On the Virtues : Part One of on the Virtues and Vices [1 ed.] 9780874622522, 9780874622485

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On the Virtues

Mediæval Philosophical Texts in Translation No. 45

Editorial Board John D. Jones James B. South David twetten Wanda Zemler-Cizewski

William of Auvergne

On the Virtues Part One of On the Virtues and Vices Translated from the Latin With an Introduction and Notes by

Roland J. Teske, SJ

mediæval philosophical texts in translation no. 45 Roland J. teske, sj, series editor

© 2009 Marquette University Press Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53201-3141 All rights reserved. www.marquette.edu/mupress/

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data William, of Auvergne, Bishop of Paris, d. 1249. [De virtutibus et vitiis. Part 1. English.] On the virtues : part one of On the virtues and vices / William of Auvergne ; translated from the Latin ; with an introduction and notes by Roland J. Teske. p. cm. —4 (Medieval philosophical texts in translation ; no. 45) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN-13: 978-0-87462-248-5 (pbk. : alk. paper) ISBN-10: 0-87462-248-4 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Virtues. 2. Theology, Doctrinal—History—Middle Ages, 600-1500. 3. Philosophy, Medieval. I. Teske, Roland J., 1934- II. Title. B765.B83D4813 2009 179’.9—dc22 2009030244



The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences— Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1992.

For my brothers, John, Robert, Charles, and Paul

Contents Introduction................................................................................................................................9

On the Virtues Chapter 1: Being about to speak of the virtues, he first subtly examines the definition of virtue that Tully proposed; then, he also adds the definition of Aristotle and examines it as well. Afterward, he explains whether potency differs from habit and brings forth certain very subtle things from the workshop of philosophy, which, you see, cannot be suitably summarized............................................................................................................31 Chapter 2: Three things are required for the moral rectitude and goodness of human life: first, that it give honor to God; second, that it be beautiful in itself; third, that it be useful or beneficial to others. He also shows the duty not to harm others and the duty to honor the creator are among the first impressions.......................................................51 Chapter 3: He again discusses virtue at length, asking whether such a habit is will or knowledge or both or one in relation to the other. . ........................................................58 Chapter 4: He discusses the name “virtue,” saying that in antiquity only fortitude by which we stand up to labors and pains was called virtue, but that soon others were called by the name ‘virtue.’....................................................................................................................63 Chapter 5: He discusses another name for virtue, saying that virtue is called perfection because a soul without virtue is imperfect in a sense and like something unformed and material in relation to a person endowed and perfect with the virtues. Then he speaks about the state of the soul from Aristotle and Plato. ......................................................65 Chapter 6: He speaks about a third name for virtue because virtue is also called spiritual health by a likeness to bodily health, as he explains well.................................................66 Chapter 7: Virtue is also called decor because virtue is the greatest ornament of our soul and its greatest splendor......................................................................................................67 Chapter 8: He explains other names by which virtue can be called by means of certain likenesses. .............................................................................................................................68 Chapter 9: He explains the distinction he makes between morals and habits; then he explains what the virtues are that are called natural, which, as he says, are not equal in all persons and are not properly called virtues, but rather abilities and approximations to those things that belong to virtue. ................................................................................73 Chapter 10: Now he first begins to discuss the virtues in a theological manner, and he compares the natural virtues to the feet and to the other members of the human body. But he compares the consuetudinal virtues to aids to members that are perhaps lacking or that are injured in some other way.................................................................................110 Chapter 11: He shows that our natural goods are not sufficient to merit the reward of eternal happiness, as some heretics think, namely, the Pelagians, who denied that grace is necessary. But our author says that it is so necessary in the present life that he says that a soul that is perfect in all the natural and consuetudinal virtues is not able to receive or to be capable of glory and that for this reason other perfections are required than those that come from the natural and consuetudinal virtues. ............................................... 112

8 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues Chapter 12: He says that the virtues are gifts on account of the reasons stated before, and he says that they are beatitudes on account of the fruit that depends upon them, namely, on account of the reward from them and because someone who has them is blessed. For, as the vices are miseries, so the beatitudes are happiness by which we especially surpass other souls and by which we are the image of God. Then he adds the reasons because of which twelve virtues are called fruits. He soon comes to a definition of virtue. .. 190 Chapter 13: He begins to speak about temperance after the treatise on justice and first about the word itself, because temperance is derived from tempering and by it those things that are excessive are tempered and cut back. Then he moves on its species, adding many questions.................................................................................................................. 214 Chapter 14: This cannot be summarized well on account of the variety and multiplicity of matters which he discusses. ........................................................................................ 218 Chapter 15: He cleverly and ingeniously discusses the volitions and affective or moving virtues, explaining the ways by which their establishment is made possible for us. .221 Chapter 16: He deals with the same topic, but the following cannot be summarized and pulled into an argument. Hence, the diligent reader should see all these things one by one and accurately note all the points that are singular, and in that way he will learn, if he is willing, to rule his affections in the best way. ....................................................... 228 Chapter 17: He discusses the rest of the emotions in the same way and presents some doubts in his fashion and resolves them. ....................................................................... 232 Chapter 18: He lists the virtues that come from the irascible power. .......................... 247 Chapter 19: He proposes a comparison of the virtues to one another and to the contrary vices, something that he does much more subtly and theologically............................ 254 Chapter 20: He compares the gratuitous virtues to the natural ones and to natural operations and motions. He does the same for the vices and their motions and passions. And he discusses much as a theologian. ................................................................................. 263 Chapter 21: He teaches that the virtues and graces are much greater than the vices and the motions of the virtues are greater than the motions of the vices and likewise that their delights and sorrows are greater than the delights and sorrows of the vices and that vices are improperly called delights. He proves the proposition stated above by the following example because a carnal man loves his own body more than every pleasure of the body, while a holy and good man loves his body more or at least no less than a carnal man, and he shows that the love of grace is greater than the love of nature. . 268 Chapter 22: He begins to explain the connection and bond of the virtues by which they are held together so that it is necessary that, whoever has a single one also has the others. But this must be understood concerning genuine virtues. .......................................... 272 Chapter 23: He subtly discusses whether virtues can increase and decrease in intension. 276 Select Bibliography................................................................................................................. 283 Index of Names..................................................................................................................... 289 Subject Index......................................................................................................................... 293 Index of Biblical Citations..................................................................................................... 301

Introduction

W

illiam of Auvergne, or of Paris, was born in the former Province of Auvergne circa 1180. Little is known of his early life, but by 1223 he was a master of theology at the young University of Paris and a canon of the cathedral of Notre Dame. William was consecrated bishop and placed over the see of Paris in 1228 by Gregory IX and remained bishop of Paris until his death in 1249. He began his writing as early as 1223 and continued his huge masterpiece, Teaching on God in the Mode of Wisdom (Magisterium divinale 1 et sapientiale) during his episcopacy amid many other works and problems. The present volume contains a translation of William’s On the Virtues (De virtutibus), which is a part of his treatise, On the Virtues and Vices (De virtutibus et vitiis), an immense work that runs from folio 102 to folio 328 in volume one 2 of the Opera omnia. It is divided into six parts in that edition. The first part, On the Virtues (De virtutibus), runs from folio 102 to 191; the second part, On Morals (De moribus), runs from folio 191 to 260; the third part, On Vices and Sins (De vitiis et peccatis), runs from folio 260 to 293; the fourth part, On Temptations and Their Resistance (De tentationibus et resistentiis), runs from folio 293 to 309; the fifth part, On Merits (De meritis), runs from folio 310 to 315; and the sixth part, On the Rewards of the Saints (De retributionibus sanctorum), runs from folio 315 to 328. Henceforth, On the Virtues will be used to refer to the first of the six parts, and On the Virtues and the Vices will be used to refer to all six parts of the work. On the Virtues and the Vices is in turn a part of William’s Teaching on God in the Mode of Wisdom, which contains seven works, namely, On the Trinity (De trinitate), On the Universe of Creatures (De universo creaturarum), On the Soul (De anima), Why God Became Man (Cur Deus homo), On the Faith and the Laws (De fide et legibus), On the Sacraments (De sacramentis), and On the Virtues and Vices (De virtutibus et vitiis). The intended order of the works within the Magisterium and the chronological order in which they were composed dif1  For the only book-length account of William’s life and works, see Noël Valois, Guillaume d’Auvergne, Évèque de Paris (1228-1249): Sa vie et ses ouvrages (Paris: Picard, 1880. For a briefer account of William’s life, see an introduction to one of my previous translations, or my “William of Auvergne,” in Dictionary of Literary Biography: Vol. 115: Medieval Philosophers, ed. Jeremiah Hackett (Detroit: Gale Research, 1992), pp. 344–353. 2  William of Auvergne, Opera Omnia. 2 vol., ed. F. Hotot, with Supplementum, ed. Blaise Le Feron (Orléans-Paris, 1674; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963).

10 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues fer. On the Universe of Creatures and On the Soul, for example, were among the last works to be written, but are second and third in the intended order of the 3 Magisterium. In his edition of On the Grace of Christ (De gratia Christi), in which he argues that On the Grace of Christ fits into the Magisterium as an appendix to Why God Became Man, G. Corti argues that various references to On the Virtues in other works of William indicate that On the Virtues was composed in two stages: the first, chapters 10 and 11, which represent the original nucleus, to which William referred in On Faith, chapter 3, as “the many and various things” that he had already written on the virtues, and the second, the remaining chapters 1 4 to 9 and 12 to 23, which contain many references to On Faith. Corti dates the first part before and the second after 1228, the date of William’s consecration 5 as bishop. Thus the original nucleus contained the distinction characteristic of William’s thought between the three sorts of virtue: natural, consuetudinal, and gratuitous. There is also a division within the Magisterium that G. Corti has pointed out between William’s whole magisterium (totum magisterium), which includes all seven works, and his first magisterium (primum magisterium), which includes On the Trinity, On the Universe of Creatures, On the Soul, and the beginning of 6 On the Virtues. Corti’s distinction between the two parts of the Magisterium relieves the tension between William’s claim to proceed in that work by way of rational proofs and the goal of the Magisterium, which he claims is the ultimate 7 perfection of the intellect in the vision of God. Thus the first nine chapters of On the Virtues, which are “philosophical” in the sense that they attempt to proceed by way of rational proofs and involve no appeal to faith or scriptural rev3  See Josef Kramp,“Des Wilhelm von Auvergne‘Magisterium Divinale.’” Gregorianum 1 (1920): 538–613, 2 (1921): 42–103 and 174–195 for a discussion of the dating of the parts of the Magisterium and the order of their composition. See also G. Corti, Il “Tractatus de Gratia” di Gugliemo d’Auvergne. Corona Lateranensis 7 (Rome: Pontifica Universitá Lateranense, 1966) for further refinements of the relationship between the parts of the Magisterium. Corti makes the attractive suggestion that the Magisterium is not so much a single large work, as a way of doing philosophy or pursuing wisdom; see Il “Tractatus,” p. 306. In that way other works such as De gratia and Rhetorica divina can also be included in the Magisterium. 4  Given Corti’s division, which I believe is correct, one has to suppose that the central nucleus was slightly modified to fit with the parts that were subsequently added. 5  See Il “Tractatus de Gratia” di Gugliemo d’Auvergne, pp. 22–23. 6  G. Corti, “Le sette parte del Magisterium diuinale et sapientiale di Guglielmo di Auvergne,” in Studi e richerche di scienze religiose in onore dei santi apostoli Petro et Paulo nel XIX centenario del loro martirio, 289–307 (Rome: Lateran University, 1968). 7  See my “William of Auvergne on the Relation between Reason and Faith.” The Modern Schoolman 75 (1998): 279–291.

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elation, pertain to the primum magisterium. Chapters twelve to twenty-three, on the other hand, pertain to the totum magisterium and are more theological in 9 the sense that they depend on faith and revelation. The original nucleus then serves in the finished work as a transitional section between the more philosophical and the more theological parts of the work.

Style, Structure, and Content of the Work

On the Virtues is typical of William’s style in that sense that it rambles, often in a seemingly random fashion, and runs off into many excursus on related issues that seem to have popped into his mind at the moment. William is fond of images to illustrate points that he wants to make and often raises a series of objections to a point, which he then proceeds to answer. An introduction can hope to do little more than provide a guide for the reader who undertakes to read the work or who is looking for some particular teaching, highlighting the basic structure and pointing out some characteristic features of the work. The first nine chapters follow “the path of proofs” and do not depend on scriptural revelation, while chapters eleven and twelve mark a transition to the subsequent chapters that proceed in a mode that is dependent upon revelation and faith. William begins chapter one with a definition of virtue as “the 10 habit of a well-constituted mind” (102b), which he attributes to Cicero, and points to various problems it leads to. He then turns to Aristotle’s statement that “virtue is that which perfects a well-disposed subject and which makes his 11 action good ...” (103a). and mentions doubts that it raises. William’s use of the Nicomachean Ethics marks one of the first influences of the new translations of the work upon Latin thinkers. It reveals William’s somewhat critical stance toward Aristotle as well as one of the first attempts to use the Philosopher’s thought in relation to Christian ethics. William, however, had only the versio

8  In “Die Tugend und der gute Wille: Wilhelm von Auvergnes Auseinanderstezung mit der aristotelischen Ethik,” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 102 (1995): 20–32, G. Jüssen said, “Wilhelm will den Gegenstand seines Traktats, die Tugenden, in ihrem ersten, grundlegenden Teil (Kap. 1–9) erklärtermassen in Form einer kohärentem wissenschaftlichen Theorie (scientia) behandeln, die sich massgeblich Positionen und Probleme nicht auf die Autorität der Schrift, sondern auf rationale Argumentation stüzt (per vias probationum),” here p. 20. 9  See G. Corti, “Le sette parti del Magisterium divinale ac sapientiale di Guglielmo di Auvergne.” 10  Since the chapters are often quite long, I have identified the source of quotations by giving the folio number and column from the Opera omnia for the first quotation from the folio in question. The folios numbers are also included in the translation. 11  See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6.1106a14–17.

12 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues antiquissima of Aristotle’s Ethics, which contained a translation of merely books 12 two and three. Aristotle’s statement also raises problems in William’s mind about the relation between the goodness derived from the Aristotelian sort of virtues, which are produced in the soul by custom or by repeated actions, and the goodness that Adam and Eve had when they were first created by God. William refers to the former as “consuetudinal virtues,” following the versio antiquissima, and refers to the latter as “natural virtues”—the sort of goodness that the first human beings possessed before the fall and that remains in fallen human beings in a much diminished or impaired degree. In chapter eleven he will add a third sort of virtue, namely, gratuitous virtues that post-lapsarian humans need to make up for the damage that they suffered from original corruption. William used the term “supernatural” only three times in the work. In one case he uses it to describe a potency above our fallen nature, by which “we act with freedom 13 or promptly, secondly firmly, and thirdly with joy” (106a). Here it is a consuetudinal virtue that is described by the term “supernatural,” not a theological or gratuitous virtue, which is a gift of God. The second time he uses it to refer to 14 the noble abstract substances as beings that are above nature. The third time he refers “necessary or due love,” which he says he called “supernatural,” where he seems to be referring to his statement that gratuitous love of God, like faith, 15 is something above or beyond our nature. William asks what it is that is added to the soul by the frequency of actions and replies with a cluster of images and says that it “is goodness or evil that has taken root, become pregnant, or is with child, ready and set for the birthing of its actions, and again not merely full, but heaped up, and ready and set to overflow” (106b). Against Aristotle William holds that a habit can at times be acquired by a single action “through the forcefulness of the impression or 12  There has been very little attention given to William’s treatise, On the Virtues. Helmut Borok’s Der Tugendbegriff des Wilhelm von Auvergne (1180-1249): eine moralhistorische Untersuchung zur ideengeschichtlichen Rezeption der aristotelischen Ethik (Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1979) is the only book-length study of William’s ethics in the twentieth century and is focused upon the first nine chapters. Aside from the articles already cited there is a study of William’s treatment of the passions by Silvana Vecchio, “Passio, Affectus, Virtus: Il sistema delle passioni nei Trattati morali di Gugliemo d’Alvernia,” in Autour de Guillaume d’Auvergne († 1249). Ed. Franco Morensoni and Jean-Yves Tilliette (Turnhout: Brepols, 2005), pp. 173–187. 13  Here William uses the term “supernaturalis,” but not in the sense in which grace or revelation is supernatural. He simply means a potency beyond the natural potency of the intellect or will. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.4.1105a32–34 and 2.3.1104b4–8. 14  See chapter nine, fol. 124a. 15  See chapter twenty, fol. 149a. See chapter 9, fol. 128a and chapter 11, fol. 135b where he speaks of a love “above nature, supra naturam.”

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through the good disposition of the one who receives it” (107a). He discusses the generation of a habit and contrasts it with the generation of a body and explains that it is not contradictory for the soul to act upon itself and be acted upon by itself. He notes that, “if the human soul were not able to act upon itself and to be acted upon by itself and to move itself and to be moved by itself, there would perhaps be no freedom of choice, and there would be no virtue and vice ...” (108a). William notes problems that arise from Aristotle’s claim that virtue is a mean between two vices and explains that goodness is not a true mean between vices for one does not have to pass through such a mean in going from one extreme to the other. Finally, William insists that a virtue is not a storeroom of the mind “because from a storeroom or aggregate nothing more and nothing better goes forth and also nothing other than what was put in it” (108b). In chapter two William explains that human life has three goals; it ought “to give honor to God, to be beautiful in itself, and to be useful or beneficial to others” (109a). William argues that the whole of our lives ought to honor the creator, for otherwise they would be unjust either as a whole or in part. It is, furthermore, easy to do all that we do for his honor and glory since the intention of giving him honor adds no great burden to what we do. Aristotle said that “good” has many intentions and held that the good in moral matters is the mean between two extremes. But the good without qualification is something that is sought for its own sake. Other things do not make people happy or blessed and should only be sought as means to the good without qualification. Virtue then is either the good without qualification or a means to it. Since virtue is not the end, it can only be a means to the end. Hence, William concludes that, according to Aristotle, the virtue and goodness he spoke about are merely roads or paths to the good of eternal happiness. He quotes Cicero to show that the consuetudinal virtues are those on account of which human beings are said to be good since they make people good or useful to the state. He also cites Boethius to show that such virtues are instances of goodness and shadows and likenesses of true and perfect goodness. In summary, William says that good and goodness have three intentions. The first is utility, the second an imitation of true goodness, and the third a combination of the two in the common ignorance of the unlearned, who often love the lowest goods and are content with them. In chapter three William asks whether virtue is “will or knowledge or both of them or one in relation to the other” (111b). He quotes Aristotle as saying that virtues are “acts of willing or are not without willing” and goes on to explain that there are only three kinds of powers in the soul, namely, apprehensive powers and moving powers, the latter being subdivided into a power that

14 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues 16

commands motion and a power that carries out motion. A power that carries out motion, such as that in the legs and hands, does not admit of virtue in the sense in which we are speaking of it. If virtue were in the apprehensive power, that is, the intellect, it would be either opinion or knowledge since no one regards doubt as virtue. But a person is not said to be more virtuous for having more opinions or more knowledge. Hence, William concludes that virtue is not found in the apprehensive power. Even Aristotle had said that knowledge 17 contributes little or nothing to virtue. Hence, virtue is generated in the power that commands motion or the will. Moreover, a person is good or bad in terms of his will, not in terms of his knowledge. Similarly, a human being with a good will is good without qualification. William develops a comparison of the will as the king or emperor of the soul with the senses as his messengers and the 18 intellect as his counselor. Hence, he concludes that “habitual goodness is only the will as a habit, that is, the will strengthened by custom in doing good actions” (112b). He admits, however, that knowledge does contribute something to virtue, in much the same way as the power of sight contributes to our walking correctly. Since the will has the supreme power of command, all of our actions are subject to it, and their goodness or badness necessarily follows upon the will’s goodness or badness. On the other hand, William acknowledges that prudence is a cardinal virtue and is a virtue of our higher apprehensive power, as faith also is. They are not, however, generated through frequent acts of knowing, but by the illumination from the first light. In chapter four William turns to the naming of virtue. He mentions Cicero’s claim that in antiquity virtue meant fortitude and offers several etymological explanations of the term, tying virtue to bodily strength and virility. He also notes that there are spiritual burdens that require spiritual strength in someone who bears them. For example, there are spiritual labors and struggles against temptation. He continues his examination of names for virtue in chapter five. Virtue is called perfection since the human mind is very imperfect without virtue and is something potential compared to the completeness of virtue. Aristotle had compared the original state of the soul to a blank tablet, but William insists that the souls of Adam and Eve were not created empty. He briefly alludes to the Aristotelian doctrine of the agent intelligence—where he confuses Avicenna’s position with that of Aristotle—and to the Platonic doctrine of the 16  William’s distinction of the various powers of the soul is indebted to Avicenna’s psychology. 17  See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.4.1105b1–2. 18  See my “The Will as King over the Powers of the Soul: Uses and Sources of an Image in Thirteenth Century Philosophy,” Vivarium 32 (1994), 62-71.

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archetypal world. Finally, he mentions Augustine’s claim that the source of our illumination is the eternal truth. Chapter six continues the list of names of virtue and compares virtue as spiritual health to the health of the body. In chapter seven William adds “decor” to the names of the virtues. He suggests that decor is derived from fittingness (decentia) and claims that nothing is so fitting our souls as virtue. Chapter eight adds to the names of the virtues beauty, which William sees as a further ornament of decor, and he also mentions agility, clothing or garments, and weapons or arms. William winds up with a total of twenty two names for virtue. Finally, he admits that there is a type of knowledge generated by frequent acts of knowing, which is called experience and which is a virtue of the intellective power, but insists that such knowledge is only like a good and faithful counselor at the side of the king and emperor, that is, the will, which can be either good or bad, and the goodness or badness of the will determines the goodness or badness of the person. In the lengthy chapter nine William first distinguishes between habits and morals (mores) and claims that morals “are habits as a result of which there is a frequency of action without premeditation,” when, for example, someone runs through the psalms without attention or devotion. Habits, however, becomes morals only when the habits are long-standing. William says that it is not necessary that someone who has one of the consuetudinal habits have all of them and that such virtues are not genuine or complete goodness, but approaches and attempts at complete goodness. Turning to natural virtues, William says that they are “natural and immediate principles of voluntary and praiseworthy actions, that is, ones naturally impressed upon human souls or any others, such as natural gentleness, natural piety,” and so on. Human souls and the noble abstract substances were originally created with such natural virtues and not merely in potency, as Aristotle thought. The separate substances—or angels in Christian terms—do not acquire new habits, since they receive everything from above, while our souls are in touch with our bodies and receive modifications from them. William argues that the separate substances could not have been created in an evil or neutral condition between virtue and vice. There are also traces of natural virtues in some animals, such as friendship in dogs, piety in wolves, and faithfulness in horses. The natural virtues need not be equal since they come from God freely. But in Adam and Eve and in the noble abstract substances, the natural virtues were created complete and perfect. 19  For a more complete account of the role of the agent intelligence and of the Platonic archetypal world, see my“William of Auvergne’s Rejection of the Agent Intelligence,” in Greek and Medieval Studies in Honor of Leo Sweeney, S.J. (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), pp. 211–235 and “William of Auvergne’s Rejection of the Platonic Archetypal World,” Traditio 53 (1998): 117-130.

16 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues Aristotle called our loves passions and held that it was evil to live according to our passions, but William holds that it is self-evident that certain things are to be loved and others hated in a praiseworthy manner, although he grants that a passion that is merely a passion, that is, one by which a person is merely acted upon and does not act, merits no praise or blame. We can also be angry in a praiseworthy and in a blameworthy way. He argues that a person is judged good or evil on the basis of what he loves and hates. William develops an argument that we cannot will anything unwillingly, that is, will something while not willing it. He concludes that “the will is most free from coercion and impediment or prevention ... and is one of the higher powers by which a human being surpasses the other animals and by which the rational soul surpasses the other souls” (120a). Our intellective power, on the other hand, is necessitated in its assent to the first principles or axioms and to the conclusions of syllogisms. Hence, the intellect is not free to assent or not assent with regard to such propositions. In matters of faith, however, the intellect is free to assent or to dissent. The external senses, as well as the internal senses, namely, common sense, imagination, and memory, can only act according to what they receive. Similarly, the inferior moving powers, namely, the concupiscible and irascible appetites, are not free. Hence, only the will is completely free, while the intellect is free only in some respect and in certain matters. William argues that the will is most free in its first and essential operation, namely, willing. He explains how its operations flow from its power and claims that willing comes from the will in three ways: first, “at times it is sent forth or emanates from its fullness spontaneously, and this happens freely in every respect, as happens in people who are given over to the virtues or to the vices” (121b). Secondly, willing “proceeds as something counseled in those in whom these things are restrained by the obstacle of doubt. ...” Thirdly, willing “proceeds as something entreated, and this is done by suggestions, persuasions, and prayers. ...” William distinguishes willing from mere velleity. “I will,” he says, “like a decision or a decree of a magnificent and resolute king who strives by all means that what he has decided come about. ...” “I would,” on the other hand, is rather a wish or desire. “I will,” then, issues a command to the powers that carry it out. For “the will, like a king or emperor, is utterly free and fully lord over all that we are or that is subject to us” (122a). Thus the lower powers of motion are like servants subject to it, while the senses are like messengers of the king 20 and the intellect his counselor. Returning to the passions, William claims that, as readily moveable, they “can be firmed up into good and bad habits and into examples of goodness and of malice. ...” Once they have been firmed up by habits, “love and hate, sorrow and joy, anger and gentleness ... are virtues and vices, like roots and fountains 20  See above note 16.

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of goodness and of malice,” from which exterior actions proceed. Against Aristotle, whom he took to hold that someone becomes evil only by committing frequent bad actions, William holds that one becomes evil by a single act of blasphemy against God or by a single act of murder, although he admits that someone can become evil by becoming angry frequently. He believes that Aristotle was speaking about the generation of consuetudinal virtues alone or of those habits that win civic praise or blame. William turns to the natural virtues, asking what those who have them do as a result of them and how their actions differs from those of the gratuitous virtues. He claims that only knowledge of those things that makes our life praiseworthy or blameworthy pertains to the natural virtues, that is, the knowledge of those things that pertain to living well. Such knowledge includes the knowledge of moral goodness and of happiness. Following Aristotle, William holds that a human being has a proper function, which is to live well, as nature teaches each of us. The rules of natural moral goodness include, first of all, that we should fear, hope in, love, honor, and obey God; secondly, that we should harm, injure, and cheat no one and live justly, piously, and truthfully with all other people, and, thirdly, that we should use lesser goods soberly, moderately, and thankfully. William claims that we know these rules of the natural virtues in the same way that the first principles of the disciplines, for the creator has immediately impressed the knowledge of them upon the higher substances and upon human souls. The higher substances and the souls of Adam and Eve would not have been created perfect if they lacked the knowledge of such rules. The first parents, William believes, also had other forms of impressed knowledge, but not the sort of knowledge that is acquired through proofs. Their knowledge was also a single knowledge received from above, not the sort of knowledge that is diversified by the various things from which it is received. William then turns from natural knowledge to the natural affective virtues, beginning with the greatest and most noble of them, namely, love. He claims that “natural love is not directed toward the good insofar as it is good without qualification, but rather at a determinate good, that is, at this good and for its sake ...” (125a). Hence, one loves his own parents more, even though they are no better than other human beings. It is commonly said that “well ordered charity begins with oneself ...” (125b). Accordingly, each human being is bound to love himself with natural love. William claims that the statements of Saint Paul and Saint Augustine that seem to say the contrary are referring to persons who seek their own interests. He defends at some length the goodness of a love for oneself and one’s body. Love, William claims, “is not a relation in the true sense, but rather a quality in essence and truth, though it has some reference to the beloved” (126b). For relation in the proper sense demands the existence of its correlate, but we

18 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues can love what does not exist. Everyone agrees that a return should be made to natural benefactors, such as God and our parents. Because the noble angelic substances and Adam and Eve had a knowledge of the creator, they necessarily had a natural love for him because of his beneficent generosity and also had a natural love for themselves, but they loved God incomparably more than themselves because he was incomparably more useful to them than they were to themselves. Moreover, since nature teaches nothing perverse, the noble substances and our first parents did not make themselves equal to God in their affection. William distinguished three forms of love. The first form is the love of gratitude for God as creator, father, giver, nourisher, preserver, and governor of all goods. The second form of love is love sold for the price of the object loved. It is the love for pleasure, riches, honors, and other goods sought only on their own account. The third form is given or gratuitous love, love that flows from love that is a grace and not owed. Before the sin Adam and Eve and the angelic substances loved God out of a natural love more than themselves. Furthermore, natural justice did not allow that they love themselves more than the creator. This natural love for the creator was free and gratuitous without any venality, but it was not “the grace that lies in between nature and glory and is the pledge and foretaste of glory ... [and] that elevates nature and carries it above itself to the creator ...” (128b). That is, this natural gratuitous love of the creator is not the charity “that renders us pleasing and acceptable to God and worthy of the kingdom of heaven ...” (128b–129a). Now, however, because of “the perversity and oppression of original corruption it is very difficult and impossible” (129a) to find such natural love in human beings. Thus William concludes his treatment of the natural virtues of the angelic substances and of Adam and Eve and prepares the way for his discussion of the gratuitous virtues. Chapters ten and eleven formed the original core of the work written before William’s episcopacy; they also mark the beginning of a theological treatment of the virtues. In chapter ten William begins to “examine the virtues according to their theological and sapiential depth, making it clear how far the wise men of the world were and still are far from the truth of the knowledge of them” (130a). He compares our natural virtues to our bodily members, such as legs and hands, and the consuetudinal virtues to various helps to injured bodily members, such as wooden legs or crutches. Although such bodily aids or helps somewhat restore the lost bodily functions, they never restore them to their original condition. So too, consuetudinal virtues somewhat restore our natural virtues damaged by the original corruption inherited from Adam and by personal sins, but never completely bring them back to their original condition as they were before the fall. In chapter eleven William begins to examine whether there are virtues more lofty than the natural and consuetudinal virtues, arguing against the Pelagian

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heretics, who maintained that we had no need of such gratuitous virtues. William states that it is his intention here “to establish such grace in view of the needs of our present life, which must be correct and acceptable to the creator and have the other perfections, which we say cannot come only from the natu21 ral and consuetudinal virtues” (130b–131a). Although William’s clear emphasis is on the need for grace as a help to our fallen nature rather than upon grace as elevating our nature, he is also clear that human nature needs the gratuitous virtues as intermediate between the natural and consuetudinal virtues and the virtues of glory. He lists seven ways in which grace is a help for our fallen nature (gratia adjuvans), but he is relatively silent about grace as elevating (gratia elevans). Such 22 silence is, of course, quite in accord with the Augustinian view of grace. He does, however, say that, “however perfect the human mind is with the natural and consuetudinal virtues, it is not able to receive glory ...” (131a). He argues for this from the biblical statements that no one can see God and live and from the fact that even bodily joy can be so strong that it extinguishes life; hence, the infinitely greater joy of glory would certainly extinguish our natural life. Even Adam and Eve with all the perfection of their natural powers and virtues were unable to receive glory until they were transferred to a life that was immortal and unable to suffer. He rather eloquently describes what he means by grace: the help of the divine generosity for doing what is good and pleasing to the creator and deserving of his remuneration, which is the reward of eternal happiness, and also for fighting against oneself and against all the things that attack us with a spiritual attack, and also for conquering oneself and all the things that attack us with the aforementioned attack, and again for holding, retaining, and restraining oneself, for bridling, tying down, taming, and subjecting oneself with perfect control, and also for preserving oneself unwounded and completely without injury amid the swords, spears, arrows, and all the enemy weapons striking from every direction and trying to inflict spiritual death, likewise, for keeping oneself cool in the midst of the flames and in the midst of the Babylonian furnace, not only without being burned, but also without 23 becoming hot, free from chains, shackles, and prison, and, to be brief, free in slavery and most clean in a sewer of impurity. 21  I have conjectured “virtutibus” instead of “viribus.” 22  In “Nature et grâce dans la théologie de Guillaume d’Auxerre et de Guillaume d’Auvergne,” Ephemeridies Theologicae Lovaniensis 53 (1977): 83–106, here 97, A. Vanneste says,“Guillaume y insiste sur le fait que les tentations auxquelles l’homme se trouve sans cesse soumis, sont si nombreuses et si graves que ses forces naturalles ne suffisent point à les surmonter. L’on est donc obligé de constater, dit il, ‘necessarium esse nobis praeter vires nostras, atque prudentiam adjutorium, quod non nisi divinae gratiae manifestum est esse donum.’” 23  See Dn 3: 19–23 and 91–92.

20 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues As evidence for the need of the gratuitous virtues, William appeals to the experience testified to by many of fierce, even demonic temptations. Since we must do battle against such powerful enemies, we need special helps in that fight. William goes on to list seven of these helps, namely, skill in waging war, an attack against our enemies by God himself, a restraining of such enemies by the mercy of God, divine consolation and comfort, divine protection, like that of the three boys in the fiery furnace, the marvelous strength of divine grace, and the armor of divine grace in waging war. As every prince and king provides his warriors with all the strength and help he can, so almighty God provides for his warriors the grace they need. The misery and weakness of our souls in the face of temptation makes the need for such grace even more evident. Since Adam and Eve fell even when their natural powers were whole and unimpaired, our natural powers in their present state obviously need the help of divine grace. For, although “our souls are created most pure and holy,” they “are corrupted and weakened ... by union with bodies ...” (133a). Hence, we have lost the health and purity of natural goods that cannot remain in the corruption and impurity of bodies. Our souls in our present corrupt and perverse bodies are like a skilled physician with a fever, whose medical skill is obscured and swallowed up by his diseased condition. Nor is free will enough to overcome the corruption and perversity in which we find ourselves. In order that our spiritual self may conquer our carnal self, it is necessary that help be given us “sufficient to defend and to preserve our spiritual self and to subject, trample down, and constantly mortify our carnal self, and this is what we call grace, namely, the gratuitous gift of the creator that is applied to our natural powers ...” (134a). We first of all need the gift of faith in our noble apprehensive power, that is, “to believe him above oneself and against oneself.” A similar service is owed to him by our noble moving power by which he is to be loved above all things. Because such faith and love are beyond the power of our intellect and will, we need the gratuitous gifts of God by which we can believe him and love him. Such faith, William insists, cannot be persuaded by probability or forced by the evidence of its truth. Similarly the love we have for God is a gratuitous gift of God, not a volition generated by his natural goodness. By such gratuitous love “one virtuously and mightily intends him whose honor and glory is sought, and he is loved by it insofar as he is good, but not because he is good ...” (135b). Similarly “prophecy is an illumination above all the lights of our souls ... solely because of the gratuitous gift of the creator” (135b–136a). William lists ways that gratuitous love is similar to faith in the same manner of its generation from above. He compares it to rectitude as a remedy to lameness and argues that it is like faith in the way it arms the soul. He provides ways for us to imagine or think about the loftiness of the gratuitous virtues and explains why, although many have the gratuitous virtues, they are not seen in them. The gratuitous virtues are instances of genuine goodness and alone

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make us truly right or just. William explains that our lives are right or have rectitude insofar as they come from God and move toward God without bending or curving to the side. “For the whole of human life is right when it does not in any way wander off from the extremes, that is from its beginning, which is God, and from its end, which is also God” (138a). As there is one rectitude for human life, so there is one virtue, as Augustine taught in On the Morals of the Catholic Church, where he reduced the four cardinal virtues to forms of love. William argues that there are not four loves and claims that love is only four in terms of its relations, just as God’s love is not multiplied by the many objects of his love. This love does not dispense with a need for the other virtues. Since this love is always right; it does not tolerate with itself any vice or sin; it is also strong, fervent, and universal. After distinguishing its strength from its fervor, William turns to its universality. Love for a friend cannot be for him in only a certain respect, but must be a love for everything that belongs to him. William even quotes that common saying that “he who loves me loves my dog” (140a). In a similar way one who loves God must love all of his elect. Other creatures of God—even lions, bears, and crocodiles!—are to be loved in accord with the purpose for which they exist. Having spoken of love’s rectitude, strength, fervor, and universality, William adds another five differences that bring love to its excellence. The first is tenderness; the second amplitude or breadth; the third dearness or costliness; the fourth immensity, and the fifth folly or madness. For each of these William offers scriptural examples. For instance, Saint Paul spoke of the folly of love when he said, “We are fools for the sake of Christ” (1 Cor 4:10). William wonders how it is that the virtues are conquered and even extinguished so easily by the vices, although, as habits, they are supposedly difficult to change. Chastity, for example, is extinguished by one mortal sin, while the habit of grammar, on the other hand, is not lost by a single solecism. In reply he claims that virtues are not extinguished due to their own weakness, but because of the weakness of their subject. For a virtue is like “a most courageous warrior on a feeble or injured horse” and cannot but fall when the horse falls (142a). The virtues make our souls strong, but “they still do not set them free from the wounds and weakness of original corruption in this life.” Although the virtues are completely extinguished by a mortal sin, they are still easily revived in some cases. William compares such virtues that are easily revived to hot coals in which a fire is easily rekindled as compared to coals that have been soaked in cold water. At this point William begins to speak about “those things that pertain to the virtues in common” when they are called gifts, virtues, fruits, and beatitudes. He first of all explains that “a gift is something given that cannot be demanded back, that is, something that becomes the recipient’s possession” (143a). Yet God’s gifts to us remain his as well. William briefly examines the meaning of

22 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues each of seven gifts of the Holy Spirit from Isaiah 11:1–3 and insists that “they are truly gifts and virtues” (143b). Hence, there is no need to fuss over whether they are called one or the other. Wisdom “is a virtue and is the greatest strength fortifying its possessor,” as William shows from a series of scriptural quotations. Even fear of the Lord is a virtue, as is seen in many passages from scripture. William wonders why Isaiah said that first six of the gifts rested upon the Lord, but that seventh filled him. In explanation he suggests that the six were seen less clearly in him by the Jews who thought of him only in human terms. Hence, they thought that he lacked understanding. The gift of counsel, he says, “can be understood as the most profound and most hidden will of God the Father ...” (144b), which was revealed in the savior. The gift of knowledge is the knowledge of good and evil, concerning which the Jews thought that he was mistaken when he declared those who are poor and who mourn to be happy. The spirit of piety is understood as the worship of God and the virtue of compassion. The spirit of fear in the sense of reverence is said to have filled him, and as man he always had it in mind. But he did not have a fear of offending God or a fear of punishment. Isaiah mentioned these seven gifts in praise of the redeemer, not because they were more excellent, but because they seemed less evident to those who regarded him as only human. William then undertakes to explain “the intentions of these seven names in accord with the general meaning of the scriptures” (145b). He states that wisdom “is the gift by which the palate of heart is cleansed and rectified and also raised up so that it can attain by it savors to which it cannot rise by the ability of nature.” Wisdom (sapientia) then is savorous or tasty (sapida vel saporata) knowledge, as William explains at length. Thus wisdom as opposed to knowledge involves a love or delight in the good, which perhaps accounts for the term 24 “sapiential, sapientiale” in the title of William’s great work. He contrasts spiritual sight with spiritual taste and claims that the latter is a virtue of the higher appetitive power rather than of the apprehensive power. In contrast with faith, which is spiritual sight, “this sense of taste for the divine sweetness is a taste by which the truth of the divine sweetness itself is spiritually perceived” (146b). Faced with an objection that, since the charity by which we love God and the neighbor is one, the savor of the divine sweetness ought to be the same as the savor of other things, William concedes that the charity by which the neighbor is loved on account of God is that same as that by which God is loved, but he argues that the sweetness of the goal and that of the path to the goal are not the same. Although, as William concedes, the philosophers have understood wisdom as “the knowledge of sublime and profound things, for which reason the divine sciences are called among them sapiential” (148a), William means 24  See my “William of Auvergne on Philosophy as divinalis and sapientialis,” in Miscellanea Mediaevalia, ed. Jan A. Aertsen, Band 26: Was ist Philosophie im Mittelalter? (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1998), pp. 475–481.

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by wisdom a savory or savorous knowledge, which entails a love and delight in sublime and lofty things as well as a knowledge of them. William then names and explains the spiritual savors, that is, “dispositions of things that can naturally generate in us volitions, such as loveableness and odiousness, from which are naturally generated in our souls the volitions of love and hate” (148b). These dispositions are goodness, salubrity, health, and utility. The first of the volitions that William lists is fear, which is threefold: the fear of reverence, the fear of offense, and the fear of punishment. The second volition is hope, which is also threefold: the hope of pardon, the hope of grace, and the hope of glory. The third is shame by which we are embarrassed to have or to do something indecent or immoral in God’s sight. The fourth is love, which is begotten by his beauty. The fifth is hunger or thirst, which his sweetness begets in us. The sixth is “necessary or due love” (149a), which, Henry says, he called supernatural; it is the love begotten in us by God’s very generous beneficence. The seventh is righteous love, that is, “genuine friendship, most sincere love, and alone worthy of the name of charity. ...” Injuries and sins also involve volitions, the first of which is fear, “by which the palate of the heart tastes what is penal, and this state or savoring is the fear of sin.” The second is sorrow; the third shame; the fourth anger; the fifth indignation. The sixth is hatred; the seventh contempt; the eighth abomination, which provokes a spiritual nausea. The ninth is horror; the tenth is cursing, and the eleventh is detestation. Temporal things also evoke well-disposed tastes or volitions. For to well-disposed souls they taste of mud, pitch, birdlime, and dung; they prick the human heart and smack of falsity and deception. In all William counts fourteen savors of riches “by which they are savorous for healthy palates” (150a), and he adds twelve spiritual savors of foods and drinks. They are first refreshment for the failing of the body and secondly medication for its illnesses. By the third one “savors bodily food as something pertains to an ox or a horse” so that we think of the body as an animal and the table as a manger. By the fourth one savors the gifts of divine generosity, and by the fifth one savors the divine piety, which is like alms given to the poor. William lists loftier savors by which we savor God’s familiarity, his spiritual patronage, the stipends of his army, and the redemption of souls. We also savor food as something that traps the bodily palate, and we savor the goodness of the divine sweetness sprinkled over us. We savor the way God serves us in his gifts and savor the prices of souls redeemed by the blood of Christ. William then states the operations of the seven gifts in a different way than the one stated above by pointing to “seven evils that amazingly and miserably subvert and defile human life” (152a), for each of which he finds scriptural backing. The first is childishness; the second brutishness “by which we grasp only the externals of sensible things and cling only to them, ... unable to reach the

24 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues interior of hidden things.” The gift of understanding is opposed to such childishness, and by it we understand every creature as a gift of God and grasp the inner power of the sacraments. William then wanders off into a discussion of the gift of understanding and its relation to faith. The third evil is that of “crisis and danger” (153b), against which the elect have the gift of counsel, which again leads William into an excursus on the role of the gift of counsel. The fourth evil is “the continuous striking of wars and spiritual struggles” (154b), against which we have the gift of fortitude. In describing the gift of fortitude, William lists the kinds of spiritual infirmity or weakness, to which fortitude is opposed, namely, pusillanimity, tenderness of heart, spiritual combustibility or inflammability, levity or instability. Fortitude, however, is said of six virtues and is like a genus in relation to them. The fifth evil is “falsity or error by which human beings are deceived or err about goods and evils ... both in terms of quality and quantity ...” (157a), against which the faithful are fortified by the gift of knowledge. By one ray of light from this gift of knowledge men see that temporal goods are poverty, are covered with birdlime, and are vanity. By another ray they know the goods and evils of honors and dignities. By a third ray they see the sort of good this life is; by the fourth they see the many spiritual faces of this world—a 25 topic on which William has written another work. By the fifth they see the goods and evils of our souls; by the sixth they see the goods and evils of our bodies, and by the seventh they see the goods and evils of the virtues and vices. The sixth evil is “profundity or accursedness by which our life does not give honor to or is even contemptuous toward God ...” (158a). The seventh and last evil is the foolish security that one experiences despite all the surrounding perils. And with that William brings the long chapter to a close. Having shown that the virtues are gifts, William also argues in chapter twelve that they are beatitudes, not merely because they are efficient causes of beatitude, but because they are formal causes of beatitude, that is, because the possession of them makes us blessed. Correspondingly, the vices are true miseries. The virtues are also called fruits, either because they are food and refreshment for the mind, or because they are grown in the garden of the mind. Asked why Saint Paul calls a particular twelve virtues or gifts fruits of the Holy Spirit in Gal 5:22, William replies that the apostle listed these merely as examples. Then he turns to an understanding of the virtues as the saints have spoken of them and first examines “the definition of Saint Augustine who said that ‘virtue is a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly and which no one uses badly and which God produces in a human being’ without the hu-

25  On the Faces of the World (De faciebus mundi) has never been edited, although it is extant in sixteen manuscripts. See Jennifer R. Ottmann, “List of Manuscripts and Editions,” in Autour de Guillaume d’Auvergne († 1249), pp. 375–399.

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man being” (159a). He examines each part of the definition, wondering, for example, whether such a definition can apply to each virtue, since that would imply that each virtue by itself is sufficient for living rightly. He concludes that Augustine was here defining the virtue of charity or love and claims that “by that love one lives rightly” (160a). And he gives two reasons: “first, because, as the standard of the divine will, it directs and regulates the will and its rectitude, and secondly, because the whole of life is subject to such love, and this love has the whole of it in its power and, for this reason, draws the whole of it after itself and makes the whole of it follow God’s will.” And yet William argues that the other virtues are not superfluous because each contributes its own rightness and because the virtues help and assist one another. He agrees with Augustine’s claim that no one can use a virtue badly, but argues that the last part of the definition, namely, “‘which God produces in a human being without the human being,’ does not seem to fit every virtue” (161a). He gives two reasons, first, that “God does not seem to produce in such human beings without a human being the virtues procured and obtained by prayers, tears, fasting, and other exercises.” Human beings not only prepare themselves for receiving the virtues, but also merit them by “congruous merit”—the sort of merit by which it is fitting that God reward someone who, without sanctifying grace, does not 27 merit reward in a strict sense, as one does by “condign merit.” God produces the virtues in a human being, while human efforts provide at most an occasion for the mercy of God. William notes that Augustine did not intend to define either natural or consuetudinal virtues by his definition, since natural virtues can be used wrongly, and consuetudinal virtues are not produced without the efforts of a human being, although the gratuitous virtues are “infused suddenly, gratuitously, and from above” (161b). William notes that the sacred writers have called prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude cardinal virtues for three reasons: first, because our whole moral life hinges upon or revolves around them, secondly, they hold sway over the whole of human life, and thirdly, because, as the college of cardinals assists and advises the pope for the governance of the Church, so these virtues assist and guide us for the governance of our lives. He, however, suggests that the correct reason is their governance and excellence in relation to the other virtues. He also rejects the idea that these virtues are philosophical rather than theological, pointing out that they are often mentioned in scripture. He also rejects the idea that the cardinal virtues are political, although he admits that some virtues concern only the individual while others concern other people. 26  Peter Lombard, Book of the Sentences (Liber sententiarum) 2, dist. 27, 1; PL 192: 714. The definition is composed of things that Augustine said in different places. 27  The congruous merit of an action makes it fitting that God reward the action, but not as a matter of strict justice. Condign merit requires that one be in a state of grace and merits reward in the strict sense.

26 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues The editor of the 1674 text put the virtue of temperance in a separate chapter, but he put the consideration of prudence, justice, and fortitude in the present chapter. Prudence is the art or doctrine of living well, and William distinguishes kinds of prudence in accord with different kinds of life, such as life in the world, in the cloister, in the army, and so on. Prudence is a modification of our rational power and lies in a mean between two extremes. It also called “reasonableness, by which our rational power stays reasonable so that it does not rashly assent to persuasions and does not rashly dissent from them, especially in matters pertaining to salvation and their contraries ...” (163a). Having already dealt with fortitude, William turns to justice, “a virtue by which each person is given what is essentially his due, that is, insofar as it is his or owed to him.” It has six species, of which obedience to superiors, first of all, to God and then to others, is the first. The second is discipline, which is owed to inferiors. The third is equity, which is owed to equals, and the fourth is faithfulness or fidelity, which is opposed to fraud and deceit. The fifth is veracity in statements and promises, and the sixth is truth in actions, which is opposed to hypocrisy and false pretense. William introduces Cicero’s derivation of faith or faithfulness, but counters that with biblical examples of faithfulness. Noting that Seneca wrote a whole book for Nero on mercy or clemency, William explains how clemency and severity fall under justice as discipline. He also explains how justice is at times used as a general name for all the virtues. The proper role of justice is to pay back what is owed, and William examines at considerable length whether one acquits himself of a debt if he pays back what is owed without the intention of repaying the debt. He argues that one must have at least habitually in mind the intention of paying to God the obedience owed him in fulfilling the commandments, although in human affairs he claims that one has to have the actual intention of repaying. He also explains the sense in which we can repay anything to God since everything that we have is his. He says that God’s gifts become our possessions in some sense, although in another sense they remain his. There are then two intentions of justice, one by which justice entails the fulfillment of all the commandments, the other by which in temporal affairs one owes some sort of debt, such as taxes or obedience to the law. William raises the question of someone who serves in an army out of a just duty to his prince, but plunders the enemy out of covetousness, and argues that in such a case one must distinguish which motive is the efficient cause of his action. If he acts out of covetousness and only incidentally out of service to his prince, he does not act justly. William notes that there are many such questions touching upon justice and explores a few of them in a number of sample cases. In chapter thirteen William turns to a consideration of temperance. He explains that the virtue gets its name from tempering or cutting away what is excessive in three areas: first, in the use of sex, secondly, in the use of food and

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drink, and thirdly, in the use of those things that protect our bodies, such as clothing and housing. In the first area temperance is called chastity, which William distinguishes into marital, religious, and virginal chastity. In the second area it is called sobriety and abstinence. In the third area it does not have a proper name, but is opposed to the vice of luxury. He notes that some have not unreasonably added modesty in the gait and motion of the body as a fourth part of temperance. Against the Aristotelian idea that temperance is a mean between too much and too little, William argues that the focus of temperance is upon trimming away excess, although he admits that there may be excessive cutting away in the use of food and drink, so that temperance might lie in a mean between too much and too little cutting away. The author of the brief introductions to the chapters simply gave up on any attempt to indicate the contents of chapter fourteen. William turns to determine “the number of the virtues, whether gifts or graces ...” (167b). He first lists five virtues of our noble apprehensive power or intellect: faith, prudence, knowledge, understanding, and counsel. William had written a treatise, On Faith, on the first gift. In order to serve God as he deserves, we need to know him, and we know him by faith. By prudence people dispense what has been given to them for the honor and glory of the Lord. By the gift of knowledge, they discern truth from falsity, and by the gift of understanding, they know what is pleasing to God and salutary for us. Finally, by the gift of counsel people know how to face the dangers that confront them. Thus there are five gratuitous lights of the intellective power, as there are five natural lights of our apprehensive power, namely, imagination, the estimative power, memory, reason, and intellect. Without the five gratuitous lights of our intellect, one cannot serve God in a religious and praiseworthy manner, as William goes on to show. In chapter fifteen William lists the affective virtues, which he distinguishes 28 in accord with the things from which and to which our volitions move. First, there is the goodness of God toward which we are moved by “gratuitous, most pure, and most correct love” (169a). Secondly, there is the sweetness of God by which he refreshes our souls as food and drink refresh our bodies. Thirdly, there is God’s most magnificent glory and majesty by which we are moved to honor and venerate him. Our volitions, then, which correspond to these three, are love for his goodness, hunger and thirst for his sweetness and refreshment, and honor and veneration for his glory and majesty. God’s benefits beget a fourth volition, namely, gratitude, while his goodness and our sins produce the fifth and sixth volitions, namely, hope and fear. God’s wisdom produces a seventh volition in us, namely, shame not merely over our sins, but over our failure to act in a better way than we do. Although William distinguishes four distinct 28  On William’s classification of the passions or volitions of the soul, see Silvana Vecchio,“Passio, affectio, virtus: il sistema delle passioni nei tratttati morali di Gugliemo d’Alvernia.” In Autour de Guillaume d’Auvergne. Pp. 174–187.

28 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues sorts of fear, namely, fear of punishment, fear of offending, fear of reverence, and fear of shame or embarrassment, he fits these under the previous volitions so that the total number of volitions or affective virtues toward God is seven. But there are also volitions for things apart from God, namely, for ourselves, for things made for us, and for things made by us. In this respect William claims that we and the angels have the same natural and gratuitous virtues, although the angels do not have faith and hope, which have no place in them. William then asks how many volitions we should have for one another and argues that a multitude of good volitions arises in us on account of another person’s many states and dispositions. For one and the same person is a man, and hence, he should be loved as a human being. But he can also be a prince or prelate, on account of which he is owed honor, reverence, and obedience. Or a person can be a subject, on account of which he is owed instruction, discipline, and defense. The author of the introductions again gave up on summarizing the content of chapter sixteen. William claims that the concupiscible power can have only six volitions, namely, “love and hate, sorrow and joy, spiritual hunger and satiety, or aversion” (171b). He holds that love for others for the sake of God is the same habit as love of God. He argues that hate is a distinct volition from love and that there are two good habits of love and hatred, just as there are two vices of love and hatred. For hatred of our sins and vices is a good habit, and hatred for our neighbor is clearly a bad habit. In chapter seventeen William continues his discussion of the volitions. He first asks whether sorrow and joy are merely passions or also virtues. Despite Aristotle’s claim that we cannot gain or lose merit by the passions, William points out that Catholic doctrine clearly maintains that sorrow and repentance over sins merit mercy in the eyes of God and that we are commanded by Saint Paul to rejoice in the Lord. Furthermore, one can rejoice rightly or wrongly; hence, there are vices and virtues in joy. Joy in the Lord also drives out the sadness of this world, which, according to 2 Cor 7:10, produces death, that is, a spiritual death, for it is a sort of spiritual nausea at spiritual goods. Desire too can be a virtuous habit, as William shows from other passages of scripture. William turns to the irascible power and lists a total of twenty two contraries in the passions or volitions in terms of superfluity and lack in it. For example, he points out the excessive inflammability of some dispositions and the contrary lack of any such quickness of temper and sets the mean between them in an anger that is obedient to the intellect and will. Similarly he indicates that inflexible rigor and complete remissness form another contrariety, while the mean, he says, is usually called responsiveness. In chapter eighteen William turns to the virtues of the irascible power, that is, of the sensitive appetite concerning pain and suffering. He notes that, since there are twenty two pairs of contrary vices and only one mean between each of the contrarieties of the vices, there will necessarily be only twenty two virtues

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of the irascible power. He, however, adds another two that he previously mentioned, namely, horror at and execration of evils, so that there are ultimately twenty four. He explores some possible objections to the doctrine that there is only one mean between two contrary vices. For example, one might claim that sparingness and generosity are two means between prodigality and greed and that justice, mercy, and equity are means between two injustices, one of superfluity and the other of lack. William also argues that there are five species of humility in accord with the contrary species of pride. Hence, when the twenty four virtues of the irascible power are added to the six of the concupiscible power, the total number of the virtues comes to thirty. Despite such concern with the numbering of the virtues, William also maintains that there is only one virtue whose operation has to do with true salvation. He shows how the cardinal virtues are linked to the one virtue concerning true salvation. Thus he comes back to Augustine’s view that the four cardinal virtues are basically only one love with four functions. In chapter nineteen William argues a number of points regarding the relation of the virtues to one another. For example, he claims that in the same subject all the gratuitous virtues are equal. He also argues that the natural virtues are all also naturally equal in the same subject and that the virtues of glory will also be equal. In chapter twenty William turns to a comparison of the gratuitous virtues to the natural virtues. First of all, the virtues of glory are in the ultimate degree of perfection and purity, while the natural virtues are in the lowest degree of perfection. The natural virtues are like seeds, while the virtues of glory are like trees or their fruit, and the natural virtues are like footprints, while the virtues of glory like those who pass by and leave their footprints. The superiority of the gratuitous virtues to the natural virtues receives fuller proof. William compares gratuitous love to natural love. For example, the love by which a holy man loves justice is infinitely superior to the natural love by which he loves his own life. For the superiority of gratuitous faith William appeals to what he wrote in his treatise, On Faith, and adds other proofs. For example, he claims that “the believing intellect holds it no less incredible that the Catholic faith is false on some point than any other impossibility ...” (184b). Similarly he points to the eight beatitudes that are only seen as sorts of happiness in the light of faith. In chapter twenty one William argues that the virtues and graces are greater than the vices and that the delights of the virtues are greater than any delights that might come from the vices. In chapter twenty two he explains the bond or connection of the virtues and argues that a person who has one virtue has all the others, provided that the one virtue is a genuine virtue. For example, he claims that genuine chastity purifies the whole mind and claims that to call a person chaste without qualification who only fornicates with one person is like calling a

30 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues vessel whole which has only one crack. Similarly a person who is genuinely just is unjust toward no one. Hence, there is an inseparable concomitance of the virtues. Finally, in chapter twenty three William discussions whether the virtues can become more or less intense. He argues the intension in the virtues is a withdrawal from their opposites and a drawing close to the first and highest virtue, which is God. He argues that a virtue cannot be decreased by venial sins, not because of the strength of the virtues, but because God’s justice cannot allow any number of venial sins to completely extinguish the virtues, which would entail the punishment of hell for venial sins. And with this discussion William draws an end to the first part of On the Virtues and Vices.

Text and Translation

The text of the 1674 edition at times defies translation. I have frequently conjectured a possible reading that seemed to make better sense of the text. The division into chapters is less felicitous than one might desire, for some chapters are very long and rambling, while others are needlessly short. The chapter titles, which refer to William in the third person, were clearly not his work and at 29 times misrepresent his thought. At times I added some words that an English translation seemed to require. William seems to have enjoyed producing lists of virtues and vices and dispositions of the soul and does so often seemingly with no ordering principle. His treatise on the virtues is remarkable in its attempt to incorporate an Aristotelian account of habits and virtues into an Augustinian account of virtue with its emphasis upon the need for grace if one is to have any genuine virtue after the corruption introduced in our nature as a result of Adam’s fall. William’s work in the first half of the thirteenth century combines a knowledge of Aristotelian consuetudinal or habitual virtues with an Avicennian account of the powers of the soul, which were also called virtues, and with a Augustinian account of the need for grace and the impairment of human nature as a result of Adam’s sin. His distinction between natural, consuetudinal, and gratuitous virtues marks a significance step in the integration of Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology. His work is a far cry from the work of Aquinas and Bonaventure at the end of the century, but is valuable for anyone who wants to read the latter greats in their historical context—without which their greatness cannot be measured.

29  For example, the claim in the title to chapter nine that natural virtues are not properly called virtues does not, I believe, reflect William’s view.

The Virtues Chapter One Being about to speak of the virtues, he first subtly examines the definition of virtue 1 that Tully proposed; then, he also gives the definition of Aristotle and examines it as well. Afterward, he explains whether potency differs from habit and brings forth certain very subtle things from the workshop of philosophy, which, you see, cannot be suitably summarized.

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ince it has become clear from the very order of divine things and of the sapiential sciences that the science of virtues and morals, of vices and sins, as well as of merits and their rewards, follows upon the preceding sciences, we will with the help of God begin to examine these in the mode of wisdom and by the paths of proofs, until their being, which involves some question and contradiction, is established so that you may acquire certitude on the questions and opinions that have previously existed on them and also still exist. After this, however, we will speak about these in other ways, in order that the knowledge of them may not only be clear in many ways, but also pleasing and productive of the volitions by which the perfection of our souls is helped, by which they are aroused and also armed for wars against the vices and sins, and by which virtues and morals are made desirable to our souls, not only because of the hope of rewards, but also because of their perfection, grace, sweetness, and healthiness, and the multitude and beauty of their marvels. We will also first of all state the words of those who came before us and explain them by a brief and clear explanation. If Tully, therefore, who said that 2 virtue is “a habit of a well-constituted mind,” understood in this statement that virtue is a quality of a well-constituted mind, that is, something that constitutes a mind well, that is, ordering it well, he still leaves us with no slight ambiguity. For he either understood that virtue orders a mind well in a certain respect, that is, in terms of a part or that it constitutes it well without qualification, that 1  Tully is Marcus Tullius Cicero, the great Roman orator and philosopher. 2  The definition is found in Boethius, On Topical Differences (De differentiis topicis) 2; PL 64: 1188D. In her book, Boethius’s De topicis differentiis, translated with notes and essays on the text, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), Eleonore Stump refers in the notes to Aristotle’s definition of virtue in Nicomachean Ethics 1106a21–24. In “Oraison et art oratoire: Les sources et le propos de la Rhetorica divina” (Autour de Guillaume d’Auvergne, p. 207). J.-Y. Tilliette attributes William’s definition to Cicero in De inventione 2.159, where Cicero says that “virtue is a habit of the mind suited to the limit of nature and to reason: virtus est animi habitus naturae modo et rationi consentaneus.”

32 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues is, in terms of the whole. But it does not seem that it does this in terms of the whole, since certain virtues seem to behave in another way. For prudence seems to constitute well or to order well only the intellective power in the mind, not the whole mind. But if Cicero understood this in a certain respect or in terms of a part, he perhaps does not seem to speak correctly, not only because the 3 human mind is not divisible into parts, but for two other reasons, namely, because it is perhaps impossible for the human mind to be well-constituted or well-ordered only in terms of a part. For it is perhaps impossible that one of its higher powers alone be corrupted or perverted so that the others are entirely immune and free from perversity and corruption. Secondly, if every virtue is a universal habit, it perhaps does not tolerate any perversity or disorder in those minds along with itself. Hence, it expels from the whole mind all disorder, and for this reason it necessarily orders or constitutes well the whole mind. We will determine these issues in what follows. But if someone says that virtue is a habit of a well-constituted mind without qualification, that is, a habit that is in a mind well-constituted, that is, wellordered, like a city in which commands are properly given and properly obeyed and which is administered by prudent councilors or consuls, [103a] just judges, and other magistrates, as is fitting, this is no more an account of virtue than of knowledge, except perhaps insofar it is not possible that genuine virtue exist in a mind of another sort, although it is possible that genuine knowledge, such as arithmetic or geometry, exist in a very perverse mind. But the statement of Aristotle by which he said that virtue is that which 4 5 perfects a well-disposed subject and which makes his action good seems to have no other intention than that virtue is what makes its subject healthy from its contrary injury. For “well-disposed” is the same thing as “healthy,” as we read in Matthew, chapter nine: It is not the well, but the ill who need a physician (Mt 9:12). And in Mark, chapter two it says: The healthy do not need a physician, but those who are ill-disposed (Mk 2:17). “Well-disposed” can also be understood as “well-disposed for actions,” as is seen from what follows in the same statement, namely, from the fact that it makes one’s action good. But it seems to us rather that the true literal meaning of Aristotle in this statement is that it makes perfect the good person having it so that “having” is taken in the accusative case, as if it said: virtue is what makes perfect the good subject having it. And what follows is his explanation of what is good, as if he said that is good which makes one’s action good, and this explanation and the example Aristotle gave of an eye means this. And this literal meaning should not be scorned. For every virtue 3  On the soul’s being indivisible into parts, see William’s On the Soul (De anima) ch. 2, pt. 10 and ch. 3, pt. 2. 4  I have conjectured “which, quae” instead of “by which, qua.” 5  See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6.1106a16–17. William paraphrases rather than quotes the versio antiquissima.

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disposes well and perfects that of which it is a virtue, just as the virtue of the eye makes both the eye and its action good. For by the virtue of the eye we see well. 6 He likewise gives an example of a horse and its virtue. Then, moderating his statement, Aristotle adds: If, of course, this holds true in human beings, that is to say: If virtue is spoken of in this way in human beings, that is, as in the case of an eye and of a horse, every virtue will certainly be a habit, by which a human 7 being is made good and by which his action is made good. In this statement he seems to have understood virtue and goodness to be the same thing, just as prior to this statement he linked virtues and evils as contraries, something that he would not do unless he took virtue and goodness as the same thing. He also clearly says that people are said to be good and evil in terms of their virtues and 8 vices. But this statement of Aristotle raises two doubts, that is, one, insofar as he 9 says that virtue is a habit by which a human being is good. Hence, a human being is good not only because of virtue, but because of each virtue. Hence, it seems to turn out that the same human being is, according to Aristotle, good 10 and evil, especially in the consuetudinal virtues. For example, someone is seen to be at the same time chaste and greedy or generous and envious or chaste and prodigal. But our custom in speaking does not admit that someone is said at the same time to be good and evil without qualification, but only in some respect, and thus, as it seems, he said neither circumspectly nor truthfully that virtue is a habit by which a human being is good or by which anyone is good. Hence, virtue will also not be goodness without qualification, but only in a certain respect, just as that is not heat without qualification by which its proper subject is not hot, nor is that properly color by which its proper subject is not colored without qualification. But he leaves us with another doubt about this statement insofar as he said that we are neither good nor evil because of our passions or powers and that we 11 are neither praised nor blamed in terms of them, but only in terms of habits, since it is evident that those who act only according to nature act well and in a praiseworthy manner. For nature suggests nothing wicked and nothing evil. This, however, is evident in the first parents who, if they had followed only their 6  Ibid. 1106a18–21. 7  Ibid. 1106a22–23. 8  Ibid. 2.5.1105b30-31. 9  See ibid. 2.6.1106a14–23. 10  William used the “versio antiquissima,” which translates hjjqikhv: as consuetudinalis. Since William also uses moralis, I have used “consuetudinal” and “moral” to translate his words. The Thomas-Lexikon says that a consuetudinal habit is an acquired one produced by custom. See Summa theologiae 1-2.56.5c: “A consuetudinal habit is nothing other than an ability acquired through custom. ...” 11  See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.5.1105b19–1106a13.

34 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues nature, not abandoning it, would never have sinned, nor does anyone somewhat intelligent [103b] doubt that we should obey the creator in everything and that nature advices this. But it especially cannot be doubted that in the first parents, in whom human nature certainly had no darkening or injury, nature would have prompted this and would have done so without any contradiction or rebellion. But when the woman gave ear to the voice of the serpent or the man turned his ear to the voice of the woman who persuaded him against 12 the commandment of God, away from the voice, indeed from the outcry of nature, abandoning the good instinct of nature, he acquiesced in the perverse suggestion. Hence, it is evident that those who use only natural powers and use them only naturally act well and in a praiseworthy manner. Hence, it is not 13 only our habits by which we are good and by which we make our action good. Moreover, we rightly ask of Aristotle and his followers whether in the state of innocence Adam and Eve were good or evil or neither. It is evident that they were not evil at that time since God had created in them everything that was in them, but God never created evil in them or in any others. Hence, there was no evil in them. They were not, therefore, evil at that time; hence, they were either good or in between. But if they were not good, but in between, all that they were they were only by nature. Hence, that in between state existed by nature before either extreme. But it seems clearly impossible that the intermediate in any kind of contrariety naturally exists before either extreme. Moreover, if we suppose that some human being was created in the contrary state, it is certain that he was evil at that time, that is, at the time of his creation, and evil of this sort will be natural, as it is in accord with the error of the 14 Manichees. Hence, the contrary state will be goodness, and thus Adam and Eve were good in that state. But they were not good as the result of passions and habits they acquired, whether through the repetition of the actions or in some other way. Hence, they were good only as a result of their powers and in terms of them alone. Moreover, of what sort does he say that the intelligences or angels were as a result of their creation alone, if he admits that they were created, or of what 12  See Gn 3.1–6. 13  William, like Augustine, thinks of human nature first of all as God originally created it and secondarily as it exists after the fall. Such an historical concept of nature, which is changed by original sin, is quite different from a philosophical sense of nature, as is found in Aristotle. See my “William of Auvergne on the Various States of our Nature,” Traditio 58 (2003): 201–218. 14  William refers to the Cathars of his own time as Manichees, although the original Manichees, the followers of Mani who died in 271, flourished in the 4th and 5th centuries and were combated by Saint Augustine. William argued against the Manichees in On the Universe (De universo) Ia–Iae, chs. 2–10. See my “William of Auvergne and the Manichees,” Traditio 48 (1993): 63–75.

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sort does he say they are, if he holds that they were not created, since he admits in them nothing acquired at all, nothing adventitious? He, of course, will hold that all such substances are only good, especially since he contends that the demons or devils absolutely do not exist, and they try to introduce proofs for 15 this. For if he says, in accord with his view, that in such substances potency and act 16 are the same, and that for that reason it is not surprising if such substances are good in terms of potency, because this is the same as to say that they are good in terms of act, since act and potency are, of course, the same in them, he does not for this reason escape because he necessarily has to admit that they are good by the goodness of the potency. But if natural potencies or powers in human beings do not have such perfection that they are necessarily united to their acts or are the same as them, they are not, nevertheless, for this reason evil or not good, since they are of themselves the principles of good and praiseworthy acts. Moreover, if anger in a lion, rapaciousness in a wolf, insidiousness in a fox, and greed in a crow, and other things like this were to be blamed in such animals, they would necessarily be natural vices in them. Hence, their natural contraries, which are everywhere praiseworthy, will be natural virtues in them. Because their contraries are naturally found in human beings and are certainly praiseworthy in them, for example, natural gentleness, natural beneficence, natural simplicity, natural generosity, and in the same way with the others, natural virtues, therefore, naturally exist and did naturally exist in human beings. But bear in mind that the Manichees hold that the previously mentioned dispositions are wickedness, even in the animals, and were created by the evil God, whom they call the prince of darkness, along with his subjects. For they claim that he is the source, not only of all evils, but also of all wickedness. Moreover, in the law [104a] of Mohamed it is said—at least if those statements are statements of someone that is worthy of the name “man”—that God 17 created the angels from the light, but the devils from flame, in which it is clearly seen that he understood that the devils were created evil, while the angels were created good, and that he held that the goodness of the angels and the malice of the devils was natural. Moreover, if evil were natural, it is only an injury or worsening or failure of a power or potency that is in itself and of itself naturally good, and this evil is certainly only evil insofar as it injures such a good in one of these ways, that is, by lessening or by removing it, as a privation, or by adding something that 15  See perhaps Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.7.1172b25–30, where the Philosopher argues for the goodness of the prime mover, and 12.8.1173a13–15, where he goes on to ask how many separate substances there are. William is perhaps also referring to Avicenna’s intelligences, none of which were evil, as the fallen angels are. 16  See Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.6.1271b19–22. 17  See, perhaps, The Koran, 67.005.

36 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues is not suitable, in fact something that is unsuitable, such as greenness on a human face, or something that is superfluous or excessive. It is evident that, if the evil is removed from an evil man or from an evil soul, each of them remains something good. It is evident, therefore, from these considerations that besides these virtues that he defined there are necessarily natural virtues and sorts of 18 goodness in the noble abstract substances and that there were at one time such virtues in human beings, namely, in Adam and Eve. It has also been made clear to you from these considerations that natural virtues are merely natural potencies, and this is true when they are free and completely immune from the 19 diminution, superfluity, and unsuitability that I mentioned. But there is a question about how potency differs from habit. And some have thought that potency and habit are one in their subject and that habit adds nothing over and above the potency except an unburdening, which is merely the removal or privation of an impediment by which the potency is impeded from performing its act well. And it is the same way with freedom. But an example of this is the power to walk in a human being who has been shackled or whose feet have been bound in such a way that he can walk somehow or other and by walking can break or burst his chains. In that way, as they say, by walking this human being does not acquire a new power to walk, but sets free or releases his original power by breaking the shackles or bursting the chains. Thus someone who practices any good acts does not acquire something new, but sets free and releases his own natural powers. But when it is objected to them that even someone who has his power to walk free from shackles and chains becomes by exercising, walking, running, and jumping someone who is better disposed and who renders the action of that power better, and thus acquires a habit, facility, readiness, or ease for that action, which he previously did not have, they reply, as before, that he acquires nothing new by such exercises, but impediments are merely removed. For example, impediments are perhaps removed in the nerves, muscles, tendons, and ligaments of the feet, legs, hips, and the humor or viscosity of other members, which impeded their agility, is perhaps removed, and the heat, which helps such a power no small amount, is also increased. In the same way in our souls also, the obscurity and denseness, which adhere to its powers from the side of the body, like rust, is scraped and cleaned away and brightened, like iron, which is made bright and shiny from its natural obscurity and blackness by the exercise 18  William is referring to the intelligences or separate substances in Avicenna’s metaphysics; they are abstract in the sense of immaterial. 19  Avicenna used “virtue” (virtus) in speaking of powers of the souls, such as the intellective power (virtus intellectiva). William’s natural virtues are, it would seem, virtues in that sense, especially as such powers were before sin, although he also speaks about natural kindness, natural piety, and natural magnanimity as naturally impressed upon the soul.

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of some action, or like a mirror or glass, which is brightened by wiping, or like a precious stone, which is made radiant and shining by polishing, or like water, which is purified until clear, losing its mixture of pollutants by the movement of its flow. And none of these comes about by some addition to the previously mentioned things, but rather by a removal. For sculptors, filers, and polishers do not add anything to the things they work on, but rather remove things. But the view of these people seems to harmonize with the opinion of Plato who held that the sciences were buried and covered over in human souls [104b] and are not acquired and are not added to them in any way, but that those that 20 previously existed are uncovered and are seen. In the same way iron that is made into a mirror by burnishing does not acquire the potency or power of reflecting images through the burnishing, but that power is uncovered for it and is seen in it. But what Plato held concerning the sciences, he necessarily had to hold concerning the virtues that are acquired through the frequency of actions. It is clear, therefore, from all the preceding that Aristotle did not define virtue in general or understand goodness in a general sense, but only moral or civil virtue, or rather virtue in accord with custom, namely, that by which the crowd or common run of human beings is accustomed to call human beings good and for which they praise them and for the contrary of which they blame them. Few among human beings grasp the natural goodness, which we mentioned, because mere philosophers do not grasp it, just as they do not grasp gratuitous 21 goodness unless it has perhaps been revealed to them. On this we will speak more at length in what follows. But concerning the habits that Aristotle holds, it is no easy question whether they are new qualities added to the natural potencies or whether they are lib22 erations or unburdenings, as we said above. For if over and above the potency for doing what is just, there is, as a result of the frequency of doing such acts, a habit, which is called justice, it seems likewise that from the frequency of seeing a similar addition is produced over and above the power of seeing or sight, and thus there will be a consuetudinal sight over and above natural sight, and the same way over and above hearing, and over and above each of the five other senses. On this it seems that Aristotle should say that the potency for doing what is just admits something in between in relation to those things that are just on account of its distance from them and for this reason needs something 20  See, for example, Plato, Meno 85DE. William very likely knew of Plato’s position from Augustine or Cicero. 21  That is, the philosophers did not know the naturally good state of Adam and Eve or the state that results from the gifts of grace, since they are known by revelation, although William seems to have thought in his De anima that the original state of our nature could be inferred from our present misery. 22  I have conjectured “liberations, liberationes” instead of “liberties, libertates” and “unburdenings, expedimenta” instead of “experiments, experimenta.”

38 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues in between, but sight neither admits nor needs something in between on account of its nearness to the act, which is seeing. Hence, it immediately produces that act when a visible thing or object is presented to it. But a natural potency for doing what is just is not such on account of the opposite reason. But someone might say that, since such a habit is not divisible into parts, it is impossible that it be acquired in time or by parts. For what is not divisible into parts is generated as a whole all at once and suddenly. After all, if part after part is generated in it, it would necessarily be divisible into parts. Such a habit, therefore, is generated as a whole all at once and suddenly. Hence, it is generated in one action or as a result of one action, and therefore not as a result of the frequency of actions. Moreover, it is either generated in the first action or not. If it is generated as a result of the first action, it is not, therefore, generated as the result of their frequency. If it is not generated in the first action, either something of it or nothing of it is generated. If something of it is generated, it will be divisible into parts; if nothing, for the same reason it is also not generated in the second or in any of the later actions, since all have the same power in acting. Hence, it is not generated in all of them together. But someone might say that it is generated from the final action, while the others are preparatory; it, therefore, properly comes from the one alone, not from the frequency, except in an equivocal sense. This, however, must be investigated in another way. For it is said to be impossible in every way that something is generated in the soul as a result of any action that is in the soul. For example, when someone does one of those things that are just, such as, in punishing an evil-doer, it is evident that such an action will be performed upon the one who is punished without any turning back upon the agent. Hence, it generates nothing in the soul of the one who punishes, but only in the one who is punished. Moreover, this operation is the act of the one who punishes. But it is impossible that the act of any agent act upon itself, because it cannot act upon itself by itself or by another action. For if it acted on itself by another act, this would go to infinity. For there would be no reason why the first action could not act by itself rather than a second action or why it should rather require another action rather than the second. Hence, it does not require another action for acting on the soul, [105a] nor would the second act require this, and so on to infinity. But it seems quite absurd that an act, which comes from the soul, should generate in it something else, producing it by itself. For an action is nothing but the path to and the generation of a subsequent modification. But according to this view it would be the generation of a modification, namely, of that modification that comes to be in the soul through it, and in that way it would act, as if it were, on the soul and back upon itself. But this seems patently impossible since by the whole intention of the agent the whole action bears upon that which is modified.

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Moreover, everything in the soul of the one who punishes the evildoer, that is, everything that pertains to this punishing, is nothing but the deliberation or the plan or the actual thought of the punishment or of the crime or the will or the actual willing of the punishment or of the end, that is, of the good that is intended by such punishment. But it is certain that none of all these is or comes to be in the soul from that action that we call punishment; in fact, the punishment itself comes about from all these taken together. Hence, nothing at all is generated or comes about in the soul as a result of this act or from this act, and it is possible to show this concerning other acts in the same way. Moreover, according to this view, since the soul is what does that action, it will be doing all that and acting upon all that and in all that which is done by the action. Hence, it will also be something that acts upon itself and that generates in itself what is generated in it by that action, for it will be acting upon itself and acted upon by itself—and this in the same respect because, according to this view, a habit is generated in the soul from the frequency of its actions. Nor is it like Aristotle’s example of someone who medicates and heals himself, because in that case the person is acting in one respect and acted upon in an23 other. For in terms of the soul he acts upon the medicines, grinding parts of them and mixing and heating them. But in terms of the soul he will be only acted upon by their powers. Moreover, according to this view, a good or a bad habit will be generated from frequent acts of apprehension and thinking. Hence, there will be something in our intellective or cogitative power as a result of the thinking or apprehend24 ing. I mean something other than the apprehending or thinking, and in this way through the act of seeing there will come to be or exist in the power of sight something other than the act of seeing. Hence, through that there will for the same reason come to be in it a third thing, and through the third a fourth, and so on to infinity. Moreover, that which is or is of itself produced in the cogitative power from the act of thinking is necessarily of the same species as it, since every action of nature takes place through similarity. For whiteness of itself naturally imprints whiteness on a subject that can be whitened. Hence, if as a result of the act of thinking something else is naturally imprinted on the cogitative power, there will necessarily be imprinted on the same power essentially another act of thinking of the same species, and in that way there will be two acts of thinking of the same species in act at the same time in the same subject in the same 23  See Aristotle, Physics 2.1.192b23–28. 24  William seems to identify the intellective power and the cogitative power; St. Thomas distinguishes them and regards the latter as a sense power. See George Klubertanz, The Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the Vis Cogitativa according to St. Thomas Aquinas (St Louis: Modern Schoolman, 1952).

40 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues respect. But this is equivalent to saying that there are two whitenesses at the same time on the same surface. Moreover, something white can in no way be acted upon in terms of whiteness by something else equally white. Hence, the cogitative power is in no way receptive of something, as long as it has in itself a modification of the same spe25 cies in act, and in that way as long as it has one act of thinking in itself in act, it is not receptive of another of the same species. Moreover, the cogitative power would according to this be something acting on itself through the act of thinking and acted upon by itself through it, and this in the same respect since it is not divisible into parts. And in that way contraries would be present in the same thing in the same respect. For to act and to be acted upon are contraries without qualification. Moreover, how do they understand that a form acts upon its own subject, when the form and its subject are the same thing? And in that way for a form to act or imprint something else on its proper subject will mean that the subject acts or imprints something on itself. Moreover, such a habit, that is, one generated as a result of the frequency of apprehending or of willing will necessarily be of the same species with them. For it makes no difference whether the generation of heat is produced by one act of heating or by many. For whether it is done by one act of heating or by many, [105b] the same species of heat is generated by the one or by many acts, and the reason is that one act of heating is of the same species as many. In a similar way one act of willing is the same as many, however many times one act according to species is repeated. Hence, there will be one impression of the same thing both when the agent acts once and when it acts many times. Hence, the habit, which Aristotle holds is generated by such repetition, will be of the same species as the act of willing or of apprehension or of any other operation from whose frequency or repetition it is acquired. Moreover, if the habit generated is of another species than the modifications or actions that generate it, from where will it get its difference of species? For from one agent and in one respect there never naturally comes to be a multi26 tude or diversity. But there is one agent and in one respect in all the frequency. Just as, then, something hot, which always acts by reason of its being hot, does not of itself generate anything except what is hot, whether it acts only once or many times, so it is impossible that any action or being acted upon, working one time or many times, generates by itself something diverse or different in species. 25  I have conjectured “act, effectu” instead of “affect, affectu.” 26  William is appealing to the Avicennian principle, “From what is one insofar as it is one there comes only what is one.” See my “William of Auvergne’s Use of the Avicennian Principle: ‘Ex Uno, In Quantum Unum, Non Nisi Unum,’” The Modern Schoolman 71 (1993): 1–15.

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Moreover, it is evident that the frequent seeing of moderate or intermediate visible objects helps and strengthens vision. But to refrain entirely from seeing weakens it and in the end extinguishes it. Does such a frequency ever generate a new habit of seeing? And in that way there will be two habits in each human being who sees well, that is, one that exists naturally and this habit of seeing acquired by exercise. But if Aristotle holds two powers of sight, he necessarily has to hold two blindnesses. But if he says that a new habit is not generated in the power of sight through such frequency, but that the natural habit is invigorated, unburdened, and helped in many ways, why will he not similarly also say in the case of the other potencies that a new habit is not generated in them and in terms of them, but that the potencies are invigorated, strengthened, freed, and unburdened? Moreover, since a habit gets its name from “having,” there will be a habit of something that is had, but a habit of the thing that is had is not a quality in its genus, but rather a relation or something relative. But every virtue, with which he is concerned, is a quality in its genus, just as an evil is also, because in terms of them persons are said to be of such a kind, that is, good or evil. Moreover, how does a habit differ from a disposition according to him, ex27 cept that a disposition is easily lost, but a habit is lost only with difficulty? But ease and difficulty of loss are not distinguished in term of species. After all, blackness in a crow and whiteness in snow are not of a different species from what they are in things which can be easily dyed or undyed. For genuine whiteness and blackness are ultimate species. Moreover, what is knowledge that has become a habit but knowledge that has taken root and has been confirmed? But confirmation and taking root are not the generation or acquisition of new knowledge, as it said elsewhere, because confirmation is not the creation of a new law, but the approbation of a previous one. Moreover, suppose that, while one and the same person teaches, two persons learn the same knowledge from him, but the one has a strong and tenacious memory, while the other has a forgetful and weak memory. It is evident that knowledge will be generated in both of them, but in the one it is easily lost because of the weakness of his memory, but in the other is lost with difficulty because of the goodness of his memory. Hence, the knowledge will be a disposition in the one and a habit in the other, since a disposition and a habit differ only in the ease and difficulty of loss. Hence, the knowledge of those things is a habit, not because of something that is generated or added to it beyond the essence of a disposition, but because of the goodness, as we said, of the recipient. In the same way, if someone wrote and or impressed the same writing or seal on 27  On the distinction between a habit and an disposition, see Aristotle, Categories 8.8b.2.28–29.

42 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues soft wax or on hard wax, it is certain that the writing or impression would be the same, but the one would be easily lost, but other only with difficulty. In this way it can happen with the virtues. [106a] For by preaching or exhortation the same patience will be generated, with God as the source, in a person naturally angry and in a person naturally gentle, but in the one it is easily lost, while in the other only with difficulty. For those who are naturally angry easily lose patience and are inflamed and leap to anger and vengeance, while the gentle do so only with difficulty. But this difficulty does not come from repetition or frequency, but from the goodness or good disposition of the subject, as Cicero says. “Nature,” he says, “immediately created a man lofty in mind; discourse concerning 28 the ineffable virtue of magnanimity has become rooted in the mind.” Moreover, virtue and goodness are goodness for one reason and a habit for another. But is it certain that virtue is essentially goodness? It does not, therefore, seem that it is possible that any other answer be given as to why it is a habit except than it is a spiritual quality that is lost with difficulty. Hence, habit does not seem to add anything beyond the essence of knowledge or goodness except strength or difficulty to lose. Because, then, the frequency of the actions is not added to the goodness so that it is goodness or to knowledge so that it is knowledge, but perhaps so that it is greater or better or stronger, it is, therefore, evident that a habit is not generated as a result of the frequency of the actions except in a certain respect. Just as someone might say that a white man is generated, so a habit too is not generated in terms of the whole by which it exists as a result of the frequency of the actions, although perhaps that is generated in it because of which it is called a habit, just as if someone says that solid knowledge is generated insofar as solidity is generated for that knowledge. But someone will perhaps say with probability that, just as one application of something hot to something else that is cold produces a lessening, that is, of the coldness or some small impression of heat, and then after it has been repeated many times and the coldness has gradually been destroyed, it impresses pure hotness and its own power, so perhaps when good actions have been repeated, whether interior or exterior, they consume something else that is contrary to the virtue by gradually lessening it, until the final disposition is impressed, which is, for this reason, a habit, because it clings deeply and tenaciously to the subject that has been prepared and made suitable by the preceding actions. Someone will perhaps say that the frequency of the actions is the deepening of the disposition and the implanting of it, just as by many blows and much hammering upon it, a wedge is gradually driven deeper and is fixed until it stands there firmly or is removed with difficulty, so the repetition and fre28  See Cicero, Tusculan Disputations (Tusculanae disputationes) 2.4, where Cicero said: “Nature begot you great, lofty, and scorning things merely human; therefore a discourse held against death easily took root in a brave soul,” which is certainly the source of William’s rather botched citation.

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quency of the actions fixes and deepens knowledge or goodness until it clings intimately to the human soul. Or, just as a plant gradually sends roots into the earth until it clings for its life to the earth, so knowledge and the virtues are gradually spread out into the interior of the human mind by habituation until they cling to it as if for their life, and then they are called habits when the possession of them has been strengthened. Hence, they seem to be called habits also for this reason that they are then seen to be truly had when they go beyond a weak possession by the mind. For as long as they can be easily lost, they seem almost not to be had, but to be like guests welcomed for a time. But afterward they stay in the mind like citizens and permanent residents. Moreover, according to Aristotle, we have a supernatural potency so that, 29 because of it, we act freely or promptly, secondly firmly, and thirdly with joy. For otherwise a person does not act in a virtuous manner unless he performs the act of the virtue promptly and freely. For if the action does not come from the heart, but through force or with difficulty, it does not come not from a habit, but rather from a weak and frail disposition. In the same way, it is not a habit if from weakness or feebleness someone ceases to act, that is, because of a slight or moderate bother or difficulty, such as slight loss or labor. For these are certain indications of a goodness that has not been confirmed or that has not yet turned into a habit in the person. Likewise, if someone acts without joy, but with fear or sadness, he indicates, according to Aristotle, that he does not act [106b] out of virtue, but is rather moved by some exterior principle. For it is a joy for a just man to do justice (Prv 21:15), as we read in Proverbs, chapter 30 twenty-one. It involves some question, however, whether the truth is such, namely, that virtuous action necessarily has these three qualities, and we will explain it in what follows. But we will first try to complete the explanation of the questions that we set forth earlier. We will, therefore, say that there is a difference between memory and the habit of knowledge, just as there is a difference between a cistern and a fountain, or in some other way. For memory is a storehouse that holds and guards what has been stored away. But a habit is what generates and produces new things, namely, new acts of apprehension and of willing and new actions, like a fountain that belches forth and continually spills out new waters, while a cistern contains and preserves waters that have been stored away, and there is no flow or emanation of new water from it. Old and past things, therefore, are drawn out of the storehouse of memory, that is, those things that, as we said, had been stored away in it. But from a habit of knowledge new conclu29  Here William uses the term “supernatural, supernaturalis,” but not in the sense in which grace or revelation is supernatural. He simply means a potency beyond the natural potency of the intellect or will. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.4.1105a32–34 and 2.3.1104b4–8. 30  I have corrected “eleven” to “twenty-one.”

44 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues sions and new discoveries come forth like the waters of a fountain. By the constancy of actions or of good works the natural powers become like fountains and wells of ready and free emanation, though they were previously like dry or almost dry river beds. Hence, they are almost filled, as it were, by the frequency of good actions, not so that they give forth them alone, like cisterns, as we said, and storerooms, which, of course, give forth only what has been put in them, but so that they also generate them. The custom of good works is like the irrigation, the seeding, or the impregnation of our natural powers, and for this reason there are afterward produced and generated from them praiseworthy actions, like crops and offspring. It does not, however, matter much if someone says that a habit is a fountain that has arisen on the earth from the repetition of actions of one of the natural powers or is a well dug in it or that the natural power became a fountain or a well through such repetition or if he says that a habit is such a natural power that has been impregnated, irrigated, fecundated, or sown through the repetition already mentioned. But if someone asks what it is essentially that is added or acquired in the human soul or in some of its powers through the frequency of the actions and what it is essentially, we reply that it is essentially goodness or evil that has taken root, become pregnant, or is with child, ready and set for the birthing of its actions, and again not merely full, but heaped up, and ready and set to overflow. And it is perhaps called a habit from this, that is, from having a fountain-like and overflowing bounty. For it is rightly called a habit because it makes someone rich who has it and who is its possessor, I mean, rich and abounding in good works. Or it is perhaps called a habit because of what the subject in which it is has and possesses and is most fully master of. For subjects in which there are modifications and dispositions that are easily lost neither have nor possess them, but they wholly have and possess habits, whether good or bad, and they command them and are masters of them. Some have, nonetheless, thought that spiritual and interior habits, about which we are speaking here, are called habits 31 like exterior habits. For they either clothe or adorn our souls, if they are good, or they produce the contrary in them. And the variety of habits in religious persons indicates the reality of their professions, like the proper insignia of religion, for example, the habit of the Cistercians, the habit of the Cluniacs, and so on with the others. Thus like insignia of various sorts of goodness or evil, habits reveal those who wear them to those who see them spiritually. As for the question whether a habit is acquired by one action or many, we now reply to this that at times the whole habit is generated by one action, and this in two ways, [107a] namely, through the forcefulness of the impression or through the good disposition of the one who receives it. For it often happens 31  We still speak of the clothing of a monk or nun as a habit. William illustrates this sense of habit in speaking of the Cistercians or Cluniacs.

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that someone is won over to some vice or virtue so effectively that it penetrates to the depth of the heart and clings to it. It also happens that from one act of intercourse or even from the sight of a woman someone is corrupted by the vice of incontinence in perpetuity; it is also well-known that someone captured once by enemies becomes perpetually afraid of them, and this perhaps happens in most cases whenever a habit is generated by the frequency of the actions so that we say that a habit is generated at the same time from all of them, like heat or color in terms of what it is. For one disposition is generated after another until the last one or the last ones are arrived at, which ought to be the greatest of all, just as one degree of heat is generated after another until the last and greatest degree is arrived at. And it is possible to see this clearly because one thought is generated after another and one deliberation after another and one plan after another, and in that way one act of willing after another, and one exterior action after another in all these persons who frequently repeat the same actions, just as in the generation of heat there is always destroyed lukewarmness or some degree of the lesser temperatures that were generated. And each of those that is destroyed in this way is followed by a stronger and greater temperature until the last and greatest is arrived at. It happens in that way in the generation and destruction of spiritual dispositions until the generation of the habit is completed. And notice that in the generation of heat that is final and greatest, nothing is generated by the generation of the preceding degree that is or ought to be a part of it, but there are, nonetheless, generated dispositions by which the subject of the last degree of heat is made fit for receiving it and in order that the generation of it might take place in it. But in the generation of bodies it is otherwise, because in them one part is generated after another and the generated parts remain and are added to one another until the body that is generated is constituted and completed with the full integrity of its parts. And so, the parts successively generated in that way remain both on account of the strength of their substance and because it is necessary for the body generated to be constituted out of them and because nature intended to assemble a whole from them. Besides, they have absolutely nothing contrary according to their essence in relation to the whole. We, however, understand this in the generation of simple homogeneous bodies. But in the generation of heat the degrees of heat generated prior to the last do not now remain, because they are contrary to the last degree in the same way in which the middle degree is contrary to both of the extremes. It is, therefore, clearly true that nothing of the last degree of heat is generated by the generation of any of the intermediate degrees. I mean nothing in act and nothing that ought to be a part of it in act. But that which is the last degree of what is to be generated is generated potentially in each of the intermediate degrees. In the generation, therefore, of bodies and of bodily dispositions it is such that in the generation of bodies there is always gener-

46 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues ated something else, which will be a part of the last thing generated. But in the generation of bodily dispositions it takes place according to potency, and the reason is that in these there is always generated something intermediate that cannot be a part of some extreme. But in the generation of bodies there is always something of the body to be generated, which is a body and part of that body, namely, of the one to be generated. In the generation of spiritual things, however, which are indivisible into parts, the process does not move through a continuum or through parts. Hence, when it is asked whether by the first action of a frequency there is generated something other than the good or bad habit, we reply that there is not generated something else that is a part in terms of act, but there is perhaps generated an act of loving or of willing, which is a great help toward there eventually being generated love as a habit or a will, and in the second action [107b] there will perhaps be generated a stronger act of loving and willing. But nothing of these is a part of the habit to be generated, but a great help toward the generation of the habit that is goodness or evil, 32 which has not been assembled from such dispositions, but left from them and not from them as parts, but as seeds. But if someone asks whether the whole is generated all at once or by parts, I reply that it will be generated by parts potentially, but not in terms of act, because in terms of act it is not divisible into parts. It is, therefore, generated from such dispositions as in seeds and like a chick in an egg. Hence, we speak of generation in that case in a very loose sense because the generation of a habit, as Aristotle understood it, is like only the sowing of it. But if someone asks whether at times the first thing generated is a habit, we reply, “Yes,” for example, when there has preceded a frequency from which or through which it ought to be left behind, and a bad disposition of the agent, as we touched upon above, does not pose an impediment. But if someone says that this habit now exists though it did not exist before nor any part of it at all, and so it is now generated or created, we reply in defense of Aristotle that it does not follow, and this is evident if one understands generation according to the intention of Aristotle. For it is the same as if he argued in this way: It exists now though it did not exist before, nor did any part of it, and so it is now first sown or prepared for everything. But it is possible, as we said, that in one single instant a habit is generated without any preparation, as we said. But we resolve what he asks about the reflexiveness of such actions, saying: Things apprehended act upon our souls and imprint upon them impressions and modifications, which we call thoughts and volitions, through which similar ones are afterwards generated. For example, someone saw or heard that a person did one of the actions that these are, and he was pleased with it on account 32  I have conjectured the addition of “not, non.”

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of the goodness of justice and the beauty of the same, and he began to love him, and there was aroused in him a desire for doing similar actions. And that desire was increased until there was generated the will to do something similar. Then he did that action. You see that the action generated in him an apprehension through sensation, thought, or imagination, and an approval and delight in it, then love, next the desire, and afterwards the will to do similar things. But if the first action, which was certainly external and far removed from him and apprehended from afar, generated in him such volitions, for how much better reason did this more proximate action generate in him such volitions, and one producing similar effects from a nearer source will in that way for better reason produce greater ones in him. The impressions in the soul, which were generated through the apprehension of the first action, are, therefore, distinct from those generated though the second, and the latter are greater and more forceful. This action, therefore, in no way comes from those same thoughts and volitions that it generates in the soul through its apprehension, nor does the agent by acting produce this action from them, but rather from previous ones. Hence, it is not in any way contradictory that the actions that are in our souls act upon them and turn back upon them, nor is it contradictory that the thoughts and volitions in apprehension are similar to those thoughts and volitions from which and through which they proceed, but it is absolutely contradictory and impossible that they should be the same in number. Nor is it contradictory that the soul both acts upon itself and is acted upon by itself and does this in terms of different powers. For the power of memory at times generates in the power of imagination an imaginative apprehension, and the sensory power acts upon the power of memory, storing up in it sensible forms, and what is more, in terms of the same power it acts and is acted upon in itself. Otherwise, invention and learning would be nothing. For when someone draws a conclusion from some principles and learns it [108a] from them, the soul is undoubtedly acting in terms of the intellective and reasoning power, both generating the knowledge of that conclusion and being acted upon, that is, receiving it. But, because it acts from the principles, it is acting from some things, that is, from those that pertain to the principles, and it is acted upon by other things, that is, by those that pertain to the conclusion. Nor is there a difference between the intellective power and the power of reasoning. For there is, of course, one noble power of the human soul apprehensive of lofty things. Knowledge of conclusions is, after all, generated in the same thing in which there is the knowledge and the understanding of principles, and nothing prevents that in the same human soul there are two qualities of the same species in terms of the same power, just as there are two instances of knowledge of similar things and two loves of two persons and two instances of sadness over two deaths of two friends who are very much alike. For the intellective or noble apprehensive power is not only the subject and place of the

48 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues sciences, but a fountain that pours out and generates both at the same time or that pours in and is receptive of them, according to the word of the Truth in John, chapter four: The water which I will give him will become in him a fountain of water leaping up to eternal life ( Jn 4:14). For if the human soul were not able to act upon itself and be acted upon by itself and to move itself and to be moved by itself, there would perhaps be in it no freedom of choice, and there would be in it no virtue or vice; similarly, there would be neither merit nor sin. And again, if it could not both act and be acted upon in terms of the same thing, the same contradictions would perhaps ensue, 33 and to think otherwise seems to verge upon the insanity of the Manichees. Hence, it will be fitting to give some consideration to these points when we 34 speak about temptations and resisting them and about their wars and victories. But someone might ask whether persons who are most rapacious, stealing wherever they can and prodigally and profusely giving away their plunder, generate in themselves contrary habits, namely, avarice and prodigality, from the frequencies of the contrary actions, or whether they generate neither of them. And this latter can seem more likely. For each of the contrary acts seems not only to destroy the other, but also that which is left from it, in accord with what we read in Ecclesiasticus, chapter thirty-four: One man builds, and another man 35 destroys. What does it profit them but the labor? (Sir 34:28). It is as if someone heated something and cooled it again, and the reverse. It would remain neither hot nor cold, nor would the remnants of heat or of cold be preserved in it in any way. Hence, it remains that the person is at the same time avaricious and prodigal. And there is the same question concerning someone lascivious who occasionally and at times acts in accord with chastity and often likewise often falls again. Are contrary habits, namely, incontinence and chastity, generated in him, or neither of them? To this we reply that in both cases neither habit is generated since the contrariety of the actions prevents it. But since the acts of avarice and of prodigality are both evil, though they are contrary, they agree and are in harmony insofar as they are evil and harmful to the human soul and highly injurious to the powers of the same. Although, then, they are contrary and destroy each other, still what is common to each of them, namely, the injury and 33  In On the Universe (De universo) Ia–Iae, ch. 8, William argued that one of the roots of the Manichaean dualism was the claim that one of two contraries cannot arise from the other and that, for this reason, evil cannot come from good, but must have its own first principle. 34  I have conjectured “temptations, tentationibus” instead of “thoughts, cogitationibus.” The fourth part of this work is entitled On Temptations and Their Resistance (De tentationibus et resistentiis). 35  I have corrected “him, ei” to “them, eis” in accord with the Vulgate.

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harm to the soul, is both left behind by each and remains with both of them. Just as too much heat destroys too much cold, but still does not take away the injury that comes from the other, but rather increases it, and the converse, so falling and getting back up are contrary and the one completely removes the other, and yet getting up does not heal or remove the injury or defilement that comes from falling. Also, that which follows in the words of Aristotle, namely, that virtue is the 36 goodness between two evils, raises many questions and doubts. And he calls the two evils “superfluity” and “deficiency,” which we commonly call “too much” 37 and “too little.” For the mean between two extremes is less distant from each of the [108b] two extremes than the extremes are from each other. Hence, through goodness goodness and someone good in that way will differ less from someone evil in that way than someone evil from one extreme will differ from someone evil from the other extreme. Moreover, Aristotle himself says in the same place that contraries are most 38 different from each other. And in the book of the Categories he says that they 39 differ most of all, and in the book of the Metaphysics he says that contrariety 40 is complete difference. Hence, they are more different or distant from each other than from the mean or than the mean is from them, and thus the two evils are more distant from each other than the intermediate virtue is distant from them. But it seems just the opposite, namely, that good and evil are contraries and likewise goodness and evil. Hence, they differ most or are most distant from each other. The two vices, then, are less distant from each other than they are distant from goodness. 41 Moreover, if goodness is, as he says, the mean between two evils, it will be, therefore, posterior by nature. For every mean, if it is a real mean between two true contraries, is by nature posterior to each of them, just as an intermediate color is with two extremes. But we reply that goodness is not a true mean between two evils, and this is seen from the fact that one does not pass from one to the other through it. Likewise, it is not composed of them, as an intermediate color is composed from white and black and as lukewarmness is composed from hot and cold. But the things with which the good habits are concerned, about which Aristotle intended to speak, are means between superfluous and deficient things or between too much and too little in the way in which a number is located 36  37  38  39  40  41 

See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.9.1109a20–22. See ibid. 2.6.1107a3–5. Ibid. 2.7.1108b33–35. See Aristotle, Categories 6a18. Aristotle, Metaphysics 10.4.1055a17–18. Ibid. 2.9.1109a20–22.

50 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues between any two numbers around it, such as between ten and five or any of the other intermediate numbers. For example, just as between eating too much and eating too little there is eating in some quantity, just as between eating a pound of bread and eating a quarter pound there is eating the middle amount of it. But when it is objected that contraries differ from each other in the greatest amount, we understand this among things of that genus, such as the previously mentioned evils in their genus, just as the color white and the color black differ most of all in the genus of color, but the color white and the color black do not differ from each other more than color and grammar. But someone might say: Since virtue and art are concerned with things that 42 are very difficult, but the actions as a result of which the habit is left behind are more difficult than those that proceed from the habit—in fact, when a habit has been strengthened, the actions that come from it are not only easy, but also pleasant; therefore, they are less virtuous than the preceding ones or are completely non-virtuous. We reply that the difficulty and trouble in actions comes from weakness and not from virtue. For the fact that a weak and sick horse carries a rider or weight with labor and pain does not come from its virtue, but from its weakness. But the fact that a strong and powerful horse carries them with sprightliness and ease comes from its virtue and goodness, just as the fact that we at times see by means of the eye with difficulty and pain comes from its defect or evil state, and the fact that we see clearly and with pleasure comes from its virtue and goodness. Virtue and art, then, are concerned with things that are very difficult, making them not only very easy but pleasant for their agents. We have, therefore, already explained in part the words of Aristotle in the definition of consuetudinal virtue and showed you the manner of its generation and that this virtue is not a storeroom in any way nor assembled from actions or dispositions from which it is left behind, because from a storeroom or an aggregate nothing more and nothing better goes forth and also nothing other than what was put in it. But from such a habit there go forth both greater and better actions than those were by which it was left behind or generated and also infinite actions, though those were finite. And we have explained that the generation of it is not through a continuum and through parts [109a] except potentially since its essence is not divisible into parts and that at times such a habit exists first. But it is not, nonetheless, said to be generated at that time because it is not at that time on the way to being, but is in complete being. Generation, however, is the path to being. We have also assigned for you the reason for its naming, namely, why it is called a habit, and we showed you how it is a mean between two evils. It was also explained to you along with these that there are three manners of the generation of this habit, and we showed and 42  See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3.1105a10–11.

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listed them for you. We also disclosed to you that there are certain natural virtues, and their being was established, and we will speak in the following about the relation of them. And we will investigate other things that have to do with them. Since, therefore, these matters are such, we will search out concerning such virtues how they belong to goodness or make people good and what is or ought to be the intention of good or goodness in them.

Chapter Two Three things are required for the moral rectitude and goodness of human life: first, that it give honor to God; second, that it be beautiful in itself; third, that it be useful or beneficial to others. He also shows that the duty not to harm others and the duty to honor the creator are among the first impressions.

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e must, therefore, first ask this, namely, of what sort human life must be or should be. We say, therefore, that human life ought to give honor to God, its giver, be beautiful in itself, and useful or beneficial to others. After all, it is obvious that, if it were insulting to God, ugly or shameful in itself, or harmful or bad for others, it will be unjust toward God and also toward the living person himself and to the others he harms. For it is no less unjust to pour insults than to inflict injury upon him, nor is it less injurious to harm oneself alone, if this alone could be the case, than to harm another. And this is evident from the fact that the duty not to harm is among the first impressions and is naturally embedded in and impressed on the human heart, and there is no human heart that does not naturally admit that it ought to harm no one. But what nature universally and naturally admits is necessarily true. For it is impossible for nature to lie naturally and universally. Hence, it is evident that the duty not to harm is one of the first impressions and one of the naturally self-evident truths. But he does no less harm who takes away from anyone due honor and glory or pours forth insults upon him than one who holds back what he owes or who takes another’s livelihood or money. It is, therefore, evident that a life that is insulting to God or does not give him honor is unjust and harmful to God and, moreover, insofar as it is insulting or does not give him honor, it is harmful to him. For if someone says that it is enough that human life gives honor to God only in part, he undoubtedly is mistaken because, as the whole of life comes from him, so the whole is owed to him. Moreover, by what privilege will the rest of human life be exempt from giving honor to God? Moreover, does not all the fruit belong to the one who owns the whole tree? And do not all the crops belong to the one who owns the whole field? Does not all its labor belong to the one who owns the whole horse? And also the whole service of the same horse? Because, then, the whole of what we are, the whole

52 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues of our life, the whole of the good we have or do, is wholly God’s work, God’s gift, God’s benefit, he should be honored by us from the whole of each of these. Hence, God is to be honored by our whole life, our whole works, both interior and exterior. For he is to be honored from all his works, from all his gifts and benefits [109b]. Hence, our whole life ought as a whole to give honor to God. Moreover, there is no nation so barbarous, so unlearned, so uncivilized that it tolerates hearing that its gods should not be honored, that does not regard it as intolerable blasphemy, and that does not avenge it with the sword and fire to the point that it judges those who presume to say something of the sort do not deserve teaching and correction, but simply punishments, unless they immediately come to their senses. Hence, it is evident that the honor of the creator is among the first impressions since human nature cannot bear even a word against it and avenges it so severely. But if someone says that the honor of the creator is really impressed naturally upon human minds, but that it is not necessary on this account that the creator be honored from the whole of life and in the whole of life, we reply that from the whole gift honor is universally owed to its giver. Hence, the creator is to be honored from every good and by the whole of it, insofar as he is the one who gives and increases any good. It is necessary, therefore, that the whole of human life give honor to God; otherwise, it will be unjust either in its whole or in a part, if it does not give to God what is his, namely, due honor. Moreover, who would dare to say that we should serve God in part and in part not serve him? For if he is the Lord in absolutely all parts, he should, therefore, be served in all things and through all things. But what does not give honor to the one to whom it is offered is not service. Moreover, if all works and actions of free servants ought to belong to their lords, and if servants may not take any of such works and actions from their lords, for how much better reason may we not take a work or action from the Lord of lords and the Lord of the ages! Moreover, all my works are necessarily either good or evil or indifferent or idle. It is, however, not permissible that they be evil, but it is also not permissible that they be indifferent or idle. Just as it is not permissible for servants to be idle or to do works that do not bear fruit for their lords, so for incomparably better reasons it is not permissible for us to do works that are not for the honor of God or to be idle when we can work for his honor. We ought, therefore, to turn to his honor all the things that we do that are not evil. Moreover, if the honor of God added to our good works—or, as certain people think, to our indifferent ones—does not make them more difficult or more burdensome in any respect, will it not be blameworthy to pass over the honor of God in such acts? For how much better reason ought the honor of God not to be passed over in them because it makes them easier or more pleasant! For example, you eat or drink or sleep as the needs of the body demand.

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If you add the honor of God in your intention so that you think in your heart that you also want to look after the needs of the body for the sake of the honor of God, what, I ask, have you lost? Or what burden is imposed on you from this, namely, if you want to eat or drink or sleep in accord with the needs of the body also for the sake of the honor of God? In fact, unless you are excessively perverse, you have also added a condiment of great sweetness to your work from that addition, when by your intention you have added the honor of God. But if someone says that the intention of taking care of the weakness of the body suffices for carrying out such an action and, therefore, the other intention is superfluous, we reply that an evil intention also suffices for eating, but in order that you may eat in a good way and in order that you may do this as a servant and worshiper of God, it does not suffice unless you add to your action the honor and reverence of God. But if someone says that it is not necessary and is not required of anyone that he act in that way in all things, although the holy words say: Whether you eat or drink or whatever else you do, do it for the glory of God (1 Cor 10:31), and again elsewhere: In order that God may be honored in all things (1 Pt 4:11), we ask whether [110a] we should aim at some end in such actions. But if he replies that the end of such actions is the sustenance, refreshment, or preservation of the human body, we ask again whether such preservation is to be sought for its own sake alone and not for the sake of something else. But he cannot say that it is to be sought for its own sake alone, just as the body itself is not to be. And the reason is that body is an organ or instrument for actions that are done by the soul through it. But it is universally evident that the being of an organ and its health or goodness are both sought and preserved for the sake of the actions that are done through it. Thus the eye and its health and goodness are sought not for their own sakes, but for the sake of seeing. But if he says that such actions are to be sought for their own sake alone, it is evident that he is mistaken, since, in accord with this, they ought not to be sought for the sake of a greater good. Hence, they could not be useful or helpful for obtaining a greater good than they themselves are. And this is something obviously false, because seeing and hearing and the like are useful for knowing and ultimately knowing is clearly useful for obtaining eternal happiness. Likewise, all the other perfections and good actions of human souls are useful and helpful toward eternal happiness, albeit through many intermediate goals. And of all benefits this eternal happiness is the greatest and is, so to speak, the benefit of all benefits. Hence, if it is to be sought by us and if all those things that are useful for it are to be sought by us, it is evident that they are to be sought for its sake. We ought, therefore, come to a stop in no lesser good. Hence, no lesser good is to be sought for its own sake alone. Moreover, since we were born and created wholly for it and since whatever we naturally are or have, we are or have for the sake of it, everything, therefore,

54 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues ought to be wholly given or referred to it by us. We ought, therefore, to intend it in all that we do. What is a good life but the correct road leading to eternal happiness? And what else are good actions in life but good strides or steps on the road to eternal happiness? Because, therefore, we have to go to the end of the road by the whole of life and by all the strides, it is, hence, not permissible to come to a stop in some action that turns aside from the road. One turns aside from it though vice. But one stops when one’s intention and aim is positioned short of and does not extend to eternal happiness. 43 Moreover, since there are many intentions of that which is good, Aristotle determined that good in consuetudinal virtues is called the intermediate or mean or what is balanced or moderate between excess and lack, as he said in 44 the book of Ethics that good is said to be an amount as in the intermediate. Hence, good seems to be spoken of only in relation to great and obvious evils, in accord with this intention. For prodigality and avarice are such obvious evils, and prodigality is so great an excess and avarice is so great a diminishment that one who holds back from each of them is judged to be good, that is, temperate, and yet no mean is held onto only for the reason that one withdraws from each of the extremes and by the middle path walks on none of them. Nor is it held onto for this reason alone that one is walking apart and far from each of them, but rather on account of the fact that by it one comes to the goal of the journeying and perhaps in order that one may get there more directly and easily by it than by one or the other of them. But the mean is not held onto only for the reason that one avoids each vice on the extreme, but in order that one may acquire by the mean that which is not acquired through either of the vices on the extreme, but would rather be lost [110b] through each of them. It is necessary that the mean have a goal better than itself on account of which it is sought and aimed at. Moreover, if it is a good without qualification and through itself, once it has been obtained, other things are not sought, nor should they be sought. But other things do not suffice to make people blessed or happy. In fact, once they have been obtained, that good remains to be sought through them. It is, therefore, evident that all other things are good and are to be sought for the sake of it. Moreover, such virtue and goodness is either to be sought for its own sake alone or for the sake of something else alone or for its own sake and for the sake of something else. And it is evident that we should not come to a stop in any good short of ultimate happiness since we were born both to go to and arrive at it and were created to obtain it. It is, therefore, evident that we should come to a stop in every good, which, once it has been obtained, nothing else is to be 43  William uses “intention” in the Avicennian sense of meaning or signification as well as in the sense of what is intended or aimed at. 44  I have conjectured Ethicorum instead of Topicorum, since the reference seems to be to Nicomachean Ethics 2.6.1106b26 –28.

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sought, because there is no good beyond that. But everything of that sort, namely, everything in which we should not come to a stop and which, when obtained, something else remains to be sought, is a path. Hence, such virtue or goodness about which we are speaking here is a path, but a path is not to be sought for its own sake. Hence, such virtue is not to be sought for its own sake alone. But if someone says that it is to be sought only for the sake of something else, but is only to be sought because it is good, it is, therefore, to be sought because it is good for something else, and its goodness is only goodness for something else. But such a goodness is only a path for acquiring a greater good and is called utility by its real name. But if he says that it is to be sought for its own sake and for the sake of something else, it will be at the same time goal and path. For that which is to be sought for its own sake is the goal of the seeking, and that which is to be sought for the sake of something else is a path. This is, however, problematic in itself. Moreover, if someone sought such virtue or goodness only for its own sake, he would sin in terms of it, since it is to be sought also for the sake of something else. In the same way, if he sought it only for the sake of something else, he would likewise sin, since it should be sought for its own sake. Moreover, suppose that someone seeks it for its own sake in order that, once he has obtained it, he may rest in it. Would he not act wrongly since he was born and created for a greater good? Moreover, we should in no way come to a stop in it; therefore, it should in no way be set as an end. But an end is that which is sought for its own sake. Hence, such virtue is in no way to be sought for its own sake. But if someone says that it should be sought in this way for its own sake because, even if it should happen that another good is not acquired, it is, nonetheless, of itself to be both loved and sought, just as its contrary is to be avoided, he, of course, speaks the truth. But we are not asking what is to be done in that case, but what is to be done now, namely, since it is the case that it is the role of such virtue or goodness to acquire eternal happiness. It has, therefore, already been explained to you from this that the virtue and goodness that Aristotle intended are paths for acquiring and obtaining another 46 good, and that good is called among them eternal happiness. But although many other goods come from it and through it, still in the end and ultimately eternal happiness is obtained through it. On account of these goods, human beings are said to be good, as Cicero says about justice, that “as a result of it men

45  I have omitted “once it has been obtained, nothing else is to be sought, quo obtento non est aliud quaerendum” as a needless repetition. 46  That is, the philosophers.

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are called good.” For in it is found “the greatest splendor” of moral goodness. For from justice human beings have peace with one another, even from unjust men. For through justice those who are just avoid harming or injuring anyone, and through it the wicked and daring are held back so that they do not leap forth to the injury of others. From peace and security there also comes an increase in numbers, not only in human possessions, but in human beings, just as on the contrary from wars and plundering and other disturbances the opposite things come, namely, a decrease, not only in human possessions, but also of human beings. It is the same way with temperance and intemperance. For there is hardly an evil in human affairs that does not proceed [111a] from some form of intemperance, as is seen with dissoluteness, drunkenness, and gluttony. They are, therefore, rightly called good, who are strong with these consuetudinal virtues. I mean good in the sense that they are useful to the state, and these virtues are instances of goodness, that is, of usefulness, since through them so many and such great goods come to human beings and human affairs. Those persons who are just the opposite are called evil, even pestilential. But if someone says that, as “justice is a likeness to the higher and divine sub48 stances,” as Boethius says, so goodness is as well, he speaks the truth, and as Aristotle says that certain things are said to be white because they are close to 49 things truly and purely white, so it is with good persons and good things. But because perfect goodness is also perfect happiness and the likeness of goodness is also the likeness of happiness, as we will explain in the following, it is necessary that the goodness, which is the path to it, is goodness in some way, namely, like a shadow or slight likeness of true and perfect goodness, just as in general the intermediate dispositions by which one comes to the extreme, perfect, true, and pure are in some way likenesses of it and those that are closer are more like to it. Such virtues, then, are instances of goodness as a result of the likeness that they have to true and perfect goodness, just as we are accustomed to say that grace is a certain shadow and likeness of everlasting glory. For potentially they are not without a admixture of vice until one comes to the pure, perfect, and last. And this is what the prophetic words of Isaiah, chapter sixty-four, say: All our acts of justice are like the rag of a menstruating woman (Is 64:6), and the ignorant call them great goods. In the same way common and unlearned men also call great goods even those that are the least, namely, temporal ones. But they do not grasp the greatest goods at all, and they childishly wander about in temporal goods and suppose that those are great or the greatest goods, which are the least or almost no goods. And in that way men call great or even the 47  See Cicero, On Duties (De officiis) 1.7.20. 48  Boethius, On Topical Differences (De differentiis topicis) 1; PL 64: 1176A. 49  See perhaps Sopistical Refutations 5.169b1b11–16.

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greatest goods those which are very modest and at times those which are rather instances of evil, and they suppose that those which are vices to be virtues. We have already disclosed to you that someone who stops in his tending or undertaking short of eternal happiness is diminished and misuses the goods that are short of eternal happiness, and the reason is that he makes goods that are the way the end. In the same way, then, someone who makes the end the way and does not stop or come to a rest in the end, but seeks through it something else without it, abuses it, so someone who stops on the way and stops as in an end, misuses the way, when he makes it an end. Moreover, he is an enemy of his own nature since he deprives it of the good of all goods, on account of which he was born and created. It is as if someone born for a kingdom neglects the kingdom and refuses to accept it out of cowardice or laziness, since he is content with a small field. Moreover, such a man undoubtedly contradicts the perfectly correct order of the creator since the order of the creator is that life is destined for the end of most peaceful and most pleasant rest and that all our actions are steps toward the fatherland of the most ample happiness, and on account of this and for this, as we mentioned above, we are all that we naturally are and have the whole of whatever good we have in ourselves from whatever source. On this account he willed that our life run with time at the greatest speed in order that our arrival at that good might be most speedy and in order that the lowest goods, from which we flee with such great speed and which flee from us with such great speed, may not be able to detain us and either impede or slow down our journey. It has, then, already been shown to you from all these points that good and goodness is said in three ways. And the first intention of goodness is utility. The second intention is a likeness of true and perfect goodness. The third is a verbal mingling of true goodness, and [111b] the common ignorance and the smallness or shortsightedness of the intellect of the unlearned provides the cause for this intention and naming, as we said. For it has become known so far only to a few human beings that the glory of God is the principal end and perhaps the only end of truly good actions. For as the human community loves the least goods alone and is content with them unless people are trained and educated otherwise, so they know and think only of those goods, like children who know and care about only milk and pears and apples. But it raises a question whether someone who aims at eternal happiness alone and does good actions only in order to obtain it without any eye to the honor and glory of God should be called good or just, and it seems that he is clearly unjust, first of all, because, as we said, he deprives God of what is rightly his, when he not only does not show him honor and glory in his works, but does not even intend them. Secondly, since eternal happiness is a created good, we should in no way come to a rest or a stop in it as in an end. For just as no

58 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues good of that sort exists on its own account, so it should not be loved only on its own account. Otherwise, one contradicts the providential plan of the creator and nature itself in many ways. Since no good of that sort is an end in itself, but rather a path for you on account of something else, it should in no way be regarded as an end, but rather as a path, just as, since the creator is in himself the end as well as the beginning of all goods, he should in no way be regarded as a path, and what is naturally only a path in itself should in no way be regarded as an end. Moreover, such a person loves happiness and eternal life on account of himself, a mere human being, and loves God on account of it, or he does not. If he does, he loves it more than God. If he does not, he is ungrateful to its giver, God, since he loves his gift to that point and does not love its giver on its account. But if he says that he does not love God on its account, but loves it on God’s account alone, he either loves God and it equally or loves one more. But if he loves them equally or loves it more than God, he injures God since he is to be loved incomparably more than it. Moreover, such a person does everything on its account and nothing on account of God. He, therefore, loves happiness and eternal life more than God. Moreover, if such a person serves God only for the sake of obtaining this happiness from him, he sells God his service, which he renders him. Hence, there is between him and God in this respect only venality, commerce, or business. But businessmen do not serve one another, but merely exchange commodities and prices. Moreover, such a person serves only himself. For he intends to do good for himself alone and not for God. But we will speak more carefully and at greater 50 length concerning these merits and rewards. Thus far it has been determined for you that such a person should not be said to be either good or just without qualification, but in accord with one of the three previously mentioned intentions.

Chapter Three He again discusses virtue at length, asking whether such a habit is will or knowledge or both or one in relation to the other.

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fter this, however, we will inquire whether such a habit is equally will or knowledge or both of them or one in relation to the other. For Aristotle says that “virtues are” either certain “acts of willing or are not without

50  That is, in the treatises, On Merits (De meritis) and On Rewards (De retributionibus), which are parts of On the Virtues and Vices (De virtutibus et vitiis).

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willing.” Let us begin, therefore, and say that in the human soul there are found only three kinds of powers, namely, apprehensive and, secondly, moving powers, of which there are two kinds or [112a] parts, namely, a power that commands motion and the power that carries it out, and the power that carries it out is in no way able to receive a virtue. For no aptitude of the members for motion, no habit that can be generated in them is called virtue—I mean the virtue with which we are dealing here. The virtue, therefore, that is generated by the frequency of times and of actions is generated either in the apprehensive power or in the power that commands motion. But if it is generated in the apprehensive power, then it is easy to state that it is either opinion or knowledge. For doubt and wonder have up until now been called virtues by no human being. But that such virtue is neither opinion nor knowledge is evident from the fact that someone who has more opinions or knows more is not better or more virtuous in those matters that pertain to the virtues. This, however, would necessarily follow. For if opinion or knowledge were virtue, such an increase would be an increase in that virtue, and in someone in whom the one would be increased, the other would be increased. In the same way Aristotle says elsewhere that love is not the desire for intercourse. For someone who loves more does not desire intercourse 52 more. Aristotle himself, however, bears witness that knowledge contributes 53 little or nothing to virtue. It remains, then, that such a habit is generated only in the power that commands motion, but the power that commands motion is the power of willing. In the power of willing, however, there is not generated any 54 habit except willing or nilling. Hence, such a habit will be only willing or nilling. Moreover, if from frequent acts of apprehension there is generated only an apprehensive habit, then, from frequent acts of willing there is generated, so to speak, only a habit of willing or a voluntary habit. Hence, according to this, moral virtue will be only will. Moreover, when the will is given, the habit is given, I mean: the goodness and a good person are given by the good will alone, and they are removed when it is removed. And so, a person is properly and essentially good by the will. Hence, a good will is properly and essentially goodness. Moreover, when it alone is given, nothing other than it is given, and when it is removed, nothing other than it is removed. In that way, however, goodness is given and removed. It is, therefore, goodness, and goodness is it. But it is evident that it is true that, when that alone is given, goodness is given, and 51  52  53  54 

Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.5.1106a 3–4. William quotes the versio antiquissima. Aristotle, Topics 6.7.146a4–12. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.4.1105b1–2. “To nill” is obsolete in English, and we have no noun for the negative. The Latin “noluntas” means more than not willing, which can mean the mere absence of willing. Rather, “noluntas” is a positive act of willing not to do something.

60 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues when it alone is removed, goodness is removed, from that fact that a human being with a good will is good without qualification, and someone who has a good will, that is, such a habit, necessarily has goodness, whatever else he may not have, and someone who lacks such a good will is not good, whatever else he may have. Hence, nothing except a good will makes the one who has it good, and Augustine also says in the book, On Free Choice, that we live correctly by 55 the will and we sin by the will. Likewise, Seneca says, Every sin is voluntary 56 so that, if it is not voluntary, it is not a sin. Hence, it is necessary that it be this way with regard to good people as well. Moreover, since in the human mind the will is like the emperor to whom all other things are subject and obedient, but the sciences and memory and other such things are like councilors who are able only to suggest and urge benefits and to point out dangers in actions, but cannot command or carry out anything, and since the members and lower powers of motions are like servants and executors of the orders or commands of this emperor, while the exterior senses are like messengers and runners reporting those things that they see or hear outside to the councilors or emperor, it is evident that for all such things to be administered in a good or bad way lies entirely in the goodness or badness of this emperor. He is good who administers and rules all such things, and he is evil who does just the opposite; everything depends on the goodness or badness of the will. Moreover, if you remove goodness from the [112b] will while anything else remains in a human being and while however much of it you want remains, goodness is removed from him. Put goodness in it, with whatever else you want removed from him, and you have put goodness in him, and with regard to evil it is evident that, if evil has been put in the will, the human being is necessarily made evil with anything else removed. And if evil has likewise been removed from the will, the human being does not remain evil, whatever other things may remain in him apart from the evil will alone. We, therefore, reply to all these arguments that this habitual goodness is only the will as a habit, that is, the will strengthened by custom in doing good actions, although the apprehensive power does not exist in us without its modifications, does not, I mean, exist without the acquisition of its improvement in many ways. For it acquires quickness and certitude in knowing, which are good things. From the experience of actions done, there is generated in it the knowledge of many other things, nor can there be an improvement of it in actions done or to be done that does not help in many ways the goodness we mentioned, that is, the good will. For as Augustine says, the learned act better 55  See Augustine, On Free Choice (De libero arbitrio) 2.19.50 and Revisions (Retractationes) 1.9.4; PL 32: 596-597. I have corrected “Enchiridion” to “On Free Choice.” 56  See uncertain author, Proverbs of Seneca (Proverbia Senecae) 1.

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in all ways, and Aristotle’s words that knowledge contributes little or nothing 58 to virtue should be understood with regard to other sorts of knowledge and knowledge of other things, not with regard to the knowledge by which we know virtuous actions. Just as sight or seeing does not contribute little or nothing to walking, but rather very much, so knowledge of actions also contributes much to the doing of them. And as the power to walk would be much impeded if it were not helped by sight by which it guides our steps and by which it exercises foresight and caution, so virtue without the light of such knowledge would be equivalently blind, not knowing what to do or how to act, just as a blind person walking along and not knowing where or how far he should go is seen to walk in a dangerous manner. Just as, then, in certain men the virtue of undertaking and producing magnificent and sumptuous buildings is one thing, while the architectonic art of producing them is another, so in good men the knowledge by which they know what to do and how, when, and for whom is one thing, and the virtue and ability of undertaking and doing such actions is another. That statement of Aristotle by which he said that knowledge contributes lit59 tle or nothing to virtue could, nonetheless, be understood in the sense that it contributes little or nothing to the being or essence of virtue. But it contributes very much to its well-being, as we said, insofar as it directs and illumines its actions. In the same way sight contributes nothing to the power of walking in terms of its essence, but contributes very much to its goodness, that is, so that it makes one walk well or makes one’s actions in walking good. But if someone says that consuetudinal virtue is not generated in either of 60 the previously mentioned powers, but in both of them together, his statement is impossible, and the reason is that, according to him, such a habit would either be totally in each of these powers or partly in one and partly in the other. But it is impossible that a numerically single habit should be in two subjects at the same time. It is likewise impossible that it be partly in one and partly in the other, since that habit is not divisible into parts. If that habit is also something else in this way, it would not be anything one. For just as from those factors that generate it, nothing one can be produced, that is, from knowing and acting or from their potencies, so from what is generated from it or from them, nothing one can be produced or composed, and just as from the frequency of actions of walking, a habit is generated only in the power to walk and its organs, but not in the eyes or in sight, though such actions are not done without these, so a virtuous habit is generated only in the motive power, which is a spiritual power of walking, not in the noble apprehensive power, which is [113a] interior vision. 57  58  59  60 

See perhaps Augustine, On the Happy Life (De beata vita) 2.8; PL 32: 964. See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.4.1105b1–2. Ibid. I have conjectured “but, sed” instead of “or, seu.”

62 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues But if someone asks why willing the good makes those who will it good, while knowledge of the good does not make those who know it good, we reply that the will is the power of command, as we said above, and all our actions are subject and obedient to it and, for this reason, the good administration and praiseworthy governance of ourselves and of our affairs, that is, of all that belongs to us, necessarily follows its goodness or badness. Moreover, we ourselves are, so to speak, subject to our will, although by subjection that is most free, but we are not subject to our knowledge in any way. Hence, when our will that we obey in all things is good, every action of ours is good, because every action of ours is then merely the execution of the good will that commands in a good way. Moreover, willing is more intimate and penetrating than knowledge. It is, therefore, not surprising if it makes the one who wills more like itself than knowledge makes the one who knows. Moreover, willing unites the one willing and the object willed and also unites those who will to one another. For this reason those who will one thing are said to be one on account of the unity of the object willed. But the union of any extremes to the middle is greater and stronger than that of the extremes to each other. Hence, the union of the one willing to the object willed is greater than the union through it of those willing it to each other. It is the same way between a lover and the beloved and between mutual lovers. For those who love each other and are friends are said in common parlance to be one. For a lover and his beloved are so united that a lover does not regard himself as something other than what he loves, as is seen in a miser and his riches, who does not regard himself as something other than the mass of his wealth. Hence, he calls his fields, presses, and threshing floors his members. It is, however, unheard of over the ages that a knower calls some of the things he knows and what he knows a member of himself. But although love and will seem to differ in character, they are one in subject and essence. But whether the knowledge of actions, which is acquired by familiarity and experience with them, should be called virtue or is virtue, as seems to be the case, since prudence is a very well-known virtue and the first among the four cardinal virtues, involves no small question, and we have said in this part, the 61 fifth part of the whole treatise, that is, in the chapter on faith, what ought to suffice for someone intelligent, and yet we consider it necessary to repeat this with the addition of those things that are necessary for knowing the virtue that is called prudence, and we will bring you to know there that prudence is not 61  For the parts of the Teaching on God in the Mode of Wisdom (Magisterium divinale et sapientiale), see Guglielmo Corti, “Le sette parti del Magisterium divinale ac sapientiale di Guglielmo di Auvergne,” Studi et Ricerche di Scienze Religiose in onoro di Santi Apostoli Pietro e Paulo nel xix centenario del loro martirio (Rome: Pontificiae Universitatis Lateranensis, 1968), pp.289–307.

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the only virtue of our higher noble apprehensive power, but that there are also 62 many others, as we have already explained concerning faith. But the generation of them is not through one of the three ways by which we have shown that a consuetudinal virtue is generated. It is rather by the illumination of the first light, which is the one and true God, and it is a sprinkling from the first and universal fountain, which fills all the ages. What I said, therefore, has now been determined for you so that you know that it is not necessary that the habit, which is virtue and knowledge, be generated from the frequency of the apprehension or knowledge of what is to be done and that, even though it is a habit, not all such knowledge is a virtue. It is, nonetheless, possible that such knowledge that is a virtue be generated, and we will explain this in the chapter on prudence.

Chapter Four He discusses the name “virtue,” saying that in antiquity only fortitude by which we stand up to labors and pains was called virtue, but that soon others were called by the name ‘virtue.’

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fter this it remains for us to see the naming of the virtues and the reasons for them. First, [113b] therefore, their general naming by which they are called virtues, and this name of them, as Cicero says, belonged to 63 fortitude alone in antiquity. The reason for this is evident because the virtuousness or strength of the other virtues was not immediately known. But they were scarcely seen and mentioned beyond the courageous, who were not easily able to be conquered by labors and pains. Afterward, however, it became known through various experiences that other struggles, other wars arise against the human mind, that is, from pleasures and riches, from honors and glory, and from other things of that sort, victory over which is very rare and difficult. For this reason they were called courageous and virtuous who either conquered or could conquer such things, and the good qualities by which they were able to do this were called virtues and instances of fortitude. Virtue, then, took its name from power (vi) and protecting (tuendo), for by power it protects its possessor from such enemies so that he is not injured or corrupted or taken captive by them. Probably virtue also took its name from man (vir), just as, according to some, truth (veritas) was thought to be so called because it makes true men interiorly and makes them manly in mind, just as on the contrary whoever possesses vice is made effeminate and weak because of it. There are others who said that virtue was named the state of a man (viri 62  See William’s treatise, On Faith (De fide) in Opera omnia (Paris-Orléans, 1674; reprinted Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963), I, fols. 1-18. 63  See perhaps Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 5, 39–41.

64 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues status), as it were, through the likeness of bodily fortitude and virility, and such a habit was named virtue and fortitude through the likeness of natural power. But this is for three reasons or rather four. Certain men are said to be strong in a bodily sense for bearing burdens; others for enduring labors; others for wars; still others for repelling injuries, like a boar or a crocodile on account of the hardness and thickness of its hide. For each of these is found without the other. For someone is found to be strong for burdens who is not found to be strong for one of the others; someone very tender in the flesh is found to be very brave for wars. But spiritual burdens are the governance of any multitude, and many are found to be weak and feeble for it, preferring to work by writing, reading, studying, arguing, and preaching, or also in a bodily way, such as by farming, rather than to bear the burden of governing a multitude, especially one that is ill-tempered and discordant, as was clearly seen in the case of Moses from 64 his statements. But there are spiritual and bodily labors, such as chanting psalms, reading, singing, and praying, and many others of this sort that we have just named. And many other bodily labors are self-evident. But in relation to both of them many are found to be strong who are weak in many spiritual wars. They are readily cast down by a wind of vainglory, laid low by anger or hatred, or easily captured by cupidity or ambition. Thus many are very strong and magnificent for the wars of spiritual temptations, but are weak for the previously mentioned ones, namely, for burdens and labors. And the reason for this is that they refused to be conquered because of holy pride and always have before their eyes God, who sees the mind of those fighting for him, who quickly helps them, and who most magnificently rewards them, as the holy and wise Augustine said. “From heaven,” he said, the Lord “shouts, ‘Fight; I will help; 65 conquer; I will crown you.’” For some it is troubling to be conquered because of the greatness of their heart, and especially by an enemy who does not have strength and weapons against us unless we perhaps give them to him. For some there is also fortitude in the mind, as there is hardness in stone or in the hide of a crocodile or as in the hands of those accustomed to hard work, as in tanners, farmers, smiths, and metal workers, and because of this goodness they are injured with difficulty and easily fend off spears thrown by spiritual enemies, such as are the words of insults, detractions, and others of this kind that strike and pierce the heart. By this power they easily break through things that resist, as a stone by its weight [114a] descends and breaks through the air and afterwards water and then also earth, entering into it somewhat. In this way when hard things 64  See, for example, Nm 11:10–14. 65  Augustine, Homilies on the Psalms (Enarrationes in Psalmos) 39.10; PL 36: 440.

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either of insults or words begin, they break them easily without an injury or wound of their hearts. But there is rightly a question as to whether there is one fortitude from which all these actions proceed, and likewise whether it is the same as patience. Then what will gentleness be and what will that goodness be because of which one is said to be meek, and one rightly asks how they differ in relation to one another, whether by reason alone or also by subject and essence. But we have not yet come to these points, and for this reason we are saving that to be determined in its place.

Chapter Five He discusses another name for virtue, saying that virtue is called perfection because a soul without virtue is imperfect in a sense and like something unformed and material in relation to a person endowed and perfect with the virtues. Then he speaks about the state of the soul from Aristotle and Plato.

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he second of the names, however, by which virtues are often called is perfection, and the reason is that, when the human mind is without them, its being is very imperfect and very unformed in relation to its well-being. And a human being in that state is like something potential and material in relation to a human being made complete with these perfections, and we said somewhere that he is like an image that has been carved, but not polished and not trimmed with the entire beauty of the members. But we said 66 this in reference to the state of corruption. But this perfection in it, that is, the perfection of the virtues is like a composition of fine colors and like gilding. When, therefore, you have imagined the human mind in this perfection, you will see that before this perfection it is like something material and potential in relation to the completion of such perfection, and you will find it related to itself in these two states as a boy is related to a man. For although a boy is called a man, he is something potential and material in relation to a man. But when we have disclosed to you the state of original corruption, we will show you other similarities of these things, which are entirely improbable and incredible to those who are ignorant of that corruption and perversity. The comparison, however, that Aristotle uses in these things of a tablet that has not been written 67 on and of a mirror in which there is not yet reflected the appearance of any form sufficiently express his intention and view of the human soul, which he thought was created empty of the sciences and virtues, but receptive of them, and we grant that he spoke the truth to some extent. But he did not see and did 66  William refers to the state of human beings after Adam’s fall. He discusses this state in his On the Soul (De anima) ch. 5, pts. 10–13. 67  Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4.430a29–31.

66 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues not arrive at the whole truth about the state of the human soul, that is, how it existed immediately after it was created, but he did truly touch upon it. And the 68 reason is that he was completely ignorant of the corruption that we spoke of. Besides, if corruption and immersion into the body did not impede it, it would perhaps not be created empty, as Aristotle thought, as we are, nonetheless, stating here. For the souls of Adam and Eve, which were created before all the others, were not created empty. After all, it is clear that in terms of its higher noble powers the human soul draws close to the region of light, in fact to the eternal light itself, which according to Aristotle is the last of the ten 69 intelligences, and he calls it the agent intelligence. But according to Plato, it is the world of forms or of ideas, which he calls the archetypal world, the ex70 emplar world, and the intelligible world. But Augustine calls it the eternal 71 truth. [114b] Since, I say, the soul is next to such light and without anything in between, unless it has been impeded in some way from the side of the body, it does not seem to be possible that it not be illumined by such a light immediately upon its creation. For everything that can be illumined by any light is immediately flooded with that light as soon as it is next to it, unless an evil disposition of the human soul should prevent this. There is, however, no evil disposition of the human soul in its creation, except from the side of the body. Hence, it could rightly seem that it is not possible that the human soul be created empty in that way, as Aristotle says, except in a state of such corruption.

Chapter Six He speaks about a third name for virtue because virtue is also called spiritual health by a likeness to bodily health, as he explains well.

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he third of the names of virtue or goodness is that by which it is called spiritual health, and this is in comparison with the injury and wounding and disease of vices and sins. And such health in good souls is like and proportionate to health in bodies. Just as when the humors, spirits, and members are well-disposed in the body, that is, without superfluity and deficiency both in quality and in quantity, the body is well-disposed and healthy, so proportionately, when thoughts and volitions are well-disposed in the human soul, it is well-disposed and healthy. And likewise, when the vital warmth is 68  That is, Aristotle knew nothing of original sin and the harm it inflicted upon human nature. In his On the Soul (De anima) , ch. 5, pt. 11, William implies that one should be able to infer that our present condition could be only a penalty for sin. 69  William here, as he often does, takes Avicenna’s view to be that of Aristotle. On the role of the agent intelligence, see Avicennca, Metaphysics 9.3; ed. Van Riet, p. 476. 70  See Plato, Timaeus 28A; ed. Waszink, p. 23, ll. 21–22. 71  For example, Augustine, Confessions (Confessiones) 7.10.16; PL 32: 742.

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well-disposed in the body, so that it does not rise to the heat of fever or any other degree, the body is well-disposed in that respect and healthy, so when love and will are well-disposed in the human soul so that they do not reach the point of the ardor of unnatural and inordinate desires, the human soul is well-disposed and healthy in that respect. And just as when the power of sight has no blurriness or darkness or a consequence of that, the eye is well-disposed and healthy, so when our interior power of sight has no darkening or a consequence of that, the human soul is well-disposed and healthy in that respect. But according to some, this part in the soul is called the mind in accord with to the statement 72 of Aristotle in the book, Topics. But what we said will be made more evident when it will be explained to you that the vices are like diseases, infirmities, and wounds, but sins are like wounds and accidents.

Chapter Seven Virtue is also called decor because virtue is the greatest ornament of our soul and its greatest splendor.

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ut the fourth naming is that by which virtue is called decor. But it is called decor (decor) from its fittingness (decentia) or from what is fitting, and the reason is that nothing so befits the human soul as virtue, and this is evident from the contrary since nothing so ill fits it as the contrary of virtue, namely, vice. There is absolutely nothing so alien to and so discrepant with human nature as vice. For just as nothing so fits the eye as sight or what aids sight, such as the roundness, clearness, and nobility of the pupil, so nothing is so ill-fitting to it as blindness, badness, cloudiness, or anything else among these things that impede sight. And in general, the monstrousness of brutish morals is to the human mind like [115a] the monstrousness of the members of brute animals to the human body. For just as the head of a jackass on the human body would be terribly ill-fitting and very unsuitable, so a brutish or foolish mind is in the human soul. And just as the mouth of a serpent would be ill-fitting on the human body, so the vice of detraction or any other poisonous speech is in the human soul. And again, just as the snout of a pig would be ill-fitting on the human body, so the vice of gluttony is in the human soul. And it is this way with the others. And this spiritual monstrousness is of far greater and, in fact, of incomparable indecency, and offends spiritual eyes more and is more horrible to see than that bodily sort. And the reason is that there is a greater disparity of such inept and unsuitable additions, that is, of the vices to the human soul, than of those bodily members to the human body.

72  See, perhaps, Aristotle, Topics 1.18.108a25.

68 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues

Chapter Eight He explains other names by which virtue can be called by means of certain likenesses.

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he fifth name is that by which virtue is called beauty, and this beauty is what exists in the human body especially as a result of colors, and this beauty is an ornament of decor. For because of fitting members that are fittingly united and joined to one another, the human body is fitting, and it is beautiful when the color gold is in the hair, blue or various colors are in the eyes, white with a touch of red in the face. In the same way when the human soul has, as it were, the colors of the virtues over and above the decor of the natural powers, it will be beautiful and fair. And so, both of them are mentioned so often 73 in the Book of the Canticles in its praises. But if anyone wants to understand it the other way around, calling beauty what we call fittingness, we are not going to fight over the name provided that the reality is clear, nor does the order of the words force us so that, because the position and form of the members is naturally prior to the addition of colors in a fit and beautiful body, the bridegroom ought to say, “You are fitting and beautiful,” since the sacred words often do not follow the order of a human 74 artist, and especially in the words of love and of lovers. For although that love is holy and most well-ordered, it neither preserves nor cares about that order in the words of lovers, but at times it compels one to say first and most of all what first and most of all attracts and inflames the lover. Deservedly, then, the bridegroom first called the bride beautiful and afterwards fitting. But because Jerome calls black beautiful, as he calls a beautiful garment black as because of 75 a beautiful or bright blackness, we do not find fault if someone understands beautiful as lacking a beautiful color, that is, a fitting color, and by implication unfittingly, but suitably colored, as we said. You ought, however, to recall that this fairness is not found in human souls except when its powers have been cleansed from original perversity and the other deformities of the vices. But before, they are neither fair nor beautiful, except for the souls of our first parents in the state of innocence, as we said above, in which they needed neither cleansing nor deliverance, since they still enjoyed their natural fairness, and except for the soul of our Lord and Savior, which, as ought to be most certain for you, did not even have any trace of original stain. But in the souls of the first parents in the state previously mentioned, the fittingness and beauty were necessarily the same, as you can recall from what has 73  See, for example, Sg 6:3. 74  Sg 6:3, for example, has the reverse order. 75  See perhaps Jerome, An Interpretation of Two Homilies of Origen on the Song of Songs (Interpretatio homiliarm duarum Origenis in Canticum canticorum), Homily One; PL 23: 1125.

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gone before, because the natural powers of souls were their virtues in those first parents, that is, [115b] immediate principles of praiseworthy voluntary actions. The sixth naming is that by which a virtue is called agility, and the reason is primarily because of the likeness to bodily agility. For those who are ready for great, fast, and skillful movements of the body are called agile from the action and motion of their bodies, for example, those who are ready and unimpeded for running or jumping or other movements of the body, which seem very difficult to other human beings. Commonly men and women dancers are called agile, and likewise fighters. In the same way those who are unimpeded and quick for praiseworthy actions and who in those actions that seem very difficult to other human beings experience little or no difficulty at all are said to be agile or quick in mind and, if we may say so, light, since they do not know the weight of heaviness or slowness. But this can be understood from observation and especially from the monasteries and colleges of holy men in which it is clearly possible to see men who are most prompt for all the sacred observances, for example, for rising in the middle of the night to praise the Lord, most ready for the work of psalmody and sacred chants, most strenuous for private prayers, most fervent and avid for readings, most untiring for bodily labors, and, to put it in one word, all the pious exercises proceed from their open storehouse, and 76 they bring forth the children of good works without labor and pain. Thus 77 they remove far from themselves the ancient curse upon Eve. The seventh name is that by which it is called clothing or a garment in a likeness and proportion to a bodily garment. For a bodily garment has three uses. First, it protects against the cold and other injuries from the climate. Second, it covers the private parts, that is, the shameful members. Third, it adorns and seems to add no small amount of splendor and charm to its decency and beauty. But in the same way each virtue protects against the coldness of disordered love and fear and against the heat of unnatural and worldly desires, and it covers the ugliness of vices and sins, and it adorns our souls with a manifold splendor and charm, as we said, and makes them more pleasing to their heavenly spouse. Nor should you be surprised that we called the disordered love of the flesh or of the world coldness, although a spiritual coldness, since you learned elsewhere that coldness draws together heterogeneous things, that is, things of diverse natures. Do you not see how avarice draws together things that are diverse and naturally distant from each other and that in a similar way all disordered love draws together the human mind and external things and vices and binds them to one another? Do you not see how through avarice money, wood and stones, fields and forests, homes and vineyards, mills and presses, cattle and human 76  I have conjectured“without, sine” instead of “with, cum,” as the sense seems to require. 77  See Gn 3:16.

70 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues beings cling to the human mind? And in a similar way the vices themselves also cling to human souls through the same love, although no intelligent person fails to know that all these things differ greatly from their natures. But with regard to every fear, both good and evil, it is evident that it is a spiritual coldness from the tremor of the heart that it induces and from other factors that will be mentioned in the following. But you ought to know that in sacred scripture and also in very common usage the whole beauty and variety of virtue taken together is called clothing, as is said in Matthew, chapter twenty: Friend, how have you entered here without having clothing for a wedding? (Mt 22:12). And in a similar way it is understood to be a stole in Luke, chapter fifteen: Quickly bring out the first stole (Lk 15:22). For if it were correctly understood only with regard to innocence, that prodigal son would not be sufficiently nor decently clothed again. This meaning, however, clearly fits both texts. But we clearly read in Zechariah that both clothing and garment are understood for each virtue. He says: Take from him the dirty garments, and clothe him with white clothing (Zec 3:4). Likewise, in Ecclesiastes, chapter nine, it says: Always let your garments be [116a] white (Eccl (9:8). But in the psalm it explicitly says: They have divided my garments and have cast lots over my clothing (Ps 21:19). From these passages it is evident to you that certain virtues are to be called winter clothing against the cold, namely, of fear and torpor, and that some are to be called summer clothing against the heat and fervor of worldly and carnal desires and likewise against the ardors of anger, envy, hatred, and others like these. The eighth name by which it is called is weapons or arms on account of their necessary and highly helpful use for fighting spiritual wars. But we will say in the following which of them are arms of attack, and we will mention their ways of protection and defense and ways of victory, and we will assign practices and guides for each of them. The ninth naming is that by which it is called by the names of the members of living beings. For example, some are called eyes, some hands, some feet, some wings, some ears, some the navel, some teeth, as is seen in the books of the prophets and from the description of visions and, most of all, from the 78 Canticle, on the explanation of which we have already said many things. We mentioned them, nonetheless, as it was then granted us and as the task of that explanation required. But here we will follow up on these points more carefully and extensively. The tenth naming is that by which the virtues are called by the names of the elements. For a certain one of them is called fire, such as correct love. Another is called air and wind; another water, and another earth. You will be taught the 78  William wrote a work entitled On the Song of Songs (In Cantica Canticorum),which has never been printed.

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reasons for these names in the following, and we will disclose to you to which of them such names correspond. The eleventh naming is that by which the virtues are called by the names of living things composed of the elements that are merely living like the plants, not animals. For a certain one of them is called cedar; another cypress; another myrtle, another cedar of Lebanon, and so on with the other trees, either noble or common, such as apple, pear, fig, and vine. The twelfth naming is that by which the virtues are called by the names of herbs, such as, by the name hyssop and nard, and generally by the names of the green herbs, and although few of such names are found in sacred scripture, many can still be used for them on the basis of a likeness with the virtues, that is, of the virtuous operations that come from the herbs, and we will bring you to know about these. The thirteenth naming is that by which the virtues are called by the names of the flowers, such as a rose and a lily, and at times they are named after flowers in general, as in the second chapter of the Canticle: Surround me with flowers because I am languishing from love (Sg 2:5). But at other times they are called by specific names, as in the previously mentioned examples. The fourteenth naming is that by which they are called by the names of the inanimate elements that are congealed or solid, and first by the names of the metals, for example, by the names of gold, silver, amber, and others, secondly, by the names of precious stones. For one of them is a sapphire; another a pearl, and so regarding certain others some are called by the names of liquids, such as by the name of oil, balsam, and certain others. The fifteenth naming is that by which they are called by the names of the stars or planets, for example, by the name of the sun and by the name of the moon, by the name of Venus, by the name of the evening and the morning star, and at times by the names of the constellations, Arcturus, the Pleiades, the Hyades, and Orion. The sixteenth naming is that by which they are called by names of structures, such as doors, windows, steps, storerooms, cookhouses, and kitchens, and again walls, ramparts, and bulwarks. The seventeenth naming is that by which they are called by the names of tools, such as nails, chains, shackles, reins, spurs, and ropes. The eighteenth naming is that by which they are called by the names of vessels, namely, sacred vessels, that is, of the temple, such as bowls, pots, cauldrons, stands, lamps, candelabra, [116b] and the like. The nineteenth naming is that by which they are called by the names of ministers and especially in accord with our rites in which ministers are arranged at times in choirs and at times in processions. For a natural exterior procession in the literal sense, that is, with one cleric following another, is free and a representation of spiritual procession, something that will be explained in the following.

72 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues But the twentieth naming is that by which virtues are called by the names of various furnishings in a home, such as napkins, table service, kettles, cushions, upholstery, tapestries, and other things suited for such actions through a likeness. The twenty-first naming is that by which they are called by the names of ornaments of men or of women, such as earrings, jewelry, and insignia. The twenty-second is that by which they are called by the names of animals. For example, gentleness is called a lamb, and hard work an ox. Perhaps there are others also. But we will continue with regard to these, matching them and comparing the virtues to them in terms of likeness. Having said this, let us, therefore, return to where we were, and let us say that a certain type of knowledge is a virtue and that such a knowledge is generated from frequent acts of knowing and is called experience. This knowledge is a great strength of the intellect, sustaining it and supporting it against the impulses of suggestions and persuasion as well as of opinions and thoughts, so that it does not rashly or dangerously assent to them, and likewise against the wavering of doubts. And this virtue is generated from many experiences in voluntary matters because things seem one way and are another. For those who are not experienced in such things are tossed about by every wind of teaching, and they are disturbed by the diversity of advise, as though they were weightless. When someone, therefore, has experienced that he or others have been mistaken in such matters many times, he will not easily or lightly give himself to believing. Rightly, then, the experience or knowledge by which one stands firm so that he does not rush into rashness, dangers, or even errors, is a virtue that strengthens the intellect against such wavering and failures. For by its vim, vigor, and violence one breaks down those obstacles we mentioned and resists them, and one does so with more strength and is more virtuous to the extent that one has been confirmed by greater experience and more familiarity in these matters. But, although such a virtue is a goodness of the intellect or of the intellective power, a human being is not, nonetheless, good as a result of it. For we have now explained to you why knowledge of the good does not make a person good, and it is clearly possible that such a habit exists in a bad person, that is, in one who does wrong and is evil. For such a person is like a evil person who has a good counselor, but does not want to be guided by his counsel. For an intellect illumined and armed by such a habit, as we said, is like a good and faithful counselor at the side of an evil king or emperor, that is, the will which reigns and commands in the whole human being. Such a human being, however, is a good counselor, but not a good agent, and he is like someone who has good and healthy vision or eyes, but does not want to guide his steps by them. He knowingly brings himself down and injures, defiles, or hands himself over to the enemy or wild animals for captivity or plunder. But whether such knowledge is genuine knowledge and of what sort it is can be clearly seen by you from

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those things that you learned in the fifth treatise in the chapter, On Faith. For such knowledge is undoubtedly lifeless and dead, like the knowledge of medicine in a sick physician. Though the medicine shows him how he can be cured, it still does not raise him up and strengthen him to use the needed and life-saving medicine.

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He explains the distinction he makes between morals and habits; then he explains what the virtues are that are called natural, which, as he says, are not equal in all persons and are not properly called virtues, but rather abilities and approximations to those things that belong to virtue.

A

fter this we will determine for you what is the difference between hab80 its and morals (mores), and we will say that “morals are habits” as a result of which there is a frequency of actions “without premeditation,” 81 as Avicenna says. And an example of this is found in human beings who run through the psalms or other narratives, with which they are familiar, not only without any premeditation, but without any attention or devotion of the heart. It is, therefore, called an instance of morals (mos) either from the fact that the action is sudden (mox), that is, without delay or, more likely, from length of time (mora), that is, because of the length of the familiarity. Hence, in the common understanding morals and custom are taken to be the same. For this reason it is the same to say in accord with the common meaning “according to morals” and “according to a custom.” Habits, therefore, are not a morals as soon as they are habits, but over time they become morals so that it can truly be said that morals are long-standing habits. It has, therefore, already been explained to you from all these considerations that not all habits are immediately morals and that it is not necessary that someone who has one of such consuetudinal virtues has all the others. The reason for this, however, is that it is not necessary and perhaps is not possible that someone who accustoms himself in actions as a result of which one consuetu79  The Treatise, On Faith and the Laws (De fide et legibus) is the fifth in William’s Magisterium divinale et sapientiale. 80  William’s use of “mores” represents a challenge to a translator. In some respects, mores seem to be the equivalent of morals, as in Avicenna, whose definition William adopts, in others they seem to be unthinking habits of acting in a certain way, for example, in the recitation of psalms without attention or devotion. I have chosen “morals” to reflect Avicenna’s definition since William is here generally speaking about consuetudinal habits. He adds no further explanation in his treatise, De moribus. 81  Avicenna, Metaphysics 9.5; ed. Van Riet, p. 517. Avicenna is clearly speaking of Aristotle’s Ethics; he goes on to say that “it has already been commanded in the book on morals that the mean be held to.”

74 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues dinal virtue is left behind accustoms himself in actions as a result of which all are left behind. From this it is also evident to you that it is not necessary that all the consuetudinal virtues be equal, just as it is not necessary that their causes be, that is, the frequency of the actions as a result of which they arise. For it is possible that someone becomes habituated more in every way in the actions of justice than in those of chastity, and the other way around, and that his soul is better disposed and naturally more suited for receiving one than the other. It has also been explained to you that none of such virtues is genuine or complete goodness, but rather goodness in a certain respect and very diminished and that because of none of them is someone worthy to be called good except in some way or in some respect, because none of them makes a person totally good. But the reason for this is that none of them totally wipes out and eradicates evil from a human soul. In fact, each of them tolerates along with itself some evil in the soul. It has also been shown to you by this that they are certain approaches and like certain attempts at genuine goodness or virtues. They are, nonetheless, very far from their attainment, and on account of some distance from the greatest evils and vices they are virtues and goodness on the basis of the reasons we have given. But what we read in the philosophers, namely, Cicero, Plato, Seneca, Macrobius, and certain others with regard to the four virtues that they commonly call cardinal, is not true except of true and genuine prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude. But we will make you know in the following of what sort they are. And because we have made mention to you of the natural virtues, we will as a result speak about them. We will say, first of all, that natural virtues are natural and immediate principles of voluntary and praiseworthy actions, that is, ones naturally impressed upon human souls or any others, such as natural gentleness, natural piety, natural magnificence or magnanimity [117b] and in general the names of the consuetudinal virtues and also of others naturally go with and are suitably adapted to the others. The establishment of such virtues, however, is easy, first, by their definition that we gave, namely, natural and immediate principles of voluntary and praiseworthy actions. For this is among the manifest and self-evident truths. For nothing else can be understood to be or be called virtue by right reason. For in the noble abstract and immaterial substances, for those who are willing to consider, it is evident that such virtues are natural and were created along with them, if it is true that they were created perfect, that is, in the very act of natural perfection, not merely in potency, as Aristotle held with regard 82 83 to human souls. But Plato, as we said above, held the contrary. For in such substances it is not necessary that new habits be generated by the repetition of actions since their powers receive everything from above and nothing from 82  Aristotle, On the Soul (De anima) 3.4.430a29–31. 83  See above, chapter one, fol. 104b, and Plato, Meno 85DE.

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below. But the reason for this is that they are in no way able to be acted upon by these things that come afterwards, that is, by inferior things. But the reason for this is that they are absolutely not in contact with them. In our souls, however, it is otherwise, because our souls are in some way in touch with our bodies and, for this reason, necessarily share in their modifications. And for this reason they also receive many impressions through those modifications from other bodies. But the abstract substances are so apart and so distant and in a region of much unlikeness that a modification cannot reach them from these things that are below them and are after them, nor does any impression from such things reach them. Rather from their fullness and perfection they pour out their influence upon the incomplete, diminished, and needy things that are below and after them. As a result, therefore, of their nearness to the first and universal fountain they are filled in their very creation and completed with the fullness of natural perfection, looking for nothing from the side of lower things. An example of this is found in the heavenly bodies, which in 85 their creation were completed with their ultimate fullness, according to them, neither looking for anything from lower bodies, nor, of course, receiving anything from them. And they do not cease to pour out their many influences upon them, for example, illumination, warming, chilling, wetting, drying, and combinations of all these, having everything from above, from which they pour out their influence on what is lower. In the same way the noble abstract substances, having everything from above, neither receive nor look for anything from below. But our souls can receive and be perfected from both directions, and for this reason they are influenced and perfected from both directions. But 86 all these things are explained to you elsewhere. It ought, therefore, to be evident to you from these considerations that there are natural virtues in such substances like consuetudinal habits, even like morals, to this extent, namely, that they are most ready and unimpeded for correct voluntary and praiseworthy actions. Hence, they are genuine, though natural, virtues. For naturalness keeps from them neither the name nor the idea of true goodness or true virtue. Otherwise, God most high would be most of all kept from both, though goodness and virtue are naturally said of him most of all. Moreover, what is closer to true goodness or virtue and what is more like the most good and most virtuous are necessarily the greatest virtues and goodness. Hence, the virtues and goodness of such substances are most of all virtues and most of all goodness, and the substances themselves are most good and most virtuous since their virtues and goodness are closer to the goodness and virtue 84  I have omitted “similar, similes,” which seems to be a mistake. 85  That is, according to the philosophers. 86  See William, On the Soul, ch. 6, pt. 33; fol. 193a–b.

76 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues of God most high, and such substances themselves are closer to God most high. [118a] Moreover, of what sort will we say that such substances are? Will we say that they are naturally good or evil or neither? And again, are they virtuous or vicious? Because, therefore, it is wrong to say or to believe that they are evil or neutral, neither vicious nor in between vice and virtue in terms of their natural state, it is necessary that they be believed to be good and virtuous. Hence, it is necessary that natural goodness and virtues be found in them. Moreover, what will we call in us natural gentleness, natural piety, natural kindness, natural magnificence, natural patience, and so on with the rest? Will we say that they are not virtues although their contraries are vices? For no one doubts that those we mentioned are certain forms of goodness, although small and limited ones. Smallness, after all, does not change the species, just as largeness does not. Moreover, if they were in us by themselves without the contrary vices, they would, I say, exist naturally, and we would be good and virtuous by means of them. Hence, it is evident that they are natural virtues and sorts of goodness. But traces, in fact explicit likenesses of them are found in the animals, such as natural piety in lions, who are said to lead back to the road people who wander off and are lost. And a natural magnanimity is seen by which they are believed to spare human beings, who prostrate and humble themselves before them, as well as other animals that are smaller than the lions themselves, unless violent hunger and necessity forces them. In the same way the fidelity and truth of friendship is apparent in dogs. Likewise, a natural piety is seen in male or female wolves. By many experiences it has been discovered that with such natural piety they defend from other animals and also feed children abandoned or exposed by their mothers. But gratitude toward benefactors is found in every kind of animal, such as in the lion that was set free in our times from the jaws and teeth of a certain dragon. The lion was so grateful and devoted to its deliverer that he behaved most meekly in the middle of an army and daily presented him with the most delicious and plentiful gifts from his hunting. Prevented from following him by ship, he tried to follow him through the sea by swimming, and giving out in swimming he perished in the sea. It was the same with a dolphin who recognized a boy who used to give it bread to the point that it carried the boy sitting on its back as far as the boy wanted and put him back on shore when he wanted. Countless examples of these occurrences can, however, be read about and seen by those who are willing to see. After all, who would not admire the faithfulness of certain horses, if we may speak in that way, which in the middle of battles fight against the enemies of their riders with hooves and teeth with an incredible boldness and courage and rescue and set their riders free from the hands of the enemy, and often they bring them victory. There are also found in

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animals incredible examples of prudence, providence, medical knowledge, the art of architecture, and the cunning of the hunt. It is also evident that there were these natural virtues in Adam and Eve before their natural gifts were illuminated by gratuitous ones. With regard to these, therefore, there is rightly a question whether they are equal in whomever they exist, and in noble abstract substances it can rightly seem so, since there is no inequality from the side of the creator nor from the side of the recipient. For from the one light of the sun all the rays coming down on the same recipient are necessarily equal. In the same way from the primordial light, which is God most high, all the rays of any gifts that fall or come down upon the same recipient are equal. And this certainly would be true if such an outpouring of rays were natural, but because it is voluntary and entirely placed in the good pleasure of the creator, the creator is free to pour forth equal or unequal rays upon whom and when he wills. And this is a point on which almost all [118b] the philosophers were mistaken. For considering the natural unity of the creator, which is utterly incapable of division and of diversity, they thought that a multitude or a diversity could not come from him by himself. And they set it forth as a principle that “from what is one, insofar as it is one,” a multitude cannot come and that from what is the same a diversity cannot come 87 by itself. But the cause of this error is evident, as we said, namely, the ignorance of his freedom, which is in the ultimate degree of distance from coercion and any impediment. Similarly, there was a failure to consider his supereminent will, by which he is most ready to do whatever he wills, whether one thing or many, whether the same thing or diverse things. 88 Moreover, according to Aristotle and his followers, the senses and the intellect are two rays coming down from the one fountain and father of lights over the same human soul, and yet they are not naturally equal, since sensation seems clearly more ready and unimpeded and certain in its actions than the intellect. For as soon as the senses were created, they acted most certainly and perfectly, but not the intellect, nor in this life is it ever brought to the perfection of its action. Similarly, sight and smell are two rays in one and the same animal soul, for example, in a canine soul, and smell is seen to be far more subtle and lofty in the same soul. In the same way in us sight is more subtle and lofty than 89 hearing, and we say this in accord with Aristotle. 87  See, for example, Avicenna, Metaphysics 9.4; ed. Van Riet, p. 481. Interestingly, William accepts the truth of the principle, but only in natural activities. See my “William of Auvergne’s Use of the Avicennian Principle: ‘Ex Uno, In Quantum Unum, Non Est Nisi Unum,’” The Modern Schoolman 79 (1993): 1–15. 88  William often uses the expression “Aristotle and his followers,” especially to refer to Avicenna. 89  See perhaps Aristotle, On the Soul 3.3.429a3.

78 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues Moreover, what else is the multitude of powers in the human soul or in another noble substance than the radiance in a star? And what else is the human soul in the human body than a radiant star in a cloud? For from the knowledge of the human soul there shines forth the radiance of the natural powers in the whole body in accord with the capacity of the individual members, just as from a star that is in a cloud there shines forth a variety and multitude of rays. But the radiance of the same star is seen to be one and equal through the whole. Hence, all the natural powers and virtues proceeding from the essence of the same soul are seen to be equal. We reply to this that rays shining forth from the same light are diversified in two ways, first, as a result of the nearness to or distance from their origin. For the rays of the sun are weaker to the extent that they are farther from the sun. They are also diversified in accord with the diversity of the recipients. For they are weaker in water than in air. But from the diversity of the actions of the organs or members it is evident how great is the diversity of the recipients of the radiation of the human soul in the human body. For in the human body the bones receive only life. But the eyes receive sight, and the ears hearing. And it is this way with the others, and it is perhaps true that the human soul has a greater light in relation to life than in relation to sense or intellect. And the reason is that the ray of life shines forth from it from greater proximity than that of sense or of intellect. Likewise, perhaps motion does also, for which reason the soul first produces these two in the human body, that is, life and motion. But when a sense has been destroyed or the intellect has been put to sleep by the violence of some illness, life and motion is still strong in us. It is not, therefore, necessary that radiance of the human soul, which we mentioned, be one and equal through the whole body. But an example of this is found in both heavenly and earthly bodies. For in the sun light and heat are not equal. In fact, the light is greater and more extensive than heat. And in the same body smell and taste are not equal. On the contrary, at times smell is greater than taste, as in a certain kind of roses, and at times taste is greater than smell, as in pepper. And there are countless examples of these things. For perhaps anger is greater in a lion than many other of its powers. And in marvelous things, which natural magic uses, you will find certain powers [119a] surpass others and are far more eminent and excellent than the natural powers that are found in the same soul or in the same animal. Know, however, that in us natural piety and natural gentleness and others of the sort are not virtues, but certain abilities and approximations to what 90 are virtues, that is, to praiseworthy actions and passions and perhaps no less to blameworthy ones. For as those who seem naturally magnanimous, though 90  I have conjectured the nominative “virtutes” instead of the genitive “virtutis.”

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ready and apt for magnanimity, are also close to both pride and anger, and as those who are said to be naturally pious are apt and able for acquiring and receiving true piety, so they are inclined toward that unhappiness that philoso92 phers call a vice, namely, misery of heart, because of which they cannot look at the death of a single chicken or lamb and are very ready for the vice of remissness. In the same way those who seem apt for constancy are inclined to stubbornness by the same disposition. But in Adam and Eve and in the noble abstract substances such habits were created complete and perfect, because the natural powers in them are themselves habits on account of readiness and freedom for praiseworthy and voluntary actions. These, then, are like seeds at the beginning, which can be corrupted into vices, as we said. And Cicero calls them the beginnings of the virtues when he says, “There are innate in us” the very beginnings of “the virtues which, if they were permitted to mature,” we would be readied for beatitude since “na93 ture herself would produce them by a divine gift. And elsewhere he calls these abilities or aptitudes sparks given by nature. “We,” he says, “extinguish these 94 sparks” given by nature. These sparks, however, and these beginnings or seeds, according to Aristotle, ought to be understood as nothing else than the natural powers themselves. According to Plato, however, they are complete, but buried, 95 as it were, in the earth of the body and obscured by the cloudiness of matter. However, although Aristotle thought that he destroyed the view of Plato in the 96 book of the Metaphysics and explained the truth on this matter, he still left many difficult questions and determinations for and against himself, and he did not speak against nor respond to the arguments of Plato, as it is perhaps necessary for us. And, therefore, we will keep this for its own place, namely, 97 the treatise on the noble abstract substances. To this extent, then, it has been determined for you at present what the natural virtues are and of what sort they are. But because Aristotle calls our loves passions and considers it evil and vicious 98 to live according to our passions, we must inquire regard to them. For accord-

91  I have conjectured the addition of “as, sicut.” 92  That is, mercy (misericordia), which William alludes to with “misery of the heart (miseria cordiis).” Cicero reports in his Oration in Defense of Murena (Oratio pro Murena) 61 that Zeno the Stoic regarded only a fool as merciful. 93  See Cicero, Tusculan Disputations 3.1.2. 94  Ibid. 95  See Plato, Meno 85DE. 96  See Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.9.990a33–993a11. 97  That is, the second principal part of On the Universe (De universo). 98  Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 2.5.1105b19–23.

80 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues ing to him it does not seem that, insofar as they are love or hate, sorrow or joy, 99 anger or peace, and the others of this sort, they can be virtues. We will, therefore, say first of all that it is self-evident that certain things are to be loved and certain things are to be hated and that it is possible to love certain things in a good and praiseworthy manner and likewise to hate certain 100 things in a good and praiseworthy manner. A passion, however, which is only a passion, insofar as it is a passion, has no praise or blame, in fact no goodness or evil. Hence, these are not merely passions. For in things belonging to others, insofar as they belong to others, no one is worthy of praise or blame. But passions insofar as they are passions are the actions of others and are not the actions of those who are acted upon, although the passions are in them. An example of this is an image that has been skillfully carved and decorated. For the image should not be praised because of such beauty and fairness because the beauty and fairness in it are passions and come only from someone else, though they are in the image. But the whole praise is due to the artist, just as an image is not, on the other hand, to be blamed. In the same way, if we say that these are only passions and are in us from others, we are not good or bad as a result of them, nor are we to be praised or blamed, just as we are not good or bad because of our members, nor [119b] are we to be praised or blamed because each of them is only the work of another and was produced in us by another without our doing anything in relation to them. Moreover, it is self-evident that from frequently being angry, whether in a good or a bad way, there is acquired a habit of anger in us by which people are called irritable or we are called and are irritable. Similarly, from frequent rejoicing a habit is generated by which we are called and are jovial. But it is self-evident that because of such habits we are good or bad. Hence, such habits are instances of goodness or evil, and on this account they are virtues and vices. Moreover, because of such habits we are well or ill disposed in relation to the passions and voluntary external actions. For by such habits we either resist the passions in a good way or we admit them in a good way or in a bad way. Hence, 101 such habits are virtues and vices, according to Aristotle. Moreover, someone is judged to be good most of all and especially because he loves what is to be loved and hates what is to be hated. For it is impossible for someone to be good who loves what is to be hated or who hates what is to be loved. Hence, such love and hate are instances of goodness and virtue, and their contraries are necessarily vices. 99  Ibid. 2.5.1105b29–1106a2. 100  William is here using “passion” in the sense of the Aristotelian category of being acted upon as opposed to acting. 101  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.5.1105a10–11.

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Moreover, who doubts that avarice is a vice, for it is only an inordinate or immoderate love of money? Similarly, is not envy also a vice, which is, of course, sorrow over the prosperity of someone else? And in general, they say that envy is sorrow over the good of another. But if such love and pain are vices, their contraries will necessarily be virtues. But if anyone says that Aristotle understood by the passions only the evil dispositions of our souls because they are injuries to them, he does not seem to understand Aristotle. For according to him passions are dispositions that are not permanent, but quickly pass, just as is evident in the book of the Categories where he distinguishes a passion from a passive quality, and he says there about passions that denominations do not come from them. For he says, someone 102 who becomes red on account of embarrassment is not said to be red. For a passion is not to be understood as the effect or influence of an action, as in 103 the book, On Six Principles, but as only a disposition that is not permanent. And it is called this in comparison with a habit, which is solid and permanent, while a passion is readily changeable and not permanent. But whatever Aristotle understands here, it is necessary to examine about these whether they are our operations or actions, though internal and spiritual, and whether they are true impressions. For either they are produced in us and not by us, and then it is evident that they have neither praise nor blame, nor are we good or bad because of them with the goodness or evil with which we are dealing here, just as we are not because of our members and because of other things that have been or are being produced in us. As we commonly and usually say, we do not merit because of our passions. But if they are produced in us and by us, our souls will be operating upon themselves and thus at the same time acting and acted upon, and they will be giving to themselves and receiving from themselves. But these are contraries. 104 Hence, they will not be in the same thing or in the same respect, and in that way they either will not be in our souls at the same time, or they will be in them in different respects. Hence, our souls seem divisible into parts, as we touched 105 upon above. It will also happen in accord with this that they will be praiseworthy and blameworthy in a single respect. But we have already said that nothing prevents one of the powers from acting upon another in the same soul, for example, the apprehensive power on the moving power, just as imagination acts upon the power of desire, as Aristotle 102  103  104  105 

See Aristotle, Categories 8,9b12–14. See Gilbert de la Porrée, On Six Principles (Liber de sex principiis); PL 188: 1264. I have conjectured the addition of “secundum.” William argued that our souls are not divisible into parts in On the Soul (De anima) ch. 2, pt. 10 and ch. 3, pt. 2, and he mentions their indivisibility above, chapter one, fol. 102b.

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says. The desirable imagined thing moves the desire; therefore, the image of what is delightful gives birth to the desire, just as light gives birth to heat. But whether the same power can move itself [120a] or act upon itself raises a ques107 tion, as we touched upon above, and with regard to the will it seems that it elicits from itself its operation, which is willing. For willing does not naturally come from the will without the act or the habit of willing, as heating or growing hot comes from heat, but it comes rather voluntarily and freely. For it is impossible for it to will something unwillingly, that is, to will it while not willing it. But the explanation of this is easy. Let A be something willed, and let the will not will A. I say, then, that, if it does not will to will A, it does not will A. For willing is neither sought nor avoided, nor rejected nor hated except on account of what is willed. Hence, if willing A is rejected or hated or avoided on account of A, for much better reasons A is rejected, hated, or avoided. Hence, if willing A is not willed, for much better reasons A will not be willed. It is evident, then, that in whomever willing A is not willed, A itself is not willed. It has, therefore, been explained that it is impossible that someone will something unwillingly, that is, that he will something while not willing it. Hence, whoever wills something either wills that he will it or puts up with it. It is evident, therefore, that willing does not proceed from the will or from the power of willing in the manner of nature, which is in a servile manner, as we said 108 above, and not freely. For upon whatever willed object it falls, the willing is free for the one who wills and for the will. For it cannot be either forced or dragged to it against the will, as we said. In the same way it will be explained to you that the will or one who wills cannot be prevented or impeded from willing; in fact, because one wills to will A, one immediately wills A of necessity. And the reason is that he does not will to will except on account of A. Hence, he wills A more. For willing is not sought except on account of what is willed. That on account of which each thing is 109 such is even more such. You can in this way deal with loving and desiring and hating. But with regard to hating, it is just the opposite, and with regard to nilling it is likewise. For example, if someone hates to hate A, he does not hate A, 106  Aristotle, On the Soul 3.10433a11–22. 107  See above, chapter one, fol. 108a. 108  William is appealing to the Avicennian claim that nature acts in the manner of a servant. See Avicenna, Metaphysics 9.2; ed. Van Riet, p. 448. He appeals to this principle fairly often, for example, in The Trinity, ch. 11; ed. Switalski, p. 76, and in The Universe Ia-Iae, ch. 9; Paris-Orléans ed., I, 603a. On this principle, see Michael Miller, “William of Auvergne and Avicenna’s Principle ‘Natures Operates in the Manner of a Servant.’” In Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition: In Islam, Judaism and Christianity. Ed. John Inglis (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2002), pp. 263–276. 109  See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2.72a28–30.

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and if he does not will to nill A, he wills A, but if he loves to love A, he loves A of necessity. And if he desires to desire A, he desires A. But with regard to what is read in the Psalm, Because my soul has longed to desire your ordinances all the time (Ps 118:20), someone who in that way longs and desires to desire the ordinances of God desires them, but does not desire them with a desire that is so great and so fervent that he wills to desire them. Otherwise, what he says would not be true: My soul has longed to desire. For no one longs for or desires what he knows that he has. For if someone desires to desire A, he undoubtedly desires A. He, therefore, has the desire of A, and he perceives it in his soul. Hence, he does not desire it, but desires another desire of A that he does not yet have. Hence, it is obviously true that he does not desire A without qualification, but rather a certain desiring of A or a desiring in some way, and he does not desire the desire of A without qualification, but a certain desire of A or some sort of desire of A. It has, therefore, been made evident to you that in us the will is most free from coercion and impediment or prevention, and this is one of the higher powers by which a human being surpasses the other animals and by which the rational soul surpasses the other souls. But know that necessity moves the other powers both in us and in the brute animals, and it is possible to see this in individual cases. For our intellective power necessarily has to consent to the first impressions and first principles and to all the propositions that are called common conceptions of minds or axioms and likewise to the arguments of syllogisms and also to conclusions from them after it has consented to their propositions. It is not, after all, possible to speak against such an argument 110 interiorly, as Aristotle says. Because, [120b] therefore, in such things our intellective power is not free to assent or to dissent, and similarly in the opposites of them, it is evident that it is subject to necessity and determined in that area. 111 In certain matters, nonetheless, as we said in the treatise, On Faith, it is free to assent and to dissent, to believe or disbelieve, and for this reason there hovers around it goodness and evil, praise and blame, merit and demerit, and finally punishment and reward, which does not happen with the lower apprehensive powers and especially with those that apprehend things externally, such as the senses. For sight is not free to judge that something white is other than white, nor is touch free to judge about cold and hot, nor are any of the other senses free to judge otherwise about any of their other objects than it receives from or is modified by it, that is, only according to the testimony of the modification or change that it receives from the sensed object. For the modification that is impressed upon the sense by the sensed object in general is like a witness from the sensed object testifying as to what sort it is and like a messenger coming 110  See Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.3.1005b18–34. 111  William, On Faith (De fide), ch. 1, fol. 3a.

84 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues from its side who reports concerning what sort it is. It is possible to find the same thing in the other senses when they are not impeded by illness or another cause. We say this on account of the tricks of magicians and the illusions of demons. It is possible to see the same thing concerning the powers that are apprehensive from the interior, such as the common sense, imagination, and memory. For when unimpeded, as we said, the common sense can only act in accord with what it receives from the individual senses, and the imagination acts simply as it receives from the common sense, as if it one said “as has been handed on to it.” For it is like a little one who does not know how to make up something or is unable to make up something, but who simply and truly speaks what is in him, and for this reason it is commonly said that truth is heard from children. But if someone raises an objection that monsters have never been seen or perceived by another sense, but are still imagined and portrayed in pictures and sculptures and also fashioned by various crafts, we reply that the parts of them have undoubtedly been perceived by the senses and handed on by these to the imagination, nor is it a new heap, every part of which is old, nor should someone be said to make something new who gathers together only old things. In a similar way, that should not be called a fiction in every respect, each part of which is the truth. But it is more evident in memory, which does not give back in remembering anything but what has been put or stored in it. With regard to the inferior motive powers, however, it is evident to someone who considers them individually that their modifications are necessary, not free in any way. And for this reason Augustine said in On Genesis Literally Inter112 preted that brutes are moved by necessity, not by freedom or by will. Otherwise, sins and merits, praise and blame, virtues and vices would necessarily have a place with them. For it would be imputed to a dog or a cat that it snatches a piece of meat or that it rages against other animals. It would be imputed, I say, as a vice and sin, and justice would be meted out to and complaints lodged against them, just as it is done with human beings. But no one in his right mind imputes it to a lion that it is angry or to the previously mentioned animals that they snatched meat and raged against other animals. But if someone says that dogs and horses are beaten and cats are beaten in the presence of lions in order to correct them and that Aristotle says in the 113 book of the Metaphysics that certain animals can be disciplined, we reply that this correction, as it is called in them, is not voluntary or free, but on the contrary necessary. For it follows upon the necessity of their passions, fear, hunger, 112  I have not found this in On Genesis Literally Interpreted or anywhere else in Augustine. Hugh of Saint Victor does say something almost exactly like this in a treatise on creation and the state of human beings. See Hugh, The Summa of Sentences (Summa sententiarum) 3.8; PL 176: 100–101. 113  See Aristotle, Metaphysics 1.1980a30–980b24.

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and any pleasure of which they are receptive. But these passions are generated in them necessarily insofar as they are concerned, because there is no virtue in them or any other power by which they repel them when they see things that cause delight or are frightening for them. Hence, they [121a] are never held back from them except by another’s power or violence or by fear. But these come from outside, not from them. It has, therefore, already been explained to you one by one that, of all the natural powers of the rational soul, only the will is completely free. The intellective power, however, is free in some respect and in some matters. But all the others are naturally subject to necessity and determined. And this is according to Aristotle, not, however, according to us, and we will discuss this in the following parts, namely, in the treatise on original sin, although in the treatise, 114 On Marriage, and in the treatise, On Baptism, we have said about this many 115 things, which it is necessary to recall. But now we will return to the will and to willing. We will, therefore, say that, as the will is most free, so also is willing, which is the first and essential operation of it and which goes forth or proceeds from it most freely, that is, without a necessity that stems from the side of the will or that comes to it from outside. For the operations flow from their virtues or powers in three ways. And the first is by an overflowing of fullness, like water from a most abundant fountain, or heat from fire, or light from the sun, and this is the manner of all natural operations. In the second way they come from a foreign influx or influence, and in this way apprehensions and passions flow from the souls of brute animals. As a result of these things that come from outside, we perceive and are affected by the passions of sorrow and joy, anger and gentleness, and so on with the others. In the third way they come at an order or command, as movement does in us and in these animals, as there come those things that are a result of movement, such as speech and the works of the crafts and also of necessary things, such as to plow and to sow and the others like them. For the power of walking does not elicit from itself the manner of walking except when it has been commanded either by the will or by some passion, as fear commands flight, hope pursuit, anger striking with the foot, tooth, horn, or anything else from among those things that the creator gave to animals in the place of weapons. It is the same way with speech, which does not proceed from the tongue and lips, palate and teeth, unless these have been commanded and ordered to form words. And for this reason the philosophers have correctly divided the moving power into two branches, namely, the power that commands movement and the power that causes or executes it, and the loftier power that commands movements is the 114  Both are parts of William’s On the Sacraments (De sacramentis). 115  See William, On Matrimony (De matrimonio) ch. 8; fol. 522b–524b, and On Baptism (De baptismo) ch. 1; fol. 416a–418a.

86 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues will. The lower powers of command are the concupiscible and irascible powers, 116 which, according to Aristotle, we share with the brute animals. But the fourth manner, besides those three proper ones, is the will, which is difficult to know, that is, how willing flows or proceeds from it spontaneously without any impulse or attraction involving necessity, but most freely, as we said. And for this reason it is always imputed as good or as evil. For it is not permissible that willing fall upon something useless or that is of no benefit, and this has in part been explained to you in this pages that have gone before, that is, where we showed the reasons on account of which the operation of the intellect does not follow the dispositions of the things with which it is concerned, that is, why to know or to understand what is virtuous is not virtuous and to know or to understand what is evil or a vice is not evil or vicious, but to will what is good or virtuous is good and virtuous. Similarly, to will or to love what is evil or a vice is evil and vicious. For within the will there resides the 117 whole authority for moving a member, as Augustine says. And we add that the whole power and whole dominion over both what we are and over everything that we have in our power resides in the will. For this reason, the act of willing hands over the whole will to what is willed and binds the whole will to it and makes it cling to it. Hence, through the act of willing, what is willed draws the whole human being after itself and holds the whole human being subject. But it is not that way with the passions, which are to rejoice and to be sad and 118 the others like that. For they are subject to the will, unless it has been injured or overwhelmed, for example, [121b] when it lies prostrate with illness, as will be explained to you in the following and is conveyed to some extent in the Letter to the Romans where it says, To will lies next to me (Rom 7:18), that is, lies prostrate at my side, unable to raise itself up. Know, therefore, that willing flows from the will in three ways. For at times it is sent forth or emanates from its fullness spontaneously, and this happens freely in every respect, as it happens in those people who are given over to the virtues or to the vices. For with men who are totally given to the virtues, their hearts are immediately inclined to everything good that it is possible for them 116  See Avicenna, On the Soul (Liber de anima seu sextus de naturalibus) I, 5, ed. S. Van Riet (Louvain: E. Peeters; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972), vol. 1, 83–90. The distinction between the two sensible powers of appetition is clearly found in Avicenna as well as in St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, qu. 81, art. 2. In Étude comparative de la psychologie d’Aristote, d’Avicenne et de St. Thopmas d’Aquin (Tokyo: The Keio Institute of Cultural and Linguistic Studies, 1968), p. 137, Norisko Ushida says, “La distinction d’Avicenne et de saint Thomas entre le concupiscible et l’irascible correspond à peu près à la distintion aristotélienne entre l’appetit et la colère dans la moralié humaine. ...” He appeals to Nicomachean Ethics 3.11.1116b23–1117a9. 117  See Augustine, On the Trinity (De trinitate) 12.13.17; PL 42: 1008. 118  I have removed “not, non” because it seems a mistake.

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to do as soon as it is presented to their eyes or to their thoughts. In a similar way those who are given to depravities are carried off with an amazing speed to every evil that either feeds or helps their iniquities so that they will them. In the second way the act of willing proceeds as something counseled in those in whom these things are restrained by the obstacle of doubt, just as water that is ready to flow is held back by a plug. For certain good men are prepared to will what they have come to know is good, but in their case doubt holds back the flow of the will, that is, the willing. For not wanting to will what is not good, they hold back their willing until the truth is disclosed to them, and when the truth has been disclosed, they allow their intellect flowing with deliberation 119 to flow into the will, and there proceeds the act of willing, as if the obstacle of doubt and danger were removed. And although it may be held back by the obstacle of doubt and danger, it is, nonetheless, the will itself that holds itself back so that it does not flow forth through willing or also through willing not. For the will is not in the power of someone else, but in its own power. In the third way willing proceeds as something entreated, and this is done by suggestions, persuasions, and prayers. And in that way good men and also bad men often make unwilling people out of themselves and out of others who are willing, as well as the opposite. For there is no other human power over the human will but counsel, persuasion, and entreaty. After all, the fact that those who are unwilling are at times made willing by gifts should be referred to the way of persuasion and suggestion. For with venal human beings gifts hold the role and power of counsels and persuasions. On this account the human beings of the vilest prostitution most arrogantly acquiesce, not to sound counsels or good persuasions, but only to gifts. And just as holy men take care to incline the wills of others to good things, so from their own wills they strive to obtain this by holy thoughts and by the inspection and the hearing of the sacred words of God. For they often would like to will what they do not yet will. For it is not the same thing to say, “I would” and “I will.” The optative mode, after all, takes its name from the reality. Someone, then, who says, “I would” says that he desires, but not that he precisely wills. But someone who says, “I will,” indicates that he precisely wills. “To will,” then, comes from “I will,” like a decision or a decree of a magnificent and resolute king who strives by all means that what he has decided come about and that his statute or decree be observed. And it is for this reason that he moves, gathers, and rouses all his power to the extent that the matter that he determined or decreed requires. For this reason Augustine said, He should not be said to will who did not act when 120 he could. There is, therefore, the same difference between wishing, wanting or desiring, and willing in the precise sense, as there is between being pulled 119  I have conjectured “willing, velle” instead of “not willing, nolle.” 120  Augustine does not seem to have said this.

88 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues and being broken and as there is between approaching somewhat and totally going after the one who pulls. Likewise, there is the same difference as between being moved by persuasions and pleas and being persuaded to the point of deciding. For someone who said, “I would, I want, I wish or desire,” indicates that he is moved somewhat and is inclined toward what is desired and wanted. But someone who says, “I will,” indicates that he has been persuaded and fully moved and has already decided and even handed the matter over to execution. For as we already said, the will is the loftier power that commands movement, and the powers that are in the sinews, muscles, and nerves are the powers that carry out [122a] the movement of the members and of those things that come about through that movement, such as speech, walking, making, and things of that sort. To will, then, which comes from “I will,” is to give a command to those powers we mentioned, which carry out movements. To say, “I will,” is, however, to affirm the command. But at times it is said to issue the command or to give a command, that is, when it is said with the intention of commanding, as, when someone says to a servant, “I will that you do this,” intending by this to give him a command. At times a friend says to a friend, “I will that you do this,” and the reason is that one is subject to the other through friendship. For this reason they are laughed at and should rightly be laughed at who take counsel about these things which they will decisively and unchangeably. For someone who wills something decisively is not ready to change his will in accord with the counsel. Otherwise, he does not seek counsel, but agreement, just as Balaam consulted the Lord in Numbers, chapter twenty-two, whether he should go to Balak, the king of Moab, who called him to curse the people of God. For having 121 been enticed and attracted by desire, he had decided interiorly to go to Balak. In what follows, however, we will give you many likenesses and expressions and more evident examples of this. To this extent, therefore, it has for the present been determined for you that the will, like a king or emperor, is utterly free and fully lord over all that we are or that is subject to us and that the lower powers of motion are with full right subject to it and are like servants ready to obey all its commands, and this is so whether they are powers that command movement or that carry it out. The exterior or particular senses, however, are like messengers who run this way and that and who report those things that are outside or that take place in sensible things. But the common sense and imagination and also memory are like bookcases or libraries that contain descriptions of all the things that are outside or that are being done or have been done, just as is customarily done in the home of kings. But the intellect is like a counselor. Reason, however, is like a judge, and the middle terms of proofs are like witnesses. When, therefore, the will 121  See Nm 22:19.

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follows the counsel of reason in its actions, it wisely governs its kingdom; when it judges in accord with reason, it produces justice and judgment in its whole kingdom, and it is the king seated on the throne of judgment who by his glance scatters every evil (Prv 20: 8), as is read in Proverbs, chapter twenty. But when it hands itself over to the counsels of its servants, that is, of the lower powers and the senses, it hands itself over to the service of servants, and it is like a king who, having abandoned the counsel and wisdom of the elders, follows the will and counsels of mindless children, and in that way justice and judgment are subverted in his kingdom. And it is like a prince who willingly listens to the words of a lie, and for that reason has evil men as all his ministers (Prv 29:12), as is read 122 in Proverbs, chapter twenty-nine. For all the lower powers of command and all the others serve the impiety of the same, for sight and hearing and any of the other powers serve the libidinous will. Such ministers, then, are impious, because they are ministers of impiety, but the guilt belongs to the power that commands with impiety. On account, therefore, of the freedom and condemnation of the will it was said in Genesis, chapter four: Your appetite will be beneath you, and you will be lord over it (Gn 4:7). It is, therefore, evident from all these things that we have said that the passions, which are readily moveable in the ways that we showed, can be firmed up into good and bad habits and into examples of goodness and of malice, which are virtues and vices. And for this reason, when love and hate, sorrow and joy, anger and gentleness, and the others of this sort have been firmed up by habits, they are virtues and vices, like roots and fountains of goodness and of malice, from which there proceed the passions or exterior good and bad dispositions. And despite whatever Aristotle thought, we do evil deeds because we are al123 ready evil; we are not or do not become evil only by doing evil deeds, just as as the word of the Truth [122b] cannot be undone or rendered void, by which it is said in the Gospel of Matthew, chapter eight: A good tree cannot produce bad fruits (Mt 7:18), and again, Every good tree bears good fruit (Mt 7:17). And in chapter twelve of the same it says: Either make the tree good and its fruit good, or make the tree bad and its fruit bad (Mt 12:33), and in the same chapter: From its fruit a tree is known (Mt 12:33). And again it says: From the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks (Lk 6:45), and again it says: A good man brings forth good things from the good storehouse of his heart, and a bad man brings forth bad things from the bad storehouse of his heart (Mt 12:35). And in chapter fifteen of the same book it says: Those things that comes out of the mouth come from the heart, and they defile a man. For from the heart there come evil thoughts, murders, adulteries (Mt 15:18–19), and so on. And likewise in Mark, chapter seven, it says: Nothing outside of a man that enters into him can defile him (Mk 7:15). And 122  I have corrected “thirty-nine” to “twenty-nine.” 123  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1.1103b14–22.

90 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues again it says: Those things that go forth from a man are what defile him. For from within there proceed from the heart of men evil thoughts, adulteries, fornication (Mk 7:15.21), and so on. And afterwards all these evils proceed from within and defile a man (Mk 7:23). How, after all, did Aristotle think that someone who consented for an hour or a moment to deny God and who blasphemes God only once or kills a man, something that happens in a moment, is not evil in that hour and worthy of death? Or how did he think that he would only be evil when he had killed many thousands of human beings? Who is there who could not judge him evil and worthy of death at that hour? But Aristotle will perhaps say that he is not evil with a consuetudinal habit, which is true, but he sinned gravely and did what deserves to be punished by death. It is, however, already evident that what such a person did is evil and that the action is evil, which is certainly only evil, that is, blameworthy, because of the malice of the will from which it proceeds. For if he killed the man by chance or in ignorance, it would not be imputed as a sin. He is, therefore, evil or acted in an evil way as a result of the evil of the will by itself, not as a result of the evil of the act. Hence, we are evil when we will in an evil way or will evil things rather than because we do evil things. And again, we sin interiorly, that is, in the heart or soul more than when we do evil deeds externally. Moreover, it is certain that the malice or goodness by which we are evil or good is in us and within our souls. But from them there proceed evil actions. Hence, because of them we are evil and do evil things. Hence, to act in an evil way frequently comes from the malice or injustice that is within the soul by which we are evil. The opposite, therefore, is not the case, namely, that we are evil as a result of frequently acting in an evil way. Moreover, who doubts that the interior malice of the will can increase and become hardened into a habit without any exterior action? For someone can become evil without acting frequently in an evil way, as is seen in anger, which increases more and even grows hot and burns to the extent that its exterior action is less and more seldom. And this is evident. For whether its exterior action is vengeance or victory by means of it, the anger is mitigated and quiets down. But no one doubts that anger is one of the greatest sorts of malice and one of the greatest vices. Hence, it is evident that we become good or evil, not from frequently acting in a good or evil way, but rather the opposite. Moreover, because of the fact that someone only once plots the death of a prince, he is judged a traitor and guilt of a crime against majesty, and he would be considered one of the worst men and would be punished by the severest penalty. It is the same way, after all, because of the fact that someone kills only one human being out of malice. Similarly, someone is judged sacrilegious because of only one violation of a sacred place. And it is the same way with the other crimes, nor is there any sort of law that waits for a habit, nor is there any

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doubt that both divine and secular laws correctly pronounce judgment. For it would be a sad state for human affairs if we waited for a habit in crimes and if the perpetrators of single crimes were not judged evil, even for single crimes. For it would turn out that everything sacred [123a] would be violated, that all princes would killed and all human beings as well, that all cities would be burned and destroyed before all perpetrators of crimes became habitual doers of their crimes. But you ought to recall the four ways that we assigned above for the generation of habits. The intention, therefore, of Aristotle here seems to be that he is speaking of consuetudinal habits alone or of these habits that generate civic or popular praise or blame. And in fact in no kind of goodness or malice has the community of citizens the custom of praising or blaming because of one good or evil action, as if on the basis of one testimony alone, but a real custom in name and definition arises rather from a plurality of either the same or of similar actions. But inasmuch as they aim to provide for the safety and utility of human beings and of the fatherland, laws cut off malice as hostile to human beings as soon as they uncover it, in fact like the root of crimes, like a plague, and like a cause of the upheaval and disturbance of human affairs, for they do not allow it to grow or to sink roots. Rightly, therefore, do the laws and legislators judge evil those who commit single crimes. I mean evil in the sense of harmful and injurious to others. For if one murder were left unpunished, on the occasion of it there would be movement on to many murders, both by those for whom impunity often begets an incentive for wrongdoing and by friends of the murdered person who want to avenge the deed and by friends of the killer. We said that murder is a plague because it would spread so widely as an incentive, unless the severity of the laws immediately extinguished it. The community of human beings, therefore, is not accustomed to call men good unless their goodness is proven by the testimonies of many good actions. Similarly, the community is not accustomed to call men evil in this way, that is, on account of sudden and quickly passing good or evil passions, on the basis of which they have not dared to judge human beings good or evil. For it did not seem right to them to judge that human beings are at one moment good and at another evil or that the change from good to evil, or the reverse, is so easy. Legislators and the laws, therefore, use the terms goodness and malice in an equivocal sense, and so does the community of human beings, which Aristotle follows on this. With these points stated, it remains, therefore, for us to examine concerning the natural virtues what and how much those who have them as perfect can do as a result of them and to what extent their actions differ from the actions of the gratuitous virtues and likewise how the ends of natural virtues differ from the ends of gratuitous virtues, where we will have to determine whether the natural virtues alone suffice for doing perfectly the good that is acceptable to God most high.

92 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues Since, therefore, we state that a certain prudence or knowledge is a natural virtue on the basis of the causes and reasons we stated, which we have no doubt should be enough for you, we ask, first of all, whether things are known or cognized by such sorts of knowledge and prudence, and it seems first of all that things of which ignorance is neither shameful nor blameworthy, such as ignorance of geometrical, philosophical, arithmetical, and in general mathematical matters and in the same way of natural matters, do not pertain to this knowledge. For no one is worthy of reproach, no one is to be blamed for ignorance of such things. Knowledge, therefore, only of those things because of which our life is praiseworthy or blameworthy and good or evil seems to pertain to these virtues. Those, after all, who defined philosophy as the art of 124 living, as Cicero and Seneca stated, undoubtedly meant only the knowledge of such things. Moreover, only ignorance of how to live well is to be reproached and blamed, as Apuleius teaches through induction in the book on The God of 125 Socrates. Asked whether you know how to frame laws, he says, you [123b] will boldly reply, “I do not. Nor does it embarrass me not to be a legislator.” But asked whether you know how to live well, you will not dare to say, “I do not know,” either out of fear of lying or out of embarrassment, which is the fear of 126 just reproach. This embarrassment, therefore, is natural, and for this reason it is evident that this nature in us is embarrassed over this ignorance. Hence, it should not exist in us. Hence, it is evident that nature naturally generates this embarrassment in us. Moreover, nature itself requires of us that we live well, and we are naturally bound to live well and, hence, bound to all those things that living well requires and, for this reason, to the knowledge of those things by which our life is made good. Moreover, what law is naturally written in the heart of a human being but the concept of the commandments of natural morality? And what is the natural inscription of them but the natural knowledge of them? For what Cicero says is undoubtedly true, namely, that by nature we are most avid and most desirous 127 of moral goodness. But no good is sought unless it is good and to the extent it is known. Hence, by nature we are most knowledgeable of moral goodness. For morality is nothing but the goodness of life. But the same knowledge is knowledge of the goodness of life and of someone who lives well. Hence, we 124  See Cicero, Tusculan Disputations (Tusculanae disputationes) 2.16 where he calls philosophy the teacher of life. I have not found the reference to Seneca. 125  See Apuleius, On the God of Socrates (De deo Socratis) 22. William paraphrases rather than quotes here from Apuleius. 126  See below, chapter fifteen, fol. 170a, where William give this as a definition of shame (verecundia) and attributes it incorrectly to Seneca. 127  Cicero, Tusculan Disputations (Tusculanae disputationes) 2.58.

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naturally know how to live well and, for this reason, those things that pertain to living well. Moreover, as Cicero himself says, no one can look at us who does not know 128 that we were born for moral goodness. Hence, the end on account of which we exist and toward which we naturally tend is moral goodness. But the virtue moving it and guiding it to the end for which it exists is naturally innate in each creature. Hence, the virtue that, unless impeded, leads us to moral goodness is innate in us. And since one does not come to moral goodness by chance nor in ignorance, it is necessary that the knowledge of it be innate in us. Moreover, just as weights are in bodies, so loves are in souls, as Augustine 129 says. But there are in bodies natural weights that naturally incline and bring them to the places of their natural rest. Therefore, there are in souls natural loves that naturally incline and bring them to the state of their natural rest. But the state of the natural rest of our souls is happiness. Happiness, however, is nothing but moral goodness, as we will teach in what follows. But the knowledge of these things of which the loves are naturally innate is us are natural. Hence, the knowledge of moral goodness or of happiness is natural. Moreover, if in a human being the eye exists for the sake of some proper act, such as to see, and the ear for the sake of hearing, and if it is this way with the others, the whole human being will also exist for the sake of something that will be its proper act. And if a horse exists for the sake of some proper act, as well as a deer, an ox, and each of the other animals, a human being will, therefore, likewise exist for the sake of some proper act. Hence, there will be some proper act of a human being. Moreover, the proper act of a human being is the act that is most fitting for him and is most of all required in him. But to live well is most fitting for a human being and is most of all required in him. Hence, among all the kinds of knowledge the knowledge of living well is most of all required in him and is most fitting for him. Moreover, according to the order of nature a human being has some proper function, that is, some suitable act, as the protection of human beings and of their possessions is the proper function of dogs or as running, carrying human beings, or something of the sort is the proper function of horses, and so it is with the others. Or else there is no proper act of a human being. But if there is no proper act and function of a human being, he was created with less care on the part of divine providence than the other animals. He also seems on this account to have been created uselessly and in vain, just as a vessel given no certain function seems to have been fashioned uselessly and in vain. 128  See Cicero, On Duties (De officiis) 3.35. 129  Augustine, Confessions (Confessiones) 13.9.19; PL 32: 849.

94 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues But if he says that a human being has many acts and was created on account of them, either all those acts are equal, or there is one among them [124a] that is more excellent. But it is evident that not all acts are equal because to see and to hear are unequal. And again, to build, to plow, to sow, and to worship God or to live well are unequal. Hence, it is evident that some act or some acts among these are more excellent. But there is nothing in a human being either equal to or better than to live well. Hence, to live well is his most noble and best act. But that best thing in each is its end and the proper natural act of it. But if in each being there exists one thing that is best, the rest are natural aids and exist on account of that one thing. And since nature naturally teaches each being what is natural and proper to it, nature also naturally teaches a human being to live well. Moreover, if the true and proper function of a singer is to sing and of a reader to read and if there is no genuine singer who does not know how to sing, and so on with the others, and if there is no genuine weaver who does not know how to weave, there will not naturally exist a genuine human being who does not know how to live well, and someone who is naturally prevented from living well is naturally prevented from being a human being. And, of course, according to Aristotle, human beings are created and born perfect with the first perfection that belongs to nature, that is to say, with the perfection of matter and of form, 130 that is, with a soul, body, potencies, and powers. They are, however, able to be made perfect with second perfection, which is the beauty of knowledge and the virtues. But according to Plato, as we have often mentioned, they are created perfect in both ways, but the second perfection in them is impeded, as we 131 will report in what follows in accord with his opinion. And we will explain it in accord with the truth. To that extent, however, we intend to explain that the sciences are said to be natural according to three intentions or modes. And in the first way they are of course understood to be natural, that is, naturally implanted or inborn, that is, as the result of nature itself of the sort that we said above were in the supernatural, that is, the noble and abstract, substances. In the second way they are called natural, that is, given them from their coming to be or creation, such as those that we said that Adam and Eve had. In the third way they are called natural, that is, acquired without learning and revelation. Hence, they are for this reason called natural to us and at times innate because for the present they do not come to us from outside, but arise or come forth from within, that is, from the interiors of natural beings. On this 130  See Aristotle, On the Soul 2.1.412a18–412b24, where Aristotle distinguishes soul as the first act of a body potentially having life from the second acts by which an animal acts in a particular way. 131  See Plato, Meno 85DE and Augustine, On the Trinity (De trinitate) 12.15.29; PL 42: 1011. Plato held that our knowledge is really remembering; hence, our souls merely have to disinter knowledge that was buried in them from before birth.

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account Augustine says that love of the good and the notion of the true are 132 innate, where he understands innate, that is, born from within or from our natural interiors. On the basis of these points that we have mentioned, then, it is evident to you that these kinds of natural knowledge that we call virtues are not about anything but those things that pertain to living well or to moral goodness, and these are the rules of natural moral goodness, such as that we should fear God, hope in God, love God, honor God, and obey God; next, that we should help all other people, harm no one, injure no one, cheat no one, and live justly, piously, and truly with all; thirdly, that we should use soberly and moderately those things that come after us and not without thanksgiving, inasmuch as they are the gifts and benefits of God. You see, however, that we have divided the rules of natural moral goodness in three parts, of which the first part pertains to God, the second to us, and the third to things whose use has been granted us by the giver of good things. But if someone asks why such kinds of knowledge are virtues, we have already replied in the treatise, On Faith, and in those parts that have come earlier 133 in this treatise that they are the strengths of our intellective power, its armor, and the principles of praiseworthy voluntary actions, just as instances of ignorance and the contrary opinions are blameworthy and vices and the observance of them blameworthy and worthy of punishment. If anyone [124b] asks what is the manner of knowing such kinds of knowledge, namely, whether it is like knowing through a sense, for example, through sight or hearing, or it is like the understanding of principles or like understanding through demonstration or through some other way of proof, we reply that the manner of knowing is like the understanding of the first principles of the disciplines or doctrines and is perhaps more noble insofar as the goodness of the creator wanted the knowledge of these matters to be more intimately impressed and to adhere to such substances more than the knowledge of the doctrines or disciplines, that is, of the mathematical and natural sciences, to the extent that he knew that it was more useful and salutary for them and conducive to greater honor for himself. But in our souls it is also to some extent the same because these kinds of knowledge enter and are received in our souls both more easily and more deeply and cling to them more strongly than the content of the previously mentioned principles. And the reason is that every virtue and every potency is naturally more suited and inclined to those things by which it is set free and helped toward what is its greatest good, that is, to its ultimate end and perfection, than to other things. Because, therefore, these things are more related to living well or happily than the others, our souls for this reason 132  See Augustine, On the Trinity (De trinitate) 8.3.4–5; PL 40: 949–950. 133  See William, On Faith (De fide), ch. 1, fol. 3b–4a, and above, chapter three, fol. 113a.

96 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues admit them more readily and more intimately, just as our bodies admit air more intimately than water as more useful and more necessary for life, and human beings themselves admit more intimately other human beings as more useful and necessary for themselves, that is, into greater friendship and familiarity. But if someone asks whether such sorts of knowledge are diversified in accord with the diversity of recipients, we reply that they are not, just as sight is not diversified in accord with the diversity of things seen. But the reason for this is that which we gave concerning faith, namely, that it is not diversified by so great a diversity of things believed. But if someone asks whether the law of that knowledge was natural, which is said to have been written in the heart of a human being, that is, of Adam and Eve, naturally, that is, from birth, or in us, as we have explained it, we reply that knowledge in the proper sense is about truth, but truth in the proper sense belongs to affirmations and negations. For of the modes of speech only affirmation or negation has truth or falsity. But law insofar as it is law is imperative. Hence, it is not said to be true or false, but rather just or unjust, to be observed or not to be observed. And law is a container or an aggregate of commandments. There is, therefore, knowledge of the fact that God is to be feared, but in the proper sense to fear God and similar things belong to law. The sacred teachers and common usage, nonetheless, at times use the two in a confused manner, and we did too in accord with the difference of understandings and intentions of law in the preceding treatise, namely, On Faith and the Law or Laws. It has, therefore, been explained to you by these arguments what are instances of natural knowledge and prudence and of what sort they are that are worthy of the name of the virtues, as well as why they are called virtues and with which things they are concerned and what is the manner of knowing in them and that such things are ones that pertain to living well or happily and their contraries. From this it is also evident to you that the noble substances would not have been created perfect with natural perfection without these, but would have been created, on the contrary, with the embarrassing and shameful imperfection that is an ignorance or a lack of knowledge of how to live well or happily. And the same thing must be held with regard to the souls of Adam and Eve. But if anyone asks whether such substances also naturally have other kinds of knowledge, that is, of other things, as Adam and Eve had from their creation, it seems to us that they did, but not such kinds of knowledge as are acquired by us through the paths of proofs. Rather their knowing of such things was like seeing interiorly, that is, to understand, as we said. Nor are they idle or [125a] superfluous in them, as they are not among those of us who use them well. For there are many wondrous things about God in them, and for this reason a knowledge of those things raises up and directs those who use them well to praise the creator. No small amount of his praise and glory would have been removed from the creator in them, that is, in the noble abstract substances and in

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Adam and Eve, if they did not know so many and such great wondrous works of the creator that are found in natural and mathematical things. They would also have lacked no small amount of splendor and light, if they did not have those kinds of knowledge, and their intellects would rather have been filled and cloaked with darkness, if they did not know heaven and earth and some of those things that are in them. For they would be like a man on a journey, who sees only his own walking, the end of the journey, and his own footprints, but is blind in relation to all other things. But if someone asks whether there a single knowledge for those substances 134 or for them, by which they knew all such things, it seems to us that there was. For just as by one light of vision we see all visible things by our natural vision, so those substances and the first parents gaze upon and see all the things that are naturally intelligible by their natural intellect in a far more lofty and noble way, and they do so all at once. But the reason for this is that they do not know things through being acted upon by things, as we know visible things, nor do they need time or change in order to see them. But we will discuss and examine 135 these things in the treatise concerning such substances. Here it is aside from the present question. But we call this knowledge a virtue most of all insofar as it directs one toward living well, because it raises up, moves, incites its possessor to do what it shows should be done. But if someone asks whether this knowledge can be recorded in writing and can be explained in speech, we reply that it can to a certain extent. But it is impossible that our words or writings correspond with this understanding or knowledge, as we will show in the same treatise. But with these points determined in this way, we will turn to the natural affective virtues, and we will begin from the greatest and most noble of the volitions. And it seems, first of all, that this love is the greatest of all these in accord with the principle that “that on account of which anything is such is 136 more such.” Hence, those things that are loved with a natural love are loved most. But to love oneself or one’s goods seems to have no praise inasmuch as it is natural and involves no difficulty at all and especially on account of the words of the Gospel of Matthew, chapter five: If you love those who love you, what reward will you have? (Mt 5:46). And again in Luke, chapter six, it says: If you love those who love you, what thanks do you have for that? Even sinners love those who love them (Lk 6:32). In the same way it seems for the same reason to involve no praise or thanks, that is, gratitude, to love one’s father and mother. Moreover, if love is only for the good insofar as it is good, a father ought not to be better, and a mother is not better, because or insofar as they are father and 134  That is, Adam and Eve. 135  That is, in the second principal part of On the Universe (De universo). 136  See Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2.72a28–30.

98 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues mother than without these relationships. Hence, they are not to be loved more with these relationships or on account of them than without them. Moreover, these relationships, namely, fatherhood and motherhood and other attainments are indifferent things and add nothing to goodness. Hence, they ought to add nothing to love. Hence, you ought not to love your father more than any other man. Moreover, if goods should not be loved except insofar as they are good or because they are good, things equally good should, therefore, be loved equally. Therefore, anyone good in a way equal to your father should be equally loved by you. But in these matters and in all things of this sort you must know that natural love is not directed at the good insofar as it is good without qualification, but rather at a determinate good, that is, at this good and for its sake, and though your father is good in a way equal [125b] to any others without qualification, you still do not love him equally, nor should you love him equally, because he is not equally good to you and to the others. Nor does it follows that, if two men are to be loved equally, they are, therefore, to be equally loved by you, just as if they are equally good, they are not, therefore, equally good in relation to you, but if someone carefully looks at these statements, a father is not better insofar as he is a father, nor a mother insofar as she is a mother, than without these. If he understands this about natural goodness, he also says what is false without qualification. For he who is a father has the goodness that he has insofar as he is a man and also the goodness that lies in the utility of generation, which is an outpouring and overflowing goodness. Hence, he is not only better for you by a natural goodness, but also without qualification. Fecundity, after all, is no small good, and we all recognize this in sheep, cows, trees, and fields, because we judge all of these to be better as a result of fecundity and fertility. Likewise, it does not follow that, if any two things are to be equally loved, someone sins who does not equally love them. For though they are equally to be loved, they are not, nonetheless, to be loved equally by each person. In accord with this reason someone equally good to each person, as one is to oneself, should be equally loved, and someone who is better should be loved by each person more than he should be loved by himself. But this does not seem to be the order of nature. Hence, it is usually and commonly said of charity that well-ordered charity begins with oneself, that is, from its proper subject. And the same thing is seen with reference to human beings, namely, that among human beings each one first of all and most of all loves and is bound to love himself with a natural love. But it seems strange and difficult to know whether someone loves or even can love himself. For love is chain and a tie. But how can there be a chain or a tie of the same person to himself, and how is someone understood to be tied to himself? If love is friendship, how will it exist in only one person? And since it is a relation, how will it be a

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relation of one person to himself? For friendship is a relation of equality in the category of relation. Moreover, just a bodily brotherhood cannot exist except between at least two, so spiritual brotherhood, which is only love or volition, cannot exist except between two. Moreover, what is love when possessed but generosity beyond which there is no generosity, and what is love when enacted but the first and greatest gift of all gifts? But generosity and giving are not of one person to himself, and the reason is that a gift exists naturally in the giver more than in the receiver. Hence, if the same person were giving and receiving love, love would necessarily be more and less in him. Moreover, what is it to give but to transfer to the recipient and to make one’s gift the recipient’s, and this is done through giving since otherwise it would not be his. But how will this be the action of one person toward himself? Moreover, the gift naturally belongs to the giver before it belongs to the recipient. Hence, if the same person is giving and receiving, such a gift as natural love is will be in the same person earlier and later. Moreover, if the same person is the giver in one respect and the recipient in another respect, how will he be generous to someone equally rich and equally wealthy, namely, to himself? For these reasons and others it seems that there can in no way be a love of the same person for himself. Nor was it properly stated by the apostle in Second Timothy, chapter three, that in the last days there will be persons who love themselves (2 Tm 2:1.2), and the statement of Augustine in the book on The City of God is not correct that the foundation of the city of 137 Babylon is love of oneself and that it grows to the contempt of God. Rather it was said in a figure of speech about such persons who seek what is in their own interest. For in the same way someone who loves another seeks what is in 138 the other’s interest. And many seek what is their own as if they loved themselves in action, not in volition, [126a] because it does not seem possible that someone should have the volition of love for himself. Nor does someone seek riches or delights because of the volition that he has for himself, but because of the volition that he has for riches and delights alone. For a person given to pleasure loves delights for their sake, that is, for the sake of the delights alone. It is the same way with a genuinely greedy person or one desirous of riches. And it is the same way with the others. Nor does an ambitious person seek honors for himself. For people do not draw such things to themselves, but go after them, clinging to them and having become slaves of them in a most shameful and most vile servitude. 137  See Augustine, The City of God (De civitate Dei) 14.28; PL 41: 436. 138  I have conjectured “other’s, alterius” instead of “one’s own, sua.”

100 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues It should, however, be known in a better way and more correctly that there can be and is a love for oneself. But an explanation of this has two modes. The first is through the definition or account of love. For love in its truest sense is only an intention that seeks something else, that is, that moves to obtain it, and this again has two modes because it either moves one to acquire that in which it is, and then it is rightly called concupiscence, desire, ambition, or some other of such names. It is evident that concupiscence is the love of pleasure, and its search for that pleasure and moving to obtain it. Similarly, the desire of riches and the ambition of goods seek for and move to obtain them and quiet their motion in them. The second mode is that in which love is an intention that seeks, not the one in which it is, but the other one, and in accord with this intention love is friendship. For there is an intention that seeks the honor or the advantage of the one toward whom it is directed, that is, of the friend. Friendship, after all, does not move to seek or to obtain the friend, but rather to seek or to obtain for the friend an advantage or honor or something else from among those things that are believed to please friends. Hence, it is evident that love of pleasure and love of a friend are said equivocally, except in that case that Seneca gives, when he says: If you cultivate friendship for future mishaps, “this is a business deal ... 139 not a friendship,” that you boast of. For some people seek friends as they seek fields or trees or the protection of walls and ramparts, that is to say, in order that they may receive some advantage from friends, in the way in which servants or horses are sought. Hence, it is evident that such human beings do not aim at friends, but at themselves, and for this reason Seneca called it a business deal, not friendship. For just as businessmen give to other businessmen in order to receive more things or better ones, so these people offer services to friends, not in order to benefit them, but in order to receive greater benefits from them, not content with equal benefits, just as businessmen are not content if their recompense does not surpass the price paid. Because, then, it is evident that no one is naturally prevented from the intention of seeking what either pleases or helps himself and that this intention is undoubtedly love in its intention, it is evident that no one is prevented from love of himself. Hence, it is evident that it is possible that there be a love of someone for himself. The second explanation is that no intelligent substance is naturally prevented from knowing or understanding. On the contrary, each one of such substances necessarily understands and knows itself. But if it knows that it is good, how is it prevented from loving itself? For by the same reasons by which some people were led to believe that no one can love himself, it is necessary that they be led to believe that no intelligent substance can understand or know itself. .

139  Seneca, Moral Letters (Epistulae morales) 1.9.10.

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Moreover, if we can love and ought to love the good things of others, how are we prevented from loving our own goods? Is it on account of the fact that they are ours? But this is most absurd in terms of nature since every nature loves itself. For each of [126b] the animals seeks for itself food and a nest and also a mate for the sake of generation. Hence each animal naturally loves itself on the basis of the definition of love since it naturally seeks for itself good and useful and salutary things. Moreover, who with a sound head would dare to say that a human being does not naturally love his own body or the parts of his body? For he nourishes, cherishes, and defends them with such great labor in order to rescue them at any price if danger to them threatens him and if he can? Hence, it is evident that he would deny nature since it is in every way a seeker of useful and salutary things for its proper subject and a guardian and defender of them. On this account we said that, in accord with the words of Augustine by which he said, 140 As weights are in bodies, so loves are in souls, as weight is present in a heavy body from nature, so a natural love is present in every noble substance from nature, and as weight seeks a suitable and salutary place to rest its body, so this love seeks suitable and salutary things for every noble substance. And this love is not like a chain or a tie of the same to itself, but rather a tie of the substance and of those things that are useful or salutary for the same. Hence, it seeks to join those things to one another, just as weight or inclination is the chain or tie of the body and the place suited to it. And on this account it seeks to join them, that is, the place and the body, in actuality. Hence, just as weight or inclination draws a body to the place naturally suited to it, and seeks it for the same, so this love draws every noble substance to the state naturally suited to it and seeks it for the same. Know also that such love is not a relation in the true sense, but rather a quality in essence and truth, though it has some reference to the beloved. But this is evident from the fact that it does not necessarily require that the loved object, that is, the object sought, exist. But a relation in the true sense demands a corresponding relation in its correlative, and they accompany each other with a necessary and inseparable concomitance so that, if the one exists at some time, the other necessarily exists at that time. Know also that this love does not fall under the idea of what is given and what is received, just as weight and inclination do not. For through it or in it nature does not intend to give something, but rather to acquire or claim what belongs to it by the right of nature and what is owed to it and in certain case to repay this, as we will explain in what follows. In that way you see that the nature of a heavy body does not intend to give something through weight and motion or in them, but in gratuitous love 140  See Augustine, Confessions (Confessiones) 13.9.10; PL 32: 849.

102 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues there is perhaps the idea of what is given and what is received. But we will speak about that in what follows. And because we said that there are two intentions of this love, namely, to acquire and to return, we necessarily have to show to whom or for what a return should be made through this love and to whom this love should be returned. Everyone agrees that a return should be made to natural benefactors, such as God and parents. For this reason it is commonly said that God is to be loved as creator, giver of life, preserver and source of all natural goods, teacher, and illuminator of them. But love is to be returned to parents, that is, to father and mother, and to ancestors insofar as we have knowledge of them. For they were helpers and ministers by whose ministry we were given life, as is said in Ecclesiasticus, chapter seven: Remember that you would not have existed except through them; give to them as they gave to you (Sir 7:30). But such love is not owed to children on the basis of beneficence, but rather on the basis of the law and teaching of nature, which pours out this love, like the power of generation, on all children, as [127a] was done to them by their parents. And in that way let them do it for those whom they beget. But because the noble angelic substances and Adam and Eve in their natural perfection had a knowledge of the creator and necessarily had a natural love for him because of the generosity of his beneficence toward them and had a natural love for themselves, as we said, there is some question whether by this natural love by which they loved God they also loved themselves or whether they loved themselves and God equally or themselves more than God or God more than themselves. And it has seemed to many that they loved themselves more than God with a natural love, because they could not go against themselves nor above themselves by a natural love. For no nature is seen to be able to do something against itself or above itself. Moreover, if by such love, that is, by natural love, they did not love God except as their source and the source of all their goods, they did not love him except because and insofar as they loved their benefactor. Hence, they loved him only in view of and by reason of his benefits. But they love those benefits only on account of themselves, and because they loved God only on account of themselves, they, for this reason, loved themselves more than him. “For that on 141 account of which each thing is such is more such.” But it seems just the opposite, namely, that they should not be loved without qualification more than God since they are without qualification incomparably less good, nor are they better for themselves in these things than God is for them. On the contrary, God is better and more useful for them than they are for themselves. For in no way can they do any good for themselves except in procuring the conservation of their being and their life and in seeking those things that pertain to living 141  Aristotle, Posterior Analytics 1.2.72a28–30.

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well and in living well. But God gives them all these and also being itself with all its perfection and natural beauty. Moreover, to live well is not naturally found in them except in naturally using well the natural gifts of God. For their natural good use comes from nature. Everything, after all, that is nature is a gift of God. Moreover, a natural seeking is an activity of nature and comes from nature, and for this reason it is a gift of God. Similarly, everything acquired naturally, that is, through nature, is likewise a gift of God. Hence, it is evident that they naturally had or could acquire nothing but gifts of God. It is evident, therefore, that God is incomparably more useful for them than they are for themselves, because, even if they could grow in natural goods naturally, either by acquiring new ones or by bettering those they already have, such an increase would also be a gift and work of God, albeit through nature, that is, through their natural 142 goods. For “whatever is the cause of the cause is the cause of the effect,” and every primary cause exercises more influence even over the effect of a secondary cause, and the reason for this is that the primary cause pours out its influence from its proper fullness and abundance, but a secondary cause does so only from the flow and outpouring it receives from the first cause. For as we have explained elsewhere, second or intermediate causes are only messengers and 143 bearers of the outpouring of the first cause to its second effects. Moreover, nature does not have or teach or do anything perverse, inasmuch as it is taught by the teaching of the creator and is directed, regulated, and ordered in every way by the rectitude of his will, and since it is clearly perverse to prefer anything else to or to rank anything else before God or even to make it equal to God, it is impossible naturally or by nature that any substance prefers itself or even makes itself equal to God in love or volition. Hence, it also follows that none of the previously mentioned substances naturally loves itself more than or equally with him, because love, as we said, seeks the good, that is, the good of the one for whom the love exists [127b]. But no other good should be sought for God than glory, honor, praise, blessing, thanksgiving, and service, and these goods are to be sought for him both in ourselves and in others. They are, of course, to be sought for him, not because he needs them, since his riches are at the peak of sufficiency and abundance. But the natural love by which such substances love themselves likewise seeks the goods naturally surrounding or living with them, such as we mentioned above, namely, living well or happily, natural morality and those things that pertain to both of them. We ask, therefore, whether they should prefer these to the goods of God that we mentioned. But if someone says that such substances should prefer them to 142  Venerable Bede, Philosophical Sentences or Axioms Gathered from Aristotle and Other Excellent Philosophers (Sententiae, vel axiomata philosophica ex Aristotele et aliis praestantiis collecta) Q; PL 90: 1041 143  See William, On the Trinity (De trinitate) ch. 6; ed. Switalski, p. 41.

104 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues the goods of God, then, one of them or several of them or all of them together should be preferred to the service of God. Hence, if it turns out that they cannot be possessed along with the service of God, the service of God should be abandoned on their account. But it is clearly seen how false this is from the fact that all of them should also be spent in the service of God and, if necessary, consumed in the service of God. For by the law and justice of gratitude the recipient of a benefit is at least obligated to the giver of it to the extent, that is, that he should repay it either by giving or expending that or as much as that, if the means is available to him, and even more if that were possible. For if the recipient of a benefit were bound to the giver only to the extent that he received from him, the benefactor would be only a lender or creditor, and the recipient would be only indebted for the loan, and the benefit or benefaction would be only a loaning or an accommodation. Moreover, since they receive all natural things from the creator, they are, therefore, bound to serve him because of all of them and in return for all of them and in all of them. It is, therefore, not permissible for them either to have or to retain any of them without the service of the creator. Hence, the service 144 of the creator is not to be given up for having or retaining any of them or for all of them. Hence, neither one of them nor even all of them together should be preferred to the service of the creator. It has also been explained that in that service all other things should not be regarded as equal, for they should rather be expended and consumed for the service and in the service of the creator if there is need. It is evident that the service of the creator is to be preferred to them all. It remains, therefore, that the goods of the creator should be sought more by such substances than their own goods are naturally sought. Hence, their love ought to be greater for the creator than for themselves. But as natural love is in them, so it also was from the beginning and is still. Hence, by natural love they loved God from the beginning and still love him more than themselves. Moreover, to what end were those such pure and such excellent natural goods given to them if not for the honor, glory, and service of God, and so on. And there is no other end of all goods universally than God who is their source, as we read in Proverbs, chapter sixteen: God has made all things on his own account (Prv 16:4). Moreover, there is no doubt that all the gifts and benefits of God are to be turned to his honor and glory. But nothing else should be made of them, nor should they be twisted or turned to something other than the end for which they were given. This, then, is the end of all the gifts and benefits of God. But the end is always better than that which is for the end or on account of it, and the same should necessarily be preferred. It is evident, therefore, from these 144  I have conjectured “having, habendo” instead of “releasing, solvendo.”

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points that these goods of God we mentioned are to be loved more by such substances than those gifts, which we have already mentioned. But because in general that is to be loved more whose goods are more to be loved or more to be sought, God is, therefore, naturally to be loved more by those substances than they are to be loved by themselves. Whatever, however, must be done naturally 145 [128a] they both do and have done from the beginning. For they are not violators or transgressors of the natural law. Hence, they love God with a natural love more than themselves and have loved him more than themselves from the beginning. We also add that the natural law requires this in them, and natural 146 love would incite and induce them so that, if it were necessary, they would lay down their life and all the other goods they have for God, if the honor and glory of God would require this and this were possible. Moreover, their natural virtues are necessarily all equal. Hence, their obedience and love for God are necessarily equal in them. It is, however, certain that, if God commanded them to give up all their goods for his honor, they would be ready to do this, if they could, out of natural obedience or justice. They would not, however, be changed in their nature with regard to natural properties as a result of such a command. Hence, as a result of the natural obedience, which was created in them and created along with them, they are even now ready to do that, if they could and God commanded. Hence, it is evident that as a result of natural justice they are bound to prefer the will of God to themselves and to all they have. But natural love and this justice are equal. In the offering of love, therefore, that is, in loving, they ought to prefer God to themselves and to all they have. For obedience stands in proportion to obeying, and love in proportion to loving. From these considerations, then, it ought to be evident to you that such substances undoubtedly love the creator with a natural love more than themselves and naturally seek or search for the things of the creator more than for those of their own and that this love comes as it were from the law or justice of natural gratitude. And it has been shown to you that this love is for the creator as creator and as father and as the giver, nourisher, preserver, and governor of all goods and, in general, as the universal and gratuitous benefactor. And we call this love, which is the first form of love, owed love. This love, therefore, is like the love of gratitude both owed and repaid. But the second love, or second form of love, which we mentioned secondly above, is love sold for the price of the loved object, such as is the love of pleasure, riches, honors, and other goods that are sought only on account of themselves. The third love is surrendered or given and gratuitous. For this love flows from love that is a grace and is not something owed. It does not sell itself, but gives, and it is not sold. By it the good of the lover is not intended, but the good 145  William is still speaking about the separate intelligences. 146  I have conjectured “so, adeo” instead of “to them, ad eos.”

106 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues of the beloved. In this love the lover gives himself and everything he has to the beloved when such love is perfect, and we will speak about it and its meaning more at length in what follows. But know that by what we are saying, namely, that Adam before the sin and those angelic substances loved or are loving God out of a natural love more than themselves, we are not forced to say that a nature can do something above itself or against itself. For it is not against nature that a nature does as the creator made it to do or commanded it to do by natural law. Nor it anything else so in favor of nature or in accord with nature as what it does for the creator. Nor is it more above nature for a nature to love something else more than itself than it is for a nature to know something else more or better than itself, as the human soul also knows many things better than itself with bodily sight. But perhaps natural justice also does not tolerate that such substances naturally love themselves except on account of the creator. For if they loved themselves on account of themselves, they would misuse themselves. They would, after all, cling to themselves with love on account of themselves. Hence, they would enjoy themselves, but only the blessed and glorious Trinity is to be en147 joyed, as blessed Augustine teaches. Moreover, since they are to be loved only because they are good and insofar as they are good and since they are not good [128b] on their own account, since they are not the very end of their own goodness nor some other cause of it, they are not, therefore, to be loved on their own account. It is evident, therefore, that natural justice does not allow that they love themselves except on account of the creator, since they are not naturally to be loved on account of themselves or on account of something other than the creator, since something other than the creator cannot be the end of their goodness. If, however, someone asks whether by this love they love or have loved God insofar as he is God or insofar as he is good, we have already replied to this and have said that this love is not absolutely for God insofar as he is God or insofar as he is good, but rather insofar as he is their God or insofar as he is good for them. Nor are we forced to say that someone who loves his benefactor insofar as he is his benefactor or also because he is his benefactor loves him for the sake of his benefits. And what is more, if the cause of this love is the benefits, it does not follow on this account that the benefits are loved. For not every cause is necessarily a final cause. A fire, after all, burns by means of wind or by means of wood, but not for the sake of wind or for the sake of wood. Thus the fire of such love burns by means of the wood of benefits and by means of the wind of good words, just as also by means of apprehensions of the beauty and goodness of the beloved, but not for the sake of these. In the same way thirst and hunger at times burn by means of the smell of food or drink, but not for the sake of 147  Augustine, On Christian Doctrine (De doctrina christiana) 1.5.5; PL 34: 21.

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the smell. Someone who is hungry or thirsty, however, does not seek in food or drink the smell as an end, but rather by means of the smell seeks the savor and refreshment in both of them. For by means of the benefits of the creator, as if by certain smells, his necessary and salutary goodness is perceived, and thus by them or through them he is loved, but not on account of them. But if someone asks whether the creator would be loved with this love if his benefits were curtailed, we reply that he would not. For if his benefits were curtailed, he would not be loved as a benefactor or insofar as he is a benefactor, just as, if the smell were curtailed, food and drink would not sought by an appetite provoked by smell. But if he asks whether the creator would be loved without qualification insofar as he is good by a natural love or by another love, we reply that, if this were possible, that is, that the benefits of the creator were curtailed in such a creature, the creator would still be loved by it insofar as he is God or insofar as he is good, if the creature apprehended his divinity or goodness and was not impeded by the perversity of its own corruption. But if he asks about the manner of loving, we reply that it is free and that this love would be gratuitous because it would be without any venality and would have no sort of business dealing, as we explained above. It would also be straight, that is, not having any curve or bend, and we will explain this in what 148 follows. And it would be a grace in the sense that it is free and would be a genuine gift and love given with the purest and most sincere giving. It would, nonetheless, not in any sense be the grace that lies in between nature and glory and is the pledge and foretaste of glory, which is the most noble help for nature to love God and to cling to him, and it is incomparably more lofty and excellent than nature or any natural disposition because it is something that elevates nature and carries it above itself to the creator and elevates it as if from the lowest 149 step to lofty flight, and we will establish all these points in what follows. But if someone asks whether God is also loved above all other things by this love, which is, of course, natural, we say that he is and that he is also loved more than the lover. Otherwise, this love would be perverse and wicked if those things were loved more than God or even if something were loved equally with him. Nor does it follow that, if God is loved above all things and freely, this love is charity and is that gratuitous love that renders us pleasing and acceptable to God and [129a] worthy of the kingdom of heaven. The difference between these will be seen when we disclose and establish the essence of that love. But if someone asks whether even now this manner of natural love is found in human beings or at least in the substances stripped of matter, we reply that 148  See below ch. 11; fol. 137b. 149  William begins to discuss the virtues and grace in chapter ten, where the philosophical part of the work moves into the more theological part of the work.

108 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues on account of the perversity and oppression of original corruption it is very difficult and impossible that it be found in human beings. For it so bends human nature back upon itself and so confines it around itself that it is almost impossible for it to raised up and stretched out to the creator, until it is set free from the servitude of this corruption. But in the substances stripped of matter and free from this servitude and confinement we do not doubt that such love exists and abounds. But someone will doubt whether, when the creator is loved insofar as he is benefactor or insofar as he is creator, he is loved on account of something else or is loved freely, although through other things. And if he says that the creator is not loved freely in this intention because the eye of the intention is directed to the benefits and because such benefits seem to persuade such love, he will perhaps not speak without probability. And if someone also says that such love is not pure or straight on account of the admixture of benefits and on account of the bending back of the intention toward one’s own personal advantages, he will speak correctly. One must, nonetheless, carefully distinguish what “on its own account” means. For the meaning of “on its own account” is multiple. At times “on its own account” means “the price of the effort” or “the effort’s price,” as when it is said that the will is loved on its own account because it is the price of love and because it is given or spent or rather expended in order to obtain love. It is, however, certain that with this love God is not loved in this sense of “on his account,” because one does not intend to obtain him by this love. In a second sense he is said to be loved on his own account, that is, for his advantage, as if it were said that he is loved on his own account; that is, by this love his good is intended or sought, and this, of course, now by a natural love. Insofar as he is a benefactor, he is loved on his own account because his good or the good for him is intended with a natural love, such as that it is fitting to be intended or sought for him. In no way, however, is God loved with a natural love on account of those benefits. For in that case those benefits would be loved more, and this would be iniquity and perversity, that is, that the benefits should be the end or the final cause of love for him. For this is to say that he is loved on account of the benefits, that is, out of love for the benefits, just as a teacher is loved on account of a boy, that is, out of love for the boy whose teacher he is, and in that way God would be inferior in love and would come after his benefits, just as a teacher who is loved out of love for the boy is inferior to and comes after him in love and volition. But someone will ask whether natural virtues are strengthened in such substances by the frequency of the acts and their length and firmness, as every virtue and every power is strengthened, made firm, and intensified in us by its moderate and due exercise. Why, then, in the lofty substances, that is, in the knowledge of the angels and any other that there may be, is it not the same? For since they have not ceased to do for ages what pertains to justice and kindness

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and to the other natural virtues, will such long habituation and exercise not strengthen and not increase or intensify such virtues of them? We will reply to this that such substances are not affected by the things that they do or on which they act. But it is otherwise in our souls. For our souls received new apprehensions and new volitions in all the things that they do for the first time, and thus by habituation and exercise they advance in many ways in the virtues [129b] that they practice. But the abstract substances do not act like that. For they are absolutely apart from the tumult of the modifications and impressions coming from things that are lower than them, and for this reason habituation or exercise is perhaps nothing with them, insofar as it is in them. For the actions they do in themselves are continuous, and their state is not changed in some respect in accord with the change they produce with us and in us. For example, they often produce in us or with us new illuminations and new revelations and many visitations of divine grace, and it is not necessary in any way that new modifications or impressions are produced in them on account of these. In the same way it is not necessary that some new modification is generated in the sun as a result of the new illuminations or new heating that it produces or as a result of any of its other actions. Concerning these substances, however, you will acquire certitude 150 in the treatise on such substances. For the present, however, know that the whole development of such substances is from above, that is, from the influence of the first and universal fountain and from the irradiation of the first and universal light, although our development may at times provide an occasion for such development. For there are revealed to them or to certain of them certain secrets of the providence of God, which God is pleased to produce in us through them. Hence, the mystery of the incarnation of the Son of God and of the salvation of the world was hidden through God’s providence, as well as other such things. And this is what we read in Ephesians, chapter three: In order that the manifold wisdom of God might become known to the principalities and powers in the heavens through the Church (Eph 3:10), that is to say: to the Church and through the Church. But whether it is possible to understand that text in another way you will learn in the same treatise. It is, however, evident from sensation that there is also a certain natural gracious or gratuitous love. For there is no human being who is perverted with such a great malign corruption that he does not love the good. I mean the good of a human being when it is known to him, unless he perhaps suspects that its goodness may be harmful to him, and this is properly the result of fear or pride or envy or some other such passion. Likewise, when human beings see an impious or contemptuous person or one who attacks others beaten or punished in some other way, they generally rejoice over that person’s punishments out of a 150  That is, in the second principal part of On the Universe (De universo).

110 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues natural love of justice. And it is generally true, as the holy and wise Augustine 151 says, that love of the good and the notion of it are naturally implanted in us. But if someone asks about the number of the natural virtues, we reply that it is the same as the number of kinds of goodness and of good works. In the following, however, the question about this will be determined better and more at length. If someone asks whether bodily chastity is also a natural virtue, Aristotle will reply that it is rather against nature or that it is only a certain moderation of intercourse and a mean between superfluity and lack, that is, between too much and too little, or that it is merely holding back from such pleasure out 152 of a longstanding custom. Hence, he comes to the madness that he denies 153 that those who do not feel such pleasure are chaste, though the ultimate perfection of chastity is either a lack of feeling for such pleasure or leads to it. For the ultimate perfection of the virtues is not only to make one by its actions not only unconquered or unconquerable or unable to be taken by storm, but is also to make one not subject to attack or immune from attack. We have, therefore, up to now spoken of the habitual and natural virtues, and we did this, raising and examining many scattered questions in order to propose for the studious a certain arena for their talent and matter for exercise in disputations for those who burn with the love of the truth and in order to provide for the wise an occasion for savoring more things, as we followed in this part to some extent the rudiments and the beginnings of the philosophers, by which, even if its truth is not discovered to perfection, its discovery is nonetheless somehow or other aided.

[130a]Chapter

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Now he first begins to discuss the virtues in a theological manner, and he compares the natural virtues to the feet and to the other members of the human body. But he compares the consuetudinal virtues to aids to members that are perhaps lacking or that are injured in some other way.

F

rom now on, therefore, we will examine the virtues according to their theological and sapiential depth, making it clear how far the wise men of the world were and still are from the truth of the knowledge of them. We will, therefore, say first of all that natural virtues are in our souls as feet are in human beings or in other animals and that the consuetudinal virtues are like wooden legs or helps for walking. And in general the natural virtues in our souls also stand in a likeness and proportion to our members. But the consuetudinal virtues stand in a likeness or proportion to helps for them, which we use on

151  Augustine, On the Trinity (De trinitate) 8.3.4–5; PL 42: 949–951. 152  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.11.1119a11–21. 153  Ibid. 2.11.1119a6–11.

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account of a loss of or injury to our members, as on account of the loss of a foot we use a wooden leg or on account of a loss of hands we use hooks or iron claws. So too, on account of a loss of legs we use sticks to support us, which the common folk call “crutches.” It is the same with other helps, which an injury or loss of bodily members forces us to beg and apply to ourselves. And the reason is that powers are in our souls in a certain likeness to how our members are in our bodies. Hence, injuries of them are in them as injuries to our members are in the members. Hence, helps against those injuries are like helps against those other injuries. But the injuries of the natural powers in our souls are from original sin 154 and from the original corruption that we will establish in what follows. Many of the philosophers, however, were completely ignorant of it, but many of them and of the poets were apparently able to imagine it, and many of the heretics 155 refused to believe it out of an intolerable pride. As those injured or impeded, because they are lacking in some members, are forced to seek or to fabricate for themselves helps by which they somehow or other compensate for such losses or injuries, either for walking or for some other action, so those of us injured or impeded in our natural powers necessarily have to work to acquire the helps of the consuetudinal virtues and to produce them for us by the great labor and difficulty of developing a habit. But know that, as by wooden legs or other helps for walking, one never walks correctly, so one never acts as correctly by the consuetudinal virtues as one walks by the others, and the reason is that such injuries and impediments to the natural powers are never perfectly healed by them. Hence, such injuries and impediments also remain with them in part, and as we have also previously noted, it is either difficult or impossible that all the injuries and impediments to our natural powers be helped by such virtues on account of the amount of time and habituation that they require. But our life is brief and not readily receptive to form so many and such great habits that it can receive them in so short a time. It is already, therefore, evident to you that the efficient cause of the natural virtues and the giver of them is immediately and of himself the creator and that they are like the organs of our good voluntary actions—I mean perfect organs having no injury or impediment. And they are, as we already stated, the decor of our souls and their primary beauty and [130b] fundamental or radical perfection. But the consuetudinal virtues are like certain helps and supplements to defects and injuries, but ones that never attain the perfection of the natural vir154  William does this in ch. 11 or this work and in On the Soul (De anima) ch. 5, pts.10–13. 155  William frequently blames Aristotle for failing to understand that our present misery is explicable only by a primal sin. He is perhaps referring to Ovid’s Metamorphoses in which Prometheus’ theft of fire led to the end of the Golden Age. The Pelagian heretics, against whom Augustine wrote during the last twenty years of his life, held that we are now born in the same condition as that in which Adam was created.

112 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues tues either in decor or in strength, and the reason is that the natural members adorn each person more than their supplements and those members naturally given to each person inhere and adhere more firmly than adventitious or acquired ones. But the need because of which they are established is the need for moral goodness and for a good life for which human nature universally admits and testifies that we are born.

Chapter Eleven He shows that our natural goods are not sufficient to merit the reward of eternal happiness, as some heretics think, namely, the Pelagians, who denied that grace is necessary. But our author says that it is so necessary in the present life that he says that a soul that is perfect in all the natural and consuetudinal virtues is not able to receive or to be capable of glory and that for this reason other perfections are required than those that come from the natural and consuetudinal virtues.

B

ut from here on we will try to examine whether there are other virtues more lofty and more noble than these, which the creator gave to his chosen and beloved ones like wings for flying to the height of eternal beatitude and happiness, something that we recall that we stated at some point. For many people and especially heretics thought that our natural goods alone can suffice for living well and for serving the creator in a worthy and praiseworthy manner and for meriting from him the reward of eternal happiness. And the Pelagian heretics were men of this sort; they denied that there is grace and held that it was not at all necessary. And there were others who claimed that there is no difference between the natural virtues and the graces in terms of species or substance, but only in terms of more or less. Neither of them acknowledged the essences, benefits, or necessity of these graces. But it seems to support their view that there is nothing intervening between the nature of the abstract substances, that is, of the holy angels, and their glory, but since their nature was perfect and immune from every injury or impediment, it was found to be receptive of glory without the intervention of grace. 156 Why, then, cannot human souls likewise be receptive of glory by the perfection of the natural virtues alone without the means of the graces? But if someone says that human souls are further removed from the loftiness of their glory than the angelic substances, it is evident that this is not true, when their natural perfectability has been brought to the act of its perfection. For then the perfection that is natural for the holy angels, even from their very creation, will undoubtedly be acquired by human souls. Hence, there will not then be a difference between the holy angels and human souls that have thus become perfect in proximity to or distance from glory. But since we hold that grace 156  I have conjectured “glory, gloriae” here instead of “grace, gratiae.”

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intervenes between nature and glory only on account of the necessity of the present state, with regard to Adam and Eve insofar as it pertains to their state before sin, and on account on the present misery, which is in part original corruption and in part arises from it, the intention of the present undertaking is to establish such grace in view of the needs of our present life, which must be correct and acceptable to the creator and have the other perfections, which we 157 say cannot come only from the natural and consuetudinal [131a] virtues. Know too that, however perfect the nature of the human mind is with the natural and consuetudinal virtues, it is not able to receive glory, which is clear from the following. For if a drop—in fact what should not be called even a drop—of the divine bounty induces the death of the body, as at times happens in the rapture and ecstasy of the saints, as blessed Augustine explains in book 158 twelve of On Genesis Literally Interpreted happened in the rapture of Paul, for how much better reason will it not sustain the immensity of the divine brilliance when it presents itself and pours itself out unveiled? For this presentation and outpouring of glory is the excellence of our intellective power, and this is what we read in Exodus, chapter thirty-three: A human being will not see me and live (Ex 33:20), because human life, as it is in this life, does not sustain the brilliance of the vision of God. The passage in Job, chapter twenty-six, is similar: Since we hear scarcely a small drop of his speech, who will be able to gaze upon the thunder of his greatness? ( Jb 26:14). Moreover, it is evident from sensation that death of the body also results from the greatness and strength of each of the spiritual passions for those experiencing them, for example, from the strength of love, fear, or joy. But it is evident that, no matter how great bodily joy is in relation to the torrent of the pleasure of glory, it is not like a drop in relation to a sea or to a river. Hence, it follows of necessity that, if bodily joy extinguishes the present life by its greatness, for much better reason the torrent of the pleasure of glory does so by its immensity. From this it is also explained to you that Adam and Eve in the state of the perfection of their natural powers and virtues were in no way able to receive glory until they were transferred to life that is immortal and incapable of suffering, although their life was far stronger and more solid in that state and far less subject to sufferings than ours. From this it ought also to be evident to you that a bodily paradise of the sort that the perfidy of Mohamed dreamed up cannot exist along with a spiritual 159 paradise. But we will not explain this because neither paradise itself nor the 157  I have conjectured “virtues, virtutibus” instead of “powers, viribus.” 158  See Augustine, On Genesis Literally Interpreted (De Genesi ad litteram) 12.27.55— 28.56 where Augustine explains Paul’s vision of the very substance of God when he was rapt to the third heaven, as he says in 2 Cor 12. 159  See The Koran, Sura 56, 7–39.

114 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues name of such a pseudo-paradise, if it were possible, would belong to it in any other way than a dunghill and mud hole is a paradise of pigs. For no impurity can be thought comparable to that paradise. But let us return to where we were and say that we here understand by grace the help of the divine generosity for doing what is good and pleasing to the creator and deserving of his remuneration, which is the reward of eternal happiness, and also for fighting against oneself and against all the things that attack us with a spiritual attack, and also for conquering oneself and all the things that attack us with the aforementioned attack, and again for holding, retaining, and restraining oneself, for bridling, tying down, taming, and subjecting oneself with perfect control, and also for preserving oneself unwounded and completely without injury amid the swords, spears, arrows, and all the enemy weapons striking from every direction and trying to inflict spiritual death, likewise, for keeping oneself cool in the midst of the flames and in the midst of the Babylonian furnace, not only without being burned, but also without becoming 160 hot, free from chains, shackles, and prison, and, to be brief, free in slavery and most clean in a sewer of impurity. And there are many other similar things in the bitterness of this life, on account of which life was said to be warfare and 161 temptation in Job, chapter seven. We will, therefore, accept from sensation such presuppositions in every faculty, as is permitted to those who philosophize, which need not be evident to the senses of every individual, just as the astrologers accept from sensation the revolution of all the stars and of the starry heaven, though they are not evident to the senses of every individual because not everyone has applied his senses to know them. In the same way it is not evident to everyone that our common struggle is not against flesh and blood, but [131b] against the principalities and powers, against the rulers of the world of this darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in the heavens (Eph 6:12). But countless holy men and holy women have known from sensation that the demons attack them with every kind of attack, that is, through gentleness and harshness, as the apostle himself said about himself in chapter twelve of the Second Letter to the Corinthians: And lest, he said, the greatness of my revelations should fill me with pride, an angel of Satan was given me in order to strike me (2 Cor 12:7). By sense experience that fact was made known to the first parents, whom the demons despoiled and wounded gravely in their natural characteristics and expelled from the joys and 162 happiness of the earthly paradise, as we read in Genesis, chapter three. Job also knew that fact from sense experience, as Satan also tried to induce him by 160  See Dn 3: 19–23 and 91–92. 161  See Jb 7:1. 162  See Gn 3:7–24.

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such great attacks and cunning to curse God, as we read in Job, chapter one. By the deceit of the same one Christ the Lord himself was tested in himself in many ways by him, as we read in Matthew, chapter four, Mark, chapter one, 164 and Luke, chapter four. And this experience has continued up to our time, for we have listened to many who complain about such temptations, who report in their misery the various scourges that they suffered from demons and ask our counsel about them. But we have listened to holy men and priests who consult holy and wise men and bishops over such temptations and afflictions. Countless such temptations have been left for us in the writings of the saints. Just as, then, it was 165 166 permitted to Ptolemy to presuppose those things that Ambrachius had experienced before him in matters of astronomy and it was permitted to those who came after Ptolemy to presuppose those things that Ptolemy grasped by his studies both concerning the stars and the lights of heaven, so it ought to be permitted to us to presuppose those reports of such great persons which so venerable an antiquity has left for us in their writings and which we know by our own experience and which each individual can also experience in himself or in others, if they want to make diligent use of their senses for this. For it is not permissible or in any way proper that the salutary truth, which we intend to snatch and vindicate from the midst of these contradictions, should be of a lower condition than that truth whose investigation has more toil than fruit. Once, then, this is presupposed, namely, that we must wage war and achieve victory against such powers, and also something else that is self-evident, namely, that they are far stronger and cleverer than we are, it clearly follows that besides our natural powers and prudence there is necessary for us a help that is clearly nothing but a gift of divine grace. But we will name for you and list these helps, of which one is the skill in waging war, namely, that which David knew when he said: Blessed is the Lord my God who trains my hands for battle and my fingers for war (Ps 143:1). For this reason it was said in Proverbs, chapter twenty-four: A wise man is strong, and a learned man robust and mighty (Prv 24:5). Likewise, there are the words from Wisdom, chapter eight: Dreadful kings will fear me, and among many I will appear good and in war strong (Wis 8:15). Just as spying and exploration are great helps to those waging war and likewise other skills in waging war, so this 163  See Jb 1:6–2:10. The Latin text refers to chapter nine, but that does not fit at all. 164  See Mt 4:1–11, Mk 1:12, and Lk 4:1–13. 165  Ptolemy (Claudius Ptolemaeus) was an Egyptian astronomer who died in the second century from whom the medieval world inherited the Ptolemaic system. 166  Ambrachius was apparently an astronomer upon whom Ptolemy depended for various data. Ptolemy relied on the observation of Theon of Alexandria, his teacher, and Ambrachius may be an Arabic version of his name.

116 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues prudence by which are known the plots, cleverness, as well as the strengths of the previously mentioned enemies, are great helps for spiritual persons. A second help is an attack upon the enemies that merciful God at times produces by himself, when he fights for his warriors, as we read in Exodus, chapter fourteen: Let us flee from Israel. The Lord God is fighting for them (Ex 14:25). And in chapter fifteen of the same book we read: The Lord is like a fighting man (Ex 15:3). David recognized this help when he said to him: Take up arms, and [132a] rise up to my help (Ps 34:2). A third help is the restraining or tying down of the enemies by which the mercy of God holds such enemies bound so that they do not fight against us as much as they might want, as is seen in Job. Satan asked God to give him the power to tempt him, when he said: Stretch out your hand against Job ( Jb 1:11). And in the Psalm it says: And the whelps of lions roar in order that they may snatch and seek from God food for themselves (Ps 103:21), that is, they seek the death of our souls, for whose death they hunger and thirst, and in which 167 their powers were bound by being tied down. For God does not send our souls into their jaws, but only permits them to tempt us and to fight against us. On this account the apostle says in chapter ten of One Corinthians: God is faithful who does not allow you to be tempted beyond what you can endure (1 Cor 168 10:13). A fourth help is consolation or comfort. How great a help it is can be seen from its opposite, namely, faintheartedness and failure of spirit. Nothing brings down those who are fighting more than this, and nothing defeats them more shamefully than this, because without any wound or any blow it compels them to turn their tails to the enemy and flee. A fifth help is protection, and this protection is like that by which the three boys were protected in the Babylonian furnace and preserved unharmed in the 169 midst of the fire and which God promises his elect in Isaiah, chapter fortythree: When you pass through water, I will be with you, and rivers will not cover you. When you walk in fire, you will not be burned, and the flame will not burn you (Is 43:2), and so on. We read about this protection in chapter five of Wisdom: His right hand will protect them, and by his holy arm God will defend them (Wis 5:17). After all, who would doubt that God works wonders in certain of his holy ones, in fact in all those of adult age. For all the desirable things of this world are a fire for setting ablaze the hearts of human beings. But in the midst of such great fires the hearts of his elect are cold from the fire of evil desires, and this comes only from God’s protection and by no less a miracle than that 167  I have conjectured “being tied down, religatione” instead of “being released, relaxatione.” 168  The Latin text says “Two Corinthians,” which is incorrect. 169  See Dn 3:49–50.

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by which those three boys in the Babylonian furnace were preserved unharmed 170 in their bodies. A sixth help of divine grace is the marvelous strength of divine grace, like the strength that is said in Judges, chapters fourteen, fifteen, and sixteen, to have 171 been given to Sampson beyond other human beings. For just as that bodily strength in him was marvelous to the foreigners, and a similar strength was not naturally found among human beings, so marvelous examples of strength are always found in holy men and women, such as the strength of Moses and 172 of Elijah in fasting and similar examples of strength for suffering and for acting were found in the martyrs and confessors, and we experience them even today in other saints. For who would not admire their vigils, their persistence in prayer, their labor in chanting the Psalms, and the examples of strength in holy men in the practice of the other sacred exercises? And who would dare to attribute them to nature when the whole nature of human beings admires them as loftier than natural ones? A seventh help of divine grace is armor on those waging war—the sort of armor that we have at times called patience, which preserves the hearts of all the saints invulnerable against the fiery darts of the enemy. So also, some holy men are armed by the sword of the Spirit, which is the word of God, so that, wherever they use it, it puts to flight the host of spiritual enemies, as we read about Elijah in Ecclesiasticus, chapter forty-eight: Elijah the prophet arose like fire, and his word burned like a coal (Sir 48:1). For this reason it is said in the Psalm that a sword is on their lips (Ps 58:8), and another version has: And death is on their lips. But on the lips of certain people the word of God is not a sword nor the death of death, but is like a melodious song that is sung with a pleasant and sweet sound (Ez 33:32), as the Lord says in Ezekiel, chapter thirty-three. For in preaching they do not behave like those who are fighting with a sword or like those aiming at death for their enemies by means of the word of God, but rather like those practicing humorous or theatrical or musical gestures. [132b] These then are the seven helps necessary for those waging war, and under one of them we include the guardianship and protection of the angels, which the Lord calls a fence or a wall in Isaiah, chapter five, where he says: I will take away its fence, and it will fall into ruin. I will destroy its wall, and it will be trampled upon (Is 5:5). For we should not doubt that the holy angels calm down, ward off, and restrain the demons so that they do not harm human beings as much as they would want, as we read in Tobit, chapter seven, that Raphael seized the demon by the name of Asmodeus and bound him in the desert of upper Egypt (Tb 8:3). 170  See ibid. 171  See Jgs 14–16. 172  See Ex 34:28 and 1 Kgs 19:8.

118 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues But it is evident that every prince and every leader provides help to the army of his warriors proportionate to his power and ability and in accord with the warriors’ needs. Otherwise, he would deal with them unjustly and treacherously, exposing them to the sword of the enemy, and he would send them to war unprepared to his own shame and loss. Hence, it is necessary that the King of kings give to his army all the helps that we mentioned and listed because the need of such helps is evident in the whole army of the saints, and he has in himself the ability to give such helps. Hence, it is evident from these considerations that the grace of God is necessary for human beings, who are God’s warriors, amid such great perils of spiritual wars, and it is also evident that, as we said, this grace is above nature as a help for gaining victory. But we will make this clearer if we disclose the misery and weakness of human souls, which can easily meet with agreement in each person. For it is evident that in the state of its present life the human soul is exposed, as unarmed against every sword and as 173 dry tinder for spiritual fire. A certain sign of dryness is its readiness to burn. For it immediately blazes up at contact with or at the touch of fire and is completely consumed, unless the contact immediately ceases. There is no soul that can fail to experience this in itself. For as soon as something desirable occurs to it in thought or touches it by sensation, it blazes with desire or lust for it, and unless the contact passes, it wholly goes up in flames and blazes with the ardor of passion. The same desirable object is a single sword of deadly love, entering and piercing the human heart as soon as it touches it. From the ease, namely, of its being pierced we see its not being protected, that is, by protective armor. Because, therefore, without the previously mentioned helps human souls constantly suffer such burns and wounds, it is evident that they are dry timber exposed to such fires and unprotected against such swords. It is also evident that by themselves they are situated in the midst of such fires and in the midst of such swords. Thus it is also evident that all things are troublesome with fire and sword, for example, ignominies, injuries, troubles, or torments. All these things burn souls with anger and hatred and inflict wounds of pain on them. Moreover, all desirable objects are snares for trapping them and prisons for holding them. For the soul of a lover is held captive and bound in everything that is wrongly loved, and there are countless other miseries to which human souls are exposed in the state of the present misery, from which they are unable to defend themselves by their natural powers. Because, then, it is no less a miracle nor a mark of lesser virtue for a human soul to remain unharmed in the midst of spiritual fire than for the body to remain unharmed in the midst of bodily fire, and because it is in no way due to a natural power that a combustible body remains unharmed in the midst of fire and flames, it is evident that it is in no way due to a natural power that a human soul is preserved unharmed 173  I have conjectured “sign, indicium” instead of “judgment, judicium.”

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in the midst of such fire and flames. Hence, it is necessary that this be due to a more lofty and noble power. It comes, therefore, either from the protection of divine nature by itself, as we said, [133a] or from the help given gratuitously to the natural powers by the divine goodness for their preservation and defense. But someone might say that our souls need nothing better than that their natural powers be good and that their natural good powers suffice, that is, that they need only be purified or healed. For our souls are able to protect themselves by the purity and health of their natural powers alone. We reply that in Adam and Eve and in the angels who fell, their natural powers were most pure and most strong, and yet they were not defended and preserved by that purity and health. We reply to that objection that, however great the natural purity and health of our good souls, they still are defiled and weakened by the impurity and corruption of our bodies. For it is certain that our souls are created most pure and most holy, but are corrupted and weakened, nonetheless, by 174 union with bodies, as we said. Moreover, if a soul, no matter how healthy in its natural powers, should be joined to a feverish body, that is, one that has in itself a slight disorder of fever, will it not feel the feverish heat and temperatures and shakes? Will it not similarly experience a lack of taste and bitterness of the mouth? And it is necessary that the other objects of the senses or sources of delight or sadness behave in the same way. Hence, it is necessary that the soul be weakened in accord with the weakness of the body and be corrupted in accord with its corruption with respect to its lower powers, and the reason is that in terms them it is not only joined to the body, but also to punishment so that whatever change is produced in the body is also somehow or other produced in it according to one of the previously mentioned powers. Hence, it has already been explained to you by these considerations that the health and purity of its natural goods cannot remain by themselves in our souls along with the corruption and impurity in which our bodies are found in the state of present misery. For there is so great a union, in fact so great a fellowship and communion of our souls and bodies that the corruption and weakness of our souls necessarily follows upon the corruption and weakness of our bodies. Moreover, as the eye stands in relation to the power to see and the foot in relation to the power to walk, so the whole body stands in relation to the whole soul. Just as, then, when the eye is clouded or otherwise obstructed, it disturbs or impedes the activity of the power to see and just as when the foot is bound or twisted, it disturbs or impedes the activity of the power to walk, twisting it and causing it to limp, so, when the whole body is somehow injured or impeded, it injures and impedes the activities of the whole soul in the part of its injury or impediment. And this is generally true in natural instruments as well as in 174  See above, chapter nine, fol. 124b–125a.

120 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues artificial ones, as when the cords in a harp are shortened or ineptly stretched, the activity of playing the harp is impeded by this. And it is the same way with other things. Because, then, the human body has been injured and corrupted in its interior, in fact in its inmost parts, it necessarily injures and corrupts the inmost activities of our souls, which take place in it and through it. Moreover, if a corrupt humor corrupts and perverts, though naturally, the power to taste and the external, that is, bodily appetitive power, how much more will the natural and inmost substance of the heart corrupt and pervert the palate of the heart and the interior appetitive power! This corruption and perversion is, of course, evident to the senses when things good for us so universally taste bad and things bad for us taste good. For what sweet and bitter are to the palate of the body, good and evil are to the palate of the heart. Goodness and badness, after all, are the flavors of spiritual things, and for this reason someone is a genuinely wise person and endowed with good spiritual taste for whom things taste as they are, that is good things [133b] taste good and bad things taste bad. Moreover, the nature of our souls does not by itself withdraw itself from the corruption and perversity of our bodies, nor is it by itself able to conquer it. In fact, it is attracted to it, conquered by it, and involved with it. A most suitable example and most certain indication of this is found in a highly skilled physician who is feverish. For when a thirst for a harmful drink or the appetite for something else that is bound to harm his health or to increase his illness grows strong in him, neither his skill nor his love for his own well-being and health restrains him from the perverse appetite. In fact, his skill is obscured, and the love of health is swallowed up in him, and he entirely goes after such a desire, not caring about the risk to his life. You see, therefore, that this corruption and perversity of the bodily appetite conquers and drags captive after it the whole soul of the physician to the risk of bodily death, and his great skill in the art of medicine cannot resist it, nor can the great desire for health. It is similar in the spiritual passions, such as the appetite for carnal pleasure and other perverse desires, and when they begin to burn, neither the natural love of morality nor the wisdom, however great, of any writings suffice to extinguish and conquer them and to defend the soul from them. Perhaps, however, in their beginnings, when they are still weak and like merely sparks, the soul is able to overcome them as a result of its own natural goods. But when they have grown into flames and fires, like fury and insanity and like bestial madness and a violent storm, they carry the soul off captive into every danger. The poet seems perhaps to have seen this, who said, “A remedy is prepared too late when evils have grown strong over long stretches 175 of time.” He, of course, spoke only of a natural remedy because he did not 175  Ovid, Remedies for Love (Remedia amoris) 91–92.

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teach about any other against the disease of such love. For nature devised all those remedies. But someone might say that free will is enough for each person to resist such fires since no one sins or can sin except voluntarily and no one can do anything evil entirely against his will. Hence, if he does not will to be overcome, he will not be overcome, and if he does not will to succumb, he will not succumb so 176 that “he wills not to” is understood as a single expression from the verb “nill,” not from the verb “not to will.” We reply that, if someone really wills to conquer any temptation, he conquers it. I mean if he wills precisely and absolutely. I do not mean if he would will. But the human soul cannot will in that manner of willing by itself—that is, on the basis of its own natural goods—at every moment, because at that moment when the objects causing desire or sadness have penetrated into it, it cannot preserve itself unharmed and unwounded, just as a dry tree cannot in the midst of a fire, and just as even a green tree cannot leaf out or flower or produce branches in such a state. For it is so bound to the cor177 ruption of the body that, when it is burned by external objects causing desire or sadness, it has necessarily of itself to follow after it. But we have spoken about this in what went before, and we will speak about it more in detail in 178 what follows, namely, in the treatise, On Temptations and Their Resistance. Let us, therefore, return to the point at which we were and say that human nature does not suffer a defect in knowledge or in the certitude of knowledge in relation to those things that are beneath it, namely, in relation to those things that pertain to the flesh and to the world, whether they are good or bad, and it is also perfectly perceptive in relation to them, for example, in relation to fire and water, in relation to swords, torments, chains, and prisons, in relation to happiness and deformities, to wounds, death, and all other similar bodily evils, and it has most certain knowledge and infallible sensation with regard to them, and similarly with regard to their contraries. But with regard to the analogous previously mentioned spiritual goods and evils, [134a] it does not have certitude of knowledge nor sensation. For this reason it rushes without pain into spiritual swords and fires and into spiritual death, which is the separation of the soul from God. Let us, then, suppose that it has a perfection in relation to spiritual things similar to what it has in relation to carnal things. There will, therefore, be in it equal spirituality and carnality. Hence, in that case neither will conquer the other. If, then, one decreases infinitely, the other will remain infinitely stronger 176  In English the verb “nill” is obsolete, although a trace remains in the expression “willy-nilly,” but Latin had both “velle” and “nolle,” which are equivalent to “to will” and “to nill.” 177  I have conjectured “burned, adusta” instead of “helped, adjuta.” 178  See On Temptations and Their Resistance (De tentationibus et resistentiis) is the third part of the whole On the Virtues and Vices (De virtutibus et vitiis).

122 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues than it. But it is this way in the state of this misery because there is almost no spirituality in our souls either in perception or certitude. For although God is the fountain of all sweetness, he is utterly lacking in sweetness to our souls, and 179 we sense neither the scent nor the flavor of his sweetness. We perceive hardly at all the beauty and sweetness of the virtues, and we not only do not see that the wounds of sins are death, but we even delight in them most insanely. Next, who sees that this world is a spiritual sea for drowning and killing our souls? I mean, sees this with as clear a vision as the visible sea is seen to be for submerging works. Similarly, who sees the spiritual perils of this spiritual 180 sea, namely, the Syrtes, the Sirens, Scilla and Charybdis, storms and other spiritual dangers. Who sees them with a vision like the vision by which similar bodily dangers are seen? From these considerations and many others that you can easily gather, it is evident to you that our spiritual self, that is, what in us is higher and more noble, has been infinitely pressed down and has become weaker than that which is lower in us, namely, our carnal self. But it is necessary that our spiritual self conquer and overcome our carnal self and that spirituality prevail in us against our carnality. It is necessary, therefore, that a help be given to us that is sufficient to defend and preserve our spiritual self and to subject, trample down, and constantly mortify our carnal self, and this is what we call grace, namely, the gratuitous gift of the creator that is applied to our natural powers in order that spirituality may conquer, overcome, take captive, and mortify our carnality. You see, therefore, the necessity that forces us to admit grace. Moreover, we have already explained that, in order that our apprehensive power may be religious and acceptable to God, it needs a more lofty and more noble knowledge than its natural knowledge is or any other knowledge that is naturally acquired. But our noble moving power owes no less a debt of reli181 giousness than that apprehensive power. Hence, in order that it may be religious and acceptable to God, there is necessary for it a loftier and more noble love than any natural love of him is, which is not a love either of grace or of glory. For the human soul in this state is not capable nor receptive of the loves 182 of glory, as we have already explained. Hence, it does not in this state need the love of glory. But it does need in this state the love of grace. Moreover, the flesh lusts against the spirit, and the spirit lusts against the flesh. For these are opposed to each other (Gal 5:17), as the apostle says in chapter five 179  I have conjectured “scent, odorem” instead of “honor, honorem.” 180  The Syrtes are the treacherous sand banks off the coast of North Africa; the Sirens were mythical birds with the faces of virgins who lured sailors to their ruin. Charybdis was a dangerous whirlpool between Sicily and Italy opposite the dangerous rocks of Scylla. 181  The noble apprehensive power is in William’s Avicennian language the intellect, and the noble appetitive power is the will. 182  See above, this chapter, fol. 131a.

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of the Letter to the Galatians. Either, then, they are equally strong, or one is stronger. For if they are equally strong, why, then, is the victory of the spirit over the flesh so rare and the victory of the flesh over the spirit so frequent? After all, the victories ought to be equal in number and magnitude since they have equal causes. But if the flesh is stronger, the spirit needs help against it. For by itself the less strong cannot conquer the stronger, and this is the help that we are seeking. But someone might say that God is the helper of those who are fighting, giving victory to them by his power, without adding something new to their souls, just as, when he fought for the children of Israel, casting down by his power the Egyptians [134b] or other enemies of the children of Israel. Such an objector, first of all, destroys the victory for such warriors. For someone who does not conquer by his own power does not conquer. After all, in this case the adversary is killed by someone else—I mean by someone else whose power does not belong to him. We say this on account of kings, who are said to conquer when their armies conquer, although they personally do not fight, for their power is in some sense the power of the army. After all, the royal power is the army. Moreover, an army fights in the name of the king and by his authority. Hence, by that trope and manner of speaking he fights. Hence, he also conquers. But if out of a love for a person someone kills or otherwise conquers his enemy, that person should not be for that reason said to have either killed or conquered the enemy. It is evident, therefore, that someone who speaks in that way destroys the victory. Hence, he also destroys its crown. Moreover, the objector destroys all virtue and goodness in the elect. For since according to him a person cannot conquer the dissoluteness in himself by something that is in him, he cannot, therefore, be said to have chastity, since if chastity is or can be anything, it is a virtue and goodness by which dissoluteness is resisted and its evil conquered. And it is this way with the others. Moreover, the objector destroys both merits and good works because according to this error good works are not necessary at all, since God by himself and by his own power produces the resistance to and destruction of the vices, and similarly he destroys all other goods for the same reason. Hence, from neither side will there be merits, that is, neither from resistance to or mortification of the vices, nor in the love of other goods, because the love of good things is to be attributed to God no less than the avoidance of evils ones. Moreover, we have already explained in another treatise, namely, in the chap183 ter, On Faith, what sort of service our noble apprehensive power owes to the creator, and this is to believe him above oneself and against oneself. Because, then, the creator is no less good than he is true or truthful and because such 183  See William, On Faith (De fide), ch. 1, fol. 7a.

124 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues service is owed him by reason of his truth, a similar service will be due to him from our noble moving power by reason of his goodness. But if someone says that the first service is not owed to him by reason of his truth or truthfulness, but by reason of his lordship, that is, because he is Lord and commands that he be believed in that way, that person of course speaks the truth, but in the same way he commands that he be loved, namely, as above all things and in contrast to all things, and that he be loved gratuitously. For if the former is beyond the strength of our intellective power and beyond its ability and is a gift coming to it from above, the latter will for this reason be above the ability of the moving power and be a gift coming from above. For God did not make that apprehensive power in any way more powerful for knowing than he made this moving power powerful for loving, nor the converse. Hence, a gratuitous gift of the divine goodness is necessary for our moving power. Moreover, in the same place we said and explained that to love the good as good or because it is good is not virtuous without qualification, nor does it have grace or merit. For such love is persuaded by the goodness of another or attracted by benefits, like the love of friends and benefactors. Hence, it has nothing of praise or grace, in accord with the testimony of the Truth in the 184 Gospel. But to love someone evil or an enemy is a mark of virtue and of the grace of the lover, and it is necessary in general to explain and establish virtuous love or virtue by the same paths by which we established and explained faith as a virtue. For just as someone who is persuaded by its probability or is forced by the evidence of its truth or by syllogistic necessity does not believe it by his own virtue and by his own light, so to speak, namely, in that respect, but by another light, namely, that which either probability brings or the evidence of that truth sends forth or the necessity of [135a] of demonstration imposes and determines, so too he does not love something in its goodness by his own virtue or his own goodness. The intellect loves it, drawn off, not by its own heat, so to speak, but by that of another. For such is the goodness of another, which is, of course, a spiritual fire for warming hearts with the warmth of love when 185 it warms them. Moreover, this generation of love is natural. The natural generation of de186 sire is through apprehension, as Aristotle says, because the delightful object moves the imagination, and that motion is understood to be desire, nor did Aristotle intend any but a natural generation of desire. But that whose generation is natural is itself natural. Hence, such love or desire by which something else is loved as good is only natural. 184  See Mt 5:46. 185  I have conjectured the plural “them, ipsa” instead of the singular “it, ipsum.” 186  See Aristotle, On the Soul 3.10.433a18–21.

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Moreover, who would fail to see that it is inborn in each of us to love the good as good and because it is good and that love is naturally generated through apprehension of the good? In the same way heat is generated through light. For light is related to heat as apprehension or knowledge of goodness is to love. Notice, therefore, that love of God because he is good and insofar as he is good 187 exists in the lover as a result of the gift and goodness of God, just as heat exists in what is bright and luminous and just as becoming hot does. But it is the same in natural production and generation. But virtuous love, which we aim to establish here, is likewise from the divine goodness, but not through apprehension nor through natural generation, as we said, but through being given, so to speak, and as a gift. But if someone asks whether such love is created by God, we say that it is, but that other love is not created by God; in fact it is produced by him in an188 other manner of production. For creation is the work of the divine will alone without any other manner of production by anything at all. But in that case there is not a production without a means, because apprehension is a means. In the same way God does not properly create heat because he produces it in this lower world by means of the light of the sun, but it is evident that God creates love, however good, in the way in which he is said to be the creator of all things and to have created all things. But if someone asks how love is created and generated without apprehension although heat is seen to be generated in many things without light, we reply that heat is generated from motion alone or light and that the element of fire, which surrounds, moves around the whole air, and covers it from above, is dark in itself, that is, lacking light, although it is hot in the ultimate degree of heat. For if it were luminous, the whole heavens would always be seen to be ablaze with light and would cover the whole air from above as if with flame. 189 Moreover, we explained in the treatise, On Baptism that all the virtues and all the gifts of the graces, which the need for salvation requires, are infused at the same time in baptized infants. And it is evident that this happens without apprehension unless perhaps one would call apprehension in this case the sense of touch by which the little one feels the cold holy water poured over it and 190 into which it is plunged. And in general the gifts of the graces and virtues with which we are dealing here are infused for the most part without apprehension of their realities and not by means of an apprehension productive of them, although at times something of them is infused with apprehension, as at times the grace of compunction and the grace of devotion, and many graces of 187  188  189  190 

I have conjectured “gift, dono” instead of “house, domo.” I have omitted “creation and, creationis et” to preserve the sense. William’s On Baptism (De baptismo) is part of his treatise, De sacramentis. I have conjectured “which, quam” instead of “water, aquam.”

126 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues revelations are often infused in those who hear holy exhortations or meditate on the things of God. And because those things that we said, when speaking 191 about faith in the previously mentioned treatise, ought to suffice to you for establishing such love, we will not repeat them here. You, therefore, ought to recall them in order that we may pursue other things. If, therefore, someone asks how [135b] God is loved by such love, namely, gratuitous love, that is, love gratuitously given, and not by a natural love, but by one above nature, we will say that by such love one virtuously and mightily intends him whose honor and glory is sought, and he is loved by it insofar as he is good, but not because he is good, as we have determined and as we have said regarding faith that it is the obedience of our noble apprehensive power, which is the intellective power. And just as by such faith all the things that pertain to the foundation of the true religion are believed, so by such love all the things that pertain to the honor and glory of God are loved, sought, done, and endured. Similarly, all his wishes are carried out and their contraries avoided. By such love one’s own death is also loved and made an object of delight, and in this way such love undoubtedly conquers its own nature and itself. For out of a natural love one might be able to endure death for someone he loved in that way, but death could not be loved since it is so bitter and such an enemy to nature. But if someone asks about the most insane heretics who seem to love death with a most demented love and not only to endure it bravely, but also to em192 brace it with delight, we now reply to this that, just as what is weakness and frailty seems to be courage and patience in them, so what can seem to be love in them is madness, not love, and the devil mocks them, just as children are often mocked when one pretends that a fall is a jump, and however much they injure themselves by jumps, their nurses and mothers say to them, “How well you jumped, my son!” By flattery they believe that they jumped vigorously rather than fell foolishly. It is for this reason, after all, that they rejoice over an injury from a fall, not, of course, with a genuine joy, but rather with an imagined one, like mad persons laughing and grumbling. Moreover, just as faith is weak and lame that depends upon dispositions that 193 exist in its object, as we explained in the previously mentioned treatise, so love also is weak that depends on the goodness of its objects. Hence, just as such faith is not a virtue, so such love will not be a virtue either. But if someone says that love that is directed toward God is so firm and is a virtue merely because the goodness of God on which it relies is immutable and 191  William, On Faith (De fide), ch. 1, fol. 7b. 192  The more radical Manichees of Augustine’s time, namely, the Circumcellions, were known for their acts of suicide for their faith. See Augustine, On Heresies (De haeresibus) 69.4; PL 42: 43. 193  See William, On Faith (De fide), ch. 1, fols. 4b–5a.

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fixed and strong in the ultimate degree of strength, he obviously is mistaken, just as a lame person is not firmer merely because the pavement is more solid, nor is a foot itself stronger merely because a brace is attached to a lame foot. In the same way our love or our noble moving power is not firmer in that respect because it relies on the strongest support of the divine goodness, nor is its foot, that is, love, less lame. For in this same way lame and blind people walking the same street or pavement would walk with equal firmness. But this is not true, and the reason is that, although they rely on the same support of firmness, they do not rely on it with equal strength, but the lame do so weakly. But such an example is evident in a man with one foot mutilated, because his walk is not straighter if he walks with a iron artificial leg than with a wooden one, nor is he himself firmer or stronger in himself, and concerning these points we have satisfied you in what went before. Moreover, if our apprehensive power received noble illuminations from above us that are more lofty and more excellent than natural ones, why will our noble moving power not likewise receive from above perfections suitable to it that are better than natural ones, since it needs them more and lacks them with greater peril? For if it is defeated in any war with the vices, nothing of the rest remains for us, but if it is defended and preserved, everything else is safe, and we emerge as victors. Moreover, it is evident that prophecy is an illumination above all the lights of our souls. [136a] It is, however, evident that prophecy comes, not because of the vision or activity of our nature, but solely because of the gratuitous gift of the creator. In that way there are many other illuminations of the sort, such as all the revelations of those things, of which the natural possibility of the human intellect does not attain knowledge. Either, then, along with these God will give proportionate loves to those to whom he gives such illuminations, or he will not. If he gives them, we have what we are aiming at, but if he does not, then, the prophets will be loftier than some human beings in the light of prophecy alone, but similar to or equal to them in the other respects. But it has always been apparent that this is clearly false. For the prophets have always stood forth as holier and loftier than other holy men to the extent that their prophecies were brighter with light. Moreover, since natural knowledge is not lower than natural love and not more distant from the state of glory, but there intervenes between natural knowledge and that which belongs to glory an intermediate knowledge, which is faith, as we have explained, there will, therefore, intervene between natural love and that love which belongs to glory an intermediate love, and in this way it is possible to show this concerning the other volitions and habits, namely, concerning hope, fear, and any others. But if someone asks whether the apprehension or knowledge that belongs or will belong to glory begets a love congruous with it in glory, we reply that it is

128 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues not necessary because everything that pertains to glory will be infused into the human soul at the same time, not one part after another, but everything will flow at the same time from the one fountain. And if we granted this, it would not be against what we are saying here, but rather against our opponents. For if natural knowledge begets natural love and the knowledge that belongs to 194 glory begets that love which belongs to glory, then, that knowledge which belongs to grace, namely, faith, will beget a love congruous with it, which will at 195 the same time belong to grace, not to nature. We have, therefore, now established for you the lofty and noble virtues that transcend in nobility both the consuetudinal and the natural virtues with a universal establishment, and we have shown to you the differences of them, that is, of the consuetudinal and natural virtues, and that the consuetudinal virtues are helps for our natural powers that have been injured and weakened in many ways, just as certain instruments are also helps for injured feet and hands. We have shown that natural virtues are like sound members, that is, feet and hands, by which, nonetheless, it is not possible to walk above or beyond that level of natural equity, and we have shown that it is not possible to act by them beyond or above the limits of nature, either bodily or spiritually and that, even if these were found to be perfect in us, they cannot defend or protect us from the corruption in which we are, nor from the battles of the passions, nor from the ambushes and attacks of the evil spirits and also that, if the statement of Plato were true concerning human souls, each of them would be in this misery like a sick physician with a fever. But we have touched upon many examples and likenesses concerning this misery, namely, that the human soul is in the body of such death, like dry wood in the midst of a fire and like a human being plunged into the depth of the sea or of much water, and like water pouring out of and flowing from a vessel perforated on every side. And we have said many similar things that are evident to the senses, from which it follows that in this life more lofty virtues are necessarily needed by our souls in order to protect them from burning up in the midst of such fire and from the depth of the waters and from other failures and in order to hold them in vessels full of holes, that is, in these bodies, and in order to keep them from flowing away and dispersing. But we will make it known in the following that original corruption is this whole peril and danger, which we have spoken about, [136b] and is far greater and rife with more dangers than we said. We have also explained along with all these points that the more lofty virtues, which are rightly to be called theological, are these more lofty virtues, just as those which the creator gave to his elect in order to fly to the height of blessedness, and that the activities of them are 194  I have conjectured “glory, gloriae” instead of “grace, gratiae.” 195  I have conjectured “grace, gratiae” instead of “glory, gloriae.”

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flights in comparison with the activities that come from the other two kinds of virtues. But the examples that we proposed concerning the misery of human souls, which they suffer in the present life, we did not pursue, fearing prolixity. We also explained to you that neither consuetudinal nor natural virtues were signs of perfect goodness or virtuousness and that for this reason they are not worthy of the name of virtue or of goodness because they do not make those in whom they exist truly good or virtuous. In particular, however, we have spoken more at length about natural love on account of its many questions, which you heard, and on account of the opinions of some people who have not thought about it correctly, believing that no creature could love the creator more than itself, and we have clearly destroyed this error for you. Similarly, we have destroyed the error of certain people who have thought that it does not differ in species from this lofty and noble love, but only according to more or less. For those it necessarily follows that nature and glory and the things that belong to nature and to glory differ only according to more and less. And for this reason the state of human souls here in the present life and the state of glory will differ only in the same way. But we will destroy this in what follows. But when you want to imagine the purity and nobility of lofty love, you ought 196 to remember those things that you heard in the treatise on the virtue of faith. For it is similar to faith in its generation because it comes only from above, that is, from the giver of good things, just as faith does, and by the same manner of generation because, as was said, it comes from him, as faith does and not through his natural activity, just as a sword comes in one way from its crafter and in another way from one who gives it already fashioned and completed. 197 Thirdly, it is most like it in rectitude against the lameness that we mentioned to you and touched upon here. Fourthly, it is very similar to it by reason of the strength with which it arms and protects the soul in which it is, especially from hatred and anger against the fiery darts of injuries and insults and all forms of persecution. But when you want to imagine other virtues similar to this one, you will imagine them on the basis of likeness to lofty apprehensions, such as prophecy with its divisions and holy understanding and the sorts of divine revelations that are found among us in this world. For just as they hold the human intellect suspended and elevated on high, especially away from the senses and other things pertaining to the body, so those virtues hold our volition, that is, our noble moving power, suspended and elevated in spiritual and lofty things. One 196  See William, On Faith (De fide) 1, fol. 6a. 197  William perhaps gives the first two grounds for similarity, namely, purity and nobility, in the previous paragraph without numbering them.

130 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues example of this is found in Blessed Maurus, the disciple of Blessed Benedict. The virtue of obedience so carried him off and removed him from the senses 198 that he did not see the water and fearlessly rushed into it. Another example is found in Adam and Eve, whose minds such virtues occupied and held so rapt as if on high in the things that are above that they did not recognize their bodily 199 nakedness, as we read in Genesis, chapter three. Secondly, you will imagine them on the basis of their perfection as they are seen in very holy men who exist in this world as if they were already out of it and as if they are living in another and higher world, as the apostle says: But our life is in heaven (Phil 3:20). They will, however, be more apparent to you when 200 you learn what it is to be in the spirit. For these virtues cause us to be in the spirit and make us to be spiritual and make human beings to be above human beings and more than human beings, [137a] as the apostle teaches in chapter one of the First Letter to the Corinthians: When there are quarrels and strife 201 among you, are you not still human beings? Thirdly, you will imagine them by comparison with the vices. For as the vices cast down and plunge the human soul into those things that are beneath it and come after it and bind, imprison, and hold it captive in them and as the true natural virtues hold, guard, and preserve it in its own state and natural rectitude, so these sublime and noble virtues carry it off and elevate it above itself, that is, above its natural powers and hold it as if suspended in spiritual and eternal things. This is, however, evident from their cause and proportion. For since these lofty and noble virtues are naturally no less powerful over the human soul than the vices, it will follow that they can naturally elevate it above itself either more than or equally to how the vices can send it down beneath itself. Moreover, if these bodily things that are fallen through weakness—I mean the weakness of corruption—can bring about this lowering in it, which we mentioned, it will be necessary that these spiritual and eternal things will be able to bring it to that elevation, which we mentioned, through the healing of the previously mentioned weakness and deliverance from that corruption. And they will do so more to the extent they are stronger than the fallen and bodily things. And the human soul itself is naturally more able and better suited to tend toward the height, that is, of glory than to move backwards and fall downward, inasmuch as it was created for that height. 198  See perhaps Gregory, Life of Saint Benedict (Vita sancti Benedicti) 2.7; PL 66: 146, where Gregory recount how Maurus walked out on the water of a lake to save a drowning boy. 199  See Gn 3:7. 200  See Lk 2:27 and 4:1, as well as Rv 1:10; 4:2; 17:3, and 21:10 on being in the spirit. 201  See 1 Cor 3:3.4.

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But if someone asks where there is and from where there comes good health from the previously mentioned weakness and from where there comes deliverance from the previously mentioned corruption, we reply that it comes from the giver of such virtues, who generously gives both at the same time along with them to those in whom he infuses these. But this takes place especially in virtue of the sacraments and sacramentals, which are usually performed on them, although at times this happens on other occasions and in other times, as 202 we have explained in the treatise on the same. But if someone says that those who are endowed with such virtues and have them are few, we reply that there are really very few who have them in their perfection and fullness, but more who have them in a mediocre amount, and very many have them in their greatest imperfection and in almost their beginnings, and all these are very few in comparison with the multitude of vices. We also say that many have them, in whom they are not seen for many reasons, one of which is the likeness that is found in virtuous, natural, and even vicious external actions, such as there is in walking or in eating. For whether someone eats out of virtue or out of natural appetite or out of a desire for the pleasure of taste, the external actions are very similar in the act of eating, and most of the time they do not differ or seem to differ at all. The second reason is the rarity of the lofty actions. For it is given to very few to be in the spirit all the time. But where this happens more often, that is, in the actions that more often elevate the human soul in that way, these are prayer and contemplation, nor should you be surprised if the actions themselves are rare, since those who perform such actions are very rare. For there are very few good and holy men who aim at them. The third reason is the subtlety and spirituality of them, that is, of such virtues because of which they are very difficult to know. For those in whom they exist are generally unseen, and those people themselves are ones who especially fear that they may not have them, even when they have them. Here you ought to remember what we said in the preceding parts in the explanation of such things, namely, that only these virtues that we are speaking about here are instances of genuine goodness and that they alone make human beings truly good and truly virtuous, and the reason is that only these make 203 them truly right or truly just. For if, as you learned elsewhere, that is straight whose middle parts do not diverge from its extremes. I mean what is straight in dimensions [137b] will be like and proportionate to such things in morals. But the extremes of our life are none other than its beginning and its end. There is, however, no other beginning from which our life begins and end toward which 202  See William, On the Sacraments (De sacramentis). 203  The Latin “rectus” can mean “right” or “straight.” We have no single English word that can quite capture both meanings.

132 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues it moves than God. When, therefore, it will be totally directed toward him as it comes from him, our life will in that case undoubtedly be right. It is the same way with an intention and an action because, when an intention comes from God and moves toward him without departing from him, it will be right in someone. Moreover, what is straight has no curve or bend. But a curve returns to the beginning, while a bend goes off to a side. An intention, therefore, and action by which someone intends himself and works for himself, that is, for his own sake, that is to say, for his own advantage or his own utility or one of those other things with which human desires are concerned—such an intention and an action are curved. For they proceed from the one who intends and does them and return and are curved back to the same. But intentions and actions that are ultimately directed to the advantage or harm of the neighbor are produced in the same way. An intention or action goes to the left in accord with the 204 customary language of sacred scripture, when one seeks through it the harm of the neighbor as one’s end. It, however, goes to the right when one seeks the advantage of the same neighbor. But understand advantage in the large sense so that the honor and pleasure and will of the neighbor is also understood as his advantage. When, however an intention and an action are directed to the highest end, namely, God, that is, for the sake of glorifying or honoring God or for the sake of carrying out his good pleasure, it is undoubtedly right. Moreover, that is necessarily right which, if lined up with or applied to what is right, does not diverge from it. But it is evident that the divine will is the most right of all right spiritual beings. Hence, it is necessary that every intention and operation that does not diverge from it in any way is right, and the same thing must be held concerning the will. For a will that completely agrees with the divine will is necessarily right. But this is a will by which one wills what God wills and as God wills and in accord of what God wills. For no one doubts that, when something curved or bent is applied to the straight, it diverges from it. And we understand this spiritual application and in spiritual matters as only the consideration and comparison of them to each other. For just as someone places a straight bodily thing along side a ruler in order to tell whether it is straight, so someone who compares his will to the divine will, considering whether he wills what God wills, how God wills, and on account of what he wills, makes a spiritual application of his will to the will of God, and from that application he can determine if he sees or knows the will of God. But it is rightly asked whether the will of someone who gratuitously wills 205 the good of another is right, as those who have written on friendship say. We 204  For example, Mt 25:33. 205  See perhaps Hugh of Saint Victor, On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith (De sacramentis fidei christianae) 2.13.10; PL 176: 538, although William’s reference is very vague.

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reply that, if considered more carefully, such a will has turned away from a right will and has been diminished from a perfect will. For a right will is directed toward the height of divine glory and is stretched out to that, but a will of this sort lies on the level because it is not elevated above the utility of the neighbor. Hence, it is necessarily turned away from the prescribed will, which is necessary for it to be a right will. It is also obviously diminished from a perfect and complete will since it stops so far from the end or goal, which is God. Such a person, then, who wills in that way is like a traveler who ought to walk toward the height and walks on the level and who ought to walk the length of many miles, but he passes through only one of them, finally giving up his journeying. For every will and every intention, which is for the sake of glorifying God or carrying out his good pleasure, is naturally stretched out to God and comes to an end in him. [138a] It is, therefore evident to you what is properly right in morals or moral actions. For that is most properly and truly right which is neither curved back nor bent aside and which in no respect diverges from the first right, which is the truest standard of rightness. But this is the divine will, as Augustine says 206 on those words on the Psalm: Praise is fitting for those who are right (Ps 32:1). For then the whole of human life is right when it does not in any way wander off from its extremes, that is, from its beginning, which is God, and from its end, which is also God. But this is the case when the whole of life is from him and the whole of life is directed toward him. For the whole of life is not from him when it has something disordered, and for even better reasons it is not directed toward him insofar as it is disordered. The situation is similar with intention, will, and action. But you ought to know that rectitude does not suffice to make any of these perfect or to purify it totally or to cleanse it from evil. And the reason is that, even if intention and will come from God and are directed to God, they are at times weak and remiss and also partial or in a certain respect. For if someone wills something that God wills and as God wills, his will is, of course, in God and right in that respect, but in many other respects it is perhaps discrepant from the prescribed standard of rectitude. And in this it is perhaps not sufficiently firm nor sufficiently fervent, nor entirely cleansed from its contrary. In accord with what we read in Proverbs, chapter twenty-one: The sluggish person wills and does not will (Prv 13:4). And in Romans, chapter seven, we read: What I do not will, I do (Rom 7:20). It is possible, then, that the will be good in some respect and not good without qualification. But when the will, that is, the power of willing, is fervent and firm and universally or totally stretched out toward God, having no curving backward nor turning aside, then it is good without qualification with perfect goodness. For the goodness of the 206  See Augustine, Homilies on the Psalms (Enarrationes in Psalmos) 32.2. Sermo 1.2; PL 36: 278.

134 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues will consists in these four characteristics, namely, rectitude, fervor, firmness, and integrity or totality. In bad men and in those laboring under some vices, after all, we experience that they have good dispositions of the will and also good habits of their wills, but partial ones. For some who are liable to sins of the flesh are found to be good toward the poor, and this particular will in them is found to be right and fervent for helping the poor and this on account of God. In the same way many other particular acts of willing are found to be good and right in men and in women and are called virtues and praiseworthy morals. But we understand that they are virtues in a certain respect and are particular and very diminished and are not worthy of the name of virtue without qualification, and we explain this in what follows. But it can be seen from what we have said that there is numerically only one virtue and one goodness—or that there are perhaps four, as Augustine seems 207 to claim in the book, On the Morals of the Catholic Church. There he says that, insofar as he grasps or understands it, prudence is only the love of doing all things prudently and nothing rashly or incautiously. And he likewise says that justice is a similar love for doing those things that are just and fortitude the similar love for tolerating or enduring bravely whatever is necessary and temperance the similar love for cutting back those things that should be cut back in our body. It is, therefore, good to discuss and to examine concerning these virtues whether the truth is such. We, therefore, say first of all that the love of the way for the sake of the end and the love of the end for its own sake are one love or come from one love, just as the love of wine on account of its savor and the love of its savor on account of the wine are one love. Hence, the love of God for his own sake alone and the love of anyone else for the sake of God will necessarily be one love as a habit or two dispositions from one love as a habit. But we say this because love is spoken of in two intentions. For love is spoken of as the habit because of which someone is called a friend or beloved, and love is also spoken of as the disposition by which you love, that is, in act or as loving. It is also accepted among all, namely, among all our sacred doctors and [138b] scholars that the love of God and of neighbor is one love, though there are two commandments. In this way it is necessary that there is one love of God and of all other things that are loved only on his account, whatever they are. Whoever, then, loves to act well, to live well, to suffer adversity or any other good on account of God alone, loves it with the same love with which he loves God. But it is one love alone by which he loves in accord with each of the three ways we have determined. Hence, there will necessarily be one love, whatever else is loved on his account alone. Hence, 207  See Augustine, On the Morals of the Catholic Church and the Morals of the Manichees (De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum) 1.15.25; PL 32: 1332, where Augustine defines each of the cardinal virtues as love of a certain kind.

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there will not be four loves as Blessed Augustine thought. For someone who correctly and praiseworthily loves to act prudently loves that only on account of God, as we have already explained many times. Hence, there will not be four virtues except in terms of reason or relation, nor will those loves about which he speaks be four loves. Moreover, if these loves were diverse on account of the diversity of the things loved, faith too would necessarily be very diverse in one and the same believer on account of the diversity of things believed. I mean things that are diverse not only in number or species, but also in genus and category, since all these evident diversities are found in the objects of faith. But someone might say that it is not necessary that faith be diversified by the diversity of the objects of faith because it does not come from the things believed, but is a light infused into a believing soul from above and is one in number and not in its subject, but follows upon the unity of its principle and giver, as we said. And we explained in the treatise on faith, which is a genuine virtue and the source and foundation of true religion, that it is necessary to say this as well concerning true and pure love of the creator, which comes from 209 above, that is, from the creator, as his gratuitous gift. For concerning the loves and desires that are generated in our souls by the things themselves, you ought to have no doubt that they follow upon the dispositions of the things by which they are generated, that is, that they are varied and diversified in accord with the unity and diversity of such things themselves. Moreover, what we are saying can be made evident for you from their contraries, that is, from a comparison with their contraries. For from one base love by which some base lover of some woman burns for her, he does so many diverse and also contrary things in order to satisfy his passions in them, and, likewise, with one love of money a greedy person now plows, now sows, now trades, at times steals, at times snatches, at times buys, and sometimes sells, and even kills. And it is the same way with a proud person in every branch and species of pride. For countless are his diverse actions, which he does either in order to acquire empty glory or for the sake of having some honor or on account of something else from those things that pride demands. Hence, nothing prevents that from one and the same love of God there can come however great a multitude and diversity of actions, which are ways to obtain the end that is sought through the love of God. Moreover, ask the individual holy men who have done so many and such diverse actions, whether in cloisters or in other places or offices, why each of them did those things. Each one will undoubtedly reply that he does all such 208  It is not clear that Augustine was speaking of four loves, although he does speak of four virtues. 209  See William, On Faith (De fide), ch. 1, fol. 6b.

136 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues things on account of the love of God and out of the love of God. But each has it as most certain within himself what his principle is that moves him to do whatever he does, nor does error or ignorance on this matter have any place within someone. Hence, it is evident that on the basis of one and the same love of God there can be however great a multitude and diversity of good actions. 210 According to this, then, it is not necessary that there be the four loves or four virtues about which we spoke above. It is not necessary, I repeat, [139a] that there be four only on account of the diversity of the actions. But if someone says that this variety of good actions can and does exist in a sufficient way as a result of the love of God alone; therefore, it is not necessary to have any other virtue, or it is superfluous to have any other, we reply to this that, even if it were not necessary to have other virtues on account of the essence of the actions, they should be maintained for the sake of the better condition of these actions. In the same way, even if it is not necessary to have sight only for the sake of the action of walking, it is, nonetheless, necessary to have it for the sake of walking in a better way. For walking is much more secure and correct on account of the walker’s vision, and it is the same way on account of the toughness of the skin on the soles of feet or on account of the strength of shoes. It is the same way with prudence in the actions of love. For they are much better and are done in a much better way when prudence guides them and likewise when fortitude strengthens them and when justice regulates them and when temperance sets boundaries to them. And whatever perhaps seems to you to be the action of faith, of which we have made mention, it cannot come from that love. For love cannot command except insofar as nature itself by itself can or insofar as it can as the result of helps, whether of graces or others. Hence, it cannot command to our human intellect the activity that belongs to faith except insofar as it follows upon it. But it cannot proceed to it by itself except with the help of faith, as we have shown elsewhere. For such love cannot command except that for which it finds or enables the ability. Because, therefore, it does not make anyone able to believe, it is necessary that it find an intellect able to believe. For an intellect is able to believe on the basis of something other than love. But the likeness is strong, although it is not seen. For just as it cannot command flight, and the reason is that it neither finds nor enables the ability, it cannot command believing except when it finds an intellect capable of this. For just as it does not bestow flight when it commands one to fly, so it does not give belief when it commands it. Since, therefore, this love is always right, it will be a genuine virtue that tolerates with itself neither vice nor sin, when it will be strong or firm, when it will be fervent, and when it will be universal. And its strength is other than its 210  I have added the negative here, which seems necessary.

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fervor. For its strength consists in its clinging to the beloved, that is, the inseparability or difficulty of separation from the beloved. But its fervor is nothing else than the vehemence of the desires for those things that are sought for the beloved or in any other way on the basis of love. But this is evident from the fact that those cling to God much more strongly and more firmly, who are less fervent than many others with regard to him and his interests and who cling less firmly to him, as you see. For at times friends love one another more ardently than brothers and seek their interests more vehemently than those of brothers. They are not, nonetheless, loved more firmly and more strongly than brothers. And at times it happens that a neighbor is loved more fervently than God by very holy men, but not, nonetheless, more strongly, which the ease and difficulty of separation make manifest. For holy men are separated from neighbors incomparably more easily than from God. For just as it seen in natural things that some things are heated more easily and more vehemently by certain other things, but do not, nonetheless, retain the heat either more firmly or longer than those other things on account of the dissimilarity in natural things, as in dry wood or iron with respect to heat and in air, stone, and every metal with respect to cold and in different parts of the earth with respect to becoming wet. It happens in the same way with vital and vivifying heat. For dry wood is heated more easily and more ardently in a given amount of time than iron, but does not retain the heat more strongly or more firmly. In fact, it is just the contrary. In the same way [139b] cold and cooling is received in the air, stone, and every metal. For air cools more rapidly and more easily than iron or silver, but does not retain the cold more firmly. The same thing happens in becoming wet. For some parts of the earth become wet more easily and more rapidly than certain others and have a weaker retention for this and easier drying. For example, parts of the earth that are used to being under water longer than others are found to have a greater and also quicker and easier drying and hardening than others when such waters have receded or been drawn off. And such parts of the earth are commonly called marshland, whether because they float in the water or the water does in them or because different parts lie under water for a long time. Similarly, the air is illumined more quickly and more easily than many other things, even than the eye of any animal. The air is, nonetheless, stripped completely of light more easily than the eye, and this is so because after the withdrawal of exterior light there remains in the eye a trace of its impression. And for this reason vision is afterwards slightly impeded. From these considerations, then, and from countless others you can clearly see that someone does not love more who loves more fervently. But even if this fervor proceeds from the root of love, it still has its strongest help from the goodness and intension of apprehension. And this is from the nearness or proximity of the beloved. Why, then, is it surprising if love for God is at times

138 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues less fervent on account of the weakness of our apprehension and distance of the beloved at that time? And why is it surprising if the senses themselves are helped by the strength of apprehension so that one is more fervent toward the beloved who is better apprehended and is nearer? For this reason John said in chapter four of his first canonical letter: How can he who does not love his brother whom he sees love God whom he does not see? (1 Jn 4:20). But concerning the strength and firmness of love we read in chapter eight of the Canticle: Love is as strong as death (Sg 8:6). And in chapter eight of Romans we read: I am certain that neither death nor life, and so on, can separate us from the love of God (Rom 8:38.39). Just as from the same fire, one and the same person can become now more and now less warm, so from the same love one can be now more and now less fervent, and from the same fire, nothing prevents now a larger and now a smaller flame from flashing forth. Insofar as a fire is helped by the state, positioning, or suitability of the wood or impeded by their contraries, it emits a greater or lesser flame. In the same way the same love is helped by the state of one’s apprehensions, meditations, words, and recollection of benefits, as if by the positioning of wood, so that it emits a greater flame, that is, a greater fervor and act of love; it is also in the same way impeded by their contraries. And the comparison is fitting since speaking about or apprehending the beloved is as the state of the wood is for increasing or helping bodily fire, or as the positioning or suitability of the wood is a help for bodily fire, so are recalling and remembering benefits for the spiritual fire, which is love or volition. But what we are saying is more evident, namely, that there is a single firmness from the dispositions that are required in order for love to be a virtue because without firmness it is not even a habit and for that reason not a virtue, since every virtue is a habit. Strength or firmness fall within the definition of a virtue, and from that it takes its name. It, therefore, remains for us to explain to you that there is also required for it the fourth disposition that we mentioned above, namely, universality. You have, then, already learned elsewhere that what is said of something only in a certain respect or in terms of a part is not said of it without qualification and truly so that what is white only in terms of a part is not truly and without qualification white. In that way [140a] a friend of someone who is his friend only in a certain respect and in part cannot be said to be his friend truly and without qualification. Similarly someone who is an enemy in part is not truly an enemy, nor can he be said to be his enemy without qualification. In the same way someone who goes after or attacks another in part cannot be said to be at peace with him or to have peace with him. And it is generally accepted among all peoples that someone who is a friend loves everything that belongs to his friend. And

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it is commonly said that he who loves me also loves my dog. And in general, someone who hates something of another’s goods is not his friend. Moreover, someone who loves some of the injuries, insults, or losses that another suffers is not his friend. Because, therefore, all human beings are not only God’s goods, but also his great goods, he is not truly and without qualification a friend of God, who hates some human being. Moreover, if anyone hates another’s dog or horse, he does not love him without qualification or truly. How much more is this true if he does not love one of his sons! But because only vices and sins are injuries and insults that God suffers, it is evident that anyone who loves any of the vices or mortal sins is not a friend of God, but rather his evident enemy, and he is such at least by his action, if not by his intention. But if someone says that, for someone not to be a friend of God or to be his enemy, it is not enough that he hate some of God’s goods or that he love some of God’s enemies or insults, but it is required that he do this knowingly and intentionally, that is, that he intend to do this against God or at least knows that it is against him, we reply that God loves his true friends so much that he does not allow them not to know what pleases or displeases him, as we read in the second chapter of John’s first canonical letter: The anointing that you have received from him remains in you, and you do not need anyone to teach you, but his anointing teaches you about all things (1 Jn 2:27). For of all the dangers, the greatest vices and sins are to be avoided most of all, and God is to be loved most and is the most faithful guardian of those who love him and guards them most of all from dangers. Hence, he especially points out the dangers to them and protects them against them. Hence, he does not allow them to be mistaken in such matters. Moreover, the love of God is the good that he loves most of all in his elect since on account of it he gives gifts to, loves, and rewards them and especially wants them to guard it and to avoid what is contrary to it. Hence, he most of all gives them the means by which they may guard it and avoid its contrary. But they cannot guard it or avoid its contrary unless they also know the danger of its loss and of its contrary. Hence, it is necessary that God enlighten his friends in those matters that he commands to be observed with such great strictness and that are omitted with such great danger. But we have already spoken about 212 such a lack of knowledge and about many other things in that single treatise, and we have written about when it excuses and when it does not and to what extent it excuses and to what extent it does not. 211  See, for example, Petrus Cellensis, Sermon 42, On the Resurrection of the Lord, (Sermo 42: De resurrectione Domini) PL 202: 773 or Petrus Blesensis, Sermon 40: On Saint Michael and the Guardianship of the Angels (Sermo 40: De sancto Michaele et custodia angelorum); PL 207: 682. 212  See William, On Faith (De fide), ch. 1, fol. 6a.

140 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues It has, therefore, already been explained to you that the true love of God, namely, that love that makes one a true friend of God without qualification is universal and does not admit hatred in a certain respect or in part, either in intention or in action. Similarly, it does not admit injury or insult to God because both of these attack God and deal hostilely with him. In the same way this love does not tolerate an attack upon or war against any of his servants. For every king and prince is attacked in his subjects, and he rightly regards as an enemy someone who attacks his soldiers. After all, it rarely happens that kings themselves personally fight or that someone fights against them in that way. But if someone asks whether lions and bears, crocodiles and other such animals that are hostile to human beings should be loved as goods of God on his account and thus should not be killed and, for this reason, not feared, we reply to this [140b] that they are to be loved for that for which they exist, namely, for the use of human beings insofar as they are for the use of human beings, and because they are at times not useful for human beings unless they are killed, they are to be killed in order to have the bear’s hide and meat and other parts and for medicine. In general, however, all God’s works are to be loved, and each one of them in its way proclaims his power, wisdom, and goodness. For this 213 reason Blessed Augustine says that all things praise God. All creatures also should be loved like the tones of a very beautiful song by which the praise of the creator is constantly played. For as he himself says, the whole series of the 214 ages is like a most beautiful song that God sings. Individual creatures are its syllables, but the individual generations or ages are each from God. Someone who does not love the song or singing undoubtedly does not love him whose praise is sung in it. But if someone asks how serpents and scorpions are loved when they are killed, we have already replied that they are loved as they should be loved when they are killed for medicine, and likewise, when they are killed in order that they may not be hostile to human beings or in order that they may not harm them. This too can be because of the love of God. In the same way too, when heretics are killed like poisonous animals for fear that they may spiritually kill other human beings by slaying in them the life-giving faith, they are killed, not out of hatred, but rather out of love of God and of human beings, and they are also dealt with lovingly when they are kept from harming themselves or others. There is, nonetheless, no need to be concerned about the killing of flies or even of larger animals, whether they are hostile to human beings or necessary or salutary for them since their replacement is so very easy. And it is also the law of God most high and his statute that such beings kill and even devour one another, and for this reason some such beings are born in order to be food for 213  See Augustine, Confessions (Confessiones) 7.13.19; PL 32: 743–744. 214  See perhaps Augustine, City of God (De civitate Dei)11.18; PL 42: 332.

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others. For by the law of nature rapacious birds and wild animals devour those weaker than themselves. Furthermore, by the authority of God human beings have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the birds of the sky in order that 215 216 they may eat them as they want, as we read in Genesis, chapter nine: Let there be fear of you and trembling before you over all the animals of the earth and over all the birds of the sky along with everything that moves in them (Gn 9:2). It is not necessary that friendship or good faith among true friends be extended to straws or chaff, that is, so that, if someone burns the chaff of another or somehow destroys it in another way, he should be said to have acted against his friendship or good faith. Nor should he be said to have done so even if he kills a deer or a boar or even an elephant, because even an elephant is merely chaff among so many good things of God. If, however, someone asks what is the difference between love, will, and intention, we say that they are the same in their subject, but it is said to be love or friendship from clinging, will insofar as it commands something to be done or not to be done, and intention from seeking. Hence, it is called intention from intending or from attending to what is sought, and in every task the principal intention is the will, that is, the will of the end. But will is simply the command to do or not do something, whatever it may be. The will, however, to have or not to have something is desire or concupiscence. But love is the will for another’s good, as we are speaking of it here. It is, nonetheless, called love from the adherence to or volition toward the beloved or from union with the beloved, of which union we read in Acts, chapter four: The multitude of believers had one heart and one soul (Acts 4:32). It has, therefore, already been explained to you which love is worthy of the name “virtue” and of the name “goodness,” and also that there are three more or less essential differences that perfect its virtue and goodness, and that these are rectitude, strength or firmness, and universality. But the fourth difference, about which [141a] we spoke, which is the fervor or love of the volition, illumines it, of course, and causes it to be better, but is not a necessary part of it insofar as it is a virtue or goodness. And we showed you often that fervor is separated from it. But there are also other differences by which it is brought to excellence, that is, another five, of which the first is tenderness, the contrary of which God censures in Amos, chapter six, when he says: And anointed with the finest oil, they suffered nothing over the crushing of Joseph (Am 6:6). For there are some hardhearted lovers who feel none of the adversity that befalls their friends with a feeling of compassion. Hence, they are said to be tender lovers and tenderly 215  See Gn 9:2–4. 216  I have conjectured “Let there be, sit” instead of “If, si.”

142 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues loving, who somehow suffer in themselves through compassion all the evils of their friends and similarly experience all their goods through congratulation. The second difference is amplitude or breadth, on account of which it was said about the commandment that is concerned with love: Your commandment is exceedingly broad (Ps 118:96). But we understand its exceeding breadth to mean that enemies are included. We extend it, however, so that it includes everything, in fact the whole series of the ages, as we already said. But the third perfection is dearness or costliness. For certain people love God, so to speak, as if they judged him of little worth and a poor acquisition, and what is worse, to the extent that they can, they want to have him at a lower price, always thinking that he is much too expensive, and, so to speak, trying with all their might to lower the price for which he is being offered to them. For if God and the whole kingdom of heaven is offered to them in return for the observance of the Carthusian Order, as if he were being offered to them at too dear a cost and as if too great a price were being asked in exchange for him, they reply that they do not want to do or give so much in exchange for obtaining him and that they want to have him at a lower price. And to put it in one word, scarcely and most rarely is someone found who would not like to have him at a lower price than what is offered, as if God were worth less than everything that is asked in return for having him and as if the risk threatened them in the purchase of him that he might not be worth as much as they are asked for him. These most foolish or rather most insane bargainers do not know that they get a greater gain from purchasing him, the higher the price that is paid for him. And to the extent that he is bought for less or more cheaply, that is, at a lower or cheaper price, they acquire a smaller gain from his purchase. The situations are just the opposite in the minds of the devils and of worldly folk and in the minds of those aflame with the love of God, in whom the charity of God is poured out by the Holy Spirit (Rom 5:5), according to Romans, chapter five. It is the end of the commandment from a pure heart, a good conscience, and sincere faith (1 Tm 1:5), according to the first chapter of the First Letter to Timothy. This dearness or costliness produces in the minds of the righteous the complete opposite of the previously mentioned conditions. But the fourth perfection is immensity. For certain people want to measure and limit their love, determining ahead of time within themselves how many things and what great things they should do for the love of God, as not wanting to extend themselves further, but thinking within themselves to do or to give so many and such great things, and nothing more, in return for God. These people do not heed what the Truth says in John, chapter three: God so loved the world that he gave his only-begotten ( Jn 3:16). But his only-begotten is immense, as the universal Church confesses and preaches, “The Father is immense, the Son is

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immense, and the Holy Spirit is immense.” Similarly, John, chapter fifteen, says: This is my commandment that you love one another, as I have loved you ( Jn 15:12), that is, without measure. Otherwise, someone might set for himself some measure as a limit in suffering or acting out of love for him. This immensity is called excessive in Ephesians, chapter two: On account of his excessive love by which he loved us (Eph 2:4), and similarly it is called excess in Luke, chapter nine, where we read: But Moses and Elijah were seen standing [141b] with him in majesty and were speaking about his excess, which he was going to complete in Jeru218 salem (Lk 9:30–31). This immensity, therefore, was called an excess without qualification as if it were a going beyond measure. For excess and limitation are contraries. But the fifth perfection is folly or madness, by which many pursue it, having spurned and abandoned all things, like the love of the insane, just as Amasius, insane with love pursued Amasia, having abandoned father, mother, and all 219 other things. On this we read in Matthew, chapter four: Having abandoned their nets and father, they followed him (Mt 4:22). Likewise, we read in Luke, chapter five: Having abandoned everything, they followed him (Lk 5:11). This is the foolishness of God, which is wiser than human beings (1 Cor 1:24), as the apostle says in chapter one of the First Letter to the Corinthians. This is the foolishness of which the same apostle says in chapter four of the same letter: We are fools for the sake of Christ (1 Cor 4:10). It is evident by the daily experience of the senses how foolish, in fact how insane the world regards those who love God in that way. The most evident examples of this fact are found in those who have spurned the world and joined the Franciscans or Dominicans, and it is not surprising that the apostles believed the Lord Jesus to be insane because he persisted in teaching and preaching to the point that he could not even eat bread. We read about this in Mark, chapter three: They went out to lay hold of him. For they were saying that he had fallen into madness (Mk 3:21). But we venture to say even more, namely, that, if he had proposed in the assembly of all the angels that there is a certain loose woman on earth given to every passion and defiled with every kind of shamefulness, to whom no prostitute is comparable in strength or foulness, and said, “I want to take this woman as my wife and make her queen of heaven and to make her entirely equal and to love her to the point that I am nailed to the wood of the cross for her robberies and shameful deeds”—if, I say, he proposed such things and did not reveal to them, so to speak, the most profound and most inscrutable wisdom of such 217  Pseudo-Athanasian Creed, “Quicumque,”DS 75. 218  “Excessus” here is generally taken to mean Christ’s departure, i.e., his death, and return to the Father, but William clearly intends excess as in his excessive love. 219  I have not found this story, but the names, Amasius and Amasia, male and female lovers, seem to have been used in many Latin love stories, several of which I found by using Yahoo.

144 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues folly, they would think him utterly insane, and they would undoubtedly reply what Peter, hearing similar things, said to him in Matthew, chapter sixteen: Far be it from you, Lord; this will not happen to you (Mt 16:22). But we should not doubt concerning the holy angels and those who are enjoying that brilliance of glory that, if the Truth proposed such things to them, they would immediately recognize that it should be done in that way. If, however, they were suffering the darkness of Peter, they would reply in a way similar to Peter. But it raises a question of no small difficulty and of considerable wonder for many that the virtues are conquered and even extinguished so quickly and so easily and by such slight, it seems, impulses and attacks of the vices. For first of all, since they are habits, they are necessarily difficult to change. But the contrary is fully apparent in many persons. For almost nothing is more easily removed from human minds than the virtues, and a fall from them seems rather 220 easy, as the poet says: “The descent to Avernus is easy.” Moreover, by the very fact that they are virtues, they are strengths that make the human mind strong. Hence, they make it unconquered or unconquerable, at least by something equal or inferior. The vices, however, are not only weaker than the virtues, but are also weaknesses and debilities. Moreover, how is it that the habit of chastity or of any other virtue is completely extinguished by a single contrary action, in fact by a single consent to the shamefulness of fornication? Similarly, charity is completely extinguished by any mortal offense. In natural habits, however, just the opposite happens. For resting many times or frequently does not destroy in us the power of walking or the noble will, and not seeing many times or not hearing does not destroy in us the natural habit of sight or hearing. Moreover, if someone has the knowledge of grammar, I mean knowledge as a habit, [142a] he does not lose the habit of knowledge by once uttering a barbarism or a solecism or by once writing incorrectly. And in a similar way, if someone has the knowledge of music as a habit and a practical knowledge as well, if he sings or plays the cither badly a thousand times, such knowledge is not for this reason extinguished, lessened, or harmed in him, but is rather at times increased. What, then, is the reason that a virtue, no matter how strong and firm it may be, is destroyed by one contrary act, while knowledge is not destroyed in a similar way? Secondly, though bodily fortitude in war endures so many actions contrary to it, for instance, at times flight, at times a fall, at times capture and chains, it does not on this account die in a courageous man and an outstanding warrior. How does it happen that spiritual fortitude in war can sustain no contrary action or passion, but immediately gives way and even dies? Moreover, since charity and whatever pertains to it is incomparably greater than desire and lust and whatever pertains to them, how does charity give way 220  Virgil, Aeneid 6:126. Avernus is the underworld to which Aeneas descended.

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to one of them? Or how is what comes from it conquered by one of them or by something that comes from one of them? For it is like a huge bonfire, while they are only small drops? How is so great a bonfire extinguished by throwing or pouring on it so little water? Some have said on this topic that the virtues have a haughty nature and cannot on this account endure even a little stink or abomination from the side of the vices, and this is the talk of people who think like children and who are completely ignorant of the things about which we are trying to speak and have empty daydreams about them. The words of others on this are that it is easier to destroy than to build. But this is the language of people who want to escape in some way or another. It is not, however, language that unties the knot of the question and removes the doubt. Know, therefore, that the virtues do not collapse, fail, or succumb, nor do they give way to the vices. And they are not extinguished by their own weakness or debility, but by the weakness or debility of the subject who supports and carries them. For the virtues are in the human soul during the present misery like a most courageous warrior on a feeble or injured horse. Just as, after all, such a warrior necessarily has to fall with the fall of such a horse and does so on account of the debility of the horse, not on account of his own debility since he is most courageous, so it is with the virtues. For the human soul is so feeble, so injured, so wounded or damaged by original corruption that it readily falls at a slight push, and along with it the virtues that it supports and carries. But if someone says that the virtues ought to prevent this by their strength since they make the soul strong and robust, we reply that they, of course, do this as much and as long as one wills. For as long as the soul wills to use them and to fight with them in acting or being acted upon, a human being is strong and robust because of them. But when he neglects them or turns away from their use and turns to their contraries, he is like an insane fighter who throws away his weapons and, what is more, his strength, and surrenders himself into the hands of enemies. This, therefore, is not a failure of the weapons, but rather a failure of the warrior who casts aside his weapons and his strength, which, even if they remained for the conquered, captured, or slain warrior, could still not do anything by themselves. But notice that, although the virtues make human souls strong, they still do not set them free from the wounds and weakness of original corruption in this life, and for this reason no matter how strong and firm human souls are because of the virtues, they are, nonetheless, in this life wounded and surrounded by much weakness. We will, however, examine this more carefully in what follows, that is, in the treatise, On Temptations and Their 221 Resistance, and we will fully satisfy those with understanding on this.

221  See William, On Temptations and Their Resistance (De tentationibus et resistentiis), which is the fourth part of On the Virtues and Vices (De virtutibus et Vitiis).

146 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues But you ought to know that it is voluntary actions by which [142b] the virtues are most of all attacked, and the reason for this is that, as we said above, 222 “the virtues are either acts of will or not without will.” And for this reason they also attack the sciences that are virtues, since they are very closely united to the will, as raising it up, rectifying it, and giving it life. And for this reason, when it falls and dies with respect to this life, namely, the life of grace, they too fall and die. But dead sciences are separate from the will, and on this account nothing comes to them from the error or perversity of the will. Hence, they can be entirely perfect along with the perversity of the will. For nothing of geometry and grammar pertains to the rectitude of life or of the will, or the converse. The worst of men, after all, can be the finest geometer or grammarian. We have, therefore, now solved that question of why voluntary solecisms or barbarisms do not diminish or harm the science of grammar. But knowledge and virtue must necessarily be just the opposite. A perverse voluntary action would, therefore, injure or extinguish it. But with regard to the problem that not seeing many times does not diminish or harm sight as a natural habit, we reply that not seeing very many times and for a very long a period can be something that would extinguish it and the sort of thing that might spell the end of it and that might for that reason produce and increase a privation. But someone might ask how, if virtues are completely extinguished, a resurrection for them and their actions is so easy. For certain people rise up from falls so easily and so quickly and are not slow in doing penance so that chastity seems not to have been extinguished in them, but to have fallen asleep for a while. To this we reply that, just as a coal suddenly extinguished, remains hot with a certain heat, as is found in ashes, and is for this reason more easily rekindled than if it were completely cooled and wet down or drenched with cold water, in failures of the flesh it is the case that in them too there remains after a fall a certain heat, that is, a love for living chastely, but far distant from the virtue of chastity, just as the heat remaining in a suddenly extinguished coal is distant from its burning. In these people, therefore, the virtue of chastity can be easily rekindled through the grace of repentance. But some remain, not merely extinguished, but also cold and wet. These are the people who after a fall remain lifeless or languishing, and this torpor is a spiritual coldness in them. They also remain wet with certain remnants of the past pleasure, and their rising up is far more difficult, just like the rekindling of coals that, after being put out, have been made cold and wet or like logs taken from or coming from cold water. This is the reason why, when human souls or human beings are in the midst of pleasures or in the remnants of them or even 222  See above, ch. 3, fol. 111. William is quoting Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.5.1106a 3–4.

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in the preludes to them, their turning back or conversion is difficult, just as the kindling of logs soaked with cold water and still dripping is difficult. We, therefore, have now stated the essence of virtue in accord with every intention and manner of it, and we have explained its perfections or the differences by which perfection is achieved in a genuine virtue in order that it might be a virtue without qualification and not in a certain respect, namely, firmness, 223 universality, rectitude that is not diminished, but stretched out to the end of life, which is God, then vivacity that is sufficient to move the human mind and raise it up and elevate it from the languor of the present corruption and that would in no way endure the death contrary to it. But this death is separation from God, who is the life of souls, and this separation is the separation of an offense by which the love of grace between God and the human mind is broken and the mind ceases to be a friend of God until it is reconciled to him through penance. We have also stated the perfections that belong to true, holy, and most pure love by which it is perfected to its eminence and peak. [143a] We have also stated the species and modes of love and their differences from one another. But after this we will speak about those things that pertain to the virtues in common, when we will show the differences of the three names by which at times we see that the virtues are called, namely, gifts, virtues, and fruits, as we read in Galatians, chapter five: But the fruits of the Spirit are charity, joy, peace, patience (Gal 5:22). and so on. Some people add a fourth name, namely, beatitude. For the Truth himself promises beatitude to the eight virtues named in Matthew, chapter five, as it is said: Blessed are the poor in spirit (Mt 5:3). And in this explanation or distinction there is not the utility that requires disputation or investigation, but on account of misguided and feebleminded persons who look for grammatical points under theological ones, not knowing the difference between them, and who for this reason quarrel with a great uproar over them and, so to speak, croak most foolishly about God, we will state for you the grounds for these names. You have then already learned elsewhere that a gift is something given that cannot be demanded back, that is, something given that becomes the recipient’s possession. Hence, to give in the proper sense is to make one’s own possession that of the recipient. Because, then, the gift belongs to the recipient, there is rightly no reason why he is bound to return it to the giver or to someone else. But it is not that way with money given as a loan or with something else given as a loan. Hence, it is evident that every virtue, which is a best gift and perfect boon from above, coming down from the Father of lights ( Jas 1:17), as James says in chapter one, is necessarily a gift, because every such virtue is made by the divine generosity the possession of the recipient and, for this reason, a gift, although it is true from Matthew, chapter twenty-five, and Luke, chapter nineteen, that 223  I have conjectured “universality, universalitas” instead of “universal, universalis.”

148 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues each is given to its possessor as a loan, like a talent for trading, just as everything 224 else is. But it is not necessary that we detain you in explaining how the gifts of God are his and remain his and are made ours after he has given them to us. For he does not alienate any good from himself by giving it, something that is not found in other cases of giving. But the reason for this is the universality of his most dominant power and command, from which it is impossible that anything be exempt and through which it is necessary that whatever is found or can be found in the universe or in the whole world be subject to him with the highest degree of subjection and possessed by him with the fullest ownership. His gifts, nonetheless, are the possessions of those who receive and have them. You see, therefore, that all the natural and gratuitous virtues are gifts of God from the meaning of “gift.” On this account they are called best gifts and per225 fect boons in the first chapter of James. For this reason Augustine also says, 226 Among the gifts of God charity is the greatest. But if someone asks how this practice has arisen that the gifts of the Holy Spirit are said to be seven and how, when there is discussion of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the sacred teachers and scholars understand that it has to do only with such gifts, we reply that at one time it seemed to us that those seven gifts consisted more in receiving than in pouring out or emanating. For since virtues, insofar as they are virtues, seem to be principles of certain voluntary actions, as we have often said, those seven gifts seemed to us to be principles of receptions in a sense, that is, to be aptitudes for the reception of things that come down and flow down into the human mind from the fountain of grace. For to savor and taste spiritual delights and savors is more to receive and to be influenced than to be poured out. Similarly, to understand spiritual and divine things, I mean, to understand with the understanding that is a gift, seems more to be illumined or to receive light than to produce or pour out such light by understanding. It seemed to us to be this way with the gift of counsel, because from this gift holy men [143b] look out for themselves or others. From such a gift they did not seem to us to bring forth words of counsel, as if from the storehouse of memory or to pour them forth from a fountain of experience, but rather to be illumined at the time and to receive the lights of counsel, by which they might be made people who see from those who do not see. In accord with this we read in Job, chapter twenty-eight: I became an eye for a blind man ( Jb 29:15). Similarly, it also seemed to be the case with the gift of fortitude that it was a certain aptitude or capacity for receiving reinforcement from above. But to be strengthened is more to receive than to act. And because to be strong is 224  See Mt 25:14–30 and Lk 19:11–27. 225  See Jas 1:17. 226  See Augustine, On Baptism (De baptismo) 5.23.33; PL 43: 193.

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distinct from being able to be strengthened, so to speak, the virtue, which is called strength, is distinct from the gift that is called strength in that list. It is also in accord with these ways with the gift of knowledge, which is properly the knowledge of good and of evil, because to know or to see in things good and evil is to be illumined and to receive a certain light from above, not to bring it forth as if from a storehouse nor to have it flow forth from a fountain. And it is the same with the gift of piety. For this piety is more fittingly understood as veneration or reverence of holy things, that is, of everything that is holy, first of all, of God himself, who is the holy of holies, and of all that is holy. For we did not think that reverencing or venerating holy things interiorly, that is, in the heart, was to do something, but to receive something from the holy things themselves. We thought that one should regard in the same way the gift or spirit of fear. For someone who fears seems to be affected or to receive more than to do something. Besides someone does not seem to do something virtuous or beneficial who fears. For flight seems more the mark of weakness than of virtue. But some persons added to this argument of ours that these seven gifts specially came to be called gifts because they are sought and obtained by the seven petitions of the Lord’s Prayer, as you will find in their writings and in the 227 little book of Bernard, which begins as follows: “Five sevens.” But do not deceive yourself in these matters that are almost matters of grammar, and do not be concerned too much about whether they are called gifts or virtues, because they are truly gifts and virtues since the meaning of both names belongs to them. For the wisdom with which we are dealing here is a virtue and is the greatest strength fortifying its possessor, as we read in Ecclesiastes, chapter seven: Wisdom has strengthened the wise man more than ten princes of the city (Eccl 7:20). And again we read in Proverbs, chapter twenty-four: A wise man is strong, and a learned man is robust and mighty (Prv 24:5), and there are many other such passages, and we should understand the other six in the same way. Hence, it is said that wisdom is better than strength, and a prudent man more than a strong one (Wis 6:1). For interior and spiritual wars are greater and harder than exterior and carnal ones. And the wars of the intellect are no less hard and bitter than those of the volitions, something that is especially apparent in battles and struggles with the spirit of blasphemy. And on account of both sorts of struggles, it was said in Proverbs, chapter sixteen: A patient man is better than a strong man, and one who is master of his soul is better than one who storms cities (Prv 16:32). Those, therefore, who dream in this way about the virtues because they still do not understand either the names of the horses, 228 as the poet says, or the battles, or the struggles of the virtues, or their noble 227  See Hugh of St. Victor, On Five Sevens (De quinque septenis) PL 175:405–414. See chapter one for the seven petitions in the Our Father. 228  See Ovid, Metamorphosis 2.192.

150 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues triumphs, rightly crawl around points of grammar, busying themselves with matters that are not very useful. But it can be evident in many manners and by many paths that in accord with the understanding of such people these gifts are virtues, and in order to begin with the last, which seems the weakest of all, we say that fear is a virtue. Otherwise, hope, its contrary, would not be a virtue, since all contraries are either in the same genus or in contrary genera or are the genera of other things, such as good and evil, of which Aristotle says that they are not genera, but genera of 229 other things. But hope is not in a contrary genus of the virtues, nor a genus of 230 other things. [144a] Hence, it necessarily remains that it is a virtue. But if someone said that fear of the Lord and the virtue, hope, are not contraries, for otherwise it would be impossible that they were present in the same person, he certainly speaks the truth, because hope and fear, just like to hope and to fear, are understood to be contraries in the same thing and in the same respect and in the same way. For hope is only about what is good, and fear is not contrary to it unless it is about what is evil, because fear of the punishment of hell is a gift of God. But all the sacred teachers have agreed that initial fear, that is, someone who initially fears, has his eye on both, that is, on punishment and on reward, and serves God, in part out of a love for the reward or justice, in part out of fear of punishment. Hence, hope and fear of contraries are present in the same person at the same time, and for this reason they are not contraries in this way, that is, in this respect. But if they are related to the same thing, they are undoubtedly contraries. For it is absolutely impossible that the same person hope for and fear the same thing in the same respect. Hence, it is evident that hope and fear without qualification are truly contraries, just as their acts are contrary, namely, to hope for and to fear. For they are like pursuit of and flight from. When, therefore, both are good and it is evident that one, namely, hope, is a virtue, it is necessary that the other also be a virtue. It seems, moreover, that hope and fear are one virtue. For just as from one power of walking, there is in animals motion forward and motion backward, pursuit and flight, and approach and withdrawal, so there is in the human soul from one virtue the equivalent spiritual acts previously mentioned, namely, forward motion and backward motion, spiritual approach and withdrawal, spiritual pursuit and flight. But to hope for and to fear are like to pursue and to flee. Hence, it is necessary that they come from the same virtue. Fear, then, is not only a virtue, but it is the same virtue as hope. Moreover, it takes no less power to flee than to pursue, I mean no less power to walk. Nor do they involve less strength when they are of the same speed, nor 229  See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.6.1096a16–29. 230  I have deleted the repetition of “But hope ... other things.”

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is it more virtuous to pursue in that way than to flee. Hence, to pursue spiritually, which is to hope, is not more virtuous than to flee, which is to fear. Moreover, to speak and to be silent pertain to the same modesty, and similarly to drink wine and to abstain from it belong to the same sobriety. And in general, this holds for all other contrary and good actions. Moreover, who would doubt that it is most virtuous to snatch oneself from the chains and to escape from the prison of sins, to cast off the very heavy yoke of evil habit, to leave his cloak to the Egyptian woman, as we read in Genesis, 231 chapter thirty-nine, to burst the chains of the world, to come forth from the tomb of the depth of sins, with hands bound and feet wrapped, and from the bosom or crest of the earth with the cloth cast off from one’s face, as we read in 232 John, chapter eleven? But it is evident that all these come about through the fear of God. But we will narrate more at length these and similar and incomparably greater and more marvelous ones in the following treatise on the works 233 and marvels of the virtues. Next, if fear of the Lord drives out sin, as we read in Ecclesiasticus, chapter one: Fear of the Lord, it says, drives out sin (Sir 1:27), and if in the fear of the Lord there is the confidence of fortitude (Prv 14:26), as we read in Proverbs, chapter fourteen, and if one who fears God is frightened of nothing (Sir 34:16), as Ecclesiasticus, chapter thirty-four, says, how is the fear of God weak? Moreover, how is the fear of God his treasure (Is 33:6), as we read in Isaiah, chapter thirty-three? How is fear of the Lord riches and glory and life (Prv 22:4), as we read in Proverbs, chapter twenty-two, if fear of the Lord is not a virtue? For spiritual treasures are necessarily either virtues or sciences. Moreover, how is this fear of the Lord the fountain of life (Prv 14:27), as we read in Proverbs, chapter fourteen? For what else can[144b] either spiritual life or the fountain of life be? Secondly, how will piety not be a virtue? For if it is understood as reverence or honor of the saints, it is necessary that it be a virtue, since its contrary, namely, irreverence is clearly a very evil vice. But if someone says that nothing prevents vices from being opposed to or contrary to the gifts, although the gifts are not virtues, it is evident that he is mistaken, and the reason is that one is necessarily contrary only to one. Since, therefore, the vices are absolutely contraries to the virtues and gifts, it is necessary that certain virtues be gifts. Moreover, to be a gift is to be named or denominated from something else and names or denominates only from something accidental. For it is evident that it is apart from the essence of anything that can be given that it be given 231  See Gn 39:15 for the account of Joseph leaving his cloak in the hands of the Egyptian woman and fleeing. 232  See Jn 11:44 for the description of Lazarus coming out of the tomb. 233  This would seem to be the second treatise in the whole work, namely, On Morals (De moribus).

152 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues or made into a gift. Hence, becoming a gift or being a gift comes to such things after their essence is complete. Hence, it is evident that to be or to become a gift is accidental to anything; hence, it also accidental to every virtue. This distinction between the gifts and the virtues, over which they labor with such great curiosity and err with such weakness, holds no question except this one alone, namely, why Isaiah the prophet, speaking of the Lord, the savior, explicitly and by name, said of them that six would rest upon him, but of the last, 234 that is, of the spirit of fear, he explicitly said that it would fill him. Since the other gifts, therefore, are not less, in fact some of them are greater, such as charity, why was the prophet silent about the others and stated these alone in praise of the redeemer? It seems to us that this was the reason, namely, that these seemed to be less apparent in him in the opinion of the Jews and also of those who viewed him and thought of him only in human terms. For everything that he was doing in human terms seemed to be either stupidity or folly to such human beings. And this is the foolishness and folly of God, about which the 235 apostle spoke in First Corinthians, chapter three. Similarly the savior seemed to them to be without understanding, and for this reason they mocked him like 236 someone insane, saying that he had a demon, as in John, chapter eight. But from the gift of counsel he was called counselor (Is 9:6) and a messenger of great counsel (Is 9:5 LXX) on account of his eminence. They knew nothing about him through whom the world was counseled against absolutely all evils. Counsel can there be understood as the most profound and most hidden will of God the Father, which Blessed Augustine calls “the depth” of the mystery of 237 “the salvation of the human race,” and in Colossians, chapter one, it is called the mystery hidden from the ages (Col 1:26). And usually we call everything that we want to be kept secret a counsel, and when we want it to be hidden, we say, “It is a counsel.” The spirit of counsel, therefore, is said to have rested upon him (Is 11:2) because the Spirit by whom so great a counsel was entrusted to him was also finally fulfilled by him, and so it rested without any unrest of sin. But the Jews and those like the Jews, who supposed that only our weakness was present in him and thought that he died or endured death as a result of the weakness of the flesh rather than as a result of the fortitude of the spirit or the spirit of fortitude, were utterly unaware of the spirit of fortitude (Is 11:2). Concerning the gift of knowledge, however, which is truly and of itself knowledge of good and evil, they likewise were mistaken regarding him. For when they saw him choose, love, and even extol by preaching those things that they themselves thought were evil, but reject and flee from those things that 234  235  236  237 

See Is 11:2–3. See 1 Cor 3:19. I have corrected “four” to “three.” See Jn 8:52. Augustine, Confessions (Confessiones) 9.6.14; PL 32: 769.

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they judged good, they considered him as lacking knowledge and as being ignorant rather than as having knowledge of good and evil. For when he preached, Blessed are the poor in spirit; blessed are they who mourn (Mt 5:5.6), they believed that he was mistaken and preaching error rather than that he had knowledge and spoke the truth. And do not doubt that the whole chapter, namely, Matthew, chapter five, with its explanations and proofs [145a] pertains to the gift of knowledge, as is apparent from the exposition that we have already written on it. But with regard to the spirit of piety (Is 11:2), it is no less evident that piety is understood in both of the two ways. For piety is understood in two intentions, and according to one it is the worship of God, which in Greek is called theosebia. Though it was present in Christ the Lord incomparably more than in all creatures, it was hidden from the Jews. For this reason they said: This man who does not observe the Sabbath is not a man from God ( Jn 9:16). For they did not consider him a worshiper of God, but rather a destroyer of divine worship and a subverter of that people. For this reason they said in Luke, chapter 238 twenty-three: We find this man subverting our people (Lk 23:2). But in accord with the other intention of piety it is understood as the virtue of compassion, which they, who thought that he did not die out of compassion for the human race, but rather for his impiety, did not recognize in him. For this reason they 239 preferred Barabbas, a thief and a murderer, over him. The spirit of fear (Is 11:3), however, is said to have especially filled him with respect to the grace of reverence, because as a man he had God always before his eyes. For this reason the grace of reverence had filled his most holy soul beyond every thought of ours, as the apostle says in chapter five of the Letter to the Hebrews: In all things he was heard because of his reverence (Heb 5:7). But this grace marvelously purifies the souls who see or look forward to God, and it does not allow anything sinful either to approach them or to remain in them. The reverence for the divine majesty is, of course, so great in those who gaze upon it that they put up with nothing sinful in themselves, and if they find something of the sort in themselves, they shake it off with full haste and cast it away from them. Hence, just as the blessed redeemer was filled with the vision of the Father, so he was filled with reverence for him, and just as the vision by 240 which he continually saw the Father was of incomparable clarity in comparison to the vision of all the others who see the Father, so his reverence toward the Father was in relation to the reverence of all others. Hence, the purity of his most holy soul was incomparable, not only to the purity of all human souls, but also to that of absolutely all the angels, that is, greater beyond all comparison. 238  I have corrected the Latin text which has Mark, chapter thirteen. 239  See Mt 27:17–23. 240  I have conjectured “clarity, claritatis” instead of “charity, charitatis.”

154 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues Because the fear of reverence in that way purifies and sanctifies those in whom it is, it is said to have especially filled him whom it purifies with incomparable purity. But concerning the fear of offense or the fear of hell, it is evident that this filling can not be understood in him. For he never had a fear of offending the Father, since he was most certain that the reason why the Father was well pleased 241 with him could never be lessened or harmed in any way. For if the apostle was certain, as he himself testifies in chapter eight of the Letter to the Romans, that neither death nor life, neither the present nor the future, could separate him from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus (Rom 8:38–39), for how much better reason was Christ the Lord himself certain of this as man! Concerning the fear of hell he was also certain beyond every estimation of ours that he was going to smash and despoil the underworld and bring back his captivity from there with the triumph of glory. Neither the fear of offense nor the fear of hell, therefore, filled him, nor did they have any place in him in any way. But on account of these three species of fear, namely, the fear of reverence, the fear of offense, and the fear of the punishment of hell, which come from the Holy Spirit as his gifts, the Holy Spirit is called the spirit of fear (Is 11:3). For natural fear, namely, horror over death, pertains to nature, not to the Spirit. Human fear and worldly fear, after all, are evil in their usual meaning. We have, therefore, stated for you that these seven gifts were mentioned and listed in praise for the redeemer, not because they are more excellent than others, but because [145b] to those who saw in him only our humanity and weakness they were less in him and seemed less in him. When, therefore, you hear it said that there are seven gifts of the Holy Spirit, you ought to understand: mentioned and listed in praise of the creator by Isaiah the prophet. For those seven are not the only ones and are not the more excellent ones, as we said. But know that you will find holy commentators on the scriptures speaking in various ways of them. Gregory, therefore, calls faith the gift of wisdom in his 242 commentary on the first chapter of Job, section forty-six. But Ezekiel says the wisdom drives out folly and dullness of the intellect, that counsel drives out 243 rashness, and that fortitude drives out its contrary, and so on with the others. But the text of scripture generally does not follow these intentions, and we can, of course, say many things here, but we do not want to burden you. In a few words, therefore, we will disclose to you the intentions of these seven names in accord with the general meaning of sacred scripture. And so we will state

241  See Mt 3:17. 242  See Gregory the Great, Moral Teachings on Job (Moralia in Job) 2.46.71; PL 75: 588. Gregory is commenting on Job 1:13–15. I have corrected “forty” to “forty-six.” 243  See rather the previous note for where Gregory says this. It is not found in Ezekiel.

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those intentions in which you will not find a discrepancy with the books of the prophets and with other books of the canonical scripture. Wisdom, therefore, is the gift by which the palate of the heart is cleansed and rectified and also raised up so that it can attain by it savors to which it cannot rise by the ability of nature. Of it Bernard says, Wisdom is that by which things 244 taste as they are, that is, good or bad. Of this Ecclesiasticus, chapter six, says, 245 Wisdom is doctrine in accord with its name, that is, savorous, as its name “wisdom” indicates. Cicero seems to have imagined something about this when 246 he said that wisdom is seasoned with the knowledge of the virtues. From all these, therefore, it is clearly inferred that wisdom is savorous or tasty knowledge, and this is to be understood in two ways because wisdom graces its knower with savor, that is, with the savor of the lofty delight that comes from the spiritual sense of the divine sweetness. On this account we said that the gift of wisdom raises up the palate of the heart. For the pleasure that it pours out from itself and with which the divine goodness floods human minds is so far from the other sorts of sweetness and pleasure that the palate of the human heart can attain it only by a new sense of taste. On this account certain people have not incorrectly understood the gift of wisdom as this new and lofty sense of taste, and it is not necessary that there be one spiritual sense of taste for tasting all the spiritual savors, as there is one bodily sense of taste for tasting all the bodily savors. But the reason for this is that all the bodily savors are in one genus, but the savor of the divine goodness is not in the same genus with the others, but far different and in no way comparable to them. Hence, it can be tasted only by its own sense of taste that is not common to the others. In the second way the savor of love arises through knowledge, just as happens in the knowledge of beauty, and from that knowledge there comes the savor of the love of beauty and the savor of delight in it. For in general we call savors the volitions of souls and the dispositions of things from which such volitions are generated, just as we call a savor the good love in the human soul, and we call its savor the goodness in the good thing. For it is savorous or tasty knowledge, either when it comes from the savor of things or when it begets in the soul the savor of volition. And for this reason it is rightly to be called sapiential or 247 wisdom. For just as foods are recognized from their taste and smell, and this comes about through their savors or odors, and such knowledge can be called savorous or savory and also sapiential from bodily sapience to taste, so to speak, 244  Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermon 15: On Seeking Wisdom 5 (Sermo 15: De quaerenda sapientia); PL 183: 578. 245  See Sir 6:23. 246  It seems to have been a fairly common saying that wisdom is knowledge seasoned by the savor of the virtues, but I have not found it prior to William’s time. 247  The Latin for wisdom, namely, sapientia, is linked to the verb to taste or the noun savor (sapere and sapor).

156 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues so too the things can be called savorous that can be known by spiritual taste, as it were, through their savors, which we mentioned. For what is sweet to the palate of the mouth seems good to the palate of the heart, and what is bitter to the palate of the body likewise seems evil to the palate of the heart, and goodness and sweetness [146a] and badness and bitterness are similarly related to one another. There is a question whether in the human soul a spiritual sense of taste corresponds to the bodily sense of taste or whether spiritual delight in taste is something other than the delight of love. And this seems so because the scriptures, both old and new, so testify: Taste and see, the prophet says, that the Lord is sweet (Ps 33:9). And again he says: I will be sated when your glory appears (Ps 16:15). The same prophet says: How sweet your words are to my mouth, and so on, more than honey and its comb (Ps 118:103). Similarly Ecclesiasticus, chapter twenty-four, says: My spirit is sweeter than honey, and my heritage sweeter than honey and its comb (Sir 24:27), and in the same chapter of the same book it says: Those who eat me will still hunger and those who drink of me will still thirst (Sir 24:29). All those nouns and verbs pertain to savor and the sense of taste, as the following pertain to the sense of smell and to scent. In the same Ecclesiasticus it is said: My fragrance is like undiluted balsam (Sir 24:21). And again it says: Like a vine I have brought forth the sweetness of smell (Sir 24:23). In the new testament Matthew, chapter five, says: Blessed are they who hunger and thirst for justice (Mt 5:6). And in the Gospel of John there are the words that the Truth frequently cries out: I am the living bread, and he who eats me will live on my account ( Jn 6:51.58). All these testimonies undoubtedly pertain to the spiritual sense of taste and to spiritual savors, unless perhaps someone would say that all these things were said metaphorically and not in the proper sense. But if it is true, namely, that God is not the living bread and true refreshment of human souls, but that this was said only through a likeness, as if visible beauty were said to be the food and refreshment of sight because we say that someone sees through it or in terms of it, many problems seem to follow, even if in general what causes delight is said to refresh. We, therefore, necessarily have to ask about this. First of all, then, we said that it can seem that, just as spiritual sight and hearing are the same as each other and with the intellect, so spiritual taste and smell are the same as each other and also with the intellect. But this is not so, and the reason is that the noble apprehensive power is single in human souls, but the spiritual and noble moving powers are many, which are clearly different from the apprehensive power and from one another. But spiritual smell and taste are either two moving powers or one moving power, and for this reason in no way are they the same as the intellect. It can, nonetheless, not improbably be said that, although spiritual sight and hearing are the same as the intellect in subject and essence, since the intellect, that is, the act of intellection, namely,

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the first operation of the intellective power, is not incorrectly called sight or vision insofar as it comes about through what is seen, but it is no less reasonably called hearing or the act of hearing insofar as it comes about through words or other audible signs. By these same comparisons this intellective power is not improperly called sight and hearing or the spiritual power of sight and spiritual power of hearing, regardless of how what is said in the Gospel of Matthew may 248 be understood, because interior sight and hearing are the same thing. It has been shown to you in this way that spiritual sight and taste cannot, therefore, be one virtue. It is evident from this that taste is necessarily a moving virtue, but sight an apprehensive virtue. But it is impossible that one and the same virtue or power be apprehensive and moving. But if spiritual taste is a power in the human soul, it will necessarily be the gift of wisdom, either one of its perfections or the sole and entire perfection of it. For taste is essentially and properly savor and concerned with things able to be savored. For you have already understood that this wisdom is a gift or habit by which things taste as they are. It is apparent from this that such taste or sensible object is the divine sweetness first of all and most of all and that it alone is its satiety and repletion or fullness. Such objects of sensation, that is, objects of taste are other things [146b] insofar as they are able to be savored, that is, through their savors. And 249 we will name and count them for you in the following, although taste does not seem to be one on account of the reason that we stated above. For other savors are not spoken of univocally with the savor of divine sweetness, just as they are not one in species nor in genus with it. It is not, nonetheless, necessary that the sense of taste for the divine sweetness be other in genus than the sense of taste for other things. Each of the two tastes is a gift and a virtue. But if someone says that, because there is one faith concerning God and concerning many other things, such as concerning the resurrection of the dead and the judgment to come, which are things infinitely distant from him and not coming close to him in genus nor in species, there ought to be one sense of taste for the divine sweetness and other savors, despite the diversity and distance already mentioned, we reply to this that in this life God is not apprehended by faith except through those things. For his bare truth is not in this life apprehended by faith, but is apprehended as if under the covering or as if under the 250 cloud of the universe or of all things, as the apostle says in chapter thirteen of First Corinthians: We see now through a glass in an enigma, but then we will see him face to face (1 Cor 13:12). But it is evident that the vision of something under a covering and the vision of the covering are one vision as vision, just as the vision of a human being under his clothing and the vision of his clothing 248  Perhaps Mt 13:13–17. 249  I have conjectured the plural instead of the singular. 250  I have corrected “fourteen” to “thirteen.”

158 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues are and just as just as the vision of color and the vision of the colored object beneath it or through it are. Thus faith concerning God through things or under things is one vision. But this sense of taste for the divine sweetness is a taste by which the truth of the divine sweetness itself is spiritually perceived, although only slightly in this life by those to whom it has been given, not through its covering or sign. Therefore, what is introduced concerning taste as similar is not similar. But if someone says that the charity by which God and the neighbor are loved is one, although God and the neighbor are so far removed and distant from each other and, therefore, the wisdom by which the savors of the divine sweetness and the savor of other things will be one, despite the previously mentioned remoteness and distance, we will reply to this similarly that motion to the goal and motion to the road on account of the goal or through the road to the goal are always one motion. It is the same with the beginning of motion to the goal and of motion to the road on account of the goal. Rightly, therefore, the habit, charity, by which God is loved and the neighbor is loved on account of God is one charity since the beginning of the motion of love to God, as to the goal, and the beginning of the motion of love for the neighbor, as the road to God, the goal, is one. For the neighbor is not loved with charity except on account of God. We also say the same things concerning charity, which is the act or motion of loving. But the wisdom that is the sense of taste for the divine sweetness, and the wisdom that is the sense of taste for other savors is not that way. For the savoring of other things does not come about in this way for two reasons: first, because evil things, that is, vices and sins, are in no way paths to the savoring of the divine sweetness; secondly, because good things and goodtasting things are in accord with such taste not paths to the sweetness of the divine goodness, except in that general way in which all good things are certain paths for indicating the divine goodness. But if someone wants to say that there is numerically one wisdom for all things that can be savored so that God can be understood from the diversity of things that can be savored, we do not want to quarrel about the term, provided that the truth of the matter is made clear, to the extent that we can. For we know that the sense of touch is numerically one natural habit, although there is so great a diversity and discrepancy of the objects of touch. For although hot and cold, rough and smooth, soft and hard, sharp and dull, and heavy and light are five in their genera, they are perceived by a single sense, namely, touch. But the proper cause of this is that all those have the same organ and the same mode of sensation. [147a] For all of them are able to be sensed by the same fleshy part of the finger that is called the index finger. But in the taste, which we call sapience, there is neither the same generic savor nor the same mode of sensation. For the divine sweetness is perceived by its own savor. But other things are not like that; rather, both these things and their savors are intro-

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duced within the soul through apprehensions, unless perhaps they come from things that are within the soul, as the virtues and gifts proper to each soul are savored with their own savors and delight and refresh the soul when it perceives them, which is very rare. But things that are outside, that is, outside the soul, bring their savors to our souls only through apprehensions, unless they are perhaps abstract things, such as the holy angels, whose presence and spiritual activity refreshes and delights human souls and at times, though most rarely, with a marvelous sweetness. And the reason is that their contact with souls raised above the contagions of sensible things and the vices is easy. Such souls are at the horizon of their 251 region, and at times the union with them is so great that they feel the holy angels to be within them. On this account the prophet Zechariah said so often: And the angel who was speaking in me said (Zec 1:9.13.14; 2:3; 4:4.5,etc.). Nor is it surprising that we read that these things were done with an angel since we read that they were done with the very Son of God, as David says in the second last chapter of Two Kings: The spirit of the Lord spoke through me (2 Sm 23:2). And in the Psalm he said: I will listen to what the Lord God says in me (Ps 84:9). We will speak about this union or contact in the proper place, namely, in the 252 treatise on the substances abstracted or stripped of matter. But let us return to where we were and say that, if the divine sweetness were only like the sweetness of beauty, joy and blessedness would not come from it of itself and properly, except the joy and blessedness of spiritual vision, that is, of the intellect, and this could seem so to someone from what Augustine says. 253 Because we are promised the sight of the highest beauty, and from what he 254 says elsewhere: “O most sweet light of purified minds!” For as bodily light and beauty are the source of sensation and delight for exterior or bodily vision, so spiritual light and beauty are the source of spiritual sensation and delight for spiritual vision, that is, for the intellect. Hence, according to this, God would not of himself and by himself cause the joy and blessedness of the whole human mind, but only of one of its powers. But this is obviously impossible since the other powers do not have less merit, nor do they have less favor in his eyes. Hence, there will not be less reward of eternal blessedness in the other powers, that is, the higher and nobler ones, than in the intellective power. 251  See On the Soul (De anima) ch. 7, pt. 6, fol. 211b, where William says that “the human soul is located and ordered so as to be on the horizon of two worlds. And one of these worlds is, for it, the sensible world, to which it is most closely united by the body, but the other is the creator himself in himself as the exemplar and mirror of the universal and most clear revelation on the first principles” (The Soul, tr. Roland J. Teske [Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2001], p. 445). 252  That is, in the second principal part of On the Universe (De universo). 253  See Augustine, On Order (De ordine) 2.19.51; PL 32: 1019. 254  Augustine, On Free Choice (De libero arbitrio) 2.16.43; PL 32: 1264.

160 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues Moreover, since in created things besides the light of truth by which some things are bright only for bodily vision and other things only for spiritual vision, such as things that are immaterial and abstracted from matter, and besides the beauty by which they likewise delight, each of them is found to be a sweetness and savoriness so manifold, so abundant, so varied, for even better reasons there is found in God, the fountain of all these, that is, in the fountain of light, beauty, and sweetness, a sweetness appropriate to the abundance and overflowing of so great a fountain, if the luminosity and beauty in things comes from the first light and beauty. For so manifold a sweetness in things will come only from the first sweetness. Moreover, even if in God beauty and goodness are essentially one thing, they are still seen to differ in reason and relation so that beauty as beauty is of itself and properly a source of delight for the intellect, and there will necessarily be goodness in it because goodness is of itself the proper source of delight of volition. Moreover, either our volition will or will not have its own source of delight in God. If it does not, he, therefore, himself does not sufficiently beatify the human soul, but only in [147b] part or in some respect. If that is so, it will be only goodness or sweetness or something else of this sort. Moreover, no one ought to have any doubt that God is both lovable and desirable. Either, then, he is lovable and desirable only because he is most luminous and beautiful or under some other title or relation. But if he is lovable only insofar as he is most luminous and beautiful, he is lovable, therefore, only in terms of spiritual sight, that is, in terms of the intellect. Hence, he will not be lovable from one’s whole heart, nor should he also be sought by the human soul in terms of its whole, and the soul would not be wholly created for enjoying him. But if he is lovable under another relation and title, for example, because he is good or sweet, there will be another sweetness for the human soul from him than the sweetness in terms of interior sight or the intellect, by which God will cause the joy and blessedness of the human soul in terms of volition. But if he says that there will be inestimable sweetness for the human soul from his glory when the soul sees it, just as a lover has joy from the glory of the beloved when he sees it—and more joy to the extent that the glory is greater and to the extent that he sees greater glory—he undoubtedly, of course, speaks the truth, and such joy is the joy of sincere and pure love, about which it should not be doubted that the angels rejoice inestimably with that joy when they see 255 the King of kings in his beauty, as we read in Isaiah, chapter thirty-three. And what we said above is not inappropriately understood concerning this joy: I will be sated when his glory appears (Ps 16:15). But to say these things along with the foregoing is to claim that the human soul is only an intellect in terms 255  See Is 33:17.

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of what is noble and chief in it. For a power created only for the sake of seeing, whether spiritually or corporeally, is only sight, whether spiritual or corporeal. Hence, they maintain no other beatitude of the human soul, that is, ultimate perfection of it, than to see the beauty or the glory of God, whether they maintain it as luminosity or as only spiritual sight. Moreover, according to this, how will the blessed angels be happy? For if they are happy only by seeing, as we said, when their whole substance is happy and glorious, those angelic substances will be only intellects without spiritual senses and volition, as we said, that is, without the volition of love, which they have for the creator and through which they are made incredibly joyous and blessed from his glory. But we call it a spiritual sense in the same way as when the life is sensed by the sense by which we sense that we live. But if the holy angels do not sense that they are living, but only know that they are living, as they also know about other things, except that they see their own life from closer up than another’s life, this is an error that leads us to a condemnation of human beings and to a confusion of things, as far as it extends. For the sense of which we are speaking is intimate knowledge, and to sense is nothing other than to know intimately and immediately. Hence, those who know the divine goodness intimately and immediately necessarily sense it. But they sense it as it is, and on this account they sense it as most sweet. And this sense of the divine sweetness interiorly is sapiential taste or is the wisdom, about which we are speaking here. For it should in no way be doubted concerning the fountain of sweetness that it is most sweet beyond every thought and in the ultimate degree of sweetness and that it is totally the glory and beatitude and ultimate perfection of human souls, glorifying and beatifying them and perfecting them by its union with them, I mean, that ultimate union that is hoped for in the fatherland. And we 256 will speak about this in the treatise, On Merits and Their Rewards. This, [148a] then, is the intention of the name, wisdom, namely, savory or savorous knowledge. This wisdom is either general for all things that can be savored, as we already said, or there are two, one of which is for the divine sweetness or savoriness, while the other is general for all the other savors or savory things. At times, however, among us and among the philosophers, wisdom is understood as the knowledge of sublime and profound things, for which reason the divine sciences are called among them sapiential, and divine wisdom itself is properly called wisdom. For this reason a fool in the proper sense is someone ignorant of the things of God, no matter how knowledgeable he may be of other things. In accord with this, the fool said in his heart: There is no God (Ps 31:1 or Ps 52:1). But the knowledge of profound and hidden things is also called wisdom. On this account cleverness is also thought to be wisdom, 256  William has two treatises, On Merits (De meritis) and On the Rewards of the Saints (De retributionibus sanctorum). They are the last parts of On the Virtues and Vices (De virtutibus et vitiis).

162 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues 257

and likewise providence, as we read in Proverbs, chapter nine: Wisdom built 258 a home for herself (Prv 9:1), and in chapter fourteen of the same book we read: A wise woman builds her home, while a foolish woman destroys even with her hands a home that has been built (Prv 14:1). We also read about good sense in the same chapter of the same book: A wise person fears and turns away from evil (Prv 14:16). On account of the sublimity and profundity of things Augustine 259 says on the first chapter of Job that wisdom is faith, perhaps for the reason that in relation to the life to come sapiential knowledge in this life is faith, that is, belief, though belief beyond any doubt. Skill in working is also at times called wisdom in Exodus, chapter thirty-six: And so, Bezalel and Oholiab made it, along with every wise man to whom God gave wisdom and understanding in order to know how to produce as a carpenter what is necessary for the use of the sanctuary and what God commanded (Ex 36:1). Know that these intentions or interpretations are used and are very frequent in the scriptures. You ought also to know that at one time we were of such an opinion that we believed that each virtue and the art of acting in accord with it were wisdom, for example, that justice and the art of doing those things that are just are wisdom. But we thought this for two reasons, namely, because “virtue 260 is more certain and better than every art,” as Aristotle says. And on this account someone who acts on the basis of virtue acts better and more wisely than someone who acts on the basis of art. Secondly, by virtue something is known more interiorly, as if from smell and taste, and, therefore, more sapientially. But by art something is known more exteriorly, as from color and other extrinsic characteristics. For a just man does not simply and merely know justice, but also is seen to be delighted in its savors, as we read in Proverbs, chapter twentyone, where it says that it is a joy for a just man to do justice (Prv 21:15). For it seemed to us that a chaste person not only hated the foulness of sexual immorality, but also abominated it. But abomination is in the proper sense the savoring of its foulness and wantonness. But it does not follow that, if a chaste person abominates the foulness and wantonness of sexual immorality, he does this out of chastity. For this wisdom is perhaps the companion of all the virtues. Out of chastity, then, one flees and hates it and pursues the contrary. But out of wisdom one abominates it as foul and filthy. For as the virtue of chastity purifies the flesh and the spirit, so it cleanses the palate of the heart and prepares it for spiritual or sapiential tasting. But God always infuses this wisdom into a clean palate of the heart. But concerning the enmity for justice there should be no doubt that it is a certain savoring of it in one intention, and similarly with 257  258  259  260 

I have corrected “twenty-four” to “nine.” I have corrected “thirteen” to “fourteen.” Perhaps William meant Gregory the Great here: see above, note 242. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.6.1106b15. William cites the versio antiquissima.

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the enmity for chastity, and this will be apparent from the naming and listing of the savors. For even when each of the vices does not attack the contrary virtue, it still tastes inimical to the same virtue. By testing and attacking it, it acts inimically because in every way it tastes inimical to the contrary virtue. Hence, it introduces a hatred of itself in the same when it is in the mouth of the intellect [148b] through thought, just as any savor, when in the mouth, introduces its savor to the palate and tongue. Because, therefore, the contrary vice always introduces a hatred of itself to the palate of virtue when it is in its mouth, as we said, although it in no way acts as an enemy, that is, although it does not provoke the virtuous soul against itself by testing or attacking, we rightly called the enmity a spiritual savor. But next we will name, list, and explain these spiritual savors for you. We will, therefore, say first of all that these savors are dispositions of things that can naturally generate in us volitions, such as lovableness and odiousness, from which are naturally generated in our souls the volitions of love and hate. And it is this way with the others. Hence, it is necessary that there be the same number of such dispositions as there are of the savors and such volitions. Because, therefore, goodness is the first among such dispositions, the first savors in things will necessarily be of the modes or kinds of goodness. And for this reason there will be the necessity by which one thing is necessary for another; secondly, salubrity; thirdly health; fourthly, utility. These are in quite familiar language called four sorts of goodness. But these sorts of goodness are bent back or reflexive and goodness for someone, but their contraries are similar evils. And for this reason there are generated from them in our souls only similar and proportionate volitions, such as bent back or reflexive hatred. Each person loves such sorts of goodness or goods and seeks them for himself and his people, and he similarly hates their contraries for himself and for his people. But absolute goodness, that is, goodness considered absolutely and without qualification, begets a direct love in one who considers it correctly, and this love 261 is genuine friendship, as we showed in what went before. And this is the divine goodness, which does not have a genuine contrary. For if it had a contrary, it would have something coequal and equally lasting, since all genuine contraries are coequal and equally lasting. But you ought to recall that in the foregoing we named and listed for you the volitions of human souls for God, the first of which we said was fear, and we said that it was threefold. We said that the first and most correct was the fear of reverence, and his gloriousness and greatness or magnificence begets this in us. We said the second was the fear of offense, which our love for him and his generous beneficence toward us especially begets in us. We said that the third 261  See above, ch. 9, fol.126a.

164 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues was the fear of punishment, and his justice, which does not allow us to sin with impunity, begets this in us. The first, therefore, of our volitions for God and his first savor by which he begins to be savorous for us is fear. And on account of it it is written in the Psalm and in Ecclesiasticus: The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom (Ps 110:10 and Sir 1:16). That is, the beginning of the heavenly wisdom and savoring by which we begin to savor and taste God is fear of God. Perhaps for this 262 reason it was said: “Fear first made gods in the world.” The second volition for him is hope, and this is likewise threefold: first, the hope of pardon, second the hope of grace, and his mercy begets these two in us. For by reason of the fact that we know that he is merciful, we hope from him for the pardon of the sins that we have committed and the grace by which we may avoid similar sins from now on and may live in a way acceptable to him. The third is the hope of glory or of the eternal reward that his mercy and truth beget in us—his mercy by which he promises it and his truth by which he proves himself truthful in his promises. The third volition for him is shame by which we are embarrassed to have or to do something indecent or immoral in the sight of his most holy eyes, and his constant and continuous sight of all things, both of ours and of those belonging to others, [149a] begets this volition in us. The fourth is love, and his beauty, whose sight brings about inexplicable joy, begets this in us. And this is the love because of which one is called a lover. And the Book of Canticles is most full of this, because of which is it also called 263 the canticle of love in a certain title of it. Concerning this it says in chapter 264 eight of Wisdom: I became of a lover of her beauty (Wis 8:2). And again it says: She is more beautiful than the sun (Wis 7:29). The fifth is hunger or thirst, and the most refreshing sweetness of the same begets this in human souls. Of this Ecclesiasticus, chapter twenty-four, says: Those who eat me will still hunger, and those who drink will still thirst (Sir 24:29), and to this there pertain all those testimonies that we introduced above in support of spiritual taste. The sixth is necessary or due love, which we called supernatural. And his very generous beneficence, by which he has shown and unceasingly shows himself to be creator, father, nurturer, guardian, defender, protector, and giver of all goods, begets this in natural beings and those with knowledge. The seventh is righteous love, which is genuine friendship, most sincere love, and alone worthy of the name of charity, according to the usage of the moderns. 262  Publius Papinius Statius, Thebaid 3.661. 263  I found eleven hits for “song of love, canticum amoris” in reference to the Song of Songs in PL. 264  I have corrected “nine” to “eight.”

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But his pure and absolute goodness considered by itself begets this—I mean insofar as it lies in him. For we are not able to burn for him with so holy a love, just as we are not able to gaze upon him or recognize him because of the evil of original corruption and our multiple separation from him, which the state of present misery and sins cause. It is, therefore, apparent to you that there are seven good volitions of our souls for God. But the last of these is the most right, most pure, and most noble of all, and alone worthy of remuneration by itself. For the fact that God rewards all the others comes from his most affluent generosity and truth by which he never deprives those who have hope of what was promised. But injuries and sins are volitions that I will state and enumerate for you. I mean good volitions, of which the first is fear. For all sin is penal on account of the justice of God and also on account of its own evil. This is the first savor of sin by which the palate of the heart tastes what is penal, and this taste or savoring is the fear of the sin, and it is the beginning of that wisdom by which sins and vices taste to us as what they are and of what sort they are. The second is sorrow, and by this the palate of the heart tastes the wound or injury of sins, as we read in Isaiah, chapter one: The wound, bruise, and swelling sore are not wrapped with medication (Is 1:6). The third is shame, and by it the palate tastes what is shameful and that over which one should be embarrassed. The fourth is anger, and by it we taste injury and the provocation to revenge both concerning it and concerning us. The fifth is indignation; by it we taste indignation, not only because it is unworthy of being done by us, but also of being endured. The sixth is hatred, and by it we taste our enemy and his attack, and for this reason we are armed against him and declare war against him. The seventh is contempt or spurning, and the uselessness of sin begets this in us. The eighth is abomination, and its foulness and filth beget this in us and provoke spiritual nausea because we reject it from ourselves. The ninth is dread because we recoil from it, as from what is deadly and poisoned. And its deadliness, so to speak, 265 begets this in us, as we read in Ecclesiasticus, chapter twenty-one: Flee from sin as from the sight of a serpent (Sir 21:2), and the other things we read there. The tenth is cursing, and pollution begets this in us, and on this account we turn away from it as from spiritual sacrilege. The eleventh is detestation, and its impiety by which it is against God and his worship begets this in us. Know, however, that all the other dispositions of the vices and sins are reduced to these. The fact that they are sins and chains, prisons and slavery clearly pertains to [149b] their deadliness. These are the eleven good tastes by which vices and sins taste to the well-disposed palates of the heart. These are the spices from which a medicine against sins is compounded. These are the spears by which a salutary compunction of 265  I have corrected “one” to “twenty-one.”

166 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues our hearts is produced and a medicine for the wounds that sins have inflicted. These are the blows from the lance of Pelias that offer a medicine for their 266 wounds. This is the lead in the arrow of Cupid; this is the antidote that kills and removes the venom of vices and sins. These are the grounds of proof from which the Holy Spirit elicits arguments, from which he draws eleven conclusions and eleven times concludes for the human heart, as we read in John, chapter sixteen: He will accuse the world from sin ( Jn 16:8); that is, from sin itself he will elicit arguments to repel and confound the insanity and folly of sinners. These are the allegations from which the sentence of the damnation of sin is drawn, according to what we read in Romans, chapter eight: From sin God condemned sin (Rom 8:3); that is, from sin itself he took the allegations, and he daily takes the allegations in penitents, from which he condemns it in them and makes sin to be condemned, as Goliath is killed by his own sword, as we read 267 in One Kings, chapter seventeen, as Holofernes is killed by his own dagger, 268 as we read in Judith, chapter thirteen. But temporal things that are called riches are also well-disposed tastes or volitions for well-disposed souls. Of these the first is that they taste like mud, as 269 we read in Habakkuk, chapter two: He loads himself down with thick mud. To the greedy man gold and silver do not taste of mud, but of riches. The second is that they taste of pitch, in accord with what we read in Ecclesiasticus, chapter thirteen: He who touches pitch will be defiled by it (Sir 13:1). The third is that they taste of birdlime because of their gluttony, as Augustine says on the psalm 270 that the love of temporal things is a birdlime of spiritual wings. The fourth is that they taste of dung, in accord with that which the apostle says in the Letter to the Philippians, chapter three: I considered all things as dung in order that I might gain Christ (Phil 3:8). The fifth is that they taste of thorns that prick and wound the human heart in many ways, as we read in Luke, chapter eight, and 271 Mark, chapter four, in the parable on the seed. The sixth is that they taste of the falsity and deception that they have, as the Truth says in Matthew, chapter thirteen: The falsity of riches chokes off the word (Mt 13:22). The seventh is that they taste of vanity. What then are the good dispositions of temporal things, namely, of those things that come with time and pass with time and are lost, when they beget seven savors in well-disposed souls? The first is mud, the abundance of which is 266  267  268  269  270 

See Ovid, The Remedies for Love (Remedia amoris), 47–48. 1 Sm 17:51. See Jdt 13. Hb 2:6. See Augustine, Homilies on the Psalms (Enarrationes in Psalmos) 138.13; PL 37: 1792. I have restored Augustine’s“wings, pennarum” in place of“penalities, poenarum.” 271  See Lk 8:7 and Mk 4:7.

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most cheap. On this account for one to whom riches taste like mud, their abundance tastes most cheap and worthy of rejection and in no sense to be amassed, that is, worthy to be amassed. And a rich man is nothing other than a man who is deluded over a heap or mass of mud with a great most insane blindness and who is glorying over it as over a heap of noble riches. And we have already said much on other things in sermons, and we read many things worth remembering in the canonical scriptures and in the writings of the saints. We read of how riches are pitch, defiling their lovers with a clinging and sticking defilement, and of how birdlime holds back wretched hearts that attach themselves to them, and this either in part or as a whole, like little birds that attach themselves to branches coated with birdlime and are caught and are either held back there wholly or do not fly away without the loss of or damage to their feathers. In the same way greedy and covetous people have lost the feathers of good thoughts and good volitions, either wholly or in part, and have left them in the birdlime of riches. For they cast forth their innards there, 272 as we read in Ecclesiasticus, chapter ten. We read of how they are like dung and why and for what reason they always defile and [150a] make those who touch them stink. Those who ought to smell of heaven and heavenly things and the scents of the virtues and the fragrance of the other graces smell of earth and taste of earth. It is evident that the earth is six elements in comparison with heaven, and six of the elements are considered by the philosophers, because of which the earth resides in the depth or deepest part, that is, in the middle of the world. We read of how riches are thorns of countless cares, fears, and sorrows, and they also inflict sores or wounds on those who handle them. We read of how they are deceptive and a trap that catches those who want and think of them. We read of how they are a lie, when, though promising satiety and abundance, they give only hunger and need and their increase. We read of how they are vanity when they neither bestow plenitude on one who has them nor support for one leaning on them nor fruit for one laboring in them or for them, as we have already explained many times and amply in other places and do not cease to explain daily in preached sermons. 273 The are also other savors of them, that is, those by which they savor of the burdens that plunge one into the depth of death and darkness, punishments of thieves, robbers, and burglars and the provocations of them, not only to all their purloining and robbery, but also to every danger and every death of those who possess them. Thirdly, they savor of strife, because of which in the explanations of the books of Solomon we have generally interpreted the quar274 relsome woman as this affluence of temporal things. All the courtrooms and 272  See Sir 10:10. I have corrected “five” to “ten.” 273  I have conjectured the nominative “aliae” instead of the dative “aliis.” 274  See Prv 19:13, 21:9, 25:24, and 27:15.

168 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues consistories echo with uproar and shouting for this affluence. In the same way riches savor of wars and the dangers of all wars, on account of which a rich and wealthy man is exposed to every kind of ambush and attack for no other reason than because of the riches themselves. They savor of a sword because they pierce the hearts of men with the wound of their evil love. They savor of fire because they burn with the ardors of desires, and they savor of excessive water because they drown and extinguish the hearts of human beings with the waves or swells of harmful cares. In all, there are, therefore, fourteen savors of riches insofar as they are riches, by which they are savorous for healthy palates and those who are endowed with a taste for such savors. But specifically there are twelve spiritual savors of foods and drinks for anyone; they taste similarly for sapiential palates. The first is the failing and consumption of one’s own body, and those people taste this insofar as they are food or refreshment. For they are not food or refreshment unless they repair what is failing and used up. The second is medication in which illnesses and fevers, to which hunger and thirst are like additions, taste well to the wise. On this account Augustine says on Romans, chapter fourteen, that foods are to be taken 275 as medicines, and for this reason not only with temperance and due measure, but also with the memory of death, whose knock or push that impels toward it is the approach of both hunger and thirst. The third savor is that by which one savors bodily food as something pertaining to an ox or a horse, because the body should be regarded as an ox, and for this reason the table of the body as a manger and its whole dwelling as a stable. Since, however, this savor embarrasses the palate of a well-disposed heart, the one sitting on or mounting this horse spiritually undoubtedly eats at the trough of his horse or jackass and eats along with his horse or jackass, and pushing away from himself bodily food like the hay or oats of his horse or jackass, he seeks for himself fitting and proper food, that is, spiritual food. The previously mentioned horse or jackass cannot attain the delights of spiritual food. On this account it was said in Jeremiah, chapter fifteen: If you separate the precious from the cheap, you will be like my mouth, that is, separate the spirit, that is, the rider, from [150b] the flesh, that is, the horse or jackass, and separate spiritual delights from straw or oats of the body, a table from a manger, and the heavenly palace from the stable of the body. Who except someone mindless would not only blush, but also find abominable and stand in horror at eating with his jack276 ass or pig or sow in sulfurous vessel? But the human body is really a spiritual pig or sow if one pays attention to its uncleanness and foulness.

275  See Augustine, Confessions (Confessiones) 10.31.44; PL 32: 797. 276  I have conjectured “sulfurous, sulfureo” instead of “fulfureo,” whose meaning I could not find, although that may not be much of an improvement.

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The fourth savor is that by which one savors the divine generosity and does so insofar as it is a gift. The fifth is that by which one savors the divine piety and does so insofar as it is a benefit of alms that the divine piety distributes for the feeding of all of us as his poor. The sixth is that by which we savor our own poverty when God’s mercy is given to us on account of our neediness. But there are loftier savors that follow, of which the first is that by which we savor God’s service to us or God’s familiarity, which like a father he distributes to the children of his family, and like God he distributes to us, his servants. And on this account, he brings himself to such a table as a robber and a thief, who is not one of the children of God the Father and not a member of his family. The second is that by which we savor the salary of spiritual patronage, because it is given to us clerics and priests as a salary, as if to advocates of souls both dead and alive, that is, for presenting the case of souls before the Father of mercies. Hence, he eats it as a robber and thief, who does not try to present the case of souls, as we said. Hence, they need not only to know such laws and the pleas of so lofty a consistory or courtroom, but also to enter pleas, whenever it is opportune, with elegance and solicitude. Alas, such a salary has such avid recipients and passionate lovers and so few who plead cases and such unskilled and negligent ones! The third savor is that by which those who taste properly savor the army, as we said, and this insofar as there is a stipend. For it is the stipend of the clerical army, although not alone and not the whole stipend. One receives such a stipend, like a robber and a thief, who receives it without reason, who neglects to fight for souls, that is, for souls against their enemies, and what is worse, fights against God who is angry at them. But we have named and listed these fights and battles in the treatise, On the Sacraments and Sacramentals, in the chapter on confession, and for this reason we do not repeat them here. Alas! How many and great—I will not say recipients, but robbers and thieves—such a stipend has. These men not only neglect to fight for souls, but also fight against them with all their pursuits and forces and also against God, the most sweet giver of these wages, and what is worse and what gives honor to the principal enemy of God and of their souls, namely, the devil, they fight with God’s stipend, and receive no other stipend from the devil for whom they fight than to be hurled down to endless death and eternal punishments, as we read in Romans, chapter six: The wages of sin is death (Rom 6:23). On account of the failure and infidelity of those who are enrolled in this spiritual, that is, clerical army, the people of God are handed over to the prey and plunder of demons; on this account they are captured in masses, by hundreds, and by thousands and are slaughtered because there is no one on their side to defend them. For this reason clerics are given the tonsure, like a sword, by which they may rec-

170 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues ognize that they are defenders of souls. Alas, how shameful it is and how one should be embarrassed to present oneself as a fighter or defender of souls by reason of tonsure and [151a] habit and to exhibit or have no fighting quickness or a fighter’s fortitude, to show in all things that one is an enemy of souls, and to profess a womanish fragility, the frailness of a life of softness, and the weakness of limbs. The fourth savor is that by which one savors the redemption of souls, as we read in Proverbs, chapter thirteen: The redemption of a man’s soul is his wealth (Prv 13:8). And in Daniel, chapter four, we read: Redeem your sins by almsgiving and your iniquities by mercies to the poor (Dn 4:24). For all ecclesiastical benefices were given to the churches for the redemption of souls, I mean, for their redemption from the captivity of sins and punishments. Whoever of us, then, are clerics who have received such benefices have received redemption, I mean, the price of redemption, not only without reason, but also perniciously, if we do not work enough for the liberation of souls, if we do not procure it as such redemption requires. For who would dare to be such a traitor that, after he had received the redemption of his friend, namely, by pact or condition, in order to procure his liberation from prison and chains, he would endure without any pity his being tortured there for a long time and finally fixed to the gibbet. The fifth savor is that by which one savors food that hooks one or a hook embedded in food that, fixed in the jaws or throat, catches the eater by his eagerness for the delight that is believed to be in the food, as a trap catches a mouse, a hook fishes, and a snare a bird. You explicitly read about a trap in Wisdom, chapter fourteen: Because the creatures of God were created as hatred and as temptation of human souls and as a trap for the feet of the foolish (Wis 14:11). But you read about a hook and a snare in Ecclesiastes, chapter nine: As fishes are caught by a hook and birds by a snare, so men are caught by a bad time (Eccl 9:12). Bodily food, therefore, is food that conceals a hook, that is, the pampering of dainty pleasure, because while the dainty eater believes that he is the hunter and trapper, he is caught by it and, as it commonly said, hooked. Hence it is that all who feast, all gluttons and drunkards are like fishes caught by a hook, that is, pierced by the briefest pleasure for their mouths and throats. We read about a hook in Habakkuk, the first chapter: You make men like the fishes of the sea—understand with respect to such capture, and then: He has brought the whole up by a hook; he has dragged it in his net (Hb 1:14). Elsewhere we have told you that such men are men given over to death and already destined to be fixed to and hanged upon the gibbet of hell by ropes around their necks or by ropes 277 through their necks, and, as it is commonly said, bound by their gullets, they are dragged to the gibbet of hell. And in the same common language, they are, if it is properly said, captured by their gullets. For a rope for the neck, around 277  I have conjectured the addition of “by, per.”

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the neck, even a rope on the gullet—we are saying this in common language— is the love of dainty pleasure in the mouth or throat. Alas, how wretched a spectacle for the eyes of the pious is the countless multitude of men so hooked, horribly bound by their gullets, men who are dragged off to a hellish hanging. The sixth is that by which those who are wise in a lofty manner savor the goodness of divine sweetness, and this as by a slight sprinkle and thin scent of it and as if by something interposed. For something of that sweetness, as Augustine says, is sprinkled over that region. And in the book, On Free Choice, he says, “Woe to those who turn away from your light” and are delighted “in their own carnal act, as fixed in their own shadow,” where “they still have that 278 which delights them from the refulgence of your light,” as if he said from the refulgence of your sweetness. For all sweetness in creatures is only like a slight sprinkle and very thin scent, like a trace of the divine sweetness in the ultimate degree of smallness. As a scent, therefore, invites someone with the sense of smell to that by which [151b] it is sprinkled, and as a sprinkle invites one to the fullness from which it drips, and as a traces invites one to the one who passes or imprints it, so all sweetness in any creature invites one to the most overflowing fullness of the divine sweetness. As, therefore, someone hungry and thirsty is not content with the sprinkle of that which he strives to have nor with the scent of food or of drink, just as a hunter is not content with a trace of the animal that he wants and is seeking to capture, so those with lofty and spiritual taste and smell are not content with these, so to speak, sprinkles, scents, and traces of the divine sweetness. For they are hungering, sniffing in a lofty and spiritual way; they are lofty and noble hunters, and ones pursing and going after the noble prey of divine sweetness, as it is said in Ecclesiasticus, chapter fourteen: Going after it as a hunter (Sir 14:23). On the contrary, however, it is said of certain people: His enemies will lick the earth (Ps 71:9). These are those who, having spurned the most abundant source of divine sweetness, lick these sprinkles, which we mentioned, immerse themselves in them, and become inebriated by them with a drunkenness by which they are insane to the point of all brutish follies. But the immersion of so great a multitude of human beings and their most insane capture in one drop of sweetness is amazing and miserable, and it is an amazing madness to prefer that drop to the fontal depth or deep font of the divine sweetness. For the whole orb of the earth is like a drop of predawn dew before you (Wis 11:23), that is, in 279 comparison with you, as we read in Wisdom, chapter eleven. Lovers of temporal things, therefore, lick temporal things without finding in them a source of satisfaction, for it is impossible for anyone to be satisfied by licking. These 278  Augustine, On Free Choice (De libero arbitrio) 2.16.43; PL 32: 1264. I have corrected William’s reference to On True Religion (De vera religione). 279  I have corrected “one” to “eleven.”

172 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues are people who do not reckon their money in bread and their labor in satiety. But it is most shameful and foul to bend over to lick such small and such slight sprinkles and to turn one’s back on the table prepared in heaven, about which 280 we read in Luke, chapter thirteen, and not to care at all for the riches of the house of God and the torrent of pleasure by which his elect will be inebriated. The seventh is that by which all these things have the savor of the most dutiful service. For all these things serve us by every sort of our consumption of them and to every expense of their own. In our service some are, of course, afflicted with labors; others are stripped of their fur; still others deprived of their feathers; others of their hide; others are cut up, others burned, and still others consumed by all sorts of death and destruction. This savor is beneficial for this purpose, namely, that we disdain to serve things that were born to serve us in so dutiful a service and to such great destruction of themselves. And we see that they serve us without any ceasing. We have now in general stated for you the twelve spiritual savors by which bodily foods and drinks ought to serve us. But one who does not know how to elicit savors from foods by chewing does not know how to eat. Hence, one who does not know how to draw such savors from foods by the grinding of meditation does not know how to chew such bodily foods in a spiritual way. Nor does he have a palate or mouth for eating, who is not able to perceive such savors. For without these savors they consume rather than eat bodily foods, not as human beings, but rather as jackasses or swine. And for them they are not foods except in a certain respect, because they are foods only in terms of the body. Although, as we said, their souls can be refreshed from those twelve savors, only their bodies are refreshed to the detriment of their souls. We recall, however, that we once said that the thirteenth savor is that by which souls savor their price, that is, the blood or death of Christ. For by the most precious death of the Redeemer and by his life-giving blood, they were in some sense acquired and bought for the priests and the whole clergy, for which reason it is usually called the patrimony of the crucified, and thus they were also bougth by the death of the martyrs, and by the most holy labors of the confessors [152a] and virgins, on account of which we said many times in preached sermons that all such things are red with the blood of Christ and the martyrs and drip with the sweat of confessors and virgins. This savor is good for two things: first, for parsimony. For when they are thought to have been bought at so great a price, it is not merely persuasively suggested, but also strongly urged that we should consume them sparingly. Secondly, it is good for repressing the lasciviousness and dissoluteness of pleasure. For who would not be horrified to be lascivious in the blood of Christ and the martyrs and to be dissolute in the labors, sweats, and pains of all the saints? For 280  See Lk 13:28–30.

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in the devotion of the faithful, all of these have been repaid by Christ to the merits of the saints and offered by the faithful. But we shall now return to state and list for you the operations of the seven gifts in accord with another way than that stated above. We say, therefore, that there are seven evils that amazingly and miserably subvert and defile human 281 life. The first is moral childishness of which Isaiah, chapter sixty-five, says: A child of one hundred years shall die (Is 65:20), and the apostle says in the First Letter to the Corinthians, chapter fourteen: Do not become children in your minds, but little ones in malice (1 Cor 14:20). On this Seneca says, “It is 282 most shameful that we have the titles of elders, but the vices of children.” And again he says, “There remains in us not childhood, but what is worse, 283 childishness.” On this Wisdom, chapter twelve, says: Living in the manner of mindless infants (Wis 12:21). Against this evil of childishness, therefore, there is the gravity and maturity of wisdom by which we look down on childishness and grasp things worthy of men, that is, great and lofty ones, and embrace them with love, regarding all temporal sweetness as milk and all temporal goods as pears, apples, and nuts. By giving these up one shows whether he is a child or a man. Likewise, one does so by the surrender or loss of temporal things. For someone who rejoices when these are offered to him or grieves when they are taken away from him undoubtedly declares by such joy and sorrow that he is a child or—what is more true—that he is childish. But one who is a man by reason of the gravity and maturity of such wisdom rather thinks that he is being mocked and shown contempt when such childish things are offered to him. For who except someone who is a mocker and wants to show contempt would offer an adult or elder a pear or a nut or extend a nipple for him to suck. The second evil is brutishness by which we grasp only the externals of sensible things and cling only to them, standing outside and unable to reach the interior of hidden things. Against this evil there is the penetration of the gift of understanding. For by it we attain the hidden aspects of things and the hidden meanings of signs. Hence, even the name of understanding (intellectus) is derived from that which is within (intus), as if it were the reading (lectio) of interior things or internal reading. On this account Gregory says in On Ezekiel 284 that this understanding removes dullness. For it is like a sharp and clean light that penetrates all the exteriors of both things and signs and attains all the interiors. By this gift we read on the exteriors of creatures not only their interiors, but all the invisible things of God (Rom 1:22), as the apostle says in the Letter 281  282  283  284 

I have corrected “sixty” to “sixty-five.” Seneca, Moral Letters (Epistulae morales) 4.2. Ibid. See Gregory the Great, Moral Teachings on Job (Moralia in Job) 2.49.77; PL 75: 592.

174 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues to the Romans, chapter one, just as through the motions and operations of the bodies of animals, which are of course all external, we read the interiors of the animals, for example, their souls and their powers. Similarly, in the exteriors of signs, whether positive or natural, we read the interiors of what they signify. Through this gift all things, both natural and artificial, are signs for us and a book replete with salutary learning. This gift is served by the second, third, and fourth parts of contemplative knowledge, namely, meditative, speculative, and symbolic or comparative, about which we intend to write along with the others, 285 if God grants life and space. [152b] Every creature speaks of God to this gift. By this gift Augustine questioned creatures, as he himself says: I asked the sun and the moon, the sea and the stars about my God, and they answered me that we are not he, but he made 286 us, and so on. To this gift the heavens declare the glory of God (Ps 18:2), and so on. On account of these words or statements Augustine called all creatures little signs of God, speaking in this way: For you do not cease to indicate to us of what sort and how great a sign for minds is your sweetest light and virtue, 287 and your signs are every beauty of creatures. To this gift all the sacraments speak their invisible powers and operations by their exterior forms. To this gift temples and their furnishings, also their due measure, ministers and their equipment, and all exterior worship speak. To this gift all the ceremonies of the laws, and figures, likewise parables, enigmas, and visions of the prophets speak, 288 as Daniel says, because understanding is a work in vision (Dn 10:1). But if someone says: Therefore, one who has the gift of understanding understands all these things that we have mentioned, we reply that this does not follow. Similarly, although sight reveals all visible things, it does not follow that whoever has sight sees all visible things. But just as someone who has sight is prepared to see all the visible things to which he applies his sight in a suitable way, so too someone who has such a gift is prepared to understand all intelligible things. But through such a gift a philosopher behaves like a curious traveler who goes about different places and territories to see the visible things that are in them. For someone who actually uses such a gift wanders about with his mind among things that he seeks to understand, walking spiritually by its light, like the light of a lamp lit at night. For the state of this life is like a night in which we need many lamps or lights, and the gift of understanding is the gift of those lights. But you should know that all people do not have this gift of understanding equally or as equal. For some have it as most ready for understanding all the in285  286  287  288 

William, it seems, never did write this work. See Confessions (Confessiones) 10.6.9; PL 32: 783. See Augustine, On Free Choice (De libero arbitio) 2.16.43; PL 32: 1264. 43. I have corrected “Job” to “Daniel.”

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telligible things that are set before them, as some people have exterior vision for gazing upon all visible things that are placed before them. But others have a lazy understanding, just as people have sight, who suffer pain or some other impediment in the eyes that impedes the movement of the eyes and their ability to see. And some people have such a gift well exercised and for this reason very strong and also very bright. For all the gifts and virtues are strengthened and brightened by exercise, just as they are darkened and give out because of idleness and inactivity. An obvious example of this is found in natural things, as you see in the power to walk, which is strengthened by suitable exercise in walking, but weakened by too much quiet, at times to the point of failure, just as vision is either weakened or completely lost because of a long stay in some place, but is brightened and strengthened by suitable exercise. You should know that this gift, namely, the gift of understanding, is of such brightness and sharpness in some people that it is likened very much to the spirit of prophecy, such as some believed existed in Abbot Joachim, and he is said to have said about himself that he was not given the spirit of prophecy, but the spirit of understanding. But if someone examines his books, On the Apocalypse and On the Harmony of the Two Testaments, he will be amazed at the gift 290 of understanding in him. But someone might ask what sort of knowledge is the knowledge that is acquired by the gift of understanding, that is, whether it is merely belief [153a] or certitude. And if it is certitude, it does not differ from faith except only in terms of the material, that is, because faith is about fundamental and basic points of the Christian religion, that is, about hidden and profound matters that are veiled in mysteries or overshadowed by meanings. And if it is certitude, it will be like vision, or it will be the certitude left behind by proof. But this is clearly false; in these matters the expositors of the books of the prophets and of the law of the Hebrews do not use proofs, but only explanatory narratives. Vision, therefore, cannot be the operation of such a gift, because the matters about which there is the operation of such a gift are such veiled and overshadowed matters, as we said, but the matters that are seen by themselves in the proper sense are uncovered and lie without anything interposed and as seen, or vision is upon them. Hence, understanding and seeing are opposed as seeing something without a covering and judging about something covered. 289  I have omitted “But others have a lazy, Alii autem habent pigrum,” which seems to have been transposed from below. 290  William refers to Joachim of Flora (Fiore) who lived 1135–1202 and wrote Expositio in Apocalipsim and Liber concordiae novi et veteris testamenti. The first work was published in Venice in 1627 and photographically reproduced in Frankfurt am Main in 1964; the second was published in Venice in 1519 and photographically reproduced at Frankfurt am Main,1964.

176 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues Although the operation of such a gift is belief, it still differs both in matter and form from faith. It differs in matter, as we said, because understanding is about things under signs and overshadowed of themselves and insofar as they are a book, whose interior reading is salutary knowledge. But faith is about the basic and fundamental matters of religion, not in this way; that is, not involving the looking at signs or veils, but only at their truth, salutariness, basic role, and fundamentalness to religion, stressing them and relying on them as the foundation of salvation, but in the form or the matter of knowledge. By these things that we have said, the difference between them is clearly apparent: to know a thing as the thing by itself and as a thing signified, that is, by another thing. We said this on account of words and other signs that we use in place of words, such as letters and figures similar to letters, are clearly different ways of knowing. For a difference in the ways of knowing necessarily differentiates the sorts of knowledge. Nor is the operation of this understanding like the operation of seeing under a covering. For sight does not use a covering as a sign of the thing that is under the covering, but as tied to it and accompanying it. Hence, if something were under the same covering, he would see it equally, and it is equally possible that any other thing be under the same covering either wholly or in part, and for this reason it is possible that it be seen under the same covering. But it is not that way with a sign, for it is not possible that just any thing be 291 under any sign. Rather, things are not to be determined by any signs except given or positive signs, such as words and names. The gift of understanding, however, uses names and words no more than faith does. But if someone asks whether the understanding of all those things that are understood by the gift of understanding can be acquired through teaching, we say that it can, because it is possible that every prophecy and all the mysteries that are understood by such a gift be both taught and written down carefully and clearly. But the understanding acquired in that way would be derived from things themselves and not from above. On this account the difference and relation between them would be like the relation of light coming down from the first light upon our souls and light that is reflected and comes up from things to our souls and like the solar light, that is, the light coming down from the sun and the light coming down from the moon, according to the opinion of those who say that the rays of the moon are solar rays, but reflected ones. For Aven292 nathan, the philosopher, wrote about this a single treatise [153b] in which he thought that he explained that the moon is illumined by the sun through reflection of the solar rays.293 291  I have added “not, non.” as the sense seems to require. 292  Avennathan or Alhazen is one of several Latinized forms of the Islamic author, Ibn al-Haytham (965–1039 ). William refers to his book on optics. 293  I have conjectured “reflection, reflectionem” instead of “refraction, refractionem.”

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But let us return and say that this light that we call the gift of understanding is applied to the elect against the brutish dullness, by which we are dull and brutish with a natural corruption, that is, which is innate in us. It is either applied by the gift of divine grace or is acquired through teaching or one’s own exercise, that is, the examination of books or diligent meditation. And what we are saying, namely, that the gift of understanding is opposed to brutish dullness, is apparent from what was said by the prophet, namely: Do not become like a horse and a mule that do not have understanding (Ps 31:9). For it is certain that brute animals cling to the outsides and stay in them and, so to speak, even stand outside. But they perceive nothing of the interior, except insofar as the natural estimative power suggests to them. And this is what Boethius says in his book, On the Art of Music: “A sense” perceives “nothing of the whole, but gets only to 294 the surface.” But reason considers that something is underneath—understand 295 reason as judgment derived from “I think, you think, I thought.” But you ought to know that the estimative power in the souls of animals, whether rational ones or others, is much like the gift of understanding. But the gift of understanding is incomparably broader and loftier, and the estimative power uses only natural signs, not insofar as they are signs, but as things that accompany them. The gift of understanding, however, uses natural and positive signs, but insofar only as they are signs. If someone asks whether anyone has salvation without this gift, it seems that he does not. For to understand seems to fall under the commandment since its opposite is blamed in scripture, namely, in this verse: Behold a man who refused to understand in order that he might act well (Ps 35:4), and also here: Because they did not understand the works of the Lord and the works of his hands, you will destroy them (Ps 27:5). It is seen to be expressly commanded to rulers in this text: And now, kings, understand (Ps 2:10). Likewise its opposite is also forbidden there: Do not become like a horse and a mule that do not have understanding (Ps 31:9). We reply to you, therefore, that there is no adult Christian in whom this gift is not apparent on the basis of some use of understanding or on the basis of a facility or readiness for it. For although many do not grasp the great and lofty matters of what is signified, they do grasp some things in accord with the capacity of their simplicity and learning. And you can experience this also from children who are not able to grasp the language of the mysteries and still understand some of them and similarly in deaf and mute adults. But you can rightly admire the excellence of this light in the sacred teachers and writers on the basis of their teaching and writings. And there is the same question about the other gifts, and the same reply. 294  Boethius, On the Art of Music (De arte musica) 5.1; PL 63: 286. 295  William gives the principal parts of verb, “I think, reor.”

178 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues The third evil is that of crisis and danger, and against this the gift of counsel is applied to the elect by the gift of divine piety. Those who lack it rush into dangers since they cannot foresee or take precaution against them. Precipitous rashness begets these downfalls. Of such a gift, however, there are two proper operations. The first of these is the removal or restraint of impetuosity, and the slowing down of action before complete, exact, and carefully examined deliberation. For some are so impulsive that they do not wait for full deliberation in their actions, but others do not await even beginning to deliberate. The second operation of the same gift is the foreseeing of dangers. The third and also the chief of them all and one of greater light is the discovery or finding of escape or evasion, and this is called counsel in the proper sense. But the other two are more properly [154a] called, one, the awaiting counsel, the other, taking counsel or deliberating. Although many are called men of counsel, still not all are endowed with this gift. For there are men ready with expertise in legal knowledge in cases and in other things that pertain to the law and are prepared to give just counsel, as there are others who have this from experience and practice. Farmers and vintners and workers of all the arts are consulted and correctly and rightly give counsel concerning the works of their arts or crafts. But the gift of counsel extends only to those matters that pertain to the divine honor and human salvation. And these are the two areas in which a man aims to avoid all the dangers that exist or are concerned with them. To this gift there pertains whom and when one should consult whether to remain in the world or to enter religion and again whether to lead a private life or to undertake a public office, such as the episcopate or archdiaconate or the like. By this gift one always looks out for that by which the greater honor for God and the greater salvation of souls is acquired, such as in the transfer of persons from churches and to churches, for example, when one should stay, when one should transfer, when the status should be changed and when not. In all of these cases, whether for counseling or for choosing, although experience and learning help those counseling and those consulted to some extent, the gift of counsel is still of far greater light than the one in whom it exists and whom it makes choose or undertake what it dictates by its power and vivacity. For practice and learning do not offer this by their power, and for this reason one should most of all consult in such matters, not just any men who have it in any way, but those who have the gift with much light. For the responses of these men will generally seem to be like prophetic utterances, and this is because of the revelations of dangers and benefits that the human senses are not sufficient to see by themselves. On this account those who are placed in the office of counseling souls ought to beg with the total insistence of prayer and devotion from the giver of graces that he might increase and multiply that light in them so that he himself replies with salutary counsels to those who consult through them, whether by supplying or suggesting replies. For the

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spirit of counsel is much like the spirit of prophecy, and the spirit of prophecy is in some sense a gift, that is, insofar as at times it reveals things very deep and most hidden from the light. By this light the darkness of all who are perplexed is put to flight, and life without this gift is sailing or navigating without knowledge of all the dangers that threaten sailors. Moreover, life without this gift is like fighting without a leader and like warfare without a commander. For war is managed with order, and there is safety where there are many counsels (Prv 24:6), as we read in Proverbs, chapter twen296 ty-four. For since human life is a sailing on the sea of this world and warfare or battle, while many and great dangers threaten those who are sailing and are at war, the elect are defended against them by the gift of counsel. If someone asks whether counsel is at times offered by such a gift about temporal and bodily dangers, we reply that it is, as we frequently read in the Book of the Kings concerning David, who consulted the Lord about whether he should go out against the enemies of his people, and in all these consultations it is clear that according to the literal sense of the text the Lord was consulted and that he gave counsel about temporal or bodily things. And also generally, according to the testimony of Blessed Augustine, where a man does not have what he should do from human reason, the divine words of response should always be implored, [154b] as and when a man does not have what he should 297 do from his own virtue or power, the divine help is to be asked for. In the acts of the saints we often read that they gave counsels to some people against 298 imminent bodily dangers, as Saint Eligius gave counsel to a certain Bishop Cornates not to return to his city on account of the bodily danger that he foretold threatened him, and afterward it is certain that it happened to him. But in these cases and similar ones the luminosity of this gift is clearly seen, by which it is likened, as we have already said, to the spirit of prophecy. But if someone asks whether this gift has parts and rays, as we said of the gift of knowledge and whether they can be reduced in writings to an art or at least a collection of them, we reply that some can be written down and taught, but a general collection of them cannot be found, and the reason is that there is and never has been anyone in the number of the saints to whom all the spiritual and temporal dangers of all human beings has become known, as all the mysteries have been revealed to none of the prophets. For we read in Exodus, chapter eighteen, that a certain salutary counsel was revealed to Jethro on account of Moses and the people, which Moses humbly accepted from him, and although

296  I have corrected “twenty-eight” to “twenty-four.” 297  See Augustine, Answer to the Academics (Contra Academicos) 1.1; PL 32: 919. 298  Perhaps Eligius of Noyon, who was born in Limoges, France, in the late sixth century, became bishop of Noyon, in present-day Belgium, and died circa 660.

180 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues Moses was endowed with so eminent a spirit of prophecy, he did not know this 299 counsel before he heard it from Jethro. We read that the counsels of learned men were written down in many cases. But as they could not foresee all the cases, so they could not write down all the counsels. They also receive the counsels that they pass on to others, either by praying or meditating or conferring with others or by deliberating, while the Holy Spirit suggests and reveals them. As the Holy Spirit does not always touch the hearts of prophets, that is, does not always illumine them with his revelations, so he does not always touch consultors or counselors, but, as we said, when they procure them by prayers or by other sacred exercises along with them, or others procure them with them. For some procure them, as Elisha did in Four Kings, chapter three. When he was asked by the king of Israel, he commanded that a minstrel be brought to him, and after the minstrel sang, 300 the hand of the Lord was placed upon him and he prophesied. When Blessed Hilary could not see something in the holy writings by himself, he had recourse 301 to Blessed Martin and said, “Pray, Martin.” From this there has been established the praiseworthy custom in the church of God that, whenever we do not know what we should do, we have recourse to holy men in order that they might obtain that what we should do in this case may be inspired in us or may be revealed by the Lord. The fourth evil is the continuous blows of wars and spiritual struggles. Against this evil, therefore, God arms and fortifies his elect by the gift of fortitude, by which all adversity is conquered in marvelous and almost innumerable ways. Among other things that the world is named and said to be by different comparisons, it is rightly called a field of battle for spiritual warriors, of course. A blockade walls them about on every side, as we recall that we said more amply and extensively in the special treatise on the gift of knowledge. What, then, the necessity is, what the salutariness is, and what finally the utility or reward of the gift of fortitude is can be clearly seen from these points, since by means of it the elect defend themselves, conquer in battle, and receive the crowns of countless victories from the reward given to good people. There is a doubt, however, whether there is one fortitude by which one fights against all adversity or some special fortitude should be held to be the gift of fortitude here. [155a] There are also other questions about these that we shall try to follow up briefly and determinately. And among the first, fortitude does not seem to be a virtue, but rather to pertain to all the virtues, as each virtue arms and fortifies its subject against the contrary vice, as bodily chastity forti299  See Ex 18:13–27. 300  See 2 Kgs 3:15–19. William follows the Vulgate numbering for the Books of Kings. 301  Perhaps Saints Hilary of Poitiers and Martin of Tours, who certainly knew each other, according to the Life of Martin (Vita Martini) by Sulpicius Severus, which can be found in PL 20.

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fies its subject against dissoluteness of the flesh, and as abstinence does against gluttony, and as sobriety does against drunkenness, and so on with the rest. If, then, fortitude and nothing else does these three things, it is necessarily identical with each of the virtues, because each does the same and only the same as the others. Moreover, since each of the other virtues does these three things that we named, namely, arms, fortifies, and defends against its contrary vice, it is useless to place another virtue or gift among these three. 302 Moreover, Cicero says that fortitude is untiring endurance of troubles. According to this, then, to suffer troubles untiringly or in a manly way will be the work of fortitude. But no one doubts that this is the work proper to patience. Patience and this fortitude, then, will be identical. Moreover, what is the difference between fortitude and gentleness, between magnanimity and that virtue by which one is said to be meek? But if someone says that, when chastity fights against dissoluteness, fortitude fights as well, since the troublesomeness of the temptation is borne and conquered by it, he necessarily has to grant that, wherever there is the troublesomeness of temptation, fortitude necessarily fights there as well. For if it is troublesomeness itself against which fortitude fights in the proper sense and of itself, it is necessary that wherever troublesomeness is conquered, fortitude will also fight. Moreover, when temptation acts by attractive means and the temptation itself delights, resisting the temptation is troublesome. But to endure what is troublesome, as troublesome, is the work of fortitude. Hence, all resistance of what is troublesome will come from the virtue of fortitude. Because, therefore, all resisting is troublesome, every victory will also necessarily come from the virtue of fortitude. For if resisting temptation were only pleasant, it would also not be war and for that reason not virtuous nor victorious. For although scripture says: It is a joy for a just man to do justice (Prv 21:15), it is still not merely joy and not always such. But in order that the truth may appear, we shall determine for you the species of spiritual infirmities or weaknesses. The first of these, therefore, is pusillanimity, and it is a species of timidity. The hearts of many are weak with this infirmity so that not merely great things, but also middling ones and none at all cast them down. For the words of those who speak foolishly are middling. Those, therefore, who fear such words, either doing evil or not doing good out of fear of them are the weakest of all human beings. These are soldiers who are knocked down and conquered, not by a strong wind, but a light breeze and very thin rustling. These are the most ridiculous and are in no sense to be counted in the number of warriors, nor are they to be counted as men, who are shoved 302  See Cicero, On Invention (De inventione) 2.163.

182 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues down and fall because of words that were not yet spoken, as if by a wind that has not yet blown, not daring to do good nor to avoid evil because of such a fear. They are men whom chimeras and figments of the mind, which never existed and never will exist, hurl down and conquer. For they are conquered by the mere thought of the enemy, whom they picture to themselves within their minds. These men are to be mocked with all sorts of loud laughter; these are men who fall because of the temptations of others, as if by the shoves received by others, and die from the wounds of others and are in peril because of others’ illnesses. This kind of men dreams with the most insane vanity of their own virtue and fortitude, in fact of the perfection of each of them. For when they hear that someone is being worn down by a shameful temptation, they fall into contempt for him and spurn him, and they think that they are strong insofar as [155b] they do not suffer similar temptations. When these men see or hear of the wounds of others’ sins, they die, sinning mortally by amazement, arrogance, and scorn for their brethren. When others are wounded, by a diabolical miracle they themselves die from their wounds, like the most terrified of women who, when they see the blood or the wound of another, clasp their hands together, knock their knees, and fall into a swoon from the greatness of their fear. While these people mock the weaknesses of others and despise the weak, they are in danger in their own weakness, not only in a shameful and vile way, but also in a most ridiculous one and by a greater feebleness than that which they mock. Magnanimity is opposed to such an infirmity that we mentioned and to all 303 the species of the same. Cicero calls it “loftiness of mind,” but commonly among us it is called height of the mind. And since the contraries are also vices of such great and such ridiculous debility and feebleness, that is deservedly called fortitude, that is, by which great and arduous things, both seen and heard, delight the one in whom it exists, as Cicero says. He says, Nature created you lofty in mind. Words, therefore, heard about magnanimity immediately found 304 a place in you, that is, rested deeply in you, because it deeply pleased you, nor is longanimity another virtue than magnanimity. As longness is magnitude, so longness of heart is greatness of heart, although by another comparison. For longanimity is so called insofar as longness of labor and difficulty or the tedium of long waiting is conquered and also held in contempt. For certain men 305 are short in mind, so to speak, and want immediately whatever they desire to happen or to attain, and similarly they want anything difficult they endure to pass quickly. They, therefore, have a shorter mind for such things. But they are like farmers who want the harvest to follow immediately after sowing, who 303  Cicero, On Duties (De officiis) 3.24. 304  See Cicero, Tusculan Disputations (Tusculanae disputationes) 2.11. 305  I have conjectured the addition of “whatever, quidquid.”

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want immediately to harvest the seed once it has been sown and desire that everything that requires a long time to be completed quickly. Know, then, that by this virtue things that seem great, whether great in longness or great in amplitude or great in height, are held in contempt. Honors are great things in height according to the judgment of the worldly, and riches and relationships seem great in amplitude. This virtue is the one by which great things, as great, are conquered and held in contempt, as Seneca says, “There is nothing greater than a great mind,” that is, once it is great, nothing is great. 306 And again he says, “Nothing is greater than a mind that scorns great things.” But someone might say that the greatness of difficulty is not conquered by this virtue, which is magnanimity—not conquered, I mean, insofar as it is magnanimity, but rather insofar as it is difficulty, although great difficulty. It seems to us, however, that greatness, whether it is that of difficulties or of those things we mentioned, which of course seem sweet, pertain to the virtue of magnificence or of magnanimity, namely, as the enemy against which it fights and the matter with which it is concerned. And it is one thing to conquer difficulty insofar as it is difficulty and another to conquer its greatness insofar as it is greatness. For insofar as it is greatness, it is conquered by being scorned or by being considered trifling, that is, by thinking of it as small. But insofar as it is difficulty, it is conquered by not fearing it before it comes and by enduring it when it comes. There is another weakness of the human heart that is properly said to be a tenderness of the heart, and because of this weakness the human heart is at times easily wounded or injured. A certain indication of such weakness is a quickness to grieve and to do so for a slight cause. And this weakness is quite similar to the debility of the body that is called bodily tenderness, which is hurt by an injury, wound, fracture, or for some other [156a] cause; on account of such tenderness, people laboring under this weakness and complaining of the hardness of others, say that harsh words were spoken to them or that they were treated harshly and that their hearts were explicitly wounded and that others pierced, transfixed, struck, and at times beat upon their hearts. Fortitude, which is like a certain hardness in the human mind, is therefore rightly opposed to this weakness or debility. This, however, is a certain toughness for suffering the previously mentioned injuries, just as there is hardness in the body by which it resists injuries and beats back or does not admit wounds. This virtue is in our higher concupiscible power because the contrary habits are in it as well as those things that are passions in terms of it, namely, tenderness, wounds, and sorrows. This hardness, however, is similar to bodily hardness that reduces sensitivity in the body for animals, and on account of this it makes it hard to be acted upon, to be injured. and to be hurt. A similar hardness is 306  Uncertain author, The Proverbs of Seneca (Proverbia Senecae) 44.

184 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues acquired in the hands of men and also in their other members by familiarity with hard work and sufferings, as in the hands of certain cooks who touch hots meats and burning coals without injuries, burns, and pain, at least to some extent. A similar hardness or fortitude is acquired in the hands of carpenters, masons, tanners, and farmers. Spiritual hardness is a certain consuetudinal fortitude analogous to such bodily hardness. The third weakness in the human heart is like spiritual combustibility, that 307 is, irascibility, that is, a quickness to anger. Fortitude by which the burning of anger is resisted is, therefore, opposed to this weakness. In dry and readily combustible wood, however, and similarly in straw there is found a similar quickness to burn or to blaze up. But in iron and certain kinds of wood and in wet wood, there is found the contrary fortitude. But such spiritual fortitude about which we are speaking differs from that which we recently mentioned, first, because that is in another power, namely, in the concupiscible power, but this is in the irascible power. It differs, secondly, because that is opposed to sadness and sorrow, but this is opposed to anger. The difference between sorrow and anger is clear because sorrow properly seeks mitigation and consolation, while anger seeks victory and vengeance. And the other can be called the incapacity for sadness or sorrow, that is, difficulty in feeling sorrow. But this is not incorrectly understood to be a slowness to anger by which the fires of anger are resisted. For anger and peace seem to be contraries, as exterior war and exterior peace. For as exterior war stands to exterior peace, so interior war stands to interior peace. Hence, as those are contraries, so these are. But irascibility is nothing else than anger as a habit. Moreover, as anger by which victory is sought through war stands to war itself, so interior peace stands to exterior peace, because it will be like its efficient cause. Therefore, in turn, as such an exterior war stands to exterior peace, so anger as a habit stands to peace as a habit. Hence, as those are contraries, so are these. Because, therefore, only one is contrary to one, and such anger is contrary to the fortitude, of which we are speaking, and to peace, and this fortitude and peace are necessarily identical with peace. But if someone says that such burning of anger is resisted by patience, we reply that peace is at times called patience, but properly patience has to do with sorrows or difficulties, insofar as they are sorrows or difficulties, and because anger is not without difficulty, as it is not without insults, it is at times called the suffering of insults by an expansion of the term and an extension [156b] of its meaning so that it is the endurance or victorious endurance of all the sufferings inflicted from others that are troublesome. Perhaps it might seem to someone that anger is rather an action than a being acted upon, insofar as it seems to be a motion toward and a principle of acting, 307  I have conjectured “irascibility, irascibilitas” instead of “irascible, irascibilis.”

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that is, toward avenging and conquering. But we shall speak about this in the following, namely, in the treatise, On Temptations and Their Resistance. But in the meanwhile you ought to know that, as we said, this anger and peace are like war and peace and like a storm and a calm at sea and like motion and rest in a body that is disturbed by motion and change, as water is, and like cloudiness and clearness in the air. You also ought to know that anger is like the interior elevation or raising up, and the elevation or raising up of the heart is a shadow and indication of it. An example of this is seen in roosters whose combs are elevated and raised up when anger sets them ablaze for fighting one another. A fourth weakness in the human heart is levity or instability, to which is opposed the virtue that is called constancy, stability, and also perseverance. This is found both in the noble apprehensive power and in the moving power. On account of it Ecclesiasticus, chapter five, says: Do not expose yourself to every wind and do not walk on every road (Sir 5:11), and in chapter nineteen of the same: He who is quick to believe is light of heart and will be diminished (Sir 19:4). And the apostle says in Ephesians, chapter four: Do not be carried off by every wind of doctrine like little children (Eph 4:14). But in the apprehensive powers it is clear from daily experience that some people are very quick to rejoice and to laugh and similarly quick to their contraries in the same way. For some people are easily disturbed and are calmed with the ease. We have now, therefore, named and listed for you four weaknesses in the human heart, of which each is a vice, and similarly four virtues opposed to them, each of which is rightly called fortitude. But which of these four is to be understood as the gift of fortitude rightly raises a question, and it seems rather that the gift of it is the virtue of constancy because constancy wonderfully exalts the human mind and likens it to angelic holiness and perfection, as that wise woman of Thekoa said to King David: Like an angel of the Lord, so its my lord the king, such that he is not moved by a blessing or by a curse (2 Sm 14:17), as we read 308 in Two Kings, chapter fourteen. For the evil of instability has been judged so evil among us that in chapter fourteen Job put it as the ultimate of evils or at the height of evils, adding it to the other evils of human misery, and it never 309 stays in the same state. For it is a certain image of eternity or of eternal happiness and a quite marvelous one to be at rest in the unrest of the present life and not to be changed amid so many and such great commotions and shoves. Because these are marvelous and very great, the same thing can be seen from each of the others. But the statement of the person who said that the gift of fortitude lies in undertaking great and arduous things, as if he said that the gift of fortitude causes one to undertake them in a manly way, but the virtue of fortitude causes one 308  I have corrected “thirteen” to “fourteen.” 309  See Jb 14. The whole chapter describes the instability of human existence.

186 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues to follow them up in a manly way, as to undertake them with strength—this statement is mistaken. And the reason is that its proper gift would necessarily have to preside over each virtue. What could be the reason that there should be two fortitudes, one for undertaking hard things, the other for following them up? And similarly it is not necessary that there be two justices, one for undertaking things that are just, the other for following them up. And similarly it is not necessary that there be two chastities, and so on with the others. For the undertaking and the following up of all good and virtuous operations needs the same end and principle. The gift of chastity, then, would be apart from the virtue of chastity, and on this account there would be as many gifts [157a] as there are virtues. But it is clear from these points that the gift of fortitude is the virtue of fortitude. And fortitude, insofar as it is fortitude, is concerned with arduous and difficult things. Thus, insofar as such things are said univocally, not equivocally, of the four previously mentioned, they are also said of the other two, namely, patience and that which is predicated by this term “meek.” That is meekness (mititas) taken from “sending (mittendo).” For a meek person accepts the spears of tribulations and persecutions, though without injury, just as soft and yielding things receive the stones and rocks of great torments without injury to themselves, as if they applaud them and even embrace them. But a patient person accepts spears, though with injury and pain, but conquers them by the virtue of patience, enduring them without any disturbance of himself. And Aristotle bears witness to this for us, saying in the book, Topics, that a person 310 is meek who neither suffers nor is drawn away from his state —understand from his state of virtue. But he is patient, who of course suffers, but is not drawn away—understand: he suffers pain and injury. But both a meek and a patient person are called brave, and someone patient is said to be better than a strong man—understand a warrior or someone strong with the fortitude that we above called a certain hardness of the heart, insofar as it is more victorious to fight when wounded and in pain than to conquer when completely healthy and uninjured, and for this reason, when Solomon said in Proverbs, chapter sixteen: A patient man is better than a strong one, he immediately added, and he who governs his own soul is better than one who storms cities (Prv 16:32). But although a meek man may not suffer from the spears of tribulations and persecutions; I mean, he does not suffer injury or pain, he is not for that reason less brave, nor is his virtue less for this reason. In fact, it is more and a greater virtue or more and greater fortitude to the extent that it conquers more easily and to the extent that it is less exposed to injuries from others. For pain and suffering

310  I have not found this reference, and I suspect that one should read “Ethicorum” instead of “Topicorum.”

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and a wound of themselves add nothing to virtue, but they offer the material for its victory. But if someone says that by that virtue a meek person does not suffer and adds that he also does not do anything; hence, that virtue is idle, in fact utterly useless, we have already settled this matter insofar as we have completed the discussion and explained what we said with completeness. Where we said that someone is meek because he does not suffer anything, one should understand pain and injury, and again, when we said that a meek person accepts the spears of persecutions, one should understand without injury and pain. For reason does less on this account because it acts without labor, pain, and difficulty. For then virtues in potency would be utterly idle and useless, since neither labor nor pain nor difficulty have any place in them. In fact, they would be useless in that case since the principal utility of virtues is their actions or operations. In accord with this God would be the most idle of all and doing absolutely nothing, since labor is at the furthest remoteness from him and fatigue most removed from him. We have, therefore, now explained to you that fortitude is said in the proper sense of six virtues and that it is like a genus in relation to them and that there is no reason why one of them should be called gift of fortitude rather than the others. Rather, fortitude in general or as general is understood to be the gift of 311 fortitude and is called the spirit of fortitude in Isaiah, chapter eleven. And this is in accord with the intention that we have explained, namely, when this is a gratuitous gift, not in that intention by which it is said to be consuetudinal fortitude or even a natural virtue, but when it has the perfections that we listed above and stated. The fifth evil is falsity or error by which human beings are deceived or err about goods and evils, and that both in terms of quality and in terms of quantity when they believe that what is good is evil and the converse, as we read in Isaiah, chapter five: Woe to you who say that good is evil and evil good (Is 5:20), and so on. But in terms of quantity they err when they believe that great goods are [157b] are small ones or the converse. Against this evil of falsity and deception the elect are armed and defended by the gift of knowledge, which is essentially concerned with good and evil, as it is also called in Genesis, chapter 312 three, where the tree of the knowledge of good and evil is mentioned. On account of this error it is said in Wisdom, chapter fourteen: Those who live amid so great a war of ignorance call so many and such great evils peace (Wis 14:22). For because of this error the bitterest and most dangerous wars of pleasures and also of both sorts of peace are loved by those who lack this gift of knowledge, as if they were peace from the vices. For as Socrates says: In war the bodies of men 311  See Is 11:2. 312  See Gn 2:17.

188 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues are wounded by spears, and in peace the bodies of the same are wounded by the 313 pleasures of the heart. On this account Solomon said in chapter fourteen of Proverbs: Go against a foolish man, and he will not know it (Prv 14:7). Understand that it is against him, because the foolish men do not know that pleasures capture and captivate their hearts, bind them, reduce them to servitude, and kill them. And they impose on them other evils that pertain to wars; in fact, what is beyond all insanity, they consider so deplorable a misery happiness and believe that great and most gracious services are offered them when such pernicious evils are imposed upon them. Concerning both kinds of peace, that is, both from interior and exterior temptations, we have said many times that its battles or attacks are the most dangerous and destructive of all, and in this life there is no more dangerous temptation for holy men than not being tempted. And no war rises up against them more fiercely and strongly than the peace that many seek. By the light of this gift, that is, of knowledge, there are uncovered for holy men the falsities about goods and evils that we mentioned. The rays and parts of this gift are in accord with the divisions of goods and evils. For example, one of its rays is that by which temporal riches are seen to be poverty. By this ray holy men gaze upon riches and see first of all what small goods they are, secondly, that they are covered with birdlime, and finally that they are thorns that pierce and injure. Thirdly, they see that they are vanity since they neither support those that lean on them nor those who possess them, and they do not satisfy those who possess them. Nor do they offer fruit to those who labor for them. Then they see the great evils to which they make their lovers subject in accord with this error, as if, when they believe that they steal them, those filled with cupidity are captured by them. This error is undoubtedly the error of the snare and the trap as we showed from Wisdom, chapter fourteen, where we read that the creatures of God were created as hatred for human beings and as a downfall and as a trap for the feet of the foolish (Wis 14:11). There are many other evils concerning riches that are clarified by the light of this gift for those endowed with it, and similarly concerning the goods of poverty. The second ray of such light is that by which the evils of honors and dignities are known and also the goods that are found in them, and they are savored by those who administer them well. The third ray is that by which is known the sort of good this life is, that is, how fleeting, how feeble, how weak, and with what great evils and dangers it is mixed and besieged. Similarly, there is known by it how good death is and how many and what great goods come from it. 313  I have not found this reference.

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The fourth ray is that by which this world is seen from all its spiritual faces, 314 about which we recall that we wrote concerning thirty, but stopped writing because other business forced us to. Such faces are the operations and likenesses by which the spiritual evils of the world are known by the light of this gift. For example, by one of its faces the world is clearly seen to be a road with all the dangers that can impede or injure travelers. Secondly, it is seen to be a field of battle with all the likenesses and relations of those that are found in a literal field of battle. Thirdly, it is a spiritual siege surrounding us on every side, attacking the elect with every machine of war [158a] and so with the others. Of these we have disclosed the road and destruction of the thirty previously mentioned faces. The fifth ray is that by which we view the evils and goods of our soul, which are born in us, as adventitious. The sixth ray is that by which we see our bodies and those things that are goods and evils of the bodies. The seventh is that by which we are illumined to know good and evil in the virtues and vices and sins. The gift of knowledge, therefore, is like a star with these six rays, each of which would fill a noble and precious book with a careful and complete description of the divisions of its parts. But the opening of the road and foretaste, as it were, of these kinds of knowledge or of one such great knowledge should suffice for you. But the utility and at the same time the necessity of this great gift will be more clearly seen in what follows. The sixth evil in human life is profanity or accursedness by which our life does not give honor to or is even contemptuous toward God, than which no evil is more destructive. Against this evil, therefore, God protects and arms his elect with the gift of piety, which, as it is understood here, is properly the veneration of the holy, that is, first of all, of God himself, then of those things that he has made holy and that have been appropriated for honoring him, just as images, which have nothing of holiness, are also counted among holy things. They are endowed with this gift, who venerate all holy things and also signs of holy things, who do not pass before a cross, even in a public street, without a bow of the head toward it, and similarly do not touch sacred vessels except with hands that have been washed and without other acts of veneration. What are those who do this in small matters, therefore, to be thought to do in great ones, unless they are perhaps men of infantile, that is, of childish and ridiculous religion? And this gift is properly in the irascible power. The seventh and last evil is foolish security, and a man surrounded by so many and such great perils can have nothing more dangerous than this. For it is security that either puts to flight or slays our spiritual guardians. 314  William’s On the Faces of the World (De faciebus mundi) has never been printed.

190 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues Lest the life of the saints, therefore, should be childish, the merciful Lord educated and raised it up with the gravity and maturity of wisdom. Lest it be darkened because of brutish and animal dullness, he at the same time illumined and sharpened it by the gift of understanding. Lest it be ruinous because of dangers, he suffused it with the gift of counsel. In order that it might be victorious, he armed it with the gift of fortitude. In order that it might be free from errors and deception, he poured out upon it the gift of knowledge. In order that it might give honor to him, that is, that it might be religious, he decorated it with the gift of piety. In order that it might be safe from dangers and ambushes, he strengthened it with the gift of fear. For although fear can seem to us either 315 destruction or weakness, there is still nothing stronger in us. On this account we read in Proverbs, chapter fourteen: In the fear of the Lord there is the confidence of strength (Prv 14:24) and in Ecclesiasticus, chapter twenty-nine: One who fears God will tremble at nothing (Sir 34:16). And this will be explained in the following where we will speak about the works and wonders of fear. Let this then suffice for you on the seven gifts as a foretaste and prelude of the great treatises, which will perhaps still be written by others by the help of the grace of God. But know that blessed Augustine amply uses the term 316 “knowledge” and the term “gift”in the first book of On Christian Doctrine. But with regard to the gifts it was our intention here only to open the path and to provide at least a small opportunity for those wiser and more experienced.

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He says that the virtues are gifts for the reasons stated before, and he says that they are beatitudes on account of the fruit that depends upon them, namely, on account of the reward from them and because someone who has them is blessed. For as the vices are miseries, so the beatitudes are happiness by which we most of all surpass other souls and by which we are the image of God. Then he adds the reasons why twelve virtues are called fruits. He soon comes to a definition of virtue.

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ut now we shall return to the things that follow, and we shall say to you that the virtues are gifts on account of the reasons we have stated. But the virtues are beatitudes, not only in terms of efficient causality, that is, on account of their fruit or the effect of beatitude that is given because of them by him who rewards the good, but also in terms of formal causality, since we are blessed in having and partaking in them. For in the same way the vices and sins are truly miseries and make those miserable in whom they are present. Thus it is truly necessary that true virtues are truly beatitudes. For it was most truly

315  I have conjectured “destruction, interitus” instead of “to be destroyed, interimi.” 316  See perhaps Augustine, On Christian Doctrine (De doctrina christiana) 1.37; PL 34: 35.

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said in Proverbs, chapter fourteen: Justice raises up the needy; sin makes peoples miserable (Prv 14:34). But there is an explanation for such an idea, namely, that vices and sins are true miseries. For it is evident that the vices and sins are true diseases, true wounds, true forms of servitude, true defilements, and other such 317 things about which there can be no doubt that they are true miseries. Hence, it is necessary that the virtues are true beatitudes. For as beatitude stands in relation to misery, so virtue stands in relation to vice and sin. Hence, in turn, as virtue stands in relation to beatitude, so vice or sin stands in relation to misery. Moreover, it is necessary that all contraries fall either under the same proximate genus or under contraries or be universal, as Aristotle says concerning good and evil, namely, that good and evil are not in a genus, but are the genera 318 of other things. Virtue, therefore, and vice or sin are either in one of these two genera, which is evidently impossible, or fall under those two so that one is under the one and the other under the other, or they are genera of other things. But it is not necessary that we delay much here because we have already 319 written elsewhere a separate treatise on the eight beatitudes, and in the following where we will speak about merits and retribution, we will prove this 320 irrefutably. But the virtues are called fruits either because they are the food or refreshment of the mind or because they are the fruits of the human mind. The mind, however, is like a field or garden of the virtues and sciences, and on this account they are explicitly called fruits of the spirit (Gal 5:22), that is, of what is spiritual in us. But this is what presides over or is superior to that in us which is animal, that is, by which we surpass the brute animals and by which we are also the image of God. This field is sown by the life-giving seed of the word of God in order that it might bring forth these fruits. The human soul also brings to birth the virtues that it conceives, and it bears them as the result of the embraces of its heavenly and eternal spouse, namely, our God and Lord Jesus Christ. Or they are for this reason called fruits of the spirit, that is, of the Holy Spirit as their giver and producer. But someone might say that the Holy Spirit cannot be understood there by the term “spirit,” on account of what follows in the next chapter of Galatians: He who sows in the spirit will also harvest eternal life from the spirit (Gal 6:8). After all, how is it possible to sow in the Holy Spirit? To this we reply that God himself replies concerning the Spirit in Jeremiah, chapter two: Have I become 317  I have conjectured“truly, vere” instead of“true, veri or verae” throughout the sentence. 318  See perhaps Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.6.1096a11–7.1097a23. 319  If William wrote a separate treatise on the beatitudes, it is not listed among his extant works. 320  See On Merits and Rewards (De meritis et retributionibus), which is the fourth part of On the Virtues and Vices.

192 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues a desert for Israel or a late-blooming land? ( Jer 2:31). In this he clearly implies that it is possible for seed to be sown in him—and not as in a desert so that he does not bear proper fruit, nor as in a late-blooming land so that [159a] he fails to give due fruit at the due time. The sowing in God of due worship and honor is said by that figure by which servants are said to sow pleasing services in their masters and to expect a reward as fruit, as is written in the Psalm: Those who sow seeds in tears, that is, seeds of services to God, will reap in exultation an eternal reward (Ps 125:5). And the apostle says: He who sows in the Spirit will reap from the Spirit eternal life (Gal 6:8). If someone asks why the apostle calls those twelve virtues or gifts fruits rather than other virtues or gifts, we can answer that he listed those twelve for the sake of example, leaving us to understand the same thing about the others. For it is probably not safe to hold that he imposed the term on these twelve because they are more the fruits of the Spirit than the others. Someone will, nonetheless, believe that the apostle called those twelve “fruits” because they do battle against the flesh more evidently than the others or because refreshment of the spirit comes from them more evidently, as is seen by those who consider them individually. For the first four are charity, joy, peace, and patience, which clearly refresh the human soul, but the next eight are magnanimity, goodness, benignity, gentleness, faith, modesty, continence, and chastity (Gal 5:22–23). Or they are called fruits of the spirit because they are very spiritual and make their possessors spiritual, just as their opposites make them carnal and natural. Or understand them to be fruits of the human spirit because the human spirit was created most of all on account of them and because they are required of it as something due, just as fruits are required of a tree. But with these points explained, let us return to what is the main point of our intention and speak about the virtues in a general discussion in accord with the tradition of the saints and their lofty understanding, putting in first place and explaining the definition of Saint Augustine who said that “virtue is a good quality of the mind by which one lives rightly and which no one uses badly and 321 which God produces in a human being” without the human being. It is, I say, a good quality, not by participation, that is, not by partaking in or having goodness, but rather by its essence or essentially, that is, by being goodness itself, just as the color white is not said to be white by participating in or by having whiteness, but by being whiteness itself. It is the same, therefore, to say “good quality of the mind” as to say “goodness of the mind,” just as the white color of a body is the same as to say the whiteness of the body. But what follows in that definition we explain in this way, for you learned elsewhere that something right (rectus) is that whose middle parts do not di321  Peter Lombard, Book of the Sentences (Liber sententiarum) 2, dist. 27., 1; PL 192: 714. The definition is composed of things that Augustine said in different places. See his Free Choice of the Will (De libero arbitro) 2.19.50; PL 32: 1288.

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verge from the extremes, but the extremes of our life are God, the beginning from whom our life comes, and God, the end for which or because of which it exists. Hence, a life that in no respect diverges from those extremes is necessar323 ily right, and this is what we said above, one that has no bending or curving back. For a life that has a curve diverges from one of those extremes, namely, from God. This is the life by which many live for themselves, seeking only what is their own and in no way stretching out their intentions and actions to pay honor to God. Rather, they bend them back completely upon themselves or to what is their own and keep them in themselves. From what has gone before you see that a life is truncated and twisted almost in its whole length when it is not stretched out beyond its own subject, for it ought to belong to God to 324 that point, as we said. On account of this straightness and proper extension it is said in Wisdom, chapter eight, that wisdom stretches from end to end mightily (Wis 8:1), and this is true of created wisdom, which does not enclose or imprison itself or its actions in its own subject. Rather, it stretches them out through gratitude or devotion to God, their beginning, when it ascribes them to him and recognizes [159b] that they are because of him or from him like gifts of his grace. But it stretches them forth by extending them to God, their end, when it seeks the glory of God through them. Uncreated wisdom, however, stretches by its omnipotent might and power from the first thing created to the last, checking, ruling, moderating, retaining, and conserving the whole mightily, that is, without resistance or rebellion. For there is nothing that can resist the good pleasure of his will. But this part of the previously mentioned definition has no small question. For it is necessary that this part fit each virtue. For it is necessary that each part of a definition of a genus fit each part of each of its species and each of the individuals of each species. By any virtue, therefore, one lives rightly. Hence, each virtue by itself suffices for living rightly, and from this it clearly follows that besides that one all the rest are pointless and useless. Moreover, chastity is not sufficient except for doing things that are chaste insofar as they are chaste. Hence, it suffices only for directing or straightening out a part of life. By it, therefore, one does not live rightly without qualification, but in a certain respect. And it is possible to speak of many others in this way. What Augustine gives, therefore, is not a definition. For neither a definition nor a genus nor a species are said of what is defined or of what falls under it in a certain respect, but without qualification.

322  The Latin “rectus” can mean either right or straight. In fact, here the two meanings are present in a way that no single word can handle in English. 323  See above, ch. 11, fol. 138a. 324  See above, ch. 2, fol. 109a.

194 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues Moreover, since there are as many twists or distortions in life as there are vices or sins, and since a virtue of itself removes only the distortion of its contrary, there will not be one virtue that removes all the distortions from human life. But someone might say that one rectitude is opposed or contrary to every crookedness or curvature and that each rectitude also removes every one of them sufficiently, just as a single good health is contrary to every disease and by itself removes every disease, and likewise the one truth stands in relation to every falsity, and every perfection stands in relation to every imperfection. Hence, one rectitude of life is sufficient to remove every crookedness, curvature, and deviation. We reply to this that the rectitude of one branch does not suffice to remove every twist of a tree, whether a curve or bend of its tree, or that it does not suffice to remove a twist of the trunk or a twist of the other branches. Thus, since our life is divided by such a great multitude of branches, it does not follow that all the branches of our life are straightened by one rectitude. Moreover, since the three powers of the human soul have their own and different twists, how is it possible that the three powers be straightened or rectified by one virtue, especially since a virtue is a rectitude only of that power in which it is and in accord with which it is? For faith is the rectitude of only our intellective power. And again, it is the rectitude or the rectifier of it only in a certain respect, namely, in respect to those things that pertain to the foundations of religion. But someone might say that one virtue is not the rectitude of our whole life formally, but effectively, so that, although it is in one power, it pours rectitude into the other powers and their actions and keeps distortion from them and keeps error away from it, as it pertains to it. In the same way, although sight is only in the eye, it not only directs its operation and keeps error from it, but also from the actions of the walking power. For it governs and directs walking. Similarly, the rectitude of instruments directs walking, and it is most truly said that by sight one walks most rightly, as one does by good or straight feet or leg bones. So too, one lives rightly by each of the virtues and walks rightly in the path of morals or of the commandments of God, but in various different ways by the different ones. We reply that, if he wants to rest his case on his example, he is clearly mistaken because, if it were as he supposes, it would be necessary that either all the virtues or at least many of them would be operative in each action, [160a] and it is neither true, nor is it customary, to say that one walks rightly by sight or by seeing. Rather, one only sees or knows by sight where or on what path he should walk. For although the operation of the hands at times assists sight, it is not true, and no one says, that someone sees by his hands, even though the hands assist seeing in many ways, for example, by opening windows, holding a lamp, and the washing and medical treatment of the eyes. Besides, in accord

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with this, the definition would not be univocal, nor would it be said univocally of every species and individual of what is defined. We reply that the mind of Augustine on this point was to define the virtue of charity, which he says in the Book of Church Teachings is one in subject and 325 essence, but four in relation or duties, which we mentioned above. And there is no doubt that by that love one lives rightly, and this is so for two reasons: first, because, as the standard of the divine will, it directs and regulates the will and its rectitude, and secondly, because the whole of life is subject to such love, and this love has the whole of it in its power and, for this reason, draws the whole of it after itself and makes the whole of it follow God’s will. It does this by its com326 mand and power, as we said. For it commands the rational power to study, to ponder miracles, to page through books for the sake of warding off errors, doubts, and the darkness of ignorance. In this way, then, it directs and rectifies the reasoning power, although it itself is only in the concupiscible power, and it is related in this way to the other powers. For just as the head of a family who presides over his house in a good way with one rectitude or one will of goodness, corrects every distortion of the vices and sins and all malice in his whole family and does this by his command alone, so when this virtue we mentioned presides in the house of our heart or mind over the whole family of works and actions, it wipes out and corrects every distortion of the vices, and brings it back to the norm of rectitude. In the same way a good and faithful master, placed over many different workers, such as carpenters, masons, ironworkers, and gold workers, rules and directs the works of all by his command and keeps and turns away from them every distortion and other vice, and in this way when charity commands all the powers and members of the human soul and also our members, like someone commanding all the many workers, it does not permit any distortion or other evil to exist in their works, and the rectitude of life, as we have explained, undoubtedly is in harmony with this. For in this way no other virtue makes life correct except charity. But since “life” here is understood as behavior, and behavior has four parts, namely, thoughts, volitions, words, and actions, someone might rightly understand that virtue is that by which one lives rightly, that is, by which one acts rightly in each part of life, that is, of his behavior, which is to say that virtue is a good quality of the mind by which one acts rightly in each part of life, that is, by which we either think correctly or will correctly or are moved interiorly in a correct way or act externally in a correct way, not, of course, with the correct325  I did not find this in On Ecclesiastical Doctrines (De ecclesiasticis dogmatibus), neither that of Gennadius nor that of an uncertain author. Augustine says something along these lines in On the Morals of the Catholic Church and the Morals of the Manichees (De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum) 1.15.25; PL 32: 1332. Perhaps William has mixed up the titles. 326  See above, ch. 9, fol. 122a.

196 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues ness of grammar, but with moral correctness, to which vice or sin is properly opposed. “Life” should not, therefore, be understood there for the whole of behavior, but generally, as it is also predicated by this verb “he lives.” For he lives and is commonly said to live who lives for any part of time. In the same way he lives correctly who lives correctly in any of four such parts, and this is the rectitude by which one is not out of harmony with the rule or rectitude of God’s law, to which rectitude sin, as defined by him, is opposed, according to the same Augustine. He says that “sin is a word or deed or desire contrary to the law of 327 God,” [160b] that is, a thought, volition, action, or speech contrary to the law of God. For he takes “desire” for of two things, namely, thought and volition. Through these things, therefore, that we have said, the previous questions have been resolved. For it does not follow that, if one lives rightly by this virtue, the other virtues are superfluous or useless for living rightly. There are two reasons for this. For each virtue produces its own right living, as we said, and if some other virtue were not necessary for the sake of the right living that this virtue produces, it would, nonetheless, be necessary for its own right living, which it produces, as we said. The other virtues are not superfluous or useless for another reason, because the virtues mutually help one another in their operations in many ways, as is seen in the example of hands and eyes that we gave. For eyes help the hands in their working in many ways, and they are helped by 328 the hands in many ways, as we showed. But you ought to recall those things that we said to you about rectitude and notice that rectitude is, according to one intention, contrary to error or sin. For this reason Aristotle says that there 329 is no rectitude or error with regard to sensation, and this rectitude is either the essence of each virtue or something that accompanies it. But the rectitude extending between two extremes without any divergence from either of them 330 is only the virtues, which “are either acts of will or not without will” or acts of love or not without love. You also ought to know that the extremes of such virtues are not always God as beginning and God as end, but at times the one who acts is one of the extremes, and God is the other. An action, however, is right and similarly an intention, which is stretched out from the one who acts and tends toward God as end, as we said, that is, for the sake of his glory, honor, or good pleasure. The virtue of gratitude, therefore, stretches out its operations toward God as beginning or author. But there are five operations of this virtue, about which we 327  Peter Lombard, Four Books of Sentences (Sententiarum libri quatuor) 2, dist. 35, 1; PL 192: 734. 328  See above, fol. 160a. 329  I have conjectured the addition of the negative since Aristotle says that there is no error in a sense regarding its proper object; see his On the Soul 2.6.418a12–13. 330  See Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.5.1106a3–4.

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shall speak in the following. What follows in the previous definition of Blessed Augustine, namely, “which no one uses badly,” is necessarily most true. For since virtue is of itself the principle and cause and root of all the good uses that can be elicited from anything whatsoever, it in no way allows a misuse or a bad use of itself. Besides, since every misuse or bad use is a sin, it is evident that it is impossible for anyone to use a virtue badly. For this would be to use a virtue badly or to sin. Moreover, since every virtue is a form of goodness, as we said, and of rectitude, to use a virtue badly is nothing other than to elicit a bad use from goodness and thus to act badly out of goodness and to act in a distorted way out of rectitude. To act badly and in a distorted way, however, is to be evil or distorted. Hence, to use a virtue badly would ultimately be to be evil out of goodness and distorted out of rectitude. But what Augustine says somewhere, namely, that 331 servile fear is a good that no one uses in a good way, is not opposed to this, because, although such a fear is a good gift of God, it is, nonetheless, not a virtue. And the reason is that, although it makes us avoid evils, that is, vices and sins, it does not, nonetheless, do this in a good way, that is, in a praiseworthy way, but in the manner of a slave and of a brute animal, that is, almost solely out of fear. For it occupies the mind and the intention of the one who has such fear so he has the eyes of his heart only on the avoidance of punishment. In the same way a dog seeing a stick raised against him is restrained from food only by the fear of it, and in the same way a thief, who sees armed guards and does not dare to steal, is deterred only by that fear of the guards. In a similar way sailors who want to lighten the load on a ship in order to escape an imminent storm cast their merchandise into the sea. In the same way such men cast off the burdens of their sins when they see the imminent storm of the coming judgment and their being plunged into the depth of the abyss of hell. Just as the dog in the previous [161a] example does not act out of abstinence, and the thief in the second example does not act innocently, and the sailors in the third example do not act generously, so those who fear like slaves because of such a fear do nothing in a good way, nothing in a praiseworthy way. That which follows last in the same definition, namely, “which God produces in a human being without the human being,” does not seem to fit every virtue. For first of all, God does not seem to produce in such human beings without a human being the virtues procured and obtained by prayers, tears, fasting, and other exercises. Not only do they cooperate by preparing and readying themselves for the reception of them, but they also seem to merit them by some 331  The statement is not to be found in Augustine, although he discusses servile fear in a number of places. See, for example, Homilies on the Psalms (Enarrationes in psalmos) 118, Sermo 25.7; PL 37: 1576.

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kind of merit, namely, by the merit which is usually called “congruous merit.” Otherwise, what would the words of Gregory mean: “Meanwhile, do whatever 333 good you can in order that God may enlighten your heart for penitence.” But 334 Isidore says that chastity is merited by interior groaning. Moreover, what does “without a human being,” that is to say, either without the merit of a human being or without the effort or help of a human being, mean? It does not mean without merit because at times it is gained even by one’s own merit, but congruous merit, as we said, and at times by condign 335 merit, as Augustine says elsewhere. For Stephen, the protomartyr, obtained the conversion of Paul by his prayer in which he said: Lord, do not hold this sin against them (Acts 7:59). But someone might say that “without a human being” is understood there as without his effort, what, then, will the effort and preparation mean by which sinners intend to obtain pardon and grace? Do they in vain prepare themselves for the gifts of God? Moreover, does someone who opens a window, even someone who removes obstacles to its opening, not cooperate in the entrance of light or the illumination of that house, and does someone who approaches a light not cooperate toward his own illumination? And do they not cooperate with the sun for carrying out such illumination? Likewise, do not those who draw near to a fire cooperate toward their own being warmed? And does not the fire likewise cooperate for such an operation? And these comparisons are most fitting since the virtues are like lights, the sun, and heat. But Christ the Lord is the sun of intelligence (Wis 5:6) and of justice (Mal 4:2), on the basis of Wisdom, chapter five, and Malachi, chapter four. We reply to this that one must understand “in a human being” as “not by a human being.” But as for what is said here about previous merits and actions, such merits, actions, and preparations are causes and also merits. Hence, they are causes, not by which virtue is produced or given, but without which it would not be produced or given. But we call the cause by which something is produced the efficient cause, the instrument, and the means that carries the act of the agent to that in which there lies the principal intention, just as air is the 332  Theologians distinguish condign and congruous merit. The former is measured in terms of commutative justice and gives a real claim to reward. The latter is measured in terms of distributive justice and claims a reward only in terms of fittingness or equity. 333  See Peter Lombard, Sentences 4, dist. 16; PL 192: 879. Peter attributes the citation to Gregory’s On Penitence (De poenitentia dist. 5). 334  See Isidore of Seville, Three Books of Sentences (Sententiarum libri tres) 2.40.1; PL 83: 643. 335  Despite what William says, the distinction between condign and congruous merit is much later than the time of Augustine.

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means that carries the light to the last thing that is illumined and at times carries heat to the principal object heated. And the agent or doer is helped by the intermediate instrument. But in the bestowal and production of the virtues the human being in whom God produces the virtue does not help God as he produces it, because the power of the omnipotent creator does not need help, since he very often gives and infuses the virtues no less without such preparations and actions, as is seen in baptized little ones who do not prepare themselves for them and do not cooperate in any way. If someone asks what good such efforts and preparations are for those who make them, we reply that dallying in sin and neglecting to seek forgiveness and grace are either sins or circumstances of sin, which, despite the help of the justice of God, do not permit the coming of grace and are obstacles to grace, like bad merits. But their contraries do not help God, who does not need help, nor is he either stronger or more generous for granting and producing forgiveness as a result of these, but they somehow give a place and a certain occasion to the mercy of God in order that his mercy, which previously gave those preparations and efforts, may give [161b] them more amply. And to put it briefly, a person who makes such preparations helps himself, not God, and there is not a similarity with the sun and fire because their operations do not have their influence through their powers except on things that have been prepared, as we said. But the operations of God through his omnipotence have their influence both on persons who are prepared and on those who are not prepared and penetrate them only in accord with his good pleasure. But if someone objects that through ministers and the ministry of priests God sanctifies the sacrament and produces the virtues and gifts of the graces in them, we answer the same thing as before that without priests and their ministry almighty God produces the same effects no less freely and powerfully and in no lesser amounts, when it is his good pleasure, and he does this without priests and their ministry. Still, as we said about the neglect and contempt for proper preparation, so we say this about the neglect of priests and their ministries, because they give an occasion for the severity of God by which he abandons in the filth of their sins those who neglect and scorn the sacred min336 isters and their ministry, just as their contraries, solicitude and veneration, give occasion to the most generous mercy of God so that he looks upon, visits, and enlightens with the gifts of his graces and virtues those in whom these are present, or rather to whom he had previously given them. You also see from these last words of this definition that Augustine did not intend to define here either natural or consuetudinal virtues. He did not intend to define natural virtues because human beings often use them in a bad way, as they use sight, hearing, intellect, and memory in which we abound far more 336  I have conjectured “solicitude, solicitudo” instead of “solitude, solitudo.”

200 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues than is necessary. But he excludes consuetudinal virtues from this stated definition, because, although God produces them, he does not produce them without a human being, because they are generated amid much labor and by the 337 frequent acts of a human being, as we explained above. They are not infused suddenly, gratuitously, and from above. But you ought to know concerning such instances of cooperation that, although they are produced for some virtue or gift, they are not produced for all of them, and the reason is that in the very act of prayer or of some other action by which the virtues are sought, the one who prays or acts is moved only by very few motions. But all the virtues without which the same person does not have salvation are infused at the time when one does not directly and essentially cooperate except by those motions he has that are similar or close to them, just as a certain desire to please God is similar to one of the desires that proceeds from charity, and a certain love of God is likewise quite similar and close to the love of God that comes from charity. So too, a certain sort of believing is similar to the believing that comes from the virtue, faith. When, therefore, in praying or acting one is moved by such motions, he rightly cooperates and prepares himself for those virtues to be infused in him. For as by such acts he approaches or draws near to those acts, so one who prays or works in general prepares himself in general for God to give him the gifts by which he may please him by all the virtues by which it is necessary to please God. But the sacred doctors call certain virtues cardinal virtues, namely, prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude, for one of the three reasons we mentioned, as it seems to us. The first of these is that the whole of human life revolves around them and acts from them. And if one departs from them or from one of them, one necessarily falls either in part or wholly, just as a gate stands in relation to its hinges (cardines). But the whole of life is like a gate by which the 338 happy life is opened for us when one’s life is good, but closed when it is bad. For a good present life is the entrance into it, and it is seen to depend and to be borne totally by these hinges, just as a gate is by its hinges. The second reason is that the poles (cardines) of heaven [162a] hold sway over the whole lower world and determine and limit the heavenly motions. For this reason expanses of the sky are distinguished in accord with them, for example, the east, west, north, and south. In this way these four virtues hold sway over the lofty part of our life in calm and clarity, as if in a heaven, and they contain, limit, and distinguish the whole of a good life. And as every heavenly motion comes from those four previously mentioned regions and expanses, so every virtuous motion and action comes from these virtues, as many think who do not believe that there are other virtues. 337  See above, ch. 1, fol. 104b. 338  I have conjectured “is opened, aperitur” instead of “is covered, operitur.”

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The third reason seems to be taken from the sacred college of cardinals. For just as after the sovereign pontiff they preside over the whole clergy, so these virtues preside over all the other virtues, and just as the previously mentioned college of cardinal helps the sovereign pontiff for ruling the whole church, so that he does nothing about important and difficult things without them, so the human mind does and can do nothing about important and difficult works, that is, those in which salvation or perdition lies, without them. It is, however, good for the human mind and everything that is under it when it is ruled by such cardinal virtues and it rules what is under it and is ruled. But some have interpreted them as the four rivers of paradise both from the course of the riv339 ers themselves and from the functions of the virtues. But the truth in this is, as we rather believe, that they called them cardinal from the governance and excellence that they are seen to have in relation to the other virtues. For this reason they are most frequently mentioned among the philosophers, and they alone are discussed among them, and for this reason certain persons have called them merely philosophical, separating them from the theological and evangelical virtues, which they say are faith, hope, and charity. But the extent to which they are mistaken in this is clearly seen because sacred scripture, which is genuine theology, explicitly both mentions and lists these four virtues. Wisdom, chapter nine, speaking of eternal wisdom in these 340 words, says: Wisdom teaches justice, sobriety, and truth, than which nothing is more useful in life for human beings (Wis 8:7), clearly using wisdom in place of prudence and sobriety in place of temperance. But all save those who lack the senses of the eyes and ears can understand that prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance are frequently mentioned in the two scriptures of the New and 341 Old Testament. If this is the reason why they call them philosophical and not theological, it is evident that they are mistaken since they are not less either known or mentioned among theologians and in true theology than among philosophers and in their philosophy. There are others who are mistaken about them both in reality and in their name; they call them merely political, not knowing what they are saying or about what they are speaking. But you ought to know that there are certain personal virtues, that is, ones whose function serves only their proper subject, that is, adorns, belongs to, and perfects the life of that subject, and these virtues are called monastic from monad, as if solitary or personal. There are other virtues whose function is necessary for more persons. And this happens in accord with one or the other of two manners, namely, either by serving and distributing what pertains to 339  See Gn 2:10–11. 340  The Vulgate of Wis 8:7 reads: For she teaches sobriety and prudence and justice and virtue. 341  I have conjectured “if, si” instead of “thus, sic.”

202 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues many, and these are called economic, that is, distributive, or by ruling or commanding, and these are called political from “polis,” which means “city,” as royal or civil virtues, and this is because a king is a ruler of one city. But you have this division from the book of Plotinus on the degrees of the virtues from the 342 testimony of Macrobius. Such persons, then, understand the political virtues as secular, not as sacred or sanctifying those who have them. But they seem to have been induced to say that there are no virtues but these four, because they thought that the light from them was sufficient for knowing everything that they should do and everything that they should avoid. [162b] They called this light prudence. Besides, one skill has only one art. If, therefore, living well is only one skill or one work of skill, its art will of necessity be one. 343 Moreover, both Cicero and Seneca call the art of living philosophy. But what is this philosophy if not the prudence by which we act? Moreover, to act well or badly is one pair of contraries. There will, therefore, be one discipline or art of living well or badly. Moreover, are there many arts of living? If there are, what are they and how many are they? But if there is one, what is that single one but prudence? Moreover, one act naturally has one virtue and one art. If, therefore, to live is one act, there will be one art of living. We reply to this that philosophy is one science composed of many and is many sciences gathered together, as we said also concerning the art of living that it is one art gathered together from many and is divided into many branches, as living itself is. For one lives in the world in one way and lives in the cloister in another, and again one lives in the world in one way in a clerical position and in another way in a military position, and again in one way in the city and in another way in the country, and so on with other things. Likewise, in the cloister the various ways of living are manifold, and in accord with both the secular and cloistered variety there are varieties of knowledge and of prudence, skills, and arts, or whatever other name it is fitting to call them. We, therefore, grant that his statement that one skill has one art, under this understanding, namely, with the distinction we made concerning unity and multiplicity so that, correspondingly, one art is understood to be one skill and similarly one art is many and multiple. You see, therefore, from what we have said that there are many sorts of prudence in accord, so to speak, with the many sorts of lives. The multitude and variety of rules of cloisters clearly shows this. For the rule of Blessed Augustine is different from the rule of Blessed Benedict. But the rule of Blessed Augus342  See Plotinus, Enneads 1.2 on the distinction of the kinds of virtues. I have not found the reference to Macrobius. 343  Cicero, On Ends (De finibus) 1, 42. I have not found the reference to Seneca.

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tine is only the teaching or art or prudence by which its followers know or are taught how one should live. In the same way the rule of Benedict is also only a certain prudence or art or teaching by which its followers know or are taught how one should live as a monk, and it is the same way with the others. Similarly, the teaching and science of military life is different. There is not, therefore, one prudence for living without qualification, except in the sense that we said that there is one philosophy, namely, the science assembled from all the sciences or teachings about things that can be known by art or teaching. Through these statements we have, therefore, answered for you the previously raised questions, and we will further explain to you in the following to what the name “prudence” belongs, according to the customary usage of the scriptures, and that such persons extend it beyond the norm of the scriptures. But someone might say that, just as there is only one sight for seeing exterior visible things, so there ought to be only one interior sight for seeing interior visible things. Hence, prudence will only be one science branching out into parts or species, as exterior sight does. We reply that exterior visible things insofar as they are visible are a single kind, as if under a different disposition, which is what is colored, but interior visible things do not have a single disposition under which or through which they are seen and in which they are unified, as we showed concerning intelligible things. For they are under a different disposition insofar as they are intelligible by the gift of understanding from that under which they are knowable insofar as they are knowable by the gift of knowledge—I mean under a different disposition, not only in species, but also in genus. For designation is another disposition in genus than goodness or evil. But designation is a disposition that properly serves the gift of understanding, but goodness and evil serve the gift of knowledge, as we said. Moreover, just as there is not one sense or one knowledge of exterior [163a] sensible or knowable things, so there ought not to be one interior sense or knowledge of interior sensible or knowable things, especially since the diversity of interior sensible or knowable things is far greater than of exterior ones. In what follows we will, however, give you reasons in a certain number on account of which the lights or apprehensive virtues are only five. But someone might ask why in our apprehensive virtue there are found vices that do not seem opposed to such virtues and, for this reason, they necessarily require either another virtue or other virtues contrary to them. For example, there is found a light-mindedness for believing, which is labeled credulousness, about which it is said in Ecclesiasticus, chapter nineteen: One who is quick to believe is light of heart (Sir 19:4). Similarly, there is a slowness to believe, of which it is said in Ecclesiasticus, chapter one: Do not be unbelieving about the fear of the Lord (Sir 1:36). The Truth himself says in the last chapter of Luke: O you who are foolish and slow of heart to believe (Lk 24:25). And similarly in the last chapter of Mark it says: He upbraided their unbelief and the hardness of their

204 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues heart (Mk 16:14). And Seneca says of this: “To believe all things and to believe 344 nothing is a defect.” And of this light-mindedness in believing the apostle says in Ephesians, chapter four: In order that we may not be little ones who are tossed about and are carried about by every wind of doctrine (Eph 4:14). Moreover, this slowness and lightness of mind are clearly vices. Since, therefore, they are contraries in accord with superfluity and lack, a virtue necessarily lies in between them. Moreover, each of such extremes is to be avoided, and we must pull back from each of them. But one does not pull back from each of them except by walking between the two. It is necessary, therefore, to walk between the two, but this is the mean. But virtue alone is the path by which one should walk. Hence, between two such vices there is a virtue as the mean. We reply to you on this point that prudence is truly a mean between such vices, and it is like a certain temperance of our rational power. Hence, it is also called by another name, reasonableness, by which our rational power stays reasonable so that it does not rashly assent to persuasions and does not rashly dissent from them, especially in matters pertaining to salvation and their contraries, and these things are found in matters pertaining to prudence. In matters of the other gifts the vices are opposed by the gifts themselves, for example, in matters of faith by faith and in matters of counsel by counsel, and so on with the others. And the reason is that anyone of the five gifts is a sort of belief, as we said above, and for this reason it is a remedy or healthiness against the disease of the contrary belief. But we have already explained to you what fortitude is concerned with according to every intention of it as well as its branches or species or parts, and 345 we listed them. But with regard to justice we say here that it is a virtue by which each person is given what is essentially his due, that is, insofar as it is his or owed to him. But there are six species or branches or parts of it, of which the first is obedience. And this is owed to superiors as superiors, that is, insofar as it pertains to their position as magistrate to command. Hence, it is owed first of all to God, then to his ministers both secular and ecclesiastical, as we read in Romans, chapter thirteen: Let every soul be subject to the higher powers (Rom 13:1). And we read in One Peter: Honor the king. Slaves, be subject in all things to your masters, not merely to the just and gentle and modest, but to the ill-tempered as well (1 Pt 2:17-18). The Truth himself expressly says in Matthew, chapter ten, that his ministers must be obeyed on account of God: If anyone does not receive you or hear your words, it will be more tolerable for the land of the peoples of Sodom and Gomorrah on the day of judgment (Mt 10:14.15). And again he says: 344  Uncertain author, Proverbs of Seneca (Proverbia Senecae) 77. 345  I have conjectured “but, vero” in place of “truly, vere.”

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He who receives you receives me (Mt 10:40). Similarly, he says in Luke, chapter 346 ten: He who hears you hears me and he who spurns you spurns me (Lk 10:16). The second and, as it were, correlative part of justice is discipline, and we owe this to [163b] subjects or inferiors, and it is the virtue that is called the ruling virtue among the philosophers. For by it inferiors are ruled, and they are ruled by sparing them, punishing them, deterring them from evils, and urging them toward goods. The third part is equity, and this is what is owed to equals, namely, not to trod on or oppress any of them in order that they may have an equal condition of nature. But the fourth virtue is faithfulness or fidelity, and this is properly against fraud and deceit. The fifth is veracity, and this in statements and promises, and it is against lies and perjuries and against promises or pacts not kept. The sixth is truth; this is proper to actions and deeds, and it is properly against the falsity of hypocrisy and of other false pretenses. And although Cicero says in his book, On Duties, that the faith is so called 347 from that which is done (fiat), still the meaning that we gave concerning faith is more frequent in the sacred scriptures. Concerning it the Lord often teaches in the Gospel that a servant is called faithful and that human beings are called faithful from this faith, that is, because they should be trusted, because we can securely entrust ourselves and our possessions to them. On this account God 348 too is said to be faithful in One Corinthians, chapter ten: God is faithful, the apostles says, who does not allow you to be tempted beyond what you can endure (1 Cor 10:13). Similarly it says in the Psalm: The Lord is faithful in all his words (Ps 144:13). And because faith or fidelity or veracity as well as truth is justice, you will find in scripture that one is used instead of the other and that the general term “justice” is used instead of each of these three, for example, it says there: The Lord is faithful in all his words, and it similarly says: The Lord is just in all his ways (Ps 144:17), that is to say: faithful. Someone trustworthy or faithful in accord with this intention, therefore, is worthy of confidence. This is clearly seen from the contrary. For a perfidious person is the same as a deceitful or fraudulent or deceptive one. Hence, he is unworthy of confidence or of being trusted. But if someone asks about severity and mercy or clemency, about which Sen349 eca wrote a whole book for Nero, under which of these species it is contained, we answer that it is contained under discipline. For discipline is called severity 346  I have omitted: “And again in the same work of the same man, Et iterum in eodem eiusdem,” which seems out of place here. 347  Cicero, On Duties (De officiis) 1.23. 348  I have corrected “Two Corinthians,” to “One Corinthians.” 349  See Seneca, On Clemency for Nero (Ad Neronem Caesarem de clementia).

206 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues insofar as it is severe (saevit), that is, imposing punishments on wrongdoing 350 or following the truth by of merits. But insofar as clemency lightens (lenit) and completely forgives the punishments merited or owed, it is on this account called by another name: leniency. But it is so called clemency from “cleos,” which 351 is glory, because nothing in a prince or prelate is more glorious than clemency, and hence, each of the two dignities are conferred with anointing so that kings and priests recognize that they are set over their subjects by the sacred anointing not as executioners, but as loving guardians and governors. And the whole of the previously mentioned book is concerned with the praises of this virtue, namely, clemency. It is apparent from this why lying and pretense and deceit or fraudulence are vices or sins, because they are clearly contrary to the virtues we mentioned and, therefore, contrary to justice. Hence, they are necessarily types of injustice. But you ought to know that at times justice seems to be a general name for all the virtues, and then it is taken as the whole observance of the law of God, and because in that law all the works of the virtues are expressly commanded, the entire observance of the law of God is necessarily the carrying out or doing of all virtuous acts. Justice, therefore, in terms of its effect will be the acts or works of all the virtues. People, therefore, correctly called any virtue justice since in accord with this intention the action of any virtue is one of justice, and there is no doubt that, if a person loves God with that intention by which he is bound at least not to do him any injustice, he gives him his love as something due to him, that is, as owed to him by law. In that case, therefore, loving comes both from the virtue of justice and from the virtue of love, but from the one, namely, justice as what commands [164a] it, while from the other, namely, the virtue of love as its fountain, just as if it were said that a steward gives out money from the command of a lord and gives it from his purse, box, or storeroom. There is an example of more explicit likeness if you say that a servant gives water from the wish of his master and gives it from a well or fountain. But every virtue is like a fountain or well in relation to its mediate or immediate operations, and all the virtues and operations are like emanations from the fountains of their proper virtues. But if someone asks what is the proper emanation from the fountain of justice by itself, that is, insofar as it is a fountain, we answer that it is to pay back, and on this account whether we obey our superiors or command our subjects, we pay back to both of them properly and essentially out of justice, and we mean to pay back what is due to each of them, that is, what is owed to them by law. But it is possible to pay back the proper emanation of each virtue, as 350  I have omitted “supple,” which was added presumably to indicate the need for the addition of “meritorum” in the text. 351  That is, it is the Greek for glory.

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we showed in the operation that is loving, for loving him belongs to God, and for this reason we owe it to him by law, and it is the same with fearing, hoping, and believing. For each of these is commanded by the law of God, and in that way each of the other similar actions is owed to God by law. Hence, it turns out that it is paid back or done out of the justice of obedience, and this is the reason why justice is said to embrace all the virtues, namely, because it makes all their proper actions or operations its own, when it elicits them from itself as that which commands them. But if someone does something justly with the intention, that is, of not offending God or because it is pleasing to God, it will be a work both from love and from justice, but from love as what commands, while from justice as its fountain. For to pay back what is just, insofar as it is just, and what is paid back, insofar as it is paid back, are the proper and essential emanations of justice, and these examples ought to be sufficient for you. It, however, involves no small question what sort of act paying back is and whether it is a genus in relation to loving and to every virtuous action. For one who loves God is seen to pay back to him what is his, that is, what is owed to him by law. And similarly, one who fears him and believes him or hopes in him is seen to do so. Moreover, if God had all such actions from us, what more could he demand? Hence, the action that we call paying back seems to be superfluous and utterly useless. Moreover, if I owe you money or something else, in order to be freed from such a debt, do I have to do anything other than pay or transfer the money to you? Can you exact from me something other than the money by reason of such a debt? In the same way it seems that God cannot seek or demand from us anything but the spiritual actions, of which we have set forth examples. Hence, when he has obtained these, we are set completely free before him as before our creditor. Moreover, can a creditor seek from me the act of paying back the money? 352 Since he has only given me the money, why then does God require from us the act of paying back? We reply to this that, if you do not hand over to your creditor what you borrowed with the mind or intention of paying back, you will not be freed in his eyes. For if you gave the borrowed money to the other person with the mind of giving, helping, disposing, or transferring, you were not freed in his eyes from the obligation of the debt. In fact, he is conversely obligated to you either for remedies or for other things, just as if someone summoned to court for a hearing comes there by chance, not because he was summoned, he is not by such a chance arrival released from the obedience to the judge by which he is bound to come when summoned. We do not, nonetheless, 352  I have conjectured “has given, muneraverit” instead of “has counted, numeraverit.”

208 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues say that, if he comes in that way, he cannot present himself to the court and that he should not be admitted if he does offer himself. And so, with absolutely no thought of his obligation and not intending at all to be released from the obligation, if, because he fears and loves God, he brings it about that [164b] God has from him what he owed to him, he does not properly and essentially pay him back, and he is not set free before God from the debt of the obligation, nor is he set free when he does not fear God or care to be set free. For we are bound by the strongest obligation to believe and think that we are obliged most strictly to all the commandments of God. For if someone fulfilled all such commandments merely because they are good and honorable, not having in mind at all that they are the commandments of God and that he is bound to fulfill them on this account, this person would be good in some way in fulfilling them, but not just or a servant of God or someone who serves God or someone who has God as Lord, or even as God, since he has no care at all about keeping or obeying his law. But concerning the question he asks, namely, whether it is necessary in every virtuous act or at least in some virtuous act and also at some time to intend to carry out that act with the intention of justice, that is to say, as what is owed, either with the intention of paying back to God what belongs to him or with the intention of freeing oneself from such an obligation by which he is bound to such an act, we reply that it does not seem necessary to us. It is, nonetheless, necessary that this belief by which we are bound to obey God in all things and through all things should be habitual in the mind of each person. For when God commanded that he is to be feared or loved or honored or any other of such things, he did not in any way command that this was to be done with this or that intention, about which we have spoken, but he commanded merely and simply that we fear and love him. Hence, he did not obligate us to these intentions that we spoke of for the acts. Hence, by the mere doing of such acts we are set free from the obligation by which they were commanded. In the same way, after all, if someone vows to enter religion and if afterward he enters, although he does not think or intend to be released by such an entrance from the vow he made, he is still, nonetheless, released. For he did not vow to enter merely with such an attitude or intention, but merely to enter. It is the same way with an oath as well, if he swore to enter or to do something else and afterward does it. It is necessary, therefore, that it be the same way as well with the commandments of God because they were simply commanded. For even if along with the acts of commanding on the part of God there was added a vow or an oath about keeping them, one is still, nonetheless, only obligated to fulfill them simply in the ways and conditions mentioned above. It is, therefore, not necessary that someone observing or fulfilling the commandments of God should think about or intend such an obligation or his release from it, but it is necessary, as we said, that there be habitually in his mind the belief about such an obligation,

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and the reason is that, if someone fulfills all the commandments only out of sincere and correct love, he fulfills them in a manner that is praiseworthy and acceptable to God. In fact, he does not otherwise fulfill them in a manner that is acceptable before God. And this is one of the reasons on account of which it is said that love is the fulfillment of the law (Rom 13:10) in chapter thirteen of Romans. To repay to God what is his, even without the intention of repaying, takes place in such cases, namely, in the fulfillment of the commandments. But in public affairs we do not seem to be set free unless we act with the mind of repaying or making restitution. For example, if someone takes by force gold or silver from a temple, he cannot afterward offer it in the temple as a gift or offering, nor does it seem to be able to be accepted by God except as repayment or restitution, or with the mind of repaying or making restitution. But the reason is that someone who offers something with the mind of giving a gift has in mind that it is something of his own. Hence, if it is another’s, he offers a sacrifice or an offering from stolen property. For as long as he acts as lord and owner of the thing over which he believes that he has no right, he is its thief, and the thing is stolen property in his hands. Hence, whoever presumes to offer such a thing with that disposition makes [165a] a sacrifice or offering from stolen property. But someone might say that according to this we cannot offer anything to God since all things belong to him with the fullest right, as he himself bears witness in the Psalm: Mine is the world and its fullness (Ps 49:12), and when in the last chapter of First Chronicles David was offering vast amounts of gold, silver, bronze, stones, and lumber, he said: This abundance that we have prepared in order that a house may be built for your name comes from your hand (1 Chr 29:16), and again: We have given to you what we have received from your hand (1 Chr 29:14). The things, therefore, that are in the temple do not seem to be any more our own than those which are in our hands. We reply that those things that are in our hands as a result of his gift are both his and ours. Otherwise, if everything of ours were not his, we would not be his servants by fullest and most singular right. But the things in the temple are his alone, that is, made proper to him, so that it is not permissible for us to take them, after we have offered them, or to put them to our own uses. The sum of all these points is that you understand that there are two intentions of justice, one, that is, which is broad in accord with which every work owed is called or becomes a work of justice because it is owed or for some other reason, and in this way all the works of the commandments are works of justice, however they are done. And this is the way in which Augustine says 353 that there are two parts of justice: to turn away from evil and to do good. 353  See Augustine, Homilies on the Psalms (Enarrationes in Psalmos) 36, Sermon 3.8; PL 36: 388.

210 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues Likewise, this is the justice that does not make someone miserable and does not abandon someone in misery, and this justice is in general divided into not doing harm and doing good. For by not doing harm we turn away from things that we should not do or that are not permitted, that is, from whatever is harmful. But by doing good we bring about to the extent that we can, or we procure the goods that we should, and we owe these two sorts of goods. For we ought to turn away from harmful things and to do good ones, that is, useful and salutary ones. But justice by which each is given his due is understood according to each of these interpretations because in some sense God’s right to be loved and feared is, of course, justice, which Cicero defines in the book, On Duties, in which, as he says, is found the greatest splendor of moral goodness and that 354 because of which human beings are called happy. It is the justice of rulers or governors when it has those six parts that we ascribed to it above. For when the rulers are ruled by God and God himself governs those who govern, that is, when the rulers of others obey God in full subjection, when they are faithful, true in their actions, truthful in their words, equitable in business, severe and merciful at the same time to their subjects, they excel in that justice that is the greatest splendor of moral goodness. For such rulers are resplendent in the human race, and like great luminaries they also enlighten their subjects with their learning and discipline, as is said elsewhere: “By their teaching the church 355 is made bright as the moon is made bright by the sun.” But the second intention of justice is seen in temporal affairs either offered or provided or otherwise owed, such as taxes, tolls, and other necessary things, on account of which we said, for example, that a person in debt is not seen to be set free unless he gives those things with the mind to repay. But someone might ask about a person who has to lead an army and who, when called up, enters the army more out of a desire to plunder the enemies of the king than with a mind to serve or to render such service, whether he satisfies his king if he comes into the army in that way. We reply that he satisfies the king externally and that, although it is sinful, covetousness does not impede military service in that case, but in fact fosters and helps it. For to the extent that men burn with greater covetousness for the goods of the enemy, they are more fervent in attacking them. But if this covetousness detracted from the military service, he would not satisfy the obedience owed and the king. And it is not impossible that one action have two ends, nor is it impossible at times to intend two ends by one action. For by one and the same service nothing [165b] prevents a servant from intending the honor of his lord and his own advantage 354  See Cicero, On Duties (De officiis) 1.20, where he calls justice the greatest splendor of virtue, because of which men are called good. 355  Gregory the Great, Antiphonal (Liber responsalis sive antiphonarius), at vespers on the feast of the apostles; PL 78:820.

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or that of another. Thus it is possible for us to seek by one and the same action the honor of God and our own salvation at the same time. But if someone asks whether the previously mentioned service in the army is an act of covetousness or of justice or of both at the same time, we answer that it is necessary to distinguish whether covetousness is the moving or efficient cause of offering such service or it attaches itself and is incidental to it, and it is necessary to do this with justice as well. For if he intends to serve his lord only in appearance, that is, not caring about the right of his lord or about victory, but only wanting to look out for his own covetousness, it is evident that such an action is one of covetousness only. For by a pretense of justice or obedience he mocks his lord. That work, therefore, has only the skin, if we may say this, or appearance of justice, but has the reality of covetousness. The situation is the same with a monk who does not care at all about the virtue or merit of obedience, but accepts being prior because he is enticed and attracted only by covetousness or ambition. But if the situation is just the opposite so that justice and obedience are the moving and efficient cause of the previously mentioned action, while covetousness is incidental, the action will be one of justice, and the reason is that, if the covetousness entirely ceased, that action would still be done through justice. But you ought to know that not every case of covetousness, as we commonly speak of it, is a mortal sin, as happens with many persons in the previously mentioned case. For many covet the goods of the enemy and take them from the enemy because they know that they are permitted by the right of war to do this and to make their own what is acquired by a just war, although they 356 would otherwise in no way desire to take or invade them. And so, such covetousness, so to speak, that is, which follows justice in that way, is not a mortal sin, and at times it is no sin. But it can sometimes even be meritorious. For if someone desires the weapons of enemies of the faith, their camps, munitions, horses, or anything else, I mean desires them for this reason, namely, that they may not do harm to the Christian religion, who can doubt that these actions can be done meritoriously? But a most evident example of the previously stated distinction is found in the marriage act to which at times concupiscence gives the grounds—to use the legal term—and it is done out of the desire for pleasure. But at times it is an act of justice, namely, when it is performed with the mind of rendering a debt. For then the pleasure of the flesh, without which the act can either hardly at all or never be performed, is incidental. There are other almost countless questions concerning justice and especially concerning obedience. For example, should a monk, who knows that he is unstable with regard to the flesh and weak with regard to other passions of the 356  I have conjectured “take, capere” instead of “desire, cupere.”

212 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues flesh and knows that he is well off in the cloister, but exposed to these previously mentioned temptations and others in the world, leave the cloister at the command of the abbot and receive a priorship outside in the midst of many such dangers? For some think that he ought to be so confident because of the virtue of obedience that he will conquer and escape such dangers, noting that, relying on and filled with such a virtue, Peter walked on the sea with his feet, 357 as we read in Matthew, chapter fourteen. And Blessed Maurus, the disciple of Saint Benedict, ran over water for a long stretch, because he was gifted with 358 a similar virtue. But the privileges of a few, whether those who command or those who obey, do not make common law, although it is true that we should rightly believe that Peter did this by the power of the omnipotent Lord who commanded it and that Maurus was deservedly supported by the waters because of the merit of so great a father who commanded it and by the power of God. But we think that in the sort of case that we proposed, if the monk cannot obtain by the insistence of his plea that the abbot withdraw such an order, he should convey it to the bishop of the place. And if he likewise refuses to [166a] apply a remedy concerning this, he should defend himself by an appeal, because he is clearly under a burden, and it does not seem to us that the abbot can command such dangers from his power or office. For God gave him that power to build up, not to destroy (2 Cor 13:12), as we read in the last chapter of Two Corinthians. And again in the same place it says: We cannot do anything against the truth, but for the truth (2 Cor 13:8). But if someone says that those dangers that the monk says that he fears are uncertain, but the danger of disobedience is certain and evident, we answer that it is not true. For it is not disobedience whenever what is commanded is not done, just as it is not injustice whenever what is just is not done. For just as a stone is not unjust, although it does not do what is just or do it justly, so too this monk is not disobedient. Moreover, where someone does not have the power to command, disobedience has no place if that person is not obeyed, and it seems to us in this case that the abbot does not have the authority or power to command such dangerous things. And if someone considers the case more carefully, the abbot does not seem to command as an abbot, that is, as a father and minister of salvation, but he seems rather, as an enemy, to expose the monk to dangers and to hand him over to the beasts of the vices and demons to be devoured. It would be far more tolerable, however, for that monk to incur the sentence of excommunication to the point of expulsion from the monastery, and if it came to that, he would then necessarily have to fulfill the command of the abbot or transfer 357  See Mt 14:22–33. 358  See Gregory the Great, Life of Saint Benedict (Vita sancti Benedicti) 7; PL 66: 146.

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to another monastery, if he did not obtain a remedy against this through a superior. But where a subject doubts whether what the prelate commands is permissible or not, it has been determined that he should obey the command of the prelate. The reason for this, however, is that in such doubts he must have recourse to the counsel of prelates and should stand by the same. For prelates are placed over subjects for this purpose, namely, to look after the subject in such cases. But if, nonetheless, the ignorance of the prelate is such that he is rightly not someone to be consulted in such cases, one should have recourse to the counsels of more prudent ones. But with regard to a minister who knows that an innocent person has been condemned to death by an unjust judgment and who is commanded to hang him, we do not believe that he is bound; he is bound on the contrary rather to undergo death. But my counsel in such cases is to procure the release of the innocent through a review of the unjust sentences or through other means, but it does not pertain to my present purpose to write about them here. For what 359 we read in Proverbs, chapter twenty-four: Rescue those who are being led to death, and cease not to free those who are being dragged to destruction (Prv 24:11), pertains to all persons, as God has given to each the ability to do such things. But we understand this in the literal sense with regard to those who are being dragged to death as innocent. We understand by the abilities to deliver in this case the prayers, power, and prudence by which at times we cautiously confront evils. Since, however, no one is to be obeyed except on account of God, that is, 360 insofar as he is the minister of God, as we read in Romans, chapter thirteen, that is to say, no one is to be obeyed by reason of his ministry in opposition to God, and if he goes beyond the limits of his ministry or office, that is, by commanding what does not pertain to his office, it is not necessary that these people be obeyed. And that is what we read on this in Matthew, chapter twenty-three: Do what they say (Mt 23:3), where there is authority, add “from the 361 chair,” that is to say, where they speak from their office or teaching authority. But with regard to a prince who has an unjust war, if it is publicly or clearly unjust, it seems to us that subjects are not bound to enter the army in such a war nor to help him in this. But if some of his subjects were so powerful that they could speak against and resist him in this, we believe that they are bound to do this in order that the multitude of those unduly subject might be relieved through them both from the sin of waging war unjustly and from the oppression by which they are compelled to this. For [166b] such a prince 359  I have corrected “twenty-three” to “twenty-four.” 360  See Rom 13:4. 361  The Latin has: “add, “and the chair, supple et cathedra.” I have conjectured “from, ex” instead of “and, et,” based on the scribes and Pharisees who sat on the chair of Moses (Mt 23:2).

214 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues is a prince of thieves and robbers, compelling his subjects to thefts, robberies, arson, sacrileges, murders, and countless other evil deeds. For in an unjust war such actions are done. Hence, if there were someone who brought about justice with regard to it, he should not be judged a thief, robber, arsonist, sacrilegious person, or murderer, but the prince should be judged to be such and moreover to be someone who compels his subjects to be such by his acts of oppression. But if there is a doubt about whether the war is just, it should be imputed to the men of rank if they follow the prince in this matter before it has been examined and shown that the war is just, and it is better that they suffer the violence of unjust oppression from such a tyrant than that they foster his injustice and act unjustly along with him. It would, however, be better to persuade such a man that he does not have God on his side and that he should rightly fear that the multitude of his subjects might abandon him in the crisis of battle because he forced them to wage war in opposition to God and justice and because they would be helping him not from the heart, and in that way he might be deterred and cease from his impious venture. We have, therefore, stated for you justice and its parts and its two operations, and we have sampled some questions for you that are concerned with them, leaving the rest to the disputations of the schools.

Chapter Thirteen He begins to speak about temperance after the treatise on justice and first about the word itself, because temperance is derived from tempering and by it those things that are excessive are tempered and cut back. Then he moves on its species, adding many questions.

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ut temperance can become known to you to some extent from its very name. It is, however, named from tempering by which what is too much is cut away, and this is done in things that serve our body. The first of such things is the use of women where the virtue of temperance cuts off all use of other women, permitting only the use of one’s wife, and in that use it does not permit any superfluity and excessive ardor. For this reason Augustine says 362 that an excessively ardent lover of his own wife is an adulterer. This excessive ardor, after all, goes to the point of extorting pleasure and of violence to nature and of seeking incentives to dissoluteness and to countless sorts of foulness and also to abominable abuses so that a wife is not like a wife, but like a prostitute, and so that one does not possesses his vessel in holiness and honor, but in the passion of desire (1 Thes 4:4) and has it like a vessel of deplorable turpitude, as the apostle teaches in chapter four of First Thessalonians.

362  See Augustine, Marriage and Concupiscence (De nuptiis et concupiscentiis) 1.15.17; PL 44: 424

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The second part lies in the use of foods and drinks, with regard to which two vices are most well-known, namely, gluttony or overeating, which is found in the use of foods, and drunkenness, which is found in the use of drinks. Each of them is rather an abuse. The third part lies in the use of those things by which our bodies are protected, and of these some things are clothing and others are dwellings. The intemperate and excessive use of these, however, is called luxury. And you will find in the human race some persons so given to the display of clothes and accessories to clothing, such as pins, rings, belts, charms, that they do not seem either to love or to think of anything else. You will find others no less given to the beauty and magnificence of homes, as Seneca says: Do not live sparingly 363 and build with luxury. This is something many do. The first species or part of temperance, then, is chastity from chastising the 364 rebellion or petulance of the flesh. When chastity becomes so strong that one does not seek the remedy of marriage, but [167a] renounces it, it is called religious chastity. For this reason holy women are called religious, who have in this way renounced all the pleasure of sexual desire so that they have also given up marriage out of love for the heavenly spouse. It is, therefore, accidental to chastity to be religious chastity, because chastity is and is called religious chastity on account of that perfection. Similarly, virginity is accidental to chastity on account of the integrity of the flesh or of the gateway of the flesh. For as the apostle says in chapter seven of One Corinthians: If a virgin marries, she 365 does not sin (1 Cor 7:28). But it is impossible that any virtue be lost except through sin. If then a virgin marries and, as a wife, renders the marriage debt to her husband, she does not for this reason lose the virtue that was before called virginity. Hence, that virtue remains in her after contracting marriage, but it really ceases both to be called and to be virginity, just as this woman ceases to be called and to be a virgin. Virginity is a name and is imposed on the virtue of chastity from something accidental to it, as we said, just as “virgin” is also. Nor does it follow that, because this woman had virginity and now does not have virginity, she, therefore, loses virginity. In the same way it does not follow that, because this man had a white shield and now does not have a white shield, he, therefore, lost his white shield if the shield only lost its whiteness and became black. It is true that this man had a white shield and now does not have a white shield, but did not, nonetheless, lose a white shield or a black one, because he did not lose a shield of any color.

363  See Seneca, Moral Letters (Epistulae morales) 2.20.1. Seneca wrote, “Do you dine sparingly, and you build luxuriously?” 364  I have conjectured “that, ut” instead of “and, et.” 365  I have omitted “he says, ait” since it does not seem to fit.

216 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues But a more explicit likeness is seen in the case of man who had a bull and had him castrated in accord with his peasant know-how. He had a bull and now does not have a bull, but he still did not lose a bull. Similarly, before he did not have an ox and now has one, but he, nonetheless, did not for this reason acquire one. For it is the same as if it were said that she had chastity with integrity of the flesh and now does not have chastity with integrity of the flesh after she rendered the marriage debt, but she still did not lose chastity with the integrity of the flesh or even without integrity of the flesh. The first part or species or branch of temperance is called chastity or continence. The second is called sobriety or abstinence, and this virtue is opposed to the two previously mentioned vices. Nor is it surprising that one virtue is opposed 366 to two vices or even to more, just as health of mind, as we said above, is a virtue and just as a certain equality is, but one health is opposed to all illnesses and one equality is opposed to all inequalities. But the third part, which is opposed to luxury in general does not have a determinate name in our language. For frugality or parsimony seems to be found only in food and refers only to edibles. Certain persons have not unreasonably added a fourth part and call it modesty by a most appropriate name. For it is the virtue that moderates one’s gait and the whole motion of the body, and similarly laughter and the voice. For in such things certain persons are immoderate and indecorous so that they do not seem to move by their will like human beings, but rather to be carried by an inordinate agitation. But those who behave in an orderly and decent manner are usually called modest. There will, then, be four branches or parts of the virtue of temperance, and their use is seen to be about the things that have to do with the body, as we said. But someone might say that, because every virtue is a mean between two vices, which are such in terms of superfluity and lack, temperance ought to be like the intermediate disposition between too much heat and too much cold. Hence, temperance is a mean between two. We reply that in terms of the present meaning temperance cuts away excess in four kinds of things in accord with its four parts or branches, and they are the proper matter of its actions. No one, however, ought to doubt [167b] that the name “temperance” is used in its broad meaning for all the virtues that are means between superfluity and need, because such vices are certainly certain intemperances and evil excesses. The virtue of temperance, nonetheless, most of all cuts back what is superfluous as superfluous. For this reason Seneca seems to have said that it is the work of

366  Perhaps above, ch. 12, fol. 159b.

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temperance to bring it about that “nothing is in excess.” Understand: in our words or actions in the previously mentioned matters. But someone might say that there can be too much and too little or superfluity and lack in foods and drinks, as it happens that someone at times eats or drinks too much and also less than is just or due. For some persons fast to the point of making themselves light-headed and of weakening their body, which makes them incapable of and unsuited for other holy labors and sacred exercises. In this case one can say in accord with the saying of Seneca that the virtue of temperance, that is, of abstinence in such a case provides and brings it about that there is not too much in eating, and each cuts away both sorts of superfluousness or excess, and for this it has the eye of its intention essentially focused, not on supplementing what is too little in food, but on cutting away what is excessive in the affliction of fasting. What, therefore, a reduction or smallness to the point of a due measure offers follows upon and accompanies the aim of abstinence or temperate abstinence. But the cutting away of excess by the affliction and weakening of the flesh through fasting is the essential proximate end and immediate intention of this sort of temperance, and Seneca seems to have held this in the previously quoted words. But if he said that it is the same to say: “In order that there may not be excess in the small amount of food and in order that there may not be too much in the affliction of the flesh through a small amount of food, that is, that there may not be a lack in food, and that temperance aims at the latter as it aims at the former,” we reply that temperance does not essentially aim at this, that is, that there not be too little food, but rather that there not be an excess in the affliction of the body as a result of the small amount of food. For the aim of interior temperance seems to be the chastisement and repression of the flesh through moderation in food and drink so a lack of moderation does not make it unbridled and rebellious against the spirit. No one doubts that every person who abstains aims at this through the abstinence of temperance, if I may say this. For there are other sorts of abstinence. After all, one kind of abstinence is the justice that avenges the injuries and insults to God in our flesh, and another kind is holiness that sanctifies our bodies through fasting. And still another kind is the obedience by which the person who abstains or fasts aims at nothing but to obey the commandments of the Church. And there are perhaps others. But we do not want to delay in such matters because we are hurrying on to others, content to open up for you some path for exercises and to give you the chance to see greater and loftier things in these.

367  See Terence, Andria 1, line 61. The phrase is a translation of a Greek slogan attributed to Solon. I have not found it in Seneca.

218 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues We have, therefore, now gone through a consideration of the seven gifts, the twelve fruits, the eight beatitudes, the four cardinal virtues, saying a few things about their scope and depth and leaving much to others.

Chapter Fourteen This cannot be summarized well on account of the variety and multiplicity of matters which he discusses.

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fter this we have attempted to investigate and establish the number of the virtues, whether gifts or graces, by which the Spirit of God adorns the heavens, that is, the souls of the saints, which are more heavenly than heaven. On account of the reasons we gave, do not be concerned about whether we call them gifts or virtues or graces. We have, therefore, already listed and named for you the five apprehensive [168a] virtues, which are like five shining stars, illuminating the clearest heaven of our intellective power or virtue. The first of these is faith, whose usefulness and necessity we have disclosed 368 in a special chapter on it, and here we will also do the same thing, although in another way. We say, therefore, that, since we must serve or live for God, we necessarily have to know him somehow or other and likewise those things that we said, namely, that we must serve him and live for him. For it is obviously impossible for anyone to serve someone who is utterly unknown. It is likewise impossible for anyone of his own accord to enter the service of someone and to undertake such service of his own accord unless he knows somehow that he ought to undertake such service. But it is not possible for anyone to know this except someone who knows about him the sort of things on account of which he ought to undertake such service. It is, therefore, necessary for those entering upon the service of God and undertaking it to know God and also such things about him on account of which he deservedly ought to be served in such servitude. But we have called and do call such knowledge the faith by which one believes that God exists and is so great and so good that such service is rightly due to him. It is also necessary that these things be believed in such a way that the manner of believing is itself a service or servitude, not an insult or injury to him whom we ought to serve, since such faith is the source and foundation of such servitude, namely, religious servitude, which is called latria in Greek. From these considerations, then, it has been explained to you that it is necessary that there be such faith, not only in those who are serving God, but also in those who are drawing near to him, as the apostle says in chapter eleven of Hebrews. For he says: It is necessary for someone drawing near to the Lord to believe that he exists and rewards those who seek him (Heb 11:6). But its most evident and essential root, ignorance of which is to be wiped out by the sword and fire, 368  See William, On Faith (De fide), Prologue, fol. 1b.

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is that which we set forth, namely, that one must serve and live for God and that everyone who is able and suited for this by nature must do this. We say this on account of children, fools, the insane, and those otherwise prevented by an invisible impediment. From this root it clearly follows that those who serve God or draw near to his service must have faith in God. It has also been explained through the same root that this virtue necessarily has such an effect that, if it is removed, service is also removed, since faith is the source and foundation of this service, which is called true religion. But when it, that is, faith, has been established, it is easy to establish prudence by which people dispense what has been entrusted to them for the honor of the Lord and by which they work in those things for the Lord’s gain. If a temporal prudence is required in the servants of temporal lords so that they do not dissipate the goods of their lord through its contrary, that is, imprudence, and so that they conserve and increase them through prudence, and this in their fruit or essence, for how much better reasons is spiritual prudence required in the servants of God in order that they may honorably conserve the goods of God entrusted to them either in themselves or in others and dispense them profitably! For by that prudence they know how to weigh, count, and measure what has been entrusted to them and is to be acquired—whatever is for the greater honor of the Lord, what is more pleasing to him, what is more profitable to him. Hence, it is in this way clear that we ought to be businessmen without the loss of the things that God has entrusted to us and that prudence is highly necessary for us amid our countless perils. For it is the proper light that illumines and governs dispensations, negotiations, and services. On this account mention is so often made of the prudence of servants in negotiations in 369 Matthew, chapter twenty-five, and Luke, chapter nineteen. [168b] But the falsity and deception of false goods and also of true ones, as we 370 touched upon above, produce the fullest confidence with regard to the gift of knowledge, since it involves countless numbers of people. For there is no escape from such falsity and deception without the light that reveals and uncovers them. I mean that there is not for those who live here for a long time in an adult age. And there is another darkness of no slight damage to mortals because true and great goods are hidden from us, while false and small goods mock us. Present delights, riches, honors, glories, and false powers shove themselves ahead of true and great goods into the eyes of mortals who are wrapped in fog from their original oldness—they thrust themselves, I mean, ahead of true and great goods, and they capture all by a love of themselves until such fog is scattered by the light of this gift. It is not, therefore, necessary to tie the necessity of this gift to another root or to other proofs since it is evident and most obvious that the 369  See Mt 25:14–30 and Lk 19:12–27. 370  See above, ch. 12, fols. 157ab.

220 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues whole human race is seized, held captive in the opposite darkness, and pulled to the destruction of eternal death. By this darkness God’s creatures have been made into enemies of human beings and into a temptation for the soul and into a trap for the feet of the foolish. This light uncovers the falsity of such a trap; the virtue of this light cuts away and breaks the connections of such snares and chains. In fact, wherever it shines, they disappear like a dream before its brightness. But the gift of understanding is established by the very modes of speaking, indeed by the various utterances and languages by which God speaks what is pleasing to him and salutary for us. But what is more necessary or salutary for us than to understand what is pleasing to God and necessary for our salvation? On this account we read in Proverbs, chapter fourteen: An intelligent minister is accepted by the king (Prv 14:35). After all, how will someone who does not understand it be able to obey the will of God? Besides, without such a gift all signs, all mysteries, all figures will be useless, as the apostle teaches in One Corinthians, chapter fourteen, where he says: If I come to you speaking in tongues, what good will I do you unless I speak either with a revelation or with knowledge or with a prophecy or with a teaching? (1 Cor:14:6), and many other such things on this are found in the same chapter. But the necessity of facing countless dangers makes it evident with unshaken faith that the gift of counsel is necessary. We have said many things on those 371 dangers above. But note that for the sake of brevity we disclosed there only the roots and principles of the proofs. But someone might say that, just as there are five lights of the natural senses of the body, so there ought to be five lights of spiritual sensation, that is, five gratuitous lights of the intellect, or that, just as there are five natural interior lights in the human soul, namely, imagination, estimative power, memory, reason, and intellect, so there ought to be five interior gratuitous lights. In wanting to establish in this way the five lights mentioned above, he appeals to a rhetorical argument and a feeble conjecture, but does not present a physical or theological proof. But pay attention to these matters, and you will find that we have stated the truth supported by solid roots and armed with valid arguments. There have, therefore, now been established five lights of the apprehensive virtues, which are faith, prudence, the gift of understanding, the gift of knowledge, and the gift of counsel. With regard to these it is evident that one does not live in a religious or a praiseworthy manner without them. For neither a religious life nor the service of God is begun without faith. But without prudence it is evidently impossible that God be served in a praiseworthy manner or that his goods be dispensed without the loss and expense or that one does business fruitfully. It is, however, clear that without the gift of understanding many nec371  See above, ch. 11, fols. 153b–154b.

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essary and salutary things that in many ways assist salvation lie hidden: [169a] the mysteries of the scriptures, the forms of the sacraments, and other signs intelligible to those who see them. But by the gift of knowledge no intelligent person has any doubt about what are the illusions and deceptions of the false and least goods to which we are exposed. But only those know them, who have been given to see the many and great dangers that inescapably surround and besiege those who do not have the gift of counsel. From these considerations, then, you see the necessity and at the same time the utility of five such lights, that is, those of the apprehensive virtues.

Chapter Fifteen He cleverly and ingeniously discusses volitions and the affective or moving virtues, explaining the ways by which their establishment is made possible for us.

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ut the establishment of the affective or moving virtues—to the extent we are given to see—is possible for us here only in the ways that we will state. One of these ways and the first one is through the things from which and toward which their motions exist, and among these God is the first, and because of necessity, when he somehow naturally acts upon our souls, it is possible that our motions or volitions can exist only through three kinds and in one of three ways. For they are either directed toward him in terms of himself, that is, by reason of those things that belong to him essentially, and these are three, as it is permitted for you to think of their number. The first of these is absolute and pure goodness toward which and by which we are moved by the motion or volition of love—I mean of gratuitous, most pure, and most correct love. The second is sweetness that delights and refreshes in the ultimate degree and produces other such things in our souls in a likeness and proportion with bodily food, about which we have set forth many testimonies from the scripture in what went before, such as: Taste and see that the Lord is sweet (Ps 33:9), and those words from Ecclesiasticus, chapter twenty-three: My spirit is sweeter than honey, and my inheritance sweeter than honey and its comb (Sir 24:27). And again scripture says: Those who eat me will still hunger, and those who drink me will still thirst (Sir 24:29). And again it says in the Psalm: Great is the multitude of your sweetness, Lord (Ps 30:20), and again: They will spew forth the memory of your sweetness (Ps 144:7). On account of this refreshing love and most delightful refreshment it was said in Exodus, chapter twenty-four: They ate and drank and saw the God of Israel (Ex 24:11.10). If this were understood of bodily food, it would, of course, seem to have been said utterly without purpose. The third is his most magnificent glory or most lordly majesty, for which and by which we are moved to honor or veneration when it is granted us to think of or consider it worthily.

222 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues Our volitions, then, in terms of him are three in the spirit, namely, love, and this is directed toward him as goodness or as good. Second there is hunger or thirst, which we consider as one along with the delight of their refreshment, and of these it is said in the Psalm: As a deer longs for the fountains of water, so my soul longs for you, O God (Ps 41:2). Likewise, there are the words: My soul thirsted for the mighty, living God (Ps 41:3). But of both sorts of refreshment it was said: I will be satisfied when your glory appears (Ps 16:15). But someone might say that his beauty also exists in terms of itself, we answer that delight in him from his beauty pertains to spiritual vision, that is, to our intellective virtue, just as delight from bodily beauty belongs to bodily vision or is in terms of it. But he might add that love is directed toward him because of beauty or in accord with beauty, in accord with what we read in Wisdom, chapter eight: I have become a lover of his beauty (Wis 8:2). For as bodily beauty naturally begets love in those who [169b] see it, so for incomparably stronger reasons that other beauty will beget love of itself in those who see it. We reply to you that nothing prevents that love from existing to the extent that there is 372 beauty whose sight is presented to us, as Augustine says, so that a lover and love are seen to pertain most of all to beauty, as beauty, as is seen from Wisdom, chapter eight: I have become a lover of his beauty (Wis 8:2). And we have already said in the forgoing that such love is a certain species of love, and we called it 373 love sold for a price, namely, for pleasure. But nothing prevents beauty from being goodness, but knowable only through sight. It is goodness insofar as it is suitable for our volition, that is, insofar as it moves our moving power to union with it. For the good is, as we have explained in our individual treatise, On Good 374 and Evil, that which essentially moves our volition and does this through conjunction or union, a union that can only be love. But evil is just the opposite, that is, because it moves our volition and does this toward division and separation from it. Hence, as the creator is delightfully good in the ultimate degree in terms of spiritual sight by reason of his beauty, so there is such love because of him and for him. And as he is beneficent in the ultimate degree of generosity and outpouring, so there is naturally because of him and for him the love that 375 we above called natural. And as he is good in himself in the ultimate degree of graciousness, so there is also naturally because of him and for him gratuitous love because he infuses such most correct love gratuitously and as a gift in accord with the good pleasure of his omnipotent will. 372  See Augustine, On Order (De ordine) 2.19.51; PL 32: 1019. 373  See above, ch. 9, fol. 128a. 374  See William, “On Good and Evil (Tractatus Magistri Guillelmi Alverni De Bono et Malo),” ed. J. Reginald O’Donnell, C.S.B., Mediaeval Studies 8 (1946); 245–299, here 247–248. 375  See above, ch. 9, fols. 126b–129b.

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There are naturally, therefore, as we said above, three species of love because of him and for him, that is, insofar as such love concerns his nature and our nature, if original or adventitious corruption did not impede our nature. We have, therefore, listed the three species of the affective virtues that are directed to God in terms of God, that is, by reason of the things that he has essentially. For he is essentially good with each of the three previously mentioned 376 goods: essentially savorous in the ultimate degree, essentially sweet in the ultimate degree of sweetness, outstanding in the ultimate degree of eminence and height. And on this account there are because of him and for him love, savor or wisdom or savorousness, and honor or veneration. But his benefits beget a fourth volition in us, and this is properly called gratitude, whose act is usually called thanksgiving. But his goodness and our sins produce the fifth and sixth volition, namely, fear and hope. For our sins, which we have already committed or believe we have committed or which we wonder about even before we commit them, afflict us with a fear of punishment. But the sins that lay in ambush for us somehow inflict a fear of offending, although each of these fears is a gift of God and principally from him alone. For our sins are not sufficient to produce such great goods. This is evident from the fact that when sins entirely cease, that is, in heaven, neither of these fears will exist. The seventh volition is likewise produced not by the goodness of God as goodness, but by wisdom that most clearly and constantly sees all things, as the apostle says in Hebrews: No creature is invisible in his sight. For all things are bare and open to his eyes (Heb 4:13). Similarly we read in Ecclesiasticus, chapter twenty-three: His eye sees all things (Sir 23:27), and again: The eyes of the Lord are much brighter than the sun, seeing every path of human beings and the depth of the sea and gazing on the hearts of human beings into their hidden parts (Sir 23:29). And you read many other things like this in the text of scripture. Boethius, however, says at the end of his book: “A great need” [170a] for moral goodness “has been implanted in us” if we do not want to pretend to be 377 ignorant since “we do” all things “in the eyes of the judge who sees all things.” This shame, that is, the motion of this virtue is imposed upon us by our sins, if you take “sins” in the wide sense so that even a lessening of our goods is understood to be a sin. For he does not know how to be ashamed, who is ashamed only over his sins and is not ashamed over the lack and diminishment of his goods. For as it is shameful to act wrongly, so it is shameful not to act well and to act less well than it is fitting or necessary.

376  I have conjectured the addition of “sweet, suavis.” 377  Anonymous, Soliloquies of the Soul to God (Soliloquia animae ad Deum) 14; PL 40: 876.

224 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues But someone might say that shame is not another volition than fear in accord 378 with Seneca’s statement that “shame is a fear of just reproach.” We reply to this in two ways: First, since “sense of shame (verecundia)” is explicitly derived from “fear (vereor),” it is nothing other than respect (verentia) or reverence (reverentia). Reverence, however, is nothing but reverential fear. But because shame is spiritual flight, just as fear is, shame and fear seem to be the same thing. You 379 should, however, know that the first and least noble fear is flight from punishment and the seeking of escape from it. But the second is fear of offending and the seeking to avoid it, and, to speak the truth, fear of punishment is the avoidance of punishment, I mean its spiritual avoidance. Similarly, fear of offending is the avoidance of offending. The end of each, however, is safety, but the end of the first fear is safety from punishment, while the end of the second is safety from offending. But reverential fear is flight from, that is, from greatness or loftiness. But the end of such motion is one’s own smallness or lowering. For to reverence someone great or lofty is nothing other than to withdraw within the limits of one’s own smallness and inferiority because of the consideration of his greatness or loftiness. As a result there at times come about for certain persons such anxiety and humbling that in the presence of the wise they feel that they know little or nothing and in the presence of the eloquent they become almost speechless, just as happened to Moses in Exodus, chapter four, where Moses said to the Lord: From the time you spoke to your servant, I have become someone of more handicapped and slower speech (Ex 4:10). Similar to that is the statement in Lamentations, chapter three: I am a man who sees my poverty in the rod of your 380 indignation (Lm 3:1). For from the rod of God’s indignation, that is, from his scourge, while considering the greatness and loftiness of God’s power and loftiness, he clearly sees and perceives his own poverty, that is, his poverty, inferiority, and every defect. Embarrassment or shame is flight from sight or vision and the avoidance of it. The end, however, of such flight is hiddenness or concealment or the disappearance from being seen, which he was fleeing. Because, then, motions are determined, distinguished, and diversified by their terms and scopes, it is evident that those four motions, namely, fear of punishment, fear of offending, the fear of reverence and of shame or embarrassment are distinct motions by an essential and specific diversity. Hence, their principles are necessarily distinct by a similar diversity. For shame moves from one thing and to another thing in another way than fear does according to each of its previously mentioned species. 378  Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights (Noctes Atticae) 19. 6. 3, where it is attributed to unidentified Greek philosophers. 379  I have conjectured “least noble, ignobilissimus” instead of “most noble, nobilissimus.” 380  I have conjectured “from, ex” instead of “there is, est.”

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In total, then, there are seven volitions directed toward God: three directed toward him in terms of himself, namely, honoring, loving, and savoring, so to speak. The fourth is from the benefits that come from him like pure overflows from him and toward him, and this is called gratitude by its usual term. The fifth is directed toward him on the occasion of our evils, namely, fear in accord with its first two species. For our evils are both sins and offenses against God. But the sixth is shame, as we said, which moves away from the sight or gaze of God himself to a hiding place or to the disappearance of our foulness, and that hiding place we recall that we have [170b] often called confession or disclo381 sure. But the seventh is the hope for pardon, deliverance, and grace, whose motion is not without an occasion from our evils, as we mentioned above. For no one hopes for pardon from God except for a sin that he acknowledges. No one hopes for deliverance except from an evil, either in which he is or which he knows is imminent. No one hopes for grace except one who knows the failure of his own powers to please and to serve him. But the hope for retribution and glory does not seem to take its occasion from our sins, for we hope for the retribution of eternal glory only because of our merits and the most magnificent goodness of God and in no way because of evils. But our evils give some occasion for the promises of God. For our torpor, pusillanimity, remissness, and tepidity are roused, enlivened, strengthened, and stretched by the magnificence of God’s promises, as the Psalmist is seen to say about himself where he says: I turned my heart to carrying out your ordinances for eternity for the sake of retribution (Ps 118:112). For just as God once enticed and attracted the people of the Hebrews to his worship by the promises of temporal goods and turned them away from idolatry by contrary threats and evils, so he considered that the people of the gospel were to be enticed and attracted by promises of eternal goods in order that at least the magnificence of the heavenly promises would attract and in a sense buy those whom the love and pure goodness of God would not by themselves gratuitously induce to worship God. Nor is it doubtful for those who study and understand the sacred scriptures that those promises of temporal goods were symbols of these promises. But if someone says that reverential fear is nothing other than honor, we answer that he is undoubtedly mistaken since honor, insofar as it is honor, is obviously a motion toward God, but reverential fear is a motion away from him, not only as from our author, because we are not dealing with that, but also as from our end. For reverence is like a withdrawal, in fact like a spiritual yielding and giving place by which we customarily yield and give place to betters. 382 For when we see our betters, we yield to them and give place to them, pulling ourselves back in a bodily or literal sense, but when we honor them, we are 381  See, for example, Divine Rhetoric (Rhetorica divina), ch. 24, fol. 364a. 382  I have omitted “just as, quemadmodum.”

226 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues spiritually moved rather toward and to those whom we honor. Nor do we contradict ourselves because we say that there are seven volitions, that is, affective virtues, understanding that they are directed toward God as end, when we say that some are from him as a end, because we understand “end” in a wide sense as anything that determines. For we say that one who is feared is the end of fear, not one to whom it is directed as to a final cause, but one to whom it is directed as a material cause, so to speak, because it somehow determines the fear, when one says “God.” For the end to which any motion moves as to a final cause is that whose acquisition is essentially intended. Hence, once it is acquired, the motion ceases. Because, therefore, it is necessary that all volitions that are directed to God, I mean correct volitions, are as a first possibility directed to him on his own account, that is, without the procurement of benefits, and this again in two ways, either at the occasion of evils or not at their occasion. And when not at their occasion, it is gratitude on account of benefits, but at their occasion it is fear, hope, and shame, as we said. But honor is love and savor of him in terms of himself. Our evils, however, are found only in three kinds, namely, sins, punishments, and defects. It is evident that there are seven volitions, that is, seven affective virtues directed toward God since our evils give occasion to only three, but benefit gives occasion essentially only to one, while the consideration of God himself essentially gives occasion only to three. [171a] But because things apart from God are either we ourselves or were made on our account or are made by us, it is necessary that all our volitions be directed toward these three kinds of things, namely, toward ourselves or toward those things that were made on our account or toward our own works. And in this respect we do not separate ourselves from the angels because we and the angels have almost all the same virtues. For the angels do not have other virtues, either natural or gratuitous ones, than we have, except for a very few such as faith and hope, which have no place with them. For where there is the brightest and fully present knowledge, there is no place for faith, but where the reality is present, there is no place for hope, as the apostle says: For how does one hope for what he sees? (Rom 8:24). Likewise, to see through a glass and in an enigma does not pertain to the future glory, as the apostle says in One Corinthians, chapter thirteen: We see now through a glass and in an enigma, but then we will see face to face (1 Cor 13:12). Again he says: Now I know in part, but then I will know as I am known (1 Cor 13:12). Perhaps, however, there are also other virtues, that is, gifts, which the glory of heaven does not admit on account of their imperfection, such as the fear of offending, which is usually called filial fear, and similarly, initial fear. The reason, however, for this is that in these two virtues security is completely mingled with fear. For we will be completely safe from punishment and from offending since it is impossible that either of them touch the multitude of that state of glory.

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We will, therefore, first have to ask here how many volitions we should have for one another. Because, then, volitions, which are things themselves and are impressed by things themselves, follow the diversity and number of the things, it is necessary that the number of things, in terms of the species, state, or disposition in accord with which they are gratifying to the volitions, be the same as such things or dispositions, and because it is possible that one thing have many states or dispositions, it is necessary that there be many such volitions for the same thing or because of it. For example, one and the same person is a man, on account of which he is owed love by every other human beings, and he is a prince or a prelate, on account of which he is owed honor, reverence, and obedience, and he is a subject, on account of which he is owed instruction, discipline, and defense, and he is at times an opponent of the truth, on account of which he is owed, so to speak, contradiction, and at times he is in misery, either spiritually or corporeally, on account of which he is owed pity and also help, if the ability is present, and he is himself the companion of all other human beings, at least in nature, but at times also in fortune and at times in grace, on account of which he is owed faith, truth, and equity. But we understand companionship of fortune in the wide sense so that this companionship is understood to be found in war, in business, in meals, or in journeying. At times a person is holy, not only with the holiness of the grace that makes one pleasing to God, but with sacramental holiness, on account of which, even if it were alone, he is owed veneration and preservation from profanity. You see, therefore, how great a multitude and variety of good volitions arises for a single person because of the multitude or variety of his states and dispositions. But although we speak this way, we are not unaware that instruction, correction, and defense can come from one and the same volition and also from diverse volitions, just as they all can come from charity by itself or from piety alone or from zeal or from justice, as from the obligation of the pastoral office, from all of these at the same time, and from the honor of God alone. You also ought to know that we do not understand by this that a diversity of volitions follows upon such a diversity of dispositions, as we showed concern383 ing apprehensions, especially in the treatise, On faith, [171b] but there is really a diversity of actions because all the volitions are necessarily motions in accord with the diversity of their ends, which are, as we said above, that from which and that toward which they are. Just as the motion of piety is toward easing or removing the misery of another, the motion of justice is toward restoring to another what is his, the motion of benevolence is toward either increasing, preserving, or defending the good of another, the motion of zeal is toward removing or preventing insults to God, and so on with the others. The motion 383  See William, On Faith (De fide), ch. 1, 6a–6b.

228 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues of fidelity and truth is against fraud and lying, both of which are undoubtedly parts of injustice and iniquity, and it is this way with the others. Because, then, the motions, whose ends are diverse, are necessarily diverse, their immediate principles will necessarily be diverse. For remote principles of diverse motions can be the same, and the remote principles of contrary motions can also be the same, and this is because, although the motions are diverse or even contrary, they are united at least insofar as each of them, or any of them, if there are more than two, is a way toward acquiring the end whose acquisition is intended by them. For example, when someone intends to appear generous or to be praised for generosity, it is evident that he at times intends to steal, rob, and otherwise acquire things wrongly, and to give away what he has acquired in that way. Although, then, to rob and to give are contrary motions, they are united in this respect in such persons because they are both a way to the end, that is, the vainglory that one intends. For one intends each of them on account of such an end. But this love of vain praise is naturally the remote principle for each. For the proximate and immediate principle of robbing has to be avarice, covetousness, hatred, or anger toward the one who suffers the loss.

Chapter Sixteen He deals with the same topic, but the following cannot be summarized and pulled into an argument. Hence, the diligent reader should see all these things one by one and accurately note all the points that are singular, and in that way he will learn, if he is willing, to rule his volitions in the best way.

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ut since these things are so, it is easy for you to see and list the correct volitions that human beings do have or can have for one another or toward one another. But we will show384 this to you also in another way, and we will say that our concupiscible power is able to receive only six volitions, which are love and hate, sorrow and joy, spiritual hunger and satiety, or aversion. And we understand this hunger to be only desire, but we do not find the contrary to desire to be anything but satiety, aversion, or abhorrence, unless someone calls the privation of desire its contrary. And we have already satisfied our obligation concerning love because it is a virtue in accord with each of its three species. Love, nonetheless, that is directed toward anything else on account of God comes from the same habit of love from which there comes the motion of love toward God. For in general, it is necessary that the motion toward the end and the motion to the road on account of the end come from the same basic moving power. Love, therefore, for God and for human beings for the sake of God is the same habit. And it is the same way with the honor by which we show honor to one another for the sake of God. It is similar also with shame, if in some case it could be found 384  I have conjectured “will show, ostendemus” instead of “have shown, ostendimus.”

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that someone is embarrassed before the eyes of human beings on account of the eyes of God. The volition, therefore, of love for one another does not increase the already stated number of the affective virtues, and similarly honor does not. But with regard to hatred there is a question of whether it is different virtue from love. For contrariety does not make a discipline many, nor does it make a sense many. For it is, of course, the same discipline [172a] by which we know health and what pertains to health and by which we know illness and what pertains to it. How, then, is it not by the same habit that one of the contraries is loved and the other hated? Similarly, by the same virtue of sobriety we take food according to need and abstain from what is superfluous. How, then, will one of two contraries not be loved and the other hated by the same virtue? Besides, by the same sense of taste one of two contraries is savored and the other is found tasteless, and one is desired, while the other is cast out or rejected. How, then, will it not be by the same habit of love that one contrary is embraced and the other fled from? Besides, from the same principle of voluntary motion contrary motions go forth, namely, upward or downwards, forward or backward, and to the right or to the left. Moreover, let us suppose that this person has only the habit of love for some good and has no habit for the contrary, whether this be possible or impossible. We ask how this person will stand in relation to the contrary of the previously mentioned good since it is evident that he will not love it and will also not stand indifferently in relation to it. Since he loves its contrary, he will either hate it or love it. But he will not love it since he loves its contrary. He will, therefore, hate it. Since, therefore, he does not have another habit concerning either one of such contraries than love, this hatred or hating will necessarily come from the habit of love by which he loves its contrary. Another habit, therefore, than the supposed love is not necessary on account of the hatred of the contrary of what is loved. And many have thought this for the previously stated reasons. But the truth is just the opposite, as it seems to us. For it is naturally impossible that one contrary come from the other. Hence, it is impossible that hate come from love or that love come from hate. Similarly, it is impossible that hating comes from loving, or the converse. Moreover, if hate did come from love, it would necessarily likewise have to be the case that love comes from hate, and it is not more correct that there be a single habit of love on account of loving and hating than that there be a single habit of hate on account of the same. We, therefore, said that there are really two good habits. But the reason for this is that, just as there are found in the universe things to be loved either for their own sake or for the sake of something else, so there are found things to be hated, and as we are commanded to love certain things by God’s law, so we are commanded to hate certain things. For vices and sins are to be hated in themselves and for the sake of themselves, even if this was commanded by no law

230 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues and no honor would follow from it. And he explicitly maintained both habits who said: I have hated the wicked, and I have loved your law (Ps 118:113). Nor, unless the former were virtuous and the latter a virtue, would the prophet have praised himself both for the passion of good hate and its habit and as much as boasted, when he said: Did I not hate those who hate you, Lord, and did I not waste away over your enemies? I have hated them, he said, with a perfect hatred, and they became my enemies (Ps 138:21–22). But if someone says that, if hate were a virtue, its act would be commanded by God’s law, we reply that it is commanded by the law, as the Truth testifies in Matthew, chapter five. He says: You have heard that it was said to the people of old: Love your neighbor, and hate your enemy (Mt 5:43). Ecclesiasticus explicitly says: Hate cursing intensely (Sir 17:23). Moreover, since to hate and to attack vices and sins is an act praiseworthy in itself, it will also necessarily be of itself a good act of some virtue. But it cannot be of itself an act of love. Hence, there will be a virtue that is hate, as we said. Moreover, each person is bound to this, namely, to hate vices and sins, and the heart of every intelligent person confesses this, as something inscribed in it naturally. But this is the most divine law. Hence, such an act is commanded by the divine law. Moreover, love of vices and sins is by itself a vice. [172b] Hence, its contrary is by itself a virtue, and this is, of course, what we think. But the view that certain people hold that from the love of a good there also comes the hatred of its contrary is true in the way that we will state. For when someone loves something, he is disposed as the result of the love so that, when he thinks of its contrary, a hatred for it is impressed upon him, and he is moved by hatred for it. But such hatred does not come from the love by itself; rather, it comes through the action of the contrary, as we said, and it is true that loving and hating are one habit, but it is a remote habit that is neither love nor hate, but is prior to both, and it is called goodness without qualification. Of this the Psalmist says: Teach me goodness, discipline, and knowledge (Ps 118:66), and it is mentioned in 385 Galatians, chapter five, as one among the fruits of the Holy Spirit. Augustine calls this goodness sweetness of the heart by which it does not admit or put 386 up with malice, but attacks it. In the same way Blessed Bernard calls malice 387 bitterness of the heart because what is good is bitter and inimical to it. For as a result of this goodness we are ready to embrace good things and to cast out their contraries. From this goodness, then, there come good love and hate, and to be taught this goodness is nothing else than to have it or receive it. Similarly, we are taught fear of the Lord and, in general, all the virtues only by obtaining 385  See Gal 5:22. 386  I have not found this statement in Augustine or anywhere in PL. 387  I did not find this reference in Bernard or anywhere in PL.

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and acting according to them. Just as, therefore, something hot is that from which heating flows into neighboring vessels and flows with opposition and resistance into cold ones, so a heart is good that is similarly related to good and evil. There is a difference, however, between goodness and kindness because in the proper sense a person is kind who, when provoked to anger and hatred, loves the person who provokes him, and “kind” has that meaning commonly. And this is what Gregory says on the words of the apostle in One Corinthians, chapter thirteen: Charity is patient and kind (1 Cor 13:4). It is patient,” says Gregory, “in order that it may tolerate evil people; it is kind in order that it 388 may also love those whom it ought. And for this reason those who said that someone is said to be “kind (benignus)” as if he were “well set afire (bene ignitus),” said this with the idea that someone is well set afire if his fire of good love is not extinguished nor diminished by some tribulation. If someone asks what is the proper motion or operation of this goodness, we say that it is readiness and promptness to admit, sustain, and do anything good and to turn from, repel, and attack any evil. But if someone says that the particular habits are sufficient for this—for example, chastity is sufficient for the goods that pertain to chastity and for the evils of its contrary, and so on with the others—so that this goodness, which is universal, is for this reason superfluous, we reply that one can say the same thing about the universal sciences of all things. The science of the quantity of geometry is not superfluous by which are universally known everything that is demonstrated there universally concerning magnitudes, although the same things are taught particularly and specifically concerning numbers in arithmetic and concerning continuous quantities in geometry. For to be simply ready for every good and opposed to every evil from one radical and universal habit is, as we said, quite different from being ready for some particular good from the proper and particular habit for something else. For this goodness makes its possessors like God in a marvelous way; in fact, it unites them to God and puts them in harmony with him. But if you want to know this goodness, consider the will of someone who does not know much about what is pleasing to God, but is ready to will whatever he recognizes that God wills and from now on wills that the will of God be done and wills to do it in all things. Who would dare to say that this will, which is so good and upright and in no way out of harmony with the standard of the divine will, is superfluous. For although no particular willing of a particular good follows, such a person is good and upright by this will alone, unless someone perhaps should say that with such [173a] a will he could will in a particular case what God does not will. But even this does not prevent what was said from being true, namely, that with this 388  See Gregory the Great, Moralia in Job 10.6.10; PL 75: 925.

232 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues will alone without the help of any particular will this person would be good, upright, and acceptable to God and that, if he died in this state, he should be magnificently crowned by God. But perhaps a particular willing of some evil or a morally evil will cannot exist along with it, or merciful God also does not of himself allow those who are so disposed and in harmony with him to go astray. For the anointing teaches them concerning all things (1 Jn 2:27), as is said in the first canonical Letter of John, chapter two.

Chapter Seventeen He discusses the rest of the volitions in the same way and presents some doubts in his fashion and resolves them.

B

ut concerning sorrow and joy there is a question that cannot easily be determined, namely, whether they are only passions or also virtues. For if they are only passions, since we absolutely cannot gain or lose merit only 389 by passions, as we will explain in the following, penitents needlessly sorrow over their sins and grieve over them in vain, which is not only contrary to the Catholic and true doctrine, but also contrary to nature, by which it is natural for us to grieve with the grieving and weep with the weeping (Rom 12:15), as the apostle teaches in Romans, chapter twelve. Besides, what is interior repentance, which is really either the return of souls to God or no small part of this return, but sorrow over sins committed? But what will the invitations to grief and mourning given us by the prophets be, since grief and mourning do not merit mercy in God’s eyes? For if the root, which is certainly sorrow, has no merit, the branch of action will not either. But God invites us to this, as Isaiah, chapter twenty-two, testifies. On that day, he says, the Lord of hosts will invite us to this (Is 22:12). But in chapter nine Jeremiah himself desires and seeks a fountain of tears with these words: Who will give water to my head and a fountain of tears to my eyes, and I will weep day and night over the slain of the daughter of my people? ( Jer 9:1). On this view what do the words mean in Lamentations, chapter one: Therefore, I am weeping, and my eye pours down water (Lm 1:15). But David also said: My eyes poured down streams of water because they did not keep your law (Ps 118:136). Why did they say these things if sorrow and grief have no merit? Besides, how did the apostle count joy among the other virtues in chapter five of Galatians, that is, among 390 the twelve fruits. Moreover, if joy is not a virtue, why is its act found in a commandment and commanded so frequently? For example, it says in the Psalm: Exult, you righ389  William is using “passion” in the Aristotelian sense of being acted upon by something else. 390  See Gal 5:22.

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teous, in the Lord (Ps 31:11), and the apostle says in chapter four of Philippians: Rejoice in the Lord always. Again I say: rejoice (Phil 4:4). Moreover, it is naturally written in the heart of human beings that we should rejoice and sorrow over certain things. Hence, the habits from which rejoicing and sorrowing come, as one should rejoice and sorrow, are virtues. Moreover, there is rectitude and sin, praise and blame with regard to rejoicing and sorrowing. Hence, they are virtues and vices from which these actions come to be. Moreover, it is possible to rejoice wrongly and rightly as well as in a praiseworthy and a blameworthy way. It is necessary that there be vice and virtue by which they at times are bad and at times are done rightly. Moreover, how will a habit of virtue not be generated from frequently rejoicing rightly? And likewise, how will a vice not be generated from frequently rejoicing wrongly, and likewise from frequently sorrowing wrongly? We reply to this that sorrow and joy are truly virtues when they are understood as names of habits, and this joy is an almost continuous serenity of the heart from the presence of God who dwells in it, which even adversity does not cloud or obscure, and that is [173b] properly one of the twelve fruits. And of this the apostle says in chapter four of Philippians: Rejoice in the Lord always (Phil 4:4), and so on. And bear in mind that the joy of hope and the joy of love and the joy of patience are far different from this, and there is no virtue that does not have its own joy attached, just as there will be joy in the future. For it is truly written in Proverbs, chapter twenty-one: It is a joy for a just man to do justice ( Prv 21:15), and for a chaste man to act in accord with chastity, and 391 so on with the rest. And Aristotle also says this, as we explained above. For there is the joy of hope over future goods, but the joy of love over the honor of God. There is the joy of patience over the salvation of neighbors, but the joy over tribulation, on account of which David said: Your staff and your rod have comforted me (Ps 22:4). He did not say of these: “I hope for or will obtain consolation from these.” Job too spoke similarly, when he said: And this is a consolation for me that he does not spare me in afflicting me with sorrow ( Jb 6:10). But there is the joy of the apostles of which we read in Acts, chapter five: And they went forth rejoicing from before the council that they were considered worthy to suffer insults for the name of Jesus (Acts 5:41). This could be so for two reasons, either because they were accepted for a sharing in the sufferings of Christ, as for a sharing of the chalice or cup of the king, or because they were considered worthy of so noble a contest or conflict and victory. But pay attention to the joy that we said was a fruit of the Spirit, and you will find it in many holy men whose countenances are always happy and joyful. Socrates can be thought to have had something like this. Seneca says of 391  See above, ch. 1, fol. 108b, and Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.3.1104b4–11.

234 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues him that he had a harlot for a wife and whoring sons. Having endured the fifty 392 tyrants, he never laughed, never changed his countenance. And bear in mind that laughter is not an outpouring of this joy. For this joy is a something serious that does not turn into laughter. For what Seneca said of it to Lucilius is 393 true. He said, “Believe me, true joy is something serious.” But bear in mind likewise that, no matter how much this sorrow, which is usually called the gift of mourning and the grace of tears, may grow in strength, no matter with how much bitterness it may seem to afflict the mind, is never without some sweetness or joy. On account of this Solomon says in Proverbs, chapter fourteen: A stranger will not interfere with the joy of a heart that has known the bitterness of its soul (Prv 14:10). And you will generally find in holy men that their countenance never glows with a more pleasant splendor than when the grace of compunction embitters their hearts and floods their faces with tears. Experience of this will produce complete faith in it for you. For sorrow from such a gift is most sweet, most pleasant, and full of marvelous spiritual refreshment. Similarly, tears are most sweet that have flowed forth from that fountain, and such joy and such a sorrow are not opposed to each other. I mean the joy that is a fruit, and the reason is that we never find more joyful persons among the saints than those whom we know to be more sorrowful. God forbid, however, that this sorrow drive away this joy since it calls forth a reason for joy and clearly increases it. For who doubts that the presence of God summons the sorrow that is compunction, if it is not present, and increases it, if it is? Moreover, it destroys and puts to flight the reason for sadness, namely, sins, and removes them further away after destroying them. But if someone asks to what sort of joy this sorrow is contrary or what sort of joy it drives from the hearts of the saints, we say that it is only empty joy, such as is every carnal and worldly joy, about which the Truth says in Luke, chapter six: Woe to you who laugh now because you will mourn (Lk 6:25). Concerning this sort of sorrow Matthew, chapter five, says: Blessed are they who mourn (Mt 5:5). And in 394 that tribulation the Lord enlarges us, as the Psalm says, and he is with us in this tribulation. Of it Ecclesiastes, chapter one, says: He who adds knowledge 395 also adds [174a] sorrow (Eccl 1:18). Concerning this knowledge and sorrow Augustine says in book two of On Christian Doctrine, “This knowledge makes a 396 person not exteriorly boastful, but interiorly full of lament.” But we see how good this sorrow is from what Seneca says to Lucilius: “It is a quality of a good 392  I have not found the source and have conjectured “countenance, frontem” in place of “strong, fortem.” 393  Seneca, Moral Letters (Epistulae morales) 3.23.1. 394  See Ps 4:2. 395  I have omitted “at first, primo,” which seems out of place. 396  See Augustine, On Christian Doctrine (De doctrina christiana) 2.7.10; PL 34: 39.

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mind not to rejoice over vain things.” And he immediately adds, “Perfection and its height are far more not to sorrow over vain things than to rejoice over 397 them.” But if someone asks how holy men rejoice as a result of the presence of God dwelling in them, whether it is because they feel or know or presume his presence in themselves, we reply that this is yet another joy, just as the joy of hope is, but that they rejoice because of the presence of God dwelling in them, just as they sorrow at his absence and at his not being present with the most salutary and pleasant sorrow that we mentioned. God surely gives such joy, as he gives the grace of compunction. Nor is it surprising if serenity is poured out in the hearts of the saints because of the presence of so great and so pleasant a light. But if someone asks what sort of sadness or sorrow this sort of joy drives out, we reply that it drives out the sadness of the world, about which the apostle speaks in chapter seven of Two Corinthians: The sadness of this world produces death (2 Cor 7:10). But it also drives out the most empty joy of this world. It, however, especially drives out the evil of ennui (acidia), which they call a loathing of the internal good. But ennui is most truly an aversion for the spiritual good because a person is not ablaze with desire and has no relish for its sweetness or joy. But what some say is not true, namely, that it is compulsory service (angaria) of the Lord’s cross, that is, discipline, because such a cross is carried in compulsory service only through the impatience and weakness of the flesh. The person with ennui, first of all, has an aversion for God himself, the fountain of all sweetness; secondly, he has an aversion for the spiritual storehouse of psalmody, hymns, canticles, and whatever pertains to the sacred language; thirdly, he has an aversion for the most sweet exercise of sacred observances, since he stands with a cloudy and murky heart, a darkened face, and an inert body in relation to those things that belong to pious exercises. This vice is at 398 times increased and helped by the humor or vapor of melancholy. The first and greatest remedy of this is grace. But in terms of what belongs to human ministry, it is a release and relaxation from labors and other exercises and from the enclosure of the cloister. But we believe that music also helps much toward this. We, however, leave the rest to the doctors. This vice can seem contrary to the gift of wisdom for the reasons that we stated. For aversion seems to be most of all concerned with taste, and it is really contrary not only to the gift of wisdom, but to every virtue. For it extinguishes 399 every holy desire and every spiritual joy. Hence, since every affective virtue has its own desires, its own sweetness, its own joy in the things that pertain to it, it is contrary to every virtue and permits none in the human heart. 397  See Seneca, Moral Letters (Epistulae morales) 3.23.1. 398  I have conjectured “humor, humor,” instead of “honor, honor.” 399  I have conjecture “affective, affectiva” instead of “effective, effectiva.”

236 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues Do not be disturbed because we called it aversion. For we called it aversion because, as aversion rejects all food and medicine from the human stomach, so this disease totally rejects everything that is spiritually salutary and pleasing from the human heart. For it is not like an infection of the entrance to the stomach, which is aversion in the proper sense, but it is a universal infection of the whole heart. For it is universally in the heart like a universal infection in the body, attacking every sense of the body, making not merely the sense of taste to feel aversion and to reject things that can be tasted, but also making it to reject visible things, and it is the same with hearing and in all other things. The universality of this disease, therefore, prevents it from being properly and directly contrary to the gift of wisdom, since the gift of wisdom properly [174b] and as a spiritual grace is the spiritual sense of taste of the opening of the stomach, so to speak, or belly of the heart. But as we are accustomed to use this intention, abomination is a volition like a disposition that causes nausea or vomit400 ing of the heart. But this nausea or confession, by which we customarily say that the filth of the vices and sins is vomited forth, is an indignant or hostile abandonment, whether of good or of evil. For from a poor disposition of the spiritual stomach it happens that nausea rejects good things with indignation, just as from its good disposition it rejects evil things. And we experience this in ourselves because we who are thought to be or to have something good in ourselves are rejected by someone with indignity and abomination, not without cursing and spitting, when he festers with these words, “Hiss, hiss,” something that we ourselves heard from the lips of someone who did not know or advert to this, although he was a notorious sewer of sodomistic abomination. But according to Augustine abomination is written without the mark of aspiration from that which is every mark, or is its intention. According to this it is a source of displeasure or of unhappiness, but commonly it is poor restraint (astreitas) or poor raiment (astrucitas). For this reason someone poorly equipped (male astructus) is called in the vulgar Gallic language unfortunate or 401 unhappy. But association with them and experience will teach better than we are able to describe to what extent and how human beings corrupted in mind abominate holy persons and everything holy in both ways. Concerning the first intention of abomination it was explicitly written in the Book of Proverbs: A detractor is an abomination for human beings (Prv 24:9), but concerning the second intention it says in Proverbs, chapter fourteen: The way of the wicked is an abomination to the Lord (Prv 15:9), that is, a source of displeasure and unhappiness. But the first mentioned abomination is a foulness that provokes vomiting, 400  See Divine Rhetoric (Rhetoric divina) ch. 24, fol. 364a, where William calls sacramental confession a vomiting of one’s sins before the priest. 401  The sense of the preceding sentences is unclear, and I have not found the meaning of the Latin terms in the last two sentences.

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and this is because a detractor always carries about and turns over in his mouth the filth of the sins of others and constantly chews on the excrement of others. 402 But that desire is a habit is seen from what is read in Daniel, chapter ten, where the Archangel Gabriel says to him that you are a man of desires (Dn 10:11). And in Proverbs, chapter thirteen, it says: A living desire is a tree of life (Prv 13:12), where it was not called a flower, but a tree. On this account it 403 seems to connote that it is in habit. But it seems to us rather that desire is only an act, and it is at times an act of love and like a flame for love or like ardor for fire. And as there are three species of love, so there are three species of desire in accord with them. And in general there is no virtue that does not have its 404 own desire, as we said above, just as there is none that does not have its own joy. Who, after all, has any doubt that the desire for purity and to be unstained by forbidden pleasure is proper to chastity. Similarly, it is proper to justice that each should have his due. And in the same way it is proper to discipline that each of the subjects be ruled. In the same way sapiential taste or the taste of wisdom is desire, in fact, a thirst for the living fountain, which is God, as the Psalm bears witness: My soul has thirsted for God, the living fountain, as a deer longs for the fountains of water (Ps 41:2). From hatred there is also seen to come desire, but desire for the evil of another. Similarly, from anger there comes the desire to humiliate and subject, but this happens in the way we said above. For hate comes from love and love from hate, but not essentially nor properly, but 405 accidentally, as we said above. No one, after all, is so full of hate that he does not have a love of the evil that he desires in this love, nor are this love and hatred contraries or incompatible. They, in fact, accompany and help each other, the one causing the other. We have already told you of the passions and volitions and virtues that naturally come to be and exist in the concupiscible power, and we had before told you of the noble apprehensive powers and the virtues that naturally come to be and exist in our noble apprehensive power. And we have listed them for you and found [175a] them to be five in number according to species. But the following, which belong to the concupiscible power were found, as we proceeded, to be only four, as we named them, namely, love and hate, sorrow and joy, unless someone should want to add an aversion for evil as a contrary to an aversion for good, which we mentioned above, and say that it is like a universal virtue governing the whole human heart, by which every perverse evil, that is, of vice and sin, is rejected—and rejected as burdensome or harmful or insipid, that is, as tasting bad. And according to the last member of this division, namely, what 402  403  404  405 

I have corrected “nine” to “ten.” I have omitted “and it is in habit, et est in habitu,” which seems out of place. See above, fol. 174a. See above, ch. 16, fol. 172a.

238 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues tastes bad, it will only be a virtue like the gift of general wisdom, about which we spoke above. But the sweetness or tastiness, which we said above was our sixth volition toward God, undoubtedly belongs to our concupiscible power. We also mentioned for you other virtues, such as temperance, which is likewise in the same power with all its parts and branches, or species. But with regard to justice it could not yet be made certain for you whether it is wholly in one of the three powers mentioned or in each one in a certain respect or wholly in two of them. But because it has parts or species, about which no one doubts that they lie in the irascible power, we will name for you and list all its passions and volitions both good and evil, which naturally come to be and exist in it. You ought to recall that what is properly sought by and that in which our noble apprehensive power essentially comes to rest is the true or the truth. And 406 for this reason its operations are not only about the true or the truth, but also about the false and falsity, that is, so that it avoids the latter, just as they are about light and darkness. Similarly, the sweet or sweetness and the good or goodness are related to our concupiscible power. And for this reason its operations are not merely about these, but about their contraries, not in order that we may acquire them, but in order that we may rather avoid them. But under the terms “good” or “goodness” there are understood the useful or utility, the necessary and necessity, and the salutary and salutariness. But that which our irascible power properly seeks and in which it essentially comes to rest is the 407 high or height, the magnificent and magnificence, and similarly the noble or nobility, the arduous and arduousness, similarly, the difficult and difficulty. And for this reason its passions and operations are not only concerned with these, but also with their contraries, as we said concerning the other powers. We, therefore, discover twenty-two contrarieties of the passions or volitions in this power, namely, the irascible power, or in accord with it, which are all vicious or vices in terms of superfluity and lack. As the first of these we set down inflammability and its lack. For some persons do not become angry like human beings, but become inflamed with fury or madness so that they become angry almost without paying attention to how much they ought to be ablaze or with what risk to themselves or to others. They use whatever is available to them so that they rage with a sword or even their own teeth against those at whom they are angry. Others are so extinguished that they cannot be set afire or even warmed up to anger by any fire of injury or insult. The mean between these is an obedient anger of the sort that Blessed Bernard wrote that Saint Malachi had, when he said that anger came to him when summoned, but did not im-

406  I have conjectured “operations, operationes” instead of “relations, comparationes.” 407  I have conjectured the addition of “and magnificence, et magnificentia.”

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pose itself wrongly. And we ourselves have heard from the lips of a holy man, whom we believe, that he did not become angry except when he wanted and to the extent he wanted. The second is inflexible rigor or remissness, that is, feeble laxness. Of these sins we have a large supply of examples. And this plague is, according to Gregory in his Moral Teachings on Job, a form of pride, where he says, “A proud mind is bent by no exhortations to that which it does not desire by itself, but it even 409 seeks to be forced to that which it spontaneously desires.” Just as, therefore, [175 b] this rigor is bent by no exhortations, so the contrary remissness or laxness is touched by no persuasion. But the mean between these two vices is usually called responsiveness. But in James, chapter three, it is said to be readiness to be persuaded where he describes the wisdom that comes from above ( Jas 3:17), saying that it is easily persuaded, that is, that makes people easy to be persuaded, that is to say, acquiescing in its persuasion. The third is insurmountable or unbreakable hardness and fluid softness. For some people are not softened by benefits so that they receive Christ as a seal upon their hearts by which there might be impressed on them likenesses of his beauty, nor are they broken by scourges, as we so often read in the Book of Exo410 dus about the Pharaoh that his heart was hardened, and as we read in Job, 411 chapter forty-one, about Behemoth: His heart will be hardened like stone and strengthened like the anvil of a smith ( Jb 41:15). This is the heart of stone that the Lord promised in Ezekiel, chapter thirty-six, to take away from the children 412 of Israel and to give them a heart of flesh. These persons are neither broken by fear nor softened by love. In fact, they are injured by benefits and scourges and are not tamed, as we read in Proverbs, chapter twenty-one: A wicked man boldly hardens his countenance (Prv 21:29). But the persons contrary to these are broken by every scourge and softened by every benefit to do or to suffer anything. They are slaves in the acceptance of persons and of gifts, slaves to threats and to little gifts. For they abandon the truth for a mouthful of bread, and they favor certain persons, contrary to what we read in Proverbs: Abandon 413 the truth for no reason. This hardness is experienced more by sensation than by reading. For it is generally the case in such persons that whoever associate or join themselves to them, whether by asking or persuading or by having any sort of dealing with them, do not leave them without a wound or bruise, as if from 408  See Bernard of Clairvaux, On the Passing of Saint Malachi, Bishop (In transitu S. Malachiae episcopi) Sermo 2. 3; PL 183: 487. 409  See Gregory the Great, Moral Teachings on Job (Moralia in Job) 34:52; PL 76: 747. 410  See, for example, Ex 7:13, 7:22, 8:19, 9:7, 9:12, 9:35, 10:27, and11:10. 411  I have corrected “forty-two” to “forty-one.” 412  See Ez 36:26. 413  See Prv 28:21.

240 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues the hardest stone, according to what we read in Ecclesiasticus, chapter thirteen: What does a clay pot have in common with a kettle? If they hit one another, will it not be broken? (Sir 13:3). The hearts of all other human beings are like clay pots in relation to the hearts of such persons, while they are like bronze kettles smashing the vessels of clay. But the contrary vice makes hearts ready for everything shameful, making them effeminate and like prostitutes so that such persons resist nothing shameful that pertains to the irascible power. The fourth, however, is cruelty and womanish mercy, in accord with the un414 derstanding of Cicero who wanted mercy to be a vice. For that weakness and mercy of heart are found in women so that they can see or hear of no scourge or discipline without intolerable pain. For this reason, when they hear of the thirst 415 of Roland or the sale of Joseph they are afflicted with the most fierce sorrow. If they see a lamb or a goat killed, they all but faint because of sorrow, and such persons cannot look at a wound, blood, or a bruise or see children spanked. On this account, woe to children if such people are their fathers and mothers! Woe to their subjects if they are prelates! The cruel, on the other hand, are those for whom the slaughter of human beings is not only tolerable, but also pleasing. For this reason those who are accustomed to eat raw meat with its blood are also called cruel because of the ferocity or because of the blood (cruor), whose shedding they do not find abhorrent. The mean between these is humaneness, as if between beastly wildness and this womanish and effeminate mercy, that is, weakness in showing pity. It is, of course, entirely beastly not to shrink from the shedding of human blood and much more so to shed human blood or to cause its shedding. But to show pity in a womanish way falls below human rectitude. But the fifth contrariety is restlessness and laziness, or listlessness. For some people are so restless that they never rest from the scandals of others, intolerant of their own quiet and that of others and most ready for [176a] strife and quarrels. Others are so listless and lazy that they never move themselves or others without rebellion and opposition, allowing any insults to God whatsoever or any loss of souls whatsoever to pass. Hence, they are called lazy (desides) as persons who cannot be torn from the place (de sede) of their quiet and called listless as persons clinging to their own peace and quiet, as if they were nailed or bound to it. The mean between these is earnestness or commitedness. For an earnest or committed person does not pursue or carry out his duty restlessly or cease from it listlessly or lazily. The sixth is excessive spirit and lack of spirit. Their mean is equanimity or magnanimity. An excessively spirited person is someone who, as raised up and fervent, undertakes things beyond his powers, while a person lacking spirit 414  See Cicero, Oration in Defense of Murena (Oratio pro Murena) 61 Cicero reports there the statement of Zeno, the Stoic, that only a fool is merciful. 415  For the thirst of Roland, see the French epic poem, Chanson de Roland 165.22212230, and for the sale of Joseph, see Gn 37:17–27.

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turns away from and shuns in his mind even those things that are within his powers, that is, things less than his powers. A person of equanimity or magnanimity is one who does not raise himself up to things higher than his powers nor give up at lesser ones, but adapts and apportions his powers to various matters and tasks. The seventh is shamelessness and prudishness. Their mean is modesty. For a shameless person is one who is not embarrassed to do or say shameful things in the eyes of men or even of God. But a prudish person is one who is embarrassed to do even good deeds in the sight of someone else. A modest person, however, is one who is embarrassed only to do shameful things or to do things in a shameful way. The eighth is vehemence and tepidity. The mean between these is appropriateness. For a person is vehement who puts in more effort or work than the matter requires, while a person is tepid who puts in less. But a person is just right who does what is necessary and to the extent that it is necessary. Exaggeration and importunity pertain to vehemence. A person exaggerates who does or undertakes a matter or business too fervently. A person is importune who proves himself prolix or boring in either. At times, however, a person is said to be importune, that is, not waiting for the opportune place or time. But here a person is said to be importune, as in a doorway (in porta), that is, pestering or besieging the person with whom he has to do business or not allowing him to emerge from it or to enter it, to the extent he can. The ninth is contentiousness or quarrelsomeness and weakness or shyness. The mean is a kind of justice. For a contentious or quarrelsome person is one who wants to win by all means, whether through cheating or through outcries and quarrels. A weak or shy person is one who does not want to win even through equity, truth, and justice or to obtain it when he can, but rather endures and chooses to be made subject rather than to rebel and resist. But the mean between these persons is someone just who wills only justly to obtain 416 what belongs to him, as the Lord prescribed in Leviticus, chapter sixteen: 417 Justly pursue what is just (Lv 16:20). The tenth is pride in terms of its first part, which is the lust for domination, and servility. For the proper operation of such pride is the will to be over and to dominate others. But servility is in the proper sense a vice by which servitude, even shameful or lowly servitude, is loved and tolerated. This vice is most evident in the people of black Saracens who expose themselves to be sold or as on sale, like brute animals, nor is there anything that they are not pleased either to suffer or to do for their masters, or at least they do not refuse. The mean between these is equality. One who is endowed with it does not walk in great and 416  I have corrected “nineteen” to “sixteen.” 417  Also see Lv19:9–18 and 35–36.

242 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues marvelous things above himself and does not exalt his soul above any human beings equal to him in nature and his companions in the present misery. This equality is called humility (humilitas) from earth (humo), which a truly humble person always has before his eyes, bearing in mind that he himself is earth. In the same way Abraham says in Genesis, chapter eighteen, I will still speak to my Lord though I am dust and ashes (Gn 18:27). But servile people place themselves lower than the earth, when they serve earth, that is, human beings, so servilely. The eleventh is ambitiousness and lowliness. Ambitiousness, however, is the desire for honors and [176b] riches for their own sake. The contrary is flight from and rejection of them for their own sake. For just as some people are so blinded that they think that honors and dignities are desirable for their own sake, so others are so worthless in their own eyes that they repudiate or refuse them on their own account, not on account of the burden and danger that is linked to them, but because they think that they are so unworthy of dignities and honors that they hate and stand in horror of them. The mean between these two is similarly another sort of humility, by which they subject their necks to their burdens and, nonetheless, reject them to the extent that they can and for their own sake. And those who are endowed with this humility regard the heights of honors as showcases of opprobrium, and when they are honored by human beings, they do not rejoice at being honored, but rather grieve that they are being mocked. For the statement of Blessed Bernard is most true, namely, that all purple is a matter of mockery after the Lord Jesus was mocked in pur418 ple. To this we add that every crown and every scepter likewise is a matter of the kingdom of mockery after the king of glory was mocked in them. But a part or branch of pride is the scorning, contemning, or despising of others and at times being indignant at them. Scorning is a movement against lowliness as lowliness. Indignation, however, is a movement against what is unworthy as unworthy. At times it also comes from the dignity that one believes he has. Such persons are indignant at things unworthy of them and at persons for whom greater things seem to be done than their dignity calls for. They are also indignant because they are not treated in the way that the dignity they believe that they have demands. Similarly, both of these at times comes from arrogance. The twelfth is elation and dejection. Elation, however, is the elevation of the mind to the height of vanity to such an extent that others seem little to that mind, just as to those living on a high mountain or in a lofty tower the people who are on the ground seem to be little cranes or even crows, although they are big people and tall in stature. But dejection is that pressing down of the mind below itself to the point that it seems far littler in wisdom, goodness, and the

418  See Bernard of Clairvaux, The Fifth Sermon on the Feast of All Saints (Sermo V in festo omnium sanctorum) 9; PL 183: 480.

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virtues. The mean between these is a third sort of humility, which is standing in the proper level and within the bounds of one’s own gifts. The thirteenth is vainglory and its contrary, which is acceptance of abuse. For certain people have erred because of the love of glory to the point that they do not care at all about the truth of merits, content with only the opinion of human beings and the small gifts of empty praise. For this reason we are accustomed to call them mockingly chimeras because such human beings base their thoughts not in reality, but only in opinion and because it makes no difference whether one believes a lie while awake or dreams it. They boast not over being great and good, but over being thought such by human beings. Acceptance of abuse descends to the point of ignominy so that one is not angry or pained over disgrace, insults, or a bad reputation, being cruel toward oneself. 419 As Seneca says. “Cruel,” he says, “is the person who neglects his reputation.” And Ecclesiasticus says against this: Have care about a good name (Sir 41:15), and Augustine says, “Life is necessary for us on account of God, reputation on 420 account of our neighbor.” The apostle, however, in chapter two of One Timothy says in particular about a bishop that he must have testimony from those who are outside. The mean between these is the excellence by which one flees from that chimerical vanity and avoids ignominiousness. Of it Ecclesiasticus, chapter thirty-three, says: In all your works be excellent (Sir 33:23). But this excellence is the firmness of mind by which the reality and name, or the truth and reputation, are preserved. For some cling to the reality or truth so that they do not care about reputation, while others are so fond of reputation that they neglect the truth on its account. The fourteenth is arrogance and its contrary, which has no other familiar name [177a], but can quite conveniently be called self-deprecation or false humility. Arrogance, however, is that state of being immoderately raised up by which a person attributes to himself what is not his or claims that his merits deserve what they do not deserve. But the contrary vice is that by which one is disposed in the opposite way with regard to his powers and merits, always regarding his powers and merits as less than is just. And such human beings are always belittling themselves and their deeds or destroying whatever good they do, always attributing whatever is theirs to the powers and merits of others. At the start of ventures, these people fail in spirit, giving up under the burden before they have undertaken it. At times these people do not dare to ask God to help them and to have pity on them, and they place so little value on their prayers that they do not trust that God will pay attention to them. The mean between these vices is the limit and measure by which good persons truth419  This seems to have been a fairly common saying in the medieval period; it is at times incorrectly attributed to Augustine, but does not seem to stem from Seneca. 420  See Augustine, On the Good of Widowhood (De bono viduitatis) 22.27; PL 40:447.

244 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues fully measure themselves and their actions so that they do not think themselves more than they are or less than they are. What Gregory says about Job is not contrary to this, namely, that it is the mirror proper to good people “that 421 they think themselves less than they are” —I mean: that they think with the understanding, that is, that they fear, not that they assert it as true. In accord with this he says elsewhere that “it is the mark of good minds to recognize sin 422 where there is no sin” —I mean recognize, that is, to fear or wonder, not to hold as certain, which properly belongs to that vice that we said was contrary to arrogance. The fifteenth is audacity and timidity, which someone will perhaps call magnanimity and pusillanimity, though they are really different. For magnanimity is not only fervent, but also persistent in great undertakings and proceedings— and this in the face of their greatness. For a magnanimous person in the proper sense aims at something great or magnificent, and so his goal is to conquer great things. But an audacious person in the proper sense rises up in the face of dangers and thrusts himself into them beyond his capacities. Timidity, however, is flight or shrinking from dangers that are easily escaped and even from things that are not dangers. And it is like the vice that is called skittishness in horses, as we read in the Psalm: They trembled with fear where there was nothing to fear (Ps 13:5) and in Leviticus, chapter twenty-six: The sound of a blowing leaf will terrify them (Lv 26:36). The sixteenth is want of endurance (impatientia) and lack of feeling. The mean between these is patience. For those wanting endurance are not only unwilling to tolerate injuries and insults from others, but also do not tolerate themselves or what is their own. Hence, they become angry at their own poverty or any of their other troubles, and what is more remarkable, they are intolerant of their own intolerance itself. On this account Plato said that, when 423 an irascible person stops being angry at others, he is angry at himself. But bear in mind that there is a want of endurance of another sort in the concupiscible power, and it is like a tenderness of heart by which it can easily be injured by difficulties, that is, by labors and afflictions. But this want of endurance with which we are dealing here is in the proper sense provoked by injuries and insults, insofar as they are injuries or insults. And its response is not a sorrow that seeks comfort or mitigation, but an anger that is bent on vengeance. For such a person wanting endurance in the proper sense seeks vindication. This lack of feeling, however, is like an insensitivity to injuries and insults, and it is not like that virtue that is praised by the term “meek.” For a meek per421  Gregory the Great, Moral Teachings on Job (Moralia in Job) 34.22.43; PL 76: 742. 422  See Gregory, Letter to Augustine of the Angles (Epistula ad Augustinum Anglorum), Reply to the Tenth Question (Responsio ad decimam interrogationem); PL 77: 1195. 423  I have not found this reference to Plato.

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son calmly accepts injuries not without feeling, and it is a virtue in the irascible power. But in the concupiscible power it has corresponding to it a virtue that likewise calmly accepts difficulties, and it does so gently and without injury of sorrow. But bear in mind that this want of endurance with which we are dealing is the same as proneness to anger (iracundia). But the term “want of endurance” is in regard to injuries received since a person who endures (patiens) them is so called from endurance (patientia). But the term “proneness to anger” does not connote anything about sufferings. For a person prone to anger is equally angry at those who do him good and those who injure him. And many such persons are said to be wanting endurance without distinction, just as they are called angry. The seventeenth [177b] contrariety is, according to certain persons, presumption and despair. But presumption is excessive confidence, while despair is lack of confidence. The mean between these is a moderate hope and trust. And hope is nothing but the reliance or disposition by which one relies on his own powers or merits or on the mercy of God or on anything else. And presumption is a vice that destroys a healthy fear, just as despair and lack of confidence destroy a healthy confidence and healthy hope. Despair withdraws all the support both of God’s mercy and of merits and does not allow the soul to rely on either of them or on both of them. Hence, in the one case it undermines the mercy of God, just as presumption undermines a healthy fear and, in that way, the justice of God. It is evident, then, that these two vices are opposed to the goodness of God. For his justice and mercy are like two parts of the divine goodness in terms of their effect. Because, therefore, the one, namely, presumption, attacks the one part, that is, justice, while the other, namely, despair, attacks the other part, that is, mercy, they obviously are opposed to the goodness of God. And because all the ways of the Lord are mercy and truth (Ps 24:10), they block and close his ways to the human heart or the ways of the human heart to him. Hence, they undoubtedly exclude God from the human heart. The eighteenth is levity, or inconstancy, and stubbornness. But the mean is constancy or perseverance. A person of levity or inconstancy is one who is too ready to undertake things and similarly to cease from them. But a stubborn person is deaf to and unready for both of these. A person with the mean is constant and persevering. And this contrariety is found in each of our three already mentioned powers in accord with their passions and dispositions. For some are too ready to believe, and some are similarly too ready not to believe. But others are stubborn in both of these. Similarly, some people are too ready to enter into friendships and in the same way to abandon them, while some are unready for both. People are the same way in great and arduous things for some are too ready for the undertaking of them and similarly too ready to abandon them, while others are just the opposite in both of these.

246 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues The nineteenth is irreligiousness, or profaneness, and superstitiousness. The profane or irreligious person is one who does not venerate holy things, while the superstitious person is one who venerates or worships even things that are not holy or things that are slightly holy instead of ones that are very holy. The mean between these is the religious person who venerates or worships those things that should be venerated as they should be venerated. The twentieth is wildness or dog-like tameness. For some are so wild and424 fierce that they do not tolerate companionship, and human society does not please them, as Seneca says, “Life without a companion is the life of a lion or 425 wolf.” But some enter into or join any group without any discretion or faithfulness, like dogs commonly called tramps, which do not cling to their masters more than to others so that they seem to belong to any house whatsoever. But the mean is sociableness. The twenty-first is flattery and mordacity. Certain persons are so biting that they are unwilling to say to anyone what pleases that person. But some are so fawning that they strive to say to each person what pleases him. And of these persons we once said that they are properly priests of the devil or of hell, always making the commendation, which is the office of the dead, and always carrying 426 out the office of the dead, which begins with “I shall please” (Placebo),” likewise, always burying the infernal dead, as the Truth says in Matthew, chapter nine: Let the dead bury their dead (Mt 8:22), where an authority says, “A dead man buries a dead man when a sinner flatters a sinner.” The mean between these is, according to Cicero, the role of friendship. Thus he says “to admonish and to be admonished is the office of true friendship” in such a way, nonethe427 less, that [178a] admonition lacks flattery. The twenty-second is agreeableness or disagreeableness. For certain persons disagree with everything and cannot be brought to any agreement about the good. But others agree with everything that they see that other people hold, shrewdly pretending to hold what the others hold, which is the proper vice of courtiers and members of the court. For this is the special desire of certain people, namely, to anticipate what their masters think, and to do this in order to agree with it, which vice is in a sense flattery. For they aim to please their masters by this, as people do through flattery, which vice most of all has place among those who do not want to have counsel, but agreement from their secretaries and domestics. 424  I have conjectured “and, et,” instead of “or, sive.” 425  William appeals to the same quotation twice in On the Universe (De universo) Ia– IIae, ch. 14 and IIa-IIae, ch. 91. It seems to be a variation on fragment of Epicurus quoted by Seneca in Moral Letters (Epistulae morales) 2.19.10. 426  Ps 114:9: “I shall please the Lord in the land of the living,” which from the eighth century was used in the Office of the Dead. 427  Cicero, On Friendship (De amicitia) 25.91.

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Besides these there are two other dispositions which are related to both. For when they are directed toward good matters, they are vices, but when they are directed toward evil ones, they are virtues. These are horror and execration. If it is horror over spiritual evil, that is, over sin or vice, as something deadly, it is good and virtuous. Similarly, execration of the same things, as sacrilegious and impious, is good and virtuous. But when they are just the opposite, they are undoubtedly the worst vices. But effrontery and insolence are not different from the vice of impudence. For effrontery is irreverence in speaking, but insolence is the same as shame428 lessness, as is seen from Ecclesiasticus, chapter twenty-three: Hand me not over to an irreverent and shameless mind (Sir 23:6). There are listed among the virtues purity and innocence, which, since they consist of a mere privation, are neither virtues nor vices. But in the positive sense they follow, at least in part, the volitions that they entail. For example, if purity is either flight from or hatred of defilement or of lascivious unions, they follow that flight and hatred. That is to say, it will be that flight or hatred 429 and will exist in the power, in which it is, in the same way. And if innocence is understood in a positive sense, it will be a certain kind of justice or a part of justice. Holiness, which has two operations proper to it, is also mentioned and listed among the virtues. The first operation is separation from the things that pertain to the flesh and to the world, whether they are permissible or not. The second is involvement in the things that pertain to the honor and worship of God. For we are accustomed to call holy only those who separate themselves from worldly things and are completely dedicated to the service of God. Religiousness is the same thing. But since these operations proceed from some of the dispositions mentioned, holiness is always the same in its subject and essence as either the fear of God or the love or honor of God.

Chapter Eighteen He lists the virtues that come from the irascible power.

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aving set forth and explained these matters in this way, we will return to explaining the number of the virtues that exist in terms of the irascible power. Because, then, it is evident that there are twenty-two contrarieties of vices named in it and in terms of it, but there is only one mean for each contrariety, the number of the virtues will necessarily be twenty-two. But if someone says that between white and black there are many intermediates, such as red and green, and many others of the sort, we reply that white and 428  I have changed “twenty-four” to “twenty-three.” 429  I have omitted the second “and that flight or hatred, et fuga vel odium.”

248 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues black are not spoken of in accord with superfluity and lack, but this is easy to see for those who are intelligent. For between the superfluous and the insufficient there is only the equal or commensurate. Likewise, between too little and too much there is only a sufficient amount or enough. But the equal, commensurate, and sufficient are not divided essentially, but as if by accident, [178b] namely, in accord with the diversity of their subjects, because what is enough for one subject is not enough for another in food, drink, clothing, and other things. But the intermediate between white and black is divided essentially, that is, in accord with the diversity of their mixture by which the intermediate ones are composed and come about. But if someone says that sparingness and generosity are two intermediates between prodigality and greed, and that likewise justice, mercy, and equity are between two injustices, one of which is in accord with superfluity and the other in accord with lack, we reply that sparingness and generosity are one in subject and in essence, but differ only in concept or relation. For sparingness (parcitas) comes from sparing (parcendo) or holding back in a good way, but generosity (largitas) from giving (largiendo) in a good way. After all, it belongs to the same virtue to hold back in a good way and to give in a good way, just as it belongs to the same sobriety to hold back from and consume food in a good way—in a good way, that is, virtuously or praiseworthily. Thus the justice and mercy of equity are the same thing in the previously mentioned case. But when merits as merits provide the reason for the action, the action is said to be just, that is, equal to or corresponding to the merits. But when misery provides the reason for the action, it is called a work of mercy. For at times misery is that to which an action is owed, just as to merits. Just as we should give or do well to anyone by reason of his merits, so we ought to by reason of his misery, and just as an action was owed or is owed to anyone by reason of merits, so an action is owed to someone by reason of the misery in which he is. For nothing is more just or more owed, nor does God demand anything of us more strictly than to be merciful, and he punishes nothing more severely than its contrary, as is clearly seen from Matthew, chapter eighteen, where he demands back a remitted debt from 430 the wicked servant because he refused to be merciful to his fellow servant. Nothing is more just than to be merciful. And if one pays careful attention, pious subventions are not so much given to those in misery as also paid to them. For this reason a certain almsgiver rebuked the poor who thanked him for his gifts of alms, saying, “Hush! Do not thank me because I give you nothing, but I only give back to you what was yours.” This was also likewise said by us and is said by many wise persons, because the dispensation of alms is not a diminishment of or a derogation from justice or an injury to it in some way. But the reason why the dispensation is 430  See Mt 18:23–35.

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made undoubtedly makes that which is given to be just. Otherwise, it would not be a dispensation, but a dissipation. Moreover, no one doubts that the contrary of mercy is inequity and injustice. Hence, mercy is justice. Moreover, the whole of natural law unquestionably is equity. But mercy is natural equity. For even greater reasons, then, gratuitous mercy will be equity. Moreover, what will mercy be but the equality of which the apostle spoke in 431 chapter seven of the Second Letter to the Corinthians. For to be merciful is to produce that equality. Mercy, after all, is like a flooding river that fills by its flooding the adjacent empty areas until they equal its depth. Thus, when mercy is bountiful and overflowing, it fills up emptiness and needs by its flooding, and it makes all the needy equal to its own subject by a bountiful sharing. These virtues are, therefore, in total twenty-two, but when the two we mentioned last are added, namely, those whose actions are execration and horror over evils, there will be twenty-four, all told. But the vices of the same power or in terms of the same power will be forty-four and, with the addition of those two, forty-six, although such execration and horror are not spoken of in a bad way in accord with superfluity and lack. And for this reason neither of them produces a contrariety, and this is the reason why the number of the vices is the same as the number of the opposite [179a] virtues, that is, a pair or two for each virtue. But if someone says that humility is a virtue in a single species and is not divided, know that such a person is mistaken. The explanation of this is that humility and pride are unqualifiedly and totally contrary. And pride is spoken of in term of superfluity, and there is contrary to it that which is spoken of in terms of diminishment. Each of them are divided into five species, of which two in each case are spoken of in terms of superfluity and diminishment. Thus the five produce contrarieties. But it is impossible that a species one in number be the mean between many such contrarieties. Humility, however, is clearly a mean in individual contrarieties of that sort. It is clearly necessary that humility be divided into five species. Otherwise, a species one in number, as we said, would be the mean between many contrarieties. But it is evident that it is impossible that the same thing be a mean between many terms that are directly opposed to one another. For if “A” and “B” were two terms located on the same straight line, but “C” and “D” were placed under and directly opposite, it is impossible that the same point be the mean between “A” and “C” and between “B” and “D.” But the species of pride similarly stand related in an equally distant opposition and in a spiritual straight line, and its opposite vices are described by the previously mentioned terms arranged with the equal distance, opposition, and position. 431  See 2 Cor 8:13. I have corrected “first” to “second.”

250 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues It is, therefore, evident that humility is divided into five species in accord with the species of pride and their opposed vices. But in the concupiscible power or in terms of it there are found only love and hate, sorrow and joy, spiritual hunger or thirst, and satiety, and the contrary aversion, of which we have spoken above. Contrary to it are hunger and thirst, which are only desire, as we understand them here. But at other times hunger and thirst are the gift of wisdom. There are found, therefore, in the concupiscible power or in terms of it six virtues in number, namely, love and hate, sorrow and joy, hunger or thirst, that is, desire, and its contrary, which is either good disdain or good aversion, by which sins are rejected as unclean or harmful. Hence, the virtues of the two powers altogether are only thirty. For we have 432 already likewise named and counted hope and fear and honor for God as well as a sense of propriety among the virtues that belong to the irascible power. But because in accord with the rational power the virtues will be only five, as we have already shown, the virtues of all the powers will be thirty-five altogether. But if someone should say that this enumeration is not in accord with the essence and truth, but in accord with concepts and relations or comparisons, he will perhaps not say this without probability and without reason. For truths that are salutary or that pertain to our salvation are united and in communion insofar as they are salutary and pertain to our salvation, and this is the most important and principal reason on account of which knowledge of them is sought, praised, and accepted by God. It can rightly be seen that there is only one virtue that is about them or concerning them insofar as they are such. After all, for one thing, insofar as it is one, there is only one apprehension or volition. But the salutary truth insofar as it is salutary is undoubtedly one, for neither truth nor salutariness as such are divided, nor do they divide their subjects. Hence, there is one virtue whose operation has to do with true salvation, insofar as it is true salvation, or is salutary in its beginning, its root, its foundation, or its end, that is, as beginning, rooting, or founding salvation or directing it and helping it as a means or as an end. Hence, prudence is one virtue, enlightening, strengthening, and arming the human mind [179b] with any salutary truth, nor does a diversity of such truths diversify it, because prudence is from on high and not from them, as we have already often mentioned, and even if prudence followed its matter, its matter is not truth, as truth, but as salutary. But salutariness does not divide it because it too is not divided. For this salutariness is the productiveness or effectiveness of salvation or, what is truer, the materiality of salvation. Each of them is true, but in a different way. For the salutary truth is in a certain sense the matter concerning which and about which the belief of faith exists, and in another way it is the efficient cause moving our intellective power and productive in a 432  I have conjectured “hope, spem” instead of “seven, septem.”

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certain way of merit—I mean the merit of salvation. For the things that move in some sense produce the salutary motions, that is, as occasions, although the Holy Spirit causes them as the principal cause. This argument, therefore, has some probability for showing that prudence is a single virtue in species and in the matter concerning which every operation of it has to do, and this prudence is the salutary, vital, and living knowledge of the salutary truths to be believed and to be believed salutarily. It is the same way with justice and temperance. For concerning matters that pertain to us and to another or others, that is, in which it is possible that there be another’s injury or loss, fraud, deception, and such things, justice helps and directs us. For we hold it necessary to act justly with anyone else, that is, to render him what is his right and to harm the right of another in no way. But no one doubts that we owe many things to others and that we ought to do many things with others. Hence, the virtue that directs us in these matters and guards and protects us from the evil acts of others is necessary for us. But for all these things one justice suffices by itself. For to whom is it doubtful that we must live justly, that is, without violating and harming the right of another, I mean, live justly toward an other or toward all others whatsoever? Justice, therefore, is necessary for us on account of matters pertaining to others. But because there are other things that pertain only to us, such as food, clothing, and those that pertain to them, a virtue is necessary for us that directs and adorns our life in such matters, and it is called temperance by its usual name. By it we use things of this sort without excess. For the intemperate in the proper sense are those who are excessive in such things, as we said above in the words 433 of Seneca, because temperance is in the proper sense “nothing to excess.” For overindulgence and excess regarding baths and oils, clothing and beds as well as homes are the most vain delights of intemperance and the worst vices. Sacred scripture, which was produced and written down under divine teaching, calls this virtue sobriety in Wisdom, chapter eight, and the Letter to Titus, chapter two. For it says, it teaches sobriety and prudence and justice and manliness (Wis 8:7), and again: That we may live soberly and justly and piously in this world (Tit 2:11). It, however, calls it sobriety as a summation. You see, therefore, that there are two vices, intemperance, which is toward oneself, and injustice, which is toward another, nor is it possible that someone sin except in one or the other of the two ways and in accord with one of the two kinds of things that we mentioned. Hence, there cannot be other vices or sins or more of them or ones of another kind, and on this account it is also not possible that there be other or more of their contraries, that is, of the virtues. In this way it is seen that justice and temperance are stable, and on this account two kinds of goods and two uses of them. For gifts are all the things 433  See above, note 359.

252 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues either that we owe to others or in which we ought to share with others. But because there is a third kind of things, which are usually called evils, namely, adverse things, such as poverty, diseases, wounds, chains, prisons, injuries, insults, strife, wars, labors, pains, and last of all [180a] death and because it is also possible to be shamefully conquered by them and to sin in many ways in order to avoid or escape them, there is necessary for us the virtue by which all these things are conquered and which strengthens, arms, and fortifies us against all 434 these. And in Wisdom, chapter eight, this is called manliness (virtus), but it is now commonly called fortitude. But this is the virtue by which all the terrifying things we mentioned are conquered. On account, therefore, of the goods either which we owe to others or which we share with them, justice is necessary. On account of the goods that we apply to our needs temperance is necessary. But on account of the evils that break and deter us fortitude is necessary. Because, therefore, all things are included in these three kinds, while virtue is that which makes us use things well and be related well to all things, and because every good person is one who is related well to all things and uses well those that are to be used, it is seen for this reason that these three virtues necessarily make up, direct, and adorn our life, with regard to our two powers, namely, the concupiscible and irascible. But if someone says that nothing of love and hatred and of many other things pertains to these three, let such a person who refuses to think this way have recourse to the words of Augustine by which he is seen explicitly to hold that these four about which we are speaking are only one and that they are essentially only love ordered and strong in the subject or essence and truth, but they are 435 four in concept or relation and function, according to the same Augustine. And let him have recourse likewise to the words of Aristotle by which he says 436 that “virtues are either a certain will or not without will.” But it involves no small question whether all the virtues are twofold, as we said above concerning love, hatred, sorrow, joy, and many others. But concerning faith it seems the same way. For as we are bound to believe the articles of the salutary truth, so we are bound not to believe their contraries. Hence, as a pious and living belief in them is necessary for us, so is a pious and living disbelief of the contrary heresies. And it is this way with the others as well. As each person is bound to do and to embrace what is just, so he is bound to avoid, reject, and stand in horror at what is a vice. If someone should want to say this, we do not contradict him, but this matter needs discussion and debate. For this seems to be as though it were said that one natural virtue or power were necessary for 434  See perhaps Wis 8:7. 435  See Augustine, On the Morals of the Catholic Church and the Morals of the Manichees (De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum) 1.15.25; PL 32: 1322. 436  Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.5.1106a 3–4.

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something hot to repel cold and another for causing heat, and it is possible to find similar pairings or duplications by which it would be frivolous to duplicate the virtues. But what seems quite true in these matters is that the number of the virtues is as we stated. Nor is the example necessary that the love of something and the hatred of the contrary are two virtues or two vices, although it is possible at times that it is so. For as the result of the love of something its contrary is driven out, and this driving out is always called hatred, as an effect is often called by the name of its cause. For driving out and separation is of itself the effect of hatred. And for this reason, when they come from love, although accidentally, they are still called hatred by the trope that was mentioned. In the same way not to believe heresies can come from the faith, and it can of itself come from another disposition. Concerning it and similar ones it can correctly be said that they are not virtues, and this is because their end is of itself only the avoidance of evils. But the avoidance of evils does not of itself produce good, but of itself it defends the human heart from evils and malice. Hence, it is seen that they are not instances of goodness in the proper sense and for this reason not virtues. But if someone should wish to call them virtues because they are directly contraries to the vices and fight directly against them and rectify them and also strengthen, arm, and defend the human mind, we do not quarrel about such a name or naming. For it suffices for us for the present question that the truth of the matter [180b] is known. You must also notice carefully that justice and all the other virtues that we named and listed above have a double intention insofar as they are at times dispositions of the concupiscible power and at times dispositions of the irascible power. For the fact that evil-doers are punished can come either from a love of peace and tranquility among men or from a zeal for rectitude, that is, from a holy and good anger, by which a judge is incensed at evil actions. And according to the first intention justice is in the concupiscible power and in accord with it, but in the second intention it is in the irascible power and in accord with it. And it is this way with many others and perhaps with all. 437 But we have understood the twenty-two contrarieties mentioned above according to the intentions by which they fit with the irascible power, and you can see this from what has been said above.

437  See above, ch. 17, fol. 175a.

254 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues

Chapter Nineteen He proposes a comparison of the virtues to one another and to the contrary vices, something that he does much more subtly and theologically.

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fter this we will speak about the measures and comparisons of the virtues, both to one another and to the vices and also to the natural virtues, if in fact other measures follow apart from number, and concerning their number we have passed over many things, in part failing out of ignorance, in part prevented by other occupations, and in part burdened by the profundity and multitude of these matters. In this desire and undertaking of ours we have, nonetheless, done enough, because we have given to those willing and able to philosophize about them some opportunity for exercising their minds, and we have to some extent opened the path for seeking and finding the truth for minds that have been exercised and developed. Know, therefore, first of all, that all the gratuitous virtues are equal in the same subject. The explanation of this is multiple, and the first explanation proceeds from the first giver and fountain of the virtues. For as coming from his side, there is no difference among them of more or less. For he is one in every way, most removed in the ultimate degree of distance from inequality. Hence, if there is an inequality among them, it will necessarily come from the side of the recipient, and this is, of course, plausible for those who do not understand the nobility of the actions of the creator. For as in the same mass that which is drier and thinner receives a greater heat from the same fire than what is moister, harder, and more resistant to fire, so in the same subject of the human mind it also seems plausible that it happens in a similar way in accord with the variety of its dispositions. For those who are by nature given to anger seem more suited and apt for receiving the zeal and severity of righteousness than for receiving the virtue of patience and gentleness. Hence, they receive the former virtues as greater than the latter. For from the same source that which has greater capacity receives more, that is, a great outpouring, and from the same agent that which is more resistant and less suitable receives less of the virtue. Hence, the previously mentioned virtues are unequal in the same subject. On this we reply that it is the nobility and freedom of the power of the omnipotent God that everything is done in accord with his good pleasure in all things, not in accord with the dispositions of the recipients. This latter is the manner of the operation of nature, which, as we said above, operates ignobly 438 and servilely. For according to it, God would pour out either the least virtues or no virtues into the phlegmatic, since the phlegmatic temperament helps no

438  See above note 108.

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virtue of the soul, as Galen says in his book, On the Elements. But it is an obvious judgment on such matters that we see [181a] great and wonderful virtues of humility, obedience, and subjection suddenly infused into persons who are very proud both because of natural corruption and because of the addition from custom, although they are least apt for them. Moreover, to the extent that this nature is more given to anger, to that extent it is more in need of a greater remedy of the contrary virtue. Hence, the most merciful and most wise God offers that to it more to that extent. Moreover, if on account of the fact that someone is given to anger, God would give him a lesser virtue of patience or gentleness, he would on this account give him less help against a domestic enemy because he would need more help and a greater amount of it. For this reason he would use a weaker medicine because he saw that he was sicker or that his illness was greater. For this reason he would pour on less water because he knew that he was burning with a greater fire. Anger is, of course, a natural and also habitual and domestic enemy and a pestilential disease and a spiritual fire. Moreover, by however small an amount of gratuitous virtue, anyone can resist any temptation of whatever greatness, as we will explain in what follows, 440 namely, in the treatise, On Temptations and their Resistance. It is not, therefore, necessary to infuse greater and stronger virtues on account of greater and more frequent temptations, especially since weakness, that is, the subjection to and ease of the temptations, offers a great opportunity and help for the perfec441 tion of the virtues, as the apostle expressly says in One Corinthians, chapter twelve: Virtue is made perfect in weakness (1 Cor 12:9). And again, he says: When I am weaker, then I am stronger (2 Cor 12:10). Just as the strength of the virtues is occasionally a hindrance for many, so weakness also helps many toward the acquisition and height of humility. For there is a just man who perishes in his 442 justice, as we read in Ecclesiastes, chapter eight. And just as knowledge at times puffs a person up with pride, as we read in One Corinthians, chapter 443 twelve, so do the virtues, as the Lord expressly shows in the gospel on the Pharisee and the Publican, of which the one who was puffed up over his virtues

439  Galen wrote a work entitled On the Elements from the Opinion of Hippocrates (De elementis ex sententia Hippocrates), which was translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona. Hence, William could have had that translation available to him, but there does not seem to be anything in it like what William attributes to it. 440  See On Temptations and Their Resistances (De tentationibus et resistentiis), which is the fourth part of On Virtues and Vices (De virtutibus et vitiis). 441  I have corrected “two” to “one.” 442  See Eccl 8:14. 443  See 1 Cor 8:1.

256 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues was rejected and the other who was humbled over his sins went home justified. 444 All of this is expressly found in Luke, chapter eighteen. Moreover, natural virtues all seem to be naturally equal. For from where would they have inequality? Sight, after all, does not seem to be greater or stronger for seeing than hearing for hearing, and so on with the others. Likewise, memory for remembering and imagination for imagining seem to be equal, to the extent that we are speaking from their side. For the fact that some power or some other natural virtue has more or greater helps does not make it to have to be greater. For because the clearness of the pupil in someone is greater or because the clearness of the air helps someone, his sight is not greater on this account, although it happens that he sees more, nor does his sight seems to be more or better. Therefore, natural virtues seem to be naturally equal; hence, gratuitous ones are also. For if the former follow the unity and equality of their giver, these gratuitous ones do so for much better reason, namely, because they come down from him as if from someone nearer. Moreover, if helps do not add greater strength to the virtues, although they do to their operations, then hindrances do not take anything away from them or diminish them. Hence, the virtues do not in this way follow upon their helps and hindrances, but upon the unity and equality of their giver. But someone might say that they really do not follow upon exterior helps or hindrances, but upon interior ones. For because of them their essences are diminished or increased on account of their nearness or even their union with them. We reply that such helps or hindrances in no way impede or help the most omnipotent and most free will of their giver, nor does he pay attention to this, but only to what is to the advantage of his honor and glory and the wellbeing of their recipients, and at times it is to their advantage that those that are more impeded by such impediments receive lesser ones on account of less experience in order that, having more frequent struggles, [181b] they may gain more frequent victories and in order that they may always realize that they are human beings, mindful of their weakness, and in order that those who are at almost every hour exposed to shipwreck and driven by the spears of the enemy may constantly have in themselves the fear of God. For even if such weaknesses may seem to offer impediments to certain virtues, it is, nonetheless, evident that they offer no small helps to others, as is clearly seen regarding the fear of God, humiliation, and many others. Moreover, if such helps and hindrances alone and of themselves produced an inequality of the virtues, the inequality will cease when they cease. For when an essential cause ceases, it is necessary for its effect to cease, just as, when the interposition of the earth ceases, a natural eclipse of the moon ceases. In heaven, therefore, inequality of the virtues will necessarily cease when the cause of all 444  See Lk 18:10-14.

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such hindrances will have been removed, once human souls have been cleansed and purified and brought to the highest purity of their nature, when every stain, both adventitious and inborn, has been wiped away and every natural mingling has been removed far from them. But if they will be equal in heaven, it necessarily follows that they are equal on the way there. For rewards and merits, whether of grace or of glory, are universally proportionate so that it is necessary that the proportion of reward to reward is the same as the proportion of merit to merit. For example, if merit is double in relation to merit, reward will also be double in relation to reward, and if merit is equal, the reward will be equal. Since the virtues of the way are merits, but the virtues of heaven are rewards, it necessarily follows that, just as the rewards will be equal in the same subject, so the merits are now equal. But no intelligent person doubts that the virtues of heaven are the rewards of the present virtues and that glories will follow upon the present graces. Moreover, if the gratuitous virtues are unequal in the same subject and if all the merits of actions are proportionate to the virtues from which they come so that the proportion of the merit coming from this action to the merit coming from that action is necessarily the same as the proportion of the virtue to the virtue, it will be impossible that someone be remunerated or rewarded otherwise than in accord with the demand of merits. And we explain this as follows. For since by every meritorious work the one who does it merits eternal life or eternal reward, he will by unequal merits merit unequal eternal rewards or eternal life in unequal degrees. But it is impossible that the eternal reward be given in unequal degrees or that eternal life be unequal. But pay attention to the root of this proof, and see that it is necessary that eternal life, which will be given to the saints as a reward, either follows in its measure and proportion upon the virtues of those who merit it or upon the meritorious acts of the virtues. Because, then, the virtues are equal according to the previously stated position and the actions or merits are unequal since they are not proportionate to their roots, that is, to the virtues from which they come, it will be necessary that greater and lesser eternal life be given to the same person since it will follow upon each virtue and also be given to each meritorious action. And so some person will be blessed and more blessed and will sit on high and still higher, as if in different thrones. And this is clearly impossible. For each will sit in his own place and rank. For as we read in Ecclesiasticus, chapter sixteen: All mercy will make a place for each person in accord with his merit and in accord with the understanding of his pilgrimage (Sir 16:15). Just as, therefore, it is impossible that someone obtain greater and lesser glory in heaven, so it is impossible that someone in this life obtain at the same time greater and lesser grace, and the reason is that total glory is given to each grace and likewise to each act of mercy at the same time. And similarly, each work meritorious of divine justice, if one is in the end found doing it, and similarly, each gratuitous and meritori-

258 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues ous virtue suffices for eternal [182a] retribution. For if someone says that two or more good works are required for this, therefore, if someone is found to be good and in only one good meritorious work, I mean, if he would be found to die in that one alone, he would not obtain the retribution of eternal life, which may God forbid! But if someone objects that virtues, as well as works and merits, increase in many people and that God leaves no good unrewarded—I mean no meritorious good, therefore, when someone is good, if he later becomes better, an unequal eternal life will be given to him or two unequal states of glory, we will reply that one eternal life is given for all, and it will suffice for all, still it will be measured out for each person according to his best state or the greatest merit of the same person. But this is the final state of each of the elect in this life, as, on the contrary, the final state of the evil is the worst, but that will be better determined in the following treatise, On Merits and Rewards. Moreover, if by the path of nature all the members of a nature grow proportionately, that is, equally according to proportion so that, if a foot and a hand increased to twice their size, it would be the same also with the others, hence, if all the virtues are infused as equal, since they grow equally or proportionately, they will always remain equal. Moreover, the wars of all the vices are equal; that is, we understand the temptations as equal and the attacks equal in terms of power. That is to say, no one can be tempted concerning dissoluteness to some point without being able to be tempted to avarice to that point, and so on concerning the other vices. Human souls, therefore, must be equally armed and equally strengthened against all the conflicts of the vices. But, as they must be armed and strengthened, so God arms and strengthens them. Hence, he arms and strengthens them equally against all the conflicts of the vices. Therefore, it is possible that they be armed and strengthened by equal arms of the virtues and equally in equal arms of the virtues. Moreover, all the vices are potentially equal, that is, in power and might, which is seen from the equality of the attacks and battles that we mentioned. Because, therefore, the arms of the virtues must be given to human souls against the vices, and because equal arms must be given, the all-good and most wise God gives them to them. Hence, he gives them equal arms of the virtues. Moreover, each person is as good as he is chaste. For who would dare to say that he is less good than chaste, or the contrary? Hence, he is as chaste as he is good, and likewise, he is as just as he is good, and vice versa. For it is necessary that whatever things are equal to the same thing are equal to each other, and in this way it is possible to show this regarding the other virtues. All the virtues, therefore, in the same subject are equal. Moreover, if the virtues are unequal in someone, his goodness will either be measured according to the greater ones or according to the lesser ones or ac-

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cording to both. But if they are measured according to the greater ones, such a man will either be equally good in relation to another man who has all his virtues equal to the greater virtues of that man—for example, if we suppose that Socrates has three virtues greater than all his other virtues, but that Plato 445 has all his virtues equal to those three virtues, which we name, for example, A, B, and C. Socrates and Plato, therefore, will be equally good or virtuous. For Socrates’ goodness will be measured according to the greatness of A, B, and C. But Plato’s goodness is according to the greatness of all his virtues, which are all equal to A, B, and C. Therefore, the goodness of Socrates and the goodness of Plato will be equal, which is impossible. Moreover, according to this, if all the virtues of Plato decreased to equality with the lesser virtues of Socrates, except for those three, while those three [182b], namely, A, B, and C, remain in equality, then there ought to be no doubt that Socrates and Plato are equally good, as they also were before. Since, therefore, Plato’s goodness has been lessened neither totally nor partially, the goodness of Plato is also not decreased by such a loss of its parts. But if someone says that goodness is measured according to the lesser virtues, there is the same destruction in turn, that is, given that those three virtues are lesser in Socrates and the others greater, although they are still equal. But if someone says that goodness is measured according to both, he cannot say this save according to one of two ways. That is, he can say this by way of division, namely, with the understanding that the goodness of this man is according to the magnitude of the greater virtues in the end and likewise according to the smallness of the lesser virtues, that is to say that the one is good and better and is not good precisely in some quantity because he is not as good as his greater virtues are great nor as good precisely as his lesser virtues are great, it clearly follows that there will be no certain reward for him in the fatherland and no certain place of his being seated in the glory of the saints or that he will be seated there in two places at the same time. Or he can say this by way of conjunction, that is to say, that he is neither as good as his greater virtues are great nor less good to the extent that his lesser virtues are small, but that he is in between, from which many difficulties follow. For example, it follows that his greater virtues are rewarded less than is just and his lesser ones more than is just. For the virtues will not be rewarded in him in accord with their magnitude, and the reason is that he will be blessed or glorified in the fatherland insofar as he is good or as he is good. But he is not good according to the magnitude of his greater virtues, in fact he will be rewarded less according to this error; hence, he will not be blessed or glorified according to the magnitude of them. But as he will be rewarded, so his virtues will be rewarded, and vice versa, and 445  I have conjectured “we name, nominamus” instead of “by names, nominibus.”

260 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues as he will be blessed and glorified, so he and his virtues will be rewarded, and vice versa. Hence, those greater virtues of him will be rewarded less than is just. In the same way it is possible to show that his lesser virtues will be rewarded more than is just, which is frivolous and contrary to the justice of God, first, because he rewards no one less than is just. For this would be injustice. It is contrary to the justice of God, secondly, because to take away from the greater virtues the rewards due to them and to add to the lesser virtues beyond their due rewards is not only perversity and without reason, but is in fact contrary to reason. Hence, there will be no reward of unequal virtues in the same person. But it is evident that this is impossible; hence, that from which this follows is necessarily impossible. But this is the inequality of the virtues in the same person. Hence, such inequality is impossible. Moreover, there is no doubt that God is equally to be feared with reverential fear, as he is to be loved and honored, the cause of which is the equality of things in him, for example, his most supereminent nobility because of which he is to be honored is equal to his goodness because of which he is to be loved, and so on with the others. Moreover, what is lovableness or desirability, that is, the due amount or worthiness to be loved save his goodness itself? And it is this way with the others. Hence, his lovableness, or worthiness to be loved, or honorableness, or worthiness to be honored, are equal. He is, therefore, equally honorable or to be honored as he is lovable or to be loved. And it is this way with the others. Because, therefore, he will be honored by each person in the fatherland to the extent he is to be honored and because he will likewise be loved, and so with the others attributes, the love and honor and fear of God and the others of the sort will necessarily be equal in the same person. Moreover, there free choice will be fully set free and, as fully free, it will have in its most free power [183a] all its virtues. But the virtues will not have any impediment in their operations. Hence, it will elicit movements and operations as great as can be elicited from them. Each person, therefore, will in the fatherland love God as much as he will be able to love from the charity he will have there. Similarly, he will fear, and so on with the others. But then he will not fear less than he loves, and the converse, because, if he feared God less than he loved him—and the converse—he would do him an injustice because he is to be equally feared and truly loved—and the converse—and without qualification by each person. You see, therefore, that in the fatherland all the motions toward God will be equal. But the motions there will be equal to their virtues on account of the reasons we mentioned. Hence, all the virtues that are directed toward God will be equal there. But the principal motions of all the virtues will be directed toward God. Therefore, all the virtues will be equal.

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Moreover, there our souls will be purified totally and equally according to all their powers, and on this account they will be equally receptive of the gifts of the glory of their beatitude. Hence, they receive them as equal. But these gifts are the virtues of the fatherland. Hence, the virtues of the fatherland will be equal in the same person. And, therefore, the virtues of the way will be so as well. Moreover, what will be the glorification of our souls but their assimilation to him? But our assimilation to him exists only in the gifts of heaven or the virtues of glory. Just as, therefore, whatever things are in him belong to him naturally, so they are of themselves equal. Moreover, he will produce in us our glory, that is, the whole adornment and beauty of our beatitude, either by a natural operation, as the sun produces heating and lighting, or by a gratuitous and voluntary operation in accord with the riches of his generosity. But if he does this by a natural operation, then he produces equal effects in those who are equally receptive. Because, then, our superior apprehensive power, namely, the intellective power, will then be equally receptive of illumination, as our noble moving powers will be of their motions, and the converse, since they have been purified of all impediments, they will receive equal gifts from the giver of all gifts, but these are the virtues of the fatherland. But if he produces glory in us only by a giving that is gratuitous and voluntary, since it comes from one cause alone, namely, on account of the love alone by which we loved him, all retribution will be equal. For if it is only charity that merits those rewards or if merit exists only in accord with it, all the merits of the virtues of this life will necessarily be equal. Hence, their rewards will be also. But these are the virtues of the fatherland. Hence, the virtues of the fatherland will be equal in the same person. But if this is so, the virtues of this life are so necessarily. But if someone would say that each of the virtues of the way is by itself meritorious and that each has its proper merit, although we will discuss this more at length in what follows, that error seems, nonetheless, very improbable. In the same way it seems possible to say of bodily members that the power to walk was greater in someone than the power to work with the hands, and that through it someone serves God more by laboring with the feet, for example, by going on a pilgrimage or on some other journey, than by the labor of the hands; thus God will make his feet more glorious in heaven than his hands, and likewise his ears more than some other members because he likewise served God more in them and through them than through the other members. But these and other such ideas are very inappropriate. Moreover, as God will be known there, he will also be loved, as the power of the intellect will there persuade or show, so it will also rouse—so to speak—the

262 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues volitions, although here it is not that way. But this is on account of multiple illnesses and corruptions of the volitions by which one is prevented from fol446 lowing the intellect that goes ahead and shows in advance what is to be done. For there our whole interior man [183b] follows the intellect by the steps of the volitions, with the same speed by which the strongest and freest bodily legs follow the lead of sight. For then the will of our love will not be slower or less effective for those things that pertain to it, that is, for its loves, than the intellect for illuminations and visions. Moreover, what is the glory of the human mind but the ultimate act of that potentiality and the most increased fullness of its possibility? But we understand with the eyes the increase according to species, not according to degree, because in the species itself of glory there are many degrees, only according to more and less and not substantially or according to a different species. Because, therefore, all the possibilities and potentialities of the three higher powers of our souls are equal, the ultimate acts both of nature and of glory will be equal in them—we say “of nature” on account of certain philosophers. It is, however, evident that their ultimate acts are the virtues of glory—whatever the philosophers might dream up in this area. But that the possibilities and potentialities we mentioned are equal is evident by itself since the intellect is by nature equally powerful for understanding and knowing as the affective power for loving, fearing, desiring, and so on with the others. And this is so because volitions are no less necessary for human souls than apprehensions, nor is the magnitude of volitions less necessary or useful for them than the magnitude of apprehensions. Just as, therefore, in the same soul this potentiality and possibility are equal, so are their ultimate or complete acts. If they are found as such, they are equal; similarly, it is also necessary that the acts of glory are equal in the same way. But pay attention to all these things that we have said, and you will see that in certain of them we have put the roots and chief points of the proofs, in others we have advanced further. Even if they do not suffice for you for conviction or certitude concerning the equality of the gratuitous virtues, they will still be ways and occasions for you to acquire certitude as well as material for exercise.

446  I have conjectured “goes ahead, praevadentem” instead of “prevails, praevalentem.”

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Chapter Twenty He compares the gratuitous virtues to the natural ones and to natural operations and motions. He does the same for the vices and their motions and passions. And he discusses much as a theologian.

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fter this we will speak about the relation of the gratuitous virtues to the natural virtues and operations and natural motions as well as to the vices and their motions and passions. We will say, therefore, first of all, that those that pertain to glory, that is, the virtues and their operations, are in the ultimate degree of perfection and likewise in the ultimate degree of purity and goodness. But those that pertain to nature are in the lowest degree in relation to those and are in relation to those, like seeds in relation to trees or fruit and like footprints in relation to those who pass by and like very tenuous and slight likenesses in relation to the truth and like shadows in relation to those things by which they are cast. But someone who understands the fullness and perfection of glory has no doubt about these matters, and we will explain this first in the case of gratuitous love and natural love. For it is evident to persons who consider it that a holy man loves justice more on account of God by gratuitous love than he loves his own life by natural love. And we add that he loves it more to infinity. But such an explanation is easy and has many paths. First, because he exposes his life to death in order to retain justice, and he is ready to do this not only once, nor only twice or three times, but a countless number of times, [184a] that is, an infinite number of times. Hence, he prefers this justice to his own life an infinite number of times, despite the natural love with which he loves it. Hence, he loves justice to an infinite degree with gratuitous love more than he loves this life with natural love. Moreover, he would love an infinite number of such great lives infinitely more than one of them; natural love, therefore, would be infinitely greater for such an infinite number than it would be for any one of them. But in comparison to this his gratuitous love for justice is greater than his natural love for all those infinite lives. For he would risk or abandon all of them in order to retain justice. Hence, it is evident that the gratuitous love by which justice is loved on account of God is infinitely greater than the natural love by which anyone 447 loves his own life since it is infinitely greater than the love which contains it an infinite number of times. Moreover, no one has any doubt that a holy and just man loves justice on account of God with gratuitous love more than he loves his own son with natural love. And he similarly loves it in the same way more than two sons and more than a thousand. Let us suppose then that he has an infinite number of sons 447  I have conjectured “quae” instead of “qua,” that is, the nominative rather than the ablative.

264 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues who are equally loved with natural love. No one can doubt that the love for all of them is infinitely greater than the same man’s natural love for each of them. And the reason is that it is composed of an infinite number of loves as great as it is. For every aggregate from such an infinite number of things of its kind, however small their quantity is shown to be, is infinitely greater than them, as has been explained elsewhere. Because, therefore, gratuitous love of this justice is greater than the same man’s natural love for all his infinite number of sons, and because it is infinitely greater than the same man’s natural love for each of his sons, it is evident that gratuitous love is infinitely greater than someone’s 448 natural love for his own son, as was clearly seen in the case of Abraham. Moreover, if the life of grace for some good man could be preserved without the life of nature, would not such a man prefer to live with the life of grace than with the life of nature? He, therefore, would love the life of grace unqualifiedly more than the life of nature. Hence, he would also love the individual elements of the life of grace more than the individual elements of the life of nature, taken and considered proportionally. That is to say that he would love the sight belonging to grace more than the sight belonging to nature and the hearing belonging to grace more than the hearing belonging to nature, and so on with the other elements. Moreover, with gratuitous love there are loved not only those things that belong to grace, but also those that belong to glory, but by natural love there are loved only those things that belong to nature insofar as they belong to nature. The life of grace is ordered, that is, so that by it things are loved in accord with their order, that is to say that greater things are loved more and lesser things less and also equal things equally, and again insofar as they are greater, they are loved more and insofar as they are less, they are loved less. But the goods that belong to grace and to glory are infinitely greater goods than those that belong only to nature. Hence, the goods of grace are loved with infinitely more love than the goods of nature. But the goods of nature are loved more with the love of grace than with natural love because they are loved for greater goods and because of a greater love. For the very body that is loved for future glory is loved incomparably more because of the love of grace than the present life is loved for any natural goods of the present life, which are loved with only the love of nature. Moreover, that love of grace by which the body—and the soul as well—is loved for future glory, first of all, conquers and absorbs the love of nature so that it forces the goods of nature to be neglected for the goods of grace and glory. For Blessed Benedict neglected the sciences, which are [184b] great natural goods of the human soul for the goods of grace, as Blessed Gregory says, because he withdrew from the natural goods of the body and also from the life 448  See Gn 22:1–14.

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of the same, “knowingly unknowing and wisely unlearned.” The love of grace for those goods of nature is, therefore, greater than the love of nature for them. But the love of grace for those things that belong to grace and glory is infinitely greater than for those things that belong to nature. 450 Moreover, by the love of grace those things that belong to grace and glory are loved either finitely more or infinitely more than those things that belong to nature. For if they are loved infinitely more, that is what we are seeking. If they are loved only finitely more, where, then, is the order of love, since it is evident that the goods of grace and glory are infinitely greater goods than the goods of nature? Hence, such a love by which they are not loved insofar as they are greater goods is not the love of grace since it is not ordered love. It is possible to reason in the same way concerning fears and sorrows and their contraries. In apprehensive powers, however, the explanation we made concerning faith will be enough for you. For in the case of all lights the one of two placed next to another that swallows up the other is greater. But it is evident to the faithful that the light of faith in the sacrament of the altar so swallows up the light of the five senses that none of them shines in opposition to it, none of them murmurs against it, and even if one does murmur, it is captured and trod down so that it is believed in no respect at all in opposition to the light of faith. Similarly, the light of the senses, of the intellect, and of reason and every light of the natural sciences is both swallowed up and obscured, and all the testimonies of sensible accidents are driven away by the testimony and statement of the faith. You clearly see, therefore, the greatness of the light of faith, which does away with and swallows up so many and such great lights, or at least conquers and captures their assertions and either crushes or drives off their testimonies, so that, despite them, it alone is believed. Moreover, there is no believer who would not swear that it can more easily be the case that a triangle does not have three angles equal to two right angles than that the least of the articles of faith is false. Moreover, every believing intellect holds it no less incredible that the Catholic faith is false on some point than any other impossibility, that is, one which does not touch the faith. For every believing intellect would rather believe that a jackass is a goat than believe anything contrary to any of the articles of faith. Hence, anything contrary to one of these articles is more incredible than any other impossibility, that is, one that does not touch or attack the faith. There is, however, the same proportion of credibility to credibility in their contraries as there is of incredibility to incredibility in any two cases. Each of those articles that belong to the faith is, therefore, more credible and more probable 449  Gregory the Great, Life of Saint Benedict (Vita sancti Benedicti), Prologue; PL 66: 126B. 450  I have omitted “tam.”

266 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues for the believing intellect than anything else that is credible or probable. There is, however, the same proportion of belief to belief as there is of credibility to credibility and of probability to probability. Hence, whatever comes from the articles of faith is believed more in the faithful intellect than anything else. Moreover, look at many of the articles of faith, and you will find them improbable in the ultimate degree of improbability and incredible in the ultimate degree of incredibility, such as that God is a man, that God has died, that bodies rise that have died and have been reduced to dust and scattered to all the winds. The incredibility, improbability, darkness of these is so great that it conquers every light of the human intellect and reason and all the lights of the sciences and of natural doctrines. But they are conquered by the light of faith and become most lucid, that is, most probable and most credible; in fact, what is more, they are most believed because of the light of faith. [185a] Hence, the light of faith is greater than all those lights. For however dark those three articles that we mentioned may be, they are bright with the light of faith for the believing intellect and for no other. But by the gift of knowledge it is easy for you to see how great a luminosity belongs to it from the darkness of those things that are bright through it. Look at the eight beatitudes, and you will see that the darkness of penalties would hide them out of sight and beyond our knowledge if they were not resplendent because of the light of the gift of knowledge as if a light were cast over them—the penal character of poverty, of course, first, and so on with the others. The lights of human intellects certainly failed to reveal them; likewise, the lights of the natural sciences also failed until by the light of the gift of knowledge they became bright because of the light poured out by the true light, Christ the Lord. 451 Moreover, although natural goods of the body are loved with gratuitous love and similarly the natural goods of the soul, but on account of the goods of grace and glory, they are, however, likewise loved with a natural love, but only for the goods of nature. The soul and the body are, of course, loved with a natural love for those things that belong to nature alone, namely, for health, strength, beauty, and other such things. When, therefore, these loves are wellordered, the object of love is loved by each of them as much as and as it is to be loved, and its good is sought by each love as much as and as it is to be sought. But it is evident that the goods of grace and glory, which are sought by gratuitous love for both the soul and the body, are infinitely greater than the goods of nature, which are sought for our souls and for our bodies by a natural love. Hence, if both of these goods are sought by a well-ordered love, the goods of grace and glory are sought with an infinitely greater love than the goods of nature, and they are loved infinitely more. Hence, the love of grace for the objects 451  I have omitted “bodily, corporalia,” which seemed redundant.

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of its love is infinitely greater than the love of nature for its objects. Hence, it is infinitely greater without qualification. For each love is unqualifiedly as great as it is for the objects of its love and to the extent the objects of its love are loved by it. But you ought to recall those things that you learned elsewhere, namely, that it is not necessary that, if something is infinite in relation to something else, it is infinite without qualification, as a body is infinite in relation to a surface and a surface in relation to a line and a line in relation to a point, since each of them is finite by an absolutely certain proof. You should also know that to be an aggregate from an infinite number of things of a certain size is not the same as to contain an infinite number of things of such a size or larger. A right angle contains an infinite number of things of a certain size or smaller than an angle of contingence because it contains an infinite number of acute, straight-line angles, each of which is greater 452 than the angle of contingence. But it is impossible for it, namely, a right angle, to be composed from an infinite number of angles of contingence, and what is more amazing, it is impossible that from an infinite number of angles of contingence there be gathered any straight-lined acute angle, however small, or even another that is equal to it. But the explanation or demonstration of this is very easy for those who are trained even slightly in such matters. But someone may say that, as benefactor and as father, God is the good of our nature and is, as such, loved by a natural love. We reply that he speaks the 453 truth, as we showed above. But if he asks whether gratuitous love is infinitely greater in him than natural love, one can answer that it is and also that the reason is that it is purer and more correct beyond any comparison. But there is no comparison or proportion of what is pure to what is not pure, as we will explain elsewhere. Moreover, he who loves himself for a friend loves the friend incomparably more than he who loves the friend for himself, but one must always bear it in mind that such loving is not univocal and, for this reason, not comparable, because grace is also in between the goods [185b] of glory, which are the greatest, and the goods of nature, which are necessarily less than the greater and the greatest goods. Hence, the virtues of grace are universally greater than the virtues of nature, and the acts of the former than those of the latter.

452  The angle of contingence or of contact was supposedly formed by two lines that touched, that is, an angle of zero degrees. It seems that it was only in the sixteenth century that such an angle was recognized to be none at all. 453  See above, ch. 9, fol. 128a.

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Chapter Twenty-One He teaches that the virtues and graces are much greater than the vices and the motions of the virtues are greater than the motions of the vices and likewise that their delights and sorrows are greater than the delights and sorrows of the vices and that vices are improperly called delights. He proves the proposition stated above by the following example because a carnal man loves his own body more than every pleasure of the body, while a holy and good man loves his body more or at least no less than a carnal man, and he shows that the love of grace is greater than the love of nature.

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ut with these points established, the explanation is easy that the virtues and graces are greater than the vices, that their motions are greater than the motions of the vices, and that their delights and pains or sorrows are greater than the delights and pains of the vices, at least if there are genuine delights coming from or in accord with the vices. We also said some things about 454 this in the treatise, On Matrimony, to which we intend to add some points here. We will say, first of all, that a lover of pleasure, to whatever degree, loves his own body more than every bodily pleasure. But a holy and just man loves his own body more or at least not less than such a man of pleasure. I mean that he loves it more or at least not less with natural love. Let us, therefore, suppose that such loves are equal. Whatever, then, is greater than one is greater than the other. For there is necessarily the same proportion of every two equals to any third, as you learned elsewhere. Since, therefore, every love of grace and of mercy and every virtue of grace is greater than natural love, it will be greater than the other love equal to it, namely, the natural love by which a man of pleasure loves his body. Hence, it will also be greater than every love less than it is. But love for any bodily pleasure is less than it is. This, however, will become more evident if we call the first love “A,” that is, the love by which a holy man loves the good of grace or the good of glory. But let us call the second love “B,” that is, the love by which he naturally loves his own body. And let us call “C” the third love by which the man of pleasure loves his own body. Let us call “D” the fourth love by which he loves pleasure. Because, therefore, it was explained that A is greater than B, but B and C are equal, it follows that A is greater than C. Hence, it follows that it is greater than D, since D is less than C. And the reason is that no one is so insane a lover of pleasure that he does not love his own body more than any bodily pleasure. In the same way it is shown with regard to the love of money that it is less than any love of grace, because it is less than the love of anyone for his own body. For no one is so great a lover of money that his love for money is not less than for his own body. There is no one, after all, who would not prefer to lack 454  William’s On Matrimony (De matrimonio) is part of his On the Sacraments (De sacramentis).

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all money than his own body and who would not throw away all money to redeem his body. Hence, there is no one so insane as not to prefer his own body to all money. It is evident, therefore, that the love of a person, however greedy or covetous, for his own body is greater than for any amount of money. Because, therefore, every love of grace is greater than every love of anyone for his own body, as we have explained, every love of grace is greater than every [186a] love of nature and thus greater than all greed or covetousness, since every greed or covetousness is less than every love of nature for the life of one’s own body or for the body. It is the same way with the love for power, dignities, honors, vain praises, and empty glories. There is no one who would not prefer his own body and life to all these. For even if men given to such vanities suffer many things, many labors and pains in their own bodies for those vanities, still none of them is so foolish that he wants to die or to lose his body for all of them. In fact, he would rather do just the opposite. Nor does it pose an objection, as some can suppose, namely, that some, as they say, hate insults more than death and that they say they prefer to die rather than to live in shame and opprobrium. For it does not follow that, if they hate insults more than death, they love honor more than life. The statement of Seneca is true that injuries go deeper than good 455 deeds. Nor do we believe that it is true, no matter how much it is affirmed by some people, namely, that they hate insults more than death. For if death and insults were striking them equally, if they were equally near and threatening equally, we believe that they would certainly say and think something else and avoid death rather than insults, if the choice were open for them. For life is at times neglected, and we do not perceive how much we love it until death knocks through illness or another injury. For we do not know how tenaciously we cling to life until death tugs at us through illness, and we fear to be torn, as it were, from it. But one rightly asks about the unbelief and madness of heretics who are seen to love their errors so stubbornly and inseparably that they prefer them to their own life and bodies and—what is a sign of greater insanity—they at times 456 seem to accept the death of their bodies with great joy. But we already replied 457 to you about this in the treatise, On Faith. Here, however, we will say to you that the actions of heretics that stem from their heresy should be considered the actions of demoniacs and of the possessed and nothing else, nor should they be judged otherwise. For by no sin is someone so given into the power of the devil or is so made subject to him as by the sin of heresy. That sin, after all, is what tears out the life of grace by its roots and totally extinguishes it. For just 455  See Seneca, Moral Letters (Epistulae morales) 10.81.7 and 23. 456  The more radical Manichees of Augustine’s day, the Circumcellions, were known for their self-destruction. See Augustine, On Heresies (De haeresibus) 69.4; PL 42: 43. 457  See William’s On Faith (De fide), ch. 3, fol. 17a–17b.

270 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues as the possessed and demoniacs do not do what they do out of love, but under the impulse of madness and the instigation of the evil spirit, so heretics do too. And just as in the heart of someone possessed, any shadow and image, however small and tenuous, still arouses vehement and very strong corporeal motions in the body and through it, so the fantasy of heretical vanity existing in the heretical heart produces great effects in the body and through it, although it is itself small. But in such persons who have been subverted and seized in mind, nature, which has been placed in the power, not of its own nature, but in that of another, cannot care even for itself. Just as a madman’s actions do not come from virtue or magnificence, but from an alien power and disturbance, so does what heretics do. But what they seem to do with gravity and maturity comes from the depth and cunning of Satan who tries to cover over with exterior gravity the interior madness, as occasionally also happens in many melancholy people. The delights of the virtues are greater than the delights of the vices. But concerning the delights and pains that are in accord with the virtues, it is easy to show that they are greater than the delights and pains of the vices, with what we said always borne in mind, namely, that in the vices and in accord with them there is no genuine delight. The explanation of this follows. For [186b] in accord with the definition of the philosophers, delight is the union of the suitable with 458 the suitable. But nothing is naturally more unsuitable to and more discrepant with the nature of souls than the vices and vicious things are. In fact, they are the only things that injure and corrupt human souls. Hence, it is impossible that there be genuine delight for our souls in the vices or in accord with them. But another definition of delight is the following. Delight is the apprehension of a thing natural to the apprehending power. But “natural” can be suitably understood here in no intention except in this way, namely, naturally suitable to the apprehending power. Since, then, every vice is naturally unsuitable to every power of ours and most discrepant from it, it is evident that there cannot be genuine delight in it or in accord with it. Moreover, since every vice is an insanity, making the human mind deranged, and since deranged and insane persons do not have a genuine delight, but rather an imagined one, it is evident that the vicious do not have genuine delight, as we read in Wisdom, chapter seven: I am indeed myself mortal, and so on, from the seed of a man and the pleasure of sleep concurring (Wis 7:1.2). Moreover, sound eyes are to be believed about colors and sound palates about tastes, and so on with the other senses. But no one doubts that holy men see better and taste or savor things better in their heart than those who are corrupt and have become rotten with corruptible delights of the senses or the flesh. For one must stand by judgment of holy men about such things. Because, then, they judge delights of the senses or of the flesh to be deadly abominations and 458  See Avicenna, Metaphysics 8.7; ed. Van Riet, p. 432.

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not delights, they should in no sense be considered delights, but rather deadly abominations. Moreover, those who have perished and drowned and were killed in them are not to be asked about shipwrecks and other perils, but those who have escaped from them. Nor are those who are dreaming to be asked about their dreams, but those who are awake. For “it is the mark of someone awake to recount a 459 dream,” as Seneca says. Because, therefore, those given to such delights are as if immersed in and endangered by the waves of concupiscence and are as if asleep and dreaming in them, they are not to be asked about them as long as they are that way, nor are they to be believed. But the repentant are to be believed about such things like those who have escaped from shipwreck and like those who have awaken from such dozing, sleep, and dreams. But all these testify in their confessions that they were as if swallowed by the Sirens of their pleasures and mocked by the phantasms of their dreams. Hence, they are undoubtedly dreams and delusions, not genuine delights. Moreover, past delights taste bitter and abominable to the repentant, as is seen from his testimony and the confirmation from groans, sobs, sighs, wailing, weeping, and many other such things, and the outpouring of bitter tears. But who doubts that a man is of better judgment when he repents than when he does the actions over which he needs to repent? Hence, in this matter we should stand by the judgment of the repentant and not by that of the sinners. Those delights, therefore, and the sort of delights that are such in the judgment of the repentant are true and should be considered such. Therefore, these delights are abominable in accord with the truth and should be considered bitter and abominable. Moreover, what is such by nature is more such. Because, then, the virtues are by nature delightful, but the vices come from the unsoundness and error of nature, it is evident that the virtues are more delightful than the vices, at least if there is room for comparison between the virtues and the vices. Moreover, are not all delightful things delightful in accord with the greatness of the loves that are in them and in accord with the greatness of their goodness and suitability to those whom they delight? Because, therefore, there is no comparison or proportion [187a] of the loves that are either virtues or in accord with the virtues of the graces to the loves that are vices or are in accord with the vices, nor of goods to goods, nor of the suitability of the virtues and their goods—I mean their suitability for our souls—there is, therefore, no comparison of the delights that are in accord with the virtues to the delights that are in accord with the vices. And this is what Blessed Augustine says: God 460 forbid that there be as much delight in the vices as in the virtues. But that 459  Seneca, Moral Letters (Epistulae morales) 6.53.7. 460  See Augustine, Sermons (Sermones) 52.3.3; PL 38: 254 for a similar idea.

272 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues the delights of the virtues are greater than natural delights is evident from the fact that they are closer to the delights of glory, which are the greatest. For what is closer to the greatest is necessarily greater. And this is what we read in the Psalm: How sweet to my mouth are your words, more than honey for my lips (Ps 118:103). And again it says: More desirable than gold and many precious stones and sweeter than honey (Ps 18:11). But if someone says that what is such by nature is more such and that for this reason natural things are more delightful and thus natural delights are greater than the delights of the virtues and grace, we reply that the virtues are delightful by nature—I mean by their nature and ours, which was made for them and created on account of them, as we showed 461 above from the testimony of Cicero. But if someone asks how natural delights, that is, the delights of natural temporal goods and also of the vices, seize, grasp, and captivate human minds by their sweetness, while the delights of the virtues and graces do not do so and in fact seem to be almost insensible, for they are perceived by very few and also only slightly, we reply that the two sorts of delights are not perceived in accord with their magnitude, but in accord with the disposition of our souls, that is, in accord with a lesser or greater corruption of the palate of the heart. For certain persons taste sensible savors more clearly; others taste them less clearly. It is not necessary, therefore, that, if the savors are greater, they are perceived more by certain people, just as it is not necessary with regard to a greater fire or heat that it is felt more by each person. For some people are more sensitive to such matters than others, and for this reason some persons are scarcely warmed on account of that by which others are burned or set ablaze.

Chapter Twenty-Two He begins to explain the connection and bond of the virtues by which they are held together so that it is necessary that whoever has a single one also has the others. But this must be understood concerning genuine virtues.

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fter this we will speak about the connection and union of the virtues, that is, about their inseparable concomitance, on account of which it is appropriately said by the philosophers and sacred teachers that someone 462 who has one also has them all. Know, therefore, that the explanation of such a statement is multiple, and the very nature of the virtues, which are in themselves universal, that is, having complete goodness, not in a certain respect nor in particular, produces the first explanation. For we intend this only concerning 461  See above, note 303 and Cicero, Tusculan Disputations (Tusculanae disputationes) 2.11. 462  Augustine, Letters (Epistolae) 167.2.4ff. (in PL 22, Letter (Epistola) 137; PL 22: 1144). Augustine attributes the statement to the philosophers, probably the Stoics.

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genuine virtues. This is the universality by which they direct, perfect, and illumine the human mind totally, that is, in all things and through all things, in no way tolerating their opposite. For example, it is not genuine chastity that does not totally purify the human mind, that does not exclude its contraries, that is, fornication, adultery, and whatever else there is. For who calls someone chaste without qualification and in the proper sense who fornicates with just one person? This is to call whole a broken vessel that has one big crack and to call a person sound who has one wound, which is, nonetheless, lethal or deadly. In the same way it is to call someone clean [187b] who immerses himself or rolls around only in one sewer and to call someone cold who is aflame with only one fire and to call a person uninjured who is pierced by only one sword. It is likewise to say that someone 463 is not dead who has died only one death. It is evident, then, that a person who is defiled by any lust is not chaste. Moreover, just as carnal delights are harmful, so certain spiritual delights are also harmful and deadly, such as to delight in wicked children, in the multitude of subjects, as we read in Ecclesiasticus, chapter sixteen: Do not rejoice in wicked children if they become many, and do not take delight in them (Sir 16:1). Similarly, to take delight in riches and honors is generally deadly. Likewise, no one doubts that it is evil to take delight in the misfortune of another. It is evident, therefore, that both carnal and spiritual delights are deadly and corrupt the chastity of the mind and that there need be but one chastity against all fornication, both spiritual and carnal. For fornication and adultery are not spoken of equivocally in two senses. After all, regarding spiritual marriage, which is contracted between the King of kings and each faithful soul, it makes no difference by which adultery it is violated. It makes no difference which adulterer’s embraces are preferred to the embraces of that spouse. For that was said without qualification and univocally in Jeremiah, chapter three: But you fornicated with many lovers ( Jer 3:1). For to whatever thing one transfers the love owed to the creator alone, in whatever other thing he places his delights, which he ought to have in the creator alone, he fornicates or commits adultery with it, in a spiritual way if that thing is spiritual, in a bodily way if it is bodily. Moreover, if it is necessary that there be two kinds of chastity, one bodily, the other spiritual, it is likewise necessary that there be two kinds of justice, that is, one spiritual and the other bodily or temporal. Hence, it is necessary that there be two kinds of faith, that is, one concerning temporal or bodily things, the other concerning spiritual things, and so on with the others. Moreover, in accord with this, that will be justice without qualification and truly, by which nothing will be truly just. For it is possible that someone be just in temporal things, possessing them, handling them, and judging about them 463  I have added the negative to retain the parallel with the rest of the sentence.

274 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues without injury to another, and still be unjust, injurious, and unjustly judging in spiritual things. The former man, then, will have temporal justice, so to speak, but will not be just truly and properly just or just without qualification because of it, and the reason is that such a just man is unjust and injurious in spiritual things. Because of his temporal justice, then, nothing will be just, because neither the man himself nor his soul nor anything else will be. It is evident, therefore, from all these considerations that justice and chastity is each absolutely one universal virtue concerning both temporal or bodily things and concerning spiritual things. And it is this way with all the others. For if the matter with which they are concerned diversified the virtues by its diversity or multiplicity, none of them would be one in number or species, since any matter of the virtues, I mean the matter with which they are concerned apart from God alone, is multiple, as is apparent to individuals who consider the individual virtues. The nature of the virtues has, therefore, been explained to you, and by it the inseparable concomitance of them will be easily explained to you. For if he is just who is in no way injurious to anyone, repaying or rendering his whole debt to each person, it is necessary that he who is just have all the virtues, and this is so because such a person fulfills the whole law of God and carries out the individual commandments of the virtues. Hence, he also renders to God due faith, due fear, due honor, due love, and whatever else he owes him or human beings, and he likewise renders due chastity, due fortitude, and the works and actions of all the other virtues. Moreover, since he [188a] owes God purity and cleanliness and renders to God everything that is his, it is necessary that neither avarice nor dissoluteness nor any of the other vices pollute him. Hence, he necessarily keeps himself free and clean of every vice and likewise keeps himself adorned with every virtue, to the extent he can. Hence, he who has genuine justice necessarily has all the other virtues. That can also be explained indirectly. For if it is possible that someone have any of the vices along with such justice, then, given that, nothing impossible will occur. Suppose, therefore, that he has dissoluteness. Because it is a commandment of God to avoid dissoluteness, and obedience is owed to God in all things and through all things, since he does not obey in this matter, he is disobedient to God and unjust toward him. Hence, he is just and unjust at the same time. But this is impossible. That, therefore, given which, this happens is impossible. But this is that previous supposition, namely, that he has some dissoluteness along with justice. And in the same way it is possible to reason concerning each of the other vices. In the same way it is possible to show that a person is not prudent without qualification, who is imprudent in some respect. But who can more correctly be judged imprudent in some respect than anyone who is deceived by the deceptiveness of the vices? But whoever sins mortally is most shamefully deceived and suffers an infinite fraud in the cheapest goods,

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as is found in Proverbs, chapter six: The price of a harlot is scarcely one loaf, but the woman snatches the precious soul of a man (Prv 6:26). And it is this way with the other sins and vices. 464 Similarly, someone cannot be said truly and unqualifiedly strong, who in some part of himself is either feeble, wounded, or dead. But such a person is one who labors under any of the vices. He is not, therefore, unqualifiedly and truly strong, who is feeble because of the weakness of any vice. In this way it is possible to show the same thing concerning charity or friendship with God. For he is not unqualifiedly and truly a friend, who is an enemy in some respect. But he who hates even the least of his children is expressly an enemy of God because he is a murderer, as John says in chapter three of his first canonical letter: Everyone who hates his brother is a murderer (1 Jn 3:15). And in James, chapter four, it says: If anyone wants to be a friend of this world, he becomes an enemy of God ( Jas 4:4). In the same way it is possible to show this concerning temperance because it is impossible that someone be unqualifiedly controlled or temperate and uncontrolled or intemperate in some respect, just as it is impossible for someone to be unqualifiedly cold or tepid and burning in some respect, and it is likewise impossible that someone be unqualifiedly diminished, or have less in one respect, and be excessive in some respect. This is no less evident in general. For example, if we said: It is impossible that someone be unqualifiedly virtuous and in some respect vicious or to be unqualifiedly vicious and good in some respect, just as it is impossible for someone to be unqualifiedly white and in some part black. With any genuine goodness, therefore, it is impossible that there exist any evil. Because goodness and evil, virtue and vice, are therefore, direct contraries in the case of any adult, it is necessary, if any virtue exists in any adult, both that no vice exists along with it and that all the virtues exist along with it in the same person. The second explanation is through the justice of God, which rewards every genuine virtue with eternal happiness and by which the glory befitting it and corresponding to it is given to every virtue and grace, as we will teach in the last 465 part of this treatise. It is, therefore, impossible that future glory and damnation be given to anyone at the same time, but this would happen if such virtue and any vice were present in the same person at the same time, and yet it is impossible that a person die in both of these states. Hence, that from which this follows is necessarily impossible. It is, therefore, impossible that a genuine virtue and any vice be present at the same time in the same person. Moreover, just as grace that makes one pleasing [188b] is related to eternal reward, so mortal sin is related to the contrary damnation, because, as those 464  I have corrected “to live, vivere” to “truly, vere.” 465  That is, in The Rewards of the Saints (De retributionibus sanctorum).

276 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues have their deserts in their way, so these will in turn have theirs. Just as, therefore, eternal reward is related to eternal damnation, so such grace is related to such sin. Hence, just as the former, that is, eternal reward and eternal damnation, cannot be present at the same time in the same person, either partially or totally, so the latter cannot. Moreover, the effects of the graces or the virtues of the way are inseparable and necessarily accompany one another so that where there is one, there are all. For wherever there is one virtue of glory, there are all as well. Hence, the inseparable virtues of the way will necessarily be united by a similar concomitance. Thus, in whomever there is one, all are necessarily present. But notice that the proofs which we introduce here are founded upon this root, which all the teachers accept, namely, that any of such virtues renders a person worthy of eternal life and that eternal life is owed by the justice of God to any work proceeding from any such virtue, I mean, by a voluntary act. And we will speak about this in the treatise, On Merits and Rewards.

Chapter Twenty-Three He subtly discusses whether virtues can increase and decrease in intension.

A

fter this we will say a few things concerning intension and remission, where we must first ask whether virtue can become intense and remiss or can only become intense and cannot become remiss, or whether it can become both equally. And it seems, first of all, that it cannot in any way become intense, just as it cannot be increased or diminished, since the virtues are indivisible into parts. For something indivisible that remains indivisible remains the least and in the ultimate degree of smallness. It does not recede from the smallness in which it was, and for this reason it does not increase, but it cannot grow smaller since there is no smallness beyond smallness of the ultimate degree. Moreover, in the essence of any virtue there is no addition since it is indivisible, nor is there a purification of it from its contrary since there is no subtraction from it. For if a subtraction were produced in it, it would be possible to find parts in it, because it would be possible to find in it what was subtracted and what remained. Hence, it would necessarily be divisible, but this is impossible since its subject is indivisible. Moreover, intensity is produced in bodily qualities in terms of purification, and remission is produced by an admixture of the opposite, and that has no place in the virtues. This, then, is the manner of intensities and remissions in them. Moreover, intensity is a drawing near to a thing in terms of its genuine 466 name, as Aristotle says in the book, On Six Principles. Which, then, will be 466  See Gilbert de la Porrée, On Six Principles (De sex principiis); PL 188: 1268.

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the genuine virtues, those that pertain to the way or those that pertain to the fatherland? It seems impossible that either of them are. For all genuine whitenesses are equal, because genuine whiteness is pure whiteness, and such a white thing is white with whiteness in the ultimate degree. But all white things in the ultimate degree are equally white, and their whitenesses are equally white. If virtues of the way or virtues of the fatherland are genuine virtues, it is necessary that they be equal. But this is impossible. For if it were the case, either all souls that are here would be equally good or those that are in the fatherland would be equally good, since the virtues of the way are either individual goodnesses or, if they are taken all together, there is one goodness by which the soul in which they are is good. And similarly, the virtues of the fatherland are individual beatitudes or all that are in one subject, taken together, are one beatitude that beatifies that subject. On this we reply that intension in the virtues is a distancing from the opposite. Hence, those in the ultimate degree of distancing from the vices are in the ultimate degree of intension, that is, are most intense or most in terms of intension. [189a] Similarly, intension in the virtues is a drawing near to the first and greatest virtue, which is God, and intension in justice is a drawing close to the justice, which is God, and piety to the piety, which is God, and charity to the charity, which is God, and so on with the others, which is clearly explained from this. For those things that make one more like God are greater or more intense, and those that make one equally like God are equal or equally intense. And for this reason John say in chapter three of his canonical letter: We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him (1 Jn 3:2), which is said by antono467 masia. For we will be most like him when our virtues are the greatest, that is, in the ultimate degree of their perfection, which will be in the fatherland. For the glorification of our souls will be nothing else, as we shall teach in the following, than that assimilation to God. If someone asks in what or as what this intensity will be known and measured, we reply that, with other circumstances remaining equal, distancing from the vices is known from such motions, as we will name. For example, someone who hates is more horrified at and abominates them more in his heart by which he feels them less, when he is struck from the outside and is similarly disposed. We say this because an unlikeness of dispositions and diversities either helps or hinders the motions we mentioned. For example, someone is horrified at a vice, which he had not previously known or heard about, as at a monster, not so much because of its greatness as because of its novelty and detests it as wicked far more than many who are more just and more holy than he is. And a holy man feels more and feels a scoffing at dissoluteness as greater than someone less holy and just, and this is either on account of food and drink or on account 467  Antonomasia is a figure of rhetoric by which something is named after its archetype .

278 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues of the multiplication of the matter from which dissoluteness comes, while the other feels it less on account of fasting or some other affliction or occupation or something else of the sort. And for this reason those virtues are equal, which equally move by equal motions their subjects that are equally disposed and equally move them to undertake equal tasks, that is, ones of equal difficulty, as such motions are lessened or intensified or become remiss for equal almsgiving, equal fasts, and equal labors. They are helped or also hindered by good or bad dispositions of their subjects, as the motion of audacity is impeded by natural pusillanimity and the motion of magnificence is too, and similarly various others. Likewise, the motion of zeal is helped and intensified from a natural inclination to anger and also from a choleric disposition, and for this reason it does not follow that, if someone is moved more, he is moved more because of a greater virtue. In the same way that burns more or is hotter, which burns or is hotter from greater heat, or that is less hot which is hot from less heat, as happens in iron and dry wood. As a result, such wood would burn and iron would be scarcely be heated, and as a result, a pebble is thrown a long distance, but a great rock is scarcely moved. But it is impossible that such virtues be diminished or lessened. For they are totally extinguished by mortal sins, but if they were lessened by venial sins, eternal rewards would also be, and in that way something would be subtracted from them. But subtraction from the eternal reward is eternal punishment because it involves an eternal loss and the removal of an eternal good, namely, a part of that eternal reward, and in that way venial sin would be punished by an eternal punishment. Moreover, according to this view, such a virtue could be consumed by venial sins alone. For if it were lessened by such an amount by one venial sin, then, by two equal venial sins twice that amount would be subtracted from it. Since, therefore, there are not infinite merits in it or such great parts of infinite merit, it would be consumed, therefore, by infinite venial sins. Suppose, then, that he dies in those venial sins without any mortal sin, he will not be damned with eternal damnation since he does not have a mortal sin, nor will he be rewarded with eternal life since virtue would be extinguished [189b] in him. Let it suffice for you that a path has been opened for you to explain that virtues cannot become less and that this is not because of their strength or the impossibility of their essences, but because of the truth and equity of divine justice that does not permit that eternal punishment be inflicted for a venial sin, just as Adam was immortal before sin and therefore unable to be wounded and injured in this way, that is, by the protection of divine justice, but not by a natural inability to suffer. For if someone wanted to kill Adam before the sin by sword, spear, or fire, divine justice would not permit this, which does not permit punishment to precede sin, but rather orders punishment after sin. Adam, therefore, would not have a natural inability to suffer by a sword or fire in that

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state, which he in fact did not have, but the order of divine justice that, as we said, did not permit the punishment to precede the sin. For just as sin was the cause of death and, if sin did not precede, death would not be inflicted, so it is the cause of the whole present penal condition. Therefore, you see that it is not the same way with virtues as with numbers. For the fact that a number cannot be increased or decreased causes the determinateness of its essence. On account of that determinateness it would be essentially diversified by any addition or subtraction, and that which is left after a subtraction is another number than that which was there first. Likewise, that which is constituted by addition is a number other than that which was there first,. For the number “three” is specifically other than that which is left after the subtraction of unity from it, that is, than the number “ two.” It is other than that which is increased from the joining of unity with it, that is, than the number “four.” Hence, if virtue existed in this way with a determinate essence, it would not be decreased or increased nor become more or less intense. But it is evident that it becomes more intense. That it is not decreased, therefore, comes from the protection of divine justice, not from the determination of its essence, as we said. But we shall add another explanation for you on this. For suppose that someone dies with only one venial sin that diminishes something of that grace in a hundredth part of it. It cannot be doubted that venial sins will be expiated in purgatory and not before, because he who committed it died with it, but it will not be forgiven before it is expiated or full penance is done for it. Hence, it will only be forgiven in purgatory. We ask then whether the grace that had been lessened in him through the venial sin returned to its previous quantity or intension or not. If it does, he will rise better than he died, and he will be presented in judgment better than he left this life. Otherwise, that grace would increase uselessly, and he would not be going to be rewarded in accord with its magnitude or intension. Moreover, according to this view there will be room for meriting in purgatory. For since greater glory would be owing to him for the state of purgatory than for the state in which he died, the reward and therefore the merit would be increased. And in that way he acquires new merit in purgatory, that is, the merited part that is restored to him. But if the grace previously removed by the venial sin is not restored when such a sin is expiated, then he is punished twice for the same sin because he is punished both by the removal or diminishment of grace and by the punishment paid in purgatory. Moreover, according to this view, someone who sinned venially would merit more in purgatory, and the reason is that, if A sinned one hundred times more than B, his goodness would be diminished here one hundred times more and for this reason one hundred times more would be restored to him in purgatory. But the restoration there is not full unless there is an increase of merit

280 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues and there is also merit there. Hence, if someone sins here venially and departs here in the state of grace, grace would be made greater for him in purgatory by so much, and his merit would be increased more, and in that way one would derive an advantage from his evil, and a great advantage from greater evil. Moreover, that punishment inflicted in purgatory is either sufficient to expiate that venial sin [190a] for which it was inflicted, or it is not. If it is, he is unjustly dealt with if another punishment is inflicted upon him for it. Hence, no other punishment is inflicted for that same sin. Hence, a diminishment of grace is not inflicted on him. But if it is not sufficient to expiate that sin, it cannot be denied that it expiates it in part. For if it does not expiate it in part, it would be inflicted uselessly and to no purpose. But if it expiates it in part, it is evident that the sin can be totally expiated for some part of the punishment of purgatory. But the diminishment of grace and glory is a greater punishment than however great a punishment of purgatory, and no one is in purgatory who would not prefer to endure any punishment of purgatory rather than those two. Nor does grace or some part of it have an assessment of its true value, and for much better reason glory does not. But the punishment of purgatory is finite in all ways. Therefore, he is punished by an infinitely greater punishment when he is punished by the removal and diminution of grace and glory at the same time than he would be punished only by a punishment that sufficiently expiates that sin. But that is the punishment of purgatory, as we said. Moreover, if a venial sin diminished such grace, another equal sin will diminish and weaken it more than that one when it finds it already diminished and weakened. Hence, an equal sin will finally find it so diminished and weakened from such venial sins that it completely extinguishes it, as happens in a sick person, whose strength is diminished through equal increases of fever because one of them will find his strength so diminished and weak that it will completely extinguish it. It is similar with equal sprinkles of water on a fire because the last sprinkle that finds it diminished and weakened by the previous equal sprinkles will completely extinguish it, although it was no greater than one of the previous sprinkles. Moreover, nothing is able to diminish something by its power, which is not able to consume the whole if its power grows strong and increases against it. Hence, if venial sin is able by its power to diminish however much from the graces or virtues, it will be able gradually to consume it if the power of sin is multiplied. But its power is multiplied by the addition of other venial sins as if it were increased in itself. Hence, by venial sins or by one such sin continuously growing in itself, one of the powers of the graces will be totally consumed. Moreover, either there is some comparison or proportion of mortal to venial sin, or mortal sin is infinitely greater. But if there is some comparison, for exam-

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ple, that mortal sin is a hundred or a thousand times greater, some number of venial sins will equal one mortal sin. For if it is a hundred times greater, a hundred equal venial sins will equal it. If it is a thousand times greater, a thousand will equal it. From this two problems arise. The first is that, as any of the virtues of grace is totally extinguished by a mortal sin, so any are extinguished by a hundred or a thousand venial sins, and as one of such virtues cannot exist along with a mortal sin, so it cannot exist with a hundred or a thousand venial sins, which taken together are equal to one mortal sin. For if the evil of one sin can extinguish either by its power or by its contrariety any power of grace or does not allow it to exist along with itself, it is necessary that the equal evil of many venial sins do the same thing. The second is that whatever proportion of sin to sin there is, it is necessary that there be the same proportion of punishment to punishment. There will, therefore, of necessity be a proportion of the punishment due to mortal sin to the punishment due to a venial sin. Because, then, the punishment of hell is owed for any mortal sin, but not for a venial sin, rather either temporal punishment or the punishment of purgatory is alone due to it, hence, there will be a proportion of the punishment of hell to any other. But this is clearly impossible, [190b] since the punishment of hell is infinite in duration, whatever might be the case regarding its bitterness. But every other punishment is finite in duration and at least not greater than that of hell in bitterness and thus either less or equal in bitterness; hence, it is infinitely less without qualification. For all punishments, one of which is infinite in duration, but the other finite, if they are equal in bitterness or at least proportionate, the one that is infinite in duration is infinitely greater than the other. And we have 469 already explained that in the fifth treatise and in that part of it in which we showed that perpetual or infinite punishment is owed for any mortal sin and from divine justice. It has, therefore, been explained to you that there is no proportion of mortal to venial sin in guilt or in evil. Hence, there is no proportion of effect to effect, that is, of the harm and injury of mortal sin to the harm and injury that venial sin causes, nor of the injury that venial sin causes to the injury that mortal sin causes. Therefore, the injury to grace that mortal sin causes is incomparably greater than the injury that venial sin causes to it. There is, therefore, no comparison of the diminution or removal of grace that is caused by mortal sin to that which is caused by venial sin, but a removal of the totality of grace is produced by mortal sin. There is, therefore, no comparison of the totality of grace, which is totally removed or consumed by mortal sin to that of it which is consumed by venial sin. Hence, that which is removed from grace by venial sin is not a part of grace, since there is a proportion of the totality of grace to 468  I have conjectured “some number, aliquot” instead of “something, aliquod.” 469  William perhaps refers to the fifth part of On the Virtues and Vices.

282 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues each part of it. But if a part is not removed, it does not diminish the whole. It is, therefore, impossible that any virtue of grace that makes one pleasing to God be lessened by venial sin. But if someone says that it is not necessary that, if a part is removed, something else proportional to the whole is taken away on account of this, because it is not necessary that every part be proportional to its whole, as is clearly seen in the angle of contingency, which is of course a part of a right angle, and still does not stand in some proportion to it. For it is otherwise with the virtues. For the virtues are not increased by except by a comparable and proportional increase 470 which is added to them or which is increased, and the reason is that what is added to a virtue is always of the same most specific species with it, and it is also the same way with it if something is taken away. But the angle of contingency is not of the same species with a right angle nor of the same genus. But of necessity all magnitudes of the same species are necessarily comparable, and we say this here. In the fatherland it may be otherwise. For the love of Christ the man is undoubtedly comparable to no other and is perhaps of another species, on which we state nothing here for certain. But we shall speak about the comparisons of the virtues of the way to those that belong to the fatherland in the last part of this treatise. Here, then, we shall make an end of the first part of On Virtues and Morals, concerning which we have not written many things on account of a lack of skill, on account of other occupations, on account of laziness, out of fear of prolixity, and because of sins that most of all impede us and others in such matters. Still we do not doubt that we are exposed to the bites of detractors and that we will be accused of curiosity and prolixity by certain others in this area, who since they either read, or hear, or know little about the virtues and morals, suspect that there are no other things to be inquired into concerning the virtues and morals. Or, as Aristotle says, as unskilled, they look upon such great and such sublime matters from afar, not noticing how pious and how salutary is curiosity in such matters nor how much time they themselves incessantly spend out of 471 the vainest curiosity on useless things and ones barren of piety. Doing, therefore, what we can, we have given some opportunity [191a] to the wise, and we have set forth for the exercises of mind not a dry arena of fruitless questions and disputations, but a highly useful and salutary gymnasium for conquering errors and for snatching the truth from their midst with noble triumphs.

470  I have conjectured “to them, eis” instead of “to it, ei.” 471  I have not found this reference.

A Select Bibliography Primary Sources and Translations

William, of Auvergne. Opera Omnia. 2 volumes. Edited by F. Hotot, with Supplementum. Edited by Blaise Le Feron. Orléans-Paris, 1674; repr. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1963. ——— De trinitate. An Edition of the Latin Text with an Introduction by Bruno Switalski. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1976. ———. The Trinity, or the First Principle. Translated by Roland J. Teske, S.J. and Francis C. Wade, S.J.; introduction and notes by Roland J. Teske, S.J. Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 28. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1989. ———. De Universo. Nuremberg: Georg Stuchs, 1496. Contains the first and second parts of the first principal part. ———. The Universe of Creatures. Selections Translated from the Latin with an Introduction and Notes by Roland J. Teske, S.J. Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 35. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1998. ———. “Tractatus Magistri Guilielmi Alvernensis de bono et malo.” Edited by J. Reginald O’Donnell. Mediaeval Studies 8 (1946): 245–299. ———. “Tractatus Secundus Guillielmi Alvernensis de bono et malo.” Edited by J. Reginald O’Donnell. Mediaeval Studies 16 (1954): 219–271. ———. De immortalitate animae. Edited by Georg Bülow. In Des Domininicus Gundissalinus Schrift von der Unsterblichkeit der Seele nebst einem Anhange, enthaltend die Abhandlung des Wilhelm von Paris (Auvergne) “De immortalitate animae.” In Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, II, 3. Münster: Aschendorff, 1897. ———. The Immortality of the Soul. Translated by Roland J. Teske, S.J., with an Introduction and Notes. Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 30. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1991. ———. The Soul. Translated by Roland J. Teske, S.J., with an Introduction and Notes. Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translations 37. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2000. ——— . Guillaume d’Avergne: De L’Âme (VII, 1–9). Introduction, traduction et notes par J.-B. Brenet. Paris: J. Vrin, 1998. ———. Il “Tractatus de Gratia” di Gugliemo d’Auvergne. Edited by Guglielmo Corti. Rome: Lateran University, 1966. ———. On the Providence of God. Part Three of the First Principle Part of the Universe of Creatures. Translated by Roland J. Teske, S.J., with an Introduction and Notes. Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 43. Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2007.

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Ancient and Medieval Works Cited

Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights (Noctes Atticae). Edited by Martini Hertz. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1886. Anonymous, La chanson de Roland. Edited with translation and commentary by Léon Gautier. Tours: Alfred Mame et Fils, 1887. ———. Proverbs of Seneca (Proverbia Senecae). In Catonis disticha de moribus, etc. London: Charles Hoole, 1670. ———. Pseudo-Athanasian Creed, “Quicumque,” Demziger-Schönmetzer 75. ———. Soliloquies of the Soul to God (Soliloquia animae ad Deum) 14. PL 40: 863–898. Apuleius, On the God of Socrates (De deo Socratis). Aristotle, Categories, Metaphysics, Nicomachean Ethics, On the Soul, Physics, Sophistical Refutations, and Topics. In The Basic Works of Aristotle. Edited by Richard McKeon. New York: Random House, 1941. ———. Aristoteles Latinus: Ethica Nicomachea. Translatio antiquissima. Edited by R. A. Gauthier. Leiden: E. J Brill, 1972. Augustine, On the Happy Life (De beata vita). PL 32:959–976. ———. Confessions (Confessionum libri tredecim). PL 32: 659–868. ———. On Free Choice (De libero arbitrio). PL 32: 1221–1310. ———. Homilies on the Psalms (Enarrationes in Psalmos). PL 36: 68–37: 1866.

———. Revisions (Retractationes). PL 32: 583–656. ———. On the Trinity (De trinitate). PL 42: 817–1098. Avicenna. Metaphysics (Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina). 2 volumes. Edited by S. Van Riet, introduction by G. Verbeke. Louvain : E. Peeters, 1977.

———. On the Soul (Liber de anima sue sextus de naturalibus). Edited by S. Van Riet Louvain: E. Peeters; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972.

Aquinas, Thomas. Summa theologiae. 4 volumes. Ottawa: Institute of Medieval Studies, 1941. Bede, Venerable. Philosophical Sentences or Axioms Gathered from Aristotle and Other Excellent Philosophers (Sententiae, vel axiomata philosophica ex Aristotele et aliis praestantiis collecta). PL 90: 965–1090. Bernard of Clairvaux, Sermon 15: On Seeking Wisdom 5 (Sermo 15: De quaerenda sapientia). PL 183: 577–579.

———. On the Passing of Saint Malachi, Bishop (In transitu S. Malachiae. episcopi) Sermo 2. 3. PL 183: 488–490.

———. The Fifth Sermon on the Feast of All Saints (Sermo V in festo omnium sanctorum) 9. PL 183: 475–482.

Boethius, Anicius Manlius Severinus. On Music (De musica) 5.1; PL 63: 1167–1300.

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———. Oration in Defense of Murena (Oratio pro Murena). Edited by H. Kasten: Leipzig: B. G. ner, 1972.

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———. Tusculan Disputations (Tusculanae disputationes). Edited by M. Pohlenz. Stuttgart: B. G. ner, 1982.

Gilbert de la Porrée, On Six Principles (Liber de sex principiis). PL 188: 1257–1270. Gregory, The Great. Antiphonal (Liber responsalis sive antiphonarius). PL 77: 725–850.

———. Letter to Augustine of the Angles (Epistula ad Augustinum Anglorum). PL 77: 1183–1200.

———. Life of Saint Benedict (Vita sancti Benedicti). PL 66: 125–204. ———. Moral Teachings on Job (Moralia in Job). PL 75: 509–1162. Hugh of Saint Victor. On Five Sevens (De quinque septenis). PL 175: 405–414.

———. On the Sacraments of the Christian Faith (De sacramentis fidei christianae. PL 176: 173–618.

———. The Summa of the Sentences (Summa sententiarum). PL 176: 41–174. Ibn al-Haytham (Avennathan or Alhazen). Alhacen’s theory of visual perception: A critical edition, with English translation and commentary. 2 vols. Edited by A. Mark Smith. Philadelphia : American Philosophical Society, 2001. Isidore of Seville, Three Books of Sentences (Sententiarum libri tres). PL 83: 537–738. Jerome of Bethlehem, An Interpretation of Two Homilies of Origen on the Song of Songs (Interpretatio homiliamum duarum Origenis in Canticum canticorum). PL 23: 1117–1174. Joachim of Flora (Fiore). An Explanation of the Apocalypse (Expositio in Apocalipsim). Venice, 1627; reproduced Frankfurt am Main, 1964.

———. Book on the Harmony of the New and Old Testament (Liber concordiae novi et veteris testamenti). Venice, 1519; reproduced Frankfurt an Main,1964.

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———. Timaeus. Translated into Latin by Calcidius. Edited by J. H. Waszink. London: Warburg Institute and E. J. Brill, 1975.

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Borok, Helmut. Der Tugendbegriff des Wilhelm von Auvergne (1180-1249). Eine moralhistorische Untersuchung zur Ideengeschichtliche Rezeption der aristotelischen Ethik. Düsseldorf: Patmos-Verlag, 1979. Bridges, John Howell. The Philosophy of William of Auvergne with respect to Thirteenth Century Christian Aristotelianism. Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1969 Corti, Guglielmo. “Le sette parti del Magisterium divinale ac sapientiale di Guglielmo di Auvergne.” In Studi et Ricerche di Scienze Religiose in onoro di Santi Apostoli Pietro e Paulo nel xix centenario del loro martirio, 289–307. Rome: Pontificiae Universitatis Lateranensis, 1968. Faes de Mottoni, Barbara.“Gugliemo d’Alvernia et l’anima rapita.” In Autour de Guillaume d’Auvergne († 1249). Edited by Franco Morenzoni and Jean-Yves Tillette. Brepols: Turnhout, 2005. Pp. 45–74, Jüssen, Gabriel. “Wilhelm von Auvergne.” In Contemporary Philosophy. A New Survey. Volume 6. Philosophy and Science in the Middle Ages, Part I, pp. 177–185. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990.

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———. “Wilhelm von Auvergne und die Entwicklung der Philosophie in Übergang

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———.“Wilhelm von Auvergne und die Transformation der scholastischen Philosophie

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———.“Die Tugend und der gute Wille: Wilhelm von Auvergnes Auseinanderstezung mit der aristotelischen Ethik.” Philosophisches Jahrbuch 102 (1995): 20–32.

Klubertanz, George. The Discursive Power: Sources and Doctrine of the Vis Cogitativa according to St. Thomas Aquinas. St. Louis: Modern Schoolman, 1952. Laumakis, John A. “The Voluntarism of William of Auvergne and Some Evidence to the Contrary.” The Modern Schoolman. 76 (1999): 303-312. Miller, Michael. “William of Auvergne and Avicenna’s Principle ‘Natures Operates in the Manner of a Servant.’” In Medieval Philosophy and the Classical Tradition: In Islam, Judaism and Christianity. Edited by John Inglis, 263–276. Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2002. Stump, Eleonore. Boethius’s De topicis differentiis. Translated with notes and essays on the text. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977. Teske, Roland J. “The Will as King over the Powers of the Soul: Uses and Sources of an Image in Thirteenth Century Philosophy,” Vivarium 32 (1994), 62-71.

———. “William of Auvergne on the Various States of our Nature.” Traditio 58 (2003): 201–218.

———. “William of Auvergne and the Manichees.” Traditio 48 (1993): 63–75. ———.“William of Auvergne’s Use of the Avicennian Principle:‘Ex Uno, In Quantum Unum, Non Nisi Unum.’” The Modern Schoolman 71 (1993): 1–15.

———.“William of Auvergne on Freedom of the Will.” In Moral and Political Philosophies

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———. “William of Auvergne’s Debt to Avicenna.” In Avicenna and His Heritage. Acts

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———. “William of Auvergne,” in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed. Jorge J. E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone, 680–687. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2002.

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Index of names

A



Homilies on the Psalms, 64, 133, 166, 197, 209

Adam, 30, 65, 106, 111, 278



Letters, 272

Adam and Eve, 12, 14–15, 17–20, 34, 36–37, 66, 69, 77, 79, 94, 96–97, 102, 113, 119, 130



Marriage and Concupiscence, 214



On Baptism, 148

Alhazen (Avennathan), 176



On Christian Doctrine,106, 190, 234



On Free Choice, 60, 159, 171, 174, 192



On Genesis Literally Interpreted, 84, 113

Aristotle, 5, 13, 15-17, 28, 34, 37, 40, 46, 54-56, 58, 66, 85-86, 90-91, 103, 111, 277, 282



On Heresies, 126, 269



On the Good of Widowhood, 243



Categories, 41, 49, 81



On the Happy Life, 61



Metaphysics, 35, 49, 79, 83-84



On the Morals of the Catholic Church, 21, 134, 195, 252



Nicomachean Ethics, 11-12, 14, 3133, 43, 50, 59, 61, 73, 79-80, 89, 110, 146, 150, 162, 191, 233, 252



On Order, 159, 222



On the Trinity, 86, 94-95, 110



Sermons, 209, 271

Aeneas, 144

Amasius 143 Ambrachius, 117 Apuleius 92



On the Soul, 65, 74, 77, 82, 94, 124, 196



Physics, 39



Posterior Analytics, 82, 97, 102



Topics, 59, 67, 186

Asmodeus, 117 Augustine of Canterbury, 244 Augustine of Hippo, 15, 17, 24-25, 29, 34, 37, 60, 87, 111, 126, 135, 162, 193, 196, 198-199, 230, 236

Avicenna, 14, 35–36, 66, 73, 77, 82, 86, 270

B

Balaam, 88 Barabbas, 153 Bede, Venerable, 103 Benedict, Saint, 130, 202, 212, 264–265



Answer to the Academics, 179

Bernard, Saint, 149, 155, 230, 238–239, 242



City of God, 99, 140

Bezalel and Oholiab, 162



Confessions, 66, 93, 101, 140, 152, 168, 174

Boethius, 13, 31, 56, 177, 223 Borok, H., 12

290 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues

C

Goliath, 166

Cathars, 34

Gregory the Great, 9, 198, 265

Christ, 10, 21, 23, 115, 143, 153–154, 166, 172, 191, 198, 233, 239, 266, 282



Antiphonal, 210



Letter to Augustine of the Angles, 244



Life of Saint Benedict, 130, 212, 265



Moral Teachings on Job, 154, 173, 231, 239, 244



On Penitence, 298

Cicero, 5, 11, 13–14, 26, 31–32, 37, 74, 155

On Duties, 56, 93, 182, 205, 210



On Ends, 202



On Friendship, 246



On Invention, 131, 181



Oration in Defense of Murena, 79, 240

Gregory IX, 9

H

Hebrews, 153, 175, 218, 223, 225

Tusculan Disputations, 42, 63, 79, 92, Hilary of Poitiers, 180 182, 272 Holofernes, 166 Cornates, 179 Hugh of Saint Victor, 84, 132, 149

Corti, G., 10-11, 62 J

D

David, the king, 115-116, 159, 179, 185, 209 Dominicans, 143

E

Eligius of Noyon, 179 Elijah, the prophet, 117, 143 Elisha, the prophet, 189

F

Franciscans, 143

G

Gabriel, 237 Galen, 255 Gilbert de la Porrée, 81, 277

Jerome, Saint, 68 Jethro, 179 Joachim of Flora, 175 Joseph, the patriarch, 141, 151, 240 Judith, 166 Jüssen, G., 11

K

Klubertanz, G., 39 Kramp, J., 10 L Lazarus, 151 Peter Lombard, 25, 192, 196, 198 M Macrobius, 74, 202

Index Manichees, 34–35, 48, 126, 134, 195, 252, 269 Martin of Tours, 180 Maurus, Blessed, 130, 212 Miller, M., 82 Mohamed, 35, 113 Moses, 64, 117, 143, 180, 213, 224

291 Statius, Publius Papinus, 164 Stump, E., 31 T Theon of Alexandria, 115 Tilliette, J.-Y., 12, 31 U

O Origen, 68 Ovid, 111, 120, 149, 166

Ushida, N., 86 V Valois, N., 9

P Pelias, 166 Petrus Blessensis, 139 Petrus Cellensis, 139 Plato, 5, 37, 65–66, 74, 79, 94, 128, 244, 259

Vanneste. A, 19 Vecchio, S., 12, 27 Virgil, 144 W

R

William of Auvergne, 12–18, 20–26, 28, 31, 33. 35-37, 39–40, 42–44, 54, 59, 70, 80, 82, 85, 92, 105, 107, 122, 125, 131–132, 143, 146, 155, 171, 174–177, 180, 189, 195, 198, 222, 232, 236, 268

Raphael, 117



Teaching on God in the Mode of Wisdom (Magisterium), 9-11

S



On Faith, 10, 27, 29, 63, 73, 83, 95, 123, 126, 129, 135, 139, 218, 227, 269



On Faith and the Laws, 9, 73, 96



On the Grace of Christ, 10



On Merits, 9, 58, 161, 191, 258, 276 On Morals, 9, 151

Prometheus, 111 Ptolemy, 115

Satan, 114, 116, 270 Seneca, 74, 92, 202, 216–217, 224, 233, 243, 251

Moral Letters, 100, 173, 215, 234235, 246, 269, 271



On Clemency for Nero, 26, 205





Proverbs of Seneca, 60, 183, 204



On Temptations and Their Resistance, 9, 48, 121, 145, 185, 255



On the Rewards of the Saints, 9, 58, 161, 191, 258, 276

Socrates, 92, 187, 233, 259 Sodom and Gomorrah, 204 Solomon, 167, 186, 188, 234

292 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues

On the Sacraments, 9, 85, 131-132, 169



On the Soul, 9-10, 32, 65-66, 74-75, 77, 81, 111, 124, 159, 196



On the Trinity, 9-10, 103



On the Universe of Creatures, 9-10, 34, 48, 79, 97, 109, 159, 246



On the Virtues, 9-12, 30



On Vices and Sins, 9



On the Virtues and Vices, 9, 30, 58, 121, 145, 162, 191, 281



Why God Became Man, 9-10

Z Zechariah 70, 159

subject Index A

anger, 42, 64, 70, 78–80, 85, 90, 118, 129, 244–245, 253–255, 278 abstract substances, 12, 15, 36, 75, 77, 79, 94, 96, 109, 112 and hatred, 228, 231, 237 action, 13, 25, 36-38, 40, 54, 69, 77, 109, and peace, 184-185 111, 139, 146, 178, 210–211, 214, virtue, 17, 28, 35, 89, 238 216- 217, 230, 232-233, 244, 248, volition, 23, 165 257, 269-271, 274 apprehension, 39–40, 43, 47, 59, 63, and apprehension, 47 124–125, 127, 137–138, 250, 270 and habit, 43-44, 50 appetite, 16, 29, 89, 107, 120 and intention, 52-53, 132-133, 140, armor, 20, 95, 117–118 193, 206

and morals, 73



and passion, 80-81, 144, 184



and rectitude, 194-196



and will, 60, 62, 90, 99, 133



good, 11, 14, 32-34, 42, 44, 53-54, 57, 60, 91, 136, 151



exterior, 17, 45, 90, 131



diversity of, 78, 135-136, 227



frequency of, 12, 15, 34, 39, 42-46, 48, 59, 61, 73-74



single, 13, 144



truth in, 26, 205



virtutous, 43, 61, 200, 207



voluntary, 69, 74-75, 79, 95, 111, 146-148

agent, 14–15, 38–40, 46–47, 66, 72, 198–199, 254

art, 26, 31, 50, 61, 77, 86, 92, 120, 162, 177, 179, 202–203, 288 B benefit, 52–53, 86, 100, 104, 169, 226, 239 beatitude, 6, 22, 24, 29, 79, 112, 147, 161, 190–191, 218, 261, 266, 277 beauty, 23, 80, 94, 103, 106, 155–156, 174, 215, 239, 261, 266

divine, 159-161, 164, 222



of virtue, 15, 31, 47, 65, 68-70, 111, 122

C carnality, 121–122

agility, 15, 36, 69

charity, 18, 25, 107, 142, 144, 152–153, 164, 195, 200–201, 227, 231, 260– 261, 275, 277

amplitude, 21, 142, 183



begins with oneself, 17, 98

angelic substance, 18, 102, 106, 112, 161



for God and neighbor, 23, 158

angels, 15, 28, 35, 108, 112, 117, 119, 139, 143–144, 153, 159–161, 226, 286



gift of God, 148



fruit of the Spirit, 147, 192

294 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues chastity, 29, 74, 181, 198, 231, 233, 237, 274

definition, 5–6, 24, 91–92, 100–101, 270



and temperance, 27, 215-216



of charity, 195



fruit of the Spirit, 192-193



of morals, 73



genuine, 30, 273



of love, 100-101



gift of, 186, 192





habit, 48, 144

of virtue, 11, 25, 31, 50, 74, 138, 190, 192-193, 197, 199-200



virtue, 21, 110, 123, 146, 162-163, 186

concupiscence, 100, 141, 211, 214, 271 consolation, 20, 116, 184, 233 contrariety, 28, 34, 48–49, 229, 240, 245, 247, 249, 281 corruption, original 12, 18-19, 21, 65, 108, 111, 113,128, 145, 165 counsel, 22, 24, 27, 72, 87–89, 115, 148, 152, 154, 178–180, 190, 204, 213, 220–221, 246 creator, 17, 19, 34, 57, 77, 85, 95–97, 103, 123, 125, 140, 154, 159, 161, 164, 199, 222, 254

delight, 22–23, 47, 85, 119, 122, 126, 155–156, 159–160, 170, 182, 222, 270–271, 273 demonstration, 95, 124, 267 duty, 5, 26, 51, 240 E equality, 99, 216, 241–242, 249, 256, 258–260, 262 error, 24, 34, 77, 123, 129, 136, 146, 153, 161, 187–188, 194, 196, 259, 261, 271 eternal happiness, 6, 13, 19, 53–55, 57–58, 112, 114, 185, 275



as end, 58, 106



cause of the virtues, 111-112

eternal life, 48, 58, 191-192, 257-258, 276, 278



giver of grace, 20, 113-114, 122, 127-128, 135

F



honor of, 5, 13, 51-52



knowledge of 18, 102



love of, 18, 102, 105-108, 129, 135, 273



service of, 104, 112, 123

custom, 12, 14, 33, 37, 44, 60, 73, 91, 110, 180, 255 D dearness, 21, 142 decor, 5, 15, 67–68, 111–112 deficiency, 49, 66

faith, 10–12, 14, 20, 22, 24, 27–29, 63, 132, 136, 141–142, 154, 157–158, 162, 211, 234, 250, 273–274, 285, 288; see also William, On Faith

and hope, 201, 226



articles of faith, 265-266



faithfulness, 26, 205



fruit of the Spirit, 192



gratuitous, 20-21, 29, 128



heresies, 253



intermediate, 127



life-giving, 140

Index

295



necessity of, 218-220, 252





objects of faith, 16, 135, 175-176, 204

cardinal virtue, 25, 74, 134, 135, 200-201





virtue, 124, 126, 129, 200-201, 218, 252

gift of, 24, 148, 152, 154, 180, 185187, 190



spiritual, 144,



virtue of intellect, 14, 27, 126, 194, 220



virtue of, 5, 14, 24, 63, 181-187

falsity, 23–24, 27, 96, 166, 187, 194, 205, 219–220, 238 fear, 27, 43, 69–70, 84–85, 92, 109, 113, 115, 127, 131, 140–141, 149, 152–153, 165, 82, 203, 214, 239, 244–245, 269, 274, 282

fountain, 85, 89, 149, 151, 232, 234

habit as, 43-44



God as, 63, 75, 77, 122, 128, 148, 160-161, 235, 237, 254



intellect as, 48, 109



virtue as, 17, 206-207



filial, 226



gift of fear, 190, 197

freedom, 12–13, 36, 48, 77, 79, 84, 89, 254, 287



initial, 150, 226

friend of God, 139-140, 147



of offending, 22, 28, 154, 223–224, 226

friendship, 15, 76, 88, 96, 98–99, 132, 141, 246, 285



of offense, 23, 28, 154, 163, 224-225



genuine, 23, 163-164

of punishment, 22–23, 28, 150, 163–164, 223–224



love of, 100



with God, 275

of God, 17, 22, 95-96, 151, 164, 174, 190, 203, 207-208, 210, 230, 247, 250, 256, 260

fruits, 89, 218





reverential, 23, 28, 154, 163, 224225



servile, 197



spiritual infirmity, 181-182



virtue of, 150-151



and virtues, 6, 22, 24-25, 147, 190192



of the Holy Spirit, 25, 147, 191-192, 230, 232-233

G

fervor, 21, 70, 134, 136–138, 141

generation, 13, 20, 38, 40-41, 98, 101– 102, 124-125, 129

firmness, 108, 127, 134, 138, 141, 147, 243



from above, 21, 129



natural, 125



of a habit, 13, 45-46, 51, 91

first parents, 17–18, 34, 68–69, 97, 114 folly, 21, 143–144, 152, 154, 166

of bodies, 45-46 fortitude, 26, 65, 136, 144, 151, 170, 204, of consuetudinal virtues, 17, 50, 63 252, 274 generosity, 29, 35, 99, 228, 248 bodily, 64, 144,

296 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues

divine, 18-19, 23, 102, 114, 147, 165, 169, 222, 261

gift, 12, 21–22, 52, 58, 87, 95, 99, 105, 135, 159, 169, 173–181, 185–190, 197, 200, 203, 209, 219–223, 234, 238, 266



fruit of Holy Spirit, 192, 230-231



genuine, 15, 21, 74, 131, 275



kinds of, 16, 44, 49, 57, 76, 89, 91, 110, 163, 238



moral, 17, 56, 80, 92-93, 95, 112, 210, 223



of God, 79, 103-104, 115, 122, 124125, 127, 139, 148



natural, 17, 20, 37, 76, 95, 98



genuine, 107,



of faith, 83



gratuitous, 20, 122, 124, 127, 135,



perfect, 56, 129, 133



natural, 77, 99, 103, 187



of the Holy Spirit, 148-155, 157, 173



of counsel, 27, 148, 152, 178

glory, 6, 13, 18, 29, 53, 63, 122, 128, 130, 133, 135, 144, 151, 154, 206, 225, 242–243, 257, 264–268, 272, 275, 279



of fear, 190,



of fortitude, 24, 148, 180, 185-187, 190



of knowledge, 24, 27, 149, 152-153, 179-180, 187-190, 203, 219-221, 266



everlasting, 56, 225



God’s, 53, 57, 133, 160-161, 174, 193, 196, 222



God’s honor and, 13, 20, 27, 51, 57, 103-105, 126, 156, 256



God’s majesty and, 27-28, 221



grace and, 264-266, 280



hope of, 23, 164



nature and, 107, 112-113, 129, 262



of piety, 149, 189, 190



of understanding, 22, 24, 27, 174177, 190, 203, 220



of wisdom, 154-155, 157, 235-236, 250



of angels, 112



of saints, 259,

goodness, 20, 23, 34, 41, 46–47, 53, 64– 65, 90, 98, 106–107, 109, 120, 156, 165, 203, 242, 253, 263, 271–274, 276, 280



praise and, 96, 103, 261



state of, 127, 129, 226, 258



virtues of, 19, 29, 261, 263, 276



and knowledge, 42-43, 61, 125, 137



and passion, 80-81



grace, 7, 10, 12, 20, 23, 31, 37, 43, 56, 105, 109, 125, 128, 148, 153, 164, 198–199, 225, 227, 236, 257; see also William’s On the Grace of Christ



and virtue, 5, 12-13, 17, 33, 37, 42, 49-51, 54-55, 66, 72, 74-75, 80, 123, 134, 141, 192, 197, 258-260, 277 and the will, 14-15, 59-60, 62, 195,



angelic, 15-16, 35-36



and venial sin, 279-282



divine, 24, 27-28, 95, 119, 124-127, 140, 155, 158, 160-161, 163, 171, 221-223, 225, 245



and virtue, 7, 27, 29, 107, 124, 218, 268, 272, 275-276, 280



as help, 19-20, 114

and glory, 56, 264-266, 280 and merit, 25, 124

Index

297



between nature and glory, 18, 107, 112-113, 267

heretic, 6, 18, 111–112, 126, 140, 269–270



divine, 20, 109, 115, 117-118, 177, 190, 193

holiness, 185, 189, 214, 217, 227, 247



genuine gift, 107, 122



gifts of, 37, 125, 199, 218





hope of, 23, 164



life of, 146, 264, 269

of God, 17, 20, 24, 27-28, 51-53, 57, 95, 103-105, 126, 132, 178, 189190, 192-193, 196, 211, 219, 221, 223, 225-229, 233, 247, 250, 256, 260, 274



love of, 7, 122, 147, 264-266, 268269



of a human being, 28, 100, 132, 204, 210



need of, 6, 19, 30, 112



of the devil, 169



of compunction, 234-235



of the saints, 151,

honor, 5, 13, 15, 95, 135, 214, 235, 269

hope, 23, 27–28, 85, 127, 165, 201, 223, 226, 245, 250

H

in God, 17, 95 habit, 12, 16, 21, 28, 34, 49–50, 58–61, 63–64, 72, 80, 82, 89, 127, 151, 184, joy of, 233, 235 237 of grace, 23, 164, 225 and disposition, 41, 31, 134 of glory, 23, 164, 225 and gift, 157 of pardon, 23, 164, 225 and morals, 6, 15, 73-74 of reward, 31 and potency, 5, 31, 36-37 virtue of, 150-151 and virtue 6, 11, 30-33, 42, 138, 144, humility, 29, 242–243, 249–250, 255 183, 233 hunger, 76, 84, 106, 116, 164, 167–168 and will, 5, 14

for God’s sweetness, 23, 28

consuetudinal, 15, 17, 33, 75, 90-91



spiritual, 28, 156, 221-222, 228, 250



generation of 13, 38-42, 44-46, 48, 51, 74. 80, 91, 111, 233

I



natural, 41, 79, 144, 146, 158



of love 28, 134, 158, 228-230



religious, 44, 170



universal 32, 231



as a fountain, 44, 48



health, 5, 15, 20, 23, 53, 66, 119–120, 131, 163, 194, 216, 229, 266 hell, 30, 150, 154, 170, 197, 246, 281

illumination, 14–15, 20, 63, 75, 127, 198, 261 imagination, 16, 27, 47, 81, 84, 88, 124, 220, 256 immensity, 21, 113, 142–143 impression, 13, 40, 42, 45, 75, 137 incontinence, 45, 48 indignation, 23, 165, 224, 236, 242

298 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues integrity, 45, 134, 215–216



definition of, 26, 204, 208, 210

intelligences, 35–36, 66, 105



intention of, 209-210, 253

intension and remission of virtues, 30, 276-277, 279



love of, 110, 156, 263-264

intention, 13, 19, 26, 32, 38–39, 46, 51, 53–54, 57, 65, 88, 91, 100, 108, 113, 132–133, 137, 139–141, 147, 153, 161–162, 187, 190, 192, 196–198, 204–210, 217, 236, 253, 270 and action, 113, 132-133, 139-140- 141, 196 as aim or purpose, 39, 54, 88, 108, 113, 132, 141, 192, 197-198

as meaning, 22, 26, 32, 46, 51, 54, 57-58, 65, 91, 94, 96, 108, 147, 153155, 162, 236, 253,270



of honoring God, 13, 53, 133, 193



of repaying a debt, 26, 207-209



of virtues, 100, 102, 134, 161, 187, 190, 196, 204-210, 217, 253

name for all virtues, 26, 206 natural, 18, 105-106, 108 of God, 30, 164-165, 198-199, 245, 257, 260, 274, 279, of gratitude, 104-105 parts of, 204-205, 214, 247 repayment of a debt, 26, 206-207, 211, 237

K knowledge, 5, 13, 15, 18, 23, 30–31, 47, 60, 63, 73, 77–78, 108, 121– 125, 139, 164, 174–176, 178, 218, 226, 230, 234, 250, 255

and prudence, 92, 202, 251



and virtue, 14, 32, 59, 61, 72, 94, 97, 102, 110, 146, 155

J



and wisdom, 22-22, 155, 161-162

joy, 12, 16, 28, 80, 85, 89, 113, 126, 164, 173, 228, 232, 235, 237, 250, 252, 269



and habit, 41-44, 58-59, 63, 144



gift of, 22, 24, 27, 149, 152-153, 179-180, 187-190, 203, 219-221, 266





and blessedness, 159-161



bodily, 19, 113



kinds of, 95-96, 176, 189, 202



fruit of the Spirit, 147, 192, 232



natural, 17, 92, 95-96, 122, 127-128



to do justice, 43, 162, 181, 233



of living well, 17, 93, 96

justice, 6, 18, 29, 37, 43, 47, 56, 84, 89, 106, 107–109, 134, 150, 162, 181, 191, 217, 227, 233, 237, 241, 252, 255, 273



of moral goodness, 17, 93



and mercy, 245, 248-249



as a habit, 37,



cardinal virtue, 25-26, 74, 136, 200201, 251

light, 29, 35, 69, 78, 82, 85, 97, 124, 137, 148, 158, 180-181, 185, 199, 235, 238



commutative, 198

L



bodily, 77-78, 85, 115, 125, 159, 198



divine light, 149, 171, 174



first, 14, 63, 77, 109, 160, 176

Index

299



fountain of, 77, 160

M



of counsel, 148, 178-179



of faith, 29, 265-266

magnanimity, 36, 42, 74, 76, 78–79, 181–183, 192, 240–241, 244



of human intellect, 27, 266



of knowledge, 24, 61, 188-189, 219220, 266



of prophecy, 127



of souls, 20, 66, 127, 135, 159, 176, 220



of truth, 160



of virtues, 198, 202-203, 220



of understanding, 173-174, 176-177



one’s own, 124



true, 266

love, 22, 25, 46-47, 59, 62, 67-69, 71, 81, 95, 113, 118, 123-124, 141, 146, 150, 155-156, 160-161, 168, 171, 173, 225, 233, 239, 262, 270

malice, 16–17, 35, 89–91, 173, 195, 230, 253 mean, 3, 28-29, 49, 54, 73 204, 238-246, 249 mercy, 20, 25–26, 28–29, 79, 116, 164, 169, 199, 205, 232, 240, 245, 248– 249, 257, 268 memory, 16, 27, 41, 43–44, 47, 60, 84, 88, 148, 168, 199, 220–221, 256 misery, 79, 115, 128, 185, 188, 191, 210, 227

of heart, 79, 248



of souls, 20, 118, 129



present, 37, 111, 113, 118-119, 122, 145, 165, 242

modesty, 27, 151, 192, 216, 241



and hate, 16-17, 23, 28, 80, 89, 163, 228-230, 237, 250, 252-253

morals, 6, 9, 15, 21, 31, 67, 73, 75, 131, 133–134, 151, 194–195, 252, 282



correct, 27, 70, 195-196, 209, 221222

mortal sin, 21, 211, 276, 278, 281–282



gratuitous, 12, 18, 20-21, 29, 101, 107, 109, 126, 221-222, 261, 263264, 266-267

N



natural, 17-18, 29, 93, 97-99, 101108, 110, 120-122, 126-129, 163, 263–264, 266–268

names for the virtues, 63-73 natural law, 105–106, 249 natural morality, 92, 103 natural potencies, 35–37



necessary, 12, 23, 164, 274



of God, 12, 17, 28, 125, 134-138, 140, 142-143, 154, 158, 163-166, 200, 206-208, 215, 222-223, 226228, 247, 260, 273-274, 282



of glory, 122, 243,

O



of grace, 7, 122, 147, 264-269



of gratitude, 18, 105

operation, 16, 29, 38, 40, 198, 231, 241, 247, 254



of oneself, 7, 17, 99-100, 219



sold for a price, 18, 105, 222

nature, human, 19, 30, 34, 52, 66-67, 108, 112, 121



and actions, 81



intention and, 132

300 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues

natural, 7, 85, 261, 263



name of virtue, 5, 14, 65



of animal bodies, 174



natural, 29, 74-75, 90, 96, 102-103



of the concupiscible power, 238



of intellect, 10, 77



of the gifts, 24, 173, 175-176, 178



of natural powers, 19, 112-113



of the intellect, 86, 157, 238





of sacraments, 174



of souls, 31, 53, 75, 161



of the will, 16, 82, 85



of virtues, 29, 65, 141-147, 187, 255



of virtues, 29, 187, 194, 196, 206207, 214, 231, 250-251, 256, 260



ultimate perfection, 10, 29, 95, 110, 161, 277



virtuous, 71, 186

philosophers, 9, 23, 31, 37, 55, 74-75, 77, 79, 85, 103, 110–111, 161, 167, 174, 176, 201, 205, 224, 262, 270, 272, 284

original corruption, 12, 18, 21, 65, 108, 111, 113, 128, 145, 165 original sin, 34, 66, 85, 111 P palate of the heart, 22–23, 120, 155– 156, 162, 165, 272 paradise, 113–114, 201 passions, 12, 34, 78-79, 81, 84–86, 89, 91, 113, 120, 128, 135, 183, 211

and habits, 80



and loves, 16



and vices, 7, 263



and virtues, 28, 232, 237



and volitions, 27-28, 237



mere, 16, 28, 80, 232



neither praised nor blamed, 28, 33, 80



of irascible power, 238, 245

patience, 42, 65, 76, 117, 126, 147, 181, 184, 186, 192, 233, 244, 254–255 peace, 56, 80, 138, 147, 184–185, 187– 188, 192, 240, 253 perfection, 6, 19, 35, 94, 111, 121, 130– 131, 142–143, 147, 157, 182, 185, 194, 215, 235, 263

philosophy, 4–5, 10, 14, 22, 30–31, 82, 92, 201–203, 286–287 piety, 15, 22–23, 36, 74, 76, 78–79, 149, 151, 153, 169, 178, 189–190, 227, 277, 282 pleasure, 77, 85, 99, 110, 113, 131–133, 146, 155, 170–172, 193, 196, 199, 214–215, 237, 254, 270

and virtue, 50



of body, 7, 120, 211, 268



love of, 18, 100, 105, 211, 222, 268

potency, 5, 12, 15, 31, 35–38, 43, 46, 74, 95, 187 power,

appetitive 22, 120, 122



apprehensive 14, 20, 22, 27, 48, 59–61, 63, 81, 122–124, 126–127, 156–157, 185, 237–238, 261



cogitative 39–40



concupiscible 28–29, 183–184, 195, 228, 237–238, 244–245, 250, 253



intellective 15–16, 27, 32, 36, 39, 47, 72, 83, 85, 95, 113, 124, 126, 157, 159, 194, 218, 250, 261



irascible 7, 28–29, 184, 189, 238, 240, 245, 247, 250, 253



moving 20, 81, 85, 122, 124, 127, 129, 156, 185, 222, 228

purity, 20, 29, 119, 129, 153–154, 237, 247, 257, 263, 274



natural 19–20, 34, 36, 44, 68–69, 78–79, 85, 111, 113, 115, 118–119, 122, 128, 130

R



of command, 14, 62



reasoning 47, 195

primary cause, 103 principle, 15, 30, 40, 43, 47, 77, 82, 97, 135–136, 186, 197, 220, 224

first, 16-17, 48, 83, 95, 159,



of actions, 35, 69, 74, 95, 148, 184, 229, 303

privation, 36, 146, 228-229, 247 proper act, 93–94 proper function, 17, 93–94 protection, 20, 70, 93, 100, 116–117, 119, 278–279 prophecy, 20, 127, 129, 175–176, 179– 180, 220 prudence, 27, 32, 63, 76–77, 115–116, 134, 136, 204, 213, 219–220

art of living well, 26, 202-203



cardinal virtue, 14, 25-26, 62, 74, 200-201

knowledge and, 92, 96, 202, 251

virtue of intellect, 27, 32, 250

purgatory, 279–281 punishment, 39, 95, 119, 169, 179, 197, 226, 279

rectitude, 20, 146, 193, 197, 233, 240, 253

and divine will, 25, 103, 133, 195



and faith, 194



of human life, 5, 21, 51, 146-147, 194-196



of love, 129, 141



of human soul, 130, 133



of the will, 133-134, 195

religiousness, 122, 247 remission, 276 repetition, 34, 40, 42–44, 55, 74, 150 reverence, 22–23, 28, 53, 149, 151, 153– 154, 163, 224–225, 227 S sacraments, 9, 24, 85, 131–132, 169, 174, 221, 268, 285 salvation, 26, 29, 109, 125, 152, 176– 178, 200–201, 204, 211–212, 220–221, 233, 250–251 savor, 22, 107, 134, 148, 157–158, 164– 165, 167, 169–171, 223, 226, 270

spiritual, 23, 155–156, 163, 168, 172



and reward, 83, 150

sciences, 22, 37, 48, 60, 65, 94–95, 146, 151, 191, 202–203, 231, 264



eternal, 169, 278



divine, 23, 161



fear of, 22-23, 28, 150, 154, 163164, 223-224



natural, 95, 265-266



of hell, 30, 150, 281



sapiential, 31, 161



of purgatory, 280-281

sensation, 47, 77, 109, 113–114, 118, 121, 157–159, 196, 220, 239

302 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues service, 20, 26, 52, 58, 72, 89, 103, 123, 169, 172, 210–211, 235

of God, 104, 124, 192, 218-220, 247

shame, 23, 27–28, 92, 118, 164–165, 223–226, 228, 269 sign, 118, 158, 174, 176, 269 sobriety, 27, 151, 181, 201, 216, 229, 248, 251 spirituality, 121–122, 131 state of innocence, 34, 68 straight, 107–108, 131–132, 193–194, 249

U understanding, 73, 97, 100, 129, 145, 150, 162, 192, 202, 226, 240, 244, 257, 259, 262

gift of, 22, 24, 27, 148, 152, 173177, 190, 203, 220



of principles, 47, 95

utility, 13, 23, 55, 57, 91, 98, 132–133, 147, 163, 180, 187, 189, 221, 238 universality, 21, 138, 141, 147–148, 236, 273

substance, 45, 78, 100–101, 103, 112– 113, 120, 161

V

superfluity, 28–29, 36, 49, 66, 110, 204, 214, 216–217, 238, 248–249

virtue; see also: definition

supernatural, 12, 23, 43, 94, 164 sweetness, 27, 31, 53, 122, 156, 160, 164, 173, 221, 223, 230, 234–235, 238, 272

divine , 22–23, 155, 157–159, 161, 171

T taste, 23, 78, 119, 131, 155, 158, 162, 165–169, 171, 221, 229, 235, 270–272

sapiential, 161, 237



spiritual, 22, 120, 148, 156-157, 164, 171, 236

venial sin, 278–282

affective, 17, 27-28, 97, 223, 226, 229, 235



cardinal, 14, 21, 25-26, 29, 62, 74, 134, 200-201, 218



consuetudinal 6, 10, 12-13, 17-19, 25, 30, 33, 50, 54, 56, 61, 63, 73-74, 110-113, 128-129, 199-200



gratuitous, 7, 12, 17-21, 25, 28-30, 91, 148, 254-255, 257, 262-263



natural, 6, 12, 15-18, 25, 29-30, 3536, 51, 74-77, 79, 91-92, 105, 108112, 128-130, 187, 199, 252, 254, 256, 263



of the fatherland 261, 277



of the way, 257, 261, 276–277, 282

temperance, 6, 25–27, 56, 74, 134, 136, 168, 200–201, 204, 214–217, 238, 251–252, 275

vision, 41, 61, 72, 97, 122, 127, 136–137, 157–159, 174–176, 224

of God, 10, 113, 153

temptation, 14, 20, 114, 121, 170, 181– 182, 188, 220, 255



spiritual, 159-160, 222

tenderness, 21, 24, 141, 183, 244 thirst, 23, 27, 106, 116, 120, 156, 164, 168, 221–222, 237, 240, 250

volition, 6, 20, 6, 129, 141, 155, 160, 164, 196, 223–224, 228, 232, 236-238, 247, 250

and affective virtues 27-28, 97, 226, 229

Index

303



and apprehensions 47, 262



and counsel, 89, 154



and love, 20, 23, 99, 103, 108, 138, 161, 163, 221-222, 229



beginning of, 164-165



good, 28, 165, 167, 227



gift of the Spirit, 22-23, 154-155, 157, 235-236, 238-239, 250



God’s, 28, 109, 140

W



gravity of, 173, 190

war, 20, 115, 117–118, 127, 140, 144, 165, 179, 181, 184–185, 187–189, 211, 213–214, 227



knowledge of profound things, 23, 143, 161



savorous knowledge, 22, 155, 161, 223



taste for divine sweetness, 158, 161



virtue, 149, 162

weakness, 24, 43, 50, 126, 137–138, 149, 154, 170, 182, 190, 240–241, 255–256

of body, 53, 119, 130, 170



of corruption, 130-131



of the flesh, 152, 235



of memory, 41



of souls, 20-21, 118-119, 145



spiritual, 24, 181, 183-185



vice, 144, 275

weapons, 15, 19, 64, 70, 85, 114, 145, 211 will, the, 25, 30, 47, 108, 122, 133, 195, 241, 262

and virtue, 146



as habit, 14, 59, 90



as king of the soul, 14-16, 60-60, 72, 88-89



determines goodness or badness, 15, 59-60, 90



most free, 16, 82-83, 85



of God, 105, 132, 220, 231



power of command, 14, 62, 85-88, 141

wisdom, 9–10, 27, 31, 62, 120, 163, 170, 193, 198, 237, 242, 252, 284; see also: Teaching on God in the Mode of Wisdom and Wisdom (Wis)

304 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues

Index of biblical citations  

Old Testament Genesis

3:7 4:7 18:27

139 89 242

Exodus 4:10 224 14:25 116 15: 116 24:10-11 221 33:20 113 36:1 162 16:20 26:36

Leviticus

Numbers 11:10-14 22:19 23:2 14:17

2 Samuel

8:3 13 1:11 1:6-2:10 6:10 7:1 14 26:24 29:15 41:15

Tobit Judith Job

241 244 64 88 159 185 117 166

2:10 4:2 13:5 16:15 18:2 18:11 21:19 22:4 24:10 27:5 30:20 31:1 31:9 31:11 32:1 33:9 34:2 35:4 41:2 41:2-3 49:12 52:1 58:8 71:9 84:9 103:24 110:10 114:9 118:20 118:66 118:96 118:103 118:112 118:113 118:136 125:5 138:21 143:1 144:7 144:17

116 115 233 114 185 113 148 6:26 239 9:1

Psalms

177 234 244 156, 160, 222 174 272 70 233 245 177 221 161 177 232-233 133 156, 221 116 177 237 222 209 161 117 171 159 116 164 246 83 230 142 156, 272 225 230 232 192 230 115 221 205

Proverbs

13:4 13:12 13:8 14:1 14:7 14:10 14:16 14:24 14:26 14:27 14:34 14:35 15:9 16:4 16:32 19:13 20:8 21:9 21:15 21:29 22:4 24:11 25:4 24:5 24:6 24:9 27:15 28:1 29:12 1:18 7:20 8:24 9:8 9:12 2:5 6:3 8:6

275 5:6 162 5:17

133 237 170 162 188 234 162 190 151 151 191 220 236 104 149, 186 167 89 167 43, 162, 181, 233 239 151 213 167 115, 149 179 236 167 239 89 Ecclesiastes

Song of Songs

Wisdom

234 149 255 70 170 71 68 138 198 116

Index

305

6:1 7:29 7:1-2 8:1 8:2 8:7 8:15 11:23 12:21 14:11 14:22

149 164 270 193 164, 222 201, 251 115 171 173 170, 188 187

Sirach (Ecclesiasticus) 1:27 151 1:36 203 5:11 185 7:30 102 13:1 166 13:3 240 14:23 171 16:1 273 16:15 257 17:23 230 19:4 185, 203 21:2 165 23:6 247 23:27 223 23:29 223 24:21 156 24:23 156 24:27 156, 221 24:29 156, 164, 221 33:23 243 34:16 151, 190 34:28 48 41:15 243 48:1 117 1:6 5:5 5:20 33:6 9:5 9:6 11:2 22:12

Isaiah

165 117 187 151 152 152 152-154 232

43:2 64:6 65:20 Jeremiah

2:31 3:1 9:1

Lamentations

1:15 3:1

Daniel

4:24 10:1 10:11

170 174 237

Amos

6:6

141

Habakkuk

1:14

Zechariah

1:9 1:13-14 2:3 4:4-5 3:4

Malachi

4:2

116 9:12 56 10:14-15 173 10:40 12:33 12:35 192 15:18-19 273 16:22 232 17:22 22:12 23:2 232 23:3 224

170 159 159 159 159 70 198

New Testament 4:1-11 4:22 5:3 5:5 5:6 5:43 5:46 7:17 7:18 8:22

Mathew

115 143 147 153, 234 153, 156 230 97 89 89 246

1:12 2:17 3:21 4:7 7:15 7:21 7:23 26:14 2:27 5:1 4:1-13 5:11 6:25 6:32 6:45 8:7 9:30-31 10:16 15:22 23:2 24:25 3:16 4:14 6:51 6:58 8:52 9:16 11:44 15:12 16:8

32 204 205 89 89 89 144 166 70 213 213 Mark

Luke

John

115 32 143 166 89, 90 90 90 204 130 130 115 143 234 97 89 166 143 205 70 153 203 142 48 156 156 152 153 151 143 166

306 William of Auvergne ❆ On the Virtues Acts

5:22-23 192 141 6:8 191-192 233 198 Ephesians 2:4 143 Romans 3:10 109 1:22 174 4:14 185, 204 5:5 142 6:12 114 6:23 169 7:18 86 7:20 133 Philippians 8;3 166 3;8 166 8;24 226 3:20 130 8:38 138, 154 4:14 233 8:39 138, 154 12:15 232 Colossians 13:1 204 1:26 152 13:10 209 1 Thessalonians 1 Corinthians 1:24 143 4:4 214 3:3-4 130 3:19 152 1 Timothy 4:10 21, 143 7:28 215 1:5 142 8:1 255 13:12 226 2 Timothy 10:13 116, 205 10:31 53 2:1-2 99 12:9 255 13:4 231 Titus 13:12 157 14:6 220 8:7 251 14:20 173 Hebrews 2 Corinthians 7:10 28, 235 4:13 223 8:13 249 5:7 153 12 113 11:6 218 12:7 114 12:10 255 James 13:8 212 13:12 212 1:17 147 3:17 239 Galatians 4:4 275 5:17 122 5:22 25, 147, 191, 230, 232 4:32 5:41 7:59

1 Peter 2:17-18 4:11

204 53 1 John

2:27 3:2 3:15 4:20

139, 232 277 275 138

Mediæval Philosophical Texts in Translation Complete List Under the Editorship of Gerard Smith, SJ Grosseteste: On Light. Clare Riedl, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑201‑8 (Translation No. 1, 1942). 28 pp. $5. St. Augustine: Against the Academicians. Mary Patricia Garvey, R.S.M., Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑202‑6. (Translation No. 2, 1942). 94 pp. $10 Pico Della Mirandola: Of Being and Unity. Victor M. Hamm, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑203‑4. (Translation No. 3, 1943). 40 pp. $10 Francis Suarez: On the Various Kinds of Distinctions. Cyril Vollert, SJ, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑204‑2. (Translation No. 4, 1947). 72 pp. $10 St. Thomas Aquinas: On Spiritual Creatures. Mary C. Fitzpatrick,Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑205‑0. (Translation No. 5, 1949). 144 pp. $15 Guigo: Meditations of Guigo. John J. Jolin, SJ, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑206‑9. (Translation No. 6, 1951). 96 pp. $10 Giles of Rome: Theorems on Existence and Essence. Michael V. Murray, SJ, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑207‑7. (Translation No. 7, 1953). 128 pp. $15 John of St. Thomas: Outlines of Formal Logic. Francis C. Wade, SJ, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑208‑5. (Translation No. 8, 1955). 144 pp. $15 Hugh of St. Victor: Soliloquy in the Earnest Money of the Soul. Kevin Herbert, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑209‑3. (Translation No. 9, 1956). 48 pp. $5

Under the Editorship of James H. Robb St. Thomas Aquinas: On Charity. Lottie Kendzierski, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑210‑7. (Translation No. 10, 1960). 120 pp. $15 Aristotle: On Interpretation: Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan. Jean T. Oesterle, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑211‑5. (Translation No. 11, 1962). 288 pp. $20 Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam: On Copia of Words and Ideas. Donald B. King and H. David Rix, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑212‑3. (Translation No. 12, 1963). 124 pp. $15 Peter of Spain: Tractatus Syncategorematum and Selected Anonymous Treatises. Joseph P. Mullally and Roland Houde, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑213‑1. (Translation No. 13, 1964). 168 pp. $15 Cajetan: Commentary on St. Thomas Aquinas’ On Being and Essence. Lottie Kendzierski and Francis C. Wade, SJ, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑214‑X. (Translation No. 14, 1965). 366 pp. $20 Suárez: Disputation VI, On Formal and Universal Unity. James F. Ross, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑215‑8. (Translation. No. 15, 1965). 132 pp. $15

308 mediæval philosophical texts in translation St. Thomas, Siger de Brabant, St. Bonaventure: On the Eternity of the World. Cyril Vollert, SJ, Lottie Kendzierski, and Paul Byrne, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑216‑6. (Translation No. 16, 1965). 132 pp. $15 Geoffrey of Vinsauf: Instruction in the Method and Art of Speaking and Versifying. Roger P. Parr, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑217‑4. (Translation No. 17, 1968). 128 pp. $15 Liber De Pomo: The Apple, or Aristotle’s Death. Mary F. Rousseau, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑218‑2. (Translation No. 18, 1968). 96 pp. $5 St. Thomas Aquinas: On the Unity of the Intellect against the Averroists. Beatrice H. Zedler, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑219‑0. (Translation No. 19, 1969). 96 pp. $10 Nicholas of Autrecourt. The Universal Treatise. Leonard L. Kennedy, C.S.B., Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑220‑4. (Translation No. 20, 1971). 174 pp. $15 Pseudo‑Dionysius Areopagite: The Divine Names and Mystical Theology. John D. Jones, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑221‑2. (Translation No. 21, 1980). 320 pp. $25 Matthew of Vendome: Ars Versificatoria. Roger P. Parr, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑222‑0. (Translation No. 22, 1981). 150 pp. $15 Francis Suárez. On Individuation. Jorge J.E. Gracia, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑223‑9. (Translation No. 23, 1982). 304 pp. $35 Francis Suárez: On the Essence of Finite Being as Such, on the Existence of That Essence and Their Distinction. Norman J. Wells, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑224‑7. (Translation No. 24, 1983). 248 pp. $20 The Book of Causes (Liber De Causis). Dennis J. Brand, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑225‑5. (Translation No. 25, 1984). 56 pp. $5 Giles of Rome: Errores Philosophorum. John O. Riedl, Tr. Intro. by Josef Koch. ISBN 0‑87462‑429‑0. (Translation No. 26, 1944). 136 pp. $10 St. Thomas Aquinas: Questions on the Soul. James H. Robb, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑226‑3. (Translation No. 27, 1984). 285 pp. $25

Under the Editorship of Richard C. Taylor William of Auvergne. The Trinity. Roland J. Teske, SJ, and Francis C. Wade, SJ. ISBN 0‑87462‑231‑X (Translation No. 28, 1989) 286 pp. $20

Under the Editorship of Roland J. Teske, SJ Hugh of St. Victor. Practical Geometry. Frederick A. Homann, SJ, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑232‑8 (Translation No. 29, 1991) 92 pp. $10 William of Auvergne. The Immortality of the Soul. Roland J. Teske, SJ, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑233‑6 (Translation No. 30, 1992) 72 pp. $10 Dietrich of Freiberg.Treatise of the Intellect and the Intelligible. M. L. Führer, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑234‑4 (Translation No. 31, 1992) 135 pp. $15 Henry of Ghent. Quodlibetal Questions on Free Will. Roland J. Teske, SJ, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑234‑4 (Translation No. 32, 1993) 135 pp. $15

complete list

309

Francisco Suárez, SJ. On Beings of Reason. Metaphysical Disputation LIV. John P. Doyle, Tr. ISBN 0‑87462‑236‑0 (Translation No. 33, 1995) 170 pp. $20 Francisco De Vitoria, OP. On Homicide, and Commentary on Thomas Aquinas: Summa theologiae IIaIIae, 64. Edited and Translated by John Doyle. ISBN 0‑87462‑237‑9. (Translation No. 34, 1997) 280 pp. $30 William of Auvergne. The Universe of Creatures. Edited, Translated, and with an Introduction by Roland J. Teske, SJ. ISBN 0-87462-238-7 (Translation No. 35, 1998) 235 pp. $25 Francis Suarez, SJ. On the Formal Cause of Substance. Metaphysical Disputation XV. Translated by John Kronen & Jeremiah Reedy. Introduction & Explanatory Notes by John Kronen. ISBN 0-87462-239-5 (Translation No. 36, 2000) 218 pp. $25 William of Auvergne. The Soul. Translated from the Latin with an Introduction and Notes by Roland J. Teske, SJ. ISBN 0-87462-240-9 (Translation No. 37, 2000) 516 pp. $50 The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs. Translated with Introduction and Notes by John P. Doyle.ISBN 0-87462-241-7 (Translation No. 38, 2001) 217 pp. $25 Dominicus Gundissalinus.The Procession of the World (De processione mundi). Translated from the Latin with an Introduction & Notes by John A. Laumakis. ISBN 0-87462-242-5 (Translation No. 39, 2002) 87 pp. $10 Francisco Suárez. A Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics or “A Most Ample Index to the Metaphysics of Aristotle” (Index locupletissimus in Metaphysicam Aristotelis). Translated with an Introduction & Notes by John P. Doyle. ISBN 0-87462-243-3 (Translation No. 40, 2003) 430 pp. $45 Henry of Ghent. Quodlibetal Question on Moral Problems. Translated from the Latin with an Introduction and Notes by Roland J. Teske, SJ. ISBN 0-87462-244-1 (Translation No. 41, 2005) 82 pp. $10 Francisco Suárez. On Real Relation (Disputatio Metaphysica XLVII) A Translation from the Latin, with an Introduction and Notes by John P. Doyle. ISBN-13: 978-087462-244-1. ISBN-10: 0-87462-244-1 (Translation No. 42, 2006) 430 pp. $45 William of Auvergne. The Providence of God regarding the Universe. Part Three of the First Principal Part of The Universe of Creatures. Translated from the Latin with an Introduction and Notes by Roland J. Teske, SJ. ISBN 978-0-87462-246-1 (Translation No. 43, 2007) 204 pp. $23 Hervaeus Natalis. A Treatise of Master Hervaeus Natalis (D. 1323) The Doctor Perspicacissimus On Second Intentions, Volume One—An English Translation & Volume Two—A Latin Edition by John P. Doyle. Translated from the Latin with an Introduction and Notes by John P. Doyle. ISBN 978-0-87462-247-8 (Translation No. 44, 2008) 622 pp. $47 William of Auvergne, On the Virtues, Part One of On the Virtues and Vices. Translated from the Latin With an Introduction and Notes by Roland J. Teske, SJ. ISBN 978-0-87462-248-5 (Translation No. 45, 2009) 310 pp. $30

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310 mediæval philosophical texts in translation

Mediæval Philosophical Texts in Translation Roland J. Teske, SJ, Editor This series originated at Marquette University in 1942, and with revived interest in Mediæval studies is read internationally with steadily increasing popularity. Available in attractive, durable, colored soft covers. Volumes priced from $5 to $50 each. Complete Set [0-87462-200-X] receives a 40% discount. John Riedl’s A Catalogue of Renaissance Philosophers, hardbound with red cloth, is an ideal reference companion title (sent free with purchase of complete set). New standing orders receive a 20% discount and a free copy of the Riedl volume. Regular reprinting keeps all volumes available. Recent volumes are also available as ebooks. See our web page: http://www.marquette.edu/mupress/ Order from: Marquette University Press 30 Amberwood Parkway Ashland OH 44805 Tel. 800-247-6553 Fax: 419-281-6883 Editorial Address for Mediæval Philosophical Texts in Translation: Dr. Roland J. Teske, SJ, Editor MPTT Department of Philosophy Marquette University Box 1881 Milwaukee WI 53201-1881 Marquette University Press office: Marquette University Press Dr. Andrew Tallon, Director Box 3141 Milwaukee WI 53201-1881 Tel: (414) 288-1564 FAX: (414) 288-7813 email: [email protected]. Web Page: http://www.marquette.edu/mupress/