Order and Disorder 9780313000744, 9780275967871

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ORDER AND DISORDER

ORDER AND

DISORDER David Z. Rich

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rich, David Z. Order and disorder / David Z. Rich. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0–275–96787–5 (alk. paper) 1. Order (Philosophy) 2. Crises (Philosophy) 3. Evolution (Biology)—Philosophy. Social evolution. I. Title. B105.O7R47 2001 003—dc21 00–032380 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available. Copyright 䉷 2001 by David Z. Rich All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 00–032380 ISBN: 0–275–96787–5 First published in 2001 Praeger Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com Printed in the United States of America TM

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48–1984). 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

4.

This work is dedicated to the memory of my parents, to my father Joseph, and my mother Vanessa, and the memory of my uncle Ralph; this work is also dedicated to my sisters, Beatrice and Shayna, to my family and friends, and especially to Diana Lerner for the order and disorder of our lives.

Contents Acknowledgments

ix

Part I: THE PROBLEM SITUATION 1

The Illusion of a Paradox

3

2

Complexity Theory: Comments and Critique

13

3

Chaos Theory: Comments and Critique

23

4

Rene´ Thom’s Catastrophe Theory: Comments and Critique

35

Part II: THE DYNAMICS OF CRISIS THEORY 5

Introduction to the Dynamics of Crisis Theory

43

6

Comments on Game Theory

49

7

Introduction to Crisis Theory

57

8

Order and Disorder I: Crisis Theory

73

9

Order and Disorder II: Dynamics and Discontinuity

81

viii

10

Contents

Acceptance and Rejection: The Critical Test

101

Part III: ORDER AND DISORDER 11

Introduction to Order and Disorder

149

12

Crisis Theory and the Strategy of Evolution

159

13

Order and Disorder in Our Contemporary Era

197

14

Order and Disorder in Our Contemporary Era: The Paradox of Industrialization

225

Concluding Comments: The Ethical Imperative—Dollo’s Law and Crisis Theory

239

Selected Bibliography

245

Index

249

15

Acknowledgments I wish to express my appreciation to my editor, Cynthia Harris, and to my production editor, Arlene Belzer, and my copyeditor, Gail Witman Andrus, for their professionalism and dedication while working with me on this book. My special thanks goes to Mr. Leslie Smith of the USIS in Tel Aviv for assisting me in my research and to the people at the library at the Museum of Natural History in New York for their assistance. These ideas have been developed over the years as a student and as a writer. The ideas expressed in this book are my own, and I bear responsibility for their clarity; nevertheless, this work stands as partial payment to the teachers and thinkers from whom I have learned.

PART I

THE PROBLEM SITUATION

1

The Illusion of a Paradox Conventional science is frequently blind to the connections that can be drawn between frustrated metals, the rise and fall of stock prices, and a host of other complex phenomena. Most scientists today restrict themselves to the detailed study of one small aspect of a single discipline within the branch of one tree of science: for example, the foamy structure of the universe; the decline of Partula snails on the Pacific island of Moorea; or the molecular structure of an enzyme from the Human Immunodeficiency Virus. This is inevitable, as more and more research becomes focused in ever smaller minutiae. Peter Coveney and Roger Highfield, Frontiers of Complexity1

The difficulties with determining the connection between frustrated metals and the rise and decline of stock prices are of the same type as determining the connections between a political decision by the head of state in one country and the rise and decline of stock prices in other countries. The existence of such connections and their variables go unnoticed because of the concentration on the specific issues of the general problem. Revitalizing the monetary values of frustrated metals (sometimes considered precious) becomes an issue when politicians peg their countries’ currencies in terms of these metals instead of basing their currencies’ values on the countries’ present and projected industrial and commercial output. Also, when economies falter, causing stock markets to decline seriously, these metals are often relied on as sources of wealth, as they were prior to the Great Depression. However, when stock market uncertainty exists, there is no guarantee that a connection between these metals and the

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The Problem Situation

markets’ stabilities will be established. Indeed, when the world’s markets declined sharply on October 17, 1997, due to the overheated and rapid decline of the Asian markets, the price of gold and other precious metals also declined shortly thereafter. Worldwide confidence in the stock markets was shaken but not to the point that these markets were abandoned. As for the study of the foamy structure of the universe, the assumption that such a structure exists is based on the mathematical relationships of quantum physics and provides a scientific approach to the microuniverse which, at this stage of our knowledge, is still speculation. An early expression of a foamylike structure of the universe was given by W. K. Clifford, who expressed it to the Cambridge Philosophical Society in 1870 and then elaborated on them within the framework of Einsteinian-Heisenbergian physics by John A. Wheeler.2 Clifford posited a universe in which positions in microspace are what we consider to be the motions of matter and that in the physical world nothing takes place but these variations.3 Wheeler extended Clifford’s, Einstein’s and Heisenberg’s works and posited his geothermodynamics, in which a charged particle is a sort of entrance or gateway to a little tunnel connecting one part of space to another, like a miniature space-bridge through another dimension. While Wheeler’s approach has not been successful, the works of the Polish physicist Theodor Kaluza and the Swedish physicist Oskar Klein showed that space and time can take on other than the four dimensions posited by Einstein, by space and time being rolled up into tight circles too small to be perceived so that the dimensions are at least five, one more for each “observed” dimension by a hypotheoretical creature residing within these space-time circles. These types of theories, in which extra dimensions are added to the Einsteinian four dimensions, are now called collectively Kaluza-Klein theories.4 As for the study of a certain species of snail such as the Partula snail on Moorea island, an extensive knowledge of biology and evolution are required in order to demonstrate the relationships between these snails and their relatives in other areas of the world so that their uniqueness in their relation to their habitat can be explained. Such properties as the snail’s eating habits, its local predators, and even the direction of the swirls on its shells have to be explained, with the explanation contributing to the overall picture of biology and evolution.5 Evolution theory may also be important in the study of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), because this virus tends to mutate as all other viruses do over time as a result of treatment and the build-up of natural immunity against them. This virus is certainly unique in that it breaks down the immune system of its host when it begins to develop, eliminating all natural defenses against other illnesses that would have otherwise been repelled with little effort and no damage by the healthy immune system. In this case, evolution theory not only pertains to the development of life forms over vast amounts of time but also to the development of a deadly virus for which no cure nor truly effective front line of defense has yet been found. Nevertheless, while evolution theory is

Illusion of a Paradox

5

important in the study of this virus, background knowledge such as the workings of vaccines, other immunodeficiency illnesses such as cancer in its many forms, is extremely important in providing a basis for combating this disease. In addition, such significant approaches as social and personal hygiene must be considered as scientists seek to understand the disease and to prevent it.6 There are, therefore, several difficulties with Coveney and Highfield’s statement. One difficulty is that they do not take fully into consideration that conventional science is practiced by scientists who, by the very nature of their inquiries, are far from conventional. For example, economists who study both micro- and macroeconomic systems and their dynamics with respect to international trade appreciate the significance of what Coveney and Highfield called “frustrated metals”; moreover, they are very much aware of the influences of international relations and domestic politics on local markets. Their studies of the various aspects of economics require advanced mathematics for systems analysis; yet, with their sophisticated tools for clarification and understanding, they remain in the realm of soothsayers with respect to the accuracies of their economic predictions. The science of economics is far from conventional.7 It is out of necessity that most scientists limit themselves to one small aspect of a single subdiscipline within one branch of the tree of science. Science is composed of knowledge so vast that adequate time for learning and researching several subdisciplines cannot be allotted. The study of the foamy structure of the universe requires learning micro- and macrophysics, the study of cosmology theories, astronomy, and all the required mathematics and related background information. The study of the decline of the Partula snail on the island of Moorea, requires the understanding of ecology, meteorology, and the sociopolitical issues involving that island. Understanding HIV and the AIDS virus and finding a cure for this biological scourge of our time requires intensive research; extensive background knowledge of the social factors that cause the epidemic; and the ability to formulate and test models for controlling and eradicating it. Coveney and Highfield are correct when they state that the background expertise and sophistication of techniques employed in any field are “so daunting that it is difficult to arrive at the cutting edge of knowledge without immense demarcation.”8 They further point out that the specialization entailed “brings with it for every small area of inquiry a unique methodology and jargon that are hard for the outsider to make sense of, let alone discover whether a common conceptual framework might be shared with other scientists working with different fields.”9 With respect to this last statement, two points must be made. One point pertains to their uses of methodology. For science, methodology has taken on two meanings. One meaning concerns the method of scientific inquiry and investigation and has interested scientists since the early Renaissance. The historical watershed that divided modern science (and philosophy) from the Medieval schools was the works10 of Rene´ Descartes and Sir Francis Bacon on scientific method. Their works formed the basis of modern scientific method—reason and

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The Problem Situation

the uses of logic with Descartes and observation and experimentation with Bacon—with each approach stating specific rules and the ways these rules were to be applied.11 The scientific method came from the methodology of science, but these two differ. Method is the scientific approach taken with respect to each science and its subdisciplines; method is thus specific with the types of method used depending on the individual’s concepts of how science is to be practiced. Methodology, in contrast, is not decided individually but is determined strictly by the theory and its problem area and the physical equipment necessary for experimenting with the area. Methodology is not rigid and may very well be altered as work within the area develops. Moreover, as work develops, so does its jargon and the concepts it contains. Method, however, is strictly subjective and depends on each individual’s understanding of how science is and ought to be practiced as expressed by the various schools of scientific method.12 Methodology requires subjective aspects in the form of understanding by those working with the area as well as their abilities to alter the area through experimentation with the jargon being the language of communication and the method being the conceptual approach taken while working with the area. A difficulty may arise because of possible confusion between methodology and method. The method adapted for investigation certainly may influence the outcome of experimentation as well as bring the results of observation into the method. For example, the positivist insistence of corroboration of experimental findings with the theory used for conducting experiments may result in subtle distortions of the results to conform to the theory so that the results correlate with the theory. Or, given the Popperian approach, constructing theoretical statements that can be tested by experience may show that all the statements used according to the jargon and theory are indeed testable—but then the question remains to be answered that after such theoretical testing is conducted, how are the results to be considered? They will be scientific according to the criterion, but do they corroborate the theory in question, and if so, is this not in accordance with positivism? Shared methods of inquiry among scientists working in different areas and fields provide the foundation for communicating and considering approaches to their differing problem areas; the extent to which these differences are understood depends on the allocation of time by scientists. The demarcation between method and methodology in scientific inquiry requires further clarification, which will be given in part II of this work. The second point regarding Coveney and Highfield’s statement (that the current situation regarding methodology and jargon makes it difficult for an outsider to discover whether a common conceptual framework might be shared with other scientists), pertains to the demarcation that has developed between philosophy and science. The historical objective of science as the pursuit of eternal truth has existed since the ancient Greek thinkers sought to use their intellects and powers of observation to probe the hidden secrets of the universe. With the inheritance of inquiry of these ancient thinkers, those who have partaken in the

Illusion of a Paradox

7

pursuit of truth have improved their methods of observation and consequently sharpened their theories. Hence, both historically and in terms of our contemporary perspective, it appears that we are closer to finding this truth than at any previous time but, as was stated by Coveney and Highfield, we have detailed studies of subdisciplines and the corresponding sophisticated jargon necessary for such studies, but apparently at the expense of the bigger picture. However, while great strides have been made in science to find the ultimate truth, this goal remains elusive. Historically, when science entered into a period of certainty, it was almost considered that the ultimate truth had been realized. This was the situation with the scientific certainty brought about by Newton’s theory, which he developed from Galileo’s earth physics and Johannes Kepler’s astronomy. However, this certainty ended with the black box radiation experiments of Max Planck, himself a staunch Newtonian, and by the relativity theorists and quantum physicists who followed Planck and made their contributions because of his findings. Historically, even though science is the pursuit of the ultimate truth, the consequences of this pursuit for the development of science and its many theories and subdivisions in its respective branches and the strict experimental controls demanded by scientists, have nevertheless kept us at a great distance from the ultimate and elusive truth. While our scientific theories have attained sophistication never imagined by our Greek forebearers—with our work conducted on different levels of understanding, observation, and experimental and laboratory techniques—we are not much closer to the absolute truth than we were thousands of years ago. We realize that even though our contributions to the physical, biological, and social sciences have provided us with far greater knowledge and understanding than in any previous historical era, we cannot consider ourselves closer to the absolute truth. The physicist, biologist, or social scientist who would pronounce to the contrary would have his or her position met with skepticism, counterargument, and countertesting of this position to have it severely weakened or refuted entirely; perhaps such a pronouncement would also be met with religious indignation. What we have accepted historically is that the pursuit of ultimate truth is the pursuit of knowledge; however, while even though we have inherited this notion of truth from the Greek philosophers—and from the world’s great religions— over time, through the development of science, we have come to concentrate not so much on finding the ultimate truth as on formulating theories and testing them for the expansion of knowledge. Hence, while the pursuit of truth still remains the ultimate objective, it has become supplemented by theories which, while intended to make the paths to truth shorter, have in fact made the search longer, and certainly very interesting. It is with the practical usages of science, moreover, that we find that ultimate truth remains evasive, because the theories of science are ultimately in error, no matter the extent of knowledge the theories provide. This error may be in universal form, as was Aristotelian physics, even though it provided then seemingly

8

The Problem Situation

valid explanations for natural phenomena.13 Scientific advances may render a theory that was once stated as universal eventually to be rendered particular. This happened with Newtonian theory, which, stated as a universal, was relegated to a limit-case of three dimensions by—and, hence, deemed irrelevant to—the broader-based physics of Einsteinian relativity and quantum physics. Philosophy, on the other hand, is the love of wisdom and thus of truth; just as do scientists, philosophers seek eternal truth and wisdom. Philosophical speculation is important because it provides conceptual frameworks developed over the long history of ideas that allow scientists to deal with their areas and to step back, as it were, to view their works from viable and scientific perspectives. However, over the long development of ideas, philosophers since Descartes and Bacon, G. W. Leibnitz, David Hume, and Immanuel Kant have provided methods of inquiry, logic, and reason to assist scientists in their common pursuit.14 The early Greek philosophers recognized the common bond between the love and pursuit of wisdom and of the ultimate and enduring truth. Pythagoras (c. 550 B.C.), influenced by his travels to the Middle East and especially by the Babylonian uses of mathematics in architecture, formed a society to study the philosophical aspects of the theory of numbers. Euclid (c. 300 B.C.) codified plane geometry, and Zeno (c. 450 B.C.) made significant contributions in the study of infinity that eventually gave rise to the calculus for which both Newton and Leibnitz sought credit for founding. The common bond between philosophy and science was recognized by Sir Isaac Newton in his great work The Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, but this bond has become somewhat unclear with the specialization in the various branches of the physical, biological, and social sciences.15 This diminution of clarity has come about because as the sciences developed in light of Newton’s contributions, so did the subdivisions, the jargon, and the methodologies constructed for dealing with these sciences. With the emphasis on the minutiae of of the subdivisions, the greater pursuit of ultimate truth and wisdom has become supplemented by the more immediate pursuit of knowledge within the theoretical investigations and the practical applications of the findings of the sciences. Hence, because the pursuit of truth and wisdom was replaced by the more immediate objective of developing theoretical knowledge, the connection between philosophy and science had to be strengthened. Moreover, with Charles Darwin’s contributions in biology and evolution theory and with Planck’s contributions in the physical sciences and the consequent developments in relativity and quantum physics,16 a new impetus was provided for increasing specialization and subdivision of the sciences. Scientists found new interests as they engaged in the processes that began with the ancients in ancient times and were reestablished during the Renaissance with the writings of Descartes and Bacon, as they made contributions in philosophy as well as in the natural and social sciences.17 The contributions of scientists to the philosophy and method of science have

Illusion of a Paradox

9

been necessary as the tendencies for jargon and methodology in the various scientific subdisciplines have developed. While scientists working in these fields have contributed greatly to our knowledge, scientific knowledge is only as valid as the theories in which it is formulated, tested, and either accepted or rejected within its theoretical context. That part of knowledge that retains its theoretical viability does so only for the duration of the theory; as theoretical changes occur within the subdisciplines at a fairly rapid pace, scientific knowledge, scientia, is false and without it we still remain at great distances from the ultimate and enduring truth. Hence with respect to science in general, the paradox still holds: Even though we know more we are still no closer to the ultimate and enduring truth because our knowledge is only as valid as the specific theories in which it is vindicated and, as these theories are replaced, what we consider to be valid knowledge loses its validity with the alteration or abandonment of these theories for others of higher utility. However, if we consider science in terms of both its historical and contemporary relationship with philosophy, the paradox dissolves into an illusion. This is because one important aspect of ultimate and permanent truth is the comprehension and understanding we gain from working with the knowledge they provide, even though the knowledge gained from these theories is in error due to the theories being refuted or disbanded. For example, while we reject Aristotle’s physics as the true representation of the physical universe, we have the understanding of how his physics works and why it is invalid, given our current knowledge. This knowledge of physics is based on Galileo’s arguments against Aristotle’s physics and the uses of mathematics that Galileo employed—developed since the early Greek philosophers—to point out the errors in Aristotle’s thinking. But without Aristotle’s philosophical-cum-scientific contributions in physics, Galileo would not have had such a worthy and enduring opponent. Moreover, Kepler would not have developed his astronomy without Copernicus’s challenge to Ptolemey’s system, and without the training he received from Tycho Brahe.18 Newton’s synthesis of Galileo’s and Kepler’s contributions in his Principia demonstrated the relationship between philosophy and science, between understanding and knowledge, and his use of calculus to treat the problems of motion (shedding light on the paradoxes of infinity raised by Zeno) provided a philosophical and scientific theory for studying and working with the physical interactions that regulate nature. The probing into nature that has developed since—and, indeed, to a large extent, resulted from Newton’s work—has created both the closer interactions among the sciences and the sharper subdivisions within them. This has resulted in the necessity for the various methodologies and jargon that may seem too esoteric and beyond the comprehension of the so-called common person uninitiated in the ways of the sciences. However, once the concepts and the mathematics of each of the sciences are understood, scientists of every discipline—and indeed laypeople who are inter-

10

The Problem Situation

ested—can understand the works of their fellow scientists in different areas and subdivisions. Hence, one of the points made clear by Newton is that through mathematics, the principles of natural philosophy—and indeed the social sciences that describe the interrelations of humankind—can be understood by all those who comprehend the jargon of the mathematics involved and the ways mathematics are applied to the terms and concepts of the subdivisions and subdisciplines within the sciences. The paradox is thus an illusion because the real issue is not that the more we know the more we realize that we do not know because knowledge within its theoretical context is as valid as the theories in which it is stated, and these theories will eventually be shown to be false, to be either altered or abandoned in light of new theories with greater explanatory power. By recognizing the relationship between philosophy and science formulated first by the ancient Greek thinkers and emphasized by Newton, it is still the case that the more we know the more we do not know, but the more we understand in our contemporary quest for the ultimate truth and wisdom. This understanding is philosophy and is the genuine partner in this search for which the jargon and methodologies of each of the subdivisions and subdisciplines in the sciences are necessary for working with and within these fields of inquiry. While these methodologies and the jargon of each of the branches may seem obscure, those who work with philosophy and science can comprehend them through the clarification of the concepts of the terms and uses of the mathematical languages within each of them. By aligning with the ancient Greek thinkers, with Newton, Darwin, Planck, Einstein, Heisenberg,19 and the other people of science who are followers in their tradition—that philosophy and science are inseparable in the search for the ultimate and enduring truth and wisdom—the paradox disappears into an illusion. NOTES 1. Peter Coveney and Roger Highfield, The Frontiers of Complexity (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1995), p. 7. 2. See John A. Wheeler, “On the Nature of Quantum Geometrodynamics,” Annals of Physics 2 (1975): 604–14; and see his “Law Without Law,” in Quantum Theory and Measurement, ed. J. A. Wheeler and W. H. Zurek (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), pp. 182–213. 3. On the space of theory and matter, W. K. Clifford stated, That small portions of space are analogous to hills on a surface which is on the average flat. . . . That this property of being curved or distorted is continually being passed on from one portion of space to another after the manner of a wave. That this variation of the curvature of space is what really happens in the phenomenon we call the motion of matter. That in the physical world nothing else takes place but this variation.

Quoted from Paul Davies, Superforce (New York: Touchstone Books, 1984), p. 165. 4. See T.F.E. Kaluza, in Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie 54 (1921): 966,

Illusion of a Paradox

11

and Oskar Klein in Zeitschrift fu¨r Physick 12 (July 10, 1926): 895. For discussions on the Kaluza-Klein theory, see Robert K. Adair, The Great Design (New York: Oxford University Press, 1897), pp. 352–353, and Martin Gardner, The New Ambidextrous Universe, rev. ed. (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1994), pp. 339–40. 5. For discussion on snails, see Colin Tudge, The Engineer in the Garden (London: Pimilco, 1993), pp. 19, 20, 38–41, 132, 180, and see Richard Dawkins, Climbing Mount Improbable (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1997), pp. 198–223. 6. For a discussion on HIV and the AIDS virus, see Peter Radetsky, The Invisible Invaders (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1994), pp. 196–352, and the epilogue, pp. 404–18. 7. For a discussion on “frustrated metals” and international economics, see David Z. Rich, The Economics of International Trade (New York: Quorum Books, 1992), especially part I, pp. 3–42. 8. Coveney and Highfield, The Frontiers of Complexity, p. 7. 9. Ibid. 10. See Rene´ Descartes, Philosophical Essays Discourse on Method: Rules for the Direction of the Mind, trans. Laurence J. Laffner (New York: Macmillan, 1969), and see Sir Francis Bacon, New Organon and Related Writings, ed. Fulton H. Anderson (New York: Macmillan, 1960). 11. In the twentieth-century philosophy of science the two predominant schools of scientific method are the positivist school—with its emphasis of corroboration of experiment with theory—and the Popperian school—with its emphasis on refutability. For a critique of the Popperian school, see David Z. Rich, Crisis Theory (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1997), pp. 99–114, and chapter 10 of this work. 12. See, for example, C. D. Broad, Scientific Thought (Paterson, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, and Co., 1959). For a discussion on early modern positivism verging on the metaphysical, see Moritz Schlick, General Theory of Knowledge, trans. Albert E. Blumberg (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court reprint, 1974). 13. See Aristotle, Physics, trans. and ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936). 14. See G. W. von Leibnitz, Three Essays in Human Understanding, ed. Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennet (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); see also David Hume, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (New York: Oxford University Press, 1924), and Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1934). 15. See Sir Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy and His System of the World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962). 16. See Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968). See Max Planck, Scientific Biography and Other Papers, trans. Frank Gaynor (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1968). 17. See, for example, Henri Poincare´, The Foundations of Science (Lancaster, Pa.: Science Press, 1947), and La Science et L’ Hypothe´se (Paris: Flammarion, 1968); see also Hermann Weyl, Philosophy of Mathematics and Natural Science (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949); see also Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954); and see Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy (London: Penguin Books, 1989). 18. See Nicholaus Copernicus, Complete Works, trans. Edward Rosen (Baltimore,

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The Problem Situation

Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985–1992), and see Johannes Kepler, Sonmium, trans. Edward M. Rosen (Madison.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967). 19. See Albert Einstein, The Meaning of Relativity (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1974), and see P. Schilp, ed., Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist (New York: Tudor, 1951).

2

Complexity Theory: Comments and Critique Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection is satisfying because it shows us a way in which simplicity could change into complexity, how unordered atoms could group themselves into more complex patterns until they ended up manufacturing people. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene1

The difficulty with the position stated above is that we look at a situation from our current vantage position and impose our opinion on it as to its origins. A case could be made that these unordered atoms are the creation of a higher being who, over long periods of historical time, arranged their ordering to eventually manufacture people. Hence, the Darwinian position on evolution as stated by Dawkins is equally as valid as the creationist position stated very briefly here. Complexity theory has the advantage of being a contemporary example of the common interests of philosophers and scientists in their pursuit of the ultimate wisdom and truth, so that further probing into the complexities of the origins of the various species could shed light on the ordering of unordered atoms into life as we know it, perhaps achieving a synthesis combining both the random and controlled evolutionary approaches. However, as yet, complexity theory has not provided a standard system for working with specific problem areas, but is a body of theorems formed into a systematic approach that shares common foundations with the works of such thinkers as Henri Poincare´, Alan Turing, and John von Neumann. Poincare´’s work is foundational in complexity theory because, although this theory was developed after his time, his eclectic intellectual curiosity allowed

14

The Problem Situation

him to explore and contribute to many areas within the fields of mathematics and science. His contributions to nonlinear algebra and the mathematics of complex systems are necessary for exploring the dynamics of these many variegated complex relationships.2 Turing’s work is important because it led to modern computers and the beginning of artificial intelligence and its applications in machinery, as well as to the development of computer programming used in the formulation of complexity projects. Moreover, Turing’s conception of a computing mechanism provided, together with Boolean algebra, the basis for the development of computer logic and languages and the necessary technologies and subsequent hardware and software to enhance computer use and programming.3 Unlike Poincare´, Turing and von Neumann were contemporaries and, because of their work and common interests, they made each other’s acquaintance and shared ideas. Both men, like Poincare´ before them, had diverse interests and eclectic minds and made contributions in several fields. Each man contributed to the development of modern computers in their technical and theoretical aspects and their works are responsible for the subsequent technological advancements and our current state of the art. Indeed, John von Neumann is considered the father of the modern computer. Like Turing, he was a man of many and varied interests. Both made contributions to computation and, like Poincare´ before them, to mathematics. Moreover, as did Poincare´, von Neumann wrote works in physics and also made an important contribution with his development of game theory for economic behavior, an approach that has been modified since and used in the political, social, and biological sciences.4 Complexity theory is an eclectic body of theorems borrowed from all branches of the sciences and, as such, is a theory that is not concerned with solving single problems algorithmically, but deals with, as Roger Penrose stated, “infinite families of problems where there would be a general algorithm for finding answers to all the problems of one single family.”5 Since an algorithm is a mechanical device for computation, the (n) number of problems a family has determines the number of [Nf(n)] steps the algorithm has to take to solve the problem. Problems that are specially complicated—such as those “families” with polynomial expansion and development—are designated by

冘

r⫽n⫹m “P” ⫽ [ nr ], r⬎1

with N ⭐ Kxnr, with “K” and “r” as constants independent of n, meaning that N can be no larger than some multiple of n raised to some fixed power r established within the program. Complexity theory thus allows for the development of situations, given specific computer data. These programs attempt to copy and simulate real-time

Complexity Theory

15

situations, given the determinants that define the environments and boundaries and provide the dynamics by which these situations develop. These programs may relate to real-world conditions such as computerized econometric models of countries with the conditions of international trade included, with given gross domestic product for internal dynamics, and with the construction of firms dealing in international markets. With the necessary given inputs, “n” is the number of domestic and—where relevant—international problems each firm has, and “N” is the number of steps the algorithm has to solve the problems of each firm. Where these problems are several in number, the quantity of problems for each firm is indicated by its corresponding exponent. The program thus states the sum of all active firms and their interrelations, both domestic and international. The economic algorithm can be applied to hypothetical models and to realcountry situations with the programmed economic material being as close as possible to that of the country in question. Moreover, this model can be extended to a two-country relationship with the influences of other countries eliminated or to a possible many-country relationship, so long as the initial conditions for each country and its dynamic relationships with the other countries can be programmed. The advantage of this in analyzing each country’s relationship with the others in isolation is to determing the advantages and disadvantages each country has regarding the other and the strengths and weaknesses each has with respect to its own output and internal dynamics. Computer models such as these can be programmed in terms of complexity theory to take into account how both economic and political relations can develop, given the programmed initial dynamic conditions. For example, given the number C of countries involved, n can be the number of problem situations within each relevant firm for each country; since these would be polynomials due to the firm’s financial and commercial situation, the relationship

冘

r⫽n⫽m [ Cnr ]t r⬎1

for time t would hold. Complexity theory is also used to enter into imaginary worlds, to construct situations that are assumed to resemble the real world in some way, and to program conditions to determine how these situations function. Consider, for example, the computer arthromorph (from arthropods, insects with segmented bodies) program that Richard Dawkins and Ted Kaehler constructed. The arthromorph program differs from Dawkin’s computer biomorph program in his book, The Blind Watchmaker. Biomorphs are computerized, genetic developments from a single form—such as a branching tree or segments of trees joined together, whose sizes and shapes are determined by computerized genes that are just numbers covering computer-time evolution, whereas the computer arthro-

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The Problem Situation

morphs—like real arthromorphs—are segmented, and, during the computerized evolutionary process, genetic alterations occur within these segmentations that show the changes, some of which are subtle, within the physical construction of these creatures.6 In this example, n is the family of arthromorphs, P is the polynomial expansion given by the constant r of the family determined by the “genetic” changes to the level of m, N is the number of steps programmed to make these changes, and K is the fixed-power constant within the system limiting N. Because of its unique uses in computer programming, complexity theory provides us with a unique and contemporary tool for formulating theories and testing them as they develop in programmed conditions that simulate real-time and real-world circumstances such as models of economic interaction and, often, non–real-world circumstances such as Dawkins’s biomorphs and arthromorphs. Complexity theory therefore provides a serious advance over the traditional laboratory testing of a theory, because the time aspect for the computer is far faster than traditional laboratory testing and the testing parameters can be altered as necessary by varying the terms of the program. Complexity theory has the elements of philosophy because it is a metatheory that can be constructed to be applicable to all branches of inquiry theory computer programming. Moreover, the theories to which it has been applied—such as evolution theory, physics, robotics, biology, and economic and social theory—have their foundations in philosophical inquiry. This is so because the questions raised in each of these fields have their origins in the philosophies of the ancient Greek thinkers; all exposition on these areas is simply an extension of their theories and opinions. Complexity theory is scientific because it allows formulation and clarification of terms to develop positions for critical examination within the dynamics of programming as the theories are put to the test in computerized yet real-time conditions. It is scientific because it enables us to seek the truth of our theories as they function within the complexity of conditions by evaluating its performance and to accept or reject them according to our established criteria. Complexity theory is philosophical because it allows us to understand with as little ambiguity as possible the program’s theoretical and operational conditions as they are presented in the processes of its performance. As the theory develops, its scientific viability is determined by its performance in computerized real-time and possible real-world conditions. CRITIQUE Complexity theory is effective as a procedure for programming in order to increase understanding, but only when the terms and boundaries of the program are well defined and the rules for operating and the dynamics in the development are clearly stated. In general, these rules state the processes by which the program develops and the dynamics describe the manifold consequences of the rules as they are applied. These rules are stated at the beginning of the program, and

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the program’s dynamics are manifested as it develops. However, these rules and the dynamics that follow are formulated by the programmer who may also have designed the program. The program can be effective in the construction of specific projects for testing where the results are acceptable within certain limits and are programmed in as boundaries. Given all the testing material and the necessary built-in dynamics, this program can be worked out without much difficulty or time-lapse. An example of this is the mobile “ants” program developed by Simon Steward and Steve Appleby, in which a “pheromone trail” is laid down for other computerized ants to encounter. These ants are computerized figures, and they relate to one another in this program in such a way that as one ant perishes, another takes its job. These ants operate in swarms and act as mobile programs that can route phone calls through a telephone network to ensure that each exchange is used efficiently and is not overloaded. Coveney and Highfield explain that, like real ants, these pieces of code do not communicate directly but leave “messages to one another in each exchange as they pass through.”7 Hence, if one program fails, it does not really matter because another can come along later and pick up the message and continue. They quote Appleby as saying that this ability is what gives the program its robustness. Moreover, this program is being explored to determine its uses in managing dynamic networks, notably those that connect computers. A difficulty with this kind of program, however, is that since its robustness is suited to a static position without room for compensation or development, it has to be updated for dealing with problem shifts. The computer ants, for example, can relay messages and, in cases of failure, another program can come along and pick up from there. The difficulty lies in the time-factor and the types of breakdown that can occur. As computers become more powerful, the timefactor in program performance is increasingly significant, especially as greater quantities of more diversified material for different areas are being handled from a main computer point. Applying this ant program for communications requires that the time-factor within each system and among related systems be as brief as possible, the movement of these ants throughout the system provides a challenge with respect to processing time. This is certainly the case as computers are interlinked, each with its own program, as defined by its specific function. The rate of ant-demise, together with the time needed for other ants to resume the processes, is certainly a difficulty that has to be addressed because is important for the time-factor. Moreover, such a grand program requires that the areas of communication be well defined. Communications on the local, national, and international levels require different types of connections and concepts that must consider the geographics involved, the amount and quality of the competition, the methods of computer communication, and both the hard and soft technologies used. Moreover, environmental issues such as placing transmitters, antennas, and receivers to conform to the conditions of the lay of the land, and also the possibility of

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The Problem Situation

interference with electrical and other nearby communications systems must also be considered. Another consideration is the difficulty of computer communication within geographical boundaries and between countries that might require program adjustment to contain the ant design, the cost of which might not be worth the benefits that could result. Consider another example, one of a Dawkins-like nature. Given our current state of knowledge about genetics and evolution, we can construct a two-creature species calling them “Adam” and “Eve.” We can then examine the evolution of these creatures as they “mate” (in computer terms) and bear offspring. Moreover, we can run our program for several computer-time millennia to achieve a fairly good conception of how Homo sapiens might have evolved according to the terms of our model. Using the concepts of complexity theory, we can introduce changes into our program during the various years in each millennium corresponding to changes in the genetic alterations in order to show, to some extent, how such changes act on the environment and how the environment in turn influences these changes. For this, we would have to include in our program an environmental situation that also changes over time. Hence, one of the challenges of this program is correlating genetic changes with environmental development, showing how one influences the other. To accomplish this, it is necessary to include such factors as climate, available food supplies, the existence of different types of predators, and contacts with other social groups as they develop. This program may be difficult to construct, but skillful programmers can build these elements into the system and have them work according to the conditions and limitations of the system and show the genetic changes that come about as the program proceeds. However, while this program can provide some understanding of human evolution and its dependence on environmental conditions, it cannot really include our understanding of our genetic and historical development for so much of our very ancient past remains mere speculation. While it is a representation of human evolution and interaction with the environment, it is nevertheless a Dawkins-like program and, as such, seeks to describe and analyze the reality of a very unclear situation. Because of this, several difficulties exist. One difficulty is inherent in all complexity programs—the absence of randomness. In Richard Dawkins’s biomorph and arthromorph programs, for example, “genetic” development occurs along the lines prescribed by the program, omitting the possibility of unprogrammed genetic influences to enter and exert their influences which, of course, happens in reality when people of different races breed. Moreover, for any such Adam and Eve program to determine genetic development to any extent representing human history, unprogrammed randomness has to be considered, and this contradicts the very concepts and dynamics of complexity theory. For complexity theory, randomness cannot be built in because the theory deals only with combinations of information and their expansions as they exist within

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the original initial theoretical conditions. Hence, in this context, consider William McNeill’s statement: How modern types of men originated is one of the unsolved puzzles of archaeology and physical anthropology. It is possible that the variety of modern races results from parallel evolution of hominoid stocks toward full human status, in widely separated and effectively isolated regions of the Old World; but the very fragmented evidence at hand may be interpreted equally well to support the alternative hypothesis that Homo sapiens arose in some single center and underwent racial differentiation in the course of migration to diverse regions of the earth.8

Such randomness as described by McNeill cannot be accounted for in a complexity theory program because the uncertainty of the existence of such conditions renders them unaccounted for in the well-defined program that is necessary for complexity theory to function. Hence, in the Adam and Eve program, the existence of Neanderthal influences or indeed the existence and influence of such other proto-humans cannot be determined. By remaining outside the scope of the program, the genetic development from Adam and Eve takes into account only those genetic developments stated at the program’s beginning. The truer picture of human genetic history must therefore remain outside the scope of complexity theory. For the ant design, randomness is lacking because each ant must perform as all other ants for the information to be transported to is proper receivers. If this were not the case, there would be a breakdown of the system and the information would not reach its objectives. Since no communications program can be constructed allowing for the influence of randomness, this system remains closed and only by reprogramming can changes be introduced. It is a situation that must remain static in the dynamic world for which it is constructed. Another difficulty is that of robustness. In the program created by Appleby and Steward, if one ant “dies,” another will eventually come along following the “pheromone” and carry out the function of the deceased ant. Moreover, if for every ant that dies another takes its place, the system can be maintained, but in static equilibrium, because changes within the system have no influence on the ants behavior, unless the ants are reprogrammed accordingly. Robustness in this type of system is functional and maintained only for the duration that the system remains in static equilibrium. Old ants die and new ants take their place, operating according to the same pattern and along the same pathways. However, the system itself is subject to change as new input is absorbed and those parts of the system that are no longer necessary due to the new input are phased out. For the system to maintain its robustness given the changes, the ants must be reprogrammed to perform according to the new guidelines. Hence, in the short-run, defined by the duration of the static system, robustness within the system is maintained by the replenishment of the ants but the system’s robustness is maintained by adapting to internal changes created

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The Problem Situation

by the new input. Robustness is therefore a static equilibrium and a dynamic disequilibrium concept and depends on a system’s ability to adapt, both internally and externally, to circumstances in the form of new input that necessarily generates alterations. This dual aspect of robustness can be seen in the Adam and Eve program. For the duration of computer time given to this system, robustness is maintained by the continuing evolution of genetic derivations of the offspring of these two partners. This evolution will continue for the system’s duration, and the derivations can be seen to be distinctive in their resemblance to their two original parents. Moreover, should the system be open to the influences of more than one set of initial parents, which include different genetic material, the system’s robustness will be maintained by the derivations based on the combinations of the genetic material over computer time. However, only a limited number of parents are allowable in this system because of the vast genetic derivations and differences that would result. The system’s robustness is therefore maintained by limiting its scope, and no actual similarity to the evolution of species within the real world is obtainable. Therefore, robustness is maintained within the system for the duration of the system’s functioning. When changes in the system are initiated due to the introduction of changes and the new dynamics this generates, the system’s robustness is maintained only if the system can be adapted to deal with the changes. If not, it will either be altered accordingly or be abandoned. Robustness is therefore dependent on the system’s use. If the system is to remain closed in a static equilibrium position, its robustness is maintained for the duration of the system’s functioning. If it is to be open to outside influences thereby generating change, its robustness depends on the abilities of those who use it to maintain the system, making whatever adjustments necessary so that it can cope, providing that these changes do not affect the system’s general functioning. This point will be discussed further in part II when crisis theory will be discussed. NOTES 1. Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), quoted from Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett, eds., The Mind’s I (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), p. 124. No page source is given for Dawkins’s quote. 2. See, for example, Henri Poincare´, La valeur de la Science (Paris: Flammarion, 1905). 3. See Alan M. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” and Douglas R. Hofstadter, “The Turing Test: A Coffeehouse Conversation,” in Douglas R. Hofstadter and Daniel C. Dennett, eds. The Mind’s I, pp. 53–95. See also Roger Penrose’s discussion on Turing in his book, The Emperor’s New Mind (London: Vintage, 1990), pp. 45, 46; and see George Boole, An Investigation into the Laws of Thought (New York: Dover, 1958). 4. See John von Neumann, Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics

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(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1955): see also John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953). About von Neumann, James Gleick wrote: The father of modern computing always had Laplace in mind, and the history of computing and the history of forecasting were intermingled ever since John von Neumann designed his first machines at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Princeton, New Jersey, in the 1950s. Von Neumann recognized that weather modeling could be an ideal task for a computer.

From James Gleick, Chaos (New York: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 14. An interesting use of game theory in biology was presented by Stuart A. Kauffman in his book, The Origins of Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), chapter 6, “The Dynamics of Coevolving Systems,” pp. 237–81. 5. Penrose, The Emperor’s New Mind, p. 182. 6. See Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1987). Dawkins borrowed the term “biomorph” from Desmond Morris, who coined it “for the vaguely animal-like shapes in his surrealist paintings.” Dawkins stated that Desmond Morris claimed that his biomorphs “evolve” in his mind, and that this evolution can be traced through successive paintings (from p. 58). See chapter 3, “Accumulating Small Change,” pp. 43–74; for a computerized program of biomorph evolution, see the appendix of Blind Watchmaker. 7. Peter Coveney and Roger Highfield, Frontiers of Complexity (New York: Fawcett Columbine, 1995), p. 251. 8. William McNeill, The Rise of the West (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 5. In n. 6, he states that: Skeletons exhibiting a mixture of Neanderthal and modern characteristics have been discovered in caves of Mount Carmel in Palestine. This may be interpreted to mean that the European type of modern man developed in the Middle East from Neanderthal-like types at a time when the ice sheets isolated the Neanderthal population of Europe from the rest of protomankind. . . . But if one believes that modern man evolved earlier elsewhere, this same evidence may be considered as the result of interbreeding between sapiens and Neanderthal populations. The puzzle remains unsolved.

Quoted from pp. 5, 6.

3

Chaos Theory: Comments and Critique Why does the universe have the space-time it has, and just those laws and physical constants it has? This is a meaningless question, like asking why you get a particular hand in a game of bridge. No transcendental Dealer selects your bridge hand. The mindless universe of Everything is simply dealing all possible hands from a deck that is continually being shuffled. The God of Leibnitz is replaced by Chaos. Einstein once expressed his aversion to quantum mechanics by saying he disliked the idea of God playing dice with the universe. Imagine how he would have reacted to the notion that the dice are playing God with universes! Martin Gardner, The New Ambidextrous Universe1

COMMENTS With regard to the distinction between philosophers and scientists, Isaac Newton demonstrated that in his time this distinction was neither clear nor important. Moreover, since then, scientists and philosophers move very well in each others’ fields. For example, Albert Einstein was a probabilistic determinist, whereas Werner Heisenberg was an indeterminist. Both positions are strongly rooted in the traditional arguments concerning free will versus determinism and in probability theory that developed from observation and philosophical investigation. Scientists such as Henri Poincare´ and Pierre Duhem did important work in both The comments and critique in this chapter are based on the discussion in David Z. Rich, Crisis Theory (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1997), pp. 19–39. Copyright 䉷 1997 by David Z. Rich. Reproduced with permission of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT.

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The Problem Situation

disciplines in light of Newton’s demonstration of the enduring relationship between science and philosophy forged by the ancient Greek thinkers.2 Chaos theory, though scientific, has its foundations in philosophy. For example, Georg Cantor’s triadic set, in which regions are broken down infinitely, results in the Mandelbrot transcendental number of .6309.3 The concept of infinity was enriched with paradoxes by the ancient Greek, Zeno, and these paradoxes still haunt mathematics in such forms as Cantor’s triadic set extension and the nonstandard analysis that is engaging the efforts of many contemporary mathematicians and logicians. Gerald Feinberg defined chaos as “a type of behavior of physical systems in which the evolution of the systems cannot be predicted because of its sensitive dependence on minor changes in the properties of the system.”4 This demonstrates another aspect of chaos theory’s philosophical foundations as the search for stability out of chaos, for order out of disorder, that is integral to chaos theory. Although a chaotic system’s evolution cannot be strictly predicted, there is a degree of determinism in Poincare´ ’s stable limit cycles in which a differentiation of two variables produces a disturbance in the cycle’s oscillation which is eventually restored during the continuing phases of the cycle’s oscillation. Two philosophical issues are involved here: one concerning the evolution of a physical system and the extent to which such evolution exists; the other concerning the oscillation around a stable point in the dynamics of a system according to Poincare´ ’s stable limit cycles which, though applicable to mathematical systems, is also applicable to physical systems. Do all physical systems evolve? Some, such as snowflakes, evolve necessarily as a result of their inner dynamics, continuing to evolve until these dynamics cease, or until an interference interrupts this process. This, however, is not the same as biological evolution—in which new species evolve from existing ones and those not effective for long-term survival being rendered extinct—or as with social systems that develop according to the conditions of the people and circumstances external to the system that must nevertheless be confronted by those within the system. For physical systems, such as the snowflake, this evolution is structured within the system; once the system’s potential is realized, its evolution ceases. The question is whether external physical stimuli can influence this evolution and, if so, is this still chaos, or is a different approach required for the same problems? The other issue is whether physical systems oscillating around a fixed point in the sense of Poincare´ ’s stable limit cycles meet the criteria of chaos, and if so, how this contributes to our understanding of these systems. Programming a mathematical system to oscillate around a fixed point is of interest only for its limited uses. We can adjust the system’s parameters to achieve different oscillations with specific cyclical depth, width, and duration of the cycle’s phases; these movements will still be around a fixed position that, even after adjustments are made, is maintained. Thus, there are two types of physical systems, with one type conforming to

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chaos theory and the other most definitely not. The type of system that does conform is that of the snowflake or gas in a container. The snowflake begins its journey through the atmosphere as a droplet of moisture being formed into its final and unique shape as it comes into contact with the effects of the weather, achieving its shape as it falls to the ground and taking from the weather those forces necessary for its development. That the weather affects the droplet in its formation into a snowflake demonstrates that this external condition is necessary for the snowflake’s evolution from one form of moisture to another. This dependence on the weather is built into the flake’s evolutionary dynamics, so that the droplet takes from the atmosphere but does not in turn give to it. Unlike snowflakes, gas contributes to the atmosphere but does not take from it. In the container, the gas is kept under pressure to prevent it from escaping. Once released from the container, it escapes at a rate determined by the pressure, expanding in the atmosphere—at first at an accelerating rate and then at a decelerating rate—until it is at a state of equilibrium with the atmosphere, losing its identity and its existence. These systems conform to chaos theory in the sense that they cannot be predicted: The final shape of the snowflake cannot be known in advance, nor can the movement of the gas in the atmosphere be determined. While chaosbased computer models create conditions in order to direct a snowflake’s development and the movement of the gas, such controls in the real world do not exist. Releasing the gas in front of a fan provides general motion to the gas but it is impossible to determine the position of a specific gas molecule at a certain time. In these cases, changes in these systems were brought about because of their internal dynamics, given the influences of the environments in which they exist. Their relationship to their environment is one-sided in the sense that the snowflake takes from the environment, and the gas contributes to it. In these chaosconforming situations, there is no mutual reliability in the sense of two or more fairly self-contained systems getting together to form a working unit. Chaos systems are stable because their reliance is always constant with the consequence that snowflakes will always be unique individual systems and gas, when released into the atmosphere, will always dissipate. A type of physical system that has become a working system and does not conform to chaos is that of a theory through applications. Consider, for example, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle in quantum theory. Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations pertain to the atomic and subatomic universe, that of atoms and their waves or particles in their orbitals. Because of the magnitude of the atoms and their substructures, the uncertainty relations pertain to a realm far different than that treated by Newtonian physics. For example, if x is an expression of the accuracy in which the position of an object greater than atomic proportions moves along a straight path, and p is the value of accuracy for the momentum for the same particle along the same path, the object’s continued travel can be computed. Should there be interference

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The Problem Situation

along the path of travel, the effects of this interference can also be computed and the object’s future position can be determined according to Newtonian theory. Hence, both position and momentum are known and the process of observation has no effect on the object’s final destination. For the atomic and subatomic realms, however, the situation is vastly different. In his treatment of the uncertainty relations, Heisenberg first discussed the particle theory of matter. He explained that the position of an electron is known within a specific accuracy c at time t, visualized by a wave packet (thereby showing the duality of the problem in terms of particles generating wavelike activity) in a proper position with a proper extension of 䉭x. A wave packet is a wavelike disturbance whose amplitude is distinctly different from zero only in a bounded region which is generally in motion and changing in size and shape. As the velocity of an electron corresponds to that of a wave packet, the diffusion that occurs hinders the ability to achieve an exact definition of this velocity with respect to the wave interference. Following Heisenberg’s reasoning, this indeterminance is an essential characteristic of the electron and does not constitute evidence of the inapplicability of the wave argument. Heisenberg defined motion as px ⫽ mvx with m as the electron’s mass and v being equal to its x component of its velocity. The uncertainty in the velocity computation results in the uncertainty in px to the amount of p. He further argued that from the laws of optics, together with the empirically established law λ ⫽ h/p (the small case lambda being the electron’s wave packet), ∆ x ∆ p ⫽ h. If the wave packet is made up by the superimposition of sinusoidal waves, with all the wave lengths being near λ0, then the general number of crests and troughs in ∆λx0 falls within the boundary of the wave packet. Outside this boundary, the wave packet must cancel by interference, which is possible only if the set of component waves contains some waves for which at least n ⫹ 1 waves fall within this critical range. This provides ∆x/λ0 ⫺ ∆λ ⫽ n ⫹ 1, with ∆λ being the approximate wavelengths necessary to represent the wave packet Therefore, ∆λ/∆λ2 ⫽ 1. However, the velocity of the wave packet is vw ⫽ h/mλ, so that the spreading of the wave packet is characterized by the range of velocities v ⫽ h/mλ20λ. As by definition, ∆p ⫽ m∆vw, then ∆ x ∆p ⫽ h, with this uncertainty relation specifying the limits w within which the particle can be applied. Heisenberg’s argument is more than a position based on shifting from a particle concept to a wave concept. Making strict use of the particle concept, given the quantum position of the q-coordinate of an electron, we can assess the probability of the coordinate’s numerical value as lying between q' ⫺ dq, with d being the differential operator. Heisenberg’s argument involves Hilbert spaces5 and diagonal matrices and he concludes that the electron’s velocity and its position cannot be determined accurately. Hence, either the wave amplitudes can be known or the probability of the electron’s position can be assessed, but neither the position and velocity nor the amplitude can be known at the same time. In Heisenberg’s words: “This may

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be expressed in concise and general terms by saying that every experiment destroys some knowledge of the system which was obtained by previous experiments.”6 Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle thus states that for every atomic system in which either the particle’s velocity alone or its position alone is known, every subsequent observation will alter its momentum by an unmeasurable amount. This formulation does not refer to the past, so if the particle—for example, an electron—is in an exactly measured position with its initial position known, its position for previous times can be calculated, with ∆p∆q being smaller than the limiting value. This past knowledge—unlike in Newtonian physics—cannot be used in the calculations in any future experiments concerning the progress of the electron and, hence, is outside the domain of experimental verification or refutation. Applying the uncertainty principle to waves, Heisenberg discussed wave amplitude. Every measurement of amplitude can yield only an average of its value in a small region of space during a short interval of time. Assuming that measurements always give average values over a small area of volume, then δ v ⫺ (δ↑)2, depending on the experiment and measurement. Light waves of length, much less than the extremely small v, will not be detected while experimenting. With the measurements giving the values of E—the total energy in the system—and H—the Hamiltonian H (p, q), that is, the coordinate and the geodisic position, the field strengths average over the range of ⫹1; thus, if these values were exactly known there would be a contradiction to the particle theory. This is so since the energy and momentum of the small volume δ v are Ev↑/ π 8(E2 ⫹ H2), with momentum ⫽ δ v↑/4 k⫻H, and with k being an arbitrary constant as a measuring reference. Since the right-hand members can be made increasingly small by making v increasingly small, this is consistent with the particle theory in which energy and momentum in the small volume are composed of discrete and finite amounts of δv and hv/k respectively. Heisenberg maintained that as for the highest detectable frequency hv ⬎ hk/ δ↑, it is clear that the right-hand members of E and momentum must be uncertain by the order of quanta hv and kv for there to be no contradiction with the particle theory. Thus, the particle’s motion is associated with wave propagation with the wave picture predicting correctly the wave’s possible motion.7 Therefore, for every subsequent observation of an atomic (and hence subatomic) system, a particle’s velocity or position can be assessed, but not both. Because the wave theory predicts correctly the particle’s possible motion, it too is subject to the limitation of assessing either the particle’s position or velocity, but not both. Even observing with a highly refined electronic microscope, Heisenberg’s situation still holds. The observer of the particle and its wave dynamics will inject energy into this system through observation, thereby disturbing the system and causing it to behave in an uncertain manner. For example, locating an electron requires a large lens with a short light wave, generating recoil of light on the electron. Computing the recoil accurately requires a narrow base of angles to allow the electron to move; it also requires long-range photons for the energy

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The Problem Situation

required for observation. This, however, destroys knowledge of the electron’s position. Therefore, the very processes of observation interfere with the electron, bringing into view a fuzzy and inaccurate picture. The physical observation so necessary for experimentation cannot, therefore, determine precisely both the particle’s position and motion. Moreover, Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle for the problems of waves and particles raised by Newton and Christian Huygens (1629–1695) and transferred into quantum physics, poses problems for both scientists and philosophers in their search for the enduring truth. The above argument demonstrates that, although chaos theory is treated as relevant for some physical systems, it must be considered irrelevant for others. It can be claimed that a theory such as Heisenberg’s is a metatheory because it sets limitations on atomic and subatomic structures independent of these structures’ inner dynamics. However, the uncertainty principle is universal and appears to be an integral component of these structures. Perhaps one day it will be shown to be either invalid or a limit-case of a broader physical theory; until this happens, it is a part of quantum physics with which physicists have to contend. The uncertainty principle is universal in its stated domain and has specific nuances for atomic and subatomic systems. The description of the snowflake’s development, while universal, does not detract from the fact that each flake is unique. Moreover, the influences of weather, though uncertain, can be copied in computer models to shape computer-generated snowflakes accordingly. Heisenberg’s theory pertains to systems and their dynamics as they are, while chaos theory pertains to systems as they evolve. The applications of this theory were originally in the fields of the natural sciences but, with the development of nonlinear analysis, it has been applied to the social sciences as well. Economic systems evolve and so do social and international systems; evolution is subject to time-series equations and nonlinear analysis. However, while chaos theory pertains to evolution, crisis theory in the order and disorder of evolution is more flexible and, as an alternative, will be presented in part II of this work. The second issue that must be clarified is whether a system oscillating around a fixed point conforms to chaos theory. Such fixed points in chaos theory are termed “strange attractors.” A strange attractor is a set of points P to which any point p within P’s region approaches P as time approaches infinity. Hence, P attracts all such ps over time and is termed “strange” because its geometries of motion are such that these points move into P while the system is evolving. As a result, patterns are formed that are often erratic, as in various markets during long-run business cycles.8 As the parameters of the system change through expansion, bifurcation—that is, changes in the qualitative dynamics of the system—results, leading to changes in its evolution. This explains the differences in snowflakes and in patterns of gas expansion. A change from a system that is steady to one that oscillates is said to be undergoing a Hopf bifurcation, and from such bifurca-

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tions, new systems develop with chaos dynamics. This process continues until the dynamics of the system cease. Fractals are parts of systems that have been broken down into smaller parts. When we look at a map of a coastline, the indentations and protrusions seem finite but, when walking along the same coast, its area can be broken down into smaller lengths; these lengths can broken down into smaller lengths, and so on. Cantor’s triadic set is a fractal set, for it can be broken down infinitely. Fractals are significant because, in the development of chaos systems, they frequently lead to bifurcations and the development of new systems. Fractals can also act as strange attractors in these bifurcations because, by branching off into new systems, these systems evolve around their points of origin before developing and spreading out, just as a falling droplet of water remains within itself until weather conditions operate on the droplet as it falls, providing the basis of its evolution into a snowflake. The fractalized snowflake continues to fractalize until its development is halted with the snowflake remaining in its final form until the processes of its destruction begin. Once a chaos system’s evolution comes to an end, its fractalization is terminated; hence, the coast never ceases to exist as it is changing due to the erosion from the motion of the water and the deposits of vegetation and animal life that maintain the soil’s composure. Associated with the development of chaos systems are hard and soft excitation. A system is in hard excitation when, for an increasing parameter, its steady state suddenly becomes unstable with large-amplitude oscillations being observed. A system is in soft excitation when a parameter increases, and the steady state becomes unstable with low-amplitude buildup. In both cases, a decrease in the parameter leads to oscillation loss with its path slowing down without disruptions. Since chaos systems are deterministic, their evolutionary paths are preestablished with their development depending on both their internal dynamics and their relationships with their environments. In contrast, random stochastic influences—“noise” in the language of chaos theory—may or may not affect the system’s evolutionary development. CRITIQUE Chaos theory can be critiqued from several points of argument. One point concerns the aspects of hard and soft excitation that bring chaos theory into conflict with real environmental situations. When a chaos system is undergoing oscillation—be it hard or soft—the impact of influences incongruent with chaos systemic development can bring about unexpected disruptions. It is not that the flapping of butterfly wings in Spain which generates a unique chaos pattern will influence California’s weather.9 Given an unexpected event such as a sudden rainstorm in Spain, even the strictest of chaos theorists can only assume, but not predict its effects in California. This is significant because the noise of the unexpected can indeed be incorporated into the chaos system, which will then

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The Problem Situation

adjust its parameters as it absorbs and relates to the “noise.” The influences of El Nin˜ o—which can be considered a global chaos system—attest to the absorption of various aspects of weather noise and the incorporation of them into its general dynamics. In situations where noise renders chaos systems to be congruent with their changing environments, chaos theory is placed in a paradoxical situation. In computer models, chaos systems are isolated from environmental stimuli and perform according to the dictates of the instructions given to the computer. In these conditions, these systems are isolated from the noise of environmental factors and here no paradox exists. However, systems that perform outside computer models are indeed influenced by environmental noise, so that even the snowflake’s shape is determined by noise and the patterns in which gas is disbursed vary with the influences of its environment. Closed chaos systems are interesting in themselves for the patterns they take as generated by computer instructions, and here no paradox exists. They perform as they are supposed to but offer no information about the real world. When related to the real world, they offer information only after they begin performing, and no direction of their performance is known until the process is completed. The paradox arises because these systems are no longer chaotic but perform as any other physical (or social, or economic) system performs so that chaos, according to the theory, is no longer relevant. Their strange attractors are nonexistent, as no sets of points P exist for ps to rotate around and these systems evolve according to both their internal dynamics and the influences of external noise, which may change the external dynamics and the systems’ evolutionary direction and development. Thus, neither hard nor soft excitation for closed computer chaos systems are influenced by noise, but only by the instructions they receive. The hard and soft oscillations of chaos systems operating in the real world are disrupted by environmental noise and hence break down and perform as other systems. Their strange attractors have shifted in response to the noise and, in so doing, have lost whatever attractive pull they may have had. The paradox is that chaos systems in contact with the real world lose the properties of chaos and take the forms of other such systems, reacting to and developing within their environments, but doing so in terms of chaos considerations. Snowflakes fractalize according to chaos theory but, unlike computergenerated snowflakes that develop according to instructions and without noise, real snowflakes develop according to the environmental noise that, for chaos theory, is necessary for this development. Computer-generated snowflakes can be identical every time, but because of the noise acting on the real water droplet the shape of each snowflake as it fractalize during its development is unique, never to be copied in nature. The same holds true for the motion of gas. When released, its patterns are as unique as the environmental conditions that act upon it and, while obeying the laws of chaos, this motion is unique. Hence, with respect to Feinberg’s definition of chaos, the motion cannot be predicted because of its sensitive dependence on the minor changes within it. However, for

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31

computer-generated chaos, the direction of its evolution can indeed be predicted according to the instructions given to it. For real hard and soft oscillation, such prediction is impossible due to the external noise operating on it because these influences and the directions they take cannot be known before the system evolves. Hence, chaos systems, in the real—that is noncomputer—world, be they physical, natural, or socioeconomic, cannot be considered totally in isolation, for their very evolutionary dynamics depend directly on external circumstances. In this context, consider therefore Leon Glass and Michael C. Mackey’s comment about chaos: Technically, chaos refers to randomness or irregularity that arises in a deterministic system. In other words, chaos is observed even in the complete absence of environmental noise. An important aspect of chaos is that there is a sensitive dependence on the dynamics to initial conditions. This means that although in principle it should be possible to predict future dynamics as a function of time, this is in reality impossible since any error in specifying the initial condition, no matter how small, leads to an erroneous prediction at some future time.10

The difficulty with this opinion is obvious: every evolutionary system— whether computer-generated or real-world based—has a sensitive dependence on its initial conditions and, except for those systems that are computer generated, real evolutionary systems do not exist in isolation. Consider the natural snowflake: In an isolated existence the snowflake would not develop, for external factors are necessary for its development. Snowflakes designed by computer graphics are fulfilling the program’s requirements and, to this extent, the development is evolutionary. Since this type of evolution is computer controlled, it is unnatural; it is strictly determined and terminates when the computer is turned off or when the program ends. In the real world, snowflakes are not isolated from the external conditions necessary for the realization of their natural evolution. While there is sensitive dependence on their initial conditions, their evolution is not predictable, resulting in unique entities every time. The point is that every evolving system—be it physical, socioeconomic, political, biological, or even ideological—has a sensitive dependence on its initial conditions, even though they are evolving in dynamic environments with outside influences acting on them. Hence, in contrast to Glass and Mackey’s sentiment, even in principle it should not be possible to predict future dynamics for a system as a function of time because the external conditions are necessary for each system’s evolution since evolution does not exist in isolation. It is for this reason that chaos systems display aperiodic equations. In the real world, their growth is irregular and so the mathematics for treating them must also be irregular, showing the changes that occur as these systems evolve over time. Even in computer-generated chaos systems, the mathematics is of aperiodic equations to account for the fractalization of the systems as they develop.

32

The Problem Situation

Computer-generated systems are closed while those systems considered to fall within the realm of chaos theory in the real world are open. The closed systems proceed according to the orders of their programs while systems in the real world act and respond according to their environmental situations. The former operate within a dynamic equilibrium foundation while the latter are in dynamic disequilibrium, responding not to a fixed strange attractor but to their internal dynamics and the external forces acting on them. Hence, in criticism, chaos theory provides understanding of systems as they are restricted in computer form, and thus they share a common trait with complexity theory. However, in the real world, the computer-generated models that serve as the basis for understanding the real world must be considered only that: as dynamic equilibrium oriented models from which dynamic disequilibrium systems can be compared to be comprehended.

NOTES 1. Martin Gardner, The New Ambidextrous Universe, 3rd ed. (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1990), p. 270. However, consider also, James Gleick’s statement that “Chaos was the creation of information.” Chaos (New York: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 260. 2. See Henri Poincare´ , Science and Hypothesis (New York: Dover, 1905); Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1954); and Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy (New York: Penguin Books, 1990). 3. See Georg Cantor, Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers (New York: Dover, 1955) and for a discussion on his work, see Edna E. Kramer, The Nature and Growth of Modern Mathematics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), chapter 24, “Infinite Hierarchy,” pp. 577–97. See also Benoıˆt Mandelbrot, Fractals: Form, Chance, and Dimension (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1977). 4. Gerald Feinberg, Solid Clues (New York: Touchstone Books, 1985), p. 264. 5. For a discussion on Hilbert space, see Kramer, The Nature and Growth of Modern Mathematics, pp. 570–72, and see Hermann Weyl’s comments on Hilbert in “A HalfCentury of Mathematics,” American Mathematical Monthly 58, no. 8 (October 1951); 151. 6. Werner Heisenberg, The Physical Principles of the Quantum Theory, trans. Carl Eckhart and F. C. Hoyt (New York: Dover, 1949), p. 20. 7. See A. d’Abro, The Rise of the New Physics, vol. 2 (New York: Dover, 1951), pp. 654–56 and 670–73 for a discussion on this point. 8. See the discussion on chaos theory and crisis theory in business cycles in David Z. Rich, Crisis Theory (Westport, Conn: Praeger Publishers, 1997), chapter 10, pp. 129–56. 9. This concept is attributed to Edward Lorenz. See his article, “Deterministic Nonperiodic Flow,” Journal of the Atmospheric Sciences 20 (1993): 130–41. 10. Leon Glass and Michael C. Mackey, From Clocks to Chaos (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 6, 7. The authors state further on p. 33 that two

Chaos Theory

33

main features characterizing chaos must be fulfilled: (1) For some parameter values, almost all initial conditions give rise to aperiodic dynamics; (2) arbitrary close initial conditions display independent temporal evolution as time proceeds. Thus there is a sensitive dependence on initial conditions [italics in original].

4

Rene´ Thom’s Catastrophe Theory: Comments and Critique Scientifically and mathematically, catastrophe theory complements the calculus. Whereas the calculus is a quantitative theory of gradual change, catastrophe theory is a largely qualitative theory of abrupt change. Michael Guillen, Bridges to Infinity1

COMMENTS Catastrophe theory is elaborated in the language of topology. One key notion of topology that finds expression in Rene´ Thom’s work on abrupt change is the concept of topological equivalence in which two objects are said to be equivalent if they share certain essential attributes, regardless of their other dissimilarities. Guillen gives the example of a doughnut and a coffee cup being topologically equivalent because each has a hole in it. He states that the hole is an essential feature in the sense that, “If we imagine transfiguring a doughnut into a cup or vice versa, almost everything else about the object will have changed in the process except for the hole; it persists.”2 Topological equivalence is always judged on immutable, that is qualitative, attributes and not on mutable, that is, quantitative attributes—such details as size or shape. For this reason it is possible, and even common, for two different looking objects to be topologically equivalent.3 Gerald Feinberg has defined catastrophe theory as a branch of mathematics The comments and critique in this chapter are based on the discussion in David Z. Rich, Crisis Theory (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1997), pp. 35–38.

36

The Problem Situation

“used to describe how quantities may change suddenly when some parameter that they depend on changes slightly.”4 In his chapter, “Kinematics of Forms: Catastrophes,” Rene´ Thom discusses the morphology of a catastrophic process with changes in parameters and their influences on systems. Assuming that a natural process of any kind whatsoever occurs in an area designated as box B, and then consider that with T as time, BXT is the domain on which the process is defined. Assume that an observer has probes or other means to investigate the neighborhood of each x of BXT. If the observer detects no irregularity for point x with respect to all other points, then x is a regular point in the process. The regular point forms an open set on BXT, and the complementary set K is closed and is the set of catastrophe points thereby having some discontinuity in every neighborhood. Thom maintains that something happens in every grouping with center c when c 僐 K constitutes the morphology of the process; furthermore, he maintains that the distinction between regular points and catastrophic points is somewhat arbitrary for it depends on the fitness of the observation used, leaving open that each point is catastrophic in response to sufficiently sensitive observational techniques.5 This distinction, Thom maintains, is an ideation made precise by a mathematical model. As catastrophe is linked with discontinuity, for Thom it is natural to say that a point (x,t) 僐 K in BXT is a catastrophic situation, if at least one of the functions q(x,t)—or one of its first or second derivatives—has a point of discontinuity. Supposing that K is not densely populated, then for the neighborhood of some points there would not be chaos or turbulence while for others in more densely populated areas there would be. Overall stability would be diminished and thus lose its relevance. With the mapping of box B onto B' the closed catastrotrophe sending K onto K' corresponds under strict mapping to BXT, with the boxed elements being the same topological type, having the same form in each box. Under the section heading 2.3 “Structural Stability and Models,” Thom discusses formal and continuous models. Formal models are those of formal systems possessing the following advantages: their descriptions are simple, being axiomatic or combinatorial, with the deduction processes in these systems possibly mechanized. These models are capable of some indeterminacy of phenomena, inasmuch as deduction is an intermediate operation. In formal models, questions are undeterminable in a system with respect to knowing whether a proposition is a consequence of a set of propositions. Thom also maintains that no dynamic is possible for them. Continuous models, on the other hand, are dynamic and the use of different models provides strict determinism. Although qualitatively different models may be described by structurally unstable dynamic systems, there is the difficulty that only a small number of simple algebraic or geometric forms can be used, thereby conflicting in general with the a priori need for structural stability with a process that is apparently empirically stable. Rene´ Thom’s work is not only fascinating, it is also important in the biologi-

Rene´ Thom’s Catastrophe Theory

37

cal aspects of morphogenesis in embryonic development and for multicellular organisms. It is also important for the general theory of evolution because development is one of the outstanding issues of biology and, specifically, zoology. It is important for chaos theory, especially in the consideration of dynamic systems. Consider the snowflake again: Two droplets of water falling under identical conditions with the same external conditions affecting them evolve into two distinct and unique snowflakes. Taken as formal systems, each droplet isolated in space and time has its own structure whose description is simple and, in its isolation being axiomatic or combinatorial, it conforms to standard threedimensional geometry in its space-time framework. From its standard form in isolation, no prediction concerning its situation can be made because its formal situation is static. This process is also continuous as snowflakes are transformed from droplets to the final form of the flakes themselves. This process is due to the effects of the environment on the droplets as they descend. This situation affects two identical droplets differently as they fall because their qualities change suddenly as the parameters of the environment change, no matter how slightly. CRITIQUE The situation of catastrophe theory is identical to that of chaos theory. The evolution of systems cannot be predicted because of its sensitive dependence on changes, however minor, of the properties of systems. These changes are sudden, while the generators of the changes may be ever so slight. What Rene´ Thom has described and dealt with are, therefore, the mathematics of chaos theory. Chaos systems undergo rapid quantitative changes when a single external parameter change occurs—and more so when many parameters change—bringing changes within the system as with the snowflake and, indeed, with the dispersion of gas because they are affected by their environments in the forms of alterations in wind direction, the forces of weather, and other conditions within the area. With respect to the set K in BXT, the distinction between regular and catastrophic points is not as Thom maintains, but between static and dynamic conditions within the area. Equating the static conditions to Thom’s definition of formal, then the static conditions have simple descriptions, being axiomatic and combinatorial in composition. Deduction within these systems may be mechanized, but is nevertheless determinate. The formal condition in a thriving BXT domain—the nature of the domain is not important here—will not remain formal or static for any significant duration owing to the continuous or dynamic conditions within the same domain. Since the continuous situation is dynamic, there will eventually be discontinuity within this continuous situation. Consider the situation from this perspective: Discontinuity tends to occur in the BXT domain (and indeed in every domain that is to some extent dynamic) in a random, yet fairly persistent, manner. Discontinuity is therefore expected

38

The Problem Situation

even though the general domain is believed by the observer to be consistent. Hence, point (x,t) 僐 K, whether continuous or changing at its first or second derivative, will be discontinuous over time t owing to the impact of the dynamics within the domain. The catastrophic situation that Thom discusses is therefore to be expected for each part of the domain, no matter how small, over time. Each BXT is dynamic and hence discontinuous. Its formal or static setting may have been its initial position, captured in an instantaneous moment in time. Every domain is evolutionary, developing according to its internal dynamics and effects that external influences exert on it. Therefore, every domain can be considered as a system, with its components subject to the statics of its initial position and the dynamics imposed upon them from other parts of the domain as they change and by the influences external to the domain. In other words, according to catastrophe theory, each domain operates according to the laws of chaos, with catastrophic situations being identical to those that bring about changes in evolving systems. Every domain that has a system in use is dynamic and is subject to chaos conditions when viewed from the perspective of catastrophe theory. The association of catastrophe theory with chaos theory is valid because chaos systems tend to equilibrium due to their strange attractors even though evolution is occurring; catastrophe theory describes the changes during the continuous evolutionary development of the chaos system. Moreover, just as the chaos systems tend to equilibrium—as with the snowflake and the dispersed gas—the discontinuous changes in the system increase— first at an increasing rate as the droplet of water is being shaped into the snowflake and as the gas is released into the environment, then tapering off as the system achieves equilibrium with its environment. For chaos theory and catastrophe theory on which chaos relies for the development of systems, there are difficulties. Chaos pertains to the evolution of systems and catastrophe shows the direction that evolution takes. The snowflake’s design is due to the catastrophic changes that the falling droplet undergoes as its internal dynamics meet with the external influences on it. The released gas is also dispersed according to catastrophe theory, for there is no smooth path that the gas takes as its form is altered into various directions owing to the influences of its environment and internal dynamics. As with chaos theory, catastrophe theory is in a paradoxical situation: Evolution ceases when equilibrium is reached, yet evolution as such does not cease, but takes different paths. Moreover, catastrophic situations cease when the system is in equilibrium, but, since evolution does not cease, catastrophic situations will continue. This paradox can be resolved by distinguishing between evolution and development. The snowflake develops according to its internal dynamics and the influences exerted on it by its environment. The patterns formed by released gas develop according to the force of its pressure when released and to the envi-

Rene´ Thom’s Catastrophe Theory

39

ronmental influences on it when it disperses. According to chaos theory, the development of systems ceases when no further dynamics exist and no external dynamics can bring about alterations. For chaos theory, catastrophes stop when the system is in disequilibrium. Evolution, however, does not cease; only strains of the evolutionary process are terminated owing to interferences of external dynamics and the lack of sufficient internal dynamics to regulate the external influences. However, because catastrophe theory’s association with chaos theory renders it effective only for strictly defined chaos situations—such as computergenerated models and other such closed systems6 —crisis theory, developed for situations for treating open chaos and catastrophic situations, will be described with equilibrium considered in a different context and without the paradoxes involved in chaos and catastrophe theories. NOTES 1. Michael Guillen, Bridges to Infinity (Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, Inc., 1983), p. 164. His chapter on catastrophe theory gives a clear background to Rene´ Thom’s development of catastrophe theory; see pp. 161–73. 2. Guillen, Bridges to Infinity, p. 164, italics in original text. 3. Rene´ Thom, Structural Stability and Morphogenesis, trans. D. H. Fowler (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1989), chapter 4, pp. 38–53. For a discussion on catastrophe theory, see chapters 2–5, pp. 12–100, in which three-dimensional space-time is discussed, associated with conflicts of regimes and theories as expressed by conflicting geometries in the space-time continuum. These situations are dynamic within the Riemannian conceptualization and indeed, could be applied to other non-Euclidian geometries. 4. Gerald Feinberg, Solid Clues (New York: Touchstone Books, 1985), p. 206. The either-or aspect of catastrophe theory in terms of sudden changes in systems in response to slight changes in a parameter on which they depend has significance for chaos theory. 5. Indeed, if the observer is to be considered as part of the observational technique, then there is the issue of bias—intentional or otherwise—that must be considered. Observation is very easily colored by adherence to a theoretical position, or to plain bias. 6. Clocks powered by water are based on chaos concepts, where the different cups for holding the water that regulate the clocks’ mechanisms are semiclosed systems that obey the rules of chaos. These clocks eventually slow down due to the forces of thermodynamics. Nevertheless, they are interesting to observe for studying chaos dynamics for the duration.

PART II

THE DYNAMICS OF CRISIS THEORY

5

Introduction to the Dynamics of Crisis Theory There is much talk of crises, especially in high places. The alarm, and breathless excitement, reverebrate within the hall of power and resound through the popular media and international relations literature. Pundits and theorists of every stripe agree: crises are inevitable. Ron Hirschbein, What if they Gave a Crisis and Nobody Came?1

DECISION MAKING: METHOD AND METHODOLOGY The word “crisis” comes from the Greek, meaning decision. Crisis theory thus pertains to decision making within the context of a well-defined, rigorous, and open-ended linguistic construction within which its information acquires its unique utility as it relates to the area for which the linguistic construction was formulated.2 These constructions can be ad hoc, developed for specific areas for which the linguistics are stated for the perceived problem area and are abandoned when the crisis is resolved. In these situations, some of the terms which had utility during the crisis may be retained for further crisis, acquiring the nuances of the problem area. Crisis theories are well structured, dealing with specific realms of the physical or biological sciences or they can be grand theoretical structures from which other theories are derived, such as the Brownian movement of gas derived from Newtonian theory. They can also be theories that include other theories, such as Einstein’s use of Riemmannian geometry in his general theory of relativity. Crises are generated by the awareness of problems that can only be approached by the formulation of the relevant information into working systems

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The Dynamics of Crisis Theory

with their linguistic phrases and intended connotations—the jargon—structured so that all who are involved with the problem area can come to terms with it and resolve it. The linguistic structures are crisis theories, and they provide the basis for the method and the methodology necessary for the decision-making processes. Methodology is the approach to the decision-making process determined by each specific problem area and the theory formulated that relates to it. The linguistic jargon that defines and delineates the problem area provides the intellectual concepts and physical equipment necessary for experimenting in the area. As the problem area undergoes changes due to internal and external influences on it, the methodology employed is altered accordingly and this, in turn, requires alterations in the linguistics of the theory. Methodology is thus established with the formulation of crisis theory and provides the basis of its linguistic structure—the terms and their nuances when first stated and changes as they occur—to relate to alterations within the problem area. Method, however, is strictly individualistic, subjective, and depends on the perspective and understanding of the problem area by each of the people who work with the theory and its problem area. Method thus allows for experimenting with the theory’s terms, providing differing nuances to the accepted methodology thereby experimenting to determine how these nuances relate to the problem area. In its usage, method is restricted by the requirement that it must remain within the theoretical framework and must relate to the problem area as stated by the theory. This allows for the introduction of new approaches within the framework of the theory-problem-area relationship. Since method is personal, it can be either Popperian in orientation, or positivistic, or pragmatic, or indeed eclectic, depending on the outlook and conceptualiziations of each individual working with the theory and its area.3 There is one requirement for method, however, that it not be applied dogmatically thereby restricting the theory’s development in its working with the problem area. Hence, while method is important, it should not be emphasized over the theory and its problem area so that the decision to accept or reject a contribution should not be made on the basis that it fails to meet a specific method’s requirements in testing or in its applications, of its utility with respect to the theory and the problem area. While methodology and method are historically related, their usages are oriented to the crisis theories and their problem areas under consideration. The linguistics and physical equipment of the methodologies provide the general direction for working with and researching within the theory while the individualistic method provides the basis for experimenting with the linguistics and physical equipment necessary for expanding the theory or altering it in relation to the problem area. This is important because, while the problem area may be stable over a set period of time, this stability may not be of long-term duration due to changes that may occur within the area because of dynamics operating within it. Indeed, working with a theory on a problem area generates internal

Introduction to Dynamics of Crisis Theory

45

dynamics that may alter the area, resulting in the necessity to make subsequent changes within the theory so that the utility of the theory-area relationship is maintained. Decision making can be undertaken with a high degree of certainty when a stable relationship between theory and its problem area exists. This stability occurs when the theory’s linguistics relate to the problem area as stated by the theory. The high degree of certainty is due to the application of the specific linguistic relationship to the corresponding part of the problem area, so that any deviation from the expected results is due to minor error in experimentation, perhaps because of equipment or due to the human factor of misjudgment. However, decision making becomes less certain when there is instability between the theory-area relationship—this due to changes in either the problem area because of it being worked on or to changes within the theory due to influences within the theoretical language such as linguistic nuances that entered and influenced the language; or due to changes in either the theory, the area, or both, which have undergone alterations over time and established a new relationship. To rectify an unstable situation, the theory has to be reconstructed to meet the demands of the problem area. This requires alterations within the jargon that are acceptable to those working with the theory and for this to be realized, testing has to be undertaken. The emphasis here is on theoretical changes, because a theory is formulated for working in the problem area. In situations where the area is changing, decision making within the theoretical context becomes uncertain to the extent of the changes and for the duration required to construct acceptable changes within the theory. Until these alterations are made, the theory loses its viability to the extent of the changes within the problem area and decision making is affected accordingly. The methodology changes while the methods used by those working with the crisis theory may either remain the same, or be changed accordingly, as the individuals see fit. Thus, because decision making is based on the understanding of the problem area and the theory that pertains to it, stability and instability are important factors that have to be considered. Applying a certain aspect of a theory’s linguistics to the corresponding section of a problem area that had previously responded as determined in the very recent past does not necessarily mean that the response will be the same. Area changes may not be detected due to reliance on the theory to perform as it is supposed to so that such applications may yield unexpected results. In this situation, after the area changes are realized, the decision has to be made to continue using the theory as such until such corresponding theoretical alterations are made or to hold the application and search for appropriate changes in the theory. It is also necessary to determine that if inconsistencies between prediction and results are found, they might be due to changes in linguistic nuances. The problem may also be in shifts in both realms, in which case both have to be investigated. There is also the impact of competing theories on a specific problem area and the changes in the area’s nuances that this generates to be considered. In this

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The Dynamics of Crisis Theory

case, methodologies are brought into question, while the individuals’ methods may remain consistent. Because methodologies are as variable as the nuances that permeate them, decisions to use them or to explore further within the theoretical context have to be made. Hence, while methods tend to be persistent, there are no hard and fast rules for the uses of methodologies; they are as variable as the theories in which they are formulated. An advantage of crisis theory is that it is flexible, allowing for the exploration of theoretical structures in response to changes in problem areas so that accepted alterations can be introduced until stability is achieved or until the theory is abandoned and replaced by another that has greater utility in the area. Should the area be considerably altered due to intensive use, the influences of competing theories, and the linguistic nuances that are imposed on the area, the theoretical-area relationship will no longer hold and further theoretical reconstruction to compensate for the area changes will be abandoned. Decision making, therefore, depends on the understanding of the relationship between a problem area and the theory that relates to it. As the terms of the theory change, so do their relation to the problem area and so does the information necessary for decision making. Where several theories are involved for a problem area, one of the considerations in the decision-making process is determining which theory to use. This decision is time-oriented because the dynamics in the area change due to the impact of the changing theories. The choice of which theory to use is influenced by methodological preference, which tends to be stable unless one theory is demonstrated to be outstanding in its performance, in which case, the others will be depleted of supporters. At this point, crisis theory has been discussed in very general terms. The dynamics of crisis theory and decision making will be discussed further in the next chapters, after which crisis theory will be applied to problems in biology and politics. Discussing a theoretical framework such as crisis theory renders the theory into meta status. It becomes specific as it is formulated to relate to a problem area and develops through application. This will be shown, but first, another metatheory must be commented on—this being game theory—for it has importance in theoretical structuring with reference to a problem area and the decision making that must result.

NOTES 1. Ron Hirschbein, What if They Gave a Crisis and Nobody Came? Interpreting International Crises (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1997), p. 197. 2. Ron Hirschbein writes that when tracing the word “crisis” to its Greek origin, Denise Botsdorff “aptly stresses the double meaning of the concept. It can refer to the critical moment in the life of an issue or an auspicious time for an advantageous decision.” Hirschbein, What if They Gave a Crisis and Nobody Came?, p. 200. See also Denise Botsdorff, Presidents and the Rhetoric of Foreign Crises (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1994); Hirschbein’s reference is to p. 207.

Introduction to Dynamics of Crisis Theory

47

3. For a discussion on Popper’s method, see Karl R. Popper, Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1962); for a discussion of the logical positivist method, see Rudolph Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950). For another approach to positivist methodology, see Moritz Schlick, General Theory of Knowledge, trans. Albert E. Blumberg (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court reprint, 1974). This work is unique in that it takes the positivist approach almost into the realm of the phenomenological. For the pragmatic approach, see Charles Saunders Peirce, Collected Papers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931). Peirce is mostly noted for his contributions in philosophy, but for a discussion on his contributions in mathematics, see Edna E. Kramer, The Nature and Growth of Modern Mathematics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), chapter 6, pp. 100–133, and pp. 676– 77. The eclectic method takes from whatever approach the individual deems relevant at the time, so that there is no subservience to method, but concern for working with the problem area and its theory.

6

Comments on Game Theory Game-theoretical predictions applied to human subjects achieve their accuracy in virtue of the evolutionary guarantee that man is well designed as a game player, a special case of rationality. Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms1

If the evolutionary guarantee that man is a game player is biological, then the genetic material will surely be found to express this. Should the evolutionary guarantee be due to social evolution as distinct from strict biological evolution, then the rules of some games change according to the objectives and the consent of their players.2 In their definitive work on game theory, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern take a sociomathematical approach to games. They argue that given a physical basis for society, according to all tradition and experience, human beings have a characteristic way of adjusting to such a social background. This consists of not setting up one rigid system of apportionment, i.e., of imputation, but rather a variety of alternatives, which will probably all express some general principles but nevertheless differ among themselves in many particular respects. This system of imputations describes the “established order of society” or “accepted standard of behavior.”3

They maintain that no random grouping of imputations will do as such a standard of behavior and this standard will have to satisfy the conditions that char-

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The Dynamics of Crisis Theory

acterize it as a possible order of things. Moreover, for this possible order of things to be viable, it must provide the conditions of stability in the larger scale for society to function and in the lesser scale for its competitive activities—that is, its games in the narrower sense of such games as poker and the broader sense of political and economic activity—to be performed. Game theory is thus a competitively oriented system in which one or more players compete against a system or program. In the case of a single player, the program or system might be a gambling procedure such as the one-armed bandits, or even the state or national lotteries. In these cases, the gamble is against great odds because the machines are set to pay off at random tries and the lotteries are set to draw numbers at random. In the case of the one-armed bandits, the house has the advantage because it sets the random periods for payoff. In the case of lotteries, the state has the advantage because its payoff is far less than the income it accrues and, indeed, there have been instances where no player has won the big prize, thus increasing the state coffers as well as the prize for the next drawing and tempting more people to play. In these situations, it is the individual against the program or system, and not one player against another or many (⫽2 or more) players. There is no rational strategy involved in playing these kinds of games and whatever strategy is employed is irrational. Filling out the lottery forms based on birth dates, social security or telephone numbers, or other such methods provides no greater guarantee of winning than filling out the form in a random manner. Playing the one-armed bandits for a certain length of time or for a specific amount of money also provides no guarantee of winning. Here, information about the field of play and the rules of competition offers neither an advantage nor a disadvantage; the game is played on the basis of randomness and won on pure chance. If the structure or program entails competitiveness among its players, strategies (or policies) are based on each player having sufficient information to be able to formulate rational decisions in light of his or her objectives. With each player making a move, a set of rewards or penalties are distributed among the players, which are the outcomes for each participant. These may be business gains or losses, given the strategies of each player. Hence, the payoff for implementing a specific strategy is established not only by a player’s move, but also by the responses of the other participants; hence, while formulating a strategy, each player has to consider the others’ responses, such as their counter moves and the consequences these moves have on the individual player’s and competitors’ positions.4 Another approach to game theory is that discussed by Stuart A. Kauffman5 and is concerned with co-evolution in which either species are co-evolving among themselves, or the players are members of different species in an ecosystem. Kauffman discusses the N/K model, where N is the number of parts of a system—such as genes in a genotype, or amino acids in a protein—with each part making a fitness contribution that depends on K and reflects the richness

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of the cross-coupling system, with K measuring the richness of epistatic interactions among the system’s components. This model is restricted by the number of parameters, A. He uses Boolean algebra since each player has only two actions (0,1) for which the action either pays off and co-evolution is achieved, or it fails and may be detrimental to coevolution, and is either abandoned or left in place with the future consequences unknown. He discusses the Nash equilibrium position, which is a local combination of actions or strategies where each player is locally happier as long as the others do not deviate from their fixed strategies. Using Boolean algebra, for a large N and K ⬎ 2, and with no other constraints, couplings have no steady state attractors with the coevolving system tending to oscillate in a cycle with no stable equilibrium, comparable to the game of “rock, paper, scissors,” in which players select one of three actions with rock breaking scissors and paper covering rock. However, making a comparison between a game such as rock, paper, scissors and biological co-evolutionary couplings is problematic. For example, while equilibrium is not inherent in the game above, there is no reason for a pattern of equilibrium not to be established. The purpose of game theory is to plan strategies according to the understanding of the field of play and possible responses of competing players. Such a pattern of play can therefore be established in which each player has a good feel for the other players’ strategies and can conduct his or her strategy accordingly. While for game theory equilibrium may have important tasks, in the real world, they are insignificant, with a winning situation important. This situation may have to be to the advantage of all sides, or of only a few of the participants, or of even one participant, depending on the circumstances involved. This approach is the advantage of crisis theory and will be discussed in the following chapters. Moreover, the determinants of co-evolutionary couplings are more than just the number of participants, N, the number of parameters, A, and the measurement of epistatic interaction among the system’s components, K. Co-evolutionary couplings—and, indeed, evolution which stems from such couplings—is, in the long run, not restricted to this schematic. The general rule is not for epistatic relations to be considered in the general scheme of things, but for epidynamics to be. While equilibrium is important in the very short run, in the long run, it does not hold but dynamic disequilibrium does. This results from the necessities of evolution which require altering both the paramaters and the number of participants. This will be elaborated on further in Part II within the context of crisis theory. For its insight into strategy building, game theory is not without its difficulties. The point was made by G.L.S. Shackle that the theory as developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern makes conduct rational despite the head-on collision of interests by supposing that this is the conflict and not in real life “in the fog of deliberately engendered uncertainty and misconception, but instead a game with known rules.”6 In discussing a two-contestant game, he argues that

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each contestant is assumed to know what the payoff is, what the consequences of any pair of strategies are (one adopted by one player and the other by his or her opponent) and the complete list of strategies available to both players. He states further that in this situation, each opponent can deduce the rational conduct of the other, by this is meant “the maximum strategy by which each player minimizes the harm that, at worst, his opponent can do to him.”7 The problem with game theory for a two-person game or for a large number of players is that it supposes that each player has a knowledge of the possible strategies and will act rationally on this basis to minimize losses and maximize gains. However, given these theoretical considerations, game theory fails to take into account the element of surprise, which Schackle rightly attests is the most powerful and incisive element in the entire art of war. Moreover, the aspect of changing what appeared to be the rules of the game, continually threatens the dissolution of the circumstances and conditions in which the player supposes himself or herself to be operating. Nevertheless, comments in defense of game theory must be made. One objective of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s work is the analysis of poker. They chose this game because of the inputs of the chance drawing of certain card patterns and the art of bluffing so prevalent in this game. Given three or more players (of course, it is assumed here that a fair game is played), at the beginning of the game, the cards possessed by each player are unknown to other players, and strategies rely heavily on bluffing. As the game progresses, the chance distribution of a winning hand varies according to the cards that have been played. One skill in poker is to remember the cards that have already been played because this provides the opportunity to use the bluffing strategy if a reasonable hand is dealt while recognizing that the other players may have similar hands. Another strategy is the use of money in bluffing, to raise the ante to the point where other players cannot compete, and to bluff the remaining opponents into resigning their hands. In the case of poker, the strategies are limited and indeed restricted by the chance of the dealt hand. However, game theory provides insight into the play and the possibilities of winning and losing. Game theory is also relevant for all types of games where the rules and procedures are clearly stated and the strategies well known to skilled players. Even in chess games against supercomputers, one of the strategies of the computer programmers is intimidation based on the computer’s extremely fast and nonhuman calculations that, given the pressures of such competition, sets the human player at an initial disadvantage, regardless of the level of playing skill. However, game theory is for games, where the rules are well known and the strategies understood by competent players. This is not the case for competition in economics, politics, or indeed the strategies of military conflict. Unlike games of skill—such as poker or chess, or such games as developed by children as rock, paper, scissors and its variations—the real world of economic, political, and military activity does not rely on the full knowledge of the players. The

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rules are not always established and known by the actual participants nor, in some cases, are the players themselves brought into the game until the rules, often changing as they are, are established. Economic rules may change according to government fiat—resetting currency ratios by devaluation or revaluation—thereby affecting, in the short run, the economic performance of firms dealing in international markets and, in the longer run, the entire economy. Moreover, responses by trading partners to such policies are unpredictable: They may result in some finance ministers taking no retaliatory action in defense of their countries’ economies while other ministers may take similar actions or counteractions such as devaluations or imposition of quotas and high tariffs, which will result in further instability in world markets.8 Military policy is not regulated by game theory rules either, as the explosions of nuclear devices in India in May 1998 demonstrated. Pressures were placed on Pakistan not to test in kind, and China was pressured not to resume testing. This region has been a flashpoint since Indian and Pakistani independence, with India feeling threatened by both Pakistan and China because of previous military encounters. Since India’s nuclear explosions in May, the leaders of the Westernoriented powers have sought to impose game theory rules on the region, but national pride and religious antagonism have proved to be strong and the region remains extremely unstable. Sanctions were imposed on India and Pakistan was offered renewal of arms trading as a reward for restraint. China seeks American trade and the United States seeks China’s vast market potential. India’s economy has been hurt and its ministers have offered to cease further explosions in return for reassurances that neither Pakistan nor China will be a military threat in the future—reassurances that no single world power or combination of such powers can provide.9 Politics are also not subject to game theory rules, and the Indonesian situation in May 1998 is an example. The roots of the Indonesian conflict were exposed in October 1997, when the Asian economies were confronted with swift declines in consumer spending and corresponding rapid declines in the stock exchanges. For Indonesia, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) required imposing high fuel prices and student fees. The students rebelled, and charges of nepotism were also levied against President Suharto’s government. President Suharto was attending a conference in Cairo when the protests against his government and its policies began, resulting in further destabilization within that country, in particular, and throughout Asia in general. Suharto was unaware at the time that he was a player and the rules of the game were certainly unknown to him and to his ministers in advance. The military was called upon to maintain stability as Suharto contemplated his position amidst calls for his resignation, even from some of his top ministers. A situation that seemed quiet had become explosive, with dynamics generating throughout the region.10 The contributions of game theory have been enormous, given established rules that can be changed only by the consent of each player, but this is so only when the element of full knowledge of each player’s strategies and options exists.

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Eliminating this element removes the advantages of game theory, and since this is the situation in the real world—in biology, economics, and military and political activity—the imposition of game theory considerations is not only impractical, but also certainly invalid. As with biology, with economic, military, and political issues, there can be no epistatics. These realms, and indeed all realms not restricted by agreed-upon rules, are outside the limited realm of game theory, and must be approached with a different argument. Crisis theory, to be developed in this work, is an attempt to clarify this situation for biological, economic, military, and political issues. The theory will be discussed in the following chapters, after which it will be applied to these issues.

NOTES 1. Daniel C. Dennett, Brainstorms (Cambridge, Mass.: Bradford Books, 1981), p. 16. 2. Whether the existence of games as a means for meeting challenges is biologically oriented or socially oriented is an issue in itself. If games simulate competition without the goals of life and death, they may be mock evolutionary contests; where such games do involve various levels of existence, such as game theory in business competition or in global or even local politics, then the dynamics of biological and social evolution cannot really be separated. 3. John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1953), p. 41. In n. 2 to this statement, they write: “There may be extreme, or to use a mathematical term, ‘degenerate’ special cases where the setup of such exceptional simplicity that a rigid simple apportionment can be put into operation. But it seems to disregard them as non-typical.” This, of course, depends on each situation. For society in general, they are correct in our era but, for the dictatorships in the not too distant past, this could be argued. For this discussion, their position will be taken, but it will be quantified in part III. 4. See Jacob T. Schwartz, “Mathematics as a Tool for Economic Understanding,” in Mathematics Today, ed. Lynn Arthur Steen (New York: Vantage Books, 1980), p. 273– 88, for a discussion on game theory and economics, where he discusseses the von Neumann–Morgenstern model. 5. See Stuart A. Kauffman, The Origins of Order: Self-Organization and Selection in Evolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 42–67, 237–81. This is a very important book whose ideas cannot be given clarity here. The discussion on his game theory approach is for purposes of critique of game theory which, as with his main argument, employs chaos and catastrophe theory. Also, see his important and extensive bibliography. 6. G.L.S. Shackle, Epistemics and Economics (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1992), p. 161. 7. Ibid. 8. For a discussion on international trade, see David Z. Rich, The Economics of International Trade: An Independent View (New York: Quorum Books, 1992). 9. The date of May 1998, was chosen to illustrate how situations can become dangerous independent of one another in the same time period. The conflict between India and Pakistan is georeligious and the conflict between India and China is geopolitical.

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During the Indo-Pakistani conflicts, China has sided with Pakistan and the United States with India. Since the United States and China began discussing trade relations and civil liberties in China, the situation in this region has become more delicate than in the past. With Pakistan threatening to explode an “Islamic Bomb,” and China concerned over India’s actions and comments that India considers China still a potential threat, tensions are running high and the world’s leaders are working to calm the situation. 10. The collapse of Indonesia’s currency—the rupiah—in late 1997 and early 1998 brought about the contraction of the country’s gross national product by nearly 14 percent because of the dollar-denominated debt and the poor performance of the banking sector. Wavering on conditions originally agreed to with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a loan of $42 billion resulted in the further loss of investor confidence. After President Suharto’s resignation on May 21, 1989, his successor, B. J. Habibe, improved cooperation with the IMF, but the money supply used to prop up the failing banks rapidly tightened with inflation reaching 77 percent. In October 1997, Indonesia and the IMF finally reached an agreement with the rupiah being floated, key interest rates raised, and fiscal policy tightened. As of mid-1999, the country’s economic program had shown encouraging signs of stabilization in exchange and interest rates. Because of the economic situation, the country experienced periods of social unrest, but with the current economic improvement, unrest has declined. A major issue confronting Indonesia now is the country’s sovereignty over East Timor Province, which is not recognized by the United Nations, and is the subject of discussions between the United Nations and Indonesia. These discussions also involve Portugal (as its former colonial power) and Malaysia, which also has interests in the region.

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Introduction to Crisis Theory It seems that our autocatalytic social evolution has locked us into a particular course which the early hominoids still within us may not welcome. To maintain the species indefinitely we are compelled to drive toward total knowledge, right down to the levels of the neuron and gene. Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology1

PRELIMINARY REMARKS The development of knowledge and the search for truth are perhaps the two most significant qualities that distinguish humans from all other life forms. Whether our earlier humanoid genetic and biological mechanisms are in periodical conflict with this has still to be determined. However, we are aware of our behavioral inconsistencies expressed in the extreme by our fluctuations between peaceful and warlike, loving and hating, sensitivity to others’ situations and consideration only of ourselves. What we have come to understand about our human foundations is that they have contributed to our historical survival by allowing us to develop our prowess, both individually and collectively, when confronting difficult climatic conditions and hostile animals as well as other humans with whom we have come into conflict due to aggression, territorial expansion, and domination. During our sociobiological evolution we have learned to temper the hominoid influences on our behavior with the dominant human influences. While our collective human history has been written in the blood of wars and the tears of conflict, it tells of the greatness of our contributions in the arts and sciences.

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The struggle we have with our hominoid foundations is manifested in our self-understanding and our relations with others in the sense that the majority of our experiences occur within a civilizing context where emotions are curtailed and differences of opinion are resolved not with violence, but with reason and persuasion. Moreover, while we understand that although there are some situations that require personal or collective violence, because of the devastation that can result from violence, it has become more important to try to reason with our adversaries in order to avoid violence and reach accommodation beneficial for the parties involved. As for our international relations, the hominoid influences on our genetic composition have served us fairly well over our evolutionary development, enabling us to develop weaponry by using technologies we have invented for peaceful purposes and for our defense in many and diversified ways. Moreover, in our current stage of evolutionary development, we have been in situations during which hominoid influences have been exploited and channeled out of necessity. One such situation was during the final stage of World War II when the atom bomb was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki which brought about Japan’s surrender and led to the further development of this weapon as the Cold War began. Prior to World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union were adversaries with political and economic systems so different that each country was politically and economically hostile toward the other, with each country justifying these attitudes on ideological grounds. The Soviets argued that the capitalistdemocratic system of the United States could not survive in a world of Soviet-based international communism which, as one of its tenets, sought the overthrow of the capitalist system. To the American system of democracy and capitalism, Stalin’s dictatorship in the Soviet Union was reprehensible and counter to the human spirit and the accomplishments made so far for liberty. However, during World War II their fight against Nazi Germany brought them together as allies, sharing military strategies with the British and French. It seemed somewhat unnatural, therefore, that as victors after the war, the military alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union dissolved and they resumed their hostile postures. This time they were the major contenders for international military, political and economic domination, having divided the world into their respective spheres of influence, maintaining—perhaps rightly then—that this was necessary as a deterrent to another war. While immediately after the war the United States had the advantage in the field of atomic energy and weaponry, as the Cold War intensified the Soviet Union developed its own atomic program, emphasizing weaponry and sophisticated methods of delivery. Each side continued to fortify itself with increasingly destructive weaponry and defense systems and treatises were written about first strike, retaliation, and the realistic threat of big power mutual destruction. With the expansion of American and Soviet atomic power, their weapons became increasingly sophisticated, with the methods of delivery refined accord-

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ingly. To widen the scope of the Cold War, broadly based alliances such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) within the U.S. sphere of influence and the Warsaw Pact of Soviet-led countries were formed. Alliances were also formed in Asia with Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and, to a lesser extent, Japan facing Communist China and the Soviet military force. With the development of atomic weapons and their delivery systems and with the military-cum-political alliances that were formed, the strategies of potential military confrontation had to be revalued. Placement of nuclear weapons on allied territory and the ability to absorb a first strike and retaliate effectively were analyzed.2 As the Cold War progressed and nuclear weaponry became increasingly sophisticated and devastating, the realization of a de facto no-win military situation resulted in a mutual elimination of the uses of atomic weaponry for settling political and strategic issues between the United States and the Soviet Union and strategic arms reduction talks began between these powers. However, another factor became influential in the latter stages of the strategic arms talks. This factor was the economic cost of maintaining existing weapons systems and developing new systems to remain competitive with the other side. The economic aspect reached the crucial stage when President Ronald Reagan introduced the Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) providing Premier Mikhail Gorbachev of the Soviet Union with a tremendous challenge, made more complicated by the status of the European Economic Community (EEC). A unified currency was being discussed among the members of the EEC that would be a significant step in uniting their markets, posing a challenge for the Soviet-sponsored customs union, the COMECON. Real competition existed within the framework of the EEC’s structure. The market potential of this grouping posed a great economic challenge for the Soviet Union whose economy required expansion and improvements in production and marketing to remain viable in highly competitive world markets that were becoming both multinational and global in orientation.3 The U.S. challenge of the “Star Wars” initiative proved too costly for the Soviet economy to support. Gorbachev was thus confronted with the choice of maintaining the Cold War and meeting the U.S. challenge regardless of the economic consequences. This challenge was further complicated by discussions within the EEC concerning allowing more countries to join the community and the introduction of a single European currency, thereby strengthening the community within and making it a more formidable economic force among the world’s nations. Gorbachev was therefore confronted with a choice between matching America’s new defense system so that the powers would remain fairly even militarily to further reducing the chances of war, or protecting the economy by investing monies into improving education and internal infrastructure to be able to compete effectively in the world’s markets. Gorbachev opted for the latter choice and bargained with the United States to end the Cold War that was sapping both countries’ strength. With the end of the Cold War, a new approach to the geopolitical issues of the time was required. While international conflicts seemed to be part of the

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human condition—perhaps as a result of the hominoid influence on our genetic composition—attempts to resolve these conflicts through the force of arms was abandoned by the atomic powers. The wars that have raged since the end of the Cold War have been primarily internal in orientation with political powers vying for political and military control and religious groups seeking to annul each others’ influences. International organizations, such as the United Nations, NATO, and even the United States have sought to end these conflicts through mediation and dialogue. Perhaps the most significant consequence of the Cold War and the military struggles that occurred during that period is that physical war, as an option to resolve issues, eventually became a worst-case situation. While peace was often evasive, the war option was to be avoided unless the parties involved could not reach a peace agreement. The countries involved would be supported by the big powers which tested their advanced conventional weaponry on the battlefield and sought both political and strategic benefits as payment for their support. In this sense, the wars waged during the Cold War became surrogate wars in which the big powers supported the conflicts of nonnuclear countries for their own benefits and fought one another surreptiously, thereby avoiding the possibility of a conventional war becoming nuclear. The demise of the Cold War represented another stage in human biological and social evolution. With the end of the Cold War, the danger of massive big power nuclear conflict was reduced dramatically as the arms reduction talks between the former Soviet Union and the United States have resulted in the destruction of vast quantities of nuclear weapons.4 With the Soviet Union and the United States acting on the strategic arms agreements, the dangers of mass nuclear destruction have been reduced dramatically. Moreover, there has been cooperation between these powers in space research and in maintaining world stability, attempting to calm situations which have become dangerous due to the periodic overactivity of the hominoid influences on human behavior. COMMENTS ON OUR ERA OF KNOWLEDGE As the hominoid influences began to recede and we entered human history, attempts to balance conflicting forces—realpolitik—have been insufficient to prevent war. As we advanced historically, nations developed and the treaties between them have been violated or broken when doing so has been to the real or perceived advantage of one of the partners.5 Moreover, realpolitik served to justify nuclear weapons testing by India and Pakistan. However, the hominoid influences have not completely receded, in spite of the progress we have made since the end of the Cold War. While the big powers are reducing their nuclear capacities, thereby reducing the possibilities of nuclear war, the results of the India-Pakistan testings have induced other countries to intensify their attempts to gain access to the technologies that would allow them to acquire nuclear weaponry—this, as we enter a new millennium. While our

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civilization is progressing, the hominoid influences still bear on our behavior in spite of the contributions made since the end of World War II. However, since the end of World War II, we have entered into a new era in our sociobiological evolution—the era of knowledge. Throughout our sociobiological evolution, each historical era has been defined and delineated by the characteristics and properties that made it unique. For example, the Dark Ages was a historical era in which wisdom and knowledge were obtained mostly by studying in the Church. It was an era in which religious authorities relied upon the teachings of the Church and upon superstition to control people and universal education was nonexistent. Monarchs vied with religious leaders for absolute rule and education was based on folk wisdom and passing skills from one generation to the next. The Renaissance that followed the Dark Ages began, to a large extent with the work of St. Thomas Aquinas. In his Summa Theologica,6 he incorporated the Aristotelian concern for nature and the teleological cause of the Supreme Being as creator of the universe. The contradictions between the Greek philosopher’s theology and Roman Catholic doctrine were resolved through St. Thomas Aquinas’s emphasis on the Aristotelian concern for nature in contrast to the neo-Platonic emphasis on the heavenly world as interpreted by preThomistic scholars. It was St. Thomas Aquinas’s renewed emphasis on this world as well as his concern for the next that liberated the arts and philosophical inquiry. The study of both the earth and the heavenly spheres led to the rebirth of knowledge—the knowledge of the ancient Greeks and their philosophy and art, as well as the study of law, the knowledge of Rome, and its statesmen and legislators. As Rome had become the center of the Catholic Church in the West—in contrast to the Church in Byzantium which remained the Eastern Roman Empire after the fall of Rome but which, having accepted Christianity, competed with Rome as the center of the Christian faith—the great movements in the arts and sciences began in Rome and spread throughout its Western sphere of influence. It was early in the Renaissance that artists such as Giotto (c. 1266–1337) made their impact on painting and sculpture. Later, Leonardo da Vinci (1452– 1519)—with his contributions to scientific thinking and profound artistry—and Michelangelo (1445–1564)—with his emphasis on the human form in religious themes in his paintings and sculptures—aided in the reconsideration of nature and provided the basis for expanding philosophical inquiry, reinstituted by St. Thomas Aquinas, into earth-bound nature and the heavens. Thus, during the Renaissance, Nicholaus Copernicus (1473–1519), a canon in the Church, posed a hypothetical alternative to earth-centered astronomy, positing the sun as the center with the earth and the other planets revolving around the sun, moving on Ptolemaic epicycles. Copernicus had revived the ancient heliocentric system of Aristarchus of Samos (3rd century B.C.) who posited a system with the sun at its center and the planets revolving around the sun in circular orbits.7 The circle was considered to be the most perfect form,

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but the paths and motions of the orbiting planets seemed out of phase and could not be accounted for accurately in this system. Copernicus rectified this by placing the planets on Ptolemaic epicycles, thereby achieving observational correctness. This proved overly complicated and Copernicus maintained that the shift in positions placing the sun at the center and having the planets revolving around the sun on Ptolemaic epicycles, while proving accuracy in observation, was merely an intellectual exercise in the spirit of the Renaissance. It was an exercise that attracted Galileo (1564–1642) and Kepler (1571–1630) in the defense of Copernicus and led to the development of modern science.8 Galileo’s defense of the Copernican system before the Inquisition was in keeping with the spirit of the era, but not because Galileo developed Copernicus’s astronomy. It was only after Galileo was humbled before the Inquisition, condemned for his heretical support of this system as truth and not merely an intellectual exercise as Copernicus maintained, that he wrote his greatest work on earth physics. In the Dialogue Concerning Two New Sciences, he argued against the Aristotelian system of physics, while placing his own conception of physics within a mathematical framework, allowing for measurement, analysis, and prediction.9 Johannes Kepler’s concern with the Copernican system was based on his own notion of simplicity and, to some extent, mysticism. The Copernican system was more simple than the Ptolemaic system, but both were clumsy, cumbersome, and far too complicated. As a student and assistant to Tycho Brahe (1546–1601), Kepler observed the same heavens as his teacher, but saw different things. Brahe viewed the heavens from a Copernican framework of the heliocentric system of epicycles. Kepler viewed the heavens from the approach of finding the harmony of the spheres and the Copernican system, with its epicycles, was far too cumbersome for the simple harmonic relation Kepler sought. Relying on Brahe’s observations, Kepler searched for the mathematical system that would provide the simplicity and harmony he thought existed in the heavens. The circle is the most perfect form. By applying the circle to planetary motion Kepler could not account for the problem of the motion of Mars. The observations and tools for computation and measurement that Kepler had at his disposal were far more sophisticated than those of Aristarchus, but still, the motion of Mars provided difficulty when considering the orbit as circular. Kepler then posited the ellipse as the orbit of planetary motion, with the speeds of the planets around their elliptical orbits varying with their relative positions to the sun.10 Galileo’s and Kepler’s theories were quite separate. Though Galileo was interested in astronomy, he posited a physical theory that pertained only to the earth. He knew of Kepler’s work, but did not take the astronomer seriously. Their two systems remained separated until Isaac Newton synthesized them, reformulating them into a unique theory of earth and heaven physics. It was Newton’s synthesis with its significance for mechanics as they related to the processes of production that brought about the end of the Renaissance with all its artistic

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glory and scientific achievement and began the next historical era—the Industrial Revolution. During this era, the economic processes and their influences on societies undergoing the Industrial Revolution were not only tremendous, but also unique in human history. The village life of the industrializing countries was altered as big cities were centered around industrial complexes, attracting people to the new city life and to work in the developing industrial complexes. The emphasis on education inherited from the Renaissance allowed not only the teaching of general subjects, but also provided education and practical experience in the disciplines required by the developing industrial societies. With the establishment of large-scale industries, new auxiliary service industries were formed, resulting in the demand for higher work skills that could be obtained only by further education and training. Hence, the requirements of the Industrial Revolution made educational programs more intense and sophisticated to meet the challenges of the new era. This led to improved medical care, more efficient transportation systems for moving people to and from their work places, and an increased ability to cope with the dynamics of the new era of industrialization. With industrialization came the development of the financial markets, notably the stock and commodities markets, which became sources for investment. As profits from industrial output and personal liquidity were channeled into these markets, both the marketing and financial aspects of the business cycle became institutionalized. While these cycles were often severe, the resilience of industrialization was such that sufficient momentum existed in its dynamics to move from recession to recovery to prosperity phases. The Industrial Revolution began in 1776, and with the Congress of Vienna in 1815, Europe enjoyed relative peace for a hundred years, allowing industrialization in both Europe and the United States to flourish. This was interrupted by World War I, which engulfed Europe and Russia and led to the entry of the United States. This great war resulted not only in tremendous loss of life and natural and industrial resources, but it also left unresolved many of the domestic and international problems that led to the war. Moreover, the strong influence of American isolationism led the U.S. government to withdraw its support from the League of Nations, an American initiative sponsored by President Woodrow Wilson. German humiliation by the terms of peace, the lack of stability among the newly formed countries in Eastern Europe, and Japan’s aggression and exploitation in China and other Asian countries perpetuated the postwar instability. It is a moot point to argue that in the absence of the Great Depression the difficulties of the post World War I period would have eventually been resolved. However, as countries were undergoing postwar reconstruction, the need for international cooperation was certainly not foremost on the agendas of their leaders. Moreover, with Japanese resurgence as an aggressive power and with fallout from the Russian Revolution still exerting unsettling influences in Eastern Europe and the United States, the skills of international politics developed over

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the centuries could have been directed toward developing the League of Nations to establish a lasting world peace. It is also a moot point to discuss the nations uniting in the spirit of reconciliation to try to establish a new world economic order during the Great Depression. However, because hominoid influences were still operating due to the trauma of the war, the world’s reaction was to enact policies that were formulated for each country to protect itself economically with the result that policies such as devaluation to stimulate exports and reduce imports were met in kind, so that no advantage was gained for more than a very short time and the world’s economies remained depressed. The German leadership realized that the fastest way out of the economic crisis was to engage in wartime production—thereby stimulating the economy and acquiring the means to redress the humiliating peace conditions imposed upon it. This provided the necessary political and popular support for the policies of war that were about to follow. Moreover, as these policies were developing, they gave the revitalization of industrialization sufficient momentum to reinstate a semblance of cyclical movement. Nevertheless, with the Great Depression, the era of industrialization had come to an end and the world’s powers confronted a new situation in which Germany, Japan, and their allies sought redress through another world war. Our contemporary era of knowledge is the outcome of World War II. While every historical era is unique—delineated and defined by the circumstances and characteristics that bring it about—our contemporary era of knowledge represents a new level in human evolution, and is perhaps the most dynamic in history. The Renaissance, with its great contributions in the arts and sciences, attests to the levels of creativity that can be achieved in an era, providing that circumstances allow it. In our era, we have inherited the works of the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution, enabling us to better exploit the possibilities and opportunities available now. If used wisely and properly, we can finally suppress our hominoid genetic influences to improve the difficult conditions which confront us. We can abandon the strategies of war by eliminating the conditions that bring about military conflict through formulating the conditions for discussions of genuine peace. We can solve the conditions of poverty and the despotism that thrive on poverty so prevalent in developing and emerging countries; we can develop and exploit our technologies for improving the overall human condition. As we develop our era and the pursuit of knowledge, however, we must be mindful of a very important caveat. We should be aware of our hominoid influences as we pursue and develop knowledge. In this context, we should remember the burning of the library in Alexandria, which housed the greatest works in antiquity. The library was burned because the wisdom and knowledge it held had little relevance inasmuch as they were not applied to the social and political issues of the day. The library’s wealth of information was used not to serve the common people, to improve the quality of their lives by providing better amenities and eliminating poverty, but to expound on the esoteric posi-

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tions occupying the philosophers and people of letters who turned away from the social, political, and economic challenges of their time. While contributions to wisdom and knowledge in our era are many and unique, we must not only be enthralled by our achievements, but must also apply them to the scientific, social, political, and economic issues that are part of our era. This is the subject of discussion to be developed in the last part of this work in connection with crisis theory: however, before this can be discussed, comments on social time are in order. COMMENTS ON SOCIAL TIME Social time is defined and delineated by events, processes, and circumstances that express their specific conditions within the eras in which they occur. Specific social times in an era, or several such times, may take place more or less congruently, depending on the contributions that are made and the dynamics they generate. There may also be a single contribution in a historical era that is so impressive that the entire era is known by its characteristics. For example, in the Bronze Age and the Iron Age, working with these metals led to improvements in construction and developments in warfare with the prime concern in these eras being the applications of these metals and the search for technologies to improve their qualities. One contribution that had a tremendous influence on its era and the era to follow was Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. The influence of his contribution was so significant that the idea spread from its original domain of biology to the social sciences that still remain in its grip. Despite the importance of the earlier theory of Lamarckian evolution, to which Darwin acknowledged his debt—and indeed was, himself, somewhat of a Lamarckian—it was greatly overshadowed by Darwin’s theory and, because of Darwin’s contribution, it was reduced—wrongly—to insignificance. Moreover, it was nearly discredited completely because of its applications by T. D. Lysenko of the Soviet Union during Josef Stalin’s regime in ways not intended by J.P.B. Lamarck. Lysenko sanctioned Lamarkinism as the official policy of the sociobiological evolution of the worker’s state as exemplified by the Soviet Union.11 Social time is dependent on the era in which it occurs because only the events unique to the era have their value in the specific era alone. While this seems tautological, it is not so because, on closer inspection, it reveals the historical truth that just as an era is delineated by the events of the past and crystallized into a set of unique circumstances, these circumstances are the manifestations of events and contributions of social times that impart to the era its uniqueness. This is the case even though these events may have repercussions and consequences in historical eras in general and the social times within an era in particular. An example of this is Henri Poincare´ ’s contribution of nonlinear mathematics during the Industrial Revolution. His awareness of the unpredictability of dy-

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namic systems provided the basis for the work that followed in nonlinear mathematics in which difference equations provided the foundations for dynamic systems in the natural and social sciences and resulted in the development of chaos theory and complexity theory that followed with the development of computers. How, then, is our social time to be understood, and what is its relation to crisis theory? Our contemporary era began in the aftermath of World War II with the social time of reconstruction in Europe, Asia, and other regions affected by the war. It was also a time when a shift occurred from wartime to peacetime production, coping with the pent-up demand of civilians who had been engaged in wartime production, of demobilized military forces, and citizens on all fronts who had worked to support the war effort. Because all wars develop originality of thought, the originality in World War II was unique due to the levels of scientific knowledge and technology. Computers were first put to use as part of the war effort in breaking codes. The dream of splitting the atom, as ancient as the Greek Democritus (c. 460–c. 370 B.C.) and the Roman Lucretius (c. 96–c. 55 B.C.), was realized with the explosion of the first atomic bomb, developed by the Americans when they became aware that Nazi Germany had begun working on such a weapon. Jet propulsion was developed by the Nazis for powering V1 and V2 class aerial bombs and supersonic flight was achieved when fighter planes on all sides, in the heat of combat, broke the sound barrier. Moreover, the breakthroughs in science that were made during the war began our era of knowledge. The development of atomic energy for both military and peaceful purposes was undertaken, and jet propulsion in avionics was applied to both military flights and civilian air travel. While supersonic flight took longer to develop commercially because of the costs involved and the limited demand for such travel due to the cost of tickets, it was readily developed for military aircraft. Computers, first used by big corporations and government agencies, eventually became commercial due to the personal computer market and the competition stimulated among the producers. However, the social time that developed from the war was also a period of conformity. The unique innovations during the war required innovative thinking in the formulation of both the theories and their applications. However, conformity was imposed on work processes due to the transformation of the production line from military to civilian products, the reorientation of the workers into civilian life, and the techniques of assembly line work that developed during the war. Moreover, this conformity was subtly reinforced by the influence of the Great Depression on industry and the individual in the workplace, manifested in the insecurity of maintaining a place of employment.12 Society was also able to tolerate nonconformity as a release from the strict conformity imposed in the workplace. As the war years passed, therefore, grassroots movements arose to protest against conformity to the extent that it had become entrenched in the early postwar culture. The “Beat movement” that first

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found expression in the ideas of the San Francisco school of writers, then spread throughout America and to the rest of the world, provided a balance to the extent that conformity was accepted and the limits on creative expression reduced. Jazz music maintained its freedom of expression and experimentation as its artists extended their chordal relationships in their melodic-cum-rhythmic improvisations, delving into both classical and folk-music harmonies in their compositions and performances. This generated a conflict as society moved from the social time of postwar readjustment to the social time of the beginning of the realization of our new era, but this was not without disruption. As with the end of World War I, issues remained unsettled and new issues arose to generate military conflicts. The Cold War began as the United States and the Soviet Union, victors of the war, still found each other’s policies and ideologies unacceptable, even after their military alliance in the war against Germany and, to a far lesser extent, Japan. The Korean War was fought because the North, with its Communist leanings and support from the Soviet Union and Communist China, invaded the South with the intention of bringing the region into the Communist domain. The Americans acted within the United Nations to mobilize U.N. troops into a peace-keeping force, spear-headed by U.S. troops, to repel the invasion.13 While the Korean War was waged during the social time that began after World War II, it was the Kennedy administration that initiated a new social time. The civil rights movement had been opposed by states that rejected the notion of equality of opportunity and of individual rights. The movement had declined in importance because it lacked the power to overcome this opposition and had broken into feuding splinter movements. The issue of civil liberties was brought to the forefront by the Kennedy administration and its supporters and these rights, guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, were finally recognized by the opposing states and accepted. This was also the social time when France was involved in Vietnam. The southern part of Vietnam, traditionally French in outlook, was attacked by soldiers from the North and the French sought to defend against them. President Eisenhower maintained a contingent of military advisors in Vietnam to assist the people of that country. With the French defeated and having withdrawn, the Kennedy administration followed Eisenhower’s policy and increased the number of advisors. After President Kennedy’s assassination, the Vietnam conflict began to intensify and President Johnson increased the number of combat personnel in the region leading to increased involvement. The involvement of the United States in the Vietnam War resulted from the military retreat by the French from the area. Vietnam, traditionally French in orientation, was divided into North and South, with Communist China and the Soviet Union supporting the North. The expanding influence of communism brought the French military into battle against the North. When the French withdrew, leaving a political and military vacuum, the United States felt obligated to fill it. As the involvement intensified, the Vietnam War became highly

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controversial in the United States and throughout the world, generating both domestic and international protests which were exploited successfully by North Vietnam and its Soviet and Communist Chinese backers. The protest movement in our era, originally against the conformity that society imposed after the war, took up the Vietnam War as a cause, arguing that lives were being lost in a war that nobody wanted and that the resources could be better put to use in tackling domestic poverty, housing, and other welfare issues. President Lyndon Johnson attempted to justify spending the resources and sending men into battle by explaining that the Great Society of America could afford both the war machine and social welfare programs. Because of the intensification that continued under President Johnson, the social time was one of extreme protest. The Democratic party lost to the Republicans and President Richard M. Nixon brought the troops back home, leaving South Vietnam to fall under the onslaught of the North. However, with Nixon’s involvement with the break-in of the Democratic party headquarters at the Watergate building complex in the country’s capital, a new social time began, as protest intensified against the president, calling for either his impeachment or his resignation. President Nixon resigned, but during his administration he established contacts with Communist China and began the thaw with the Soviet Union. The dynamics of these changes continued throughout successive administrations and, under the presidency of Jimmy Carter, a Middle East peace treaty was signed between Israel and Egypt, which established the precedent for the peace talks and treaties that were to follow. Our era of knowledge was developing, with mainframe computers increasing in sophistication and personal computers coming on-line, becoming connected through network systems. The problems of oil supplies and distribution due to sanctions, cartel production, and pricing by OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) due to the outcome of the Yom Kippur War, diminished reliance on the Arab countries for oil as other non-OPEC countries came online, together with underutilized American oil wells. Atomic energy was also an alternative, with reactors coming on-line to a certain extent, weakening OPEC’s hold on the market. With the Reagan administration, the exploitation of technology became a weapon used in the Cold War, as discussions on weapons control were held between the Soviet Union and the United States. When the Americans began research on the “Star Wars” project, the Soviet leadership, under the direction of Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, realized that their country would be unable to compete effectively with the EEC and the U.S. economies and the “Star Wars” project. These factors meant that changes in the economy had to be rapid and painful, resulting in the ratification of the nuclear test ban treaties that ended the Cold War and the eventual devolution of the Soviet Union into the Commonwealth of Independent States, a confederation of former Soviet countries in which each country is allowed to pursue its economic policies, but whose domestic and foreign policies are still somewhat controlled by Russia.

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While the Renaissance was the era of the rebirth of knowledge, and the Industrial Revolution was an era of applying knowledge to manufacturing processes, our era of knowledge is the development of knowledge and its expansion into unique and manifold domains of our existence. While societies influenced by the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution were developing the arts and technologies, they were also engaged in the exertion of their hominoid influences. America fought a civil war; Europe fought World War I, with the Americans entering on the side of the allies; and World War II engaged the entire world, leading to the American-Soviet standoff and the Cold War that resulted in the early stages of our era. While our era of knowledge has not quieted the hominoid influences on our collective genetic makeup, it has had a stimulating effect that is certainly unique to our era. With the development of knowledge comes its applications to problems that confront us. We have learned to work with land, rendering barren land productive; we have learned to harness the energy sources of the sun and the atom for our uses; we have developed sophisticated fax machines, computer networks and personal telephones, making communications easier; we have developed transport systems for moving goods and people more efficiently and more swiftly. Moreover, as our social time develops and expands, countries that have not established the necessary political, industrial, and educational infrastructure to participate in our era and its social time are nevertheless seeking the benefits our era has accrued. Those countries engaged in power struggles that are either religious and/or political in nature—including civil war—are trying, nevertheless, to partake of our era’s benefits. With the development of knowledge in our era, the emphasis has been less on military confrontation among the countries who recognize the era and its potential, which is why the Cold War ended and the emphasis on economic growth and the development of markets have taken its place. This has resulted in concerted efforts by the world’s postindustrial nations that have entered into our era of knowledge to assist in finding solutions for regional areas of hostilities that have the potential to engulf the world in further conflicts, enabling these countries to divert their natural and economic resources from war to developing their societies and economies. Our era of knowledge reflects the traditional demarcation between philosophy and science, but still maintains its contemporary foundation. The philosophical aspect in our era takes into consideration the unique dynamics of the era, in which scientific theories are formulated, critiqued, and altered, eventually to be replaced by another theory of greater utility. Moreover, the technologies that are being developed in our era are also subject to the same dynamics, with more efficient techniques and products entering the markets as a result of competition. Our era of knowledge, manifested in dynamic disequilibrium, is also integral to the politics and economics of our world today, with their great promise and dangerous instability.

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One important aspect of our era of knowledge must be mentioned here. As the era began after World War II, it has had a somewhat quieting effect on our hominoid influences. With the advancement of our social times, we have come to understand that the ways of past history are incongruent with our era and, that for development and expansion, wars are not only unnecessary, but they resolve nothing. We have come to realize that development and expansion lie in the development of markets and the expansion of the sciences for the welfare of all mankind. We are also aware that the struggle with our hominoid influences still persists. The Sudan, other countries on the African continent, former Yugoslavia, and several of the Middle Eastern countries attest to this. We must be careful not to let the hominoid influence overwhelm us, entering into these conflicts as participants. We must approach these conflicts and resolve them for the betterment of humanity and transfer these warring regions into participants and competitors within our era of knowledge. NOTES 1. Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, abridged edition, 1980), pp. 300–301. Consider Thorstein Veblen’s sentiment: In so far as modern science inquires into the phenomena of life, whether animate, brute, or human, it is occupied about questions of genesis and cumulative change, and it converges upon a theoretical formulation in the shape of a life-history drawn in causal terms. In so far as it is a science in the current sense of the term, any science, such as economics, which has to do with human conduct, becomes a genetic inquiry into the human scheme of life; and where, as in economics, the subject of inquiry is the conduct of man and his dealings with the material means of life, the science is necessarily an inquiry into the life-history of material civilization, on a more or less extended or restricted plan.

From “The Limitations of Marginal Utility,” Journal of Political Economy 17 (1909), quoted here from Daniel M. Hausman, ed., The Philosophy of Economics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 179. 2. For example, see Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, 2nd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1960). 3. See David Z. Rich, The Economics of International Trade: An Independent View (New York: Quorum Books, 1992), part III, The Changing Economic World, pp. 145– 87. See also Herman Kahn with the Hudson Institute, World Economic Development (New York: Morrow Quill, 1979; see also Richard J. Barnett and Ronald E. Mu¨ ller, Global Reach (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1974), and Richard E. Caves, Multinational Enterprises and Economic Analysis (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985). 4. For a discussion of the strategic arms talks, see Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits (New York: Vintage Books, 1985). 5. For an example in our century, prior to the outbreak of World War II, the Soviet Union was considered to be Nazi Germany’s natural enemy, but when they signed the nonaggression pact of 1939, Eastern Europe resigned itself to the fact that they could not rely on Stalin’s contempt for Nazism to bring the Soviet forces to their defense. In

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the aftermath of the war, when Germany’s betrayal of the pact allowed it to attack the Soviet Union without success, Stalin had control of Germany’s eastern sector as well as most of the East European countries previously occupied by Germany. 6. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica: A Concise Translation, ed. Timothy McDermott (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1989). See also Earnest L. Fortin, “St. Thomas Aquinas,” in History of Political Philosophy, ed. Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1987), pp. 248–75. 7. Hannah Arendt commented that because of his theory, Aristarchus was threatened with impiety. See Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1 (New York: Harcourt Brace and Jovanovich Harvest/HBJ Book), p. 54. 8. See Nicholas Copernicus, Complete Works, trans. Edward Rosen (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985–1992). 9. See Galileo, Two New Sciences (New York: Macmillan, 1914). 10. See Johannes Kepler, Kelper’s Sonmium, trans. Edward Rosen (Madison: University of Wisconson Press, 1967). 11. See J.P.B. Lamarck, Recherches sur l’organization des Corps vivan (Paris: Millard, 1802), and idem, Philosophie zoologugue (Paris: Dentu, 1809). Arthur Koestler wrote that Darwin remained half a Darwinist and half a Lamarckian. In 1875, toward the end of his life, Darwin wrote to Sir Francis Galton that “each year he found himself more compelled to revert to the inheritance of acquired characteristics because chance variations and natural selection alone were apparently insufficient to explain the phenomena of evolution.” Quoted from Arthur Koestler, Janus (New York: Vintage Books, 1979), p. 196. Lysenko’s experimentation with Lamarck’s theory was inappropriate because the theory pertains to the realm of biology and zoology, while Lysenko’s experimentation was social and sociological. For a discussion on neo-Lamarckianism, see Arthur Koestler, The Case of the Midwife Toad (London: Hutchison, 1971). 12. Workers’ unions relied on conformity to achieve the bargaining goals, but the white collar worker had no union representation. For a discussion on conformity and their positions, see William H. Whyte, The Organization Man (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1960). 13. The problems of the Koreas persist, but are intensified by the poverty in the North and the lack of aid by its previous Soviet and Chinese benefactors. This problem is exacerbated by the leadership in the North staging periodic commando raids against the South to deflect the population’s worry over its immediate economic future.

8

Order and Disorder I: Crisis Theory The conduct of rational choice is governed by strategies based on analytic knowledge. They imply deductions from preference rules (value systems) and decision procedures; these propositions are either correctly or incorrectly deduced. Purposive-rational action realizes defined goals under given conditions. But while instrumental action organizes means that are appropriate according to criteria of an effective control of reality, strategic action depends only on the correct evaluation of possible alternative choices, which results from calculation supplemented by values and maxims. Ju¨ rgen Habermas, “Technology and Science as ‘Ideology’ ”1

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS The conduct of rational choice is indeed governed by available strategies based on analytic knowledge. However, they do not necessarily imply deductions from preference rules or value systems and none at all from decision procedures. When considering available strategies based on analytical knowledge, values may enter the decision-making process, either providing the choice greater consideration and/or directly or indirectly influencing the decision. Values and value systems are personal; they may influence decisions, but whether they do, and if they do, the extent of this influence is also personal. They cannot be separated from the individual decision maker and indeed may exert an influence consciously unknown to the decision maker. Decision making has to be considered in terms of the situations and the options confronting the decision maker. Consciously, decisions are made within the context of consid-

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eration of the options and the objectives sought by the decision maker as a consequence of the decisions taken. For example, a business person makes decisions to market imitative products according to his or her understanding of consumer response to similar products. If the product is innovative in nature— that is, one which has not yet achieved consumer response but has been tested in market research programs—the decision to market is based on the research and the expectation of the product’s consumer utility. If the initial decision is made to market an innovative or imitative product, then there are other decisions that have to be made. They include: advertising style; its intensity and frequency; the main types of consumers at whom the product is initially targeted; and problems of economies such as the most efficient and cost-effective methods of transporting the product and establishing the product’s distributing points to handle the product throughout the various marketing regions. In this context, Habermas’s distinction between instrumental and strategic action needs further clarification. While strategies do govern the conduct of rational choice and while instrumental action organizes the means of conducting the strategic action, strategies have to be formulated and actions taken according to programs and time schedules. Analytic knowledge within the framework of decision making does not retain its stablity for a long-run duration, but is subject to changes within the knowledge system in which it is formulated and developed. The knowledge system retains its content—and remains intact—until linguistic nuances are introduced. These nuances may be incorporated into specific linguistic relationships from other such relationships within the system or they may be brought into the system from linguistic concepts of other systems. Once incorporated, these nuances influence through their use of part or all of the system’s linguistic terms and concepts. Analytical knowledge within the system will thus be changed, moving the system from its original condition of a wellordered body of knowledge from which strategies can be formulated and decisions made to a somewhat disordered body of knowledge that requires appropriate alterations corresponding to the degree of disorder for its utility to be restored.2 Knowledge systems are crisis theories—so termed because, in part, while they are initially well-ordered theories, the uses of which enable decisions to be formulated, bargaining positions conducted, and scientific experiments derived— their utilities are maintained only for the duration that their original linguistic concepts and terms remain formulated, accepted, and intact. They are also crisis theories because they serve as bases for contention concerning interpretation and the introduction of change. For example, a labor contract is a crisis theory because it contains the necessary conditions for employers and employees to come to terms and work. However, when one side or the other introduces nuances into the contract that are useful within the linguistic context but previously unrecognized by the other

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side and acted upon, then there is a crisis that can be resolved within the theoretical context, or by a new contract—one that the sides will attempt to formulate to minimize unexpected nuance infiltration. A business program is a crisis theory because it allows change and development within its structure so that, while the overall program remains intact, such aspects as pricing, distribution, and responses to competition can be taken into account within the context of the program. Scientific theories are also crisis theories because they allow for experimentation, alteration, and change due to knowledge not previously considered or to competing theories that challenge the theory. Hence, it is argued here that any working, well-ordered body of knowledge from which decisions are made and strategies formulated—whether the body is of political, scientific, or business orientation—is a crisis theory; such a theory can be worked with, altered, and have its utility maintained, given the conditions that will be discussed in the following sections of this chapter. CRISIS THEORY: THE SCHEMATIC Each crisis theory is composed of two interrelated languages. One language defines and delineates the area of concern with which the theory deals; the other defines the operations of the first language on the problem area. The area language as it is constructed by its formulator and accepted by those who work with it, tends, in its original static form, to be complete for at this stage its defined area language is restricted by the problem for which it was constructed. Hence, the operational language also tends to be restricted by the types of, and procedures for, operations allowed by the theory’s formulator and positions as defined by the constructed languages. The schematic for a crisis theory C*t takes the form C*t ⫽ Σ (OdA)t,

with O the operational language, A the area language, and the subscript “d” the defining relationship. The sigma sign is the summation operator of the theory’s operational and area statements. The time-signature “t” indicates whether the theory is static or dynamic, depending on the duration of its use and the confidence in its utility as stated. When static, the theory relates to its domain as is; when dynamic, there is no guarantee that the same operational and area statements will exist in time period n ⫹ 1, as in time period 1. The reasons for different time periods are that either different contributions have different impacts on the area and its operational language that may induce changes within a specific crisis theory, or that nuances have infiltrated one or both of the languages, or that competing theories may render some of the statements entropic. In the static form of C*t, there are a fixed number of corresponding statements in both A and O, so that the a elements that compose A are matched isomorphi-

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cally with the o statements in O. This, then, is the formal statement of a crisis theory and during its uses the theory is highly dynamic and changing. Moreover, C*t is a highly dynamic system whose viability depends on the conceptualizations of those who work with it. Its dynamic and evolutionary development is not axiomatic but requires active participation in the theory’s functioning. The meaning of terms may be altered slightly, and this affects their utilities as the nuances are incorporated into the theory’s performance.3 The formal crisis theory schematic may or may not provide a simple description of the domain for which it is constructed since this depends on the domain and the complexity of the information involved. The axiomatic aspect of the schematic lies in its operational language which is usually combinatorial. Within the formal schematic, no questions are undeterminable because of the isomorphic mapping of the operational language onto the area statements. Because the area statements describe the real domain for which the theory is formulated, in its static form the theory is devoid of statements that cannot be determined or decided upon within its structure. Deduction has a limited role initally, being of importance during formulation and in checking for inconsistencies after the theory is finalized. Because the theory’s dynamics are generated only after it has been accepted in its static form, it makes no difference initially if a proposition stands on its own or is a consequence of a set of existing propositions. In the theory’s static form, the significant point is how a proposition in one language relates to its corresponding proposition in the other language and how these languages relate to the defined and delineated problem area. The terms of other theoretical languages may or may not be incorporated but, if incorporated, they will have to take on the theory’s nuances.4 As an example of a crisis theory, consider Stuart Kauffman’s contribution to evolution theory, with the uses of Boolean algebra to describe combinatorial evolutionary dynamics. The terms of reference are the A statements and the procedures for working with them are incorporated within O. A describes the dynamics of evolution within his conceptualization of co-evolving systems, and O is the language that treats these dynamics and shows how they can be applied. On the basis of A and its segments, O is employed to build models, construct computerized languages that can handle molecular development based on this theory of evolution, and offer explanations for both observed and predicted phenomena. When in use, a crisis theory retains its formal position when the area for which it was formulated, defined, and delineated according to the understanding of those who work with the theory remains stable for as long as its operational language relates isomorphically to its area language. If there is no difficulty, the theory works as smoothly as it was initially designed to function. COMMENTS ON UTILITY A central difficulty in constructing a crisis theory is that while the general problem may be very broad in scope, composing the activities of several disci-

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plines, a crisis theory seeks a limited range by its rigorous definitions. In this manner, the theory seeks to remove or diminish as much as possible the influences of those parts of the general domain that are not to be considered within the theory’s realm. Hence, the theory must be constructed so that all extraneous influences are eliminated or kept to a minimum to allow the maximum effect of the utility prescribed to the theory. Utility is a measure of a theory’s effectiveness as determined by the theories’ objectives within the delineated domain of the problem area and its ability to incorporate nuances that are not part of the original construction. Hence, a theory C*t is to be measured between two limits. The lower limit of zero is a boundary that is never reached because the theory breaks down before reaching this point and is not subject to further restoration; however, before this situation is reached, the information within the theory has diminished the utility to the extent that the theory is no longer workable and hence abandoned, deprived of its original intention. A theory’s languages compose its elements which contain information and the manner in which the information is to be used. The area language describes the theory’s content and range and the operational language defines and describes the manner in which the area is to be worked. When these languages perform as they are supposed to according to the theory, the upper utility limit of 1 is approached but, like the lower limit, it is never reached. The quantity of the information and its content within the general area is in a fairly constant state of movement, being altered with new contributions, changing and being reformulated as theories are being phased out and as others enter the area. Thus, maximum utility remains elusive because the theory’s languages are changing as the area fluctuates. The maximum limit can be approached, however, and this is the intention of the theory’s innovator and those who work with it. The maximum and minimum limits are boundaries of the theory in time t, indicating the theory’s working status with regard to its problem area at that time, so that O ⬍ C*t ⬍ 1 is the general position of a working theory. Its proximity to either of these limits indicates the theory’s viability, so that as C*t approaches 1, its utility is increasing; as it approaches O, it is becoming entropic. Utility is assessed according to the theory’s working relation with its problem area. The theory’s innovator states its position with respect to the problem area, demonstrating the theory’s working ability. Since the theory’s information content and viability are determined by the ability of its languages to relate to its defined and delineated problem area, this determination is probalistic because maximum utility is unattainable. Utility tends toward the maximum limit when the theory functions as required, relating to the area with its area and operational languages performing as formulated. The theory’s languages function according to their information content and the situation of its problem area. The area language must therefore be so formulated that the operational language can work on it and hence on the problem area according to the theory’s defining and delineating terms and conditions. In the formal sense, a theory’s utility is assessed according to how well it

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relates to its defined and delineated problem area as set out in its languages. Because maximum utility is impossible to maintain over time, the theory functions according to a probabilistic relationship between the workings of the languages and the actual defined and delineated problem area. Utility can thus be stated: Ut ⫽

冘[P (O A) ⫽ I (O A)] ; d

d

t

that is, the theory’s utility at a specific time is identical to the equality between its probability measure and its information content—I—the summation sign covering the entire linguistic relationship; “d” being the defining and delineating operator of O unto A, with the probability measuring the information of A and O as they relate to and work with the area. Because these languages contain information, the probabilistic measure determines the validity of the statements’ information content. The closer their relationship to their domain, the greater the statements’ probabilities, and, hence, the greater the utility of C*t. As the innovator seeks to formulate a theory with a utility approaching the maximum 1, both the theory’s innovator, followers or imitators seek to maintain the high utility level by attempting to reconstruct those elements that are reduced in utilities owing to shifts in the area and/or to nuances incorporated into the languages, causing alterations. Lack of treatment in these circumstances results in further erosion of the theory’s utility which may eventually bring it into a state of irreparable entropy. COMMENTS ON ENTROPY Utility measures the theory’s performance according to its original formal statement, yielding the results required by its operational and area languages. Utility is thus a measurement of how well the theory serves its purpose for a stated period of time. It measures the significance of the theory’s information content, given the defined and delineated domain of its specific problem area and the effectiveness of its operational language on its area language. Entropy, however, is both a measurement and a condition of the theory’s decline as assessed by its insufficient effectiveness in its performance according to its languages and objectives. As a measurement, entropy indicates how far the theory deviates from its original purpose. Given the stability of the problem area, this condition can be corrected, or at least alleviated, through the restructuring of the affected languages to the point where the theory can perform without too much difficulty.5 As with utility, the presence of entropy lies within the theory’s information content which is assessed with respect to the information’s probability as the operational statements relate to the area. A decline in a theory’s utility is a direct result of the lack of a viable relationship between the theory’s statements and the problem area. Changing the meanings of these defective statements may

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affect the original intention of the theory as it was constructed, but if these changes are not too extensive, the theory’s utility is restored and most likely will continue its working relationship with the problem area it defines and delineates. If such reconstruction is not undertaken, the theory retains its original form and will decline further over time until entropy becomes so pervasive that the theory cannot be saved. One way this decline occurs is that alternative and competitive theories are introduced. Throughout the early stages of competition, these alternative theories maintain their utilities to a large extent, thereby rendering the weakened theory with even lower utility or complete entropy, as the case may be. Should alterations be initiated to correct the entropic statements, the theory will most likely continue to be used, employed somewhat differently due to the possible influences of competition and changes in the problem area as they have developed over time. Therefore, because the entropy measurement shows that the theory is approaching the lower limit, the theory is either replaced by one of vastly higher utility or it is abandoned and falls into practical disuse.6 Throughout the history of ideas, all theories eventually decline, become entropic, and are eventually abandoned. All accepted working theories initially have utility; while they are being used they are infiltrated by utility, usually in small and correctable amounts owing to area shifts and linguistic changes. To restore the utility of these theories, the entropy has to be removed. Over time and through usage, however, changes occur within the theoretical linguistics and the problem area for which corrections cannot be made for the theory’s utility to be maintained and the theory will be abandoned or maintained until another of greater utility can be formulated. Changes in theories have been occurring more rapidly in our contemporary era of knowledge than in any previous historical era so that, more than ever, even though theories in their original constructions and high utilities are the basis for the development of knowledge, they are subject to rapid changes through their uses and through changes in the problem area. As a theory maintains its integrity through its use, it also undergoes changes in its linguistics and in its relation to its problem area. With respect to the position of chaos, theories are not static and in equilibrium, but are evolutionary, dynamic and in disequilibrium; they are unstable, adapted through their use to cope with their problem areas and internal changes. Since there is no equilibrium, these theories fall into disuse when they become too entropic to salvage. This includes situations when theories of greater utility are formulated, resulting in those existing and previously worked upon being abandoned. This topic is discussed further in the following chapters where it will be demonstrated that all theories comply with the dynamics of crisis theory. Therefore, chaos theory and complexity theory are inadequate with respect to crisis theory for explaining the phenomenon for which it was developed. The statics of chaos and complexity theory have been discussed. Now, crisis theory has to be placed in its dynamic setting, after which some further comments on complexity and chaos theories are presented.

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NOTES 1. Ju¨ rgen Habermas, “Technology and Science as ‘Ideology’ ”, On Society and Politics: A Reader, ed. Steven Seidman (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), p. 244. 2. This is in keeping with the concept that has developed since modern science began: that knowledge, while useful, is false. Knowledge changes within the system and the extent of the change determines the system’s utility at the time. 3. This formal schematic of crisis theory can be contrasted to Thom’s formal model of catastrophic situations. Thom’s formal model is described as simple, being axiomatic or combinatorial, with deduction within the model being formalized and theoretically mechanized. Moreover, some questions may be undecided within the model in the sense of knowing whether a proposition is the consequence of a set of propositions. Thus, he maintains that no dynamic is possible for them. 4. All information within the theory that does not pertain to its structured languages is either for clarification or for embellishment, thereby relegating the status of this information to a metalanguage, which is relevant in that it seeks to improve on the conceptions of the working languages. The metalanguages cannot, however, assist in the workings of the operational and area languages. 5. In the context of this work, the general definition of entropy C*t ⫽ Σ [(o,a) I (AodOa)]

which reads that entropy of a crisis theory C* at time t is the negation of elements o and a, as they are included in A and O during this time. Those elements not included in this summation are not entropic because the equation pertains to only the defective area statements affected by or together with the operational language. The “I” signifies the theory’s information content with respect to the defective statements and the number of statements affected shows the extent of the entropic condition and hence the theory’s viability. 6. Concerning the term “entropy,” Sadi Carnot, Rudolf Clausius, Ludwig von Boltzmann and others who used this term in physical systems were not concerned with linguistic information in the sense that it is used here, but with the functioning of physical systems and their eventual breakdown. Since the pioneering work done on the second law of thermodynamics—as entropy was called—this law has attracted attention in other fields of inquiry. Hence, theories do not have to pertain to the physical realm and entropy does not have to relate specifically to the decline of physical energy. Because theories are abstractions stated as formulations and conventions for working with problem areas, they have utility while they are valid; they are used and examined, accepted and applied, until better theories replace them or until new information relating to the problems for which these theories were developed renders the established theories inadequate. Entropy is thus a condition resulting from a theory having inadequate information with which to relate to its problem area, rendering it insufficient through its diminished capacity. The extent of this diminution depends in part on the availability of other alternatives.

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Order and Disorder II: Dynamics and Discontinuity The critique of language and of the linguistic form of thinking becomes an integral part of advancing scientific and philosophical thought. Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms1

PRELIMINARY COMMENTS The uses of language are, of course, necessary for expressing philosophical and scientific ideas and concepts. To understand philosophical and scientific arguments, it is therefore necessary to understand the terms used and the manner in which they are employed.2 Moreover, the critique of language and linguistic forms of thinking is relevant when examining the relationship between operational and area languages as they relate to the defined and delineated area and as they are developed. Linguistic critique, as such, tends to sophism with the demand for terms to be defined the defining terms to be defined, and so on. Scientific and philosophical languages are first to be understood in their theoretical contexts in terms of their meanings and procedures for operation; they are to be critiqued if, through critique, they can be brought into higher utility or into entropy; in the latter case, they are examined and worked upon to restore their utility. It is perhaps with this in mind that Michael Guillen wrote that if the distinguished line of mathematicians has taught us anything in the last two thousand years, it is that “dimension is in the eye, and in the imagination of the beholder.”3 His comment is correct and it also applied to the scientists and philosophers.

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Moreover, as used in his essay, “dimension” is a convention that holds great influence over people. For example, Henry More (1641–1687) held to the convention that the fourth dimension in space and time is where ghosts dwell and that Descartes, influenced by the pragmatic convention of the rationalism of science which he helped establish, rejected the idea of a fourth dimension as being unrealistic. As philosophy and science have developed, convention—or dimension—have been replaced by accepted and workable theories that are to be considered “true” until they are demonstrated otherwise. While in modern science and philosophy the convention of a fourth dimension is accepted, the acceptance of this dimension occurred only after much work was done in the development of ideas with the fourth dimension being not the superstition of the past, but the dimension of the space-time continuum in relativity theory. While the discussion of such a dimension by learned people during the Renaissance gave credence to the idea that such a dimension existed, its significance was debated. It was only when modern relativity captured the imagination of physicists and philosophers that this dimension gained practical significance and, hence, importance in intellectual discussion. Given the dynamics of modern relativity theory, the convention of the fourth dimension being a region for speculation and a domain for ghosts no longer held. Conventions may exist due to certainty or uncertainty. Although our knowledge of astronomy has advanced greatly since Newton combined earth physics with the physics of space, we still speak of sunrise and sunset—a convention that is useful, although refuted by the findings of contemporary physics. Conventions such as trying to comprehend dimensions in space-time not observable and definitely not observed is an example of uncertainty and cannot be scientific according to our understanding. Examples such as this provide impetus to search further into nature and when we are fairly convinced of their existence, to try to understand them. Because of convention, dimension is in the eye of the beholder. Imagination is also in the eye of the beholder, but unlike dimension, it is highly personal, free flowing, and often unrelated to anything significant in one’s past. However, only when imagination is applied to reality in theoretical form as a conventional framework or as a theoretical challenge to a theoretically based conventional framework, are great contributions made. This may take the form of repairing the entropy in a theory or formulating a new theory. It took great imagination for Einstein to visualize the world of special and general relativity and the inclusion of time as the fourth dimension, forging them into a working theory. Even on a smaller scale, working with the theories requires imagination to bring the theory into new domains as well as resolving the difficulties due to entropy. The founders of chaos and complexity theories had such imagination to bring new approaches to explain physical, social, and biological phenomena. Their contributions were at first outside mainstream conventional thinking, but as they demonstrated and tested their contributions, both chaos and complexity theories

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became respectable approaches to understanding phenomena. However, these theories like all theories, are impositions on problem areas by those who conceived them. This is the way of science; however, these theories must also confront critique. For reasons stated in part I of this work, both chaos and complexity theories are problematic and, as a result, crisis theory is being formulated instead. As crisis theory was presented in its static form, it must now be placed in a dynamic setting with convention being the theory, dimension its scope, and imagination necessary for those who work with it. THE DYNAMICS OF CRISIS THEORY In its formal status, crisis theory provides the basis for those who want to work with the theory. For example, while studying Newtonian theory, one learns the calculus and applies it to the three laws of motion that Newton derived from the theories of Kepler and Galileo. However, a theory’s formal status is insufficient because the theory’s dynamics must be applied to its problem area to comprehend the intricacies that are involved with both the theory and its problem area. This point raises two questions. One question is, which version of a theory in its formal status should be studied when, during its history, the theory has undergone many changes and corrections for entropy? The answer is that the current accepted version of the theory should be studied because it contains much of the information of its previous versions. If this information were not included, the theory would be deficient as a working format for the development and expansion of concepts. Newton’s theory and Newtonian theory are different even though the latter is based on the former; the particle approach that Newton advocated resulted in Max Planck finding packages or quanta of radiation being ejected in his black box experiments. The second question is that, given changes in the theory over time, to what extent should the current theory be considered to be representative of the original theory? The answer is that, as long as the original theory’s foundations are intact, entropy has made no serious inroads so that there is no great deviation in the theory’s utility over time; the theory should be considered as representative of the original theory. The second question is significant because other theories are derived from grand theories, such as Brownian gas theory which posits gas particles in motion due to the gravitational attraction among the particles and collisions with other particles due to the motion. It could be argued that British biologist Robert Brown’s (1773–1858) theory of the motion of gas particles would not have been formulated—nor would any comparable theory—without Newton’s groundwork. Moreover, Galileo’s and Kepler’s theories, while dealing with laws of motion for earth physics and planetary physics respectively, lacked the knowledge that Newton had gained from their works and the relevant works of others before them. Entropy is the final condition of all theories, even of one which

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has been employed successfully over a long period of time. Newton’s theory has not been discarded, even though it has been restricted to the status of being a limit-case to relativity and quantum theories. But even in this diminished— indeed, entropic position—Newtonian theory remains the grand theory for neoclassical physics. For such theories as Newton’s physics, even though they are entropic because of their limited domains and restricted uses, they remain important for their defined and deliniated areas. The same situation holds for the theories of quantum physics and modern relativity theory even though both theories have undergone significant changes since their original formulations. For example, the existence of black and white holes in outer space, though not considered by Einstein’s formulation of his special and general theories of relativity, can be explained by the general theory with the laws of relativity holding for black holes and time sequences with differing dimensions holding for white holes. As for quantum physics, the weak and strong forces of gravity that hold the atom together and finding new subatomic particles are both extensions of the original expressions of quantum physics. Earlier contributions such as those of Lord Kelvin, who maintained that the atom is a vortex in ether, and J. J. Thomson’s conception of the positive electricity in the atom as a continuous fluid, have been rejected; because they are entropic, they are now of historical interest only.4 Thus, both grand and lesser theories that have been replaced by other theories may still have utility in their being of historical interest. Both Aristotle’s and Galileo’s theories are studied, yet Aristotle’s theory was rendered entropic by Galileo’s theory, and Galileo’s theory was made entropic by Newton’s contribution. This is the way of the progression of ideas and, while practical utility has been removed by these theories, their utility is in their historical significance for the development of ideas. Theories that do survive in working capacities after they have become restricted by varying degrees of entropy are theories that maintain continuity. Their utility remains in the domain for which they were formulated and developed, but because these domains remain limited by problem shifts, they are entropic in the sense of not being used for new developments in the general field. For example, research in physics is not being conducted intensively in the domain of Newtonian physics although it is still of great importance on the macroscale but, rather in quantum physics and, to a lesser extent, in relativity theory. While Newtonian theory is used in the exploration of planets, relativity and quantum theories are being employed in researching galaxies. Theories that survive in working capacities retain their utilities for their limited domains and will continue to do so until rendered entropic in the historical sense of being replaced by theories of greater utility.5 Theories can be rendered entropic not only by problem shifts, but also by contradictions that enter their languages through use. These situations are due to nuances that, while once accepted with the theory adjusted accordingly, eventually generate changes that, over time, generate internal difficulties that can be

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corrected only by endangering linguistic relations that have acceptable utility. In this situation, the theory is continuous in that it is still being used and contributions can be made with it. This will be the case until another theory with higher utility and free of such contradictions is presented. The new theory will replace the previous one, which will then become entropic beyond repair, relevant only in terms of the history of the discipline. With respect to this point, grand theories are of limited duration because they will eventually degenerate into entropy. Chaos theory is an example of this process. Posited as a grand theory by its founders, chaos theory is entropic for reasons stated in the first part of this work. Chaos theory is important because of its uses in nonlinear mathematics and the resulting time-series equations. For processes in which cyclical behavior exists, the theory shows the strange attractors that determine the cycle’s equilibrium position. When the cessation of development is built into the system, chaos theory is useful in showing where the decline begins and the system—be it in life form or mechanical—ends. Chaos theory is limited in its uses, however, and perhaps finds its fullest expression in analogue computer models of events or systems such as weather conditions or with complexity theory for biological evolution where the terms are programmed into a computer with the developments being expected to a degree such as snowflakes, weather mapping, evolution, and other situations whose dynamics are placed within their theoretical constructs. Chaos and catastrophe theories have provided us with a unique approach to the natural and social sciences by providing a conception of continuity in these disciplines. For example, by using chaos theory in economics the arguments of evolutionary economists can be demonstrated. They maintain that long-run business cycles exist, occurring over the years considered by chaos theory in economic reasoning, manifested in certain constant cyclical patterns, and that as economies become prosperous, they eventually degenerate into entropy with the cyclical downturn into a state of recession or depression.6 In biology, the concept of evolution—with its mixed tendencies of randomness and selected control that can be directed by the ordering agent of dissipation—has gained followers for both chaos and complexity theories. For chaos theory, the time-delay equations in models of feedback control in psychology are of great importance for biological research and research into time-delay in physics can also yield important information. For complexity theory, descriptions of evolutionary processes demonstrate possibilities based on random selections of computer-generated combinations and the movements of the newly constructed life-forms into new physical territory and their communications with the life-forms there. The point is that, given the contributions of chaos theory and its partner catastrophe theory and of complexity theory, these theories are limited to the development of the models on which they operate. As the limitations of these theories have been stated in the first part of this work, it suffices to restate here that they are based on dynamic equilibrium in a dynamic and disequilibriumoriented world. Crisis theory lacks the difficulties of chaos and complexity the-

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ory and the complications that are inherent in catastrophe theory. For this to be understood, crisis theory and its participants will be explained, after which the concepts and tools for testing contributions in light of a theory’s languages, its problem area, and competing theories will be discussed. Grand theories are formulated to be continuous because they are represented as presenting the latest knowledge in their respective fields. The theory posited here is more of a metatheory, a method for formulating theories and for testing them. In this sense, it adheres to a metagrand-theory status and emphasizes discontinuity with the dynamics of change and/or areas bringing the representative theories down into entropy or strengthening their utilities in competition. THE PROCESSES OF IMITATION AND INITIATION Because of the working relationship between a theory’s area and operational languages, the condition for the theory’s dynamics are established. The problem area is first defined and delineated and the operational language is formulated to relate to the area. However, given the formal status of a theory, it is only after the procedures by which the theory’s operations are described and the manner in which they apply to the area are established, that the theory takes on its dynamic form; moreover, only when working with a theory do shifts in its area occur. This is the case for theories that are imitative and whose dynamics are tested in a well-formed problem area as well as grand theories that are unique in that they state a new problem area as well as formulating the languages for working with it. In this context, working with a theory as it is stated is termed “strict imitation.” After a theory has been formulated and critically tested, it may be rejected outright or be accepted by those in the field and /or in other fields who become interested.7 At first, the theory is worked upon in its defined and delineated problem area according to its operational and area languages. Those who work with the theory as such are its strict imitators. Through strict imitation, the theory is worked out as originally stated. For example, those who worked with Newton’s theory, in contrast to Newtonian theory as it developed and expanded, were its strict imitators, just as those who work with chaos or complexity theory in their original expressions are strict imitators. Strict imitation is necessary throughout a theory’s existence for its development, as it permits the theory’s languages to be employed according to the area and operational criteria and eventually allows for experiments with the languages and the problem area according to the theory’s terms. Strict imitation is thus the application of a theory as it has been formulated and accepted. The purpose of strict imitation, however, is not to show inconsistencies within the theory because, when stated in its final formulation, all contradictions and all internal paradoxes that had existed linguistically would have been eliminated, if ever having existed at all. For this reason, the theory is accepted after passing the

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initial critical test, just as those who work with chaos and complexity theory as stated are strict imitators. Strict imitation is necessary for the development of a theory because it permits the theory’s languages to be used and experimented with according to the theory’s operational terms. By this process, consequences can be drawn out that could not have been realized with just the consideration of the languages, applications, and experiments that follow. Strict imitation is also necessary to teach the theory to others. It allows the theory to be explained as formulated so that others can learn the theory and understand its operations. For example, we learn of Galileo’s theory when considering the pendulum and the motion of the earth or, when sitting in a train, watching the train beside us move—or are we moving?—demonstrating the earth-bound relativity that Galileo formulated. We can learn Einstein’s theory by using his mathematics and by imaginary experiments such as considering motion without friction. Quantum theory can be learned in part from observing atoms as they are smashed, producing subatomic particles as consequences. These processes are expressions of strict imitation as these theories are demonstrated according to their accepted formulations. Hence, strict imitation serves the dual role of working with a theory as stated and explaining the theory, again as stated. Imitation also takes another form, that of explorative imitation. This imitative process consists of searching for difficulties within the theory. While the theory’s languages are in use, the introduction of ambiguities and nuances, after these languages are accepted and worked upon within a viable theory, may very well generate contradictions. Explorative imitation is thus the intentional introduction of ambiguities, allowing the operational and area languages to take on nuances that are not initially allowed according to the theory’s requirements. These ambiguities may result from introducing slight changes in the meanings of terms in use in other theories, or in specific theories only, even though for the theories in question these terms in their contexts have already been rigorously defined in their procedures. The explorative imitator may impose some of these nuances on the theory to analyze their possible influences; as a result, the nuances may inject greater utility over time than the original languages could. The explorative innovator might not, at the time, comprehend the dynamics of these nuances and/or how the nuances are best incorporated into the theory. Moreover, the theory’s utility may be increased over time as the original terms degenerate into entropy with the languages being salvaged only by these nuances due to the theory’s stagnation or decline because of competition from other theories or from area and/or operational language shifts for which adjustments have not yet been made. The introduction of these nuances reduces the theory to entropy with respect to its former position because the statements in which these nuances are incorporated no longer have their original utility in their theoretical context. Repairing the entropy of these statements is the task of the innovator who may also be the explorative imitator.

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Another form of explorative imitation is awareness imitation which occurs because of the awareness and understanding of other, not necessarily competing theories, with problem areas including segments of the imitator’s problem area. Because of the influences and impacts of different theories on a single area, the area undergoes changes that render the area’s statements entropic to the degree of change within that segment of the theory. Although other imitators (strict or explorative) may be unaware of the alterations within the area—owing perhaps to unfamiliarity with the other theories in which that part of the area is incorporated—the awareness imitator analyzes the distinctions between the area statements and the area, as such, as it has been affected. The awareness imitator brings this to the awareness of others who, when comprehending the situation, engage in initiation to develop a solution. Awareness imitation is also involved with the alterations of linguistic nuances by other meanings that have entered into one or both languages. As a result, de facto shifts occur within the theory, while the area remains stable for a specific time period because the area changes in accordance with the theory. If these linguistic deviations reduce the theory’s utility, the affected languages have to be altered and corrected through their reconstruction. The initiator’s task, therefore, is to either find or construct the terminology that maintains the theory’s utility in light of these nuances by maintaining the effectiveness of the restructured, thus corrected, statements. Having brought the theory into entropy, the explorative imitator may then become a strict imitator or innovator. In the role of strict imitator, the initiative contribution is evaluated to determine if it conforms to the theory’s utility requirements. As initiator, competition is entered into in order to provide a contribution of the highest utility according to the theory’s probability requirements. While the initiator alters either the area, the operational language, or both, to correct the entropic statement, the final statement will take the form: oda' which is then presented to the theory’s imitators for evaluation. The imitators will then determine whether the corrected statement’s utility within the theory is restored. Furthermore, the statement must meet the rigors of competition without generating dynamic entropic effects on other theoretical statements. While such influences may not readily be present, this can be assessed over time. While this is discussed further in the context of the critical test, some further comments here are now in order. Consider an initiative contribution as a solution to linguistic (as opposed to area) entropy. One of a statement’s components, say the a component, has become entropic because of nuances not originally considered within the theoretical construct, but imputed to the term. The initially corrected a will lead to a reconstructed o and because the corrected statement remains within the theory, these alterations may generate negative dynamic effects throughout the theory. The o portion of the statements may be used in part, or completely, with other operational terms and its restructuring may lead to the incorporated statement’s nuances throughout the theory or in specific aspects of it.

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In our era, theories are weakened by the increasing knowledge they generate. Since knowledge is not increased in isolation but its very content and structure depend on the theory within which it is formulated, increased knowledge generated within the theory tends to weaken the theory and bring it into an entropic condition. Since knowledge is not increased in isolation but is theory-based, it is different from fact which is isolated and stated independently of theory. Furthermore, although knowledge is increased within theoretical contexts, it is also decreased in theories as theoretical statements become entropic and are replaced by corrected statements. This process by which knowledge is generated— through imitation and initiation—makes knowledge public and available to all who want to work with it. As theories are developed through use and brought into entropy by the influences of linguistic nuances, area shifts, or both, the knowledge incorporated into a theory can be decreased as well as increased. As a theory’s entropy is corrected, the knowledge contained in its previously entropic statements may be those parts of the statements that are altered to retain the theory’s utility. While the theory’s utility is thereby reinstated, that part of the entropic knowledge is cast aside, perhaps to be restructured and reincorporated within the theory with a probability and utility measurement that suits the theory. In our era of knowledge we share with the past the pursuit of truth, but in this pursuit we are confronted with a situation unique to our era. We find that in this pursuit our theories are problematic, because the knowledge and wisdom we acquire from our theories and consider as valid and possessing utility with a theory for any time period may become entropic at another time. Thus, through explorative imitation, the difficulties of our theories are exposed for which solutions free of entropy are sought. Moreover, as theories are developed, expanded, and altered by their imitators who are offsetting difficulties through their uses, the theories interact and the uses of the knowledge so gained innovate other theories, either for different eras or in competition with existing theories for the same area. In previous historical eras, fairly long periods of gestation were required so that theories could be worked out with the consequence of problems being brought to the fore. For example, in the seventeenth century when Newtonian physics were established, it was inconceivable that this theory was adequate for only a limited area of the universe. Not only was Newtonian theory accepted as the true paradigm of the physical sciences, but mathematics (which Newton helped strengthen with his contribution to the calculus) was considered to be the queen of science, only to be ruled over by Newtonian physics which was considered to be the king.8 This gestation period was long, some 250 years, before the cracks in the Newtonian edifice became noticeable, most notably because of Max Planck’s work. For inititation, the corrected statement is oda' that the initiator must consider within the theory’s probability and utility positions as well as its total dynamics. Should the initiation be only a matter of removing problematic nuances, thereby

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restoring the statement to its original meaning, the probability assessment should pose no difficulty since this procedure tends to restore the theory to its original stable utility position. By restoring its static equilibrium position, the dynamic changes that occurred within the theory have been eliminated, leaving the theory as close as possible to its original probability and utility positions. With entropy of this kind removed, the theory remains more or less intact, depending on the time taken to restore the theory and the extent of the changes within the theory already generated. Static equilibrium exists when there are no competitive theories to challenge its status. The corrected entropy leaves the theory more or less intact while new information is accepted only if it conforms to the theory’s probability and utility requirements. The absence of competition allows the theory to be of sufficient authority for its imitators to justify its unique position. While explorative imitation may bring a theory’s languages into new domains, the strict imitators and initiators are under no obligation to deal with the dynamics generated by the explorative initiator, other than to remove them from the theory should they become troublesome or to accept the changes and work with them accordingly. Prior to the scientific developments of the Renaissance, the Ptolemaic theory of astronomy and Aristotelian stellar physics on which the Ptolemaic theory is based held sway for many centuries because of the influence of religion and the absence of viably challenging theories, primarily due to religious influence. Imitation undertaken during these centuries was strict in form with initiation concerned with correcting deviations in calculations. It was the revolutionary work of Copernicus and the subsequent contributions of Galileo and Kepler that brought about real changes in the development and acceptance of new theories. Their contributions were innovative, and backed by the best observations and calculations they and their followers could offer in the arena of challenge and debate, won over the ancient and glorious predecessors. Given the dynamics of our era of knowledge, theories cannot enjoy the luxury of static equilibrium. Entropy cannot be removed in a static theory and leave the theory restored to its original paradigmatic status. Because this entropy is in the form of information either from competing theories occupying some common ground or, when no competition exists, from other sources that have been linguistically incorporated, it affects the theory’s utility. This entropy may be caused by shifts in the problem area with which the theory is unable to cope. Since the initiator’s task is to remove entropy and restore the theory to utility, if the contribution is accepted, the theory’s integrity is thus preserved. It will remain so until either a major shift occurs, or until too may corrections are made thereby obscuring the theory’s original purpose, or until competing theories are proved to be superior, thereby eventually bringing the theory into disuse and irreparable entropy. Initiators seek to understand the difficulties that arise within their theories’ languages and areas with the intention of constructing viable contributions to resolve the difficulties of entropy. Again, consider the entropic statement odat.

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First, the initiator has to analyze the statement to determine which of the languages is entropic and assess in isolation the effects of the language that is not entropic, providing that one language is free from entropy. In all cases, languages may possess influences from other languages that do not hinder the statement’s utility, and indeed may enhance it, so that only those statements brought into entropy are subject to reconstruction. Should such entropic nuances have infiltrated a so that a's meaning has declined in utility, that is, a→0, its utility in C*t has been reduced and as it affects o, them o→0. Similarly, should o tend toward the lower limit, then it will influence a’s position likewise. The difficulty confronting the initiator in attempting to restructure the statement lies in providing a formulation that satisfies the theory’s probability requirements, assuming that only a limited combination of formulations are possible. Given that it is known in which language the difficulty lies—say o—because languages have their modalities restructured at first takes on the possible solution of the reformed statement a〫d〫o', with the diamond shaped sign standing for “possible,” so that the new statement is a possible solution to the problem. Given that the possible solutions are finite in number, the initiator must decide which of the contributions are of sufficient merit to be chosen in competition. Structuring a solution is the work of the initiator and deciding which is the best solution is the task of those who work with the theory. Given a limited number of solutions, it is apparent that each is potentially viable as they are presented for evaluation. The status of each solution must therefore be decided by measuring the solution according to the theory’s probability requirements. Since the theory has undergone change, it is no longer static, but the probability requirements remain the same: [P(U*t)] ⫹ P (oda) ⫽ I (oda)t

meaning the probability of the theory’s utility is identical to the total information of its operational and area languages that thereby provide the theory with its utility. Given this assessment, when time and information change so that one or more statements deviate from their original utility, the proposed solutions must be placed in the probability equation for their evaluation. Since each of the proposed solutions is credible, the process of evaluation— the critical test—has to be undertaken. Although the critical test will be discussed in the next chapter, it can be stated here that as each solution appears to fit, the situation of solution dominance has to be considered. While one proposed solution appears to be conclusive, thereby promising the best fit, it may be of lesser probability when critically tested while other solutions with lower dominance may be demonstrated to be of higher probability and utility. Solution dominance results from the ordering of solutions and is established by imitators and initiators on the basis of their understanding of the theory as well as their awareness of languages of other theories, together with their abilities to restruc-

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ture languages to place their nuances in well-ordered patterns in theoretical context. Before this can be discussed further, comments on innovation are in order. THE PROCESSES OF INNOVATION While imitation develops knowledge through the restructuring of theories, innovation provides another form for generating knowledge. Innovation consists of the construction of a unique theory for a set of problems conceived by the innovator for which no previous theory existed.9 This is strict innovation and must be distingiuished from competitive innovation. Strict innovation is the process that brings elements of knowledge from other theories, whether operational or of utility only for their historical value, into a new and working theory for a set of problems that the strict innovator comprehends, but were not previously acknowledged as problems. The construction of such an innovative theory requires that the problem area be well defined and delineated so that the area language is clear and has an operational language capable of working effectively with it. After defining and delineating the area and formulating the theory’s languages, the strict innovator has to establish the utility criteria and must assess each operational and corresponding area statement within the probability requirements as stated according to the theory’s utility criteria. Because innovation is unique, the argument for the theory has to be expressed convincingly for consideration by those to whom the innovator directs the theory. Journals, conferences, and reviews are available for providing exposure and proper evaluation. Competitive innovation is the construction of a unique theory that is intended to replace an existing one. For competitive innovation, there may be one or several theories since more than one competitor may have entered the field. For competitive innovative theories, the problem area is already defined although innovative theories may sharpen definitions and place different emphases on delineation. Moreover, the innovative aspects undertaken must result in the development of a better formulation or approach to the problem area that reduces or eliminates the utilities of other competing theories. The problem area itself can be the focus of the innovative theory that redefines and/or delineates it thereby attempting to make the theory more functional than its competitors. Hence, while strict innovation defines problems and formulates the languages to work with the problem area, competitive innovation already has the problem stated and is formulated to do a better job of handling the—perhaps reconstructed—problem area. Competitive innovation thus attempts to reduce the utilities of the other theories and to establish its predominance as the singular viable theory. The advantage of competitive innovation is that the audience is established, making it easier for journals and conferences to provide exposure and proper evaluation. Innovation, imitation, and initiation are thus necessary for the development of crisis theory. The term “crisis theory” is used here for two purposes.10 One

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purpose is to contrast the concept with complexity, chaos, and catastrophe theories because, given the critique of these theories—they relate only to their theoretical aspects—whereas crisis theory is a metatheory that relates to both the theoretical aspects and the participants involved in theoretical development. Imitators must understand and use the theory’s languages and, in the case of explorative imitation, bring the languages into new domains, allowing initiators and innovators to perform their roles of working with and evaluating their theories in consideration of the problem areas for which they are constructed. Crisis theory also permits testing procedures for initiation and strictly competitive contributions, while chaos, catastrophe, and complexity theories provide theoretical statements whose dynamics are generated within their models but, as such, do not provide for critical debate and testing. The second purpose is to demonstrate that theories constructed according to the conditions of crisis theory are dynamic and, as such, are in equilibrium only for the period of their initial acceptance. Since theories are in crisis because of the possibility of their intrusion by entropy, it is entropy that allows for the development of knowledge within theories and, through innovation, the development of knowledge by way of new and possibly competing theories. By removing entropy within theories through initiation, these theories are strengthened and by constructing new theories, knowledge is generated by the problem areas and operational languages of these theories. Another important point needs mentioning here. Chaos, catastrophe, and complexity theories are about events such as the development of snowflakes, the expansion of gases, the oscillation of cells, the movement of business cycles around the fixed equilibrium point of a strange attractor, and the development of computer-generated “life-forms” according to computer programs. Crisis theory pertains to the domains of problem areas and the development of theories that deal with real-world problems. Crisis theory is thus based on the concept that the world is a given fact, is objective and, even though our interpretation of the world is subjective, we understand and interpret by the ways in which we conduct our lives and work with our theories. When we use our theories, we perform according to our roles either as imitators, initiators, or innovators. We find grounds for contesting; we challenge and explore, entering into new territory using our languages as vehicles for our exploration. When we innovate, we do so on the basis of our own personal comprehension—and even daring—as we formulate new theories. With crisis theory, we thus impose ourselves on our objective and impersonal world, and we respond accordingly to the changes we impose on it. Crisis theory can be contrasted to chaos, catastrophe, and complexity theories on several points. First, crisis theory is evolutionary within a real-world, realtime context. This is because crisis theories decline into entropy while others are altered by initiations and others are innovated and operate with high utility. While chaos and catastrophe theories require fractals and bifurcation and treat strange attractors that bring chaos systems into equilibrium, crisis theory denies

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the existence of long-term equilibrium, maintaining that equilibrium exists only when theories are first formulated and accepted so that, when in use, the theories become dynamic and subject to utility and innovation. Complexity theory subjects its domain to preformulated computer instructions while crisis theory operates according to its areas and languages that are subject to shifts and can be restored through initiation. The chaos that exists in analyzed systems is due to our interpretations of these systems such as the programming of a snowflake’s development or feeding econometric data that show cyclical fluctuations in a “strange attractor” pattern into a computer. When we observe a problem area and formulate theories to work with it, since our theories are our own impositions, we adjust them as the area is altered through use and through changing information. Because chaos and catastrophe theories are equilibrium-oriented, they cannot handle these changes. Complexity theory operates according to computer instructions that generate the progress, including changes that are part of these instructions, rendering complexity systems closed in the sense that there is no spontaneity so that changes are expected and handled according to the computer instructions. Crisis theory, evolutionary to the extent that theories continue until brought down by entropy, relates to these changes and, according to each theory, attempts to deal effectively with these changes through initiation and/or innovation. Nonlinear analysis as the basis for chaos, catastrophe, and complexity theories is also useful in the construction of crisis theories. For example, econometric models with their time-series equations permit the consideration of events over time that cannot be considered in static evaluation. As a result, events can be controlled more effectively. Since time-series equations for equilibrium result in the “strange attractor” effect, no such attractor exists for models in disequilibrium because there are no theoretical model positions that relate to the real world because the problem areas and their theories in the real world are dynamic and in disequilibrium. In biology, isolated cells may oscillate according to their biological programming, but this is neither an example for, nor an explanation of, chaos and catastrophe theory. Cells take on significance only while they function in organs in which their tasks are interrelated. While the study of cells in isolation is important for understanding biology and pathology, for the organ as a working unit, cells assume their tasks according to the laws governing the specific organ. Chaos and catastrophe theories are therefore accepted as valuable exercises and share with complexity theory models that act according to specific instructions, the actions of the models tested to determine if they correspond to the conditions of the theories. In spite of the importance of chaos and complexity theories—because of their difficulties presented in this work—crisis theory with the critical test as an integral part of its method has been formulated.

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CRISIS THEORY AND OUR ERA OF KNOWLEDGE Historical eras possess a momentum that carries ideas and theories formulated within the social times of the era over into different domains. Moreover, eras end when their representative features are no longer prominent and are replaced by other characteristics. While the outstanding features of previous eras remain, they are considered both within their original contexts and within the contexts of our current social time and historical era. Our contemporary era of knowledge has developed from the Industrial Revolution, moving us from the difficulties of the era of industrialization, the Great Depression, and World War II that signified the finality of that era to the problems of the postwar period and the Cold War that ensued and, in our social time, to the paradoxical situations in which the search for universal peace is conducted amidst the waging of ethnic wars, of great prosperity and poverty, of political leaders seeking the luxuries of our social time while behaving like the dictatorial rulers of earlier historical eras. Our era of knowledge has developed to the extent that its social times are more than ever represented by the interactions among theories and the uses and applications of information through imitation, producing information and knowledge of a quality and extent unprecedented in our history. In previous eras, fairly long periods of gestation were required to tackle theoretical difficulties with the exceptions of those theories that were rejected out of hand. Paradigmatic theories that were accepted—such as Newton’s theory, which held sway for some 250 years—were considered true in the sense that they were operable.11 Hence, since the beginning of our era, the rate of the turnover of knowledge has been greater than ever before. Moreover, with theories existing in greater number, entropy sets in at a faster pace, bringing problems to the fore through explorative imitation. Knowledge, as established by theory, rapidly becomes entropic and is subject to repairs by initiators. Information is formulated and adjusted to fit into innovative theories, thereby resulting in explorative imitation in these and competing theories which, in turn become entropic, requiring repairs. With the abundance of theories and the subsequent turnover of knowledge in our era, each theory has its own gestation period, a span of time in which imitators work out the theories’ dynamics and societies accept the results. The explorative imitators that find fault with these theories place the theories between the boundaries of entropy and utility. However, the gestation period is not due to a psychological condition seeking a rest from change, but desiring instead a degree of stability. The gestation period exists because theories must settle after their difficulties are resolved to a fairly reasonable extent and are established to be worked upon by strict imitators to determine what they can accomplish within their defined and delineated problem areas. Hence, for any period of time, the

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situations in contemporary societies that have entered our era of knowledge take the form:

冘C*[C* UC* ] , n

C**t ⫽

e

u t

1

where C** is the society in which knowledge is generated by the dynamics of theories, with C*e and C*u representing the total number of crisis theories, both entropic and of utility during the time t under consideration.12 There is an exception to this situation in which C** is in a condition of (near) total gestation which usually follows a period of intensive innovation and imitation. This is a condition in which a society becomes saturated during these periods of activity and there is great reluctance to undertake further innovation or endeavor in explorative imitation. Consequently, new theories that make their debuts while established theories are being worked out through strict imitation are not very likely to find receptive audiences that will shift their loyalties and devote their time to work with them. This type of gestation, occurring when theory saturation is setting into the social knowledge structure, requires that imitators work out most of their theories’ ramifications before explorative imitation can get seriously underway. Until this is accomplished, innovation is likely to proceed slowly as problems are seen to be handled by the prevailing theories, and individual conceptualizations of new problem areas and corresponding theories will not readily find interested audiences or even those who will offer critiques. The exception to this is an innovation that is so profound and the problem area with which it deals is so elusive for other theories, that its impact for both followers and critics is in fairly equal response to its profundity and contribution. An innovation of this quality stimulates explorative imitation in many theories, in spite of gestation when strict imitation prevails. A common indicator of the shifts in dynamics is when various theories are at various stages of utility and entropy. In the situation in which C**t is in gestation, the total of activity in time t is of strict imitation, a situation occurring following burgeoning activity in explorative imitation and innovation. Theories in gestation are in equilibrium because they are not worked upon only in strict imitation because the general gestation period prevents entropy from entering them. These theories are dynamic because they are being worked upon and having their nuances and ramifications drawn out with possible consequences for the area and operational languages in time t⫹1. Hence, during this period, the theories’ utility positions remain stable, with entropy being effective only in those theories in which it existed prior to general gestation. Gestation periods are, however, of very short duration and the usual condition is one of dynamic disequilibrium. This allows for theoretical shifts due to the correction of entropy and for the significant innovative theories that are formulated. With changes in time, the theoretical positions of entropy and utility shift, resulting in initiation and the critical testing of these contributions.

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The general condition of dynamic disequilibrium does not rule out gestation for specific theories. Some theories, especially those newly formed, are being worked on by strict imitators operating according to the utility requirements of their theories. These are functioning theories with the results of their operations conforming to their utility requirements. No explorative imitation is being undertaken to any serious extent, nor is their yet any need for this activity due to the theories’ newness. The situation when some theories are in gestation while others are not, with others still in various stages of explorative imitation while still maintaining high utility, demonstrates the stages of equilibrium prevailing in societies’ theoretical systems and indicates their states of knowledge. The C** for each society having entered our era of knowledge is placed between the boundaries of utility and entropy, so that 0⬍ C**⬍1 for time t. In our contemporary era of knowledge, the extreme situation of C**→ 0 for a society can exist only when the society, once having entered our contemporary era, can no longer perform, perhaps because of political paralysis or because of war requiring the diversion of innovation and general human intelligence into military issues. However, for these societies, these conditions are of short duration because they have sufficient internal dynamics to overcome political paralysis and, because of technological advancements, wars are of short duration. Once resolved, internal matters and the dynamics of knowledge can again be undertaken.13 In our contemporary era the issues of acceptance and rejection are of great importance, with the critical test, as an integral component of crisis theory, contributing to acceptance and rejection. Deciding on the validity of contributions, especially when competition exists, is of great importance, given the rapid turnover of knowledge. The psychological aspects of acceptance and rejection are also important regardless of the outcome of the testing. The critical test will now be discussed. NOTES 1. Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 1, Language, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1975), p. 82. 2. “Language” also refers to mathematics which is why Newton explained the calculus in his Principia Mathematica and why Einstein and the quantum physicists took for granted the understanding of advanced mathematical understanding on the part of their readers in the construction of their theories. 3. Michael Guillen, “A Realm of Manifold Possibilities,” in Bridges to Infinity (Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher, 1983), p. 92. 4. J. J. Thomson did, however, find “small subatomic particles” and called them electrons. 5. Examples of this situation are Aristotle’s and Galileo’s physics and the physical theories of Lord Kelvin and J. J. Thomson.

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6. See, for example, Brian J. L. Berry, Long-Wave Rhythms in Economic Development and Political Behavior (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991); see Joshua Goldstein, Long Cycles (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988). One of the early economists to consider a long-run business cycle theory was Nicolai D. Kondratieff, in his important and classic work The Long Wave Cycle (New York: Richardson and Snyder, 1984). 7. The critical test is an important aspect of crisis theory and will be discussed at length in the next chapter. 8. The foundations of the queen of science—mathematics—began to be brought into question. Attempts to resolve its difficulties such as Euclid’s fifth parallel axiom, which as Euclid stated as: “If a straight line falling on two straight lines makes the interior angles on the same side less than two right angles, then the two straight lines if extended will meet on that side of the straight line on which the angles are less than two right angles.” Quoted from Morris Kline, Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 78. On the same page Kline states that “The parallel axiom in the form stated by Euclid was thought to be somewhat too complicated. It lacked the simplicity of the other axioms. Apparently even Euclid did not like his version of the parallel axiom because he did not call upon it until he had proved all the theorems he could without it.” For a further discussion on the status of the fifth axiom, and the attempt to place mathematics on a rigorous foundation, see Philip J. Davis and Reuben Hersh, The Mathematical Experience (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1980), chapter 7, “From Certainty to Fallibility,” pp. 318–44. Moreover, Einstein’s theory, despite its importance for complimentary problems of space exploration and the different relativistic fields in atomic interactions has begun to show possible cracks in its impressive edifice. For example, black holes in space, considered to be supergravitational fields due to imploded stars, may obey laws inconsistent with the Einsteinian space-time conception. Moreover, white holes, which may possibly be inverted black holes, may also be tunnels leading to other parts of the universe and these parts may have physical laws unique to their regions. Attempts to understand gravity in terms of a unified field theory have thus far been unsuccessful and Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle throws this important search into question. A force-field of gravity must be analyzed but, according to Heisenberg, this asserts an unavoidable influence on the field because of the interaction of observation on the field. With technological innovation, however, this difficulty may yet be surmounted. 9. However, such situations as innovating nearly identical theories, such as Newton and Leibnitz innovating the calculus independently, do occur occasionally. 10. Contrast these purposes with the comments in chapter 5, n. 2. 11. Another example is that the duration of Einstein’s theory is not yet determined. With the problems of black and white holes, with the difficulties of quantum physics in the relativistic context, and with no adequate formulation as yet for explaining universal gravitation within the accepted concept of space-time, relativity will no doubt be replaced by a theory of greater explanatory power. 12. In the context of C**, time period t is the social time and is determined by the number of theories in their various stages of development and dynamics and by the social and political events that result from the theories—such as the policy of peaceful uses of atomic energy and social responses and negotiating peace between warring factions as

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in Yugoslavia and in the warring African and Middle Eastern countries. This point will be discussed later in chapter 17. 13. The underdeveloped societies as well as many of those in various stages of development have not yet entered into our era of knowledge and cannot cope effectively with the contributions of the postindustrial societies that have fully entered into our era.

10

Acceptance and Rejection: The Critical Test ‘Reality’ is offered operationally as a construct of the mind that observes it, and to all intents and purposes the model of narrative reality selected is in turn in these cases the product of a vision in which the quality of mind itself is a function of a temporal (evoutionary paradigm). ‘Primitive mentality’ engenders an ‘alternative reality’. Christopher Nash, Word Games1

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS Reality is not offered operationally as a construct of the mind that observes it, but the understanding and interpretation of what is observed as reality most certainly is. This difficulty is manifested in crisis theories—temporary paradigms that are evolutionary in their development—when attempts are made to eliminate the ambiguities considered by the participants involved. Discussion and debate are not models of narrative reality, just as innovations and initiations presented in the literature of a subject whose persuasion depends on literary persuasion are more than modes of narrative reality. They are explanations and clarifications of positions, of arguments and presentations, to be considered for acceptance or rejection, presented to people whose qualities of mind in the form of approaches to the problem area under discussion may indeed be functions of the temporal paradigms—that is, crisis theories—with which they work that are evolutionary in their development through strict imitation. Moreover, the primitive mentality engenders an alternative reality when those true believers who maintain their loyalty to their crisis theories, regardless of the extent of entropy that has per-

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meated the position, reject out of hand initiative contributions formulated to correct the entropy or innovations which are posited as better theories. With these contributions being considered and worked on by people who are aware of the difficulties of their crisis theories, reality is altered; yet the people with primitive mentality are not willing to resign their positions—thus their intellectual capacities are hindered by dogmatism. Even though theoretical evolution has been hampered or perhaps ceased because of entropy, these people who are unwilling to consider different approaches to the solution of entropy have become dogmatic to the point that, with respect to their theories, their intellectual capacity has become impaired. In our era, it has become necessary to impose strict discipline when working with crisis theories, because disciplines tend to overlap due to the use of terms with different nuances when placed within the theories. Social, that is nonrigorous languages, are used to embellish and have little or no influence on these theories due to their specific problem orientation. However, as theoretical operational and area languages work within their unique relationships, a difficulty that confronts thinkers who consider imitations and innovations, is the adaptation of established knowledge-oriented terms to the contexts of the problem areas and operational languages in their theoretical considerations. This is even more difficult for the primitive thinkers who may very well consider their theories under attack by these knowledge languages. Therefore, they defend their positions even though entropy has reduced their utility and innovative and imitative contributions have created new realities that must be evaluated by a critical test by those who realize that their paradigm has been weakened through entropy and challenged by new contributions that, with respect to initiation, may strengthen it or, by innovation, may replace it. The critical test as a means of evaluating contributions has to be approached from three different aspects: (1) The psychological aspect that depends on the proclivities and personal dynamics of the evaluator; (2) the social aspect pertaining to initiation and innovation that depends on the state of gestation with respect to the number of existing and viable contributions and those being presented (that is, t when C* is in saturation); and (3) the critical aspect in which, while the results of the test may be decisive, they may change over time. Prior to developing these aspects, however, background comments are in order. Throughout history, whenever people worked, they performed their tasks according to the procedural patterns of their occupations. There was deviation from these patterns when they found that circumstances were unsuitable for these procedures, requiring instead applications of different methods for dealing with their situations. These deviations in the working procedures were seldom radical, however, occurring mostly within the work format,2 with great changes developing mostly when challenges from nature or in the form of war posed problems for which the conventional methods could not provide effective solutions. In these situations, when individual initiative came to the fore to provide leadership for change and repair, the challenges were met and often conquered.

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The exceptions to this have been the great historical changes that brought historical eras to an end and, in their wake, brought forth new eras. With these eras have come new social, economic, and political situations with problems that are certainly unique to these eras. For example, in our era political and military conflicts are manifestations of past eras with the emphasis on war and conquering. However, now it is understood that knowledge is property common to all countries to develop and apply to their specific circumstances. Thus, while wars and political dissension still divide us, the use of knowledge for profit and for the betterment of humanity unites us as never before. Since the development of science in the Renaissance, new theories have been posited using the conceptual tools of the eras. New schools in the arts were founded that helped to clarify and contribute to the eras, with different artistic forms of expression interpreting the eras and their changes during their various social times. Moreover, the methods of work developed throughout human history according to the requirements of the social groupings of clans, cities, states and countries. The rapid changes in the policies and procedures of work that began with the Industrial Revolution demonstrated the continuity of history in the applications of the arts and sciences that developed during the Renaissance to the problems of production, allowing work procedures to undergo corresponding changes— not in accordance with social demands or to meet the challenges of man-made disasters, but according to the applications of science to the work processes and the development of new products and markets. This required the refinement of marketing and advertising not only to make these products known to the consuming public, but also to meet the competition that ensued.3 In the aftermath of World War II, and in light of the end of the Industrial Revolution, a certain ambiguity to change developed which established a conflict in our era. During the post–World War II period, when production reverted from military equipment to the peacetime manufacture of consumer goods and services with increased demand due to military demobilization, there was an initial return to the prewar concepts of production and marketing. Military regimentation prevailed to some extent so that conformity in both society and in industry was expected. The industries and organizations that provided the technologies for wartime production had both the means and the resources to mobilize labor and capital for peacetime production, thereby providing employment for the newly released soldiers to move the economy upward again. It was necessary for these organizations to impose a different civilian-oriented discipline on their employees in light of the labor struggles that occurred during the Great Depression, seeking to reduce significantly disruptions in the workforce in light of the support of the labor movement. There was a rigidity that was both necessary and justified for the transition to peacetime production. It was the only way the objectives of industry and manufacturing could be achieved. The problem was that to a certain extent, in light of the new conditions of our era of knowledge, this approach was also untenable. What was required and eventually achieved as the era got under way was a different approach to pro-

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duction from that which prevailed during the Industrial Revolution. Critical thinking as well as discipline were required. They were eventually introduced in the upper and lower echelons as workers were allowed some freedom of expression about their work methods based on their experience, completing the explorative imitation that was opening up the competition in existing markets as well as leading to the conceptualizations of new products and the market research required for testing the products’ potential as commercial successes. Consequently the conformity was eventually relaxed as the economy was restored and businesses and labor organizations confronted and dealt with domestic and foreign competition from both allies and previous enemies, both untouched by, or recovering from, the ravages of the war. The struggle for both intellectual and economic supremacy within industries and among the countries had intensified, with the era of knowledge providing the conditions and the opportunities conducive to the struggle. The dynamics of our era soon developed into a conflict in which existing theories were subject to intellectual scrutiny and brought into entropy, clashed with the psychologically oriented defense of many who innovated theories, and with their imitators who worked loyally with them, partly out of psychological commitment. Knowledge is objective, conforming to theories’ probability requirements that allow them to be worked with by strict and explorative imitators. Because the development of theories is the result of individuals’ efforts—of their energies and imagination in solving problems raised by others or by themselves—knowledge develops because of the rise and decline of theories. Moreover, there is also the defense of theories for and against initiative contributions, using the rules established by the critical test. The conflict results when there is a psychological defense of theories, even though constructive criticism is presented, or when the critical test—repeated if necessary—provides information that either weakens or invalidates the theory in its entirety. As theories are developed, when their statements become entropic, initiative contributions are formulated and tested. However, the defense of theories and their initiative contributions should be based not on the psychological proclivities of the people involved, but on the basis of the rules established for critical testing. Should the outcome of the critical test demonstrate the utility and viability of an initiative contribution, there may nevertheless be some resistance to accepting it due to the perceived need to guard the existing theory in its totality from competition even though, objectively, corrections are in order. Contributions by Galileo and Kepler were outside the scope of Aristotelian physics, and quantum theory and relativity in the contemporary context have greater explanatory power than does Newtonian theory. Newtonians who held fast to their theory in light of the developments of Einsteinian relativity and quantum theory have, perhaps reluctantly, had to release their hold and adapt to the current theories. Planck was still a Newtonian, and while he worked with radiation he founded quantum theory.4 A consequence of testing is that it not only focuses on the issues being chal-

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lenged, but it may also generate concern for other issues that are important for the contribution’s development. While new theories stimulate interest, critics of these theories should examine them only on the basis of their stated objectives and claims. With initiations, critics should examine the contributions’ abilities to alter the entropic statements so that their utilities are maintained. For innovations, each theory in its entirety is necessarily under scrutiny, because it may be challenging other theories or may be posited as a revolutionary contribution to ideas. Moreover, critique is necessary as a social filter, removing from the general body of knowledge ideas and theories that have no real merit and provide little or no viable information, resulting in a conflict between contributors and society because theories posited with the best intentions are demonstrated by way of critique to be inadequate. This situation may be beneficial to such contributors as it permits revaluations and reconstructions of the contributions that may result in other viable contributions. In the history of ideas, while Galileo rejected Kepler’s mystical search for the harmony of the sphere, this search was partly responsible for Kepler’s formulation of planets orbiting in elliptical form around the sun. Critique does not necessarily eliminate misunderstanding because those constructing the tests may not fully comprehend the contribution or may provide a critique that, unintentionally, is not quite accurate due to misunderstanding the nuances and the rigor of the contribution. This is due to honest errors in judgment and not because of personal involvement with other theories nor because of dogma. With the absence of professional and dogmatic rejection and stated in good faith, errors in critique stand to be investigated by others concerned with the problem area and the contributions formulated to deal with it. When critique is conducted in good faith, it is professionally objective, regardless of its potential for error. Though not ideal, works rejected by some critiques may be accepted by others. Copernicus’s work is an example: It was critiqued on the basis that if the earth did indeed move around the sun, its inhabitants would fall off because of this motion. Often, a historical period of social time— perhaps an era itself—has to pass before a theory can be worked out sufficiently for its utility to be realized. While theories of evolution existed prior to Darwin’s work, his theory is still being studied and continues to provoke religious arguments with the seven days of creation considered as seven historical areas.5 THE CRITICAL TEST AND THE FIRST APPROACH: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECT Critique is made on the basis of education and experience and the lessons and understanding derived from them. However, since we humans are complicated creatures with differing tastes, preferences, opinions, often varying over time and determined by emotions and irrational feelings, total objectivity has never been within the complex of the human condition. Even those who evaluate a contribution have to contend with these aspects of their behavior, no matter

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how much they attempt to suppress their personal considerations while seeking to understand the contribution’s significance, importance, and utility for the problem area. The total negation of personal propensities is impossible so that even a seemingly irrelevant factor such as personal feeling prior to the critique can become relevant in the process of evaluation.6 Critique can, moreover, be given with professional objectivity as contrasted with personal objectivity. This is accomplished by the critic who takes into account his or her personal proclivities and either suppresses them as much as humanly possible at the outset of the critique or clarifies at the outset the influences of personal bias, thereby evaluating the contribution given these personal constraints. However, critique also has objective complications. One critic may honestly and openly reject a contribution and another recommends its acceptance. This conflict poses great difficulty for the imitators using the contribution to assume the role of critics and devise a critical test to determine its utility and viability with respect to its problem area. Since the work must be evaluated according to its probability and utility requirements as well as its workability within the area, these criteria may, over a period of social time, become invalid. One such example of correction is J.P.B. Lamarck’s theory of evolution, which was revived in a Darwinian context. However, in some situations, contributions are vindicated after being rejected. One such example is J.P.B Lamarck’s theory of evolution which was revived in a Darwinian context: As natural conditions impose themselves on life forms resulting in natural selection and adaptation, there is the possibility of these changes being imprinted on the genetic code. A further discussion on evolution must wait for the next part of this work. Usually, acceptance or rejection is always permanent unless the work being considered is either so insufficient that, in the case of rejection, critics demonstrate without real contest that the work bears little or no significance for the stated problem area or the problem area as stated in the work is of insufficient social or professional interest to generate imitators or competitors. The professional and social inertia toward reviving respectable yet rejected works is far greater than discrediting accepted works unless these works become entropic and are then questioned, perhaps even rejected, until adjustments are made and utility is reestablished. This may require the contribution to be incorporated in another contribution such as Lamarck’s contribution into the later version of Darwin’s theory. In any case, this is the task of the initiator because the contribution must be reconstructed for its utility to be restored. However, in situations where contributions are generally rejected outright by the majority of critics, they are relegated to history, if they are recorded at all.7 Moreover, the longevity and duration of accepted contributions can only be considered from a historical perspective. For example, the long duration of the Ptolemaic theory of astronomy was due to its utility and the acceptance of the theory because it suited religious dogma by religious authorities. While Ptolemey’s theory in the history of ideas is secure, no astronomer today would act

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on its validity. The theory endures because it is taught only from the viewpoint of the history of the development of knowledge as an example of the ideas of an era and their duration. For acceptance, a theory’s construction, the criteria of utility, and the probability assessment must be significant enough to stimulate interest. While this requires a degree of publicity in journals and lectures, acceptance relies mainly on the outcome of the critical test. Should the outcome be negative, the contribution will be rejected. In this situation, even though the theory may still attract supporters, they will only be of marginal influence. In cases of initiation, there are usually several competitors, each with its own supporters. These supporters are explorative imitators who, prior to a contribution, have analyzed both it and the competing contributions. The reason there are supporters for different contributions is due to their differing perspectives and their requirements for the contributions. The results of the critical test determine not only which contributions are inadequate, but also show, to a large extent, which contributions will be accepted. Acceptance and rejection must also be considered from another perspective. In our era, the turnover of knowledge and the formulation of theories to provide solutions to difficulties within problem areas through initiation and innovation occur at a rate and intensity that is unique. Nevertheless, while people are receptive to change and newness, a period of gestation is required under certain circumstances to absorb the changes and newness that have already occurred. This often results in a buildup of psychological resistance to new contributions because of the many probem areas and theories involved in working with them, thereby creating a bias among critically thinking people which, during evaluation, is supressed as much as possible. Nevertheless, since the tendency toward bias is inherited in the contemporary human condition, during periods of social gestation it poses difficulties for new contributions that are manifested in the critical processes of evaluation.8 These difficulties are associated with anxiety as when a contribution is rejected not based on its merit, but because society or its relevant segment is unable to absorb the contribution. Before this can be discussed further, clarification of anxiety in this context is necessary. Another difficulty exists for the critical test, regardless of the extent of gestation. Those giving the critique, at one time or another, most likely have been engaged in innovation or initiation and the contributions they are critiquing are usually in the same problem areas as their own contributions. Innovations may be reviewed critically, yet with a bias that the critic does not recognize owing to his or her capacity as innovator. Initiations may be viewed critically from the same approach, especially if the contribution competes with the critic’s work. However, should the contribution be reviewed from a professionally unbiased position, people considering the review will be aware of any biases that do appear and their influences will be minimized when the work is taken under consideration. In some instances, however, an intentional bias exists, resulting in erroneous

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evaluations, thereby posing a difficulty of another dimension. When this happens, because of our eras’s rapid turnover of knowledge, many critics have to subject their own contributions to critical test. This may result in the distortion of their objectivity when evaluating the works of others because, as innovators, they may review critically, yet with a bias of which the critic is unaware owing to his or her capacity as an innovator. Initiations may be viewed critically from the same aspect, especially if the contribution conflicts with that of the reviewer. In these examples, critique is presented as objectively as possible, with whatever biases that do exist made explicit either at the outset or, most certainly, during the critique. However, should the contribution be critiqued from a genuinely biased position, those considering the critique will be aware of this bias and the critique’s influences will thereby be minimized. For clarification of the critical test and the critical aspect, further comments on truth and knowledge are in order. The argument in this work is that theories contribute not to truth, as such, but to knowledge as a way of reaching ultimate truth. Knowledge statements are facts relevant within their theoretical frameworks with changes in knowledge as the way to approach ultimate truth. It was a fact that the sun rose in the east and set in the west until the Aristoteliancum-Ptolemaic theory was replaced by the Keplerian-Newtonian theory in which the earth and the other planets move on elliptical orbits around the sun. We now accept as truth that, within the context of greater astronomical construction, the earth and the other planets are held in the solar system which is maintained in balance by the influence of other such systems and the heavenly constellations, even though we still talk of the sun rising in the east and setting in the west. It was a fact that what went up always came down. Now, it is apparently true that up and down are relative and not all objects that break away from earth’s gravitational pull will return, as the properly functioning satellites and exploring spacecraft aptly demonstrate. Nevertheless, we still talk of the directions of up and down because of the convenience of language, but we accept the gravitational limitations on their uses. Knowledge and fact remain intimately related in the goal of reaching the ultimate wisdom, understanding, and truth. In this context, truth is philosophical as it pertains to comprehending the human condition. After the historical parting of philosophy and science, philosophy retained its inquiry into the methaphysical dynamics of nature and existence, employing the sophisticated tools of logical reasoning. For the sciences, truth shares with philosophy theory-based facts and with each valid theory, greater understanding of humanity and the universe. However, since facts are theory-based, they are derived from the theory as it is used and within the theoretical context, facts can be neither true nor false, but valid or invalid, of utility or entropy. Herein lies the problem of evaluation. Critics who evaluate new innovative or initiative contributions must consider new facts as they are presented within the material, which may conflict with those in the critic’s contribution. For initiation, the critic may not consider the competing contribution credible, and

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for innovation, the critic may—from a position of recognized or even unrecognized bias—consider the contribution a threat to his or her own contribution. The problem for critics—and this is also expressed in the critical test—is that the irrational aspect of human behavior may overcome judgment, resulting in rejecting contributions not based on their quality, but because they threaten previous and competing contributions and those who support them. Galileo’s condemnation by the Inquisition was not based on the study of his works and the rejection of the theory he constructed, but because of the threat they posed to established teachings. While theories may become heavily entropic, their supporters who do not recognize the entropic condition will continue to work with the theory as it is. In this situation, when initiators make contributions to restore the theories, or when competitors formulate theories to compete with them, the original adherents will reject these contributions out of hand and continue their work as if nothing serious has happened. Rationally, working with a theory depends on its viability and objectively, a theory is as valid as its utility. Its utility is at its highest when the theory deals with the problem area as initially stated with its operational and area languages unchanged. Objectively, when a theory becomes entropic to the extent that repairs result in a radical deviation from its original purpose, the theory continues to be worked with for one of two reasons. One reason is that there are no alternatives, no competing theories to challenge it, and it is maintained until a better theory is formulated, tested, and approved by the majority of those concerned with the problem area. However, should an alternative theory be formulated, critically tested, and approved, those who still hold on to the entropic theory do so irrationally, due to their personal commitment to the theory. This attitude of maintaining a theory as is, regardless of its entropic condition and the attempts made to either alter it and restore its utility or to remove it through innovative competition, is a psychological way of coping with anxiety. Having achieved a sense of belonging to a worthy endeavor by supporting and working as a strict imitator with a theory that was once viable, the tenacious person’s emotional identity with the theory is irrational. This does not mean, of course, that people working with a theory should not be loyal to it; indeed, loyalty exists as strict and explorative imitators seek to exploit the theory to its fullest, drawing out the theory’s advantages and attempting to correct its faults. However, this commitment should be professional with the theory used and, if necessary, defended professionally, not from emotional attachment. When a theory’s utility has declined sufficiently that initiative corrections can no longer restore its utility, it should be abandoned when viable competition exists because entropy has become too extensive and the theory’s utility cannot be restored. While there are no Aristotelian physicists today, Aristotelian physics is still taught in courses on the history of science and philosophy. With the theory’s utility having significantly declined, the tenacious person’s emotional identity with it is irrational. Such tenacity is because the person found

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psychological comfort in belonging to a group that identifies with the theory and, as such, the person refuses to relinquish his or her grip on it, even after the theory has been demonstrated to be entropic beyond repair. Having made an enormous psychological commitment, resulting in mental confusion between theoretical fact—due to those statements from which theoretical fact is stated declining into entropy—and truth, which is permanent, unchanging. This person believes that since the theory has had the ability to achieve all its objectives, it is therefore true in its content so that it is enduring, with initiations to correct entropy neither affecting the theory’s original purpose nor reducing its utility. This erroneous association of fact based on theoretical utility with truth due to the theory’s durability has become fixed in this person’s mental awareness. It is a situation entirely different from that of the pre-Planckians who worked with Newton’s theory and considered it a true and enduring representation of nature, a situation altered by Planck and the subsequent contributions made by Einstein and the quantum physicists. They were not true believers as they recognized the possibility for limitations on Newtonian theory and when Planck’s findings were made public, quantum physics and relativity theory were formulated and they were willing to accept these theories after they were analyzed and submitted to testing. Hence, there was no psychological influence to cause them judgmental error and they recognized the decline in the utility of Newtonian theory, rendering it a limit-case of quantum theory and Einsteinian relativity. Through his innovation, Planck reluctantly brought physics into new realms, resulting in further innovations in the attempts to resolve the difficulties that his contribution raised. The problem of a strong personal commitment—as opposed to an objective professional commitment—must now be addressed. Strong personal commitment to a theory as it stands, regardless of its entropy and initiative attempts to resolve it or when innovative theories of much higher utility are posited, is due to the dynamics of anxiety. These dynamics are expressed in the dread of not belonging, the personal feeling of importance, caused by not being recognized by a segment of society the person respects, and the dread of being rendered impotent intellectually with the theory’s decline. This is part of the social and psychological pathology of our contemporary era; it is manifested by the commitment of the true believers of theories, especially those theories rendered entropic by competing theories. This anxiety influences critical judgment negatively, often to the extent that critical judgment is negated, resulting in inaccurate or inadequate critiques leveled against theories that are being reviewed. Anxiety is a common existential awareness. In its greater intensity, it is manifested in feelings of intellectual impotency rendering the person experiencing anxiety unable to contribute to the dynamics of knowledge by way of explorative imitation, initiation, or innovation. A person in a sociopathological condition will seek to overcome these feelings of anxiety by clinging tenaciously to the theory in the capacity of a strict imitator, maintaining this situation regardless of the theory’s status with regard to utility and entropy.

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Anxiety is an ontological condition, and when it attacks it is debilitating with people closing in on themselves. It attacks mostly when people feel fragile or sensitive in their situations. When anxiety, or the fear of it, results in dogmatism as manifested in holding on to a position or theory that is no longer of utility when viable alternatives exist, it becomes a condition for mental instability, resulting in improper functioning in our contemporary era when relating to their theories or the theories of others. Expressed in critical evaluation, this dogmatism results in a distorted impression of the critiqued work so that an inadequate evaluation is not presented as the contributor intended. This is certainly counterproductive and, in previous historical eras, anxiety may have prevented contributors from receiving a fair evaluation. In our contemporary era however, there are many sources of information such as publications, debates, and lectures and there is competition among these sources for evaluating and testing works. Thus, while one critic rejects a work because of anxiety, others will be ready to provide a professional critique that is as unbiased as possible. Anxiety is part of the human condition, capable of debilitating reason and distorting judgment, thereby damaging the critical processes required for making contributions and for evaluation. When it motivates, it may close off one’s self from the dynamic world or it may inspire significant contributions, including the innovation of new theories. The frequency of anxiety attacks and their impact depend on the person’s inner strength, which determines the person’s ability to act productively both as contributor and critic regardless of anxiety’s effects. THE CRITICAL TEST AND THE SECOND APPROACH: THE SOCIAL ASPECT AND GESTATION Social gestation results from one of two conditions. In one condition, the current quantity of working theories reaches the social restraints that do not permit new theories to receive the necessary attention in light of their problem areas. The other condition is more specific and historically oriented, occurring when theories relating to problem areas are no longer relevant for the social time in which they are used. The use of the word “relevant” in this context does not refer to the history of theories, their problem areas, and their deveopment; rather, it refers to the present utilities of the theories in their social time. We may refer to different social times when discussing comparisons in the development of knowledge between different periods and times, but for current social gestation the utility of our current theories is relevant for us now and, while historical comparisons may be useful and theories of biology, physics, and the social and computer sciences as developed in earlier social times may be important—especially for clarifying the progress we have made in these disciplines—other than the necessity of understanding history, these theories have little practical use now. Because of these two conditions, social gestation is manifested in two forms: the specific or special form that relates to problem areas and their theories and

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the time form that expresses the termination of either a social time or a historical era. The dynamics of both forms are the same with the difference between them being in the scope and social significance of the gestation periods. For the critic and the critical test, an awareness of the changing circumstances in which a work is presented should be taken into consideration and, should the work be critiqued during gestation, the critic should be aware of the influence of anxiety on the critic’s professional objectivity in relation to his or her own work, as discussed earlier. Specific gestation occurs when problem areas are saturated with contributions so that, consequently, new contributions receive little enthusiasm and critical testing is not conducted. While critique will be fair during specific gestation, its significance may be diminished due to the lack of willingness to consider new contributions. This is the case not only with scientific theories, but also with all forms of intellectual endeavor in which inquiry takes place and results in an abundance of theories in competition in a single general problem area, taking into consideration the overlapping of theories and their uniquenesses and differences. During this gestation, an innovator taking a slightly different approach to a problem area other than existing theories, regardless of its utility, will attract little attention. Only those theories that are radical in terms of the probem area and are of high utility will make the critics sufficiently enthusiastic to critique the contribution and provide critical testing. Moreover, periodic specific gestation is necessary as saturation sets in due to the exploitation of the problem areas and their theories. During these periods of gestation, imitators find limits to their theories, and innovation slows down considerably or ceases. An example of this is our current situation in physics with the final subparticle considered found, thereby completing the range of possible particles resulting in reactor-induced collision. The area is saturated with theoretical information, however the two views of wave and particle dynamics must still be reconciled.9 Only certain specific conditions and contributions during each era give rise to new knowledge, thereby enhancing the eras’ development. While conditions for the computer were present in the latter part of the Industrial Revolution, they were developed in the early social times of our era with computer science developed extensively in our present social time.10 While scientists experimented with rocketry during the last part of the Industrial Revolution, only in our era was the technology developed for ballistic missiles for military purposes and for exploring outer space.11 This is not a tautological concept in the sense that these and other outstanding contributions were made in our era because they occurred within the circumstances and technologies of our era; this concept is far more sophisticated than that. Each historical era is defined by its unique conditions. While spaceships could not be produced in the Renaissance era and the Industrial Revolution era their artists and philosophers contributed outstanding works, ushering in the modern concepts of perception, philosophy, and science. The Renaissance was also an

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era in which the previous historical era of the Dark Ages reasserted its fight against worldly knowledge by blacklisting works of science and philosophy and by inquisitions. Nevertheless, the dynamics of knowledge had already taken hold with the rebirth of Aquinas’s neo-Aristotelian philosophy within the Church furthered by those thinkers and artists who followed in the renewed pursuit of knowledge. Political philosophy also developed in this era because of the shifts in territorial possessions among the monarchies; the writings of Dante and Machiavelli were among the most prominent treatises in political thought of the time. It was an era of mathematical advances such as calculus, with Newton’s three laws of motion working as far as observations of outer space could be made. The microscope was invented by Anton van Leeuwenhock (1623–1732), opening up the microworld. This was an era of the revival of ancient Greece, its philosophy, its architecture, and its literature. Developments in the arts and sciences during the Renaissance provided the solid basis for the Industrial Revolution that was to follow. The Renaissance ceased when its arts and sciences were in gestation, resulting in artists seeking new vistas and techniques and scientists seeking fields where they could apply their abstract thinking. The logical place for such applications was in the processes of production and, with this, the Industrial Revolution began. An era is thus defined and delineated by its main properties. The Dark Ages was an era in which intellectual and artistic pursuits were overshadowed by religion and superstition. This era gave way to the Renaissance after Aristotle’s discoveries were incorporated into the thinking and writings of Aquinas and his followers. The Renaissance gave way to the Industrial Revolution when scientific theory was applied to the processes of production. With the Great Depression, the Industrial Revolution came to an end, followed by our contemporary era of knowledge with its strong industrial base and developments in the various sciences and arts. Therefore, special gestation exists when theories have saturated an era to the extent that all further contributions, unless monumental to the extent of generating new interest, will most likely be critiqued and ignored regardless of their merits. With similar competing contributions and with little interest in new contributions, the area that is defined and delineated by these theories also stagnates and declines in utility because it lacks new dynamics. In circumstances when there is no gestation established, contributions decline as new contributions are accepted and applied, thus altering the problem area as these contributions are applied. Depending on the extent of special gestation, initiation is slowed as explorative imitation is reduced due to the lack of incentive because of saturation. This condition is more prevalent for innovation because interest in new contributions has declined accordingly. The role of critique during periods of specific gestation is in the ability to assess the conditions of problem areas and theory (contribution) saturation so that if the special gestation period is one in which, during saturation, strict

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imitators are working out the dynamics of their theories, critiques must take this into consideration when the contribution is being evaluated or reevaluated. The gestation period may be brief enough so that some contributions maintain their utilities whereas others are eliminated through competition because their supporters are attracted to other theories and the results of the critical test. Since it is the domains of difference that tell in competing situations, these conditions must be considered when discussing problem areas and testing their theories. Consider C theories (or contributions) each containing operational and area statements a, b, . . . , n, with linguistic differences existing only for clarification and embellishment that are critically unimportant. As well as having statements that are similar, each of these theories has statements that are different, distinguishing them from one another. For example, theory D*t in the group of theories C has distinguishing statements efg, and theory R*t has distinguishing statements bq, ik, and wz, and so forth for the rest of the contributions in the group. Unless entropy enters into a contribution and affects the similar statements in the group, these statements will have no effect on the theories’ utilities for competition and testing. Only changes in a contribution’s languages will place it in a different competitive situation, perhaps improving its position with alterations strengthening its utility. Each theory is affected when area changes occur, but the domains of difference among the competing theories may compensate for the changes and improve the competitive positions for one or several of the contestants. Since theories are dynamic, their statements of similarity are influenced by statements of difference within each theory. This is because they generate dynamics within the theory due to the alterations that occur in their linguistic structures and within the specific aspects of the broader problem area to which they relate.12 Should any of these statements become entropic, the entropy will affect the entire contribution for generating knowledge. Altered entropic statements, corrected with their utility restored, also affect the contributions’s utility. Consider statements s and v in D*t; these statements have become entropic because of linguistic infiltration that has brought about changes in their nuances. Since these statements are isomorphic onto their respective parts of the area, they have become entropic and have to be altered. This process raises two questions. First, prior to their alterations, how do they affect the contribution’s other statements? Second, once the entropy is removed from these statements and their utility restored, how will they then influence the contribution? These questions must be considered not only with respect to the contribution in isolation, but also with respect to its status as a competitor in a dynamic situation. These questions have to be approached from the position that the contribution under consideration functions in an area which is subject to changes due to competition and other influences unrelated to the immediate competitive situation, but by the nuances of the contribution’s competing statements. Nuances in

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one contribution that are incorporated after meeting the probability and utility requirements may be incorporated into other competing contributions which, in turn, have to be altered to preserve their utilities. Moreover, since changes in one contribution may affect the problem area, these changes will also require alterations within the other competing contributions working in the same area. This increases the dynamics in the area, resulting in a fairly rapid turnover of information within the contribution, generating conditions for other competing contributions of high utility to enter the area, even though saturation (or near saturation) may exist and the dynamics of the contributions are being worked out by strict imitators. This is the reason that only contributions of very high utility and originality will generate enthusiasm in these circumstances and be considered for evaluation and critical testing. Because the period of specific gestation is a well-defined problem area in which existing contributions are being worked on, it is also a period in which explorative imitation is subdued. Since the statements of difference generate dynamics within the area and among the competing contributions, explorative imitation is still being conducted to strengthen the contributions’ competitive positions. Therefore, special gestation does not mean the cessation of all explorative or innovative activity; nor does it mean that the emphasis is mainly on strict imitation with contributions being worked on within their own dynamics. It does mean that either saturation or near saturation in a problem area exists and will remain until competition either alters the contributions, or the problem area, or both, since it is competition that generates the dynamics necessary for bringing about changes. For specific gestation, innovation that is both unique and of high utility can be relevant, providing that it is critiqued and found to perform as stated. It may attract people so that the existing contributions are strengthened further by those still working with them or decline with severe entropy as the innovative contribution gains adherents who abandon their previous contributions. Therefore, should tranquility be associated with specific (or special) gestation, in most situations it is of short duration. This is because of the statements of difference between the competing contributions which make each of them unique. The entropy that invades these contributions and is corrected, strengthens them and improves their competitive positions. Since these changes may generate changes within the statements of similarity, these changes could possibly alter the contribution to the extent that—if they are in accordance with the probability assesment—could affect the contribution’s competitive position, thereby generating dynamics within the problem area that require the other competitors to be reevaluated. Specific gestation is therefore a period of calm and tranquility only for the duration that the statements of difference remain unaltered or an innovative contribution of high quality is not brought into the area. It is a period in which competing contributions have their dynamics worked out by strict imitators; it is a period of competition among the contributions during which new contri-

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butions entering the competition have to be of extremely high quality to generate sufficiently new dynamics to bring about area shifts that result in changes in competing contributions’ operational and area statements. It is also a period in which contributions become entropic as a result of the dynamics of competition that bring about area shifts due to the contributions’ influences on the area. This results in the information from competition entering both the area and its contributions, generating changes in both due to the incorporation of this information which has been reconstructed to meet the probabilistic requirements of those contributions using it and the conditions of the area that has absorbed it. Critical evaluation of contributions in competition depends on the contributions’ strength and the situation in the problem area. If the area is changing and some contributions do not respond to these changes, critical evaluations will indicate this, and those contributions will retain low utility ratings until the appropiate alterations are made. If the contributions fail to respond because their strict imitators do not recognize the need for change (perhaps due to anxiety)13 or because, having recognized this need, innovators fail to provide contributions of sufficiently high utility, these contributions will decline in competition. Moreover, apart from the issue of anxiety, strict imitators may ignore the need for changes because they are concerned with working out the dynamics of the contribution as it is and are unconcerned about the effects of other contributions’ dynamics on it. Critical evaluation must take into consideration the utility and probability assessment of initiations within contributions, the utility of innovations in existing problem areas, and the construction of new areas. This is especially important when the problem area is changing because of the influences of information from the competing contributions—and from information from other sources—on the area. Two points significant in the broader context of the critical test must be made concerning critical evaluation. One point is the validity of the critique over time, which bears specifically on the critical test; the other point is relevance of the critique over time which refers to the critical test and specific critiques. These points are relevant for both single contributions (theories) and for those in competition. Critiquing a contribution that has no competitors requires that, if a negative critique of the contribution is given, the contribution should be critically tested to determine the critique’s validity. The critical evaluator proposing the test should devise testing guidelines if they are not included in the contribution’s format. Should the critique be demonstrated to be valid and the contribution fails, its reasons can be demonstrated by the test. The argument can be taken from here, if necessary, to the critical evaluator’s own guidelines, should they differ from those of the contribution. Given that these guidelines are sound, they can be tested by others for a confirming or rejecting opinion. Whether the contribution is static at the time of evaluation or undergoing changes due to initiation or in the problem area, the critique is made public so that no difficulty is encountered in assessing the critical evaluator’s own position. This is important because critical evaluators may have differing

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opinions and since they are made public and available to those who work with the contribution or are interested in it for other reasons, these critical evaluations can also be examined and tested. The same holds for competing contributions although because more than one contribution is involved, critical evaluations will be numerous, resulting in debate among the various contributions’ supporters and the demand for more refined critical testing. This is important because, resulting from the competition, some contributions will be abandoned while others will be strengthened. Such a situation during specific gestation allows for only those contributions with the highest utility to enter the arena. Moreover, a positive critique has little value if, over time, the critiqued contribution declines rapidly into entropy. Similarly, a negative critique has little value over time if the contribution that was so considered increases in utility while other competing contributions decrease. Dynamics occurring within contributions and their problem areas take place within the historical era. The sum total of these area-contribution (theory) relationships, their beginnings and cessations, and the initiations made within them, lead to social gestation in which the general dynamics within contributions and their problem areas have stabilized to a large extent and no theories of revolutionary significance are formulated and offered for testing. It is a period in which competition is well defined among the areas with few contributions entering or dropping out of the respective problem areas. This period is not static in the sense that new theories and problem areas are being constructed. It is, therefore, a period during which activity occurs among contributions, but at a socially slower rate than previously. It is also the period that signals the demise of the historical era. For example, the Renaissance began with the development of science from exposure to neo-Aristotelian thought as advanced first by the perspective of St. Thomas Aquinas and his theological and naturalist followers, then by Galileo in light of Copernicus’s astronomy, followed by Kepler, Newton, and other great scientists and mathematicians of the era. With most of the physics based in Newtonian theory, the problem of the nature of light remained puzzling and the anti-Newtonian argument for light behaving as waves very strong. As the Renaissance progressed and moved into the era of industrialization, Newtonian theory reached the stage of gestation. The Renaissance declined when physics began to be recognized as a discipline separate from a branch of philosophy and began to be applied to processes of production when the arts that developed throughout the era began to be saturated both in themes and in general styles.14 The applications of science to the production processes resulted in the specialization of labor and greater efficiency in manufacturing procedures. Moreover, the different artistic styles and conceptions that were inspired by the urbanization processes resulting from the centralization of industrial plants and the housing of communal services that were required for working in the manufacturing centers expressed the emotions of these conditions. They also helped clarify these conditions for the new city dwellers and the industrialists who developed the

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manufacturing processes. With Newtonian theory remaining dominant in the physical sciences, developments in biological theory were taking place as industrialization continued with new urban centers accommodating this expansion. In the attempt to understand the origins of biogical evolution, Lamarckianism and Darwinism were competing and, as Darwin’s theory won out, attempts to explain the processes of social evolution, Social Darwinism, and other social dynamics in terms of metahistorical forces were in vogue.15 In physics, while the particle-wave controversy was never resolved, it was only during the final years of the nineteenth century that Newtonian theory was seriously brought into question and seriously challenged by the works of Planck, who nevertheless remained a staunch Newtonian. Poincare´ ’s work in nonlinear analysis contributed to economic theory and was used by micro- and macroeconomists to analyze business policies and production cycles. Also, in light of the new concepts in physics and the search for the foundations of mathematics, Poincare´ ’s contributions in mathematics were unique.16 As the industrial era expanded, production increased and goods and services were more available. More people migrated to the countries that offered the greatest potential for personal and financial development, railroads were built for the movement of people and goods, and the airplane was developed for transportation and for war. Communications were also improved with the telephone and telegraph. With better transportation and communications, the applications of science reduced the costs of production, making goods and services available to an increasingly larger consuming public. Recessions and depressions became part of business activity with classical and neoclassical approaches applied to the problems of the business cycle. But with recovery from World War I bringing a new economic outlook, and the theories of relativity and quantum physics being worked out and promising a new understanding of our world, the Great Depression took place, bringing industrial output to a near standstill. The defining and delineating aspects of the Industrial Revolution no longer held and the era of industrialization came to an end. Our contemporary era has its foundations in the Industrial Revolution and the applications of industrializing technology in conducting World War II were also applied in the aftermath of the war in the early years of our era. For all the prewar theoretical developments in atomic physics, it was necessary to beat the Axis powers in the weapons race, thereby creating the atomic revolution and postwar applications of atomic energy for both military and peaceful uses. Moreover, with developments in mathematics, the computer came into its own to provide rapid calculation and programming. The experiences of combat pilots during the war, combined with rocketry developed by the Germans, were incorporated into jet air travel. The lessons learned from the war and their applications in peacetime rectified the social gestation that terminated the Industrial Revolution and established our era of knowledge. Hence, the factors that bring about social gestation are those that terminate an era. The Dark Ages ended with the discovery of Aristotle’s works which

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resulted in a renewed interest in nature. By the authority of Aquinas, the Scholastic thinkers examined this world as well as the other world and the concepts and methods of scientia—of science offered by William of Occam, Jean Buridan, and John Duns Scotus—began to take hold. The subjects of the arts became the choices of the artists, as opposed to the religious themes dictated by tradition, and with the exploration of nature and the emphasis on personal expression in the arts, the processes of scientific inquiry began. With these developments, social gestation in the previous era of the Dark Ages had set in and the era declined, yielding to the era of the rebirth of knowledge. The Renaissance ended with the applications of science to the problems of production, but the tradition established during the Renaissance of developing personal expression in the arts and the development of the pure sciences continued. Moreover, the applications of science as technology brought about a change in emphasis in the arts and sciences as disciplines for their own sakes. The artists had become interpreters and clarifiers of society and its dynamics, but the scientists who dealt with technology shaped the societies according to the requirements of industrialization. The Industrial Revolution underwent social gestation when the old methods for settling conflicts that defied diplomatic overtures—those of war—brought the industrializing nations into world conflict. Political judgments that resulted in conditions that caused the war were medieval in conception, based on shifts in world power and attempts to settle scores and conquer lands. Moreover, as industrialization expanded and conflicted with workers’ movements, old-style nationalism was supplanted by a universal movement of workers, finding its expression in Russia at the end of the war. Russian communism brought about a new political force that posed a threat to the victorious Western powers. Nevertheless, after the war, issues were still to be resolved, and the peace imposed on Germany encouraged the rise of a new nationalism to oppose the universalism of Russian communism. While industry was providing employment and output, the profit motive focused on the value of paper—stocks and bonds— as well as on industrial output. The situation developing in the international arena also contributed to the search for financial security, resulting in the overextended purchase of commercial paper. As uncertainty increased in Europe and Asia, the paper chase intensified until stocks and bonds became prime commodities, obeying the laws of supply and demand and profit taking. In the United States, the market became overheated, falling and bringing down all the major international markets with it. The amount of money in circulation shrank, resulting in the decline in industrial production and a decline into unemployment. The Great Depression had begun, bringing in its wake World War II to rectify the disgrace imposed on Germany and its allies in the aftermath of World War I and to resolve the conflict of nationalism versus internationalism.17 The era of industrialization ended and, in the aftermath of that war, our era of knowledge began. Social gestation therefore indicates the decline of an era. Even though con-

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tributions are still being innovated and others brought into entropy, the conditions and the circumstances that provide the era lose their dominance. Since the Industrial Revolution came to an end, the processes of industrialization continue, moving developing economies into our era and spreading to underdeveloped countries. Nevertheless, the defining and delineating properties of our era are its orientation toward the development of knowledge and the information derived from knowledge. During social gestation, those contributions and theories being formulated are of utility and transfer over into the new era. Mechanical computation in the 1930s became part of the computer transformation in our era, and the theories of the atom led to the development of atomic weaponry, generating new directions of research and the application of atomic energy for peacetime energy uses and military strategy in our era. At this point in the discussion, an intentional ambiguity has to be clarified. Throughout this chapter the terms “critique” and “critical testing” have been used in ways that indicate that no difference is meant between them. Of course, they are different and their uses in this context have been intentional. This is because criticisms of contributions, be they innovative or initiative, may themselves be sufficient to influence the opinions of those who are interested in the contributions and are working in the designated or related areas of concern. However, it is the actual critical test, devised in agreement between the contribution’s proponents and opponents that will come down on one side or the other in the argument, but not necessarily at the time that the test is undertaken. Even those contributions for which no test has been devised in the sense of a controlled laboratory (or with controlled conditions outside of the traditional laboratory setting) can be subjected to ideal experiments, should the sides concerned agree to the conditions. Examples of theories that cannot be tested under traditional laboratory conditions are the two opposing approaches to cosmology: the Big Bang and the Steady State approaches. The Big Bang approach maintains that the world came about because of a tremendous explosion of immense proportions, scattering cosmic debris throughout what would become space, after which cosmic matter formed into solar systems owing to the intense gravitational forces that were established after the explosion. This argument is sustained by the red shifts on the spectrum generated by the heavenly bodies as they move away from our solar system. The Big Bang argument is also substantiated by the many galaxies and their solar systems, indicating that the initial explosion spewed vast amounts of debris at tremendous speeds until the forces of gravity placed them into galactic and solar-oriented relationships. Proponents of the Steady State approach maintain that the Big Bang is only surmise, based to a large extent on the story of creation in the Bible. However, according to observations, galaxies exist and, while they are in celestial motion with some moving away from us, others are approaching. What we observe using the finest telescopes such as the Hubble space telescope and other sophisticated methods such as observations from spacelabs, is a dynamic and

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changing universe with solar systems collapsing into black holes and new systems being formed and galaxies in motion. While the evidence gives credence to the Big Bang theory, the creation of the universe is still speculation and perhaps there is no real conflict between the Steady State theory, Big Bang theory, and the teaching in the Bible. The Steady State approach is ancient, going back to Aristotle’s writings on physics and teleology in which the planets are said to move on spheres, each layer moving to the final cause, the Supreme Being. However, the Big Bang approach has won over many more adherents. While both approaches are theory oriented and their arguments are accordingly theory-derived, the contemporary appeal of the Big Bang theory is that it provides greater intellectual stimulation, leading to such contributions as Alan Guth’s “inflation” theory. According to Guth, the inflation of infinity generated tremendous forces that conflicted and caused the great explosion.18 No viable innovative explanations have been provided by the Steady State theory for, according to this theory, there was no physical first cause for the creation of the universe. The critical testing of these theories depends to a large extent on their proponents’ future contributions, especially the evaluation of the logic and utilities of their arguments together with whatever new technologies may be used in the development of their arguments and in their testing. It is, of course, ideal when competing contributions are debated for a single problem area for which a critical test agreeable to all sides can be devised to determine finally and permanently which contributions are to be accepted and rejected. With respect to the theory of evolution and natural selection, T. D. Lysenko’s corruption of J.P.B. Lamarck’s theory and his applications of this corrupted theory to Soviet society were shown to be unworkable. The argument in its favor was that, given sufficient time, it would be shown to be valid and applicable; the duration of sufficient time was never established. Its significance for the Lamarck-Darwin debate was that it placed Lamarck’s theory in a negative light even though, in his later years, Darwin was influenced to some extent by Lamarck’s argument. Survival of the fittest requires adaptation to circumstances and this is a major point in Lamarck’s theory, expressed in the concept that external changes impose adaptive changes on life forms. Moreover, the debate on evolution has broadened to include the arguments of the evolutionists against the creationists who deny all forms of biological evolution. Critique can assist in this debate and, through the development of arguments and changes in the structures in the theory and its problem area, rigorously conducted critique can serve as a substitute for critical testing that may be inapplicable in this and other similar debates. This does not mean, of course, that further technical advances will not assist us in coming down conclusively on one side or the other in these kinds of issues even though critique is used as a replacement for, or in addition to, critical testing. Moreover, such technologies always permit critical examinations of tenets accepted by the proponents of one or both sides of the debate. For

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example, assume that experimental technology far more sophisticated and sensitive than that employed by Michelson and Morley in their experiment did detect a difference, no matter how slight, in the velocity of light measured in different directions,19 that both the equipment and the experimental finding have been examined by impartial observers (in the sense discussed earlier), and that the equipment was found to be without fault. The effects of this on modern physics would be tremendous: Both Einsteinian relativity and quantum mechanics assume that the velocity of light in vacuum is constant and is the absolute limit-value of energy. Shifts in this limit brought about by changes in the direction of light would cause great disturbances in relativity and quantum physics, similar to the cracks in the Newtonian edifice brought about by Planck’s findings. This would surely revive the argument of light traveling through an ethereal medium—a neoether—and would obligate relativity and quantum physicists to resolve the problem of the nature of light. The argument may take the form that light, consisting of particles, is influenced by other less energetic fields in close proximity, thereby exerting a wavelike effect when traveling through matter-filled space and moving from one energy field to another. Measuring devices using spectra can be set up, once in a pattern and once at random, with light being measured through spectra in north-south and east-west directions. The influences of gravity on the light’s motion as it moves from one field to another and the effects of matter on the light as it moves from one measuring devise to the next, thereby determines whether a neoether theory holds or the accepted constant rate for the velocity of light in vacuo is correct. Moreover, given that light does consist of wavelike motions, its particle properties can be explained in terms of vortices of energy traveling through space and exerting particlelike properties due to the tremendous energy with the vortex acting as a particle. These vortices occur by the motion of light as it is influenced by the gravity of the measuring devises and of the surrounding matter. The existence of an ether drag can be investigated further by this testing, and it is possible to resolve the wave-particle controversy by this approach. Whichever position is accepted, research will be directed toward the innovation of new theories to defend the particle and the wave approach and to construct theories that will contain both. While a critical test is preferred to critique alone, in situations such as the wave-particle controversy for which sufficient technology and sufficient theoretical understanding are absent to establish a critical test, critique on its own must serve as the best method. Critique also serves the purpose of bringing a contribution to light, be it innovative or initiative in origin. Without critiques, contributions in journals, academic seminars, and books would not be viable forms for presenting works, because the time lapse between the contributions’ initial presentation and reaching the targeted audiences might be sufficient to render them entropic through disuse. Critique examines contributions for their significance in their problem areas, perhaps also setting guidelines for constructing critical tests to determine

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their viabilities. Critique is important in situations where technologies are still inadequate for proper testing so that ideal experiments—such as those that seek to overcome the difficulties of observation in Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle—can be constructed and evaluated, provided the ideal experiment is agreed upon by the sides concerned. Hence, while critique cannot substitute for a critical test, it can provide the basis for an ideal construction for such a test, leading perhaps to the ideal experiment that may be decisive in terms of critique. By bringing to the fore contributions that may have gone unnoticed, the problems are that much more exposed to the dynamics of inquiry and change. The dynamics of the critical test and its reliability remain to be discussed. The critical test is relevant for both periodic and social gestation. For periodic gestation, the critical test can determine which of the competing initiations is most viable for the contribution in question and which of the competing contributions provides the highest utility for the problem area. There may be more than one contribution of high utility, each with its own benefits that the others lack, and each with its own deficiencies that the others may also lack. The critical test tends to be decisive, resulting in other contributions being abandoned (except those that are adhered to for reasons of anxiety stated earlier) or they may be strengthened with higher utility and reentered into the competition. For social gestation, the culmination of critical tests may bring the entire complexities of contributions into question, showing that their utilities have declined, thereby paving the way for another historical era to begin. Before the critical test can be discussed, however, further comments on social gestation must be made. Social gestation results when periodic gestation occurs in most problem areas due to saturation together with the decline in innovations with those innovations that are being presented unable to generate sufficient interest, in spite of their utilities, to make big impacts on their problem areas. It is also a social time in which the foundations of the new era are being established. In economics, for example, all the neoclassical macrotheories assumed full employment so that when the Industrial Revolution came to a close with high unemployment and unused capital during the Great Depression which was the transition period between the demise of the Industrial Revolution to the beginning of our era, J. M. Keynes critiqued the full employment assumption, focusing on its expression as stated in A. C. Pigou’s Economics of Welfare, a work that Keynes considered to be of great clarity and elegance.20 In physics, developments in relativity and quantum theory continued, but the technologies for exploiting the knowledge in terms of releasing and harnessing atomic energy began during the war and expanded in our contemporary era of knowledge. Here is where the uniqueness of social gestation lies. Periodic gestation has been discussed in terms of competition within areas in which changes are induced as established contributions fail and new ones are formulated with high utility and attract attention. Without the influence of new contributions, the current contributions will be subject to internal changes and the dynamics of initiation’s entropy invade the contributions. These contributions will remain in

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use until the areas shifts radically or the contributions become heavily entropic, or both. Social gestation is thus a microsocial situation in which the dynamics of periodic gestation for the manifold problem areas are no longer of high utility. This is because the culminative conditions of social gestation cannot account for the aggregate body of new contributions—in the same way that the Dark Ages could not withstand the contributions in the arts and sciences due to the influences of Aristotelian philosophy; in the same way that the Renaissance had to yield to the Industrial Revolution with its emphasis on the applications of science to production; and in the same way the Industrial Revolution yielded to our era of knowledge and the information it generates that becomes commodities in our socially oriented situation. Hence, social gestation sets in when the trends of theories in the sciences and contributions in the arts and technologies are no longer applicable to the realities of contemporary dynamic societies. As an example of a theory that had tremendous influences but did not relate to the trends of a society, consider communism. The difficulties between workers and employers encountered as the Industrial Revolution developed were significant enough for the development of socialist theories and the formation of the communist movement, whose foundations were expressed theoretically by Karl Marx in Capital,21 and somewhat emotionally by Marx and Fredrich Engels in the Communist Manifesto (1848). The theories of socialism and communism were important for workers because industries tended to centralize to an extent previously unknown, thereby commanding greater control over productive resources, including labor. As the Industrial Revolution expanded, the labor movement rose and became a political force as a result of its strength and determination. Moreover, during the Great Depression, echoes of socialist and communist thought still reverberated with some strength, but mostly out of frustration over industry’s inability to pull out of the depression. Since the problems of the Great Depression have been resolved in our era, the writings of socialist and communist thinkers find little support as the problems in our era are vastly different from those of the previous era. The writings of the socialist and communist thinkers, foremost among them Marx’s economic writings, while now mostly historical, retain their economic message. They showed the problems and the growing pains of industrialization, with Marx’s Capital serving as the watershed between classical and neoclassical economic theory. The shifts in the majority of problem areas and their theories (contributions) bring about social gestation and the decline of the era. Shifts in problem areas on a macro scale render the era entropic and the innovative contributions in this social time are directed to new problem areas as defined by these shifts. The great artistic and scientific contributions during the Renaissance differed vastly from the artistic and philosophical works of the Dark Ages, just as the scientific, artistic, and philosophical works of our era differ significantly from those of the Industrial Revolution. The renewed interest in scientific problems during the Renaissance led to the philosophy of science, a discipline that remained unsophisticated during the Dark Ages even though the foundations were established

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in the writings of John Duns Scotus, William of Occam, and Jean Buridan. The difference between these writers and those of the Renaissance is that they were not rigorous with respect to scientia when compared to the writings of Bacon and Descartes. The problem areas did differ significantly from Duns Scotus et al., who were steeped in the thinking of their era, as were Bacon and Descartes in the historical context of the social time of the middle Renaissance. From the argument in this section, it can be seen that periodic gestation can occur in each problem area. For the duration that the problem areas do not deviate radically in the aggregate, the historical era remains intact. Aggregate radical deviation brings about the decline of an era and the beginnings of a new one. The themes and innovations expressed in a new era are established based on the new and, as yet untried, contributions of the previous era. Thus, in history when there is change, there is also continuity as the new comes from the viable, and as yet fully unexploited, old. Social gestation issues from aggregate specific gestation, and the innovations that will set the theme and establish the patterns in the new era are those that capture the interest and imagination of participants working mainly with the new and viable theories in the previous era when strict imitation had become prominent, explorative imitation and initiation were minimal, and innovative contributions were not readily accepted unless—for the most part—they were perceived to be of the caliber to introduce a new era. THE CRITICAL TEST AND THE THIRD APPROACH: THE CRITICAL ASPECT Every historical era is defined and delineated by its problem areas. These problem areas and the contributions innovated to work with them give uniqueness to the era. Our era is unique because of the impact of knowledge and the information that results in our societies. Indeed, the extent of the development of knowledge and the ability to work with it and alter it when necessary indicates a society’s status in the classifications and stages of postindustrialization and of developing, or underdeveloped socioeconomic bodies. Moreover, while these status classifications are far from static, and the underdeveloping societies strive to achieve the status of postindustrialization, the postindustrialized countries maintain their levels of achievement in the development of knowledge and the quality of information. Moreover, the extent of the impact of knowledge is a determining factor in assessing a country’s standard of living. A classic example in our era was in Nicolai Ceaucescu Romania where government permission was required to obtain a typewriter because the government feared the communication of new ideas and sought total control over their expression. Since that government was overthrown, the new government is attempting to rectify the situation and bring the country into our era. The entire Eastern bloc has been affected by our era, its dynamics of inquiry leading to developments in knowledge, and its developments of contributions that were previously restricted and remained impover-

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ished for it. Since the decline of the Soviet Union, they are seeking assistance to be brought fully into our era, but this will be discussed further in the last part of this work. Whether contributions (theories) are alone or dominating a problem area in rigorous competition, they are subject to critical testing. Given that a contribution is critiqued and tested by several sources, both critique and the critical test have to be analyzed from two perspectives: (1) the validity of the critique and the critical test must be considered, over time, with respect to other critiques and tests of the contribution with their relevance being assessed over time; and (2) the significance of critiques and tests must be considered with respect to one another when pertaining to the same contribution and the initiated restructuring due to internal entropy and as it relates to the dynamic problem area. These perspectives are discussed here with the aid of historical examples in which critiques and critical tests were formulated.22 Consider, for example, the discussion on the spontaneous generation of life. Louis Pasteur (1822–1895) argued that life comes only from life, while his erstwhile opponents, Nicolas Joly, Felix Archime´ de Pouchet, and Charles Musset, argued that life comes about spontaneously. Each side critiqued the other’s position and, to settle the argument, each side agreed to a critical experiment. Each side filled flasks with Pasteur using a yeast-based broth while his opponents used a broth made from hay. Each side boiled the contents of the flasks and went to great lengths to expose the flasks to extreme conditions—Pasteur on Mount Blanc and his opponents in the Pyrenees. Each side opened its flask with Pasteur’s opponents demonstrating that their opponent’s argument was wrong. While they critiqued Pasteur’s argument, he found no life in his flask. Sarcasm was used in the critique, and even ad hominum arguments were employed, albeit with a degree of professional sophistication. Since the results of this test were inconclusive, it was refined further when Pasteur’s opponents challenged him to a public experiment before the distinguished audience of the French Academy of Sciences. His opponents maintained that, should a single flask grow microbes after being opened for an instant, they would admit their error. Performing their experiments before the Academic Committee, the flasks were examined and then opened. The judges concluded that Pasteur’s argument was correct, and that life could only come from life, and that the argument for spontaneous generation was unscientific. This decision was made only after the committee noted that both Pasteur’s experiment and that of his opponents were conducted with the most perfect exactitude. Critical tests, however, are not necessarily free from difficulties as this test has historically demonstrated. John Tyndall, a British scientist, found years later that since Pouchet and his associates used a broth of hay instead of yeast as did Pasteur—hay holds tiny stubborn seeds of microbes that withstand hours of boiling—the results of the test were still inclusive. Tyndall finally resolved the debate by pointing out that because the broths were different and because of the tough microbe seeds in the hay broth, while the results of that test were still

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inclusive, the spontaneous generation argument remained in error because when conducted with yeast, life was not generated; and had the hay broth been subjected to boiling for a longer duration, it would also have demonstrated that life could come only from life.23 Another historical situation is the theory of evolution. Since the works of Lamarck, A. R. Wallace, and Darwin, several serious contributions have been made to the Darwinian theory of evolution. For example, one of Darwin’s followers, R. A. Fisher, attempted to clarify evolution and sexual attractiveness. Considering the male peacock, he wrote that plumage development and the preference for such plumage by the female must thus advance together, and so long as the process is unchecked by severe counterselection, will advance with ever increasing speed. In the total absence of such checks, it is easy to see that the speed of development will be proportional to the development already attained, which will therefore increase with time exponentially, or in geometric progression.24

Richard Dawkins explains that Darwin accepted female whims as given in his theory of natural selection and that their existence is an axiom rather than a point to be held and explained in its own right. Dawkins explains that, partly for this reason, Darwin’s theory of sexual selection fell into disrepute until Fisher rescued it in 1930. He further states that, unfortunately, many biologists either ignored or misunderstood Fisher’s argument, citing the position advanced by Julian Huxley (1881–1975) that female whims are not legitimate foundations for a truly scientific theory. Huxley’s criticism of Fisher’s argument was an indirect critique of Darwin’s, since whims and tastes are both part of Darwin’s and Fisher’s theories and Fisher was a Darwinian. However, since the breaking of the genetic code and the subsequent research done in genetics and evolution, Fisher’s position, which is a refinement of Darwin’s theory of natural selection, has been reconsidered and refined.25 At the time Darwin presented his theory, Gregor Mendel’s (1822–1884) theory of selection had been formulated, but the exposure his theory had received was insufficient for its understanding in the general theory of evolution. However, when Mendel’s laws did gain recognition, Darwin’s position on natural selection and inheritance was little considered because of his nonrigorous approach to the role of female preferences for certain male characteristics for mating and evolution. Huxley’s critique and rejection of Fisher’s attempt to revive and redefine Darwin’s argument resulted in Fisher’s theory being neglected, only to be reconsidered, in turn, by modern evolutionists. The role in both male and female preference is now considered important in the evolutionary dynamics of natural selection and reenforcement of special properties attractive to both sexes is accepted as a sufficient factor for further reenforcing and refining these properties in both species. Because Huxley and other biologists neglected this aspect of Darwin’s theory

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due to his lack of scientific rigor on this issue, they neglected a very important aspect of evolution. Without sexual attraction, the mating process would be reduced to fulfilling the sex drive and evolution would be considerably slowed and most likely would have taken different paths from those traveled. Fisher’s work can, however, be critiqued on the basis that he did not carry his argument far enough. The further advanced a species along the evolutionary scale, the greater is its refinement in selective tastes. While this can be observed clearly among Homo sapiens, there are no hard and fast rules that account for physical-sexual attraction. With human behavior, there are too many variables to account for and they change over time with each person, which is perhaps why no serious studies have been undertaken to explain this aspect of human behavior in terms of genetics and evolution. Concerning the critical test conducted by Pasteur and his opponents, the real results were not known until Tyndall pointed out that the conclusion drawn by the distinguished committee for that test under those conditions was, in fact, not established. The committee was convinced by Pasteur’s presentation of his experiment together with the general climate of opinion at the time which demanded measurement and derivation. It was scientifically sensible to accept the concept that life could only come from life, and it was acceptable to question the theory of spontaneous generation. Experimentation in our social time, however, requires more refined criteria and control as well as greater knowledge of the types of materials and their properties being tested. Neither Pasteur’s nor his opponents’ testing would be acceptable. At that time, the critical test to determine the validity of spontaneous generation was conducted in the scientific spirit established by Bacon and Descartes. In this scientific climate, the concept of spontaneous generation seemed mystical and far from being a scientific explanation of life, as if life depended on a nonself-generating force. The popularity of spontaneous generation was due to its mystical and, therefore nonrigorous, foundations and Pasteur questioned it in the esprit of a scientific attitude liberated from the mystical influences of the Dark Ages, thereby placing his worthy opponents on the defensive. Tyndall’s reconsideration of the critical test in a calmer atmosphere found the test to be inconclusive. The conclusive experimental results and the critical test conducted by Tyndall provided the accepted answer, left the origins of life within the context of the Big Bang theory still unresolved. Concerning R. A. Fisher’s argument, Darwin’s nonrigorous position on the role of sexual attraction was ignored because of the inability to experiment with classical Darwinian theory in a laboratory and also, perhaps, because of the greater battles over Darwinian theory being waged. For example, the popularized version of Darwin’s theory that monkeys are the evolutionary ancestors of mankind, contested in many learned debates and journals, leaves much to be explained such as the missing links in the evolutionary chain between simians, hominoids, and Homo sapiens. Moreover, the religious argument that man was created in the image of God as used against Darwin’s theory, is somewhat

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difficult to refute in terms of Darwinian evolution even though Judeo-Christian monotheism maintains that God has no image and that our general behavior in this world is far from Godlike.26 However, while Fisher’s clarification of Darwin’s argument explains the dynamics of sexual attraction among the species—of which the peacock’s plumage is an example—it does little to explain sexual attraction among humans. A critical test can be established among various species of animals, isolating the conditions unwanted for the test and providing conditions that are required. For example, a critical test with peacocks, can entail the isolation of one female and several males, one with perfect plumage and the rest with degrees of damaged plumage. According to the Darwin-Fisher thesis, the female would relate sexually to the bird with perfect plumage and avoid sexual contact with the rest. Whether this is the case or not, such a test is extremely difficult for humans and may be unethical. The point is that, while a critical test can be established to evaluate Fisher’s argument, the validity of this test is limited if its results cannot be generalized to pertain to all life forms. For this, and similar situations, critique is very important. However, the critique should not be conducted in a style similar to Julian Huxley’s sophisticated ridicule; rather, it should be constructive critique, pointing out the difficulties of the arguments and, in this case, the need to repeat the test using different combinations of male and female birds; and, for a comprehensive theory of sexual preferences and its role in evolution; and for generalizing the criteria of the critical test and applying the consequences to such a theory. These historical examples of Pasteur and Darwin demonstrate the difficulty of the critical test, showing that the test itself may be insufficient in determining a theory’s validity. As a corollary to this, critique may be insufficient in providing necessary correct evaluation of information due to the inability of the critical test to come down on one side or the other in terms that are historically valid. When Galileo critiqued Aristotelian physics, he did so by showing that his approach was analytical. With his use of mathematics, he demonstrated the precision of his theory and the inability to achieve clarity, comprehension, and to draw out further theoretical and practical consequences lacking in Aristotle’s theory. In so doing, Galileo did not form a counter example to one of the Aristotelian theoretical statements, but critiqued the theory in its entirety. Challenging a single statement in a theory requires that critique focus on differing approaches to the consequences of the statement and the validity of each as well as the consequences of each competing statement. Because critique is important in shedding light on the contribution’s significance or lack of it, it should be followed by a critical test to determine which statement is superior. This is the testing of initiation when statements are competing within a contribution and the testing of contributions in general when the statements are within competing theories. Moreover, when a single theory is involved, a critical test may be insufficient in determining the theory’s validity, making both critique and the critical test

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necessary. In the historical context, the critical test employed by Pasteur and his opponents turned out to be not only about the existence of spontaneous generation. It was a testing of an entire dimension of issues such as the understanding of the factors that lead to sexual proclivities and inheritance and the evolution from life forms of other life forms that would not exist if life was generated spontaneously. The role of critique can be seen in Tyndall’s explanation that as such, the test as it was conducted left the argument unsettled even though the scientific community approved of the Committee’s decision. The questions raised by Pasteur and his opponents have taken on new dimensions in our social time and, as our knowledge of astrophysics expands, we may have a clearer understanding of the origins of life. For Fisher’s argument, a critical test such as that posited earlier would most likely be critiqued for the experimental conditions. For example, several female peacocks with the equivalent number of male peacocks some with various degrees of damaged plumages may provide a better experiment, given proper controls such as the absence of external influences that interfere with the birds’ activities. This experiment can be duplicated not only with other peacocks, but with other animals as well. For it to be inclusive, however, it would have to include experiments on humans for whom sexual attraction is more than just physical appearances. Personality, intellect, and the ability to evaluate the malefemale situation are also considerations of great importance and are also difficult to measure scientifically. The critique leveled by Darwin’s defenders against his theory of sexual attraction was due to the looseness of his approach on this issue. While it was an important concept in Darwin’s theory, he presented it with a lack of rigor compared to the rest of his argument. In light of his extensive research, he nevertheless neglected this aspect of his general theory in spite of the strong defense he had for his greater argument and the controversy it generated. Although Darwin’s position on sexual attraction was dismissed because of the critique his supporters leveled against it, Fisher restated the Darwinian position and allowed for further analysis by opening paths to critical testing. While the critique against Darwin’s theory was part of their assault on evolution in general, the critique by his defenders was, in part, an admission that they had foremost the important business of rebuffing his detractors and so could not be very concerned with the lack of rigor within the context of his general theory. Because Fisher’s restatement of Darwin’s argument presented it in a different light, if a critique was presented against it, it would not be against evolutionary theory as such, but against the experimental conditions that supported Fisher’s argument and the conclusions that his supporters could derive from it. Concerning initiation, when two or more contributions are competing to resolve an entropic statement within a theory, a critical test is important to determine which initiation will be accepted. Critique may then raise questions about the test’s validity, which can be evaluated. Either the critique of the test is

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accepted and a test is performed again, or the critique is rejected by the majority of the people working with the problem area and the test’s results are upheld. Both the test and whatever critique may be raised must be considered with the theory’s utility, for it is on this basis that initiations compete with the one of highest utility usually accepted. The critical test must therefore be constructed on the basis of the similarities and differences of each competing initiation. With regard to their similarities, these are not at issue in the test unless they affect the innovation’s dynamics within the theory so that the main focus will be on the differences, assessing the possible dynamics that each initiative contribution may generate. At first this assessment will be conjectural, possibly providing the basis for critique after the test is conducted and the decision is made on which innovation is to be accepted. Moreover, in critique, the arguments made for and against may result in the construction of a further test if it can be demonstrated that the absence of sufficient rigor resulted in the acceptance of an initiation of lesser utility. With respect to innovation, the critical test is constructed to determine the acceptance or rejection of the entire contribution, because the entire contribution is not just a single entropic statement. If Eddington’s eclipse experiment showed that light did not bend as a result of gravitational pull, Einstein’s theory would have been rejected, leaving the problems raised by his theory unanswered, perhaps to be addressed by other competing theories of relativity.27 The critical test tends to be more decisive for innovations than for initiations. For example, either a theory behaves as excepted or it does not; if not, then it remains viable only until there are competing theories to challenge it and will be used until it is replaced by a theory of higher utility as determined through competition. In the argument concerning the Big Bang and the Steady State theories of cosmology, should a critical test be established to determine the validity of either of these theories, the other would decline in utility and become entropic to the extent that its only uses would be in the incorporation of some of its statements into the remaining theory after being adjusted to meet that theory’s probability and utility requirements, for the historical perspective of the argument, and the reasons that one theory was rejected and the other accepted. Repeatability of a critical test provides the basis for obtaining the results of the original test. When the test repeated and different results are obtained as was the case with Tyndall’s repetition of Pasteur and his opponents, either the experimenters did not follow the exact experimental procedures or the original testing results are inaccurate, as with Pasteur and his opponents. The scientific accuracy of the critical test can be evaluated by way of experimental repetition because each repetition of the test is an evaluation, reconsidering the validity of a contribution or its statements corrected by initiation, as the case may be. Acceptance is achieved when the people assessing the contribution’s critical test and its results agree that it possesses the utility necessary to work effectively with the problem area. Should further experimentation be

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conducted, it is for either demonstrating or clarifying the contribution or its statements and for showing that the critical test itself provides the reasons for accepting the contribution. Consider the critical test for initiation. The operational and area statements oda in theory B*t has become entropic because of linguistic infiltration from another theory that differs in domain, but is related in conceptualization to that of D*t. An example could be the adaptation of a physical concept into a sociological theory, such as Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle into the prediction of mass group behavior and individual behavior within the mass group, given specific conditions under limited control. The statement in B*t has declined in utility because of the linguistic information from the other theory, there-by rendering it entropic. If such an alteration is significant because it either strengthens the theory or weakens it, B*t’s utility will be effectively reduced until necessary adjustments are made on the affected statement so that utility can be restored. In these situations there will always be some competition, even if only one initiator is involved. In the situation of only one initiator, the competition is in finding the best alteration of the entropic statement within the theory’s context. For example, because the initiative contribution must fit within the theory’s probabilistic consideration, the contribution of, say c must fit within the probability equation P(c 僐 B*t) ⬅ [I (Σcda)]t,

meaning that the contribution must fit within the theory, given the sum of the information content of its operational and area statements, without generating further movement into entropy in time t. Since its utility within the theory is measured by probability and how it relates to the theory, as B*t is equal to the sum of all its statements, the contribution may have a fairly low, but, in light of the competition, acceptable probability rating. Thus, while acceptable within the theoretical context, yet another contribution may be able to provide a higher rating, thereby motivating the initiator to provide a better solution. This may also hold for the initiator positing several contributions before publicizing the one he or she thinks has the highest probability. Once selected, its utility within the theory must be assessed, and this is done by placing it within the utility equation: Uct ⫽ [P (cda)] ⫽ [I (cda)]t.

With c being the contribution with respect to the entropic statement, if, after several possible contributions, the initiator considers this to be of the highest utility, it will be submitted for others to evaluate. Since this is a single contribution, it will be accepted if the imitators consider it worthy. This consideration depends on whether the imitators determine that the initiator’s utility assessment is correct. If, after close examination, the imitators

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agree, the contribution is accepted; if there is no agreement among them, critique of the initiator’s method may result and be at issue, with the testing conducted again, usually resulting in the majority accepting or rejecting the contribution. Should the test results be accepted, the initiation will be included according to probability requirements and utility criteria; should they be rejected, then either critique will come into play and the critical test will be undertaken once again to determine the reason for the discrepancy between the initiator’s findings and the opinions of the test’s reviewers or the contribution will be finally rejected and abandoned. Consider the situation in which two or more initiators submit contributions as solutions to an entropic statement. Each initiator may submit more than one contribution, each meeting the probability and utility standards. In this situation, each initiator will select the contribution that he or she considers the best for testing. While the competing contributions will have areas of agreement among them, it is on the basis of the differences that they are tested because these differences set each contribution apart from the others and make it unique. Since the probability requirements and the utility criteria have been met for these contributions to be considered, the only problem is to determine the best contribution. The theory’s imitators have to test each contribution for the differences and assess these differences for their probability and utility and project onto the theory the influences these differences will have on each contribution for the problem area. This is accomplished by establishing critical tests among the competing contributions with the imitators assessing each contribution and placing it on an agreed-upon scale of measurement. Should two or more contributions be assigned to the same place on the scale, critical testing can be conducted to determine which of these contributions has a higher probability and is of higher utility within the theory when the theory’s dynamics are considered. Included in this is determining which of these contributions will most likely bring about lesser amounts of entropy. Since this is a projection into the future, time-series equations must be established on the basis of these projections. Inductive reasoning has to be employed, taking into consideration that future influences on the problem area and the reconstructed theory cannot be accounted for accurately. In situations that are undeterminable, critique can be used to analyze the method and considerations that brought about the contributions with this information incorporated in the decision-making processes. If this situation is still unresolved, the majority opinion will prevail, leaving the other contributions still to compete, perhaps to be altered and incorporated when entropy sets in again. With respect to future projection, given the dynamics of the theory, nonlinear analysis is to be inductive in the dynamic sense of relying on the past and present and projecting the contribution into the future. For example, considering the competition among the contributions, given [c1, c2, . . . cn]t (with n being a reasonable number of competing contributions), the theory will take the form:

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as the maximum utility of 1 for the approximation of each of these contributions. With each of these contributions included separately for testing, their dynamics can be analyzed using time-series equations. For example, with ct ⫽ 1 included in the theory 僐 (cda)t~僐 (cd at)t ⫹ 1 with the same holding for the other contributions. If the contribution suits the theory first in its static position and then in its dynamic position of t ⫹ 1, then it retains its acceptability even though this is an approximate fit due to the uncertainty over the possible influences of other, as yet unknown, future information that might affect the theory and/or its problem area. As for competitive innovation, this situation occurs when there is a known problem area for which there are either no theories or the theories that do exist are inadequate and are used only until better contributions are formulated. When the problem area is already defined and the current theories are inadequate, the problem area becomes static with the dynamics occurring within the existing theories being only semantic adjustments initiated due to the linguistic attempts to move the theories closer to the problem area. While these adjustments affect the theories, since the theories remain inadequate, they have little dynamic influence over the problem area. The area itself shifts according to linguistic influences on it that result from the reality of the area incorporated into its languages and this, in turn, is incorporated into the theoretical languages. The inadequacies are maintained nevertheless and no dynamic influences on the area are exerted. An example of competitive innovation occurred in the search for the genetic construction of insulin that took place at the Harvard University Medical Center, The University of California at San Francicso, and the City of Hope National Medical Center. Stephen S. Hall, in his fascinating book, Invisible Frontiers (1987) documents the contest as well as the competition among the pharmaceutical companies that financed and otherwise supported the search for recombinant DNA insulin. As Hall stated: It was not a seminal meeting, at least not in the usual sense of the word. No shattering new natural laws were proposed when a group of biologists gathered in Indianapolis in the Spring of 1976, no cherished long-standing dogmas were challenged. When this particular meeting began on May 24, the scientists did what they usually do at these affairs. They reported, one by one, on the latest results coming out of their labs, and each report provided a kind of pointillist dot of information; if you stood back and took it all in, you could begin to connect, discern a pattern. And when the meeting concluded one day later, some of the scientists went home convinced that they could achieve something that had never been done before in the history of biology. With the eager clumsy fingers of human curiosity, they planned to reach inside a living cell and tinker with its innermost mechanisms, manipulating the machinery of heredity in a way inconceivable even five years earlier.28

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This conference established the beginning of the search for recombinant DNA insulin, and it established genetic research as a field unto its own. Innovative competition is therefore not evaluated in the critical test on the areas of similarity among the contributions, but the areas of difference; given the future projections of these differences, the best among the competing contributions can be determined. In the absence of a choice, critique can produce a review of the procedures and claims of each contribution, which should clarify the situation and perhaps lead to a decision. If not, then further critical testing can be set up, this time taking into account the results of the previous test and the critique generated thereafter. Yet another consideration must be mentioned in this context and this is the time factor in the presentation of the innovative contributions. These are not necessarily placed before their respective audiences for their evaluation at the same time and while, the first contribution makes a significant impact on the targeted audience, this does not necessarily diminish the impacts that other competing contributions will make. The time factor for presentation is important only because it is a first valid attempt to resolve the difficulty, but it is not the determining factor in the acceptance or rejection of a contribution. The time factor is important, however, because it allows other innovators to reconsider their contributions, analyze the areas of similarity and difference, and to make whatever appropriate adjustments are necessary in their contributions before presenting them. Thus, while the first innovation presented may generate excitement and attract followers, it is not necessarily accepted for use. Given the time differences in their presentation, each innovation has supporters, so that when the critical test is established and performed, it still may not determine which contribution is superior, making it necessary to rely on the critique that follows. In these situations, competition will continue until either a critical test is established that will finally determine the superiority of one of the competitors, or until one or all of the competing contributions and/or the area becomes entropic and declines in utility. In the latter case, should the problem area be affected, it may be replaced by another area with differences that may make the competing innovations viable and tested again or be replaced by an area of different conceptions and linguistics, thereby rendering the competing contributions entropic. A situation in which an innovation is formulated for which there are no competitors occurs when contributions are constructed for a problem area for which previous, perhaps competing, contributions have been demonstrated to be inadequate. An example is Newton’s theory in which the theories of Galileo and Kepler were unified into a single theory. Galileo, in his famous Dialogues pointed out and demonstrated the difficulties of Aristotelian physics and demonstrated the superiority of his own. With respect to astronomy, Kepler simplified Copernicus’s theory by eliminating the epicycles and placing the planets in elliptical orbits around the sun. The competition that these theories had was

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minimal, and they retained their utilities in their respective domains until Newton reformulated them and unified them in his theory with those areas that became entropic due to the unification being corrected or cast aside. For example, Galileo’s relativity is limited to earth physics whereas Kepler’s theory of planetary motion does not account for the sweeping pattern of the sun nor does it include the dynamics of relativity among the heavenly bodies. While both Galileo’s and Kepler’s theories relied heavily on mathematics—a conceptual revolution brought about by the freedom of thought of the Renaissance— neither theory accounted adequately for infinitesimal motion nor for the changes of relative motion among differing celestial and earthbound bodies. Newton and Leibnitz developed the calculus to account—each with his different problem areas—for these motions.29 With Newton’s work, a new physics was formed which endured until Max Planck, a staunch Newtonian, established the groundwork for a new theory of relativity. Consider the situation in which competition for a problem area is inadequate and leads to a new theory. Such a situation was the state of economic thinking during the Great Depression. In view of Marx’s theory, economics developed from its classical conceptualization in which Adam Smith’s theory30 was developed and expounded upon, leading to the theory of the firm as the generator of economic activity and growth and to the general theory of business cycles. Within these different aspects of economics there were theoreticians who developed their own approaches, and competition existed among them as their arguments were debated, critiqued, and tested critically within economic models. These tests led to further critique and testing, and new theories were constructed that went through the same process. Since Adam Smith’s work, as a general body of knowledge, economics has branched out into different problem areas, with significant contributions made in monetary theory, the theory of plant location, welfare economics, urban economics, and international trade. It was the Great Depression, however, that brought into focus the issues that Adam Smith originally raised, those of the nature and the causes of the wealth of nations. The theories formulated during the Great Depression to explain its depth and endurance were mainly classical in origin with the full employment assumption either stated explicitly or assumed theoretically as a given. Economics is both a theoretical and an empirical discipline and the full employment assumption did not hold empirically. In his work, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money, John Maynard Keynes pointed out the theoretical and empirical difficulties of the full employment assumption, formulating his own theory based on employment, consumption, interest, and money, thereby tackling the real issues of the Great Depression.31 Newton’s theory, which reigned for some 250 years, was brought into question by Planck’s findings and became a special case in Einstein’s theory, operating only in a three-dimensional conceptualization. Keynes’s work met

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opposition by the monetarists; moreover, his theory is no longer adequate because its antidepression policies do not deal effectively with economic issues as they exist in contemporary societies. In each example stated earlier, the resulting theory became entropic, giving way to a theory that was effective. While the consequences of Einsteinian relativity still have to be worked out, its weaknesses lie where uncertainty in the validity of its applications exist, such as black and white holes in space, “worm holes,” and the nature of universal gravitation that may be treated as another dimension to the space-time continuum. These points will be discussed in my next book. THE CRITICAL TEST VS. THE CRUCIAL EXPERIMENT: COMMENTS ON METHOD Having stated both the conditions under which critique and the critical test can be used together and for which critique can be used in place of a critical test to clarify a contribution’s status, it can be seen that the decisiveness of such tests in determining a contribution’s validity—and, of course, the valid contribution is preferred in competition—is wanting. The deficiency is due to our imposition of our outlooks and our wills on a world that exists independently of our consideration of it. This is our physical and psychological limitation. The basis of our search for the ultimate truth is elusive, moving from us each time we approach it. On its own, philosophy has been unable to reach this truth, resulting in the development of science which branched off from philosophy as a method for finding truth. With the great accomplishments of science, its separation from philosophy has not been permanent, as Newton demonstrated; indeed, scientists become philosophers when discussing the method of scientific inquiry. Within the context of the dual role of scientists as philosophers, further comments are in order comparing critique and the critical test with Karl Popper’s crucial experiment. In a footnote to chapter 10 of his Logic of Scientific Discovery, Popper says of the crucial experiment: “It should be noted that I mean by a crucial experiment one that is designed to refute a theory (if possible) and more especially one which is designed to bring about a decision between two competing theories by refuting (at least) one of them—without, of course, proving the other.”32 In his Conjectures and Refutations Popper stressed a point made in the Logic of Scientific Discovery, that Pierre Duhem’s famous criticism of crucial experiments made in The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, “succeeds in showing that crucial experiments can never establish a theory. He fails to show how they cannot refute it.”33 The issue here is whether crucial experimentation can indeed refute theories, either on their own or in competition. Therefore, the status of the crucial experiment with respect to critique and the critical test has to be explored.

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The test conducted between Pasteur and his esteemed opponents was designed to bring about a decision between two competing and opposing theories. The theory of spontaneous generation was refuted by the results of Pasteur’s test as they were understood, but these results, de facto, do not meet with Popper’s criterion for the crucial experiment. Pasteur’s results were accepted by the distinguished board of the academy but, in fact, as Tyndall was to point out, according to the results, neither Pasteur’s nor his opponents’ experiments proved in any sense its own case nor refuted the other. In this case, a Popperian crucial experiment had been conducted: Either Pasteur’s position was correct and his opponents’ wrong or his opponents’ position was correct and Pasteur’s wrong, but not both. Given the actual terms agreed to for the experiment, had Pasteur’s experiment been conducted differently— using the same broth as his opponents, and heating the broth for a sufficient time—the results would have been conclusive and final. With the retrospective view of history, we know that they were not conclusive and final even though the academy, in its wisdom, ruled decisively in favor of Pasteur. In this case, the results of the experiment demonstrated that the Popperian crucial experiment did not hold. The results were, however, consistent with the critical test because critique— in this case Tyndall’s—shed light on the experiment, demonstrating that although the academy accepted Pasteur’s results and thereby rejected the results of his opponents, historically, the results were indeed insufficient to determine the outcome of the experiments. Critique is not integral to the Popperian crucial experiment, but it is necessary in the processes of the critical test. Tyndall’s critique of the experiment provided the necessary understanding of the situation to decide that, given the experiment’s conditions and terms, Popper’s crucial experiment cannot hold. Since each contribution in its own right has utility with respect to its problem area, usually the either-or criterion does not exist when contributions compete. Measuring utility is, thus, the sole objective basis for determining acceptance or rejection. The acceptance of a contribution, therefore, does not necessarily mean the outright rejection of its competitors. It merely means that the accepted contribution at the time of acceptance has a higher utility rating and that the other competitors can increase their utilities to the point of being either equal to or superior to the accepted contribution, thereby relegating the accepted contribution to the status of competitor once again. In these situations, given the dynamics of competing contributions within their problem areas, the processes of correcting entropy and, through initiation, increasing utility will continue as the contributions and/or their common problem areas are changed radically from their original positions, until they become too entropic to salvage. This differs from the type of competition where the areas of difference among the competing contributions are decisive with those of the highest utilities being accepted and the others cast aside. While this is an either-or type of competition, the crucial experiment is still insufficient. The crucial experiment has no room

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for critique, no opportunity for correction, or for reentering the competition. The critical test allows for critique such as the findings that Tyndall came across. The crucial experiment is decisive and absolute in its judgment, leaving no possibilities for the correction of ambiguities that may have entered the experiment; the critical test allows for such considerations through critique. Hence, because of the difficulties of proving or refuting contributions of high utility for problem areas because neither proofs nor refutations are possible in the absolute sense, the critical test with its accompanying critique determines the acceptance or rejection of a contribution, be it in competitive or strictly innovative. The Popperian crucial experiment is too extreme, rendering it unable to deal effectively with the complexities of contributions and their problem areas. As science has become technically oriented and many-faceted, it has become impossible to establish experimental conditions for valid contributions for absolute theoretical refutability that, when applied, can be refuted experimentally. Contributions of high utility do not yield to these conditions, and it is the utility, or the lack of it, that is important. Aristotelian physics is not used in physical computations because, as a theory of physics, it has no practical applications, and as such its utility has ceased to exist with its significance only in the context of the history of ideas such as the basis for an opposing argument in Galileo’s dialogues establishing his new earth physics. Aristotle’s physics was not refuted in a Popperian crucial experiment; it was discarded in light of the critique presented against it in Galileo’s theory. Neither Copernicus’s nor Kepler’s theories have been overthrown by crucial experimental refutation; instead, Copernicus’s theory has been discarded because of its extremely low utility, and Kepler’s theory was adapted and incorporated into Newton’s theory. Popper is correct when he maintains that “the striving for knowledge and the search for truth are the greatest motives for scientific discovery.”34 His approach to scientific discovery, however, limits this search because knowledge is theorybound. Information is disseminated through theories (contributions) and, where relevant, the information is altered to conform to the theories’ utility and probability requirements. In this manner, theories are altered and knowledge changed. Because science is practiced by using theories, the ultimate goal of all science—finding permanent and enduring truth—may remain elusive, always beyond our intellectual abilities and technological grasp. However, we have knowledge in our theories, and although we understand that the utility of this knowledge will eventually decline, we also understand that it will be replaced by other theoretical knowledge of greater utility, subjected to the probability and utility requirements to which all contributions are subjected. Our theories stand or fall—maintain their utilities or decline into entropy—according to the relevance of their information and the status of the problem areas for which they are formulated. In our search for ultimate truth and wisdom, scientists are aware that their theories are not permanent and enduring, but are always changing due to the infiltration of entropy, the alterations made within the theory to maintain utility, and their consequent influences on

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the problem area to restore utility. Still, the pursuit of elusive truth and wisdom remains the ultimate objective of scientific research. It is posited here that critique and the critical test are the methods by which initiative and innovative contributions are evaluated. If crucial experiments in Popper’s meaning had any validity, it may have been in the earlier stages of scientific development, during which, because of the newness of science, strict proofs and refutations were considered important. These were, however, for either-or situations required by the sciences at that time and they lacked the sophistication of such experiments as those of Pasteur and his opponents. Hans Christian Oersted’s experiment—in which electric current current passing through a wire and caused the deflection of a compass needle—meets the requirements of a crucial experiment. This experiment led to the development of electromagnetism. It can be repeated with the same results occurring. In this type of experiment, critique has no role; nevertheless, the knowledge contributed to science because of this development has been tremendous. However, even in its consequences, the critical test has proven superior to the crucial experiment in the sense that Maxwell’s equations have been replaced by Einstein’s field theory in the macrorealm of physics and is considered valid within transformational fields. However, Einstein’s theory is valid only for the duration of its utility.35 Concerning the crucial experiment between two competing theories, Popper argues that these theories must be considered together with their background knowledge. The differences in the background knowledge must be taken into account because “we do not assert the refutation of a theory as such, but of the theory together with the background knowledge; part of which, if other crucial experiments can be designed, may indeed one day be rejected as responsible for the failure.”36 With this emphasis on the refutability of a theory together with its background knowledge, the Popperian crucial experiment cannot fare too well in competition among methods in the real world of scientific inquiry and development. According to the crucial experiment, Pasteur’s refutation of his opponents’ theoretical position would thus result in casting aside the background knowledge of the boiling point of hay seeds together with the duration of the boiling period for killing various types of microbes. Having decided the issue irrevocably and, as Tyndall demonstrated, for the wrong reason, the consequence was not only the victory of a faulty argument, but perhaps also in the permanent inhibition of knowledge concerning microbes and the development of life in general. The critical test is both decisive and more reasonable than the crucial experiment. It is more liberal and hence not so condemning in the sense of either-or, with the loser banished forever; the critical test allows for the information of the losing side to be adapted and incorporated according to its probability and utility. Tyndall’s findings are acceptable according to the critical test and his analysis led to the revival of knowledge about spontaneous generation and the continuity of life in a theoretical context of greater utility than Pasteur’s exper-

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imental findings could yield. Using the either-or criterion of the crucial experiment, Tyndall could not reconstruct Pasteur’s experiment; but such reconstruction is legitimate when using the method of the critical test. The ultimate goal of science of finding permanent and enduring truth is elusive because science—scientia—is knowledge and is neither permanent nor enduring, but is theory-bound and ultimately entropic, to be replaced by knowledge of higher utility. The permanent and enduring truth to which science and philosophy aspire—if it exists at all—is static as it must be if it is to be permanent and enduring. Knowledge is not static, and since it is theory (contribution-)bound, it often contains nuances corresponding to those of its theory’s languages and is not usually subject to the either-or criterion of the crucial experiment. The very dynamics of knowledge are theory-bound, changing, and eventually entropic, which renders it qualitatively different from wisdom and truth, the achievements of which are the ultimate goals of scientific pursuit. For scientists and philosophers to achieve these goals, they work with contributions that are dynamic and hence subject to the conditions of utility and entropy. Until the ultimate and single goal of science and philosophy of achieving enduring and permanent truth is reached, scientific knowledge and philosophical wisdom— the tools with which their practitioners work—will continue to remain subject to the dynamics of utility and entropy. Strict imitators will continue working out the ramifications of their contributions, and explorative imitators will continue revealing problems to be resolved by initiators. Innovators will subject their contributions to critique and critical testing, and these methods will continue to be employed to evaluate initiative and innovative contributions. Throughout the historical development of philosophy and science, great and dominating contributions have become entropic, declining over time, and have been replaced by contributions of higher utility. In this manner, knowledge and wisdom have developed and will continue doing so until enduring and permanent wisdom and truth are achieved. Theories have been structured to account for phenomena, while other theories have been structured to generate phenomena. Complexity theory and chaos theory have been developed for both purposes, explaining phenomena with the tools of nonlinear programming reasoning, generating phenomena—such as computer models—using equilibrium dynamics. However, social, physical, biological and economic conditions that chaos and complexity theoreticians seek to explain using their nonlinear and equilibrium concepts do not, in fact, behave according to chaos and complexity theory; they behave according to crisis theory, as explained in part III of this work. .

NOTES 1. Christopher Nash, Word Games (New York: Methuen, 1987), p. 65. 2. The type of deviations and their effectiveness depended then, as now, on the insight and creative abilities of the individuals involved. An outstanding example of this

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is Archimedes whose brilliance would not allow him to work with standard procedures for very long. He always searched for, and found, new methods for working out unique approaches to solve difficult and, often seemingly, unsolvable problems. For a discussion on original thinking and creativity, see David Z. Rich, The Dynamics of Knowledge (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1988), especially part 2, pp. 41–128. 3. An outstanding example of the application of science to production is the assembly line, which Henry Ford invented and which still serves as the best model for mass production. It has advanced, using such technologies as blueprinting techniques, electronics, advances in metallurgy, time-cost studies that rely on linear programming, and matrix algebra for determining efficient work procedures and assembly-line modification for different working operations, models, and products. Sophisticated robotic techniques in production use the assembly-line approach, serving as an example of Ford’s vision. The assembly line has been demonstrated to be effective as a method of production and in its adaptability for procedural changes while maintaining its basic concept intact. 4. Gerald Feinberg wrote that, “Progress has come from finding novel ways to test the theory and deriving unexpected consequences from it.” Einstein’s theory was put to the test by Eddington’s eclipse experiment, which demonstrated that, in accordance with Einstein’s theory, light bends under the influence of gravity. However, Eddington’s geometry was superior to Einstein’s because, in this novel form of the critical test, the geometry posited by Eddington demonstrated the relationship between gravity and light, while Einstein attempted to unite gravitation with electromagnetism only in 1950 as a result of the problem of bending light raised by Eddington’s experiment. See Gerald Feinberg, Solid Clues (New York: Touchstone Books, 1985), from the introduction, p. 22. See Arthur S. Eddington, The Mathematical Theory of Relativity, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914). 5. The Kabbala has a great deal to say about the seven days of creation and the creation of earlier worlds. See Arieh Kaplan, The Light Beyond (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Maznaim Publishers, 1981). See also Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, trans. M. Friedlander, 2nd ed., revised (New York: Dover, 1956), esp. part II, pp. 145–250. 6. When asked to review a book, this present writer was requested to be as kind as possible. 7. See, for example Petr Beckmann’s discussion of modern mathematicians who claimed to circle the square, in A History of π (pi) (New York: St. Martin’s Press/The Golem Press, 1971), chapter 17, “The Modern Circle Squarers,” pp. 173–82. 8. This bias is due to the intensity of imitation and, when need be, of initiation so that working with a contribution is not readily abandoned. 9. Particles can still be as vortices of energy moving through a neoether which may be a gravitational field, generating wavelike effects in the atomic structure and generating further gravitational effects as it moves. This will be discussed further in a future work. 10. See, for example, Charles Babbage, Passages from the Life of a Philosopher (London: Dawson’s Publishers of Pall Mall, 1968). This is a reprint from 1864. See also, George Boole, The Laws of Thought (New York: Dover Publishers, 1961). Both Babbage and Boole wrote during the era of the Industrial Revolution and their works were instrumental in the development of computer science. See also Martin Davis’s essay, “What is Computation?” in Mathematics Today, ed. Lynn Arthur Steen (New York: Vintage Books, 1980), pp. 241–67. 11. See Strobe Talbott, Deadly Gambits (New York: Vintage Books, 1985). 12. For clarification, a general problem area most likely has several subsets—as with

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general relativity theory having the problem of universal gravitation, the wave-particle dichotomy, and the problem of photon direction, as when a photon is shot through a hole on a screen in which there are two holes, with the photon entering both holes simultaneously. These are problems of quantum physics that can be considered to be part of general relativity and have yet to be resolved. These problems will be treated in a later work. 13. In these instances the fear of anxiety influences judgment so that imitators subject to this fear refuse to recognize the problems of the contributions with which they work. The fear of anxiety may either be suppressed consciously so that it operates in an unconscious manner or its conscious awareness may result in the decision to ignore the difficulties. In both cases, the fear of anxiety and its influences in these situations is a response to an ontological condition. Whether it is pathological depends on other conditions of each individual. See Rollo May’s essay, “Contributions to Existential Psychology,” in Existence, ed. Rollo May with Ernst Angel and Henri F. Ellenberger, contributing eds. (New York: Simon and Schuster/Clarion Books, 1960), pp. 37–91. An early treatment of anxiety was given by Søren Kierkegaard in his work The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1954). Kierkegaard’s work helped clarify the human condition during the Industrial Revolution when established traditions were breaking down due to the impact of industrialization on societies. Whether his analysis of the human condition is to be considered from a religious standpoint is not relevant here even though religious institutions were confronted by changing outlooks and social ideals due to industrialization. The point here is that Kierkegaard’s argument touched the ontological condition in this era and increased the understanding of anxiety during these times. His argument is pertinent now for two reasons. First, industrialization is still incomplete for much of the world. For emerging and developing countries undergoing the processes of industrialization, conditions similar to those of the Industrial Revolution— such as breaking down traditions and establishing new ways of life, the movement from the villages to industrial centers, and the socioeconomic problems that result—will exist. Second, traditional political and religious institutions that remained during the Industrial Revolution are undergoing changes now due to increased knowledge resulting from the dynamics of our historical era. This has resulted in the need for stability and tradition in light of the dynamics of rapid changes, which our knowledge has imposed on our social institutions and relationships. 14. The Impressionist, Expressionist, and Surrealist schools that have developed during the Industrial Revolution were qualitatively different from the schools developed during the Renaissance. Just as the Renaissance schools sought to relate to the reality of their situations, so did the artistic schools of the Industrial Revolution. Impressionism, for example, sought to copy the reality of nature using the effects of light; the Expressionists used Impressionistic techniques to portray their emotions about the changes that were occurring: and the Surrealists opened the psychological pathways that were forming in light of industrialization. See Bernard Berenson, Aesthetics and History (New York: Doubleday, Anchor Books, 1953). See “Art History Specifically,” and conclusion, pp. 231–72. 15. The competition among the industries and auxiliary businesses that serviced them was rigorous, and because the economic dynamics of the time were little understood, those firms that could not compete effectively closed down. Theories of the firm were formulated and new concepts of general competition were stated. Monopolies, oligar-

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chies, and other forms for restricting competition were employed and analyzed. Social Darwinism was one explanation given to account for those firms and individuals who could not compete effectively. Thomas Sowell wrote that: Lazy amorality might be the “finest” quality to survive a sufficiently extreme welfare state, for example, or ruthless ambition is a sufficiently lassiez-faire economy without adequate law enforcement. Darwin himself did not make the political applications known as “Social Darwinism.” It was Herbert Spencer in England and William Graham Sumner in America, and countless disciples in both countries who turned the Darwinian principle of biological change into a political principle satisfying the status guo.

Quoted from Thomas Sowell, Knowledge and Decisions (New York: Basic Books, 1980), p. 345. 16. For a discussion on Poincare´ ’s relativity, see Roberto Torretti, Relativity and Geometry (New York: Dover Publications, 1996), chapter 5, “Einstein’s Quest For a Theory of Gravitation,” pp. 130–85, esp. pp. 132–33. 17. While Germany proclaimed a national socialist government, its outlook was universal in that the German government sought to impose its ideas and methods first on its neighbors and then on the world. Russian communism shed its universality and focused on the development of Russia, but not without an ideological debate and the assassination of Leon Trotsky who had argued for a universal movement after Stalin settled the debate by attempting to build communism first within the borders of the newly formed Soviet Union. 18. The Big Bang theory does not conflict with the creation story in Genesis, but the Steady State theory does. Maimonides rejected the Moslem Steady State approach to the universe as having always existed because it clashes with Judaic approach of the creation. See Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, pp. 171–73. See Alan Guth and Paul Steinhardt, “The Inflationary Universe,” Scientific American (May 1984): 116–20. 19. For discussions on the Michelson-Morley experiment, see Robert K. Adair, The Grand Design (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 78–80, and J. T. Frasier, Time, The Familiar Stranger (Redmond, Wash.: Tempus Books, (1978), pp. 229–30. 20. See A. C. Pigou’s book, The Economics of Welfare (London: Macmillan, 1920) and Keynes’s discussion on Pigou’s work in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (London: Macmillan, 1947), pp. 38–39. He also critiques Pigou’s Theory of Unemployment, the title of which he calls “a misnomer.” See The General Theory, “Appendix to Chapter 19,” pp. 272–79. For a critique of Keynes’s theory, see David Z. Rich, The Economic Theory of Growth and Development (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1994), pp. 137–43, 160–69. 21. Karl Marx, Capital (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1961). Marx’s work is erudite, employing mathematical reasoning to support his arguments. Moreover, partly because of his reasoning, economics entered its neoclassical period in which the focus was on the firm and full employment was assumed. 22. These examples were stated by this author in Crisis Theory (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1997), pp. 101–14. 23. For a discussion on this contest, see Paul de Kruif’s fascinating book, Microbe Hunters (New York: Pocket Books, 1943), pp. 60–155. 24. See R. A. Fisher, The Genetic Theory of Natural Selection (New York: Oxford University Press, 1930). Fisher’s quote is from Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (New York: W. W. Norton, 1987), p. 199. No page number is given for Fisher’s quote.

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25. For a further discussion on Fisher’s position, see Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker, p. 200. 26. The 3rd Principle of Maimonides’s 13 Principles of Faith in the Jewish religion states: “He hath neither body nor substance; we can compare nought unto Him in His holiness.” 27. For example, Poincare´ ’s theory of relativity dealt with similar issues, but was overshadowed by Einstein’s because of its uniqueness. For a discussion on Poincare´ ’s theory of relativity, see Roberto Torretti, Relativity and Geometry (New York: Dover Publications, 1996), Section 3.8., pp. 83–87. 28. Stephen S. Hall, Invisible Frontiers (Redmond, Wash.: Tempus Books, 1987). 29. For a discussion on Newton’s and Leibnitz’s contributions, see Lloyd Motz and Jefferson Hane Weaver, The Story of Mathematics (New York: Avon Books, 1993), chapter 6, “The Birth of the Calculus,” pp. 125–50. Newton formulated the calculus to explain physical concepts while Leibnitz’s was strictly a mathematical concept. Since both theories were formulated at the same time, but independently, a feud arose over priority. 30. See Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Modern Library, 1973). 31. For a critique of Keynes’s theory, see Rich, Economic Theory of Growth and Development, pp. 137–143, 160–69. 32. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London: Hutchinson, 1962), p. 277 n.2. 33. Karl R. Popper, “Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge,” in Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), p. 112 n.2. 34. The full sentence reads: “Although it can neither attain truth nor probability, the striving for knowledge and the search for truth are still the strongest motives for scientific discovery.”The Logic of Scientific Discovery, p. 278. 35. Concerning James Clerk Maxwell’s equations, Edna E. Kramer states that since these principles are expressed as a set of partial differential equations, instead of recording their abstract mathematical form as Maxwell stated them, their physical interpretation can be given as follows: (1) The electric flux across a closed surface is zero. (2) The magnetic flux across a closed surface is zero. (3) A variable field generates an electric field (Faraday’s law of induction). (4) A variable field generates a magnetic field [Maxwell’s hypothesis formulated on the grounds of symmetry with (3)].

Kramer states further that Einstein’s field equation to which his space-time continuum was to conform, controlled the possible distributions and changes in what is called the “gravitational field” and were the gravitational analogue to Maxwell’s equations. See Edna E. Kramer, The Nature and Growth of Modern Mathematics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 244–46, quoted from p. 244. Although these equations are analogous to Einstein’s equations, they are Newtonian in orientation. Because Newton’s theory is a special case of Einstein’s, Maxwell’s equations are included in the Newtonian special case. 36. Popper, “Three Views Concerning Human Knowledge,” p. 112.

PART III

ORDER AND DISORDER

11

Introduction to Order and Disorder The history of ideas is replete with examples of remarkable breakthroughs that have drastically altered the direction, methodology, and the conceptual basis of a discipline or a philosophy. Such breakthroughs in the past seem to have come just at the right time to fulfill important intellectual needs. Lloyd Motz and Jefferson Hane Weaver, The Story of Mathematics1

The history of ideas is indeed replete with examples of breakthroughs that have altered the directions of conceptions and procedures within philosophical and scientific systems. However, to state that such breakthroughs, be they in the past or present, seem to have come at the right time to fulfill intellectual needs is to state a tautology in the sense that if the breakthroughs were accepted, they came at the right time; if rejected, they either were not serious breakthroughs or, if serious, they did not come at the right time. Moreover, the concept of breakthroughs coming at the right time to fulfill important intellectual needs requires further clarification. For example, Copernicus was not the first to posit a heliocentric system of astronomy; nor was his system simple. It was a quasi-Ptolemaic system with planets moving on epicyclic patterns around the sun. The system posited by Aristarchus (c. 310–c. 230 B.C.) was less complicated, with the planets moving on circular orbits around the sun. Because these circular orbits reduced the accuracy of computation, the Ptolemaic system of epicycles proved more accurate for calculating; however, accuracy was gained at the expense of simplicity. While in Copernicus’s theory the sun replaced Ptolemy’s earth as the center of the universe, his theory had to retain the epicyclic nature of planetary motion

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so that the accuracy of calculations could be maintained; but this, again, was at the expense of simplicity. Kepler’s system was similar to Aristarchus’s but along with the sun at the center, he also posited that planets moved in elliptic orbits, thereby resolving the discrepancies between observation and theory that had resulted in the rejection of the heliocentric system since the time of Aristarchus. Ancient Greek culture was very influential and astronomy was a very important part of working out calendars and for the daily recording of events. Moreover, while Greek culture spread, other countries were developing their cultures and commercial infrastructures, for which calendars and astronomical observation were very important. During the Renaissance, in light of Aristotle’s philosophy, exploration of the world took place not only within the realms of physics and biology but also geographically, it was a historical time of exploring new routes to both established and new markets. The effective competition for new markets and raw materials required refinements in navigation for finding the shortest land and sea routes for developing commercial and cultural relations and for conducting military operations to protect and expand new and established markets. The breakthrough of the Copernican revolution did not come just at the right time to fulfill important needs. Copernicus structured his work as an intellectual exercise, and apart from this, there was neither any practical nor intellectual need to replace the earth with the sun at the center of the universe. Because navigation is star-oriented and the heliocentric system had failed in the past to explain planetary motions, Copernicus maintained the epicycles in his system to preserve the accuracy that the Ptolemaic system achieved. The point is that breakthroughs such as Copernicus’s—and subsequently Kepler’s in which the sun is at the center with the planets revolving around the sun on elliptical orbits—did not come at the “right time to fulfill important intellectual needs,” but were due to a significant extent to the historical era in which they were established. This historical era of the Renaissance allowed for the exploration of the world, both within the realm of biology and physics, and the exploration of countries and peoples. While such liberalism existed during the time of ancient Greece, the conceptual tools then were not sufficiently developed to allow for the inquiry and pursuit of problem areas that occurred during the Renaissance. Each era, with its uniqueness, builds on previous eras. While the Dark Ages discouraged secular inquiry, during the Renaissance, the concepts of ancient Greece were viewed differently, and this allowed Kepler to move from the concept of the perfection of the circle as a form to the distorted circle of the ellipse; with the ellipse, the inaccuracies between observed and theoretical planetary motion, especially that of Mars, were resolved. It is therefore not that such breakthroughs come just at the right time to fulfill important intellectual needs, but that the era provides the necessary intellectual environment, as it were, for considering problem areas in terms of the intellectual opportunities that exist within the era. In our contemporary era of knowledge, we are confronted with Poincare´ ’s

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caveat. Poincare´ cautioned against the endless number of deductions in one formula when considering the infinite because the principle of contradiction fails “just as experience proves itself to be insufficient.”2 Indeed, for theoretical constructs in which an infinite number of statements does exist, logic breaks down because the law of contradiction enters the reasoning process. However, for crisis theory, the law of contradiction is irrelevant because the number of statements is confined within the theory. Since the strict relationship between a theory (contribution) prevents the infiltration of the infinite, only through entropy does the theory decline and only by reestablishing utility can the theory be restored, albeit in somewhat different form. Although this part of Poincare´ ’s statement is not a worry for imitators, the second part of his statement, with modification, remains a challenge to philosophers and scientists alike. He states that this rule, which is unattainable either by experience or by analytical proof is an example of a synthetic judgment a priori. Why does the judgement force itself upon us with irresistible evidence? Because it asserts nothing about the nature of things but only about an original faculty of the mind. For the mind recognizes its capacity to repeat a certain act continually, once it has become convinced of the possibility of such an act. But the mind does have an immediate intuition of this possibility; experience only affords the opportunity to employ it and so to become conscious of it.3

The modification is that it is not the rule that the principle of contradiction fails since, in crisis theory, the confrontation with the infinite is not an issue because of the strict definitive and delineating relationship between a theory and its problem area. The difficulty is that during the time the theory is in use, we are bound to it as if it really does relate to reality and and is therefore not part of our mental construction even though we understand that the theory is knowledge-oriented and not based on truth or wisdom. While this is skepticism, it is both positive and necessary for theoretical construction and imitation because it enables us to recognize and appreciate the barrier that exists between us, our fallible knowledge—even though we seek to remove this barrier—and the universe as it exists and is manifested in enduring and permanent wisdom and truth. Given this skepticism, we still assert our right to work with contributions as strict imitators, to challenge theoretical and problem area statements as explorative imitators, and to be bold enough to develop new contributions as innovators, employing the rules of contradiction as we proceed. In the preface to their book, The Collapse of Chaos, Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart discuss a paradox. They state that the more we learn about the universe, “the more complicated it appears to be, but we have discovered that beneath the complexities lie deep simplicities, laws of nature.”4 Their position is that nature’s simplicity is due to chaos and complexity, a position not held by the

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present writer. If nature—and indeed any scientific discipline dealing with nature—appears to have simple laws, it is only because imposing our theories on specific problem areas places the various aspects of nature within our grasp, providing us with temporary conceptual tools to work with them. The natural laws of our disciplines therefore appear to be within our grasp because we have isolated the problem areas, removing them from influences we consider irrelevant to the issues being treated. These are our theoretical impositions and for the natural (and social) disciplines our impositions may be valid—as with previous impositions such as spontaneous generation, the ether-drag, and the Ptolemaic-cum-Copernican theory of astronomy. Hence, the argument presented here as our “laws of nature,” or the “laws” of any other discipline, are theory-oriented and are our own constructs for working with our specific problem areas. The more we relate to our problem areas, therefore, the more our behavior tends to become instinctive, indeed somewhat reflexive. This, however, is imitative because we act in this way as strict imitators. For example, our search for biological laws regulating the processes of life led us to unravel the genetic code to a large extent, revealing the hereditary influences that generate our appearances. We are searching further into genetics for the structures that will provide us with clues to our personalities. Basing the study of all of nature on genetics alone, even though this may be a promising endeavor for inquiry, is itself insufficient. Psychology is also important; it is the combination of genetics and our psychological involvement in our world and its influences on us that allow us to develop. Perhaps because we each have specific genetic compositions, each of us acts differently and is affected differently in our encounters with the world. This shows, however, that neither genetics nor psychology alone are sufficient for understanding human behavior. A combined discipline—call it “psychogenetics”—will, when developed into a working theory, produce difficulties because of explorative imitation that will generate new contributions such as competing innovative theories and shifts in the developing problem areas within the general psychogenetic field. This is the way knowledge develops. It is as consistent as human desire for knowledge and is as complex as the personalities of the very people involved in the pursuit of wisdom and truth. Cohen and Stewart combine chaos theory and complexity theory to derive simplicity and they maintain that the key to understanding this lies in the interaction of featured characteristics for as many different spaces as possible.5 The approach presented here differs in the sense that while there is interaction of featured characteristics, these characteristics are not physical in the biological sense, but theoretical statements as they relate to the specific problem areas. When a theory is constructed, there is no room for possible spaces because no spaces can exist due to the isomorphic relationships among the theoretical statements and the problem area. When change does come about, it is either within the theory, the problem area, or, occasionally, both. There can be no different spaces for crisis theory because of the isomorphic relationship between the theory and its prob-

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lem area so that changes that develop within this relationship are due either to entropy, which can be corrected by restructuring the affected statements, or to area shifts, which can be corrected by corresponding shifts in the theory. The complexity that does exist in crisis theory is due to the terminologies of operational and area languages; it disappears as one learns to understand these languages. For those uninvolved with the problem area and its theories, this complexity will persist, but when the languages are learned, the complexity vanishes. This corresponds to the simplicity of the laws of nature that Cohen and Stewart discussed; these laws are simple because they are understood, and they are laws only within their theoretical contexts. Hence, while the theory endures, so will its laws; when the theory becomes entropic, these laws may also decline in utility or be relegated to a different status such as with Newton’s three laws of motion within the broader context of Einsteinian relativity. With regard to complexity theory and the simplicity of the laws of nature, such natural laws are written into programs to develop biomorphic situations, to regulate inputs, and to determine how the biomorphic life forms will react and adjust. Of course, this is deterministic because situations and responses are programmed into the system; but the advantage of applying complexity theory is the ability to perceive and comprehend these situations. Complexity theory is therefore based on providing conditions, providing biomorphological life forms with situations in which they can develop and expand. However, since all the conditions are programmed, the laws are simple as they are understood within the context of the program. Moreover, with both chaos and complexity theory, the simplicity of their laws of nature is based on equilibrium. This is a throwback to a cyclical approach to the world on which natural laws are based, just as the seasons are cyclical and time is cyclical. We are born, live, and die; yet the dynamics of life continue in this cyclical pattern. In the fields of economics and commerce, there are also cycles; these and all other cycles are based, erroneously, on the dynamics of bringing the cycle into equilibrium. In the first part of this work, arguments were presented against complexity and chaos theory and although complexity and chaos are rejected here (and, with them, catastrophe theory), equilibrium cannot be dismissed entirely in the dynamic processes of nature. Time appears to be indeed cyclical, and if life and death are to be considered cyclical, then so be it; the cyclical aspects of these enduring conditions tell nothing about them because it is their content, the events that occur within them, that is significant. There may be warm winters and stormy summers, short springs and lengthy autumns so seasons may be “unseasonable.” Moreover, even though time may be cyclical, there is time that is fulfilled and time that can be better used. The point is that the cyclical aspects of our world provide only the most limited wisdom and truth even though they are theory-bound within the context of the Newtonian-cum-Einsteinian concept of planetary motion and time. Crisis theory is not cyclical in orientation and pertains only to theories and

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their specific problem areas. Although complexity and chaos theory are closed in the sense that they account only for the dynamics necessary for the system,6 crisis theory depends on both internal and external dynamics as they affect the theory and its problem area. The external dynamics of complexity and chaos theories operate as part of their systems; crisis theory responds to external dynamics as entropy enters the system and its affected statements are corrected by initiation. Complexity and chaos theories are closed; crisis theory is open. Complexity and chaos theory function entirely on the dynamics of built-in conditions; crisis theory functions according to internal conditions and is responsive to external conditions to the extent that these conditions can be absorbed into the theory after proper adjustment without affecting the theory’s utility. The sharp alterations that are so much a part of catastrophe theory are accounted for in crisis theory as external influences and are treated accordingly through initiation. Because of the openness of crisis theory, and because the dynamics of catastrophe theory are closed and therefore rejected and replaced by the dynamics of explorative imitation and innovation, crisis theory is far more effective in dealing with issues that catastrophe theory, even when together with chaos. Moreover, because there are no built-in dynamics for generating situations in closed systems such as chaos theory and complexity theory, crisis theory, being open, is relevant to both changing internal and external conditions with the ability to cope with both by initiation. The sets of operational and area statements within crisis theories make them more appropriate than either complexity or chaos theories. Moreover, in crisis theories the mapping of operational statements onto area statements allows each operational and area statement relationship to be analyzed separately, which is important when entropy sets in and one or more affected statements need to be detected. For example, in a given crisis theory, C*t (oda)t, several statements have been affected by the terminologies from other crisis theories. Finding these statements is the task of explorative imitators, because strict imitators may be unaware of the defective statements, considering the system to be functioning according to its probability and utility requirements. This is undertaken by partially differentiating each statement, separating it from the others to analyze its specific dynamics individually as well as in relationship to the context of the theory. This takes the form of:

冘(o a) 1,2, . . . ,n .

⳵C*t/⳵

d

t

The defective statements may indeed be known since they are obvious as such within the theoretical context with most imitators accepting them because they consider their theory most effective for the problem area and are reluctant to consider seriously any alternative approaches. This is the situation with schools of thought whose proponents recognize difficulties in their innovator’s contribution, but accept the innovation as it is until contributions with much higher utility are presented, or until initiators provide solutions that correct the defi-

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ciencies and raise the innovation’s utility to its previous standard or, perhaps, increase it. In either case, changes will be attempted and with respect to competition among the initiations, those of the highest utility will most likely be incorporated and given a critical test. In the critique that will ensue, neither complexity theory nor chaos theory allow for these dynamics, because the dynamics of each complexity and chaos system are built-in and are not subject to personal intervention in the sense of explorative imitation, initiation, or innovation. Since partial differentiation is used to isolate groups of statements, the sudden and often radical changes discussed by catastrophe theory can be accounted for in crisis theory. Statements—and, indeed, theories—become entropic, sometimes fairly swiftly, as did Newtonian theory after Planck’s findings. The situation with catastrophe theory is that of either-or in the sense that either one situation is obtained or another one is, but not both, thereby relying on the principle of contradiction. For catastrophe theory the principle of contradiction does not account for the nuances that theories of science require. The problem areas of the sciences are many-faceted, rendering them unaccountable by catastrophe theory’s strict either-or conditions, such as matter and antimatter, and an ambidextrous universe in general.7 In the processes of logical reasoning, the principle of contradiction is necessary because it prevents both contradictions and ambiguities from entering thought construction. Its uses in crisis theory differ from those in catastrophe theory, because in the either-or situations of catastrophe, no allowance is made for repair. Statements in crisis theory that are not rendered entropic due to the infiltration of other languages that have not been adjusted do portray a property similar to catastrophe theory in the sense that either they fit into the theory and function as required, or they are inappropriate and must be either corrected or removed. For crisis theory, each statement is constructed to fit the theory on the basis of its probability assessment and its utility within the theory’s general context as it relates to its problem area. The either-or condition it shares with catastrophe theory is that either the statement performs according to the theory’s probability and utility criteria, or it is defective. Because of the statement’s importance prior to its entropic condition, the dynamics of initiation are employed to restore the statement, perhaps strengthening it as a result of competitive initiation. If it is demonstrated that the entropy is extensive to the point that reconstruction cannot be carried out, initiation ceases and the defective statement is removed, perhaps replaced by a new statement of higher order. This process is complicated because the defective statement is an integral part of the theory. After initiators work to restore the statement, the critical test and critique follow to determine which of the contributions, if any, are viable on their own and of utility within the theory. If, after the critical test and the following critique, the decision is made and accepted that none of the competing contributions have sufficient theory-oriented utility, the statement may be maintained until further initiations are presented, or it will be removed. Since there

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is no practical time limit on initiation, as long as the theory remains dynamic, other statements may be brought into the focus of competition due to their entropy. This process will continue until the theory itself approaches entropy and eventually declines to the point that its utility, if any, is only in a historical context. The dynamics of crisis theory differ, therefore, from those of chaos and complexity theory. The dynamics of both those theories are closed and unreceptive to influences not built into their systems, catastrophe theory is oriented to strict either-or conditions that allow for no changes to be incorporated into situations under its consideration. Crisis theory considers influences from outside sources, including either-or situations, and the dynamics of these influences are viable for initiators and imitators after these influences are adjusted for incorporation into the theory without reducing its utility. One more point needs clarification before applications of crisis theory in the order and disorder of evolutionary and contemporary sociopolitical dynamics can be explored. This pertains to nonlinear analysis. Interpreting the dynamics of a theory in terms of linear analysis and strange attractors is considered here to be erroneous. This judgment is based on the methodological merging of two differing concepts of dynamics. One concept refers to the dynamics of the theory itself and the other to the dynamics that result from its applications. This means that both the theory’s internal dynamics and those of its problem area are to be considered, given the isomorphic relation between each of the theory’s statements and their corresponding parts in the problem area. Hence the significance of the “t” in the C*t formula, as the time factor is necessary when discussing and working with these relationships. Using a central strange attractor point in tracing the development of a dynamic process, as with chaos theory, only demonstrates that the dynamics are not to be considered as multidimensional timeoriented. For while chaos theory allows for the plotting of dynamic paths over time, these paths are plotted in one-dimensional cyclical motions with time considered within terms of movement and direction, but not in terms of content. Both time and content are important in crisis theory; they are also important in complexity theory, but there the content is predetermined by their initial dynamics without allowing the entry of external dynamics to exert their influences. Crisis theory allows external influences and requires the processes of initiation for corrections and the introduction of new statements. However, for crisis theory, nonlinear analysis is not oriented to strange attractors, but to conditions resembling attractor positions, which are in fact circumstances that may bear some similarity to events that have occurred in the past. For example, we observe cycles in the process of nature and we find it fashionable at times to seek cycles in the processes of history, politics, physics, and the dynamic processes of economics. Moreover, we look in vain for regularity in long-term events that may provide some consistency to our world, but the context tells us nothing. In our search for permanent and enduring truth, we seek natural laws of which we can be certain and on which we can build. The

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laws of complexity theory and of chaos and catastrophe theory have been demonstrated to be of little consequence in our search. In our world of order and disorder, only when we relate theories to their problem areas in a crisis-theory context does theoretical order assume meaning, allowing us to work with our problem areas and exploit the dynamics of the theory-area relationship. Cyclical motions, such as they are, and strange attractors around which cycles move are not relevant for crisis theory. Nonlinear analysis does not bring a crisis theory back to either its starting position or to an equilibrium position with respect to its problem area.8 Rather, it brings the theory to a new position and situation with respect to its internal dynamics and its problem area. This position may be continuous in a straight pattern or in a cyclical pattern, depending on the type of problem being considered. For economics, the patterns are cyclical but differ from the dynamic equilibrium approaches of long-term cyclical activity. For political dynamics, the patterns are not cyclical, but broken—in the long run for the duration of the political systems in which they operate. For sociopolitical dynamics, long-or short-term patterns may or may not be cyclical, depending on each situation. For the biological sciences, the cyclical patterns are those of the species’ life cycles, but these cycles are, in themselves, unimportant; it is the content of the lives that is important because it provides meaning to all life forms. Our planets move in cyclical patterns, but our understanding of our solar system is theoretical, and the conditions for critically testing these theories are extremely difficult. In the development of our theories, a schematic is necessary from which to work. Such a schematic should allow us to relate our theories to their problem areas without the extra baggage of equilibrium-oriented chaos theory concepts, the prevention of outside influences, as with complexity theory, and the simplistic either-or situation of catastrophe theory as our world is far too complicated to behave according to the logic of either-or. The concepts that the world with all its nuances does relate to are those of crisis theory, with its linguistic nuances, imitation, initiation, innovation, and competition of contributions. The emphasis is, therefore, not to be placed on strict logic, closed systems, or the necessity of equilibrium. The emphasis is to be placed on the adaption of languages to fit theories for which probability and utility are its main concerns in a context of disequilibrium. Examples of this are shown in the chapters that follow. NOTES 1. Lloyd Motz and Jefferson Hane Weaver, The Story of Mathematics (New York: Avon Books, 1993), p. 125. They give a specific example of the calculus that was founded independently by both Newton and Leibnitz, which revolutionized the physical and natural sciences and has been instrumental in the development of economics. 2. Henri Poincare´ , “On the Nature of Mathematical Reasoning,” The Review of Metaphysics and Morals (Paris: Hachette et Cie, 1984), pp. 371–72. Quoted here from Ernst Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge, trans. William H. Woglom and Charles W. Hendel (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974), p. 79.

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3. Poincare´ , “On the Nature of Mathematical Reasoning,” p. 79. 4. Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart, The Collapse of Chaos; (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 1 5. This is discussed in The Collapse of Chaos; for example, see p. 442. 6. These dynamics may be internal or external, but they must be applicable as part of the system. 7. For example, see Martin Gardner’s book, The New Ambidextrous Universe (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1994). 8. Concerning economic activity, William Baumol and Jess Benhabib wrote that: Chaos theory shows that a simple relationship that is deterministic but nonlinear, such as a first order difference equation, can yield an extremely complex time path. Intertemporal behavior can acquire an appearance of disturbance by random shocks and can undergo violent, abrupt qualitative changes in the values of the parameters.

William J. Baumol and Jess Benhabib, “Chaos, Significance, Mechanism, and Economic Applications,” Journal of Economic Perspective 3 (1989): 77–109 (quote from p. 79). On p. 80, they state that “It warns us that apparently random behavior may not be random at all.” Quoted here from Brian J. L. Berry, Long-Wave Rhythms in Economic Development and Political Behavior (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 14, 15.

12

Crisis Theory and the Strategy of Evolution Although Darwin argued that natural selection was bound to produce better and better adaptation to prevailing conditions, he would have no preconceptions whatever about the kinds of change that would result in closer adaptation. Sometimes—more often than not I would say—closer adaptation involves some measure of what might be called technological elaboration. Colin Tudge, The Engineer in the Garden1

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS In his book, What is Life?, the physicist Erwin Schro¨ dinger argued that the existence of life is based on two principles. One principle, the quantum theory, establishes the dynamics of life on the molecular scale, with genes as molecules changing only discontinually as in quantum jumps. The second principle of “order from disorder” establishes the processes of living on the macroscale. This is the physical realm and forces that we understand as physical laws—such as the irreversibility of time, universal gravitation, and electromagnetism—that impose order on a world that would not function with any standard of predictability or continuity and would be void of the ability to produce or evolve.2 The dynamics of quantum physics and the universal laws that impose order on a potentially disorderly world guarantee the continuity and evolution of life. Continuity in this context, while an abstract notion, depends in reality on historical factors and current situations that can certainly be demonstrated by the existence of phyla and their phyletic groups and their differences that make them unique. Moreover, this uniqueness also demonstrates a discontinuity since

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each phyletic group develops in its specific environment and is, in turn, influenced by it. These differences are manifested in temperament and ability, which allow the group to survive and flourish in their environmental situations. While these statements are accurate historically, there are questions concerning prehistory that are, most likely, forever beyond our abilities to answer. We cannot go back into prehistoric time when life began and was divided into its variegated forms in its different environments. While we have historical remains and artistic works such as cave drawings, we can date these findings only on the basis of our current technologies and our understanding of evolutionary, era, and social time. We nevertheless consider that our conception of time may not be relevant to the prehistorical era, and we must consider that our ancestors calculated time differently according to their cultures and what was then civilization. It is this lack of clarity of the situation and events in prehistory that gave rise to the debate between the creationists and the evolutionists. The creationist argument takes two forms: the strict static form and the more liberal dynamic form. The evolutionist argument also takes two forms: the genetic form and the sociotechnological form, the strategies of which will be discussed in terms of crisis theory. Consider the creationist static form. This position states that life was created in the beginning and that while some species failed to maintain a sufficiently dynamic existence in light of their situations and thus became extinct, the species that did survive did so due to their abilities to maintain their food supplies and to defend themselves against predators and, thus, continued to thrive. According to this position, those phyla and their phyletic groups that did survive retained the physical characteristics of their ancestors so that those phyla that live now are the very same that lived since the creation. The more liberal, dynamic form of the creationist position argues that while the beginning was brought about by the Creator with the manifold phyla preserved during the Great Flood, there can be no physical evolution as the Darwinists argue. The various species of plant life, insects, animals, and the different races of humans exist because of the impositions placed upon them by environmental differences. Moreover, having been created, these life forms migrated to their various environments and made their lives accordingly, adjusting socially among themselves to the available food supplies, the conditions of shelter, and the dangers of predators. Neither of the creationist positions, however, maintains the importance of genetic changes (mutations) on the development of phyletic groupings because the creationist position in general holds that each phyla and its phyletic grouping has its own genetic composition that determines the size, color, and personal physical characteristics with which the Creator endows each of its members. Moreover, as a result of these endowments, each individual among the many animal phyla has an awareness of its independent (free) will according to the degree and extent of its collective and individual endowments and expressed by

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its actions. For humanity, these endowments are manifested in each individual’s pursuits and the social consequences of his or her actions. Because these endowments are greater for humanity than for the other life forms, the social obligations are greater, thus, the consequences as determined by society must be considered before actions are taken. This issue will be discussed further in the last chapter of this work. The evolutionists include both the theories of Charles Darwin (1809–1882) and the neo-Darwinian thinkers as well as the theories of the geneticists whose work began with Gregor Mendel (1822–1884)3 and has since developed with the work of Francis Crick, James Watson, and their colleagues and the geneticists that followed. Genetics has since been used to explain physical traits such as eye, hair, and skin color; body size; and, perhaps, such proclivities as physical skills and mental ability inherited from parents and ancestors generations back.4 These physical traits as well as tendencies for illness are located on different parts of the individual’s genetic code imprinted on the chromosonic structure. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) resides in the nucleus of cells which is a small area protected by a membrane that consists of long molecular chains or nucleotides. Each nucleotide is composed of three parts: a phosphate part stripped of a special oxygen atom—hence the preface “deoxy”—a sugar called ribose, and a third part—a base that distinguishes one nucleotide from another. The genetic code on the double helix is composed of four nucleotides: adenine, thymine, guanine, and cytosine (symbolized by the letters A, T, G, and C, respectively) with the DNA molecule being long and thin, woven into two strands and twisted together in the double helix form. The strands are made from sugar and phosphate groups with their nucleotides paired in opposite directions so that when A is paired with T, down on the double helix, the next pairing is T with A, and for AACGTTC, the pairing is CTTGCAA. Pairing A with T, T with A, G with C, and C with G provides the component steps or bases. Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart point out that the genetic code is a sort of blueprint for chemical engineering with everything one would expect to find from a well-equipped chemical factory—the human body, for example—so that the DNA blueprint results in quite a complicated organism, but one that can be understood in terms of chemistry, albeit a highly sophisticated kind of molecular engineering. We know that it is important to carry out the instructions of the DNA blueprint in the right order, especially in the embryo (or the fertilized seed pod, as the case may be). Cohen and Stewart write that: The chemical factory [of the DNA] arranges this by using chemical messengers produced by earlier genes to turn subsequent genes off and on as required. These genetic switches are lengths of DNA on either side of the segments that specify proteins. In fact, in complicated animals and plants, only five percent or less of the DNA specifies how to make proteins; much of the rest is control sequences, which organize the procedures. A lot of blueprint, in fact, seems to be instructions on how to use the blueprint.5

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While much work has been done researching the genetic codes of animals, insects, plants, and—especially—humans to understand the influences of genetics on the development of life, the emphasis on evolution from the geneticist’s perspective has been placed on mutation—either due to an error in the transmission of genetic information in the blueprint or because of the mixing of different—and perhaps compatible—genetic—material in the reproduction process. This often results in physical changes unacceptable for the development of social structures—changes in individual proclivities that may be passed on to future generations. Therefore, mutant DNA cannot be ignored in individual and, ultimately, social development; but it is argued here that mutated DNA is only one factor in the dynamics of evolution. Furthermore, the progress made in the understanding of the genetic code does not really assist in resolving the differences of opinion between the evolutionists and the creationists. The more liberal dynamic creationists argue that while the genetic code of each grouping of phylum is set, mutations that do occur are successful only if they occur in accordance with the general plan of creation. The success of the mutations being passed on throughout all the phyla’s members depends on whether they are effective in the environment.6 The general plan of creation determines the various life forms and their situations within their environmental conditions. The genetic conditions of these life forms are generally stable with mutations occurring at random (and are therefore uncontrolled) and are usually unsuccessful in being incorporated in the phyla’s collective gene pool, while those mutations controlled by biologists and zoologists have generally met with success. This process establishes new phyletic groups which are, in fact, controlled deviations of existing phyla.7 Moreover, for creationists, human evolution poses difficulties. Given their position that all life exists as it was first created—while for dynamic evolutionists, deviations are brought about only through controlled engineering—they find it difficult to understand evolution in terms of human development. For the creationist position, the difficulty with human evolution lies in explaning just what types of genetic mutation—if any—occurred to move humans from other life forms if uncontrolled genetic mutations occurred. Next, if uncontrolled genetic mutations occurred, why were these mutations not rejected through procreation? Third, if accepted, how did they become a part of the general homosapient gene pool in spite of the vast manifold deviations exhibited by humanity that, nevertheless, allow humans to retain their collective and individualistic characteristics? It is proposed that with the concept of sociotechnology introduced here, the argument between the creationists and evolutionists can be resolved. Sociotechnology is defined as the intentional individualistic process resulting in effective developments in social structures for the purpose of achieving greater efficiency for a phyletic group to maintain its existence in light of the physical and sociological conditions and problems to which it must relate and attempt to solve for

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its survival. These problems may be predatory in the abstract such as the depletion of food sources which threaten existence, or in the physical sense of being food sources for other predatory animals. They may also relate to conditions of overcrowding and the conflicts that result, leading to territorial expansion or relocation. This may require aggressive behavior and the violent conquering of territory, employing technologies for these purposes. Then the problems of dealing with the new physical surroundings, the availability of food sources (the threat of abstract predation), and the dangers of physical predation must, once more, be taken into account. These sociotechnological developments are not genetic in the sense that they become imprinted on the genetic code. Rather, they are primarily mental in development and physical in execution, requiring the uses of the mental and physical facilities and capabilities that the branch of the phylogenic group possesses. As mental facilities, they result in the limitations that are part of the group’s genetic code. To illustrate this, consider V. C. Wynne-Edwards’s discussion of birds that regulate their family size. Given the pressures of nearoverpopulation, and the restrictions of space, and food sources that confront them,8 their physical prowess is consequently improved. In the very long run (over evolutionary time), changes develop in their skeletal and muscular structures and their influences on the circulatory system as well as in the phyletic group’s neural capacity to coordinate these two systems in the physical changes they cause. Once a problem is recognized collectively and acted upon successfully by the group using its current physical and mental abilities, the solution will remain within both the collective and individual members’ behavioral patterns to be deployed until problem situations arise that demonstrate that these patterns have become ineffective. New solutions will be attempted that may include slight changes in previous approaches. Should the new solution be successful, it will also be incorporated into the collective social memory of the group and the individual member and be stored as a behavior pattern. In the future, should the necessity arise, this behavior pattern will again undergo the process of alternation for similar problem situations while maintaining previous successful approaches to be deployed again should circumstances call for them. Eventually, however, those approaches that are no longer deployed over time because of their lack of relevance to rising problem situations fade from individual and collective memory to be replaced by solutions that are effective. Whether the solutions to similar problem situations are effective and remain within the individual and social collective memory or whether they fade from memory because of disuse, the technological skills that result from the solutions to problem situations remain within the affected phyletic group because they are used to implement the solutions. Moreover, as new solutions are required for differing problem situations, regardless of how slight the nuances may be to existing solutions, new sociotechnological skills are required for the group to

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cope. These skills may consist of expansions on existing technologies, or they may be developments of new technologies necessary to relate effectively to the the present problem confronting the group. While effective behavior patterns become part of the group’s collective social collective awareness, there is no guarantee that a solution successful in the past will also be successful in the present. Nor is there any certainty that, should the solution fail or prove only partially effective, other solutions that have been developed and brought into operation—either separately or in conjunction with other approaches—will overcome the problem. Should past proven solutions retain their effectiveness, the group will continue to thrive at its present level; should the solution—either individually or in combination with other solutions— prove ineffective, flight from the problem will be the first instinctive recourse, with attempts made to develop new and effective solutions within the limited available time should the flight recourse fail. Appropriate technical skills are required for developing solutions to problems. While both the physical and mental abilities necessary for acquiring these skills are inherited, this inheritance is both biological—transmitted through the genetic code—and sociological within the context of the specie’s phylum and phenotypical development. These skills tend to be retained for problem solving due to their success in ensuring the group’s survival in light of previous problems. They are retained within the social collective awareness to meet continuing demands for development and survival, to be used when confronting new problems, and developing their solutions within the context of the group’s physical and mental abilities and limitations. Both phyletic development and natural selection thus occur through the process of confronting problems and seeking to solve them by formulating the most effective techniques, thereby resulting in their individual and social retention in the group’s phenotypic awareness. These techniques are not imprinted directly onto the genetic code, but are, through use, incorporated into its general social, physical, and mental abilities. As individuals, some members possess more of these abilities than others, but since these skills are sociological in nature, they are passed socially to the collective offspring. Moreover, while physical skills are acquired socially, many environmental and genetic factors influence the manner by which individuals acquire and perfect these skills. This also holds true for mental development. Those group members who formulate effective procedures for overcoming problems have done so by first using their mental abilities. For species of limited mental ability, the types of problems they confront are usually commensurate with their mental and physical capabilities because their mental and physical limitations place them (or, in the creationist terminology, according to the advantages and limitations they have been given) in the types of situations in which they exist. These situations include the types of problems they confront. The manner in which these problems are handled determines the group’s ability to thrive and—perhaps as a species— to evolve over time because of the skills they have acquired.

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The rapidity with which species and their various phyletic groups develop their current skills and acquire new skills to handle current problem situations determines both the rate at which they evolve and the extent of their evolution. As these skills are developed through problem solving, the types of problems a species confronts depends on its environment. Within this context of problem solving, both genetics and sociotechnology are important. Genetics determines the possible variations in size, talents, and mental and physical capacities a species can have among its members and the potential for the physical and mental activity of its members to be passed on to future generations. The sociotechnological aspect provides opportunities for the group’s qualified members to apply necessary social and physical skills to deal with problem situations so that its existence remains stable and, should circumstances advantageous to it prevail, to improve its condition. These circumstances may pertain to reducing abstract or physical predation or may result from a changed situation due to the curiosity of one or more of the group’s members taking them into new territory and, after sufficient exploration, perhaps taking the rest of the group into this territory. Technological changes within a species and its development and evolution are thus due to the species’ ability for problem solving—a point accepted by both dynamic creationists and neo-Darwinian evolutionists, including those working with the genetic aspects of evolution. While static creationists maintain that Homo sapiens were created as the highest form of life, they recognize that our development and progress as a species has been due to our abilities to confront our personal and collective problems and to solve them using the technologies at our disposal as well as the new technologies we had to invent. Given the general creationist position that the status of each phyletic was established at the time of creation, the manner in which humanity has initiated and undergone technological change has improved our general situation so that even if we were destined to be the highest life form in the great chain of being when we were created we have nevertheless undertaken to improve our positions in those fields of endeavor that we have deemed necessary for our existence. The dynamic creationists accept this position and, moreover, maintain that the development of technologies for peace and war is a natural consequence of the human condition inherited together with our will to live and survive in light of predators, even if they are—among the abstract predatory dangers such as disease and famine—our fellow humans. The positions of sociotechnology and genetics do not conflict, although disagreement may arise over the emphasis of each approach in general evolution. For example, the geneticists point out rightly that genetic codes differ for each phylum and, to a lesser extent, for each phyletic group within the phylum. Hence, there are common tree squirrels as well as those with webbed appendages that can glide among the trees in their environments. From the sociotechnological position, such differences are adaptations, developments of ways for life forms to survive in their specific environments.

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While genetic theory attempts to explain evolution in terms of phyletic acceptance of changes (mutations) in the genetic code, sociotechnology neither rejects nor diminishes the influences of genetics in evolution. Moreover, the similarities and differences among the genetic codes of members of the same phylum, but of different phyletic groups, are recognized by sociotechnology in the dynamics of evolution. The difference between the genetic and the sociotechnological approach lies in their explanation of the reason life forms of the same phylum develop characteristics that are passed on to their offspring. The geneticists maintain that it is through genetics, while the sociotechnologists maintain that it is through a combination of genetics, learning, and training. The common gray tree squirrels and gliding squirrels are from the same phylum (genus Sciurus, family Sciuridae); but while the explanation that the webbing among the gliding squirrels’ limbs is due to phenotypic adaptation—that is, due to both the influences of genetics and environment rather than a strictly genotypic development entirely due to environmental influences—is an attempt to combine these positions, questions are raised that must be addressed. Two questions pertain to dominance: First, is there a permanent dominance of either genetic or environmental influences in the dynamics of evolution in this cooperation? Second, if there is no permanent dominance, is there a genetic or environmental dominance changing for each species and in nature in general according to the different circumstances for each species and as their circumstances change? Another question pertains to strategies in the dynamics of evolution: Given the problems with which each species must deal, how are evolutionary strategies formulated? This question pertains to problem solving and the sociological and genetic consequences that are derived from the solutions acted upon. Furthermore, does sociotechnology influence genetic composition or does genetic composition with its deterministic influences over mental and physical capabilities exert a strict influence over the understanding of problems and the formulation of strategies to deal with them? Hence, is the origin of the squirrel’s property of webbed appendages that are passed on to following generations strictly genetic, or a combination of genetics and technologies incorporated into their biological and social structure? In general, the reason that phyletic groups from the same phylum differ physically in different environments still has to be explained. Similarities and differences in the genetic codes within phyletic groups of the same phylum can be observed, but the reasons for these differences cannot be explained strictly by genetics. One approach to understanding this problem is natural selection. According to natural selection, given a general phylum or species, one species of the phylum evolves into another variation—no matter how slight—over time with members of one species somehow giving rise to members of a different species with the new species derived as variations of its predecessor. Moreover, there must be a tendency for genetic variations to occur over time due to the intermingling of population pools so that as these pools increase, the possibilities increase accordingly for greater variations within the gene pool.

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Natural selection is a Darwinian concept, and is, to quote Edward O. Wilson, “The differential contribution of offspring to the next generation by individuals of different genetic types but belonging to the same population.”9 The differences that are beneficial for the population are incorporated into its common genetic composition; this composition can, in turn, be altered by the absorption over time of various genetic influences from specific individuals, becoming part of the sociophysical gene pool. Those influences that assist the phyla or phyletic group, enhancing its mental and/or physical capabilities for problem solving, are beneficial. Those that bring about mutations that diminish survival capacity are detrimental because, while they are suppressed to a certain extent by the carriers’ immune systems, they are activated when the carriers are in weakened physical conditions with their immune systems working intensely and are usually unable to cope with the influences that bring the mutant genes into operation. This process is dynamic over time. Genetic influences incorporated into the gene pool must compete with other genetic influences that have entered the gene pool and will thus become recessive within some individuals while in others it will become dominant and will compete for dominance in future generations. Moreover, some genes within the population will not be incorporated into the general gene pool and will eventually lose their influences, remaining dormant within the select portion of the population until activated because of illness or survival. The possibilities for genetic variations occurring within a population depend, therefore, on the phyletic group’s sexual exposure to carriers of the variant genes. These differences are incorporated within the exposed population. Those genes that survive are passed on and eventually become part of the population’s common genetic composition. They in turn can be altered as the gene pool spreads through the population’s descendants incorporating various other genetic influences from specific individuals. Once these genetic differences are incorporated, they are passed on through the general population. Those genes that are initially carried by a population and are successfully passed on to future generations will survive as dormant genes to be activated under certain circumstances—such as the tendencies for specific illnesses that remain suppressed by the immune systems but become activated under specific conditions.10 Moreover, should there be genetic intermingling among different populations of the same phylogeny having slightly different genetic compositions, mutations in the gene pools among the involved groups will occur. Traits advantageous to the groups will be retained over generations, and dangerous traits will tend to be suppressed only to be brought to the fore under certain circumstances of weakened physical conditions that in turn, result in weakened immune systems. Natural selection can thus be interpreted in two ways. It can pertain to the adaptation of genetic material previously absent in a specific phyletic group through incorporation into the gene pool with the group utilizing the material to its advantage in its problem solving and survival. It can also refer to the broader approach of physical and mental abilities that enhance survival and

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flourish due to superior skills acquired through the development of individually formulated techniques for problem solving that have become incorporated into the social group. It is posited here, therefore, that there is no general dominance, that both genetic and environmental influences are equally important, each in its own way. Genetics may result in superior physical and mental skills within a phenotypic group or for members of the group and, therefore, will have the tendency to be used in survival and problem solving. However, the tendency to use these skills productively and their actual usage may differ. For skills to be maintained, they have to be used, and this requires an environment with problems that have to be confronted. Moreover, it is insufficient just to use these skills on occasion. To retain the competitive advantage in the processes of natural selection, these skills must be developed and refined. Thus, evolution results when the skills acquired through genetic intermingling and the technologies for solving problems posed by environmental and physical challenges are developed and refined through use and become part of the standard problem-solving behavior. Moreover, when previously developed technological solutions for current problem situations decline in utility—diminished in their effectiveness partially or entirely—new technologies must be formulated and developed in the required time to deal effectively with these problems. A problem situation may be multidimensional, requiring the combination of previous solutions, either in whole or in part, or an entirely new approach may be required, using previous solutions as background information for constructing new ones. If, over time, solutions are provided and the problem situation is resolved, the group’s physical and mental skills are improved, with these improvements being incorporated into the group’s social awareness. However, in general, because of the group’s familiarity with its environmental situations, the problems it encounters are usually familiar with the solutions provided being standard and applied as long as they retain their effectiveness in preserving the group even though individual members may be sacrificed. Animals of prey pursue their victims, which over evolutionary time have developed the physical technologies of swiftness and prowess. Over evolutionary time, animals of prey have adjusted in turn to these technologies and have developed their own techniques, not attacking individual animals but herds because it slowed member’s initial reaction to flee due to their false sense of security within the herd and because of crowding. Such technologies as camouflage and mimicry help insects deceive their predators, but as the processes of the hunter and the hunted continue, predators use their prowess to overcome these strategies. For example, they develop better sense perception to detect camouflage, using stealth while lying in wait to trap unsuspecting victims, differentiating between mimicry and the copied life forms to trap their prey. Over evolutionary time, as tactics for survival improve, the methods used by predators also improve. Where this has not been so, there have been declines in populations of the evolutionary stagnant phyletic groups, often to the point

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of extinction. At the same time, other members of their phyletic group have managed to improve their positions with respect to live and abstract predation, meeting their own food requirements and coping with overpopulation which, if not kept in check, induces unnecessary tension and conflict among the group’s members. Developing solutions to the problems of long-term abstract predation is no less urgent than developing solutions to long-term physical predation that occurs over evolutionary time. Moreover, the solutions to both types of predation are sociotechnological as they necessarily pertain to the groups’ social structures and require the formulation of techniques and their successful applications to reduce or remove the problems, thereby improving the groups’ survival situation. Hence, while sociotechnological solutions developed for the problems of predation contribute in part to the dynamics of evolution, our understanding of the dynamics of sociotechnological development is limited because we lack knowledge of much history over evolutionary time and the ways in which life-forms coped with the problems of physical and abstract predation. While we must therefore speculate about much of what has happened, the fossils we have found allow us the luxury of speculation. Because evolutionary changes in life-forms are noticeable, we have gained a great deal of understanding of what has occurred. There are, nevertheless, difficulties with our observations. One difficulty is determining the ages of the fossils according to calibrated and uncalibrated radiocarbon dating. Calibrated radiocarbon dating is assumed to relate more closely to calendar calculations while uncalibrated radiocarbon dating refers to calculations based on carbon dating alone. This is a technical problem and can be resolved by combining the physical dating process of carbon decay with what is known about the calendar-historical events and classifying them accordingly.11 Another related problem is that as living members of the evolutionary processes in our contemporary era, we lack knowledge of too many of the events that occurred over evolutionary time. Although we have classified much information of great historical eras, we can only speculate about much of what has passed. While we have plant, insect, and animal fossils of these bygone historical periods, our carbon dating does not accurately place them at specific times in these eras. Still, since we can detect evolutionary changes in the various fossilized life forms, our lack of rigorous knowledge of conditions during these eras does not prevent us from providing explanations for the reasons and causes for these changes, perhaps shedding light on the consequences that followed. The explanation presented here is that evolutionary changes resulted from meeting the challenges of threatening problem situations that required adaptive solutions, requiring the group to either provide effective solutions or face the possibility of extinction. Adaptive solutions are those that, once developed and applied, are effective in their applications and incorporated into the group’s social awareness to be recalled should the same or similar problem situations arise again. For similar problem situations, should the solution prove only par-

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tially adequate, it will be either adjusted or—if this is not possible due to the constraints of time and urgency of the situation—be abandoned with other possible solutions being formulated, developed, and applied. For new problems that arise, variations of previous solutions may be recalled—either separately or in combination—or newly constructed solutions, if successful, will in turn become adaptive, to be incorporated into the group’s social awareness. COMMENTS ON EVOLUTIONARY TIME Considering time in terms of evolution assists in clarifying the development of species as they have undergone changes to improve their lives and positions in the world. Moreover, the study of members of phylums in their various lifeforms and their development over evolutionary time within their diversified environments clarifies the development of phyletic groups within super families due to environmental influences, genetic import, and the development of different variations of life-forms that genetics produces, and the long-run consequences and influences of solutions to problem situations on these groups. Evolutionary time can be separated into two forms. One is general evolutionary time which pertains to the biological development of the world from our comprehension of its beginnings to the present and into the future. The other is specific evolutionary time, which refers to the development of phyletic groups and their phenotypes in their various environmental situations. Both forms of evolutionary time are problematic only because our knowledge is limited and, hence, our understanding is insufficient to form a comprehensive (scientific and unambiguous) history of events. We must rely, therefore, on rational historical reconstruction of these time forms in order to understand evolution and the strategies employed in the processes of development. In our consideration of general evolution, we must go back in time to our understanding of the beginnings of our world. The issue here is not the difference in approach, hence in comprehension, to creation as expressed by the dynamic creationist and neo-Darwinist positions, as each holds to the beginning of the world.12 While the dynamic creationist position maintains that a supreme being is responsible for creation and while the neo-Darwinists maintain that creation came about only by cosmic forces leading to an explosion that brought about space, time, and the planets and the other astrobodies that exist and move in this space-time condition, both seek to understand the dynamics of the origins and development of life over time from its earliest beginnings. Hence, the necessity to break down evolutionary time into its general and specific forms. These forms will be discussed within a framework that relates to both the dynamic creationist and neo-Darwinist positions, after which sociotechnological strategies of evolution will be treated within a conceptual framework of time in terms of crisis theory. Assuming that modern astrophysicists are correct, that the earth is some 4.5 billion years old, the questions are: How was it formed and how did life begin

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and evolve? The Aristotelian Steady State concept of the universe has been discredited by such findings as the Doppler effect and the red-shift of heavenly bodies as they move away from our planet.13 According to current thinking, such motion could have resulted only from a tremendous explosion that brought stellar matter into existence with the physical force of gravity condensing it into stellar bodies that eventually fell into orbits around the star sources of their energy. The physical causes of the initial creation still remain unclear and will perhaps remain so. However, this has not prevented speculation, and on this point there is no conflict between the dynamic creationists and the evolutionists,14 because the issue is neither how the world was created nor the source of creation, but how life evolved after the creation. Therefore, consider the following position: with the earth beginning about 4.5 billion years ago, formed with inert atoms of gas and grains of dust, according to Robert Jastrow, “our planet was surely a sterile body of rock at the beginning.”15 Yet, it appears that the first form of life evolved from the chemical soup of the seas and the atmosphere. It somehow contained amino acids and nucleotides that merged, forming DNA from which manifold plant and animal life forms developed over general evolutionary time. With respect to evolution, general evolutionary time must be considered from two aspects. There is the biophysical aspect—such as the Ice Age, brought about by the geophysical conditions that prevailed and their influences on the lifeform present and developing at the time; and the Pliocene and Pleistocene Epochs when it is thought that both hominoid and human development occurred due to the nurturing of children.16 As Fekri A. Hassan writes: The peopling of the world throughout the Ice Age was mostly a function of a very slow increase in world population and an increasing adaptability through cultural developments and biological evolution. Changes in the human brain are evident throughout the Pleistocene Ice Age. The modern form of human brain dates back at least 40,000 years with a similar ancestral form associated with the Neanderthals (H. sapiens neandertalenis). Greater cognitive ability was reflected in greater sophistication in toolmaking. Greater versatility, variability, and specialized techniques are the hallmark of the later part of the Stone Age (the Upper Paleolithic).17

There is the sociological aspect of general evolution during which the physical conditions imposed sociological conditions on the life-forms. Such conditions were the considerations of heating, protection, and sustenance. Most animals and homonids—and eventually humans—huddled together in groups for protection from the elements and from predators, thereby enhancing the necessity of cooperation and the division of tasks within the group. This ensured greater efficiency in gathering food and caring for families. With respect to human evolution, Jared Diamond posits that the development of the voice box is the basis of all modern language on which “the exercise of

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human creativity is so dependent.”18 It is possible that brain enlargement in the evolutionary process allowed for the adaptation of the voice box for the expression of thoughts and ideas because more neurosynapses could exist in the large brain mass. However, while the Neanderthals had brains larger than our own, they apparently lacked the ingenuity of the Cro-Magnons (who lived approximately 40,000 years ago). For example, while the Neanderthals used stone for tools and weapons, the Cro-Magnons used bones as well as stones for tools that were “produced in diverse and distinctive shapes so modern that their functions as needles, awls, engraving tools, and so on are obvious to us.”19 While the development of the voice box was certainly important for communication and for the development of thought, the position held by this author is that both biological and physiological factors that had developed due to genetic and environmental circumstances and conditions are responsible for evolution. Genetic factors, such as the improvement of the voice box leading to language and thought, together with the expanding neurological synapses leading to cellular development in the brain and in the entire nervous system assisted in developing solutions to sociotechnological problems such as dealing with predators; finding food sources and, over time, developing animal husbandry; cultivating agriculture; and, with expansion into new territories, confronting the problems there. Moreover, the greater the complexity of a life-form is, the greater the diversity of factors responsible for its evolution are. The evolution of the single cell amoeba has not progressed since the cell first evolved. However, the evolution of complex life-forms—such as that which occurred with the development from Australopithecus (or man-ape) some three million years ago; to Homo erectus Homo habilis some two million years ago; and, eventually, to the life form of Homo sapiens and the great complexity of our life-form—demonstrates this. Mental development enhanced physical development, allowing for more effective use of physical properties for gathering food, improving living conditions, finding protection from the elements through the use of fire for warmth and building suitable dwellings in the hot climates, and defending against predators (including members of the same species). The higher the evolutionary life form is, the more complex are the combinations of dependent factors available and the manner in which both physical and mental capacities are joined and used together in the problem-solving contexts in which the species exists. Hence, general evolutionary time is related directly to the physical and social conditions that prevail. For example, The Ice Ages are stages of evolutionary time during which land bridges were built between the European and American continents, allowing for exploration and expansion into new lands and the eventual immigration southward to a warmer climate. The close of the latter Ice Age some 10,000 years ago led to the development of agriculture and, eventually to changes in the Neolithic agricultural-based social structures, trade, population increases, and to the eventual emergence of managers, scribes, and priests,

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thereby resulting in the shift from subsistence agriculture to surplus production available for the increasing number of nonfood producers. The development of agriculture and the eventual rise of a managerial class necessitated innovations in food production and distribution. Dealing with surplus food supplies required solving storage problems and, of course, the water situation was then (and is now) always difficult because water is a resource that does not submit easily to human control. Because of food surpluses and the resulting administration of storage and distribution, division of labor evolved within the social structures as more people were able to devote their time to other necessary productive endeavors such as making clothes and weaponry and educating children in the ways of life. Division of labor facilitated trade with other social groups for food supplies and the goods and services they produced. This led to the development of diplomacy and the refinement of the skills of war. Those social groups that excelled in both were the strongest defenders against human predators from other social groups. Those groups that emphasized only agricultural development fell prey to those groups that coveted others’ lands, were invaded and conquered by them, and the survivors used as slaves. The administration of spiritual needs as they existed required great sensitivity and skill because the world was largely unknown and hostile. Myth and reality merged in the teachings of spiritual leaders as they attempted to understand and explain existence in a world that appeared ordered by the transition from day to night and the changes of the seasons, yet in conflict within the social structures and in confrontations with the disorder of invasions, crop failures, the occasional turmoil within the administrative branches, and the uncertainties of life in general. Thus, the priestly classes merged the incomprehensible natural forces with conceptions of deistic influences acting upon the land, the seas, and skies. They prevailed on the human condition to provide explanations for both the order and disorder of nature and its turbulence and disasters, and of the social structures, struggles, internal conspiracies, and civil wars that occurred within them. Evolutionary time thus pertains to the great “Ages,” as they developed when our planet became hospitable to life, from the evolution of the first single cells to the beginning and evolution of humanity. For example, consider the evolutionary time of the last Ice Age. Ferki Hassan maintains that, from the inception of human society to about 10,000 years ago—after the last Ice Age, a period of two to three million years—wild game, plants, and other available wild food sources provided human nourishment and sustenance.20 Prior to the early prehistoric Ice Ages, homonids began populating the planet, evolving into Neanderthals, Cro-magnons, and, eventually, into Homo sapiens. Neolithic agricultural developments followed the last of the great Ice Ages and the major urban development that began during the Chalcolithic Age in the fourth millennium B.C. occurred during evolutionary time. However, the Bronze Age (3500 B.C.) and the Iron Age (1000 B.C.) that

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followed represented the end of evolutionary time because Homo sapiens no longer depended primarily on the physical conditions of the planet, but also on the development of their relation to the physical environments in which they lived and, often, migrated, the problems they confronted; and their ingenuity in exploiting the natural resources at their disposal while organizing their societies for living, and for defense against predators, and for war to conquer the territories and possessions of other peoples. Through the development of the uses, first, of stone, then, of bronze, and then, iron in the uses of architecture and weaponry, civilizations arose and, with them, their cultures were established and expanded, imposed both by force and by consent on other peoples. With these civilizations and their documentation, history had come into its own. Evolutionary time in which the great prehistoric Ages are calculated gave way to the rise of the historical time of the great civilizations during which the story of mankind was presented in architecture and the recorded political, artistic, and intellectual contributions that people in these civilizations developed. Recorded in the historical time of these civilizations are the eras and social times during which these civilizations expanded by conquering peoples through war and through the willing acceptance of their cultures and achievements. Their social and artistic development as preserved in their architecture, literature, and painting, have remained for posterity; their influences on other peoples and civilizations in the historical eras they established and in succeeding historical eras attest to their greatness as they developed within the social time that occurred within these eras. The questions to be addressed in the remainder of this chapter and in the following chapters are several. Is the decline of historical eras and the rise of new eras in their places a factor in our evolution? Moreover, are there factors common to every historical era that bring about their decline? Also, are there lessons to be learned from the rise and decline of historical eras that are pertinent to our current historical era of knowledge? In order to clarify the approach to these questions, comments on the methodology of considering historical and era time are in order. The situation being considered here refers to events that bring about changes that are significant enough to result in conceptual thinking and producing in the manufacturing procesess and in the arts and sciences. While changes in these processes occur during an era’s social times, era time ceases when its concepts are no longer sufficient for generating innovations to work with the historical events that are occurring—events that require new approaches that are effective and productive. Hence, the Dark Ages set in when the enlightened approaches of the Greek and Roman thinkers became subdued and replaced by a wellstructured socioreligious establishment. With the Renaissance and the rebirth of enlightenment, competition existed between the socioreligious establishment and the new approaches toward artistic and scientific method with the secular influences reducing significantly the socioreligious authorities’ stronghold.21 With the applications of the sciences to the production processes, the Re-

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naissance declined and was replaced by the Industrial Revolution. Artists and scientists continued expanding their subjects, using conceptions and applying technologies that were originally developed for industrialization to improve their experimental techniques, but this era declined with the financial crash of 1929 and the Great Depression. Our contemporary era of knowledge came in the aftermath of World War II that followed the Great Depression. In retrospect, when we view the history of our species since its early beginnings, we can observe the processes of our evolution spanning the time from the earliest prehominoids to our species of Homo sapiens. Considering our evolution, we see that it has not been totally physical, but also social, covering the Stone Ages, the Bronze and Iron Ages, through the era of the Dark Ages and the Renaissance, to the Industrial Revolution, and into our contemporary era of knowledge. When we consider our physical evolution now, it is impossible to determine whether it is still occurring. We can assume, however, that just as we evolved physically from hominoids to Homo sapiens, the process of our physical evolution is still continuing. However, whether our physical evolution is still continuing or has in fact, ceased with reaching our current status of Homo sapiens, social evolution has occurred and continues to occur for our species with the developments from one historical era to that which follows. Are there strategies for physical and social evolution and, if so, in what ways, if at all, are they similar and different? CRISIS THEORY AND THE STRATEGIES OF EVOLUTION Both physiological systems and social systems share the common property of seeking to maintain and preserve the order within them. For physiological systems, from the simplest single-celled life-forms to the human body which is the most complex of evolved life forms, there is a struggle to maintain the orderly bodily functions necessary for sustaining life in light of the potential for disorder to cause these functions to break down. Moreover, because physiological systems possess the degrees of complexity commensurate to their status on the evolutionary scale with Homo Sapiens having achieved the highest status in evolution, our social systems which are our own constructs have been created to establish order through laws and customs and have conflicted with the necessity for changes due to changing circumstances resulting from changing social times and historical eras. As our physiology has changed, having developed (evolved) from hominoids to our present Homo sapiens, our social systems have evolved from very loose structures in the Stone Age to more tightly structured systems necessary in our exploitation of the uses of bronze and, later of iron in construction, ornamentation, and weaponry during the formation of their historical ages. The complexity of societies increased through the development of the Babylonian, Egyptian, Greek, and Roman empires, requiring the further develop-

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ment of social order. Babylonian and Egyptian societies each imposed its concept of order according to its laws and understanding of the relationship between conquering and conquered politics, social ethos and customs, and economic system structures. The Greek approach to society, the arts, and philosophy not only influenced the philosophical and artistic perspectives of those societies that were their enemies, conquered by their military prowess and technology, but was also adopted by their friends. Hence, with the influence of Greece, the order established by societies influenced by Grecian civilization had their own order disrupted by disorder due to the intrusion into their borders of the Greek approach to inquiry and to the arts, as well as the Greek technology such as the use of chariots in war. While the conquest of territories and their peoples justified the concept of Roman civilization and democratic rule of law, these concepts prevailed long after Rome’s fall and destruction by those who benefited from the best of ancient Rome’s culture.22 With the fall of Rome began the early period of the Dark Ages. However the legacy of Rome’s legislative and religious contributions continued to influence the societies that remained intact under the onslaught of the barbarians who waged war for their own greed, establishing societies that sought to conquer and expand their influence, improving their economic situations by enslaving those peoples they conquered, and usurping their possessions and natural resources.23 Throughout the evolution of society, from the loosely structured social systems of the Stone and Ice Ages, to the democratic societies of ancient Greece and Rome, there has been the necessity for order as well as intrusion of disorder on order in varying degrees. The intrusion of disorder has come from within societies such as with Socrates in Athens who questioned dogma and was eventually executed for his disruptions, having been convicted of corrupting Athenian youth; and in Rome, with the occasional breakdown of the legal transfer of power due to the violent overthrow of the country’s leaders through conspiracy and assassination. As this type of social disorder continued, Rome’s internal strength weakened to the extent that it became easy prey for the barbarians who sacked it. However, the barbarians themselves soon learned that as they conquered societies, settling down and establishing social orders within their expanded boundaries, they had to form social structures and legal systems similar to those they encountered during their conquests. The lesson of history for societies is thus that the resilience of societies lies in the necessary order created by internal rigidities as expressed in customs and laws for flexibility to cope with the disorder of internal changes when challenged by their relations with other societies, thus undergoing changes while attempting to cope with their own internal changes. Hence, the extent of the evolution of societies depends on the receptivity of their peoples to recognize valid changes and to provide valid critiques of the contributions dealing with change that are posited as valid and appropriate to their individual and collective social lives. This pertains to the conduct of both internal affairs with the sophistication of control often conflicting with individual expression and to foreign affairs which

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have been complicated over the centuries by the sophistication of diplomacy attempting to temper the increasingly powerful weapons of war. Our status as Homo sapiens attests to our physical and mental evolution as we have confronted the problems of our physical existence and developed accordingly. The evolution of a species thus depends on two very significant and interrelated factors. One factor is the species’s physical ability as it exists in its landscape. The other factor is the type of problems that confront the species and the solutions provided by the species to eliminate the problems. Given these factors, the species usually confronts the type of problems befitting its status in its landscape. The stimulus-response situation of problem solving with the same problems being met with the same solutions, may be appropriate for a specific time period, but neither problems nor the approaches to solve them are static for very long.24 The objective of every species, no matter its degree of physical and mental prowess, is the elimination of the worst-case senario of the occurrence and recurrence of threatening problems. As the recurrence of problems in their varying degrees and nuances requires recurring confrontations and the development of effective solutions, the effective solutions to specific problem situations when confronted on a social scale—and not only individually—become technologically appropriate for the species involved and will remain within its repertoire, to be altered when the nuances of the problem change. They will remain within the repertoire or be developed further as other solutions are developed. These solutions are thus social and technological because they rely on appropriate natural devices, both internal through genetic evolution in order to exist within the specific circumstances of a species’ environment—such as squirrels developing webbing between their appendages for gliding among the trees in their environment—and external, such as spiders using the lay of the land for determining the best way for setting their webs. The manner in which a species employs the available technical properties thus indicates the extent of its evolution. If these properties are employed in ways that are both new and effective in dealing with its problems and the new methods are incorporated socially within the species, the species has contributed toward its evolution. If the same methods are repeated even though the problems have shifted—perhaps ever so slightly—the problems may be alleviated to some extent. Unless new types of problems arise requiring unique solutions that exercise the mental and/or physical skills of members of the species, the species evolution will cease. While the adaptation of new solutions is dependent on the species’ overall physical and mental abilities, all new approaches increase these abilities; should these approaches affect the species physically, the physical skills of its members will most likely be upgraded accordingly. The strategies of the evolution of species require both the mental awareness to perceive problems and the mental ability to conceive of ways of either reducing the threat that the problems pose or removing the problems in their entirety. Because problems confronting each species tend to be on the level to

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which the species is accustomed according to its genetic and environmental situation, a species will usually respond effectively to familiar problems because their recurrence is on the species’ level of existence. For example, all life-forms seek to escape from problem situations that are life-threatening, such as being pursued by predators. When individual members of a species are confronted with this type of problem, seeking to escape the threat may be the only immediate response available, but the manner in which escaping is done is also important. For example, finding shelter behind or under objects where the predator cannot go is a strategy that is taught by observation of the older members of the species and is usually an effective strategy of escape when one or a few of the species are involved. When the number of members of the species involved is greater than the fixed amount of such shelter, this strategy may be inappropriate and the opportunity to capture one or more of the species as the others scramble away to safety increases with the decrease of available shelter. Given a sufficient number of members involved, another strategy may be to attack the predator since some of the members will perish in any case. When more than one predator attacks, differing strategies may be involved such as some members seeking shelter while others attack or, if attack seems impossible, scattering the members in the hope of some of them surviving. The more effective the strategies are against known predators, the higher the stage of evolution that has been reached. This increased level reached by the evolutionary process is nearly imperceptible given the length of time general evolution covers and the specific evolution of the species involved, but is nevertheless expressed in the species’ survival and its development. Moreover, the development of strategies depends on the species’ genetic ability as expressed in both its mental and physical capabilities in its uses of its environment to escape from predators. For the duration of the strategies’ effectiveness, the species develops and thrives; however, if its predators are not sufficiently discouraged and find no alternative species to satisfy their needs, they will continue to attack using their current approaches. When these approaches decline in effectiveness, they, too, will evolve more efficient approaches thereby reducing— or perhaps eliminating—the developed strategies of their prey. Over evolutionary time, members of the species will continue to develop their strategies—restrained only by their genetically determined physical and mental abilities and environmental circumstances. Over evolutionary time, changing environments must be taken into account as strategies are deployed. Environments are altered due to naturally changing geological conditions such as land shifts occurring due to earthquakes and volcanic activity from previously inactive volcanoes and—since the rise of our species—human imposition on land masses due to clearing for agriculture and construction, altering the ecological relations that had existed previously. These enviromental conditions are also altered by changes in the weather such as droughts and floods and with major unstable weather conditions such as those that occur with the El Nin˜ o storm processes. To compensate for these changes, both prey and predator continue to seek to

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improve their own survival positions by developing their sociotechnological skills in their strategies as both predator and prey. A consequence of developing new strategies for survival is that the new difficulties predators confront may result in deviations in the type of prey they seek. Hence, uses of shelter and of mimicry—another use of the environment—may have to be shifted accordingly so that variations of camouflage, mimicry, and physical objects in the environment are combined in ways unique to situations to reduce the threat of predation and improve the prey’s survival. The role of crisis theory in the strategies of evolution must now be explained and its dynamics discussed. Given the pressures of existence confronting every life-form—especially the dual interaction of predator and prey—each life-form develops strategies to insure its existence as a species. These strategies are developed, applied, and maintained for the duration of their utilities, to be rejected and replaced when the utilities decline significantly. For example, plants whose inability to utilize photosynthesis effectively for their nourishment have adapted themselves to being carnivorous and have developed strategies for attracting insects and devouring them. Moreover, pollination of many plants is conducted by insects as they move from one plant to another with the pollen of plants on their bodies, thereby insuring fertilization. Other strategies for fertilization depend on wind blowing the seeds onto other plants. These established procedures are within these life-forms’ sociotechnological behavior and, having evolved to suit their genetic and environmental situations, are maintained until their effectiveness declines for whatever reason. These are strategies of existence and are maintained possibly to the point when the species is threatened. In circumstances where such threat exists, they will either decline into entropy or adapt to the new situations accordingly. In this case, adaptation means the alteration of strategies which necessitates abandoning parts of the strategies, altering them to retain utility in the processes of survival. Hence, in terms of crisis theory, order in terms of utility has broken down and disorder in terms of entropy has entered into the established system. In formulating new approaches, both genetics and the environment have to be considered. The genetics of plants are growth-inducing and, when one environmental situation becomes unsuitable, the plants will either seek other environments by relocating or changing their styles as did those plants that underwent changes sufficiently to render themselves carnivorous. This dynamic occurs over the species’ evolutionary time. When one branch of the species is in need of change and the strategy has not had sufficient time to achieve its utility and the branch is endangered, the species has spread to different locations, improving its chances of survival. There, if necessary, it will adopt differing strategies to cope with its new environment.25 Since the species’ survival and development is at issue, this often comes at the cost of sacrificing some of its members. Changing the content of the species’ information about its environmental area and adjusting its operational procedures accordingly, the species attempts to improve its position and seeks to ensure its survival.

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However, this may be difficult because other species in the area may find the intruder a source of prey. In the case of plant life, for example, foliage may become sources of food for insects, and the plant may also be confronted by other plant life hostile to its existence such as weeds. Moreover, for vegetation in general, the soil may not offer sufficient nutrients or they may differ from those to which the vegetation is accustomed thereby requiring further adaptation or relocation. New dangers may then be confronted, requiring changes in operational procedures to cope with the area. Therefore, in the processes of adaptation, there is always the unexpected to be guarded against and possible dangers to be confronted. This gives rise to innovations such as plants becoming genetically resistant to predatory insects through breeding with other receptive plants or such as plants discarding photosynthesis as their sole source of nourishment due to the lack of sufficient sunlight and the abundance of insects, becoming carnivorous for their sustenance. Crisis theory requires the active participation of its imitators so that when problem situations arise that must be dealt with—depending on the extent, significance, and scope of the problem situation—active participation by initiation and innovation must be undertaken to resolve the problem. In the processes of evolution, all life-forms undergo changes according to their genetic compositions with respect to the types of problem situations they must confront. Because these situations are usually the types that arise for each species, the responses have become imitative with standardization adequate to meet and resolve the problems. However, as the problem areas deviate, the standard imitative responses lose their utility and initiative or innovative responses must be formulated and implemented within the time span necessary to prevent or eliminate the difficulties and damage that the problems could cause. Hence, the dynamics of crisis theory are necessary for the processes of evolution. The problems generate disorder within the ordered existence of the species thereby reducing the utility of its accepted existence. The disorder is resolved when new approaches—either initiative or innovative—are implemented. If successful, stability and order are restored, albeit to different degrees, with the differences generating new dynamics and changing the species’s position in its process of evolution. Inasmuch as the dynamics of crisis theory are thus relevant to evolution, every contribution made toward evolution through innovation, initiation, and imitation is applied to the problem situations. Those successful contributions are incorporated into the species’ social organization, this holds for all plant and animal life-forms. Through their applications, these contributions become sociotechnological, remaining part of the species’s repertoire until they become entropic to the extent that they are altered through initiation or abandoned because of an accepted innovation has sufficiently high utility for dealing with the problem situation. In our development from Homo sapiens into modern man and woman (Homo

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sapiens sapiens), we have developed strategies of existence over time and have applied them within a social context. Moreover, throughout our evolution these strategies have been founded on the dynamics of imitation, initiation, or innovation according to the problem situations encountered. An example of this is the situation of the K factor—the symbol for the carrying capacity of an environment, and the r factor—used here to symbolize the intrinsic rate of population increase. As suitable environmental areas are populated, given sufficient r, K is developed and expands. In this process, services must be provided to the population so that its residents can live reasonably decent lives and support their families. K has been developed accordingly to maintain the population’s growth at a reasonable rate thereby anticipating the problems associated with growth such as employment, schooling, and urban planning, as well as the dangers of growth such as inefficient services, disproportion of wealth, and crime as a means for wealth redistribution. The difficulty is that, should equilibrium be reached between the population and the environment’s ability as it is organized to handle the requirements and needs of the population effectively, this equilibrium position is of extremely short duration. For example, when equilibrium is reached between r’s stability and K’s ability to support this population, neither K nor r are stable over time. Given that the equilibrium position holds for time t, for time t ⫹ 1, either the population has changed in number—increasing or decreasing due to natural causes—or has partially relocated with perhaps other populations moving into the environment. Also, from t to t ⫹ 1 there are shifts in the orientation of those in control of the environment. Different priorities may be involved and different internal and external political pressures may be applied. Hence, as r changes, it usually does so at rates more rapid than K’s ability to cope with the changes, so that given r as the problem area and K’s function as the operational system working with the problem area, C* (Kdr)t. Should there be a brief period in which equilibrium exists, shifts in utility are eventually achieved. However, where r shifts in t ⫹ 1, these changes are not usually readily compensated by the appropriate changes in K due, in part, to the time lag in the awareness of the reasons for the changes, perhaps due to political considerations bringing the relationship into entropy.26 Changes within K due to shifting employment within the appropriate organizations or shifts in political priorities may influence the decisions of portions of the population to continue to work in the environment so that, while some population shift may occur, leverage can still be used to influence the environment’s governmental organization and the level and quality of available services. Moreover, the defining relationship between K and r is not rigid. For example, because of population shifts, r determines the functioning of the organizational structure. According to the population’s entrepreneurial activity and productive capacity, legal systems have to be established to prevent conflicts in production and viable patents to preserve entrepreneurial activity and encourage investment.

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These issues require sufficient legislation by the authorities in K which would not have been undertaken had they not been raised within the specific portions in K. The strategies consist of adjusting K to changes in r and are neither intended to encourage equilibrium between K and r nor to maintain equilibrium should it occur because equilibrium tends to be static and the relations within the various factions within and between K and r are dynamic and changing with the changes of attitude of the interest groups involved. The strategies are intended to maintain those relations within C*t that have high utility and, if possible, to adjust those relationships whose utility has been eroded by entropy and to initiate new relations between K and r when necessary to reestablish order in the form of utility when it has declined. As political representatives of the general population and the sectors under their jurisdiction, leaders of the political, economic, and social sectors that make up the environment in which citizens reside and work are required by the mandate given to them by the people and the higher authorities of government to enact and maintain regulations that preserve order in potentially disorderly situations of intrapopulation relationships that generate conflicts. Such conflicts may concern differences in interests between employers and employees or, on the political level, the conflicts between citizens and the political establishment created to maintain effective public service. If not resolved, they may lead to extreme social unrest—perhaps to revolution. On the social level, the differences in wealth among the citizens, manifest unrest in the form of loosely and well-organized crime. Thus, given the complexities of both K and r, should equilibrium exist between them, it is of extremely short duration. The objective in the dynamic relationship between the statements of K and r is to maintain its utility, as changes within the political priorities of the leaders correspond to changes in the priorities of the population. Moreover, because societies are dynamic, when the relationship between K and r changes as the sociopolitical environment becomes entropic due to changes in such factors as declining general industrial output and economic recession that affects the wealth of society or social tensions result due to the population’s diversity, the order established by the C*t relationship breaks down. Whether the disorder continues, perhaps becoming more severe over time, or order is reinstated—albeit with different orientation determined by the appropriate policy changes in the K and r relationships— depends on whether these policy changes are adequate to remove the relation’s entropy and establish the utility necessary to maintain the dynamic working relationships among the statements of K and r. Moreover, as entropy affects some of the relationships, those unaffected continue to thrive, thereby maintaining the general utility of C*t. While the appropriate changes between the entropic elements in K and r restore utility, these changes also introduce new technologies in approach or inception that are employed within the structures of K and r. These are sociotechnologies and, through their uses for the duration of their utilities, they

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become incorporated in the society’s repertoire to be reconsidered for use with the necessary adjustments when statements in either one or both elements become entropic. For example, given constant labor unrest, the political authorities determine that, for the betterment of both labor and management and for society in general, a cooling-off period is required prior to labor taking action in the form of strikes or sanctions. Such was the case with the Labor-Management Relations Act passed in the United States—the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947—in which the elements in K and r that pertain to labor and management relations established in C*t were restructured to prevent undue labor-management unrest during the period of post–World War II economic reorientation from wartime to peacetime production to try to resolve peacefully all conflicts between labor and management, and to prevent the type of struggles—including intraunion— reminiscent of those that took place during the Great Depression.27 The general strategy of adjusting those elements in K and r that are reduced in utility because of entropy enables the leaders of the social environment in both the governmental representation and the representatives of the population to find ways to maintain the social balance, reducing strife that, if left unchecked, could possibly destroy the social fabric. This strategy, based on crisis theory, is to adjust those specific elements in the sociopolitical environment that pertain to management and labor whenever entropy sets in and those relations that were once effective in maintaining cooperation are disrupted perhaps to the point that they may break down. This crisis theory policy is thus sociotechnological because it is an available response in the attempt to resolve such conflicts and, as such, it has been effective as the Taft-Hartley Act, for example, has demonstrated. Another strategic approach uses Boolean binary networks applied to game theory. Consider, for example, sectors in both K and r that are competing for benefits such as a specific union striking for greater benefits and are opposed by the sector in K responsible for controlling general finances and by management responsible for both finances and the conditions under which labor works. Given the conflict situation, consider that the union has formulated Nu (say, ⫽ 5) conditions that its leaders consider are serious enough for striking. In response, management, presented with the union’s position, formulates its own position based on both the union’s position and its own with respect to union demands. Given that the union’s position was stated first and management’s position formulated after a sufficient time lag for considering the union’s position, with uN5 being the union’s position and management’s position being of equal response MN5 should the type of demands by each side be reflexive with management’s response relating directly to union’s demands, then these positions are matched and are subject to bargaining leading to adjustments and the possible resolution of the situation. According to game theory, given a matched situation with each player seeking to optimize payoff by setting its final fixed pattern exactly opposite to that of its opponent, the union and management representatives can thus bargain and, through adjustments in each position, reach

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agreement on each of the permutations suitable to each side so that, given the conditions for the conflict, it can be resolved by each side winning maximum payoff in accordance with the strengths and weaknesses of both sides in this specific bargaining situation.28 In this example where K represents the management and r the union, according to game theory, the Boolean permutations of each player are 64, or (25). For the game-conflict to be effectively resolved, each player must meet the other’s strategies with its own for each action; only after this is accomplished can the consideration of maximization be determined and the status of each player’s position be assessed.29 Moreover, given this situation of equal permutations in bargaining in this type of conflict situation, the bargaining process can be viewed from the perspective of crisis theory. The terms of each bargaining position are clarified with respect to the corresponding position of its opponent, with the concepts of advantage and weakness replaced by those of utility and entropy and with the concept of matrix payoff replaced by the concept of maximum utility. In terms of crisis theory, these types of conflicts arise because of the recognition of problems by one or both sides. Having stated and clarified the problems, the bargaining positions are posited. On this basis, the other side clarifies its situation and presents its bargaining position to its opponent. With each side stating an equal number of positions (five), each is met with a counter position in response by the other side with the bargaining resolved only when the positions posited allow each side to achieve maximum utility, given the restraints and limitations of the bargaining positions of each side. Once this is achieved and the issues resolved, the disorder of the conflict is removed and order is reestablished for the duration of the agreement. However, with respect to the element of surprise discussed earlier in this work, it was shown in G.L.S. Shackle’s critique that surprise is ruled out for game theory, because it is an assumption of game theory that each participant in the game knows the positions of the other side so that responses can be planned in advance. Moreover, it is also assumed that when one side makes a move, the responses are known in advance as well. In the real world, however, where strategies are unpredictable and moves that are carried out are unexpected by the opposing sides, the element of surprise is always a factor that has to be considered both in planning and in response. Crisis theory handles the element of surprise in relation to the opponents’ bargaining positions. For example, given the positions first posited by r in time t, K will formulate its positions and respond accordingly. However, because of the disorder brought about by r’s actions which disrupted the previous relationship, initially neither r’s nor K’s positions will be fixed in time. Each side should therefore be prepared for flexibility in its position to allow for the possibility that new information may enter and be incorporated after the necessary adjustments are undertaken to preserve utility. This flexibility allows for changes in each sides’ bargaining positions and, while these positions are first posited as being fixed and rigid in order to obtain the best concessions from the other side,

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readiness for flexibility allows the bargaining process to take place. Coping with the nuances of newly incorporated information provides opportunities for change in each side’s position, allowing additional time to make the necessary internal changes as well as to counter any change that may occur through bargaining so that in the bargaining process, each side can insure the highest utility for its overall position. Thus, the introduction of surprise in terms of the incorporation of new nuances and the changes in positions that result is, in this sense, expected in crisis theory and indeed dealt with in the bargaining position. With both K and r as subset sectors of the greater environment and population K and r, whatever the scope and range of influences the subsets K as the management representatives and r as the union representatives in the example above may have on the overall environment and population, the contributions made through the bargaining process and finalized through agreement are sociotechnological. They will eliminate the disorder that began prior to the start of the process thereby establishing order in these sectors for the duration of the agreement. Moreover, as the terms are publicized, other unions and managements may very well use the same type of agreement as a basis for their bargaining. Even though crisis theory accounts for the element of surprise due to the nuances of adjusted information being incorporated into each side’s position, maximum utility is achieved for each side in terms of the final bargaining positions with order under newly established conditions being restored for the duration of the agreement. Because K represents the environment, the various public sectors—such as government institutions dealing with finance, security, education, transportation and welfare—it also includes the various aspects of the general private sector in its domain so that the relationship between K and r is oriented to maintaining order in the various sectors. It is thus necessary for order to be first accepted by the sectors in both K and r and then maintained by the agreement of the general population by accepting the authorities’ mandate for establishing order in the sectors, by the respective sectors of the population maintaining order, and by the agencies appointed for overseeing that order is maintained. The prevalence of order is as sturdy as the acceptance of the authority and conditions of each sector of K. Should any sector of K or r seek to break its relationship with its corresponding sector or should binding agreements come to an end due to the termination of their time limit, the opportunity then exists for order to be disrupted in the sector with the extent and intensity of the disruption over the time for renewed bargaining depending on the relative positions of strength of each sector. If renewed bargaining is not in the interest of either or both sides, disorder will remain until other arrangements are made, such as restructuring the relevant part of the K sector or the revaluation of the goals of that part of the r sector involved. The objective is then the resolution of differences in the positions either through the dynamics of bargaining with entropy entering the positions through new information (the element of surprise) thereby requiring the revaluation of

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each side’s positions during the bargaining process or by establishing a new basis for the relevant parts of the K and r sectors to work together. During this process, atmospherics of serious conflict are often employed by each side to please their public, only to be reduced when the bargaining process proceeds and removed when agreement is reached and order is again established. However, from the time that the agreement is terminated through the bargaining process, the conflict between the sectors may very well lead to serious disorder with the authorities in K seeking temporary agreement with the representatives in r to maintain order. This type of situation has replaced the predator-pursued relationship in societies that are not engaged in internal social conflict—such as civil war or major social disobedience—or in external military conflict with other societies. Throughout the historical evolution of societies, conflict has existed periodically between the ruling establishment and those who are ruled with the consequences usually being that the ruling establishment, possessing the major means of force, used its forces to maintain its ruling position in light of actual or potential dissent that was considered a threat to the regime. As a result of artistic and scientific developments in the Renaissance, those rulers whose countries entered into the era of industrialization understood that the benefits of industrialization could be fully realized only by the establishment of a new governing process. While maintaining authority and the traditions of their countries, it became necessary to establish new laws. With the continuation of geographical exploration, greater exposure among peoples and their traditions was occurring and because of the commerce based on industrial output, a new tolerance for different social customs and attitudes became necessary. Many peoples migrated to different countries; while they had to conform to the norms of their host countries, the rule of law became especially significant in social development. Moreover, the different genetic racial compositions of these peoples required tolerance, especially because of the social and genetic changes that were occurring due to the close social and physical involvement among the peoples in the developing societies. Because societies have been dynamic, historically, predation among humans has evolved into two forms. The first and most violent form is that of war, as nations have attempted to impose their way of life and outlooks on other peoples as well as conquering their land and property. To prevent this form of predation, nations have had to defend themselves and their values against those nations that attempted to usurp them through the force of arms with the sociotechnologies developed within the context of war by both predatory and defending nations applied to the best of the abilities of the nations involved. However, within the historical context of this form of predation, our contemporary era of knowledge is significant because countries have sociopolitical infrastructures allowing their citizens to take advantage of the opportunities of our era. Among those countries that have entered our era, the military option for settling disputes has been greatly diminished even though there is predation in the fields of

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economic competition and the pursuit of political and economic influence among those countries still not incorporated into our era. This will be discussed further in the chapter 13. The second form of predation is internal to all countries and pertains to seeking dominance by one sector over another. However, unlike previous historical eras where absolute domination was considered the sole privilege of the ruling classes, our era has eased this form of predation, providing balances among the sectors so that, as one sector seeks to exploit another sector, the potentially exploited sector has recourse to rectify the situation. Consider, for example, the position of the working classes during the Industrial Revolution. Unions existed as guilds to protect artisans but not the newly forming class that worked in the developing industries. With a great deal of struggle in the industrializing countries, workers’ unions were formed to provide their members with job security, decent wages, and other benefits as industrialists and their financial backers sought to maximize profits and to minimize expenses while facing competition that was developing in both local and international industries. The struggle for unionization pitted the industrialists against the workers and since the industrialists had the financial power, they were fairly successful in restricting the development of unions in various industrializing districts. Only when social strife increased and workers’ strikes were proving effective did industrialists yield and allow unions to form. The predators in this case were the industrialists and their financial backers. The workers, in self defense, eventually formed effective unions to protect their rights and achieve conditions they considered appropriate for obtaining a decent life. Predation also takes the form of organized crime, either on the small scale of neighborhood criminals extorting protection from small businesses or on the national and international scale of drug smuggling and the substance abuse that results. Various domestic and international law enforcement agencies are active in the battle against illicit drugs with the sociotechnological aspects of corrupting law officials and the use of sophisticated communications tools and distribution methods, relying on a fairly apathetic general public that is becoming more concerned with the extent of the serious dangers of addiction and crime that result to support increasing drug needs. Predation of these kinds and other kinds with local or wide social ramifications that cannot be resolved by compromise within the sociolegal structure alone bring disorder to the society. The greater and more intense the predation, the greater the social disorder it creates. Hence, for society, disorder has two meanings. One meaning pertains to changing the status quo in light of innovations, initiations, and the eventual imitations that are incorporated into society. This is the disorder that comes about through entropy and is rectified by the establishment of utility either through innovation or imitation. This type of disorder does not preserve the status quo, because changes within societies confronted with entropy are necessary if they are to develop and advance. Disorder that affects social organizations—such as unions and management—can be resolved through bargaining

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or through the awareness that changes are to the benefit of society with a new order being established that will allow societies to flourish and to continue to develop. In this sense, disorder is beneficial and, should predation be removed to the benefit of the parties involved, the society will continue to flourish until the next social domestic or national crisis involving conflicts of interest that can be resolved through the dynamics of crisis theory. Social predation—in the form of crime, domestic, or national conflicts—that continues, however, will restrict social development as, in our era of knowledge, long-term conflicts hinder application of the processes of innovation, initiation, and imitation within the society. For example, pernicious union-management conflicts prevent acquiring the financing for innovations and changes in products that can increase the company’s market share, hence restricting profitability, while other companies enter competition through imitation. Should a company’s policy be that of imitating a successful product, being hindered by union action reduces its ability to compete and affects its profitability. The predatory aspects of local and national crime are that they remove monies that could have been invested in the economy, channeling it to wherever it can be made legal thereby further financing its illegal activities, reducing the profitability of its prey and affecting society in general in a negative way by reducing the ability of its prey to save and invest in its future. Hence, while for humanity the predator-victim relationship has been altered somewhat due to the dynamics of our contemporary era, it still exists and is as dangerous in its own way as in past historical eras. While social predation in its legal form has been provided with methods for alleviation—such as bargaining and arbitration—the criminal aspect still has to be confronted and, if not removed entirely, be reduced in its influences. The issues of petty crimes such as extortion and robbery are as serious in their own way as national crimes for they usurp the affected population of its funds and energy that could otherwise be devoted to improving its situation in society, enabling contributions to be made through innovations, initiations, and imitations. In our era of knowledge, the disorder brought about by the expression of personal and collective rights has been fairly well considered, and where degrees of disorder exist, order can be restored by bargaining and arbitration, and by the functions of the legal system. The predatory issues of crime—international, national, and local—have, however, yet to be dealt with effectively, although with the developments in intra and international cooperation, crime is being attacked more effectively, reversing somewhat its predator-prey relationship. Pernicious situations such as crime and those sector conflicts that disrupt the workings of society resulting in economic loss bring about disorder that presents challenges to both the K and r sectors. These situations are important challenges to societies and their evolutionary development, and are serious threats to those societies not yet into our era of knowledge. While disorders of these kinds can be rectified by legislation and efficient working relationships among the sectors and populations they represent, disorders of countries that have not yet entered

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into our era of knowledge present a different type of internal conflict, one of the loss of life and resources, as the civil wars on the African continent, in Yugoslavia, in Chechnya, and the military conflicts within Mexico have demonstrated. Over time, human evolution has not been entirely physical, but has also been social, with health and education benefiting, thereby allowing for the working with ideas and making contributions that can be critiqued by others.30 In this way our knowledge evolves and expands, to be eventually refuted, brought into entropy, and repaired by initiation, with further innovations occurring for established or newly constructed problem areas. Our physical evolution from early primates to thinking and working Homo sapiens sapiens has provided us with the strategies for developing our lives as individuals within our social structures. We have learned the skills of war, of how to be predators to our fellow humans, and of how to best avoid being prey of our fellow humans and prevent being destroyed or enslaved. As a species, we have accumulated this knowledge throughout our evolution and have sought to apply it to the best of our abilities within the historical eras in which we have lived and thrived. We have also learned that, as predators to our own species, we must adapt ourselves to the conditions of our eras, use the concepts and the knowledge of our eras to develop ourselves and our societies, defend ourselves with the sociotechnologies that we have developed, and prey on others as the necessity or as our power and egos allow us. However, as we have developed as a species, we have witnessed historical eras rising and declining, to be replaced by other eras with their unique conditions and situations. Our contemporary era of knowledge is such a historical era, and it is unique in the opportunities it provides us for eliminating finally the predator-prey relationship that has plagued our species. But, again, this must wait for the next chapter. CRISIS THEORY AND EVOLUTION: CONCLUDING REMARKS In his book Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Daniel C. Dennett wrote : “You only get evolution, as the Santa Fe motto proclaims, on the edge of chaos, in the regions of possible law that form the hybrid zone between stifling order and destructive chaos. Fortunately, our portion of the universe is poised in such a zone, in which the conditions of evolvability are tuned just right.”31 For crisis theory, evolution takes a different approach. Evolution comes from two sources: one approach is the confrontation with problem situations for which solutions to previous similar problems are either totally inadequate, thereby requiring innovative solutions or sufficiently inadequate thereby requiring initiations to adjust existing solutions to deal with the problem. This is sociotechnological evolution and the effective contributions from this procedure are incorporated into a species’ collective memory or behavior pattern to be applied or adjusted accordingly when similar problems arise. As innovations occur when existing

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solutions are inadequate, the accumulation of these innovations over evolutionary time move the species onto a higher evolutionary plane. However, innovations and initiations are subject to the restraints on a species’ abilities at problem solving. Because the problems confronting a species are usually conventional to the species, the solutions applied are also conventional. Should problems arise for which the species has little or no acquaintance, its biological (including its mental) abilities may be insufficient to deal with them and this can bring about either the species’ total extinction or the demise of that segment of the species to which the problem situation relates. Hence, the second approach to evolution is genetic. However, as argued in this work, evolution requires the combined sociotechnological and genetic aspects inherited by the species through the biological transmission of genetic material and through the influences of parental training and social education as they exist for each species. Moreover, as sociotechnology has its strategies developed by each species for its common problem situations, so has genetics, although this subject is both abstract and still subject to further intensive research. However, as with sociotechnology, genetic strategies can be approached from the aspect of crisis theory. In this respect, there must be order either as a result of the strategy or formed during the process in which the strategy is being realized. Concerning selection, Stuart A. Kauffman discusses the evolutionary origin of complex wholes with the systems formed from these wholes as ensembles in which the order that exists is typical to the system. His approach is to consider selection as acting on systems that spontaneously exhibit some particular form of order “that is typical of an entire class of similar systems called an ensemble. . . . The balance between the self-organized properties typical in the ensemble and selection then depends on the extent that the selection can move the population cloud [selection is considered here as moving the population cloud to particular parts of the ensemble] to that part of the ensemble which no longer exhibits the proper order.”32 Hence, he introduces an NK epistatic system, in which N refers to the number of parts in the system—such as genes in a genotype, amino acids in a protein, or otherwise—and K reflects the richness of the system’s cross-coupling in terms of the epistatic interactions of the system’s components.33 Moreover, for each gene, its allele fitness (wi) is generated by the random assignment of 2K⫹1 combinations of the K⫹1 genes which impinge on it. Hence, the fitness contribution in the context of K for other genes which impinge on it is defined by wi and is generated by the random assignment of 2K⫹1 allele combinations of the K⫹1 genes which impinge on it.34 Moreover, the fitness of a given genotype is the sum of the normalized randomly assigned fitness contributions of the N sites, so that each genotype can change to N(A-1) mutant neighbors, “and adaptive walks via fitter variants pass to local optima.”35 The Darwinist thinkers maintain that “natural selection operating on gratuitous random selection is the sieve that retains order and lets chaos pass into oblivion.”36 As for selection and self-organization, Kauffman maintains that if selec-

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tion is capable of moving a population to virtually any region of a landscape, then it is powerful enough to avoid any spontaneously ordered properties which most, but not all, entities may exhibit; if, however, selection is incapable of moving an adapting population to virtually any region of the landscape, then spontaneously ordered properties which are widespread in the landscape are very likely to be found in the organisms even in the presence of continuing selection.37 Thus, for Kauffman, selection is partly due to whole organisms moving into new territory or to whole organisms adjusting to new conditions within their established territory. For these movements, or “random walks,” the degree of selection depends on adaptation to the territory’s ruggedness, that is, its conditions; how the organism relates to these conditions depends on its epistatic relations and its determination to survive effectively within these circumstances. New conditions in an established territory are caused by factors such as organisms that have moved into it and changes within the territory’s features that require adjustment by the organisms within the territory’s influence.38 While these adjustments are not as profound as those of an organism moving into new territory, they are significant to the extent that they also determine the organism’s evolution so that, while effective adjustment ensures continued evolution until the next stage, ineffective adjustment ceases the evolutionary process, rendering the organism to remain at its present stage until it is confronted by another challenge or to face extinction because it is unable to survive faced with the necessity for change. Kauffman differentiates between adaptive evolution and co-evolution with adaptive evolution occurring on a fixed landscape with the attractors being the local optima which are single points. For co-evolution, however, the adaptive landscape of one actor “heaves and deforms as the other actors make their own adaptive moves.”39 Discussing co-evolution in terms of Boolean games: Using the NK model, he couples each N (player) with another K agent and assumes that each agent after assisting its payoff matrix changes strategies for maximization under the assumption that the other K agents do not change their strategies. He considers this position myopic because it fails to take into consideration that other agents are changing their strategies and seeking to maximize their positions. However, the improvement of one agent’s position with no subsequent responses from the other agents may prevent the overall process from moving uphill, placing them in a Nash equilibrium situation in which an agent is locally happier as long as other agents do not deviate from their fixed strategies.40 However, this situation is time-bound because other agents will eventually deviate from their previous strategies to improve their positions, given the specific situations and those of the competitors they confront. As genotypes move into new landscapes, they seek the attractor positions that provide them the best comfort and ability to adapt but these positions soon become crowded as other systems seek the same vantage points. These positions become uncomfortable, bringing about further movement. Because of the initial advantages of these attractor positions, they eventually become crowded by other

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genotypes, resulting in further movement according to the genotype’s understanding of its situation. This understanding is due to its awareness of its location and utility at adaptation. As its abilities to maintain its adaptation are hindered either by competition or overcrowding, entropy sets in and is either repaired by the innovation or initiation necessary to improve its position or it relocates to different landscapes and begins the process again. In this respect there is no difference between adaptive evolution and coevolution because every step toward maximization of a position within an established landscape influences other factors, including the landscape itself, relating to which is, itself, part of the evolutionary process. Innovative or initiative strategies employed by genotypes to maximize their situations are confronted with both the ability to utilize the landscape and to thrive on it, to survive in competition with other members of its genotypes and others also seeking to maximize their positions, and to defend against the predators who have also moved into the landscape. A consequence of this genetic strategy is that, as members of the same genotypical populations migrate to new landscapes, each member learns from the other the processes of adaptation. This learning process results in the development of sociotechnologies necessary for adaptation and evolution. This merger may serve as attractors for situational maximization, but differences among the specific genotypes within the group result in differing skills with each member possessing its learned abilities and those made available to it through its unique genetic differences. Hence, communities develop, and with communities come problem situations requiring innovations and initiations to the best of the members’ abilities. Confronting predators, using the land for sources of food and shelter, and the further procreation of the species require imitation for communal stability, while the problem situations confronting the community in general and its individual members in competition with the natural situation and with other members requires initiation and innovation. Therefore, evolution comes about not from chaos, but from the disorder resulting from the breakdown of existing systems due either to changing locations or to the confrontation with problem situations for which previously existing solutions are inadequate. Chaos assumes dynamic equilibrium; changing problem situations occur in dynamic disequilibrium. The situation of life is dynamic, and order and stability provide security for both individuals and groups that form communities and eventually societies while confronting changing problem situations. The issue is therefore not that evolution comes about on the the edge of chaos in regions of possible law that form the hybrid zone between stifling order and chaos but from changing problem situations for which existing approaches are ineffective. The order resulting from the effective solution to each new problem situation remains for the duration of the solution’s utility; afterward, in light of new problem situations or of existing ones changed in nuance, the existing order breaks down to a corresponding degree for which, if new solutions are found, order is restored and perhaps a new stage in evolution is

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reached. The concepts of crisis theory are thus necessary for the dynamics of evolution.

NOTES 1. Colin Tudge, The Engineer in the Garden (London: Pimlico, 1995), p. 295. 2. See Erwin Schrodinger, What is Life? & Mind and Matter (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967). 3. Stuart A. Kauffman points out that Mendel sent his work “to some of the best botanists of his day, even to Darwin, with almost no response.” See Stuart A. Kauffman, The Origins of Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), quoted from p. 7. 4. See the discussion on Francis Crick, James Watson, and their colleagues in Robert Jastrow, Red Giants and White Dwarfs (New York: Warner Books, 1980), pp. 208–18. Linus Pauling was also interested in genetics, but he posited a single helix for carrying the genetic code. This did not match observations, nor did it allow for the formulation of a viable theory. The double helix, however, satisfied these conditions. See James Watson, The Double Helix (New York: Signet Books, 1968). 5. Jack Cohen and Ian Stewart, The Collapse of Chaos (New York: Penguin Books, 1995), p. 73. See their discussion on DNA in chapter 3, “The Organization of Development,” pp. 56–96. 6. See, for example, Norman D. Newell, Creation: Myth or Reality? (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985) and Arthur N. Strahler, Science and Earth History: the Evolution/Creation Controversy (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1987). 7. Hence, according to the augmented creationist view, humanity has been given the ability to control evolution. See, for example, Tim M. Berra, Evolutionism and Creationism (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1980). 8. See V. C. Wynne-Edwards, Animal Dispersion in Relation to Social Behaviour (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1962), and this discussion on the aspect of birds in Tudge, The Engineer in the Garden, p. 107. 9. Edward O. Wilson, Sociobiology (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press, abridged ed., 1980), from the glossary, p. 317. 10. Hence, one approach to the study of cancer is the consideration of this issue. 11. For problems of carbon dating, see Jared Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1999), pp. 94–98. 12. Fundamental creationists accept the biblical account literally, that the world was created in six days. However, Robert Jastrow writes: The complete process of planet formation went on over a period of perhaps 50 million years, proceeding with extreme slowness at first, and rapidly increasing momentum in the final stages. At the end, all the matter in the solar system was gathered into the existing planets, and only a few atoms of gas remained in the space between. This is the situation in the solar system as it exists today.

Red Giants and White Dwarfs, p. 93. 13. See Moses Maimonides, The Guide for the Perplexed, trans. M. Friedla¨ nder, 2nd ed., revised (New York: Dover Publications, 1956), part II, chaps. xiv–xxx, pp. 174–218. Maimonides argued against the Aristotelian position that the universe always existed in a steady state and demonstrated according to biblical writings the creation of the universe.

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14. However, see Steven Weinberg, The First Three Minutes (New York: Basic Books, 1977), in which a scientific account of the Big Bang approach is provided. While the Steady State versus the Big Bang approach may be an issue, it is certainly marginal in the creationist-evolution controversy. Both schools, however, accept that the differences among the same species are due to their environments, and here the issue is semantic with the discussion focusing on whether they developed that way or whether these changes are due to the dynamics of the processes of evolution. 15. Jastrow, Red Giants and White Dwarfs, p. 197. 16. The end of the last Ice Age is dated at 11000 B.C. 17. Fekri A. Hassan, “Earth Resources and Population: An Archeological Perspective,” in How Humans Adapt, ed. Donald J. Ortner (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute Press, 1983), p. 197. 18. Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, p. 40. 19. Ibid., p. 39. 20. Hassan, “Earth Resources and Population,” p. 199. 21. The Inquisition was an attempt to maintain religion in light of the developments in scientific reasoning, which had begun questioning religious doctrine and the power of those who held authority. 22. For example, Arnold Toynbee writes: In reality the barbarians were not the authors of our spiritual being. They made their passage felt by being in at the death of the Hellenic Society, but they cannot claim the distinction of having delivered the deathblow. By the time they arrived on the scene the Hellenic Society was already dying of wounds self-inflicted in the times of troubles centuries before. They were merely the vultures feeding on the carrion or the maggots crawling on the carcass. The heroic age is the epilogue to Hellenistic history not the prelude to ours.

Arnold Toynbee, A Study of History (London: Oxford University Press, edition abridged by D. C. Somerville, 1951), p. 14. 23. Such was the way of the barbarians. When they conquered Rome, the fallen Empire became the Holy Roman Empire. For example, Toynbee writes that when they conquered southwestern Asia, they “were unconciously restoring a Syriac universal state which had first taken form in the prematurely overthrown empire of the Achaemenidae.” A Study of History, Toynbee, p. 458. 24. Behaviorist psychology is based on this principle. See, for example, B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York: Free Press Paperback, 1953). However, different nuances in the same general problem require different approaches to finding solutions—hence the dynamics of crisis theory with initiation or innovation as the situation requires. 25. With respect to plants, Jared Diamond discusses the influences of the geographical axes of continents and the influences of these axes on plant migration and the availability of vegetation as food sources. See Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel, chapter 10, “Spacious Skies and Tilted Axes,” pp. 176–91. 26. For example, these changes may be within the respective sector but not yet have their effects on their corresponding sector. 27. On the Taft-Hartley Act, C. Wright Mills has written: The story of labor in the Franklin Roosevelt era encouraged hope because labor was then emerging for the first time on any American scale; it had little need of any sense of direction other than to

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“organize the unorganized.” But in the Truman Fair Deal this is not the case: not the mandate of the slump, but the farmers’ fear that his enormous property might be taken away from him; not millions of unemployed, but labor’s fear that the Taft-Hartley acts will be used against existing unions are the underpinnings of this administration.

From C. Wright Mills, White Collar (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956), p. 322. On Taft-Hartley, Mancur Olson has written: The Taft-Hartley Act provided that impartial governmentally administered elections should be held to determine whether workers did in fact want to belong to unions. . . . The same workers who had to be coerced to pay union dues voted for the unions with compulsory dues (and normally not by overwhelming margins), so that this feature of the Taft-Hartley Act was soon abandoned as pointless.

From Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 22, and see accompanying footnote. 28. The definitive work in game theory is by John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, The Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1953). See Stuart A. Kauffman’s discussion on payoffs and the payoff matrix in The Origins of Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 222, 239. 29. Crisis theory allows for changing strategies through initiation on existing approaches and the innovation of new approaches with maximizing considered within the context of the utility of the approach and the initiations made. 30. For an interesting discussion on the effects of diseases on history, see Frederick F. Cartwright in collaboration with Michael D. Biddiss, Disease and History (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1972). 31. Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (New York: Simon and Shuster/ Touchstone Books, 1996), pp. 221–22. The Santa Fe motto expresses the opinion of Stuart A. Kauffman and his co-workers at the Santa Fe Institute. Dennett states that “You only get evolution, as the Santa Fe Motto proclaims, on the edge of chaos, in regions of possible law that form the hybrid zone between stifling order and destructive chaos. Fortunately, our portion of the universe is poised in just such a zone, in which the conditions of evolvability are just right.” 32. Stuart A. Kauffman, The Origins of Order (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 16. All quotes from Kauffman are taken from this work. 33. Ibid., p. 40. Epistatic interactions are those interactions among genes. 34. Ibid., p. 42. He defines the fitness of the entire genotype W as the average of the contribution of all the loci: W⫽

1 N Σ W1. N i⫽1

35. Ibid., p. 43. 36. Ibid., p. 10. 37. Ibid., pp. 10, 11. 38. Ibid., p. 38. 39. Ibid., p. 238. 40. For an interesting discussion on J. Nash’s work, see Michael Guillen, Bridges to Infinity (Los Angeles: Jeremy P. Tarcher Inc., 1983), pp. 149–152. Also, see Nash’s article “Noncooperative Games,” in Annals of Mathematics 54 (1951): 289.

13

Order and Disorder in Our Contemporary Era Planning is the organized application of systematic reasoning to the solution of specific practical problems. An alternative to planning is the-trial-and error method. Long before Charles Darwin described this alternative as “natural selection,” Adam Smith showed it to be the prime mover of economic progress. Wassily Leonteif, Input-Output Economics1

PRELIMINARY REMARKS The trial-and-error method in Darwinian evolution is an explanation of how each genotype may have evolved, given its specific physical and mental circumstances and the problem situations it confronted. For each species, those methods that have been tried and found to be ineffective are inevitably abandoned and— time permitting—other approaches had been developed. Over the lengthy period of evolution, some creatures were not successful in their Darwinian trial-anderror method, had succumbed to their problems and become extinct, while other creatures did succeed in finding effective methods for dealing with their problems and continued to survive and evolve. Moreover, because evolution is not only genetic but also sociotechnological, through the processes of evolution both the specific genetic construction of the individual of the species survives as well as the sociotechnological aspects developed by members of the species and employed by the general species, which provide the social cohesion for cooperation and social development. With respect to the evolution of Homo sapiens, social cohesion has been

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necessary for the species to survive. The division of labor between hunters and tillers of the soil, and, eventually, as social structures developed, the inclusion of artisans allowed societies to flourish. Darwinian trial-and-error in problem solving was eventually replaced as societies developed methodologies within the divisions of labor. While the earliest of historical eras, the Ice Ages, were imposed on Homo sapiens, the Iron and Bronze Ages were eras that were formed due to human ingenuity and innovation. Great social organizations with delineated geographical boundaries were formed, making possible contributions in architecture, music, and literature that expressed the conditions and circumstances of life in these cities and empires. Predators still existed, and the societies of ancient Greece, Israel, and the Roman Empire fell to them. With the fall of the Roman Empire, a new manmade historical era came into being in the form of the Dark Ages. The Roman Empire was replaced by the Roman Church and only when St. Thomas Aquinas acquired the writings of Aristotle and developed them in his writings did the Renaissance, another man-made era, begin. Hence, through individual evolution within a social context humanity learned to cope with historical ages imposed by history and developed the eras that represent social evolution. In this sense, the sentiment expressed by Leonteif expresses historical truth. When Adam Smith wrote The Origins and Causes of the Wealth of Nations2 he dealt with the problems of mercantilism and physiocracy. The theory of mercantilism was strictly a British approach to economic wealth in the tradition of empiricism and experimentation that had developed in Great Britain. The mercantilist school held that a nation’s wealth is based solely on its trading prowess, and it was of no significance whether the goods traded were domestic in origin or acquired from other lands. Wealth was proclaimed in coin obtained by trading more than was received thereby possessing a claim on the trading partner’s economy. This situation was termed the favorable balance of trade and was sought by the British exporters to acquire surplus foreign coin. As a strictly British approach to economic wealth, mercantilism differed from its French counterpart of physiocracy. In the cool rationalism for which French thinking is traditionally famous, physiocracy was a philosophical-cum-economic theory that maintained that a country’s wealth stems from the productivity of its soil. Agriculture was the most important industry for it provided the food necessary for feeding the population. On the basis of surplus foodstuffs, trade would enable these surpluses to be exported for goods and services not obtainable—either in sufficient quantities or at all—from the domestic markets. Phisiocracy maintained that the greater the crop yield was, the hardier the livestock yields, the healthier the population, and the stronger the economic position would be. Moreover, as both mercantilism and physiocracy developed during the Renaissance, the differences in the basic philosophical conceptualizations were manifested in the differences in their respective approaches to exploration. The

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British, as subjects of an island country, were very aware of the burden placed on them by their island isolation, and while they did not neglect the fertile lands of their agricultural sectors, they did recognize their limited space and lack of resources. By obtaining the natural resources of other lands and by mobilizing the peoples in these lands as cheap labor, they could direct their activities to foreign commerce and obtain foreign currencies to continue their activities. The French approach to exploration was not so much to conquer other peoples as to obtain new agricultural lands so that their produce could be traded under French rule and in French coin. The French exploited conquered peoples to till the soil and increase agricultural yields so that surplus crops and agricultural byproducts could be traded for finished goods and services. These two different philosophical and practical approaches found common ground in Adam Smith’s reasoning. His French was sufficient to allow him to engage in deep philosophical and economic discussions with Dr. Francois Quesnay, the main spokesman for the physiocratic school; he also debated with Quesnay’s followers.3 With Smith’s background in the mercantilistic tradition and his participation in debate with Quesnay and his school, he formulated the theory stated in the Wealth of Nations. Smith recognized that the degree and kinds of enterprise existing in Great Britain and France were not in themselves adequate for economic expansion. Guilds and other forms of unions that protected their members’ status and the qualities of their trades were limiting both economic expansion and growth. Instead, he argued for private and free enterprise in which individuals would take the risks and reap the profits or bear the losses. While Smith considered agriculture to be of prime importance, he nevertheless deflated its physiocratic significance and placed it soundly within the economic function of feeding the populace. Surplus agricultural produce could most certainly be exported and goods and services not provided by the domestic economy imported. Hence, for Smith, international commerce should not be neglected as it was important for stimulating production and earning foreign coin. However, emphasis should be placed on individual initiative and enterprise as the means for building national wealth because enterprise brought new and standard products into the markets and stimulated competition and new demand. Therefore, both agricultural development and establishment of foreign and domestic markets should be the consequence and the supportive factors of private enterprise. The trial-and-error approach that Leonteif referred to in Adam Smith’s work was the applications of science to the processes of production, and the risks the entrepreneur takes in developing new products and the opening of new markets, and the risks undertaken by those entering these markets once they showed signs of becoming established. Smith’s book appeared at the beginning of the American Revolution and the historical era of the Industrial Revolution. By focusing on market development that results from the marketing of new products, he placed the origins of the wealth of nations primarily on market development— the consequences of which were the formulations of classical and neoclassical

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economic theory and the spread of industrialization that had resulted from the application of science developed during the Renaissance to the processes of production. During human evolution, each historical era has provided conditions in which the development of the social structures formed during the latter Ice Ages were able to evolve. For example, the era of imperial expansion of the Roman empire brought about the concepts of law and legislative democracy that had begun during the formation of the Greek city-states. With the downfall of Rome and the Dark Ages that followed, philosophical inquiry had developed to the extent that when St. Thomas Aquinas became acquainted with the works of Aristotle, vistas of thought were opened. They resulted in the conceptions of enquiry into nature and the consequent rise of the Renaissance during which scientific inquiry flourished and artistic expresson expanded in the subjects of artistic themes in music, painting, and sculpture, and in the techniques of artistic expression and execution of these works. The Renaissance ended with the application of science to the processes of production and, in its place, the historical era of the Industrial Revolution began. Moreover, the early applications of science to production also consisted of trial and error, because both production and the applications of science were new and unique. With the rise of the Industrial Revolution came the necessity to finance industries, which led to the formation of the stock and bond markets and the exchanges necessary to handle their transactions. However, as a consequence, as industrialization expanded and the need for financing intensified, the stock and bond markets became centers of speculation in which shares traded hands in the effort to reap monetary profits. The focus on the financial markets resulted in speculation without controls—a situation that climaxed in 1929 and resulted in the fall of the world’s financial exchanges and the Great Depression that followed. The uniqueness of the transition from the historical era of the Industrial Revolution to our contemporary era of knowledge lies in the consequences of the decline of the Industrial Revolution and the dynamics of these consequences that resulted in the rise of our era. As the Industrial Revolution expanded, so did the conflicts for power among the industrializing countries as well as the Civil War fought between the North and South in the United States. World War I was waged to establish political power among the European countries to sustain their developing economic power. Not only was the Industrial Revolution a result of humanity’s orderly evolutionary social development, but this development was set back by the human activity of war. World War I disrupted the dynamics of industrialization that was uniting countries of differing histories, customs, and approaches to civilization through investment, commerce and trade. For the duration of the war and in its aftermath, the tendency toward union conflicted with tendencies toward maintaining the status quo of nationstate realpolitik, with each country exploiting its own position and seeking to be better than the other countries. Because of the pressing national issues

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brought about by the Great Depression, the League of Nations formed after World War I to establish international cooperation and provide an international system for resolving grievances. It was dissolved with the rise of German nationalism and militarism, and the German invasion of Poland in 1939, and the war that was consequently waged in Europe by Germany and its Axis allies. This, together with the inability to halt Japan’s policy of military expansion into China (which led to the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941), brought the previously self-isolated United States into World War II. The decline of the Industrial Revolution and the Great Depression that resulted were addressed by the world’s greatest economists. Theories of underconsumption and overproduction were posited and welfare economics were discussed—each within the conceptual framework of neoclassical economic theory and activity as it existed prior to the Great Depression. However, in England, John Maynard Keynes redefined the economic problems of the Depression from a new perspective. He established a unique approach relating the world’s industrialized economies and their governments within a conceptualization in which the esprit of laissez-faire of Smith and the classical and neoclassical economists who followed was tempered with government control of the economy. Nevertheless the dynamics of world politics at the time and the inability of governments to act with sufficient resolve to end the Great Depression served to justify the formation of the nationalistic and militaristic parties and their invasions that resulted in World War II.4 In light of the allied victory and during the early social time of reconstruction, the United Nations, formed as World War II was drawing to a close, was established to perform as its predecessor, the League of Nations. However, the important difference between these organizations was the realization of the postwar necessity to establish international economic organizations to support reconstruction and provide financial assistance to countries with financial macro difficulties. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were formed to serve as monetary nonpolitical agencies for such assistance. The impartiality of these organizations proved necessary during the Cold War which set in rapidly after the euphoria of the allied victory, with the Soviet Union and its new postwar allies confronting the Western powers and their newly acquired allies. As the postwar reconstruction continued, the problems of the developing and underdeveloped countries became apparent due to the importance these countries had in the geopolitics of power being waged by the Soviet and Western blocs. As financial and military investments increased in these countries to strengthen their positions in the international arena, the peoples in many of these countries sought independence, giving rise to two opposing tendencies on the part of the neocolonial powers. One tendency was for the powers to persevere in the colonizing tradition and maintain their geographical possessions, even at the cost of military force being applied to prevent violence and attempts at revolution. The other tendency was to use the knowledge gained from the processes of postwar reconstruction, adjusting this knowledge to suit the political, geo-

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graphic, and economic conditions of these countries to raise their living standards and levels of education so that their citizens could eventually enter our contemporary era of knowledge. The culmination of these tendencies resulted in movements for independence among these countries as their education and finances improved. These movements for independence proved challeging as they were exploited by both the Western and the Soviet bloc countries to improve their global positions and insure their channels to the resources of these countries. In the Middle East conflict, for example, the Soviet Union sided in the confrontation with countries of the Arab bloc and influenced their marketing policies while the Western bloc—predominantly the United States which with its large investment in oil exploration and refining resulting in heavy dependence on inter- and intraArabian politics to maintain oil supplies was confronted with higher prices, often contending with restricted supplies—backed Israel. This situation was of short duration and illustrates the dynamics of our era. Atomic energy, exploited for uses in weapons of mass destruction—a prominent feature of the Cold War— was also exploited for peaceful purposes such as providing electric power thereby posing a viable alternative to oil and the heavy dependence on the oil producing countries. Once the possible alternatives to oil—atomic energy being just one—were demonstrated as viable, oil prices declined and supplies remained plentiful. Our era of knowledge shares with the other post–Ice Ages historical eras the fact that it is based on the previous eras. Just as with the Industrial Revolution with the applications of science to production, in our era there is the application of science as it developed since the Industrial Revolution to the processes of production and market development; industrial development in our era, however, has resulted in the paradox of industrialization. This paradox was manifested in the development of product innovations and subsequent imitations of successfully commercial products, manufactured by workers who had to maintain the industrial discipline imposed by management. Moreover, as industry regained its profitability through civilian consumption, unions renewed their campaign for workers’ benefits and rights. However, the Cold War was raging, being fought with military intrigue and posturing, and occasionally on the battlefields of Korea and the Middle East. Another significant aspect of the Cold War was fought on the battlefield of education. In 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first successful spacecraft, Sputnik, initiating the first major social change in our era. When the spacecraft orbited the earth, the shock to the West’s education systems was tremendous. The Soviet achievement was hailed as a great accomplishment for humanity and provided the first real opportunity for space exploration. However, it also provided the awareness that the education systems in the West with their emphasis on rote learning and secondary, minor emphasis on original thinking, had to change. It was this event in 1957 that finally brought our era of knowledge into

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fruition. Computers began to come online, revising conceptualizations and allowing the development of system models for experimentation in space exploration, for research into weather and storm areas, for economic forecasting, for developing domestic and international scenarios, and for official communications and transactions. The new emphasis on education encouraged original thinking while the benefits of rote learning were still maintained. Because of the explorations into the foundations of mathematics that had begun during the Industrial Revolution, new mathematics were developed. Set theory shed light on the concepts of infinity, and with the Cantorial concept of infinity, chaos and complexity theory were formulated; nonlinear time-series concepts helped explain the processes of production but with the emphasis on the knowledge and scientific contributions formed during the Industrial Revolution. For example, the theoretical development of computer science begun in the late 1880s with the works of Charles Babbage and George Boole was continued by Alan Turing and John von Neumann during and after World War II.5 The development and applications of computer technology provided an effective instrument for controlling production and for improving methods of communication. Nevertheless, while the scientific and artistic developments in our era have relied on computers for computation, investigation, and communication among peoples in the arts and sciences, the development of this instrument and the internetting systems that allow for the easy access to information and provide swift communication is due to the knowledge gained from people such as Babbage, Boole, von Neumann, Turing, and others who applied their knowledge and probed into the mathematics and electronics of this form of communication and information gathering and dispensing. As our contemporary era began in the aftermath of World War II with the social time of reconstruction of Europe, Japan, and other countries damaged by the war, it was also a social time when a shift occurred from wartime to peacetime production to cope with the pent-up demand of civilians who had been engaged in wartime production and of the demobilized military and civilians who worked to support the war effort. This resulted in a paradox because, in spite of the breakthroughs that had occurred in science such as the unleashing of atomic energy and the development of computer theory and in mathematics, that resulted from the works of Henri Poincare´ , Georg Cantor,6 and other original thinkers, it was also a social time of conformity. Conformity was necessary to transfer the discipline of military training to the processes of industry in order to change the economy from wartime to peacetime production, especially because the shadow of the Great Depression still haunted both government and industry. Our social time in our contemporary era holds great promise. With the exploration of space now being conducted in earnest as a result of increasingly refined technologies, the older priority of maintaining the operative edge in strategy and weapons systems has taken on a different form because of the dissolution of the Soviet Union.7 In this respect, the serious international chal-

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lenge in our current social time in our era is maintaining the peace among the underdeveloped and developing countries. Moreover, with the Cold War ending in 1990, the costs of weapons research have been channeled to a significant degree to financing space research with international participation in space research programs. Since the demise of the Cold War, the reliance on surrogate countries to perpetuate big power foreign policy has enabled international economic cooperation in assisting developing and underdeveloped countries.8 Hence, the dynamics of our contemporary era of knowledge and current social time are unfolding, but not without serious domestic and international consequences. The countries on the African continent and those countries that were part of the Soviet bloc that lack the necessary infrastructure to cope with the changes occurring in our era and our social time have relied on the age-old tradition of attempting to resolve their problems through war. Moreover, the power bases established in many of these countries are now repressing differing opinions due to religious and ethnic differences—thereby demonstrating a lack of social evolution—at a time when greater personal liberty is being given to peoples in these countries and the full dynamics of our era are finding expression. As a consequence of the outcome of World War II, the international politics that occurred during the Cold War, and in light of the international situation that has evolved during our current social time, three types of countries now exist that take full advantage of the benefits of our era as contributors and participants as consumers. There are the future-oriented developed countries that take full advantage of our contemporary era both as contributors and consumers; the present-oriented developing countries that are in various stages of evolving socioeconomic systems and have evolved political systems that demonstrate sufficient maturity in domestic and international affairs to eventually move into our era of knowledge; and the past-oriented underdeveloped countries whose leadership is in various stages of domestic conflict with opposing sectors or groups— be they religious, national, or ethnic—and/or are in conflict with their neighbors due to the failure to establish policies to bring them into the present-orientation stage. In the past-oriented countries, social turmoil and states of war, as destructive as these conditions have always been for social evolution, are being conducted for more than the traditional reasons of self-preservation against an outside predator, the necessity for conquering others for power, and ensuring stability against disruptive forces. Rather, they are being propagandized as being conducted to establish and maintain the best socioeconomic system, but in fact, they further the personal positions of the political leadership, even though they may seek to benefit their countries as they understand it. Both the past- and present-oriented countries are being subjected to severe crises resulting from political shifts, changing international and domestic conditions, and their attempts to move into our era of knowledge without sufficient foundation and preparation. The future-oriented countries are strong enough politically, socially, and economically that all crises can be treated within their

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socioeconomic political systems without devastating consequences.9 These systems will be discussed and analyzed in terms of crisis theory as they exist in our contemporary era of knowledge, after which they will be discussed in the context of the paradox of industrialization that has evolved as a result of the dynamics of our era. COMMENTS ON CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL ORIENTATION Ju¨ rgen Habermas has written that: “What characterizes the passage from traditional society to society commencing the process of modernization is not that structural modifification of the institutional framework is necessitated under the pressure of relatively developed productive forces, for that is the mechanism of the evolution of the species from the very beginning. What is new is the level of development of the productive forces that makes permanent the extension of subsystems of purpose-rational action and thereby calls into question the traditional form of the legitimation of power.”10 Indeed, the “traditional” forms of power are called into question, and even though the level of development of productive forces extend the subsystems of purpose-rational action, these forces do not make these subsystems permanent. By so doing, the older system with its then-legitimation of power is not merely called into question, but replaced by a system of power appropriate for the conditions of the era. Moreover, it is not the case that every system of power—no matter the extent of its sociopolitical legitimacy—is suitable to the conditions of the era as it is evolving. That this is so in our era is demonstrated by the existence of present- and past-oriented countries that have not yet entered our era and partaken in its dynamics in industrial output, scientific contributions or contributions of significance in the arts. Political authority is gained on the basis of how well politicians relate to the dynamics of a historical era as these dynamics are incorporated into their political spheres. Throughout modern history, dictators have attempted to minimize material and ideological influences outside their countries in order to maintain their control, but, specifically in our era with the sophisticated technology of communications, the outside influences are almost impossible to stifle; moreover, because international trade is necessary for these countries to thrive economically, the exposure of the material and ideological influences of other countries is unavoidable. Habermas is correct therefore, in stating that the development of productive forces has made permanent the extension of the subsystems of purposeful and rational action. These subsystems are manifested in economics, in that businesses are subsystems of industries and that in planning innovative or imitative projects, alternative costs, profit margins and targeted primary and secondary markets must be rationally considered, especially in light of the rigors of competition. In domestic and international politics, these subsystems are the branches of the various political streams and influences. The effectiveness of their forces is assessed by their understanding of their objectives, formulating their methods,

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and utilizing their resources to obtain them, as well as the objectives, methods, and uses of resources of their opponents and other groups that do not necessarily oppose them but may differ with them. Both in business and in politics, crisis theory is utilized in planning and executing the decisions of the planning stages. For example, in business, the general program of a business is formulated to promote its products, and as the business becomes profitable, other businesses with similar programs enter the market as competitors. This requires both the innovation of new products and/or services, requiring the allocation of sufficient resources for the appropriate alterations in the general program by phasing out projects in time t ⫹ 1 that are considered to be expendable, so that while C*t may approximate C*t ⫹ 1 the context of the C*s in the different time periods will not be. Should the project prove profitable, competitors will undertake similar resource allocations and develop their projects with sufficient differences to make their products unique and, hence, competitive. With respect to domestic and international politics, crisis theories are developed by political leaders stating their positions to be used by their parties and supporters for gathering further support. For dictatorships, both domestic and international communities know the positions as clarified by the crisis theories and understand their positions and how to relate to the dictatorial rulers. In domestic and international economic competition, crisis theories are necessary so that the differences among products can be understood and consumers attracted to them according to their requirements and preferences. For domestic political parties, crisis theories are necessary for gathering and maintaining support; for international relations, crisis theories are necessary for the leadership to understand the positions of the leadership in other countries to whom they must relate. With the dynamics of international relations in the social time of our contemporary era manifested to a greater extent than in previous historical eras in international commerce as well as changing political considerations due to the demise of the Cold War and the formation of new alliances, conflict situations are no longer limited to the great power blocs, but also include countries that have entered into our era of knowledge and those that are in stages of development with crisis theories not sufficiently formulated for the necessary political maturity to provide the foundations needed for economic growth to move them into our era. Consider the past-oriented countries. Prior to the demise of the Cold War, these countries included modern social dictatorships such as the Soviet Union, as well as China; since the demise of the Cold War, the Commonwealth of Independent States that once formed the Soviet bloc are in various stages of socioeconomic and political development and the Chinese government is seeking to enter into our era, especially since Hong Kong has been returned to its domain. India and Pakistan, aligned to whichever countries support them at any one time during their many mutual conflicts remain in the transitional phase from past-orientation to present

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orientation, but have yet to establish crisis theories that can allow them to resolve their historical conflict and move into our era. One of the main difficulties with past-oriented countries is that they let the past dictate their responses to their present circumstances. History is most certainly important for understanding culture and for building on it, but the significance of history is distorted in that it is allowed to be used as the basis for current planning and decision making. Because of their strong orientation in their histories, pastoriented countries follow the patterns established by the future-oriented countries with respect to developments in science and technology because these countries generate the advances in knowledge and apply these advances in technology. Moreover, as the past-oriented countries vie for political and economic support from future- and present-oriented countries, they have to maintain competitive postures with respect to these countries to retain their influence. Because of their past orientation and their refusal and/or political, cultural, or sociological inability to deviate from the influences of their historical foundations, they have to acquire technologies on levels their systems are incapable of developing to retain their positions among the nations. The importation of futureoriented technologies is a significant development and needs to be encouraged, provided the military applications of these technologies are monitored. Moreover, as these technologies are absorbed into the countries’ infrastructures, an internal conflict arises in which the past meets the future in the applications of these technologies. The conflict is manifested as past-oriented countries base their sociopolitical (to some extent economic, and—to a lesser extent—foreign) policies on past conceptualizations while incorporating technologies from countries that are future-oriented. This situation inevitably develops into a conflict between the past and future, with the future eventually winning for three important reasons: One reason is the obvious and eventual understanding that the past, though important, is gone, holding weight only as a set of circumstances, data, and relationships. The past cannot be altered and is better understood only as historians reveal and clarify more information about it. The second reason—also obvious—is that the future has yet to be realized, and the events in the present assuredly will affect future developments so that by obtaining future-oriented technologies in the present, the past-oriented countries can better understand the circumstances that help form the future. The relevant changes can then be implemented to cope with future-oriented technologies and their implications for both past- and present-oriented countries. The third reason is political and refers to the international competition that still exists between the future- and past-oriented societies for the present-oriented societies’ alliances in the geopolitical struggle for markets and military bases. The future-oriented societies are therefore making greater efforts to continue the development and expansion of knowledge in disequilibrium crisis theories. Furthermore, the clash between the past and future in past-oriented societies intensifies as future-oriented knowledge is incorporated. Since these technolo-

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gies are difficult to incorporate in the socioeconomic and political climates in which the past weighs so heavy, little serious consideration is given to changing the orientation. For these technologies to fit and be deployed effectively in these societies, they must possess a degree of adaptability which requires retraining and rethinking without loosening the reins on the spirit of inquiry. Thus, a thawing out is necessary and is occurring now in many of the past-oriented societies, moving them into present orientation. Although there will be recurring conflicts between the conservatives of various shades of opinion—from being reluctant to accept social change but accepting it anyway as the inevitable movement of history, to the more extreme view of considering social change as a betrayal of principles, ideologies, and teachings on which the society was and is still being formed to the liberals who, though patriots, recognize the need for social change made necessary by the adaptation of the new technologies and the dynamics within the society these technologies will generate. This clash is necessary for the revaluation of values and for bringing the past-oriented societies into our contemporary era and its social times. The situation of the past-oriented countries in our geopolitical complex is the result of two apparently paradoxical approaches to domestic and international politics that represent both dependence and independence and is as ancient as civilization itself: What form of governing system is to be established that can best maintain control of society’s domestic and international spheres while participating in the commonwealth of nations in trade and political alliances? This paradox exists for the past-oriented countries because the forms of government they have evolved historically allow for only domestic considerations and is explained—indeed justified—on the basis of controlling internal disorder within the country; hence, there is the need for a method of governing that can maintain a conservative foundation within the country on which to build a socio-economic infrastructure and allow the country to move smoothly into our contemporary historical era. Moreover, this paradox is manifested primarily in past-oriented countries with oppressive governing systems in which order is maintained at the expense of individual initiative in the political and economic arenas. By controlling economic and political activity, there is also the need to control the extent of international trade and political relations. However, to maintain international relations, the geopolitical approach must be liberal in order to deal with developing present and future-oriented countries as well as other past-oriented countries that are attempting to move into our area. Hence, for these countries, while internal control is oppressive, international relations takes on a liberal approach to the extent acceptable to the community of nations. Hence, there is a paradox: by maintaining strict internal control, thereby seeking to limit damage to their countries in the conduct of their foreign relations these countries can operate internationally according to the public relations image their leaders seek to project. This Janus-faced attitude, expressed in their approaches to domestic and foreign policies, can persist as long as internal control is maintained.

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It cannot, however, persist for the duration of the dictatorship because the communications with other past-oriented countries and with present- and futureoriented countries so necessary for international trade and political support, expose these internal policies, leading to condemnation. The dictatorships in Cuba, Iraq, and Lybia are examples.11 Past-oriented countries in which oppressive dictatorships reign do not criticize these countries because they do not want to draw attention to their own internal policies. By their silence, they sacrifice assistance from the present- and futureoriented countries on which they must rely for the bulk of their foreign trade and financial assistance. Past-oriented countries with natural resources that are in demand—such as oil—do not have to rely on financial aid because their commodities are traded throughout the world; however, they do have to rely on the other countries for sales and on the future-oriented countries for the technologies for the economies of production, processing, and marketing the product. Countries that rely exclusively on a single product that is not heavily in demand, such as Cuba’s sugar, are subjected to competitive market conditions and their abilities to compete with other producers. This competition is hindered when dictators enforce production quotas while maintaining low incomes with the differences in costs-torevenues not reaching the workers. The consequences are social problems such as declining health services, substandard education, declining municipal services, and corruption as both civil servants and the other citizenry seek to protect and enhance their own socioeconomic situations. The consequence is neocolonialism—a vestige of historical past-orientation adapted to our contemporary era. While traditional colonialism has largely been repudiated in our era, where neocolonialism exists, it is with the consent of the majority of the population in the colonial countries.12 In contrast to traditional colonialism, neocolonialism may or may not pertain to previously held colonies— depending on the situation of each past- and present-oriented country. Neocolonialism is manifested by the dependence which a country imposes on its benefactors in terms of economic support and political and international backing in the global arena. While all past- and present-oriented countries require the need for economic support to build socioeconomic infrastructures for development, countries not engaged in neocolonial relationships do not allow economic support to infringe on their independence in their governments, while support might be affected in the international arena by their being rejected or not given full consideration as allies by the geopolitical blocs such as NATO that still retain viability after the demise of the Cold War. In their need for economic support, the leaders of the neocolonial countries seek sponsors and, having found them, attach their economies to those of their sponsors. Such an example was Cuba, with the former Soviet Union as the sponsor of Cuba’s primary commodity, its sugar crop. Several Middle Eastern countries, such as Syria, Iraq, and Egypt, also attached their economies to the Soviet Union, with the consequence that their economies became dependent on the Soviet Union and its satellite markets. Egypt is now a recipient of aid from the United States

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and, while tourism is a heavy industry, it is attempting to diversify its economy and expand its trading relationships. Syria has sought aid from the United States, but its stance on the peace talks with Israel and its support of terrorism are serious obstacles to support by the United States and other postindustrial countries.13 Moreover, its position in the peace efforts being made in the region also hinder its trading relationships with those countries that have made peace with Israel. The unique aspect of neocolonialism is that it commits the leaders of their— mostly past-oriented—countries to their colonizers, so that their economies tend to become rigid, to be developed only with the colonizer’s approval; hence, there are established crisis theories for the colonizer and the colonized country. As these crisis theories become entropic, no innovation is tolerated to alter them without the colonizer’s agreement; moreover, while degrees of initiation are sanctioned, no extreme deviations from the crisis theories are tolerated unless they satisfy the colonizer. The uniqueness of neocolonization is that the leaders of the colonized countries consider their countries to be sovereign, because they possess their own political systems and military forces for their defense and for conducting domestic and foreign policy. Yet, they are dependent on their colonizers for their markets— their main source of income and economic welfare. Moreover, just as their markets are so linked, so are their internal and foreign policies, and, indeed, their very sovereignty. While seeking economic and political security, the neocolonialized country may be placing itself in a precarious situation. Consider Cuba again with its reliance on the former Soviet Union for aid and as the main purchaser of its sugar crop. Relying on its Soviet patron, the Cuban leadership based their economy on the Soviet Union’s decision to make sugar the mainstay of the Cuba economy. Having built its infrastructure on its sugar market with the breakup of the Soviet Union, Cuba has had to find new markets and because of strong competition from other sugar exporting countries the Cuban economy has suffered from its declining markets. The Cuban economy can be revitalized if its leaders would abandon their past-orientation in the economic system with its emphasis on a single-crop policy and move into a future-oriented system of liberal internal policies and open international relations and commerce. Relying on its augmented version of Marxist-Leninist doctrine as the basis for its economics (when Russia and the other former Soviet countries are trying to become future-oriented and when China vacillates between its doctrinaire version of Marxist-Leninist policies and the future orientation of our contemporary era), Cuba’s leaders are trying to maintain their economy without sufficient raw materials due to their declining export position and the necessary trading, and monetary, and fiscal policies to deal with this situation. With its economy in serious condition and its markets dwindling because of inefficient domestic and foreign policies, Cuba nevertheless still maintains its position as the bastion of communism in Latin America, continuing the rift with the United States and standing against the free trade countries in Latin and South America as an example of neocolonialism. With its sociopolitical sys-

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tem and its leaders directly supported by a colonizing country, Cuba’s situation demonstrates just how precarious neocolonialism can be for a past-oriented, underdeveloped country. While it may appear advantageous for these countries to exploit a single product and rely on a single market—no matter how vast that market may be—there are no economic or political guarantees that such a relationship will endure. Emerging past-oriented countries that choose to remain in their orientation have a crisis-theory system in the form of

冘 ([C n

C** ⫽

UC*u)]t and (C**p⬎ C**em),

em

1

with the subscript “p” indicating the contributions of the postindustrial countries and the subscript “em” indicating the contributions in these fields by the emerging countries that are far exceeded by those of the postindustrial countries. The crisis theories are mainly in the fields of distributional coalitions in the realm of political affiliations and economic organizations due to the political and economic instability that still exists in these countries. Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the emerging countries gained some stability by using the big power blocs, playing off one against the other to their advantage. They shifted alliances when it was politically and economically feasible for domestic reasons, relying on opposing big powers when flexibility was allowed and even when threats were used when unwanted. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, the geopolitical situation has changed dramatically. Big power competition is no longer a major factor in geopolitical dynamics, and emerging countries must now rely on themselves geographically and—with respect to their natural resources—economically to acquire assistance for their economic development and military support in fending off predator countries and maintaining internal stability. Both the institutional investment and personal efforts in developing their arts and sciences are subservient to the investment efforts in organizing governmental—and, where acceptable—private, domestic, and international distribution programs for establishing foundations in these countries. These endeavors, while in theory beneficial, will hinder national contributions in the arts and sciences if they become politicized with political functionaries instead of strictly professional civil servants assigned to operate them. This results in the politicalizing of the arts, the lack of funding for speculative nongovernment-directed research in the sciences, increasing political and economic favoritism and lower educational standards, thereby placing these countries in worse positions than developing countries with this politicalization influencing negatively every aspect of the dynamics of the emerging societies. The types of crisis theories of these past-oriented emerging countries have proved to be as enduring and inappropriate as the governments that sanction

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and apply them, as opposed to the types of crisis theories adapted by the developing countries from the future-oriented countries in their applications in the arts and sciences. Furthermore, antiquated farming techniques and inadequate understanding of soil conservation and crop rotation, together with inadequate storage for grains to prepare for low crop yields, take their toll on these emerging countries. In past-oriented countries—such as Cuba that sought to reorganize themselves after the overthrow of Batista; and in North Korea, whose centralized government intensified its control after the Korean Armistice—their dictatorial regimes have put their agricultural programs in difficult situations. For example, Cuba’s reliance on its sugar crop and its methods of harvesting are still presented as Marxist-Leninist superiority over decadent capitalism; similarly, in North Korea, the auxiliary organizations that employ workers to distribute produce, process the foodstuffs, service the vehicles, and maintain the distribution and selling points—such as wholesale and retail stores—function according to government ideology; otherwise, they would not be employed. These ideologies are justified on the grounds that without strong governments based on ideology, these countries would break up into warring factions and only with governments based on ideologies can the unity of these countries be guaranteed. This position can be substantiated only if these ideologies provide an organizational foundation for countries whose regions are united and working together with minimal friction in order to bring them into developing country status. However, when this position is used to justify enduring dictatorships— as with many governments—these countries will retain their past-orientation status, continuing to seek aid from the developing and postindustrial countries. They will continue to use propaganda as knowledge and be a source of regional instability; the situations in North Korea, and now to a lesser extent Cuba, attest to this state of affairs. Moreover, the alliances of these countries shift owing to their requirements in changing political conditions. Their ideologies are not strong enough to quell the underground rumblings that threaten unity. For example, Yugoslavia’s Tito did not groom a successor and soon after his death, the Soviet Union declined, rendering the anti-Soviet sentiment that had held the country together since the end of World War II—“the enemy from without”—no longer valid. With the threat from outside no longer an issue, the historical tensions due to religious and ethnic differences that were held in check during Marshal Tito’s dictatorship had become important enough for the ethnic communities to resolve them through civil war and massacres for ethnic cleansing. To put an end to ethnic massacres and restore order, the United States—operating with its NATO allies—took military action to achieve a cease fire and to end the latest conflict in this trouble spot. Eventually, with peace between the Serbs and Kosovars established and with these and other ethnic scars healed, the peoples in the region may yet join the ranks of the emerging and developing countries together

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with Hungary and Romania and the other peoples of the now defunct Soviet bloc. The developing countries will never have to face situations similar to Yugoslavia’s, for they have already resolved their old, troubling, internal ethnic problems. Moreover, the economic stakes are now too high for such military ventures to be undertaken. Because of their present-orientation, these countries have committed themselves to economic—and, hence, political—integration within their geographical regions and are seeking ties with other developing and post-industrial countries to achieve internal socioeconomic development. While the military option for resolving conflicts always exists, it will be used only when conflicts cannot be resolved through peaceful means because none of these countries want to risk the destruction of their economic infrastructure and ability for growth and development. Viable developing countries are those that have made temporary commitments to present orientation with the intention of moving into future orientation after having achieved sufficient degrees of economic growth so they will be able to compete effectively once they are future-oriented. The crisis theory schematic for these countries takes the form

冘 [(C* UC* ]) , (C** ⬎C** ), n

C**dc ⫽

dc

u

t

p

dc

1

with the subscript “dc” indicating the contributions of the developing countries whose contributions are exceeded by the postindustrial countries. In spite of this commitment, the leadership in some present-oriented countries seeks to delay moving into future orientation in order to forestall relinquishing their power. By submitting to the democratic process necessary in futureoriented countries, they would have to either resign, stand in elections, or—in the worst-case situation—be deposed. It is important for present-oriented countries to establish democratic governments—each according to its evolved traditions—to gain authority from their constituents to build sound economic infrastructures and, eventually, move into future orientation. Countries such as Singapore, South Korea, and mainland China—especially since the reunification with Hong Kong—are developing countries that have already achieved fairly high levels of social integration and economic growth. Each country has its own approach to the democratic process and has made a commitment to future orientation,14 which is manifested in each country’s economic performance, in its political and economic relationships with other developing countries, and the postindustrial countries that seek economic and political relations with them. While China strives toward future orientation, the Chinese leadership is still oriented in its Communist past and it lacks strong commitment to democracy.

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This policy is justified on several grounds: First, after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, China remained intact with its former politically and militarily troublesome neighbor no longer a problem. However, even in our social time of reconciliation, because of China’s population and military strength, China continues to exert sufficient influence to secure markets for its goods and services. It has a large work force and is acquiring high technology and adapting it to its internal conditions to become competitive in technology in the world’s markets, thereby reducing its reliance on its work force in its traditional employment. Hence, China’s markets are important for postindustrial countries’ goods and services with the consequence that, because of its international business contacts, China has adapted postindustrial business methods into much of its economic activity. This has not only resulted in revisions in its planning and production, but also in liberalism entering the society with the government often responding with force and historical communist methods of control even though the new liberalism cannot be eliminated. Nevertheless, the imitation of postindustrial lifestyles is balanced by government restrictions on freedom of speech and political activity, and communism still remains in force in the active political processes. With the Soviet Union no longer a threat, the new liberalism became manifested in political action which resulted in the government suppressing what it termed “dissident behavior,” bringing China into a unique situation of requiring business knowledge and manufacturing and military technologies of the future-oriented countries while being cautious about exposure of the postindustrial ethos and sociopolitical liberty that this implies. Another factor of concern for the Chinese government is the decline of world communism resulting from the event in the former Soviet Union. Premier Gorbachev’s decision to liberalize the Soviet system led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the formation of the Commonwealth of Independent States with the Russian economy becoming highly unstable and subject to predation form criminal elements. The liberalization issue in China is thus treated with great caution as the leadership there remembers the country’s history when, prior to Mao’s unification, warlords ruled sectors and preyed on the people under their control while waging war with other warlords. Coupled with the reservation of introducing postindustrial liberty into China, its leaders have their own interests in unifying what they consider to be their historical and hence, natural interests over the region. Thus, Hong Kong’s political reunification with China has assisted in stabilizing the Chinese economy with the once-British possession still serving as a port for world commerce and for international banking and finance. However, the issue of Taiwan is still considered a point of contention by the Chinese. Formed by the more liberal Chinese leaders who fled the mainland after Mao took power in China, Taiwan has developed its own highly technological industrial base and has provided its citizens with civil rights and liberties not found on the mainland. Taiwan wants to maintain its independence from the mainland while the communist leaders

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seek to exert political and economic authority—by force if necessary—over Taiwan. The Western powers are opposed to this, because they seek to maintain a democratic country with a strong economy in the region. While integrating Taiwan into its regional sphere of influences would provide mainland China with Taiwanese industrial technology and marketing techniques—allowing Taiwan to participate in developing the mainland’s vast markets—such integration by force would result in a new Cold War situation unwanted by all involved. In light of China’s uncertain position with respect to world communism Taiwan’s position as an economically viable country and its potential for developing the mainland’s markets, to reach an agreement acceptable by all sides of this conflict, both sides should develop mutually workable crisis theories that, once agreed upon and employed, will assist the mainland to enter future orientation as Taiwan is attempting to do. Unlike China, Singapore’s commitment to present orientation seems to be unaffected by its political and geographical circumstances. Its economy is efficient and stable—growing at a rate set by its leadership—and its location on the China Sea provides it with shipping opportunities throughout the world. It is also a tourist-oriented country with a very low crime rate and provides a haven for those who accept its way of life. Singapore is a benevolent dictatorship without real, viable opposition; its stores are full and its citizens are fairly content with their lifestyle. It has no reason to move into future orientation, and the country will most likely remain in this situation until full democracy is established. The change to democracy will come about as the region becomes more dynamic economically, requiring the political commitment to democratically acceptable opposition parties. Only then will Singapore feel the pressure of economic competition and develop crisis theories that are competitive and democratically oriented. With opposition parties contesting government policies, Singapore will become a fully democratic and innovative country. Until then, its crisis theories will continue to express its present orientation with the country remaining in its position in which there is no great movement for change. Contrary to China and Singapore, South Korea, while present-oriented, is moving into future orientation. Having been occupied by Japan and having achieved independence after World War II, in 1945, Korea split into North and South at the 38th parallel, with the northern part becoming communist, supported in part by mainland China and in part by the Soviet Union. The South chose democratic capitalism and, while remaining independent, received support from the United States. In 1950, when the North invaded the South, the United Nations was called on to provide a defensive response and the United States sent its troops in as a United Nations police action, thereby eliminating the necessity to proclaim war. After much senseless bloodshed and with the United Nations tested, the conflict was temporarily resolved with both sides meeting in peace talks at the 38th parallel; the conflict has yet to be resolved permanently, as occasional border skirmishes still take place. However, in our social time, with one historical people in two countries, the

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North has lost its firm communist support. The Soviet Union no longer exists and Russia has its own difficulties with its economy, crime, and instability and can no longer support the North. China has become less generous and is demanding hard currency—preferably U.S. dollars—in payment for foodstuffs, manufactured goods, and raw materials. The North is turning to the United States for assistance, using the threat to develop nuclear weapons and sell them to other countries as a bargaining card. While maintaining its position of pastorientation, given North Korea’s economic and international political circumstances, with U.S. assistance and influence, its ideology may yield to present and eventually future orientation. South Korea’s cold war relations with the North, its years of Japanese occupation prior to the war, and its domination by the postindustrial countries have inspired it to move from being a wartorn satellite of the postindustrial countries to a thriving democracy and economy that is providing the postindustrial countries and with multinational firms strong competition in its internal markets, and demonstrating the contemporary concept of democracy as a system of governing that can survive only in a country that is competitive internally and—because of the development of export as well as import markets—internationally. While South Korea has international businesses on its soil, the country is competitive economically in electronics, automobiles, and textiles— products with which the postindustrial countries have dominated world trade previously. Although South Korea aspires to future orientation, it nevertheless remains present-oriented because of its financial debt burden and dependence on the United States for military and financial aid in defense against its northern neighbor. In spite of North Korea’s difficult financial position, it still engages in periodical border skirmishes and threatens to develop nuclear weapons using the technologies supplied by China and other anti-Western countries outside the domain of future orientation. Consequently, the U.S. response has been ambiguous, coming in the form of threats and some assistance to the North to reduce tensions and bring the North into at least a present-oriented position. Moreover, because of South Korea’s own defense burden, it must spend money and use manpower that could be better used expanding its educational system, industrial output and market development, and economic and sociopolitical contributions that could be expressed in its crisis theories. To summarize, the Asian continent is a region with development and great potential. China’s vast markets still require developing, but its inner dynamism is held in check by its past-oriented dictatorial government. Countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, Singapore, Vietnam, the Koreas, and Cambodia are capable of moving into future orientation. South Korea has demonstrated this potential with its democratic government, its economic output, and its domestic and international marketing abilities. Concerning the sociopolitical orientation on the African continent, its countries are seeking their own identities, but in many instances they suffer tribal

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conflicts, often resulting in genocide in our contemporary era. The tribal heritages of these countries are deeply rooted in their cultures and their peoples have long known the abuses of others. In the aftermath of World War II when the postindustrial countries rejected classical colonialism and granted these countries independence, their past orientation was deeply ingrained in the political parties they established to rule their countries. Therefore, not only was political rivalry involved, but also deep-seated hostility among the tribes that was previously held in check by the colonizing powers but unleashed anew with independence. This hostility has often erupted into violence and attempts at tribal genocide, as Rwanda’s experience demonstrates. With various tribes seeking to rule, their past orientation has persisted because of the intertribal conflicts that result. While the African peoples are dynamic, the vast African continent divided into countries based on tribes has resulted in many conflicts within national borders. Because the continent has known physical and economic exploitation by other countries, the people have come to accept tribal rule as they look among themselves for leadership that will bring them into our contemporary era. Outsiders are naturally distrusted; leaders from within their own tribes are supported and, with several tribes within national borders, the dominant tribe often fails to give the others proportional representation. With their vast natural resources, enlightened leadership uniting the peoples occasionally comes to the fore; all too frequently, however, once a government becomes established, it is maintained by tribal favors and promotion, thereby maintaining past orientation. The starvation in Sudan, the corruption in Zaire, and the tribal wars and dictatorships in many African countries are manifestations of this condition, holding the inner dynamism of many of the African peoples in check. South Africa—and to some extent Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia)—are the exceptions. While both countries were founded on the policy of apartheid, both are now governed by black leaders. Because of Rhodesia’s close relationship with Great Britain, its policies were changed owing to the international economic boycott of Rhodesia after Ian Smith issued a unilateral declaration of independence. After much bargaining, and because of the effects of the boycott, the British brought the Smith government down and established a democratically elected government with the new name of Zimbabwe in which the rights of all citizens were to be protected. As a British colony, Zimbabwe’s resources were not as extensively developed as South Africa’s. This situation is slowly changing, however, because due to its independence it has maintained a present orientation that has allowed the inequalities of apartheid to be disposed of without great social disruption. Zimbabwe is providing its peoples with work opportunities and decent education in a democracy, developing viable international relations and commerce. The country has the foundation for moving into future orientation and developing unique crisis theories for its society that are recognized by other present- and future-oriented societies. Although South Africa’s system was also based on apartheid, its situation

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differs from Zimbabwe’s. Having gained its independence early in its history, after many years of hesitation it finally yielded to the demand of the postindustrial countries and pressure from citizens everywhere who found apartheid repugnant and installed a black leader who once served time in prison for his opposition to apartheid. Economically, as South Africa’s diamond, gold, and armaments industries were established during apartheid, its diamond and gold industries based largely on nonwhite labor who were socially and politically discriminated against under the apartheid laws. As with other arms trading countries, its armaments industries have been affected by the ending of the Cold War and by strong competition from current traders; it is now a marginal industry with international contracts and sales greatly reduced. With the abolition of apartheid, however, international companies are finding the economic climate suitable for investment resulting in South Africa’s changing emphasis from diamonds and gold to such areas as international finance, tourism, and communications. Its education system is benefiting from visiting educators who had previously boycotted the country. These changes have long-run consequences for the improvement of the country’s economy and international standing. South Africa’s abolition of apartheid has also resulted in a high crime rate, but this is to be expected because the effects of economic activity are taking time to be realized throughout the country with poverty and revenge—with areas of great wealth surrounded by pockets of poverty—as the main causes of crime. Resources and money that could be used for education, improving infrastructure, and investing in manufacturing are going into security and the protection of property. However, the emigration rate is low and the citizens have confidence in the leadership’s ability to realize the country’s promise and move from present orientation with its static crisis theories into a future-oriented society in which innovation, imitation, and initiation in the realms of political, social, scientific, economic, and artistic activity will be developed. The countries of Central and South America are mainly present-oriented. Dictators and the corruption they bring have plagued these countries; however, their citizens are hopeful when dictators are overthrown and democracy is restored, but skeptical that it will endure. For example, Chile’s democratically elected government was overthrown and replaced by dictatorship which was, in turn, replaced by a newly restored democracy; Argentina replaced its military dictatorship with a popular democracy. Moreover, the narcotics trade with corruption in local and national government from the power of the drug lords are not new to these countries. Colombia and Nicaragua are notorious for their drug manufacturing mainly for the North American market and Mexico’s drug merchants have established conduits into the southern region of the United States. Real productive industry expressed by the people’s dynamism, however, is lacking in this region. The purpose of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is to revitalize these countries’ industries by stimulating exports from these countries as well as exports to them and by relocating North American

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industries in those countries with access to raw materials and markets where labor is efficient and its costs lower than on the northern continent. The present orientation of these countries is manifested as it pertains to labor by the influences of domestic and international big business, but the debilitating effects of the social and economic consequences of present orientation are perceived readily. As industries move in from the North, bringing with them the technologies necessary for efficient manufacturing and marketing and with the governments in these countries encouraging new industries and the benefits of employment they bring, the influences of present orientation will eventually fade as future orientation becomes dominant. As the necessary infrastructure, technology, and education are incorporated into these countries, their democratic systems will be strengthened, enabling local industries to expand and develop in competition among themselves and with industries from their regional and northern neighbors. Three more geographical regions merit attention here, each with its special problems and attempts to resolve them in terms of sociopolitical orientation. The Indian continent is an area in which all three orientations are integrated into the social structures with each country expressing these orientations in different ways. Its overpopulation and strong diverse religious beliefs have led to bloodshed and are the causes of their current conflict. Gandhi’s historical pacifist protest against British rule won India its independence, resulting in the formation of Pakistan and, eventually, Bangladesh after the Bengali peoples won their independence from Pakistan. While the Bangladesh situation is quiet, the conflict between India and Pakistan is still unresolved with the status of Kashmir currently the source of contention. The historical conflict in this region is still far from being resolved. Both countries have strong aspects of past orientation in the form of the influence of religion and the conflicts that religious differences often generate within and among their countries. Aspects of present orientation are manifested in their economic and political systems as they each lack the necessary internal unity and infrastructure for building future-oriented societies with strong innovation, initiation, and imitation. They have aspects of future orientation because their industries are capable of moving into highly technological production and innovation resulting from the incorporation of manufacturing and marketing concepts from the future-oriented countries into their economic and sociopolitical structures, thereby removing the seemingly pernicious poverty and bringing their peoples into productivity to compete domestically and internationally. Countries having political independence without the economic viability of present orientation at least is an indication that they are subjected to neocolonialism. Such was the situation in Eastern Europe when the Soviet Union imposed past-oriented communist ideology on these countries, incorporating them into a mercantilistic common market in which their economies were geared to supply the Soviet economy and were dependent on the Soviets for their main foreign market. (Eastern Europe will be discussed in the context of the paradox

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of industrialization.) Thus, for countries to move strongly into present orientation, they must be independent both politically and economically; otherwise, neocolonializers will impose their own orientation on them, as was the case with Cuba, leaving them in untenable economic circumstances should the sponsorship be removed for whatever reasons. Moving into present orientation is, therefore, dependent on the extent of independence, industrialization, and the infrastructure necessary for supporting economic development. For an emerging country such as Bangladesh to achieve present orientation, it must establish an infrastructure allowing for growth and, given its unique circumstances, it must establish a legal system that ensures just and equal laws to protect its citizens against religious persecution and discrimination. In general, emerging countries have to obtain financing from the International Monetary Fund and other sources of international aid to assist in building infrastructure and industries and the leaders of these countries must uses their skills for obtaining financing without compromising their countries’ independence. In Cuba’s case, this compromise was welcomed by both the government—having rejected capitalism—and by the Soviet Union which obtained a military position close to the shore of the United States. In the Middle East, the rulers of many of the countries in the region have maintained past orientation.15 Secure in the isolation of their religion from outside influences, the countries with great wealth from oil revenues are nevertheless politically insecure due to the international involvement of their main natural resource—oil. Their wealth is thus not due to the labors of their citizens as in postindustrial countries, but to the drilling, refining, and marketing of oil in which the international oil companies are involved. Moreover, the great wealth is fairly recent in this region, due to the embargo placed by the oil producing countries in the aftermath of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Until then, oil was considered a profitable resource, even at its low cost. In the aftermath of the war, output was curtailed and prices raised on the pretext of protesting support for Israel, but also for seizing the opportunity to raise profits significantly. Using oil as a weapon, especially against the postindustrial countries to pressure Israel to retreat from the territories captured during the war, the oil producing countries also used their newly acquired leverage to increase their influence in world affairs and to protect their resource from premature depletion. Hence, while the profits from oil were used to accumulate great wealth, since this resource comes from the ground, its supply, while still vast, is finite. Moreover, after the initial effects of the use of oil as a political weapon, other energy sources such as coal and atomic energy have come on line, reducing oil revenues and the political leverage exerted by the OPEC countries against Israel and for securing advanced military weapons systems. Because the great wealth of these countries was not founded on the basis of industrialization necessary to move into advanced present and future orientation and because of their reliance on this single product, real efforts are still to be made to establish sufficient infrastructure for advancing their orientation.

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Ironically, the great wealth accumulated from oil revenues has slowed the disorder of change in the majority of the Middle Eastern countries. This is due to the search for certainty in this highly uncertain and unstable region plagued by internal conflicts and wars. Oil has been a stabilizing factor providing financial security and political importance; it has also resulted in jealousy among the oil producing countries as they seek to increase their wealth. As a consequence, the OPEC cartel was formed in the attempt to insure that one country would not undercut its selling price to increase its revenues at the expense of the other countries. Hence, while oil is used to unite these countries in the protection of their wealth, it is also a source of conflict among them, often leading to military action as the Iraq-Iran War in 1980 and Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1991 attest. The combination of religion and authoritarian government established for protecting the inheritance of kingdoms and for maintaining strong military and security services provides the rationale for continuing in past orientation. These countries could use their great wealth to provide the economic and social infrastructure necessary for moving into present and eventually future orientation as postindustrial societies. However, because these countries are seeking to maintain their security in a highly unstable political and military region, the sociological changes that would eventually result in curtailing their monarchical systems and establishing true democracies are considered at this social time as being too disruptive. The existence of Israel in this region has also continued to be a source of concern due to its different religious orientation and proven military capability. With the diminished effect of the oil weapon against Israel and with their previous backer, the Soviet Union, since dissolved and no longer a major force in the region, these countries have turned to the postindustrial countries—mainly the United States—for military supplies and defense agreements. However, because of the prospect for real peace in this region, the changes that are taking place are challenging the past-oriented traditions with a consequence of religious extremists becoming active, supported by traditional orthodox leaders, to protect the historical-cum-religious foundations in these countries. Iran’s political power base is clerical. Religious extremists are threatening the social fabric in Algeria and, to a lesser extent, in Egypt. The leadership in many of the Middle Eastern countries has accommodated the religious extremist factions while attempting to move their countries into present orientation. The uncertainty within these countries over their historical destinies and their relations with each other and among the postindustrial countries have yet to prove sufficient to move them into present orientation. Throughout their histories the peoples of the Middle East have demonstrated their abilities to make contributions in the arts and sciences and in commerce.16 However, because of the instability in the region and the uncertainty that genuine peace will be achieved, their reliance on past-oriented crisis theories provides the security of the familiar and with the impression that regional changes can be dealt with by established political and economic crisis theories. Nevertheless,

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backing from postindustrial countries has provided a change in attitude, with the leaders in these countries seeking to maintain religion within the spiritual human experience, attempting to remove religious influences from politics, and to move their educational systems and industries into present-orientation situations. The vision of a new Middle East posited by the optimistic leaders in the region is that of a common market with extensive industrial and commercial relations and exchanges of ideas and artistic contributions that influence the world. Realizing that only with real peace can they advance their educational systems and industrial productivity, they know that by moving toward this evolutionary and visionary objective the capabilities of the people in this region will be brought to fruition, moving them into the dynamics of our contemporary era. The future-oriented countries are firmly within the dynamics of our contemporary era of knowledge, Yet, they are confronted with a paradox of industrialization that is perhaps the most crucial situation they now face. Moreover, the industrial bases of the Eastern European countries that were once within the Soviet sphere are oriented primarily to production within the old Soviet common market, the COMECON. Since gaining their independence, these countries have not yet adjusted completely to compete with the postindustrial countries although they manufacture similar products. The paradox of industrialization and its impact on the postindustrial countries and their competitors will be discussed in chapter 14.

NOTES 1. Wassily Leonteif, Input-Output Economics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 3. 2. Adam Smith, The Origins and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, ed. Edwin Cannan (New York: Modern Library, 1937). 3. Of Quesnay’s Tableau Economique, G.L.S. Shackle writes: The first great inspiration to come to an economist was, perhaps, Quesnay’s Tableau Economique, in which he saw economic society as a system of inter-organized activities, a unity in which each component process sustained and was sustained by the system as a whole. Quesnay saw the system as a steady state, unchanging from year to year, and he understood that the power of the system to maintain itself in this constancy rested on a balance, within each component sector, between the inputs and the output of the activity preceding in that sector.

Moreover, Shackle continues, Quensay contributed two vital insights, the conception of a system of interorganized activities, and the notion of the role of intra-sectional balance.

G.L.S. Shackle, Epistemics and Economics (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1993), pp. 250–51. However, David Z. Rich writes:

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Trade routes were developed mainly to exploit the various spices and food products, as well as to provide the most efficient method for transporting and trading these products. Mercantilism, then, is an offshoot of physiocracy, and its own sophistication was developed as trading among the nations gained in significance.

Quoted from The Economic Theory of Growth and Development (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1994), p. 39 n.10. For a discussion of mercantilism, see John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money (London: Macmillan & Co., 1947), chapter 23, “Notes on Mercantilism, the Usury Laws, Stamped Money and Theories of Underconsumption,” p. 333–71; specifically, see his comments on Prof. E. Hechscher’s work, Mercantilism on pp. 341–50, 358. 4. For discussions on the economics of this period, see David Z. Rich, Contemporary Economics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1986), pp. 111–19; The Economics of Welfare (New York: Praeger Publishers 1988), pp. 13–27; The Economics of International Trade (New York: Quorum Books, 1992), pp. 3–42; and Crisis Theory (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers, 1997), pp. 129–56. 5. See Charles Babbage, Passages From the Life of a Philosopher (London: Dawsons of Pall Mall, 1968); George Boole, The Laws of Thought (New York: Dover Publications, 1958); John von Neumann, The Computer and the Brain (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958); and Alan Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” Mind 59, no. 256 (1950); see also A. Hodges, Alan Turing: The Enigma (London: Vintage, 1992). 6. For example, see Henri Poincare´ , “The Future of Mathematics,” Review gene´ rale des Sciences Pures et Applique´ es, vol. 19 (Paris, 1908), and Georg Cantor, Contributions to the Founding of the Theory of Transfinite Numbers (New York: Dover Publications, 1955). 7. This is so, even though there are advocates of further intensive weapons research to cope with the threat of developing and underdeveloped countries—such as Iran, Iraq, Lybia, and North Korea—in their attempts to acquire effective atomic weapons, which will pose a threat to the United States and other developed countries, as well as neighboring and regional countries considered to pose threats. Interest has been renewed in the United States to activate the Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) in light of the potential threat of nuclear proliferation. 8. Ironically, Russia, once the prime mover of the Soviet Union, is one of these countries in need of financial assistance. The economic reforms and liberalization initiated by Premier Mikhail Gorbachev led to economic crisis as the country, in light of its dictatorial past, has yet to realize the benefits that economic liberalization conducted in an orderly fashion can bring. Hence, much of the international investment in the country has been squandered and loans are not being repaid on schedule, resulting in the sales of weapons systems to rogue countries to raise revenues. 9. The scandals that have involved President Bill Clinton since taking office in 1993 demonstrate this. Moreover, the survival of the governments of Great Britain and France despite sex scandals involving their political echelon demonstrate the stability of their political systems. 10. Ju¨ rgen Habermas, On Society and Politics: A Reader, ed. Steven Seidman (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989), from “Technology and Science as ‘Ideology,’ ” p. 247. 11. Iran, after the revolution that overthrew the shah and brought into power the Moslem government of Khomieni, is also an example. The regime currently headed by President Mohammed Khatemi tends to be more liberal than the Khomieni regime and

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is making attempts at reconciliation with the Western democracies, although the violent government response to the student rebellion and the trial of thirteen Jews accused of spying for Israel attests to the reformist president’s recognition of the power of the religious faction headed by the supreme religious leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. 12. The Falklands War of 1982 was precisely about such an issue: The Argentine government sought to claim these islands while their peoples wanted to remain British. The consequence was the British invasion of these islands and retaking them from Argentinian military control. 13. Syria’s role in drug trafficking with Lebanon as a trade route is also a factor in this issue. 14. While China still remains a dictatorship, its opening up to Western influences has brought new outlooks in government policy; moreover, its unification with Hong Kong was undertaken with the intention not to interfere with its democratic process or its financial and economic institutions and policies. This is unique in the annals of history. See Peter T. Bauer’s essay, “The Lesson of Hong Kong,” in Equality, The Third World, and Economic Delusion (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 185– 90. 15. This generalization is necessitated by the scope and limitation of this work. Countries such as Morocco, Turkey, Egypt, and, recently, Jordan with the signing of the peace treaty with Israel are seeking to move into future orientation with each country examining its situation concerning the trend toward modernization and the influences of religion. Iraq, Iran, and Syria are still firmly rooted in past orientation. Israel seeks full integration into the region while maintaining its own cultural and religious identity, giving it an ambiguous status among the other countries in the region and making the country a highly visible target for animosity in the Middle East. 16. Daniel C. Dennett points out that: The term algorithm descends, via Latin (algorismus) to early English (algorisme and, mistakenly, therefrom, algorithm) from the name of a Persian mathematician, Muˆ usa al-Khowraˆ rizm, whose book on arithmetical procedures, written about A.D. 835 was translated into Latin in the twelfth century by Adelard of Bath or Robert of Chester. The idea that an algorithm is a fool-proof and somehow mechanical procedure has been present for centuries, but it was the pioneering work of Alan Turing, Kurt Go¨ del, and Alonzo Church in the 1930s that more or less fixed our current understanding of the term.

Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (New York: Simon and Schuster/Touchstone Books, 1996), p. 51.

14

Order and Disorder in Our Contemporary Era: The Paradox of Industrialization Behind all the tension between the rich and poor countries lie the contradictions between two kinds of wealth: the financial wealth represented by money and the wealth of natural resources represented by minerals, oil, raw materials, and the land and oceans. The more global and mobile the rich countries’ money becomes and the cheaper the transport, the greater their power over static resources. The world markets offer distant communities the choice between rapidly adjusting to their own pace of change or being left off the economic map. Anthony Sampson, The Midas Touch1

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS While Anthony Sampson maintains that although the developing countries hold much of the natural wealth, they do not control the financial power to exploit it or the markets to consume it—which belong to the industrial world—it is maintained here that while the possession and control of natural resources is important for the wealth of nations, the issue to be confronted is different. The use of natural resources in the manufacturing process alone—converting them into goods and services—is not the cause of national wealth; it is the combination of the production and marketing of these goods and services that brings wealth to nations. As the emerging and developing countries seek to move into present and future orientation respectively, the reevaluation of their pricing policies for their labor and raw materials provides both profits and financial capital for reinvesting in industrial output.

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While multinational corporations are involved in the processes of economic development, the establishment of democracies in these countries allows their governments to franchise multinational corporations only if they benefit the domestic economies. For both multinational corporations and domestic industries that are developing because of entry into—or being in—present orientation, pricing for resources and for labor is determined by the crisis theories of business, labor, and the supply and demand conditions of the markets. That the crisis theories of these countries take these factors into consideration indicates that these countries are in present orientation since such considerations are absent to any effective extent in dictatorial or authoritarian past-oriented regimes. Moreover, the operations of multinational corporations in these countries indicate their confidence in the local labor forces and the willingness and readiness of these governments’ and their peoples’ to move into future orientation.2 With resources available and labor costs lower than in the postindustrial countries, the cost advantages for both multinationals and the rising—and perhaps competitive domestic industries—allow these countries to align their products and their marketing to those of the postindustrial countries. The revenue accrued from multinational sales will, after taxes, be returned to the economies and increase the economic and social infrastructure, permitting further economic growth and expansion. With the labor force gainfully employed, savings and consumption will increase, thereby resulting in increased social and market development. The arts and sciences will also benefit as more funds will be available for scientific research and artistic pursuits. However, even those countries sufficiently developed to be in present orientation must confront the situation that confronts the postindustrial future-oriented countries. This is the paradox that has developed since postwar industrialization and the efforts to reestablish the industrial infrastructure in victors and vanquished alike so that they could enter the new era and compete effectively in the world’s markets. Because of the enormous costs of reconstruction, both victors and vanquished could no longer maintain their colonies having instead to offer them independence, each at various stages of economic growth and social development. The exception was the Soviet Union, which occupied much of Eastern Europe and developed these countries’ infrastructures to satisfy its own required production of goods and services. The movement of the countries into present and future-orientation and entering into international competition depends on their production of goods and services that can compete with those of the postindustrial countries. These products must be similar enough to be close competitors even though the competitive edge lies with the postindustrial manufacturers. The only real competitive advantage of present and past-oriented countries over future-oriented countries lies in products for which there is no real competition such as tourism. The history and scenery of each country, regardless of its orientation, give them unique, hence, noncompetitive advantages. The problems of postindustrial competition are not only related to present-

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and past-oriented countries, but also to the competition that exists between the postindustrial countries themselves as demonstrated by the quotas and tariffs between the products of Japanese and U.S. industries. Although these issues are approached without trade wars occurring, they illustrate the nature of the paradox that has resulted from industrialization in our contemporary era of knowledge. While the ramifications of this paradox are important internationally, they are also important for domestic production. ORDER AND DISORDER: FUTURE ORIENTATION AND THE PARADOX OF INDUSTRIALIZATION As the postindustrial countries have entered fully into our contemporary era of knowledge, this orientation is manifested in these countries’ formulations of knowledge in the development of their crisis theories. Once accepted, these theories not only enter the countries’ academic systems and domestic markets; they are also adapted by past- and present-oriented countries throughout the world. The knowledge gained is thus incorporated into the social body of knowledge and—apart from patent restrictions that are eventually nullified—is available to all concerned to be used for current and new conceptions in the development of crisis theories if the proper infrastructure and technological comprehension for application exists. Without them, the use of knowledge is restricted in past- and present-oriented societies. Two examples will suffice as demonstration. Automobile technology is in such an advanced state that only postindustrial countries and technologically proficient present-oriented countries such as South Korea can compete effectively. The development of automobiles has also led to the establishment of auxiliary businesses, such as garages and service offices to handle sales and repairs. While automobiles are driven throughout the world, most presentoriented countries do not compete in automobile manufacturing because they lack the infrastructure. Communications is another industry primarily of postindustrial and highly motivated present-oriented countries. Celluar phones, computer systems, and facsimile communications are products of the applications of knowledge in the postindustrial countries to the problems of increasing the efficiency of communications systems. The crisis theories that the communications industries developed, brought into fruition through production and marketing, developed into highly competitive systems whose improvements and lower production costs have been passed on to consumers to increase sales. Now used internationally, only the postindustrial countries and the highly motivated present-oriented countries (again, South Korea is an example) can compete in innovations, production, and sales. Sales of automobiles and communications systems, as well as the other highly technological products of the postindustrial countries are not sold only to other postindustrial countries even though the sales here are the greatest. They are also sold to present-oriented countries and, to a lesser extent, to past-oriented

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countries. Since the present-oriented countries are trying to move into future orientation, they seek to compete with those products that can be manufactured in their countries, given their current state of the arts and technology. With their favorably comparative production and sales costs, they—like the postindustrial countries—seek markets and this is the very paradox of industrialization. With the advancement of growth and the establishment of economic order, the guidelines for industrialization have been established; yet, this order lies at the very heart of the paradox. The paradox can be stated as follows: For a country to be postindustrial, its industries must manufacture and sell goods and services that are associated with the postindustrial countries such as high technology, think-tank research organizations, automobiles, computers, airplane manufacture, advanced communications systems, and space technology and research. Only a few postindustrialized countries, such as Japan and Germany, have not yet undertaken intensive space research even though they excel in the other aspects of postindustrialization. Paradoxically, given the highly technological infrastructure of the postindustrial countries, how are the markets to be developed for their goods and services? Because they compete among themselves, their customers are offered the opportunities to make the best purchases. But how much can be purchased in countries whose capital taxation policies allow for phasing out equipment over time while the drive for innovative competition is intensive? While the past- and present-oriented countries provide markets, the rates at which these goods and services are consumed are only those appropriate to the liquidity and consumer preferences of these countries. This results in a technical market-saturation effect in which the rate of saturation depends on each country’s ability to absorb these products. The rate of industrialization is thus slowed down by the products of industrialization which is a consequence of industrial output not being absorbed at the rate at which it is produced. Of course, output has to be geared to market expectations and, for less technological products, this has some degree of success. High technology products, such as top-of-the-line computers, require that older computers be sold in the secondary (used) market for their sales. The problem is that older equipment that still performs is not so readily abandoned, but is phased out over time. When new products are successful commercially, competitors will come online fairly rapidly to provide substitutes, thereby reducing entrepreneurial profits. Even though this situation exists in all competitive markets, the postindustrial countries that lead in innovations, manufacture, and sales in both domestic and international markets maintain the production of goods and services that are high-technology based and the crisis theories for the conceptualizations and infrastructures for their manufacture. The time lag from inception to sales for postindustrial, present- and past-oriented markets allows for significant profits to be made; nevertheless, these profits are short term because when competitors come online, their products must be as good and with competitive prices to generate sales. Product innovation maintains the postindustrial countries in their

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future-oriented positions as they develop, manufacture, and sell products that the nonfuture-oriented countries are incapable of marketing and must therefore purchase from the postindustrial countries according to their requirements. This results in near market saturation over each product’s cycle as it is purchased in the future-oriented countries and in those that aspire to future orientation. These countries become highly imitative in order to establish the necessary technologies and infrastructure to enter into competition. South Korea, and to a somewhat lesser extent Taiwan, are moving into advanced stages of present orientation as they compete by imitation with the postindustrial countries. The paradox of industrialization exists, therefore, when the postindustrial countries manufacture competitive products that result in near market saturation domestically and internationally. Unlike the business cycles during the Industrial Revolution, the paradox of industrialization is a phenomenon unique to our era. Where previously, markets reaching near saturation would bring the business cycle downward, governments’ current policies of abolishing depressions intensifies recessions that occur because contemporary economies are extremely dependent on cost-intensive, highly technological production in all its aspects.3 Whereas during the Industrial Revolution, production costs were relative to the products’ sales, this relationship does not hold for postindustrial countries. The costs of innovation and product research, testing, marketing, and sales are relatively far greater now than previously; while profits are great, competition renders them of short duration. Moreover, due to the highly technological production, the tendency toward reduced profits after a respectable profit time as imitators nearly saturate the markets. Consequently, the business cycle’s upswing tends to be of shorter duration and its downswing, intense. The imposition of tariffs to protect domestic industry by reducing imports of competing products is not a viable approach to the paradox, as Japan’s tariff structure with regard to U.S. competition demonstrated. Japan’s policy led to economic confrontation that almost erupted into a trade war with the United States and has since been resolved amicably for most products. This illustrates the intensity of the competition and the tremendous investments in education, training, research, as well as in maintaining the growing technological infrastructure necessary to ensure the postindustrial and present-oriented levels of innovation and production among the postindustrial countries. It also serves to generate high levels of infrastructure and technology in present-oriented countries seeking to achieve postindustrial status. This is also the reason for the disproportionately high rates of unemployment in these countries, given their high productive capability. Domestic and international competition reduces profits significantly over time, resulting in unemployment as the downswing affecting big corporations and multinationals demonstrates. The income effect reduces consumption and, while many of the unemployed will eventually find employment in auxiliary businesses, or may

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even start their own high technology businesses, the time factor for this depends on the variables of experience, contacts, age, and the market’s receptiveness to new endeavors. Although innovation is the prescription for easing the intensity of this paradox, its relief is temporary because as innovation becomes successful, it is met with successful imitation which reduces profits and eventually leads to near market saturation, intensifying the paradox again. The products of the postindustrial countries extend the duration of cyclical fluctuations and, while government operations have eliminated depressions, recessions in our social time are due to near market saturation for cost-intensive, highly technological products resulting from innovation and generating domestic and international competition. ORDER AND DISORDER IN EASTERN EUROPE Prior to World War II, the Soviet Union’s economic and political influence on the countries within its geographical periphery was marginal. The world was in the throes of the Great Depression; the sounds of another impending world war were being heard as Germany rearmed and began its plans to invade its neighboring countries. Since these countries’ leaders sought to ease the effects of the depression and to rely on the League of Nations and the various treaties they signed for their defense, they were caught unprepared when Germany began its invasions. While the Soviet Union was considered Germany’s natural enemy, when they nevertheless signed a nonaggression pact in 1939, Eastern Europe resigned itself to the fact that it could no longer rely on Stalin’s contempt for Nazism for their defense. In the aftermath of the war, Stalin controlled Germany’s eastern sector as well as most of the East European countries previously occupied by Germany. Holding these lands proved advantageous for the Soviet Union as it renewed its conflict with its former Western allies. The Eastern European countries had fledging industries, a fairly skilled labor force to work them, and also provided markets for Soviet goods and services as well as products for Soviet consumers. In light of the formation of the EEC, the Soviet bloc was united into COMECON, a customs union in its own right, reenforcing still further the Soviet Union’s relations with its satellite countries. This was important because as the competition with the United States and its NATO countries in the military and economic spheres intensified and with these countries moving into future orientation, the Soviet bloc of the Warsaw Pact countries sought an industrial base to compete effectively. This situation continued until President Reagan raised the ante by seriously considering the “Star Wars” initiative with the Soviet Union unable to meet this challenge. The consequence was that Premier Gorbachev initiated the democratization of the entire Soviet system and its satellite countries to meet the economic and military challenges of the postindustrial countries—the consequences of which were the reorientation of the Soviet econ-

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omy and greater freedom in planning, production, and marketing by the Soviet and satellite countries. The dynamics of this approach did not cease with the economic revolution, but spread also to the political sphere; economic independence without political independence accomplishes very little and both the Soviets and the satellites demanded the political freedom to conduct their business. Stalin’s tyrannical hold over the Soviet Union and its satellites in the aftermath of the war no longer existed and, indeed, the damaging effects of Stalinism were revealed during Premier Nikita Khrushchev’s time in office although Leonid Brezhnev, who followed him, maintained a Stalin-like grip on the region to prevent the kind of anarchy that existed prior to the Communist Revolution. Gorbachev understood the limits of power and constraint in light of current economic challenges and that the consequences of the Soviets political independence were unavoidable. Upon achieving their independence, they maintained their historical unity in a confederation of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The satellite countries, having also achieved political and economic independence, decided to go their own way and economic reliance on—and cooperation with—the postindustrial countries and primarily the United States, once considered a betrayal of principles, became necessary for developing the social infrastructure and industrial base needed to move into future orientation. After establishing their independence and economic identities, several of these countries sought to redress their historical grievances. Czechoslovakia, for example, separated amicably into the Czech and Slovak nations, each establishing its own country. The Yugoslavia experience has been different, with the Croats, Serbs, and Muslims who formed the country splitting in anger and fighting against each other to resolve the festering historical animosity. Poland and Lithuania became independent and have struggled to maintain their democracies; eventually the Soviet East German zone merged with West Germany to become reunited under a democratic regime. Romania, like Yugoslavia, remained fairly independent of the Soviet regime and, with the fall of Ceaucescu’s dictatorship the Romanians are struggling to establish a viable economy and are trying to resolve their historical differences with Hungary peacefully. The Bulgarians and Albanians are seeking to establish economic growth. The Bulgarian government, though communist, was fairly lenient, but the Albanian peoples suffered under a severely repressive regime. Bulgaria is now attempting to function as a democratic country while Albania is undergoing social and political unrest. The Eastern European experiences demonstrate that while independence has brought opportunities for growth and development, it has also given rise to potential internal conflicts that were hitherto held in check. A possible danger exists, however, that some of the independent countries formerly under Soviet domination may seek to dominate their neighbors. To avoid such a situation, Hungary and Romania have sought to resolve their historical differences without bloodshed. However, given the rise of the new nationalism,4 the historical

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tendency for domination as a pursuit of national interests, so often the cause of war in this region, may flare up again and lead to conflict. Given this new situation, an active NATO has entered the region and has sought viable permanent settlements to the conflicts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Albanian situation of the ethnic Albanians in the former Yugoslavian territory. The concern is that these conflicts may spread into Macedonia and involve Greece and, eventually, Turkey in war. A secondary apprehension is that Russia may resume responsibility for the region and become active once again with the possible consequence of another cold war. Because these countries have inherited industrial bases from the period of Soviet domination, today these countries are neither past- nor present-oriented, but are involved in effective domestic and international competition in our contemporary era with the intention of becoming future-oriented societies, giving them the unique position of confronting the paradox of industrialization without first entering the phase of present orientation. While their marketing boards are undergoing changes, they are exploiting their tourism. With their low tourist prices, rich histories, and ancestries of many peoples visiting them, much needed foreign currencies are brought into their coffers. However, these countries are confronted with the paradox of industrialization, perhaps to a greater extent than other countries moving into postindustrial status. For the Eastern European countries to enter our era, they must use their existing infrastructures to expand their domestic markets to increase employment and consumption and generate economic growth. While exploiting their tourist advantages, they must also increase their industrial innovations by competing effectively in established markets with their imitations. If a country’s products are of high quality, the demand for its products tends to be inelastic as the demand for French wines, Russian caviar, and Swiss watches demonstrates. Moreover, as these countries acquire postindustrial technologies, these technologies can be applied to imitation in production and manufacturing of goods and services for export to present and future-oriented countries, with a consequence that these technologies can be adapted for innovations in both domestic and foreign markets. The problem is selecting the products to be exported. For example, Polish pickles and vodka can be found in international supermarkets along with French and Swiss cheeses. These products, though foreign currency earners, are in themselves insufficient for establishing postindustrial bases to move into postindustrial future orientation of our contemporary era. For the Eastern European countries to enter our era, they must therefore reorganize their industries for high technology production—manufacturing automobiles, computers, and advanced electronic and communications equipment equipping these products with whatever unique advantages possible to make them competitive in both domestic and international markets. This reorganization involves costs which cannot be passed on to the international consumer, as to do so would place the products at a cost disadvantage. Policies, such as tax incentives, purchasing discounts, and even the call to national pride can be

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effective means for recouping the research, investment, and marketing costs involved. In addition, monies in the form of loans and grants from the postindustrial countries and various agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund can be used to develop infrastructure and to invest in advanced technology. With proper planning and the understanding of consumer demand and marketing, these countries’ industrial and political leaders can convert their present industrial bases into viable productive facilities, absorbing work forces that will be able to adapt to the new productive techniques. Once these industries are geared for modern production, these countries will be ready for postindustrial status. This is an opening to our era of knowledge, because in countries with strong productive foundations, monies from government allocation and private contributions can be directed into the arts and sciences. Artistic institutions can be endowed privately and scientific institutions can be endowed by both government and private sources such as industrial endowments. Such funding assists countries to enter fully into our contemporary era and future orientation, as artistic and scientific contributions that result can be applied to the needs of society and to industrial output as imitative and innovative products. However, the postindustrial status will place them within the paradox of industrialization, with the goods and services these countries provide competing with those of other postindustrial countries. Whatever competitive advantages their products may have will be manifested in the technological differences initiated and/or price incentives offered. FURTHER COMMENTS The paradox of industrialization is integral to our contemporary era and is due to the present-day concept of industrialization. For countries to be advanced industrially, they must produce goods and services that are highly technologically advanced and must do so competitively so that their product will sell. This results in rapid near market saturation and the costs of the products’ nuances to increase their competitiveness are compensated by sales due to competitive prices to move the goods and services. This paradox, though inherent in our contemporary era, is nevertheless necessary because it stimulates the manufacture of highly technological products. The initial profits for successfully commercial products are very high with technological advantages protected for the duration of their domestic and international patents. Nevertheless, competition allows for nuances of products and for similar competitive products to enter the market. The greater amounts of profits are thus earned during the time lapse between the products’ initial appearances in the markets and the imitative competition entering the field. Depending on the product, this lapse may be of sufficient duration to render the product highly profitable after research, production, and marketing costs are deducted. Nevertheless, the paradox of industrialization has serious implications for our era. The educational standards necessary to work productively in all phases of

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technological industries are higher in our social time than in any other period. The necessity for theoretical, technological, and practical training places heavy demands on institutes of higher learning and competition for employment in the highly technological industries is intense. Because of this, small, specialized companies are entering the markets providing employment where the bigger firms are unable to do so because their staff is working on current and future planned projects. While the postindustrial countries have greater technological output, due to their advantages in research, production, and marketing, those countries in the latter stages of present orientation have the opportunity in terms of the paradox of industrialization to form their own markets by establishing their own unique criteria for future orientation based on their histories and their comprehension of our contemporary era. Thus, they generate strong competition with the future oriented countries. The paradox of industrialization encourages neocolonialism in which the postindustrial countries dominate the past-and present-oriented countries. For example, the Eastern European countries—while seeking to establish themselves— have not yet accomplished this. Since the postindustrial countries have the strongest economies, the most stable political systems, and the highest levels of education, neocolonialism manifests itself primarily in industrial domination and, to a lesser but still important degree, in political domination. This domination is prevalent in the present-oriented countries due to assistance, aid, and technological instruction. As the present-oriented countries proceed to move into future orientation, they develop their own industries which gives them a degree of competition in the international markets. While aspects of political influence are discernable in this neocolonialim, generally they are not necessarily dominating. Neocolonialiam is a consequence of qualitative differences between past-and present-oriented and future-oriented crisis theories. Due to the future-oriented countries’ strong industrial bases, their liquidity is channeled into research which results in innovation, initiation, and the critical testing that follows, providing the basis for developing from strict imitative production to explorative imitation and initiation in response to market changes due to competition. The resulting explorative imitation that results permits the examination of production and marketing techniques with initiation providing for changes to be incorporated after they have undergone critical testing when differing opinions make such testing necessary. Although these political influences result from postindustrial countries’ economic strength, political influence through aid and assistance is nevertheless a consequence as postindustrial countries exert their financial—and at times military—influence to achieve their international objectives. With the Cold War over and presentoriented countries attempting to move into future orientation, the international objectives of the postindustrial countries tend to be similar with regard to aid and assistance for present- and past-oriented countries. In geographical past-oriented regions of great political and economic insta-

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bility—such as in Africa and the Middle East in which war and strife are common—conditions of starvation and the absence of political freedom exist such as in Somalia and the Sudan. The starvation, illness, and military conflict are debilitating while the warlords maintain their wealth through force. International agencies of the postindustrial countries are attempting to remove the scourge of starvation, control the spread of epidemic illnesses, and establish democratic forms of government consistent with these peoples’ histories to bring them into present orientation as soon as possible. Given the depth and intensity of these complicated situations, these remain long-run objectives. Whether these objectives can be achieved depends on the acumen of those involved—on the rulers in these countries to ease or relinquish their control to establish environments for business and competition. Should this long-run objective be achieved, these countries will benefit from the future orientation of our era; until then, neocolonialism will remain and those past-oriented countries retaining their status will continue to deal with their social and economic problems and suffer the whims and fancies of dictatorship. The present-oriented countries have achieved their status by formulating their crisis theories while those in past orientation still have to develop their situations. This has been so for commerce, for example, as business leaders placed their countries’ industries in the production patterns of present and futureoriented countries, with labor leaders responding accordingly. Their political leaders developed their countries’ democratic systems according to their histories and the systems of the postindustrial countries with sufficient flexibility to deal with problems of industrial urbanization and suburban living. As these crisis theories are subject to entropy, they allow for linguistic changes due to innovation and initiation. Because these theories are dynamic, the democratic ambience permits competing crisis theories to be posited and critically tested for their utilities and abilities to perform competitively. As these crisis theories gain sophistication, they eventually move these dynamic present-oriented countries into future-oriented postindustrial status, thereby competing with the established postindustrial countries. They will also be brought fully into the paradox of industrialization as they compete imitatively with goods and services of the established postindustrial countries. The only way out of this paradox is through the innovation of unique products that have such consumer demand that even though imitative products will soon be on the markets, a sufficient period of time will lapse before profits are affected. Effective crisis theories of sufficient quantity must therefore be formulated to maintain high-grade research to sustain industrial innovation in the postindustrial countries to maintain high profits before imitation reduces them. Although present-oriented countries can maintain imitative output and bring profits from sales, this imitation can only sustain industrial output without wide profit margins. Once these countries have entered future orientation, they can no longer be strictly imitative to maintain their industries; moreover, other countries will become present-oriented and will compete rigorously for imitative

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markets. The new postindustrial countries, like the others, will have to emphasize innovations to compete with those already established to maintain their postindustrial orientation. By relying on imitation, they will return to present orientation, remaining without the ability to establish new markets and reap the initial profits that result from highly technological innovations. Eastern Europe is in an advantageous situation for eventually moving into future orientation. The region’s industrial base established to support the Soviet economy can be vitalized sufficiently to move these economies well into present orientation. Formulating viable crisis theories for planning, manufacturing, and marketing competitive products will improve these countries’ situations so that with sufficient experience in international competition, their industries will move into innovation, eventually bringing these countries into future orientation. Hence, it is necessary for past- and present-oriented countries aspiring to future orientation to first undergo industrialization since this requires the establishment of physical infrastructure such as roads, railways, and airports for moving goods, services, and people to domestic and international markets. Social amenities such as urban centers, health care services, and educational and recreational facilities will either follow or be developed along with industry, depending on the foresight and acumen of the political and social leaders. Because industrial activity is the primary stimulus for moving into future orientation, once it is achieved, the paradox of industrialization will set in only to be alleviated temporarily through viable innovation. Innovative and imitative crisis theories will continue to be formulated and refined to deal with entropy generation and maintaining demand from consumers. FROM A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE Every historical era has come to an end for reasons internal to the era. The Ice Ages ceased with the development of social structures that allowed for both agricultural and, what was then, urban development to exist simultaneously. The Iron and Bronze Ages ceased when the tools for working and for war made from these materials were firmly established and empires rose in part because of the advantages these metals provided. The Roman Empire was most powerful, conquering and subjecting vast territories to its rule and ways of life. With the fall of Rome the Dark Ages set in, and the Roman Empire became the Holy Roman Empire under the authority of the Church, while the Eastern Church in Byzantium ruled the Balkans extending its influence into Russia. It was Aristotle’s works, translated from Greek and Arabic into Latin that influenced St. Thomas Aquinas’s thinking, bringing the Dark Ages to an end and initiating the Renaissance. This era ended with the applications of the science of the era to the problems of production, culminating in the Industrial Revolution, which in turn ended with the Great Depression. A historical trend has still to be considered, that of the diminishing time duration of eras. The Dark Ages lasted approximately 775 years, the Renaissance

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endured for approximately 525 years, and the Industrial Revolution lasted some 150 years. Each of these eras had its own unique social times during which changes were brought about within the era, enhancing its unique characteristics. The Dark Ages witnessed the flowering of the Christian religion and the rise of the Moslem faith, the control of education by the Scholastics, and the merging of religious authority with political power. The Renaissance saw the development of the arts and sciences due to the thawing of religious doctrine on the conceptions and teachings of science and on artistic expression. During the Industrial Revolution, regions that were separated geographically were brought together through industrial expansion. The American Civil War was fought to maintain the union of the country divided by conflicting ideologies; Napoleon in France sought to unite Europe under French domination; and the problems of Europe that led to World War I were left unresolved to be fought over again in World War II. The difficulties of the business cycle were brought into sharp perspective when the expected cyclical upswing of the Great Depression failed to materialize, leading to a new and radical approach to economic activity. Our contemporary era of knowledge came into its own in the aftermath of World War II. So far during its social time, two events have been major: the imposition of the Cold War with its subsequent dynamics such as the Korean and Vietnam conflicts and the wars in the Middle East, and the end of the Cold War with the dissolution of the Soviet Union’s empire and the great efforts of the postindustrial countries to help the past-and present-oriented countries to move into future orientation. Whether our era will be of shorter duration than others and what factors will bring about its termination cannot be foretold; we can only surmise. For example, when the majority of present-oriented countries move into future orientation, the necessity for innovation to remove the paradox of industrialization will be so great and the realization of innovation so costly that innovative crisis theories may decline and an imitative, mature world economy will prevail. This is contrary to the very dynamics of knowledge in our era and will result in an excess of knowledge without practical applications. Another plausible scenario is that the gap between the past- and futureoriented countries will not be overcome as the inerita for this movement is perpetuated by the increasing contributions of the future-oriented countries and the inability for past-oriented countries to establish sufficient infrastructure to close this gap. This scenario predicts that, as the gap widens, another major war will be fought, bringing down our era because, with all its knowledge, it did not succeed in raising up the past-oriented countries to present and future orientation. As for our era’s duration, it will last as long as its dynamics are able to continue crisis theory innovation, initiation, and imitation and this is dependent on more countries moving into future orientation. Therefore, another paradox seems to be inherent in our era: On the one hand, as more countries enter our era, the greater the difficulty will be for crisis theory innovations to be realized in production programs; on the other hand, the in-

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ability to enter our era is widening the gap in productivity between the types of countries, with the possibility of another global conflict. Our era still holds great promise but whether they can be realized for the benefit of all countries in their striving to be unique while, at the same time, being members of the unifying commonwealth of the world will unfold as our era with its social times develops. NOTES 1. Anthony Sampson, The Midas Touch (New York: Truman Talley Books/Plume, 1991), p. 229. 2. See the argument offered on this point in David Z. Rich, The Economics of International Trade: An Independent View (Westport, Conn.: Quorum Books, 1992), chapter 9, “Circa 1992: Multinational Corporations,” pp. 155–163. 3. For a discussion on the four-phased business cycle and the development of the three-phased cycle, see David Z. Rich, The Economics of Welfare: A Contemporary Analysis (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1989), pp. 99–148. 4. The rise of the new nationalism has become prominent in Austria and Switzerland with the public support of nationalist political parties. This may pose possible difficulties for continuing European unification.

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Concluding Comments: The Ethical Imperative—Dollo’s Law and Crisis Theory The project of giving to ethical life an objective and deterministic grounding in considerations about human nature is not, in my view, very likely to succeed. But it is at any rate a comprehensible project, and I believe it represents the only intelligible form of ethical objectivity at the reflective level. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy1

As with every social species, we have evolved due to the combination of our genetic inheritance and our applications to the physical and social problems that have confronted us. Moreover, because we are a unique social species, we have generated problems through our behavior with some of their solutions being more successful than others. In seeking to understand and work with our surroundings, we have developed sciences with which we can work with nature, thereby controlling its physical and biological aspects. However our ethical dimensions as we have developed them since the our evolution into Homo sapiens during the historical ages, still require consideration. Our contemporary era of knowledge is unique ethically because its technological advances and opportunities are held out to those countries that still remain outside our era; moreover, with the current international economic and political dynamics, we have made it a social and historical ethical imperative to strive to enter our era and are willing to assist them in their efforts to do so. Having evolved from the Ice Ages during which nature imposed its physical conditions on us, we have learned how to live with and—to a large extent—

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regulate nature, by developing our physics to probe nature’s secrets and deepening our knowledge of genetics to improve the quality of our grains and livestock. While we are still at the mercy of nature’s disastrous temperaments, we have learned to deal with and control—to a large extent—its earthquakes, storms, floods, fires, and droughts. Whether nature dictates that we will continue to evolve physically and mentally over time is speculative, but as we evolved as a species we have been engaged in serious challenges and conflicts—many of our own making—in varying degrees of intensity and our solutions have been incorporated into our social awareness and organization. With regard to evolution in general and in the specific context of our species, there is a difference of opinion between Louis Dollo’s Law of Evolution and crisis theory as it is applied to evolution. Dollo’s Law states that evolution is irreversible and that evolutionary properties inherited by a species will be retained by the species over time.2 Dollo’s Law is, however, a statement about the statistical improbability of following a specific evolutionary trajectory twice, in either direction. However, a single evolutionary step can be eliminated by a biologically accepted mutation that enhances a species’ survival and its ability to function effectively in its environmental circumstances. Richard Dawkins points out that the mathematical space of all possible trajectories is so vast that the chances of two trajectories ever arriving at the same point at the same time is exceedingly small. While it may seem that the random genetic drift allowing for positive and negative mutations would always cancel itself out, bringing the path back continuously to the same genome—in the absence of active forces determining selection, the very fact that a limited sample in large-space opportunity leads inevitably to the accumulation of distance between actual genomes—a situation that Daniel C. Dennett calls the upshot of Dollo’s Law3 — does not necessarily hold with respect to crisis theory. With regard to Dollo’s Law and crisis theory in our contemporary era, while our current state of physical evolution remains much as it was thousands of years ago, it is our mental evolution that has allowed us to develop our historical eras. As expressed in our artistic and scientific achievements, our evolutionary status has provided us with the abilities to expand our knowledge and to apply it. We have developed from the Ice Ages imposed on us by nature, through the historic Imperial Ages of conquest, through the Ages of Darkness, and into the Renaissance with our exploration and developments in the arts and sciences, and then into the Industrial Revolution with the applications of the arts and sciences in the processes of manufacture and production, and, eventually, into our contemporary era of knowledge. These historical movements have obligated us to consider our ethical situations, especially in our era because of our understanding of the necessity to put aside our predatory instincts against our own species. Whether this is due to our continuing physical evolution lies outside the scope of our current understanding, but we have come to realize a universal ethical imperative in the current state of our evolution that, as a species, we are still engaged in very serious

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conflicts, still acting as predators, and with great wealth that can be directed toward means of mass destruction. At the same time, we have developed a historical era in which destructive conflicts can be prevented and conflicts settled without the loss of lives; areas already destroyed by human predators can be rebuilt, and lives shattered by current conflicts can be put back together again. The formulation of crisis theory results from the dynamics of knowledge that occurs in our era. Innovative, initiative, and imitative crisis theories have been responsible for the development of technologies and working systems of knowledge that have led to the development of our technological and artistic contributions that have given rise to our future-oriented societies and have caused less developed societies to emulate them and strive to enter into future orientation within the context of their own histories and the abilities of their peoples. Hence, in our era we have the order of the future-oriented societies as manifested in their research and innovations and the disorder brought about by their contributions as attempts are made to reorganize to imitate the contributions and initiate changes for improvement in the resulting competition. We also have the order of future-oriented stability in their political systems and the disorder of past- and present-oriented countries that still practice predation within their boundaries and against their neighboring countries. As approaches to evolution, Dollo’s Law and crisis theory are in disagreement. Physical and social evolution for species such as ours cannot be separated because our physical and social development have relied on each other since the evolution into our species. Moreover, aspects of our physical development such as our appendix remain even though whatever functions were pertinent biologically have ceased being so very long ago according to our current medical and physiological knowledge. This does not mean, however, that Dollo’s Law holds and the functions no longer exist; in the future, uses for such organs may be found or perhaps during our physiological evolution these organs will be reinstated without ambiguity as being important to our existence. Given that our physical and social evolution cannot be separated, our knowledge as developed by our crisis theories may remain significant historically but this cannot discount the possibility that, as we develop our crisis theories, knowledge which has been rendered entropic and obsolete cannot be revived with different nuances and, hence, given utility. Our laws of physics serve to demonstrate this. While Galileo’s theory was rendered obsolete by Newton’s, we still use his theory for computing macrosituations such as the relative speed of different objects and we still use it when considering the motions of pendulums such as with clocks. When infinitesimal distances are considered in our threedimensional world, we still use Newton’s theory although Einstein showed that the world is four-dimensional, and his theory of relativity, together with quantum theory, have rendered Newtonian theory as a limit-case. For crisis theory, the trajectories of social evolution are reversible but the nuances of the original contributions are altered through changes in utility over time. Considering Dollo’s Law, crisis theory also provides the possibilities of physical evolution

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should the path for returning trajectories be required by the biological and sociological circumstances. However, should reverse evolution occur, the reinstated changes will be with different nuances that have been altered accordingly to meet the conditions that brought about the reverse evolution and will suit the circumstances that brought about the changes. The ability of crisis theory to reincorporate previous contributions altered for current situations has given the ethical imperative in our contemporary era a different nuance. The goods and services of the future-oriented countries are known throughout the world due to future-oriented innovations in communications. While physical predation continues within national borders and among neighboring countries, another kind of predation must replace it, this being the competition among crisis theories and their supporters in the conflict of ideas and their applications. It is here when entropic contributions can be revived and, with their different nuances, be applied to meet the qualifications of critical testing and to be candidates in the competition for working with current problem situations in bargaining, and in industrial, artistic, and scientific innovations and initiations. In light of the circumstances of our contemporary era, the ethical imperative has taken on new meaning. The goods and services of future-oriented countries are known throughout the world due to future-oriented innovations and imitations in communications that are used in the worlds’ countries. In our era, for physical predation to cease within national borders and against neighboring countries, another form of predation must replace it—the competition among knowledge systems as presented and defended by their supporters in the conflict of ideas manifested in crisis theories in the realms of bargaining, in the arts and sciences, and in business and industry. The ethical imperative dictates that the past- and present-oriented countries must be moved into future orientation to eliminate their physical intra- and international strife. For this to be accomplished, competition among businesses and among ideas must be established in these countries. This will necessitate the development of infrastructure and the channeling of wealth from war and predatory conquest into innovative and competitively imitative projects. Order will then be established by viable crisis theories as manifested in their applications in bargaining and in industrial, scientific, and artistic innovations and imitations that will follow. Disorder will result from the entropy that intrudes these crisis theories either bringing these theories down or, when possible, resulting in initiation sufficient for their reconstruction and utility. Regarding the ethos of our contemporary era, we have evolved from pre– Stone Age Homo erectus to modern Homo sapiens and the crisis theory approach to evolution developed here describes the processes of evolution being due to biological properties and problem solving. For a species confronting the same types of problem situations, evolution will not result. In our prehistory, we had to confront problems of variegated nuances and had to develop solutions based on our physical abilities and mental prowess or perish. With our physical

Dollo’s Law and Crisis Theory

243

and mental abilities we have overcome predators and obstacles that had confronted us with the result being that our social existence is a manifestation of our capabilities to cope with the familiar and generate the new so it too becomes the familiar. By doing this, we have broken from nature’s determining our historical eras and established our own. The theory presented in this work is not Social Darwinist in orientation. There is no emphasis on the survival-of-the-fittest approach to societies or to individuals because, as a species, we have survived with our own species as our greatest predator. Although our history has been bloody, it has also been glorious, moving from our emergence from the Ice Ages into the conquest of ancient empires and with their decline, into the Dark Ages, to the Renaissance, the Industrial Revolution, and into our contemporary era of knowledge. Through our efforts, we have progressed and overcome. In the ethos of our contemporary era, we are facing a great challenge—that of developing our crisis theories of knowledge for the betterment of competition, with the possible consequence of finally ending physical predation among ourselves and—with our crisis theories and the development of knowledge that results—continuing the movement into global future orientation. Our technology has become so advanced and our weapons of predation so comprehensively destructive that, for our physical survival and social evolution, the formulation of crisis theories for moving into and developing our future orientation is our only way for the continuation and the evolution of our species. NOTES 1. Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 153. 2. Louis Dollo, “Les Lois De L’evolution,” Bulletin de la Societe´ belge de ge´ ologie, de plae´ ntologie, et d’hydrologie 7 (1893): 164–67. 3. Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea (New York: Simon and Schuster/ Touchstone Books, 1996), p. 124. See also Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker (London: Longmans, 1986), p. 94. This point is referred to by Dennett in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, p. 125.

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Index Acceptance, 82, 101, 107, 131, 138, 139 Albania, 231 Alexandria library, 64 Apartheid, 217. See also South Africa Aquinas, St. Thomas, 61, 113, 117, 119, 198, 200, 236 Appleby, Steve, 17, 19 Archemedes, 141–42 n.2 Area language (statements), 75–77, 80 n.4, 81, 86, 91, 96, 102, 116, 132, 154 Arendt, Hannah, 71 n.7 Argentina, 218. See also Falklands War Aristarchus of Samos, 61–62, 71 n.7, 149– 50 Aristotle, 84, 113, 118, 121, 150, 193 n.9, 198, 236; Aristotlian physics (philosophy), 7, 9, 84, 104, 121, 129, 135, 140; concern for nature, 61 Australia, 59 Babbage, Charles, 142 n.10, 203 Bacon, Sir Francis, 6, 8, 11 n.10, 125, 127 Bangladesh, 219 Baumol, Williams, 158 n.8 Benhabib, Jess, 158 n.8

Big Bang theory, 121-22 131, 144 n.18, 194 n.14 Boole, George, 142 n.10, 203; Boolean algebra, 14, 52, 76, 183, 191 Botsdorff, Denise, 46 n.2 Brache, Tyco, 9, 62 Brezhnev, Leonid, 231 Bronze Age, 65, 173, 175, 198, 236 Brown, Robert, 83; Brownian movement, 43 Bulgaria, 213 Buridan, Jean, 118, 125 Burma, 216 Cambodia, 216 Camouflage, 160, 179 Cantor, Georg, 24, 203; Cantorial infinity, 203; triadic set, 24, 29 Carbon dating, 169 Carnot, Sadi, 80 n.6 Carter, Jimmy, 68 Cassirer, Ernst, 81 Catastrophe theory, 35–37, 38–39, 39 n.4, 79, 83, 85–86, 92–93, 153, 155–57 Chaos theory, 24–25, 28–30, 37–39, 79, 82, 85–87, 92–94, 151–53, 158 n.8, 192; hard excitation, 29–30; soft excitation, 29–30

250

Index

China, 53, 59 n.9, 63, 67–68, 206, 213– 14, 216, 224 n.4; Hong Kong, 206, 213–14, 224 n.4; possible Cold War situation, 215 Clausius, Rudolph, 80 n.6 Clifford, W. K., 4, 10 n.3 Clinton, Bill, 223 n.9 Cohen, Jack, 151–52, 161, 193 n.5 Cold War, 58–60, 67–69, 95, 201–4, 206, 209, 214, 217, 234, 237; possible Cold War situation, 315 Colombia, 218 Complexity theory, 13–17, 79, 82, 85–87, 92–94, 141–43, 154, 156–57, 203 Congress of Vienna (1815), 67 Contemporary era of knowledge, 61, 64– 66, 67–70, 79, 89–90, 94–96, 102–3, 108, 111–12, 118–20, 123–25, 150, 169, 174–75, 186–89, 200, 202–5, 206– 10, 217, 222, 232–34, 237–39, 241–42 Copernicus, Nicholaus, 9, 61–62, 90, 117, 119, 150 Coveny, Peter, 3, 5–7, 17 Creationism strategies, 160; dynamic form, 160, 170–71; strict (static) form, 160, 163 Crick, Francis, 16, 193 n.4 Crisis theory (C* ), 28, 39, 44–45, 75, 79, 80 n.3, 85–86, 92–94, 101–2, 141, 152– 54, 155–57, 170, 181–83, 184–86, 189, 193 n.29, 205–7, 211, 213–14, 217–18, 221, 226–27, 234–37, 240–42; decision making, 45; strategies of evolution, 179–83, 184–89, 188–92 Critical test, 87, 94, 96, 102, 104, 107–8, 114, 120, 121–23, 126, 129–33, 135, 137–39, 155 Critique, 105–8, 111–13, 116–17, 120– 23, 126, 129–33, 135, 137–39, 155; critical aspect, 115, 234; psychological aspect, 107, 109–110, 112–13, 116–17, 120–23, 126, 129–33, 135, 137–39, 143, 155 Cro-Magnon Man, 172–73 Cuba, 209–12 Czechoslovakia, 231

Darwin, Charles, 8, 10, 65, 71 n.11, 105– 6, 118, 121, 127–29, 193 n.3, 197; Darwin-Fisher thesis, 127–30; Darwinian trial and error in evolution, 97–98; Social Darwinism, 118, 144–45, 151, 253. See also Fisher, R. A. da Vinci, Leonardo, 61 Dawkins, Richard, 13, 16, 18, 21 n.6, 241, 244; and Ted Kaehler, 15 Democritus, 66 Dennett, Daniel C., 49, 189, 224 n.16, 240 Descartes, Rene´ , 5, 6, 8, 82, 125, 127 Developed (postindustrial, future-oriented) countries (societies), 204, 207–9, 212– 13, 217, 222, 227–28, 230, 234–36, 241–42 Diamond, Jared, 171, 194 n.25 Dollo’s Law, 240–41, 243 n.2 Duhem, Pierre, 23, 137 Duns Scotus, John, 199

Dark Ages, 61, 113, 118–19, 124, 150, 174–75, 198, 200, 240, 243

Fair Deal, 195 n. 27 Falklands War, 224 n.12

Eddington, Arthur S., 142 n.4. See also Einstein, Albert Egypt, 68, 209, 224 n.15 Einstein, Albert, 4, 10, 23, 43, 82, 97 n.2, 98 n.11, 131, 136, 145 n.27, 241; and Eddington’s eclipse experiment, 131, 142 n.4, 140, 145 n.35 Eisenhower, Dwight David, 67 El Nin˜ o, 30, 178 Entropy, 78–79, 80 nn.4, 6, 81–83, 85– 89, 90–97, 101–2, 104, 108, 110, 114, 117–18, 132, 137–39, 141, 151, 155– 56, 179, 181, 183, 185, 187, 189, 192, 235–36 Equilibrium: dynamic, 32, 92, 192; dynamic disequilibrium, 32, 69, 94, 96– 97, 192; static, 17, 79, 90, 93 Era time, 160 Ethical imperative, 239, 242 Euclid, 8, 98 n.8 European Economic Community (EEC), 59, 230 Evolutionary time, 168–70, 173–74, 178– 79

Index Feinberg, Gerald, 24, 30, 35, 39 n.4, 142 n.4 Fisher, R. A., 127–28, 144 n.25 Ford, Henry, 142 n.3 Fractals, 29; and snowflakes, 30; Hopf bifurcation, 28 France, 67, 199, 233 n.9 Galileo, 7, 9, 62, 83–84, 87, 90, 104–5, 117, 129, 135–36, 140, 241 Galton, Sir Francis, 71 n.11 Game theory, 50–54, 183. See also Shackle, G.L.S. Gardner, Martin, 23 Germany, 64, 70 n.5, 144 n.17, 158 n.7, 201, 230; Nazi Germany, 58, 64, 66– 67, 70–71 n.5 Giotto, 61 Go¨ del, Kurt, 224 n.16 Gorbachev, Mikhail. See Soviet Union Great Britain, 198–99, 233 n.9 Great Depression, 3, 63–64, 66, 95, 103, 113, 118–19, 123–24, 136, 175, 184, 200–201, 203, 230, 236–37 Greece (Greek influences), 150, 176, 198, 232 Grey tree squirrel 166 Guillen, Michael, 35, 39 n.1, 81–82 Guth, Alan, 121, 144 n.18 Habermas, Ju¨ rgen, 73, 74, 205 Hall, Stephen S., 134 Hassan, Fekri A., 171, 173 Heisenberg, Werner, 4, 10, 23, 25–28, 98 n.8, 123; uncertainty principle, 26–28, 132 Highfield, Roger, 3, 5, 6, 17 Hilbert, David, 26, 32 n.5 Hirschbein, Ron, 43, 46 n.2 Homo sapiens, 18, 19, 127–28, 165, 173– 75, 177, 180, 239, 242; Homo Homo Sapiens, 181, 187, 189, 197–98 Human Immunodeficiency Virus (AIDS), 4, 5, 11 n.6 Hungary, 213, 231 Huxley, Julian, 127, 129 Huygens, Christian, 28

251 I (information content), 78, 80 n.4, 90– 91, 94–95, 116, 132, 165, 185 Ice Ages, 171–72, 194 n.16, 198, 200, 236, 239–40 Imitation, 87, 90, 92, 95–96, 102, 142 n.8, 187, 218, 236–37; awareness imitation, 88; explorative imitation, 87–90, 95–96, 113, 115, 125, 155, 224; strict imitation, 86–87, 96, 101, 125, 155, 157, 180–81, 188, 230 India, 53, 54–55, n.9, 206, 219 Indonesia, 53, 55 n.10; President Habibe, 55 n.10; President Suharto, 55 n.10 Industrial Revolution, 63–65, 69, 95, 103, 112–13, 118–19, 120, 123, 143 nn.13, 14, 200–203, 229, 236, 240 Initiation, 89, 107–8, 113, 116–17, 125, 129, 130–31, 142 n.8, 154–57, 180–81, 187–89, 191, 218, 234–35, 237, 242; competitive initiation, 93, 155; strict initiation, 93, 96 Innovation, 92, 94, 96, 102, 105, 107, 109–10, 113, 115, 125, 131, 135, 154– 55, 157, 180–81, 187–90, 192, 228, 230, 235–37, 242; competitive innovation, 92, 134, 135; strict innovation, 92, 102, 206, 218, 230; time factor, 135 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 53, 55 n.10. See also Indonesia Iran, 221, 223 n.7, 223–24 n.11, 224 n.15 Iraq, 209, 221; invasion of Kuwait, 220, 223 n.7, 224 n.15 Iron Age, 65, 175, 198 Israel, 68, 198, 202, 210, 220, 224 n.15, 223–24 n.11 Japan, 58, 163–64, 167, 202–3, 229 Jastrow, Robert, 171, 193 n.4 Jazz, 67; the Beat generation movement, 66, 67 Johnson, Lyndon B., 68 Jordan, 224 n.15 K, 181, 184–86; and K population, 185, 188 Kaluza, Theodor, 4 Kant, Immanuel, 8; and David Hume, 8

252 Kauffman, Stuart A., 50, 54 n.5, 76, 190– 91, 193 n.4; adaptive evolution, 191– 92; co-evolution, 191–92; N K epistatic system, 190–92, 195 nn.32–39; and the Santa Fe Motto, 189, 195 n.31 Kelvin, Lord, 84, 97 n.5 Kennedy administration, 67 Kepler, Johannes, 7, 9, 62, 83, 90, 104–5, 117, 136, 140, 150 Keynes, John Maynard, 123, 136; and A. C. Pigou, 144 nn.20, 21 Kierkegaard, Søren, 142 n.13 Klein, Oskar, 4, 10–11 n.4 Koestler, Arthur, 71 n.11 Korea, 71 n.13, 202, 216; Korean War, 6, 202; North Korea, 212, 215, 223 n.7; South Korea, 59, 213, 215–16, 227, 229 Kramer, Edna E., 47 n.3, 135 n.35 Lamarck, J.P.B., 65, 71 n.14, 106, 121, 127; Lamarckian evolution, 65, 118 League of Nations, 63–64, 201, 230 Leibnitz, G. W., 8, 144 n.29, 157 n.1 Leonteif, Wassily, 197, 198, 199 Lucretius, 66 Lybia, 209, 223 n.7 Lysenko, T. D., 65, 71 n.11, 121 Machiavelli, Nicolo, 113 Mackey, Michael C., 31, 32–33, n.10 Maimonides, Moses, 145 n.26, 193 n.13 Marx, Karl, 124, 136, 144 n.21 Malaysia, 216 Maxwell, James Clerk, 140, 145 n.23 McNeill, William, 19, 21 n.8 Mendel, Gregor, 127, 161, 193 Mercantilism, 198, 223 n.2 Method and methodology, 5, 6, 44–46 Mexico, 189, 218 Michelangelo, 61 Michelson-Morley experiment, 122, 144 n.19 Middle East, 21 n.8, 209, 220, 222 Mills, C. Wright, 194–95 n.27 Mimicry, 68, 179 More, Henry 82

Index Morgenstern, Oskar, 54 n.3. See also von Neumann, John Morocco, 224 n.15 Morris, Desmond, 21 n.6 Motz, Lloyd, 149, 157 n.1 Multinational corporations, 226, 229 Nash, Christopher, 101 Nash, John F. and equilibrium position, 51, 191, 195 n.40 Natural selection, 164, 166–67 Neanderthal Man, 171–72; Neanderthal influences, 19 Neocolonialism, 209–10, 234–35 Newton, Sir Isaac, 7–10, 24, 62, 83–84, 97 n.2, 98 n.9, 113, 117, 139, 145, 241; Newtonian physics (theory), 8, 25–26, 82–83, 86, 89, 95, 104, 111, 117–18, 122, 136, 145 n.35, 155, 157 n.1, 241 New Zealand, 59 Nicaragua, 218 Nixon, Richard M., 68 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 218 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 59, 60, 209, 212, 230, 232 Occam, William of, 119, 125 October 17, 1987, stock market crash of, 4 Oersted, Hans Christian, 140 Olson, Mancur, 195 n.27 Operational language (statements), 75–77, 81, 86, 91, 96, 102, 116, 132, 134 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 68, 220–21 Pakistan, 53, 60, 53–54 n.9, 206, 219. See also Bangladesh Paradox of industrialization, 202, 205, 219, 222, 228–29, 230–35 Pasteur, Louis (spontaneous generation), 126–30, 134, 138, 140–41 Pauling, Linus, 193 n.4 Peirce, Charles S., 47 n.3 Penrose, Roger, 14, 20 n.3 Physiocracy, 108. See also Quesnay, Francois; Shackle, G.L.S.

Index

253

Planck, Max, 7–8, 10, 82, 110, 118, 122, 136, 151 Poincare´ , Henri, 13–14, 23–24, 65, 118, 145 n.27, 150–52, 203 Popper, Karl R., 137, 140; crucial experiment, 137–39, 140–41; Popperian approach (method, school), 6, 11 n.11 Predation, 185–88, 241–43 Probability requirements (assessment, position), 89, 106, 108, 113, 116, 131– 33, 155 Ptolemy, 9; Ptolemaic epicycles, 61–62; Ptolemaic theory, 90, 106, 149–50 Pythagoras, 8

COMECON, 59, 222, 230; Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), 68, 206, 214, 261; Mikhail Gorbachev, 59, 68, 214, 220, 223 n.8; Russia, 63, 68, 119, 144 n.17; Sputnik, 202 Sowell, Thomas, 144 n.15 Steady State theory, 120–21, 131, 171 Steward, Simon, 17, 19 Stewart, Ian, 151, 152 Stone Age, 175–76. See also Cro-Magnon Man Sudan, 70, 217, 235 Syria, 209, 216, 224–25; and Lebanon, 224 nn.13, 17

Quesnay, Francois, 199, 223 n.3. See also Physiocracy; Shackle, G.L.S.

Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, 183, 194–95 n.27. See also Olson, Mancur; Mills, C. Wright Taiwan, 214–15 Thom, Rene´ , 35–38, 39 n.3, 80 n.3 Thomson, J. J., 84, 97 nn.4, 5 Toynbee, Arnold, 194 nn.22, 23 Tudge, Colin, 159 Turing, Alan, 13, 14, 203 Turkey, 224 n.15, 232 Tyndall, John, 126, 128–29, 131, 138–41

Reagan, Ronald, 58, 68; Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”), 59, 61, 63, 230 Rejection, 101, 107, 138–39 Renaissance, 5, 8, 61–64, 69, 82, 96, 102, 112, 117, 119, 124–25, 136, 143 n.14, 150, 174–75, 186, 198, 200, 236– 37, 240, 242–43 Romania, 125, 213, 231 Rome, 6, 176, 194 n.23, 200, 236 r-sector, 181, 184–88; r population, 185 Rwanda, 217 Sampson, Anthony, 225 Schro¨ dinger, Erwin, 159, 193 n.2 Shackle, G.L.S., 51, 52, 184, 222 n.3 Singapore, 213, 216; and present orientation, 215 Smith, Adam, 198–99 Social time, 65–67, 95, 111–12, 127–29, 160, 203–4, 206, 208, 215 Sociotechnology, 162, 165–66, 189; sociotechnological evolution, 189 Somalia, 235 South Africa, 217–18 South America, 210, 218; Latin (Central) America, 210, 218 Soviet Union, 58–60, 65, 67–68, 70 n.5, 126, 201–3, 206, 210–11, 214–16, 219, 221, 223, 233, 236–37; Cechnya, 189;

Underdeveloped (past-oriented) countries, 204–6, 207–9, 211–12, 226–28, 234– 35, 237, 242 United Nations, 60, 67 United States of America, 53, 55 n.9, 58– 59, 60, 63, 67–69, 183, 200–203, 209– 10, 212, 216, 229; American Revolution, 199; Civil War, 237 Utility, 44, 76–79, 80 n.2, 81–85, 88–89, 90–94, 95–97, 102, 104, 106, 108, 110– 12, 114–17, 131–35, 138–41, 151, 154– 56, 168, 179, 182, 184, 188, 192, 195 n.29 van Leeuwenhock, Anton, 113 Veblen, Thorsten, 70 n.1 Vietnam, 67, 216; Vietnam War, 67–68 von Boltzman, Ludwig, 80 n.6 von Neumann, John, 13, 203, 223 n.5 Wallace, A. R., 127 Warsaw Pact, 59

254 Watson, James, 193 n.4, 242 Weaver, Jefferson Hane, 149, 157 n.1 Weinberg, Steven, 194 n.14. See also Big Bang theory Wheeler, John A., 4, 10 n.2 Williams, Bernard, 239 Wilson, Edward O., 57, 167, 193 n.9 Wilson, Woodrow W., 63. See also League of Nations World Bank, 201, 233 World War I, 63, 66–67, 69, 118–19, 200, 204, 237

Index World War II., 58, 61, 64, 66, 69, 118– 19, 175, 183, 201, 203–4, 217, 230, 237 Wynne-Edwards, V. C., 163 Yom Kippur War, 68, 220 Yugoslavia, 70, 212–13 Zaire, 217 Zeno, 8, 24 Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), 217–18; Ian Smith, 218

About the Author DAVID Z. RICH is an economic consultant, independent researcher, and freelance writer. His earlier books include The Economic Theory of Growth and Development (Praeger, 1994) and Crisis Theory (Praeger, 1997).