On the Borders of World-Systems: Contact Zones in Ancient and Modern Times 9781789693416, 9781789693423

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On the Borders of World-Systems: Contact Zones in Ancient and Modern Times edited by

Yervand Margaryan

On the Borders of World-Systems: Contact Zones in Ancient and Modern Times edited by

Yervand Margaryan

Archaeopress Archaeology

Archaeopress Publishing Ltd Summertown Pavilion 18-24 Middle Way Summertown Oxford OX2 7LG www.archaeopress.com

ISBN 978-1-78969-341-6 ISBN 978-1-78969-342-3 (e-Pdf) © Archaeopress and the individual authors 2020

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Contents Yervand Margaryan Introduction������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 1 Yervand Margaryan The Euphrates frontier in the Byzantine period: undergoing the new reality�� 6 Pavel Avetisyan and Arsen Bobokhyan Mountainous landscapes as bounded territories and spaces for the formation of early identities�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������� 59 Aram Kosyan The northern gates of the Euphrates-Tigris contact zone������������������������������������� 71 Beniamin Mailyan ‘The Caucasian Frontier’ and Terek Cossacks: an ethnocultural phenomenon at the junction of the Christian and Muslim worlds���������������������������������������������������� 94 Vladimir Ruzhansky Jewish history within the framework of frontier theory�������������������������������������125

This monograph is an interdisciplinary study by a group of authors of different ages working in different areas of social studies (archaeology, oriental studies, historiography, regional studies and political theory) and engaged in different historical periods, but focussed on one issue – the world-system and civilisational analysis. The monograph is addressed to researchers and postgraduate students, as well as a wide circle of readers interested in theoretical and macrosociological issues of ancient and modern history.

Introduction This collection of essays is the result of studies conducted by scholars representing different spheres of humanitarian sciences (archaeology, orientalistics, regional studies, theory of political sciences, international relations) whose professional interests cover the timespan from early antiquity until the modern period. What unites them is the problem of world-system and geocivilisational analysis of corresponding periods. In the course of preparation of the volume the participants undertook interdisciplinary studies so as to converge the available data in a given sphere. This resulting collection has a prospective character, the main goal of which is the solution of a major problem – the study of worldwide practice, oriented towards the problems of the modern social world as a system. In the terminological sense the present volume follows the traditions of world-system analysis, but in fact some articles break the stereotypes formulated in the final decades of the last century, in order to form more relevant, stereo pair, system-structural and structural-functional concepts. The main focus of this work is the borderland – limes,1 which resembles an impenetrable cordon, and an open, interactive environment as well. In this world of interworld encounters and different civilisations, an exchange of goods and ideas took place. In the course of the history of empires, the main centres of convergence of local and imperial civilisational values were the military camps and settlements, and their colonists – the pivotal civilisational agents. In the field of social-political sciences, the term ‘contact zone’ began being used comparatively recently. Perhaps this could explain the discrepancy and vagueness of formulations in studies where it is used in different contexts. More frequently, ‘contact zone’ is used for denoting the ‘borderzone’, ‘frontier’, ‘boundary line’, ‘buffer territory’, ‘limitrophe’, ‘interface’, ‘cordon’; more vague or specific (although not always justified) meanings of this term are also used. Obviously, the concept of the ‘contact zone’ opens new possibilities and treatments for the understanding of many historical realities of ancient, medieval and modern periods, however the arbitrary usage of this term can only discredit the very idea. The concept of the contact or boundary zone might be defined as follows: ‘contact zones’ are located between two, rarely three or four ‘domain zones’,2 each having its ‘nucleus’, ‘semiperiphery’ and ‘periphery’. These terms were introduced by I. Wallerstein, who took the concept of the world-system (World-System)3 from F. Braudel. Accepting the terms used by Wallerstein, we, however, do not share some basic foundations of his theory. According to Wallerstein Limes (in Latin – ‘boundary, limit’) – a border between different sections of land, granted to the citizens of the community. During the Roman empire limes denotes the fortified border of the state, a fortified boundary (rampart, wall) erecting watchtowers defended by the legions. The system of the limes included a network of well-maintained roads, military camps and signal posts. Limes construction was initiated and augmented by the emperors Octavian, Domitian, Trajan and Hadrian. As a result, a whole defence system was organised, consisting of military camps of different sizes (castra and castellum) and fortified guard posts (burges). As well as providing defence for the empire, the limes also served as a means of custom control. 2 In the given context we find this mathematical term more appropriate. 3 See: Wallerstein 1974-1989; Wallerstein 1987: 309-324. 1

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the ‘nucleus’ is a cluster of the most developed ‘central’ countries and regions that sets the directions of the development of the ‘world-system’ and defines its keyparameters. The ‘periphery’ (not always identical with a real periphery) consists of countries and regions, occupying marginal positions in the system, which barely play any role. Moreover, according to Wallerstein, the ‘periphery’ is destructive by nature and it often negatively influenced the development of the ‘world-system’. But the participants of our project hold the view that the theoretical schemes and structures of Wallerstein are somehow biased, having a simplified view on world history. In Wallerstein’s theory, the role of the ‘nucleus’ is overestimated, and the ‘periphery’ underestimated. Even a brief view into world history reveals quite distinct patterns: often, having reached some limit, the ‘nucleus’ begins to lose its creative qualities, becoming the main cause for the system crisis of one or other civilisation, and sometimes even the whole ‘world-system’. In some cases the crisis leads to the destruction of the mightiest system. But in some other cases the ‘world-system’ switches on underlying defensive mechanisms, stimulating the renewal of the ‘nucleus’. In this case the impulses for renewal come exactly from the periphery of the civilisation. While the ‘nucleus’ continues to remain a hostage to traditional system of values, on the periphery, located in a much more plastic and mobile marginal environment, vital ideas and attitudinal paradigms of future epochs come into being, which are in turn able to change fundamentally the architectonics of the ‘world-system’, including the ‘nucleus’.4 From this moment onwards exactly, the ‘periphery’ directs the whole ‘world-system’ and defines its constructive peculiarities and vital rhythms.5 This concerns, first of all, the pre-industrial periods. It gives sufficient reasons for the reevaluation of the role of the ‘periphery’ in the periodic cycles of the global ‘worldsystem’. While looking closely at the problem, the ‘periphery’, especially the border zone, appears as a kind of laboratory, where new civilisational paradigms arise, crystallise, and undergo testing. In cases where the ‘nucleus’ is flexible enough and sensitive to innovative ideas, renewal of the whole civilisation took place, ‘into old skins new wine is poured’; in effect a new nomos comes into being,6 which is shamelessly given the old name. But more often, the nucleus, especially its conservative elite, resisted modernisation of the socium, trying to prevent the embedding of new institutions and values at This pattern was first recognised by the outstanding Arab thinker Ibn-Khaldun. He states that the selfrenewal of civilisation took place under the positive influence of the periphery. Accordingly, the periphery is responsible for the destruction of civilisation. Ibn-Khaldun regards the end of civilisation as a means of welfare if it loses its creativity and the ability for self-regeneration. Dead civilisations can, however, prepare the ground for future ones (Sorokin 1992: 176; Mahdi 1957; Grigoryan 1960; 1966; Irwin 1997: 461-479). 5 See: Shils 1975. 6 In this same sense, nomos should be understood first of all as a civilisational paradigm, world order. In the modern period the term nomos was first used by the well-known German lawyer and political philosopher – and father of geopolitics – Karl Schmitt (1888-1985). In his theory of ‘big spaces’ (Grossraum), Schmitt figuratively speaking describes the agon of two alternative nomoi – those of the Earth and the Sea. This agon has determined the character of the modern period. 4

Introduction

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the expense of older ones. In such cases a change in the ‘nucleus’ appears, which, due to its not being renewed, starts to move towards the periphery, close to the sources of the goal-setting ideas of the new period.7 The change of the nucleus, therefore, symbolises the appearance of a new civilisation. An example of the deactualisation of the nucleus, and its shift from the centre to periphery, is Classical Greece, which, after the campaigns of Alexander the Great, had become a periphery of the Hellenistic world forever, passing its dominant role over to Eastern countries. Another example is the irrelevancy of the classical Roman civilisation, which had lost its former creativity in the 2nd-3rd centuries and appeared in the state of a system crisis. The only way out of that crisis became the shift of the civilisational nucleus towards the Hellenistic East, where the Eastern Roman empire was formed – a new type of civilisation enrobed with the name of its predecessor. Similar shifts of the nucleus, which sometimes seem spontaneous and unexpected, in reality are quite predictable. Civilisation is a multidimensional concept and can occur as a minimum on two levels – temporal (spatial-provisional) and spiritual (ΝΟΜΟΣ, PAX). But these levels are not always authentic and sometime do not overlap. Between two or more civilisations, and also between the civilisation and the so-called ‘barbarian’ world, exists a clearly marked boundary zone. Historians and archaeologists long ago abandoned the idea that limes was exclusively a defensive structure, an impassable cordon. Most likely it was a kind of a membrane between two worlds, ensuring a well-balanced exchange of goods, cultural values, ideas, spiritual beliefs, etc. In some cases the boundary zone was intended to serve as an impassable cordon between absolutely hostile civilisations and communities (e.g. The Great Wall of China, The Maginot Line, The Mannerheim Line, the Iron Curtain, around the USSR and its satellites during the Cold War, etc.), and in other cases in the role of contact zone. Two or more civilisations may constitute the contacting parties, or the civilisation and the ‘barbarian’ element. The continuous chain of northern Hellenistic city-states can be seen as illustration of such a contact zone, those entities that used to encircle the northern Black Sea region. As is known, these states were mediators between Scythian tribes and Greek colonists of the northern and western Black Sea regions. Another good example of a contact zone, obviously, was the Roman limes. Among the more important sections of the latter were the Upper German-Rhaetian limes (550 km) and Hadrian’s Wall in Britain. Remains of the limes have been preserved in the territory of Scotland, in the regions of the Rhine and Danube, as well as in the west of North Africa. It was via the limes that western and eastern civilisations made contact, as well as civilisation and the barbarian world. However, the limes was not simply a border, but first of all a continuous wall, a symbol of the power and might of the empire, between PAX ROMANA and the rest of the world. The closest Greek equivalent of the limes, perhaps, was encapsulated in the term temenos,8 a bordering, Margaryan 2012: 66-95. Temenos – a Greek word which denotes a sacred space, decoupled from the everyday world, a protected place. As a rule in ancient Greece the territory around a temple was such a space, where one could feel and experience the presence of the god. This word however has also another meaning, indicating a 7 8

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sacred zone located amid the territories of different communities, guarding the centre from hostile influence. Since ancient times, the temenos was known as a space populated by various marginal elements (outcasts, runaway slaves, foreigners, etc.). Located on the border of different social groups, systems, statuses and cultures, and experiencing the influence of their contradictory norms and values, these bordering elements of traditional societies provoked different social transmutational changes. But, if in the Archaic period limes-temenos was regarded as a boundary between communities, in the succeeding periods this concept acquired a new meaning, e.g. as a volatile periphery of an imperial or civilisational platform, the so-called Nomos. For example, the Roman limes in the East became the border between PAX ROMANA and the eastern Hellenistic nomos, located beyond the Euphrates.9 Thus, the fault line between the ‘world-systems’ could be very wide and occupy a considerable space, hence in some cases it is reasonable to define not through the lines but fault lines. Such a fault line, for example, could include the territory between the Euphrates and Tigris, as well as the territories of many other frontiers registered in the course of world history. This present volume has as its main goal the identification of several basic nomoi and draw fault lines between them, and also to show which civilisations were integrated in these macrosystems. Ervand Margaryan Bibliography Edwell, P.M. 2008. Between Rome and Persia. The Middle Euphrates, Mesopotamia and Palmyra under Roman control, Between Rome and Persia: 27-30. London and New York: Routlege. Grigoryan, S. 1960. Velikie mysliteli arabskogo Vostoka (Great Thinkers of the Arab East). Moscow: Znaniye. Grigoryan, S. 1966. Srednevekovaya filosofiya narodov Bližnego i Srednego Vostoka (The Medieval Philosophy of the Peoples of the Near and Middle East). Moscow: Nauka. Irwin, R. 1997. Toynbee and Ibn Khaldun. Middle Eastern Studies 33: 461-479. Mahdi, M. 1957. Ibn Khaldun’s Philosophy of History. London: Routledge. Margaryan, Ye. 2006. Mec Hayk’i yev Kommageneyi hogevor aṛnč‘ut‘yunneri patmut‘yunic‘ (ark’ayakan hangstaran` ὁ τεμένος) (From the history of spiritual relations of the Greater Armenia and Commagene (royal cemetery - ὁ τεμένος). History and Education 3-4: 17-24. Margaryan, Ye. 2012. Na styke rimskogo i vostočnoellinističeskogo tsivilizatsionykh ‘nomosov’. Iz istorii priyevfratskoy kontaktnoy pogranzony. (On the junction of Roman and Eastern Hellenistic civilisational ‘nomoi’. From the history of the Euphratian contact border zone). Critics and Semiotics 16: 66-95. Shils, E. 1975. Center and Periphery: essays in macrosociology. Chicago: Chicago University Press. sacred space protecting a central core (see Margaryan 2006: 17-24 for more detail on this). 9 Edwell 2008: 27-30.

Introduction

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Sorokin, P.A. 1942. Man and Society in Calamity. New York: E.P. Dutton. Wallerstein, I. 1974-1989. The Modern World-System (3 vols). New York: Academic Press. Wallerstein, I. 1987. World-System Analysis. In A. Giddens and J.H. Turner (eds) Social Theory Today: 309-324. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

The Euphrates frontier in the Byzantine period: undergoing the new reality Yervand Margaryan

Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University, Yerevan Abstract: Since the earliest periods the Euphrates frontier was a zone of clashes between the great empires of antiquity. Little has changed in our days. Upon establishing a certain balance of power the empires switched to a strategy defined by us as ‘small wars’, i.e. positional wars requiring less strain of forces and conducted mainly on the borders. On the Byzantine-Arab and later Byzantine-Seljuk border, small wars were fought mainly by local stratiotes – acrytes and apelates, and the hostilities were deployed in the territory of Armenia Minor, Cappadocia and Pontus. The border zone on the opposite side, known as Sugur, entered into the Caliphate and embraced the territory of Cilicia, Commagene and North Mesopotamia. A key role in these positional wars was played by the stratiotes of Armenian descent, or the representatives of other indigenous peoples in this region. Keywords: Euphrates frontier, ‘small war’ strategy, acrytes and apelates, Byzantium, western Armenia, caliphate.

What can I call this?! You built not a fortress! Horror you built, fury you built! Armenian epic Berserkers of the Sasun We are surrounded, so they cannot escape us. Baysangur of Benoa (Naib imam Shamil) A new empire – a new strategy. A ‘small war’ Transmitting nodes. Transmitting nodes existing between civilisations and worldsystems from the earliest times on are known in science as ‘bridges’ or contact zones, settled or traditionally inhabited by groups of people or entire ethnos, that played a mediation role between world-economies and world-empires. These bridge-cultures emerging on the trans-boundary zone or, in other words, on the periphery of worldsystems, are underestimated and insufficiently studied, and therefore are of much greater interest to us than the core and semi-peripheral space. This contribution is devoted to the study of the above phenomenon, namely of the frontier line passing by the Euphrates. In trans-boundary zones, tolerance for otherness has traditionally been higher, and the cultural pressure of central authorities on indigenous populations or settlers was weaker. The main requirement for the frontier people was their adaptability to local, natural and climatic conditions, endurance, patience and self-confidence,

On the Borders of World-Systems (Archaeopress 2020): 6–58

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determination and steadfastness to defend their lands in battle, which implied protection of the borders of the empire. Frontier people possessed these qualities in full measure. At the same time, both the native population and migrants were perceived as ‘aliens’ in respect of the other groups of the title ethnos. Meanwhile the connection with the root system of the habitat, the inner sense of being at home on this land, and at the same time their self-perception as an important part of something much larger and more important, namely the defender of the empire, the guardian and bearer of its basic civilisational values, generated the dichotomy of the frontier consciousness.1 These acts of transgression can be seen almost along the entire border of the Eastern Roman Empire – North,2 West,3 and, of course, along the Euphrates frontier.4 As noted by the Byzantinist V.A. Arutyunova-Fidanyan,5 who has greatly contributed to the study of this issue: ‘The border structure at the beginning of the Byzantine reconquest in Asia Minor may be designated as ‘frontier’ considering, especially, their common genetic roots.’6 And the typical frontier men on the eastern borders of the Eastern Roman Empire were, of course, the acrytes (ακρίτες) – a kind of military settler-stratiotes (στρατιώτες),7 combining peaceful labour with military service. As known after the battle at Yarmouk in 636, and especially after the death of Heraclius, stratiotes formed the core of the Byzantine army and remained its mainstay until the fall of the empire (Figure 1 a, b, c, d, e, f, g). Up to this day we come across references in literature to the ‘genetic link’, or the view that the Byzantine army was natural heir to Roman military traditions. The first Byzantine emperors really tried to adhere to the Roman-Latin format of military organisation, combat formation, and army discipline. For a long time the frontier troops in the west and east of the empire consisted mainly of legions, whose martial traditions dated back to the times of Roman glory and fame.8 However, the Byzantine army was not a replica of its Roman forerunner, either externally or substantively. Unlike its predecessor, Rome, Byzantium was not a militarist empire driving endless conquests, and did not view war as the main source of wealth and slave power, which sustained the economy of the First Rome (Figure 2). The chief concern of the Eastern Roman Empire was the preservation and protection of its territories For more on this, see Jakušenkov, Jakušenkova 2016: 13; Oleynikov 2002: 229-236. Vus 2013: 227. 3 Garbsch 1970; Mackensen 1999: 199-244; Kolosovskaya 2000. 4 Oikonomidès 1972; Ahrweiler 1974. 5 Adontz 1908: 91-104; Arutyunova-Fidanyan 1980a; 1980b; 1994; 1997; 2002; 2004; 2007. See also Obolenskij 1971: 303-312; Haldon and Kennedy, 2006. 6 Arutyunova-Fidanyan http://www.radnews.ru/модели-организации-лимеса-восточные/(in Russian) (accessed in 10.20.2020). 7 The stratiotes owned unalienable land, with the right of succession from father to son on condition of mandatory service in the border troops; they were exempt from any taxes except for land (canon). 8 Bannikov, Morozov 2013. 1 2

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Figure 1a. Silver dish made in honour of Heraclius for his victory against the Persians. Byzantine Medium. US, The Metropolitan Museum of Art of New York City (Metropolitan Museum Journal Vol. 8. 1973).

Figure 1b. Theodore Stratilates and Theodore Tyron of Protat. between 1290 and 1310. Karyes, Fresco by Manuel Panselinos, 14th c. (Mylonas P. ‘The Protaton at Karyes and the Painter Manuel Panselinos’ (in Greek), Nea Estia, 1,089 (1972), pp. 1, 657–62).

The Euphrates frontier in the Byzantine period

Figure 1c. Agii Anargiri Kastoria Fresco St George and St Demetrius. (https://www.alamy.com/agii-anargiri-kastoria-fresco-st-george-and-st-demetriusimage214093709, viewed 01.01. 2019).

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Figure 1d. Mosaic depicting St Demetrios, early 1113 year, Kiev (Gosudarstvennaya Tret’yakovskaya galereya.Izdaniye 2-ye; Dopolnennoye. Izdatel’stvo: AlexSoft, 2004. State Tretyakov Gallery. Creation of the 2nd; Augmented. Publisher: AlexSoft, 2004).

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Figure 1e. Saint Theodore Tiro, from Candia, Second quarter of the 15th century, egg tempera on wood, (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Saint_Theodore_Tiro_from_ Candia.jpg, viewed 01.01. 2019).

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Figure 1f. Icon with Saint Demetrios. Byzantine Medium. US, The Metropolitan Museum of Art of New York City (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Demetrios_icon_ Met_1970.324.3.jpg, viewed 01.01. 2019).

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Figure 1g. A fresco with Saint Mercurius and Artemius of Antioch. Tsigaridas E. Manuel Panselinos. From the Holy Church of the Protaton. Thessaloniki, 2003. (http://www. eikastikon.gr/xristianika/panselinos/index_en_next.html, viewed 01.01. 2019).

(sometimes along the entire perimeter of the borderland)9 from barbarian invasions (Vandals, Goths, Avars, Varangians, Slavs, Seljuks, etc.), as well as from the Sassanid Empire and the Caliphate, and not their expansion, which inevitably led to a change in the very philosophy of war, as well as the transformation of the army structure and organisation. The field army – cumbersome, slow and expensive, was recruited in the rare periods of military campaigns and dismissed immediately after their termination. Even Justinian, with his endless wars, had to collect and dismiss the military several times. In the period of Justinian II the old Roman army, based on the principles of bureaucratic centralism set forth by Diocletian, was already proving ineffective. ‘However, Justinian’s government aimed at recreating the slave-owning despotic world empire temporarily removed the question of restructuring the system of Diocletian. The deepest crisis that struck the empire under the successors of Justinian was accompanied by the collapse of all former state and legal concepts.’10

Byzantine imperialism was more manifest in orthodox messianism and the expansion of Roman cultural influence on the neighbouring countries and peoples, although there were some exceptions to this. 10 Kučma 2001: 87. 9

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Figure 2. Roman soldiers. The Column of Trajan (Lancaster, Lynne (1999), ‘Building Trajan’s Column’, American Journal of Archaeology, Archaeological Institute of America, 103 (3): 419–439).

So under Justinian already the empire was focusing rather on defence along the entire perimeter of its borders.11 The changes and perturbations of that period were reflected in military treatises known as ‘strategicons’. Since the subject has been long and thoroughly studied by Byzantinists, we will discuss it in passing. Up to the 10th century, what was characteristic of almost all Byzantine treatises was their defensive trend. Thus very important for understanding the views and concepts prevailing in the Eastern Roman Empire is the military doctrine of an anonymous author of the 6th century, containing no hint of the over-emotional perception of warfare characteristic of ancient authors. On the contrary, war is characterised as ‘extreme evil and the embodiment of all ills’,12 because it bears hardship and suffering. It is worth noting that these, in a sense, pacifist ideas were expressed shortly after the death of Justinian: at a time when Roman aspirations to revive the former greatness of their capital, to make the ‘Second Rome’ worthy of its name, had not yet lost their attractiveness in Byzantine society.

Sporadic outbursts of military activity as, e.g., in the beginning of Heraclius’ reign, were based on successful contingencies, beginning with the crisis in the Sassanid state in the first half of the 7th century, rather than on the might of Byzantium. 12 Kučma 2001: 88. 11

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However, the anonymous author of that military essay realised that the epoch of Rome’s military domination of Rome had passed, and he was living in other, far less magnificent and glorious times: hence the poorly concealed inferiority complex. In his research, Anonymous is relying more on the authority of antiquity than on his own knowledge and skills. Characteristic for almost all military theorists of that time was epigonism, and the treatise of Anonymous was no exception. It was a typical product of the period: the entire system of the author’s views was wholly based on the concepts of the military science of Classical Antiquity. Like most of his contemporaries, the author believed that antiquity gave the world unsurpassed examples of military genius, which the modern era just could not reproduce. Perhaps this is why the Byzantine Anonymous suggests using traditional antique methods in combat, for example, the phalanx13 – intended for offensive operations and ineffective in defence. This and other examples manifest the inertness of thought of one who, on the whole, was a relatively clever and prepared military theorist of the 6th century, his distrust in the experience of military commanders fighting exhausting wars on the borders of the empire, conditional on the reality and not the strict calculations of ancient theorists. Another outstanding sample of theoretical military thought is the so-called Strategikon by Pseudo-Mauritius,14 whose worldview, based on the dogmas of Christian Faith, predetermined the author’s approaches to the problems of war and peace and principles of army efficiency. Pseudo-Mauritius echoed the ideas of the 1st-century AD writer Onasander, being perhaps the first to argue in his Strategy that only a just cause could justify war and expect Divine favour. Onasander’s ideas, developed in the Strategikon of Pseudo-Mauritius (Composition 23, IV chapter), were expressed in the formula: ‘The cause of war must be legal’ (Strat. VIII B. 12). It was a completely new approach to war. The Aristotelian idea of δικαιος πόλεμος and the Ciceronian justum bellum were abstract ethical-philosophical concepts, considered by no one in Classical military treatises. Wars in antiquity were predominantly imperialistic, and the question of their ‘legitimacy’ was never raised by invaders: criteria for a just war were exclusively on a legal plane. It was not predatory war that was considered unjust, but those which violated concluded treaties and were fought in defiance of existing legal acts, or against rules established by imperialist powers. Also justified were revanchist wars waged on the principle of ‘an eye for an eye’. But the lands ‘conquered by spear’, that is, by the legitimacy of the conqueror and those ruled, based on the conqueror’s right, were considered just spoils for invaders.15 The right of the conqueror was considered sacred, as no conquering hero would be likely to succeed without the good will of the gods. Kučma 1980: 84-85. Dennis 1984: 58-63. 15 ‘Since antiquity the spear was considered a weapon used by the gods to express their attitude to people’s actions. Therefore, the lands ‘conquered by spear’ were considered the gift of gods. Alexander thought so too. The spear thrust into the ground was a great symbol to him. He openly worshiped the morals of the strong and expressed his claims for the land of enemies, and possibly all of Asia in the face of gods’ (Šaxermajr 1997: 102). 13 14

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Challenging the conqueror’s right to conquered lands was possible only by force: defeat in such wars meant the loss of divine benevolence. And now the manuals on warfare tactics by the heirs of arrogant Macedonians and Romans were either preceded or alternated with reflections on just wars! There were two reasons: the triumph of Christianity preaching non-violence and high moral values, and changes in the military-political conjuncture on the international arena. Initially Christianity played an unimportant role in the life of the Byzantine army. However, the developing circumstances brought inevitable changes to army life. According to Pseudo-Mauritius, there was a notable innovation in the Byzantine army relating to measures of political-educative nature.16 In such militarist states as Assyria, Alexander the Great’s, Roman, or medieval nomadic Asian empires, the main stimuli and sources for soldiers’ aspirations for service and victory were fame and booty. The Byzantine Empire was mostly deprived of the opportunity to stimulate its soldiers with the promises of rich trophies, so activities, called until recently ‘outreach work with personnel’, came to the fore. The basic role in maintaining the morale of fighters was assigned to chaplains, who had to strengthen the spirit of the army and encourage feats in the name of the sovereign and faith. In addition, the chaplains were there to support the army’s trust in God and self-reliance, and care for the bodies and souls of the fallen. However, there are few direct indications of the existence of such an institution in the literature. A similar institution was pivotal in the Eastern Armenian army, and there are many examples.17 Undoubtedly, in Byzantium18 soldiers were perceived first as defenders of the emperor and the empire, and only then as ‘faith warriors’. Another reason for establishing in the Roman Empire new, state-legal concepts based on Christian principles of morality was perhaps more prosaic, namely the inability of the Eastern Roman Empire to wage aggressive imperialistic wars in any direction. From the very moment of its emergence and until its downfall, the empire was surrounded by external enemies so numerous that its citizens could scarcely comprehend. Attacking most of these enemies was meaningless, even suicidal, so Pseudo-Maurice, sharing, in principle, theories on the preference of waging war on hostile territories, dominant in antiquity, believed at the same time that conducting military actions in one’s own territory was more expedient. The army fighting in its own territory is safer, as, when need arises, soldiers have the opportunity to retreat to fortified points (Strat. VIII A. 44), something which is Kučma 1980: 92. The Armenian Apostolic Church celebrates the Day of Remembrance of the Ghevondyan Armenian priests who fell at Avarayr on 26 May 451, as well as the numerous Armenian soldiers and their commander St. Vardan Mamikonean in the First Crusade, in which, according to Ełiše’s testimony ‘every man in his soul was a church and a priest himself ’ (Ełiše 1971). 18 Kučma 1980: 73. 16 17

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impossible in hostile lands, as soldiers are in unfamiliar territory, under constant threat, and the army is required to be in a state of permanent readiness. According to Pseudo-Maurice, in the land of the enemy the army must unhesitatingly use ‘scorched-earth tactics’. He considered harvest time to be the most favourable for invasion, when damage caused to the enemy would be particularly sensitive and its adverse consequences would be longest felt (Strat. VIII A. 30). Such a tactic is inexpedient for an empire seeking to expand its territory at the cost of its neighbours and turn the local population into tributaries. But Byzantium did not seek to conquer new lands (except during the periods of Justinian and Basil II Bulgaroctonus – ‘The Bulgar Slayer). Its main goal was containing the onslaught of enemies on the borders of the empire, therefore the invasion served to one purpose – to inflict maximum damage to the enemy and to return home - not necessarily with rich booty, but with small losses. In essence the Byzantines, like modern Chinese,19 did not fight, but played off one enemy against the other,20 and this quite successfully, or hired barbarians to defend their borders against other barbarians. G. Delbrück, who believed that already in the 4th century there were practically no natural Romans in the Roman army, and the empire was guarded exclusively by mercenaries recruited from various barbarian tribes, primarily Germans, described this situation as follows: ‘Although the struggle that is being waged is still a struggle between Rome and the Germans, it is no longer a struggle of the Romans with the Germans. Warriors who are fighting are Germans or other barbarians, Huns or Slavs who are at war with their own kind.’21 Another effective way to deal with the pressure of barbarians on the borders of the empire was synoikismos – the forcible resettlement of native peoples of the Near East to Macedonia, Thrace, and sometimes Africa.22 The Romans borrowed this practice from their predecessors – the Hellenistic monarchs of the Near East,23 although the roots of this phenomenon go back to Hittite and Urartian epochs.24 Another interesting example of a military treatise is the work of Leo VI, a clear advocate of the defensive (defensive tactics in war). Even the official title of the emperor speaks volumes. In his treatise he called himself ‘Λέων, ὁ ε εἰρηνικός ἐν Χριστῷ αὐτοκράτωρ, πιστός, εὐσεβής, ἀεισέβαστος αὔγουστος› (‘Leo, peaceful; Autokrator in Christ, faithful, pious, ever revered Augustus’).25 He also bore the title Margaryan 2016: 15-27. The Armenian historiographer Sebeos ascribed the defence program set forth in a letter to the Sassanid ruler Xosro to Maurice: ‘There is a crooked and disobedient people which dwells between us and causes trouble. Come now, I shall assemble mine and send them to Thrace. Assemble yours and have them taken East. Should they die, [our] enemies will be the ones dying; should they kill others it will be our enemies who perish, and we shall live in peace. But should they remain in their own country, we shall have no rest’ [g47] (History: Chapter VI). See also: Whitby 1988. 21 Del’bryuk 1994: 181. 22 See the above passage from the Sebeos’ History. 23 Tarn 1949; Perikhanyan 1959; Sarkisyan 1960; Košelenko 1979; Biсkerman 1985. 24 Melikišvili 1958; Piotrovski 1959; Arutyunyan 1970; Oganesyan 1980. 25 The Taktika of Leo VI 2010: 2. 19 20

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‘Wise’, for writing treatises, poems and speeches, as well as a code of law called ‘Basilica’, started by his father, Basil I, the Armenian. The title ‘pacifist’ taken by the author of a military treatise meant that the main mission of this Christ-loving monarch was defence, or in modern language ‘coercion to peace’, and not aggression and annexation of foreign territories (Figures 3-4). It was extremely important to Leo that the wars fought by the empire were just: ‘Above all, when mobilising for war, make sure that the cause of this war is just and never take up arms against the enemy unjustly unless they, because of their accustomed impiety, have first initiated hostilities and are invading our land. ‘We must always embrace peace for our own subjects, as well as for the barbarians, because of Christ, the emperor and God of all. If the nations also share these sentiments and stay within their own boundaries and promise that they will not take unjust action against us, then you too refrain from taking up arms against them. Do not stain the ground with the blood of your own people or that of the barbarians. For while you are making accusations against the enemy, saying that they who have not been injured by you should not begin to take up arms unjustly, they may bring the same charges against you, claiming that they have not engaged in any hostile act against the subjects of Our Majesty but have been living in peace with them. We must always, if it is possible on our part, be at peace with all men, especially with those nations who desire to live in peace and who do nothing unjust to our subjects. We must always prefer peace above all else and we should be at peace with those nations and refrain from war.’ (II, 29-30)26 The tactical manual for conducting hostilities ‘De velitatione bellica’, written in the second half of the 10th century, was of absolutely utilitarian nature. The authorship of this treatise is of uncertain date. Being commissioned by, and based on, the instructions of Basileus Nicephorus II Phocas, it was written by one of his senior officers or perhaps his brother Leo Phocas27 – the strategos of Cappadocia who defeated in October 950 a 30,000-strong army of the Aleppo emir Sayf alDawla, thus taking revenge for the recent Roman defeats at the hands of the emir’s troops. Defeat of the Saracen army by the very modest forces of acryte units became possible owing to the skilful employment by Leo Phocas of ambush and maneuvering tactics (passing ahead of the enemy to occupy the dominant heights along the road, striking the convoy on the most vulnerable part of the march, simultaneous attacks from three points to disperse the enemy forces, night battles, giving the enemy an opportunity to escape, etc.). However, the experience of other generals from the Armenian acrytic Phocas clan: Bardas, Nicephorus and Constantine Phocas, as well as Johannes Tzimiskes (Arm. Čmškik), the nephew of Nicephorus Phocas and the cousin of Nicephorus and Constantine, were also taken into account in the treatise. De velitatione bellica is the conventional Latin title for the Byzantine military treatise on skirmishing and guerrilla-type border warfare, composed around 970: its 26 27

The Taktika of Leo VI 2010: 35. The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy 1985: 140; Kučma 1994: 132-137.

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Figure 3. Liber de velitatione bellica (https://books.google.co.uk/ books?id=MNQFAAAAQAAJ).

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Figure 4. Detail of the Imperial Gate mosaic in Hagia Sophia showing Leo VI the Wise.jpg (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Detail_of_the_Imperial_Gate_mosaic_in_Hagia_ Sophia_showing_Leo_VI_the_Wise.jpg).

original Greek title is Περὶ Παραδρομῆς (‘On Skirmishing’). The original author is unknown, but is likely to have been a high-ranking army officer close to the Phocas family. The translation of the title, like the composition itself, accurately conveys the very essence of the doctrine of ‘small war’, as enacted by acrytes on the eastern borders of the empire. The highly experienced anonymous strategos (Leo Phocas?) considered that the main task for stratiotic detachments was not in itself the defeat and destruction of enemy forces28 (setting such a task for small acrytes units would be tantamount to criminal ignorance), but inflicting maximum devastation on enemies and driving them out of the empire. The next stage was the pursuit of the enemy in its territory, for as long as possible without bearing heavy losses. The anonymous author provides a figurative description of this war tactic: ‘προλ.1 Τὴν τῆς παραδρομῆς μέθοδον παραδοῦναι βουλόμενοι, εἰ τάχα καὶ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν μὴ χρειώδης ἐστὶν εἰς τὰ τῆς ἕως μέρηἅτε Χριστοῦ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν τὸ πολὺ τῆς καθ’ ἡμῶν δυνάμεως καὶ ἰσχύος τῶν τοῦ Ἰσμαὴλ ἐκγόνων ἀμβλύναντος καὶ τὰς ἐφόδους αὐτῶν ἀναχαιτίσαντος, ἀλλ’ οὖν, ἵνα μὴ τὴν λήθην καὶ ἄγνοιαν ἐπεισαγαγὼν ὁ χρόνος φθείρῃ τὸ ταύτης ἐπωφελὲς καὶ ἐξαφανίσειε, δεῖν ᾠήθημεν γραφῇ παραδοῦναι ταύτην, ἵν’, εἴ ποτε ταύτης δεήσει Χριστιανοῖς καιροῦ τινος πρὸς τὸ μέλλον καλοῦντος, ἕτοιμός ἐστι συνεργὸς ἀγαθὴ τῷ τε κοινῷ παντὶ καὶ τοῖς αὐτὴν 28

The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy 1985: 138-141.

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μεταχειριζομένοις. προλ. 2 Ἡμεῖς γοῦν ταύτην οὐ μονονοὺκ ἀκοῇ παρειλήφαμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πεῖράν τινα παρ› αὐτῆς ἐδιδάχθημεν, τὸ μὲν αὐτοὺς σχόντες διδασκάλους καὶ παιδευτὰς τοὺς ταύτην σχεδὸν εἰπεῖν ἐφευρόντας τὴν μέθοδον, τὸ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ μόνοι ταύτῃ χρησάμενοι καὶ πεῖραν αὐτῆς ἐγκολπωσάμενοί τινα κατὰ τὸ ἡμῖν ἐφικτόν. προλ.3 Αὕτη τοίνυν κατὰ τοῦτο ἔχει τὸ χρήσιμον, ὅτι περ οἳ ταύτην μετήλθοσαν μετ’ ὀλίγου μαχίμου λαοῦ μέγιστα καὶ ἀξιομνημόνευτα ἐξετέλεσαν ἔργα· καὶ γὰρ ἅτινα μὴ κατορθῶσαι ἴσχυσεν ἢ ἐτόλμησεν ἡ Ῥωμαίων σύμπασα στρατιά, ὅτε τὰ τῶν Κιλίκων καὶ τοῦ Χαμβδᾶ ἤκμαζεν, εἷς ἐνίοτε τῶν ἀρίστων στρατηγῶν σὺν μόνῳ τῷ τοῦ ὑπ’ αὐτὸν θέματος λαῷ, φρονίμως καὶ ἐμπείρως τοὺς πολεμίους ἐπιτηδευσάμενος καὶ συνετῶς διατιθεὶς καὶ στρατηγήσας, μόνος ἀπήρτισε. προλ. 4 Τοῦτο δέ φαμεν, οὐχ ὅτι τοῦ πλείονος τὸ ὀλίγον προκρίνομεν μάχιμον, οὐδ’ ὅτι ταύτην ἐξαίρομεν τῶν λοιπῶν στρατηγημάτων καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων τῆς τακτικῆς, ἀλλ’ ὅτι στρατηγῶν τοῖς ἀρίστοις αὕτη συνεργὸς ἀρίστη καθέστηκεν, ἵν’, ὅτε μὴ κατὰ πρόσωπον τοῖς πολεμίοις ἀντιτάττεσθαι δύναιντο, ταύτῃ τῇ μεθόδῳ χρώμενοι ἀβλαβεῖς τε ἑαυτοὺς καὶ τὴν ἰδίαν συντηροῖεν χώραν. προλ.5 Ταύτην Βάρδας ὁ μακαρίτης καῖσαρ, ὅσα ἐμὲ γινώσκειν, εἰς ἄκρον κατώρθωκε καὶ παντελῶς ἀφανισθεῖσαν ἀνενεώσατοἵνα μὴ τοὺς παλαιοὺς τῶν στρατηγῶν ἀπαριθμῶμεν καθ’ ἕκαστον, μόνους δὲ τοὺς πᾶσι γνωρίμους καὶ καθ’ ἡμᾶς, ὃς ἐν τοῖς γειτονοῦσι τῇ Ταρσῷ θέμασι, τῇ τε Καππαδοκίᾳ καὶ τῷ Ἀνατολικῷ στρατηγῶν, μυριάκις τὰς τῶν Ταρσέων καὶ λοιπῶν Κιλίκων δυνάμεις ἐτραυμάτισε καὶ μέγιστα κατ’ αὐτῶν ἀνεστήσατο τρόπαια· παρ’ οὗ καὶ ἡμεῖς ταύτην γυμνασθέντες τὴν μέθοδον, τὴν ταύτης κἂν ποσῶς παρειλήφαμεν πεῖραν. (ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΡΑ∆ΡΟΜΗΣ ΤΟΥ ΚΥΡΟΥ ΝΙΚΗΦΟΡΟΥ ΤΟΥ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ) / ‘We have acquired this knowledge from hearing about it but also from having been taught by a certain amount of experience. For one thing, the men who instructed and trained us in this method where the very ones, you might say, who invented it. Then, on our own, we have put it into practice and, as best we could, almost made it a part of us. This method has the following advantage. By making use of it some commanders with only a small fighting force have achieved prodigious and truly remarkable results. Let me give an example. The entire Roman army could not find the daring or the strength to restore order at the time when everything was working out of in favour of the Cilicians or Hamadan. It was then that one of the best generals of the day, accompanied only by men of his own theme, relying only in his intelligence and experience, took action against the enemy. He laid his plan carefully, accompanied against them, and by himself brought the situation under control. We say this not because we prefer a small fighting force to a larger one or because we think this method is better than other stratagems and tactical procedures but because it has proven itself to be extremely helpful for the best generals. When the situation is such that they cannot confront the enemy directly, they may employ this method and they will preserve both themselves and their country. To the best of my knowledge, it was Bardas, the blessed Caesar, who brought this method to the summit of perfection. I do not want to enumerate all the ancient commanders but shall limit myself to those in our time whom everyone knows. When this method had completely vanished, it was Bardas, who brought it back. When he was a general in the themes bordering on Tarsus, namely, Cappadocia and Anatolicon, thousands

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of times he inflicted harm on the forces of Tarsus and the rest of Cilician and gained won tremendous victories over them.’29 The author of the treatise recommends evading military conflicts whenever possible, even at the cost of the reputation of the empire,30 for the evil caused by war always outweighs the evil from disadvantageous peace. Therefore, an experienced tactician who has been in a tight corner many a time still prefers hit-and-run tactics: defensive, positional battles to any other type, ignoring offensive methods (Anonymous, VI, 5.P. 56-68). The combat initiative is completely handed to the enemy. Anonymous thinks only of weakening as much as possible, by any means, the effect of the enemy’s assault (XXXI-XXXVIII). According to Anonymous, rare counter-offensives should be conducted at night, relying more on intelligence, darkness, and the effect of suddenness, than on soldiers’ resoluteness and stamina. Thus so much attention in the treatise is paid to characterising night battles (XXXIX) and preparing ambushes (L), as well as to aspects of the intelligence service organisation (I-III). Acrytes and apelates The final transition from ancient methods of warfare to so-called ‘small wars’ came after the defeat of the Byzantine army at the battle of Yarmouk, which clearly showed the inefficacy of the traditional Greco-Macedonian phalanx tactics, i.e. linear attacks along the entire front line. On the contrary, it confirmed the effectiveness of the maneuverable and unpredictable acrytic light cavalry (cursors),31 combined with frontal attacks by a dense formation of heavily armed cavalry (diferensors) and the minimum use of infantry.32 The regular field units were frequently replaced by smaller squads of militiamen from the local population,33 vitally interested in protecting the borders of the empire, as, above all, these frontiers were where they lived. Mobile patrolling of the territory and garrison service were delegated to auxiliary units from the local stratiotes: Armenians, Kasogs, Isavres, Mardaites, Syrians, Arab tribes (Jordanian Hassanids), etc. After the defeat at Yarmouk the Byzantine army lost all resemblance to its Roman-Latin precursor. The field units were either exterminated or demoralised, being scattered throughout the eastern provinces of the empire. Local militias had to fight back not only Arab invaders, but also Greek marauders. Local militia detachments, led by experienced commanders, being left without central guidance switched to Scythian war tactics, avoiding battles in a dense The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy 1985: 148-149. The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy 1985. Cursors attacked using cavalry charges or outflanking the enemy; if necessary, riders would quickly dismount and fight well on foot; some military theorists consider them as a type of mounted infantry. 32 Predominant among the Byzantine infantry were the deputates – sappers (menzors), orderlies, bearers and light infantry, armed with throwing weapons, daggers and round, wooden shields with an iron rim and a bubo (Razin 1955: 508-510). However, during the time of Justinian the Byzantine commander Belisarius still actively used the phalanx, while the native Eastern Armenian, Narses, won more battles thanks to his use of cavalry. 33 Kučma 1980: 202. 29 30 31

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formation and seeking to attack more from ambushes, using infiltration instead of direct assault, where victory is achieved by means of dispersing and depleting the enemy force, and not by its destruction. Byzantium fought in this way along the borders of all its provinces throughout its confrontation with the Caliphate, placing resistance points all the way down and using small, mobile stratiotic forces, exhausting the enemy with incessant sorties and clashes. Singled out among the stratiotes are usually the so-called ‘acrytes’ and ‘apelates’. Smaller acryte squads were usually based in outposts and small sentinel fortresses. Their duties included watching any movement on the border and warning the population and the authorities of danger. In De velitatione bellica this tactic is described as follows: ‘Τοὺς τῶν μεγάλων ἀκριτικῶν θεμάτων τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀναδεχομένους καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτῶν ἐπικράτειαν τὰς κλεισούρας ἔχοντας πάσῃ μηχανῇ καὶ προθέσει καὶ ἀγρύπνῳ ἐπιμελείᾳ προσήκει σπουδάζειν καὶ ἀγωνίζεσθαι τὰς τῶν Ῥωμαίων χώρας διαφυλάττειν τῆς τῶν πολεμίων ἐπιδρομῆς ἀσινεῖς καὶ ἀνεπηρεάστους, βιγλάτορας ἐφιστῶντας ῥωμαλέους καὶ ἐπιτηδείους καὶ τὰς ὁδοὺς εἰς ἄκρον ἐπισταμένους’ / ‘Commanders who had assumed responsibility for the large border themes and who have authority over the mountain passes should use all means, take every step, and never relax in their labours, and fight to keep the territory of the Romans secure and unharmed by enemy incursions. To this end they should station sentries who are in good physical condition, competent, and who know the roads perfectly.’34 Due to the special natural conditions, the line of defence stretching along western Armenia needed no solid defensive structures, such as Hadrian’s Wall, the Great Wall of China or the Maginot Line. As is made clear: ‘Καὶ εἰ μὲν ὄρη εἰσὶν ὑψηλὰ καὶ δύσβατα διορίζοντα τὴν πολεμίαν, ἐν τούτοις τὰς βίγλας ἵστασθαι· ἀπέχειν δὲ τὰς στάσεις τῶν βιγλατόρων ἄχρι μιλίων γʹ ἢ δʹ. Καὶ ἡνίκα τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἐξερχομένους θεάσονται, δρομαίως ἀπέρχεσθαι εἰς τὸ ἔτερον στασίδιον καὶ ἀπαγγέλλειν ἃ ἐθεάσαντο, κἀκείνους πάλιν πρὸς τὸ ἕτερον στασίδιον σπουδῇ πολλῇ· καὶ οὕτως καθεξῆς μηνύεσθαι τὰ τῶν καβαλλαρίων στασίδια εἰς τοὺς ἐφομάλους τόπους ἱστάμενα καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν ἀναμανθάνειν τὸν στρατηγὸν τὴν τῶν ἐθνῶν ἔφοδον’ / ‘If there are high and rugged mountains on the frontier with the enemy, they should place watch posts on them… When they observe the enemy moving they should quickly alert the next station and report what they observed. In turn, these men should race off to the next station. In this way the information will eventually reach the cavalry posts situated on more level terrain. They will then inform the general of the alien incursion.’35 The borderline themes of not only western Armenia but also of a number of regions in Asia Minor, Lazika, Thrace, and High Taurica were organised using echeloned, locally focussed engineering defences,36 consisting of special, discrete defence points – ‘clisura’. ‘Clisura’, which means ‘mountain pass’ in modern Greek, in Byzantine The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy 1985: 140, 151. The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy 1985. 36 Vus 2013: 227-246. 34 35

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Figure 5. Clisura (Yilankale-fortress-errected-in-the-12th-13th-century-by-the-armenian-king-leo-ii).

times meant ‘frontier fortress’ or ‘mountain fortification’, with a small adjoining territory, or in general a ‘small province’ headed by a governor (clisurarch), whose authority was less than that of the strategos (Figure 5). Perhaps another reason why there was, and could not be, no continuous stationary line of fortifications on the border marchland with the Muslim world was the impermanence of the border zone, its frequent transition from hand to hand. The Arabs named it ‘Iqlim al-Sugur’ and it covered some western regions of Greater Armenia, part of Lesser Armenia, and the former Byzantine regions of Euphraticia and Cilicia. There are several versions of the origin of the term ‘Sugur’: according to one of them, Caliph Harun al-Rašid, this area refers to ‘front teeth’, i.e. a barrier or protection.37 After the offensive rush of Muslims petered out in the Armenian mountains, the caliphs settled Sugur with Arab and Berber tribes, and the zone along the Euphrates and Cilicia turned to a shifting but impenetrable corridor, a sort of Christian-Muslim ‘inter-land’, where by the decree of providence the Armenians, Cappadocians, Isaurians, Commagenians, Cilicians and Osroenians appeared to be the main actors. Some of these ethnic groups, unable to withstand the tension of endless struggle, disappeared – either perishing or dissolving among the neighbouring Christians or Muslims. The core, and the most resilient ethnos, were the Miaphysite Armenians and Chalcedonite-Cappadocians. The most active military tribes in Sugur were Banukilab and Banusulaim. After the conquest of Sugur by the Arabs the caliphs established two border zones, resettling there the Bedouins from the depths of the Arabian Peninsula. The first border cordon was called as-sugur ad-ja-zariya and covered the Mesopotamian border fortifications; the second – the Cilician – was also known as the Syrian assugur-aš-šamiyya. The first border zone embraced the fortified cities of Malatia 37

Šidfar 1987: 4.

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(the administrative centre of Melitene), Hadas, Marash, Zaperta, etc., while the second included Tarsus (the administrative centre), Adana, Mopsuestia, Anazarba, etc. In addition to these two border zones, the major frontier fortifications were at Theodosiopolis or Carno Calak (Calikala) in Armenia, and Samosata in Commagene (as-sugur-al-Bakriyya). According to the early 10th-century geographer Kudama ibn-Jafar, the Arabs undertook three campaigns annually: in spring, summer and winter. The Saracens intruded the Byzantine borderline through the ‘Cilician Gates’ and ‘Darb al-Hadas’ mountain passes. Masoudi and the 9th-century geographer Ibn Xordadbeh refer to two main routes used by the Arabs for their raids on Byzantine border areas. The first, from Aleppo to Podandus, passed along the road to the Taurus Range through Kinnasrin, Antioch, Alexandretta, Mopsuestia, Adana and Tarsus, stretching further through the ‘Cilician Gates’ to the fortresses of Lulua and Safsaf on the opposite side of the range. Another route started at Raqqa and stretched through Sarudj, Samosata, Hisi Mansour, Melitene, Zaperta, Maraš, and the Darb al-Hadas mountain pass to Cappadocia. Ibn Xordabeh cites the maintenance costs of the Mesopotamian and Syrian border fortifications, Theodosiopolis and Samosata, and the composition and costs of the Arab fleet (ustul), which had always been under the command of the ruler of the Syrian border fortifications.38 As a rule, during Saracen raids the Byzantine central authorities did not hurry to send significant military forces to the sites of their incursions. Local residents, led by acrytes and apelates, had to fight off the offenders, relying primarily on their own forces and resources. Acrytes took the first, and usually most painful blow, raising the alarm and organising the evacuation of the civilian population to supporting fortresses, which served as refuges for valley populations in the case the enemy broke through, and held the defence until reinforcements came. Help was provided only in the case of invasion by a large army, but not always even then. At the same time, the civilian population not only sought refuge within the walls of the fortified cities but actively joined the resistance, thus dispersing the enemy forces and compelling them to simultaneously besiege many fortified points with well-armed local garrisons. Perhaps one of the first to use this tactic in the wars with the Arabs was Theodoros Rštuni in the 640s (Figure 6).39 Whenever the authorities sent reinforcement the acryte infantry stayed in the fortresses to defend the civilians while the light cavalry of the apelates, known also as τραπεζίται (literally ‘table companions’ like the Armenian ‘ընկեր’ – ‘table companion’, friend, fellow soldier, militiaman),40 made bold rear raids on the enemy. The trapezite gangs41 led by the chieftain – the comit(as), attacked convoys, disrupted Iqlim al-Sugur: neutral territory between Byzantium and the Caliphate (Ter-Gevondyan 1977: 56). For more on Theodoros Rštuni, see Ter-Ġevondyan 1984: 305-309; Šaginyan 2007: 224–235; 2011. 40 Like the trapezy among the Zaporožian Cossacks. Not to be confused with antique τραπεζίτης – ‘moneychanger’, ‘banker’. See The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy 1985: 140, 153. 41 Or band – a cavalry squadron headed by comes or komit(as). Depending on expediency, the number of band members varied from several dozen to several hundred men. 38 39

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communications, delivered ‘languages’, and informed the command of enemy movements. As mentioned above, particularly prominent among the stratiotes were the acrytes (ακρίτες) – border/frontier guards, and apelates – raiders, cattle thieves/hijackers. The term acrytes translated as ‘frontiersman’ was derived from the Greek άκρη/ άκρον, which meant ‘outskirts’ or ‘border’, similar in Armenian to եզր42 and to the limitans of the Late Roman period. The acrytes united into communities and clans, and, depending on the international and domestic political situation, their troops could be of greater or lesser importance. In wartime they served at garrisons, with the chiefs of the acrytic militia consisting of the medium-sized and larger landowning families, who formed the basis of the heavily armed cavalry – cataphractaries (Figure 7). (Actually the troops stationed along the borders of the empire were a mixture of regular field units and local militia-stratiotes, perhaps without a clear distinction between them.) In peacetime the ordinary acrytes were occupied with farming, trade, rustling, acting as hired guides, escorting caravans, while the higher-status acrytes served in the positions of domesticus, komit(as) and lohag officers in the imperial army, or officials in local administration. The social ladder in the Roman Empire worked efficiently, and therefore many stratiotes, especially in troubled times, could rise to the highest positions, including that of a basileus. In this way, through his exceptional personal traits, Basil (Barsegh), son of an Armenian frontier man (farmer and warrior) from Thrace (Macedonia theme) enjoyed a meteoric career, from horse trainer to caesar (the second highest title in the empire after the emperor). Ultimately, through a place coup, he ascended to the throne and laid the foundation of a new dynasty.43 In many respects the acrytes resembled the Cossacks who appeared along the bordering areas (outlying districts) of Russia44 over a thousand years later, with the wars waged by Byzantium along the entire perimeter of its borders being quite comparable to the Caucasian War in 1885,45 given that Russia pursued expansionist goals in the Caucasus while Byzantium was traditionally defending. Spontaneously emerging acrytes squads were perceived critically by the central authorities, including those basileuses who came from acrytic backgrounds The resemblance of these words – close in meaning – may be explained by their common IndoEuropean roots. 43 Ter-Sahakyan 1905; Adontz 1948: 495; 1965: 384; Toumanoff 1963: 200; 1971: 131; Kašdan 1967: 174-176; 1974; 1975; Bartikyan 1985: 47-54. 44 The comparison of acrytes with Cossacks and the so-called ‘Russian Caucasians’ is more apposite than with the notion of the American hunter-frontiersmen. Like Cossacks or the ‘Caucasians,’ the acrytes, despite how they looked and acted, were tied to such state-forming social institutions as the tsar, the army, and the church. 45 The adjutant of the Commander-in-Chief of the separate Caucasian Corps, Prince Svyatopolk-Mirsky, wrote about the Caucasian War in 1855: ‘The Caucasian war is not an ordinary war; the Caucasian army is not an army making a campaign. It is rather a militant people created by Russia and opposed to the militant peoples of the Caucasus for defending Russia. This state of affairs is not established by anyone; it appeared by the force of circumstances, after many unsuccessful attempts to organize this region...’ (Knyaz’ Svyatopolk-Mirskiy 1872). 42

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Figure 6. Goliath detail of Goliath on South-East Façade Surb Khach Church Church of the Holy Cross_Akdamar Island, Van11-th cent. (David Nicolle, ‘An introduction to arms and warfare in classical Islam’, in: Islamic Arms and Armour, ed. Robert Elgood, London 1979: 169).

themselves. Many kings tried to put an end to the acrytes laissez-fair attitudes and to dissolve the self-sufficient and self-governed people’s squads. However, the inability to find an alternative to the local militia, or replace it with regular army units, as well as the high cost and unreliability of the overseas mercenary squads, made the stratiote army irreplaceable. Reaching a certain critical mass, the military contingents recruited among the Varangians (Norwegians and Anglo-Saxons, Τάγμα των Βαράγγων, Βάραγγοι),46 Slavs, Vandals, etc., eventually proved a disaster for the 46

Benedikz 1969: 20-24; Shepard 1973: 53-92; Bartusis 1992; Pryor, Jeffreys 2004.

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empire. All of this repeatedly compelled the basileuses to seek support among the local populations of the empire – from hardy shepherds in the high mountains to settlers of the military-landowner classes with various levels of prosperity or social backgrounds. The predominant ethnos among the acrytes protecting the borders along the perimeter of the empire were Armenians,47 Isaurians (the indigenous people of Asia Minor – evidently descendants of the Hittites, Luwians and Cilician Capers),48 Mardaites (possibly Armenianised, Mard tribes),49 Circassians (kasogs), the Hellenised peoples of Asia Minor (Paphlagonians, Galatians, Pontians and Cappadocians – the two latter, in fact, closely related ethnic groups) called Romans or Greeks by their contemporaries from having lost their native dialects and were now Chalcedonians. There were almost no Hellenes or Lebanese within the Byzantine land units mostly manned by Syrians, baptised Arabs, Jews, Avars, Varangians, Bulgars and Slavs; instead, the Greeks and Lebanese served in the navy. Contemporary sources noted the friability, unreliability and low-fighting qualities of Greek warriors. The predominance of the Armenian element in the eastern part of the border was not accidental: these borders of the empire passed through Armenia (Theme Armeniaca, Greek Θέμα Άρμενιάκων, Armenian Արմենիակոնի բանակաթեմ, established in 667/668, with the administrative centre still in the same Amasia),50 and were inhabited by Armenians51 from time immemorial (Figure 8). Unlike most of the assimilated ethnic groups living in the small countries of northern Syria (Commagene) and Asia Minor that bordered with Armenia, Armenians were never ‘Grecised’ (even those who professed Chalcedonism) throughout the history of Byzantium. P. Charanis is convinced that in the 6th-7th centuries Armenia was the main supplier of soldiers to the empire.52 This conviction is echoed by J. Rosser: ‘Since the sixth century Armenians migrated to Byzantium in large numbers, becoming the most adaptive among other ethnic groups in the empire; at the same time they retained their original literature, religion and art. Thousands of Armenian soldiers served in imperial forces; a number of important military commanders and civil administrators, including the emperors Leo V, Basil I, Roman I Lacapini, John I Tzimisces were Armenians.’53 This statement is confirmed by Armenian, Syrian and Arab medieval sources. During the wars and enemy raids, the acrytes fought autonomously, without relying much on the help of central authorities and only formally coordinating their actions with the capital, which carried on as normal and took little interest in the situation Bartikyan 1980: 244-250; 1987: 190-200; Part. 2. 1987. № 4; 181-193; Part. 3. 1988. № 1: 163-178; Rosser 2011: 52. 48 Мargaryan 2015: 5-91. 49 For more on this, see Bartikyan 1983: 66-82. 50 Každan 1991: 177. 51 Arutyunova-Fidanyan 1994; 1999. 52 Charanis 1959; 1961; 1966. 53 Rosser 2011. 47

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Figure 7. Cataphracts. The Column of Trajan (Lancaster, Lynne 1999, ‘Building Trajan’s Column’, American Journal of Archaeology, Archaeological Institute of America, 103 (3): 419–439).

on the borders or the lives of the frontier peoples. The latter were quite comfortable with this state of affairs: the rare, irrelevant, and incompetent interferences of the corrupt central authorities with their autonomous and self-sufficient life brought nothing but anxiety. Certainly the Byzantine emperors had to get along with the religious eclecticism on the borders of their empire. Nevertheless, from time to time some of them tried to impose Greco-Roman orthodoxy among the Armenians, Syrians, Jews, Copts, etc., or possibly to channel the processes into the mainstream. The authorities realised the importance of the official religious indoctrination of the army, especially during the period of the Byzantine Reconquista. The warrior-emperors, mostly coming from the Armenian border environment, Nicephorus II Phocas (912-965), John I Tzimisces (969-976) and Basil II Bulgaroctonus (c. 958-1025), tried to strengthen the official religious component in the spiritual education of imperial warriors.54 Among the regimental priests accompanying the Byzantine army in the campaigns were such famous saints as Monk Athanasios of Athos, the founder of the monastic order on the Holy Mount Athos, who accompanied the victorious campaign against Crete, led by the emperor Nicephorus II Phocas. In his Tactika, the Emperor, revered as a saint on Mount Athos after his death, placed special emphasis on the issue 54

For more on this, see Schlumberger 1890; Kučma 1965: 112; 2001: 69-84; 2001: 85-100; Pertusi 1974: 238.

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of spiritual and moral education of soldiers, particularly through establishing mandatory regular prayers: ‘It is necessary for the commander to establish in advance... that in the camp where all troops are stationed the army priests prayed earnestly during the glorification and at evening and morning prayers, and the whole army up to a hundred times exclaimed: ‘Lord, have mercy!’ with due attention and fear of God, and with tears; so that no one dare [deal with] some kind of labour at prayer time.’55 Nicephorus Phocas is echoed by the god-fearing Leo VI: ‘Because of this, it is necessary for you, O general, to handle and observe all things, above everything else, for the service of God. In particular, honour and revere his priests and bishops, and keep his holy temples as places of asylum…’56 (Epilogue, 8). Most likely the tradition of ideological education within the army of Christ was adopted by the Romans from the Armenians, leading for almost two centuries endless wars under the banner of the Cross with Zoroastrian Iran, and then with the Muslims; or from the Arabs who conquered lands under the green banner of Islam. Faith as the main ideological factor became the subject of discussion in Byzantine polemological treatises, beginning with the Strategicon of Mauritius. Later, the idea of the ‘most pious army’ put forward by the ‘peace-loving’ emperor,57 Leo VI the Wise, was picked up by military treatises of the middle of the 10th century. Chalcedonism was the state backbone in the empire. In polyethnic Byzantium, where the titular nation did not actually exist, the self-designation of the Byzantines as Romans, regardless of their ethnicity, was rather an idea that developed to stitch the First and Second Rome together. There were no descendants of ancient Hellenes (in the sense given to the term now) in Asia Minor, even in the Hellenistic era. Moreover, in the Middle Ages there were almost no Hellenes left in the Balkans as they were driven out by barbarian tribes, primarily Slavs58 and Avars, and later by the settlers from Asia Minor and the Armenian Highlands, whom the empire moved en masse to the Balkans to stop the onslaught of the Slavs and Turks, as the Hellenes themselves appeared to be unable to cope with this difficult task. In Asia, with its multi-layered ethnic background, the ‘Roman-Greeks’ found themselves in a very disadvantageous position with respect to such indigenous peoples as the Syrians, Armenians, Jews, pre-Arab Egyptians,59 and the Arabs The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy 1985: 140. The Taktika of Leo VI 2010: 623. Lev VI Mudryy 2012: 341. 58 Rudakov 1997: 69. 59 ‘Six centuries of Roman-Byzantine rule’ – wrote O.G. Bol’šakov – ‘did not destroy the uniqueness of Egyptian culture. Tremendous architectural monuments competed perhaps by the Alexandrian lighthouse only would remind of the great past at every step. Greek official acts, Greek city names were the external cover on an array of local Coptic culture. There was a significant Greek population only in Alexandria and large provincial centers, the overwhelming majority of the Egyptians retained their native Coptic language; correspondence, deals and divine service were maintained on it. In the everyday practice of the Coptic population all cities retained their ancient names. Egypt as one of the oldest centers of Christianity actively participated in the development of religious doctrines. The Egyptian clergy was in permanent opposition to the official church of Constantinople, refusing to accept its dogmas. Passive opposition of the Egyptians, a kind of cultural patriotism that never poured into political forms 55 56 57

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Figure 8. Byzantine Empire Themata-650.

themselves. Each of these ancient Near Eastern peoples, living there long before the appearance of the first Hellenes or Romans, had their own national identity, faith or religion, as well as national culture, based, which is very important, on the national script. Therefore orthodox Chalcedonism, Greek writing, and especially Greek orthodox literature, turned out to be the most important Roman ideological instrument designed to level the national and ethnic differences of the subjects of the empire: to make all of them Romans – not only formally, by the fact of being subjects of the Roman emperor, but also ideologically. Especially important was achieving this within the army. Jumping ahead, it is worth noting that the imperial authorities only partially managed to solve this problem. The paternalistic ‘Chalcedonisation’ of the foreign civil servants who occupied high positions in society was easy and painless, especially in the capital, with its prevalent and state-supported Chalcedonite population. However the situation was different in the eastern border provinces, not as authors of military treatises, such as Leo-Philosopher, would like to see it. The mountaineers, isolated from the capital, stubbornly held on to their identity and did anything to ensure it: via the national church, language, script, and clan traditions.

of struggle was concealed behind bitter abstract theological disputes. Egyptians were indifferent to the change of authorities, having been weaned from the active participation in deciding the fate of their own country by millennia of despotic royal rule.’ (Bol’šakov 1989: 15-16).

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Tradition of the ‘small war’ in Armenia and Asia Minor Some scholars are convinced that the adoption of a new warfare paradigm in the Byzantine Empire was due to Sassanid influence.60 Certainly, the Persian, or rather the Parthian, influence on building a new military strategy based on exhausting the enemy forces, making its army bleed, and then squeezing him out of the defended territory cannot be underestimated. The influence of neighbouring Iran on the Romans, the military sphere included, is undoubted. However, the strategy of the Scythian war as practised by the Parthian cavalry for centuries was not quite ‘small war’, as described by Byzantine military theorists, being led by the indigenous populations of the mountainous regions of Asia Minor and the Armenian highlands for as long as anyone could remember. Parthian cavalry – the forerunner of the Turkic cavalry of subsequent periods – was relatively numerous and preferred to operate in open, deserted, and waterless areas,61 luring the enemy deep into its territory and counterattacking at the first opportunity. Meanwhile the traditions of guerrilla warfare in the highlands of Asia Minor and Armenia, besides differing from Scythian warfare in scale and form, had much older roots, going back to the times of the large civil and temple communities of the Hellenistic and pre-Hellenistic periods. As is known, the large temple-civic communities existing in Comana of Pontus and Comana of Cappadocia, Zela, Ameria, Cabira, in Innaknean (Taron) and other regions of Armenia,62 in Arsamea by the Nymphaeus (Commagene), in Hyerothecion on Mount Nemrud (Commagene), in Iberia, west Iran, and other countries of the region, were the major cult centres of syncretic deities (Mehn, Ennio-Ma, AnahitAnahita, Mithra-Mihr-Apollo, Aramazd-Zeus, Vahagn-Verethragna-Ares, etc.) and characteristic of Hellenism (Figure 9). These temple communities had vast estates in collective possession, significant wealth and hierodules – sacred slaves who, as shown by Anahit Perikhanyan,63 were slaves in name only; they were free Dmitriev 2008: 5. A vivid example of Scythian warfare was Suren’s tactics in the war against Marcus Crassus in 53 BC, which ended with Roman defeat at the battle of Harran. However, in 36 BC, in the war against Marcus Antonius, ending with the complete extermination of two Roman legions and the negation of all their siege techniques, the Parthians used Armenian ‘small-war’ tactics in the highlands. The latter were obviously copied from Tigran II and Mithridates IV Eupator, who successfully applied them against Lucullus shortly before that (in 68 BC), managing to squeeze the Romans out of Armenia and causing them considerable damage. That campaign was crowned at the battle of the Aratsani River, where Armenian archers shot poisoned arrows at Romans crossing the river, while on the opposite bank they were awaited for by heavy cavalry, crushing the legions of Lucullus and compelling them to retreat. Under the pressure of his scared soldiers, Lucullus, having suffered huge losses, was forced to withdraw his army from Armenia to northern Mesopotamia. Tigran did not pursue Lucullus, deliberately letting the Romans go. 62 Margaryan 1992. 63 ‘In the period of independence, – noted A. Perikhanyan – ‘the supreme priests were their ἡγεμόνες and the inhabitants themselves were no longer considered subjects of the kings but peasants (οίγεωργοί, οί πάροικοι) or farmer-warriors subordinate to the temple and civil community led by the priest. It is appropriate to link them with the military rural settlers in Thiatira (Lydia) (QGIS.221) led by the hegemon-strategos (cf. the Ephesus inscription) in Magnesia (QGIS.229), and it will be clear that we are dealing with civilian and military settlers in the city and in chora.’ (Perikhanyan 1959). 60 61

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Figure 9. Sar-Comana.jpg (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sar-Comana.jpg).

individuals, entitled to civil rights and even privileges. The high priests of the above and other cult centres were influential. Thus the high priest of Comana of Pontus was the second highest after the king. The same was true for Iberia and Armenia. Temple complexes were well fortified and located in remote mountainous areas controlling the caravan routes that passed through the ravines, collecting duties from merchants. At the same time the temples performed the functions of administrative centres and treasuries, governed by the priests from local or external aristocracies, forming the elite of the country.64 Characteristic of these temple-civic units was the existence of their own armed detachments, led by the priests. During enemy raids, the residents of temple-civil communities and the so-called ‘choras’, i.e. surrounding settlements or villages, A typical example of such nobility was the Iranian Hayr Mardpet clan, assigned by the Armenian Orontids (Yervandids, 6th-2nd centuries BC) to protect all fortresses that contained royal treasure. The head of this family was the chief court eunuch and the tutor of the crown prince, earning him the nickname Hayr (Arm. father). The Mards, like all the ethnic groups living in Armenia, and north of it up to the Kura, were converted by Gregory the Illuminator. They were the ‘copper walls’ of Byzantium during the Arab invasion (7th century). By moving the mards to Western Armenia, the Emperor really made the South of Armenia vulnerable to Arab invasion from Syria and Mesopotamia and strengthened the Western borders, which was much more important for the Greeks, because Western Armenia defended Asia Minor. 64

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sometimes located many kilometres away from the temple, would rush under the protection of its impregnable walls, reinforcing the detachments of local militia. According to Anahit Perixanyan, the majority of the inhabitants of these communities were residents of the royal lands of λαοί βασιλικοί type, free community peasants or military settlers – catoyks and cleruches, who lived in numerous fortifications and fortresses scattered along the chora. They were not directly subordinated to the temple, but were under the command of the high priest as the king’s governor in the district. According to sources, a few, well-armed squads of cleruches and catoyks proved to be brave and resolute warriors. During external threats, the enclaves of the temple and civil communities did not fully rely on their kings (be it the Seleucids or local dynasts) and acted independently, mostly by partisan methods, as the Greek-Macedonian phalanx was ineffective in the mountains of Pontus, Cappadocia, Commagene, and Armenia. At the same time the king’s power in these communities was often formal and the kings had to accept their autonomy and be content with them as a reliable and inexpensive barrier against possible enemy attacks.65 Obviously, the theme organisation of the borderland existing in these areas was not a purely Iranian borrowing. It existed in the Near East from ancient times and was only legitimised under Emperor Heraclius (610-641). This system was by no means an innovation, at least in Asia Minor and Armenia, having existed there long before the reforms of the Sassanid king Xosrow I Anuširuwan (531-579) and Heraclius, who, according to G. Ostrogorsky, was the creator of medieval Byzantium.66 Similarly the equestrian chivalry that became a model for the entire medieval feudal society was not a purely Parthian invention. The traditions of equestrian chivalry in the above areas had very old roots, arising at least in parallel with those in the Iranian world. All the listed military tactical ideas and methods of warfare were innovations for the Mediterranean Romans and Greeks, but not for the peoples of the Near East. Thus, the acryte army traditions, strategy and tactics for waging ‘small wars’ in mountainous regions went back to Hellenism periods, or perhaps much earlier, to the times of confrontation between the Hittite (Asia Minor) and Hayasa kingdoms (western Armenia, 14th-13th century BC).67 Acrytes vs imperial authorities Despite the obvious utility, and even irreplaceability, of acryte troops, the imperial authorities did not always favour the Anatolian, and especially Armenian, acrytes (before the creation of the themata system and the theme-stratiotic militia in the 7th century the tensions and conflicts of the central government in the east of the empire were mainly connected with the basic Armenian princedoms – naxararutyuns).68 Perikhanyan 1959: 77-81; Bickerman 1985: 80-82. Ostrogorski 1940: 96. 67 See Kapancyan 1947. 68 The first and quite successful attempt to weaken the Armenian ‘satrap’ and the naxarar houses was made by Justinian (see Adontz 1908: 28-45). The crowned reformer introduced two large innovations regarding the new status of the ancient Armenian aristocratic families: ‘On the hereditary right of Armenians’ and ‘On Armenians and their following the Roman laws in everything’. In these Novellas, 65 66

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After the imperial authorities succeeded in weakening and practically eliminating the Armenian naxarar houses, their place was almost immediately occupied by other, not so ancient and self-sufficient, but very influential, Armenian clans: the Doukas, Gabras (Gavras), Kekaumenos, Kurkuases (Gurgenides), Phocas, Skleros, Vatatzes, Vrachamios, Museles (Mušeghids), Taronites, Apokapes and Basilakis, Bourtzes, Tornikioi, Theodorokanoi, Dalassenoi.69 Although these clans belonged to the nobility, they did not descend from the ancient Armenian naxarar families. Some tried to elevate their genealogy to this or that exterminated Armenian or Parthian naxarar house, but, with the exception of the Mamikoneans and Pahlavuni (perhaps one of the Kamsarakan branch), all attempts by the great Byzantine feudal lords of Armenian descent seemed unconvincing. Nevertheless, the families of the outstanding Byzantine political and military figures (Narseh, Melias (Mleh, Mlents)) – the founder of the theme of Lykandos, the famous Varda Phocas, the legendary Manuel Mamikoneans, John and Theophilos Kurkuases, Roman Museles, Gregory Taronites, Katakalon Kekaumenos, Gregory Pakourianos (Bakuryan) and many others), all came from this social environment (Figure 10). Dislike of acrytes often led to open confrontations, with negative consequences for both the acrytes and the empire, moreover recurrences of anti-acrytes sentiments seemed to coincide for some reason with the most difficult periods in its history. Perhaps the most dangerous and harmful measure of the empire against the acryte army was the deportation by Emperor Mauricius (582–602) of Armenians – native peoples of the borderlands from their historical homeland – to Thrace, North Africa and Crimea, and as a result he exposed entire sections of the eastern frontier. To close the gaps the empire hastened to resettle here acrytes from other eastern regions, or, worse, barbarians from other parts of the empire, thus making the border even more vulnerable. Undoubtedly by shuffling the indigenous and alien populations like a deck of cards, from one end of the empire to the other, the authorities pursued primarily political purposes, which often overbalanced the military objectives. The consequences of the forced resettlement of Mardaites (an ancient tribe of unknown origin) into the ‘copper walls’ in deepest Byzantium were absolutely negative for the empire. According to H. Bartikyan, Mardaites were descendants of the ancient tribal union of Mards – Armenised Iranians70 who professed Christianity like Armenians, while living in the east of the Armenian highlands.71 It is unknown the Armenians are ordered to completely drop their way of life and common laws governing the Naхarar order: ‘We wish our laws to fully apply to Armenians’, declared Justinian in his second innovation adding: ‘... so that good laws were also in force in the country of Armenians and to make sure that they did not differ in any way from our state’, etc. In the Foreword to Novella 21, ‘On Armenians and their following the Roman laws in everything’, published on 18 March 536, Justinian declared that ‘We taught them [Armenians - E.M.] to apply Roman laws and codes and ordered them to be governed only by the laws accepted by the Romans’. 69 See Fisсhеr, 1889; ‘Pravoslavnaya Enciklopediya’ 2004: 214-215. 70 Bartikyan 1983: 66-82. 71 The area of the Mards’ initial territory in the Armenian highlands was southeast of Lake Van. In Armenian sources it is called ‘Bun (Actual) Mardasta’. According to Strabo, after the defeat of Darius III many tribes and peoples allied to Persians continued resisting Alexander the Great (XI, 6, 1) and the

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Figure 10. Alexander romance. Armenian illuminated manuscript of_XIV century.Venice, San Lazzaro, 424 (https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Древнеармянская_переводная_ литература#cite_note-_11f3e21175b5c963-4).

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how they, in the figurative expression of Theophanous, managed to ‘ascend’ into the Syrian/Lebanon mountains. Byzantine authors translated the ethnonym of this nationality from Aramaic as ‘rebels, apostates, robbers’ (similar to Russian Cossacks), and the Arabs called them jarajima.72 In any event, they had an organised army and were the stronghold of imperial power in the east. The Roman emperors feared and disliked any semi-independent formation populated by robust ethnic groups, adhering, in addition, to their ethno-confessional ideas. Therefore these populations were often resettled in remote parts of the empire, away from their native lands, to their own detriment and that of the empire. According to Theophanous, after the defeat at Yarmouk the Romans left Lebanon and Syria. It is unknown what else the Arabs could still have seized if the militant Mardaites were not in their way. Fighting with small forces, with no support from the Greeks, they managed to stop the Arab advance deep into the empire. Unlike the Romans, the Mardaites skilfully used the advantages of the mountainous relief and small-war tactics. Moreover, time and again, wherever possible they would break the frontline with counter offensives. The acryte tactics of warfare caused considerable losses to the enemy. In some concern, Mu’awiyah, then the governor of Syria and the future caliph, immediately understood the danger to the Caliphate represented by the Mardaites, and the acryte cavalry of Theodoros Rštuni was forced to retreat and turned to Emperor Constantine with the proposal of peace on favourable conditions for Romans. Apprehending the successes of the Mardaite acrytes the emperor hastened to take advantage of the opportunity to get rid of them. This is how Theophanous the Confessor described the history of the Mardaites deportation: ‘In this year [AM 6169/AD 669] the Mardaites entered the Lebanon range and made themselves masters from the Black Mountain as far as the Holy City and captured the pick of Lebanon. Many slaves, captives and natives took refuge with them, so that in a short time they grew to many thousands. When Mauias and his advisers learned of this they were much afraid, realising that the Roman Empire was guarded by God. So he sent ambassadors to the emperor Constantine, asking for peace and promising to pay yearly tribute to the emperor. Upon receiving these ambassadors and hearing the request, the emperor dispatched with them to Syria the patrician John... After exchanging many conciliatory speeches, they mutually agreed to draw up a written treaty of peace under oath, stipulating yearly tribute of three thousand [pieces] of gold, fifty captives and fifty thoroughbred horses to be paid by the Hagarenes to the Roman state. These conditions having been approved

Mards proved particularly stubborn among them. According to Isidore of Charax, under Phraates I (176171) the Mards were assigned the protection of mountain passages (Isidor Xarakskiy 2000: 408-411). According to Plutarch, Mard light cavalry fought in the front ranks of Tigran’s army at the Aratsani River (68 BC), where Lucullus was defeated by Tigran II the Great (Plut. Liv., 21. XXI. 5-6). For Mards in Armenia, see Danielyan 1976: 203-208. 72 See The Encyclopaedia of Islam, sv. Djardjma 2016.

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by both sides for a duration of thirty years, complete peace prevailed between the Romans and the Arabs.73 ‘In this year [AM 6178/AD 678], Abimelech sent emissaries to emperor Justinian to ratify the peace and on these terms: that the emperor should remove the host of Mardaites from Lebanon and prevent their incursions; that Abimelech would give the Romans every day a thousand gold [pieces], a horse and a slave; and that they would share in equal parts the tax revenue of Cyprus, Armenia, and Iberia. The emperor sent magistrianus Paul to Abimelech in order ratify the agreement… The emperor sent orders to receive the Mardaites, recalled 12,000 of them, thereby injuring the Roman state: for all the cities along the border that are now inhabited by Arabs, from Mopsuestia to the Fourth Armenia were then weak and uninhabited because of the assaults of the Mardaites. Since this time they have been repressed and the Roman country has been suffering terrible ills at the hands of the Arabs until this day.’74 None too clever also was the decision to dissolve the state formation of Jabiyya allied to Byzantium. This small kingdom in Eastern Palestine (Jordan), known also as the Hassanid state,75 belonged to the Syrian church and held under its control all Arab tribes and small kingdoms. In 529 Justinian proclaimed Haris ibn Sa’alba, the ruler of Syria, the title of king of the Arabs and that of a patrician for the Byzantines. The Hassanids were gradually disseminating the Syrian version of Christianity, close and understandable to Arabs, and if not for Byzantium the Monophysitism would continue spreading it further southwards until the entire Arab world was involved. However in 585 Mauritius, most likely under a false pretext, accused the Arab king Mundar ibn-Harith of treason and liquidated the Hassanid state. The spread of Christianity among the Arabs ceased, creating favourable conditions for the birth of Islam and the Arab Caliphate (after all, as the saying goes, ‘a holy place is never empty’). That the Hassanidеs were not planning a mutiny against the empire is confirmed by the fact that Prophet Muhammad had been repeatedly sending envoys to the overthrown Hassanids,76 offering them the highest positions possible if they sided with their blood brothers and helped in war against the scheming Romans, known for their treachery and ingratitude, but they refused. After a small victory over an Arab cavalry detachment in an accidental skirmish, the Byzantines decided that Arabia was not a threat;77 moreover, the empire had recently defeated the Sassanids and was stronger than ever. Therefore official in Constantinople stopped paying subsidies to their allies – the Arab federates – resulting in the conversion en masse of those people to Islam. Even the governor Farwa ibn-Amir of the Jazz tribe, who had been The Chronicle of Theophanes 1997: 496. The Chronicle of Theophanes 1997: 506. 75 Šahid 1995; Zahran 2007. 76 Krivov 1985: 155-156. 77 Krivov 1985: 156. 73 74

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faithfully serving Byzantium, rejected Christianity and accepted Islam, whereupon the enraged Byzantines captured and tortured Farwa to make him renounce the new faith, but he was unswerving and took a martyr’s death on the cross. It is noteworthy that the Romans promised Farwa that they would restore the Arab kingdom and make him the ruler of all Arabs, but Farwa had lost his trust in Byzantium and its false promises, remaining faithful to the Prophet and his teachings. His last words were: ‘Tell the leader of the Muslims that I am ready to sacrifice myself and give all I have for the sake of Allah.’78 Of course, Farwa’s steadfastness in his new faith, even under torture, cannot be explained as just another disappointment to the imperial authorities; the earnest preaching of the adepts of the new religion truly appealed to the souls of Arabs and turned them away from the Romans. Yet the martyrdom of Farwa apparently sobered the Byzantines. In view of the Muslim threat, and trying to stop the mass defection and conversion of Arabs to Islam, in 629/630 Heraclius made certain concessions to the Arab nobility and restored the bordering Arab kingdom ruled by Jabal,79 who in turn recognised his vassal dependence on the emperor.80 However, restoration of the Hassanid state by the Romans was belated. Being proclaimed a king in 631/632, Jabal needed time to restore the state apparatus, develop diplomatic relations with the neighbouring Arab princes, as well as to draft and train troops. But there was no time. In 634/635 already the major part of his kingdom was occupied by Arabs,81 most of whom, once fighting for Byzantium, defected to side with its enemies. Yet Jabal’s forces took part in the battle at Yarmouk, where the followers of Muhammad directed their main assault on their Christian compatriots, who fled, being unable to withstand the furious Muslim onslaught. The Muslims did not take Arab Christian captives. Thus the thoughtless actions of Heraclius and his haughty grandees weakened the empire and delivered Syria right into the hand of the enemy. The consequences of the liquidation of the Armenian kingdoms in Greater Armenia and the resettlement of a highly developed settled population to the eastern regions of Byzantium by Basil Bulgaroctonus and Konstantin Monomach, on the very eve of the Seljuk invasion, were even worse. (Almost as if the Emperors were deliberately preparing living space for the arrival of the Turks). To dilute the predominantly Armenian contingent of acryte squads, the Romans intended to settle the lands of western Armenia with foreigners from other regions of the empire instead of deported Armenians. However repeated attempts by the Byzantine emperors were of little success. The overseas aliens, or re-settlers from other regions of the empire (Avars, Saxons, Normans, Bulgarians, Slavs, etc.), did not stay there long – life in the Xišam, Abd ab-Malik ibn 2003: 582-583. Pigulevskaja 1964: 213-214. 80 At the same time the Romans recognised the semi-independent status of Byzantine Armenia, appointing, at the request of the Armenian naxarars, rulers of the country (639) – a representative of an ancient aristocratic family, a talented army commander and visionary – Theodoros Rštuni (Whittow 1996: 209). It is worth noting that on the eve of the Arab invasion the Sassanids, desperately needing the help of Armenian cataphracts, also started flirting with Armenian naxarars. 81 Krivov 1985: 156. 78 79

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high-mountain border fortresses was too severe and dangerous. Moreover, lacking the farming skills necessary for mountainous zones, they left the land granted to them and went home at the first opportunity, or were assimilated into the local population. At the same time any successful synoikia (συνοικία) led to Armenisation, rather than Hellenisation, of the aliens. First of all this involved those excellent warriors, the Isaurians and Mardaites, whom the Byzantine authorities trusted least of all; they were closer to Armenians in spirit and faith than others, plus they shared a common dislike for imperial authority (especially after their forcible deportation from their homelands).82 It is no wonder that the central authorities sought to replace the acryte squads, consisting of local men, with the imperial field army, or at least with alien squads – the so-called ‘proniars’. Being experienced and tough warriors, the Armenian and Anatolian stratiotes bravely defended the borders of their land but were not eager to fight for the king along the distant borders of the empire; nor did they not want to become mere weapons in the hands of courtier grandees (even of Armenian or Isaurian origin) in their struggles for power. Another action by the emperors to resettle acryte squads to distant lands, sometimes without their families, led to endless unrest and mutinies. The Armenian acrytes did not think of themselves as simply mercenaries, and were motivated to fight (albeit far from home, i.e. at the battle of Yarmouk River) only when the empire, and hence their homes, was threatened with real danger. Whenever drafted, the Armenian stratiotes fought in good faith against barbarians and other external enemies,83 but it was not their Similarly the Russian troops that fought in the Caucasus in the middle of the 19th century differed strikingly from the regular army of the Russian Empire in form, armaments, way of life, and tactics. As noted by Leo Tolstoy, participant in the Caucasian war, in his novel The Cossacks: ‘Living among the Čečens, the Cossacks became related with them and internalised the customs, way of life and mores of the mountain people; but they retained the Russian language and the old faith there, in all their former purity... So far the Cossack families are considered to be related to Čečens, and the love of freedom, idleness, looting and war are the main features of their character... The Cossack, by inclination hates the mountaineer horseman who killed his brother less than the soldier standing with him to protect his village, but who smoked out his house with tobacco. He respects the enemy-mountaineer but he despises the soldier who is a stranger and oppressor for him. Actually, the Russian peasant is some kind of alien, wild and deplorable creature for the Cossack, in whom he sees a petty tradesman and a Malorossian resettler, whom the Cossacks scornfully call šapoval. Their dandyism in clothing consists in imitating the Circassians. The best weapons are obtained from the highlanders; best horses are bought or stolen from them. A strong Cossack flaunts his knowledge of the Tatar language and, after getting drunk, speaks Tatar even with his own brother.’ (Tolstoy 1936: 15-16). 83 Procopius of Caesarea mentioned many Armenians, Persians (apparently Parthians), Paphlagonians, Cappadocians and Syrians fighting on the western borders of the empire. One of them was an Armenian soldier retainer of Narses by name of Anzalas, who won fame in the wars of the Emperor Justinian against the Goths: ‘… But later on one man from the Gothic army, named Coccas, who had a great reputation as an active fighter, rode his horse out and came close to the Roman army and uttered a challenge, if anyone was willing to come forth against him in single combat. Now this Coccas happened to be one of the Roman soldiers who had previously deserted to Totila. And immediately one of the spearmen of Narses stood forth against him, a man of Armenian birth named Anzalas, who was likewise mounted on a horse. Coccas then made the first rush and charged his foe in order to smite him with his spear, aiming the weapon at his belly. But Anzalas, by suddenly turning his horse aside, frustrating his enemy’s charge. By this manoeuvre he was placed on his enemy’s flank and he now thrust his spear into his left side. Coccas fell from his horse to the ground and lay there a dead man, whereupon a tremendous shout arose from the Roman army, but even then neither side began any fighting.’ (Procopius 1928: VIII, XXXI, 11-18). See 82

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habit to fight at the whim of another palace clique for the sake of incomprehensible political expediencies. Noteworthy in this respect is the passage in the Sebeos’ History (Chapter X, 56): ‘Once again [during the reign of the Emperor Maurice] the remaining  naxarars of Armenia started to unite, seeking to stop serving the Byzantine emperor. They also wanted to enthrone their own king so that they too would not have to go to Thrace to die, but rather [they planned] to stay where they were and die upon their own soil. But there was disunity in their councils regarding what they established. And some of them went as informers taking the story to the emperor’s ears. Then [the rebels] dispersed here and there eluding [the Byzantine forces].’84 The resentment of the Armenian nobility and rank-and-file soldiers was aggravated by the fact that the Greeks themselves, being in some sense the title nation, were not at all eager to fight against the external enemies of the empire, preferring to engage in safer activities in the rear. One way or another, the acryte laissez-fair always generated mutinies, heresies, iconoclastic movements, thereby infuriating the emperors and court (one can also see the uncompromising resemblance of acrytes to Russian Cossacks). The emperors, quite reasonably, saw a threat in allowing the acrytes free reign, not only to the foundations of the centralised state but also to their personal power. After all, most of the usurpers came from the Armenian border environment (although most often they were not from Armenia itself. By tearing the armed people away from their roots, the emperors automatically turned the settled stratiotes into ruthless adventurers looking for wealth and glory wherever possible: a coin has two sides). The attitude of the urban population, including the Constantinople Armenians, to the acrytes was also negative. The acrytes and apelates were perceived as carriers of an anti-state, anarchic principle, seeking a communal way of life or feudal-republican governance, while in the eyes of the Byzantine scribes the natural and legal was simply monarchical order. Republicanism, like any independence in general, seemed almost witchcraft. At times the rulers and authorities in Constantinople did all they could, although with no particular success, by means of bribery or otherwise, to restrain or control the acrytes. Thus, the author of the treatise De velitatione bellica, attributed to Emperor Nicephorus II Phocas, complained: ‘ Ἐν δὲ ταῖς ἄκραις τῶν ἀρμενικῶν θεμάτων, ἐπεὶ οἱ Ἀρμένιοι οὐ καλῶς οὐδὲ ἀσφαλῶς τὴν τῶν βιγλῶν ἐκτελοῦσι δουλείαν, ὀφειλόμενόν ἐστι φυλάττεσθαι τὸν ἀπὸ παλαιοῦ κρατήσαντα τύπον ἐν ταῖς βίγλαις τῶν Ἀρμενίων, καὶ ἀνθρώπους ἐπιλέγεσθαι καὶ ἀπογράφεσθαι ἐπιτηδείους, λαμβάνοντας μισθὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοῦ ἐπισωρευόμενον, ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ τοιοῦτος στρατὸς τῇ τῶν βιγλῶν λειτουργίᾳ ὑπηρετεῖν ὤφειλεν, ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀννώναν ἑκάστῳ μηνὶ τὴν τετυπωμένην, καὶ ὑπαλλάττειν αὐτοὺς καθ’ ἕκαστον μῆνα καὶ δι’ αὐτῶν τὰς ὁδούς, ἐν αἷς οἱ πολέμιοι ἐξέρχονται, φυλάττειν ἀσφαλῶς. Ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ αὐτοὶ οἱ μετὰ μισθοῦ καὶ ἀννώνας, Ἀρμένιοι ὄντες, καλῶς τῇ τῶν βιγλῶν ὑπηρετοῦσι δουλείᾳ, ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποστελλομένων κατασκόπων χρὴ τὰς κινήσεις τῶν φοσσάτων ἀναμανθάνειν, καὶ τραπεζίτας ἐπιλέγεσθαι γενναίους καὶ also: Amory 2003: 368; Bury 1958: 265. 84 Sebeos History 1996.

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ἀνδρείους, οὓς οἱ Ἀρμένιοι τασιναρίους καλοῦσι …’ / On the border of the Armenian themes, where the Armenians may be acting as sentries, the regulations which have been in force from ancient times should be observed, since the Armenians carry out sentry duties rather poorly and carelessly … They should receive the stipulated allowance each month. Their duty is to guard the roads along which the enemy may approach. But even with the salary and monthly allowance, these men are not very likely to perform sentry duty well, for, after all, they are still Armenians.’85 The fact is that the Armenian frontier men served on both sides of the border – some were relatives. Armenian merchants, especially retail traders, crossed the borders freely, encountering no obstacles from the acrytes and apelates, being their relatives or kunaks (blood brothers). Local residents on both sides of the border knew each other in person and had no hostile feelings towards each other. However, all of this aroused distrust and fear on the Roman side, annoyed both by the acrytes themselves and by the status quo they had established on the border. The acrytes felt the same for the Romans. Any efforts of officials commissioned by the capital to put things to rights and curb the free reign of the acrytes ended in nothing. Nevertheless, the authorities periodically repeated their attempts to reformat the eastern and southern themata of the empire, which could not but affect the defence capabilities of the border units. Reorganisation of acryte military contingents was implemented by means of their ‘bureaucratisation’, involvement into the field imperial army, and the propagation of traditional drills in the spirit of the ancient Roman army. All of this negatively told on the independence of commanders and fighters, suppressing military initiative. The specificity of the ongoing border war, where an independent, fighter with initiative was more likely to survive, seemed to exclude regimented, formal discipline. Acryte officers had to complete complex tactical tasks without regard for bureaucratic Constantinople. According to the English historian J.B. Bury, it was the long struggle with the Saracens in the East that gave rise to a new type of warrior, the cavalry man (καβαλλάριος) – the horseman, knight (Ritter), ‘whose heart yearned for adventure and who was used to acting regardless of the orders of the emperor or military superiors...’86 However, the main reasons why imperial authorities tolerated acryte freedoms and postponed reorganising their squads into a field army were financial ones. The maintenance of even a few field units, the ‘comitatenses’, was a heavy burden on the imperial treasury. Digenis ironically remarked to the Roman king visiting him on the Euphrates: ‘And despite that, you are spending on soldiers beyond all measure’ (IV, 1031 ). Unlike the Constantinople comitatenses, the stratiotic units earned their living by peaceful labour and raids on enemy lands. Nevertheless, in the 10th-11th centuries the Byzantine authorities went on the offensive against the acryte forces. Perhaps one of the reasons for their unwillingness 85 86

The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy 1985: 153. Vasil’jev 1998: 116.

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to have an army consisting of local stratiotes was the growing feudalisation of the state, which led to the strengthening of the role of the Armenian and Anatolian nobility in the army and state administration. Reaction to such unwillingness by the capital’s elites to make space was followed by the major uprisings of Bardas Skleros and Bardas Phocas. Many were probably scared by the prospect of similar occurrences in eastern Armenia, weakened under the last Bagratids due to the fragmentation and wilfulness of the local provincial nobility despite its huge potential. The weakening of many traditional enemies of Byzantium,87 and successes in foreign policy achieved under the rule of the Macedonian dynasty, created the illusion of invulnerability of the Byzantine Empire among the capital’s elites. There was confidence that Byzantium was no longer threatened, and it itself could become a threat, therefore defence forces creating so much trouble on the ground were no longer needed and it was time to change the military doctrine of the empire, that saw itself now as the true heir of Rome and the light of Orthodoxy. It is difficult not to agree with Henri Gregoire, who believed that having reached the apogee of its grandeur under Basil II, Byzantium was imbued with the idea of its own superiority and fell into excessive carelessness. Under Basil II the Byzantine authorities had already returned to the old idea that it is more expedient to rely on barbarian mercenaries (especially on account of the surplus manpower available for enlisting mercenary squads at the time) than to maintain local armed troops.88 This was sometimes even expressed by such outstanding tacticians of acryte warfare as the Phocases. Thus the introductory part of De velitatione bellica reads: ‘For Christ, our true God, has greatly cut back the power and strength of the offspring of Ismael and has repelled their onslaughts. Nevertheless, in order that time, which leads us to forget what we once knew, might not completely blot out this useful knowledge, we think we ought to commit it to writing. If in the future, then, some situation should arise in which Christians need this knowledge, it will be ready to assist those who have the responsibility of using it, as well as the entire commonwealth.’89 Yet mercenaries were of little help in protecting the borders of the empire, instead they were helpful in conquering neighbouring countries, punitive operations, forcing satellite communities to obey, and keeping subjects, especially the eastern satraps, in fear. Of course, the maintenance of ‘condottieri’ in peacetime was a burden to the treasury, but in wartime mercenary units payed off with interest. Hence the logical conclusion – it is better to fight in a foreign land, rather than in one’s own. Changes in military doctrine led to reformatting the defensive structure of the empire, especially in the east: reduced was the number of themata; troops were Many barbarian tribes switched to settled lives; their elites, imitating Byzantium, converted to orthodoxy and started their own state formation. 88 Levčenko 1950: 233. 89 The Anonymous Byzantine Treatise on Strategy 1985: 147. 87

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consolidated in five large regional divisions, separated by tagmas. Under the Komnenos, acryte squads were finally disbanded. Instead of military duties, the government imposed taxes that were to be spent on recruiting mercenaries overseas (Varangians, Slavs, Anglo-Saxons, Polovtsians, etc.), thereby releasing local populations from the need to fight in defence of their homes. Benjamin of Tudela, the Jewish traveller who visited Constantinople at the time, painted the Roman army in this light: ‘Wealth like that of Constantinople is not to be found in the whole world. Here also are men learned in all the books of the Greeks, and they eat and drink, every man under his vine and his fig-tree. They hire from amongst all nations warriors called Loazim (Barbarians) to fight with the Sultan Masoud, King of the Togarmim (Seljuks), who are called Turks; for the natives are not warlike, but are as women who have no strength to fight.’90 (Emperor Manuel I Komnenos, hiring numerous European knights for his army,91 compared them to ‘steel cauldrons’ in contrast with the Greeks, whom he called ‘clay pots’.) Like ancient Roman praetorians, the mercenaries began to control the destinies of the empire. They freely interfered in the internal lives of the capital’s great families, participating in plots and palace coups. However, to protect the interests of the political groups who bribed them, and in order to influence the life of the country, they had to stay in the City – explaining why the Varangians, Saxons and Slavs were not at all eager to serve on the eastern border, where they would have to fight real enemies. Manuel aggravated the situation by adding the taxes collected for the maintenance of the army to the main treasury, thus diluting army funds among other regular expenditures of less than paramount importance. Widespread corruption and court excesses absorbed the funds allocated to the army. Defaults in payment for military service gave rise to riots among mercenaries and various categories of servicemen. To improve the situation, Manuel introduced the proniary system of army maintenance, resembling the European benefice system. To liberate the capital from scheming dignitaries and mercenary commanders with their cutthroat squads, constantly demanding pay for nothing, Manuel started granting them lands in the east.92 Some scholars suggest that the proniary troops of the early Palaiologos period were in effect revived stratiote militia, but this opinion is not really convincing.93 Judging from the History of Niketas Choniates, who was annoyed by Manuel’s recruiting methods and maintenance of the mercenaries and proniaries, the true state of things looked as follows: ‘The Romans made a rule... to pay salaries to soldiers and make frequent inspections... But that king collected Benjamin of Tudela 1907: 23; Kos’minskij (ed.) 1951: 214. ‘...Likewise preference shown by Manuel to the West’ – wrote A.A. Vasil’yev – ‘alien to Byzantium, and in those days still unable to equal Byzantine culture, brought fatal consequences for the state. Accepting foreigners with open arms and giving them the most responsible and advantageous positions aroused so much indignation among his subjects that bloody clashes could be expected at the first opportunity.’ (Vasil’jev 1998: T. 2 Ch. 6). 92 Každan and Epstein 1985: 172. 93 Zolotovskij 2015: 100-115; 2016. 90 91

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all the money provided for the soldiers’ maintenance in his treasuries as water in a pond, and slaked the thirst of the troops by the so-called gratuitous offerings of the population, using the work invented by previous kings, and only occasionally allowed to soldiers who often smashed the enemies. Thus he, without even noticing it, weakened the army and wasted an abyss of money on idle wombs, and worsened the situation in Roman provinces. In these conditions the best warriors lost the competition in danger, since what motivated them to show military prowess was no longer something special as before... but was made available to all. And the inhabitants of the provinces who formerly dealt with only one state treasury suffered the greatest oppression from the insatiable greed of the soldiers, who not only denuded them of silver and obols but also took their last shirt...’94 Yet despite the empire’s short-sighted policy concerning the acrytes (Romanos Diogenes decided to convert the Armenians into Chalcedonism just on the eve of the Manzikert battle), they were still the main defenders of its borders. Any time when the empire was in trouble and shaken it was not mercenaries or noble proniaries who fought desperately against the Turks and Saracens on its borders. The resistance to nomads in Asia Minor and western Armenia almost always concentrated around the ancient cities and settlements and was always organised by indigenous populations. Having lost any support from the capital after the defeat of Romanos Diogenes at Manzikert (Manazkert, Manavazkert) in 1071, the acrytes did not stop fighting the enemy and remained a faithful (although split and broken) shield of the empire. While the acrytes, alone, were desperately resisting the nomads, the capital was gripped with depression and confusion. According to Michael the Syrian: ‘Now the emperor of the Greeks Michael [VII, Parapinaces, 1071-1078] was weak and a womanizer and had no interest in war. He was afraid of the Turks. He sat around eating and drinking’ (IV, 166).95 Isolation and loss of communication with the centre, and chaos in the capital, should inevitably lead to the secession of once-bordering administrative units of the empire and the turning of the so-called Armenian or acryte themes into independent state formations ruled by Armenian dynasties.96 Distinguished among these principalities were the clans of Domesticus of the East, Sebastos and Augustus Philartos (Philaretos) Varažnuni, Basil Gogh and the Cilician Rubenides, who created independent states,97 while the Ošinid principality remained loyal to Byzantium until the capturing by the Rubenides of their ancestral estate – impregnable Lambron and many other fortresses. Owing to his energy and persistence, Philaretos Brachamios (Φιλάρετος Βραχάμιος), the descendant of the ancient Armenian clan of Vahavia (the Vahramids), with small forces much inferior to those of the enemy, managed to create a virtually Nikita Xoniat 1860-1862: 269. The Chronicle of Michael the Great, Patriarch of the Syrians 2013. 96 Dédéyan 1981: 73-102; 1993: 67-85. 97 Mikaelyan 1952. 94 95

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independent Armenian state in the Euphrates contact zone – the homeland of Digenis Acrytes and the Paulician commanders Karbeas (Karapet) and Chrisochir.98 This is how the rise of Philaretos99 is described by Michael the Syrian: ‘The Turk Emir Danišmend invaded the region of Cappadocia and subdued Sevastia, Caesarea and other places in the northern region. The Danišmendi clan comes from him. Suddenly, along with the appearance of these possessions, there appeared a new estate in those parts, which quickly expanded. Kidnappers100 of Armenians, numbering about fifty men, united and formed a detachment. Taking advantage of the Turkic invasion they advanced and began to engage in various crimes. In the Maraš area they met a young man, Philaretos, also Armenian... He was strong, insidious, bold in destruction and slaughter, and they took him with them. He became their chieftain. And when these regions were left without leadership these Armenians ravaged them simultaneously with the Turks. Then Philaretos captured one of the fortresses in the region of Cilicia. A large number of Armenians gathered around him and he continued capturing other fortified places [fortresses] in Cilicia. Hearing about this, the emperor of the Greeks sent him gifts. Then Philaretos headed to Constantinople and the Greeks were happy about it. They presented gold weaponry to him and proclaimed him augustus. Then he went and consolidated in Tarsus and Mopsuestia, seized Maraš, Kišum, Ra’ban, Edessa, Anazarba and entered Antioch. He fortified and penetrated the areas of Jihad and Melitene. Possessing a numerical superiority he, together with the Greek army,101 fought against the Turks. But he was unable to withstand them [long] and therefore left, despicably, his religion, went to Bagdad, then to Xorasan and became a Muslim.102 He received charters from the Caliph and the Turkic Sultan, according to which he was granted the places he captured. When he returned he saw that the Turks controlled most of the regions including those owned by him... He went to Maraš where he died... This Philaretos entrusted Melitene to the rule of Thoros... After him was the Armenian Hareb, then Balasian, and later Gabriel, under whom Buzan captured it [Melitene].’103 As we see, the Armenian and Syrian authors did not spare the black paint when describing this outstanding military and political figure. The reason was Philaretos’ apostasy. Tradition says that he himself regretted his defection, that is why, on his return to Maraš, he did not fight to restore his power in the region, despite having the possibility to do so. Instead he returned to the faith of his fathers. Michael the Syrian adds more: ‘They say that before his death he again converted to the Christian faith’ (XV, 4). Philaretos died in 1086 in one of the remote Armenian monasteries of his native Vaspurakan, where the Turks found and killed him for his murtad, randomly shedding Turkic blood. Philaretos accepted his death calmly, having time to say a last prayer. Garsoïan 1967. Gravett and Nicolle 2006; Yarnley 1972: 331-353; Finlay 1854. 100 I.e. apelates. 101 To help Philaretos, Constantinople sent a Frankish squad of 8000 men. 102 Philaret had already renounced the faith of his forefathers, accepting the Greek confession; now it was easier to convert to the faith of those against whom he had been fighting for a whole decade. 103 Andrews 2016: 64-66; Gusejnov (ed.) 1979. 98 99

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After the collapse of Philaretos’ principality, some parts of his possessions were ruled by his former associates and vassals, the most influential of whom was Prince Basil (Vasil), nicknamed ‘Gogh’ (Arm. ‘stealer’, i.e. ‘apelates’). He received that nickname because of his use of acryte tactics, taking his enemies by stealth and surprise. His successes in the war against Turkic nomads were no less impressive than those of Philaretos. Relying on small, but maneuverable forces, he managed to seize fortified positions in the north-east Cilician mountains: Kaysun (Kesun), Hromkla, Maraš. Under the rule of his heir, prince Basil Tgha (‘Youth’), these regions passed to the Crusaders. The brother of Gogh Basil, Bagrat, also owned several fortresses. The following generations of Armenian acrytes seceded from Byzantium and created the Cilician Armenian principality of Rubenides, from which, in 1198, emerged the Armenian Cilician kingdom. The successes of the Cilician Armenian army should be sought in the use of centuries-old traditional acryte tactics, but the history of acrytes ends in Cilicia. The parallels traceable between Philaretos, Basil Apelates, and other figures of acryte descent, and the Gavras clan – another Armenian acryte family of the same period – are clear. The Gabras (Gavras, Greek: Γαβρᾶς) were large landowners in aldia, Kolonei and Armeniaca (Pontus and north-western Armenia). Being an outpost of the empire in the west the Gavrases, at the same time, were known for their anti-imperial stance,104 which might be explained by mutual rejection of values (not religious, as the Gavrases quite early converted to Chalcedonism), professed by the capital’s elite and Eastern frontier men. Relying on the local acryte squads, the Gabrases defended the northeastern borders of the empire, primarily the approaches to the Black Sea, from the Seljuks and Danišmendids. During the war one of the Gabrases, Theodore, died as a martyr105 in the Turkic captivity and was beatified. It is worth noting that Theodore Gabras became also a hero of Turkic folklore where he was sung as a noble and brave opponent. The name of the Gabras (Gavras) family comes from the root GBR (Arabic  kafir, Persian gabr or Turkish gavur) – ‘infidel’.106 This is what Muslims called the Byzantine border guards – acrytes. Later the representatives of the Gavras clan are found serving both the Byzantine emperors and the Iconia sultans, which, as noted, was characteristic of the Euphrates contact zone. Perhaps the most famous member of the family on Seljuk service was a certain emir Gavras, captured and beheaded by Romans as an apostate. Also known is Johannes Gavras, the first adviser to Sultan Klij-Arslan II, who, according to Niketas Choniates, was ‘the closest person to the Sultan’ and negotiated with Salah ad-Din on his behalf. After the Sultan’s death Bartikyan 1987: № 3: 190-200. Anna Komnina 1965; Soderžaniye žitiya sv. Feodora Gavrasa 1906: 135-136; St. Theodoros Gavras is also mentioned by Zonara (Zon., XVIII, 22), who called him a ‘sevast’ and ‘martyr’; Dombrovskiy, Maxneva 1973. 106 Many scholars think that their family name was derived from some Armenian toponym that might be their birthplace (see: Vassilief 1936; Jakobson 1964: 81; Každan 1973: 88-92; Ter-Ghevondyan 1977: 153154; Bartikyan Н. 3. 1987: № 3: 190-200; № 4 181-193; 1988: № 1 163-178; Kesmedji 1999; Karpov 2007; Šaginyan 2008: 68-85). 104 105

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he intended to return to his estate in Erznka, but was killed by the Turkmens. In Muslim sources he is referred to as Ikstiyar al-Din Hasan ibn Ghafras.107 The continuing discriminatory religious and national policy of the empire against the Armenians, completely unjustified in the face of the growing threat from the Turks and other Muslims, led to an open confrontation between the capital and the frontier world. The Romans finally lost the support of the acryte troops in western Armenia and the Euphrates zone, who were soon either exterminated by the Turks or left for Cilicia; some went to serve the new rulers. The Romans themselves could not and would not fight. There was no one to protect the eastern frontiers of the empire. The final flourish of the acryte army came in the rule of the Laskaris Cappadocian soldier dynasty, under which the acryte units, at least in Cappadocia, experienced a brief rise. However, in 1262, after the suppression of the uprising against the usurper of the imperial throne Michael VIII Palaiologos, the acryte detachments were dissolved and partly integrated within the regular army. Some final thoughts The material discussed in this article and in some of our previous works108 reveals the following regularities: • For thousands of years the Euphrates contact zone has played (and is still playing) an exceptionally important, and at times crucial, role in the affairs of the Near East, as this region has found itself at the junction of major world systems from antiquity to modern times. Fearsome mountainous landscapes adjoin fertile valleys that thrive on the outpourings from the largest water system in the Near East – the Euphrates and its tributaries. In antiquity, the mountains along the Euphrates were wooded, and rich in vegetation and minerals. Caravan routes passing through there linked East and West, North and South. The Euphrates frontier zone being at the crossroads of several world systems and several civilisations, there were ongoing clashes between these diverse worlds and empires, which could not but affect the existence of this small but densely populated sub-region. • The bordering position of the region determined the characteristic features of its population: fanaticism, multiculturalism, dynamism, adaptability to rapidly changing living conditions, etc. The flexibility and adaptability of the residents of the Euphrates zone was surprisingly combined with firmness and endurance, adherence to traditions that were thousands of years old, native culture, language and religion. • The cross-position of the Euphrates frontier from earliest times to the present day has evolved into an arena of continuous wars and an object of 107 108

Bryer 1970: 164-87, 180-181; Bartikyan Ch. 3. 1987. № 3: 190-200. Margaryan 2012: 5-30; 2015: 5-91; 2017; 2018: 18-43.

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•

• •

•

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political speculation. The people on the frontier constantly had to repel many enemies from different compass points, relying only on their own strengths and resources. As a rule they could not count on support, even when the zone along the Euphrates coincided with the control of this or that empire. Based on experience gained since the clashes between Hayasa and the Hittite kingdom, the so-called ‘small-war’ strategy – the tradition of waging war in the mountains with small forces – evolved in the region. The ultimate goal of this strategy was to exhaust and make the enemy forces suffer for further incursions into his own territory. This strategy was also successfully applied by the inhabitants of the region in the Hellenistic and medieval periods. ‘Small war’ entails not only defence, but also quick and frequent raids deep into hostile territory. In the middle ages this tactic was usually called the ‘Acryte War’. The main small-war strike force was the stratiote army, also known as acrytes (frontiersmen, border guards) and apelates (raiders, kidnappers). Its commanders came from the nobility, but did not from the ancient Armenian naxarar houses. Basil I, the founder of the ‘Macedonian’ or ‘Armenian’ royal dynasty, the ‘clan of the Komenos’, as well as a large number of Armenians on the Byzantine throne, were raised in frontier environments. Many members of these families professed Chalcedonism (for successful career promotion), although some of them, for reasons unknown, returned to the Armenian Apostolic Church. Small wars at the intersections of world systems were common and unavoidable realities of these territories, perhaps a condition for their existence in the form we are discussing. Small wars in the Euphrates border zone were a consequence of the weakness and inability of the central authorities to defend the borders of their empire. Thus, the frontier populations of the mountainous regions of western Armenia were responsible for protecting the borders and maintaining the balance of power in the region. As noted, the acryte squads were, as a rule, formed and led by local feudal clans, not always by old elites, but almost always effective. Relations between the acryte nobility and the imperial authorities were mostly tense. This was it seems unavoidable, for ethnic, cultural, religious, economic, political and other reasons. However, the acryte squads bravely defended their lands, ensuring thereby the security of the borders of the empire and objectively contributing to its prosperity. Nevertheless, the autonomy and uncontrollability of frontier themata annoyed the imperial authorities, trying from time to time to mire the border forces in bureaucracy and bind them to Chalcedonian orthodoxy. In the 10th11th centuries, when the imperial authorities considered that there were no dangerous enemies on the eastern borders of Byzantium, and there was no longer a need for the stratiote army, the state decided to sweep away acryte free reign: the border world, the environment giving rise to this freedom, was dismantled. The populations on the frontier resisted desperately, riots sprang up everywhere, but the resistance of the acryte elite was broken and

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Yervand Margaryan their squads were dissolved or subsumed into the regular army. The ancient stratiote garrisons were manned by mercenaries from northern and western Europe, southern Slavs, or nomads from the Eurasian steppes. • The liquidation of the stratiote army had negative consequences for the empire. The Seljuk invasion that started in the 11th century led to huge territorial losses in the east and was stopped by resurgent squads of Armenian acrytes. However, the appearance of the Ottoman Empire and the anti-acryte policy of the imperial authorities led to the final demise of this frontier force and the liquidation of the Euphrates border zone. • This border zone, however, was periodically reborn but with new players. In the 20th century, Armenians and other eastern Christians appeared there for the last time, the result of the secret agreement drawn up by Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot in 1916, by the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920, and on the Wilson map of the same year. Today it is a zone of a new intermediary world, inhabited by the Kurds, who replaced the Armenians, and the role of Rome has long been taken by the Turks. New wars are coming in the old formats, or rather old wars with new players.

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Pigulevskaya, N.V. 1964. Araby u granic Vizantii i Irana v IV-VI vv (Arabs At the borders of Byzantium and Iran in the IV-VI centuries) (in Russian). Moscow: Nauka. Piotrovskiy, B.B. 1959. Vanskoye carstvo (Urartu) (in Russian). Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Vostochnoj literatury. Pravoslavnaya Enciklopediya 2004. Vol. VIII: 214-215 (in Russian). Moscow: Cerkovnonauchnyj centr “Pravoslavnaja Enciklopedija”. Pryor, J. H., E.M. Jeffreys 2004. The Age of the ΔΡΟΜΩΝ: The Byzantine Navy ca. 500-1204. Leiden: Brill. Razin, Je.A. 1955. Istoriya voyennogo iskusstva, Vol. 4. (in Russian). Moscow: Voenizdat. Rosser, J.H. 2011. Historical Dictionary of Byzantium. 2nd edn, Lanham, Md: Scarecrow Press. Rudakov, A.P. 1997. Očerki vizantiyskoy kul’tury po dannym grečeskoy agiografii (Essays on Byzantine culture from Greek hagiography). Saint Petersburg: Alteia. Runciman, S.  1988 [1929].  The Emperor Romanus Lecapenus and His Reign: A Study of Tenth-Century Byzantium. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sarkisyan, G.X. 1960. Tigranakert. Iz istorii drevnearmyanskix gorodskix obščin (in Russian). Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Vostochnoj literatury. Schlumberger, G. 1890. Un empereur Byzantin au dixieme siècle – Nicephore Phocas. Paris: Firmin-Didot et cie. Šaginyan, A.K. 2007. Perviye našestviya arabov na Armeniyu i otvetnye poxody armyano-vizantiyskix otryadov. Nekotoryye xronologičeskiye utočneniya (First Arab invasions of Armenia and retaliatory campaigns of Armenian-Byzantine detachments. Some chronological clarifications. Historical and philological journal of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia 2 (175): 224-235 (in Russian). Šaginyan, A.K. 2008. Sistema administrativnogo deleniya i upravleniya Arabskolgo xalifata v Armenii i Arminiyi, Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta (Vostokovedeniye) (Administrative division and management system of the Arab Caliphate in Armenia and Arminiya. Moscow University Bulletin (Oriental Studies) 3: 68-85 (in Russian). Šaginyan, A.K. 2011. Armeniya i strany Južnogo Kavkaza v usloviyax vizantiysko-iranskoyi arabskoy vlasti (Armenia and the countries of the South Caucasus under the conditions of Byzantine-Iranian and Arabic power) (in Russian). Saint Petersburg: Aletheia, Saint Petersburg State University. Šahid, I.A. 1995. Byzantium and the Arabs in the Sixth Century, Vol. 1, Part 1 and Part 2. Washington, D.C.: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection. Šaxermayr, F. 1997. Aleksandr Makedonskiy (Alexander the Great) (in Russian). Rostovon-Don: Nauka. Shepard, J. 1973. The English and Byzantium: A Study of Their Role in the Byzantine Army in the Later Eleventh Century. Traditio, Vol. 29: 53-92. Šidfar, B.Ja. 1987. Narodnyj roman o Zat al’-Ximme. Žizneopisaniye doblestnoy Fatimy i povestvovaniye o podvigax jejo slavnyx predkov (Perevod s arabskogo, predisloviye i primečaniya Šidfar B.Ja., рerevod stixov Reyna Je.B.) (in Russian). Moscow: Nauka. Salway, P. 1982. Roman Britain. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Štayerman, Ye. M. 1987. Social’nyye osnovy religii Drevnego Rima (The social foundations of the religion of ancient Rome) (in Russian). Moscow: Nauka. Tarn, W.W. 1949. Éllinističeskaya civilizaciya (Hellenistic Civilization) (in Russian). Moscow: Inostrannaja literatura. Ter-Gevondyan, A.N. 1977. Armeniya i Arabskiy xalifat (Armenia and Arab Caliphate) (in Russian). Yerevan: Izdatel’stvo Akademii nauk Armjanskoj SSR. Ter-Łevondyan, A.N. 1984. Hayastani k‘ałakʻan vičakə arabakan aṙaǰin aršavankʻneri žamanak, in Hay žoġovrdi patmutʻyun (The political position of Armenia during the Arab campaigns). In The History of the Armenian People, Vol. II (in Armenian). Yerevan: HSSH GA hratarakchutyun. The Encyclopaedia of Islam (online: P.J. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs (eds)). sv. Djardjma. Leiden: Brill (retrieved 2016-01-11). Tolstoy, L.N. 1936. Kazaki (Cossacks) (in Russian). Moscow: Khudozhestvennaja literatura. Toumanoff, С. 1963. Studies in Christian Caucasian History: 185-192. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press. Toumanoff, С. 1971. Caucasia and Byzantium. Traditio 27: 111-158. Vassilief, A.A. 1936. The Goths in Crimea. Cambridge, Mass.: The Academy. Vasil’yev, A.A. 1998. Istoriya Vizantiyskoy imperii (History of the Byzantine Empire), Vol. 2 (in Russian). Saint Petersburg: Aletheia. Vus, O.V. 2013. Rannevizantiyskiy laym v Severnom Pričernomor’ye: organizaciya i struktura inženernoy oborony (The Early Byzantine Limes in the Northern Black Sea Region: The Organization and Structure of Defence Engineering). Vizantiyskiy vremennik T. 72 (97): 227-246 (in Russian). Whitby, M. 1988. The Emperor Maurice and His Historian: Theophylact Simocatta on Persian and Balkan Warfare, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Whittow, М. 1996. The Making of Byzantium, 600-1025. London: University of California Press. Zahran, Y. 2007. Ghassan Resurrected. London: Stacey International. Zolotovskiy, V.A. 2015. Proniya v voyennoy organizacii Vizantii rannepaleologovskogo vremeni. (Pronia in the military organisation of Byzantium in the early Palaeologian era). VolSU, Series 4: History, Regional Studies, International relationships (33) 100115 (in Russian). Zolotovskiy, V.A. 2016. Proniya v voyennoy organizacii Vizantii rannepaleologovskogo vremeni (Pronia in the military organisation of Byzantium in the early Palaeologian era). VolSU, Series 4: History, Regional Studies, International relationships, Part 2ю (in Russian) (URL: http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/ proniya-v-voennoy-organizacii-vizantii-rannepaleologovskogo-vremeni-čast-2 (04.08.2017).

Mountainous landscapes as bounded territories and spaces for the formation of early identities Pavel Avetisyan and Arsen Bobokhyan Institute of Archaeology and Ethnography, NAS RA

Abstract: The present contribution considers the problem of identity building in early societies, testing it through the model of bounded territorial relations and by using the case of mountainous landscapes, and particularly that of Armenia. Historical and archaeological materials regarding this region enable us to put forward a local conception of bounded territory and early identity. According to the present data, three main periods of transformations can be differentiated: Late Historical (5th century AD - 5th century BC), Early Historical (6th - 9th centuries BC), and Prehistorical (9th century BC - 9th millennium BC). The diachronic view on social and cultural developments of the region reveals a compact geographical and cultural zone, with its more or less clear borders, which is characterised by similar geo-climatic conditions, and a shared value system. Plateaus are the typical landscape type for this geographical zone: the valleys within them play a major economic role, while mountains act as natural borders, creating also political entities and special identities. By defining three levels of homogenous territories - nations, empires, city-states, it is supposed that the Armenia of the Late Historical period is characterised by traits typical of a nation; in the Early Historical period we deal with the emergence of a local empire, and in the Prehistorical period, since the 3rd millennium BC, we see the gradual process of the formation of city-states. Keywords: Borders, identities, bounded territories, mountainous landscapes, Armenia, Late History, Early History, Prehistory.

Introduction World-systems theory as a multidisciplinary approach to world history and social change emphasises the world system as the primary unit of social analysis. It divides the world into core, semi-peripheral and peripheral countries. The core countries focus on higher skills and intensive production, and the rest of the world focuses on low-skill production and extraction of raw materials. This constantly reinforces the dominance of the core countries.1 However, the definition of a world system is essentially dependent on ‘regional histories’ and corresponding identities which create a background for economic position of this or that social entity. Such identities are visible in the context of emerging borders – margins, limits, frontiers, peripheries – that define various kinds of real and imaginative spaces in which social and cultural transformations take place.

1

Wallerstein 2004; for further readings and consideration in Armenian scientific circles, cf. Margaryan 2016.

On the Borders of World-Systems (Archaeopress 2020): 59–70

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This contribution demonstrates the essential role of an historical approach to discourses in social and economic issues of early societies by underlining the role of emerging identities for the creation of bounded territories. In particular, the case of the mountainous landscape is demonstrated as a model of formation of early identities. Its main idea is that human existence in a state of ‘mountainous solitude’2 developed populations that completely differed from those living in lowlands and steppes. Mountains as natural borders contributed to the traditional and conservative nature of human communities, and thus developing a special conception of identity. Two approaches to the problem of identity formations Two main approaches can be underlined regarding the problem of identity formations, the first of which is more sociologically, and the second historically, oriented. Both these approaches are well reflected in the works of B. Anderson on imagined communities and S. Grosby’s works on bounded, trans-local territorial relations. According to the first approach, the main causes of national identity are (a) the declining importance of privileged access to particular script languages because of mass vernacular literacy, (b) the movement to abolish the ideas of rule by divine right and hereditary monarchy, and (c) the emergence of printing press capitalism – all phenomena occurring with the start of the Industrial Revolution. According to this approach, nations are socially constructed. The idea of the ‘nation’ is relatively new and is a product of various socio-material forces. Nations are limited in that they have finite, if elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations. The concept was born in an age in which Enlightenment and Revolution were destroying the legitimacy of the divinely ordained, hierarchical dynastic realm.3 For the second approach, the human tendency to form attachments to the image of the native land suggests something fundamental about human behaviour. From this point of view the ideas of modern nationhood were already present in the ancient Near East, in regions like Egypt, Israel, Edom, Armenia, which later became the major model for European nation formation. Examination of evidence from the ancient Near East indicates the existence of conceptions of relatively precise boundaries, territories, and, perhaps, also nations. Of course, bounded territorial relations constitutive of certain ancient collectivities was not based, in part, on a conception of citizenship derived from birth in the land, as in many instances of the modern national state. Nonetheless, one is justified in recognising in antiquity instances of a consciousness of a bounded, trans-local territorial relation and, thus, perhaps nationality. The evidence for the existence of various conceptions of such

2 3

Ortega y Gasset 1957: 70. Anderson 1983.

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relations is constitutive of respectively various collectivities in the ancient Near East.4 The essential difference between the two approaches mentioned is not only chronological. The first approach tests the possibility of the appearance of national identities in economically conditioned spheres, the second in bounded territorial relations. Hence, for us, we deal here not with totally various approaches but more with various methods. Ancient Armenia: A case study Historical and archaeological materials regarding ancient Armenia enable us to put forward a local conception of bounded territory and early identity formed within a mountainous landscape. The corresponding materials we suggest can be divided into three main periods – Late Historical, Early Historical, and Prehistorical – the investigation of which in the longue durée enables us to demonstrate the process of social transformation. We begin with later periods, as they enable clearer insights into the problem with the wider use of written sources. Late Historical period (5th century BC – 5th century AD): Early Medieval Armenian (Pawstos, Agathangełos, Ełishe, Khorenatsi), as well as Classical (Strabo, Pliny, Ptolemy), sources refer both to the history and geography of Early Medieval and Classical Armenia, in which we find essential evidence on territorial conceptions and local identities. In this period we encounter feudal-system Armenia, with dynastic lords and princes (naxarars) with their relatively independent territorial principalities or ‘satrapies’, which were presided over by the king of (Greater) Armenia.5 We may observe five traits of collective self-consciousness that are constitutive of a nation of Armenia: 1) A relation of a bounded areal jurisdiction – a territory; 2) A language (after 400 AD – also a script); 3) Belief in an ancestry common to all Armenians; 4) Existence of a national assembly; 5) Certain beliefs/actions appropriate only for the ‘Armenian soil’. Throughout these early histories we meet repeatedly the phrase ‘land of Armenia/ Armenians’ (erkir Hayoc’). It is not a geographical term explicitly signifying the areal possession of the royal house; nor does the term signify primarily a polity, for the latter is designated repeatedly by the term ‘realm/kingdom of Armenia’ (asxarh Hayoc’), or ‘realm of the land of Armenia’ (asxarh Hayastan erkri). The term erkir Hayoc’, ‘land of Armenia,’ appears to signify the territory of Armenia, that is, it appears to signify a relation, one of whose referents is a bounded locational proximity. It should be noted here that the existence of separate terms, ‘land of 4 5

Grosby 2005. For details, cf. Adontz 1970; Grosby 1997.

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Armenia/Armenians’ and ‘realm (of the land) Armenia’ may prefigure our own terminological and conceptual distinctions between ‘nation’ and ‘state’. Certainly in antiquity, the existence of a trans-local territorial designation in contrast to a description of the geographical possession of the king does not indicate the existence of a nation; nonetheless, it is certainly suggestive of a degree of translocal cultural homogeneity or relation. Once again, an element in ascertaining the existence of a nation is a designation common to both a ‘people’ and an area of land (Hayk’). It is because this common designation indicates that the image of an area of land has become one of the referents around which the image of a ‘people’ has been constituted; that is, it indicates that there exists a bounded territorial relation, a territorial collectivity of nativity. Indicative of this ‘conflation’ between terms signifying a land and its people, characteristic of nationality, are statements like the following: ‘the Persian army did not dare to enter again into Armenian borders [sahman], and there was peace in the land’.6 The existence of a cultural homogeneity is also demonstrated through a language common to the territory of Armenia,7 and also the awareness that it was constitutive of that territory. This may be seen in the term ‘land of Armenian speech’ (erkir haykakan lezui) (Pawstos V.xxx), which relates both to Lesser and Greater Armenia. Another notion is the belief in common ancestry (= blood). In the above quotation from Pawstos, reference is made to ‘all the dwellers in the house of T’orgom’. We learn from Khorenatsi (I.xii) that Hayk, the term used to designate both Armenia and the Armenians, was ‘son of T’orgom… the ancestor of the Armenians’.8 In this connection, also important is the fact of the presence of all Armenian ‘council’, represented by all classes, which resembles a national assembly.9 Essential for identity is also the idea that certain beliefs and actions were appropriate only on Armenian soil (Pawstos IV.liv). Conceptions of territorial boundaries are also present in Armenian sources. We have already seen examples of the use of the terms ‘border’ (sahman) and ‘territory’ (sahmank’). Characteristic of the many uses of these terms include: ‘from the confines (limits, boundaries) of the land of Armenia’ (Pawstos V.xx) or ‘borders of the native land’.10 There did exist relatively precise conceptions of the bounded territory of Greater Armenia.11 The best description of the boundaries of the latter is to be found in the ‘Geography’ of Khorenatsi (or Anania Shirakatsi), describing in detail Pawstos V.xlii. Cf. Strabo XI.14, ‘they [the Armenians] all speak the same language’. 8 Cf. also Agathangełos 1976: p. xvi. 9 Pawstos III.xxi, cf. also IV.li, where the council is described as meeting without the king and in opposition to him. 10 Ełishe 1982: 131. 11 Cf. in Pawstos III.vii: ‘over [Armenia’s] territory all the way to the small city of Satał and to Ganjak, [which is] the border of Atrpatakan’; in more detail, cf. Pawstos IV.i and Agathangełos dcccxlii. 6 7

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how Greater Armenia was composed of areas/sub-areas with precise territorial conception.12 Boundaries in antiquity were often defined naturally.13 However, any conclusion that boundaries in antiquity were only established by such physical markers as rivers or mountain ranges is unwarranted. In this regard it is worth of mentioning Khorenatsi’s (II.lvi) description of the borders established by king Artashes: ‘And he established markers for the borders in the following way: he ordered four-sided stones to be hewn, their centres to be hollowed out like plates, and that they be buried in the earth. Over them he had fitted four-sided obelisks, a little higher than the ground’. The best attestations of this evidence are archaeological finds of borderstones with Aramaic inscriptions ordered by the same king Artashes.14 Remarkable too in this context are also the data provided by Agathangełos (176, p. xxxvi), where ditches are mentioned as being dug to fix the borders, and Pawstos (IV.i), with the fixing of the boundary line marking the division of Armenia in AD 387. It is very possible that the Armenians may have also distinguished conceptually a more precise boundary from a more imprecise frontier. As we have observed, the word sahman designates a boundary, and its plural indicated the relatively precise jurisdiction of the area within a set of boundaries, i.e. a territory. However, there is another term, marz, which may have meant ‘border district’ or perhaps ‘frontier’. Early Historical period (6th–9th centuries BC): The origins of borders and corresponding conceptions of the Late Historical period could go back to the period of the Achaemenide Empire. How was it before? By this question we must look back to the Urartian kingdom as reflected in Assyrian and Urartian cuneiform inscriptions and in the archaeological data. Their juxtaposition reconstructs an administrative system of ancient Near-Eastern type, which has its own way of representation (cuneiform writing, special language, special fortresses, temples) and coexists with local groups/cultures. The core area of administrative assemblage of the Near-Eastern type is located around Lake Van, and covering two centuries, spreads in all directions, creating special zones of interactions.15 Textual data on Urartu’s boundaries come from the Assyrian king Sargon II (722-705 BC), in the narration of his 8th campaign.16 There are two key geographical concepts in this account, reflected in the Akkadian terms miṣru and nagû. The miṣru correlates with our concept of a border, applying to the Urartian state as a whole. The nagû is a territorial building block out of which the state is composed. Sargon enters Urartu, from south of Lake Urmia, by passing a fortress that stands at the ‘head’ of the border of Urartu: ‘I set forth from Uishdish and arrived at Ushqaia, a great Eremyan 1963. For the ‘natural’ boundaries of Armenia, cf. Strabo 1854; Pliny 1942, VI.10; Ptolemy 1932: 123-125. 14 Naveh 1971. 15 Cf. Zimansky 1985; 1995. 16 Zimansky 1990. 12 13

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fortress which is the frontier post [lit. head] of the boundary of Urartu, which bars entry into the lands of Zaranda’. Sargon attacks also a fortress that he locates ‘on the lower frontier of the land of Urartu, bordering on the Nairi-lands’. The king names five nagû-s in Urartu. Usually a fortress guards the approach to a nagû, and some geographical feature – mountain or river – separates it from the next nagû. In these provinces one or more primary fortresses or fortified cities are mentioned, each surrounded by scores of ‘settlements in the vicinity’. For each plateau, or expanse of alluvial land, there are one or two major concentrations of population: these valleys surrounded by mountains define the nagê.17 The mountainous areas between them seem to be of secondary economic or political importance to a state that was focused on the administration of agricultural productivity. Archaeological data suggest a much less clear division between Urartu and the lands around it. If we go to the southern borders of Urartu we reach Šubria or Muṣaṣir (south of Van and Urmia), that were subject to military intervention, but apparently not direct control. There were no limes or clearly delineated miṣru here: these territories were more frontier, not border.18 If we go to the west, we find ourselves in Taurini or Tumishki (Erzurum und Elâzığ regions), with their small, buffer political units. It would seem that Urartu’s cultural influence projected much farther here than its administrative control.19 In the north there is Etiuni (modern Armenia), where the arrival of the Urartians does not mark a major social or political transformation, and the archaeology of the region reflects the continuation of a local material culture.20 So, the core territory of Urartu was around the lakes Van, Sevan and Urmia. On the plateaus, large Urartian fortresses dominated agricultural areas, the roads between them secured by small, fortified enclaves, with the population living in smaller settlements. Sargon’s narrative presents a portrait of this archipelago of state-supervised agricultural areas. The fluidity of imperial boundaries is thus as evident in Urartu as it is in other ancient empires. Prehistorical period (9th century BC – 9th millennium BC): By Prehistorical we mean the period before Urartu, i.e. before the use of script, when our knowledge concerning the problems under consideration is based mainly on archaeological data. Here we deal with the time span from the Early Iron Age to the Neolithic period.21 The Early Iron Age (12th-9th centuries BC) and the Late Bronze Age (16th–13th centuries BC) in Armenia is the period of the so-called ‘Lchashen-Metsamor’ culture, typically represented by a noticeable process of cultural integration, unprecedented Cf. Grekyan 2016: 20. Parker 2002: 373-375. 19 Özgüç 1969. 20 Biscione et al. 2002. 21 For details on social and cultural developments, cf. Avetisyan 2014, as well as Kohl 1992; Santrot 1996; Kushnareva 1997; Smith, Rubinson 2003; Sagona 2005; Badalyan, Avetisyan 2007; Bobokhyan 2008; Rubinson, Sagona 2008; Smith et al. 2009. 17 18

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economic growth, and market-oriented industry. New and large settlements emerge around huge centralised populations. Hittite and Syrian-Mesopotamian sources mention several political entities in the region during the Early Iron (Nairi) and Late Bronze (Ishuva, Alshe, Hayasa) Ages, with essential ties to the Hurrian and Hittite world. The Middle Bronze Age (24th–16th centuries BC) is a period of cultural isolation and rise of nomadism. Parallel to these processes, innovations emerge, including, among others, the final formation of early city-states with corresponding elites, wide use of tin-bronze, precious metals and jewellery making, and the rapidly rotating potter’s wheel, as well as the development of horse breeding. The cultural diversity of this period is marked by the existence of different groups, i.e. Kurgan, Trialeti-Vanadzor, Sevan-Uzerlik, Karmir-Berd, Karmir Vank. At the beginning of the 2nd millennium BC, Syrian-Mesopotamian sources mention several polities south and west of Lake Van (Supana, Tegarama, Hahhum, Nihria). The Early Bronze Age (35th–24th centuries BC) is characterised by the Kura-Araxes culture, with its fairly complex infrastructure. This had the Ararat Valley as a core area, from where, at the beginning of the 3rd millennium BC, it spreads all over the Highland zone, and beyond into various regions of the Fertile Crescent. This was a typical agricultural society with developed plough farming, cattle breeding, and crafts. Metallurgy was based on arsenical bronze; wheeled vehicles and the slowly rotating potters’ wheel came into use. Mesopotamian-Syrian sources mention some place names during the 3rd millennium BC related to the highlands, which were mainly visible in the regions of the mountainous lands of Subartu, Gutium and Lullubum, located mainly on the borderland with northern Mesopotamia. The Chalcolithic (5th–4th millennia BC) and Neolithic (9th–6th millennia BC) periods are characterised by the formation of production economy and early farming societies. The typical processes for Armenia can be seen within the contexts of developments that occurred in the region of the Fertile Crescent. Recent discoveries have revealed that already during the pre-pottery Neolithic period, and particularly in the 9th–8th millennia BC within the zones mentioned, a centre developed, monumental in nature, as well as complex cult and sign systems (Göbekli Tepe, Nevali Çori, Çayönyü Tepesi). In the Highland zone during the 6th–4th millennia BC, cultures were formed (Shulaveri-Shomutepe, Sioni) with essential ties to Mesopotamia and Syria. The diachronic view on social and cultural development of the region under consideration reveals a geographical and cultural zone with its own, more or less, clear borders. We are dealing here with the key territory around lakes Sevan, Van and Urmia, between the Southern Caucasus and Armenian/Eastern Taurus. This region is characterised by similar geographical and climatic conditions and a shared value system (defined by characteristic traits of material culture, lifestyle, mentality). Valleys surrounded by high mountains (= plateaus) are the most typical

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landscape type for this geographic zone. These valleys, the best known being Ararat, Erzurum and Mush, played a major economic role, with the mountains acting as natural borders. They created also political entities. The borders between these subareas are relatively distinct. If the western border can be approximately marked by the River Halys, where it meets the cultural world of central Asia Minor, being very similar to the Highlands culturally, then the character of the southern borders becomes more complex. The southern zone has the traits typical of local cultures, showing more active relations to the Syro-Mesopotamian world. Given all these characteristics, the given sub-area reveals development markers that bring it closer to regions with diverse cultural elements of the Urfa and Amuk types. Unlike the valley areas, the mountainous parts of this zone tend to be closer to the axial area. To the east this region ends with the beginning of the steppe zone of modern Azerbaijan, and in the north where the mountains continue until the plateaus end. Discussion Examination of evidence in ancient Near-Eastern contexts reveals the existence of conceptions of relatively precise boundaries and sociologically relatively homogeneous territories.22 This evidence may not be sufficient enough to put to rest the assumption, found repeatedly throughout the social sciences, that in antiquity there were geographically imprecise frontiers but not bounded territories and, further, that nationality with its bounded, extended territory is exclusively a modern phenomenon. It should, nevertheless, be sufficient enough to require a more nuanced understanding of certain collectivities of antiquity and their respective territories. There are a number of elements speaking for the existence of such territories as an indication of their relative sociological homogeneity, a name common to both the territory and the people who are related by inhabiting the territory, together with the fiction that the people are related by common ancestors. From this point of view one may speak of three levels of homogenous territories – nations, empires, and city-states: 1. 2.

22

The boundaries of a nation are conceptually fixed or stable and are characterised by the utmost concentration of traits of the sociological homogeneity mentioned above. The boundaries of an empire are in flux, being often a consequence of a calculation as to whether or not the increased revenues gained from any further territorial expansion, beyond the momentarily established frontier, would be greater than the military and administrative expenses required for the effort. Such a flux undermines the possibility for consolidation over time of a stable, trans-local territorial referent in the mutual recognition, i.e. a territorially bounded, shared tradition through which a sociologically relatively homogeneous ‘people’ is formed.

Cf. Grosby 1991; 1993; 1997.

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The territories of city-kingdoms, in contrast to those of nations, are of qualitatively delimited area: there is for city-kingdoms a bounded territorial relation of ‘centre’ to ‘periphery’, the latter consisting of any number of towns.23

The contradiction between these three levels could be demonstrated by the wellknown example of early Israel, the late Assyrian empire and Classical Greek citystates. Israel is characterised by sociological homogeneity, a name common to both the territory and the people, blood-ties. In contrast, for Assyria territorial expansiveness of an empire is typical, with simultaneous efforts to create universal borders and a common god (Ashur). Repeatedly found are such inscriptions as; ‘I [Tiglath-pileser III] pursued him [Sarduri of Urartu] up to the causeway of the Euphrates, the border [miṣir] of his land’. It is clear that the boundaries referred to in such inscriptions are those of a sociologically heterogeneous, territorially expanding empire.24 As to the territorially based community known as the Greek polis, the territorial solidarity of various cities with their kings was created not only through military subjugation, but also through the worship of a common deity. Indeed, for many city-states the boundaries of their respective territories were marked by non-urban sanctuaries.25 If we try to use this model for the Armenian evidence considered above, it seems possible that the ancient Armenia of the Late Historical period (5th century BC – 5th century AD) is characterised by traits typical for a nation. For the Early Historical period (9th–6th centuries BC), in the case of Urartu, we are dealing with the emergence of a local empire. In the Prehistorical period (9th millennium BC – 9th century BC), from the 3rd millennium BC (Early Bronze Age) we see a process of formation of city-states with bounded territorial relations of centre to periphery. Conclusions This article has touched on the problem of identity building in early societies by considering two main approaches that test the possibility of appearance of such identities in economically conditioned spheres, or in bounded territorial relations. In doing so the authors have tried to demonstrate the importance of historical approach by using the example of mountainous landscapes, and particularly those of Armenia. Historical and archaeological materials regarding ancient Armenia enable one to put forward a local conception of bounded territory and early identity, as formed in a mountainous landscape. According to the present data, three main periods of transformations can be differentiated: Late Historical (5th century BC – 5th century AD), Early Historical (9th–6th centuries BC) and prehistorical (9th millennium BC – 9th century BC). The diachronic view on social and cultural For similarities between decentralised political systems of mountainous societies and Greek poleis, see Korotaev 1995; cf. Avetisyan 2014: 85. 24 Cf. Tadmor 1986: 205; 1994: 52. 25 On religious citizenship, cf. de Polignac 1995: 32-88. 23

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developments of the region reveals a compact geographical and cultural zone with its own, relatively clear borders. We have here a key region around lakes Sevan, Van and Urmia. This territory is marked by similar geographical and climatic conditions, a shared value system (defined by characteristic identifiers: material culture, lifestyle, mentality). Valleys surrounded by high mountains (plateaus) are the typical landscape type for this geographic zone. These valleys play a major economic role, while the mountains act as natural borders. These borders create also political entities and special identities. By defining three levels of homogenous territories – nations, empires, city-states – it is supposed that Armenia in the Late Historical period may be identified by traits typical of a nation, meanwhile in the Early Historical period we witness the emergence of a local empire. In terms of the Prehistorical period, from the 3rd millennium BC one can trace a process of formation of city-states with bounded territorial relations. Bibliography Adontz, N. 1970. Armenia in the Period of Justinian. Lisbon: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation. Agathangełos 1976. History of the Armenians (trans. R.W. Thomson). New York: State University of New York Press. Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London-New York: Verso. Avetisyan, P.S. 2014. Armenian Highland during the 24th-9th Centuries BC: the Dynamics of Socio-Cultural Transformations, according to Archaeological Data. Doctoral Dissertation Scientific Report, Yerevan (in Armenian). Avetisyan, P.S. 2016. World-Systems, Borders and Contact Zones in the History of Ancient Near East. In E.G. Margaryan (ed.) At the Junction of World-Systems: From the History of Contact Zones of Ancient and Modern Times: 48-65 (in Russian). Yerevan: RAU Press. Badalyan, R.S., P.S. Avetisyan 2007. Bronze and Early Iron Age Archaeological Sites in Armenia: I. Mt. Aragats and Its Surrounding Region. British Archaeological Reports International Series 1697. Oxford: Archaeopress. Biscione, R., S. Hmayakyan, N. Parmegiani 2002.The North-Eastern Frontier. Urartians and Non-Urartians in the Sevan Lake Basin: I. The Southern Shores. Roma: CNR Istituto di studi sulle civiltà dell’Egeo e del Vicino Oriente. Bobokhyan, A. 2008. Kommunikation und Austausch im Hochland zwischen Kaukasus und Taurus, ca. 2500-1500 v. Chr., Bd. 1-2. British Archaeological Reports International Series 1853. Oxford: John and Erica Hedges. Ełishe 1982. History of Vardan and the Armenian War (trans. R.W. Thomson). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Eremyan, S. 1963. Armenia according to ‘Ashkharatsuyts’ (in Armenian). Yerevan: Academy Press. Grekyan, E. 2016. Biainili-Urartu: State and Society (Historical-Archaeological Study). Habilitation Work Abstracts, National Academy of Sciences of Republic of Armenia, Yerevan.

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Grosby, S. 1991. Religion and Nationality in Antiquity. Archives Européennes de Sociologie XXXII: 229-265. Grosby, S. 1993. Kinship, Territory and the Nation in the Historiography of Ancient Israel. Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft 105: 3-18. Grosby, S. 1997. Borders, Territory and Nationality in the Ancient Near East and Armenia. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient 40/1, 1-29. Grosby, S. 2005. Nationalism: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hall, Th.D. 2002. World-Systems, Frontiers and Ethnogenesis. In G. Preyer, M. Bös (eds) Borderlines in a Globalized World: New Perspectives in a Sociology of the WorldSystem: 35-66. Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publisher. Kohl, P.L. 1992. The Transcaucasian ‘Periphery’ in the Bronze Age: A Preliminary Formulation. In E. Schortman, P. Urban (eds) Resources, Power, and Interregional Interaction: 117-137. New York: Springer. Korotaev, A.V. 1995. The Mountains and the Democracy: To the Formulation of the Question. In NN. Kradin, V.A. Lynsha (eds) Alternative Ways to Early Statehood: 7793 (in Russian). Vladivostok: Dal’nauka. Kushnareva, K.Kh. 1997. The Southern Caucasus in Prehistory. Philadelphia, PA: Pennsylvania University Museum. Margaryan, E.G. (ed.) 2016. At the Junction of World-Systems: From the History of Contact Zones of Ancient and Modern Times (in Russian). Yerevan: Russian-Armenian University Press. Moses Khorenatsi 1978. History of the Armenians (trans. R.W. Thomson). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Naveh, J. 1971. The Aramaic Inscriptions on Boundary Stones in Armenia. Die Welt des Orients 6/1, 42-46. Ortega y Gasset, J. 1957. Über die Jagd. Hamburg: Rowohlt. Özgüç, T. 1969, Urartu and Altıntepe. Archaeology 22: 256-263. Parker, B. 2002. At the Edge of Empire: Conceptualizing Assyria’s Anatolian Frontier ca. 700 BC. Journal of Anthropological Archaeology 21: 371-395. Parker, B.J. 2006.Towards the Understanding of Borderland Process. American Antiquity 71/1: 77-100. Pawstos 1989. The Epic Histories (trans. N. Garsoïan). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pliny 1942. Natural History. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Polignac, F., de 1995. Cults, Territory and the Origins of the Greek City-State. Chicago: University Press. Ptolemy Claudius 1932. Geography. New York: Public Library Press. Rubinson, K., T. Sagona (eds) 2008. Ceramics in Transitions: Chalcolithic through the Iron Age in the Highlands of the Southern Caucasus and Anatolia. Ancient Near Eastern Studies, Supplement 27. Leuven-Paris-Dudley: Peeters. Sagona, A. (ed.) 2005. A View from the Highlands: Archaeological Studies in Honour of Ch. Burney. Ancient Near Eastern Studies, Supplement 12. Leuven-Paris-Dudley: Peeters. Santrot, J. (ed.) 1996. Arménie: Trésors de l’Arménie ancienne des origines au IVe siècle, Catalogue. Nantes: Somogy.

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Smith, A.T., R.S. Badalyan, P. Avetisyan 2009. The Archaeology and Geography of Ancient Transcaucasian Societies, v. 1: The Foundations of Research and Regional Survey in the Tsaghkahovit Plain, Armenia. Oriental Institute Publications 134. Chicago: The Oriental Institute. Smith, A.T., K.S. Rubinson (eds) 2003. Archaeology in the Borderlands: Investigations in Caucasia and Beyond. Los Angeles: The Cotsen Institute of Archaeology, UCLA. Strabo 1854. The Geography. London: The Cotsen Institute of Archaeology, UCLA. Tadmor, H. 1986. Monarchy and the Elite in Assyria and Babylonia: The Question of Royal Accountability. In S.N. Eisenstadt (ed.) The Origins and Diversity of Axial Age Civilizations: 202-224. New York: State University of New York Press. Tadmor, H. 1994. The Inscriptions of Tiglath-Pileser III, King of Assyria. Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities. Wallerstein, I. M. 2004. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham-London: Duke University Press. Zimansky, P. 1985. Ecology and Empire: The Structure of the Urartian State. Studies in Ancient Oriental Civilizations 41. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Zimansky, P. 1990. Urartian Geography and Sargon’s Eighth Campaign, Journal of Near Eastern Studies 49: 1-21. Zimansky, P. 1995. The Urartian Frontier as an Archaeological Problem. In M. Liverani (ed.) Neo-Assyrian Geography: 171-180. Quaderni di Geografia Storica 5. Rome: Università di Roma, Dipartimento di scienze storiche, archeologiche e antropologiche dell’Antichità.

The northern gates of the Euphrates-Tigris contact zone Aram Kosyan

Institute of Oriental Studies, NAS RA Abstract: Over the whole historical period, the Erzincan plain, located along the EuphratesTigris contact zone, played an exceptional role in the political, economic and religious life of the eastern highlands. The present study is an attempt to bring together the geographical, ecological, archaeological and written sources with regard to the Erzincan plain, thus allowing us to draw a general outline of the political and cultic-religious realities of the region. From the 2nd millennium BC until the early Middle Ages the Erzincan plain was distinguished, first of all, as a prominent cultic-religious centre located in the north of the Upper Euphrates valley, at the junction between the Transcaucasian world with central Anatolia, and, via the Elâzığ-Malatya, with Syria-Mesopotamia. Keywords: Erzincan, Altıntepe, Hittite cuneiform texts, Urartu, contact zone.

Introduction In our previous study dealing with the contact zone that runs along the western and southern reaches of the Armenian Highlands, it was mentioned that the geopolitical role of its northern section (the Erzincan plain, including Kemakh), probably had to be determined not by its economic potential but rather by its geographical factors. This part of the eastern highlands was a natural bridge linking Transcaucasia via the Erzurum plain with classical Sophene, and through the latter further with Asia Minor and Mesopotamia-Syria.1 Thus, the Erzincan plain is referred to as the ‘Northern Gates’, a determination supported by textual and archaeological evidence over centuries. In this contribution a general outline of the political and cultic-religious realities observed in the region under study will be presented. The chronological framework of the study covers the period from the 2nd millennium BC until the first centuries of the 1st millennium AD. Over the whole historical period under study several characteristics of the Erzincan plain can be distinguished: 1.

The Erzincan plain represents a ‘highway’ used by different migrations at least from the 4th millennium BC.

Kosyan 2010 (on the religious role of the Urartian site of Altıntepe and the Erzincan plain); Kosyan 2016a (on the geopolitical role of the Erzincan plain, see p.70) and 2018 [in press]; Kosyan 2017 (on the general outline of the contact zone). 1

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72 2. 3. 4.

Aram Kosyan The Erzincan plain did not provide a permanent home for political entities, irrespective of their prominence or stability. The authority of any neighbouring statehood over this region seems to have been more nominal than actual. The Erzincan plain, at least from the mid 2nd millennium BC until the early Middle Ages (pre-Christian and Christian Armenian periods), was known as an important cultic-religious centre (see below).

Geographical characteristics of the Erzincan plain (relief and climate) The Erzincan plain (the plain with surrounding areas) has a special geographical position, geological structure and climatic conditions when compared with its neighbouring areas. Located at an altitude of about 1200 m.a.s.l., it is in the shape of a triangle directed towards the east, enclosed between several mountain chains on all sides. From the north-west towards the south-east these are Chimen and Esence (former Keşiş), and from south-west to north-east Munzurdağlari (Arm. Mndzur) and Mercan (c. 3000-3500 m), which meet together near the Euphrates, leaving a pass leading to Tercan (Arm. Derjan) and Erzurum. From here runs the modern road coming from Transcaucasia and Erzurum, which, through the northern part of the Erzincan plain, then reaches into central Anatolia. To the west the plain is limited by an extensive mountainous massif (with Karadağ its highest peak at 3030 m).2 From the north-east to the south-west the Erzincan plain is c. 30 km long and 10-15 km in width.3 Two roads connect the Erzincan plain to central Anatolia. The first is the modern highway passing through Refahye, mentioned above. The second connects the plain with Elâzığ (Arm. Kharberd) and Divriği (Arm. Tevrik). This road follows the course of the Euphrates from Kemakh towards modern Kemaliye (formerly Eğin, Arm. Akn).4 The ‘North-eastern Anatolian’ fault line passes through the Erzincan plain, which was formed during the Late Pliocene and has had a constant impact on the seismic processes of the region, as seen in the frequent destructive earthquakes of high magnitude.5 This fault line begins from the Arabian peninsula and proceeds to the north-east, passing through the areas of Marash, Lake Hazar, the Erzincan plain, then Kars and the Lesser Caucasus.6 In early medieval Armenian sources this mountain is referred to as Sepuh or Gohanam, which had important spiritual significance for pre-Christian and Christian Armenia, and where the temples of several gods were worshipped. The activities of Gregory the Illuminator in the area are attested to in written sources as well (see below). 3 Parker et al. 1995: 154. 4 It is difficult to imagine that the campaigns of the Hittite kings directed to the east, against Hayaša and Azzi followed any other southern route along the course of the River Karasu (see below). 5 On the tectonics of the Armenian Highland and adjacent regions, see Türkoğlu 2009: 28ff; also Aslanyan 1970: 366ff (for the Republic of Armenia). 6 Pierce et al. 1990: 189ff. 2

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Although the Erzincan plain lies in the continental climatic zone, winters here are not as severe as in Erzurum and Bayburt. The British diplomat James Brant who travelled through this region in 1835,7 writes of neighbouring Tercan that the ‘… buildings are half underground, in the usual Armenian style...’, but in Erzincan he records that the ‘… houses here, and in all the villages of the plain, are built aboveground, which gives them a more agreeable and cheerful appearance than in other parts of Armenia... The climate is here never severe in winter and it is warm in summer. The harvest was ready [6 July] for the sickle, and the season was rather more backward than usual.’ In terms of the economic potential of the Erzincan plain the following statistics of land use are helpful:8 fields and fallows - 16.5%; fodder - 0%; gardens, vineyards, orchards - 0.5%; pasture - 17.5%; non-agricultural - 65.2%. In fact, just over 15% of the total resources could have been used as arable land, with the same amount as pasture. Accordingly, about 65% comprises non-agricultural land. Indeed, the above-mentioned percentages of land resources could not be used mechanically in terms of ancient historical periods, especially if we take into account possible environmental changes (see below). Might it be possible to suggest that, although agriculture must been an essential component in the lifestyle of the local population in the past, it was not the dominant factor? The Erzincan plain: archaeology The isolated position of the Erzincan plain within the political, religious and cultural contexts of the eastern highlands certainly impacted on its history, as is evident during the 4th-1st millennia BC. In spite of the strategic importance of the plain, strikingly it only seems to contain a limited number of archaeological sites, located in the eastern part of the region. Besides Altıntepe, Jimintepe and two other sites located in their neighbourhood (see below), other remains of settled life are yet to be discovered. The evidence to date seems to suggest that this fertile plain, lying on the main route from east to west, was only sparsely populated, however this could be more to do with the low number of archaeological surveys undertaken so far, combined with the geological peculiarities of the plain – it is covered by thick alluvium, the result of numerous rivulets originating from the mountain ranges, and also variations in the flow of the Karasu and changes in its riverbed. Thus traces of archaeological sites are not easy to observe.9 Swampy areas abound, as in the neighbourhood of the above-mentioned site of Saztepe. M. Isıklı’s terminology (‘Bird of Paradise’) is of interest in terms of the mosaics, seeming to show marshes, discovered on the floor of the 6th-century Brant 1836: 202. Devlet Istatistik Enstitüsü, Türkiye istatistik yıllığı 1971, Ankara, 1973 (cited after Zimansky 1985: 15). 9 Işıklı 2010: 267. 7 8

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AD Byzantine church located on the eastern slopes of Altıntepe.10 References to swamps in the central, low-lying areas of the Erzincan plain are recorded by earlier visitors to the plain.11 An important suggestion has been put forward by M. Forlanini in a study dealing with the localisation of Hayaša mentioned in the 2nd millennium BC Hittite texts:12 ‘In fact, the plain occupies the gap produced by a pull-apart basin along the Northern Anatolian Fault, and is filled by very deep alluvial deposits produced by the Euphrates and many small water courses flowing from the steep mountains all around it. A similar basin in the Eastern Anatolian Fault is occupied by the Hazar/ Gölcük Lake. A pull-apart basin is a rhomboidal gap in the earth surface produced by slipping along a fault line having a zed shape. The bottom of the plain is completely flat with residual marshes, and the Euphrates leaves the plain through a narrow gorge; year after year the river has dug its way into the gorge, lowering it, and discharging alluvial deposits in the plain. Therefore, if we go back in the past, we can assume the presence of a prehistoric lake that gradually silted up because of the continuous discharge of materials and the gouging of the exit gorge by the Euphrates. But, since this area is subject to disastrous earthquakes, we cannot rule out also a sudden, quick, transformation of the plain.’ M. Forlanini’s suggestion is in accordance with the description of the Taurus mountain system made by E. Huntington as early as 1901.13 Looking at the plains encircled by mountain ranges from Alashgerd (modern Turkish Eleşkirt) to Malatya (he calls them ‘interior plains’), he wrote: ‘I am inclined to believe that the basins, of which the plains form the floors, have been formed by depression and faulting or folding, and have been filled by waste from the mountains, brought in by streams and deposited partly by the streams themselves, but more generally in lakes, as is shown by the uniformly fine character of the deposit in the centre, and by the marshy tracts which still persist as witnesses of the former lakes. Most of the population naturally centres in these fertile, easily tilled regions.’ The idea that the Erzincan plain once formed a lake bed recalls a suggestion made not too long ago regarding a possible prehistoric flood in the area in the 18th century BC, which was noted archaeologically in at least two sites located in the general area of Elâzığ (İmikuşağı and Değirmentepe).14 If the waters of the Karasu could have reached a high enough level to cover a site of about 40 m in height, then one might easily imagine what could have happened in the Erzincan plain. Indeed, if the plain was once partly under water, or comprised a series of swamps, then this Işıklı 2010: 269. The mosaics show a swampy landscape and numerous birds (for the restoration of the mosaics, see Can 2007; 2009). 11 Brant 1836: 202 (‘The centre of the plain was rather swampy, and showed indications of salt’). 12 Forlanini 2017: 8-9. 13 Huntington 1901: 302-303. 14 Sevin 1995: 2f; Sevin 1998: 383ff; Konyar 2006; also Kosyan 2014. The current height of the mound of İmikuşağı is 38 m, and the thickness of the flood layer (4-5 m) suggests catastrophic activity; this flood is thought to have brought about the end of the Mesopotamian-type settlement. 10

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could explain the lack of ancient settlements. Consequently the latter should be looked for on higher areas, e.g. mounds, hills, or mountain slopes. What follows is an overview of the archaeological investigations conducted recently in the eastern part of the plain. Altıntepe The first archaeologists to study the mound of Altıntepe, located c. 17km to the east of Erzincan,15 mention its important strategic position.16 The impressive columned building of the post-Urartian, Achaemenid phase (Altıntepe II and Jimintepe II), the fortifications, painted pottery, and other features of the site have led to a suggestion that this was probably the centre of the Achaemenid administrative division (i.e. satrapy).17 Until recently, the archaeological history of the Erzincan plain was mostly considered as beginning with the Urartian period, i.e. approximately from the end of the 8th century BC, and continued, not taking into account the hiatus after the Urartian period, into the Achaemenid period. However, recent discoveries and studies18 confirm that here existed some extensive sites associated with the Early Bronze Age (Kura-Araxes period).19 These include: Küpesik Höyük (c. 500 m west of Altıntepe; 200 m x 100 m, with a cultural layer of c. 6 m); Kücük Höyük (2 km north of Altıntepe, towards Üzümlü),20 and Saztepe (2 km west of Altıntepe; height: 40 m).21 As well as these sites, pottery has been found in the fields lying between Altıntepe and Mt Esence, however its poor condition makes the provenance difficult to establish. The archaeological studies of the above-mentioned sites and accidental finds of different artefacts around them might well indicate that this region was populated, after the Kura-Araxes period and also into the Middle Bronze Age (20th-18th centuries BC). The pottery of this period suggests that the Erzincan plain was definitely connected with the Transcaucasian cultural world, possibly comprising part of it.22 On excavations of Altıntepe, see Barnett and Gökçe 1953; Özgüç 1961; 1966; 1969; Emre 1969; Burney and Lang 1971: 158-160; Summers 1993; Karaosmanoğlu, Can, Korucu 2007; Karaosmanoğlu, Can, Korucu 2008; Karaosmanoğlu, Can, Korucu 2012; Işıklı 2010, etc. 16 Özgüç 1966: 38 (‘… it seems to have been the most important administrative centre of a principality within the western frontier area of the kingdom of Urartu’). 17 Summers 1993. According to the author, here might have been located the centre of the 13th Achaemenid satrapy (p.96). In the early stages of excavations, Altıntepe II was considered to be Urartian (as is Altıntepe I and the nearby Jimintepe I) (Özgüç 1966; 1969). 18 The description of Altıntepe and its neighbourhood is based on an article of Prof. Dr Mehmet Işıklı (2010) and personal communications over recent years). 19 Işıklı 2010: 267. 20 Excavations revealed considerable amounts of Early Iron Age pottery (Ceylan 2005: 23). 21 As at Kücük Höyük, amounts of Early Iron Age ceramics were also unearthed here, but serious damage prevents from reconstructing the architecture of the site (Ceylan 2005: 23). 22 This information was recently provided by Dr Mehmet Ali Yılmaz (Atatürk University of Erzurum, pers. comm., 29.03.2018), to whom I am greatly indebted. 15

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Considering the Erzincan plain from an archaeological point of view, taking into account its geographical position, one encounters a key problem – the possible route or routes of the expansion of the Transcaucasian Kura-Araxes culture from its original area, beginning at the end of the 4th millennium BC and continuing into the next.23 The most visible traces of this expansion are the numerous impressive sites located in the Upper Euphrates basin, on both sides of the river (Norşuntepe, Korucutepe, Tepecik, Arslantepe-Malatya, etc.). Three possible routes may be proposed for the gradual expansion of the KuraAraxes population groups towards the west and south-west (to the Upper Euphrates basin, and from there to Asia Minor, Mesopotamia and Syria). The first and the most direct route is via the Erzincan plain, which borders the western extension of the Kura-Araxes homeland (Erzurum and Tercan). Numerous sites located in this region testify to the presence of Kura-Araxes culture,24 which speaks in favour of this route. The second, and more difficult, way is that which proceeds from Erzurum to the south, south-east. After passing the sources of the Araxes, the plain of Hınıs (Arm. Khnus) and the passes of the Bingöl mountains, it enters the plain of Muş, before progressing further west.25 Despite the difficulties (the mountainous landscape, cold weather, etc.), the archaeological evidence supporting this passage can be found not far from the northern and north-western shores of Lake Van and in the Muş plain – from as early as c. 3000 BC.26 There is also a third way (south), which cannot be excluded, that runs from the Ararat plain (central Armenia) to the south, and along the northern shores of Lake Van to join the second route. Ultimately it is the first route, leading from Erzurum directly to the south-west, that seems more preferable because of the easier terrain. Concluding this brief archaeological history of the Erzincan plain, it should be pointed out that until now we lack any evidence in favour of Late Bronze Age occupation. This is more than strange when we consider that we have 2nd-millennium BC Hittite texts that contain clear references to the military undertakings of the Hittite kings against Hayaša in the southern part of the region (Kemakh), not to mention that the same area was, at least in the 13th century BC, under Hittite control (see below).

On the causes of the Kura-Araxes expansion and its geography are written numerous studies, e.g. Kushnareva and Chubinishvili 1970: 49-50; Sagona 1984: 99-102; Batiuk 2005: 10-45 (on the theory of migrations and the Kura-Araxes migrations as well); Kohl 2007: 86-102; Palumbi 2008: 7-12 (for a detailed history of this problem); Rothman and Kozbe 1997, etc. 24 For a map of Kura-Araxes archaeological sites (both excavated or fixed) located in the Erzurum plain and neighbouring areas, see Işıklı 2015. 25 A detailed description of this route is contained in the account of the journey of the British officer John Kinneir who travelled through this region in 1814 (Kinneir 1818: 365-380). 26 A list of 18 Muş EBA sites (Kura-Araxes II and III), compiled by Rothman and Kozbe (1997: 115) shows that the Transcaucasian emigration events did not avoid this route. 23

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The Erzincan plain: an historical sketch General remarks When discussing the Erzincan plain a question arises connected with the nature and contents of the available written data – what was the main role of this region in the context of historical development? Factors to be considered when addressing this include its position on the road connecting east and west, which might bring the population in closer and constant contacts with immediate (and remoter) neighbours; this, in turn, might have influenced the political, economic and cultural life, thus leading to historical realities in the formation of a contact zone (including a wide spectrum of economic activities – agriculture, crafts, exchange of goods, transit trading – also easy access to technological novelties, culture, etc., ongoing in adjacent regions), as well as possible negative effects (migrations through its territory, campaigns conducted by neighbouring countries, etc.). Taking into account the comparatively small territory and position between the plain of Erzurum and the Upper Euphrates basin (Elâzığ and surrounding areas), as well as early involvement in the eastern expansion of the Hittite empire, it might be suggested that the political entities located in this region could hardly have possessed with military potential. Tentatively, it might be regarded as a contact zone located on the fringes of Hittite Anatolia and the southern part of the Upper Euphrates region (Išuwa of Hittite texts). The same could probably be said for the following historical periods (Urartian, Hellenistic-Armenian, Armenian, from the 8th-7th centuries BC until the 3rd-4th centuries AD). The 2nd millennium BC: Erzincan plain during the Hittite Empire Our first written sources referring to the Erzincan plain go back to the second half of the 2nd millennium BC – Hittite cuneiform texts dated to the 15th-13th centuries BC. Although this data is sometimes too scanty to allow us to put forward reasonable suggestions, in any case the region under discussion appears to be the area which, over the whole course of the Hittite expansion and domination in the east, had close contacts with Hatti. Here, and in close proximity, are reported certain political entities. However, ultimately our poor knowledge of the political geography of this part of the Upper Euphrates basin limits the possibilities for far-reaching suggestions. The Hittite cuneiform data we have regarding the Erzincan plain can be divided into two main spheres – the military-political and cultic-religious. Clues as to when, and in which political context, this region exactly fell under the Hittite political (maybe also cultural) dominance are given in some indirect evidence dated to the second half of the 15th century BC, contained in the texts of the Hittite kings Tudhaliya II and his successor Arnuwanda I.

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The corresponding section of the ‘Annals’ of Tudhaliya II, although badly damaged, mentions the conquests of the king in the Upper Euphrates basin, particularly that of Išuwa, where the latter is said to have been an ‘extensive’ country that had revolted against Hatti, aided by Hurri (= Mittani), and was consequently conquered by the Hittite king.27 In the preamble to the treaty, signed between Tudhaliya II and Šunaššura, king of Kizzuwatna,28 some details concerning the conquest of Išuwa are mentioned. Although in both texts nothing is said about the geography of the Hittite conquest, namely the Erzincan plain, some other texts of the same Tudhaliya and Arnuwanda (KUB XXIII 72+, IBoT I 36 and KUB XXVI 62) prove the suggestion that this part of the eastern highlands, neighbours of Išuwa, might also have been conquered.29 Of these three, especially important data is contained in KUB XXIII 72+,30 which comprises some sort of ‘instruction’ given in Hattuša, the Hittite capital, to the representatives of certain eastern political entities, vassals of Hatti. The text of the instruction had to do with a revolt in Pahhuwa, one of the eastern countries; there is mention also of an existing earlier treaty or treaties with Pahhuwa and eastern countries.31 The location of Pahhuwa until now has been the subject of some discussion.32 All the sites suggested are mostly concentrated in two distinct regions: to the west of the Euphrates, near modern Divriği; and to the north of Išuwa, in the general area of the Bingöl massif or nearby. Leaving the question of Pahhuwa for future research, we are inclined to look for it in the more easterly part of the Upper Euphrates basin. A case for this seems to come from the same text, where the city of Duggama is mentioned as one of the guarantees for the future loyalty of Pahhuwa. This Duggama is listed as one of the localities of Hayaša captured by the Hittite king Muršili II during his campaign.33 It would seem difficult to explain otherwise how an Hayašaean city could take the responsibility to secure the loyalty of Pahhuwa, located in distant Divriği. The city of Kummaha is mentioned twice in this same text as the site where Hittite troops encountered the rebellious forces. It is likely that, before the revolt of KUB XXIII 11/12 Rev. 27’-34’ (= Carruba 1977: 161ff). The same event is referred to in the ‘Annals’ of Arnuwanda I (KUB XXIII 14 Obv. 1-8 = Carruba 1977: 172). On the campaigns of Tudhaliya, see Houwink ten Cate 1970: 58ff; Klengel et al. 1999: 109ff; Bryce 2005: 123ff, etc. 28 The treaty (CTH 41 and 131) is preserved in two variants – Akkadian and Hittite – where the conquest of Išuwa is mentioned in the former (Weidner 1923: N.7, S.88ff. For a complete translation of the texts, including new joins, see Beckman 1996: N.2, 13ff). 29 Houwink ten Cate 1970: 62. 30 Sayce 1930: 5ff (transl.); Gurney 1948: 32ff (transl.); Kosyan 2006: 72ff (complete edition), see also Kosyan et al. 2018 (revised edition). 31 The Hittite text KUB XXXI 103 (= CTH 212.1) could have been one of these. 32 On the location of Pahhuwa, see RGTC VI.1: 296; Kosyan 2004a: 75ff, 114ff (attestation, references to previous studies, etc.); see also Kosyan 2018. 33 For attestations and suggested localisations of this city in the Hittite texts, see RGTC VI.1: 435-436; Kosyan 2004a: 98-99. Its deity (dBaltaik) is mentioned in connection with this locality in the fragmentary Hittite-Hayašaean treaty (KUB XXVI 39). 27

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Pahhuwa and its allies, at least the southern part of the Erzincan plain would have been under Hittite control, which was fixed by a treaty. Texts IBoT I 3634 and KUB XXVI 6235 contain information on military contingents from Kummaha and some other localities under Hittite service. The former mentions soldiers from Kummaha who served with troops in the Hittite royal palace at Hattuša. KUB XXVI 62 is a list of soldiers recruited from the settlements located approximately along the north-eastern and eastern periphery of the Hittite-controlled (or supposedly Hittite-controlled) regions. In it URUTemiya is mentioned, which in KUB XXIII 72+ is attested in the form of URUTimmiya;36 long ago it was suggested that this toponym correspond to Byantine Tsimenos, in the eastern part of the Erzincan plain (later Jimin, modern Üzümlü).37 The above-mentioned Hittite source does not provide data about the advanced integration of the Upper Euphrates region with the Empire. It would probably be more realistic to suggest the existence of some obligations (military and political) imposed on the eastern principalities (loyalty, military contingents, prohibition on relations with other states on their behalf, etc.).38 At this early stage of Hittite involvement in the recently conquered regions of the east (also in western Anatolia) hardly one should expect integrity. The best illustration to this conclusion is the case of Madduwatta, the Hittite subject in the western Anatolian state of Zippašla.39 The consequences of the limited authority over its possessions on the newly conquered periphery were dramatic. During the reign of Arnuwanda I, the successor of Tudhaliya, and later that of Tudhaliya III, the separatism of conquered countries culminated in the major disaster described in the text of Hattušili III (13th century BC).40 All the neighbouring countries began to invade the Hittite-controlled regions of the Empire, including the Hittite heartland and its capital – Hattuša.41 In the context of the relations of Hatti with the countries of the Upper Euphrates basin in the 14th century BC, and also for the purposes of our study, the location of Hayaša is of utmost importance.42 If this principality is to be looked for in the Erzincan plain, and to the east of it, as suggested recently by M. Forlanini,43 or Jakob-Rost 1965: 166ff; Güterbock and Van den Hоut 1991; see also Kosyan 2002: 229. Von Schuler 1965: 145; see also Kosyan 2004b (for the passage and discussion of toponyms). 36 For textual references and proposed localisations, see RGTC VI.1: 423; Kosyan 2004a: 97. 37 Khachatryan 1971: 86-87; TAVO, Bd.24, Map B IV 6; Forlanini, M. et al. 1986 4.3; Kosyan 2004a: 97. 38 For the responsibilities of Hittite vassals as it is fixed in treaties, see Kosyan 2016b: 129-133 (with references to earlier studies). 39 The Indictment of Madduwatta (Götze 1928, full edition of the text); also Beckman 1996: 144ff (transl.); for the story of Madduwatta, see Bryce 2005: 129-136. 40 For the full edition of the text, see in Kosyan 2016b: 69-81. 41 On these events, see Bryce 2005: 145-148. 42 As well as Hayaša, the Hittite texts sometimes mention Azzi, which is often mistakenly identified with Hayaša (for a discussion of this problem, see Kosyan 2008: 264-266). 43 Forlanini 2017. 34 35

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even in the Erzurum plain (not to mention the Black Sea coast according to some early authors),44 then it could be justified to propose that the Erzincan plain might have had regular contacts with the Hittite empire, located along the strategically important route linking Asia Minor with the Transcaucasian world. Not excluding such a possibility for the location for Hayaša, another geographical backdrop might be referred to, pointing to a more southerly location for Hayaša, between Išuwa and Lake Van.45 Leaving aside the problem of Hayaša, it should be stated that the Erzincan plain was clearly under the watchful eye of Hatti in the 14th-13th centuries BC. The question here arises – why, in the mid-13th century BC, should the region of Kemakh be under such firm Hittite control? One of the texts of Hattušili III (KUB LV 1) mentions the ‘guard of the Mount of Kummaha’ (Obv. II 8’).46 Definitely, here we are faced with a mountain located near Kummaha, while the reference to ‘guard’ should be understood as the Hittite military post, or its commander. To summarise the data provided by the Hittite texts some conclusions can be suggested. In the context of the eastern expansion of Hatti, the Hittite presence in the Erzincan plain, at least in its southern part (Kummaha), is quite visible. The problem is the next – what kind of interests were pursued by the Hittites in this region? Whether political (as a base against Hayaša, or some other political entity located to the east or north-east of the plain), or its cultic-religious importance. During the Hittite expansion to the east, at least two battles are reported near Kummaha: first against the rebellious city of Arhita, the ally of Pahhuwa (see above), and the next in the mid 14th century BC against Hayaša.47 The answer to this question must wait a little longer. As well as providing a background to the political-military sphere, the Hittite texts contain valuable information about the Erzincan plain (and probably also the surrounding regions). 1. IBoT I 33 – The Middle Hittite oracle text (MUŠ oracle)48 This text comprises the oracular question regarding the Hittite king, pronounced occasionally before evil omens occurred within the city of Kummaha, which was followed by other, similar omens. The purpose of the oracular inquiry was to determine whether these signs could affect the king in subsequent years. In this

For opinions regarding the location of Hayaša, see RGTC VI.1: 63-64; RGTC VI.2: 22; Kosyan 2004a: 48-50. Kosyan 2013: 57-60; 2011: 90-92; 2015: 273-274. For this proposal the data is contained in one 13th-century BC Hittite oracle text (KUB XLIX 11), in the context of the campaign of the Hittite army against Azzi. Here two toponyms are attested (URUUt-ku-ni-ša and URUHi-im-mu-wa), which, linguistically at least, correspond to two country-names – members of the Uruatri confederation, according to the Middle Assyrian texts, and are located in the mountainous Taurus region, but not north of it (i.e. in the Erzincan plain). 46 For this part of the text, see Kosyan 2002: 233. 47 Kosyan 2016b: 92-93. 48 Edited by E. Laroche (1958). 44 45

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regard Mt Darutena49 is mentioned. Thus, it appears that there was a temple in Kummaha, with priests busy going about their oracular duties. 2. KUB LV 1 – Hittite text of cultic character50 This 13th-century BC text mentions É.GAL hekur Pirwa (‘palace of the Pirwatemple’) in connection with the [(LÚ)]EN.NU.UN HUR.SAG URUKummaha (‘the guard of Mount Kummaha’). The text shows that in Kummaha, or its vicinity, there existed a temple dedicated to the god Pirwa, one of the prominent Hittite deities, and that the ‘guard’ was responsible for performing the required offerings. 3. KUB XXVI 39 – A treaty between the Hittite king and the ruler of Hayaša51 This defective text preserves a list of deities, both Hittite and Hayašaean (?) – as divine witnesses to the treaty. If Hayaša were indeed a treaty partner of the Hittite king, a view which is commonly stated by scholars, then it could point to the Erzincan plain, or its vicinity, as a site where these deities were worshipped. Two toponyms listed along with the names of deities are associated with Hayaša. [UR]UDuggammana corresponds to URUDuggam(m)a of the ‘Annals of Muršili II’ and KUB XXIII 72 Rev. 1, and URUArhita appears in connection with the battle near Kummaha (see above). The list of deities: U.GUR URUHayaša, IŠTAR, Zagga(-)[?], Tarumuš, Terittituniš, Unagaštaš, dU takšannaš, Baltaik, Unaggaštaš, Šilli-[…]. Two more names are partially preserved. The texts quoted above could be supplemented by several others dealing with sacrifices in Hattuša, where some eastern (of Hayašaean and Azzi) deities are referred to. d

U.GUR URUHayaša – KBo IV 3 VI 33; KBo XIX 128 II 10, VI 19.

d

U URUHayaša – KUB XII 2 I 24’.

d

U KURAzzi – KUB XXXVIII 6 IV 13, KUB XXXVIII 10a 12’.

See below, ‘The Erzincan plain in the Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic periods’. The report of a Hittite dignitary (probably a priest) regarding cultic negligence in several parts of the Empire (for a transliteration, see Groddek 2002: 1-5). 51 A list of Hittite and Hayasaean deities is preserved in this fragmentary treaty (Forrer 1931: 6-8; Jahukyan 1987: 327-330; Haas 1985: 24; Petrosyan 2004: 222-224; Kosyan 2005). A consensus is still to be reached regarding the date of this treaty (between Tudhaliya III and Muršili II (14th century BC)). An association with the time of Muršili II looks more likely (Anniya, king Hayaša), although the palaeography of signs points to the Middle Hittite period, that is at least the beginning of the XIV century BC (Carruba 1988: 69-75). 49 50

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Figure 1. Altıntepe mound.

The Erzincan plain in the Urartian period Unlike the second half of the 2nd millennium BC, the following extensive time span of about half a millennium (late 13th century BC – late 8th century BC) lacks any written source to do with the Erzincan plain. In addition, our poor knowledge of the archaeology of the region during the Late Bronze and Early Iron Ages means that we are unable to fill in this large chronological gap. We lack, therefore, any possible clue as to how the area might have looked after the disintegration of Hatti and the establishment of Urartian supremacy across the Upper Euphrates region. The Urartian presence in the Erzincan plain, connected with the erection of the Altıntepe fortress and susi temple, could be taken as an argument in favour of some interests of the Urartian kings here, although until now they remain unknown. Incidentally, the same can be said beforehand about the following Achaemenid and Armenian periods (see below). One thing is clear, for the Urartians this region was of considerable importance, taking into account the impressive building activities. The Urartians built inner walls, followed by Achaemenid outer ones.52 The measurements of the latter (12 m thick) might well point to the importance of the site. The socle of the wall is composed of rectangular blocks up to 3.80 m high and with a mudbrick superstructure. The buttresses were spaced at intervals of about 11 m.53

52 53

T. Özgüç thinks that both were erected during the Urartian presence (Özgüç 1966: 60). Forbes 1983: 21.

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Figure 2. Altıntepe temple.

The arrival of Urartians into the Erzincan plain, judging by the chronology of archaeological findings,54 might have occurred later than their expansion into the Ararat plain and Išuwa (the region of Elâzığ and around), which might probably be explained by the isolated location of this region. For any discussion on the role of the Erzincan plain in the political and economic systems of the Urartian empire, one encounters a problem first discussed by P. Zimansky.55 The scholar doubts the proposal that this region might have been integrated into the Empire, or even regarded as part of it. His main argument is the absence of any symptomatic defensive system, which we find in other parts of Urartu and where one may speak of military-political and economic integration.56 It seems that this proposal rests on the existence of different models of Urartian supremacy throughout the Empire. Extensive building activities in Altıntepe, the The chronology of the establishment of Urartians in Altıntepe is debatable. Barnett and Gökçe, later also Burney and Özgüç (and others), place this event in the reign of Argishti II (Barnett and Gökçe 1953 [‘late 8th or early 7th century BC’]; Burney and Lang 1971: 144, 146, etc.; Özgüç 1974: 859-860; Klein 1974: 92-93), which rests on the name of Argishti appearing in the inscriptions found here. T. Özgüç, however, prefers an earlier dating (1969: 70-71 [the period of Argishti I – early 8th century BC]). 55 Zimansky 1985: 10-12, 27-28. 56 ‘… at the present time, Altıntepe appears to be an isolated site, far removed from the nearest place that was indisputably in the hands of the Urartian crown’ (Zimansky 1985: 27-28). Mentioning the existence of the typical Urartian character of archaeological findings here, he states in any event that they are insufficient for any conclusion ‘that Altıntepe was under the direct control of the Urartian monarch’ (Zimansky 1985: 10). 54

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standard Urartian susi temple, storerooms, plans of tombs akin to rock chambers at Van, and other symptomatic Urartian artefacts, by themselves could point to the existence of some interests here. The eastern part of the Erzincan plain could scarcely have functioned as a defensive facility at the eastern limits of the Empire. The absence of fortifications along the roads leading to the plain might be explained by gaps in the archaeological studies (see above). The same can be argued for our case here, if some local principality had survived before the Urartians and which was forced to adopt Urartian hegemony; here actually everything is Urartian. Perhaps the solution to this problem rests in the definition of Urartian interests, forcing them to extend in this direction. If one compares the Erzincan plain with that of the north-eastern possessions of the Urartians, namely the Ararat plain, then it seems clear that the latter had solid economic potential in terms of agriculture (about 200,000 ha of fertile land); this was vital for the Urartians and it had to be protected from the north and east. Accordingly, a great number of fortifications were established here along the northern and eastern limits of the plain. In the case of Erzincan the interests of the Urartians might have been different. Erzincan plain in the Achaemenid period At some period during the disintegration of Urartu, Altıntepe was abandoned by its residents for unspecified causes (either as a result of some massive crisis in the Empire or a natural disaster).57 That the crisis negatively and significantly affected several different regions in the Urartian empire, at least during the first half of the 7th century BC, can be seen in the case of for several important fortresses (Argishtihinili, Ayanis, Karmir blur, Cavushtepe, Kayalıdere, Bastam, etc.).58 The numbers of arrowheads found in the walls of some Urartian fortresses are insufficient to support the suggestion that these well-fortified cities were captured by enemies. For Altıntepe we lack any trace of enemy attack.59 After the Urartian period, a considerable occupational gap occurred (c. 150 years, if we place its abandonment by the Urartians somewhere in the mid 7th century BC, and the arrival of the Achaemenids – in the late 6th century BC), which was ended by the appearance of Altıntepe II, typical of Achaemenid fortifications, apadana, etc.).60 Fundamental building activities undertaken by the Achaemenids seem to favour the idea that the site was abandoned by its settlers.61 T. Özgüç was the first to suggest that the abandonment of Altıntepe was the result of a disastrous earthquake (1961: 278-279; see also Mellink 1962: 79), which is normal for the plain of Erzincan. 58 Archaeological studies at the above-mentioned sites have revealed some interesting processes which characterise these fortresses in the 7th century BC – the erection of additional walls, fortification of settlements, existing or recently founded ‘outer cities’, an increase in the number of garrisoned soldiers, significant indications of food storage, the shift of inhabitants from small settlements to the fortified cities, etc. (see Grekyan 2013). 59 Since no traces of destructions are extant, T. Özgüç thinks that Altıntepe was abandoned by its inhabitants towards the end of Urartu (1966: 38; see also Sinclair 1989: 431; Summers 1993: 93, 95). 60 The first archaeologists working at Altıntepe did not regard it as such (see footnote 16 above). 61 According to G. Summers, after the Urartians an occupational hiatus occurred here (Summers 1993: 94). 57

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How long did the Achaemenids stay in Altıntepe? Logically, the eastern campaigns of Alexander the Great, particularly the battle at Arbela in 331 BC, might be taken as a terminus ante quem. Although we lack any clue as to the end of the Achaemenid presence after this event, it can be speculated that, since this region lay beyond the route of the Macedonian army, and also from the absence of archaeological traces of its destruction, Altıntepe’s palatial complex might have survived for some time – until the period of Artaxias I of Greater Armenia, at the beginning of the 2nd century BC.62 Erzincan plain in the Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic periods During this timespan the Erzincan plain might have been under the rule of the Seleucids, at least nominally, until the battle of Magnesia in 190 BC, after which it was incorporated into Greater Armenia.63 For the latter period, according to Early Medieval Armenian sources, its territory was divided between two sub-provinces of Upper Armenia (Bardzr Hayk’) – Daranałik’ and Ekełeac (Classical Akilisene). Little or nothing is known in terms of these provinces in the political life of Greater Armenia; all references to them are connected with religious activities.64 In the studies of the Early Medieval Armenian historiographers, in the passages dealing with details of the adoption of Christianity, we find numerous references which directly point to the exceptional role of the Erzincan plain in the religious life of the state.65 Agatangełos (5th century AD)66 The destruction of pagan temples by Tiridates III, king of Armenia, reveals important information regarding the Erzincan plain: 1. ‘In the first year of the reign of Trdat in Greater Armenia, they went to the province of Ekełeats to the village of Erēz to the temple of Anahit in order to sacrifice there. And when they had completed this unworthy deed, they went down and encamped on the bank of the river called Gayl’ (48: 61). [The companion of Trdat III in the trip is St. Gregory the Illuminator, before the adoption of Christianity; Erēz = Arm. Erznka, modern Erzincan; Anahit = chief goddess of the Armenian pantheon, the spouse of Aramazd;67 River Gayl = the

See Sargsyan 1971: 530-534. See Sargsyan 1971: 530-534. 64 Neither Daranałik’ nor Ekełeac are listed in the Early Medieval Armenian literature as belonging to any chiefdom (i.e. priestly family). On the contrary, the northern part of the plain of Erzincan is referred to as ‘Anahtakan gavar’, i.e. ‘the province of Anahit (mother-goddess)’ (see below in the text). 65 This information was discussed briefly in our recent studies (Kosyan 2010; 2018 [forthcoming]). 66 Textual references are cited after the English edition of Moses of Khorene, and other authors, edited by R. Thomson. 67 For the cult of Anahit and her sanctuaries, see Melik-Pashayan 1963. 62 63

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Aram Kosyan northern tributary of Karasu, flowing through the Erzincan plain, to the west of the modern city] 2. ‘Then he (Gregory) entrusted them to the all-protecting grace of God, while he himself, taking the king, hastened to the other regions of the whole territory of Armenia that they might sow the word of life. He came to the province of Daranałik’ in order to destroy the altars of those falsely called gods, where in the village of T’ordan there was a famous temple of the glorious god Barshamin. First they destroyed this and smashed his image; they plundered all the treasures, both of gold and silver, and distributed them to the poor. And the whole village with its properties and territories they devoted to the name of the church’ (784: 323). [T’ordan = location unknown;68 Barshamin = a Mesopotamian god (Ba’alshamin) whose statue was brought by Tigranes the Great in the 1st century BC and a temple was erected for him (see below)] 3. ‘When he had further confirmed these people [the province of Khałtik’, to the north of Erzincan plain], then he went to the fortified site of renowned Ani, the site of the royal burial ground of the Armenian kings. There they destroyed the altar of the god Zeus-Aramazd, called father of all the gods. And there they set up the Lord’s sign, and the town with its fortress they devoted to the service of the church’ (785: 325). [Ani = a fortress on the right bank of Karasu (Arm. Kamakh/modern Kemakh on the opposite bank); to be distinguished from Ani on the modern ArmenianTurkish border; Aramazd = the chief god of the pre-Christian Armenian pantheon] 4. ‘After this he came to the neighbouring province of Ekełeats. Here the demons appeared in the places of worship of the most important shrines of the Armenian kings, in the temple of Anahit in the town of Erēz. The demons gathered together and gave battle in the form of an army carrying shields; with a tremendous shout they made the mountains echo. They were put to flight, but as they fled the high walls collapsed and were flattened. Those who had arrived, Saint Gregory, the king and the pious army, broke into pieces the golden image of the female deity Anahit, and they completely destroyed and pillaged the place, seizing the gold and silver. From there they crossed over the river Gayl and destroyed the temple of Nanē, the daughter of Aramazd, in the town of T’il (786: 326-327). [T’il = a prominent religious centre approximately 8 km northwest of Erzincan. In the same 4th century AD it became the seat of the head (Catholicos) of the Armenian church. The town was donated to Gregory the Illuminator as his personal domain; here were buried several Catholicoi and also king Pap in AD 374 (see below)]69 5. ‘Then he hastened to the province of Derjan in order to spread there also the message of the apostolic preaching by works of labour, and to free them from the beastliness of their abominable and demon-possessed way of life… He came to the temple of Mihr, called the son of Aramazd, to the village called Bagayarich in the Parthian tongue’ (489-790: 329).

68 69

See Kosyan 2018 for an attempt to identify this place-name with URUDarutena of the Hittite texts. HHSTB 1986: 449.

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[Mihr = Iranian Mithra; Bagayarich = to the east of Erzincan and to the north of modern Mamahatun]70 Moses of Khorene (5th century BC) 1. ‘After illuminating the whole of Armenia with the light of divine knowledge... he left his own son Aristakēs as his successor and remained himself in the province of Daranalik’ in the mountain caves of Mane… Saint Gregory lived in seclusion in the cave of Mane for many years and on his death was transposed to the ranks of the angels. Shepherds found him dead and buried him in the same place without knowing who he was… But when the faith had become firmly established in these regions, after a long time Saint Gregory’s relics were revealed to a certain ascetic called Garnik, who took them and buried them in the village of T’ordan’ (Book II.91: 244-246).71 [Caves of Mane = in Armenological literature usually located in one of the ravines of the mountain Sepuh/Gohanam – modern Karadağ, to the west of Erzincan] 2. ‘Tigran consented and raised the statue of Zeus Olympus in the fortress of Ani, that of Athena in T’il, the second statue of Artemis in Erēz, and that of Hephaistos in Bagayarinc… He himself went down to Mesopotamia, and finding there the statue of Barshamin, he embellished it with ivory, crystal, and silver. He ordered that is should be brought and set up in the town of T’ordan’ (14: 149-150). The testimony in the above-mentioned sources helps us make certain proposals: 1. In the Erzincan plain and to the east of it (Terjan), at least from the 2nd century BC onwards, there were several important cultic-religious centres of pre-Christian Armenia (Erez, T’il, T’ordan, Bagayaric, Kamakh and Ani). Here all the major deities were worshipped – the chief god Aramazd, Anahit, Nane, and Mihr (Mithra). Later these temples were used for the worship of Greek deities as well – Zeus, Athena, Artemis, and Hephaistos. Nowhere in ancient Armenia is such a concentration of cultic centres attested. 2. To this should be added the royal cemetery of Armenian kings (near Kemakh, on the right bank of the river). 3. After the Christianisation of Armenia the Erzincan plain was given to Gregory the Illuminator as a domain, which is also symptomatic. Taking into account the information referred to above, and also that contained in the Hittite texts of the 2nd millennium BC, it perhaps seems unlikely that the cultic landscape of the Erzincan plain evolved only in the Hellenistic period.

HHSTB 1986: 531. In Book III.2 it is told that the tomb of Aristakes, son of Gregory was in the province of Ekełeats, in the town of T’il, and in III.8 that Catholicos Nerses the Great, a direct descendant of St Gregory was also buried in T’il. The same is reported in P’awstos Buzand’s (4th century AD) study (1989: Book III.2). 70 71

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The northern contact zone: summary Resuming the discussion of written and archaeological sources regarding the northern contact zone, several suggestions can be offered: 1. The Erzincan plain is situated in a strategically important region. From this part of the eastern Highlands proceeds the easiest and most comfortable route that connects the Transcaucasian region, via the plains of Kars and Erzurum, with the Upper Euphrates region. Trade routes, as well as military campaigns and migrations proceeding from the east and north-east to the west and south-west, and vice versa, seem mostly to have traversed this region. The other route in this direction, which passes via the northern shores of Lake Van, is difficult and uncomfortable due to the terrain. 2. The role of the Erzincan plain in the religious life of the Armenian Highland cannot be doubted, especially in the context of the 2nd millennium BC Hittite cuneiform data, which mention at least two cultic centres in this region – an unnamed temple where priests performed oracular rituals, by order of the Hittite king, and also the temple of Pirwa. Further evidence for the religious status of this area is found in the Urartian period (e.g. the susi temple of Altıntepe, 8th-7th centuries BC). Several centuries later, in the Hellenistic period, we encounter here a large number of temples dedicated to major Armenian deities, suggesting continuity. In the 2nd millennium BC, and until the early Middle Ages, the Erzincan plain was an important religious centre, while the political status of the region now is difficult to determine. Abbreviations AJNES: Aramazd, Armenian Journal of Near Eastern Studies. Yerevan (since 2017, Oxford). CTH: E. Laroche, Catalogue des textes hittites. Paris, 1971. HHSTB: T.Kh. Hakobyan, S.T. Melik-Bakhshyan, H.Kh. Barseghyan, Hayastani ev harakic˓ šrǰanneri tełanunneri baṙaran (Dictionary of the toponyms of Armenia and surrounding regions), hator 3. Yerevan: Erevani hamalsarani hratarakč’ut’yun (in Armenian), 1986. KST: Kazı Sonuçları Toplantısı (Ankara). MMAEZ: Merdzavor ev Mijin Arevelqi erkrner ev zhoxovurdner (Peoples and countries of the Near and Middle East). Yerevan. PBH: Patmabanasirakan hands (Journal of History and Philology). Yerevan. RGTC 1: G.F. del Monte, J. Tischler, Die Orts- und Gewässernamen der hethitischen Texte. Répertoire géographique des textes cunéiformes 6.1. Wiesbaden: Dr Ludwig Reichert, 1978. TAVO: Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orient. Wiesbaden: Dr Ludwig Reichert. Bibliography

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Agathangełos 1976. History of the Armenians (transl. and commentary by R.W. Thomson). Albany: State University of New York Press. Aslanyan, A.T. 1970. Tektonika (Tectonics). In A.T. Aslanyan and А.Т. Veguni (eds) Armyanskaya SSR: 366-395 (in Russian). Moskva: Nauka. Barkhudaryan, V.B. et al. (eds) 2013. Haykazuns. Myth and History (materials of an international conference held in Yerevan, June 5-6, 2012). Yerevan: Gitutyun Publishing House. Barnett, R.D. 1974. The Hieroglyphic Writing of Urartu. In K. Bittel et al. (eds) Anatolian studies presented to Hans Gustav Güterbock on the occasion of his 65th Birthday: 43-55. Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut. Barnett, R. D., N. Gökce 1953. The Find of Urartian Bronzes at Altın Tepe, near Erzincan. Anatolian Studies 3: 121-129. Batiuk, S.D. 2005. Migration Theory and the Distribution of Early Transcaucasian Culture. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Toronto. Beckman, G. 1996. Hittite Diplomatic Texts (2nd edn). Atlanta: Scholars Press. Brant, J. 1836. Journey Through a Part of Armenia and Asia Minor, in the Year 1835. Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland 6: 187-223. Bryce, T.R. 2005. The Kingdom of the Hittites. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Burney, Ch., D.M. Lang 1971. The Peoples of the Hills. London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson. Can, B. 2007. Altıntepe – Mozaikli Kilise 2005 yılı Onarım ve Restorasyon Çalışmaları. In M. Sahin (ed.) The Proceedings of III. International Symposium of the Mosaic of Turkey, 8-10 Haziran/June 2006: 101-108 (Figures pp. 201-203). İstanbul: Uludağ Üniversitesi Mozaik Arastırmaları Merkezi. Can, B. 2009. Erzincan Altıntepe Church with Mosaic. Journal of Mosaic Research 3-4: 1-9. Carruba, O. 1977. Beiträge zur mittelhethitische Geschichte. I-II. SMEA 18: 137-195. Carruba, O. 1988. Die Hajasa-Verträge Hattis. In E. Neu, Ch. Rüster (eds) Documenta Asiae Minoris. Festschrift fur Heinrich Otten zum 75. Geburtstag: 59-75. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz. Ceylan, A. 2005. The Erzincan, Erzurum and Kars region in the Iron Age. In A. Çilingiroğlu, G. Darbyshire (eds) Anatolian Ages 5. Proceedings of the Fifth Anatolian Iron Ages Colloquium held at Van, 6‐10 August 2001: 21-29. Ankara: British Institute of Archaeology at Ankara. Emre, K. 1969, Altıntepe’de Urartu Seramiği: The Urartian Pottery from Altıntepe. Belleten 33: 279-301. Forbes, T.B. 1983. Urartian Architecture. British Archaeological Reports International Series 170. Oxford: British Archaeological Reports. Forlanini, M. 2017. The Ancient Land of ‘Northern’ Kummaḫa and Aripša ‘Inside the Sea’. In M. Alparslan (ed.) Places and Spaces in Hittite Anatolia I: Hatti and the East. Proceedings of an International Workshop on Hittite Historical Geography in Istanbul, 25th-26th October 2013: 1-12. Istanbul: Türk Eskiçağ Bilimleri Enstitüsü. Forlanini, M. et al. 1986. Atlante storico del Vicino Oriente antico. Fascicolo 4.3. Anatolia: l’Impero Hittita. Roma:  Università degli Studi di Roma La Sapienza. Forrer, E. 1931. Hajasa-Azzi. Caucasica IX: 1-24.

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Grekyan, Ye. 2013. Vani t‘agavorut‘yan ankman xndri šurj (Towards the problem of the end of the kingdom of Van. In V.B. Barkhudaryan et al. (eds) Haykazuns. Myth and History (materials of an international conference held in Yerevan, June 5-6, 2012): 64-82 (In Armenian). Yerevan: Gitutyun Publishing House. Groddek, D. 2002. Hethitische Texte in Transkription. KUB 55. Dresdner Beiträge zur Hethitologie, Bd.4. Dresden: Verlag der TU Dresden. Gurney, O.R. 1948. Mita of Pahhuwa. Liverpool Annals of Archaeology and Anthropology 28: 32-48. Güterbock, H.G., Th.P.J. Van Den Hout 1991. The Hittite Instruction for the Royal Bodyguard. Assyriological Studies 24. Chicago, III.: The Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. Haas, V. 1985. Die ältesten Nachrichten zur Geschichte des armenischen Hochlands. In V. Haas (ed.) XENIA. Das Reich Urartu: 21-30. Konstanz: Universitätsverlag Konstanz. Houwink ten Cate, Ph.H.J. 1970. The Records of the Early Hittite Empire. Istanbul: Nederlands Instituut voor het Nabije Oosten. Huntington, E. 1902. The Valley of the Upper Euphrates River and Its People. Bulletin of the American Geographical Society 34/4: 301-310. Işıklı, M. 2010. The Results of Surveys in the Environs of the Urartian Fortress of Altıntepe in Erzincan, Eastern Anatolia (investigations of public settlement areas and observations on the Post-Urartian period). In P. Matthiae, F. Pinnock, L. Nigro and N. Marchetti (eds) Proceedings of the 6th International Congress of the Archaeology of the Ancient Near East, Vol. 2: 265-278. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. Işıklı, M. 2015. The Kura-Araxes Culture in the Erzurum Region: The Process of its Development. TÜBA-AR 18: 51-69. Jahukyan, G.B. 1987. Hayoc’ lezvi patmut’yun. Naxagrayin šrǰan (The History of the Armenian Language. Pre-literary period) (in Armenian). Yerevan: Haykakan SSH GA hratarakč’ut’yun. Jakob-Rost, L. 1965. Beiträge zum hethitischen Hofzeremoniell (IBoT I 36), Mitteilungen des Instituts für Orientforschung 11: 165-225. Karaosmanoğlu, M., B. Can, H. Korucu 2007. Altıntepe Urartu Kalesi 2005 Yılı Kazı ve Onarım Çalışmaları. KST 28/1: 259-270. Karaosmanoğlu, M., B. Can, H. Korucu 2008. Altıntepe Urartu Kalesi 2006 Yılı Kazı ve Onarım Çalışmaları. KST 29/1: 497-514. Karaosmanoğlu, M., H. Korucu 2012. The Apadana of Altıntepe in the Light of the Second Season Excavations. In A. Çilingiroğlu and A. Sagona (eds) Anatolian Ages 7. Proceedings of the Fifth Anatolian Iron Ages Colloquium held at Edirne, 19-24 April 2010: 131-147. British Institute at Ankara Monograph 31. Leuven: Peeters. Khachatryan, V. 1971. Vostočnye provincii Xettskogo carstva (in Russian). Yerevan: Izdatel’stvo AN Armjanskoj SSR. Kinneir, J.M. 1818. Journey Through Asia Minor, Armenia, and Koordistan, in the years 1813 and 1814. London: John Murray. Klein, J.J. 1974. Urartian Hieroglyphic Inscriptions from Altıntepe. Anatolian Studies 24: 77-94.

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Klejn, J. 1978. Urartskie ieroglificheskie nadpisi iz Altıntepe (Urartian hieroglyphic inscriptions from Altıntepe) (in Russian). Drevnij Vostok 3: 127-149. Klengel, H., F. Imparati, V. Haas, Th.P.J. Van den Hout 1999. Geschichte des Hethitischen Reiches. Leiden: Brill. Kohl, Ph.L. 2007. The Making of Bronze Age Eurasia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Konyar, E. 2006. Old Hittite Presence in the East of the Euphrates in the Light of the Stratigraphical Data from İmikuşağı (Elazığ). In D.P. Mielke, U.-D. Schoop, J. Seeher (eds) Structuring and Dating Hittite Archaeology: 333-348. BYZAS 4. Istanbul: Deutsche Archäologische Institut Abteilung Istanbul. Kosyan, A. 2002. Ani-Kamakhy khetakan darashrjanum (Ani-Kamakh in the Hittite period). PBH 3: 225-241 (in Armenian). Kosyan, A. 2004a. Haykakan leṙnašxarhi tełanunnerə (əst xet’akan sepagir ałbyurneri) (The Toponyms of the Armenian Highland) (in Armenian). Yerevan: Zangak-97. Kosyan, A. 2004b. Xet’akan KUB XXVI 62 sepagir tek’stə ev Verin Ep’rati avazani patmakan ashkharhagrutyan xndirnerə (The Hittite text KUB XXVI 62 and the problems of the Upper Euphrates historical geography): 472-484. MMAEZH 23 (in Armenian with English summary. Yerevan: Gitutyun Publishing House. Kosyan, A. 2005. Hayasai astvatsnery (KUB XXVI 39) (The gods of Hayasa): 444-457. MMAEZH 24. 444-457 (in Armenian with English summary). Yerevan: Gitutyun Publishing House. Kosyan, A. 2006. Arnuwandas I in the East. AJNES I: 72-97. Kosyan, A. 2008. Hayasan ev Azzin. In A. Petrosyan (ed.) Shnorh i verust. Araspel ev patmutyun (Hayasa and Azzi) (hodvatsneri zhoxovatsu nvirvats Sargis Haruthyunyani 80-amyakin): 263-291 (in Armenian). Yerevan: Gitutyun Publishing House. Kosyan, A. 2010. Urartakan terutyan tsayragavary (Altıntepei orinakov) (The periphery of the Urartian empire [on the example of Altıntepe]). In P. Avetisyan and A. Petrosyan (eds) Chaldyan zorutyamb (hodvatsneri zhoxovatsu nvirvats Boris Piotrovsku 100-amyakin): 21-33 (in Armenian). Yerevan: Gitutyun Publishing House. Kosyan, A. 2011. Towards the Hittite Eastern Periphery (KUB XLIX 11). AJNES VI/2: 87-94. Kosyan, A. 2013. Vanits minchev Ep’rat (hayoc vax petakanutyan akunqnerum) (from Van to Euphrates [the rise of ancient Armenian statehood]. In V.B. Barkhudaryan et al. (eds) Haykazuns. Myth and History (materials of an international conference held in Yerevan, June 5-6, 2012): 48-63 (in Armenian). Yerevan: Gitutyun Publishing House. Kosyan, A.V. 2014. To the East of Hatti. In A. Özfırat (ed.) Essays in Honour of Veli Sevin. A Life Immensed in Archaeology: 277-282. Istanbul: Ege Yayınları. Kosyan, A. 2015. Between Euphrates and Lake Van (on the Location of Hayaša and Azzi). In M. Išıklı and B. Can (eds) International Symposium on East Anatolia-South Caucasus Cultures, Vol. I: 271-276. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Kosyan, A. 2016a. Evfratsko-Tigrskaja kontaktnaja zona v III – pervoj polovine I tys. do n.ē. (The Euphrates-Tigris contact zone in the III – first half of the I mill. BC). In Margaryan (ed.) Na styke mir-sistem: iz istorii kontaktnyx zon drevnosti I sovremennosti, tom I: 99-65 (in Russian). Yerevan: Russian-Armenian University Press.

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Kosyan, A. 2016b. M.t.a. XIV dari kheta-hayasakan mijpetakan paymanagrery (The XIV century BC Hittite-Hayasaean interstate treaties) (in Armenian). Yerevan: Zangak-97. Kosyan, A. 2017. The Euphratian-Tigridian Contact zone (an overview). AJNES XI/12: 47-56. Kosyan, A. 2018. Upper Euphrates Political Geography Reconsidered, in Papers presented to Mirjo Salvini. Oxford (in press). Kosyan, A., R. Ghazaryan, M. Khanzadyan, S. Martirosyan 2018. M.t.a. XV dari khetakan teqstery Haykakan lernashkharhi masin (The XV c. BC Hittite texts concerning the Armenian Highlands) (in Armenian). Yerevan: Gitutyun Publishing House. Kushnareva, K.Kh. and T.N. Chubinishvili 1970. Drevnie kulturi Yuzhnogo Kavkaza (The Southern Caucasus in Prehistory) (in Russian). Leningrad: Nauka. Laroche, E. 1971. Les hiéroglyphes d’Altıntepe. Anadolu 15: 55-61. Manandyan, H. 1984. Erker (Studies) (in Armenian). Yerevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences Press. Melik-Pashayan, K.V. 1963. Anahit dicuhu pashtamunqy (The Cult of the goddess Anahit) (in Armenian). Yerevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences Press. Mellink, M.J. 1962. Archaeology in Asia Minor. American Journal of Archaeology 66: 79-80. Moses Khorenats’i 2006. History of the Armenians (transl. and commentary by R.W. Thomson, revised edition). Ann Arbor: Caravan Books. Özgüç, N. 1974. The Decorated Bronze Strip and Plaques from Altıntepe. In Mansel’e Armagan 2 (Melanges Mansel): 847-860. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi. Özgüç, T. 1961. Altıntepe Kazıları/Excavations at Altıntepe. Belleten 25(98): 253-280. Özgüç, T. 1966. Altıntepe. Architectural monuments and wall paintings. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi. Özgüç, T. 1969. Altıntepe II. Tombs, storehouse and ivories. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi. Palumbi, G. 2008. The Red and Black. Social and Cultural Interaction between the Upper Euphrates and the Southern Caucasus in the Fourth and Third Millennium BC. Studi di Preistoria Orientale 2. Roma: Sapienza Università di Roma. Parker, R., A. Kreimer, M. Munasinghe 1995. Informal Settlements, Environmental Degradation, and Disaster Vulnerability. The Turkey Case. Washington: The International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) and The World Bank. P’awstos Buzand 1989. The Epic Histories Attributed to P’awstos Buzand (transl. and commentary by N.G. Garsoïan). Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University press. Petrosyan, A. 2004. Haykakan dicarani hnaguyn akunqnery (in Armenian). PBH 2: 205-233. Pierce, J.A., J.F. Bender, S.E. De Jong, W.S.F. Kidd, P.J. Low, Y. Güner, F. Saroğlu, Y. Yılmaz, S. Moorbath, J.G. Mitchell 1990. Genesis of collision volcanism in Eastern Anatolia, Turkey. Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research 44: 189-229. Sagona, A.G. 1984. The Caucasian Region in the Early Bronze Age, Part I. British Archaeological Reports International Series 214. Oxford: British Archaeological Reports. Sargsyan, G.Kh. 1971. Hayastani miavorumy ev hzoracumy Artashes A-i oroq (The unification and rise of Armenia during the reign of Artashes I). In Ts.P. Aghayan

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et al. (eds) The History of the Armenian People: 521-553 (in Russian). Yerevan: Armenian Academy of Sciences Press. Sayce, A.H. 1930. Hittite and Moscho-Hittite. Revue hittite et asianique 1, fasc.1: 1-8. Sevin, V. 1995. İmikuşağı I. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi. Sevin, V. 1998. İmikuşağı Kazılarının Işığında Habur Seramiğinin Kuzey Yayılımı, XXXIV Uluslararası Assiriyoloji Kongresi: 383-391. Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi. Sinclair, T.A. 1989. Eastern Turkey: an Architectural and Archaeological Survey. II. London: Pindar Press. Summers, G.D. 1993. Archaeological Evidence for the Achaemenid Period in Eastern Turkey, Anatolian Studies 43: 85-108. Türkoğlu, E. 2009. A Magnetotelluric Investigation of Arabia – Eurasia Collision in Eastern Anatolia. Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Alberta. Weidner, E. 1923. Politische Dokumente aus Kleinasien. Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung. Zimansky, P.E. 1985. Ecology and Empire: The Structure of the Urartian State. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

‘The Caucasian Frontier’ and Terek Cossacks: an ethnocultural phenomenon at the junction of the Christian and Muslim worlds Beniamin Mailyan

Institute of Oriental Studies, NAS RA

Abstract: Despite the multiple increase in informational flow of new data, the modern view of the ethnic history of the Caucasus currently mostly remains within the sustainable stereotypes developed, because of the lack of information regarding this region and its peoples. While the history of conflicts in the Caucasus has been explored over its full length in the historiography and popular literature, the history of the ethnic-cultural dialogue there remains a topic for further studies. Obviously, any discussion of the interaction between cultures, the co-existence of different peoples in the Caucasus has an important educational significance. In the modern (post-Soviet) period of the historical science this problem had purchased autonomous meaning. This is connected also with the collapse of the Marxist theory of formations in the study of history and the search for a new methodological basis. Today it seems more appropriate to study the problem of the interaction of Caucasian cultures through the world-system prism. The Cossack groups who came into existence along the mobile borders of the ‘Caucasian frontier’, with their steppe and mountainous populations of Ciscaucasia, were very influenced by the migrations that had taken place in this region. But the ethnic identification of Cossacks today is far from resolved. In particular, the problem of ethnic components of Cossack communities is yet to be established. It is well known that the Terek Cossacks had incorporated into their communities a significant number of neighbouring peoples. The existence of non-Slavic, particularly Caucasian and Turkic components in the ethnic appearance of the Cossacks is indisputable. This could explain many similarities in the culture and physical appearance of the Cossacks and North Caucasian peoples. Probably, during the initial period of the Terek Cossacks in the Caucasus their relations with the local peoples were more peaceful in comparison with the period of the conquest of the region by the Russian empire. By this time a multi-ethnic  and multi-confessional sub-ethnos of the Terek Cossacks had come into being, which collapsed during the Civil War (1918-1921) and the establishment of the Communist regime in the Terek region. Keywords: ‘Caucasian frontier’, Terek Cossacks, Greben Cossacks, Slavs, Caucasian people, Turks, ethno-cultural phenomena, Christianity, Islam.

There is no need to argue that modern concepts on the Caucasus require in-depth scientific research. In the absence of a one-dimensional picture here, it is quite obvious that any solutions to the Caucasian problems will need a special approach, certainly, with a glance back at their historical origins, including studies into the history, demography, ethnography, and folklore of the Terek Cossacks; and all at a time when the ethno-cultural specificity of the Terek Cossacks is increasingly topical and controversial.

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The history of Cossack formation is all too complex and ambiguous. Perhaps, until the 15th century, it would be better to speak only of the formation of a form of ‘proto-Cossacks’. There are no serious grounds to think of the pre-existence of some specific Cossack ‘ethnos’ as being the direct and the only ancestor of modern Cossacks.1 Moreover, the role of the most diverse ethnic components in the formation of ‘proto-Cossacks’ is obvious. The Cossack sub-ethnos emerged as a result of complex contacts between Slavic and, to a lesser extent, other ethnic groups.2 The phenomenon of the Cossacks in Russian history is logically explained on the basis of civilisational methodology. Since Russian civilisation itself has an interim Eurasian nature and is developing under the influence of the West and East, the specific Cossack sub-ethnos, which had defended its freedom and military-democratic values from time immemorial, has also undergone some socio-cultural inversion. Formerly free people with a traditional Slavic veche-type, all-round democracy, who were embroiled in all the turmoil and Cossack-peasant riots in Russia, were gradually subordinated to the central state power as its semi-regular army. Occupying new territories on the periphery of a constantly expanding Russia, protecting its southern borderline from incessant invasions and threats by nomads and other contenders for disputed lands, the Cossacks objectively performed the function of a kind of new wave in terms of Russian civilisation by securing it on its distant frontiers. The pioneering function of the Cossacks did not disappear following their transfer into state service and the end of their autonomy; on the contrary it surfaced again with the deliberate deployment of Cossack troops on the new borders of the permanently expanding Romanov empire. The Cossacks acted as true bearerchampions for Russian geopolitics in the Empire, turning the local populations in their new regions into Cossacks, including the non-Orthodox, and extending to them the traditional Cossack values – collegiality and conciliarism. The Cossacks, like no other, embodied the Eurasian nature of Russian civilisation, both in terms of the place of residence and type of activity, as well as its objective significance. The Cossacks were not a phenomenon fixed in time. Certainly the formation of an autonomous, practically independent Cossack sub-ethnos, was actually in need of those specific institutions that could organise public life and integrate the community, i.e. the origination of elements of quasi-statehood based on customary law. Certain regional, proto-state (ataman, all-round) structures of the Cossacks constituted a natural response to environmental pressures. The main feature of the Cossacks genesis was the formation of the elements of statehood without developed forms of private property. Its practical absence conditioned the renunciation of the coercive apparatus. Due to the absence of blood ties and embedded social stratification, the partial Cossack statehood developed in a slowed down manner. Legitimate public authority, the main badge of the state, was present 1 2

Mininkov 1991: 300-310. Pronštein 1967.

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there in an underdeveloped form, i.e. without legal registration. Immature, nonarticulated social relations and amorphous socio-cultural space corresponded to the underdeveloped Cossack statehood, somewhat resembling ochlocracy. Cossacks, as is generally accepted, were mainly runaway Muscovites of various social levels, who broke with their environment and shaped their own identity, based on their subjective isolation from the majority of the Great Russian ethnos and its political centre. Up to the 18th century, the primitive Cossack quasi-statehood ensured, whether by means of filibustering or by the ideology of freedom and democratic rule, the functioning of their own sub-ethnos, without singling out any highly privileged strata in its composition. It should be emphasised that in the absence of any experience in bureaucratic power relations, and under conditions of patriarchal social organisation, amorphous socio-cultural space, the functioning of the customary law and corresponding legal consciousness, the Cossack quasistatehood represented a regime capable of ensuring the integrity of the occupied territory and a specific way of life, preserving spiritual values and mechanisms of self-government. The social and legal status of the Cossack sub-ethnos in the 16th and first half of the 17th centuries is characterised, as a rule, by its role of the avantgarde of colonisation as the most passionary part of the Great Russian ethnos with the inclusions of alien elements (Figures 1-2). In the Middle Ages the term ‘Cossack’ had the meaning of a free and reckless fighter.3 The substratum or the backbone of the groups of such people, around which a wider ethnic community was formed, consisted of Turkic, Slavic, and local Caucasian elements. It is impossible to reduce all Cossack groups to a single ethnic basis. Medieval Cossack groups were multi-ethnic and multilingual. A similar way of life obviously contributed to their integration and the formation of more numerous groups. According to researchers, the more factors (language, religion, territory, hostile environment, etc.) were involved, the faster was the process of consolidation.4 Despite high conventionality of any socio-cultural or historical reconstruction of the processes that took place in the distant past, for a better understanding of contemporary events we must, however, try to analyse the historical processes giving rise to the current patterns. Russian advances into the North Caucasus represented more than just conquest: it was also a process of ‘frontier’ formation, the creation of border zone, that involved the migration of large numbers of people abandoning their old, and forming new, communities.5 Historically, the ‘Caucasian frontier’ had the significance of a ‘contact zone’ of various ethno-confessional and ethno-social groups, whose interactions created a unique, localised mosaic. Thus, the ‘Caucasian frontier’ played an Blagova 1970: 146. Paneš 1996: 142 5 Barrett 2000: 165. 3 4

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Figure 1.

important role, not only as a mobile border, but – above all – it was a complex means of military, economic and cultural interaction of Russia with local peoples. We cannot hope to assemble a full and clear historical reconstruction of the main events in the Eastern Caucasus at the early frontier stage. It is an extremely difficult task, resulting from the scarcity of archival records and narrative sources. Moreover,

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Figure 2.

there are a number of frequently controversial opinions6 concerning the timing and nature of the incursions, and the composition of the first re-settler units from the territory of Rus into the Caucasus. We will not dwell on them in detail since our task is not historical reconstruction but the application of frontier methodology to the study of Eastern Ciscaucasia. The fact is that most scholars have not considered the early period of Russian settlement in the Caucasus from the frontier position. Even those authors acknowledging the existence of the Caucasian frontier, and 6

Vinogradov, Magomadova 1975: 160-164.

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giving their own periodisation, begin their accounts from the second half of the 18th century.7 However, the process of the frontier advance in the Caucasus seems to begin much earlier, in the middle of the XVI century. In all likelihood the first ‘frontier men’ might have been the Novgorod pirates – the ushkuyniks.8 Presumably the Greben (the crest) and the Terek Cossack communities were initially established by these elements.9 Deep and wide Russification of the local autochthonous population of Eastern Ciscaucasia took place already in the process of migrations of the Great Russian population. The Terek zone had already been partly occupied by two groups of Cossacks even before the appearance of the Russian statehood there. The first group inhabited the lower reaches (at the mouth) of the Terek, while the second lived in Greben (i.e. on the crests of the Caucasus). Greben traditions indicate that these Cossacks lived in the mountains, hence their name (endo – and exoethnonym). The former have virtually disappeared from the ethnic map of the region by the 17th century, while the latter are still residing on the left bank of the Terek, being correctly considered one of the earliest Cossack groups in the south of Russia. The ethnic and confessional composition of the Terek Cossacks is closely tied to the history of its origination and subsequent development. Their historical core consisted of the Greben Cossacks – the ‘Old Believers’ – who initially lived a free community life. Later the Cossack stratum expanded at the expense of the asynchronous arrival of the Don and the Volga (Orthodox and ‘Old Believers’) Cossacks, as well as the Orthodox Ukrainian peasants and retired married soldiers of the Caucasian army. They were gradually joined by ethnic groups of Kalmyks, Ossetians, Kabardians, Georgians and Kazan Tatar. The Kalmyks and overwhelming majority of Ossetian and Kabardin Cossacks converted to Orthodoxy. Insignificant numbers of Ossetian and Kabardin Cossacks, and all Tatar Cossacks, confessed Islam: thus the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional sub-ethnos of the Terek Cossacks was gradually formed. As already mentioned, not all of the known Cossack groups managed to survive. Undoubtedly the nucleus of the Russian-speaking Cossacks was made up of the Slav population, moving via ‘Wild Field’ conditions to a specific cultural and economic setup. With any different approach it would be impossible to explain the presence in Cossack customs and rites the expressly Slavic, Old Russian layers of culture that simply could not occur in the new converts. Moreover, the assertion that ‘the serfs gave rise to the Greben Cossacks’10 is inappropriate, as their system of values and ways of life were diametrically opposite.

Urušadze 2011. Jakušenkov, Romanova 2012: 74-80. 9 Barrett 2000: 163. 10 Ančabadze, Volkova 1993: 85. 7 8

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The origin of the very first Greben Cossacks is still disputed by scholars.11 The main theories (Novgorod, Ryazan, Don) have almost no written corroboration and the legends of the Greben Cossacks also contain no reliable indication as to the place of their initial exodus. Although the first appearance of the Cossacks in the Caucasus is buried deep in antiquity, there are at least reasons to believe that their ancestors, pushed out of their native plains by the waves of the Mongol invasion, found refuge in the inaccessible Caucasian ridges (mountains) and settled there permanently. The documents of the 16th and 17th centuries contain more definite indications that the Cossack communities in the Terek zone were replenished at the expense of various social and ethnographic groups of the Russian population.12 The acknowledgement that the Greben Cossack community was formed from various components, still does not eliminate the problem of finding its ethnic core. The fact that it was more Slavic (i.e. rather than Highlanders, Xazars, Polovets, etc.) is evidenced first of all by the layers of material and, especially, spiritual culture (beliefs, folklore) associated with the Russian people. As regards a more specific definition, the question arises whether it was north or south Russian; after all, each of the ethnographic zones had its own distinctive features. However, to date the evidence from mountain dwellers and Turkic peoples has been studied much more comprehensively than the components that formed the core of Greben culture. Some of its components survive to this day, just, owing to the presence of an early and fairly persistent tradition that assimilated many later developments. The search for the region where the main features of the Greben customs, rituals, language, etc. emanate, takes us far north-west of the Terek. We should first note that the historical roots of the Greben direct us to the north, since there are North Russian features in their language, while South Russian ones are missing. They arrived in the Caucasus with the retention of the unstressed ‘o’ (round dance, etc.), which was dying out there. That is, the final formation of their dialect as Middle Russian took place in their new habitat already as a result of communication, a confusion of tongues with the ‘South Russians’, who came there much later.13 But even if their dialect is recognised as originally Central Russian, territorially it would coincide with parts of the Novgorod and Tver regions, as well as the Moscow, Vladimir and Pskov regions of Russia.14 The key indicator of a population’s material culture is the dwelling. As with the villages of Russia proper, the structures most widespread in Greben stanitsas (villages) were log houses (srub). The Cossacks’ homes were raised on piles 1.5-2 m above ground and had a high porch. Researchers explain this by the influence of natural factors (damp earth, floods, etc.), and ethnic traditions.15 Since there were Šennikov 1987: 3-55. Kosven 1961: 246; Kozlov 1993a: 85; Kozlov 1993b: 69-70. 13 Statističeskiye danniye 1881: 75, 82-83. 14 Russkiye 1997: 94. 15 Zasedateleva 1974: 382-383. 11 12

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very few forests in the Terek zone building materials were costly. The answer was to saw logs and assemble them with their round sides facing out. This tradition was never abandoned, although in the conditions of the Terek zone the draughts in such dwellings were so strong that homes required much wood to heat. Thus they lived there only in summers, keeping their belongings there, receiving guests and staying there for holidays and family events, i.e. funerals and weddings. These dwellings were important, although families spent most of the time in adobe huts typical of the southern regions.16 The roofs of such log houses, as well as the windows, were decorated with carved finials and ridges. This type of dwelling, notably, was also introduced to Siberia by natives of the Russian north.17 The plan of the Greben dwellings was similar to that of north Russia (the stove was located to the right of the entrance, and the icon stand was on the diagonal). Also similar were beliefs in the spirit of the home (domovoy) and the rites associated with moving to a new house. The Greben Cossacks did not share beliefs in wood spirits or mermaids, traditional for South Russians. They believed, rather, in labasta, ugly, naked women who lived in the swamps and mires, scaring people and capturing walkers – sometimes tickling them to death.18 Similar ideas about terrible, shaggy women, with large pendulous breasts, who lived in pools or forests were typical for North Russians. They were called water-devils, the word mermaid being unknown there.19 Greben Cossacks began to call this ‘northern’ image labasta (from the Türkic albasly, a female evil demon) apparently under the influence of their Caucasian Turkic neighbours. Even more parallels are found in the ritual practices of the Greben Cossacks and North Russians. The most important characteristic feature of a North Russian wedding was the so-called ‘wedding lamentation’. The Greben brides sat in the corner and lamented their lot for seven days before, and sometimes even up the eve of their wedding.20 Christmastide in the western and southern Russian regions was hardly celebrated, while in central and northern Russia, and in Greben, it grew into a large festival, mainly involving the young. Accounts of Shrovetide ceremonies, notably, feature such ‘northern’ implements as the wooden plough (soxa),21 although in the 19th and beginning of the 20th century Greben Cossacks cultivated the soil with a plow (plug). As in the north of the country, Greben Cossacks celebrated the Intercession, ‘Nikola of Winter’, Spring, Easter, Shrovetide, Trinity, the Dormition, and some other holidays of the religious calendar. At the same time there were no Midsummer’s Day Rževuski 1888: 234; Radčenko 1984: 107-109. Russkiye 1997: 269. Rogožin 1893: 63-64; Karaulov 1907: 76. 19 Dinin 1994: 111-117. 20 Grebenets 1909: 29. 21 Beletskaya et al. 1996: 55. 16 17 18

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games or other elements of the agrarian calendar, since the role of agriculture was minimal. It is well known that the epic works of all genres are best preserved in the far north (Pomorie) and in the south of the country (the Cossacks),22 and, indeed, epics are encountered mostly in Greben villages on the Terek – we have no explanation for this. There are other clear similarities between and the left bank of the Terek. The populations in both regions were mainly engaged in fishing and hunting: fish prevailed in the traditional cuisine (with the Pomors saying that ‘a lack of fish is worse than a lack of bread’, and the Greben Cossacks that ‘there is no feast… or funeral repast without fish’). The centres of old beliefs established in the region preserved many East Slavic beliefs and cults. The terms ‘Kazak’, ‘Kazachka’ (for women) in the northern, Novgorod dialects were used in the meaning of ‘workers’. Pomorie had its own Tersky coast. Both in the north and south of the country, the model man had to be brave, proud and free spirited, an independent being, striving to be both special and superior. Neither the Pomors nor the Grebens mixed with the peasant classes.23 It is possible that the analogous phenomena in the material and spiritual culture evolved from similar economic and cultural backgrounds: ethnography reveals many such examples. Nevertheless this approach is not convincing. It should be noted in this connection that the north of European Russia was colonised in the 14th and 15th centuries predominantly by Novgorod,24 and many sagas preserved by Terek Cossacks mention either the Novgorodians or – quite often – Ivan the Terrible. The Novgorod pirates (ushkuyniks) in the 12th to 14th centuries might have led the way here. North Russian traditions connected the appearance of brigand hideouts, typically on mountainous terrain or at the mouths of rivers, at some distance from settlements, with ushkuyniks. There is a hypothesis among scholars working on the Russian north that these dens, organised by ushkuyniks for raids, looting and tribute taxation,25 were associated with early Novgorod occupation methods of the north. A similar hypothesis is advanced in respect of the Greben Cossacks. We know that in the 14th century the ushkuyniks sailed to Astraxan and, possibly, along the Caspian coast and the Terek. This hypothesis is corroborated by finds of central- and north-Russian archaeological artefacts in the Terek basin.26 So it seems it is time to shift the accents and connect most of them, not with the Rusich captives away from their homeland, but with Novgorod ushkuyniks. ‘Discovering’ the Terek lands, they prepared the way for the future mass migrations caused by the well-known historical events at the end of the 15th century (i.e. the defeat and annexation of Pesni grebenskix kazakov 1946: 14-19; Novičkova 1992: 182. Bernštam 1978: 78-169; Bernštam 1983: 110-226. 24 Žukov 1995: 89-91. 25 Russkiy sever 1995: 234-237. 26 Vinogradov, Narožniy 1999; Golovanova 1993; Jioev 2000. 22 23

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Novgorod in 1477, Tver in 1485, and Vyatka lands in 1489). Strikingly, the Greben epics contain absolutely no mention of the struggle against the Mongol-Tatars.27 Undoubtedly the Novgorod re-settlers (more precisely, Central and North Russians) moved both to the extreme north (Pomorie) and far south by routes they explored (in the Terek zone most likely along the Volga to the Caspian coast and the Terek). The annual rite of ‘launching ships’, widespread in Greben villages, seems to be a peculiar reminiscence of their arrival on the banks of the Terek.28 Although the old legends provide no information about the starting point for the Cossacks’ departure to the Terek zone, their route (the Volga – the Caspian Sea – the Terek – its tributaries high in the mountains) seems very real. It is worth noting that some examples of Greben folklore and rituals display ties with the Volga region,29 which (as well as in the Don basin) was the zone of active interaction between east Slavic and Turkic ethnic elements in the Middle Ages. Notably some Greben names attested by the sources of the second half of the 16th and 17th centuries find analogies with the names of Volga Cossacks in the service of the Nogai xans30 in the 15th and first half of the 16th century. The early frontier is generally characterised by insecurity (reversibility, recurrence, broken lines, mobility, deviation, frailness, etc.). The basic features of the early stages of the Caucasian frontier include: the outlying position of the populated area; confrontation between savageness and civilisation; resistance to power, freedom, democracy, liberalism; multi-ethnicity and multifaith, religious freedom; individualism, negation of the old, a new field of opportunities, etc. Moreover, the ethnic and social structure of the population was very heterotopic on both sides of the frontier: it was not ethnically homogeneous. On the Caucasian side there was a mass of small or fairly large, and at times rather dispersed ethnic groups. Much more difficult is the case with one of the basic frontier characteristics – a place of contact between savagery and civilisation. At the time of frontier formation in the Caucasus, the free masses of runaway Cossacks were at the same civilisational level as the majority of highlanders, and in some cases were even inferior to them. ‘When we talk about contacts between the Russians and Caucasians, it is not contact between civilised people and savages. The Cossacks of that time apparently stood on the same level of development with the Chechens and Kumyks, and certainly at a lower level than the Adygs, being then the subjects of the Kabardin princes, or the Kabardins themselves’.31 The legends speak of the time when the Cossacks first settled in the Caucasus mountains as being a very old event. Interesting in this respect is Tolstoy’s comment Pesni grebenskix kazakov 1946: 18-19. Beletskaya et al. 1996: 59-60. 29 Karpinski 1900: 112; Snegirev 1838: 136. 30 Kuševa 1981: 41; Posolskiye knigi 1995: 89, 131-132. 31 Kozlov 2002: 13. 27 28

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in the middle of the 19th century in connection with the arrival of the army of Ivan the Terrible at the Terek. At the tsar’s call to serve him the Cossacks said: ‘We are free Cossacks, our fathers were free and we never served any tsar... Never encroach on our Cossack freedom and we will not let the Tatars beyond the Terek.’32 The mention of Ivan the Terrible in this and other folklore sources33 is not surprising, since the Russian access to the Terek and the building of the first settlements and stockaded towns there is connected solely with him. As we know, Ivan the Terrible was not in the Terek zone, instead control in this region was undertaken in the tsar’s name by his voivodes. This tradition certainly indicates that the Cossacks had been living in the mountains long before the appearance of Russian administration along the Terek: one generation had already left the historical arena and the other was getting old. The end of the 15th century marks the extent of historical memory for the Greben Cossacks, which fits with the reasons for their ‘exodus’ from central and north Russia, as we suggest. In places new to them, ancestors of the Greben Cossacks developed a nonagricultural economic and cultural lifestyle. Moreover, as well as new trades, new military deployments also evolved (e.g. in Novgorod, divisions of men into tens and hundreds became central to the administrative-military structure of the Greben Cossacks).34 Thus the ‘Novgorod’ (North Russian) scenario has plenty of evidence. However, one of the former arguments in favour of this version (the Greben army standard bearing the coat-of-arms of the Novgorod Republic) is invalid: V.A. Potto has proved that the ‘Novgorod banner’ was granted to the Greben Cossacks by Catherine I in 1727.35 Let us also note that a large number of smallholders (descendants of the lowest rank of servicemen), whose origins are not yet fully clear, joined the Cossack groups of Ciscaucasia a little later. However, for the purposes of this present essay it is only important that they came mainly from the trans-Muscovite uyezds (administrative districts) of the north and central Russian strip.36 Thus, this group too could have brought the features of the North Russian way of life to south. All of the above shows that the actual Russian roots of the Greben Cossacks need additional study, which might allow us to speak about their remote ancestral home with more accuracy. Nevertheless, what we already know shows that, although Cossack groups (on the Don, Greben, Zaporožye, etc.) had different genetic roots, they were all to become Cossacks under the influence of similar extreme circumstances in the border zones, the ‘Wild Field’, or in the North Caucasus, etc.

Vinogradov 1961: 31. Farforovskij 1914: 76; Stanica 1914: 42. 34 Zasedateleva 1974: 83-85. 35 Potto 1912b: 31-32. 36 Kolesnikov 2000: 111-112. 32 33

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Latest genetic studies have confirmed that Cossacks along the Terek show frequencies of haplogroups R1a1a1* (M198) and I2a (P37), typical for the Russians and Ukrainians, respectively 1.5 and 2 times lower, while frequencies of haplogroups G2a3b1 (P303) and G2a1a (P18) – minor for Russians and Ukrainians, but widespread in the North Caucasus – are significantly increased.37 The Terek Cossacks absorbed over a quarter of local, autochthonous Caucasian Y-chromosome haplotypes.38 Thus, the gene pool of the Terek Cossacks occupies a solitary position, somewhat distancing them from other Cossack groups and tending towards Caucasian populations. Such a convergence is caused by sharply increased frequencies of the ‘Caucasian’ haplogroups in the gene pool of Terek Cossacks, indicating to the assimilation by Terek Cossacks of the indigenous male population of the North Caucasus. Based on the results of a comparative analysis of the gene pool of a number of Caucasian peoples with the populations of Europe and the Near East, the Terek Cossacks have joined the main Caucasian cluster.39 Hence an assumption that, during the early period of Terek Cossack life in the Caucasus, their community included a large number of men from among the surrounding highlanders, and their relations with neighbouring peoples were more peaceful than later – in the period of the Caucasian War. The conclusion by scholars that the course of Russian history consists of flight and escape from despotic state powers is quite applicable for Greben Cossacks; and in the course of such escapes they opened up and colonised new territories. However, state power followed the settlers, consolidating its positions in the newly populated areas and spreading its domination over the local population. Another issue scholars have been long concerned with is the identification of those sites associated with the Cossacks’ initial settlement in Greben. According to some authors, the information we have from the written sources about the so-called ‘free period’ is too scanty and contradictory, and there is no hope that new sources will turn up.40 It seems necessary, in the light of this, to pay attention to another source – the tales and legends – a peculiar, unwritten history of the Cossacks,41 which has not yet been sufficiently well examined. This seeming neglect is unjustified, as folklore material is much older than written accounts, and, therefore, is often our earliest historical source (containing often no more fiction than written records). Additionally, they reflect the features of Cossack ‘self-consciousness’ and perception of the world around them.42 Life in the mountains is reflected in their folklore tradition and religious beliefs.43 For example, Greben Cossacks believed that paradise was to be found in a luxurious dwelling under Mt Kazbek, where those god loved Proišoždeniye 2015: 64. Balanovskaya et al. 2009: 407. 39 Balanovskij et al. 2011: 2905-2920. 40 Kuševa 1981: 28. 41 Velikaya 2000a. 42 Matveev 2000: 114. 43 Zasedateleva 1974: 356-357. 37 38

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enjoyed all the bounties of the afterlife. Hell was also located deep in the mountains, its heat and torments reflected in the boiling waters that issued from them. Summarising the legends, we get a picture of a vast region (spreading from the foothills and mountains of present-day North Ossetia, Ingushetia and Chechnya to Dagestan). However, in the second half of the 16th century (when the Cossacks in the Terek zone are first mentioned in writing) this territory was not deserted, but inhabited, more or less densely, by mountain peoples; and with the limited numbers of early Cossack settlers it was impossible to secure the region at first. Yet from the sources that speak of the Cossacks ‘roaming’ in the high regions,44 we can understand the eventual irresistible mobility of the Cossack groups, who, according to the legends, were already adept at the skills needed to thrive there (e.g. hunting and fishing). This way of life in the Cossack settlements could hardly leave any traceable ‘cultural layer’, and calls made to undertake archaeological investigations in the high regions (made before and after Soviet times) are perhaps optimistic, especially because the material culture of the mountain people is difficult to discern from that of the Cossacks. However, finds of artefacts45 from excavations at the ‘Three-Walled Town’46 suggest that the archaeological study of Cossack strongholds cannot be completely ruled out. Thus legends about Greben Cossack settlements in the distant past do not seem contradictory. At different periods Cossack communities could have lived in one or other part of the north-eastern Caucasus. It seems this approach may eliminate the very problem of searching for the original settlements of the Greben Cossacks pointing only to the area of their permanent travels. However, such levels of movement would sooner or later change; the area held by Greben Cossacks was constantly shrinking, and on the eve of their transfer to the left bank of the Terek they had been living in the basin of the Sunža River.47 As to how the Cossacks found themselves in the mountains of the Caucasus, one of the legends says that the ancestors of the Greben Cossacks were once the associates of Yermak, but some Cossacks, headed by Andrei Shadra, broke with Yermak when he went to Siberia and settled behind the Terek. Later, Cossack society was augmented with multi-ethnic, local and alien elements, mainly linked by their similar lifestyle, based on trading (fishing, hunting). Opposite to the northern regions where the population passed to trading due to the natural and climatic conditions, in the southern regions (the ‘Wild Field’ up to the North Caucasus mountains) there were socio-political reasons to supplement trading with warfare.

Zasedateleva 1996: 23. Krupnov 1935: 124-133. 46 Golovanova 1993: 14-16; Narožnij 1998: 11-13. 47 Vinogradov 2000: 7-9; Golovanova 2001: 26-32. 44 45

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Traditions tell of the early attachment of Greben Cossacks to family life, without which the very establishment of a stable ethnic group would be simply impossible. According to the old stories, they adopted the habit of abducting women from the mountain people, as ‘no women could be otherwise obtained’ and ‘the number of Cossacks was growing more and more’.48 Cossack family life is evidenced by some 17th-century documents; one such, of 1649, tells of how the murzas of the nomadic Great Nogai horde, roaming along the Terek, ‘had beaten many Cossacks and taken their wives and children into captivity’. In 1653, after the ‘Kyzylbash devastation’, ten Cossack settlements were wiped out ‘their wives and children were dispersed’.49 Additionally, the ‘skilful housekeeping’ of the Greben Cossacks was reported back in the early 17th century.50 Such documents are interesting, not only from the point of view of the demographic situation, as they testify to the harsh conditions existing in the North Caucasus at that time, and ultimately the reason why the Cossacks opted to stand ‘under the high hand’ of the Russian Tsar. The openness of Cossack society, whose activities were accompanied by contingencies, was explained by an understandable wish for growth. In the 18th century, the Kabardin owners complained that the Cossacks did not return their runaway slaves (yasirs), claiming that the latter had already been baptised.51 The geographical mobility of the early Cossack communities influenced their tolerance and openness to external contacts, including family ties. According to researchers, there is a direct link between geographical mobility and ethnic tolerance, i.e. the more mobile the society, the more open it is to ties with other groups.52 According to various sources, some mountain populations, who had for some reason become outlaws (due to blood feuds or because their unwillingness to adopt Islam) joined the Cossacks. The Nogais and yasirs of the Kabardin (or other owners remaining in Greben villages) are known from various documents. Once baptised they could join Cossack society. In the 19th century many Cossack could clans still remember their origins. Kinship of the Greben Cossacks with the Chechens is confirmed by some generic Cossack surnames,53 coming via paternal lineage from the Chechens (mainly the descendants of the Gunoi and Varandоi teip tribes).54 Thus, liberty in the early frontier stages of the Caucasus was often manifested in marital relations, which strengthened the positive intercultural ties. Marriage, as a matter of fact, was a form of regulation of intercultural communications. Despite robbery and banditry on both sides, the Greben Cossacks and the highlanders were sometimes related to each other through the taking of wives – forced or not. Such marriages gave the colonists many advantages, and in a number of cases they simply helped them survive. Greben Cossacks married mainly Chechen or Kumyk Zasedateleva 1974: 295. Kozlov 1990b: 38. 50 Potto 1912a: 66. 51 Kabardino-russkiye otnošeniya 1957: 104. 52 Lebedeva 1991: 121. 53 Velikaya 2000b: 49-51 54 Golovlev 2017. 48 49

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Figure 3.

girls55 (Figures 3-4). Intercultural marriages in the frontier territory often led to religious transgression. Muslim wives of Greben Cossacks apparently had to be baptised, since the latter were, however, more intolerant of heterodoxy than the representatives of Terek Cossacks; they ‘did not recognise non-Christians, or at least 55

Kozlov 2002: 13.

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Figure 4.

those who did not want to convert to Christianity’.56 Even in the 19th century, when relations with the mountain people were severely strained, the Greben Cossacks still chose wives from among the Dagestani nationalities, Kabardins and Chechens.57 However, both in the 19th century and in the earlier period the ethnic and religious 56 57

Kozlov 2002: 13. Tkačev 1912: 80-85, 194-199; Vinogradov 1961: 87.

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affiliation were considered by the paternal line. This situation was obviously close to that seen during the colonisation and development of the Trans-Baikal areas and Kamchatka by Russian settlers. These inter-ethnic contacts could not but affect the wedding rites of the Cossacks. It became essential practice to include metal items among the dowry and wedding gifts, and other cultural borrowings included leaving part of the dowry in the parental home. Weddings featured elaborate costumes and jewellery, as well as the dance known as the lezginka and the playing of traditional musical instruments. There were games, competitions and other entertainments (horse-riding (djigitovka), shooting, etc.). Bride abduction was also known.58 In our opinion, this influence being the product of interethnic marriages and contacts was much deeper. Nogais had other particular traditions, i.e. kalim, avoidance, gifting and wedding train, etc. Like the Turks, Cossack brides preferred red (scarlet) wedding dresses and accessories such as coins and corals (Figure 5). These and other observations highlight the Turkic component as another important element in the formation of the Greben sub-ethnic group.59 In the 18th century the Nogais fled to the Cossacks and the Russian fortresses, and although the fugitives were ordered to return to Kabarda, no ‘extraditions’ have been documented.60 That the Greben and Kizlyar Cossacks included different populations is evidenced by nicknames and surnames – Tatarov, Cherkesov, Gruzinov, etc.61 Thus the conclusion of pre-Revolution authors that ‘Greben Cossacks represent a conglomerate of local peoples, welded together by Russian blood and united by common destiny’ was not accidental. Along with its openness, at a certain stage Cossack society underwent an endogamous ‘closure’, the transition to which was stimulated not only by alien ethnic events, but also by the arrival of Islam within their neighbours. Endogamy intensified with the transition to a completely settled way of life along the left bank of the Terek, and with preservation of the ‘Old Belief ’ and the migration policy of the government. At the end of the 18th and into the 19th century, inter-ethnic marriages became increasingly rare. The number of Greben Cossacks increased as a result of the constant influx of various social and ethnographic groups of the Russian population. Sources mention also fugitive archers, the ‘thieves’ of S. Razin and many others.62 Terek Cossacks, whose first appearance in the Caucasus dates back to 1559, were to a large extent ‘formed by a number of fugitive, disparate groups of Russian and mountain peoples’;63 the Don component is a separate issue. (The main Don transit Zasedateleva 1985: 32; Zasedateleva 1984: 58. Kuševa 1981: 41. Kabardino-russkiye otnošeniya 1957: 71. 61 Russko-dagestanskie otnošeniya 1988: 70-71; Popko 1880: 197; Omelčenko 1991: 153. 62 Kosven 1961: 246. 63 Velikaya 2003: 30-43. 58 59 60

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Figure 5.

actively manifested itself in the 17th century, when the ‘Old Believers on both sides (in groups or alone) started leaving the Don for the Terek.64 Documents from the 17th century inform about the short-term incursions of Don, Zaporožye and Jaik Cossacks to the Terek in search of food and game. There were 64

Velikaya 1995: 39.

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also reverse movements: in the early decades of the 17th century, some Greben Cossacks fled to the Don from the oppressions of the Nogai and Kumyk rulers. These ties with Don were later to became permanent.65 The ‘Old Believers’ and peasants escaping serfdom were driven individuals, ready to serve in the Terek Cossack detachments, participating in the uprisings of Bolotnikov, Razin, Bulavin and Pugachev. With the establishment of Russian rule on the Terek, the admission of such fighters to Cossack ranks was forbidden and they had the status of ‘runaways’.66 The ‘Caucasianness’ of the Greben, as the free period legacy, has been studied in sufficient detail. Scholars have noted not only the many cultural borrowings, supplanting the old elements of material and spiritual culture, but also those they all shared (log cabins and saklia, the icon stands with their triptychs, weapons hung from walls, the trepak and lezginka; they also manifested that steadfastness inherent in Russian footsoldiers and mounted fighters). Researchers have also identified the mix of Russian, North Caucasian and Turkic cultural components that provided the basis for the development of future customs (clothing, wedding rituals, etc.). All the elements of Russian spiritual culture (legends, calendar rituals, etc.) were preserved in whole or in part. Notable among the many cultural borrowings was the retention of their Slavic-Russian identity. In the 17th century, by when the Greben Cossacks had already appeared in the North Caucasus under their own exo-and endoethnonym (Grebenets), one can speak of the emergence of a new sub-ethnic Cossack group, in terms of sub-ethnos as a part of the ethnos (in this case Russian) passing to another economic milieu and characterised by its own self-awareness, dialect, and other features of material and spiritual culture. The Cossacks (as an integrity naturally formed in the course of history) as a sub-ethnos were not united: there were other local, sub-ethnic groups, each with its own cultural features and historical destiny. Thus the Lower Terek Cossacks of the Terek delta,67 known since the middle of the 16th century, took the most active part in the events of the early 17th century – the ‘Time of Trouble’. The majority left the Terek in 1606 and sailed to Astraxan: almost no one came back. Practically, only a couple of hundred people were left of the oncestrong army of ‘free atamans and Cossacks’. After 1668 they settled near the Terek Fortress and merged into its garrison under the name of the Terek Cossack Host. In the 18th century they were relocated, together with the garrison, to the fortress of the Holy Cross on the Sulak. On the eve of relocation their army numbered no more than 200 (a third of whom were ‘aliens’).68 Although later the Lower Terek Cossacks continued to trace their genealogy to the early settlers, their communities retained Kozlov1990a: 50-51. Vasilev 1986: 109. 67 Kazačyi vojska 1992: 171. 68 Potto 1912a: 57-59, 62, 87, 105; Potto 1912b: 18. 65 66

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Figure 6.

practically nothing of the original core and were constantly renewed at the expense of mostly baptised representatives of North Caucasian peoples. Some of these new arrivals assimilated with the Greben Cossacks. Thus, the Greben sub-ethnic community occurred to be the most stable. Other ethnic elements consolidated around its central/north-Russian core (with its specific dialect, religion, etc.). The existence and development of the Greben ethnic group continued, both through natural growth and through the influx of immigrants from Russia; other factors included the merging of people from other Cossack groups and North Caucasians, who at that time voluntarily adopted the baptism rites and language of the earlier Cossacks, i.e. undergoing voluntary assimilation. The complex ethnic history of the early Cossack groups was reflected in their appearance. According to a pre-Revolution researcher: ‘more often than not you see among the Cossacks a typical shortish, thickset Mongol with broad cheekbones, thin beard, narrow eyes... and the mien of a handsome mountaineer often comes across as well’.69 This is hardly a detailed anthropological study of course. A new stage in the development of the Terek Cossacks began in the 16th century when they started to serve. They controlled the trade and strategic routes, accompanied envoys, assisted the Kabardin and other princes allied to Russia, defended the emerging towns and villages from attacks by Turkish or Iranian troops, etc. In return, the Cossacks received gunpowder, weapons and rations (Figures 6-7).70 69 70

Gilčenko 1892: 112. Kozlov 1993a: 84-86.

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Figure 7.

In 1588, Russian authorities ordered the building of the town of Terki at the mouth

of the Terek; unlike its predecessors it existed for over 100 years. Its voivodes continued to employ Cossacks for certain intelligence and security operations. Overall, dependence on the authorities was still nominal and quite often the Cossacks thought of themselves as too independent to follow all the orders of the authorities.71 The migration of Greben Cossacks to the left bank of the Terek began in the 17th century and was fully completed by the early 18th century.72 This transfer was connected both to pressure from their Islamised neighbours, and with the transition of an increasing number of Cossacks to public service along the Terek. According to the Greben traditions, the Russian authorities, infuriated by the Cossacks acceptance of fugitives, demanded they resettle on the left bank, where they could be better controlled. 71 72

Zasedateleva 1974: 189-196. Vinogradov, Magomadova 1972: 31-42.

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Foreign political threats (raids by the Crimeans and their North Caucasian allies on a regular basis) forced the Greben Cossacks to lay larger settlements on the left bank, instead of the former smaller ones.73 These towns (or stanitsas, as they were called from the end of the 18th century) named after the ‘surnames’ or nicknames of atamans stretched along the left bank of the Terek for 80 versts and continued to be the main settlement region for Greben Cossacks into the future. The Greben army contributed not less than 1000 Cossacks to military service, half of whom received salaries, and the other half defended their towns ‘from water and from grass,’ i.e. for free.74 Major changes in the lives of the Cossacks took place during the reign of Peter I. In 1721 the Greben army was merged into the Russian armed forces. In place of the abandoned town of Tersk, there arose in 1723 a new Russian fortress, the abovementioned Holy Cross, in the interfluve of the Sulak and Agraxan, around which the government ordered 1000 Don Cossack families to resettle. But as a result of the hardships incidental to resettlement, the adaptation to a new location, and the outbreak of plague, only some of the families had survived by 1730. In 1736, after the Ganja agreement with Iran, under which the Russian border had to move back to the Terek, the Don Cossacks were relocated to the left bank, then receiving the name Terek Family Army.75 In 1735, Kizlyar, a new city that was to become the political and cultural centre of the north-eastern Caucasus for many years, was laid out on the left bank of the Terek, 60 versts from the Caspian Sea. The Cossacks and North Caucasians (Kabardians, Chechens, Kumyks, etc.), who had long been in the service of Russia, were transferred here from the fortress of the Holy Cross, and from then on were known as the TerekKizlyar army. The Russian speaking Cossacks lived in a special district, the so-called ‘Kizlyarskaya stanitsa’, non-Russians settled in other neighbourhoods.76 Due to the lack of sufficient forces on one hand, and the multi-ethnic and multifaith composition of the Terek-Kizlyar troops on the other, the latter were not involved with security and sentry duties, but, being unsurpassed scouts, guides and interpreters, they were assigned various missions in Persia, the Crimea, and the Kuban, with the Kalmyk and other rulers. Moreover, as evidenced by numerous records, a knowledge of the languages and customs of neighbouring and other peoples was displayed not only by the North Caucasian but also by the ‘Russian’ Cossacks.77

Yudin 1913. Zasedateleva 1974: 194. 75 Zasedateleva 1974: 197-200. 76 Omelčenko 1991: 85-86. 77 Omelčenko 1991: 71-72. 73 74

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With the emergence of Kizlyar, all Cossack groups along the Terek were subordinated to the commandant of that city. An attempt in the 1740s to unite Greben Cossacks and the Terek Family Army was not a success.78 Taken as a whole, the transfer of Greben settlements to the left bank of the Terek, the foundation of Kizlyar, and the settlement of the Terek Family Army between Kizlyar and the Greben army, can be seen as the beginning of the ‘Great Caucasian Line’, reminiscent, in its functional role, of the Roman limes. In the 18th century, North Caucasian (primarily the Ossetians, Ingush, Kabardians) aspirations to develop the by-Terek lands intensified. Thus, in 1762 the Kabardian prince Andrey Konchokin and his baptised subjects were allowed to move to the left bank of the Terek. In 1763 they laid a line of fortification on the left bank that, by 1765, had grown into the town of Mozdok, whose main populations were Georgians, Armenians, Kabardians, Ossetians, and Greeks.79 A special Cossack ‘hundred’ (sotnya), formed from these settlers (mostly baptised Ossetians and Kabardians), was tasked, mainly, to act as translators and messengers. Volga Cossack families were then settled to strengthen the fortified line along the Terek left bank. Like the Terek Cossacks, they came from the Upper Don (the ‘Uppers’); their dialect belonged to the southern patois, closest by a number of its features to the Kursk-Orel and Ryazan groups.80 The governmental decision to resettle the Volga Cossacks was made in 1765.81 Cossacks of certain settlements (stanitsas) were dragooned into the Mozdok Cossack regiment. Later, 50 Don Cossack families were additionally sent to each stanitsa, and in 1800 they brought in 200 families of baptised Kalmyks82 to settle there. However, the Kalmyks soon returned to the trans-Kum steppes, to their former nomadic way of life and former Buddhist beliefs. In 1774 after the Kyuchuk-Kainarja peace treaty with Turkey, the Russians moved to heavily fortify the new Azov-Mozdok borderline. The early decades of the 19th century were characterised by the widespread compulsory conversion of state peasants and representatives of the Caucasian peoples to the Cossack estate.83 However the government’s attempts to enlist the Mozdok Ossetians and Kabardians, as well as the Armenians and Georgians, into the Cossack estate as a whole failed. Only some Ossetians (settlers from the mountains), Georgians,84 and even to a lesser degree the Armenians, wanted to combine in this way.85 The above measures Karaulov 1912: 121. Omelčenko 1991: 86. 80 Karaulov 1900: 66-85. 81 Kozlov 1996: 93-96. 82 Karaulov 1901: 110; Yudin 1914: 23-31. 83 Zasedateleva 1974: 212-214. 84 Arakčiev 1904: 164-168. 85 Gukasyants 1914: 55-61. 78 79

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Figure 8.

were motivated by the low growth rate of the Cossack population and increased losses sustained during the Caucasian War. Administrative reforms adopted in connection with the end of hostilities in the north-eastern Caucasus resulted in the establishment of the Terek region in 1860, followed by the formation of the Terek Cossack Host (Figure 8) the following year. Later was to come the ending of the practice of adopting individuals from other social background into the Cossack estate, with the simultaneously imposed prohibition of withdrawal from it.86 The history of the Terek Cossacks has shown that by the end of the pre-Revolutionary period they represented a complex social and ethnic community, consisting of various Cossack groups (from the Don and Volga), as well as peasants, Caucasian and other individuals brought by government actions from other regions. With the help of the population concentrated on the Terek, and thanks to the efforts of the authorities, the government tried in this way to solve its economic and militarypolitical problems. Thus the creation of cities and settlements was sanctioned. Allotments of land created the conditions necessary for embedding the Cossack groups. As we have 86

Omelčenko 1991: 116-117.

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seen, the colonisation of the Terek’s left bank, its ethnic map, was largely determined by government initiatives, which brought together groups of Cossacks of different origins. The original multi-ethnic and multi-faith sub-ethnos of the Terek Cossacks that had evolved over the centuries, and binding – historically and genetically – the Slavic, Mongol, Iranian-speaking, Turkic and Caucasian peoples, was destroyed and scattered in the early 20th century in the course of the fierce civil war and the victory of communist forces in Russia, when the authorities recklessly abandoned the idea of the ‘Caucasian frontier’. Bibliography Anhabadze, Yu.D., N.G. Volkova 1993. Ethničeskaya istoriya Severnogo Kavkaza XVIXIX vv (An Ethnic History of the Caucasus). Materials to the serie ‘Peoples and Cultures’ (in Russian). Moscow: RAS Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology. Arakčiev, D.I. 1904. Poezdka k kazakam-gruzinam v Terskuyu oblast (A trip to the Cossacks-Georgians into the Terek region). Ethnographic review. Book LXIII/4 (in Russian). Moscow: A.A. Levenson Publishing Company. Balanovskaya, E.V. et al. 2009. Genetičeskiye sledy istoričeskix I doistoričeskix migracij. Kontinenti, regioni (Genetic traces of historical and prehistoric migrations: continents, regions). Narodi. Vestnik VOGiS, vol. 13/2 (in Russian). Novosibirsk: Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Balanovsky, O., X. Dibirova, A. Dybo et al. 2011. Parallel Evolution of Genes and Languages in the Caucasus Region. Molecular Biology and Evolution 28. Barrett, Th.M. 2000. Linii neopredelennosti. Severokavkazskij ‘frontier’ Rossii (The lines of uncertainty: The North-Caucasian ‘frontier’ of Russia). In M. DavidFox (ed.) American Russistics. Milestones of recent historiography. Imperial period (in Russian). Samara: Samara University. Beletskaya, E.M., N.N. Velikaya, V.B. Vinogradov 1996. Kalendarnaja obryadnost’ terskix kazakov (TThe calendar litualism of the Terek Cossacks). EO, 1996/2 (in Russian). Moscow: Institute of Anthropology and Ethnography RAS. Bernštamm, T.A. 1978. Pomory. Formirovanie gruppy i sistema xoziastva (Pomorrians: Formation of the group and economic system) (in Russian). Leningrad: Nauka. Bernštamm, T.A. 1983. Russkaya narodnaya kultura Pomorya v XIX - načale XX v (Russian folk culture of Pomorie in the 19th – early 20th c.) (in Russian). Leningrad: Nauka. Blagova, G.F. 1970. Istoričeskie vzaimootnošeniya slov Cossack and Kazax (Historical interrelation of the words Cossack and Kazax). Ethnonyms (in Russian). Moscow: Nauka. Dinin, V.I. 1994. Nekotorye osobennosti mifologičeskogo obraza rusalki u vostočnix slavyan (Some peculiarities of the mythological image of the mermaid by the eastern Slavs). EO, 1994/6 (in Russian). Moscow: Institute of Anthropology and Ethnography, RAS. Farforowskij, S. 1914. Iz folklora terskix kazakov (ostatki bilevogo eposa) (Remains of the folk-tale epos). ZTOLKS, no. 3 (in Russian). Vladikavkaz: Printing House of the Regional Government of the Terek Region.

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Gilčenko, N.V. 1892. Materiali dlya antropologii Kavkaza. Terskie kazaki (Materials for the anthropology of the Caucasus. The Cossacks of Terek). In Protocols of the Proceedings of the Russian Anthropological Society of the Imperial SaintPetersburg University for 1890-1891 (in Russian). Saint Petersburg: A.A. Levenson Publishing Company. Golovanova, S.A. 1993. Russko-severokavkazskie svyazi IX – pervoj polovini XVI veka (istoriko-arxeologičeskoe issledovanie po materialam Centralnogo Predkavkaziya (Russian-North Caucasian relations in the 9th to the first half of the 16th c. An historical-archaeological study of Central Caucasian materials) (in Russian). Doctor of Sciences dissertation, Rostov State University, Rostov-on-Don. Golovanova, S.A. 2001. Geografičeskij faktor v samoidentifikacii grebenskogo kazačestva (The geographical factor in the self-identification of Greben Cossacks). Problems of Northern Caucasian History, 6/1 (in Russian). Armavir: AGPI. Golovlev, A.A. 2017. Etno-konfesionalnij sostav Terskogo kazačego vojska (vtoraya polovina 19– načalo 20 vv) (Ethnic-confessional structure of the Terek Cossack Army – second half of the 19th – early 20th century). Regional development. Scientificpractical electronic journal, 2017/ 3(21) (in Russian). URL:https://regrazvitie. ru/etno-konfessionalnyj-sostav-terskogo-kazachego-vojska-vtoraya-polovina19-go-nachalo-20-go-v / Grebenec, F.S. 1909. Iz byta grebenskix kazakov (The everyday life of Greben Cossacks). SMOMPK 40 (in Russian). Tiflis: Publishing Office of the Caucasian School District. Gukasyants, L. 1914. Selenie Karabagly. Istoričeskaya spravka (The settlement Karabagli: an historical reference). Zapiski Terskogo obščestva lyubitelej kazačej stariny, no. 6 (in Russian). Vladikavkaz: Printing house of the Terek Regional Administration. Jakušenkov, S.N., A.P. Romanova 2012. Frontirnaya teoriya: Novij podxod k osmisleniyu socialno-političeskoj situacii na Yuge Rossii (Frontier theory: A new approach to the understanding of the socio-political situation in the Southern Russia). Innovation and Expertise 2012/2 (in Russian). Moscow: SRI FRCEC. Jioev, M.K. 2000. Ešče odna ikonka iz Priterečya (One more icon from the Terek region). In From the history and culture of the line-Cossacks of Northern Caucasus. Materials of the second international scientific-educational conference on the KubanTerek Cossacks, Armavir: AMO Kuban Cossacks Culture Fund. Kabardino-russkiye otnosheniya v XVI-XVIIIvv (Kabardian-Russian relations in the XVI-XVIII c.), v. T.II (in Russian). Moscow: Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Kabardino-russkiye otnosheniya v ХVI-ХVIII vv. 1957. Kabardino-russkiye otnosheniya v ХVI-ХVIII vv. (Kabardian-Russian relations in the XVI-XVIII c.) v. II (in Russian). Moscow: Publishing house of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Karaulov, M.A. 1900. Govor stanic byvšego Mozdokskogo polka Terskogo kazačego vojska (The Speech of the Former Stanica of the Mozdok Regiment of the Cossack Army of Terek). Russian Philological Herald, no. 3-4 (in Russian). Warsaw: Printing House of the Warsaw School district. Karaulov, M.A. 1901. Pesni poyuščiesya v stanice Galyugaevskoj (Songs Sung in the Galyu Gaevskaya Stanica). SMOMPK 29 (in Russian). Tiflis: Publishing Office of the Caucasian School District.

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Karaulov, M.A. 1907. Govor Grebenskix kazakov (The speech of Greben Cossacks). SMOMPK 37 (in Russian). Tiflis: Publishing Office of the Caucasian School District. Karaulov, M.A. 1912. Terskoe kazačestvo v prošlom i nastoyaščem (Terek Cossacks: past and present) (in Russian). Vladikavkaz: The Military Headquarters of the Terek Cossack Army. Karpinskij, M. 1900. Grebenskiye kazaki i ix pesni (The Greben Cossacks and their songs). SMOMPK 27 (in Russian). Tiflis: Publishing Office of the Caucasian School District. Kazačyi vojska. Xronika (Cossack army) 1912 (in Russian) [reprinted 1992]. Saint Petersburg: AO Dorval. Kolesnikov, W.A. 2000. Odnodvorcsi - kazaki (Cossack - smallholders) (in Russian). Saint Petersburg: Nestor. Kosven, M.O. 1961. Etnografiya i istoriya Kavkaza (Ethnography and history of the Caucasus) (in Russian). Moscow: Eastern Literature Publisher. Kozlov, S.A. 1990a. Popolneniye volnix kazačyix soobščestv na Severnom Kavkaze v XVI-XVII vv. (The replenishment of free Cossack communities in the Northern Caucasus in the 16th and 17th c.). Soviet Ethnography 5 (in Russian). Moscow: Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Kozlov, S.A. 1990b. Vzaimootnošeniya tersko-grebenskogo kazačestva s severokavkazskimi narodami (vtoraya polovina XVI-XVII vv.) (Interrelations of the Terek-Greben Cossacks with the North Caucasian peoples, 16th and 17th c.). Bulletin SKNCVŠ, no. 4 (in Russian). Rostov-on-Don: Publishing House of the SKNCVŠ. Kozlov, S.A. 1993a. Na severnom Kavkaze v XVI veke (The Northern Caucasus in the 16th century). VIŽ 11 (in Russian). Moscow: Red Star Publishing House. Kozlov, S.A. 1993b. Tersko-grebenskoye kazačestvo i migraciya naseleniya severozapada Rossii v XIV-XVII vv (Terek-Greben Cossacks and the migrations of north-western Russia in the 14th-17th c.). In The Cossacks in the History of Russia. Abstracts of reports (in Russian). Krasnodar. Kozlov, S.A. 1996. Kavkaz v sudbah kazačestva (The Caucasus in the fate of the Cossacks) (in Russian). Saint Petersburg: Kol’na. Kozlov, S.A. 2002. Kavkaz v sudbax kazačestva (XVI-XVIII vv) (The Caucasus in the fate of the Cossacks in the 16th-18th c.) (in Russian). Saint Petersburg: Istoričeskaja iljusracija. Krupnov, E.I. 1935. Gorodišče ‘Trehstennij gorodok’ (Hillfort ‘Three-Walled Town’). Soviet Ethnography, no. 2 (in Russian). Moscow: Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Kuščeva, E.N. 1981. O mestax pervonačalnogo rasseleniya gebenskix kazakov (Sites of the initial settlement of the Greben Cossacks). In Historical Geography of Russia in the XVIII century. P.II: Sources and Characteristics (in Russian). Moscow: Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. Lebedeva, N.M. 1991. Psixologičeskiye aspekty etničeskoj ekologii (Psychological aspects of ethnic ecology). In Ethnic Ecology: Theory and Practice (in Russian). Moscow: Nauka. Matveev, O.V. 2000. ‘Služiloe’ načalo v etnogenetičeskix predstavleniyax kubanskix kazakov (‘The service-class’ beginnings in the ethnogenetic vision of Kuban

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Cossacks). In From the History of the Kuban Aristocracy. Materials of the ScientificTheoretical Conference (in Russian). Krasnodar: Mininkov, N.A. 1991. Alternativnij vzglyad sovetskogo istorika (The alternative view of Soviet history). In Cossack History (in Russian). Vladikavkaz: SPAS. Narožnij, E.I. 1998. Vostočniye i zapadniye innovacii zolotoordynskoj epohi u naseleniya Verhnego i Srednego Pritereč’ya (arheologo-ictoričeskoe issledovanie) (Eastern and Western innovations in the Golden Horde period of the population of the Upper and Middle Volga region. An archaeological-historical study) (in Russian). PhD dissertation, Voronež State University. Novičkova, T.A. 1992. Sokol-korabl i razbojnaya lodka (k evolyucii ‘razbojničyej’ temi v russkom folklore) (The eagle-ship and robber-vessel: towards the evolution of the ‘robbery’ theme in Russian folklore). In Folklore and Ethnographic Reality (in Russian). Saint Petersburg: Nauka. Omelčenko, I.L. 1991. Terskoe kazačestvo (The Terek Cossacks) (in Russian). Vladikavkaz: IR. Paneš, E.X. 1996. Etničeskaya psihologiya i mežnacionalniye otnošenija. Vzaimodejstvie i osobennosti evolyucii (na primere Zapadnogo Kavkaza) (Ethnic psychology and interethnic relations. Interaction and peculiarities of evolution: the example of the Western Caucasus) (in Russian). Saint Petersburg: European House. Pesni grebenskix kazakov 1946. Pesni grebenskix kazakov (publikacija tekstov, vstupitelnaja statja i kommentarii B.N. Putilova) (Songs of the Greben Cossacks: texts, introductory article and commentary by B.N. Putilov). Groznij: Grozny Region Publishing House. Popko, I.D. 1880. Terskie kazaki s starodavnih vremen. Grebenskoe vojsko (Terek Cossacks from the remote past. The Greben army). P.1. S. (in Russian). Saint Petersburg: Printing House Department of the Royal Domain. Posolskiye knigi po svyazyam Rossii s Nogajskoj Ordoj (1489-1549) 1995. Posolskiye knigi po svyazyam Rossii s Nogajskoj Ordoj (1489-1549) (Consular Books on the Relations of Russia with the Nogai Horde) (in Russian). Maxačkala: Dagestan Book Publishing House. Potto, V.A. 1912a. Dva veka Terskogo kazačestva (1577-1801) (Two centuries of Terek Cossacks: 1577-1801). Vol. I (in Russian). Vladikavkaz: Printing House of the Terek Regional Administration. Potto, V.A. 1912b. Dva veka Terskogo kazačestva (1577-1801) (Two centuries of Terek Cossacks: 1577-1801). Vol. II (in Russian). Vladikavkaz: Printing House of the Terek Regional Administration. Proisxoždeniye osnovnih grupp kazačestva po dannym o polimorfizme 2015. Proisxoždeniye osnovnih grupp kazačestva po dannym o polimorfizme (Origins of the main groups of Cossacks based on the polymorphism of the Y-chromosome). Bulletin of ONU, Biology, T. 20, n. 2(37) (in Russian). Odessa: National University. Pronštein, A.P. 1967. K istorii vozniknoveniya kazačjih poselenij i obrazovaniya soslovija kazakov na Donu (On the history of Cossack settlements and the formation of the Cossack class in the Don river region, in New on the past of our country (dedicated to the memory of M.N. Tixomirov) (in Russian). Moscow: Nauka. Radčenko, I.K. 1984. Poselenija i žilišča grebenskx kazakov (po materialam stanici Starogladkovskoj) (Settlements and houses of the Greben Cossacks, according

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to material from the Starogladkovskaya stanica). In Settlements and Houses of the Peoples of Čečeno-Ingušetiya) (in Russian). Groznij: Čečen-Inguš Book Publishing. Rogožin, T. 1893. Nečto iz verovanij, poverij i obyčaev žitelej stanici Červlennoj (On the beliefs, superstitions and customs of the population of the Červlenaya stanica). SMOMPK 16 (in Russian). Tiflis: Publishing Office of the Caucasian School District. Russkie (Russians) 1997. In Peoples and Cultures. Moscow: Nauka. Russkij Sever 1995. Russkij Sever. K problem lokalnih grupp (The Russian North: the problem of local groups) (in Russian). Saint Petersburg: Museum of Anthropology and Ethnography. Russko-dagestanskie otnošeniya v XVIII-načale XIX veka 1988. Russko-dagestanskie otnošeniya v XVIII-načale XIX veka (Russian-Dagestani relations in the 18th - early centuries) (in Russian). Moscow: Nauka. Rževusskij, A. 1888. Terci (Terekians) (in Russian). Vladikavkaz: Printing House of the Regional Government of the Terek Region. Šennikov, A.A. 1987. Červlenij yar. Issledovanie po istorii i geografii Srednego Podoniya v XIV-XVI vv (Červlenij yar: a study of the history and geography of the Middle Don in the 14th-16th c.) (in Russian). Leningrad: Nauka. Snegirev, I. 1838. Russkie prostonarodnye prazdniki i syeverniye obryadi (Russian popular festivals and superstitious ceremonies). Vol. III (in Russian). Moscow: University Printing House. Stanica grebencov pred Ivanom Groznim (istoričeskaya pesnya) 1914. Stanica grebencov pred Ivanom Groznim (istoričeskaya pesnya) (The saga of ‘The Greben stanica against Ivan the Terrible’). ZTOLKS, no. 2 (in Russian). Vladikavkaz: Printing House of the Regional Government of the Terek Region. Statističeskiye monografii po issledovaniyu Terskogo kazačego vojska 1881. Statističeskiye monografii po issledovaniyu Terskogo kazačego vojska (Statistical monographs on the study of the Terek Cossack army) (in Russian). Vladikavkaz: Army Economic Management. Tkačev, G.A. 1912. Stanica Červlenaya (Chervlenaya stanica). SOLKS, no. 7-12 (in Russian). Vladikavkaz: Printing House of the Regional Government of the Terek Region. Urušadze, A.T. 2011. Vzaimodejstviye kultur na Kavkaze v konce XVIII – pervoj polovine XIX vv (Interaction of cultures in the Caucasus in the late 18th - first half of the 19th c.) (in Russian). PhD dissertation, Southern Federal University, Rostov-on-Don. Vasilev, D.S. 1986. Očerki istorii nizov’iev Tereka (dosovetskij period)(Essays on the History of the Lower Terek Region: pre-Soviet period) (in Russian). Maxačkala: Dagestan Book Publishing House. Velikaya, N.N. 1995. Obščie korni v formirovanii terskogo i kubanskogo kazačestva (Common roots of the formation of the Terek Cuban Cossacks. The revival of the Cossacks: modern history perspectives). In Theses of Reports, Communications and Speeches from the Vth International, Pan-Russian, Conference (in Russian). Rostov-onDon: NMC Logos. Velikaya, N.N. 2000a. Etnogonija grebenskih kazakov (The ethnogony of the Greben Cossacks). In Dikarev readings (6). Results of the folk-ethnographic studies of the ethnic

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cultures of Kuban in 1999. Materials of the Scientific-Practical Conference (in Russian). Krasnodar: GUP Kuban’kino. Velikaya, N.N. 2000b. Svadebnaja obryadnost’ kazakov i vajnaxi kak pokazatel’ etnokulturnyx svyazej (The wedding rituals of Cossacks and Vainaxes as markers for ethno-cultural relations). In The history and culture of the Line Cossacks of the Northern Caucasus. Materials of the Second International Scientific-Educational Conference of the Kuban-Terek (in Russian). Armavir: AМО Kuban Cossacks Culture Fund. Velikaya, N.N. 2003. Oficialnioe pravoslavie i grebenskiye kazaki v XVIII-načale XX vv (Official orthodoxy and the Greben Cossacks in the 18th - early 20th c.). In Orthodoxy in the Historical Fate of Southern Russia, Vol. 16 (in Russian). Rostov-onDon: Publishing House SKNCVŠ. Vinogradov, B.S. 1961 (ed.). L. N. Tolstoj na Kavkaze v zapisyax sovremennikov (L.N. Tolstoy and the Caucasus in the writings of contemporary authors). Trudy ČNII IYAL, Vol. III (in Russian). Groznij: Čečen-Inguš Book Publishing. Vinogradov, V.B. 2000. ‘Grebenskiye’ kazaki i ‘Čečenskaya’ ploskost (‘Greben’ Cossacks and the ‘Čečen’ plain). In At the Junction of Mountains and Plains: Problems of interaction. Materials of Post-graduate Lecture Seminars, vol. 3 (in Russian). Armavir: Armavir State Pedagogical Institute Press. Vinogradov, V.B., T.C. Magomadova 1975. O vremeni zaseleniya grebenskimi kazakami levogo berega Tereka (The left bank of the Terek in the time of the Cossacks). In History of the USSR, no. 6 (in Russian). Moscow: Institute of History of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Vinogradov, V.B., E.I. Narožnij 1999. O rannix etapax formirovaniya tersko-grebenskogo kazačestva (On the early phases of the formation of the Terek-Greben Cossacks). In The First Pan-Russian Scientific-Practical conference: ‘Cossacks as a Factor of the Historical Development of Russia’ (in Russian). Saint Petersburg: ZAO Poznanie. Yudin (Judin), P.L. 1913. Perviye poseleniya grebencov (The first settlements of the Greben Cossacks). TV, no. 7 (in Russian). Vladikavkaz: Printing House of the Regional Government of the Terek Region. Yudin, P.L. 1914. Mozdokskie kalmiki (k istorii Terskogo kazačjego vojska) (The Mozdok Kalmyks, in the istory of the Terek Cossack army). In Writings of the Terek Society of Followers of Cossack History 12 (in Russian). Vladikavkaz: Printing house of the Regional Government of the Terek Region. Zasedateleva, L.B. 1974. Terskie kazaki (seredina XVI – nachalo XX v.) (The Terek Cossacks [mid-XVI – early XX c.]). In Historical-ethnographic essays (in Russian). Moscow: Moscow State University. Zasedateleva, L.B. 1984. Kultura i bit russkogo i ukrainskogo naseleniya Severnogo Kavkaza v konce ХVI - ХIХ veke (The Culture and everyday life of the Russian and Ukrainian population of the Northern Caucasus in the late XVI – XIX centuries). KES, v. VIII (in Russian). Moscow: Nauka. Zasedateleva, L.B. 1985. Tradicionnaya i sovremennaya swadebaya obryadnost russkogo naseleniya Checheno-Ingushetii (The Traditional and Modern wedding rites of the Russian population of Checheno-Ingushet). In Modern and Traditional in the culture and everyday life of the peoples of Checheno-Ingushet (in Russian). Grozniy: Čečen-Inguš Book Publishing.

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Zasedateleva, L.B. 1996. Vostochnie slavyane na Severnom Kavkaze (v seredine ХVI - nach. ХХ veka)(dinamika etnokulturnih processov) (Eastern Slavs in the Northern Caucasus [in the mid – XVI – early XX centiries]). PhD diss. (in Russian). Moscow: RAS. Žukov, A.Y. 1995. Kareliya v sisteme mezhetnicheskih otnoshenij Russkogo Severa v ХV-ХVI vv. (Karelia in the system of interethnic relations of the Northern Russia in the XV-XVI c.). In Contact zones in the history of Eastern Europe (in Russian). Moscow: Institute of Russian History.

Jewish history within the framework of frontier theory Vladimir Ruzhansky

Russian-Armenian (Slavonic) University Abstract: Stereotypes have long been established in Jewish historiography, according to which the main processes in Jewish history were persecution and the reaction of Jews to these persecutions in the form of assimilation, or attempts to preserve themselves as a religious-ethnic community (Graetz, Dubnov).1 Both of these historians – Heinrich Graetz and Shimon Dubnov – explore Jewish history in conjunction with historical events in those countries where the largest Jewish communities lived. However, according to the concept of Graetz and Dubnov, Jewish history is cultural and spiritual, in contrast to the political history of other peoples. In our opinion, the thesis of the uniqueness of Jewishness and Jewish history severely limits the possibilities for objective research. Zionist historiography mainly deals with such terms as anti-Semitism, Judaism and assimilation, and considers all Jewish history as an endless conflict between Jews and the surrounding world – a form of ‘world history limitrophe’. Of course, this approach does not give an objective view of either Jewish history or its place in the world. In general, Jewish historiography is characterised by an exaggeration of the role of Judaism in the life of Jews, and, at the same time, by insufficient attention or complete disregard of cultural influences from countries and peoples on Jewishness, among whom Jews lived. At best, this influence is highlighted in the negative, and reduces to discrimination and the persecution of Jews, more simply, to anti-Semitism. At the same time, anti-Semitism is presented primarily in Zionist historiography.2 Although the history of the Jewish people has been well studied, both in individual regions and in different epochs (e.g. the era of biblical events, or the history of Judea in the Hellenistic era, the Jewish population of Medieval Europe, etc.), nevertheless the question of the factors and reasons for the survival of Jewry as an ethno-cultural community, as well as the question of the identification of Jewry, remains one of the most controversial and poorly studied points in historical science. Keywords: Jewish history, Israel, Jewry, frontiers, Limitrophe, world-system.

Introduction In our opinion, it is necessary to examine the main historical processes that determine and characterise the essence of Jewish history, before the determination of the term Jews and searching for the reasons for the survival of Jews as an ethnocultural community for two millennia. The definitions of these processes being used up to now, such as the struggle of rabbinical Judaism against assimilation on the one hand, and the preservation of Jewishness as a national-religious group under Dubnov 2008; Graec 1906: Vol. 1. See, e.g., Shaul’s History of Hagana (in Hebrew) as a universal phenomenon, and Jewry – as a unique phenomenon (Shaul (ed.) 1973). 1 2

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the pressure of anti-Semitism, on the other, do not reflect, in our view, the essence of Jewish history. This essay is an attempt to view Jewish history from a new angle, namely, from the position of world-system analysis and the theory of frontiers. The basis for this approach is, first of all, the main historical pattern in the development of mankind as a world-system: regardless of the epoch, the development of civilisation has always been determined and is determined by the military-political confrontation of the great powers – the world-empires. In this confrontation, there are always frontiers and a limitrophic zone. The limitrophe process has deep roots in Jewish history and culture and we observe this process throughout Jewish history. In antiquity, the Jewish state was in fact a border zone between the superpowers of antiquity: Egypt and Assyria, Babylonia and Persia, Rome and the Parthian kingdom. For this reason, the existence of Judea always depended on the choice of the world-empire, the limitrophe of which became the Hebrew kingdom. An error in the choice of the world-empire led to the collapse of the Jewish state. Such errors were frequently committed by Jewish elites: in confrontations between Egypt and Assyria, Egypt and Babylon, and finally, with ancient Rome. The modern period was no exception to this pattern either. In modern history, the state of Israel has found its niche as a limitrophe, or, more simply, as an outpost of the United States in the Middle East. The State of Israel began as an outpost of the British Empire in the Middle East and has been an outpost of the United States in the region for more than half a century. Equally deep roots in Jewish history are also the process of integrating Jewry first into the world-empire (according to Wallerstein), and then into the world-economy (according to F. Braudel). Third, Limitrophe Jewry, whether ancient Judea or the ‘Pale of Settlement’ in Europe, has always been associated with the peace-empire through Jews integrated into this or that world-empire. In other words, the process of limiting or, more simply, the ghettoization of Jewry has always been closely related to the directly opposite process: the integration of Jews into the world-empire. Moreover, both processes (ghettoization and integration) are interdependent, since the Jewry of the limitrophe could not and cannot exist without a world-empire, and Jews integrated into the world-empire or into the world-economy (in the case of our time) cannot exist without Limitrophe, say, in the form of the State of Israel, because they lose their self-identification. All of the above allows us to apply methods of world-system analysis in studies related to Jewish history, and, in particular, for the writing of this essay, which is based on well-known facts we can consider through the prism of the world-system analysis. This approach will allow us to get a more complete and clearer picture of Jewish history, and lay foundations for describing Jewish history through two main processes: the integration of Jewry into the world-system or into the world-empire, and ghettoization – the development of Jewry along the path of the limitrophe. And since the description of these two processes separately does not give us a complete idea of Jewish history, we consider both processes in a relationship. Conclusions will be drawn here about how the limitrophe and the world-system in Jewish history are related. In particular, the answer will be given to the question of why limitrophe needs to be integrated into the Jewish world-system, and why do Jews integrated into

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the Jewish world-system need limitrophe. In accordance with the topic of the study and the questions posed, this contribution consists of the following short sections: 1) Integration of Jewry into the world-system; 2) Ghettoisation: the limitrophe in Jewish history; 3) History of the State of Israel: the interaction of ghettoisation and integration; 4) Israel as a State of Frontiers; 5) Conclusion. Part One – Integration We can already begin to observe the process of the Jews to be integrated within the world-empire in antiquity, e.g. in Babylonia, Egypt, Rome. To substantiate this thesis, one can turn to historical sources, in particular, to Jewish Antiquities by Josephus Flavius, e.g. in his comments on the Jews of ancient Egypt: ‘For Alexander, not because of lack of inhabitants, settled some of our countrymen in a city he had built with such thoroughness; only after Alexander was completely convinced of their well-intention and devotion, he granted our ancestors this gift. For he treated our people with respect, which is confirmed, speaking of us, by Hecataeus: for the obedience and loyalty, which Jews proved to Alexander, he gave them possession of the Samaritan region, without taxing it.’ Flavius also quotes the following decree of Emperor Tiberius: ‘I, Tiberius Claudius Augustus Germanicus, emperor, high priest with tribunal authority and secondary consul, decree that: since kings Agrippa and Herod, most gracious to me, have appealed to me with a request to confirm for all Roman Jews the same rights that I approved for the Jews of Alexandria, I agreed to this with pleasure, and not only to please the visitors, but also because I found worthy those for whom they asked, for they have always been loyal to the Romans; so I decided that these rights would apply to all, even Greek cities, where there is a Jewish population, since these rights were recognised by the divine Augustus. Let therefore the Jews who live throughout the whole of our glorious empire observe their aboriginal customs unreservedly, and I, by my generosity allowing them this, demand that they keep themselves quieter, do not mock the religious rites of the Gentiles, and observe exactly their own laws. This my order, must be communicated to all the rulers of cities, colonies and municipalities, not only within Italy, but also outside it, and also to kings and princes through their own messengers.’3 We observe the process of integration of Jewry into the world-empire in the era of the Caliphate, where Jewish culture reaches its peak, and even in medieval Europe and Russia, where baptism, large monetary fortune, or services to the empire served as a pass out of the ghetto. The integration of Jews into the world-system was intensified after a period of great geographical discoveries, and especially during the industrial revolutions in Europe. But this peak is reached in the late 19th century, when, from 1880 to 1914, more than two million Jews from the Russian Empire emigrated to the United States. The absence of a ‘Pale of Settlement’ system 3

Flavij 2002: Book xix.

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Figure 1. Judea Desert.

and discriminatory legislation in the US (at least with respect to Jews), as well as economic and political freedoms allowed the most enterprising and educated Jews from Europe to quickly take a leading position in both the US economy and in American society, as examples we have the Jewish banks of Goldman-Sach, Kun Leba, Lehman-Brozer and Jules Bash. There are many examples of the successful integration of Jews into the world-empire and the world-economy. However, in order to study the question of the integration of Jews into the world-empire, in our opinion, we should first turn to hermeneutics. For example, the fact that the main monument of rabbinical Judaism was created in Babylon testifies to the integration of Jews into the Babylonian peace-empire. But even more eloquent is the language of both Talmuds: Babylonian and of Jerusalem. Both the Talmuds are written in Aramaic. Aramaic was the language of trade and politics in the time of Jesus, and in our time the so-called ‘literary Hebrew’ is also nothing but one of the dialects of Aramaic. In the Middle Ages, Jews created two integration languages for the surrounding world: Yiddish and Ladino. Yiddish, the language of European Jews, has become a kind of bridge connecting the Jewish ethno-cultural community with the European economy and culture. However, the study of the role of languages in the integration of Jewry into the world-system is a topic for a separate study. And here, summing up the aforesaid, we should note the general laws of the process of integration of Jewry into the world-system. First, the Diaspora Jews, integrated

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Figure 2. Map of Jewish Emigration, circa 1880-1924. Courtesy of .Legacy Tree Genealogists viewed 24 February 2019.

into the world-system, have always been the majority in relation to the Jews of the Palestinian limitrophe, at least since the Babylonian captivity, not to mention the Middle Ages. This trend persisted throughout Jewish history to the present day, when the Jewish populations in Israel and the United States, the largest Jewish diaspora in the world, became approximately equal. It was the Jews, integrated into the empire-world, who always determined the development of the limitrophe, and when the latter attempted to separate from the world-empire, it always ended in failure. We see this in the case of the Zealots, during the Jewish War, and later, during the Bar Kochba uprising. Second, it is to the Diaspora, and not the Palestinian limitrophe, that the Jewish people owe their most significant cultural achievements. Thus the main monument of Judaism – the Babylonian Talmud – was created in Babylon, and at the highest level in the Middle Ages we find Jewish culture reaching Muslim Spain. Third, these achievements would be absolutely impossible without the integration of Jewry into the world-system. For example, without European or American education, science, culture, such an historical frontier zone as ancient Judea or modern Israel could not provide Jewishness by virtue of the very nature of the limitrophe. Ancient Judea or modern Israel served, and serve, the identity of Jewry as an ethno-cultural community, which is important for Jews, but does not solve the problem of the people’s survival without a material basis: production, science, modern technologies and cultural achievements.

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Finally, a note should be made about the essence of the integration of Jewry into the world-system or, more accurately, the world-empire or the world-economy of the West. This integration became possible within the framework of the main component of European and American history in the ‘New Time’ – colonisation. Jews successfully integrated into the colonial policy of European powers and the United States; and not only integrated, but also implemented this policy. The participation of Jews in the implementation of this colonial policy was the essence of the process of integrating Jewry into the empire-world and world-economy of the Western world. Part Two: Ghettoisation, or the relationship between limitrophe and the worldempire On the other hand, the limitrophe has very deep roots in Jewish history. In Europe and in Russia, Jews have always lived behind ‘ghetto’ walls, both geographically and morally. The first Jewish ghetto was created in Europe in 1239 in Aragon. And before that, on the initiative of Innocent III, the Fourth Lateran Council adopted a decision obliging Jews to wear a distinctive sign on their clothes. However, historically, the ancient Jewish kingdoms of Judea and Israel were formed as a buffer between the largest powers of antiquity: first between Egypt and Assyria, then between the power bases of Alexander the Great and Persia, and so on until the very end of Jewish statehood in AD 70. The world-empires changed, but throughout its history Judea remained the limit of the largest powers of antiquity, or, in terms of the world-system analysis of Wallerstein, the world-empires. In the Middle Ages, when for a period there had no longer been Jewish state, the borders between Jewry and the surrounding world were nevertheless preserved, not only cultural and mental, but also literally, geographically. Since the Reconquista, the boundary between Jewry and the Christian world was determined by the borders of the Jewish ghetto or its more extended version: the ‘Pale of Settlement’. In medieval Europe, the Jewish ghetto was a certain quarter (or quarters) of cities, and in Austria-Hungary, Poland and Russia, it was a pale of isolation, a territory on the outskirts of the empire beyond which Jews were forbidden to leave. The process of ghettoisation of Jewishness in Europe had a number of peculiarities, the main one being that despite the conquest of the ‘Great French Revolution’ and the development of democracy in Europe, the boundaries of the Jewish ghetto not only did not disappear, but became even more insurmountable. If in the Middle Ages the key to the ghetto for Jews was baptism or money, then with the development of national states and nationalist ideologies on the integration of Jews into European society, it would seem that a fat cross was set, since it is impossible to change a nationality or race, like religion. From an administrative point of view, the Pale of Settlement consisted of small towns and villages –‘shtetl’, ‘town’ in Yiddish. In the Russian Empire, the ghetto and the Pale of Settlement formed the borders, culture and thinking of the Jews up until 1917.

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Figure 3. Map of regions within the Pale. Courtesy of Legacy Tree Genealogists viewed 24 February 2019.

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In fact, the Pale of Settlement ceased to exist only after the Second World War. And although it ceased to exist, but the state of Israel was created in the image and likeness of shtetl and Jews from the Pale of Settlement - studying the biographies of Zionist and Israeli politicians it is easy to see. Summarising, we note that the creation of the State of Israel was prepared by all the previous course of the historical development of Jewry. First, Jewry of the Pale of Settlement was ready to build a new limit in Palestine and live in it. Second, such a limitrophe responded to the aspirations of European nationalism, which sought to get rid of Jewry. Third, the aspirations of European nationalists and Jews of the Pale of Settlement, ready for voluntary deportation and life within the limits of the limitrophe, harmoniously combined Zionist ideology and the colonial policy of the European powers. Part Three. History of the State of Israel: the relationship between integration and ghettoisation Both processes – integration and the ghettoisation of Jewry – took place simultaneously; while in North America, a multicultural society is formed, which proclaims as its ideals equal rights and opportunities for everyone. In Europe at the same time, nationalism is gaining strength, the peak of which was the Third Reich. Between these two processes were the Jews, who set a goal: to integrate into the world-economy, world-culture, and at the same time to preserve themselves as an ethno-cultural community. In general, the 20th century in Jewish history was the most saturated event, radically changing the lives of both the Jews themselves and the existence of a whole region, known as the Middle East. Among the most significant historical events of the 20th century in Jewish history, the Holocaust should be especially highlighted, as a result of which Jews almost completely ceased to exist as a European people. The Holocaust also buried the Jews’ hopes for integration into European society, its culture and economy. But at the same time, long before the Holocaust, Jews already had an alternative to the ghetto, and opportunities to integrate into European society. And this alternative was the United States. At the time of the formation of the Zionist movement, European Jews could freely emigrate to the United States, where Jewish immigrants had rights and freedoms that were denied in Russia and Europe. Against the backdrop of North America, at the beginning of the last century, the emerging Jewish enclave of Palestine looked like a ghetto. Thus, in the 20th century, the development of Jewry goes in two main directions: on the path of integration into the world-economy and as a limitrophe. The first trend is related to US Jewry, the second to the state of Israel. And if the American Jewry in its mass successfully integrated into the economy, into society and into the culture of America, then the state of Israel was built in the image and likeness of the Jewish shtetl and by Jews of shtetl. In other words, even as a Jewish state, Israel was, and remains, a limitrophe in the Middle East. In our opinion,

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it is this feature that determined all the further development of the State of Israel and its main characteristics, which will be discussed below. To date, the United States and Israel are represented by the two largest Jewish diasporas, both of which are closely related to each other. Is it possible to link Jews integrated into the world-economy and the inhabitants of the ghetto-limitrophe? It goes without saying that the development and very existence of the State of Israel is difficult to imagine without the full support of American Jewry. At first glance, such comprehensive support for Israel by the Jews of the American, Russian, British, and other diasporas of many countries seems absurd, since the Jews of these countries, for the most part, have long since been successfully integrated within the economy, society and culture of the Western world. Therefore, the question arises: why do the Jews of North America need Israel? The is quite simple: the main reason for the strong support of Israel by the Jews of the diaspora (and not only the American diaspora) is due primarily to the problem of selfidentification. In other words, the Jews of the diaspora have sought and are striving for integration rather than for assimilation, just as the Muslims living in Western countries are trying to preserve their identity today. And in order to maintain selfidentification, in addition to the Pentateuch, it is necessary, in one form or another, to have a connection with the sacred Land of Israel and Jerusalem. However, we note here that the Jews and the US government drew attention to Israel only after the 1967 Six-Day War, when Israel was finally formed as the limitrophe of the Western world. Before that, the state of Israel and its predecessor, the Jewish enclave of Palestine, were the result, first, of the European policy of the ghettoisation of Jewry; second, the desire of Jews to integrate into the European empire world; and third, the colonial aspirations of European powers. In the mass consciousness, the history of the state of Israel is connected exclusively with Zionist ideology and the Zionist movement. However, from the very beginning, the idea of creating a Jewish state in Palestine did not come from the Jews. In fact, the idea of creating a Jewish state in Palestine dates back to the Protestant church from the time of the Reformation. The idea of the revival of the Jewish state in Palestine was especially popular among British Puritans, who were accustomed to praying for the return of Jews to the Holy Land. Protestant Zionism was very much in harmony with Britain’s colonial policy, especially in the second half of the 19th century, when the Ottoman Empire was experiencing a deep crisis. On the other hand, Protestant Zionism can be seen as a manifestation of the traditional xenophobic and anti-Semitic aspirations of Europeans, and among these Puritan ‘Zionists’ can be listed names such as Henry Finch, John Owen (1616-1683), John Gill (1697-1771). As an ideology, Christian Zionism took shape in the 1840s. One of the prominent ideologists and leaders of this movement was Anthony Ashley Cooper, and it was at this time that the famous phrase ‘To the people without land – the land without the people’ appeared. This phrase was first used by the Protestant

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preacher Alexander Keith D.D. in his book The Land of Israel. According to the Covenant with Abraham, with Isaac, and with Jacob (1844).4 In essence, Protestant Zionism, like the later idea of Paul de Lagarde on the deportation of Jews to Madagascar, was a plan to embody the long-standing dream of Europeans: once and for all get rid of the Jews. On the other hand, the colonisation of Palestine was in the interests and plans of Europeans, primarily the British, for the colonisation of the Middle East. (Napoleon Bonaparte tried to embody this concept into reality for the first time, but this attempt was unsuccessful). European nationalism has established insurmountable borders between Europeans and Jews. If, in the Middle Ages, Jews could escape from the ghetto by changing religion, the new racial and national barriers completely excluded the possibility for Jews to integrate into European society. However, the Jews, nevertheless, had a chance to integrate into the European world-system through the colonial policy of the European powers. The ideological basis for the participation of Jews in the colonial policy of the European powers was Zionism – the European nationalism of the 19th century, adapted for Jewry. Jewish nationalism was born in Europe and developed on the basis of European national and racial theories. Moses Hess, the philosopher and forerunner of the Zionist movement, adapted European nationalism for the Jewishness. In his main work, Rome and Jerusalem, Hess operates with terms from the ideology of European nationalism: ‘the Jewish race,’ ‘national traits and differences’, and the like.5 Moses Hess saw the future of the Jewish people in colonisation, and he was the first who formulated the principles of this colonisation: ‘For the establishment of Jewish settlements along the future path to India and China, there is no shortage either of Jewish workers or of Jewish talents and capitals, and if only a weak sprout is planted under the protection of the European great powers, a new tree of life will grow without external assistance and bear fruit’. If Moshe (Moses) Hess prepared an adapted version of European nationalism for the Jews, Theodore (Binyamin Zeev) Herzl created the Jewish national movement known as the Zionist movement, and engaged in the practical integration of Jewry into the colonial policy of the European powers. Herzl’s book The Jewish State (Der Judenstaat) was rather a manifesto about the readiness of the first voluntary deportation of Jews from Europe, and, second, the readiness of the Jewish people to integrate into the colonial policies of European powers. Here it should be noted that the Zionist movement begins in a period of history when preparations for the First World War are already well underway in Europe.6 Theodor Herzl probed the possibilities of integrating Jews into the colonial policy of the Western powers. In the framework of this activity, Herzl met with the German Kaiser, William II, the Pope, Russian Interior Minister Pleve, and the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire Abdul-Hamid II, with the sole purpose of securing an alliance Keith 1855. Herzl 1896. 6 Hess 1862. 4 5

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Figure 4. Map of Israel Map Cruzin viewed 24 February 2019.

between the Zionists and the major powers of the time. This was precisely the essence of Herzl’s efforts: to integrate Jewry into the European world system as a limitrophe, the role that the State of Israel continues to play to this day. Since Herzl, securing the colonial alliance has been the main goal of the Zionist leadership of the Jewish enclave of Palestine, and then that of the political leadership

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of the State of Israel, up to the present day. The first such union was issued in 1917, known as ‘Lord Balfour’s Declaration’ – an unofficial letter from British Foreign Minister Arthur Balfour to Lord Rothschild, head of the local Jewish community. In this letter, Balfour writes that Her Majesty’s government positively looks at the possibility of creating a national home for Jews in Palestine; thus the first union was formed between Zionists and the British Empire. Since 1917, the Jewish enclave of Palestine has developed as a colonial project, the outpost of the Western powers: from 1917 to 1939 as a British one; then, after WWII, as a Soviet (1941-1949); from 1953 to 1963, during the Suez crisis and war in Algeria, British-French; and, finally, since 1967, in the framework of the Cold War and to the present day, an American one. It should be noted here that independently the Jews could hardly have ever created their own state anywhere. In other words, modern Israel should be seen as a limitrophe, a border zone not only of the Middle Eastern conflict, but also of a wider frontier between East and West. Thus, throughout its history, the State of Israel has existed as a limitrophe, insofar as it meets the interests of the world-system. The example of Israel is interesting first of all because the creation of this state was the result of two seemingly completely antagonistic processes: on the one hand, the aspirations of Europeans to get rid of Jewry, and, on the other, the integration of Jews into the colonial policy of European powers. As a result, Israel became a European colonial project, carried out by European Jews, carriers of European nationalism. In Israeli historiography until the late 1980s, the relationship between the Jewish enclave of Palestine and the British Mandate was seen as the struggle of the Jews against the British occupants for independence. 7 It was only in the late 1980s that ‘new historians’ began to view these relations as an interaction in the matter of colonising the Middle East.8 Summarising all of the above, we should note the following features of the formation of a new Jewish limitrophe – the State of Israel. The dreams of European nationalists to rid themselves of Jews were realised in the 20th century during the Holocaust. As a result of the Holocaust, Jews ceased to exist as European people, but the Jewish ghetto did not disappear. It only moved in space – to the Middle East. Part Four: Israel as a frontier Israel is a country of frontiers, built of frontiers. The process of formation of the State of Israel had a number of features, the main one being that, first, the state of Israel, surrounded on all sides by hostile countries of different cultures, throughout its history was formed in the image and likeness of the shtetl. Second, the state of Israel is not only a frontier, but it is also built of frontiers, and it is these 7 8

Shaul 1973. Segev 2000.

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Figure 5. Cave of the Patriarchs. Hebron.

frontiers – geopolitical, ethnic, social and economic – that determine and shape the development of the state of Israel to the present day. In maintaining the balance of the already existing system, another frontier is created, balancing the previous one. This process will be demonstrated on specific examples below. The oldest and longest conflict in the history of Israel is considered to be the JewishArab confrontation; but actually it is not. The first conflict among Jewish immigrants

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to Palestine in the first wave (1881-1914) took place not with the Arabs, but with Orthodox Jews. Orthodox Jews began to settle in Palestine in the 16th century, after being expelled from Spain and Portugal. Incidentally, an example of orthodox Jews of the 16th century inspired the representatives of the Zionist movement, as the Israeli historian Israel Bartal writes. In the 18th century, Jewish enclaves existed in Palestine in Jerusalem, Hebron, Safed (Tzfat) and Tiberias. On the eve of the first wave of Jewish immigration to Palestine within the Zionist movement in 1878, the Jewish population totalled 25,000 here. The community of Orthodox Jews in Palestine consisted of representatives of European Jews who lived mainly on donations from their counterparts in Eastern Europe (mainly from Lithuania and Poland), and Eastern Jews – the Sephardim, who were mainly engaged in finance, handicraft and trade. In the early 20th century, the orthodox community constituted the majority in the Jewish enclave. The orthodox community of Israel is stressed here because Orthodox Jews have never accepted Zionists, and since then Israeli historiography has been divided into old and new yishuvas – enclaves. This division continues today, and it has quite clear geographic boundaries. Orthodox Jews live in closed communities in Jerusalem, in the MaaShaarim quarter, in Tiberias, in Safed and in the religious city of BneiBrak in Greater Tel Aviv (Gush Dan). The Jerusalem quarter of MaaShaarim was founded in 1874, long before the founding of the first Jewish quarters by the Zionists. Today it is the capital of orthodox Jewry (Haredim), who reject Zionism and do not recognise the state of Israel. Haredim has its own system of education, social security and management. This is a state within the state. The community of Haredim on the territory of modern Israel was formed in 1922 on the basis of the British Mandate of Communities Act. Since that time, the main principles of the Haredim community ‘Eda Haredit’ are self-isolation and closure for the outside world. The most famous representatives of Eda Haredit is the community of ‘Neturei Karta’. The Haredim community in Israel doubles its population every ten years, so that by 2040 the majority of pupils in Israeli schools, provided that the current birth rate continues, will be children from the Haredim families. The State of Israel sees in the Haredim a threat to the very existence of the Jewish state. The fact is that, according to the concept of Haredim, only the ‘Most High’ can restore the Jewish state; and before that, Jews should not even think about their own state. Another frontier in the state is the generally known conflict between Jews and Arabs. The history of this conflict is the subject of a separate study. We note only the main characteristics of this frontier. The Arab population of Israel currently stands at about 20%, or about two million people, according to the data of the Israeli Statistical Office. Together with Christian Arabs, the non-Jewish population of Israel is about 25% or 2.5 million. As in the case of the Haredim, Israeli Arabs live in their own cities and villages or in the Arab neighbourhoods of Jewish cities – Ramle, Lod, Akko, Tel Aviv-Jaffa and Haifa. Arab residents of Israel since 1961 have the same identity cards and passports as Jews. However, in the Arab cities or villages of Israel there is not a single Jew. The degree of loyalty among Arab citizens of the State of

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Israel is different. Among the Israeli Arabs today are many doctors, lawyers, teachers and engineers, as well as other professionals working in large industrial enterprises, hospitals and financial companies. But at the same time, for Arabs, service in the Israeli army is not mandatory, and most Arab citizens of the country of draft age do not serve in it. The level of poverty and unemployment in the Arab settlements of Israel is much higher than in the Jewish settlements, and the development of infrastructures, for example, industrial zones, is much lower. The Arab enclave of Israel has quite clear territorial boundaries and perhaps can be compared in a sense to medieval Jewish ghettos in Europe. The Jewish-Arab frontier is closely connected with the ethnic frontier in Israel, one of the oldest in Israel. What becomes clear is that the acute shortage of manpower for Israel in the course of the Arab-Israeli conflict was solved at the expense of the immigration of Jews, primarily those who survived during the Holocaust and Jews from Arab countries. The arrival of a million immigrants from Eastern Europe and North Africa provoked a new conflict between the country’s natives and immigrants, creating a further frontier inside the state of Israel. Much has already been written about the attitudes of the older residents and natives of the country to these immigrants from Arab countries. Ethnic discrimination is one of the characteristics of Israel. It was this discrimination, but already of Soviet Jews, that led to the creation in 1996 of a political party based on ethnic principles ‘Israel Ba aliyah’ led by Natan Shcharansky. And here we will turn to the most eloquent facts - first of all to the movement of the ‘black panthers’ in the early 1970s, protesting against discrimination of people from Arab countries. Finally, we can view the socio-economic divide as the newest and most profound one for Israeli society. The gap between the rich and the poor in Israel is tied to the liberal reforms of the right bloc Likud, who came to power in the country in 1977. In fact socio-economic inequality in Israel began much earlier – with the beginning of the payment of German reparations. Receiving funds from Germany, European Jews found themselves in a much more privileged position than immigrants from Morocco and other Arab countries. The socio-economic polarisation of society intensified in the early 1970s, when repatriates from the USSR received generous social assistance from the state, while immigrants from Arab countries and their descendants still had with virtually nothing. These, then, are the main frontiers of Israeli society briefly described (a detailed description and investigation of these frontiers being beyond the scope of this essay). The issue of frontiers in Israeli society is important here in terms, primarily, of answering the question of the meaning and function of the frontier for Israel itself, as the limitrophe of the Western world-empire. In our opinion, the frontiers in Israeli society are primarily due to the fact that the State of Israel was developed as a colonisation project of Great Britain, and then the USA. The process of the integration of Jews into the world-economy has not abolished the process of the ghettoisation of Jews. While in North America most Jews integrated

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Figure 6. Road map of Modern Israel Bible maps viewed 24 February 2019.

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into the world-economy, a new limitrophe was formed in the Middle East in the image and likeness of the Pale of Settlement. The State of Israel can serve as an example of the close connection and interaction of the limitrophe: Israel with the Jews of the Diaspora integrated into the world economy. At the same time, the Jews of the Diaspora, primarily American and Russian, ensure the survival of the Limitrophe – Israel, lobbying for its interests in politics, making donations and investing in the Israeli economy. In turn, Israel provides for the interests of the world-empire in the Middle East. Let us also note that the limitrophe, in the form of a Jewish ghetto or a provincial state, has always solved the problem of self-identification of Jews integrated into the world-system. In general, the example of Israel proves once again that a limitrophe cannot exist without the support of the peace-empire; we can see this worked out in the DPR and LC, Abxazia and South Ossetia. Limitrophe will exist while the world-empire has a need for it, or as long as the world-empire itself exists. Bibliography Dubnov. S. 2008. Kratkaya istoriya evreev (A brief history of Jews) (in Russian). Moscow: Fenix. Graec, G. 1906. Istoriya evreev ot drevnejshih vremen do nastoyashshego (The history of Jews from ancient times to the modern period). Vol. 1 (in Russian). Odessa: Sherman. Hess, M. 1862. Rome and Jerusalem. The Last National Question (translated by Meyer Waxman). https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Rome_and_Jerusalem (accessed 24 February 2019). Herzl, Th. 1896 (1946). The Jewish State (transl. from the German by S. D’Avigdor). Published by the American Zionist Emergency Council. https://www. jewishvirtuallibrary.org/quot-the-jewish-state-quot-theodor-herzl (accessed 24 February 2019). Flavij, I. 2002. Iudeijskie drevnosti. Kniga devyatnadcataya (Josephus Flavius. Judean antiquities. Book xix) (in Russian). Moscow: Ladomir. Keith, A. 1855. The land of Israel: according to the covenant with Abraham, with Isaac, and with Jacob. New York: Harper & Brothers. Morris, B. 1987. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947-1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Segev, T. 2000. One Palestine, Complete: Jews & Arabs Under the British Mandate. New York: Metropolitan Books. Shapira, A. 2007. Ehudim, Zionimve ma she beinehem (Jews, Zionists and what’s between them) (in Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Am Oved. Shaul, A. (ed.) 1973. SeferToldothahagana (History of the Haganah) (in Hebrew). Tel Aviv: Schoken.