G F O , Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 243, 10 N o v e m b e r ; Protocols of the C o n f e r e n c e ' s d i s c u s s i o n s are p r i n t e d in G a b r i e l N o r a d o u n g h i a n , Recueil des Actes Internationaux de l'Empire Ottoman, IV. pp. 366-408.

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Eastern Rumelia's constitution. The programme was immediately endorsed by the Ambassadors of the Three Empires and of Italy, but Noailles refused to consider it without further instructions, and White insisted upon a prior investigation of conditions in Eastern Rumelia 1 .

IV The Powers were deadlocked, and it was plain that Serbia would not be restrained much longer. The Sultan and his advisers could see but two ways out. The first, even at this late hour, was to induce Britain to compromise, and during an audience on 14 November Abdiilhamid made a personal attempt to win White over. He argued that Britain's support for a personal union was wrong-headed: "It was a delusion to think that any personal popularity which Prince Alexander might have momentarily obtained among the Bulgarians would be sufficient to withstand Russian influence in the long run among the people...wherever there are Slavs and those belong to the Eastern Church Russian influence is always paramount and it will always be so." This made no impression 2 . The second and riskier option was to encourage Serbia to invade Bulgaria. This would at least reduce the immediate military threat to the Empire, and might also provide a means of forcing Prince Alexander out of Eastern Rumelia. As the intractability of the Powers' divisions grew obvious, the Porte gave King Milan a hint that it might remain neutral if he attacked Bulgaria with the limited aim of forcing a restoration of the status quo ante in Eastern Rumelia. King Milan replied that he sought no territory, and on 12 November the Porte responded with a clear intimation that its attitude towards Serbia would remain friendly 3 . Serbia invaded Bulgaria on 14 November. King Milan promptly renewed his assurances to the Porte, while Prince Alexander simultaneously appealed to Abdiilhamid for military assistance in repelling Serbia's threat to the integrity of the Ottoman Empire 4 . The Porte was jubilant: it proposed to press Serbia for an armistice as soon as the Bulgarians had abandoned Eastern Rumelia, and on 16 November Kamil Pa§a informed Prince Alexander that "at the present time the sole means to a practical solution of the problem would be the immediate retreat of Your Highness with His troops and His return to Bulgaria"5. The Prince replied two days later: he announced that he had already

'Noradounghian, op. cit., pp. 381-9; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowilz to Bismarck, no. 247, 12 November; no. 248, 13 November. 2 F O 78/3755, White to Salisbury, no. 506.15 November. •3 J Vuckovic, op. cit., pp. 38-40. 4

lbid., p. 43; Korrespondentsiya Sultan, tel., 2/14 November. 5

po Sräpsko-Bälgarskata

Voina, no. 31, Prince Alexander to the

ibid„ no. 34, Kämil Pa§a to Prince Alexander, tel., 4/16 November; Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., pp. 221-

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left Eastern Rumelia with a portion of his troops, and that the remainder were under orders to follow 1 . The Porte laid this reply before the Conference on 19 November. Events had outmanoeuvred White, and he raised no objection when the C o n f e r e n c e proceeded to d r a f t a project of resolutions endorsing the appointment of a Delegate and an Extraordinary C o m m i s s i o n e r , and the establishment of a Mixed Commission to revise Eastern Rumelia's Organic Statute 2 . The Sultan's Ministers argued that a bloodless solution was within reach: the Empire had only to despatch an Extraordinary C o m m i s s i o n e r to Philippopolis and then ask Serbia for a cease-fire 3 . Abdiilhamid remained cautious. Initially, he had wished to refer the Serbian-Bulgarian war to the Conference, and, while he did not obstruct his Ministers' strategy, he did not hide his reservations. He warned that the Prince's withdrawal would not necessarily guarantee the submission of the Eastern Rumelian population, that the population's submission would not guarantee the termination of Serbia's invasion, and that in either case the Empire would find itself engaged in armed hostilities 4 . He had some grounds for apprehension, f o r on 15 N o v e m b e r Austria-Hungary had threatened him with war should he offer Bulgaria military support 5 . Nor was Abdiilhamid prepared to write off Britain; even after White's apparent surrender at the Conference, he sent him a message repeating his view that British policy was misguided: England is acting under an erroneous idea as regards Bulgaria in as much as she wishes to enlarge a province already Russian to the backbone. Every man, w o m a n and child looks upon Russia as their saviour and patron. T o m a k e a larger Bulgaria is to m a k e a larger Russia at our very doors. E n g l a n d . . . i s wrongly i n f o r m e d on these matters. She wants to make a barrier against Russia, instead of which she is playing Russia's game 6 . Events soon j u s t i f i e d the Sultan's caution: contrary to the general expectation, Bulgaria won the war. In a two-day battle at Slivnitsa on 18-19 November Prince Alexander inflicted a decisive defeat upon the Serbs and drove them back towards their own frontier. News of this reversal of fortunes reached Istanbul on 21 November, j u s t as Kamil Pa§a was preparing to send Prince Alexander a telegram announcing the appointment of an Extraordinary

1 Korrespondentsiya po SrdpskoDälgarskata Voina, no. 35, Prince Alexander to Kämil Pa§a, tel., 6/18 November. 2 Noradounghian, op. cit.. pp 394-9; FO 78/3755, White to Salisbury, nos. 522 and 528, 21 November.

^Turkgeldi, op. cit., pp. 223-4: GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, November. ^Turkgeldi, op. cit., pp. 223-4. 5

Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 259, 20

HHStA, PA XV, 85, Kalnok) to Calice, tel. no. 186, 15 November.

^Salisbury Papers, A39, White to Salisbury, 21 November.

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Commissioner; the telegram was amended to include a proposal that Serbia should be offered an armistice, and was despatched at once 1 . The Prince's tone changed abruptly: he replied that he would accept no armistice until Bulgarian soil had been cleared of Serbian troops, and he warned that the proposal to send an Extraordinary Commissioner to Kastern Rumelia "could compromise order and tranquillity among the population", and should be adjourned until after the conclusion

of p e a c e w i t h S e r b i a 2 . W h i t e too reverted to his earlier

intransigeance, and when the Confcrcncc met on 25 November to consider its draft resolutions he demanded the deletion of all references to the stipulations of the Treaty of Berlin and refused to endorse the appointment of a Delegate and an Extraordinary Commissioner 3 . T h e crisis now entered its most dangerous phase. On 26 November the Ambassadors of the Three Empires informed Abdiilhamid that the Conference had failed, and that he must rely upon his treaty rights to justify him in taking unilateral measures to restore order in Eastern Rumelia. They urged him to send Delegates and a Commissioner to Philippopolis at once, and to support them with a military demonstration on the Eastern Rumelian frontier; they added unofficially that the Sultan should be prepared to invade Eastern Rumelia if necessary 4 . This was precisely what Abdiilhamid had most feared. He went t h r o u g h the initial m o t i o n s of f o l l o w i n g the T h r e e E m p i r e s ' a d v i c e , appointing Gadban Efendi and Lebib Efendi to act as Delegates, and Cevdet Pa§a to serve as Extraordinary Commissioner; he also gave orders that forces should be ready for a frontier demonstration by 30 N o v e m b e r 5 . Nonetheless, he m a d e it plain that he was anxious f o r an alternative: he suggested that Eastern Rumelian opinion should be sounded before any officials were sent, and that the Three Empires should join him in a collective warning to Prince Alexander to abandon Eastern Rumelia 6 . The Porte deflected these suggestions; it had little faith in Abdiilhamid's willingness to act, but it was anxious not to jeopardise the support of the Three Empires. Reports f r o m Vienna indicated that Austria-Hungary w a s preparing to intervene militarily in d e f e n c e of Serbia, and Kamil Pa§a warned that this could p r o v o k e c o m p l i c a t i o n s throughout the Balkan Peninsula, and perhaps furnish Austria-Hungary with opportunities to seize Ottoman territory 7 . On 28 N o v e m b e r Prince Alexander agreed to a ceasefire after Austria-Hungary had threatened him with war; on the

^GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 263, 23 November;

Korrespondentsiya

no Sräpsko-Bälgarskata Voinu, no. 37, Kämil Pa§a to Prince Alexander, tel., 21 November. ibid., no. 38, Prince Alexander to Kämil Pa§a, 22 November. ^Noradounghian, op. cit., pp. 400-8. 4 G F O , Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 272, 27 November; no. 283, 5 December; Reusz to Bismarck, no. 430, Vienna, 26 November. %iirkgeldi, op. cit., pp. 223-4; Biyiklioglu, op. cit., II, pp. 7-8; Cevdet Pasa, Tezäkir 40. Tetimme, pp. 226-8. ®Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., pp. 224-5. ibid., pp. 440-3.

7

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following day the Council of Ministers warned Abdiilhamid that this removed the last obstacle to the return of the Prince's forces to Eastern Rumelia, and urged him to take immediate steps to implement the Three Empires' programme. Abdiilhamid compromised: he agreed to send the Delegates, but indicated that he would await their report before proceeding with the Extraordinary Commissioner and the military demonstration 1 . Gadban Efendi and Lebib Efendi set out for Philippopolis on the night of 29 November; for reasons which remain obscure, they were accompanied by the Sultan's personal barber, Jorji Efendi, a Bulgarian who knew Prince Alexander. They bore a proclamation which falsely presented the Conference's draft resolutions as "decisions of the Conference", and a message threatening the population and authorities of Eastern Rumelia with bloodshed if they resisted the restoration of the status quo ante. Confidentially, however, the two Delegates were instructed to consult the French, Russian and AustroHungarian consuls in Philippopolis in the first instance, and to inform themselves of local conditions and sentiment. They were also given discretion to deliver the proclamation and message privately and at a time of their own choosing, and were warned to return to Istanbul at once should the local authorities refuse to submit 2 . The Porte would have liked to secure a European mandate for its actions, but failed to persuade the Conference to sanction the Delegates' mission retrospectively; nonetheless, on 3 December it formally announced Cevdet Pa§a's appointment as Extraordinary Commissioner, and on the following day the Serasker reported that troops were ready for a frontier demonstration 3 . Abdiilhamid, however, continued to hold back 4 . T h e f a t e s u f f e r e d by the Delegates' mission a m p l y j u s t i f i e d Abdiilhamid's caution. Lebib and Gadban were confronted by continuous hostile demonstrations at Philippopolis, and on 6 December they abandoned their mission without delivering their proclamation and message. Gadban proceeded to Sofia as permanent Ottoman representative there; Lebib returned to Istanbul, telegraphing ahead that the population of Eastern Rumelia was mobilised to defend the union with Bulgaria, and that, while the majority wished to retain their Ottoman allegiance, they would probably resist if the Commissioner and any troops were sent 5 . The Delegates' failure coincided with disturbing reports that Greece was strengthening her forces on the

l

ibid„ pp. 225-6.

2

BBAr§, YEE, K39/30/Z17/1 ] 5, Delegates' Instructions, 21 Safer/29 November. GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radovvitz to Bismarck, no. 280, 3 December; FO 78/3756, White to Salisbury, nos. 554 and 555. 1 December; no. 559, 3 December; no. 564, 6 December; Biyiklioglu, op. cit., II, pp. 9-10. 4 GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radovvitz to Bismarck, no. 285, 6 December. 5 BBAr§, YEE, K39/30/Z17/115, telegram from Lebib Efendi, 25 November/7 December; Radev, op. cit., pp. 709-24. 3

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Ottoman frontier; but, just as important, it also coincided with the first indications that the Three Empires' resolve might be faltering: Nelidov suddenly ceased to advocate an Ottoman invasion of Eastern Rumelia, and White confirmed a report that Germany had entered into separate discussions with Britain 1 . All this confirmed the Sultan's fear of "opening the door to a war of uncertain outcome and incalculable consequences", and on 9 December he decided to sound the Powers' Ambassadors before taking a decision. Kamil Pa§a spoke to Radowitz and Nelidov. He warned them that nothing short of an Ottoman invasion could restore the status quo ante in Eastern Rumelia; that Greece might seize the opportunity to attack the Empire in the rear; that Slav sentiment might force a change in Russia's attitude, particularly if the conflict between the Ottoman and Bulgarian armies proved to be prolonged; and that the Empire could in no case expose itself to the risk of hostilities without a clear prior agreement with Russia and Germany. The two Ambassadors replied that they would no longer advise an invasion of Eastern Rumelia; instead, the Porte should ask the Powers to propose a solution 2 . This marked the end of the Three Empires' programme: Abdulhamid's tactics of friendly passive resistance had paid off. On 12 December the Council of Ministers recommended that the question of Eastern Rumelia should be turned over to the Powers; Abdulhamid expressed "pleasure", and on the following day the Porte issued a Circular which summarized the abortive discussions at the Conference and requested the Powers' advice 3 . In the meantime the Ottoman government had taken the first steps towards a normalisation of its relations with Prince Alexander. At the beginning of December the Prince had refused to acknowledge the Sultan's suzerain right to be represented at the armistice negotiations between Bulgaria and Serbia, and this had prompted fears that he might be planning to declare Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia formally independent of the Empire 4 . After talks with Gadban Efendi the Prince relented, however, and on 13 December Macid Pa§a was sent to represent the Sultan at the armistice negotiations 5 . Shortly afterwards, a formal armistice was concluded, to run from 21 December 1885 to 1 March 1886, and to be automatically renewed thereafter. Serbia and Bulgaria agreed to evacuate each other's territory by the end of December 1885, and to appoint delegates for talks on the formal restoration of peace 6 .

I ß B A r j , MVM, no. 465, 2 Rebiiilevvel/9 December; YEE, K9/2644/Z72/-, Sultan's instructions, n.d.; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 283, 5 December. 2 Biyiklioglu, op. cit., II, pp. 11 -6.

hbid., pp. 17-8. ^GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 291, 11 December. 5

ibid., Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel., 14 December; Dokumentì za Bälgarskata I l l , tel. from Gadban Efendi, 12/24 December.

^Vuëkovic, op. cit., p. 69.

Istoriva, no.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN: THE EASTERN RUMELIAN SETTLEMENT (December 1885-June 1886)

I The collapse of the Three Empires' programme put an end to any hope that the Philippopolis coup might be reversed; henceforth the question was whether its effects could be contained, and whether an expanded Bulgaria was compatible with Near Eastern and European stability. Abdiilhamid was pessimistic. He was convinced that Britain had plotted the coup as a means of excluding Russian influence from Bulgaria, and he saw no reason to believe that this Anglo-Russian struggle would ccasc. The Three Empires' programme had placed Russia in a position of opposition to Bulgarian expansionism — somewhat unnaturally, as Abdiilhamid admitted; the danger was that in future she would changc coursc, and compete with Britain for the Bulgarians' favour: The fact that the Russians denounced the Bulgarians' movement and did not support their expansionist aims was due entirely to the circumstancc that \the Bulgarians] had acted at the instigation of a foreign Power like England which is currently Russia's enemy and rival. Fundamentally, the Bulgarians' acquisition of power and influence and their territorial aggrandisement suit Russia's purposes too. ft is clear that Russia will realise that in present conditions, and given the Bulgarians' recent victories, a continuation ol' her previous policy will bring her no political or moral advantage, and without completely abandoning her old policy, and without taking steps to directly encourage the Bulgarians' demands...she will defend and support their claims and pretensions, perhaps with partial modifications 1 . The Sultan also feared for the future of the Three Emperors' Alliance. The defeat of the Three Empires' programme was welcome, but it nonetheless represented a defeat for the Alliance as a whole, and might ultimately lead to open conflict between Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. From St.

'BBAr§, YEE, K9/2644/Z72/-, bade, n. d.

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Petersburg, the Ottoman Ambassador, §akir Pa§a, reported a widespread belief that the Philippopolis coup had been a British ploy to divide the T h r e e Empires: Russia had seen the trap, but Austria-Hungary had not, and had unwisely encouraged Serbia's disastrous invasion of Bulgaria. The immediate danger was that Austria-Hungary's position in Serbia would be threatened: her protege King Milan was thoroughly discredited, and his Montcncgrin-backed K a r a d j o r d j e v i c rivals might make a bid to topple him. In that event, AustriaHungary might be provoked into using force against Serbia, and Russia would then face an invidious choice: cither to go to war with Austria-Hungary, or else to stand aside and forfeit her prestige and influence a m o n g the South Slavs 1 . These prognostications were not without foundation. At the end of December Calice warned the Porte that Montenegro was preparing to invade Serbia. Abdiilhamid made urgent enquiries of Prince Nikola of Montenegro: the Prince denied the story, but admitted that he had been expecting a delegation of dissident Serbs to offer his son-in-law Pctar Karadjordjevic the throne. The scare soon subsided; nonetheless, the Ottoman Minister at Cetinje drew attention to Prince Nikola's "poetic imagination", and warned that he undoubtedly saw himself as Bulgaria's future ruler or as the leader of a South Slav federation 2 .. Henceforth Abdiilhamid kept a close eye on Montenegrin behaviour 5 . These was ample material for combustion elsewhere in the Balkans, too. Serbia and Bulgaria remained technically at war, and refused to demobilise their armed forces; their promised peace talks were repeatedly delayed by wrangles over agenda and location, and not until 4 February 1886 did a Conference open in Bucharest 4 . Until then, and right up until the conclusion of definitive peace between Serbia and Bulgaria in March, Abdiilhamid could not overlook the possibility that either Russia or Austria-Hungary — f o r reasons which, though opposed, were liable to produce similar results — might induce Serbia to reopen hostilities, and thus provoke a conflagration which would end either in war between the Great Powers, or else in a RussoAustrian agreement to partition the Balkan Peninsula 5 . T h e r e w a s also the problem of Greece: since Slivnitsa her government had laid open claim to territorial compensation in Macedonia, and had backed its words with troop concentrations on the Ottoman frontier and naval sorties in the A e g e a n . Abdiilhamid warned the Powers that he would not hesitate to use force against

X

ibid„ K31/434/Z76/81, report from §akir Pa§a, 22 Safer/29 November.

2

ibid., K18/420/9/Z56/46, tel. from Cevad Pa§a, Cetinje 14/26 December; report f r o m Cevad Pa^a, 2 Cemaziiilevvel/ll February 1886; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 1, 1 January. 3 B B A r § , YEE, K18/420/9/Z56/46, tel. f r o m Cevad Paça, n.d.; tel. to Cevad Pa§a, 12 January; report from Cevad Pa§a, 10/22 April: Rakocevic, op. cit., pp. 631-4; A S R C G , M I D 1886, Bakic to Radonjic, 6/18 January; Cevad Pa§a to Prince Nikola, 19 January; GFO, Bulgarien 4

secreta,

Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 39. 8 February. ^Vuckovic, op. cit., pp. 75-90

passim.

-'Dokumenti :.a Bdlgarskata htoriya, no. 119, Sultan's instructions, 1/13 February; BRArs. Bulgaristan Irade, no. 528, 3 C cmaziiilahir/9 March.

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Greece; the Powers urged restraint, and, France excepted, sent units of their own fleets to protect Crete against a possible Greek attack 1 . Britain took a particularly strong line against Greece; nonetheless, Greek press claims of British support and a rumoured British plan to give Crete independence kept Abdiilhamid on his guard, and he repeatedly warned White that he would cede no territory 2 . It was §akir Pa§a who suggested that the Rmpire's best hope of security might lie in a fundamental change of foreign policy: he proposed an alliance with Russia. He warned that Russia would not be reconciled to a permanent loss of influence in Bulgaria, and he predicted that intensifying Anglo-Russian rivalry would eventually end in war or acutc diplomatic hostility: in these circumstances the Empire would be unable to appease both sides. §akir argued that Russia's autocratic system of government would make her a more reliable ally than Britain, whose foreign policy was at the mercy of fluctuating parliamentary majorities, and he proposed that, at the very least, the Sultan should render the Straits impregnable and so force Britain and Russia to bid for his allegiance 3 . Some approach was made to Russia: on 14 December 1885 Nelidov reported "secret overtures from the Sultan which can in my opinion give us an enormous security in the Black Sea and prepare the future right here", and he hinted at the possibility of a formal Russo-Ottoman treaty 4 . The true nature of these overtures remains obscure, however, and it is clear that nothing came of them; nonetheless, the question of alliances had been raised, and was to reappear with each subsequent deterioration in Anglo-Russian relations. For the moment, Abdiilhamid's solution was rearmament. By the end of 1885 he had upwards of 250,000 troops on active service in the Balkans, and fresh reserves continued to be called up. Plans were laid for a permanent expansion of the Ottoman army to 22 divisions, and Goltz Pa§a and Muzaffer Pa§a were instructed to prepare a new Recruiting Law, and to consider the possibility of extending military service to the Empire's Christians. Fresh arms purchases were made in Germany: Goltz. noted "a kind of mania for ordnance purchase" as orders were placed for 426 field guns, ten siege guns and five torpedo boats, and further consideration was given to the Dardanelles defences 5 . All this was undertaken is spite of the additional costs imposed by the Empire's mobilisation: these were running at some Ltq 300,000 per

^Driault and L'Héritier, op. at., pp. 209-19; FO 78/3879, White to Salisbury, tel. no. 8, 13 January. 2 BBAr§, Bulgaristan Irade, no. 480, 9 Rebiiilahir/15 January; FO 78/3868, White to Salisbury, no. 39, 2t January; FO 195/1527, Salisbury to White, 6 January. 3 BBAr§, YEE, K31/434/Z76/81, report from §akir Pa§a, 17/29 November. ^/omini-Onou Papers, Egerton 3174, Nelidov to Jomini, 2/14 December. 5 GFO, Bulgarien Nr. 4 Adh. 1, Wladersee to Bismarck, no. 735, 17 February, enclosing report from Goltz, 6 February; no. 862, 24 February, enclosing report from Goltz, 19 February; copy, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 3C, 12 January; FO 195/1526, memorandum from Major Trotter, 7 December; Silin, op. cit., pp. 97-100.

174

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T H E

G R E A T

P O W E R S

month, and had already obliged the Porte to raise domestic and foreign loans totalling Ltq 1,850,000; before long it would be reduced to the f u r t h e r expedient of a levy on official salaries 1 . II Rearmament and ialk of alliances anticipated future eventualities; in the shorter term, it was clear that the best guarantee of peace was an early settlement of the Eastern Rumelian issue. By the end of December 1885 it was clear that the Powers would offer no lead: their replies to the Ottoman Circular of 13 December were non-committal for the most part, and Britain alone had given positive advice, urging the Sultan to open direct negotiations with Prince Alexander on the subject of a personal union 2 . T h e Sultan's Ministers endorsed this advice. Kamil Pa§a argued that the Prince must see that his personal interest lay in cooperation with the Ottoman Empire and avoidance of Anglo-Russian conflicts which might imperil his throne; but Kàmil also warned that further delay might tempt the Prince to proclaim Bulgaria fully independent, and there was no guarantee that Russia would oppose this: she might attempt to trade recognition of Bulgarian independence for the Prince's deposition3.

A Ministerial

Committee

w h i c h m e t on 28

December

recommended that Prince Alexander should be invited to request appointment as Governor-General of Eastern Rumelia; the Porte should then lay this request before the Conference, and propose, as conditions, that certain outstanding disputes over the Bulgarian T ribute and Bulgaria's share of the Ottoman Public Debt should be resolved, that all f o r t i f i c a t i o n s in B u l g a r i a should be demolished, and that the Empire should enforce its right to garrison the Balkan range. Should this last condition prove unacceptable, either the M o s l e m inhabited Rodop districi of Eastern Rumelia should be placed under direct O t t o m a n rule, or else a token O t t o m a n f o r c e should be stationed

at

Philippopolis 4 . Abdtilhamid waited until Russia had indicated that she would no longer oppose the principle of a union between Bulgaria and Eastern R u m e l i a ; he then put forward a p r o g r a m m e considerably m o r e radical than anything proposed by his Ministers. Of eleven proposals conveyed to Prince Alexander by Gadban Efendi in mid-January 1886, eight were of military significance:

' i n October 1885 the Porte raised a loan of Ltq 550,000 on the izmir-Kasaba railway; a further Ltq 150,000 was raised f r o m the Public Debt, and Ltq 150,000 f r o m the state pension f u n d . In D e c e m b e r 1885 Hirsch arranged a loan of a p p r o x i m a t e l y Ltq 1,000,000 on terms w h i c h substantially restored him to the position he had lost in February 1885. G F O , Tuerkei 144, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 30.!. 25 December; no. 85, 5 April; FO 78/3756, White to Salisbury, no. 607, 29 December. 2 F O 78/3747, Salisbury to While, no. 486a, 24 December. 3

Turkgeldi, op. cit., pp. 443-9.

4

ibid.,

pp. 228-9.

THE

EASTERN

RUM ELIAN

SETTLEMENT

175

the Bulgarian army was to be considered a part of the Ottoman army; the Sultan, in the person of Prince Alexander, was to be its Commander-in-Chief, and was to maintain a Bulgarian guard of honour in Istanbul; Ottoman troops were to help guard Bulgaria's frontiers, and Bulgarian troops were to help guard the Empire's frontiers; in peacetime a full division of Bulgarian troops would be available for service within the Ottoman Empire proper; in wartime the Ottoman and Bulgarian armies would mobilise in parallel; finally, the Black Sea port of Burgas and the Eastern Rumelian districts of Kircali and Rodop would be placed under direct Ottoman control. In return for all this, and for payment of the Eastern Rumelian tribute, the Sultan offered to appoint Prince Alexander Governor-General of Eastern Rumelia 1 . The military rationale of this programme was obvious, and can be related to Abdiilhamid's preoccupation with rearmament and his fears of a European war. Its political import is less clear. Doubtless Abdiilhamid saw close military cooperation as a means of limiting Great Power influences and rivalries in Bulgaria, but there is evidence that his conceptions may have ranged further: he is known to have discussed similar arrangements with Rumania and Serbia shortly afterwards, and it seems likely that he had hopes of insuring himself against Great Power conflict through the formation of a Balkan League — an idea to which he was to return in the 1890s 2 . Be that as it may, the programme proved too ambitious for Prince Alexander, and the terms of the arrangement concluded by Bulgaria's Foreign Minister, Tsanov, at the Porte on 31 January 1886 were more modest. It was agreed that the Sultan should appoint Prince Alexander Governor-General of Eastern Rumelia, and renew the appointment every five years at his own discretion, thus abolishing the Powers' established right of endorsement; that the districts of Kircali and Rodop should be placed under direct Ottoman rule for as long as Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia were ruled by the same person; that the Empire would exercise its right of military intervention in Eastern Rumelia in the event of any hostile movement in that province or in Bulgaria; that in the event of an external attack upon Bulgaria or Eastern Rumelia the Sultan would supply Prince Alexander with as many troops as needed, while the Prince would reciprocate in the event of an external attack upon the Empire's European provinces; that an Ottoman-Bulgarian commission would prepare a reform of Eastern Rumelia's Organic Statute within four months; and that all other provisions of the Treaty of Berlin touching Bulgaria and Eastern

^Radev, op. cit., p. 725 ff.; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowilz to Bismarck, no. 2, 1 January; no. 7, 8 January; no. 13, 11 January; FO 78/3879, White to Salisbury, tel. no. 5, 11 January. The eleven conditions are printed in Korrespondentsiya po vdprosa za saedinenieto, no. 47. 2 BBAr§, Bulgaristan irade, no. 479, 9 Rebiiiiahir/15 January; no. 133,11 Rebiiilahir/17 January. The evidence for discussions with Serbia and Romania is to be found in FO 78/3869, Thornton to Rosebery, no. 129, 18 March; cf. Trandafir G. Djuvara, Mes Missions diplomatiques, p. 43. Abdiilhamid's later Balkan league projects are covered in Ali Fuad Tiirkgeldi, Mesail-i Muhimme-i Siyasiyye, III, pp. 85-109.

176

ABDULHAMID

II

AND

THE

GREAT

POWERS

Rumelia would remain in force'. The arrangement thus amounted to more than a paper endorsement o i the status quo: it sought to foster interdependence between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria while simultaneously reducing the Powers' rights of interference. A s this involved a modification of the Treaty of Berlin, it was essential to secure the Powers' assent, and on 2 February the Porte proposed that the Eastern Rumelian Conference reconvene to register its approval 2 . Abdiilhamid already h a l f - s u s p e c t e d that Russia would wreck the arrangement, and perhaps o f f e r the Bulgarians a real union rather than a personal one 3 . He was not far wrong. Russia was determined to limit Prince Alexander's personal gains and to break up the process of Ottoman-Bulgarian cooperation, and she at once demanded that the arrangement should be revised. She insisted that the pro\ isions for mutual defence should be dropped, and that the reform of the Organic Statute should be placed under the Powers' control; she also proposed that the clause appointing Prince Alexander GovernorGeneral of Eastern Rumelia should be amended to omit all reference to the P r i n c e by n a m e , to r e m o v e the Sultan's right to set a t e r m f o r the appointment, but to restore the Powers' right to sanction the a p p o i n t m e n t every five years. The demand for an appointment without term was a clear step towards a real union, and Abdiilhamid had no hesitation in pronouncing it to be unacceptable. He reluctantly agreed to sacrifice the defence clauses, and asked Britain and Germany to persuade Russia to accept the arrangement with this single m o d i f i c a t i o n 4 . The hope of mediation proved vain: G e r m a n y supported Russia's objections in full, and the Liberal government which had j u s t taken office in Britain declared its support for an appointment without t e r m 5 . Abdiilhamid conceded that the Powers should supervise the reform of the Organic Statute, but successfully resisted an appointment without term: after discussions with Tsanov, Nelidov proposed a compromise formula which stated that "the Government-General of Eastern Rumelia will be conferred by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan upon the Prince of Bulgaria in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty of Berlin". Buoyed up by the conclusion of formal peace between Bulgaria and Serbia on 3 March, Abdiilhamid accepted

^Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., II, pp. 2 2 l M 0 . 2

F O 78/3868, White to Salisbury, no. 57, 6 February.

3

Dokumenti za Bdlgarskata Istoriya, no. 117, Sultan's instructions, 23 January/4 February. Abdiilhamid had grounds for suspicion: in mid-January the Russian consul in Sofia publicly stated that Russia would support a real union. Nelidov denied it: GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, copy, Giers to Shuvalov, 6/18 January: Giers to Staal, 11/23 January. 4

B B A r § , Bulgaristan Irade, no. 500, selh-i Rebiulahir/4 February; Dokumenti za Bdlgarskata Istoriya, no. 120, Sultan's instructions, 8/20 February; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 53, 22 February; Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel. no. 40, 19 February; FO 78/3869, White to Rosebery, no. 72, 12 February; no. 8 0 , 1 9 February. 5 G F O , Bulgarien 4 secreta, toreign Office to Radowitz, tel. no. 18, 22 February; FO 78/3865, Pauncefote to White, no. 46. 0 February; Rosebery to Thornton, no. 70, 26 February; Pantev, op. cit., pp. 121-4.

THE

E A S T E R N

R U M E L I A N

S E T T L E M E N T

177

this formula, and on 4 March the Porte invited the Conference to sanction the amended arrangement 1 . It was left to Prince Alexander to raise the threat of a further crisis. On 12 March he withdrew Tsanov's concessions and demanded the reinstatement of the original formula governing his appointment as Governor-General of Eastern Rumelia: he claimcd that the revised version would restore the Powers' rights of interference and lead to instability and intrigue 2 . The Powers declined to consider any fresh amendments, but Abdulhamid took alarm when Gadban Efcndi reported from Sofia that the Prince had threatened to declare a real union between Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, and had claimed to have the support of unnamed European courts 3 . Abdulhamid still feared that certain Powers were hoping to provoke a war in the Balkans, and his immediate suspicions fell on Russia: it was suggested that she was seeking to manufacture a pretext to occupy Bulgaria 4 . He also feared that the Conference might ask the Empire itself to use force against Bulgaria, and that the Prince might conclude an alliance with Greece 5 . He preferred to compromise again, and instructed the Porte to propose an additional clause guaranteeing Prince Alexander the Governor-Generalship of Eastern Rumelia for life on condition that he remained loyal to the Sultan and to the Treaty of Berlin 6 . Neither Russia nor the Prince would accept this, however, and on 30 March Kamil Pa§a formally asked Prince Alexander to accept the arrangement as revised by the Powers; the Prince replied that he could not accept the reestablishment of "international sovereignty" in Eastern Rumelia, and that he would uphold the TurcoBulgarian arrangement, not the Turco-European one 7 . Abdulhamid agreed to proceed without him, and on 5 April the Conference gave its formal approval to the revised arrangement 8 . Prince Alexander accepted it six days later, but added that he "maintained his dispositions" on the subject of the appointment

' V u i k o v i c , op. cit., p. 98; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta,

Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 52, 22

February; Said to Tevfik, circular, 4 March; Dokumenti za Bdigarskata Istoriya, no. 126, Sultan's instructions, 18 February/2 March; Fo 78/3869, Thornton to Rosebery, no. 108, 25 February. 2 Radev, op. cit., pp. 734-5; Tiirkgeldi, op. tit., p. 231; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 67, 12 March; no. 72, 15 March. 3 BBAr§, YEE, K36/2328(5)/Z146/XV, tel. from Gadban Efendi, 19 March; Dokumenti za Bdigarskata Istoriya, no. 130, Sultan's instructions, 7/19 March; nos. 131 and 132, 8/20 March; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel.. no. 57, 21 March. 4

BBAr§, Bulgaristan ¡rade, no. 533, 13 Cemaziiilahir/20 March; Dokumenti za Bdigarskata Istoriya, no. 136, Sultan's instructions, 19/31 March; no. 138, 22 March/3 April. 5 BBAr§, Bulgaristan Irade, no. 539, 16 Cemaziiilahir/22 March. ^ibid., no. 540, 17 Cemaziulahir/23 March; no. 543, 23 CemaziUlahir/29 March; Dokumenti za Bdigarskata Istoriya, no. 133, Sultan's instructions, 8/20 March; no. 134, 10/22 March; no. 135 17/29 March. -7 GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 71, 15 March; nos. 75 and 76, 26 March; no. 79, 29 March; copy, Giers to Muraviev, 14/26 March; FO 78/3865, Rosebery to Thornton, no. 108, 27 March; no. 113, 29 March; Korrespondentsiya po Vdprosa za Sdedinenieto, no. 51, Kàmil Pa§a to Prince Alexander, 18/30 March; no. 52, Prince Alexander to Kàmil Pa§a, 19/31 March. ^ c x t of arrangement in GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 86, 5 April.

178

A B D U L H A M i D

II

A N D

T H E

G R E A T

P O W E R S

c l a u s e 1 . A b d u l h a m i d promptly issued a Firman a p p o i n t i n g the Prince Governor-General of Eastern Rumelia 2 .

Ill

T h e r e r e m a i n e d the problem of G r e e c e , w h o s e g o v e r n m e n t w a s continuing to arm and to demand compensation. The Powers had warned that they would take steps lo compel Greece to disarm only after the Eastern Rumelian issue had been settled, and this had inevitably nourished fears that the Greeks might be getting external support 3 . The British Foreign Secretary, Rosebery, had been particularly tactless in e m p h a s i z i n g the connection between the two issues, and A b d u l h a m i d continued to express a strong suspicion of Britain 4 . Kamil Pa§a was more suspicious of Russia: he foresaw that she might transfer her patronage to the Greeks in order to spite the Bulgarians and to put pressure on the Ottoman government to agree to Prince Alexander's deposition 5 . Neither doubt seemed justified at first. On 13 April the Powers unanimously asked Greece to disarm, and, upon being refused, they issued an ultimatum threatening a blockade of Piraeus. Only France declined to support a policy of coercion, and issued a separate and milder appeal to the Greek government. The other Powers stood by their ultimatum, and on 7 May they withdrew their heads of missions from Athens and set up the blockade 6 . The Greek government responded by staging a series of violent incidents on the Ottoman frontier in Thessaly. Much to the Porte's alarm, Russia showed signs of wavering: she insisted upon returning her Minister to Athens, and her Embassy in Istanbul attempted to blame the frontier incidents on the Ottoman f o r c e s 7 . T h e Sultan's troops had little difficulty in dealing with Greece's provocations, however, hnd on 24 May the Greek government abandoned the struggle and ordered a general demobilisation. The Porte was above all eager to liquidate the affair, and ii was al its own suggestion that the Powers lifted the blockade on 7 June 8 .

' Korrespondentsiya po Vdprcsa za Sdedinenielo, no. 59, Prince Alexander to Kâmil Pa§a, 30 March/11 April. 2 Tiirkgeldi, op. cit., p. 233; BBArç, Bulgaristan Irade, no. 553, 8 Receb/22 April. 3 BBAr§, YEE, K36/139/19/Z139/XVIII, Council of Ministers Report, 6 Receb/20 April. There is evidence that the Porte had secretly attempted a direct settlement with Greece in February, and, allegedly, offered territory. Sec Driault and L'Héritier, op. cit., p. 222; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta Nr. 1 Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 44, 15 February; no. 50, 19 February. 4 Dokumenti za Bdlgarskata hloriya, no. 136, Sultan's instructions, 19/31 March; FO 78/3865, Rosebery to Thornton, no. 116a. 3 i March. 5 BBAr§, YEE, K31/1729/Z158/86, memorandum by Kâmil Pa§a, 10 Receb/14 April.

^Driault and L'Héritier, op. cit.. pp. 225-38. ''ibid., pp. 239-41; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta Nr. 1, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 112, 14 May. 8

Driault and L'Héritier, op. cit. pp. 239-42; FO 78/3872, Thornton to Rosebery, no. 288, 4 June; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta Nr. I. Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 1 3 2 , 4 June.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: BATUM, THE STRAITS AND EGYPT (June-December 1886)

I

Neither the Sultan nor his Ministers had much faith in the Eastern Rumelian settlement. Hopes that it might lead to a lasting accommodation with Bulgaria had been seriously undermined by Princc Alexander's behaviour in March: his pointless defiance of the Powers, and his threat to declare a real union, were seen as a sign of poor judgement at best, and, at worst, as positive evidence of revolutionary ambitions. Abdiilhamid inclined to the latter view, and perhaps with reason, for it appears that at some stage during the negotiations preceding the settlement Prince Alexander had approached him with a proposal for a "Big Bulgaria" thinly disguised as a Balkan Confederation: Bulgaria was to expand up to Salonika, the remainder of Ottoman Europe was to become an autonomous principality, and the whole was to be placed under the Sultan's protection "like Germania" — presumably a reference to the old North German Confederation 1 . Nor did the settlement offer much hope of reducing Great Power competition in the Balkans. A collision between Russia and Austria-Hungary had been avoided, but there appeared to be no serious prospect of averting further struggles between Russia and Britain. Russia had made it plain that she would never be reconciled to Prince Alexander: even before the revised arrangement was signed by the Powers, the Tsar had spoken to §akir Pa§a of his hopes for Prince Alexander's deposition, and reports from Sofia and Philippopolis confirmed that Russia was already intriguing with the Prince's domestic opponents. There was speculation that the Tsar was seeking a pretext to occupy Bulgaria; this prompted Abdiilhamid to press for an early demarcation of the new frontier in the Rodop and Kircali districts, before a fresh upset might occur 2 .

The timing of Prince Alexander's proposal remains obscure. Abdiilhamid referred to it retrospectively on two occasions later in 1886, when he noted that the proposal had been made "about one month after the late Conference": i. e. in May, or conceivably in January 1886. See BBAr§, Bulgaristan trade, no. 644, 15 Rebiiilevvel 304/12 December 1886; YEE K9/2003/Z72/4, memorandum by the Sultan, 27 Muharrem 304/26 October 1886. 2 B B A r ? , YEE, KÌ/156/31/Z156/3, telegram from §akir Pa§a, 30 March; KÌ/156/19/Z156/3, memorandum by the Sultan, n.d.; Bulgaristan Irade, no. 524, 23 Cemaziiilevvel/27 February; no. 564, Receb/April, enclosing petition from Gadban Efendi, 23 Receb/28 April; Dokumenti za Bdlgarskata Istoriya, no. 136, Sultan's instructions, 19/31 March; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 79, 29 March; no. 92, 12 April.

180

A B D U L H A M I D

II

AND

THE

G R E A T

P O W E R S

Yet at the same time Abdiilhamid was throughly disillusioned with Britain: the net effect of her policy of direct Ottoman-Bulgarian negotiation, he pointed out, had been to leave the Empire exposed to simultaneous threats from both Russia and Bulgaria:

To date we have acted entirely on England's advice: for example, by negotiating directly with Prince Alexander. Yet if regard is had to [England's] opposition to the decision taken at the Conference and to her stated views on the subject of Prince Alexander and the union of Bulgaria, and now to her policy of running with the hare and hunting with the hounds, it would appear that in order to please the Queen [?she has encompassed| Bulgaria's union and perhaps its complete independence, and thereby placed Edirne and Istanbul in danger; and in that case she will compel Russia of necessity to occupy Bulgaria with troops, and thereafter there appear dangers without end. . A

In these circumstances, Abdiilhamid's first concern was to regain Russia's confidence; this offered the best hope of restraining her. He was inclined to believe that her hostility to the original terms of the Eastern Rumelian arrangement had sprung from a belief that it reflected British influence upon Ottoman counsels. More than once during February and March, Abdiilhamid had toyed w ith the idea of a personal appeal to the Tsar, and he had suggested to his Ministers that he might himself arrange a formal reconciliation between the Tsar and Prince Alexander, and back it with a separate Russo-Ottoman agreement to depose the Prince in the event of future misbehaviour 2 . It may also be significant that he privately asked the Tsar to replace Nelidov with I obanov-Rostovskii, who had served as Russia's Ambassador to the Porte between 1878 and 1879 3 . The Grand Vizier was more sceptical of Russia's intentions, and anxious lest Abdiilhamid play into her hands: when Edhem Pa§a was sent on a ceremonial mission to the Tsar at the

^BBAr§, YEE, K1/156/31/Z15W3, memorandum by the Sultan, n. d. 2

ibid.; Bulgaristan irade, no. 533, 13 Cemaziulahir/29 March; Dokumenti za Bdlgarskata Istoriya, no. 124, Sultan's instructions, 10/22 February. 3 BBArs>, YEE, K14/343/Z126/8, report by Kazim Bey on his visit to the Tsar at Livadia, 4 §aban/8 May.

BATUM,

T H K S T R A I T S

AND

E (i Y P T

181

end of April, K a m i l Pa§a specifically w a r n e d him to be on his guard against any proposal for Prince Alexander's removal 1 . O t t o m a n a p p r e h e n s i o n s c o n t i n u e d to g r o w t h r o u g h o u t t h e e a r l y s u m m e r of 1886. T h e Sultan strove loyally e n o u g h to i m p l e m e n t the t e r m s of his a r r a n g e m e n t with P r i n c e A l e x a n d e r : delimitation of t h e n e w f r o n t i e r in Kircali a n d the R o d o p district w a s finished in July, and it w a s p r o p o s e d to invite t h e P r i n c e to Istanbul in the a u t u m n . A b d i i l h a m i d a l s o instructed his M i n i s t e r s to c o n s i d e r w a y s of aiding the P r i n c e against internal s u b v e r s i o n 2 . Prince A l e x a n d e r s h o w e d scant gratitude. At the b e g i n n i n g of J u n e he illegally a b s o r b e d t h e E a s t e r n R u m e l i a n l e g i s l a t u r e i n t o the B u l g a r i a n N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y , and i n a u g u r a t e d the c o m b i n e d b o d y with an a g g r e s s i v e s p e e c h w h i c h c e l e b r a t e d the union with Eastern R u m e l i a as a national t r i u m p h , but m a d e no saving r e f e r e n c e to the Sultan's rights. Abdiilhamid protested: "Will the P r i n c e rely u p o n E n g l a n d and not carry o u t the a r r a n g e m e n t solely in r e s p e c t of t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e ? " T h e P r i n c e replied that he m u s t conciliate p u b l i c o p i n i o n ; G a d b a n E f e n d i c l a i m e d that Britain held that t h e P r i n c e ' s d e l i c a t e d o m e s t i c p o s i t i o n a b s o l v e d h i m f r o m t h e f u l l o b s e r v a n c e of his a g r e e m e n t s 3 . R e p o r t s that Bulgaria w a s m o v i n g troops into Eastern R u m e l i a and that she had o f f e r e d Serbia an alliance kept Abdiilhamid o n his guard, and w h e n he finally d e m o b i l i s e d his B a l k a n a r m i e s in late J u n e he left a f o r c e of t w o a r m y c o r p s in s o u t h e r n M a c e d o n i a as a p r e c a u t i o n a g a i n s t B u l g a r i a n attack 4 . A s to R u s s i a , the question a p p e a r e d to be not w h e t h e r , but w h e r e and w h e n she w o u l d m o v e . Evidence of her s u b v e r s i v e activities in B u l g a r i a and Eastern R u m e l i a continued to accumulate, and w a s a c c o m p a n i e d b y rumours of t r o o p concentrations in Bessarabia and the C r i m e a 5 . In M a y , t h e T s a r issued a n o t a b l y bellicose o r d e r of the day to his B l a c k Sea Fleet, a n d in t h e s a m e m o n t h h e a c c e p t e d an a d d r e s s f r o m t h e M a y o r of M o s c o w w h i c h d e c l a r e d that "the cross of Christ will shine f r o m S a i n t - S o p h i a " 6 . A b d i i l h a m i d

was

X ibid„ K31 /1729/Z158/86, memorandum by Kâmil Pa§a, 10 Receb/14 April. Edhem Papa's instructions are printed in Bayur, Sadrazam Kâmil Pa§a, pp. 32-6. 2

BBAr§, Bulgaristan Irade, no. 564, Receb/April; Y EE, KI/156/19/Z156/3, memorandum by the Sultan, n. d.; GFO, Bulgarien 4 Nr. 1 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 107, 3 May; Biyikltoglu, op. cit., I, pp. 59-60. ^Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, p. 245; Turkgeldi, op. cit., p. 235' BBArs YEE, K36/2328(5)/Z 146/XV. tel. to Gadban Efendi, 20 June; tels, from Gadban Efendi, 19 and 22 June; FO 78/3872, Thornton to Rosebery, no. 324, 23 June; FO 78/3873, Thornton to Rosebery, no. 339,2 July. 4 BBAr§, YEE, K14/88/31/Z88/12, report by Edhem Pa§a on military dispositions in the Balkans 2/14 June; K36/2328(5)/Z146/XV, tels, to Gadban Efendi, 16 and 26 June; tels, from Gadban Efendi, 19 and 27 June; Bulgaristan Irade, no. 580, 13 §evval/15 July; no. 583, 15 §evval/17 July; GFO, Orientalia Generalia 5, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 170,2 August. 5 F O 78/3871, Thornton to Rosebery, no. 239, 17 May; GFO, Tuerkei 153, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 119, 21 May. 6 F O 78/3871, Thornton to Rosebery, no. 268, 28 May; no. 274, 31 May; GFO, Tuerkei 153, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 122, 24 May.

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sufficiently disturbed to ask the British and German Embassies for assurances. The Russian Embassy offered none: Nelidov was absent, and the chargé d'affaires, Onou, appears to have calculated that a threatening stance would deter Abdulhamid f r o m drawing too close to Prince Alexander. Throughout June he harried the Porte with complaints against the behaviour of Prince Alexander, against measures to strengthen the defences of Edirne and the Black Sea Straits, and against arrears in the payment of the 1879 War Indemnity. In July, the M o n t e n e g r i n charge d ' a f f a i r e s d r e w the Porte's attention

to

disturbances on the Albanian frontier; Onou advised him "to frighten the Turks as much as possible" 1 . The Porte was additionally disturbed by signs that Russia might draw closer to France. It was the behaviour of these two powers in the Greek affair which first aroused suspicions of an entente; the suspicions hardened towards the end of June, when France echoed Russia's protest against the illegal fusion of the Bulgarian and Eastern Rumelian assemblies 2 . Kâmil Pa§a foresaw that this must lead to some attempt to make trouble over the Egyptian question. Egypt remained the Achilles' heel of A n g l o - O t t o m a n relations: the High Commissioners' joint mission had not gone well, and their talks had been effectively suspended since M a r c h , when Wolff rejected M u h t a r Pa§a's proposals for an expansion of the Egyptian army and an advance to Dongola in the S u d a n 3 . T h e Porte had intervened repeatedly in London, but f o u n d Rosebery reluctant to overrule Wolff and unable to offer alternative proposals 4 . France was disposed to be disruptive: Britain had rejected her overtures for a Suez Canal settlement, and in May the French g o v e r n m e n t a n n o u n c e d its support for Muhtar's Egyptian army scheme. Kâmil Pa§a managed to parry this challenge, but, when pressed by A b d u l h a m i d to find a way out of the impasse, he could o f f e r nothing better than the suggestion that the Sultan might revise his attitude towards the e m p l o y m e n t of Ottoman f o r c e s in Egypt 5 . The unsatisfactory stalemate continued: Kâmil told Radovvitz that he expected that France and Russia would make a joint attempt to interfere 6 .

' a S R C G , Poslanstvo u Carigradu 1886, Bakic to Radonjic, 4 July. 2

G F O , B u l g a r i e n 4 secreta Nr. 1, Radovvitz to B i s m a r c k , no. 110, 10 M a y ; F O 7 8 / 3 8 7 1 , T h o r n t o n t o Rosebery, no. 241, 17 M a y ; F O 7 8 / 3 8 7 2 , T h o r n t o n to R o s e b e r y , no. 317, 2 0 J u n e ; F O 78/3873, Thornton to Rosebery, no. 374, 26 July. •'por a c c o u n t s of the discussion in C a i r o see H o r n i k . op. cit., pp. 607-9; U ç a r o l , Bir

Osmanh

Pa§asi, pp. 184-94. ^ F O 7 8 / 3 8 6 5 , R o s e b e r y to W h i t e , no. 51a, 10 F e b r u a r y ; no. 58a, 16 F e b r u a r y ; R o s e b e r y to T h o r n t o n , no. 93, 11 M a r c h ; no. 94a, 12 M a r c h ; F O 7 8 / 3 8 6 6 , R o s e b e r y t o T h o r n t o n , no. 154, 1 May; no. 223b, 9 July. •'Guillen, op. cit., p. 172; Kâmil Pa§a, Hatirat, pp. 2 5 - 3 0 ; G F O , T u e r k e i 169, R a d o w i t z to B i s m a r c k , no. 118, 21 M a y ; Documents diplomatiques français, vi, no. 2 4 8 , F r e y c i n e t t o M o n t h o l o n , 17 M a y ; BBArç, Misir Irade, no. 1253, 2 9 § a b a n / 2 J u n e . 6 G F O , Tuerkei 133 Adh. 31, Radovvitz to Bismarck, no. 164, n. d.

BATUM,

THE

STRAITS

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EGYPT

183

II Russia's blow fell neither in Egypt nor in Bulgaria, but in the Black Sea. On 5 July 1886 she unilaterally abrogated article LIX of the Treaty of Berlin, which obliged her to protect the demilitarised free port status of Batum, the harbour at the eastern end of the Black Sea which she had acquired from the Ottoman Empire in 1878 1 . Russia excused this decision on commercial grounds, but the Sultan's Ministers had no doubt that the real motive was strategic, and that Russia's intention was to establish a military and naval base which would pose a permanent threat to the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia. Abdiilhamid was reluctant to take sides in what promised to be an AngloRussian issue, however, and the Council of Ministers agreed to consult the Powers before making any protest 2 . The Powers offered no support. Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy promptly endorsed Russia's fait accompli; so did France, aggravating suspicions of a developing Franco-Russian entente. Britain alone advised the Porte to protest and to demand compensation 3 . The Council of Ministers reluctantly decided that it was safer to follow the majority, and on 14 July it advised Abdiilhamid to accept Russia's scarccly credible assurance that Batum's changed status had no military significance 4 . Britain was left to make a solitary protest in St. Petersburg, and by the end of July Batum had ceased to be a diplomatic issue 5 . Nonetheless, the episode had considerable repercussions on Ottoman thinking. It appeared to point to an increase in the scope and tempo of AngloRussian rivalry in the Near East; it served as a reminder that Russia could threaten the Empire in Asia as well as in the Balkans; it also aroused fears of a British counter-stroke. Russia's demarche of 5 July was quickly followed by rumours that she was planning to invade Anatolia, while concurrent reports of Bulgarian troop concentrations against Serbia led to suggestions that Russia might encourage a Balkan war as a diversion to facilitate such an invasion. Abdiilhamid was more inclined to believe that Britain was manipulating the Bulgarians: he drew attention to reports of secret negotiations between Bulgaria and Greece, and he noted that the London Times had callcd upon the British government to abandon the Treaty of Berlin and grant Prince Alexander full freedom of action: he concluded that talk of imminent war between

^On the Batum issue see Barbara Jelavich, 'Great Britain and the Russian Acquisition of Batum, 1878-1886', Slavonic and East European Review, xlviii, (January 1970), pp. 44-66. BBAr§, MVM, no. 900, 5 §evval/7 July; no. 904, 9 §evval/ll July; FO 78/3873, Thornton to Rosebery, no. 340A, 4 July; no. 341, 5 July; GFO, Tuerkei 133 Adh. 31, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 156, n.d. 3 GFO, Tuerkei 133 Adh. 31, Radowitz to Bismarck, nos. 157 and 164, n. d.; FO 78/3866, Rosebery to Thornton, no. 223e, 9 July; no. 226, 13 July. 4 BBAr§, MVM, no. 913,12 §evval/14 July. ^Jelavich, 'Great Britain and the Russian Acquisition of Batum', p. 62. 2

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Bulgaria and Serbia might be a blind to cover an i m p e n d i n g Bulgarian invasion of Thrace and Macedonia 1 . On 15 July he noted: England has lately favoured the Bulgarians and taken numerous steps to bring to fruition the ambitions and — God forbid! — the independence and expansion of Bulgaria. Against this, Russia has taken steps to abolish the f r e e port status of the harbour of B a t u m . . . T h e s e matters confirm that the rivalry between England and Russia in Eastern policy is increasing by the moment; as this is extraordinarily h a r m f u l to ourselves, and as it is incumbent upon the Ottoman Empire to be circumspect in the face of this state of affairs, it is essential that a definitive decision be taken as to what the Ottoman Empire must do in response and what course it must adopt 2 . There is evidence that Abdulhamid and his advisers had already begun to examine the possibility of a defensive alliance with either Britain or Russia, or, at least, the possibility that Britain or Russia might seek an Ottoman alliance. A s early as April, Kamil Pa§a had expressed the suspicion that Russia might propose an understanding for the joint defence of the Straits, and in late May the Foreign Ministry Undersecretary Artin Efendi had unofficially approached Thornton with a suggestion that the Dardanelles might be opened to the British f l e e t 3 . The Grand Vizier himself had d r a w n up a report comparing the options of a British and a Russian alliance; predictably, he favoured an understanding with Britain. Kamil argued that Britain and the O t t o m a n Empire had a c o m m o n political interest in resisting R u s s i a n aggression in Asia, and that this continued to render the Empire's survival a vital British interest. Nonetheless, he recognised that Britain's diplomatic isolation and her reliance upon naval power placed the military value of her alliance in question, and the arrangement which he proposed was qualified: T h e safest course is to be on good terms with Russia and England equally in peace-time, but to secretly conclude with the English government as of now an understanding whereby England will aid the Ottoman Empire materially in the event of war between the Empire and Russia, while in the event of war between England and Russia the Empire will ally itself with England if either France or Austria or both are England's allies: if not, Ottoman neutrality will be respected. T h e problem was how to win over France or A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ; f o r the m o m e n t , Kamil could suggest only that an A n g l o - O t t o m a n understanding would do the trick of itself:

' B B A r § , Bulgaristan Irade, no 583, 15 §evval/17 July. 2

ibid„ no. 580, 13 §evval/15 July.

3

Bayur, Sadrazam

Kamil Paja. pp. 32-6; Fo 78/3871, Thornton to Roscbery, no. 2 7 1 , 2 9 May.

BATIIM,

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A N D

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185

If this understanding is concluded, then either the Three Emperors' A l l i a n c e w h i c h presently f a v o u r s R u s s i a will be d i s r u p t e d a n d transformed into an alliance favourable to the Empire, or else another T h r e e - P o w e r alliance will be f o r m e d in opposition to [the Three Emperors' Alliance] and their mutual balance will guarantee general peace between the Great Powers. Against this, Kamil categorically rejected a Russian alliance on both political and military grounds: If negotiations are opened with this Power it is clear that conditions w h o s e a c c e p t a n c c would bring d o w n England's hostility upon the Ottoman Empire will be put forward: acceptance of Prince Alexander's deposition and the restoration of Russian influence in Bulgaria, a m o r a t o r i u m on the construction of fortifications at the B l a c k Sea Straits and in important positions like Erzurum in Anatolia..., and the employment of Russian officers as instructors in the Imperial A r m y . If such conditions arc acccpted, the Empire's fundamental objective of securing the peace it requires will not be achieved; furthermore, in the event of war between Russia and England, the Empire will not be able to remain neutral and will be obliged to join in the hostilities in a d e f e n s i v e posture. In such a war E n g l a n d will be able to incite neighbouring peoples against the Empire and attack the Ottoman coasts with her fleet. Even if the Ottoman and Russian fleets are joined and able to prevent the entry of the English fleet into the Black Sea, it goes without saying that this will not cause much harm to English territory. T h u s an alliance between the Ottoman Empire and Russia will be of benefit to Russia, but utterly damaging to the Empire 1 . B a t u m brought the issue of alliances to the fore, not least because it threatened to expose the Sultan to both Russian and British pressure at the Straits. T h e f a c t that Russia had chosen to assert herself in the B l a c k Sea inevitably aroused speculation that her next move would be to gain control of the Straits, probably by offering the Sultan a military alliance. Artin Efendi confidentially warned Thornton that a Russian approach was expected 2 . But a British a p p r o a c h was considered j u s t as likely. A t the Congress of Berlin Britain had explicitly linked the issues of Batum and the Straits, and on 13 July, immediately after Russia's Batum demarche, Rosebery told Rlistem Pa§a

' Bayur, Sadrazam Kamil Pa§a, pp. 30-1. Artin Efendi's role requires comment. For some years, he had furnished the British Embassy with occasional gifts of information, most of it dubious. Even so, he was believed, and in April 1886 Rosebery agreed that Artin should be awarded £600 per annum from the Secret Service monies. Payment does not appear to have increased Artin's veracity, but may have made the British more gullible: certainly, on 29 July 1886 Rosebery told the German Ambassador that he had no doubt that Russia had recently offered the Sultan an alliance, probably including France See GFO, Tuerkei 153, Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, no. 203, London, 29 July; FO 78/3872, Thornton to Rosebery, no. 328, 25 June; no. 332, 26 June; FO 78/3873, Thornton to Rosebery, no. 377, 26 July; no. 379, 28 July; no. 386, 3 August; FO 933/117, Rosebery to Thornton, 21 April.

186

A B D Ü I. H A M

il)

II

A N D

T H E

G R E A T

P O W E R S

that the British government might be obliged to re-examine its attitude at the Dardanelles 1 . The likelihood of a British approach was f u t h e r increased by Salisbury's return to the Prime Ministership at the end of July, and on 11 August Riistem Pa§a reported that Salisbury had warned him that B a t u m might be the prelude to further Russian aggressions, and had hinted at the desirability of an understanding at the Straits: The Minister spoke in the following sense: "In such an eventuality, the question which, before all else, must be examined and agreed between England and the Ottoman Empire is the question of the Straits. If England is to actively defend the Ottoman Empire, this defence can be carried out effectively only in the Black Sea. In this case she must be certain that the Straits will be kept open to her fleet... " Without making definite proposals, he hinted that if the O t t o m a n Empire and the Government of England conclude an alliance on the bases he suggested, this alliance would be the best guarantee of the preservation of the Ottoman Empire's s e c u r i t y . . . H e said: "In my opinion, the thing to be d o n e at present is to pay attention to the course of events, and to agree and decide as of now upon the measures which will have to be taken in certain specified circumstances, and to be ready as required in the event of complications." 2 Salisbury failed to f o l l o w up this approach. A s in the p r e v i o u s s u m m e r , his strategy e n v i s a g e d m o r e than a simple A n g l o - O t t o m a n understanding: he wanted German and Austro-Hungarian support, and it was soon apparent that this would not be forthcoming. By August 1886 Bismarck w a s professing to see signs of a possible Franco-Russian alliance against Germany, and pointing to the growth of the Boulangist m o v e m e n t in France and the stridently Germanophobe tone of a section of the Russian press. H e decided that he could not permit Germany or Austria-Hungary to provoke Russia, and when Salisbury requested diplomatic support in Istanbul he replied that Britain must act independently: he advised her to conclude an alliance with the Sultan and subsidise the Ottoman a r m y 3 . This w a s precisely w h a t Salisbury did not want, and he was quick to scent a trap: an Anglo-Ottoman alliance would enable Bismarck to embroil Russia with Britain, and thus free Germany to attack France. Nonetheless, Salisbury accepted that Britain must at least take steps to increase her "influence" in Istanbul, if only to forestall the possibility that the Sultan might conclude an alliance with Russia: as a

^FO 78/3688, Rosebery t o T h o r n t o n , no. 2 2 6 , 1 3 July. ^Bayur, op. cit., pp. 24-5. ^Smith, op. cit., pp. 57-9; Weeks, op. cit., pp. 187-9; Lowe, op. cit., pp. 5-6; Holborn, op. cit., pp. 49-51; Heinz Trützschler von Falkenstein, Bismarck und die Kriegsgefahr des Jahres 1887, chs. ii-iv, passim.; Grosse Politik, iv. no. 864, Berchem to Hatzfeldt, 20 August.

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187

first step, he decided to send White back to Istanbul to replace the less experienced Thornton 1 . Viewed from Istanbul, Britain's intentions were obscure and possibly menacing; in contrast, Russia was ready to assure the Sultan of her commitment to the status quo. At the end of July the Tsar sent Abdiilhamid a personal message stating that after Batum Russia had no further ambitions in the Near East, and that she would henceforth cooperate in upholding the Treaty of Berlin 2 . The assurance was probably sincere: it would be some years before Russia possessed the naval strength to exploit her militarisation of Batum, and, despite some unofficial talk of an understanding with the Sultan by Nelidov and others, there is no evidence that the Russian government had decided to pursue an Ottoman alliance at the Straits 3 . That said, Russia was by no means confident of Abdiilhamid's own intentions. She feared that Salisbury would offer him an alliance, and that Kamil Pa§a would prevail upon him to accept it. In early August Nelidov protested sharply to the Sultan at a report that the Ottoman garrison in eastern Anatolia was to be increased by a full Army Corps, and there were suspicions of Russian involvement in an unsuccessful attempt upon the Grand Vizier's life soon afterwards 4 . For Russia, as for Britain, the problem of establishing an effective "influence" over the Sultan grew urgent'. Thus far, Abdiilhamid had expressed no preference for either Britain or Russia; most probably, he hoped to avoid a choice. During the latter part of August, however, he turned sharply and unexpectedly against Britain: a fortuitous combination of separate incidents conjured up the spectre of a general British offensive in the Near East, and drove him to probe the possibility of Franco-Russian protection. Hopes that Salisbury's return to office would lead to some progress in the Egyptian question had been swiftly disappointed: the new Foreign Secretary, Iddesleigh, declined to endorse Muhtar Pa§a's army scheme, and warned that it would be some time before

'Smith, op. cit., p. 46. GFO, Tuerkei 153, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 165, 25 July; BBAr§, YEE, K9/2003/Z72/4, 27 Muharrem/26 October. o -'The Russian government's attitude towards the possibility of an Ottoman alliance cannot be established with certainty, though the fragmentary evidence suggests that it was cautious. Following the Pendjdeh crisis of April 1885 Giers had expressed some interest, and Nelidov, it appears, had drafted a plan for an arrangement analogous to the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi; the Tsar himself had broached the issue of the Straits immediately after the Philippopolis coup of September 1885. The published diaries of the Russian War Minister, Milyutin, suggest that as late as June 1886 Nelidov may have contemplated a Russo-Ottoman alliance. By early July, however, and with the Tsar's full approval, Nelidov was advocating a policy of coolness towards the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, and a cautious rapprochement with Greece and Serbia. At all events, there is no reason to believe that Russia viewed an Ottoman alliance as a short-term priority. Sec Silin, op. cit., p. 94; 'Zapiska A. 1. Nelidova v 1882g. o zanyatii Prolivov', p. 180; Zaionchkovskii, op. cit., iv, p. 7; Pavlovich, op. cit., no. 10. 2

4

GFO, Tuerkei 153, Radowitz, to Bismarck, no. 165, 25 July; Silin, op. cit., pp. 98-100; Bayur, Sadrazam Kàmii Patja, pp. 129-31. % F O , Orientalia Generalia 7, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 195, 6 September.

188

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Britain w a s ready to o f f e r f r e s h p r o p o s a l s 1 . M o r e d a m a g i n g w a s a s u d d e n r e c r u d e s c e n c e of the Sultan's f e a r s of a British stroke in the B a l k a n s . O n 10 A u g u s t P r i n c e A l e x a n d e r suddenly w a r n e d h i m that Serbia w a s preparing to invade Bulgaria, and asked that O t t o m a n f o r c e s should be sent to the Serbian frontier. Abdiilhamid w a s immediately suspicious, and w h e n checks in V i e n n a and Belgrade confirmed that Serbia had no warlike intentions, he concluded that the Prince's story must be a ruse to m a s k an i m p e n d i n g Bulgarian attack upon the E m p i r e 2 . H e was not to k n o w that it w a s Prince A l e x a n d e r w h o had been duped, and that the tale of a Serbian invasion had been fabricated by a group of Bulgarian a r m y o f f i c e r s w h o were planning a coup. T h e conspirators struck as soon as the P r i n c e had been induced to t r a n s f e r loyalist r e g i m e n t s f r o m the capital to t h e Serbian f r o n t i e r : on the n i g h t of 20/21 A u g u s t they arrested Prince A l e x a n d e r , f o r c e d him to sign an act of abdication, and expelled h i m f r o m Bulgaria-'. Before this unexpected dénouement could occur, however, the d a m a g e to A n g l o - O t t o m a n r e l a t i o n s had b e e n c o m p o u n d e d by a s e r i o u s e r r o r o n T h o r n t o n ' s part. On 16 A u g u s t , w i t h o u t i n f o r m i n g his o w n g o v e r n m e n t , he g a v e the P o r t e an " A r m e n i a n N o t e " w h i c h d e m a n d e d t h e e x e c u t i o n of substantial administrative r e f o r m s in A s i a M i n o r in a c c o r d a n c e with Article L X I of the T r e a t y of B e r l i n 4 . T h e Porte w a s s h o c k e d by this ill-conceived m o v e , and vainly urged T h o r n t o n to w i t h d r a w his note, lddesleigh belatedly learned of it, and ordered T h o r n t o n to let the matter d r o p ; but the h a r m w a s d o n e . F a c e d with prime facie e v i d e n c e of a hostile turn in British policy in E g y p t , the B a l k a n s a n d Asia M i n o r , A b d i i l h a m i d resolved to e x p l o r e t h e possibilities of external s u p p o r t . H e t u r n e d not to R u s s i a d i r e c t l y , but to France: o n 21 A u g u s t he received the n e w F r e n c h A m b a s s a d o r , M o n t e b e l l o , and, after alluding to T h o r n t o n ' s note and to the r u m o u r s of a F r a n c o - R u s s i a n entente, he asked h o w France would react if he abandoned his reserve and c a m e d o w n on Russia's side 5 . F r a n c e w a s quick to seize her o p p o r t u n i t y . M o n t e b e l l o a v o i d e d the question of a Russian alliance, but e m p h a s i z e d France's readiness to assist the Sultan a g a i n s t Britain in E g y p t . H i s P a l a c e ally D r e y s s é Pa§a s u p p o r t e d him with a m e m o r a n d u m which accused Britain of seeking to annex E g y p t and

^BBAr§, Y E E , K18/75/4/Z75/4/51, Riistem Pa§a to Haci Ali Bey, tel., 2 / 1 4 August; tel., 8 September; F O 195/1530, Iddcslegh to Thornton, no. 259, 12 August; no. 267a, 25 August; no. 270c, 1 September. 2 B B A r s Bulgaristan Irade, no. 593, 11 Zilkade/11 August; nos. 595 and 596, 14 Z i l k a d e / 1 4 August; 'no. 597, 19 Zilkade/19 August; YEE, K36/2328(5)/Z146/XV, tels. f r o m G a d b a n Efendi, 10, 15 and 16 August; GFO, Bulgarien 4 secreta, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 176, 16 August; F O 78/3873. Thornton to lddesleigh. no. 404, 15 August; Jovan MiliCevic, Jevrem Grujic, p. 249. 3 J e l a v i c h , Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, pp. 247-51; Radev, op. cit., pp. 7 9 5 - 8 3 5 passimPavlovich, op. cit., nos. 11-14. 4 S m i t h , op. cit., pp. 43-5; FO 78/3866. Rosebery to Thornton, no. 218, 6 July; FO 78/3874, Thornton to lddesleigh, no. 428. 24 August; no. 439, 2 7 August; G F O , Tuerkei 133 Adh. 13, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 183 23 August; no. 1 8 5 , 2 7 August. 5 W e e k s . op. cit., pp. 216-7.

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establish "a second Indian Empire" in the Sudan: by these means she would dominate the Mediterranean and threaten the Hedjaz and the Caliphate, and the Empire's sole hope of resisting her plans lay in a firm accord with France and Russia 1 . A chance rumour that Italy was contemplating an invasion of Tripoli played into Montebello's hands, and after consulting Paris he offered the Sultan a comprehensive Mediterranean understanding which he suggested that Russia would support: France would undertake to defend Tripoli against Italy if the Sultan would undertake not to enter into separate c o m m i t m e n t s to Britain in Egypt 2 . Nelidov gave Montebello active support. He had little direct interest in the Egyptian issue, but he was anxious to counter British "influence" at Yildiz: his superiors in St. Petersburg r e m a i n e d deeply s u s p i c i o u s of Salisbury's intentions, and were currently preoccupied by rumours of a British plan to establish a naval base on Ottoman territory, probably on the Aegean islands of Thassos or Mytilene, but perhaps at the Dardanelles. They were also disturbed by the prospect of White's return to the Istanbul Embassy at a time when Prince Alexander's overthrow had opened up the possibility of a serious A n g l o - R u s s i a n struggle in the B a l k a n s 3 . Nelidov strove to play on the Sultan's fears: together with Montebello, he m a d e the most of the naval base scare, and attempted to link it to the British Mediterranean squadron's current cruise in the Aegean. H e also made it plain that Russia would object to White's r e t u r n 4 . Abdiilhamid required little persuasion: his o w n sources c o n f i r m e d the r u m o u r s of a British plan f o r a base at T h a s s o s or the Dardanelles, and Riistem Pa§a reported evidence of British rearmament 5 . The Sultan responded with a definite tilt towards Russia and France: he instructed Kamil Pa§a to open private talks with Montebello on the subject of Egypt, and he gave the British government a clear hint that he would not welcome the nomination of White as Ambassador 6 . These two moves provoked a "Russian alliance" scare which lasted well into October. On 28 August Thornton had suggested that Nelidov might be preparing to offer Abdiilhamid an alliance; within a month he was asserting

'ßBAr§, YEE, K39/129/3/Z129/120, 'résumé' by Dreyssé Pa§a, 6 June, submitted lo the Sultan on 21 August. G F O , Tripolis 1, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 196, 6 September; Orientalia Generalia 7, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 200, l i September; FO 78/3874, Fane to Iddesleigh, no. 467, 10 September. 3 W . N. Medlicott, 'British Foreign Policy in the Near East, from the Congress of Berlin to the Acccssion of Ferdinand of Coburg', (M. A. Thesis, London, 1926), pp. 317-8 and appendix, p. viii; GFO, Orientalia Generalia 7, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 203, 13 September; no. 213, 26 September.

2

4

Weeks, op. cit., pp. 217-8; GFO, Orientalia Generalia 7 Radowitz to Bismarck, nos. 202 and 203, 13 September; no. 207, 17 September; FO 78/3874, Fane to Iddesleigh, no. 478, 15 September. 5 BBAr§, YEE, K18/75/4/Z75/4/51, Riistem Pa§a to Hact Ali Bey, tel., 18 September K36/2328(5)/Z146/XV, tel. from Gadban Efendi, 5 September. 6 Smith, op. cit., pp. 49-50; GFO, Orientalia Generalia 7, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 195, 6 September; Tuerkei 154, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 218, 28 September.

190

A B D Ü L H A M Í D

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P O W E R S

that the offer had been made, and that Russia's terms included the cession of Erzurum, a revival of the stipulations of the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi, the abandonment of the 1879 War Indemnity, a Russian guarantee of the Ottoman Empire's territorial integrity, a return to the status

quo ante

in

Eastern

Rumelia and an end to the A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n occupation of Bosnia and H e r c e g o v i n a 1 . Thornton had particular grounds for his alarmism: his Chief Dragoman, Sir Alfred Sandison, was currently under suspicion of spying for R u s s i a 2 . Others were inore cautious, though Cálice considered a R u s s o Ottoman alliance possible, particularly if Karnil Pa§a fell f r o m office. The scare reached its peak towards the beginning of October. Much c o m m e n t was aroused by the elevation of Nelidov's protégé Yusuf Riza Bey to the rank of vezir, and there was speculation that the newly-elevated Yusuf Riza Pa§a would succeed to the Grand Vizierate or to the Foreign Ministry. Similar attention was attracted by the arrival of §akir Pa§a on extended leave f r o m the St. Petersburg Embassy, while the successive receptions accorded by the Sultan to the commanders of the British and French Mediterranean squadrons were closely scrutinised for any sign of preferential treatment 3 . Even Germany was disturbed. Goltz asserted that a R u s s o - O t t o m a n alliance was "not in the least improbable", and foresaw that the Sultan might soon be no more than "a glorified Khan of Bokhara", with potentially serious strategic consequences for Germany: Once Russian influence triumphs fully here, t h e n . . . v e r y significant forces will be developed here...If in future Russian military instructors, under the charge of a military plenipotentiary, succeed the Germans, then the Turkish army will rapidly be strong enough to at least hold Austria quite in check, which must also be of interest to us 4 . Bismarck discreetly revived his suggestion that Britain should seek an understanding with Abdiilhamid, and he arranged for the substance of Goltz's reports to be forwarded to I xrndon 5 .

' The Oriental Question, Extract, Thornton to Iddesleigh, 2 8 August; Extract, T h o r n t o n to Iddesleigh, 21 September. ^ibid., Duke of Edinburgh to the Queen, 23 September and 7 October; Iddesleigh t o the Queen, 7 October. 3 G F O , Tuerkei 153. Bulow to Bismarck, no. 340, St. Petersburg, 17 September; Tuerkei 142, Radowitz to Waldersee, 2 9 October; H H S t A , PA XII. 147, Calice to Kalnoky, nos. 4 5 A and 45D, 21 September; no. 48E, 12 October. A further point which alarmed the British government was an alleged Russian intrigue against Admiral Woods Pa§a, since Hobart Papa's death in June the sole Englishman in the Sultan's closer entourage. See Sir Henry F. W o o d s , Turkiye Amlari, pp. 227-8; F O 933/117, Iddeslcich to Thornton, tel. 21 August; tel., 22 August. 4 G F O , Tuerkei 142, Goltz to Waldersee, 23 September. 5

G F O , England 93 Nr. 1, Rant7.au to Berchem, 11 October; Holborn, op. cit., pp. 52-3.

B A T II M ,

THE

S T R A I T S

AND

E G Y P T

191

It is possible that Abdiilhamid did consider a Russian alliance, at least in theory. The Yildiz archives contain a Turkish draft of a "Defensive Alliance between the Ottoman Empire, Russia and France" which appears to have been drawn up at this period; it suggests that the concessions which Abdiilhamid was prepared to entertain were considerably less than the British and others feared. The project provided for the joint defence of the Empire's European frontiers and of its Black Sea and Mediterranean coasts and islands in wartime; that is to say, it sought a Russian guarantee against Bulgarian attack, and invited France to assume the task of defending the Empire against British seapower. It also provided f o r joint resistance to attempts to introduce the p r i n c i p l e of a u t o n o m y

into the E m p i r e ' s

internal

administration

—

presumably a reference to Thornton's Armenian note; and for diplomatic and military cooperation as required in putting an end to the occupations of Egypt, Zeyla, Suakin and Massowa. Provision was made for the joint defence of the Straits and for their passage by Russia and France, but only in the event of war; in peacetime the existing rule of the Straits would be maintained 1 . In s u m , the Sultan sought political support in Egypt and A s i a M i n o r and military insurance against British or British-inspired invasion; but he did not o f f e r to surrender his Empire's defences to Russia in peacetime, nor did he envisage alliance with Russia alone — the Egyptian and M e d i t e r r a n e a n provisions made sense only if France were a full partner. It is unclear how seriously this project was taken, and whether it was discussed with France and Russia; all that can be said with certainty is that no alliance was concluded. In the m e a n t i m e , Kamil Pa§a had pursued his Egyptian discussions with Montebello, with no great success. H e repeatedly pressed the Ambassador to explain precisely how France would assist the Empire in putting an end to the British occupation of Egypt, but got nothing more concrete than a verbal a s s u r a n c e that F r a n c e would not seek to o c c u p y E g y p t a f t e r Britain's w i t h d r a w a l 2 . Counter-pressures were soon felt: Britain and Germany were reserved but clearly hostile, while Italy warned that she would view any Franco-Ottoman arrangement in the Mediterranean as a positive justification for action against Tripoli 3 . The Sultan fared no better in his efforts to resist White's appointment: Iddesleigh proved deaf to hints, and when the Porte made its objections explicit he threatened to leave the post of A m b a s s a d o r vacant indefinitely 4 . Abdiilhamid gradually retreated: the discussions between Kamil

^BBArs, YEE, K9/224/Z72/4, draft of a defensive alliance between the Ottoman Empire, Russia and France, n. d. GFO, Orientalia Generalia 7, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 201, 12 September; Abdurrahman Cayci, Biiyiik Sahra'da Tiirk-Fransiz Rekabeti 1858-1911, p. 67, fn. 23. GFO, Tripolis 1, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 204, 13 September; no. 208, 17 September; Orientalia Generalia 7, Berchem to Radowitz, no. 252, 22 September; FO 78/3875, Fane to Iddesleigh, no. 483, 17 September. 4 Smith, op. cit., pp. 49-50; FO 78/1530, Iddesleigh to Fane, no. 272a, 3 September; FO 364/3, Iddesleigh to Thornton, tel. no. 22, 23 September.

192

ABDUL HAMlD

II

AND

THH

GREAT

POWERS

Pa§a and Montebello were amicably terminated at the end of September, and on 4 October Riistem Pa$a informed Iddesleigh that the Sultan wished to keep the Egyptian issue on a strictly Anglo-Ottoman basis. Shortly afterwards Abdiilhamid agreed to reecive White as Ambassador ad interim; talk, of a threat to Kamil Papa's personal position died away'. The Grand Vizier was sufficiently encouraged to revive the topic of an Anglo-Ottoman alliance, and on 28 September he wrote privately to Riistem Pa§a, setting forth his personal views as the prelude to a formal initiative 2 . Kamil argued that "Turkey and England are naturally bound together by their common interests in Asia", and proposed an arrangement based upon the principle that "every aggression committed by Russia, whether in Asia Minor or in Central Asia, must be considered as an action against Anglo-Turkish interests which must be resisted": If Russia could obtain our alliance, she would not hesitate an instant to continue her path towards India. However, as her plan of conquest has not reached its ultimate limit, it remains to be seen whether Russia will expose herself to a war with England, or whether she will first of all try to reduce yet again the strength of the Ottoman Empire so that we may not be able to offer any assistance to England in case of need...It is plain that if, by misfortune, India is conquered by the Russians at some future date, the Ottoman Empire will no longer be able to exist; just as England will not be able to prevent Russia's aggressions without the existence or assistance of Turkey. Kamil did not overlook the military problems of alliance with a seapower: While admitting that the British Empire is a great maritime power, [and that| in case of hostilities, it will be able to attack all the Russian Black Sea fleet, this will not suffice to prevent Russia's invasion towards the interior. In consequence, as defence on land will remain the responsibility of Turkey, she will have the right to ask that a force roughly equal to the half of the troops which she will have to direct against the Russian attacks should be assigned to support the Ottoman army as needed. The crux of Kamil's proposal, however, was the suggestion that an early settlement of the Egyptian question would enable France to join the alliance as a third partner. ' g F O , Orientalia Cieneralia 7, Radowitz to B i s m a r c k , no. 216, 2 7 S e p t e m b e r ; no. 220, 4 October; FO 195/1530, Iddesleigh to Thornton, no. 302a, 5 October; H H S t A , PA XV. 104, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 47C, 5 October; PA XII, 147, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 49A-E, 19 October; PA XV. 105, Calice to Kalnoky. no. 50B, 26 October. 2 B a y u r , op. cit., pp. 26-9.

BATUM,

THE

STRAITS

AND

EGYPT

193

In order to prevent Russia's aggressions in Asia, the support of a third Power would be indispensible. This support will be able to be obtained from one of the Powers interested in Russia's non-aggrandisement. England's occupation of Egypt is a great obstacle to achieving this end. Today, between Francc and Russia, there exists a noticeable tendency to agree to offer us their support and to procure the evacuation of English forces from Egypt. In this entente Russia's real aim is not to render a service to ourselves or to France, but rather to create and maintain an animosity between ourselves, France and England. The day when the English troops leave Egypt, France, in all other questions, will prefer the alliance of Great Britain to that of a Power which is the ally of Germany . The Egyptian question is only an embarrassment for England and a harmful obstacle for her principal interests. If she fears a French occupation of Egypt after having left herself, I will take it upon myself to obtain from France a formal assurance that she will in no case enter Egypt... In the event Kamil Pa§a held back. Riistem appears to have made no approach to Salisbury, and when the Grand Vizier broached the topic of alliances to Abdiilhamid on 6 October he did so in terms which were markedly more circumspect. He emphasized that the Straits were the key: There are in the world three Great Powers possessed of extraordinary importance: England and Russia are two of them and the Ottoman Empire is the other. The great importance of these three Powers derives from England's control of the most seas and population in the world, from Russia's possession of the most extensive territories, and from the Ottoman Empire's possession both of extensive territory and of the Strait of Constantinople. The importance of the other Powers, relative to these three Great Powers, is by far inferior. Were the Ottoman Empire to lose Istanbul (God forbid!), and were it to gain in exchange the whole continent of Africa, it would not have the importance which it enjoys now. By virtue of its possession of the Straits, the Exalted Sultanate holds the fates of England and of Russia in its hand. God forbid! — should one of these two Powers capture the Straits, it would be unique in the world. Kamil argued that control of the Straits was Russia's "national ambition": no Russian government, however well-disposed towards the Ottoman Empire, could withstand the presure of public opinion in this matter, and good relations with Russia were no substitute for a physical deterrent. Until such lime as the Ottoman Empire could afford to maintain sufficiently large armed forces it would be obliged to seek a source of external support. The

194

ABDULHAMU)

II

AND

THE

GREAT

POWERS

exclusion of Russia from the Straits was a vital British interest; Britain lacked the forces to hold the Straits herself, and would therefore support their retention by the Sultan. And yet Kamil Pa§a refused to draw the obvious conclusion: But there is no need for any kind of alliance with England in this matter; it is sufficient to maintain friendly relations on an equal basis with both England and Russia 1 . Doubtless it was the Sultan's own attitude which caused Kamil to hesitate. Abdiilhamid remained profoundly mistrustful of Britain's intentions, and by October his suspicions were further aggravated by a fresh crisis over B u l g a r i a 2 . For the t i m e b e i n g , he c h o s e to r e m a i n d i p l o m a t i c a l l y uncommitted; in the longer term, he relied upon rearmament. At the end of October his military advisers completed the drafting of a new Recruiting Law which would raise the army's peace-time strength to 850,000 men; tenders were sought for a contract for 500,000 repeating rifles 3 . Rearmament offered security against British or British-inspired aggression. It also offered a possible basis f o r r a p p r o c h e m e n t with Britain: at the b e g i n n i n g of N o v e m b e r Abdiilhamid granted audiences to White and to the Liberal Unionist leader Joseph Chamberlain, and on both occasions he suggested that is was in Britain's interest to support his plans for military expansion 4 . His immediate problem was money: the strain of more than twelve m o n t h s of abnormal military expenditure was beginning to tell, and the Grand Vizier had advised that a foreign loan was essential. Abdiilhamid was reluctant to accept this advice, but it is not impossible that he inspired an unofficial attempt to sound the British government on the prospects for a military subsidy 5 . In reality, prospects for an Anglo-Ottoman understanding were remote. T h e British government remained deeply suspicious of the Sultan's recent intimacy with Russia and France, and when despatching White to the Istanbul Embassy, Iddesleigh instructed him to warn that any Russo-Ottoman alliance or understanding at the Straits would force Britain to reconsider her attitude towards Egypt, and to abandon her traditional support f o r "a strong and i n d e p e n d e n t O t t o m a n E m p i r e in full and u n d i s p u t e d p o s s e s s i o n of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles" 6 . Equally important, however, Salisbury's

^BBAr?, YEE. K31/1901/Z158/86, memorandum by Kamil Pa§a, 7 Muharrem/6 October. 2

S e e below, chapter 14.

3

Silin, op. cit., pp. 97-8, 128-30: FO 78/3876, White to Iddesleigh, no. 545, 2 November.

4

F O 78/3876, White to Iddesleigh, no. 548, 2 N o v e m b e r ; J. L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, II, p. 269, pp. 448-51. 5 B B A r § , Y E E , K 9 / 2 0 0 3 / Z 7 2 / 4 , m e m o r a n d u m by the Sultan, 2 7 M u h a r r e m / 2 6 O c t o b e r ; memorandum by M m i l Pa§a, an Safer/30 October; FO 78/3875, Fane to Iddesleigh, no. 522, 21 October; White to Iddesleigh, no. 533, 21 October. 6 S m i t h , op. cit., p. 56; FO 195/1530, Iddesleigh to White, no. 313b, 11 October; FO 364/1, Iddesleigh to White, 22 September.

B A T U M ,

THE

S T R A I T S

AND

E G Y P T

195

N e a r Eastern policies were now under serious attack from within his own Cabinet. Since early September a f a c t i o n led by the C h a n c e l l o r of the Exchequer, Lord Randolph Churchill, had advanced the view that Salisbury's preoccupation with the Straits was outdated, that the exclusion of Russia f r o m the Balkans was an Austro-Hungarian rather than a British interest, and that Britain should base the defence of her Asiatic interests upon Egypt and the north-west frontier of India 1 . Attitudes such as these ruled out any military understanding with the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , even if Salisbury had wanted one; Churchill and his followers would not hear of a subsidy for the Sultan's army 2 . T h e y also ruled out any early concession to the Sultan's pressure for an Egyptian settlement. Salisbury would not give up Egypt until he w a s certain that the Sultan intended to maintain his independence of Russia, while Churchill's position implied that Britain should remain in Egypt permanently. For the time being, Salisbury preferred to conduct simultaneous exploratory negotiations with the Sultan, the Powers, and the Khedive, and to probe the possibility of an understanding with France- 1 . His terms for a resumption of negotiations with the Ottoman Empire were laid d o w n in a Note Verbale delivered to Riistcm Pa§a on 4 November: this stated that Britain was ready to settle all strictly bilateral aspects of the Egyptian question, but warned that she would be unable to consider an evacuation date until she had concluded arrangements with the other Powers in respect of Egypt's financial and administrative reform, and, in particular, a reform of the Egyptian Capitulations 4 . The Sultan's Ministers objected that these terms abandoned the bilateral approach envisaged under the Convention of October 1885, and might postpone Britain's evacuation of Egypt indefinitely. Abdiilhamid insisted that any fresh negotiation must rest upon the principle of a firm evacuation date; Montebello encouraged him, and hinted that France could count upon G e r m a n support 5 . The Porte's formal reply to the British Note Verbale a m o u n t e d to a rejection: it declared that Britain had only to fulfil the terms of the 1885 Convention and then withdraw; if further reforms were needed, the Ottoman government would arrange them with the Khedive after the British had left. Iddesleigh retorted that it was unthinkable that evacuation should precede reform, and, on this doubtful note, the discussion petered out 6 .

The Oriental Question, Salisbury to the Queen, 7 September; R. F. Foster, Lord Randolph Churchill, pp. 284-9; Smith, op. cit., pp. 50-5; Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit., pp. 259-62; C. J. Lowe, Salisbury and the Mediterranean, 1886 1896, pp. 3-8. 2 Weeks, op. cit., p. 191. ^ihid., pp. 228-36; Hornik, op. cit., pp. 609-12; Gallagher and Robinson, op. cit., pp. 261-2. 4 Weeks, op. cit., p. 232; FO 195/1531, Iddesleigh to White, no. 3 3 3 , 4 November. 5 B B A r | , YEE, K36/2475/ZI50/XI, Council of Ministers' Reports, 19 Safer/17 November and gurre-i Rebiiilevvel/28 November; irades, 22 Safer/20 November and 8 Rebiiilevvel/5 December; K14/2060/Z126/10, Record of audience with French Ambassador, 7/19 November; Documents diplomatiques français, vi, no. 352, Freycinet to Montebello, 19 November. 6 F O 195/1531, Iddesleigh to While, no. 383,7 December.

CHAPTER FIFTEEN: THE BULGARIAN CRISIS (August 1886-February 1887)

I

The military coup d'etat which overthrew Prince Alexander of Bulgaria on the night of 20/21 August 1886 caused the Ottoman government little surprise and even less regret: Kamil Pa§a spoke of the loss of a bad tooth 1 . The news three days later of a successful counter-coup and of Prince Alexander's imminent restoration produced corresponding gloom, and forecasts of a fresh Anglo-Russian struggle over Bulgaria; the Grand Vizier's one hope was that the Prince might yet be induced to retire voluntarily 2 . This hope was unexpectedly fulfilled. Prince Alexander returned to Bulgaria on 29 August, but then made a fatal attempt to repair his relations with Russia, telegraphing to the Tsar: "I received the crown from Russia; I am ready to surrender it into the hands of her ruler". The Tsar ordered him to withdraw. The prince decided that his position was hopeless, and on 6 September he abdicated for the second time and left Bulgaria for good 3 . Pending the election of a new Prince, the powers of the throne were conferred upon a Regency composed of the National Assembly President, Stambolov, the Liberal leader, Karavelov, and Lieutenant-Colonel Mutkurov. The Regents proceeded to appoint a government 4 . Ottoman satisfaction was undisguised. Even in his final acts, Prince Alexander had succceded in causing offence: his appeal to the Tsar was seen as a slight upon the Sultan, while a farewell speech in which he promised to ^BBAr§, Bulgaristan irade, no. 598, 21 ZilkSde 303/21 August; no. 603, 23 Zilkade/23 Augustno. 607, 24 Zilkade/24 August; YEE, K36/2328(5)/Z146/XV, tel. to Gadban, 23 August; GFO, Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 182,22 August. 2 BBAr§, Bulgaristan Irade, no. 612, 28 Zilkade/28 August; no. 613, 29 Zilkade/29 August- no 614, gurre-i Zilkade/31 August; YEE, K36/2328(5)/Z146/XV, tels. from Gadban, 27 and 29 August; tel. to Gadban, 31 August; GFO, Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel. no. 131. 28 August. 3

T h e coup, counter-coup and second abdication are described at length in Simeon Radev,

Stroitelite na sdvremenna Bdlgariya, II, book. 1, chs. 1-7 passim. e Regents determined all major policies, but generally acted through the government, which was headed by Dr. Radoslavov. For the sake of brevity, the term 'Regency' as used below refers to both the Regents and the government, except where otherwise stated.

198

A B D U L H A M I I)

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AND

THE

GREAT

POWERS

return to fight as a volunteer for the liberation of M a c e d o n i a c o n f i r m e d e v e r y s u s p i c i o n a b o u t his l o y a l t y a n d a l s o s u g g e s t e d to A b d i i l h a m i d t h a t t h e a b d i c a t i o n w a s not i n t e n d e d to be f i n a l 1 . In c o n t r a s t , r e l a t i o n s with t h e R e g e n c y b e g a n w e l l . The R e g e n t s f e a r e d that R u s s i a m i g h t s e i z e t h e o p p o r t u n i t y to o c c u p y Bulgaria, and on 6 S e p t e m b e r they a p p e a l e d to the Porte to guarantee Bulgaria against f o r e i g n intervention. T h e Porte received this appeal to its suzerain authority with a p p r o v a l , and a s k e d c a c h of t h e P o w e r s f o r an a s s u r a n c e that it w o u l d not o c c u p y B u l g a r i a . All c o m p l i e d , though Russia warned that order must be maintained and that there must be n o question of restoring Prince A l e x a n d e r 2 . T h e R e g e n c y assured the Porte that these points were understood; it had already taken steps to maintain o r d e r by proclaiming a state of siege, imposing martial law, and arresting a r m y o f f i c e r s implicated in the c o u p of 20/21 A u g u s t 3 . Preparations f o r (he installation of a n e w P r i n c e b e g a n i m m e d i a t e l y . U n d e r Article III of the Treaty of Berlin, the p r o c e d u r e fell into three stages: a Grand National A s s e m b l y representing the Bulgarian people elected a candidate, the Powers then endorsed him, and the Sultan formally invested h i m as P r i n c e of B u l g a r i a . T h e R e g e n c y a n n o u n c e d that e l e c t i o n s f o r a G r a n d N a t i o n a l A s s e m b l y w o u l d be held on 10 O c t o b e r , a n d , in a g e s t u r e of reconciliation, it invited the Tsar to p r o p o s e a c a n d i d a t e f o r the t h r o n e 4 . T h e Porte raised n o objection. It a c k n o w l e d g e d that good relations with R u s s i a w o u l d c o n t r i b u t e to B u l g a r i a ' s s t a b i l i t y , and it w a s c o n f i d e n t t h a t t h e e n t h r o n e m e n t of the Tsar's n o m i n e e need not imply R u s s i a n d o m i n a t i o n of B u l g a r i a . K a m i l Pa§a h o p e d f o r t h e n o m i n a t i o n of P r i n c e W a l d e m a r of D e n m a r k , w h o was related to both the Russian and the British royal families. Abdiilhamid indicated a preference f o r a c a n d i d a t e f r o m a G e r m a n h o u s e , but Radowitz declined to support the idea and it w a s not pursued further 5 . H o p e s of an earl\ settlement s u f f e r e d a s e v e r e s e t b a c k w h e n R u s s i a a n n o u n c e d that she would not recognise the R e g e n c y . T h e Tsar appears t o have suspected that the R e g e n t s intended to re-elect Prince A l e x a n d e r ; in any case, he w a s determined to assert his authority o v e r Bulgaria. W i t h o u t c o n s u l t i n g t h e P o w e r s or the Sultan, and with little regard f o r the T r e a t y of B e r l i n , he despatched General Kaulbars to S o f i a as a Special C o m m i s s i o n e r instructed to "assist the Bulgarians in putting an end to the present crisis in their a f f a i r s " 6 .

' ß B A r § , Bulgaristan irade, no. 615, 6 Zilhicce/5 September; YEE, K36/2328(5)/Z146/XV, tel. to Gadban, 5 September; G F O . Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 1 9 7 , 6 September. 2 R a d e v , op. cit., pp. 281 289; GFO, Bulgarien 20, Said Pa§a to T e v f i k B e y , circular, 7 September; FO 195/1530, Currie to Fane no. 281, 10 September; FO 78/3874, T h o r n t o n to tddesleigh, no. 486, 19 September. 3 R a d e v , op. cit., pp. 306-311; GFO, Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 230, 18 October. 4

R a d e v , op. cit., pp. 253-254.

5

G F O , Bulgarien 20. Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 205, 12 September; no. 2 2 1 , 4 October.

6

F o r the evolution of Russian views, see Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism, pp. 251-263, and Medlicott, 'British Foreign Policy in the Near East, f r o m the Congress of Berlin to the A c c e s s i o n of Ferdinand of Coburg', pp. 317-330. Cf., Pavlovich, Avantyury, no. 15, Sakharov to Obruchev, 12 September; G F O , Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 228, 15 October.

THE

B U L G A R I A N

C R I S I S

199

It was soon apparent that Kaulbars's real task was to undermine the Regency. Arriving in Sofia on 25 September, he immediately demanded the lifting of the state of siege, the release of all persons implicated in the coup against Prince Alexander, and the indefinite postponement of elections for the Grand National Assembly. The Regents agreed to raise the state of siege, but refused all other demands; Kaulbars thereupon embarked upon a tour of agitation across Bulgaria, and when this failed to arouse a satisfactory response he accused the Regents of terrorising the population 1 . The other Powers were unable to restrain Russia. The British government was hamstrung by Lord Randolph Churchill's opposition to Near Eastern commitments, and disorientated by the loss of Prince Alexander. Salisbury and Iddesleigh were determined that Russia should not occupy Bulgaria, but recognised that they lacked the physical means to prevent her doing so. Hopes that Austria-Hungary might be induced to take a lead were rapidly disappointed, while the recent deterioration of Anglo-Ottoman relations appeared to rule out any possibility of threatening Russia with the passage of a British fleet into the Black Sea. Iddesleigh's concern to "influence" the Sultan grew pressing, but his hopes suffered an early blow when Riistem Pa§a declined to support a suggestion that the Porte should challenge the legality of Kaulbars's behaviour 2 . The best that the British government could achieve was to promote a rapprochement between Bulgaria and Serbia: this led to an agreement on the normalisation of relations being concluded on 25 October. Even so, the attempt to construct an anti-Russian front in the Balkans counted for little without Austro-Hungarian or Ottoman support; Iddesleigh advised the Regents to be patient 3 . Nor was Germany prepared to resume the active role which she had played during the Eastern Rumelian crisis. Bismarck's increasing preoccupation with France persuaded him to offer Russia a free hand in Bulgaria, and he advised Kalnoky to do likewise. Kalnoky's inclination was to resist this advice: he was disturbed by Kaulbars's high-handedness and he faced Hungarian fears that a Russian victory in Bulgaria would mean encirclement in the east. He was reluctant to act independently, however, and in the face of Bismarck's firmness and the British cabinet's internal divisions he chose to

'Radev, op. cit., book 2, chs. 2-4 passim.-, Jelavich, Tsarist Russia and Balkan Nationalism pp 268-269. n For British policy see Smith, op. cit., pp. 52-55, 61-65; Lowe, op. cit, pp. 4-7; Bridge, op. cit., pp. 160-161; FO 364/1, memorandum by Iddesleigh, 8 September; Iddesleigh to White, 22 September and 12 October; FO 195/1530, Iddesleigh to Fane no. 313a, 11 October- Iddesleigh to White, no. 313b, 11 October. Radev, op. cit., pp. 352, 423-426, 437; Vojislav J. Vufikovic, 'Pokusaj Kralja Milana da se kandiduje za bugarski presto (1887)', Glasnik srpske adademije nauka i umetnosti, ccxvi, Odelenje drustvenih nauke, knj. 6, (1957); cf. F0364/3, 'Memorandum on the military points involved in the consideration of a Russian occupation of Bulgaria', by Sir W. White, 12 October.

200

ABDÜL HAMID

II

AND

THE

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suppress his misgivings for the moment'. Neither Francc nor Italy had anything to gain by opposing Russia: France needed her support against Germany, while Italy was preparing to renew the Triple Alliance and preferred not to separate herself from Germany and Austria-Hungary 2 . The Ottoman government assumed an attitude of extreme reserve. It was anxious to avoid an Anglo-Russian contest; it was also anxious that Russia should not be provoked into occupying Bulgaria. Both concerns were much reinforced by the apparently complaisant attitude adopted by Germany and Austria-Hungary. In private, Kamil Paga admitted that the Regents' resistance to Kaulbars was justified; even so, he was alarmed by the case with which Russia appeared to have engaged her "point d'honneur" in the dispute, and feared that events might drive her further than she intended 3 . To the Sultan he was more reassuring: he suggested that the solidarity of the Three Empires was more apparent than real, and that Germany and Austria-Hungary would combine with the other Powers to prevent Russia from actually occupying Bulgaria. However, he warned Abdiilhamid that a diplomatic rebuff in the Balkans might tempt Russia to redirect her ambitions towards Anatolia, where Britain alone could be counted upon to offer the Empire support, and he suggested that the British government should be advised to show restraint. For the time being, he preferred to hope that Russia would be appeased by the choice of a suitable candidate for the Bulgarian throne, and he advised Abdiilhamid to wait and see whether the Bulgarians would elect a candidate, and whether Russia would accept him. Only if Russia rejected the Bulgarians' choice should the Empire take an initiative, and invite the Powers to take the question in hand collecti\ely 4 . Kamil Pa§a soon revised his attitude. Elections for the Bulgarian Grand National Assembly were held on 10 October; Russia promptly claimed that they had been improperly conducted, and demanded that the Porte use its suzerain authority to pronounce them invalid. Kamil Pa§a refused, but recognised that there could be no prospect of an early settlement unless Russia were offered a line of retreat. He offered to mediate. He invited Russia to name a candidate for the Bulgarian throne, and promised to put him forward as the Empire's own; he also offered to conduct an inquiry into the Bulgarian elections, and to arrange for the Grand National Assembly to be postponed until the inquiry was complete. Nelidov endorsed the idea of an inquiry, though without committing Russia to accept its results or to nominate a candidate for the throne. The Porte nonetheless decided to proceed, and on 16

' T r ü t z s c h l e r v o n Falkcnstein. op. cit., pp. 6 - 1 2 ; S m i t h , op. cit., pp. 6 3 - 6 5 ; B r i d g e , op. cit., p. 161. 2

K . K r a c h u n o v , Diplomatichnu istoriya na Bälgariya, I, ( S o f i a , 1928), pp. 2 9 , 9 3 - 9 5 ; L o w e , op.

cit., pp. 12-14. 3 G F O , Bulgarien 20, R a d o w i t z to B i s m a r c k , no. 2 2 1 , 4 O c t o b e r ; no. 2 2 3 , 8 O c t o b e r ; no. 2 2 7 , 11 O c t o b e r ; no. 2 2 8 , 15 O c t o b e r . H H S t A , P A X V , 105, C a l i c e to K a l n o k y , tel. no. 2 1 3 , 15 O c t o b e r ; no. 4 9 B , 19 O c t o b e r . 4

B B A r § , Y E E , K 3 1 / 1 9 0 1 / Z 1 5 8 / 8 6 , m e m o r a n d u m by K l m i l Paija, 7 M u h a r r e m 3 0 4 / 6 O c t o b e r .

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October it instructed Gadban Efendi to carry out the inquiry and to find some means of reconciling the Regents with Kaulbars 1 . The decision to entrust the mediation to Gadban Efendi proved fatal to any slender chance of success. Gadban was the Sultan's choice: neither the Porte nor the Regents trusted him, and he was widely believed to be in Russia's pay 2 . His conduct of his mission did little to inspire confidence: he failed to inform the Regents of the proposed inquiry into the elections, but told them that the Russian and Ottoman governments had reached "a complete understanding" on the subject of Bulgaria, and pressed them to postpone the Grand National Assembly

i n d e f i n i t e l y 3 . H e appears to have m a d e no

corresponding effort to persuade Kaulbars to moderate his demands, while in telegrams to the Porte and to Yildiz he accused the Regents of pursuing a revolutionary policy in collusion with Austria-Hungary and Britain: The Bulgarians' rejection of all Russia's demands springs f r o m a desire to defend their nationality and f r o m secret incitement by the Austrians and the English 4 . In the opinion of the Regent, Stambolov, of the Director of Foreign A f f a i r s , N a c h o v i c h , and of others, Bulgaria c a n n o t remain in the position in which she is placed by the Treaty of Berlin. She must either be an advance guard for Russia's armies in the Balkans, or she must declare herself independent, as Austrian and English interests dictate. In all it a p p e a r s that the B u l g a r i a n s p r e f e r to d e c l a r e t h e m s e l v e s independent and to re-elect Prince Alexander 5 . The Regents declined to negotiate with Gadban; they announced that the Grand National A s s e m b l y would c o n v e n e on 27 October, and despatched Dimitar Grekov to Istanbul for consultations with the Porte and the Powers' A m b a s s a d o r s . Grekov declined Kamil Pa§a's suggestion that the Grand National A s s e m b l y elections might be re-held, and with this, the first Ottoman attempt at mediation ended 6 .

'GFO, Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 228, 15 October; no. 230, 18 October- HHStA PA XV. 105, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 49C, 19 October. . cit., pp. 19-20, 78-82; Smith, op. cit., p. 72; Grosse Politik, iv, no. 873, note by Rantzau, 27 November, no. 874, Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, London, 5 December. 5

G F O , Bulgarien 20, Radowity to Bismarck, no. 280, 27 December; Kämil Pa§a, Halirat, pp. 99101; Daily Telegraph, 1 December; Morning Post, 20 December; Levant Herald, 8 December.

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C o n f e d e r a t i o n would depend upon Russia's f u t u r e p o l i c y 1 . T h e Sultan's anxieties were compounded by a sudden reshaping of the British Cabinet at the turn of the year: Lord Randolph Churchill resigned, Iddesleigh was dismissed, and Salisbury took full charge of foreign policy by once again combining the offices of Foreign Secretay and Prime Minister 2 . Abdiilhamid's reaction gave the first hint of a c h a n g e of attitude. Hitherto he had responded to real or imagined British threats by stressing the need to retain Russia's confidence; on this occasion he sought an understanding with Britain. His calculations remain somewhat obscure. It is doubtful that he had made up his m i n d whether Britain's goal was the destruction of the Ottoman Empire, or merely its subordination; against this, he could scarcely overlook the fact that Britain could now count upon Austro-Hungarian and Italian support. H e still hoped to avoid taking sides: his first response to the press campaign was to appeal to France and Germany to procure a Bulgarian settlement through mediation between Britain and Russia 3 . A s soon as these overtures were rejected, however, he turned to Britain directly, and at an audience on 7 January 1887 he gave White his personal assurance that there was no truth in the n e w s p a p e r stories of his s u b s e r v i e n c e to Russian influence, and "as to an alliancc or understanding with R u s s i a he felt no hesitation in affirming that nothing of the kind had taken place either verbally or in writing". He also invited White to name a candidate for the Bulgarian throne. This last request was misplaced. T h e British g o v e r n m e n t had no candidate for the throne, the remote possibility of restoring Prince Alexander excepted, and for the m o m e n t its sole concern was to keep the Regents in p o w e r 4 . White hinted at interim solutions: he suggested to Abdiilhamid that the Powers might install a European General as temporary administrator of Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, or perhaps appoint a commission to reexamine the powers of the Bulgarian throne. But he did not pursue these suggestions 5 . On the other hand, Salisbury w a s at last ready to make the Sultan a serious o f f e r of cooperation in the E g y p t i a n question. L o r d R a n d o l p h Churchill's r e s i g n a t i o n had r e m o v e d o n e obstacle, and the f a i l u r e of discussions with F r a n c e another; W o l f f and M u h t a r Pa§a were still at loggerheads over the size of the Egyptian army, but conditions within Egypt seemed generally satisfactory and favourable to an initiative. Salisbury

ißBAr?, Bulgaristan trade, no. 654, 15 Rebiulahir/tl January 1887; FO 78/3878, Iddesleigh to White, no. 306, 23 December; FO 78/3994, Salisbury to White, no. 15A, 12 January; no. 17, 15 January. 2 Smith, on. cit., pp. 54-5. Q GFO, Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 284, 27 December; no. 5, 7 January; Bismarck to Radowitz, no. 318, 30 December. 4 F O 78/3996, White to Salisbury, no. 7, 6 January; no. 11, 8 January. 5 Smith, op. cit., pp. 72-3.

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recognised that he must now offer a date for Britain's evacuation; nonetheless, he was determined to sell this concession dear, and to extract terms which would guarantee British p r e d o m i n a n c e in E g y p t even a f t e r evacuation. Specifically, he envisaged a permanent British right to reoccupy Egypt in the event of any threat to the Khedive's internal or external security 1 . He did not show his hand i m m e d i a t e l y , but at the end of January he d e s p a t c h e d D r u m m o n d Wolff back to Istanbul with instructions to discuss the Ulterior Convention foreseen by the arrangement of O c t o b e r 1885 2 . Abdiilhamid received Wolff amicably, but delayed the opening of negotiations for a full month on the pretext of his preoccupation with the Bulgarian issue. The Sultan's overall stance remained one of balance: he would not commit himself to Britain in Egypt until confident that his relations with Russia would not be compromised by the Bulgarian issue 3 . In the meantime the Porte renewed its independent efforts to mediate between Russia and the Regency. It doubled that Russia would attempt to revive the Prince of Mingrclia's candidacy, and it was encouraged by signs that the Regents were anxious f o r an a c c o m m o d a t i o n : towards the middle of December they had sent Dr. Georgi Volkovich, an old acquaintance of Kamil Pa§a, to serve as their permanent representative in Istanbul, and had entrusted him with an original proposal to the effect that Abdiilhamid should himself become Prince of Bulgaria, and thus reconstitute the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria as a dual monarchy similar to Austria-Hungary. It seems likely that the proposal included a provision for Macedonian autonomy, but, even had it not, there was no possibility that Abdiilhamid would endorse a scheme which would have risked a collision with Russia and perhaps with other Powers as w e l l 4 . Kamil Pa§a's ideas were more practical. He still believed that the formation of a coalition Regency and government offered the best approach to a compromise with Russia, and at the beginning of January 1887 he invited the Bulgarian opposition leader Dragan T s a n k o v to Istanbul f o r talks with himself and Valkovich. Tsankov accepted the invitation, but the Regents suspected an attempt to revive the Prince of Mingrelia's candidacy and warned that the Porte must first name a candidate for the throne. Volkovich w a s convinced of the Grand Vizier's sincerity, however, and in defiance of his instructions he agreed to attend the talks in a private capacity 5 .

' W e e k s , op. cit., pp. 228-40; (lornik, op. cit., pp. 610-2; Gallagher and Robinson, op. cit., pp. 262-4. 2 F O 78/3994, Salisbury to While, no. 22, 18 January. % 0 78/4058, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 7, 5 February; no. 8, 5 February; no. 17, 22 February. ^ T h e proposal to offer Abdiilhamid the Bulgarian throne remains obscure; for discussion see SamardZiev, op. cit., pp. 55-7. The sole direct source for the story is Dimitàr Marinov, Stefan Stambolov, pp. 381-90. However. Ottoman records confirm that some such offer was made; see BBAr§, YEE K36/2328(5)/Z146//V, tel. from Riza Bey, Sofia, 24 July 1887. ^ K â m i l Pa§a, Hatirat, pp. 99-101; Radev, op. cit., pp. 6 1 5 - 2 3 ; Dokumenti Istoriya, no. 149, Sultan's instructions, 18/30 December.

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T h e talks opened on 18 January. T s a n k o v submitted a p r o g r a m m e which demanded the effective surrender of all power in Bulgaria into the hands of the opposition: the Regency must be abolished, Tsankov's supporters must predominate in a new government, a Russian general must be appointed War Minister, a new Grand National Assembly must revise the Constitution and reconsider the Prince of Mingrelia's candidacy, all political offenders must be pardoned, all cashiered officers must be reinstated, and recruitment to the Bulgarian army must be suspended. Kamil Pa§a rejected this programme out of hand, and proposed that Tsankov's followers should be given a minority share of one third of the places in the existing Regency and government. Impressed by the G r a n d Vizier's unexpectedly f i r m stand, the R e g e n t s authorised Valkovich to join the talks officially, and to put forward as their own counterproposal the suggestion that opposition should be granted one third of the places in the Regency and g o v e r n m e n t , subject to s a f e g u a r d s as to the distribution of portfolios, and with the reservation that no reconstruction could take practical effect until the Porte named a candidate for the throne. Volkovich delivered this counter-proposal on 27 January; the talks were then suspended in anticipation of the arrival of the Deputation of the Grand National Assembly, which proposed to conclude its European lour with a visit to Istanbul 1 . Nelidov played no part in these talks; he did not obstruct Kamil Papa's initiative, but he warned that Russia remained committed to the Prince of M i n g r e l i a 2 . However, the Russian g o v e r n m e n t f o r e s a w that the impending talks between the Porte and the Deputation of the Grand National Assembly could furnish an opportunity to bring pressure to bear on the Regency, and on 19 January it invited the Powers to instruct their representatives in Istanbul to discuss with Nelidov a f o r m of solution which they might jointly recommend to the Porte and the D e p u t a t i o n 3 . All P o w e r s accepted this proposal in principle, but it was soon apparent that Russia had nothing new to offer: Nelidov's instructions called for the abolition of the R e g e n c y , and did not exclude a revival of the Prince of Mingrelia's candidacy 4 . Prospects for an international solution remained remote: the Powers' Ambassadors waited to see whether the Porte and the Deputation would succeed in evolving an acceptable compromise 5 . The Deputation of the Grand National Assembly arrived in Istanbul at the beginning of February. It brought no new proposals, though, apparently,

'Radev, op. cit., pp. 629-47. G F O , Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 5, 7 January; no. 10, 10 January; no. 14, 21 January. 3 ibid., Giers to Shuvalov, circular, 7/19 January. ^ibid., Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 12,17 January. 5 ibid., Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 21, 28 January. 2

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it, made an unsuccessful attempt to interest Abdiilhamid in the idea of a dual m o n a r c h y 1 . The Deputation fared no better in its talks with Tsankov at the Porte. Tsankov was willing to concede the principle of a coalition Regency and g o v e r n m e n t , but he insisted that his own supporters must have a predominant share in both. Three rounds of discussions presided over by Kâmil Pa§a were taken up with a sterile debate on the nature of the Bulgarian party system, with each side claiming that it represented two parties to the other's one. Meanwhile the Powers' Ambassadors plied the Porte and the Deputation with contradictory advice: Nelidov, Radowitz and the French chargé d'affaires, Imbert, warned that Russia could have no dealings with the existing Sofia regime, White emphasized that Britain would oppose any dictation to the Regency, and Calice and his Italian colleague suggested in general terms that the Regents should make some concessions to Russia 2 . By mid-February it was obvious that the Powers and the Bulgarians were both deadlocked, and there were strong r u m o u r s that R u s s i a was considering an occupation of Bulgaria. White warned that Ottoman collusion in a Russian occupation would mean the Empire's partition, and Italy hinted that she might seize Tripoli 3 . Abdiilhamid cast about for some means of escape, and made vain suggestions for an international conference, mediation by A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and G e r m a n y , and greater British pressure on the R e g e n c y 4 . Kâmil Pa§a put f o r w a r d yet another f o r m u l a f o r O t t o m a n mediation: he recognised that the cause of a coalition regime was lost, but he suggested that the various Bulgarian parties might unite around a c o m m o n "Political P r o g r a m m e " w h i c h would l e a v e the e x i s t i n g R e g e n c y and government intact, but concede Russia's demands for a political amnesty, the reinstatement of cashiered officers, the appointment of a Russian general to the W a r Ministry and the election of a f r e s h Grand National A s s e m b l y . T h e Deputation of the Grand National Assembly left for Sofia, but promised to r e c o m m e n d the "Political P r o g r a m m e " to the R e g e n c y ; even T s a n k o v expressed interest. Nelidov was less welcoming: he accused Kâmil Pa§a of making too many concessions to the R e g e n c y , and he warned that Russia might soon lose patience 1 .

' S e e Stoilov's statement to Riza Bey in B B A r j , YEE, K36/2328(5)/Z146/XV, tel. f r o m Riza Bey, 24 July 1887. ^Radev, op. cit., pp. 647-51; G K ) , Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 26, 4 February; no. 2 9 , 7 February; FO 78/4003, White to Salisbury, tel. no. 13, 10 February. 3 K a m i l Pa§a, Hatirat, pp. 7 4 5; Radev. op. cit., pp. 651-2; GFO, Bulgarien 20, copy, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 39C, 12 February: tel. no. 32, 16 February; FO 78/3996, White to Salisbury, no. 57, 14 February. 4 G F O , Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 39, 21 February; no. 42, 2 4 February; F O 78/3996, White to Salisbury, no. 68, 21 February. 5 R a d e v , op. cit., pp. 653-7; GFO, Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 36, 14 February; no. 41, 21 February; BBAr§, Y h K , K 3 9 / 1 6 2 9 / Z 1 7 / 1 1 5 , undated paper reporting statements by Russian Ambassador.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN: THE MEDITERRANEAN AGREEMENT, THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE EGYPTIAN CONVENTION (February-July 1887)

I The diplomatic deadlock in the Near East was broken by Germany's unexpected decision to distance herself f r o m Russia. The origins of this shift were complex, and the considerations which prompted it were European rather than Near Eastern 1 . Throughout the autumn and winter of 1886 Bismarck's chief preoccupation had been France, and the possible threat of a FrancoRussian alliance: hence his decision to offer the Tsar a free hand in Bulgaria, and his refusal of all British overtures for cooperation in Istanbul. By early 1887 this strategy was in danger of breaking down, owing to crises in two of Germany's own alliances: Austria-Hungary's open quarrel with Russia over Bulgaria had put paid to any hope of renewing the Three Emperors' Alliance when it expired in June, while negotiations f o r a renewal of the Triple Alliance were being jeopardised by Italy's d e m a n d for recognition of her aspirations in North Africa and the Balkans, and by Austria-Hungary's counterdemand for a guarantee of her own Balkan interests against Russia. The danger was that Russia and Italy might gravitate towards France; the problem was to find a means of salvaging the Triple Alliance without acceding to Italy's and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ' s d e m a n d f o r N e a r Eastern c o m m i t m e n t s w h i c h would compromise Germany's relations with Russia. Bismarck's solution had two parts: he proposed to invite Britain to assume the burden of supporting Italy and Austria-Hungary against Russia in the Near East, and thus leave Germany free to reach a separate accommodation with Russia in place of the defunct Three Emperors' Alliance. The practical difficulty was that both Britain and Russia were certain to demand German support in the Near East, and Bismarck soon found himself playing a double game: he encouraged Salisbury to believe that he would favour an anti-Russian coalition between Britain, Italy and

' T h e following three paragraphs are based on Lowe, op. cit., pp. 7-18; Triitzschler von Falkenstein, op. cit.. pp. 20-9, 66-70, 82-6; Smith, op. cit., pp. 66-73; W. N. Medlicott, T h e Mediterranean Agreements of 1887', Slavonic Review, v, (June 1926), pp. 66-72; A. F. Pribram, Die politischen Geheimverträge Österreich-Ungarns, I, pp. 169-207.

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Austria-Hungary, while at the same time he assured Russia of his continuing willingness to pay Tor her friendship in Europe with support in the Near Hast. Throughout 1887 Germany sent out contradictory signals which confused all the Powers as to her ultimate objectives; in the proccss the Sultan himself was seriously wrong-footed, with particularly disastrous consequences for his Egyptian diplomacy. By mid-February Bismarck's new strategy had met with partial success. Salisbury was eager for closer relations with Italy and Austria-Hungary, and was attracted by the prospect of German support. On 12 February, as a first step, the British and Italian govenments concludcd the secret Mediterranean A g r e e m e n t , an e x c h a n g e of n o t e s w h i c h b o u n d t h e m to c o o p e r a t e diplomatically in upholding the status quo in the Mediterranean, Adriatic, Aegean and Black Seas, and to consult together should territorial changes in these regions prove necessary. This fell short of an alliance: there was no provision for military cooperation or for the division of territory. Nonetheless, it satisfied Italy, and enabled Bismarck to renew the Triple Alliance eight days later. The Triple Alliance essentially retained its character as a pledge against French aggression in Europe; however, two additional protocols gave Italy a German guarantee against French incursions in Morocco and Tripoli, and an Austro-Hungarian a c k n o w l e d g e m e n t of her right to a share in any f u t u r e partition of the Balkans. Germany thus avoided Near Eastern commitments: Bismarck advised Kalnoky to secure Austria-Hungary's Balkan interests through adhesion to the Anglo-Italian Mediterranean A g r e e m e n t , a step accomplished one month later, on 24 March. Bismarck had less success with the second part of his strategy. Russia appeared indifferent to his overtures for a separate alliance, and by midFebruary the attacks of a section of the M o s c o w press had convinced him that a Franco-Russian rapprochement remained a serious possibility. He recognised that Germany herself might stand in need of British insurance, at least for the time being; he also accepted that Salisbury's price would be cooperation in the Near East. On 1'7 February he instructed Radowitz. to assume an attitude of impartiality and reserve in all questions at issue between Britain and Russia. This applied principally to Bulgaria. Bismarck was ready to be more generous in Egypt, which was not in the first instance an Anglo-Russian issue, and on 27 February he instructed Radowitz to assist Drummond Wolff in his efforts to bring the Sultan to an agreement 1 . T h e O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t knew nothing of the M e d i t e r r a n e a n Agreement, nor, as yet, of the Triple Alliance, but it responded with alacrity to the signs of a rift between Russia and G e r m a n y . On 2 4 F e b r u a r y Abdulhamid endorsed Kamil Pa§a's scheme to unite the Bulgarian parties

1 Grosse Politik, v, no. 1007. Bismarck to Radowitz, 17 February; G F O , A e g y p t e n 3 Nr. 1, Bismarck to Radowitz, no. 46. ICJ February; no. 53, 27 February; no. 56, 5 March.

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around a c o m m o n "Political P r o g r a m m e " ; Tour days later, over Nelidov's protests, he d e s p a t c h e d Hiiseyin Rtza Bey to S o f i a to take c h a r g e of negotiations, and on the same day he instructed the Porte to open discussions with W o l f f on E g y p t 1 . T h e immediate o u t c o m e was a crisis of R u s s o Ottoman confidcnce. Nelidov was aware that Germany was at the root of the Sultan's new course, but he feared that Britain would be the beneficiary, and that Russia's security at the Straits might be jeopardised. On 1 March he gave the Porte a note which drew attention to continuing arrears in the payment of the 1879 War Indemnity, and contrasted these with the Sultan's willingness to expend large sums on armaments — a transparent reference to a substantial rifle contract which had just been placed with the German firm of Mauser. The note was accompanied by a barrage of threatening statements, and by demands that the Sullan should recall Riza Bey and dismiss Kamil Pa§a. Nelidov w a r n e d that Russia would henceforth consult only her o w n interests in Bulgaria, and he hinted that the Sultan was jeopardising prospects for a RussoOttoman alliance. His Second Dragoman, Maksimov, accused the Grand Vizier of seeking a British alliance, and threatened that Russia would seize Istanbul if the Straits were opened to British warships; he also warned that Russia could create difficulties for the Empire in Anatolia, and that she could easily win over the Bulgarians by offering them their San Stefano frontiers. He even suggested that Abdiilhamid might share the fate of Prince Alexander 2 . The attempt to bully the Sultan miscarried. Abdiilhamid was outraged by Nelidov's attempt to interfere in his armaments policy, and on 7 March he sent White a message expressing the hope that "while u n f r i e n d l y P o w e r s m i g h t object to the Sultan p r o v i d i n g f o r m e a n s of d e f e n c e and selfpreservation, friendly ones would not" 3 . Three days later he informed Radowitz that he was contemplating a rapprochement with Britain; Radowitz approved, but suggested that Egypt, rather than Bulgaria, was the appropriate terrain for this 4 . This was Abdiilhamid's own inclination: Maksimov's threat of "a second San Stefano" had impressed him, and he remained anxious that Russia should not be provoked. H e was also unwilling to trust the Bulgarians: he had recently w a r n e d K a m i l Pa§a that "in B u l g a r i a there are R u s s o p h i l e s , Anglophiles and other partisans w h o f o l l o w the policies of the respective Powers, but in reality the goal of all is Bulgaria's expansion and a declaration ^ O 78/3996, White to Salisbury, no. 72, 24 February; no. 77, 28 February; FO 78/3997, White to Salisbury, no. 87, 7 March; GFO, Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 48, 28 February; Aegypten 3 Nr. 1, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 44, 25 February; BBAr§, YEE, 36/2475/Z150/XI, memorandum by Kamil Paga, an Cemaziyulahtr/25 February; Sultan's instructions, 3 Cemaziyulahir/28 February. 2 BBAr§, YEE, K39/1629/Z17/115, papers reporting statements by Nelidov and Maksimov; FO 78/3997, White to Salisbury, no. 89, 7 March; Silin, op. tit., pp. 128-9; Boris Nolde, VAlliance Franco-Russe, p. 461. 3 F O 78/3997, White to Salisbury, no. 94, 8 March. The accumulated arrears of the War Indemnity currently stood at Ltq. 442,380. 4 GFO, Aegypten 3 Nr. 1, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 59, 11 March.

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of independence at the appropriate moment" 1 . In Bulgarian affairs, Abdulhamid preferred to keep the door to agreement with Russia open, and, while he did not recall Riza Bey, he warned the Regency that it must make concessions to Russia 2 . Nor was an Anglo-Ottoman rapprochcment in Kgypt a foregone conclusion. The proposals which Wolff had brought with him did not appear to differ significantly from those which the Porte had rejected in December 1886: pro forma, he refused to discuss an evacuation date, and warned that the Powers must first assent to further administrative, judicial and financial reforms, and to arrangements to secure freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal and Egypt's future neutralisation. He suggested that British officers must continue to hold positions of command in the Egyptian army after the withdrawal of Britain's own forces, and he argued that Britain must enjoy a permanent right to reoccupy Egypt in the event of any threat to the Khedive's internal or external security, or of a failure by the Egyptian government to honour its international obligations 3 . Kamil and Kurd Said replied that the Convention of 24 October 1885 had envisaged a strictly Anglo-Ottoman agreement to provide for the withdrawal of Britain's forces by a definite date; they suggested that issues requiring the Powers' assent should be dealt with separately. Within this framework, however, they were willing to examine Wolffs proposals for the retention of British officers and a British right of reentry, and on 10 March Kamil submitted a draft counter-proposal to Abdulhamid. This envisaged a withdrawal of British troops after one year, and of British officers after two; it also emphasized that the Ottoman government enjoyed an established and exclusive right to send forces to Egypt to suppress disorders, but conceded that British troops might be reintroduced should abnormal circumstances such as war prevent the Ottoman government from exercising this right 4 . Abdulhamid was not ready to commit himself. Nelidov warned that Egypt remained an international issue which could not be subjected to separate Anglo-Ottoman arrangements; France reiterated her view that the settlement of an evacuation date must precede any concessions by the Ottoman side. In addition, Muhtar Pa§a intervened from Cairo to remind the Sultan that the question of the future size of the Egyptian army remained unresolved 5 . Abdulhamid did not approve Kamil's counter-proposal, but he permitted the

'BBAr$, Buigaristan Irade, no. 673, 7 Cemaziyiilahir/3 March; Dokumenti

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Bdlgarskata

Istoriya, no. 153, Sultan's instructions, 23 January/4 February. 2 BBAr§, YEE, K36/2328(5)/Z146/XV, tels. to Riza Bey, 3 and 13 March. 3 4

FO 78/4058, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 10. 8 February.

ibid„ no. 20, 1 March; no. 24. 3 March; no. 28, 8 March; no. 29, 11 March; FO 78/4060, Wolff to Salisbury, tel. no. 29, 10 March; BBAr§, YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XT, memorandum by Kamil Pa$a, 14 Cemaziiilahir/10 March. 5 GFO, Aegypten 38 Nr. 1, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 56, 8 March; no. 59, 11 March; no. 64, 21 March; no. 72, 28 March; FO "'8/4058, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 43, 22 March; no. 49, 26 March.

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two Ottoman Plenipotentiaries to continue discussions with Wolff on an informal basis. By late March Wolff w a s confident that he had persuaded Kamil and Kurd Said to accept the principle of a British right of re-entry, and in anticipation of the opening of formal negotiations he drew up a draft of a convention. This proposed that the British and Ottoman governments should offer the Powers joint proposals on the subjects of the Suez Canal, reform of the Egyptian Capitulations, and a reorganisation of Egypt's financial, fiscal and judicial systems. It stated that British troops and officers would stay in Egypt for as long as necessary, and proposed that, when the troops were eventually withdrawn, Egypt should be neutralised, subject to a British right of re-entry in the event of any threat to Egypt's internal or external security, or of a failure by the K h e d i v e to honour his international obligations. It was conceded that in the event of a British re-entry the Sultan would be entitled to send an equal number of Ottoman troops to Egypt. Finally, it was proposed that the Sultan should take over the garrisoning of Suakin. Kamil Pa§a reviewed the draft convention on 29 March, and unofficially pronounced it to be broadly acceptable, but only on condition that Britain set a date f o r her e v a c u a t i o n 1 . Salisbury authorised Wolff to o f f e r evacuation in five years if certain conditions were met: the Ottoman Empire must agree to Britain's right of re-entry, the convention as a whole must be formally approved by all the Powers, and the provisions concerning the Suez Canal, the Capitulations and reforms must be implemented in full before the five years were up 2 . This offer of conditional evacuation represented a breakthrough: the Sultan had tacitly conceded that a settlement must recognise the permanency of British interests as well as of Ottoman rights, while Salisbury had at last agreed to d e f i n e specific terms and a date for evacuation. It remained f o r Abdiilhamid to authorise the opening of formal negotiations.

II The Porte could point to no equivalent progress in Bulgaria, where events had rapidly overtaken its scheme to unite the various parties around a c o m m o n "Political P r o g r a m m e " . On 3 M a r c h , two days after Riza Bey's arrival in S o f i a , pro-Russian a r m y o f f i c e r s launched a revolt f r o m the garrisons of Ruschuk and Silistra. T h o u g h the revolt collapsed within hours, the Regents reacted with unprecedented severity: the ringleaders were courtmartialled and shot, and opposition politicians were interned wholesale. The r e v o l t and the e n s u i n g r e p r e s s i o n d e s t r o y e d all h o p e s of a general reconciliation. For a f e w days it seemed possible that Russia might occupy Bulgaria, but in the event N e l i d o v c o n t e n t e d himself with a w a r n i n g that Russia would entertain no proposal for a settlement while the existing

] ibid„ no. 29, 11 March; no. 54, 30 March; FO 78/4060, Wolff to Salisbury, tel. no. 38, 26 March; tel. no. 40, 29 March. 2

ibid„ Salisbury to Wolff, tel., 1 April; tel. no. 2 0 , 1 April.

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r e m a i n e d in p o w e r ; he hinted that is w a s u p to A b d i i l h a m i d to

r e m o v e them. T s a n k o v was even m o r e extreme: f r o m the safety of Istanbul, he d e n o u n c e d any idea of c o m p r o m i s e with the R e g e n c y and d e m a n d e d that the Sultan occupy Eastern R u m e l i a 1 . T h e R e g e n t s similarly declined to h a v e any direct dealings with the o p p o s i t i o n ; they told Riza B e y that they w e r e still willing to entertain a c o m m o n "Political P r o g r a m m e " , but they e m p h a s i z e d that it was up to him to win o v e r T s a n k o v ' s f o l l o w e r s . T h i s p r o v e d d i f f i c u l t , since the bulk of the opposition's leaders w e r e n o w in prison or in exile; as a temporary expedient, and a gesture to Russia, the Porte instructed Riza Bey to o r g a n i s e a c o n s u l a r inquiry into the c o n d i t i o n of the R e g e n c y ' s i m p r i s o n e d o p p o n e n t s . A n u m b e r of T s a n k o v ' s l i e u t e n a n t s w e r e released t o w a r d s the middle of March, but a f t e r discussions with Riza Bey they a n n o u n c e d that they would stant by T s a n k o v ' s opinion and r e f u s e any negotiation. O n 2 4 M a r c h Riza Bey admitted defeat, and asked the Porte for fresh instructions 2 . T h e s i t u a t i o n w a s m a d e u r g e n t by s i g n s that t h e R e g e n c y w a s contemplating independent action. R e p o r t s f r o m Bulgaria spoke of a g r o w i n g p u b l i c agitation f o r t h e r e s t o r a t i o n of P r i n c e A l e x a n d e r , a n d t h e r e w e r e suggestions that Bulgaria might declare independence. T h e Regents themselves a d m i t t e d to R i z a B e y that t h e y f a c e d i n c r e a s i n g p r e s s u r e f r o m P r i n c e Alexander's supporters, and that these included both the P r i m e Minister and the W a r Minister, as well as a n u m b e r of army o f f i c e r s . T h e R e g e n t s e m p h a s i z e d that they w o u l d c o n t i n u e to o p p o s e the e x - P r i n c e ' s r e s t o r a t i o n , but t h e y w a r n e d that the only e f f e c t i v e safeguard against popular pressure w o u l d be to install an alternative c a n d i d a t e u p o n the t h r o n e , and they hinted that if the S u l t a n f a i l e d to put f o r w a r d a c a n d i d a t e t h e y m i g h t c l e c t a n e w P r i n c e u n i l a t e r a l l y - ' . A b d i i l h a m i d w a s still p r o n e to a suspicion that the R e g e n t s m i g h t be in l e a g u e with P r i n c e A l e x a n d e r , a n d his a p p r e h e n s i o n s w e r e increased w h e n on 2 7 March the R e g e n t s mysteriously despatched Konstantin Stoilov on a mission to V i e n n a . Kamil Pa§a placed m o r e c o n f i d e n c e in the Regents's assurances, but recognised that they were under strong pressure to act; rightly, he c o n c l u d e d that Stoilov's m i s s i o n m u s t be t h e p r e l u d e to an independent bid to elect a Prince 4 .

^Radev. op. cit., pp. 6 6 1 - 7 3 3 passim.-, Samardziev, op. cit., p. 60; Joachim v o n Konigslovv, Ferdinand von Bulgarien. Vom Beginn der Thronkandidatur bis zur Anerkennung durch die Grossmdchte 18H6 bis 1896, p. 45; GFO, Tuerkei 153, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 58, 11 March; Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 62, 14 March. 2 B B A r § , YEE, K36/2328(5)/Z146/XV, tel. to Riza Bey, 7 March; tels. from Riza Bey, 4 March, 7 March, 8 March, 11 M a r c h . 14 M a r c h , 15 M a r c h , 19 M a r c h . 25 M a r c h , 14/26 M a r c h ; K14/2364/Z126/11, report from Riza Bey, 12/24 March. 3

B B A r § , YEE, K36/2328(5)/Z146/XV, tel. to Riza Bey, 15/27 March; tels. f r o m Riza Bey, 27 March, 28 March, 30 March. ^ibid., Bulgaristan Irade, no. 679, 2 Receb/27 March; Kamil Pa§a, Hatirat, p. 80. Stoilov had a double mission: first to persuade Prince Alexander to formally reject any idea of re-election, and second, to sound Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, w h o had mooted his o w n candidacy to the Deputation of the Grand National Assembly in Vienna in December 1886. See Konigslow, op. cit., p. 46.

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The Grand Vizier advised the Sultan to join forces with the Regency and impose a settlement before matters got out of hand: the Ottoman Empire should itself propose a candidate for the throne, and appeal to the Powers for their collective support. Kamil saw no point in further attempts at mediation with Russia: he doubted that she wanted a settlement, and he suggested that her real aim was to prolong the crisis indefinitely in the hope that the Regency would eventually collapse, and perhaps too, in the hope that the burden of maintaining a precautionary force in Macedonia would eventually bankrupt the Ottoman treasury. He was also confident that the Empire could afford to abandon Russia: the recent publication of the existence of the Triple Alliance encouraged him to believe that Russia was diplomatically isolated, and he predicted that a more independent Ottoman stance would win support from a broad coalition of Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy 1 . Abdiilhamid was not persuaded. He remained anxious to enlist Russia's cooperation, and he was encouraged by a report that she might at last be ready to consider candidates other than the Prince of Mingrelia. On 21 March he made a personal approach to the Tsar with a fresh offer of mediation. He invited the Tsar to name two fresh candidates for the Bulgarian throne, and offered to submit the two names, together with that of the Prince of Mingrelia, to the existing Grand National Assembly. He undertook to secure the election of whichever candidate the Tsar preferred; he also undertook to procure the resignation of the Regency as soon as the names of the candidates were submitted to the Grand National Assembly 2 . This offered Russia little more than an opportunity to save face, and the immediate reaction from Nelidov and Giers was sceptical; Abdiilhamid admitted to Radowitz that the time had probably come to attempt a solution without Russia, but added that he would await the Tsar's formal reply to his proposal 3 . The Tsar's reply was unexpectedly favourable. On 28 March Nelidov announced that the Tsar was willing to suggest the name of a candidate for the Bulgarian throne, but could not accept the Sultan's view that the existing Grand National Assembly should play a part in the candidate's election. He proposed an alternative procedure: the Russian and Ottoman governments should agree upon a candidate and submit his name for the approval of the Powers. Kamil Pa§a objected that the proposal resembled the old Prince of Mingrelia scheme, and was bound to share the same fate: neither the Powers nor the Bulgarians would accept it. Nelidov suggested that the Sultan might

Kamil Pa§a, Hatirat, pp. 78 80. Kamil suggested that the Sultan might nominate the Duke of Oldenbourg and the Prince of Nassau, whom §akir Pa§a had reported to be possibly acceptable to the Tsar. §akir had also suggested the Prince of Leuchtenberg: BBArs YEE K36/2328(5)/Z146/XV, tels. from Riza Bey, 4 and 15 March. For details of the Empire's financial problems see GFO, Tuerkei 110, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 253, 17 November 1886; no. 269, 6 December; no. 51, 4 March 1887; no. 69, 27 March; no. 102, 17 May, no. 112, 27 May. 2 GFO, Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel. no. 31, 23 March. ^ibid., Kadowitz to Bismarck, no. 66, 25 March; Bulow to Bismarck, no. 113, St. Petersburg, 23 March; HHStA, PA XV. I l l , Calice and Kalnoky, no. 21A-D, 29 March.

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give his assent in principle, but, on Kamil's advicc, Abdiilhamid stated that he must first know the n a m e of Russia's candidate, w h o must be a person acceptable to all the Powers and to the Bulgarians. He also warned that there must be a clear prior understanding on the procedure for the candidate's eventual election and installation in Bulgaria 1 . Nelidov amplified the Russian proposal on 4 April. T h o u g h still unable to name a candidate, he stated that Russia would look to Germany to assist her in winning the other Powers' approval. He also proposed a novel formula to govern the candidate's election and installation: once approved by the Powers, the candidate would enter Bulgaria as "Sole Regent"; in this capacity he would displace the existing Regency and carry out a programme of constitutional, a d m i n i s t r a t i v e and military r e f o r m s , b e f o r e e v e n t u a l l y summoning a fresh Grand Assembly to clect him to the throne. The Grand Vizier dismissed this as an unworkable and dangerous attempt to revive the p r o g r a m m e s of Tsankov and Kaulbars. He questioned Russia's motives: Nelidov had admitted that the Sultan might have to resort to force to ensure Bulgarian compliance, and Kamil wondered whether Russia's purpose might not be to provoke conflict between the Empire and Bulgaria, and so furnish herself with a pretext for military intervention. He advised Abdiilhamid to turn the issue over to the Powers: Russia should be told that the Empire could not endorse her proposal without prior assurances of international support, and the Foreign Ministry should issue a Circular inviting the Powers to take the crisis in hand and themselves nominate fresh candidates for the Bulgarian throne 2 . Abdiilhamid hesitated for more than a month. Though impressed by Kamil Pa§a's criticisms, he was reluctant to risk a breach with Russia at a time of continuing rumours of the impending return of Prince Alexander. Furthermore, Nelidov threatened that Russia would abandon the Sultan if he issued a Circular to the Powers: she would adopt an attitude of reserve and non-cooperation, and refuse any solution which might be proposed in the future. Rather than commit himself, Abdiilhamid sought to draw Nelidov into negotiation: he asked lor- a closer definition of the Sole Regent's powers, and he continued to press for the name of Russia's candidate. Nelidov replied that the Sultan must accept the proposal as it stood, and seek clarifications later 3 . Kamil Pa§a sought support outside: White and Calice warned that the Sole Regent s c h e m e was hazardous, and questioned its compatibility with the Treaty of Berlin; they also attempted to assuage Abdiilhamid's f e a r of a restoration of Prince Alexander. Radowitz refused all the Sultan's requests for

1

Kämil Pa§a, Hatirat,

pp. 8 3 - 5 ; BBAr§, Bulgaristan Irade, no. 6 8 0 , 4 R e c e b / 2 9 March.

2

K a m i l Pa§a, Hatirat,

pp. 8 8 - 9 .

3

ibid., pp. 9 0 - 2 ; B B A r § , Bulgaristan trade, no. 6 8 2 , 14 R e c e b / 8 April; no. 6 8 5 , 17 R e c e b / U April; no. 6 8 6 , 18 R e c e b / 1 2 April; no. 6 8 9 , K 3 6 / 2 3 2 8 ( 5 ) / Z 1 4 6 / X V , tel. from Riza B e y , 2 9 M a r c h / 1 0 April; G F O , Bismarck, no. 7 9 , 9 April; no. 80. 11 April; no. 8 2 , 15 April; no. 8 7 , 2 2

no. 6 8 3 , 15 R e c e b / 9 April; 2 2 R e c e b / 1 6 April; Y E E , Bulgarien 2 0 , R a d o w i t z to April; no. 8 9 , 2 5 April.

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advice, but his reserve was sufficient to cast doubt on Russia's promises of G e r m a n support 1 . Kamil Pa§a gradually gained the upper hand, and on 2 9 April the Porte informed Nelidov that it would be unable to adopt the Sole Regent scheme in view of the likelihood of objections f r o m some of the Powers. The Porte suggested that Russia might approach the Powers herself; Nelidov replied that Russia would take no initiative 2 . Abdiilhamid still hesitated. He told Nelidov that his mind remained open, and on 9 M a y he confidentially referred the Sole R e g e n t s c h e m e to Britain, A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and G e r m a n y . All three replied m o r e or less negatively: Kalnoky f o u n d the scheme too vague, Salisbury questioned its compatibility with the Treaty of Berlin, and Radowitz indicated that Germany could o f f e r no opinion 3 . A r m e d with these responses, a Special Council of Ministers met on 18 May and drafted a Circular which gave a lengthy account of the Empire's successive attempts to mediate between Russia and the Bulgarians: it concluded with an appeal to the Powers to take in hand the question of a solution and to nominate candidates for the Bulgarian throne. Abdiilhamid approved the Circular on 21 M a y and it was issued immediately. The Ottoman Empire thereby renounced its policy of mediation and returned to the terrain which it had occupied before October 1886; K u r d Said Pa§a commented that "the question resumes its normal condition" 4 .

ffl The Grand Vizier had achieved a double success, for simultaneously he had brought D r u m m o n d Wolff to an agreement for the evacuation of Britain's forces f r o m Egypt. Prospccts for a settlement had brightened considerably at the beginning of April, when France indicated that she would no longer seek to interfere in the Anglo-Ottoman negotiations, but would j u d g e them by their o u t c o m e 5 . A further obstacle was removed when Kamil Pa§a and Wolff hit upon a paper f o r m u l a which disposed of the issue of the f u t u r e size of the Egyptian army, and on 16 April Abdiilhamid permitted formal negotiations to

'BBAr§, Bulgaristan Irade, no. 689, enclosing memorandum by Kamil Pa§a, 22 Receb/16 April; no. 690, 23 Receb/17 April; Kämil Pa§a, Hatirat, pp. 90-4; HHStA, PA XII. 148, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 24B, 9 April; GFO, Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 80, 11 April; no. 82, 15 April; Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel. no. 40, 9 April; tel. no. 42, 12 April; Bismarck to Radowitz, no. 7 8 , 1 8 April. 2 ibid., Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 91,2 May. 3 ibid„ no. 95,6 May; no. 97, 9 May; FO 78/3998, White to Salisbury, no. 167, 9 May; no. 168, 10 May; FO 78/4002, Salisbury to White, tel. no. 72, 14 May; HHStA, PA XV. 112, Calice to Kalnoky, no 32F, 10 May; no. 33C, 17 May; Kalnoky to Calice, tel. no. 4 3 , 1 6 May. 4 BBAr§, Bulgaristan ¡rade, no. 697, 27 §aban/21 May, enclosing Council of Ministers' Report, 25 §aban/18 May, and circular tel., 21 May; FO 78/3998, White to Salisbury, no. 184, 23 May. 5 GFO, Aegypten 3 Nr. 1, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 75, 4 April; Weeks, op. cit., p. 248.

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begin 1 . The discussions proceeded on the basis of W o l f f s draft convention, and progress was rapid: by the end of April substantive agreement had been reached on the various issues of reform, neutralisation and the Suez Canal, while, at Abdiilhamid's particular insistence, Wolff agreed to waive his demand for an Ottoman garrison at Suakin 2 . Real controversy centred on Wolff's proposals for evacuation and a right of re-entry. Kamil and Kurd Said demanded that Britain withdraw in t w o and a half years, not five. They also rejected the suggestion that Britain's evacuation should be conditional upon the Powers' unanimous acceptance of the Convention and upon the implementation of reforms which would require the Powers' assent. Finally, they proposed to reformulate Britain's right of re-entry in a fashion which would recognise the priority of the Sultan's own established rights of military interventon in Bgypt: Britain was to be entitled to send troops to assist an O t t o m a n intervention, and might also intervene independently

if c i r c u m s t a n c e s

prevented the Sultan from acting^. Salisbury was willing to compromise. H e declined to dilute Britain's right of re-entry, but he offered to evacuate in four years if the Khedive were allowed to retain British officers for longer. He also offered to reduce Britain's conditions for evacuation to a single clause stating that a refusal by any Power to adhere to the Convention would constitute an "external danger" to Egypt, and thus entitle Britain to defer her withdrawal 4 . Kamil and Kurd Said indicated that the "external d a n g e r " clause was acceptable, but they warned that evacuation in three years was the maximum they could concede. Influenced by a temporary withdrawal of German support, Salisbury weakened, and on 2 May he agreed to this condition 5 . Scarcely had this point been settled than Abdiilhamid intervened to reject the "external danger" clause. Salisbury forbade Wolff to give way, but Radowitz astutely suggested that the Sultan's concern must be directed at Russia, and that the clause might be rendered acceptable if it were restricted to the case of non-adherence by a Mediterranean Power. Salisbury conceded the point, but preferred to avoid too obvious a reference to France; he therefore proposed that the amended clause should be removed from

' i t w a s agreed that the nominal size o f the Egyptian army s h o u l d be 1 8 , 0 0 0 m e n , but that this should in practice be reduced by 6 , 7 0 0 to take account o f the Egyptian p o l i c e and gendarmerie. Kamil added that the resultant lolal of 1 1 , 3 0 0 need not be made up in full: F O 7 8 / 4 0 5 9 , W o l f f to Salisbury, no. 6 0 , 6 April. 2 ihid„ no. 7 1 , 21 April; no. 7 4 . 2 6 April; no. 7 9 , 1 M a y ; F O 7 8 / 4 0 6 0 , W o l f f to Salisbury, tel. no. 8 1 , 3 0 April; tel. no. 7 3 , 2 6 April; Salisbury to W o l f f , tel. no. 3 4 , 27 A p r i l ; B B A r § , Y E E , K 3 6 / 2 4 7 5 / Z 1 5 0 / X I , Council o! Ministers Report, selh-i R e c e b / 2 4 April; Sultan's instructions, 6 aban/30 April.

F O 7 8 / 4 0 5 9 , W o l f f to Salisbury, no. 7 1 , 2 1 April. 4

F O 7 8 / 4 0 6 0 , W o l f f t o Salisbury, tel. no. 7 3 , 2 6 April; tel. no. 7 9 , 2 8 April; tel. no. 8 1 , 3 0 April; Salisbury to W o l f f , tel no. 3 0 . 2*3 April; tel.. no. 3 1 , 2 4 April; tels. nos. 3 4 and 3 5 , 2 7 April; tel. no. 36, 2 9 April. •'ibid., Salisbury to White, tel. no. 3 7 , 2 M a y ; tel. no. 3 9 , 3 M a y . Details o f the A n g l o - G e r m a n ' H o l m w o o d incident 1 are given in Smith, op. cit., pp. 7 6 - 7 .

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the body of the Convention and recorded in an exchange of notes 1 . Kamil and Kurd Said approved this on 12 May, and, on this basis, final agreement was reached four days later 2 . The terms of the agreement were registered in a Convention comprising seven Articles. T w o Articles confirmed the existing Firmans, while a third proposed the conclusion of an international agreement to safeguard freedom of navigation in the Suez Canal. Article IV e m p o w e r e d Britain to maintain troops in Egypt pending her eventual withdrawal, and to exercise a general inspection of the Egyptian army for two years after that. T h e key provisions f o r evacuation, neutralisation and a right of re-entry were encapsulated in Article V. This specified that Britain would withdraw her forces f r o m Egypt at the end of three years unless the appearance of some internal or external danger should necessitate a temporary postponement. Once withdrawal was complete, the Powers would be invited to sign an Act recognising and guaranteeing the inviolability of Egyptian territory. T h e British and Ottoman g o v e r n m e n t s would each enjoy a right to intervene in E g y p t in the event of a threat of invasion or of internal disorder, or of a refusal by the Khedive to honour his obligations to the Powers or to the Sultan. Britain might intervene alone if the Ottoman government were hindered f r o m acting, though the Sultan would be entitled to send a Commissioner to accompany the British forces. Articles VI and VII stated that the Convention would be communicated to the Powers for their adherence after ratification, and that ratifications would be exchanged within one month of signature. Various annexes dealt with administrative and financial reforms, and an exchange of notes recorded the proviso that a refusal by a Mediterranean P o w e r to adhere to the Convention would constitute an external danger as defined in Article V ; should this proviso be invoked, the British and Ottoman governments would consult afresh as to the means of executing the Convention 3 . Abdiilhamid e x p r e s s e d last-minute reservations. W i t h his eye on M o s l e m opinion, he s u g g e s t e d that the C o n v e n t i o n m i g h t be held to legitimise Britain's occupation of Egypt; he also questioned whether all the Powers would adhere to the Convention. In retrospect, these doubts would acquire some significance, but, at the time, the Porte had n o hesitation in dismissing them. T h e Council of Ministers argued that M o s l e m opinion should be well satisfied with an arrangement which would assure Britain's w i t h d r a w a l f r o m E g y p t : only F r e n c h o b j e c t i o n s could delay this, and Montebello's recent tone suggested strongly that France would adhere to the Convention, as, without a doubt, would Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy.

i r o 78/4060, Wolff to Salisbury, tel. 84, 5 May; tel. 86, 6 May; tels. nos. 89 and 90, 8 May; tel. no. 91, 9 May; tel. no. 93, 11 May; Salisbury to Wolff, tel. no. 46, 8 May; tels. nos. 47 and 48, 9 May; tel. no. 49, 10 May. 2

ibid„ Wolff to Salisbury, tel. no. 96, 12 May; FO 78/4059, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 87, 16 May; BBArf, YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, memorandum by Kàmil Pa§a and Kurd Said Pa§a, 22 Saban/15 May. FO 78/4059, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 92, 24 May, enclosing text of Convention and Annexes.

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A b d i i l h a m i d a c c e p t e d this a d v i c e o n 21 M a y ; f o r m a l s i g n a t u r e of t h e Convention took place the next day 1 .

IV T h e C o n v e n t i o n ' s s i g n i f i c a n c e t r a n s c e n d e d the E g y p t i a n issue: taken together with the parallel decision to abandon Russia in Bulgaria, it o f f e r e d the basis f o r a f u n d a m e n t a l reorientation of the Empire's foreign relations and its entry into a E u r o p e a n alliance. S u c h at least w a s the G r a n d Vizier's h o p e . K a m i ! Pa§a had been q u i c k to grasp the potential i m p l i c a t i o n s of R u s s i a ' s successivc breaches with Austria-Hungary and G e r m a n y , and since early M a r c h he had anticipated a m a j o r shift in the E u r o p e a n b a l a n c e of p o w e r and an opportunity to realise his o w n pet project of an anti-Russian alliance. Initially he had been cautious: he knew nothing of the Mediterranean A g r e e m e n t or of the Triple Alliance, and, despite encouraging hints f r o m Calice and r u m o u r s of u n d e r s t a n d i n g s b e t w e e n Britain, A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and S e r b i a , there w a s n o clear indication as to w h e t h e r and h o w the P o w e r s would regroup. In a report s u b m i t t e d to A b d u l h a m i d on 10 M a r c h K a m i l c o n c e d e d that t h e T h r e e E m p e r o r s ' Alliance might yet be revived, p e r h a p s t h r o u g h an u n d e r s t a n d i n g between Russia and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y f o r mutual c o m p e n s a t i o n in the Balkans. He also conceded that the formation of a n e w anti-Russian grouping of P o w e r s m i g h t involve s o m e partition of O t t o m a n territory. Finally, he a d m i t t e d that there w a s still little likelihood that any P o w e r but Britain would be willing to c o m m i t itself to the d e f e n c e of the Ottoman Empire in A s i a 2 . Preconceptions such as these explain Kamil Pa§a's enthusiastic reaction to the n e w s of the Triple Alliance in late M a r c h . H e a s s u m e d that the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e had replaced the T h r e e E m p e r o r s ' A l l i a n c e , that it w a s d i r e c t e d primarily against Russia, and that it must rest u p o n a close understanding with Britain. F o r these reasons he promptly floated the idea of O t t o m a n entry into the Triple Alliance. In a m e m o r a n d u m submitted to A b d u l h a m i d on 2 8 M a r c h , he declared that the series of crises initiated by the Eastern R u m e l i a n revolt of S e p t e m b e r 1885 had p r o d u c e d c o n s e q u e n c e s m o r e f a v o u r a b l e than could h a v e been foreseen: . . . t h e tripartite alliance w h i c h existed f o r s o m e t i m e b e t w e e n R u s s i a , G e r m a n y and Austria, and which f a v o u r e d and assisted Russia's policy in the Eastern Q u e s t i o n , is at this m o m e n t d i s r u p t e d , and A u s t r i a a n d G e r m a n y have turned their political courses into a path m o r e beneficial

^BBAr§, Misir ìrade, no. 1277, 2 4 !jaban/17 M a y ; YF.E, K 3 6 / 2 4 7 5 / Z 1 5 0 / X I , C o u n c i l of Ministers Report, 2 5 §aban/18 May; Special Council of Ministers Report, 2 9 §aban/22 May. 2

B B A r § , Y E E , K31 / 1 7 3 0 / Z 1 5 8 / 8 6 , memorandum by Kàmil Pa§a, 16 Cemaziiilahir/10 March; H H S t A , PA X V . I l l , Calice lo Kalnoky, no. 16F, 12 March. For Ottoman fears of a R u s s o Austrian rapprochement see ibid., Calice to Kalnoky, no. 17B, 15 March; no. 18E, 19 March.

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to the Ottoman Empire. A s a result, Russia has been left helpless and has been obliged to turn to France, w h o s e constancy cannot be trusted...The importance of the existence of the Imperial Sultanate for the balance of Europe, and the necessity f o r the preservation of its territorial integrity, have been fittingly demonstrated, and a League of Powers has been formed to prevent the occurrence of aggression against the territories of the Empire. This League includes all the Great Powers except France and Russia, and, under this circumstance, the Ottoman E m p i r e e n j o y s a superlative position. In o r d e r to maintain this circumstance and position, and in order to secure its own future, it is essential that the Ottoman Empire draw near the Powers which form this League, with a view to entering the circle of alliance of this League of Powers 1 . Abdtilhamid's immediate response was cautious. He was not convinced that the Three Emperors' Alliance was beyond revival, and he was worried by French suggestions that the Triple Alliance might have pledged Tripolitania to Italy — suggestions which played upon the old suspicion that B i s m a r c k regarded the Ottoman Empire as a suitable object for compensation policies 2 . He also pointed out that Russia could be dangerous even when isolated: A s there is no need to explain, Russia is the Empire's neighbour, and, whenever she wishes, she can send powerful forces and occupy the Empire's Anatolian provinces as far as Mosul and Bagdad. Furthermore, although there exists in Bulgaria a parly which is opposed to Russia, the greater part of the population looks to Russia and f a v o u r her. Similarly, the entire population of Montenegro is committed to her, and even a section of the population of Serbia and Rumania is proRussian. T h e r e f o r e it is essential and important not to o f f e n d Russia and to keep on good terms with her 3 . This was not the Sultan's final word: he permitted Kamil and Kurd Said to sound the Triple Alliance Ambassadors, and towards the middle of April he instructed Kamil Pa§a to prepare a detailed assessment of the benefits and risks of Ottoman adhesion 4 . The Grand Vizier's conceptions were now clearer: he no longer spoke of a "League of Powers", but characterised the Triple Alliance as a pact for mutual defence on the basis of the territorial status quo; he added that there was no formal link with Britain, but that there was reason to believe that Britain would assist the alliance if it were threatened by Russia. Kamil argued that the Empire could serve as the linch-pin of this anti-Russian combination: iRamil Pa§a, Hatiral, pp. 78-80; HHStA, PA XII. 149, Calice to Kalnoky, 29 March. BBAj?, YEE, K9/2629/Z72/4, Sultan's undated memorandum; GFO, Tuerkei 158, memorandum by Berchem, 3 May; Silin, op. cit., p. 103. 3 Kämil Pa§a, Hatirat, pp. 81-2. 4 G F O , Deutschland 128 Nr. 5, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 77, 4 April; HHStA, PA XII. 149, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 21 C, 29 March; no. 25B, 12 April. 2

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A s the Exalted Sultanate occupies the position of axis of the diplomatic relations between the European Powers and Russia, the benefit which the contracting Powers will draw from the Ottoman Empire's adhesion to the said Alliance ... will be most valuable. In the event of war between Germany and France, it is o b v i o u s that Austria will be exposed to attack by Russia, that Germany and Austria will be unable to aid one another, and that with Italy's forces divided into two, her assistance will be of little use ... Equally, England will be unable to pass her fleet into the Black Sea for use against Russia without making an alliance with the O t t o m a n Empire. In such a case, the Triple Alliance could be considered null and void. But if the Ottoman Empire enters this alliance, it is evident ... that there will remain no possibility either of an attack by France upon Germany, or by Russia upon Austria, and the Ottoman Empire's adhesion to the alliance will truly assure the peace and general tranquillity of Europe 1 . The benefits to the Empire would be considerable: Firstly, as the Exalted Sultanate would in truth be capable of assuring the general tranquillity of Europe, its power and reputation would increase, the Imperial territories would be safe f r o m every kind of foreign aggression, and there would be no need to apprehend, as at present, that Russia may provoke some incident: in the first instance, an end could be put to the Bulgarian problem. Secondly, the Empire would not need to maintain an army greater than a force sufficient to preserve internal peace and security; it would be rescued f r o m its financial e m b a r r a s s m e n t s and its credit would i m m e d i a t e l y and substantially increase. Thirdly, England would no longer need to stir up certain national groups among the Sultan's subjects or attempt to find other forces against Russia; in case of necessity, the force upon which she would rely would be the Ottoman Empire as a whole. Fourthly, once it became known that the Exalted Sultanate had drawn four of the Great Powers into its circle of alliance, the Sultan's subjects would be secure against the troubles of war: their affection for their Sovereign and their obedience would increase ... Fifthly, Serbia and R u m a n i a would be proud to join the Sultan's circle of alliance. Sixthly, as long as Russia remains outside the Triple Alliance, her reputation and credit will suffer, and, since she will be unable to support this, she will make attempts to renew her treaty with Germany and Austria and join the alliance; if she succeeds in this, and should the Empire have already joined the alliance, then the Empire will in addition have obtained a d e f e n s i v e alliance with Russia, and once again assured its o w n immunity from aggression 2 .

'Kamil Pa§a, Hatirat, pp. 95-8, ^ibid., he.

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Against this, Kamil Pa§a discerned considerable danger in remaining outside the Triple Alliance. A s long as the Empire lacked allies, it would be at the mercy of any sudden complication in Bulgaria: the Regents might be driven to unilateral measures, or Bulgaria might dissolve into civil war, and in the latter case the Empire might have to intervene to restore order. If Britain and Austria-Hungary went to war with Russia over Bulgaria, the Empire could not avoid involvement, but, if the Bulgarian issue were resolved peacefully, the Three Emperors' Alliance might be restored, and the Empire would then be at Russia's m e r c y in Anatolia. Finally, there was the possibility that the Empire's increasing financial difficulties might tempt its enemies to provoke trouble among the subject populations 1 . Kamil Pa§a was not entirely mistaken in his belief that the Empire could find allies. True, Bismarck had privately ruled out Ottoman entry into the Triple Alliance on the well-worn grounds that Germany must not extend her commitments into the Near East. However, the German Chancellor saw no objection to O t t o m a n participation in the Mediterranean A g r e e m e n t , and towards the middle of April he invited Salisbury and Kalnoky to consider the idea, arguing that it would serve the cause of European peace as well as the d e f e n c e of British and Austro-Hungarian interests against R u s s i a 2 . Both statesmen responded cautiously. Salisbury expressed himself eager to gain the passage of the Straits, but indicated that he would prefer to wait for some convincing indication that the Sultan intended to maintain his independence of R u s s i a 3 . Kalnoky took a similar line, and argued that the Sultan should first be encouraged to improve his relations with Britain, and, in particular, to resolve the Egyptian issue. He also avoided Bismarck's suggestion that Abdiilhamid should be informed of the Mediterranean Agreement's existence 4 . The practical upshot was that when Kamil and Kurd Said approached the Triple Alliance A m b a s s a d o r s on the subject of Ottoman adhesion they received replies which were encouraging but imprecise: though R a d o w i t z avoided c o m m e n t , Calice and B l a n c both hinted at the eventual possibility of understandings, and added that they would regard an Anglo-Ottoman agreement on Egypt as a corollary to the Triple Alliance — a point not lost on Kamil Pa§a, who told Wolff plainly that he expected the Egyptian Convention to lead to broader understandings 5 .

^'tbid., loc. cit. ^Trützschler von Falkenstein, op. cit., pp. 87-9; GFO, Deutschland 128 Nr. 5, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 77. 4 April; Bismarck to Hatzfeldt, no. 319,11 April. 3 GFO, England 92 Nr. 2, Hatzfeldt to Bismarck, no. 141,15 April; no. 148, 21 April; FO 8/4002, Salisbury to White, tel. no. 67, 19 April; FO 78/4003, White to Salisbury, tel. no. 38, 20 April; The Oriental Question, Salisbury to the Queen, 17 April. 4 HHStA, PA XXXI, 40, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 22A-F, 2 April; Kalnoky to Calice, no. 35, 5 April; PA XII. 148, Kalnoky to Calice, 24 April; tel. no. 41, 3 May; GFO, Deutschland 128 Nr. 5, Reuss to Bismarck, no. 188, 16 April; no. 201, 22 April; no. 209,30 April; no. 239, 15 May. 5 HHStA, PA XII. 149, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 25B, 12 April; FO 78/4060, Wolff to Salisbury, tel. no. 56, 13 April; FO 78/4059, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 92, 2 May.

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It is by no means clear that Abdiilhamid was of the same mind: he kept his counsel, and it was not until M a y that he began to show by deeds that he accepted the Grand Vi/icr's assessment of the new balance of power: it is inconceivable that Abdiilhamid would have taken up a position of opposition to Russia in both the Egyptian and the Bulgarian questions had he not been confident that the Triple Alliance had isolated her. This did not necessarily mean that he had been won over to the cause of an anti-Russian alliance, but it did mark a clear break with the policy of balance between Britain and Russia which he had pursued since the autumn of 1886. In default of better evidence it is impossible to be sure what Abdiilhamid intended by this shift: there are no indications that his perceptions of Britain and Russia had changed, however, and the safest explanation is that he believed that, with or without Ottoman participation, the Triple Alliance would insure him against Anglo-Russian conflict, and enable him to assert his independence of Russia without falling into dependence upon Britain. With hindsight, the risks of the Grand Vizier's strategy are obvious. By linking the Egyptian Convention to the question of an alliance, he m a d e it certain that Russia would oppose the Convention vigorously; the Russian government's attitude remains a matter of conjecture, but it is clear that Nelidov himself had been alarmed by the talk of Ottoman adhesion to the Triple Alliance, and that he feared that an Egyptian settlement on Britain's terms might undermine the Sultan's independence 1 . Nor was it certain that France would accept the Convention: M o n t e b e l l o had indeed been kept informed of the progress of the negotiations with Wolff, at least until the final stages, but he had repeatedly warned Kamil Pa§a to be cautious and he had expressed some doubts about the proposal to accord Britain a right of re-entry into Egypt 2 . Above all, Kamil Pa§a had failed to comprehend the nuances of Germany's position: Radowitz had given him no reason to doubt that her breach with Russia was definitive, and, given his complete ignorance of the Mediterranean Agreement, it was natural that he should interpret the friendly hints dropped by Calice and Blanc as evidence that an understanding with the Triple Alliance was in prospect. It is likely that the Sultan shared this error. In view of this, the universal admission that Wolff would have obtained nothing without Radowit/.'s support should have served as a warning 3 .

^Silin, op. cit., pp. 104-7; Werner Zürrer, Die Nahostpolitik Frankreichs 1898, p. 14. W e e k s , op. cit., p. 240ff; Robinson and Gallagher, op. cit., p. 265.

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G F O , Aegypten 3 Nr. 1, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 92, 2 May; no. 110, 23 May.

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V Events rapidly belied Kamil Paga's hopes of the Triple Alliance, and with fatal consequences for the Porte's hopes of a Bulgarian settlement and for its newly-concluded Egyptian Convention. Contrary to the Grand Vizier's assumption, Germany had not finally broken with Russia, and Bismarck's recent Near Eastern policy proved — in retrospect at least — to have been a tactical expedient designed to facilitate the Mediterranean Agreement and to counter the threat of a Franco-Russian alliance. By mid-May the Mediterranean Agreement was secure, and the tension in Germany's relations with Russia and France was diminishing; Bismarck approached Giers with his old proposal for a separate alliance, and on 18 June 1887 Germany and Russia concluded a secret Reinsurance Treaty, to run for three years. This guaranteed Germany against a Franco-Russian alliance: Russia promised to observe benevolent neutrality if Germany were attacked by France. Germany promised to reciprocate in the event of an Austro-Hungarian attack upon Russia, but the real price was a pledge to assist Russia in the Balkans: Germany granted Russia a free hand in Bulgaria, and promised diplomatic support should she eventually seek to control the Straits 1 . Bismarck thereby completed his arrangements for Germany's European security, but left her facing both ways in the Near East: committed contractually to Russia and morally to the Mediterranean Agreement, and supporting Russia in Bulgaria and Britain in Egypt. In the process, he exposed the Ottoman Empire to Russian pressure in both quarters. The shift in Germany's Bulgarian policy anticipated the Reinsurance Treaty by three weeks: when the Porte's Circular of 21 May reached Berlin, it met with the reply that the Sultan should seek a settlement through a direct understanding with Russia 2 . The Porte was badly surprised, and made a vain attempt to remonstrate, but for the time being it was spared an international crisis over Bulgaria 3 . Russia answered the Circular by proposing a variant of her Sole Regent scheme: this envisaged the appointment of a Temporary Regent who should not himself be a candidate for the Bulgarian throne. Britain and Austria-Hungary considered the proposal worth exploring, and there ensued some discussion of possible candidates, the names of Goltz Pa§a and the former Governor-General of Eastern Rumelia, Aleko Pasa. being mentioned. Russia rejected both these candidates; however, she put forward none of her own, and she also asked Germany to assume the responsibility for an eventual

^Details of the Reinsurance Treaty in TrUtzschler von Falkenstein, op. cit., ch. v, passim.; George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European Order. Franco-Russian Relations 1875-1890, pp. 309-21. 2

GFO, Bulgarien 20, memorandum by Berchem, 24 May. ibid.. Said to Tevfik, tel., Constantinople. 31 May; HHStA, PA XV. 112, Calice to Kalnoky. no. 38B, 7 June; no. 39, 11 June. 3

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formal initiative. When Bismarck refused, she drew back, and by late June it was generally assumed that she had abandoned her proposal 1 . In the meantime, however, the Sultan's confidence in Germany and the Triple Alliance had collapsed. Not only had Germany reversed her Bulgarian policy without explanation, but she also appeared to have deliberately chosen to face both ways in the Near East. Her renewed support for Russia in Bulgaria implied no diminution of her support for Britain in Egypt: Radowitz had not ceased to express the fullest approval of the Egyptian Convention, and had even suggested that the Sultan should use it as a precedent to demand a French withdrawal f r o m T u n i s 2 . All this inevitably cast doubt upon Bismarck's ultimate intentions, and encouraged the suspicion that he might be pursuing some form of compensation policy in the Near East, or, at the very least, that he was attempting to safeguard Germany's European security by embroiling Russia with Britain and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, and France with Britain and Italy in North Africa. Against this background of doubt, Russia and France were able to launch a vigorous and ultimately successful campaign to dissuade Abdiilhamid f r o m ratifying the Egyptian Convention. Nelidov had been quick to denounce the Convention as "a challenge to Russia": he argued that the right of re-entry gave Britain a share in the Sultan's sovereign rights, but he made it plain that his deeper objection was to the likelihood that the Convention would lead the O t t o m a n Empire into an anti-Russian alliance. He explicitly linked the Convention to the Porte's Bulgarian Circular, he accused the Grand Vizier of following in the footsteps of Midhat Pa§a, and he warned that a continuation of the Empire's recent course in foreign policy could eventually lead to war 3 . In contrast, Montebello was initially reserved; a cabinet crisis in Paris had left him bereft of instructions, and he made no comment when shown the text of the Convention on 29 May. The Porte remained c o n f i d e n t of French adherence, but Abdiilhamid was less sure: Montcbcllo's silence disturbed him, and Nelidov's talk of "sharing rights" prompted him to express renewed concern for Moslem opinion. On 31 May he suddenly suggested that Article V might be amended to restrict Britain's right of re-entry to circumstances where Egypt faced a threat of external aggression. Kamil and Kurd Said attempted to dissuade him, but, much to their embarrassment, Montebello stated that day

1 Grosse Politik, v, no. 1038. Hatzfeld! to Foreign O f f i c e , tel„ 24 M a y ; no. 1042, Reuss to Bismarck, 17 June; G F O , Bulgarien 20, R a d o w i t z to Bismarck, no. 123, 10 June; R e u s s to Bismarck, no. 295, 26 June; Schweinitz to Bismarck, no. 249, 2 4 June; H H S t A , PA XV. 112, Calice to Kalnoky, tel. no. 61, no. 40G and no. 40J, 14 June. 2

G F O , Aegypten 3 Nr. 1, Bismarck to Radowitz, no. 111, 29 May; Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 114, 30 May; Tunis 2, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 116, 3 June; Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel. no. 7 3 , 7 June; Kämil Pa§a, Hatirat, pp. 23-4. 3 B a y u r , op. cit., pp. 120-1; FO 78/4059, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 98, 28 May.

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that he personally doubted that France would accept the right of re-entry 1 . Wolff dismissed this as a reflection of Nelidov's personal influence over Montebello; the two Ottoman Ministers agreed, and reminded Abdiilhamid that the Convention specified that objections by other Powers would be dealt with after ratification, and not before 2 . On 2 J u n e M o n t e b e l l o officially protested against Article V. T h e French government had concluded that the Convention's pledge of British evacuation w a s rendered "illusory" by the right of re-entry and by the provision for postponement in the event of internal or external danger. T h e Foreign Minister, Flourens, told the Ottoman Ambassador, Esad Pa§a, that the Convention entailed a transfer of the Sultan's sovereign rights to Britain, and thereby violated the international treaties which guaranteed Egypt's autonomy and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire; he emphasized that it was up to the Porte to find a solution, and he instructed Montebello to prevent the Sultan from ratifying the Convention 3 . Abdiilhamid noted that his doubts had proved correct, and instructed the Porte to get the Convention amended 4 . Salisbury d e t e r m i n e d to resist. For Britain, as f o r R u s s i a , the fundamental issue was not Egypt, but "influence" and the Straits, and the principal struggle was not Anglo-French, but Anglo-Russian. White noted that "it must be borne in mind that it is not this Convention alone, but our future relations with Turkey and our own influence in the East that are at stake", and Salisbury agreed: "if we fail the Sultan will be little removed f r o m a vassal of R u s s i a " 5 . W o l f f r e f u s e d all Kamil Pa§a's s u g g e s t i o n s f o r a m e n d m e n t s , even cosmetic ones, and on 13 June he a n n o u n c e d Britain's ratification of the Convention 6 . Italy and Austria-Hungary offered Britain full support, but Germany was more cautious: Bismarck was reluctant to offend Russia, and he instructed Radowitz to exert no special pressure for ratification. This caused some dismay in London, but appears to have passed unnoticed by the Ottoman government. When pressed, Radowitz assured the Porte that Germany continued to support the Convention, and neither the Sultan nor his

Livre Jaune: Affaires d'Egypte, 1884-1893, no. 61, Montebello to Flourens, 29 May; no. 64, Montebello to Flourens, 31 May; BBAr§, Misir trade, no. 1278, 8 Ramazan/31 May; YFE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, memorandum by Kamil Pa§a and Said Pa§a, 8 Ramazan/31 May; Weeks, op. cit., pp. 251-2. 2 F O 78/4060, Wolff to Salisbury, tel. no. 124, 1 June; BBAr§, YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, memorandum by KSmil Pa§a and Said Pa§a, 9 Ramazan/1 June. ^Livre Jaune, no. 63, Flourens to Montebello, 30 May; no. 65, 31 May; no. 67, 3 June; no. 69, 7 June; BBAr§, YEE, K36/3475/Z150/XI, irade, 24 Ramazan/16 June; Weeks, op. cit., p. 254; Ziirrer, op. cit., pp. 14-5. 4 BBAr§!, Misir Irade, no. 1280, 10 Ramazan/2 June; no. 1281, 13 Ramazan/5 June; nos. 1282 and 1283, 14 Ramazan/6 June. 5 F O 78/4003, White to Salisbury, tel. no. 50,3 June; Salisbury to White, tel. no. 87, 21 June. 6 F O 78/4059, Wolff to Salisbury, no. 101, 3 June; FO 78/4060, Wolff to Salisbury, tel. no. 131, 6 June; tel. no. 136, 13 June; Livre Jaune, no. 68, Montebello to Flourens, 7 June.

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Ministers expressed any doubts on this score. What continued to worry Abdiilhamid was Germany's motives'. The French and Russian E m b a s s i e s concentrated their pressure at Yildiz. At an audience on 11 June, Montebello warned Abdiilhamid that ratification of the Convention would place the Ottoman Empire in "a danger greater than any in which it has ever found itself": by transferring a portion of his sovereign rights to Britain, the Sultan would upset the Mediterranean balance of power and oblige France to take measures to protect her own interest. He hinted that this could entail some seizure of Ottoman territory, and that Italy and other Powers might draw similar conclusions. H e also made an appeal to the Sultan's Islamic sensibilities, arguing that the right of re-entry would offend Moslem opinion and damage the prestige of the Caliphate 2 . Nelidov's language was more extreme. He repeatedly emphasized that Russia regarded the signature of the Convention as a hostile act, and a sign that the Sultan had capitulated to Kamil Pa§a's pressure for a British alliance. He warned that ratification would overturn the balance of Great Power interests throughout the Near East, and absolve Russia from all her obligations towards the O t t o m a n E m p i r e , including her obligation to respect its territorial integrity; he added that a continuation of the Empire's recent course in foreign policy would eventually oblige Russia to sever diplomatic relations and declare war 3 . Abdiilhamid took these threats seriously: The Egyptian Convention will cause the other Powers to make various demands and proposals on the pretext of preserving a balance. This aside, France and Russia definitively state that they will neither accept nor adhere to the Convention, and clearly explain that they will be j u s t i f i e d in a b a n d o n i n g the g u a r a n t e e of the O t t o m a n E m p i r e ' s territorial integrity, and in acting to protect their own interests. Therefore ratification by the Empire will mean challenging these two Powers. Further, while it is clear that such a bad impression would not have been produced had France and Russia accepted and adhered to the Convention, there is no need to explain how damaging an impression Ottoman ratification will produce upon the Islamic world and upon public opinion when it is violently criticised by these t w o Powers 4 .

'GFO, Aegypten 3 Nr. 1, Bismarck to Radowitz, no. 115, 3 June; Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 122, 10 June. Documents Diplomatiques Fiançais, vi, no. 546, Montebello to Flourens, 11 June. The Sultan's entourage at Yildiz played an active part in the struggle over the Convention. Montebello was aided by Dreyssé Paça, and bribed Artin Efendi, hitherto in British pay. Nelidov worked through Yusuf Rrza Pa§a, while the British received some help from the Second Palace Chamberlain, Ragib Bey, See FO 78/3998, White to Salisbury, no. 216, 27 June; no. 219, 28 June; FO 364/2, Marinitsch to White, 4 June; Weeks, op. cit., p. 258. ^Bayur, op. cit., pp. 120-1, 136 9. 2

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BBArç, Y EE, K36/2475/Z150 XI, Sultan's instructions, 24 Ramazan/16 June.

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T h e Sultan's Ministers r e s p o n d e d with a vigorous d e f e n c e of the Convention. T h e y noted that G e r m a n y , A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y and Italy were unanimous that the Convention did not infringe O t t o m a n rights, and they argued that it was inconceivable that ratification could expose the Empire to the threat of war or to demands for territorial compensation. They also noted that the re-entry clause had been designed to meet Britain's not unreasonable f e a r that her withdrawal f r o m E g y p t might open the way to a French occupation. They dismissed the Franco-Russian talk of rights and balances as bogus: France's real complaint was that the Convention would deny her the possibility of occupying Egypt herself, or of proposing a joint Anglo-French occupation, while Russia's evident purpose was to keep the Egyptian issue open as a perpetual source of discord between Britain, France and the Ottoman Empire 1 . Even so, Kamil Pa§a sensed that Abdiilhamid must be offered some concession, and he suggested to Wolff that Britain might at least agree to a supplementary note or declaration stating that a refusal by any Mediterranean Power to adhere to the Convention should not oblige the Empire to accept any burden or sacrifice, nor entitle Britain to render her occupation permanent. Salisbury authorised Wolff to explore this proposal, and, following a further approach f r o m the Porte, he offered to extend the deadline for ratification f r o m 22 to 27 June 2 .

Montebello and Nelidov were a step ahead. On 19 June Montebello sent Abdiilhamid a note which stated that France would guarantee the Ottoman Empire against any consequences which might flow f r o m its refusal to ratify the C o n v e n t i o n 3 . Nelidov gave a similar assurance on Russia's behalf, and took the opportunity to threaten that in the event of ratifiation Russia would occupy the Straits and invade A n a t o l i a 4 . These two interventions nearly precipitated Abdiilhamid into a decision: he informed his Ministers that the issue was peace or war, that the time for the consideration of amendments was passed, and that the Empire must m a k e up its mind whether or not to ratify the Convention as it stood. He left little doubt as to his own inclination: If, as has been said, France takes steps to protect her interests which are damaged by the nullification of the Mediterranean balance, then she must seize Syria. Italy will then seize Tripoli, and Russia will occupy the Straits and attack from the direction of Anatolia, and the result of these eventualities will be either a major war or — God forbid! — the partition of the Ottoman Empire ...

hbid., memorandum by Kâmil Pa$a and Said Pa§a, 24 Ramazan/16 June; Special Committee's Report, 28 Ramazan/20 June. 2

F O 78/4060, Wolff to Salisbury, tel. no. 139, 15 June; tel. no. 142, 19 June; Salisbury to Wolff tel. no. 83, 17 June; tel. no. 8 5 , 1 9 June. 3

BBAr§, YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, note from Montebello, 19 June. ^ibid., Sultan's instructions, 29 Ramazan/20 June.

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He also declined to trust Austro-Hungarian or German advice: cooperation between Austria-Hungary and Britain had led to the loss of Cyprus and of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and if Germany advised agreement with Britain in Egypt, she advised agreement w ith Russia in Bulgaria, and this "confirms that the said P o w e r does not have a definite policy in Eastern matters" 1 . T h e Sultan's Ministers beat a tactical retreat. They conceded that the latest French and Russian statements placed the issue in a fresh light, but they pointed out that Salisbury's offer to extend the deadline for ratification to 27 June would give the E m p i r e an opportunity to consult the P o w e r s b e f o r e taking a final decision. Abdiilhamid hesitated until 25 June before agreeing that the Powers should be consulted; in the meantime Salisbury granted a further and final extension to 3 July 2 . T h e r e ensued a lull. Nelidov and M o n t e b e l l o m a d e n o f u r t h e r interventions at Yildiz; in the meantime the Porte strove to rally international support. Salisbury declined Kamil Pa§a's request that Britain should o f f e r guarantees to match those proffered by Russia and France, but he noted that neither France nor Russia had protested to the British government, and he argued that this was evidence that Nelidov and Montebello had exceeded their i n s t r u c t i o n s 3 . Bismarck echoed this opinion, and instructed R a d o w i t z to assume a more active role in support of ratification 4 . Italy went further. On 24 J u n e Blanc revealed to Kamil Pa§a the existence of the M e d i t e r r a n e a n Agreement between Britain, Italy and Austria-Hungary; he apparently gave few details, but he suggested that ratification of the Convention could lead to parallel arrangements between Britain, Italy and the Ottoman Empire, and he drew an analogy with a recent understanding between Britain, Italy and Spain for the defence of the status quo in Morocco 5 . Kamil Pa§a hastened to lay this information before the Sultan; nonetheless, he warned Blanc that Abdiilhamid was likely to insist upon German and Austro-Hungarian participation in any arrangement, for he required an assurance that Bismarck would not pursue a compensation policy 6 .

hbid., loc. cit. 2

ibid., Council of Ministers Report, 2 9 Ramazan/20 June; Sultan's instructions, 4 §evval/25 June; FO 78/4060, Salisbury to Wolff, tel. no. 94, 26 June. T h e Sultan also toyed with the idea of calling an international conference: see BBAr§, YEF,, K l 1/1760/Z150/5, instructions to Grand Vizier, 8 §evval/29 June. 3 G F O , A e g y p t e n 3 Nr. 1, k a d o w i t z to Bismarck, no. 136, 1 July; F O 7 8 / 4 0 6 0 , W o l f f to Salisbury, tel. no. 147, 23 June; Salisbury to Wolff, tel. no. 82, 17 June; tel. no. 89, 24 June; tel. no. 92, 25 June; Bayur, op. fit. pp. 139-40. 4 G F O , Aegypten 3 Nr. 1, Herbert Bismarck to Radowitz, tel. no. 37, 14 June; tel. no. 38, 21 June; tel. no. 40, 25 June; Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 129, 20 June; no. 133, 27 June; Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel. no. 81, 20 June; tel. no. 82, 24 June. 5 6

B B A r § , YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI. memorandum by Kamil Pa?a, 4 §evval/25 June.

G F O , Aegypten 3 Nr. 1, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 136, 1 July, HHStA, PA. XXXI. 40, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 44, 25 June; n >. 4 5 F . 28 June.

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237

Even so, Kämil Pa§a began to express renewed optimism, and on 28 June he settled with Wolff on the terms of a supplementär}' declaration stating that a future British re-entry into Rgypt would merely constitute an assistance to the Ottoman government, and that while a Mediterranean Power's refusal to adhere to the Convention might delay Britain's evacuation it would not entitle Britain to claim concessions prejudicial to the Sultan's rights and the Ottoman Empire's territorial integrity 1 . On the following day the Council of Ministers submitted its definitive report in favour of ratification. It noted that Britain, Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy were unanimous that the threats issued by Montebello and Nelidov were unauthorised bluff, and it warned that if the C o n v e n t i o n were not ratified Egypt w o u l d end by b e c o m i n g a British protectorate or colony 2 . Abdiilhamid w a s not convinced. He no longer spoke of the threat of war, but he continued to emphasize the political risks of ratification. H e argued that the E m p i r e ' s latest difficulties in both the Egyptian and the Bulgarian questions had arisen because certain Powers believed that it had abandoned "the path of moderation" which it had pursued since September 1885; having toyed with ideas of German mediation or a European conference, he decided on 30 June to seek an indefinite postponement of ratification in order to give time for the preparation of amendments which would render the C o n v e n t i o n a c c e p t a b l e to all the P o w e r s . H e r e f u s e d to b e l i e v e that Montebello and Nelidov had exceeded their instructions, and he drew his Ministers' attention to a report f r o m Ahmed Muhtar Pa§a which was critical of several aspects of the Convention, and particularly of Article V 3 . T h e Porte responded with a detailed refutation of Muhtar Pa§a's criticisms, and warned that further postponement was out of the question 4 . In private, it recognised that it was beaten. T h e final British deadline expired on 3 July, but Wolff indicated that he would remain in Istanbul f o r a few more days at his own discretion, and accept ratification at any m o m e n t up to his departure 5 . Kämil Pa§a warned Radowitz that threats alone could move the Sultan, but Salisbury refused to hear of a naval demonstration. T h e Triple Alliance Ambassadors s o u g h t to t e m p t A b d i i l h a m i d with the p r o s p e c t of a d h e s i o n to the Mediterranean Agreement. Blanc gave Kämil Paga a memorandum outlining a proposal for an understanding between Britain, Italy and the Ottoman E m p i r e to m a i n t a i n t h e s t a t u s q u o in the M e d i t e r r a n e a n , a n d R a d o w i t z i n f o r m e d t h e S u l t a n t h a t t h e p r o p o s a l had G e r m a n y ' s support. Abdiilhamid responded sceptically: he told Radowitz that

J F O 78/4060, Salisbury to Wolff, tel. no. 88, 22 June; Wolff to Salisbury, tel. no. 146, 21 June; tel. no. 1 4 9 , 2 4 June; tel. no. 153, 28 June. 2

B B A r § , YRE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Council of Ministers Report, 8 §evval/29 June.

3

1bid., Sultan's instructions, 9 §evval/30 June; U?arol, Bir Osmanli Pagasi, pp. 203-4.

4

B B A r s , YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Special Council of Ministers Report, 11 §evval/l July.

-*FO 78/4060, Wolff to Salisbury, tel. no. 1 5 6 , 4 July; tel. no. 157, 5 July; tel. no. 1 6 4 , 9 J u l y .

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an a r r a n g e m e n t with Britain and Italy w o u l d be valueless w i t h o u t A u s t r o Hungarian participation, and, at the very least, G e r m a n y ' s moral support 1 . T h e Sultan was resolved that the E m p i r e must "persist and persevere in the course of neutrality and m o d e r a t i o n which its c i r c u m s t a n c e s and position dictate", and on 10 July he instructed Artin Efendi to redraft the C o n v e n t i o n in a f o r m w h i c h w o u l d s a t i s f y F r a n c e and R u s s i a . H e a s k e d S a l i s b u r y t o a u t h o r i s e W o l f f to n e g o t i a t e a f r e s h , a n d he r e p e a t e d l y p o s t p o n e d W o l f f ' s customary farewell audience in the hope that this would prevent his departure 2 . A r t i n ' s d r a f t w a s s h o w n to M o n t e b e l l o and Nelidov on 14 July: it d e n i e d Britain any right of re-entry, but otherwise d i f f e r e d little f r o m the o r i g i n a l 3 . On 15 July Flourens p r o n o u n c e d it acceptable; his approval c a m e too late, f o r W o l f f left Istanbul that evening. A b d i i l h a m i d i m m e d i a t e l y protested at this "wilful rupture", and asked that W h i t e should be e m p o w e r e d to c o n t i n u e the negotiations. Salisbury refused: he did not e x c l u d e an eventual r e s u m p t i o n of talks, but he warned that "we must remain in Rgypt till w e were satisfied that it w a s strong enough to av ert the internal and external dangers f r o m w h i c h w e had sought f o r authority under the C o n v e n t i o n to guard it. W e had d o n e o u r best to shorten our stay there: the responsibility for its prolongation m u s t rest with the Sultan" 4 . Why had Abdiilhamid rejected the C o n v e n t i o n ? T h e British a s s u m e d that he had p a n i c k e d in the f a c e of F r e n c h a n d R u s s i a n threats; they a l s o b l a m e d G e r m a n y f o r being less than w h o l e - h e a r t e d in her s u p p o r t f o r the Convention. Abdiilhamid's own statements and actions suggest another explanation. In signing the C o n v e n t i o n , he had gambled that F r a n c e w o u l d not object, and that the t r i p l e Alliance would protect him against the c o n s e q u e n c e s of Russian opposition. H e proved w r o n g on both counts, and the o f f e r of an alternative guarantee t h r o u g h association with the M e d i t e r r a n e a n A g r e e m e n t failed to convince: in the first place, it a m o u n t e d to a d e m a n d that the Sultan should c o m m i t himself to a q u a s i - a l l i a n c e with Britain a g a i n s t R u s s i a , and, in the second place, it highlighted the uncertainty of G e r m a n y ' s p o l i c y a n d t h e risk that t h e O t t o m a n E m p i r e w o u l d f a l l v i c t i m t o a compensation arrangement devised in Berlin. In the final analysis, Abdiilhamid a b a n d o n e d the Convention because he belatedly saw that he had m i s j u d g e d the European balance of p o w e r ; to this extent, the C o n v e n t i o n m a y truly be said to have been destroyed by the Reinsurance Treaty 5 .

' G F O , Aegypten 3 Nr. 1, Radowitz to Foreign Office, tel. no. 94, 12 July; tel. no. 95, 16 July; England 92 Nr. 2, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 143, 15 July; FO 78/4059, Wolff to Salisbury no. 109, 11 July; FO 78/4003, While to Salisbury, tel. no. 5 6 , 1 1 July. 2 B B A r § , Y E E , K 3 6 / 2 4 7 5 / Z I 5 0 / X I . Sultan's instructions, 21 § e v v a l / l l July; m e m o r a n d u m by Kàmil Pa§a, 20 §evval/10 J u h ; memorandum and draft convention, n. d.; Misir irade, nos. 1299 and 1300, 24 §evval/15 July. ' 3 Livre Jaune, no. 73, Montebello to Flourens, 14 July. 4

ibid„ no. 74, Flourens to Montebello, 15 July; BBAr§, Y E E , K39/2237/Z121/121, m e m o r a n d u m by Artin Efendi and Re§id Bev. 4/16 July; FO 78/4002, Salisbury to White, tel. no. 97, 17 July; tel. no. 100,21 July. 5 C a l i c e at least saw Ihis clearl;. : HHStA, PA XXXI, 40, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 52A-G, 19 July.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN: FERDINAND OF BULGARIA (July 1887-March 1888)

I The failure of the Egyptian Convention spelled the end of Salisbury's hopes of achieving British predominance in the Near East through the passage of the Straits. The Sultan had shown himself incapable of resisting Russian pressure, or so it appeared, and in the immediate future it seemed possible that the Ottoman Empire would go over to Russia entirely. In addition, Bismarck's recent conduct had been dubious enough to destroy the hope of a permanent Anglo-German accommodation; Salisbury knew nothing of the Reinsurance Treaty, but he guessed that Bismarck must have made some commitment to Russia. The problem was to know what to do. One possibility was a direct settlement with Russia and France. Towards the middle of July 1887 Britain and Russia finally settled their differences over the Afghan border, and Giers intimated that he would welcome a further understanding over Bulgaria. France, too, seemed disposed to settle: she had hoped all along that Britain would agree to amend the Egyptian Convention, and immediately following its collapse she dropped a broad hint at her readiness for talks. The alternative was to fall back on a defensive strategy, and to accept Italy's suggestion that the Mediterranean Agreement should be extended and strengthened in a fashion which would encourage the Sultan to resist Russian demands in the future. Bismarck encouraged this idea, and Kalnoky soon accepted it, but Salisbury was cautious: he had never considered the Ottoman Empire worth defending for its own sake, and he would not allow Bismarck to manoeuvre him into a Near Eastern conflict with Russia. For the moment, he preferred to keep his options open 1 . Russia's attitude is less easy to fathom, given the paucity of evidence, but the likelihood is that it was not dissimilar. By destroying the Egyptian Convention, she had removed one potential basis for a military alliance between the Ottoman Empire and her enemies, but she could not be certain

^Smith, op. cit., pp. 80-7; Cecil, op. cit., pp. 49-51; Lowe, op. cit., pp. 19-21; Greaves, op. cit., p.

110.

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that o t h e r s would not arise. K a m i l Pa§a r e m a i n e d as G r a n d V i z i e r , and c o n t i n u e d to e n j o y the Sultan's f a v o u r : c o n t r a r y to initial a s s u m p t i o n s , t h e failure of the Egyptian C o n v e n t i o n had not a f f e c t e d his s t a n d i n g 1 . N o r w e r e Russia's a p p r e h e n s i o n s concerned exclusively with Britain. T h e intentions of the Triple Alliance continued to cause concern: Goltz Papa's p a s s a g e t h r o u g h V i e n n a in J u n e p r o v o k e d r u m o u r s of m i l i t a r y c o n v e r s a t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary, and Nelidov reported talk of an AustroO t t o m a n alliance which would furnish the Sultan with B o s n i a - H e r c e g o v i n a , a substantial loan and a guarantee of his Balkan frontiers, and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y with the passage of the Straits, a concession f o r a B a g d a d railway, and a pledge of O t t o m a n military support in the event of w a r with Russia. G e r m a n y w a s a l l e g e d to be a c t i n g as i n t e r m e d i a r y b e t w e e n V i e n n a a n d I s t a n b u l : n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the R e i n s u r a n c e T r e a t y , R u s s i a could not be c o n f i d e n t of Bismarck's ultimate intentions 2 . A b d i i l h a m i d w a s e q u a l l y u n s u r e of his p o s i t i o n . B y c o m m i t t i n g himself to an explicit policy of neutrality, he had a c k n o w l e d g e d the existence of t w o blocs of P o w e r s , but he trusted the intentions and durability of neither. T h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n A g r e e m e n t did not r e a s s u r e him. A n alliance b e t w e e n Britain, Italy and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y inevitably raised the spectre of partition, and by early A u g u s t r u m o u r s of an A n g l o - I t a l i a n u n d e r s t a n d i n g o v e r S u a k i n were giving this spectre some substance: On the o n e hand a d v a n t a g e s a r e a t t r i b u t e d to t h e c o n c l u s i o n of an alliance by the E m p i r e with E n g l a n d and Italy, w h i l e on t h e o t h e r , E n g l a n d takes steps to place S u a k i n u n d e r Italian control ... In t h e s a m e way it is by n o m e a n s i m p r o b a b l e that at s o m e stage [ E n g l a n d J will take steps to place Salonika under the control of Austria 3 . T h e s e suspicious reflected a deeper d o u b t about British policy: In f o r m e r times E n g l a n d w a s not s t i n t i n g in e v i d e n c e of g o o d w i l l t o w a r d s the O t t o m a n Empire, and in t h e C r i m e a n W a r she and F r a n c e gave material assistance ... B u t since the Franco-Prussian W a r her old ally F r a n c e has had to protect herself a g a i n s t G e r m a n y and is in n o position to assist others, with the result that England has been obliged to c h a n g e her policy: during the last w a r she gave the O t t o m a n E m p i r e n o assistance, while at the Berlin C o n g r e s s ... she e n c o u r a g e d the decision to truncate parts of the E m p i r e and then placed C y p r u s u n d e r her temporary administration. Later she o c c u p i e d Egypt. F o r s o m e t i m e she has allied herself with Italy and sought to draw various small states into her circle of alliance by satisfying | t h e i r appetites]4.

' F O 78/3999, White to Salisbury, no. 237, 17 July. Silin, op. cit., pp. 107-8. 3 BBAr§, Misir irade. no. 1303. 6 Zilkade/27 July. 4 BBAr§, Bulgaristan Irade, no 739, 8 Zilhicce/27 August. 2

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E q u a l l y important, however, the Sultan could not be c o n f i d e n t o f the Mediterranean Agreement's durability. Germany's recent conduct was sufficient to cast doubt upon the stability o f all European a l i g n m e n t s , and neither the E g y p t i a n nor the B u l g a r i a n issue c o u l d be counted upon to preserve the e x i s t i n g b a l a n c e o f p o w e r . F r a n c e ' s overtures to B r i t a i n had n o t

gone

unnoticed, and nor had the A n g l o - R u s s i a n agreement on A f g h a n i s t a n ; while G e r m a n y ' s tilt towards R u s s i a and the recent r e l a x a t i o n o f G r e a t P o w e r tensions over Bulgaria suggested that the T h r e e Emperors' A l l i a n c e might yet b e revived. Russia's partisans at Y i l d i z were reported to be making much o f these points, and in early August Y u s u f R i z a Pa§a h i m s e l f sought out C a l i c e and B l a n c , and bluntly told them that "the present alleged alliances . . . carry within themselves evident elements o f disintegration". He foresaw an A n g l o F r e n c h s e t t l e m e n t in E g y p t , to w h i c h Italy would d o u b t l e s s a d h e r e ; he questioned the compatibility o f Italian and Austro-Hungarian interests in the B a l k a n s ; and he pointed to Germany's renewed support f o r Russia in Bulgarian affairs: T u r k e y , who was abandoned by all in the last war, and n o w sees even E n g l a n d detaching herself f r o m the B a l k a n question, must naturally c o m e to an understanding with R u s s i a in a c c o r d a n c e with G e r m a n y ' s p r o p o s a l s , if she d o e s not wish to be the plaything o f all p o s s i b l e accidents and dangers 1 .

n All these uncertainties were swiftly put to the test o f a fresh Bulgarian crisis. B y J u n e 1 8 8 7 the R e g e n t s had lost patience: f a c e d with the P o w e r s ' continuing inability to propose a solution, they resolved to take matters into their o w n hands, and to install a n e w P r i n c e on t h e B u l g a r i a n

throne

unilaterally. T h e y had found a candidate in Prince Ferdinand o f S a x e - C o b u r g , an A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n s u b j e c t . T h e y were a l s o c o n f i d e n t that the O t t o m a n g o v e r n m e n t would not oppose t h e m : K a m i l Pa§a had already suggested to V o l k o v i c h that a unilateral election might be the best way forward, and the R e g e n t s m a d e little e f f o r t to c o n c e a l their plans f r o m R i z a B e y 2 .

Their

c o n f i d e n c e was not m i s p l a c e d . T h e Ottoman C o u n c i l o f M i n i s t e r s advised Abdiilhamid to let events take their course, and to leave the c o n s e q u e n c e s to the P o w e r s ; it judged it safe to demobilise the precautionary f o r c e in southern M a c e d o n i a . Abdiilhamid was more cautious, and f o r e s a w a risk o f Russian opposition and renewed Great P o w e r conflict; but even he c o n c e d e d that a

h Documenti diplomatici italiani, 2a serie, xxi, no. 42, Blanc to Crispi, 13 August; HHStA, PA. XII. 149, Calice to Kalnoky, 16 August. 9 Konigslow, op. cit., pp. 47-52; Bozidar Samardiiev, 'Ottoman Policy with Regard to Ferdinand's Election to the Throne of the Bulgarian Principality', Bulgarian Historical Quarterly, 2, (1978). pp. 5-6; BBAr ? , YEE, K36/2328 (5)/Zl 46/XV, tels. from Riza Bey, 10,20 and 22 June.

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prolongation of the existing stalemate could be j u s t as dangerous, and might drive the Bulgarian to restore Prince Alexander "as a Bonaparte", and launch a war for the conquest of Macedonia. He declined to demobilise, but took no further action beyond addressing private appeals to the Regents to reconsider or at least delay 1 . On 6 July the reconvened Grand National A s s e m b l y unanimouslyelected Prince Ferdinand to the Bulgarian throne. For the time being, however, a fresh international crisis was avoided. The Powers reserved their positions, and Prince Ferdinand remained in Austria: the Treaty of Berlin forbade him to enter Bulgaria until his election had been ratified by the Powers, and he was anxious to explore any possibility of gaining Russia's a p p r o v a l 2 . In the m e a n t i m e the R e g e n t s decided to dismiss k n o w n s u p p o r t e r s of Prince A l e x a n d e r f r o m the Bulgarian g o v e r n m e n t ; much r e a s s u r e d by this, Abdiilhamid agreed to d e m o b i l i s e the precautionary f o r c e in southern Macedonia, and on 14 July the Porte formally invited the Powers to express their opinion of Prince Ferdinand's election. Their replies were divided, but less sharply than Abdiilhamid had feared. Russia and France dismissed the election as the worthless act of an illegal assembly, and Germany referred the Sultan to Russia, though without expressing an opinion of her own; against this, however, Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy were careful to avoid any endorsement of Prince Ferdinand himself, though they added that they regarded his election as legal in f o r m 3 . T h e only immediate cause for alarm w a s Nelidov's warning that Russia would resist "by every m e a n s " if Prince Ferdinand attempted to install himself in Bulgaria without the Powers' consent. Abdiilhamid took this as a threat of military intervention, and expressed concern for Huropean peace 4 . He advised Prince Ferdinand to stay away, and instructed Kamil Pa§a to explore a solution with Nelidov 5 . Nelidov quickly let it be k n o w n that R u s s i a w o u l d reject any arrangement involving Prince Ferdinand; instead, he indicated that she would stand by her earlier proposal to send a Temporary Regent to Sofia, and on 3 August he informed the Sultan that the Tsar was ready to nominate a candidate for this role. Abdiilhamid expressed cautious interest, and suggested that an Ottoman Grand Commissioner might be sent to Sofia to prepare the way; however, he warned that he must first know the n a m e of the T e m p o r a r y Regent, w h o must be a person acceptable to all the Powers and to the

>BBAr§, YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, bade, 9 §evval/30 June; K36/2328(5)/Z146/XV, tel. from Riza Bey, 24 June; tel. to Ri/a Bey, 25 June; Samardiiev, 'Ottoman Policy with Regard to Ferdinand's Election', p. 6. ^Konigslow, op. cit., pp. 55-59 3 BBAr§, Bulgaristan Irade, no. 709, 3 Zilkade/24 July, inclosing report of Special Council of Ministers, 22 §evval/13 July. 4 GFO, Bulgarien 20, Kiderlen to Bismarck, no. 150,22 July; FO 78/3995, Salisbury to White, no. 169A, 16 July; Konigslow, op. rit., p. 57. 5 BBAr§. Bulgaristan irade. no. 708, 22 §evval/13 July; no. 710, 5 Zilkade/26 July; YEE, K36/2328(5)/Z146/XV, tel. to Riza Bey, 15/27 July.

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Bulgarians 1 . Nelidov departed on his annual leave, but promised the Sultan an early reply; none was forthcoming, however, and Russia's intentions were consequently left in doubt 2 . Of more immediate concern were the growing signs that Princc Ferdinand would shortly make an attempt to enter Bulgaria illegally. Valkovich admitted that this was the Regency's hope, and on 5 August the new Prime Minister, Stoilov, told Riza Bey that the Prince was due "next week": he added that Prince Ferdinand was receiving sccrct encouragement from Bismarck 3 . Abdtilhamid was not disposed to dismiss this claim. He appealed to Bismarck and Kalnoky to restrain the Prince, and instructed Rtza Bey to suggest to Stoilov that an alternative might yet be found: Bulgaria might become a republic under Ottoman suzerainty, and thus be spared the expense and the international complications of a monarchy. All these approaches failed. Bismarck expressed "total indifference"; Kalnoky deplored any act of illegality, but declained to restrain Prince Ferdinand by force, and added that it was in the Sultan's own interest to put an early end to the state of uncertainty in Bulgaria. Stoilov greeted Abdiilhamid's conversion to republicanism sceptically, and noted that he had already refused the not dissimilar notion of a Dual Monarchy 4 . With a serious crisis now likely, the Sultan turned to his Ministers, and instructed them to formulate a policy which would reconcile four objectives: there must be no war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, the Bulgarians must not attack the Ottoman Empire, Bulgaria must remain under Ottoman suzerainty, and the existing Bulgarian regime must not be overthrown by one which would declare independence. Practically, these four objectives resolved themselves into one: Russia must be prevented from occupying Bulgaria. The real issue was whether the other Powers were willing to deter her; the Sultan's Ministers were confident that they were, and predicted that a majority of the Powers would support Prince Ferdinand. They advised the Sultan to remain passive, and to make no further attempt to impede the Prince's entry into Bulgaria: once the Prince arrived in Bulgaria he should be informed that his presence was illegal, and Riza Bey should be withdrawn as a mark of non-recognition, but the Empire should maintain relations with the Bulgarian government, and should leave it to the Powers to find a solution. Abdiilhamid approved these recommendations on 8 August, but reiterated

^BBAr?, Bulgaristan Irade, no. 716, 13 Zilkade/3 August; GFO, Bulgarien 20, Kiderlen to Bismarck, no. 154, 26 July; no. 159,29 July. 2 BBAr. Bulgaristan Iradc, no. 719, 17 Zilkade/7 August. 3 ibid., no. 712, 12 Zilkàde/2 August; no. 713, 14 Zilkade/4 August; YEE, K36/2328(5) / Z146/XV, tel. from Riza Bey, 6 August. ^BBAr§, Bulgaristan trade, nos. 714, 715, 15 Zilkàde/5 August; no. 720, inclosing tels. from Tevfik Bey, Berlin, 6 and 7 August, and from Sadullah Pa§a, Vienna, 6 August; YEE, K36/2328(5) /Z146/XV, tel. to Riza Bey, 23 July/4 August; tel. from Riza Bey, 24 July/5 August.

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his fear of a Russian occupation; he also noted that Russia's attitude towards the Temporary Regent scheme remained uncertain 1 . These doubts were soon borne out. On 10 August the Porte learned of Prince Ferdinand's departure for Bulgaria; on the same day Onou announced that the Tsar had selected a Russian General, Ernroth, to serve as Temporary Regent, and wished the Sultan to send a Grand C o m m i s s i o n e r to Sofia without delay. Onou advised the Sultan not to be deterred by Prince Ferdinand's own attempt to install himself in Bulgaria: this was bound to fail, since it would be opposed not only by Russia, but also, he predicted, by G e r m a n y and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y . C o n f i r m a t i o n of Germany's readiness to support a joint Russo-Ottoman initiative c a m e later that day, but AustriaHungary's altitude remained in doubt; the Sultan postponed a decision, and instructed his Ministers to report 2 . More alarming news followed. From St. Petersburg, §akir Pa§a telegraphed that Giers had admitted that the Ernroth scheme might not suffice to meet the situation created by Prince Ferdinand's entry into Bulgaria, and that joint military measures might be required. §akir gathered that Giers was contemplating an Ottoman occupation of Kyustendil and a Russian occupation of Varna; he also gathered that the Ernroth scheme might be superseded by a plan to send Russian and Ottoman Commissioners to Bulgaria. The Porte questioned whether Gicrs's reference to military action was seriously meant; it urged the Sultan to leave matters to the Powers. Abdiilhamid commanded further discussion 3 . On 12 August the Sultan received a telegram from Prince Ferdinand, a n n o u n c i n g his arrival in Bulgaria and appealing f o r support. Riza Bey promptly withdrew from Sofia, but Onou intervened to complain at the delay in implementing the Ernroth scheme: he accused the Porte of colluding with the Regents and Prince Ferdinand, and warned that Russia could not be expected to uphold the Treaty of Berlin when the Sultan failed to d o so himself. A Special Council of Ministers advised Abdiilhamid to issue a Circular to the Powers: this should state unequivocally that Prince Ferdinand's presence in Bulgaria was illegal, and that the Ottoman government would not enter into relations with him, but it should also ask the P o w e r s what instructions they had given to their representatives at Sofia, and invite them to consider the means to a solution. T h e Ministers repeated their view that Giers's talk of military action was not serious, and advised that consideration of the Ernroth proposal should be postponed until it had been seen whether the Powers wished Prince Ferdinand to withdraw f r o m Bulgaria 4 .

' ß B A r § , Bulgaristan Irade, no. 720, 17 Zilkade/7 August; no. 721, 18 Zilkäde/8 August, enclosing report of Special Council of Ministers, n.d. 2 ibid„ no. 722, 20 Zilkade/10 August. ^ibid., no. 728, 23 Zilkäde/13 August, enclosing report of Committee of Ministers, 21 Zilkàde/11 August, and tel. from §akir Pa.'ia, 10 August. 4 ibid., no. 727, enclosing report of Special Council of Ministers, n.d.

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Abdulhamid was not satisfied. He complained that his Ministers had given insufficient weight to Onou's threat to abandon the Treaty of Berlin, and reminded them that the erosion of the Treaty of Paris had commenced with the Empire's failure to support Russia's protest against the entry of Prince Charles into the Rumanian Principalities in 1867. But his most serious criticism focused on two other issues. The first was the possibility that Russia might take military action against Bulgaria unilaterally: The |Ministers'] report reiterates that Russia is not seriously proposing the idea of occupying Bulgaria, but this opinion is not based upon convincing reasons; nor is it shown how the Ottoman Empire will act if Russia is serious and occupies Bulgaria unilaterally. It is not improbable that Russia will send troops to Bulgaria; should the Bulgarians welcome them, Bulgaria will go the way of Egypt. The sccond was the possibility that Russia might yet succeed in winning over Germany and Austria-Hungary, and reviving the Three Emperors' Alliance: If importance and attention are not given to Russia's protest on this occasion, then at some future opportunity she will judge the Treaty of Berlin to be null and void like the Treaty of Paris. Perhaps she will reconcile herself with Austria and Germany and then turn against the Ottoman Empire; in that case the Empire will be able to find no helper and ally but England, and, as [England] lacks adequate land forces, we will naturally be unable to profit from her alliance and support, and we will be unable to do other than accept and execute the demands of

[Russia, Germany and Austria]'. Germany had already indicated her support for the Ernroth proposal, but it was not until 13 August that the Sultan received an assurance that Austria-Hungary would not follow suit: Calice sent him a warning against "hasty decisions", and explained that Austria-Hungary, Britain and Italy intended to maintain de facto relations with Prince Ferdinand, despite their unanimous disapproval of his illegal entry into Bulgaria. This made up Abdtilhamid's mind: he told Onou that events had falsified Russia's prediction that Prince Ferdinand would gain no international support, and on 14 August he permitted the Porte to issue its Circular 2 . This time the Powers' replies revealed a clear division of opinion. Germany and France joined Russia in urging the Sultan to implement the Ernroth scheme without delay; Bismarck went further, and advised the Sultan to occupy Eastern Rumelia or face a Russian occupation of Bulgaria. Against

' ibid., no. 121,22 Zilkade/12 August. ibid„ no. 730, 23 Zilkade/13 August; no. 729,

2

24 Zilkàde/14 August.

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this, Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy unanimously warned that the Ernroth scheme was of doubtful legality and that any attempt to implement it could provoke a conflagration: they advised patience 1 . Abdiilhamid responded by temporizing. He invited Russia to furnish more details of Ernroth's duties as Temporary Regent; he also instructed the Porte to inform Prince Ferdinand that his presence in Bulgaria was illegal, but balanced this by sending the Prince a private assurance of goodwill 2 . The real problem was to make sense of the Powers' divisions. Abdiilhamid was adamant that he would not use force against the Bulgarians, nor take any step which might lead to the use of force: If, in accordance with the advice of |Russia, Germany and France] recourse is had to violent measures ... there is no knowing how the Imperial troops despatched to Eastern Rumelia will be received by the Bulgarians. If they are met with armed force, blood will flow and the efforts which we have made over two years to avoid such a state of affairs will go to waste 3 . By implication, this ruled out any simple acceptance of the Ernroth scheme. Yet, at the same time, Abdiilhamid dared not provoke Russia into a unilateral occupation of Bulgaria, and he did not exclude the possibility that Britain and her partners would welcome such an occupation as a pretext for partition: It is most probable that the hopes and intentions of Austria, Italy and England, who recommend patience in the face of Prince Ferdinand's unilateral entry into Bulgaria ... are to force Russia to occupy Bulgaria so that subsequently they themselves may be justified in occupying portions of Ottoman territory: thus, England will remain in Egypt, Austria will descend to Salonika, and Italy will then grab some place — or else that the\ intend to open the gate to war 4 . Similar thoughts led him to suggest that Prince Ferdinand might be a provocateur in Urabi's mould 5 . The key was Germany; without her support, the Mediterranean grouping could offer Russia no effective resistance, and it was likely that Russia would eventually force Austria-Hungary to terms:

^BBAnj, Y E E , K39/1151/Z17 111, tel. from Tevfik Bey, Berlin, 24 August; Bulgaristan Irade, no. 732, selh-i Zilkàde/20 August; / Documenti diplomatici italiani, no. 82, Blanc to Crispi, 26 August; FO 78/3995, Salisbury to White, no. 2 0 7 , 1 9 August. 2 B B A r ? , Bulgaristan Irade, nos. 734, 735, 3 Zilhicce/22 August. 3

ibid.,

no. 7 3 7 , 6 Zilhicce/25 August.

4

ibid.

5

B B A r § , Bulgaristan Irade, no 745, 14 Zilhicce/2 September.

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Just as France and Germany agree with Russia in this question, and as Austria is not in a condition and position to depart from the course which will be laid down by Germany, and as Russia's power and strength are obvious, so if Russia seeks to occupy Bulgaria, England and Italy will be able to do nothing. In that case, the danger to the Ottoman Empire will be of the order of ninety per cent 1 . The Sultan did not hide these apprehensions from the Austro-Hungarian and Italian Embassies, and at an audience on 26 August Blanc made an attempt to answer them. He argued that Germany's support for Russia was a matter of form dictated by her fears of a Franco-Russian alliance, and that she would secretly welcome Russia's defeat in Bulgaria. He emphasized that it was up to the Sultan to offer a lead, but promised him the full backing of Italy, AustriaHungary and Britain; he added that this did not mean that the Empire would be required to enter a formal alliance 2 . Abdiilhamid was unimpressed: It is clear that Germany, who indeed has no direct interest in this question, will take into account the policy which the Ottoman Empire will adopt, and that she will strive to divide Russia from France in order that she may not, by opposing Russia's demands, provoke \Russia\ into acting against her in alliance with France. However, it is also probable that in order to accomplish this goal she will seriously encourage Russia's demands. This point requires a great deal of thought...

He refused to be used as a catspaw: Russia is a Great Power possessed of huge land and sea forces, and furthermore she is the Ottoman Empire's neighbour; it therefore seems important and necessary not to offend her without compelling reasons ... It was stated by the Italian Ambassador that Italy supports the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and will not attach any condition to her alliance, but, as the Empire's fundamental concern is how to defend itself if Russia invades across the Anatolian border, it is essential that those Powers proposing an alliance should state in advance with how many troops they will assist the Ottoman Empire in the event of such an occurrence. Their failure to do this, and their satisfying themselves with phrases to the effect that they support the preservation of the Ottoman Empire and that there is no need for conditions of alliance will not suffice, and it is obvious that ... such extremely superficial assurances will be taken as evidence of no

l ibid. 2 BBAr§, Bulgaristan Irade, no. 739, enclosing Munir Pa§a's record of the conversation between the Sultan and Blanc, 14/26 August; I Documenti diplomatici italiani, no. 82, Blanc to Crispi, 26 August; HHStA, PA XV. 114, Calice to Kalnoky, 30 August.

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good intent. F r a n c e and R u s s i a , too, o f f e r a s s u r a n c e s f o r the preservation of the Hmpire's integrity... 1 . That said, there were hints of ambiguity in Germany's attitude: she had not joined Russia and France in challenging the validity of Princc Ferdinand's election, and her Embassy in Istanbul did not echo Bismarck's advocacy of the use of f o r c e 2 . The upshot was that Abdiilhamid made a direct appeal f o r German mediation. Russia had indicated that Ernroth must e n j o y the full powers of a Regcncy, including the power to appoint a new government and supervise the election of a Grand National Assembly; Abdiilhamid referred this expanded proposal to Bismarck on 29 August, and asked him to assume the responsibility for winning over Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy 3 . Not that Abdiilhamid appears to have expected an easy compromise; his immediate concern was to divert British and Russian pressure away from himself, and, as at the time of the Dulcigno crisis of 1880, to induce Germany to guarantee him against the other P o w e r s 4 . T h e m a n o e u v r e failed on both counts. Bismarck refused to mediate, and dropped a fresh hint at the desirability of military action against the Bulgarians 5 . British and Russian pressure increased. White warned that the Ernroth proposal was a trap: if it succeeded, Bulgaria would become a Russian province and the Empire would be exposed in Macedonia; if it failed, Russia would demand that the Sultan should use force, and would use this as a pretext to occupy Bulgaria herself 6 . Against this, Onou threatened that if the Empire failed to implement the Ernroth scheme Russia would reach a settlement with Austria-Hungary "within ten or fifteen days" 7 . Kalnoky denied this claim, but Abdiilhamid was sceptical: he recalled Austria-Hungary's broken promise to restrain Serbia during the R u s s o Ottoman war of 1877: It is a matter of question to what extent reliance can be placed upon the assurances which Count Kalnoky has given on this occasion. If Russia is angered and occupies Bulgaria, or if she finds a pretext to invade across the Anatolian frontier, it is probable that as before Austria will pass off the affair with an expression of regret. It is first of all essential to know what degree of assistance Austria would pledge in the event of such a Russian move 8 .

' ß B A r § , Bulgaristan irade, no 739. 8 Zilhicce/27 August. 2

BBAr§, YEE, K39/1511/Z17/115, reports by Re§id Bey, 13/25 August, and 15/27 August; GFO, Bulgarien 20, Kiderlen to Bismarck, no. 175, 15 August. 3 G F O , Bulgarien 20, copy, Said Pa§a to Tevfik Bey, 29 August. 4

B B A r § , Bulgaristan Irade, no 744, 13 Zilhicce/1 September.

5

Grosse

Politik, v. no. 1055, Bismarck to Kiderlen, 3 September.

6

BBAr§, Bulgaristan trade, no. 744, 13 Zilhicce/1 September.

7

i b i d . , no. 745, 14 Zilhicce/2 September.

S

ibid„ no. 748, 22 Zilhiccc/10 September; HHStA, PA XV. 115, Kalnoky to Calice, no. 106, 8 September.

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The Sultan's only remaining hope w a s to play f o r time, and he was fortunate that Russia's resolve showed signs of faltering. O n o u m a d e no f u r t h e r interventions, and the Porte w a s able to spend two full w e e k s considering its next move. On 21 September it asked Russia to amend her s c h e m e : E r n r o t h should be a c c o m p a n i e d by an O t t o m a n c o - R e g e n t or Commissioner, and the two emissaries should be furnished in advance with the names of three candidates for the throne; they would submit the names to a fresh Grand National Assembly from which representatives of Eastern Rumelia would be excluded; in addition the two emissaries would either c o n f i r m or replace the existing Bulgarian government, and they would complete their joint mission within three m o n t h s ' . Russia was willing to negotiate: she replied that she would prefer Ernroth to be a c c o m p a n i e d by an Ottoman Commissioner, to postpone the nomination of candidates f o r the throne until after Ernroth and the Commisioner had installed themselves at Sofia, and to allow them f o u r months to complete their joint mission. She also suggested that the Sultan should dcclare Prince Ferdinand's election to be illegal 2 . This evidence of increasing Russian moderation coincided with yet another shift in Germany's attitude. Bismarck had begun to express renewed suspicions of Russia's long-term intentions; in addition, the threat posed by the E r n r o t h s c h e m e had p r o m p t e d Salisbury to a g r e e that a p o s s i b l e strengthening of the Mediterranean Agreement should be informally discussed between White, Calice and Blanc, and Bismarck was anxious to encourage him 3 . Radowitz returned to Istanbul at the end of September, and promptly set out to disabuse the Sultan of the notion that G e r m a n y ' s stance t o w a r d s Bulgaria implied any general commitment to Russian policy in the Near F^ast. Using arguments similar to those employed earlier by Blanc, he explained that Germany's support f o r Russia in Bulgaria w a s prompted by her f e a r of a Franco-Russian alliance and in no way detracted from her closer relations with A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y , Britain and Italy, w h o s e Mediterranean A g r e e m e n t she welcomed, and to which she would advise the Sultan himself to lean, and perhaps to adhere 4 . Abdtilhamid was scarcely convinced by Radowitz's explanations: on the contrary, the fact that they coincided with a well-publicised visit to Berlin by

'GFO, Bulgarien 20, Kiderlen to Bismarck, no. 210, 26 September; Samardziev, 'Ottoman Policy with Regard to Ferdinand's Election', pp. 19-21. ^BBArf, Bulgaristan trade, no. 753, 16 Muharrem 305/4 October; GFO, Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 213, 3 October; Samardziev, 'Ottoman Policy with Regard to Ferdinand's Election', pp 21-2. 3 Medlicott, 'Mediterranean Agreements', pp. 14-6; Medlicott and Coveney, op. cit., p. 154; Lowe, op. cit., pp. 21-2. 4 G F O , Bulgarien 20, Radowitz to Bismarck, no. 214, 3 October; no. 217, 10 October; no. 223, 14 October.

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the Italian Premier Crispi revived his earlier suspicion that Germany might be using the Mediterranean grouping to p r o m o t e a compensation policy at O t t o m a n e x p e n s e 1 . Even so, this fresh evidence of the inscrutability of German intentions could hardly fail to reinforce his caution, and it was e v e n t u a l l y decided to leave the latest R u s s i a n proposal on B u l g a r i a unanswered 2 . Russia tacitly acknowledged defeat. Nelidov returned f r o m St. Petersburg, and at an audience with Abdiilhamid on 22 October he denounced Bulgaria's rulers as "nihilists and scum", and warned that Russia's Bulgarian policy was immutable; but he made no reference to the Ernroth scheme or to any alternative. Abdiilhamid replied with a simple expression of his wish for a solution acceptablc to all the Powers 3 . Ill The collapse of the Ernroth scheme removed the immediate threat of a European war arising out of the Bulgarian issue, but left Abdiilhamid no clearer as to the state of relations between the Great Powers. November 1887 proved to be a month of alarms. The Italian Prime Minister m a d e a speech which appeared to advocate autonomy for Albania; Blanc vehemently denied this interpretation, but concurrent rumours of an Austro-Hungarian plan to install a m e m b e r of the Egyptian Khedival f a m i l y as the ruler of an independent Albanian-Macedonian kingdom could scarcely fail to stimulate the Sultan's s u s p i c i o n s of the u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e s of the M e d i t e r r a n e a n A g r e e m e n t 4 . Nor could Abdiilhamid be finally certain of the Mediterranean grouping's durability: the Tsar's visit to Berlin in m i d - N o v e m b e r provoked rumours of a general Russo-German rapprochement, while the announcement that Britain and France had resolved their long-standing dispute over the Suez Canal suggested a further possibility of dissolving existing alignments 5 . T o further confuse the picture, France and Russia began to express concern at reported attempts to draw the Ottoman E m p i r e into the Triple Alliance: Abdiilhamid assured Montebello that he would hold to a policy of neutrality and reserve, but judiciously admitted that he had received overtures, though without revealing that these concerned the Mediterranean Agreement rather than the Triple Alliance 6 Important developments were indeed taking place, though the Sultan was unaware of them. During November Salisbury finally came off the fence

' B B A r § , Bulgaristan irade, no 757, 3 Safer/20 October, with enclosures. 2

G F O , Bulgarien 20, Radowil/. to Bismarck, no. 230, 2 4 October; no. 235, 31 O c t o b e r ;

S a m a r d S e v , 'Ottoman Policy with Regard to Ferdinand's Election 1 , pp. 21-2. ^BBArç, Bulgaristan Irade, no 758, 5 Safer/22 October. 4

B B A r § , Bulgaristan trade, no 759, 16 Safer/2 November; I Documenti diplomatici italiani, no. 267, Blanc to Crispi, 1 N o v e m b e r ; no. 275, 4 N o v e m b e r ; H H S t A , PA XII. 149, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 77C, 1 November; no. 80A-G, 15 November. 5

B B A r § , K36/2475/Z150/X1, m e m o r a n d u m by Kâmil Pa§a, 5 Safer/26 October: I diplomatici italiani, no. 267, Blanc to Crispi, 1 November.

Documenti

®Documents diplomatiques français, vi. no. 633, Flourens to Montebello, 3 N o v e m b e r ; no. 634, Montebello to Flourens, 4 No\ :mber; Silin, op. cit., pp. 113-5.

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and a g r e e d to the A u s t r o - I t a l i a n proposal f o r a s t r e n g t h e n i n g of the Mediterranean Agreement. He did so not because he saw a need to strengthen Abdiilhamid's resolve to resist Russian pressure — the original motive f o r the proposal — but because he feared that Germany's currently favourable attitude t o w a r d s the M e d i t e r r a n e a n A g r e e m e n t m i g h t not last, and that f u r t h e r hesitation on Britain's part might tempt Bismarck and Kalnoky to revive the T h r e e Emperors' Alliance, apprehensions reinforced by the n e w s that the Crown Prince Friedrich Wilhelm was mortally ill, and that the hopes which had been placed in his succcssion were vain 1 . T h e Second Mediterranean Agreement was duly concluded in the second week of December, through a secret exchange of notes which bound Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy to uphold the Sultan's independence at the Straits and in Asia Minor, and to assist him in resisting any illegal Russian enterprise in Bulgaria; it also bound them to retaliate by occupying Ottoman territory should he connive at such an e n t e r p r i s e . T h e a g r e e m e n t thus r e f l e c t e d its original p u r p o s e as an understanding in support of the Sultan, but only on paper; Salisbury insisted that the a g r e e m e n t ' s e x i s t e n c e should not be revealed to the O t t o m a n government, and, in practice, its function was simply to f u r n i s h the three participating Powers with mutual guarantees against changes of policy, and thereby to confirm the existing balance of power 2 . Britain and her partners sought to impress their solidarity upon the Sultan by other means, notably by provoking a series of trumpery quarrels with France in North A f r i c a 3 . Abdiilhamid was more impressed by signs of increasing tension between Russia and G e r m a n y , and between R u s s i a and Austria-Hungary. The Tsar's visit to Berlin in November was not a success: it coincided with Germany's decision to close her financial markets to Russian loans, and Radowitz firmly denied all rumours of a general R u s s o - G e r m a n rapprochement 4 . A more convincing proof of the improbability of a revival of the Three Emperors' Alliance was the outbreak of a press war between Russia and Austria-Hungary in December; this lasted through to January 1888, and was a c c o m p a n i e d by reports that Russia was concentrating troops on the Austro-Hungarian frontier and that a shooting war was i m m i n e n t 5 . Russia herself betrayed some nervousness: in December she sounded the Sultan on a rumour that Austria-Hungary had asked him to open the Straits to British and Italian warships, and she sought a fresh assurance of his intention to pursue a policy of neutrality 6 .

^Medlicott, 'Mediterranean Agreements', pp. 16-20; Lowe, op. cit., pp. 22-5. ^Medlicott, 'Mediterranean Agreements', pp. 20-3. ^Çayci, La question tunisienne, pp. 107-11. 4 HHStA, PA XII. 149, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 87B, 20 December; Grosse Politik, v, no. 1131, Radowitz to Bismarck, 19 November; no. 1132, Herbert Bismarck to Radowitz, 19 November; Medlicott and Coveney, op. cit., p. 154. 5 BBAr§, Bulgaristan Irade, no. 769, 27 Rebiiilahir/11 January 1888; HHStA, PA XV. 116, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 87A-E, 20 December; PA XII. 149, Calice to Kalnoky, no. 87B, 20 December. 6

Silin, op. cit., pp. 113-5.

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Neither A b d u l h a m i d nor his Ministers could be certain what the outcome would be, but Abdulhamid was emphatic that the Empire had nothing to gain from a war, and that his own policy of neutrality and moderation was a guarantee of peace. He also continued to manifest the gravest suspicion of Britain's ultimate objectives, and to reject any alignment of the O t t o m a n Empire with the Mediterranean grouping: England ... has made intense and persistent efforts over these past years to draw the Ottoman Empire over to her side, because of the likelihood of a war between herself and Russia. But, in the event of such a war, the Empire's proximity to Russia, its lengthy c o m m o n frontier with Russia, and the relative vulnerability of the Black Sea ports and even of the capital to Russia's Black Sea ports and the forces they contain, together with the fact that any assistance we receive f r o m Britain will of necessity be as good as non-existent, | m e a n that] in the event of defeat the very existence of the Eternal Empire will probably be in great danger, while even in the event of victory the fruits gathered will be worthless. Furthermore, the promises which England can m a k e to secure the support or at least the neutrality of Austria, Italy and other small governments will in all likelihood be made at our expense. In sum, the Ottoman Empire will suffer fundamental damage, whether victorious or defeated, and the obviousness of this has imposed upon the Empire an unalterable course of moderation and support for peace ... The benefits and fruits of this f i r m and safe course have several times been witnessed and d e m o n s t r a t e d , and that preservation of universal peace which is the acme of the hopes of civilised states and peoples ... has been achieved as a result of the Ottoman Empire's policy of moderation and neutrality 1 . In reality the risk of war was slight, and Germany moved swiftly to restrain Austria-Hungary. T h e Second Mediterranean A g r e e m e n t enabled Bismarck to repeat the manoeuvre he had executed with the First: having made sure of Britain, he took steps to repair Germany's relations with Russia. In January 1888 he publicly denied the possibility of war, and at the beginning of February he published the terms of the Dual Alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary, thereby demonstrating to Russia its exclusively defensive c h a r a c t e r 2 . Probably it was these assurances which prompted Russia to formulate a fresh Bulgarian initiative: she proposed that the Sultan should notify Prince Ferdinand that his presence in Bulgaria was illegal 3 . Bismarck expressed full support, and in the event it was from Berlin on 16 February that the Ottoman government first learned of the impending Russian initiative 4 . Abdulhamid expressed some qualms. In the first place, he was not sure what

^BBArj, YEE, K36/2475/Z150/XI, Sultan's instructions, 10 Rebiiilahir/25 December. 2

Medlicott and Coveney, op. cf., p. 169; Bridge, op. cit., pp. 172-4.

^Konigslow, op. cit., p. 78. ^BBArg, Bulgaristan trade, no 776, 4 Cemaziulahir/16 February.

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Russia intended to propose: he feared that she would ask him to order Prince Ferdinand to withdraw, and that in the probable event of the Prince's refusal she would either occupy Bulgaria herself or else demand that the Ottoman Empire take some military action. He was also concerned by concurrent reports that Bulgaria was secretly mobilising her armed forces as the prelude to a declaration of independence: It is far from improbable that, after the proposal which Russia will reportedly make for the declaration of the illegality of Prince Ferdinand's government and his departure from Bulgaria is delivered to the cabinets of the other Great Powers, the Bulgarians will declare independence ... and that they will not be satisfied with a declaration of independence, but will attempt to advance [to Istanbul] in order to expand. Further, as it is clear that England and Russia too have no good intentions and thoughts regarding the Imperial capital, it is not in the least improbable that these two Powers will take advantage of the Bulgarians' aggression in order to fulfil their own plans ... T h e Ottoman Empire has for some time been crushcd between the rivalry of these two Powers. Now Austria and Italy have joined them, and if a general war breaks out in Europe it is obvious that it will start from Bulgaria 1 . The formal communication of Russia's proposal to the Porte on 25 February assuaged some of these anxieties. As Kámil Pa§a pointed out, the simple request that the Empire should notify Prince Ferdinand of the illegality of his position contained nothing new: the Porte had sent precisely such a message to the Prince on its own initiative six months earlier. Furthermore, informal diplomatic soundings were reassuring: Germany and France would support the Russian proposal, while the other Powers would not actively oppose it 2 . Abdülhamid remained nervous lest Russia bring forward further demands, but eventually steeled himself to despatch the requested message to Sofia on 3 March; the Porte privately advised Prince Ferdinand that it would prefer not to receive a reply^. The démarche produced only the smallest of d i p l o m a t i c f l u t t e r s ; Prince Ferdinand ignored it, R u s s i a m a d e no supplementary demands, and, in any case, the death of the German Emperor on 9 March brought all diplomatic activity to a halt 4 . By the time his doomed successor Friedrich Wilhelm died in June, it was clear that Russia was unlikely to make any fresh attempt to unseat Prince Ferdinand by diplomatic or military means. The Bulgarian crisis was over 5 . Its ending had one small consequence. Since January 1887 the hapless Gadban Efendi had languished in

hbid., no. 780, 9 Cemaziulahir/21 February; cf., no. 777, 8 Cemaziiilahir/20 February; no. 766, 25 Rebiiilevvel/9 December. ibid., no. 781, 14 Cemaziiilahir/26 February; no. 782, 18 Cemaziulahrr/29 February, enclosing report by Committee of Ministers, 18 Cemaziulahir/29 February. ^ibid., no. 785, 22 Cemaziiilahir/4 March, enclosing note from Russian Embassy, n.d., and tel., Kamil Pa§a to Stambolov, 5 March. ^Konigslow, op. cit., pp. 78-9. 5

A . J. P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery in Europe 1848-1918, p. 323.

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Istanbul, where he continued to e n j o y the title, salary and a l l o w a n c e s of Ottoman Commissioner at Sol'ia. In March 1888 he asked to be relieved of his duties, pleading boredom; his request was granted, and shortly a f t e r w a r d s Gadban set out on an extended visit to his sister in Manchester 1 .

' B B A r § , Bulgaristan irade, no. 789, 10 R e c e b / 2 2 March, enclosing petition f r o m G a d b a n , 8 Receb/20 March; FO 78/4102, White to Salisbury, 17 August.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN: CONCLUSION

Russia's decision to drop the Bulgarian issue brought the Near Eastern crisis of 1885-1888 to an end. The new pattern of Great Power alignments proved stable. The Mediterranean Agreements held Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy together in defensive opposition to France and Russia; Germany remained on reasonable terms with both Austria-Hungary and Russia; the Sultan was left uncommitted and untied, and free to maintain his chosen stance of 'moderation and neutrality'. In the Near East, at least, the effect was to strengthen an existing balance of power, which would henceforth be guaranteed not only by the rivalry between Britain and Russia at the Straits and in Asia, but also by the now open rivalry between Russia and Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, and between Britain and France in Egypt. Put another way, the outcome of the crisis was a draw. The British had hoped to overturn the balance of power, but had had to make do with the Mediterranean Agreements; the ultimate prize of control of the Straits had eluded them. The Russians had been forced to accept defeat in Bulgaria, but this had not materially damaged their standing in the Near East, or in Europe: for the time being they maintained a link with Germany, and they had initiated a link with France, whose value as a counterweight to the Mediterranean Agreement and the Triple Alliance would grow with time. The result was a Near Eastern stalemate, which would last for the best part of a decade 1 . The Treaty of Berlin had survived. Bulgaria had absorbed Eastern Rumelia, and Russia had militarised Batum, but neither of these changes jeopardised the treaty as a whole. The Berlin settlement had proved more durable than its authors had anticipated, or even intended. In 1878 all Powers had assumed that the Ottoman Empire must soon succumb to internal collapse, or, at the very least, fall under the domination of Russia or Britain. Yet by 1888 no internal collapse was in sight, and the Sultan had successfully avoided exclusive dependence upon any of the Great Powers. As long as these

^For the aftermath and consequences of the crisis see the works by Taylor, Lowe, Marder, Smith and Ziirrer cited in the previous chapter.

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two conditions were maintained, the Berlin settlement was tolerably safe from the Great Powers: it was to survive for another twenty-five years. T h e S u l t a n ' s c o n t r i b u t i o n to t h i s o u t c o m e s h o u l d n o t be underestimated. By sedulously defending his own diplomatic independence, he had deprived both Britain and Russia of the possibility of total victory, and ensured the survival of a balance of power. His success was due not least to the consistency of his vision. From the beginning, he had insisted that the crisis was at bottom an Anglo-Russian p o w e r struggle, and that all other issues were secondary. He applied the lessons he had learned between 1878 and 1882: Britain was the most revolutionary of the Powers, but Russia was the most dangerous, and both were to some degree dependent upon Germany. It followed that Britain must be resisted, and Russia appeased, but that the Empire must place itself in the hands of neither, and seek to cultivate German support wherever possible. As ever, the Sultan exaggerated the aggressiveness of Britain's and Russia's intentions, and their willingness to risk war: hence the inconclusive internal debates over alliances in 1886 and 1887. But he never wavered in his preference for a peaceful solution which would preserve his own independence and the Berlin settlement, and believed that this would be best achieved by maintaining a balance in his relations with Britain and Russia. In Bulgaria, Abdiilhamid sought Russia's cooperation, while tacitly conniving at the destruction of her influence in that country; in Egypt, he sought agreement with Britain, but on terms which would not c o m p r o m i s e his relations with other Powers, or provoke A r a b and Moslem disaffection. In both issues he attempted to set his course by Germany's. His one major error was his m i s j u d g m e n t of G e r m a n intentions in the spring of 1887: this threatened to expose him in Egypt and Bulgaria simultaneously, and to force him to choose between Britain and Russia. But in the event a combination of luck, nerve and skill enabled him to avoid a choice, and to escape into a stance of 'moderation and neutrality'. His reward was a strengthened balance of power, in which his own Empire played the role of fulcrum.

T o this extent, the outcome of the crisis was a vindication of the type of foreign policy which Abdiilhamid had pursued since the Treaty of Berlin, and of the a s s u m p t i o n s upon which it w a s based. Certain of t h o s e assumptions were clarified. The debate over British and Russian alliances had r e i n f o r c e d the Sultan's preference f o r a stance of n o n - c o m m i t m e n t , by demonstrating that neither alliance would work in military terms: the British navy could not protect the Ottoman Empire against the Russian army, and vice versa. Only a German alliance might suffice, and even this assumed that German and Austro-Hungarian military strength in Europe was sufficient to deter Russia f r o m attacking the Ottoman Empire in Asia. But the confusions over the Triple Alliance and the Mediterranean Agreement had demonstrated that a G e r m a n a l l i a n c e w a s not to be had: B i s m a r c k w o u l d not commit himself against Russia. This did not affect the Sultan's assessment of

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Germany's diplomatic importance: after 1888 he continued to cultivate her, playing host to Wilhelm II, and welcoming German investment in his Empire. But he appears to have finally abandoned thoughts of a German alliance 1 . The confusions of 1887 had also confirmed Abdiilhamid's prejudice against Austria-Hungary, by demonstrating beyond all doubt that she was not a true Great Power: she was condemned to depend upon Germany, or Russia, or both, and could achieve the expansionist ambitions attributed to her only by encouraging the aggressiveness of stronger Powers. She was never to be relied upon. Yet, however successful his handling of the crisis, the Sultan's position in its aftermath was by no means comfortable. The new pattern of Great Power alignments had moved him from the periphery of international competition to its centre, a shift reflected in his decision to redefine his hitherto informal stance of non-commitment as a positive policy of neutrality. The reason was simple: the Mediterranean Agreements could gain credibility as a military alliance only if the Straits were opened to the British and Italian fleets, for Britain and Italy had no other means of assisting Austria-Hungary in the event of a war with Russia. In the years after 1888, the Sultan was to find himself under increasing diplomatic pressure at the Straits, as the British sought to impress him with scare stories of Russian plans to seize the Bosphorus, and as the Russians pressed for assurances of his intention to keep the Dardanelles closed. Abdiilhamid feared attack by both sides 2 . In these circumstances, the Sultan's neutrality was perforce an armed one, and this cost money. Since Penjdeh, he had been obliged to implement a substantial programme of rearmament, to sustain two lengthy mobilisations, and to consider a permanent expansion of his armed forces. In the process, he had been driven to conclude his first major peacetime loan, and to consider concluding a second. The ending of the crisis in March 1888 brought only a limited respite; work on the fortification of the Dardanelles against Britain continued, as did the strengthening of the Empire's landward defences against Russia. By September 1889 Abdiilhamid was driven to wonder whether the Empire's finances could sustain a policy of neutrality in the longer term 3 . Sustain it they did, but at the cost of continuing financial insecurity, and of lost opportunities for non-military investment. Lastly, the Sultan's successful defence of his independence had been accomplished at the price of accepting an expanded Bulgaria and a continuing British presence in Egypt. Both might pose serious dangers in the longer term. Formally, Bulgaria's absorption of Eastern Rumelia had cost the Empire little; ' F o r Ottoman-German relations after 1888 see Silin, op. cit., pp. 121-148; Holborn, op. cit. 46ff. 2

B B A r 5 , Y E E , K9/2641/Z72/4, memo, by Abdiilhamid, n. d. L1890].

3

£ e t i n and Yildiz, op. cit., pp. 56-61.

p.

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but it had nonetheless brought the Bulgarian army much closer to the Ottoman capital, and seriously compounded the problem of the Empire's military vulnerability in the Balkans. In similar fashion, the failure of the second Drummond Wolff negotiation appeared to have made no immediate difference to the Egyptian question: there remained a chance of further negotiation. But it left open the possibility that the British might choose to remain in Egypt permanently, or perhaps guide Egypt to formal independence: in either case, there could be serious consequences for the Sultan's hold over his Arab provinces'. Such were the disadvantages of the Empire's new international position; there were no corresponding gains. A stronger power might have exploited its pivotal role at the Straits to force Britain and Russia into favourable settlements of the Egyptian and Bulgarian issues respectively. The Ottoman Empire was too weak, and Britain and Russia knew it. Between 1888 and 1892 Abdiilhamid made repeated attempts to induce Britain to resume negotiations on a withdrawal from Egypt; each approach was rejected more brusquely than the last. Salisbury grasped the essential truth: Egypt gave Britain a hold over the Sultan, not the other way round. As long as Britain maintained her occupation, the Sultan would live in fear of a British-backed movement for Arab independence and an Arab Caliphate: he dared not provoke the British 2 . Much the same held true for Russia and Bulgaria. Although Russia had abandoned Bulgaria as a diplomatic issue, she continued to withhold recognition from Prince Ferdinand and his regime, who consequently remained in technical breach of the Treaty of Berlin. Not until 1896 did Russia relent; until then, Abdiilhamid had constantly to reckon with the possibility that events might offer Russia an opportunity to regain control of Bulgaria, possibly by invasion, or else that Prince Ferdinand might be tempted to go va banque, declare independence and launch a war for the conquest of Macedonia 3 . Either way, the Sultan dared not alienate Russia. Even so, the polity of 'neutrality and moderation' served Abdiilhamid for the best part of a decade, until the so-called 'Armenian crisis' of 1894-1896 — in reality, a complex combination of crises like that of 1875-78, involving Armenian risings in the prov inces, a resurgence of constitutionalist opposition in the capital, near-bankruptcy, threats of Great Power intervention and partition, and a short but successful war with Greece 4 . In the event, Abdiilhamid survive these crises with minimal losses: the balance of power and the Treaty of Berlin were upheld. But thereafter the pattern of Great Power relationships changed again. The Mediterranean Agreements of 1887 lapsed, and Austria-Hungary made her peace with Russia, on the basis of an

'BBAr§, YBE, K39/1783/Z13L 116. m e m o r a n d u m by Kàmil Pa§a, 7 §evval 306/6 Junc 1889. 2

Cecil, op. cìt., IV, pp. 388-92

^ B o z i d a r SamardZiev. 'Politikata na O s m a n s k a Turtsiya kàm knyazhestvo B à l g a r i y a (18881896)', Studia Balcanica, 16(1982). ^Anderson, op. cit., pp. 254-65

CONCLUSION

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undertaking to uphold the status quo in the Balkan peninsula. Britain moved into 'splendid isolation', but then returned to conclude agreements with France in 1904, and with Russia in 1907. Meanwhile Italy too began to rc-cxamine her stance: she remained formally committed to the Triple Alliance, but around the turn of the century attempted to reconcile herself with France 1 . From an Ottoman point of view, these reconciliations between f o r m e r Near Eastern rivals might appear to conjure up the old bogey of partition. In reality they did not: the Near Eastern détente reflected a belated European recognition that no one Power could succeed in gaining the keys to the Eastern Question, and that the safest course for all, in relation to the Ottoman Empire, was to uphold the status quo on the basis of the Treaty of Berlin. Abdtilhamid had m a d e his point; the Empire could safely retreat again to the periphery of Great Power competition. By the turn of the century, however, relations with the six Great Powers were no longer the Sultan's sole, or even primary, external concern. T h e hitherto dormant Balkan balance of power was coming into its own as Greece, Serbia, and, above all, Bulgaria, established their independence of Great P o w e r patrons and built up their a r m e d f o r c e s . W i t h the rapid development of the Macedonian question f r o m 1902 onwards, the possibility of a local or general war in the Balkans became established as the principal threat to Ottoman security. Abdiilhamid responded with e n h a n c e d military preparations and an active Balkan diplomacy, including attempts to revive his old idea of a Balkan league under Ottoman leadership 2 . H e was still pursuing this idea in July 1908, when the Y o u n g T u r k Revolution put an end to his autocratic power and restored the 1876 consitution; a year later, he was deposed. His Young Turk successors fared worse in foreign affairs. They lost Tripolitania to Italy in 1911, and almost the whole of the Empire's European territories to Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro in the Balkan Wars of 1912-1913; in 1914 they chose to join the side of G e r m a n y and AustriaHungary in the First World War, a conflict which ended in the Empire's final defeat and dismemberment. Abdiilhamid thought his successors were fools: possibly he was right 3 .

^Taylor, op. cit., chs. xvii-xix, passim. ^Turkgeldi, op. cit., Ill, ch. v, passim. 3 Fethi Okyar, Uç Devir'de Bir Adam, pp. 212-4.

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GENERAL INDEX A b o u k i r : 98. Afghan

A u s t r i a ( a f t e r 1867 A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ) :

border

agreemenl

(1887):

4-6;

Afghanistan: Ottoman overtures

Albanian

of

14,

16, 2 7 , 5 4 , 6 2 , 7 6 ,

55-6;

Catholics,

154,

and 46;

League (1878-1881):

27,

1878:

Balkan

rivalry

with

and San Stcfano treaty, 56; secret a g r e e m e n t with Britain,

46, 63-4, 70, 76-7 A l e x a n d r i a , 91, 94, 9 6 - 7 , 112, 117.

5 8 ; a n d C o n g r e s s of

A l g e r i a : 93.

59-61;

23,

33,

vulnerability

48,

of,

200, 229, 235,

Berlin,

occupies

Bosnia-

Hercegovina,

A m e r i c a , United States of: 62. !o

negotiations

83;

247-8,

251.

agreemcnl

63;

with

Ottoman

E m p i r e , 6 3 , 66.

Russia, 1879:

concludes Ottoman

See A r m e n i a n R e f o r m s . Anglo-Austrian

12-4, Crisis,

R u s s i a in B a l k a n s , 4 5 , 48.

250.

Anatolia:

Three

13, 5 6 ; a m b i t i o n s

18, 5 6 ; a n d E a s t e r n

Agricultural Bank: 33. 203,

League

in B o s n i a - H e r c e g o v i n a ,

to

( 1 8 7 7 ) , 29. Albania:

and

Emperors,

239, 241.

with

Empire,

garrisons

(1878):

convention Novi

67-8;

Pazar,

70;

Dual A l l i a n c e w i t h G e r m a n y ,

58. Anglo-French

Egyptian

(1884):

1880:

Anglo- Ottoman Convention passim.,

74.

agreement

115-7. (1885):

ch.

xi,

1881-2:

(1887):

218-9, 223-6, Anglo-Russian

Three Emperors'

83-4: and

212,

Alliance

Sultan's

Serbia, proposal

f o r a l l i a n c e , 8 0 - 4 ; and T r i p l e

229-39.

agreement

Concert

9 ; s e c r e t treaty w i t h

Egyptian

Convention

Gladstone's

with G e r m a n y a n d Russia, 78-

195, 2 1 2 . 2 1 8 .

Anglo-Ottoman

and

policy, 76-7.

Egyptian

Alliance with G e r m a n y

(1878):

and

Italy, 83; and E g y p t i a n crisis,

58-9.

8 1 , 93.

Arabia: 12, 23, 97. 1884:

A r a b s : 4 6 , 95. A r m e n i a n r e f o m s : a n d San treaty,

advises

Sultan

to wait

Britain to declare

A r d a h a n : 53, 58. 18, 5 3 ;

in E g y p t : s u p p o r t s H i r s c h in

Stefano

and

for

intentions

Balkan

Berlin

Junction

question,

convention, 58-9. 62,

e x p a n d i n f l u e n c e in B u l g a r i a ,

68-9,

71;

Concert

and

64-6, 82,

seeks

to

154;

Gladstone's

p o l i c y , 76, 8 0 ,

120;

railways

treaty, 4 6 , 61, 7 3 ; and C y p r u s

1885:

u r g e s Sultan to r e m a i n n e u t r a l d u r i n g F e n j d e h crisis,

134-7;

81, 85; British n o t e r e g a r d i n g

supports

Wolff

( 1 8 8 6 ) , 188, 191.

mission,

90,

107; B i s m a r c k

A s i a M i n o r : S e e Anatolia.

opposes,

Drummond

Philippopolis

144; coup,

and 157-8;

GENERAL and

Three Empires'

Agreement,

251; press war with

guarantee

251.

Sultan

against

164, 166; demands Sullan act unilaterally, Bulgaria claims

167;

with

threatens

war,

disturbed

planning

63, 66-8. Austro-Serbian treaty (1881); 83-4. Bagdad railway project: 73, 80, 107, Balkan

confederation:

Prince

199-200;

Alexander's proposal for, 179;

candidacy,

rumoured British scheme for,

mission to Bulgaria, rejects Mingrelis's

Austro-Ottoman Convention (1879):

240.

Kaulbars1

by

Russia,

167-8;

Montenegro

to invade Serbia, 172;

202-5, 209-10.

207-8; 1887:

second M e d i t e r r a n e a n

programme, 160-1; refuses to Serbia, 163; threatens Sultan,

1886:

273

INDEX

accepts Russia's proposal to discuss

Bulgarian

solution,

213; advises Regents to make concessions, 214; and renewal of Triple Alliance, 215-6; joins Mediterranean Agreement, 216; warns Porte against

Russia's

Balkan

Junction

Railways:

120,

127-8. Balkan

League:

Sultan

proposes,

175. Balkan Range: 81; Sultan's right of garrison, 60, 68, 79, 102, 158. Batum:

ceded

to R u s s i a

at

San

Sole Regent scheme, 222; and

Stefano, 53; demilitarised under

question of Ottoman adhesion

Treaty of Berlin, 60; Britain

to Triple Alliance, 229; and

links

question of Ottoman adhesion

closure of Straits, 61; Russia

to M e d i t e r r a n e a n

agreement,

229; presses Sultan to ratify Egyptian

convention,

233,

demilitarisation

remilitarises,

to

183-7.

Bayezid: ceded to Russia at

San

Stefano, 53; restored to Otoman

235, 237; holds out prospect of

Empire under Treaty of Berlin,

Ottoman

60.

adhesion

to

Mediterranean Agreement, 237;

Berlin conference (1880): 76-8.

favours

Berlin congress (1878): 56-7, 59-

strengthening

of

Mediterranean Agreement, 239; rumours

of

alliance

Ottoman

Empire,

240;

64, 185, 240.

with

Berlin, Treaty of (1878): 18, 23, 42,

and

44, 46, 60-8, 76, 101, 104-7,

election of Prince Ferdinand,

153,

242; and Prince

183, 188, 198, 202, 242, 244-

entry doubts

into

Ferdinand's

Bulgaria,

legality

of

Ernroth scheme, 246;

243-5; Russia's denies

will settle with Russia, 248; rumoured

plan

to

Albanian-Macedonian dom, 250; concludes

set

up

king-

157-60,

163-4,

175-6,

5. Bessarabia, southern: 53, 60. Beyrut: 89. Bizerta: 79. Bosnia-Hercegovina:

Austro-

Hungarian ambitions in, 12-3, 55,57;

revolt

in

(1875-6),

274

A B D U L H A M i

I)

II

AND

THE

13-4, 56; and Constantinople

GREAT

P O W E R S

206-7, 212-4, 217, 219-20;

C o n f e r e n c e , 16; and L o n d o n

a n d dual m o n a r c h y

Protocol, 17; and San Stefano

212, 214; military revolts in,

treaty,

18, 54;

2 1 9 ; and t h r e a t of

treaty,

60-1;

and

Berlin

occupied

Austria-Hungary,

18,

Austro-Ottoman

by 63;

agreement

occupation, Regent

219;

scheme, Russian

and

Sole

scheme, 221-3;

Temporary

and

Regent

scheme, election

concerning, 67; and terms of

2 3 1 - 2 , 2 4 2 - 5 0 ; and

Three Emperors' Alliance, 79;

and

revolt in (1881), 81.

Ferdinand,

installation

of

Prince

241-4;

Sultan

Bosphorus: see Straits.

proposes republic for,

Brazil: 62.

Porte c h a l l e n g e s legality of Prince Ferdinand's

Bulgaria; ]875-8:

revolts in, 13-5: future of,

discussed

by P o w e r s .

and Treaty of San 18,

53,

105;

16-7;

Stefano,

and

military

o c c u p a t i o n o f , 6 3 , 67; terms

of

Three

Alliance.

and

hmperors'

79,

See also Eastern Rumelia. Burgas: 175. C a l i p h a t e : 26-7, 34, 4 7 , 4 9 , 8 9 - 9 0 , 95, 97, 151, 204, 234.

Treaty of Berlin, 60; Russian

presence

in, 244-6, 252-3.

Anglo-

R u s s i a n a g r e e m e n t , 58; and 1878-85:

243;

102,

106;

Carlowitz, peace of (1699): 4. ^ a t a l c a lines: 53, 82. Caucasus: 5, 17, 53, Circassians, i m m i g r a t i o n of: 10.

Russian i n f l u e n c e in, 104-6;

C o m p t o i r de 1'Escompte: 120, 127.

constitution,

104-5:

Concert of Europe: O t t o m a n E m p i r e

control

arm\

of

Russian 104-5;

1885-6:

union

with

Rumelia, passim.; 162-3,

Eastern

chs.

xii-xiii

war with

Serbia,

165-7,

169,

176; f a c e s Russian

172,

hostility,

crisis passim.;

C o n s t a n t i n o p l e c o n f e r e n c e (1876-7): 16-7, 44, 57. Constitution, O t t o m a n (1876): 14-5, 21, 31, 65, 73. Corti agreement (1880): 76.

chs.

xv-xvii

C r i m e a n War, 8-9, 34, 62.

rumoured

Serbian

Cyprus: 18, 58-9

in,

188; P r i n c e

C y p r u s C o n v e n t i o n (1878): 18, 23-

o\ c r t h r o w n ,

4, 5 8 - 9 , 6 4 - 7 2 , 101-2,

plan to invade, Alexander 188,

and

Crete: 4 2 , 78.

179-82; 1886-8:

a d m i t t e d to ( 1 8 5 6 ) , 8;

Gladstone, 76-8, 101, 108.

irredentism, 105;

of,

197-8;

and

Regency,

107-

8, 114, 236, 240.

197, 207; and Grand National Assembly, and

198, 2 0 0 - 1 , 206;

candidates

for

207-9,

220-1;

198,

throne, and

D a m a s c u s , 10, 89. Dardanelles: see Straits. D e b t , O t t o m a n : 9, 4 5 - 6 , 4 9 - 5 0 , 61,

207;

107.

and Ottoman mediation, 200,

D h o f a r : 30.

Russia,

198-200,

202,

GENERAL Dobrudja: 53, 60. Dual Alliance: concluded 1879, 74-5; published, 252. Dulcigno: 76-7. Eastern Crisis (1875-8): 13, 47-8, 50-2. Eastern question: 4, 6-7. Eastern Rumelia, autonomous vilayet of: and Treaty of Berlin, 60: question of Russian e v a c u a t i o n of, 63-4, 67-8; and Three Emperors' Alliance, 79, 106; Russia's influence in, 104-5; union of, with Bulgaria, chs. xii-xiii passim.; n e w f r o n t i e r s of, demarcated, 180-1; organic statute of, 164-5, 207; legislature of, 181. See also B u l g a r i a , Balkan Range. Eastern Rumelian agreement (1886): 175-81. Eastern Rumelian conference (18856): 161-9, 177, 180. Edirnc (Adrianople): armistice at (1878), 18, 53; and question of Russian e v a c u a t i o n , 63; mentioned, 153, 160, 180, 182. Education Tax: 33. Egypt: 1879: d e p o s i t i o n of K h e d i v e Ismail of, 70. 1881-2: IJrabist revolt in, 86, 90-1; mission of Ali Nizami Pa§a to, 91; A n g l o - F r e n c h Joint N o t e c o n c e r n i n g , 93; and Anglo-French naval d e m o n s t r a t i o n , 9 4 - 5 ; and question of Ottoman military intervention, 95; and ambassadorial conference,

INDEX

275

95- 8; Dervi§ Papa's mission to, 9 5 - 6 ; and b o m b a r d m e n t of Alexandria, 96-8; British invasion of, 96-8; AngloOttoman negotiations concerning, 97-8; 1882-4: and end of f i n a n c i a l condominium, 99; and British note to Powers and Sultan, 111; and p l a n n e d B r i t i s h w i t h d r a w a l to A l e x a n d r i a , 1 12; and Sultan's o f f e r of talks, 114-5; A n g l o - F r e n c h a g r e e m e n t c o n c e r n i n g , 116; and London conference, 1 167 ; Northbrook's mission to, 117-8; and sultan's renewed offer of talks, 117-8; 1885-6: and Sultan's o f f e r of comprehensive settlement, 121-2; and H a s a n F e h m i Paça's m i s s i o n to L o n d o n , 123; and Anglo-French Financial proposals, 122, 125; and international f i n a n c i a l a g r e e m e n t , 124-5, 131-3; and British proposals to Hasan Fehmi, 122-39; and British approach to France, 139-40; 1886-7: and D r u m m o n d W o l f f mission, 141-51; and question of voluntary recruitment, 139, 143-50; and Anglo-Ottoman convention, 150-1; High Commissioners' m i s s i o n to, 151; A n g l o French talks concerning, 151, 182; Sultan seeks fresh talks concerning, 182, 187-8; Franco-Russian proposals concerning, 188-92; Britain's terms for talks concerning, 195;

276

A B D Ü L H A M I 1) I I

1887:

Britain

offers

AND

TUB

conditional

GREAT

POWERS

and Pendjdeh crisis,

134-6;

evacuation of, 211-2. 218 9;

favours voluntary

Anglo-Ottoman

for Egypt, 139; and Drummond

convention

recruitment

concerning, 223-6; and Franco-

Wolff mission, 144; and Anglo-

Russian

Ottoman Egyptian Convention,

opposition

to

convention, 232-5; and failure of convention, 237-8: France

161;

1885-6: and Eastern Rumelian crisis,

approaches Britain concerning,

161-2, 165, 182; and coercion

239.

of Greece,

See also Red Sea Coast, Sudan,

discussions with Britain,

Suez Canal.

182; supports

Egyptian ambassadorial conference

Canal

Muhtar

army

151, Pa§a's

scheme,

182;

and Batum, 183; offers Sultan

(1882): 95-8. Egyptian

Egyptian

178; Suez

Financial

Convention

Egyptian understanding, 188-9, 191-2;

(1885): 124-5, 131 Epirus: 54; in Treaty of Berlin, 60-1;

1886-7:

relations

with

Germany,

186, 200, 210, 215, 231; and

settlement of frontier. 76-8.

Bulgarian

Erzurum: 18, 53, 64, 71.

211, France: and Mehmed Ali crisis, 6;

crisis,

214;

200,

holds

208, Egypt

discussions with Britain,

195,

and Crimean War, 8: cultivates

211; and Anglo-Ottoman talks

Syrian

on Egypt, 195, 218, 223, 225,

Catholics.

12,

46;

230;

defeated by Prussia, I 2: 1878:

encourages Greek

demands,

opposes

Convention,

Egyptian

232-8;

offers

Britain talks, 239; and Prince

60, 62; offers Sultan loan. 68; and

Ferdinand, 242, 245, 248, 253;

deposition of Khedive Ismail,

fears Ottoman entry into Triple

70, 88;

Alliance,

1879:

1880-1: and

and Dulcigno crisis, 76-7; cession

of

Crete,

78;

250;

settles

with

Britain over Suez Canal, 250. Franco-Prussian war: 12, 240.

occupies Tunis, 79; 1881-3-,

and Egyptian crisis, 89-97

passim.',

and

abolition

of

Germany: unification, 12; and League of Three Emperors, 13, 56, 74;

99-

1876-9: and Russo-Ottoman war, 62;

100; and British occupation of

and Congress of Berlin, 74; and

financial

condominium,

Egypt, 111-2; 1884-5:

Dual Alliance, 74-5;

reaches

provisional

agreement with Britain,

116;

1880-1:

and Sultan's request f o r

advisers,

73-5;

and

Three

and London Conference, 116-7;

Emperors' Alliance, 75, 78-9;

reaches financial

and

tanding and

with

Sheikh

unders-

Britain, Said.

126;

125;

Gladstone's

policy, cession

76-7; of

Crete,

Concert proposes 78;

and

GENKRAL French occupation of Tunis, 79; 1881-3:

Prince Ferdinand, 243-5, 248-9, 252-

and Sultan's request f o r

alliance, Triple

80-1,

277

INDEX

3; and Second

Mediterranean

83-5;

and

Agreement,

239,

83;

and

uncertain

Alliance,

Egyptian crisis, 92-4, 97, 99-

Russia,

100; and British occupation of

Emperor, 253.

Egypt, 111-2; 1884-5:

and

251;

relations 251-3;

with

death

of

Great Britain: and Mehmed Ali crisis,

London

Conference,

6; supports Ottoman Empire as

1 16-7; advises Sultan to wait,

a buffer, 7-8; gains influence in

118;

Iraq and Arabia, 12; and Eastern

and

mission,

Hasan 127,

Fehmi

135-6;

P e n d j d e h crisis, 131,

and 134-6;

Crisis, 14-8; 1877-8: and Russo-Ottoman war, 54-

and Drummond Wolff mission,

5;

141-2, 149, 151;

Dardanelles,

1885-6:

and Eastern Rumelian crisis,

156,

160-2,

164-9;

Eastern Rumelian

and

settlement,

sends

warships 55;

through and

S t e f a n o treaty, 56-7;

San makes

secret agreements with Russia and

Austria-Hungary,

57-8;

176-7; and Batum, 183; and

concludes Cyprus Convention,

France, 186; refers Britain to

58-9; and Congress of Berlin,

Sultan, 186-7; and rumoured Russo-Ottoman alliance, 190;

59-61; 1878-80:

makes r e f o r m proposals,

and French overtures to Sultan,

64-9,

191;

warships,

1886-8:

and Bulgarian crisis. 198-

200, 202, 208, 211,

71-2;

Sultan

67;

withdraws fails

loan,

to

get

66-7;

and

213-4;

deposition of Khedive Ismail,

advises Britain to intimidate

70; threatens to coerce Sultan,

Sultan,

210;

relations

with

France, 210, 216, 231; renewal

of Triple

and

Alliance,

71; 1880-1:

adopts Concert policy and

attempts coercion of

216-7; and First Mediterranean

76-7;

opposes

Agreement,

Crete,

78;

support

216;

withdraws

from

Russia

in

Bulgaria, 216, 222 3; supports Britain in Egypt, 216, 224-5; opposes

Ottoman

entry

to

Triple Alliance, 229; favours Ottoman

adhesion

Mediterranean 229, 237-8,

249;

Reinsurance renews 231;

concludes

Treaty

support defends

Convention,

to

Agreement,

for

and Russia,

Egyptian

232-6;

and

Sultan,

cession and

of

French

occupation of Tunis, 79; and Armenian reforms, 76; 1881-2:

and Egyptian Crisis, 87-

100;

abolishes

financial

condominium, 99; 1883-4:

states terms f o r evacuation

of Egypt; cancels preliminary withdrawal to Alexandria, and orders abandonment of Sudan and Red Sea coast, 112; and Sultan's request for talks, 1145;

makes

provisional

agreement with France,

116;

278

ABDlJLHAMi

I)

II

AND

and failure of London

THE

GREAT

POWERS

Agreement, and question of Ottoman

Conference, 116-7; asks Sultan

adhesion,

216,

to occupy Zeyla and Tajoura,

Egyptian

Convention,

117-8;

keeps options open, 233; and

1884-5:

fears

Russo-Ottoman

agreement at Straits, 130,

119-20,

133-4; reaches financial

understanding with France, 122, 125; and Hasan Fehini mission,

229;

defends 233-8;

Prince Ferdinand, 242, 245-6; and

Second

Mediterranean

Agreement, 249-51; settles with France over Suez Canal, 250. Greece,

Kingdom

of; and

Russo-

122-4, 128-9, 135-6, 138; and

Ottoman war,

Italian occupation of Massowa,

treaty, 57, 60; and question of

122, 125,

new

128; o f f e r s Sultan

18; and

frontier

with

Ottoman

Red Sea ports, 126. 130, 136;

Empire,

threatens

Berlin conference award, 76-8;

with

diplomatic

Sultan,

Pendjdeh

breach

131-3;

crisis.

and 131-7;

seeks rapprochement

and Eastern

67,

73;

Rumelian

157-64,

168;

and crisis,

demands

territorial compensation,

abandons Sultan, 139 40; 1885-6:

62-4,

Berlin

with

172-

3, 178; her alleged negotiations

Sultan, 141-2; sends Drummond

with Bulgaria, 183; mentioned,

Wolff

46, 48.

to c o n c l u d e

Convention

with

Egyptian

Porte,

143-

52; and Eastern Rumelian crisis,

Hejaz: 46, 99, 113, 189.

157-69 passim.:

Hercegovina:

and

Eastern

Rumelian settlement. 174; and

See

Bosnia-

Hcrcegovina.

Greece, 173, 178; and Batum, 183; and Straits,

185-7,

90,

and

194-5, 202;

189-

Egypt,

India: 6-7, 12. Iran: 5, 29, 60.

182, 187-8, 195; and Armenian

Iraq: 12, 48.

reforms, 188; and

Italy: 12, 45, 48, 64;

dissensions

1880: and Dulcigno crisis, 76-7;

within cabinet, 195. 199; 1886-8:

and Bulgarian crisis, 199,

1881-2:

and Tunis, 79; and Egyptian

202, 206-11, 213-4: accused of

crisis,

planning Balkan confederation,

Alliance, 83;

202-5, 209; intimidates Sultan, 210-1; abortive Egyptian talks with

France,

195,

211;

1884-5:

93, 97;

occupies

enters Massowa,

1885-6:

and Eastern Rumelian crisis,

165;

with Porte, 211-2, 218-9, 223-

Sultan's overtures to

scheme,

222-3; and Mediterranean

122,

125-6; and Zeyla, 139;

concludes Egyptian Convention 5; and Sole Regent

Triple

and

Batum,

183;

and

France,

189, 191; 1886-7:

and

renewal

of

Alliance,

200,

Bulgarian

crisis, 200,

214;

First

and

215-6;

Triple and 207-8,

Mediterranean

GENERAL Agreement, 216; and AngloOttoman Egyptian Convention, 229, 235-6; and question of Ottoman adhesion to Mediterranean Agreement, 229, 236-9; and Prince F e r d i n a n d , 2 4 2 , 2 4 5 - 7 ; and Second Mediterranean A g r e e m e n t , 2 3 9 , 249, 2 5 1 ; rumoured support for Albanian autonomy, 250. Izmir; 77 Janina: 76, 78. Jeddah: 90. Kars: 17-8, 53, 58. Khartoum: 115, 126, 128. Kircali: 175, 180-1. Kotur: 60. Kremsier: 153. Kurds: 28. Kyustendil: 244. Languages School: 33. L e a g u e of the T h r e e E m p e r o r s : c o n c l u d e d 1872, 13; lapses 1879, 72, mentioned, 56, 62. London protocol (1877): 17. Macedonia: and San Stefano treaty, 53, 105; and Berlin treaty, 46, 61; rising in, 64; and Eastern R u m e l i a n crisis, 153, 156-7; Bulgarian ambitions in, 105, 184, 198, 209; precautionary f o r c e in, 181, 204-5, 241-2; and rumoured plan for independent AlbanianMacedonian kingdom, 250. Malta: 97. M a s s o w a : Italian o c c u p a t i o n 125-6, 128, 145-6, 191.

of,

INDEX

279

Mauser company: 217. Mecca: 46, 89. Medina: 46. Mediterranean Agreements: first agreement, February-March 1887, 216; Ottoman adhesion m o o t e d , 229, 2 3 6 - 2 3 8 , 2 4 9 ; Sultan's scepticism about, 2401, 2 4 6 - 7 , 2 4 9 - 5 0 ; second a g r e e m e n t , D e c e m b e r 1887, 250; mentioned. 239, 252, 255-8. Merv: 119. Metzovo: 76, 78. Moldavia: 8, 12. M o n t e n e g r o , Principality of: and Eastern crisis, 14-8; and San Stefano treaty, 53; and Berlin t r e a t y , 57-8, 6 0 ; and n e w frontier with Ottoman Empire, 67, 73; and Berlin conference award, 76-8; Russia's influence in, 101, 104, 227; and Eastern R u m e l i a n crisis, 157, 159, 172; and d i s t u r b a n c e s on Ottoman frontier, 182; mentioned, 46, 48. Morocco: 29, 236. M u h a r r e m , Decree of (1881): 33, 107. Mytilene: 189. Novi Pazar, sancak of: 63-4, 66-7, 70. Omdurman: 4. Ottomanism: 9, 24-5. Pan-Islamism: 29, 41, 49, 88, 93. P a r i s , T r e a t y of ( 1 8 5 6 ) : 8, 11; abrogation of Black Sea clauses (1871): 12, 119 fn. 2. Penjdeh crisis: 131-7, 141. Persian Gulf: 58.

280

ABDULHAMlL")

Philippopolis:

14; coup

II at,

AND 153,

155; Ottoman delegates sent to,

167-8;

mentioned,

14,

THE

GRHAT

Straits,

61;

POWERS

and

evacuation

question

of

forces

of from

Balkan peninsula, 62-4, 67-8, 70; evacuates Erzurum, 64;

179. Plevna: 4, 17-8.

and Cyprus Convention, 66;

Poland, partition of: 5, 64,

concludes peace treaty with Porte, 67; forestalls Ottoman

Pomaks: 64, 157.

occupation of Balkan range, Ragozna range: 63, 67.

68; quarrels with

Red Sea coast: proposals lor Ottoman

74-5;

occupation

of,

114-5,

117,

1880-2:

and

Germany,

British

Concert

122, 125-6, 130, 136, 138-9.

policy, 76-7, 80;

See also M a s s o w a ,

Three Emperors' Alliance, 78-

Sheikh

Said, Suakin, Tajoura, Zeyla. Reinsurance Treaty ( 1 8 8 7 ) :

215-6,

231, 238.

9; and French occupation of Tunis,

79;

and

Skobelev

affair,

84;

and

Egyptian

crisis, 92-3, 97;

Rodop district: 64, 175, 180-1. Romania: and Russo-Ottoman war,

1882-5:

rapprochement

Sultan, 101-3; and

17; and San Stefano treaty,

with

Balkans,

53; and Berlin treaty. 60; and

103-4; exercises influence in

Austria-Hungary,

Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia,

83,

103;

and Sultan's proposed Balkan

104-5; quarrels with

league,

Alexander of Bulgaria, 105-6;

175; and

British

plan

rumoured

for

confederation. mentioned,

Balkan

and

202-3;

Emperors' designs

227-8. early wars with 5-6; and

8;

Straits,

119-20,

cultivates

mission,

Balkan

war

to

Massowa,

125;

membership

of

14-7;

and

Caisse,

and

Ottoman

on

agreement of

57-9; Berlin,

59-60; makes declaration on

Sultan,

Drummond

seeks Egyptian Penjdeh

144,

151;

134-5;

and

Wolff

mission,

and

Zulfikar

arrangement, 149, 151;

threatens to occupy Istanbul, Britain.

127;

135;

occupy

crisis, 131-7; urges neutrality

and San Stefano treaty, 53-4;

Congress

129-30,

and

with

55; makes secret

123, Sultan

13;

Emperors. Crisis,

urges

1878-9: and Edirne armistice, 18, 53;

and

at

Straits, 120; and Hasan Fehmi

Empire, 17-8;

with

106;

Crimean

Three 1877-8

Three

Ottoman

Slavs, 11-2; and League of Eastern

of

Alliance,

130; fears British designs at

Empire, War,

renewal

Prince

annexes Merv, 119; alleged

12, 4d. 48, 81,

Ruschuk: 219. Russia:

concludes

1885-6:

and Eastern Rumelian crisis, 153, 156-69 passim.; Eastern settlement,

and

Rumelian 174,

176-8;

and Greece 178; and Prince

GENERAL Alexander, 179-80; intimidates Sultan,

181-2; makes

Batum

demarche,

183; o f f e r s Sultan

assurance,

187; and

Russian

alliance scare, 189-91; 1886-8:

and

downfall

Alexander,

crisis,

281

Salonika: 62-4, 67, 81, 179, 246. San Stefano, Treaty of (1878): 18, 42, 53-8, 102, 105, 203, 217. Sardinia: 8. Serbia, Principality of

(1830-1878),

Prince

K i n g d o m of (1878-1918): and

and

Eastern crisis, 14-6; and Russo-

198-209

Ottoman war, 18, 62, 248; and

of

197-8;

Bulgarian

INDEX

53;

and

treaty, 57-8, 60;

and

212-4; breaks

with

San

Austria-Hungary, 207-8,

215;

Berlin

rebuffs

Germany,

216;

Austria-Hungary, 84, 103; and

threatens

Sultan,

passim.,

military

revolts

217;

in

and

Bulgaria,

S t e f a n o treaty,

Eastern Rumelian crisis,

154,

157-8,

160;

and

war

with

169,

172,

219-20; proposes Sole Regent,

Bulgaria,

162-7,

221-3; concludes

176;

Sultan's

treaty,

Reinsurance

231;

proposes

and

Balkan

Temporary Regent, 231-2; and

rumoured

Egyptian

Bulgaria,

Convention,

218,

league,

to

188; and

Ottoman

British

adhesion to Triple

Alliance,

confederation,

232-8;

175;

plan

fears

230,

plan

mentioned,

101, 183-4, 227-8.

Ernroth as Temporary Regent, and

joint

military

action

against Bulgaria, 244; expands Ernroth proposal, 248-9; drops Ernroth proposal, 248-9; drops Ernroth

proposal,

250;

and

tension with Germany, AustriaHungary, 251; proposes

that

Sultan notify Prince Ferdinand his presence illegal, 252-3. Russo-Ottoman Peace Treaty (1879); 63, 67, 45 , 53 , 74. Convention

46,

48,

81,

armistice

83,

(1885):

169. Serbo-Bulgarian

agreement

normalisation

of

on

relations

(1886): 199. Serbo-Bulgarian

peace

conference

(1886): 172. Serbo-Bulgarian peace treaty (1886): 176-7. Sheikh Said: 126. Silistra: 219. Skobelev affair: 84. Spain: 236.

War

Indemnity

(1882);

182, 190, 217.

101-3,

Straits, of Bosphorus and Dardanelles: passage of, by British warships (1878), 55, 67, 72; and Berlin treaty, 60-1; British

Safavids: 4.

Balkan

Skiernewice: 118.

Russo-Ottoman war (1877-8); 33, 41, Russo-Ottoman

Serbo-Bulgarian

rumoured 202-3;

Ferdinand,

proposes

her

invade

for

230, 239-40, 250; and Prince 242-3;

proposed

ordered Russia's control,

to

warships

(1879),

71;

ambition

to

102;

alleged

282

A B D Ü L H A M I I>

Russo-Ottoman discussion 119-20, designs on,

AND

regarding,

130,

Penjdeh crisis,

II

173; 131-7;

141-2,

T H E

144,

117; France occupies, 27-8, 34. 45-7, 50.

158;

Tell el-Kebir: 4, 98-9.

184-7,

217;

Thassons:

202,

Thessally: 54, 60-1, 76, 78.

189,

191,

193-4,

Bulgarian

crisis,

210-1;

and

Ottoman

adhesion

Alliance

question

or

Agreement,

of

Triple

228-9,

251;

Three E m p e r o r s ' A l l i a n c e : 1881,

and

convention,

75-9;

106;

and

and

Sultan

lapses,

239.

Straits C o n v e n t i o n ( 1 8 4 1 ) ; Straits Convention

189.

Thrace: 54.

Mediterranean

fate of Egyptian 233, 235,

to

of,

6.

(187IS:

119,

122.

T a n z i m a t r e f o r m s : 7 - 1 2 , 18, 2 1 , 2 3 - 5 ,

p o s s i b l e O t t o m a n a l l i a n c e s at, and

concluded

renewed

Russia,

215;

1884,

102,

104;

107-8,

154-5;

possible

revival

241,

245;

226-7,

mentioned, 80, 9 2 ,

fn.

141,

158,

185.

2. Suakin;

P O W E R S

Tajoura: Ottoman occupation mooted,

and British

G R E A T

British 114,

occupation

of,

191; proposed

occupation

of,

136,

138,

143,

224;

rumoured

1 12,

126,

145-6,

Khedive

126, 113;

Egypt

112;

abandons.

115;

mission

Ottoman

mooted,

to, 129,

of, 136;

230-2,

250.

189, 191, 2 1 4 , 2 2 9 , French

occupation,

mentioned,

235. 79-80;

232.

I J n k i a r - S k e l e s s i , treaty o f ( 1 8 3 3 ) , 7,

112,

takeover

113-4,

215;

mooted,

T u n i s : B i s m a r c k o f f e r s to F r a n c e , 7 5 ;

requests

Ottoman volunteers for,

1882, 83200,

mentioned,

237, 240, Tripoli:

1887,

adhesion

226-9;

219,

112,

renewed

Ottoman

129-30,

understanding regarding, 2 4 0 .

Gordon's

4;

Anglo-Italian

S u d a n : M a h d i s t revolt in. 143;

Triple Alliance: concluded

Ottoman

103,

6-

190.

Varna: 202, 244. Venetians:

4.

r e l i e f expedition t o . 1 17, 1 2 4 , 136;

and

mission,

Drummond 144, 1 4 9 - 5 1 ,

S u d a n e s e slave trade: 1 4 6 .

Wolff

W a l l a c h i a : 8 , 12.

182.

Yemen: 97. Y o u n g O t t o m a n s : 11.

148-50.

S u e z C a n a l : B r i t i s h interests at, 5 8 , 89;

British

(1882),

expendilion

97-8;

international concerning, 144,

to

proposed

arrangements 111,

151, 2 1 9 ,

121,

250.

S y r i a : 6 , 12, 7 0 , 8 9 , 1 5 9 . 2 3 5 .

125,

Zanzibar: 29. Zeyla:

117,

122,

130,

136,

138-9,

191. Zulfikar agreement ( 1 8 8 5 ) : 149,

152.

INDEX OF PERSONS Abdulaziz (1830-76), Sultan

1861-

emerging suspicions of British

76: 11, 13-4.

designs

accession,

his

Arab

tsmail, 70, 88; his

15; first acts as

growing

Sultan, 16-7; question of his

self-confidence, 70-1;

calls

responsibility

Britain's

fears

Russia,

17;

education,

for war

with

character

and

Britain

bluff,

71;

seeking

Armenian

state, 71;

19-20; autocratic

outlook, 20-2; conservatism,

1880:

his

plans

for

internal

22-3; view on reform, 23-4;

reconstruction,

views on religion, 24-9; and

G e r m a n y f o r support,

Pan-Islamism,

7 3 ; turns

to

73-5;

29-30;

rela-

alarmed

tions with Ministers,

30-5;

Concert of Europe 76; seeks

Palace

36-9;

entourage,

by

Gladstone's

German

mediation

general approach to foreign

Dulcigno,

77;

policy, ch. iii,

German policy vindicated, 77;

1878

passim.;

takes personal charge of

1881:

over

believes

his

endorses German proposal

government, 53; and Treaty of

for cession of Crete to Greece,

San

78;

Stcfano,

Britain,

54;

54-5;

doubts suspects

over

seeks

German

Tunis,

Austria-Hungary, 55-6; con-

offensive

cludes

alliance with

Cyprus

Convention,

79;

and

support proposes

defen-sive

Germany

59; and Berlin Congress, 59-

Austria-Hungary,

60; argues Treaty of Berlin

response to E g y p t i a n

and

80;

his crisis

f o r e s h a d o w s partition, 61-2;

misrepresented,

fears fresh war, 62-3; draws

British-backed

parallel with fate of Poland,

atism and Arab Caliphate: 89-

64; sees British proposals for

90;

Asiatic r e f o r m as threat to

investigation

independence, 64-5; suspends

early suspicions of Urabi, 92;

Bosnian

negotiations

with

amend

British

proposals,

66;

reform requests

British loan, 66-7;

convention

67; with

fears separ-

mission

of

to Egypt,

91; in

Egypt, 92; 1882:

renews alliance overtures to Vienna, 80-1; defends policy of reliance upon Germany and

concludes peace treaty with Russia,

sends

87-9; Arab

seeks G e r m a n assistance

Austria-Hungary, 66; seeks to

1879:

upon

subjects, 70; deposes Khedive

Abdiilhamid II, Sultan 1876-1909: his

concludes Austria-

Austria-Hungary, receives

German

81 3; military

advisers, 84; treats Berlin as

Hungary, 67-8; defers entry of

political

observatory,

85;

Ottoman

hopes for German support

in

garrisons

into

Eastern Rumeli a, 68; seeks to

Egypt, 93-4; sends

pre-empt British proposals for

Esad to Cairo, 94;

Asiatic reforms, 68-9; his

Ahmed

284

ABDULHAMID

II

AND

THE

GREAT

suspects IJrabi an Arab nationalist, 95-7; sends Dervi§ Pa§a to Egypt,

1883:

9.5-6;

invites

programme, 167-9; secret overtures lo Nelidov, 173; 1886: fears major Balkan crisis, 171-3;

IJrabi to Istanbul, 96; suspects

rearms,

British

alliance

with

concern lest Urabist movement

Balkan

league,

spread to Ottoman

Eastern

Rumelian

backing

I rabi,

97-8;

Asia,

99;

173-4; proposes

close

Bulgaria

and

174-5;

and

settlement,

improves relations with Russia,

176-8; disillu-sioned with Prince

101-5;

Alexander and Britain,

his views on foreign

policy

fear of Russia,

formulated, 108-9; and British

Egyptian

occupation

179-81;

181-2;

seeks

settlement

111-2;

sees Sudanese Mahdi as second

Batum,

fears

Anglo-

Urabi, 112-3; refuses Khedive's

Russian contest, and

broaches

request for volunteers, 113;

question of alliances,

of

Egypt,

his

suspicions

intentions,

of

114-5;

British criticises

Anglo-French agreement,

116;

and British o f f e r of Red

Sea

coast, 117-8; and

Skiernewice

meeting, 106, 118; decorated by Tsar, 120; sends Hasan Fehmi Pa§a to London, 12 and occupation

2:

ol

Massowa,

125-7; and offer of Suakin, 129; considers recalling I ehmi, 127, 133; and Penjdeh crisis, 134-7; his faith in 128,

142-3; and

130,

Salisbury,

negotiations

182, 187-8,

with

Britain,

1884: refuses to take over Sudan, 114;

1885:

POWERS

183;

and

overthrow

send warships to Varna, 202; and Balkan confederation scare, 2023; his debate with Kamil Pa§a, 203-5;

proposes

Mingrelia's

candidacy,

1887-8:

fears Britain, 209-11; seeks

understanding 211-2;

way

out

seeks

negotiations

collapse

war,

of Three

166;

and

Empires'

London,

Bulgarian

scheme,

155-6; changes ministers, 156;

Bulgarian

with

and

impasse,

Empires'

206-8;

recalls Gadban, 209.

from

prog-ramme, 161-5; and Serbo-

German

mediation, 206; and Prince of

reaction to Philippopolis coup, cooperation,

Prince

Efendi to Sofia, 201; o f f e r s to

seeks

Three

of

Alexander, 197-8; sends Gadban

fears of revolution. 149-51; his

and

184,

192; his rearmament plans, 194;

monarchy

Russia's

183-91;

and White's appointment,

with Drummond Wolff, 144-51;

157-60;

195; and

214;

dual

212,

of

214;

Bulgarian

distances

self

216-8;

and

Russia, with

Drummond

W o l f f , 218-9; and Sole Regent scheme, Egyptian

221-3;

finalises

conven-tion,

223-6;

and Triple Alliance, 227-8, 230; loses c o n f i d e n c e in

Germany,

232, 236; a b a n d o n s

Egyptian

convention,

232-8;

INDEX

OF

and Mediterranean Agreement, and

2 3 7 8,

election

Ali Nizami P a j a , Marshal: 80, 91-2, 95.

240-1;

of

Prince

Ali

Ferdinand, 241-3; and Prince Ferdinand's

entry

into

Riza

Pa§a,

the

Serasker

as

attitude,

his

to

uncer-

Germany's

245-50;

fears

Arsenal,

1879-85;

1885-91: 35,

Árifi Paga (1830-95), Prime Minister 1879,

Foreign

Russia's request that he notify

1877,

1882-4,

Ferdinand

illegality

of

of

the

his

position,

see

§erif

252-3.

Council of State 1885-91: 34, Dadyan

Ministry

Kazazyan Finance

Minister

(7-1901), at

238.

1886-7, 1888-91: 37.

Council

of

State,

Delegate, Eastern

Ahmed

Commission,

Efendi

1885-

Asim P a j a (1827-?), President of the

Ahmed Esad: see Seyyid Ahmed Esad. Esad

Foreign

1880-4,

1901: 39, 121, 184-5, 234,

(1832-91),

Minister of the Privy Purse 1880-5,

Efendi

Undersecretary

Abdulmuttalib. Paja

Minister President,

70, 149, 156. Artin

Abdulmuttalib:

156,

168.

European war, 25 1 -2; accepts Prince

Palace

Ali Saib P a j a (1826-91), Marshal of

scheme,

245-9;

Principal

Secretary, 1880-5: 37, 156.

Bulgaria, 243-5; and Ernroth tainty

Agop

285

PERSON

(1813-89),

Foreign

§eyhiilislam 1878-89: 138.

1878;

Rumelian 1878-9;

Minister,

Ahmed Midhat Efendi: 28.

1884-5;

Ahmed Muhtar Paja: see Gazi Ahmed

Religious

1880-2,

Minister

of

Endowments,

1882-4: 34-5, 117, 126, 129,

Muhtar P a j a .

132-3, 137, 145-8, 156.

Aleko Pa§a Bogoridi, (1822-1910), governor-general of Eastern Rumelia 1879-84: 104, 106,

Baker Paja: 69, 71-2.

231.

B e a c o n s f i e l d , Lord, British

Alexander II, Tsar of Russia 1855-81: 15, 54, 68.

54, 72.

Alexander III, Tsar of Russia 188194: 156, 158, 179-81,

Bismarck, Otto Prince von, German

187,

Chancellor

197-8, 221, 250-1. Alexander

Battenberg

Prince 1886: 81, 202,

of

204,

222, 242. Ali F u a d B e y : 91.

153-69,

185, 209,

188 211,

1871-90:

Ottoman views of, 42, 74-5;

(1857-93),

Bulgaria

104-6,

183,

Prime

Minister 1874-1880: 15, 17,

1879174197-9, 220,

1880:

accepts Sultan's request for advisers,

73;

seeks

Three

Emperors' Alliance, 75; and Dulcigno crisis, 77; 1881: proposes cession of Crete, 78; concludes

Three

Emperors'

Alliance, 78-9; and

French

occupation of Tunis, 75, 79; and Sultan's offer of

286

ABDÜLHAMM)

II

AND

alliance, 80-4; and Egyptian crisis, 75, 92; 1882: sends Sultan military advisers, 84-5; and Anglo-French Joint Note to Egyptian government, 81, 93: declines Sultan's request lor intervention, 94; and Egyptian c o n f e r e n c e , 95-7; achieves Anglo-Erench quarrel, 99-100; 1882-5:

1886:

and Eondon Conference on Egyptian finance, 116; seeks Hasan Fehmi's recall, 127; and Drummond Wolff mission, 142, 149; and Sultan's proposed appeal for Russian support n Eastern Rumelia, 156;

fears possible Franco-Russian alliance; advises Britain to ally with Sultan, 186, 190; o f f e r s Russia free hand in Bulgaria, 199; and despatch of Russian ships to Varna, 202; advises B r i t a i n to frighten Sultan, 210: 1887-8: his d i l e m m a , 215-6; encourages Mediterranean Agreement and renews Triple Alliance, 216: distances Germany f r o m Russia, 216; opposes Ottoman adhesion to Triple Alliance, 229; favours Ottoman adhesion to Mediterranean Agreement, 229; concludes Reinsurance T r e a t y with R u s s i a , 231; refuses to propose Temporary R e g e n t s c h e m e , 232; and ratification of AngloOttoman Egyptian Convention, 233, 236: favours strengthening Mediterranean

THE

GREAT

POWERS

Agreement, 239; refuses to restrain P r i n c e F e r d i n a n d , 243; advises Sultan to occupy Eastern Rumelia, 245, 248; his s u s p i c i o n s of R u s s i a revive, 249; repairs relations with Russia, 252-3. Blanc,

Baron Alberto, Italian ambassador to Porte 1887-91: 227, 229, 236-7, 241, 247, 249.

Bleinchroeder, Gerson von: 85. Calicc

Heinrich Baron, AustroH u n g a r i a n a m b a s s a d o r to Porte 1880-1906: 80, 136, 161, 165, 167, 190, 205, 214, 222, 226-7, 229, 241, 245.

Cevad Pa§a (1851-1900), minister to Cetinje 1884-90, Grand Vizier 1891-5: 172. Cevdet P a j a (1822-95), Justice Minister 1879-82, 1886-90; Eastern Rumelian C o m m i s sioner 1885: 35, 167-8. Chamberlain, Joseph: 194. Charles I, Prince of Romania 186678; King of Romania 18781914: 245. Churchill, Lord Randolph, British Chancellor of the Exchequer 1886: 194-5, 199, 211. C r i s p i , F r a n c e s c o , Italian P r i m e Minister 1887-91: 249. Derby, Lord British Foreign Secretary 1874-8: 54, 56. Dervig Pa§a (1817-96), Marshall: 38, 95-7. Dreysse Pa§a: 39, 160, 188-9. Dufferin, Lord, British ambassador to Porte 1881-4: 41, 50, 97-9, 1 17.

INDEX

OF

Pa§a

(1818-93),

Minister,

287

Gazi Osman Paga (1832-97),

Ebu'lhiida: see §eyh Ebiilhiida. Edhem

PERSON

1878-85,

Interior

1883-5: 35,

Serasker

Marshal

of

the

Palace 1878-97: 17 35, 38,

121

84, 103, 156.

127, 138, 180. Emin Bey, Palace Chamberlain: 37.

Giers, Nicholas Karlovich, Russian Foreign

Ernroth, General K. G., proposed by of Bulgaria: 244. 246, 248-

1882-95:

Gladstone, William Ewart, Prime

50.

British

Minister

1880-5,

1886:

Esad Pa§a (1837-1894), ambassador to Paris 1880-97: 233.

Minister

102, 163, 221, 239, 244.

Russia as Temporary Regent

1880-3:

his Concert of Europe

policy, 76-85; and Urabi, 96; Fehmi Paga: See Hasan Fchmi Pa§a.

1884-5:

and Gordon,

concern

Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, Prince of

for

115; his

Straits,

120;

Bulgaria, 1887-1918: 220 fn.

agrees to receive Hasan Fehmi

17, 241-6, 252-3.

Pa§a,

Emile,

French

of

office, 140.

Friedrich Wilhelm, German Crown 142, 251;

fall

Penjdeh crisis, 134-6; loses

Foreign

Minister 1886-8: 233, 238. Prince,

and

128; and Hasan

Fehmi Pa§a, 132, 139; and

1880-1, 1883-5: 123-4. Flourens,

122-3;

Khartoum,

Ferry, Jules, French Prime Minister

Goltz Pa§a (Freiherr Colmar von der Goltz): 84, 137, 156,

German

173,

190, 231, 240.

Emperor (1888), 253.

Gordon, General: 112, 115, 117. Gadban

Efendi, Commissioner Sofia

1885-8:

177,

181,

167-9,

201-2,

at

174,

Graham, General: 112, 114-5. Granville,

208-10,

253-4. Gambetta,

122,

Leon,

French

Prime

Minister 1881-2: 92-3. Gavril P a j a Krästovich Rumelia 1884-5:

125,

129-30,

Haci Ali Bey, Palace Chamberlain:

106, 153,

37.

Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pa§a (18391919),

Marshal

Arsenal

1878; Chief of the Staff

Deputy President, Inspection

of

the

Military

Commission,

187,

1885-1908: 211,

17,

218, 237.

pretender:

88, 92, 144, 151. Hasan Hüsnü Pa§a (1832-1903), Navy Minister

1878-80;

1880-5; High Commissioner Egypt

132-7,

139.

Halim, Prince, Egyptian

General

Foreign

Grekov, Dimitär: 201, 206.

158.

182,

British

(1817-98),

Governor-General of Eastern

in

Lord,

Secretary, 1880-5: 114, 117,

1880-1903:

35,

138. Hasan

Fehmi

Pa§a

(1836-1910),

Minister of the Privy Purse 1878;

Minister

Works,

of

1879-82;

Public

Education

Minister

1882-4;

Minister

1884-5; Extraor-

Justice

288

A B D t i L H A M 1 I)

II

A N D

T H E

G R K A T

dinary A m b a s s a d o r to L o n d o n 1885:

35,

37,

121.

d e c l i n e s to restrain P r i n c e

123-9,

Ferdinand

131-8. Hayreddin

Pa§a

Vizier,

(1821-90), 1878-9:

Grand

22,

Russia,

69-70 123,

1 7 4 fn. 12. Pa§a,

Augustus,

(1822-86),

com-

mander, Black Sea squadron, 1877;

chief

1877;

commandei

1881: 38,

of

123,

naval

staff,

of

fleet,

126.

Riza

Bey

(1838-94),

m i s s i o n to B u l g a r i a in 217-20, 241, Iddeslcigh,

Lord,

1886-7:

191-2,

199,

Count

Foreign 187-8,

210-1.

Nikolai.

ambassador

to

Russian

Porte

Paja:

with

second

agreement,

at

21-

Mehmed

pretender: 1 6 3 ,

172.

Karavelov, Pctko. Bulgarian 1886:

197,

Regent

206.

Kaulbars, General N i c h o l a s ,

Russian

commissioner

Bulgaria

1886:

in

198-202,

207. K i b r i s l i M e h m e d K à m i l Paga ( 1 8 3 2 Governor-General

Aleppo secretary,

Under-

Interior

Ministry

1879-80;

Minister

of

Religious Endowments I,

of

1877-9;

1882-5;

1885-91,

1880-

Grand

Vizier

1894-5,

Aydin

1908-9,

1895-1907:

and o p i n i o n s , 1863-79:

87-9.

/ 8 8 5 :

(Georgi

l'rodanov), 168.

Gustav

Couni,

Austro-

Hungarian

foreign

minister

and

Sultan's

alliance overtures, 8 0 - 4 ; m i s givings over Russian in B u l g a r i a , with

Drummond

145-50; appointed Vizier,

opposes

:

Egyptian

with

148,

policy

199-200;

public

Russia,

207-8;

and M e d i t e r r a n e a n a g r e e m e n t , 2 1 6 ; and q u e s t i o n o f O t t o m a n a d h e s i o n , 2 2 9 ; f a \ o t i r s streng t h e n i n g of a g r e e m e n t ,

239;

invasion

of

as

156;

desires British alliance,

Kaehler, General: 84.

1881-1895

Wolff, Grand

of

character

32-4;

negotiates

convention

Sultan's barber:

breach

Kibrisli

1912-3; Governor-General

Porte, 1886-7:

Efendi

Sec

K a r a d j o r d j e v i c , Prince Petar, S e r b i a n

1864-

d'affaires

Ismail, Egyptian Khedive,

Kalnoky,

Kàmil

22.

Imbert, French chargé

Jorji

and

Mediterranean

1913),

Britisn

194,

1887:

243-4.

Secretary,

70,

248;

special

Hiiseyin: see §crif Hiiseyin.

77:

243;

K à m i l Pa§a.

Charles

Admiral

Ignatyev,

force,

251.

H i r s c h , B a r o n M a u r i c e de: 120,

Hiiseyin

by

d e n i e s intends to settle

88.

Hobart

P O W E R S

152;

Eastern

R u m e l i a , 1 5 5 ; early v i e w s o n Eastern Rumelian

settlement,

158-9;

to

prefers

setllement

to

leave

Powers,

urges White to accept Empires' and to

programme,

Serbia's

Bulgaria, act

warns

160; Three 164;

invasion

of

165-7; urges Sultan unilaterally,

Three

programme

167-8;

Empires

their

necessitates

invasion of Bulgaria,

169;

INDEX 1886:

OF

PERSON

urges Sultan to settle with

Regent scheme, 221-3;

Princc Alexander, 174; asks

concludes Egyptian Conven-

Prince Alexander to accept

tion with D r u m m o n d Wolff,

revised

Eastern

Rumelian

223-5; proposes adhesion to

settlement, 177; fears Russia

Triple

may

178;

misreads situation, 230-1; and

intentions,

struggle over ratification of

support

Greece,

suspects Russia's 180-1;

predicts

Russian

Franco-

initiative

Alliance,

226-9;

Egyptian Convention, 232-6;

over

favours

adhesion

Egypt, 182; advises Sultan to

Mediterranean

revise his attitude

236-8;

towards

despatch of troops to Egypt,

to

Agreement,

favours

unilateral

election of Bulgarian Prince,

182; fears Russia's ambitions

241; and election of Prince

at the Straits, 184; propses

Ferdinand, 242-3; and Russian

British

proposal

alliance,

attempt

on

his

Egyptian

184-5;

life,

187;

talks

downfall

rumoured,

190;

position, Kü$iik M e h m e d 1914),

prepares to sound Salisbury about

an

advises

alliance, Sultan

alliances,

to

avoid and

Bulgaria,

197-8;

offers

to

1878;

and

Hudavendigar Minister Minister

programme

for

Bulgarian parties, 214, 216preliminary

discus-sions Wolff,

with 218-9;

foresees independent bid by Bulgarians to elect

opposes

of

1878; Justice

1879;

Prime

1879-80,

1880-2,

53; 1879: Layard's hostility to; 1880:

7; his dismissal dem-anded by

220;

1878;

character and opinions, 32-3,

for Bulgaria, 212-4; proposes

adv i s e s

abandon

Upper

1895, 1901-3, 1908, 1911-2:

proposes coalition Regency

Drummond

Minister of

1882-3; Grand Vizier 1883-5,

Sultan, 203-5;

217;

Interior

President

1878; G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l

mediate

and Russian intentions with

Egyptian

(1838Palace

Governor-General of Ankara

200-1, 206-7; debates British

Russia

Said Pa§a

H o u s e of P a r l i a m e n t

between Russia and Bulgaria,

political

253. Principal

1878-9;

election of new Prince, 198200;

Prince

the Privy Purse 1877-8, 1878,

downfall of Prince Alexander of

notify

Secretary 1876-8; Minister of

192-3;

193-4;

to

Ferdinand of illegality of his

with

Montebello, 189, 191-2; his

1887-8:

289

Sultan

Russia, Russia's

Prince, to 221; Sole

scepticism

about

German

ambitions, 74-5; 1884-5:

urges Egyptian settle-ment with

Britain,

113-4;

and

dispute over Balkan railway concession,

120-1;

states

Sultan wishes to send special ambassador to London, 121; his rivalry with Hasan Fehmi Paga, 123-4; resists German

290

ABDÜLHAMII)

II

AND

pressure to recall Fehmi from London,

THE

Mahmud

Ottoman

neutrality

Penjdeh

crisis,

British

pressure

Straits

133;

fears

to

open

Minister 1881-2: 91-4. Maksimov,

at

Mehmed Zafir: see §eyh Mehmed Zafir. Midhat Pa§a (1822-84), President of

134;

warns

the Council

that

Egypt's

army,

reform

1877-8; Governor-General of

rejects

Syria

138-9;

his

and

cool

Drummond

with

Wollf,

1882,

to

Taif

1881;

1884: 15-6, 22, 31

fn. 60, 70, 97, 107, 114, 232.

145-8;

1862-1882,

King

of

Serbia

1882-9: 83, 154, 159, 162-3,

Said Pa§a (1834-7), Ambassador

Governor-

Milan IV, Obrenovic, Prince of Serbia

dismissed, 148, 156. Minister

exiled

murdered

mission, 145; his struggle to negotiations

1878-80;

General of Aydin 1880; tried

and

response to Drummond W o l f f s control

1876;

to

British o f f e r of Suakin Zeyla,

of State

Grand Vizier 1876-7; exiled,

138;

Fehmi's proposal

165, 172, 202-3.

Foreign 1885-95;

Berlin,

Mingrelia, Nicholas Dadian, Prince of, Russian

1882-5:

for

1886: 207-

10, 212-3, 221.

218-9, 223-5, 229. 232-3.

Montebello, Layard, Sir Henry Austen,

candidate

Bulgarian throne

35, 77, 156, 162. 164, 208,

Gustave

de,

French

ambassador to Porte 1886-91:

British

ambassador to Porte 1878-80:

188-9, 191-2, 195, 225, 230,

59, 69-72, 89.

232-8, 250.

L e b i b E f e n d i , delegate

to

Eastern

Muhtar Pa§a: See Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Pa§a.

Rumelia 1885: 167 8. Miinir

Leuchtenberg, Prince of: 221. Lobanov-Rostovskii,

Prince

Alexis,

Russian ambassador to Porte

Pa§a

Master

Murad V (1840-1904), Sultan Musurus

Pa§a, Ottoman

(1844-99),

of

Ceremonies: 37. 1876:

14-5, 134.

1878-9: 68, 180. Macid

Dragoman

to

Sultan wavering, 135; rejects

Kurd

Second

Russian Embassy: 217.

formally declare neutrality in advance,

declines

(1818-83),

Mahmud Sami al-Barudi, Egyptian War

in

131;

Pa§a

71.

8; opposes Ottoman takeover of

Nedim

POWERS

Interior Minister 1879-83: 35,

127; nearly loses office, 127of Sudan, 129; gives assurance

GREAT

delegate

Bucharest peace talks

at

1886:

169. Mahdi, Sudanese (7-1885): 90, 112-5, 124-6, 143. Mahmud II, Sultan 1808-39, 6, 21.

Pa§a ( 1 8 0 9 - 9 1 ) ,

Ottoman

ambassador to London 85:

114,

125,

131-4,

1860158,

161. Mutkurov, Lt. Col., Bulgarian Regent 1886-7:

197.

Muzaffer Pa§a: 173.

INDEX Nachovich,

Grigor,

Foreign

OF

Bulgarian

Minister

1879-80,

PERSON Ragib

Bey

291

(1857-1920),

121, 234.

1886-7: 201, 209. Namik Paga, Marshal (1804-92): 38.

Re§id Bey (7-1888) Sultan's Private

Nassau, Prince of: 221.

Secretary

Nelidov, A. I., Russian ambassador to

80, 92.

1878-88:

37,

Porte 1882-97: 85, 103, 129,

Riza Bey: See Hiiseyin Riza Bey.

131, 133-4, 161-2, 165, 167,

Roscbcry,

169,

173,

176,

180,

182,

187, 189-90, 200, 203, 208, 213-4,

217-9,

221-3,

230,

Nikola, Prince of Montenegro 18601910; King of 1910-8:

Montenegro

Foreign 178,

182,

185. Rüstern Paga (1814-94), ambassador London

1885-94:

71-2,

120 f n . 3, 185-6, 189, 192-3, 195, 199. Said Pa§a: See Kü§ük Mehmed Said

Emmanuel

de,

French

ambassador to Porte 1882-6:

Pa§a and Kiird Said Pa§a. §akir Pa§a (1838-99), ambassador to St. Petersburg 1878-91:

136, 165. Northbrook, Lord, First Lord of the British

British 1886:

39,

172.

Ni§an Efendi: 37. Noailles,

Lord,

Secretary

to

232-8, 240, 242-3, 250.

Admiralty

1880-5:

Nusret Pa§a, Marshal (7-1895): 38.

Salisbury,

3rd

Marquis

Mikhail, Dragoman

Chief

Secretary 1885-6,

Russian

1878-90:

182,

of

British

(1830Foreign

1878-80,

1885-6,

Prime

Minister

1887-1892, Oldenburg, Duke of: 221.

171-

3, 179, 190, 221, 244. 1903),

117-8, 128.

Onou,

Second

Palace Chamberlain: 28, 37,

1886-92:

views

on

Ottoman Empire, 57, 72, 141; at Constantinople conference, 57;

244-5, 248-9. Osman Bey, Palace Chamberlain: 37.

1878:

Foreign

Secretary,

56;

Osman Digna, Sudanese rebel: 112-3.

seeks to predetermine results

Osman Pa§a: See Gazi Osman Paja.

of Berlin Congress, 57; his

Peter the Great, Tsar of Russia, 42.

and A u s t r i a - H u n g a r y ,

secret agreements with Russia 57-8;

uses Cyprus Conven-tion Radowitz,

Joseph

von,

German

ambassador to Porte 1882-92: 85, 127, 131, 133-6, 149-50, 158, 161-2, 165, 167,

to

gain control of Sultan, 58-9; 1878-80: Asiatic

presses

Sultan

reforms,

for

64-6;

169,

suspends pressure, and seeks

182,

198, 205-6. 208, 214,

loan for Sultan, 66-7; renews

216,

223-4,

pressure,

227,

229-30,

232-3, 237-8, 249-51.

68-9;

his

bluff

called, 71-2; loses office, 72;

292 1887-6:

A B D U LH A M I D

II

AND

THE

returns to office, 140; seeks rapprochement

with

POWERS

Egyptian convention, 233;

Sultan

extends deadline for ratifica235-6;

naval

and Germany, 140 I; control

tion,

of Straits his long-term goal,

demonstration, 237; declines

142-3; offers Sultan Egyptian

to reopen negotiations, 238;

under-standing,

rejects

mistrust of Bismarck,

239;

waives demand for voluntary

keeps

239;

recruit-ment,

accepts second Mediterranean

143-4; 150;

and

Egyptian convention, at Anglo-Ottoman

alliancc,

152;

proposes

personal

union

of

Eastern

Sandison,

80; 89. §erif Pa§a, Egyptian Prime Minister

Anglo -Ottoman

rebuffed by Bismarck, suspicion

British

1880-2: 97, 99.

1881-2; 91-4. §eyh

Ebu'lhiida es-Sayyadi

of

186,

Sultan's

(1849-

1909): 30.

understanding at Straits, 186; 210;

Alfred,

§erif Hiiseyin, Emir of Mecca 1877-

returns to office, 186; hints at

Sir

§erif Abdulmuttalib, Emir of Mecca

coercion of Bulgarians, 161; loses office, 176;

open,

Dragoman, 1860-1894; 190.

Rumelia

with Bulgaria, 158; opposes

options

agreement, 250-1.

150-1;

dismisses Kamil l'a^a's hint

1886-7:

GREAT

§eyh Mchmed Zafir: 30. Seyyid Ahmed Esad: 30, 94-5.

intimacy with Russia, 186-7,

Sayyid Fazil: 30.

194-5,

Stambolov Stefan, Bulgarian Regent

210;

sends

back to Istanbul. Near

White

187;

Eastern

challenged 194-5; options

policy

by

Churchill,

keeps

Egyptian

open,

1886-7: 197, 201.

his

Stoilov, Konstantin: 220, 243. Starcke, Captain: 84. Siireyya Pa§a (1845-94), 156.

determined to pre\ cut Russia from

occupying

Bulgaria,

Principal

Palace Secretary 1885-94: 37,

195;

Sweden, King of: 134.

199; inspires press campaign Tahsin

against Sultan, 210 1; 1 88 7-8:

assumes

foreign

Pa§a,

Principal

secretaryship, 211; appoints

Tevfik, Egyptian Khedive

Drummond Wolff to negotiate

87, 89-91,

Egyptian

settlement

125, 129.

Sultan,

211-2;

with offers

Palace

Secretary 1894-1908: 28.

Thornton,

Sir

1879-92:

94, 96,

Edward,

conditional evacuation, 219;

a m b a s s a d o r to Porte

secures Egyptian convention,

184-5,

224-5;

concludes

Mediter-

ranean agreement

216; and

proposed Ottoman

adhesion

to Mediterranean agreement, 229; refuses to amend

112-4, British 1886;

187-90.

Tsankov, Dragan: 212-4, 220. Tsanov,

Ilya,

Bulgarian

Foreign

Minister 1884-6: 175-7.

INDEX

OF

PERSON

293

A h m e d , leader of

Wolff, Sir Henry Drummond, British

Egyptian national movement

High Commissioner in Egypt

Urabi, Colonel 1881-2:

87,

91-9,

1885-7: 143-51, 182, 211-2,

112-3,

218-9, 223-6, 229, 233-8.

246.

W y n d h a m , G e o r g e , British Välkovich,

Dr. G c o r g i ,

d ' a f f a i r e s al Porte

Bulgarian

119-21,

representative at Porte 1886-

charge 1884-5:

133.

92: 212-4. Yusuf Riza Pa§a, (1826-95), president Waldemar

of

mooted

Denmark, as

of

Prince,

candidate

Imperial

Commission

for

Refugees 1880-94:

39,

190, 234, 241.

Bulgarian throne: 163, 198, 206. White,

Sir

William,

British

Zihni

Pa§a

(1839-1912),

Finance

ambassador to Porte 1885-6,

Minister, 1885, Minister of

1886-91: 39, 160, 162, 164-

Religious Endowments 1885-

6,

169,

202-3,

187, 206,

217, 222, 248.

191-2,

194,

6, 1890-1, Trade and Public

210-1,

214,

Works

Minister

1899-1909:

155.

1886-90,