On Human Action and Practical Wisdom [1 ed.] 9789004321786, 9789004321779

Citation preview

On Human Action and Practical Wisdom

Modern Chinese Philosophy Edited by John Makeham (La Trobe University)

Volume 10

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/mcp

On Human Action and Practical Wisdom By

Yang Guorong Translated by

Paul J. D’Ambrosio Sarah Flavel

LEIDEN | BOSTON

The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at http://catalog.loc.gov LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2016013453

issn 1875-9386 isbn 978-90-04-32177-9 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-32178-6 (e-book) Copyright © 2013 by sdx Joint Publishing (Shanghai) Co., Ltd. All rights reserved. English edition copyright 2016 by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi and Hotei Publishing. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill nv provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, ma 01923, usa. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Preface vii 1 Practical Philosophy’s Perspective on Action 1 2 Reasons, Causes and Action 33 3 On the Weakness of Will 55 4 Shi, the Background for Practice 81 5 Ji, Shu and Yun in Practice 102 6 Practical Reason and Its Principles 121 7 Practical Activities, Communicative Action and the Rationality of Practical Processes 146 8 Practical Wisdom 180 Index 213

Preface Humans exist through action, and action is existence. Historically speaking, humans are creatures that do not transcend existence, nor are they the endpoint of natural evolution. Nature is the functional precondition of human existence, on the one hand humans are natural, but they move also beyond simple nature, and thus the distinction between humans and nature is established. This natural functioning of humans is concretely expressed through various concrete activities such as doing and making. By participating in the transformations of the heavens and earth, humans engage in action or practice in a broader sense, and thereby change the world and build themselves. Existing both in union with and distinction from nature, humans develop within natural processes. Through collective making and doing (participating in the transformations of the heavens and earth, and applying one’s natural dispositions) as well as living (i.e. daily use and constant action), humans transform their natural state of living together to attain social characteristics (by establishing a society based on interrelations). Through this they also develop various capacities, including rationality, and thus create various manifestations of civilization and culture, such as language. This allows humans to exist socially, rationally, and linguistically. So we can see that humans exist through action. Humans confirm their existence in various forms of making and doing—i.e. actual manifestations of action. Beginning with early human’s daily activities and nighttime rest, to modern work and leisure, humans have always lived by multiple doings and makings (practices). In accordance with the different traditional forms of the social division of labor, human life is displayed in the realms of the economy, politics, military, technology, and culture. These are its concrete manifestations, which are expressed as different types of doing and making. The process of human life, in its multitude of daily practices expresses a series of activity. In daily diet, personal life, or interactions with others, regardless of whether it is actual movement or oral communication, the content is always different levels of action. Generally speaking, humans are fundamentally connected to action, which means that humans exist through action. In terms of philosophical theory, human making and doing take on the form of action or practice. Broadly speaking, human activities permeate their intentions and goals. And on different levels they are restricted by universal norms. However, the two can be separated and investigated individually. Their distinction can be broken down as such: action usually tends to be narrow—it can be focused on the individual or singular activity, whereas practice often implies a wider view, such as activities characterized socially and systematically.

viii

Preface

A singular motion, such as raising one’s hand, can be viewed as an action, but is usually not considered a practice. Social revolutions are mostly interpreted as social practice, and not often called actions. Of course distinguishing the two like this is relative. Action can be related to social or systematic activities as well. For instance, there an be communication activities. Practice can also include singular or individual movements. In fact, philosophers often use these terms interchangeably. Taking political activities as an example, Aristotle mostly sees them as practice, but Hannah Arendt places this type of activity in the realm of action.1 Furthermore, action and practice undoubtedly have their own definitions, but their differentiation does not imply that they are completely dissimilar. Theoretically speaking, investigating human activity on the level of action can advance the concrete understanding of the process of practice. And research done into human activity from the dimension of practice can help to comprehend the social connotations and meanings of action. Action theory and practical philosophy are related to the separation of action and practice. In terms of their forms action theory tends to philosophically analyze actions, whereas practical philosophy investigates practice. Generally speaking, practice is involved in many aspects of human activity. Truthfully, the entirety of practice includes all activities in the process of human existence. This means that practice can encompass action. Accordingly, action theory can also be classified as practical philosophy in a broad sense. The concerns of practical philosophy itself can be oriented towards different practical domains, such as ethical, political and legal realms. And these can be seen as specific manifestations of practical philosophy. The defining characteristic is investigations of the many facets of human life. If we demarcate philosophy in terms of the categories of practical philosophy to discuss value, social norms, politics etc. then normative theories also become an important branch of practical philosophy. Meta-theoretical research, which has a different focus from the above-mentioned types of investigations, can be seen as practical philosophy in the narrow sense. Practical reason, practical reasoning and practical wisdom also belong to practical philosophy in its narrow sense. Research on this level involves the common characteristics of action and practice, their rational qualities, preconditions and qualifications for being effectively carried out including the intentionality and normativity in their processes, their reason and cause, as well as the relationship between their internal workings and external backgrounds. This book is basically an investigation into action and practice on this meta-theoretical level. 1 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998.

Preface

ix

From a historical perspective, Aristotle’s philosophy was the first to discuss problems associated with practice. According to his understanding, knowledge or thinking can be divided into practice, production, and theory. This contains two important distinctions: firstly, the difference between practical knowledge and theoretical knowledge. And secondly, practical activity versus production. This perspective on practice takes political and ethical activities as its most important content, which is opposed to production and any thing related, such as production, craft, and technological activities. According to Aristotle, the end of practical activities is some good, and the ultimate end is happiness (eudemonia). This differs from purpose of theoretical activities, which is to reach universal knowledge. Practical activities are mostly displayed in concrete situations, and inclined towards a good/end, which must be realized through uniting universal principles with specific circumstances (i.e. by activity). Hegel was greatly influenced by Aristotle’s distinctions between practical and theoretical knowledge, as well as practical and productive activity. This influence is easily seen in Kant as well. An important discussion in Kant’s practical reason is the difference between pure reason and theoretical reason. Connected to this is his division between practical and theoretical philosophy. Kant famously distinguishes between theoretical reason and practical reason. In terms of the theoretical and practical, we can see that they are many places where his thinking is related to Aristotle. And above all Kant’s practical reason is associated with moral action, although in a broader sense, it is, at the same time, involved with the legal realm. Actually, he includes a section on “the doctrine of right” and “the doctrine of virtue” in his later work The Metaphysics of Moral. The book’s discussion concerns legal relationships and actions. But whereas Kant associates good with enduring moral duties, Aristotle argues that happiness is the good. With respect to this, Aristotle emphasizes a link between universal principles and concrete situations. In the realm of practical reason, Kant is primarily concerned with universal norms. He thinks that within the domain of ethics the freedom to act allows people to transcend restraints from the necessity of cause and effect. And this freedom within the domain of ethics is rooted in abiding to universal laws or norms (i.e. those derived from the categorical imperative). Reason’s universal law guarantees action’s free nature, which constitutes an internal trend in Kant’s practical philosophy.2 2 In Kant’s Critique of Judgment he argues that “what is practical according to natural concept” equals “the practical according to the concept of freedom.” Logically, this type of criticism already posits that the two are separate. Accordingly, “the concept of nature” is related to the rule of cause and effect. And this is the basis for claiming that the “practical” also refers to

x

Preface

After Kant, Hegel also established a link between practice and the concept of the good. But compared to Kant’s first investigation of practice on the level of ethics, Hegel himself is more concentrated on legal and political spheres. He writes, “Intelligent, substantial beneficence is, however, in its richest and most important form the intelligent universal action of the state—an action compared with which the action of a single individual, as an individual, is so insignificant that it is hardly worth talking about.”3 His comment about the state is an association between legal and political activates. While the latter comment about the individual’s action is about individual moral conduct. Behind the notion that individual moral conduct is lower than the government’s good policies is the idea that activities in the legal and political domain are higher than ethical action. And for Hegel ethics mainly stops at the level of “should.” Activities in the legal and political realm are actualized in reality. Similarly, with regard to the relationship between ethical conduct and moral nature, the agent’s ethical conduct often stems from their moral nature. Whether they have a moral nature depends on several factor that are not universal. While universal laws themselves regulate legal actions. These two fields stipulate that activities in the legal and political spheres are higher than individual moral actions. Hegel gives practicality a broader meaning by including political and legal activities. However, practice and action are not limited to spheres such as morality, politics and legality, but are seen as the way humans function in the world. For Hegel practice is a type of intermediary, it is only expressed as a medium between the goal and outcome. In a much broader sense it is displayed as communication between objectivity and subjectivity. When he posits that the good expressed in the practical reason, writing “because it is intrinsically the totality of the concept, the objective which is at the same time in the form

things outside the domain of ethics. Thereby, Kant distinguishes between “technical practical” principles and “moral practical” principles. This also contains the division between the technical and moral level of the practical. At the same time, however, Kant emphasizes that the natural concept of cause and effect is related to practical rules on the technical level, and that both are “the rules of skill.” And they are absolutely no place in practical philosophy, only the practical rules of ethics which are based on the concept of freedom, are part of practical philosophy (as it is opposed to theoretical philosophy). (See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Translated by J.H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Publishing, 1951), 7–9.) This argument shows that although Kant had already seen the different manifestations of practice, any practice associated with practical philosophy was firstly ethical practice. Actually, Kant’s most important discussion, in “practical reason,” is ethical practice. 3 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Phenomenology of Spirit, Translated by A.V. Miller (London: Oxford University Press, 1977), 255.

Preface

xi

of free unity and subjectivity,”4 he is explaining the connotation given above. Of course Hegel also puts practical activity into the realms of categories, spirit, and logic. In his Logic he understands the relationship between the goal of goal-oriented activities and their method as a process of deduction. He writes “But these processes, as they themselves showed, return into purpose on their own. If, therefore, the connection of the means to the external object which it has to work upon is at first an immediate one, that connection has earlier exhibited itself already as a syllogism, for purpose proved to be their true middle term and unity.”5 Certain aspects of these views are undoubtedly reflected in the process of putting practice into reality. But here even more emphasis is placed on the logical development of reason. These aspects of Hegel’s thought make it clear that his thinks it is necessary to have an intellectual and abstract interpretation of practice. Marx makes an even deeper investigation into practice. Different from the way Aristotle or Kant understand practice, Marx first looks at the link between practice, labor, and modes of production. Accordingly, he argues, But since for socialist man the whole of what is called world history is nothing more than the creation of man through human labor, and the development of nature for man, he therefore has palpable and incontrovertible proof of his self-mediated birth, of his process of emergence. Since the essentiality [Wesenhaftigkeit] of man and nature, a man as the existence of nature for man and nature as the existence of man for man, has become practically and sensuously perceptible, the question of an alien being, being above nature and man—a question which implies an admission of the unreality of nature and of man—has become impossible in practice.6 Here it is clear that, in Marx’s view, practice is not opposed to production or craft, or limited to ethics, politics etc. On the contrary, production and craft are activities that make up the very meaning of practice. Taking labor as the form of principle, practice not only creates humans, it creates the world they live in. Practice is thereby not Hegel’s rational activity, nor logical deduction; it is primarily expressed as actual perceptual activity. This latter sense includes the 4 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, The Science of Logic, Edited and translated by George di Giovanni (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 729. 5 Ibid, 662–663. 6 Karl Marx, Karl Marx: Selected Writings, Edited and translated by David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 96.

xii

Preface

exchange of materials between humans and nature, which itself emerges as the character of society while simultaneously unfolding as a historical process. Practice thereby also purports itself through changing people and the world. It also constitutes the actualization of the most basic foundation of these transformations, and, additionally, is the final goal of human change; it simultaneously takes human liberation as its target. So it is easy to comprehend why labor is the most basic principle Marx’s view of practice labor. And it is also the foundation for the interactions between humans and nature, and the relationship between the individual and society. Oriented towards changing the world, people, and human liberation, the historical development of practical activities is also interpreted as a process moving towards a state of freedom.7 In the Chinese philosophical tradition “action” has been the center of attention since early times. Ancient Chinese texts approach human “action” from different angles. The Zhouyi 周易is rooted in calculations and predictions about various human activities. Major texts focused on li 礼, often translated “ritual” (including the Zhouli 周礼 and Liji 礼记) focuses on different social norms and guidelines. The Shangshu 尚书 is composed of historical records about the ­management of the state (i.e. actions taken by political officers). As these thoughts evolved debates about knowing and doing gradually become the major topic in Chinese philosophy. Taking Confucianism as the mainstream philosophy in China, we see that the overall orientation is towards ­investigating “doing” as ­related to “achieving oneself and things.”8 Broadly speaking, ­achieving oneself indicates self-cultivation while achieving things 7 Historically speaking, interpretations of practice have gradually transgressed the realm of ethics and politics. For example, for Roger Bacon “practice” and “practical” have narrower connotations than are given in Aristotle. Bacon uses “practical” to refer to scientific and technological activities as well as moral ideas. Thus, Bacon already expands on Aristotle’s notion of practice. And in some ways is close to Kant’s “technical practice” (see footnote 6). However, Bacon’s theory is not similar to Kant’s later attitude and stance on “technical practice.” 8 Translator’s note: The phrase “achieving oneself and things,” literally cheng ji cheng wu 成 己成物, is the title of Yang’s first book in this series. It outlines his concrete metaphysical philosophy. The phrase is borrowed from the Liji 礼记 (Book of Rites), where the terms cheng ji 成己 and cheng wu 成物 are described as humane or moral (ren 仁), and knowledge or wisdom (zhi 知) respectively. Yang’s own use refers to how cultivation of oneself can literally change the significance of things in the world. Neither “achieving oneself” or “achieving things” refers a static state that is somehow accomplished or permanent. “Achieving oneself and things” is a goal, but one that is a process and requires constant upkeep. In light of classical Confucianism this achieving can be understood as garden or being a marathon runner. Both are achievable, but require constant upkeep to remain; otherwise the garden is overrun with weeds and the marathon runner can no longer complete 26.2 miles.

Preface

xiii

involves transitions in social life. Activities in the social sphere, such as political and ethical ones, have a comparatively dominant place in this process. Chinese philosophy (again taking Confucianism as the backbone) is, from beginning to end, focused on the function of ritual9 (li 礼) in social activities. Conduct in accordance with ritual is the prerequisite for humans to move from a “wild” to “cultured” life. The “wild” is a pre-culture or pre-social state, and ­“cultured” is its opposite, namely a culturalized or socialized state. Chinese philosophy understands that it is precisely in the process of abiding social norms (i.e. ritual) that people gradually go from being “wild” to being “cultured.” The only requirement for possibly becoming a real human is behaving inline with ritual. Generally speaking, Chinese philosophy sees all activities in the social realm, and as expressions of human “action.” As Hanfeizi puts it, “Affairs are ­actions/doings.”10 “Actions” or “doings” here means the various activities people are engaged within the social realm, which must also be inline with the dao 道 or “way,” as a type of universal standard.11 No aspect of social activity can be separated from human actions. For example, in traditional Chinese society the relationship between family and friends is not seen (by Confucian philosophy) as a natural prescription. For those who are unaware of ethics, the relationship between family and friends has no moral value. Similarly, apart from dealing with or interacting with family and friends ethically, it is difficult to form ethical relationships with anyone. Ethical social relations must be founded on developing moral practices through the process of dealing with family and friends. Moreover, Chinese philosophy confirms that everyday behavior approaches dao, i.e. one’s everyday activities and practices approach universal value principles. This means that universal social values can be experienced in everyday life. From this perspective, everyday life itself should conform to universal principles (dao). This is also an acknowledgement of the connection between implementation of social value principles and daily behaviors. In this way action is not only the requirement for possibly becoming a real human, it is also the prerequisite for ethical relationships, forming society and development in a broad sense. 9

Translator’s note: The Confucian understanding of “ritual” is extremely broad. It includes everything from handshakes to clothing to the way friend address each other, or students interact with teachers. In this way it is something that completely pervades almost all aspects of everyday life. 10 Hanfeizi 韩非子, Hanfeizi 韩非子 [The Book of Master Hanfei], Edited by Chen Bingcai 陈秉才 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2007), 231. 11 Translator’s note: The term dao can be translated as “way,” “path,” or “discourse.” It is central to Chinese philosophical thought, and can often be understood as the “way” of the cosmos, which, if gone against, will only cause unproductive friction.

xiv

Preface

It is easy to see that politics, ethics, and social activity make up the predominant themes of action in Chinese philosophy. This interpretation demonstrates some commonality with how Aristotle, and Western thinkers after him, view action. Certainly Chinese philosophical investigations of human action are primarily related to self-achievement (in terms of the “self” or “individual”), although, as shown above, Chinese philosophy also approves of “helping transform and nourish the world,” and working with one’s environment to change things. These include transforming existence in a broad sense. However, the idea that people achieve a self through acting in accordance with ritual, and that social activities are constructed through abiding by dao, undoubtedly takes precedence. This orientation is specifically given expression in SongMing Li 理, or “principle,” studies (e.g. Zhu Xi 朱熹 and Wang Yangming 王阳 明). Their discussion of skill is especially related to this topic. For them skill already involves knowledge and action. So-called “study skills,” and moral goodness are directly related to knowledge and action. The goal that the “skill” of Song-Ming Li studies is directed towards is the achievement of a self through education and moral cultivation. In this view, skill is also involved with the noumenon,12 which, in a broad sense, can be seen as taking moral concepts as the significant content of the human spirit or consciousness, and makes up the internal foundation for the development of skill. One side of the unification of skill and the noumenon is the integration between knowledge and action that thereby distinguishes theoretical reason from practical reason. Another side to this makes the experience of the process of skill in everyday activities surpass instinctual behaviors or spontaneity.13 Within the implementation that develops various aspects of skill, the construction of a ritual based life and people’s individual achievements are two parts of the same process. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, two major movements have significantly impacted the field of philosophy. Firstly, contemporary schools, such as analytic philosophy, phenomenology, and the Frankfurt school, involve different forms of practical philosophy. Secondly, areas like ethics and political philosophy receive attention from many different directions. By the second half of the twentieth century both became major trends in philosophy. If we take the first area as effecting practical philosophy on the meta-theoretical

12 13

Translator’s note: “Noumenon” here means the substance of all things, or some “primary stuff” that all things are born out of. See chapter 1 for a more detailed discussion. Translator’s note: We can understand “spontaneity” here in terms of un-reflective action. For example, when a child does something immoral they are not necessarily blamed as they do not have the cognitive capacity to fully realize the implications of their behavior.

Preface

xv

level, then the latter is an expression of a revival in practical philosophy from a different perspective. In contemporary philosophy different schools of thought focus on analyzing various aspects of action and practice. Investigations of action in analytic philosophy mainly concentrate on the “theory of action” or “philosophy of action.” Starting with a close consideration of the logic of language, analytic philosophy examines action mostly in terms of its structure. Ethics is in the realm of the practical and concrete, so when analytic philosophy studies moral concepts and language it does so as “meta-ethics.” In some respects this same pattern is followed when analytic philosophy look as action. Focusing on language as the most significant starting point this tradition’s theory of action involves explaining the language and concepts associated with action. These concepts aim at grasping the formal conditions of action in logical relations or ideal situations, not the process of actually realizing action or practice. According to this type of investigation the actual link and interaction between humans and object, or humans and humans, is often suspended, while the structure of the concept of action is given the primary position.14 Phenomenology takes a very different perspective on action. Unlike analytic philosophy, phenomenology approaches action as part of the process of human life. According to Heidegger, human action is experienced in individual projects, for instance, in the process of becoming authentic. As opposed to analyzing merely on the level of its form or structure, this view deals with the actual substance or essence of action. However, while on the goal of phenomenology is to become a strict philosophical science it begins from studying consciousness. Phenomenology is an attempt to get at pure consciousness through the eidetic and transcendental reduction, taking this to be the basis for certainty and validity in philosophy. Against this background, although 14

Broadly speaking, from the later Wittgenstein’s positing that language’s meaning comes from its function, to Austin’s discussions of “how to do things with words” or “speech acts,” “function” or “doing” are difficult to separate from language. In recent years analytic philosophers have—despite mentioning the importance of practice, and affirming that language and concepts are inseparable from practice—taken the interpretation of concepts as the activity of employing concepts, and accordingly used this as the foundation for creation of semantics. Connected to this, reasoning is also see as a form of practice. Robert Brandom identifies a relationship between comprehending concepts with interpretation and reasoning. (Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 91) Although Brandom does not take action or practice itself as a topic of discussion, his argument engage in an interpretation of action and practice. By including the concept of activity, or reasoning about activity, his argument is internally oriented towards action, practice or doing.

xvi

Preface

­ henomenology develops to look closely at the use of tools (i.e. Heidegger), it p is, overall, not just about the connection between action and the individual’s life process. It often takes anxiety, vexation, or fear as the specific content— which means the connection between action and internal consciousness (or psychological experience).15 The Frankfurt school’s investigation of action and practice is done with an initial opposition to Marx’s ideas. In this respect, Habermas is a well-suited representative. Marx takes production as the starting point for his view of practice, which, for Habermas, is teleological action—i.e. focused on the relation between subject and object. As a direct criticism of Marx Habermas develops a theory of communicative action. Here he argues that practice needs to overcome its subjectivity, and step out of the relationship between subjects and objects. The idea is to show that action and practice are about communication between subjects in the “lifeworld,” not labor connected to a process of production. From the perspective of contemporary philosophical developments, Hannah Arendt already differentiated between labor and action before ­ ­Habermas. According to her the goal of “labor” is to maintain the existence of an individual life, which means that there is no freedom in nature. In order to be “free” one cannot be bound by material necessities. Only activities expressed in public realms, including politics, can have this type of free quality. In the public sphere labor can be separated into many different types of activities (the first of which is political), that Arendt calls “action.” Humans achieves freedom through “action” or political activities. She argues, Viewed, however, in their worldliness, action, speech, and thought have much more in common than any one of them has with work or labor. They themselves do not “produce,” bring forth anything, they are as futile as life itself.16

15

16

Against this background Gadamer’s hermeneutics its worth investigating. When he was developing his thought he also paid close attention to practice. But philosophically, hermeneutics is primarily interested in interpreting texts. As a medium for texts, the role of language is highlighted in hermeneutics. (Gadamer 1999: 579) In some ways Gadamer’s perspective is similar to analytic philosophy, but much of hermeneutics can also be traced back to Heidegger and phenomenology. For instance, interpretation is often seen as a manifestation of human existence, which means that it (interpretation) readily completely transcend this domain of this concept (existence). In other words, we can see the mark phenomenology leaves on hermeneutics. Of course it is also important to focus on the places where Gadamer makes specific investigations of practical activities. Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958, 95.

Preface

xvii

The bottom line is that action is not the same as labor or work, though it is similar to language and thinking. In terms of using a definition of labor (to discuss action), both Arendt and Harbermas’ theories go in a similar direction. So the link between action and language, as well as action and thinking, is, in some ways, a reflection of the differences between analytic philosophy and phenomenology. The above discussions show that the problem of interpreting practice and action is unavoidable. In terms of the connotations of practice, Marx takes labor as its most central feature, which is expressed in historical revolutions throughout history. Certain subsequent interpretations of this doctrine over intensified the significance of labor, even going so far as to identify the importance of practice with the orientation of labor. This type of logic can easily lead to suppressing individual achievements (or, the above-mentioned self-achievement) in favor of worldly accomplishments (achieving or refining things). Here the connotations of practice and labor can aid in teasing out the difference between Marx and his critics. Ardent and Habermas’ views of labor are inherently one-sided. Labor is not just about the relationship between a subject and object, nor does it exclude free activities. On the one hand labor should not be seen as the only form of practice, but on the other hand the ontological meaning of labor in human life cannot simply be denied. Action and practice are more primordial than language. Looking at their actual occurrences, the meaning of language is determined in life through the process of practice, it is not intrinsic in its object, nor do humans unilaterally fix it. Things do not exist as the object defined by a name or word. And names or words have no inherent meaning. Language is determined by conventions, through the interaction of language expressed and human activity. The precondition for using certain language symbols to indication certain objects is an understanding of objects in terms of how they function in the human world. And as language develops (including its becoming more abstract and complex) it becomes more and more indirect (especially in its description of human action and practice). Perhaps language itself is formed on the basis of its own evolutionary structure. If this is the case then human action and practice, including human communication and interaction (both with other humans and objects), still makes up the background of language’s meaning and interpretation. The “later” Wittgenstein says that the meaning of language is its application, which is inseparable from its “form of life.” On this view action and practice have an essential character and cannot be reduced to the logic of language or structure of concepts. Thereby, analytic philosophy’s attempt to grasp action starting with the analysis of language is inherently limited.

xviii

Preface

Thus it is difficult to separate human action or practice from conscious activity if we take the former to be interactions with things or others. From intentionality to specific motivations, and plans, conscious activity permeates every aspect of action and practice. Furthermore, action and practice actualize human processes in the world, and are therefore not the same as conceptual activity. They change and achieve (a certain state in) the world, just as they are responsible for changing humans, and achieving (a certain type of) human. Again, this shows that practice and action transcend the realm of pure thinking. If we interpret Marx’s practical theories as leading to an intensified emphasis on achieving the world, while overlooking the importance of achieving humans, then we can say that phenomenology results in the opposite outcome. According to phenomenology human existence is related to individual psychological experiences. Even though phenomenology starts from the individual’s experience with the world, e.g. the utilization of things at hand, in the end it concentrates on the individual’s project and psychological experiences (such as anxiety, fears, etc.) as well as the actions and practices associated with mental states and the process of consciousness. In terms of actual action and practice, phenomenology’s limitations represent the opposite extreme of those found in analytic philosophy. Sublation (aufheben) can be used to explain action and practice abstractly. It thereby takes the dimension of actual action and practice as its premise, but needs to affirm their priority. Historically speaking, everything from the formation of everything from the structure of thinking (including the structure of language) to culture psychology are all rooted in the continuation and repetition of action and practices. At the same time, they are based on the internal unification of knowledge and action, as well as the mind and language. In the process of actualization practical reason cannot be separated from practice. If rightness, effectiveness and goodness are the goal of practical reason then the latter’s specific connotations cannot be separated from concrete evidence (in practice). It is precisely in the historical development of the actual that one reaches the specific content of what it means to be good, become effective, or be in accord with rightness. And this is where suspicion of practical reason can arise. As the fundamental way of existing action or practice, in a broad sense, is not meant in the same way as action in the phrase “I act and thereby exist.” Similar to the phrase “I think and thereby exist,” “I act and thereby exist” is geared towards abstraction. “I act” is used in a similar way as “I think”: both are limited to the individual, lack essential value content, and emerge as vague and unspecified. In terms of their actual manifestations, “thinking” and “the object of thought” cannot be differentiated, and neither can “action” or “what

Preface

xix

is acted upon.” Social aspects of actions not only allow the self to interaction with others (and become social), but they also allow the action themselves to transcend their own vague and unspecified form and to have a concrete value content. In terms of their value dimension, “action,” “doing,” or “making” are firstly directed towards transforming existence. There is no way to create existence, but existence can be transformed through human action, doing, or making. This process of endowing existence with value and significance becomes the way humans themselves exist. Here, transforming existence, and the mode of human existence, express two aspects of the same process. More precisely, the actual content of this process is self-achievement and achieving or refining things. Self-achievement means realizing one’s self–including completing the self in terms of fulfilling potentials and personal goals–and is also directed at realizing group or social values. Achieving or refining things means achieving the world by functioning in the world. Human’s doing or making are, in some sense, related to self-existence, as well as being a “thing” for their object (of “doing” or “making”). Before human doing and making, things (objects or environments) display their natural forms. Humans, through “action” (in the broad sense), alter things according to a fixed value goal, or ideal. The process of making things fit “reasonable” requirements overcomes the goal’s initial subjective connotation and sublates (aufheben) the thing’s natural and unrestrained state. This is how doing and making (i.e. action in the broad sense), not only allow for humans’ self-achievement, but also achieving or refining things. Thereby, human “existence” and a thing’s “existence” can be seen as having the same nature. Through self-achievement and achieving or refining things “doing” and “making” show their original nature in the process of human existence, and they themselves (or “action” itself) acquires concrete value content. On further investigation, while the process of self-achievement and achieving or refining things (transforming one’s self and the world) bestows value connotations on action, we are still confronted with the problem of how this is possible. Ontologically, this first touches upon the issue of whether or not things and people can be transformed. This means that the existential manifestations of things and people are not predetermined or destined; they have an openness to the future. This is the precondition for achieving the world and it allows for the possibility of achieving a self. Humans themselves have a need to transform the world and themselves, which is the basis for the various goals, ideals and plans that they form. And these ideas are carried out in practice. But before they have been introduced into reality humans and the world are detached, indifferent and their relationship is difficult to evaluate. Needs, goals and ideals make humans overcome apathy and alienation from the world by altering their values requirements. In some sense goals and ­ideals

xx

Preface

also belong to what “should” or “ought” to be; they indicate that certain things are not yet realized but should be. Based on what has already been done or accomplished, goals and ideals aim at surpassing actual conditions. Practically speaking, “should” and “ought” are related to actual manifestations, and involve human ability as well as concrete social background. The actual activities used in self-achievement and achieving or refining things cannot be separated from human being’s internal capacities. Historically speaking, there are two major aspects of the interaction between human’s actual process and their ability. The first is that human potential gradually takes shape in actual processes and becomes their realized ability. Secondly, the ability expressed in these processes also composes the internal basis for the next step in the development of the processes. In terms of this second aspect, humans not only have the need to transform themselves and the world, but they also have the actual internal power to do so. Concrete social backgrounds are connected to ability. These backgrounds include social institutions, systems of norms, the histories between members of a society, technology, the advancement of civilization and the like. The employment of human ability is limited by these factors. If we say that the possibility to alter things or humans is expressed as the self-achievement and achieving or refining things, then the ontological prerequisite for this possibility is based on the internal motivation for practical processes given by the need for goals and ideas. Thereby human capability and concrete social background, as internal and external factors, comprise the conditions for the realization (in the development of actual processes) of possibilities. Kant highlights practical moral “shoulds” and emphasizes moral duty, unconditional adherence to moral principles, and the kingdom of ends—which are all concerned with “should.” Hegel’s thinking has a different orientation. It is well known that Hegel differentiates between morality and ethics. He argues that morality is just “the imperative or ought, which, therefore, still is in morality, is fulfilled only in the ethical sphere.”17 As opposed to morality, ethics is mostly developed in actual activities, its forms exist in the family, civil society, the state. Speaking to concrete manifestations he writes, “the ethical framework is not abstract like the good, but in a special sense real.”18 Here “goodness” is primarily related to moral “shoulds,” and “ethics” involves the social realm. Affirming “goodness” as abstract and ethics as concrete means that the latter takes 17 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Translated by S.W Dyde, Kitchener, Ontario Batoche Books, 2001, 98. 18 Ibid., 138.

Preface

xxi

precedence. Since family, civil society, and the state have actual manifestations, when people learn how to act they develop many different aspects of practice for these realms. In terms of understanding actual processes, it is not important to focus on the distinction between ethics and morality. However, this division has significant implications for “shoulds” and the “actual.” If they are expounded upon without consideration for ethical and moral restrictions, then Kant and Hegel’s perspectives both involve separate orientations; they both look at “should” (in terms of practical processes or transcending reality), and the “actual” (based in reality). Additionally, neither philosopher’s theory of should or the actual can be completely understood as abstract since they both use reasoning that involves practical processes and reforming actuality (transcending reality) as well as fitting in with reality—i.e. based on ideals and norms (“shoulds”) that are found in reality. Metaphysically speaking, the practical processes that take self-achievement and achieving or refining things as their content also involve the relationship between existential principles (including historical necessity) and human functioning. Practical processes are based on reality, which demands that their development is restricted by existential principles, but this does not mean that they are fully determined. Human knowledge and action is not easily separated from the process of human functioning, which is not the same as original existence or things as they are. The phrase “to help transform and nourish the world,” means that humans are an integral part of the world, and is a common view in Chinese philosophy. Actually, in the process of achieving the self and the world, history’s necessary direction itself is inseparable from human functioning. Even in the evolution of the actual world, human activity comprises their historical direction. From a meta-theoretical perspective, practical philosophy is primarily concerned with action, and the relationship between practice and existence. Here “existence” is not limited to the world’s existence, but indicates human existence itself. Through action and practice humans make their existence in the actual world and achieve their selves. In this way existence is changed on two levels. Practical philosophy develops an orientation towards ontology by taking direction from this relationship between action, practice, and existence. The development of action and practical processes includes the relationship between things like knowledge and action, the mind and objects, ideas and conduct, use and language. This also includes problems like why act, how to act, and how to achieve rationality in practice itself. These relationships and issues make an internal link between the realm of practical philosophy, ethics, epistemology, and even theoretical and practical reason. Fundamental aspects

xxii

Preface

of practice cause practical philosophy, in its understanding of humans and the world process, to have a have various levels of meaning, in many areas of individual and social existence. Looking at human existence, the questions “What is it” and “What does it do” have an internal connection. As a social being, humans always include economic, political, cultural and moral properties, and they express themselves as subjects in these areas. Therefore, this type of existence stipulates that they gain a character in reality, and it means that they are never separate from the process of concrete actions. Broadly speaking, humans are rational and symbolic; they can manufacture things and use tools. Through rational means, or symbolic forms their action develops; manufacturing and the use of tools also verifies this type of existence. As the actual precondition for the universal essence of human existence (“what humans are”), action (“what humans do”) is the external aspect of the process of existence, and also constitutes innate guidelines for human existence. As the method for interaction between humans and the world the distinguishing feature of action is that through human activity it causes certain transformations to the world, as well as humans themselves–who also endow that same action with ontological and ethical significance. Taking human and world alteration as the orientation of actualization, action is not limited to conceptual activity or bodily movements. Pure conceptual activity is ­limited to the internal sphere of an individual mind and has no impact on the s­ ubstance of external existence, which shows that it is not the same as actual action. It is the mind without the body (just as bodily motion, extension of limbs, and the physical expression of energy or restraint, or even unconscious activity, can be seen as body without the mind). The process of actualizing action must include interaction between the mind and body. In order to understand action there also needs to be acknowledgement of its fundamental units–which cannot be separated from the action’s meaning. To judge whether or not a movement is an action usually depends on whether or not it demonstrations meaning and what kind of meaning is expressed. The kind of meaning that is related to action is, first and foremost, linked to the intention of the agent, and this agent must be conscious of the action’s meaning. So the fundamental units of the action must also be the fundamental elements of its meaning. And consciousness of a specific activity or movement’s meaning is another requirement for it to become action. Indeed, a single action can be interpreted many ways, and the meaning that the subject is conscious of is only relatively certain. Actions also contain certain systematic characteristics; the basic units of an action always belong to a specific system of action and thereby make up

Preface

xxiii

one segment of that system. From the perspective of actual manifestations, actions often exist as a concrete manifestation of a system. An action can only be completely meaningful when their fundamental units are placed in a system. Non-singular, synthesized manifestations demonstrate the action’s structure. Logically, the structure of action shows different segments (of a system) and the internal connection between different aspects (of a system). In time, the structure is unfolded in general trends. This structure is embodied in many areas, from intentions to evaluations, judgments to choices and decisions. It also penetrates the interaction between the subject, actions, and their objects. With the agent as the subject, action contains intentionality and normativity. Intentionality is expressed through goals, aspirations and rationality, which are also indicators of the difference between action and simple movements. The rules for action include value principles that express norms and are used to direct and evaluate action. These rules can even provide universal standards. Action itself is always subject to value principles and multiple constraints, which make it normative and give it a conscientious character (as opposed to being purely spontaneous or instinctual). Intentionality and normativity are two dimensions of action, but they are also inherently linked. Intentions are often restricted by norms, which guide and limit function, evaluation, goals, choices, and decisions. On the other hand, norms often permeate intentional activities. In the blend of intention and norms, action develops a more realistic character. Action itself is also based on reasons: doing something, or acting for a reason, means that there is a foundation for why something is done—things done without a reason are often impossible to understand. Accordingly, reasons are first and foremost linked to the possible actions. Reasons unfold in structures, not singular manifestations, and include facts, and their recognition. Reasons also encompass human intention, goals, facts, norms, the connection between self-identity and facts, natural laws, the mutual integration of social standards and internal commitments. The relevancy of these factors is often shown in the process of actual actions. In terms of action, reasons, motivations, intentions and norms are all interrelated. For example, to recognize the connection between reasons and motivations we first have to recognize that the former can be investigated itself either internally or externally. The most important dimension of the internal aspects is the subject’s intentions and requirements. Facts (including social institutions), general standards, and norms make up the external dimension. But external reasons alone cannot necessarily bring about action, even though facts based on external reasons (such as general norms) can provide a foundation. However, if the actual process is established purely on internal intentions

xxiv

Preface

then some features of the action are truly voluntary—though this often has the tendency to become irrational. If an action is done simply in accordance to the interpretation of universal norms and principles then it is rational, but it is not necessarily done out of one’s own voluntary will. The link between reasons and intentions provides some kind of pre-condition for voluntary actions, whereas if the foundation for action is universal principles or norms then the reasons are merely conscious. It is easy to see that behind the internal or external character of reasons is the much more essential problems of whether an action is conscious, voluntary, rational or irrational. The reasons for an action are also related to another important factor, cause. And the interplay between reasons and causes is complicated. On the one hand reasons provide explanations for the basis of action. In some sense this constitutes the cause. On the other hand, causes initiate actions and explain their background. On a deeper level, the distinction between reasons and causes has to do with the interpreting actions and their relationship to norms. If understanding or interpreting actions were the only point then the object of investigation would just be the cause or cause and effect. Explaining something that already happened would always come from the standpoint of some kind of onlooker. This is how analytic philosophy interprets causes. Thereby the agent is not only the investigator and onlooker, but simultaneously the actual participant as well. Third parties thus offer possibilities for the influence and function of action: by offering their own knowledge and practice they create ideas and circumstances, which become the cause that then influences or even limits the next part of the action. The dual dimension of investigator and participant is indispensible from grasping the specific cause and effect relation in the process of an action. The cause of an action includes event-causation and agent-causation. The former is a reflection on how external circumstances influence action, while the latter speaks to the subject’s intentions, goals, and beliefs. They both function as conditions for action and nothing happens purely based on external factors or internal ideas. It is difficult to say that something is not arbitrary if we only look at agent-causation, just as explanations based on event-­ causation alone ignore autonomy. In reality, we need to appreciate the objective conditions that constrain the subject’s arbitrariness as well as the fact that agent-causation limits the impact of the external. The interaction between ­event-causation and agent-causation is displayed in the combination of autonomy with cause and effect in action, and it means that causes are not based on formal logic, they are concretely put into practice. An action’s reasons and causes lay particular stress on its basis and origin. Actual processes include the question of exactly how a specific action occurred,

Preface

xxv

which can also touch on the problem of weakness of will. The latter issue is seen when irrational desires or feelings override rational consciousness. And when rationality is weak, it usually leads to irrational tendencies. But when rationality bows to desires and feelings, certain values still form a foundation, and whether or not desires and feelings have a leading role in the actual action depends on these values. Metaphysically, the distinction between rationality and irrationality is a mind-body problem. Bodily desires and needs influence choice and attitudes towards behavior. The emotional factors in human nature are linked to, and interact with the presence of desires and feelings to intensify their influence on decisions and actions, thereby creating a limit on the extent to which rationality is employed. In the internal control over action the weakness of will does is not limited to the realm of consciousness or ideas, it also concerns knowledge and practice as well. Knowing includes cognition and evaluation. Cognition is oriented towards comprehending facts and evaluation affirms content based on values. One result of a weak will is that although the agent knows, intellectually, what they should do, they are unable to carry it out. Thereby knowing and not doing is a demonstration of a certain connection between weakness of will and the relationship between knowledge and practice. Logically, “knowing what should be done” is rational “knowing,” and whether or not it can be put into practice depends on being accepted by feelings (or emotions) and the will. If the “should” is no recognized by emotions or adopted by the will then it will probably be ignored. Weakness of will is a phenomenon that occurs in actual processes and is ontologically based on the very possibilities in existence. In the realm of ideas, it is expressed as possible intentions and desires. The existence of possible tendencies and chance blend with whether or not intentions and desires can change produce uncertainty about what action will be chosen. Interestingly enough, this also provides the basis for the weakness of will. Because multiple possibilities and uncertainty exists, intentions and ideas can change when put into action. This gap is the ontological precondition for weakness of will. A weakness of will is only actually present when there is no way to avoid it. Often times a lot of effort is required to overcome the negative influence of a weakness of will in order to reach different practical targets. In terms of practical manifestations, action and practice includes one’s thoughts, desires, and happiness. “One’s thoughts” are the rational cognition, evaluation, and judgments associated with the subject’s action. “One’s desires” are related to the subject’s choices and decisions in actions. Practically speaking, “one’s happiness” is the emotional identification and adoption of a particular action, which cannot be forced, or done reluctantly. And it is not the same as what reason

xxvi

Preface

demands, or what is decided upon impulsively. It is in accord with the feeling of happiness. When one’s thoughts, desires and happiness are unified rational cognition and evaluation begins to integrate with desire and the subject will be conscious of their pleasure. This is one way the tension between rationality and desire can be resolved. In this way, the unification of “I think,” “I desire,” and “I am happy” provides an internal basis for overcoming the weakness of will (i.e. desire’s overpowering of rationality). Weakness of will is a form of separation between knowledge and action, and it also requires differentiating between knowledge that is thought, said, and heard from what is done. The former is linguistic, or conceptual, whereas what is done or felt combines every aspect of the subject’s being. Knowledge that is done and felt means the integration of mind and body, knowledge and moral character (as it is expressed in behavior), capability and intention. This is how one transcends weakness of will (i.e. knowing and not acting according). The weakness of will can also have a significant impact on actions that occur, or the development of their internal processes. Actions, and their actual unfolding, have a broad background, which is given concrete expression as part of “shi 势.”19 Chinese philosophy has investigated different aspects of shi to reveal its significance as part of the practical background for many things. In classical Chinese thought, shi is primarily related to government practice, including various structures associated with political status. One of the most important historical manifestations of this structure is formed by the relationship between master and servant, where the master must maintain an appropriate level of shi (power, influence) in order to effectively carry out political practices. Behind this lays a concern for establishing concrete political backgrounds and conditions. The correlation between position and shi is intrinsic to social activities, and associated with practice or action situations. To put it briefly, shi emerges as the synthesis of practical conditions and backgrounds, and includes space and time. Specifically, “time” here means the historical conditions that are related to the action, and “space” refers to the social structures or fields in which action takes place. As an expression of action conditions and backgrounds, shi has no independent existence or power outside of human interaction. Whether it is displayed as in the “state of affairs” or “situation” in social or political structures–as the connection or interaction between different things, as taking on a specific 19

Translator’s note: Shi is a complex philosophical concept that has no equivalent in English. Although in certain contexts there are appropriate terms, such as force, power, ­influence, situation, form, posture, potentiality, tendency, there is no single word that expresses its richness. Chapter 4 is devoted to the relationship between shi and action.

Preface

xxvii

form in a certain action or a historical shift in tendencies, humans participate in shi’s formation and function on every level. Shi and humans interact with one another to influence and restrict practical human activities in a variety of ways. In some sense shi is an objective background, and humans cannot avoid or sway its power, “shi dominates humans.” But at the same time humans can also form shi according to different affairs, take advantage of the shi in a certain situation, and conform to shi. Shi not only makes up the actual background for practical activities, it also provides a concrete perspective for understanding them. This makes observation and judgment of “time” and “shi” indispensible for activity. So studying shi is done through comprehending the full background of practical activity, which can then be used to as guide for activity. Shi can also indicate specific circumstances, as well as the universal content of being. It is based on past or present manifestations in existence, but also speaks to the trends that guide their future development. It includes factors that are directly or indirectly related to action, as well as necessary reasons and various contingent influences. Shi thereby contains multiple aspects that are synthesized and systematized into its manifestation in the actual world. Investigating action from the perspective of shi means returning to action in the field of actuality. From this we can understand that examining the shi of action and looking at actual background of practice comprise two parts of the same process. As the background for actual activity, shi is involved with the domain of social history. Its content is the interaction between humans and the world, which can be understood on the metaphysical level. Here actual activity is not limited to actuality, but also to possibility, necessity, and contingency. Possibility directly relates to human action and practice, while necessity and contingency include those natural laws that also limit human behavior. In human action the connected distinction between necessity and contingency, are also determined by ji 几 (“almost/nearly,” “close to,” “achievement”), shu 数 (“a few,” “method,” “reason,” “number”) and yun 运 (“distant,” “use,” “transport,” “luck”). Such various elements play important roles in delimiting action.20 Ji is primarily expressed in the initial manifestations of some evolving thing or affair. Looking at its ontological connotations, this state of existence takes the relationship between actuality and possibility as its background—ji can therefore be taken to designate the process of transformation from possible to actual, or can to entail the sphere of realistic possibilities. From the perspective of the initial stages of a transformation from possible to actual, there are a multitude of possible/achievable results. Ji designates the possibility that ­exists 20

I discuss this in greater detail in chapter 5.

xxviii

Preface

in this early period, and is also intrinsically connected to the final outcome. ­Practically speaking, it is important to take advantage of the state or moment of ji when and if one can. In other words, humans, through their own effort, can work with the positive aspects of a thing or affair to advance its development at the outset of a given affair. Humans can also try to correct errors or anything negative at the outset so that negative influences on the path of development are stifled. Shu, unlike ji, indicates a necessary trend. It relates to a certain time and space, and can be taken to express whatever is necessary about a specific time and place. Shu’s necessary trend is therefore blended with reference to context, but at the same time it does not indicate the necessity of a given situation being “logically necessary.” “Logical necessity” is a formal relation (and therefore it does not have substantive content in itself), and therefore also transcends any concrete time and place. In contrast to, shu expresses the necessary trends of the physical world: it is about the actual substance of a thing or affair. Even though it is not the necessity of conceptual logic, shu is nonetheless comprehensible. Further, if humans can understand shu on a fundamental level (with reference to a specific context) they also gain the ability to predict aspects of the future of a situation. This predictability provides the basis for choosing a given action. The developments of actual processes involve natural patterns and dao—which operate in a similar fashion to universal laws or necessary trends—as well as affairs and things, which are intrinsically related to the peculiar necessities that govern specific times and places. As the expression of necessity of a certain time and place, shu is therefore both a general trend, and relates to the specific things or affairs of a particular time and place. This means predictions based on shu are always given specific content. For this reason, understanding of shu is able to provide guidance for human activity. In any given circumstance, some aspects of activities are relatively certain, while others are uncertain. These latter aspects are expressed in yun. As opposed to the certainty of shu, yun refers to contingency, which can likewise influence and limit actual processes. But yun is not identical to contingency as such, since it specifically designates contingency in the context of human activity. Shu marks a relatively stable trend, whereas yun refers to the variability in a given situation. Transformations do not rely on a single yun, but rather stems from the process of multiple yuns interacting with one another. In actual activities, yun is comparable to a “variable,” it is an unpredictable element that draws certain limits. If one focuses solely on necessary trends and ignores yun or other contingent elements, then as soon as an incidental variable becomes instrumental, one is likely to lose their active control of the action or scenario. Thus, due consideration for contingent elements, and their potential

Preface

xxix

­interactions, gives one a higher chance of adequately responding to unpredictable changes, and thus of fulfilling one’s initial intentions. However, possibility, necessity and contingency are not the only metaphysical limitations on human activity, there are also normative standards. On the practical level, normativity includes both the problems of what one ought to do and how one should do it, which involve employment of practical reason. Practical reason is chiefly concerned with how to change existence according to human ideals or reason-based needs. Unlike theoretical reason, the methods for practical reasoning are revealed in the relationship between humans and the world. Theoretical reason wants to find a way to allow human understanding to correspond to the world, in order to correctly grasp affairs or things in the world. Practical reason, in contrast, wants to figure out how to make reality correspond with human ideals, or reason-based needs. The transformation of existence is effected in human action or practice. So when practical reason is directed at changing reality, it looks firstly to the sphere of human action. Here it aims making the existing object of concern conform to ideals and reasonbased needs by creating guidelines and norms for behavior. On the formal level, practical reason is demonstrated in the principle of rightness, which contains specific value principles or norms for practice. Only behavior that follows these requirements is right or proper. Concretely speaking, value principles are shown as a principle of benefit or the principle of good needs. These relate to whether or not actions or practice agrees with one’s own reason-based needs and satisfying these needs also means actualizing goodness or value. Action and actual processes also involve methods or means, and in this area practical reason provides the principle of effectiveness. The methods for effective action require alignment with reality or facts about it, and necessity (i.e. laws of nature). If we say that the principle of rightness and the principle of goodness are given formally and substantially in the relationship between theory and practice, then the principle of effectiveness is what develops the practical manifestations of reason in its use of methods. Thereby, the rational characteristics of action and practice are displayed in conforming to social norms, reason-based needs, and natural laws. The principles (of rightness, goodness and effectiveness) are inter-related in that they are directed at goodness. So the specific content of practical reason is the uniting of the formal and substantial, rightness and goodness, through the effective pursuit of goals and employing methods. Practical reason both guides and participates in actual processes. Nature, social institutions, and the life-world are the different realms where the various manifestations of practical activity are displayed. The most important goal for action in the natural sphere is to transform nature, in society it is to

xxx

Preface

operate within social institutions to realize social ideals, and in the life-world it is to develop harmony in everyday life. In essence these sets of activities constitute the realizing of human existence. In other words, the target for all subject-­object interaction is to transform the latter, and its purpose is making the o­ bject ­conform to human needs and ideals. Activities within institutions aim at making an even more ideal society. And in the life-world, where subjects also associate with one another, one of the major functions is to provide a suitable background for humans to co-exist. Accordingly, the differences between the realm of being and of actual manifestations from the perspective of human action are relative and mutually determining. Concrete activities involve a multiplicity of different relationships. For example, the interaction between humans and the world, which is primarily displayed through the effect the subject has on the object and vice versa, or simply in their association with one another. In the social realm, actual activities take place amidst the interconnectedness of the subjects involved, which is exhibited in their relating. But actual processes do not only involve relations between subjects and objects, and subjects and subjects, they also require that one face oneself, or, the relationship between the subject and the self. There are multiple manifestations of this relationship, which are premised on the interconnection and interaction between the subject and self. Practically speaking, the subject-object, subject-subject and subject-self relations encompass objectivity, intersubjectivity, and subjectivity in actual activities. The proper status of historical development within these relations must also be recognized. Another difficultly that arises in the processes of human activity is that of rationalization, and of being rationalized. The two are actually quite different, they can be understood in terms of value or method, or investigated through the various relationships they are involved in. Both form parts of the formal and of the substantial dimensions of actual processes. In the substantial dimension, rationalization includes conforming activity to reason and feelings. Uniting activity with reason and feelings means blending universal reason with concrete circumstances. This is displayed when rational procedures communicate and integrate with feelings. There is an intrinsic correspondence between this process and practical reasoning. If we say that the principle of rightness is primarily shown through a relation to reason as such, and that the principle of goodness’s value orientation is internally united with feelings, then the principle of effectiveness means conforming both to reason, and in agreement with feeling. From a philosophical perspective, actual processes are not only connected to practical reason and questions of rationalization but also, in a broader sense, are related to practical wisdom. Practically displayed wisdom, or the

Preface

xxxi

concrete manifestations of wisdom in the practical realm, exist both in conceptual forms, and function as actual processes in the human sphere. This type of wisdom includes being in accord with, and is embodied in, the cultivation of value-oriented moral character. Practical wisdom therefore also permeates our forming knowledge about the world and humans themselves. These forms of knowing are united in the actualized capacities of humans and are displayed in their internalized norms. In the process of achieving or actualizing the self and in the actualizing and refining of things, practical knowledge is integrated with theoretical and practical reasoning, and this is the unification that allows for our describing (understanding) the world and to changing it. The process as a whole (from the most abstract to the most concrete and in their direct p ­ ractical interplay) can be referred to as practical wisdom. With regards to limitations, and the effective functioning of actual activities, practical wisdom is permeated with a concern for normative and rational judgment. Practical wisdom also lays stress on measurements and boundaries, and is thereby ­connected to theoretical and to specific analyses of situations. It leads to the unifying of moral character with effective capacity, and takes the existence of practical subjects as its ontological precondition. In the historical development of action and practice, practical knowledge comes from practice and our learning of its limitations. In this sense practical wisdom confirms that humans exist through action, and also implies that practice tend towards rationalization.

chapter 1

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective on Action Throughout everyday life, from economics to politics to culture etc., action occurs and develops in many aspects of human life. As the primary mode of human existence, how exactly should action itself be interpreted? What kind of meaning and significance does action have for humans and the world? The investigation action from the perspective of practical philosophy will provide an answer these questions. 1.1

“What humans are” and “What humans do”1

Action can be understood from either a broad or a narrow point of view. Narrowly speaking, action is chiefly expressed as the activity or behavior of the individual. In analytic philosophy, action theory or philosophy of action is chiefly understood in terms of isolated activities or actions. However, from a broader perspective, action appears in a variety of social practices, for example, in the above-mentioned spheres of economics, politics, culture and so on. These two forms of action are not separate from one another. Individual activities or actions take place within the realm of social practice, which means that the broader perspective on action includes the narrower one within it. The actual manifestations of practice are as manifold as the versatility of human existence itself. Starting from the mundane, the most fundamental manifestation of human existence can be seen to be composed of everyday actions. From simply eating, drinking, waking and sleeping, in one’s home and with family, to interactions with neighbors, and from routine activity, to relaxing and enjoyment, our daily actions vary widely. For humans, the necessary resources for the production and reproduction of life and for the production and reproduction of these resources themselves, are difficult to differentiate from one another. The latter (production of necessary resources) involves labor. Daily life is mainly based on human interactions and it is not immediately directed at the transformation of material objects 1 Translator’s note: The literal translation of the Chinese here would be “‘What [it] is’ and ‘What [it] does.’” The subject of these phrases is human beings. This section argues that humans are what they do, and that action connects various aspects of human beings on a deep level.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004321786_002

2

chapter 1

whereas production and labor are. In the spheres of production and labor human action is based on cooperation and coordination (with other humans) as well as the utilization of things. Production and labor are concrete manifestations of action. As mentioned above, they belong to the realm of social practice. Broadly speaking, action displayed in the form of social practice is expressed in many different social fields. For example, in economics action is investment, trade, administration etc., in politics or law it is connected to political or legal regulations. In contrast to these institutions, action can also display a cultural character in the context of art and the sciences. Cultural activity, including scientific research and artistic creation, undoubtedly involve conceptual dimensions. However, they are not limited to the intellect. Science, for example, is theoretical, but it also involves communication and debate within the scientific community. Its meaning therefore transcends the individual intellect, and is displayed in actions that influence and affect others. Similarly, artistic creations appear in a variety of forms, and thereby influence society in many ways, but the process of creation is not a purely conceptual activity, and is undertaken through certain concrete actions. Actions in the realm of science are directed towards truth and in art they are related to beauty. Connected to both enterprises is an ideal of “goodness” that is concretely expressed in moral action. Historically, both traditional Western philosophy and classical Chinese philosophy have evaluated action or practice in primarily ethical terms. One of the characteristics of moral behavior is that it is displayed as individual action, and connotes social practice. As an outward expression of one’s virtuous nature, moral action is understood as an expression of one’s inner character, and takes achieving one’s own virtuous nature, as well as that of others, as its end. Moral actions are given their function in social situations and in the context of the norms of a community. Humans are the subjects of actions which, as stated, compose the most fundamental mode of human existence. The questions regarding action—“What is it?” and “What does it do?”—are inseparable from the perspective of human beings. The former question is connected to the current manifestation of humankind’s development and to its unique form of existence in the larger natural context. From a historical perspective, humans manifest their existence according to their different actions or practices in history. In other words, the use of tools was an advance in labor, and is a basic expression of the difference between humans and animals. This type of “action” allows humans to instigate a departure from the natural world, meaning that human existence is determined both in relation to and in opposition to nature. Different forms of labor, and other corresponding or related actions or practices, are manifestations of

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

3

existence in different periods of history. In primitive times an important type of human action was the use of stone tools for production. This primitive form of labor is still closely related to the natural world. As history evolved, so did the forms of human labor, action and practice. Human beings themselves and the actual forms of their existence were thereby changed and accordingly continued to mutually determine one another. Farming and herding constituted early manifestations of human civilization. However, contemporary industry and production, and their corresponding political and cultural activities, form a type of human existence that is quite different from what it was in the times of farming and herding. For example, modern developments in information technology mean that the manifestation of human existence today will likely constitute the inception of a hitherto unprecedented “information age” in human history. From the perspective of the individual, manifestations of existence and forms of action are connected since each human existence is concretely expressed through actions. Aristotle recognized this early on, discussing why it is important to concentrate on actions he writes, “for these determine also the nature of the states of character that are produced.”2 In other words, a person’s character is not easily distinguished from the way they act. Gadamer also observes this. For him, “Man becomes what he is through what he does and how he behaves—i.e., he behaves in a certain way because of what he has become.”3 The question “What is action?” touches on the meaning of human existence at various levels, but as shown above, it generally involves the interaction between humans, and is expressed through productive activity and through the use of tools. However, when examining what humans are, other areas are involved as well. These usually have to do with status or position and roles. Such aspects are not just static social conditions, but have to do with how one expresses oneself through actions. As social beings, humans have certain definitive properties, including the economic, political, cultural and moral ones, and these are the spheres of society in which human beings are constituted as subjects of action. These definitive properties of human existence are actual and inseparable from concrete actions. For example, when one is engaged with economic activities one becomes an economic subject; when one participates in politics one is a political subject; following moral principles or ideals makes one a moral subject. The same applies to culture, and to other areas of society. 2 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, The Basic Works of Aristotle, Translated by W. Rhys Roberts and Ingram Bywater (New York: Random House, 1941), 953. 3 Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method, Translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London: Continuum, 2004), 311.

4

chapter 1

Humans can be interpreted as rational beings or rational animals, or as beings that manufacture and use tools. These understandings confirm different levels of definitive human properties, because it is through concrete actions formed with respect to these areas that humans exist. We can thereby see that in terms of human existence with regards to action, the questions “What is it?” and “What does it do?” have an internal identity. The connection between “what humans are” and “what humans do” however, not the same as “taking function as essence.” Here “function” is mostly given as lacking an internal basis for external movements or appearance. Zhu Xi 朱熹 (d. 1200) criticizes Chan Buddhism for understanding “function” in this way: [the disciple Youren] asks: ‘Holy Confucianism speaks of to know the nature, Buddhism also speaks of to know the nature. Are there any differences?’ The Master answers with a smile: ‘A good question. How about your opinion? Try to make an explanation.’ ‘According to my view as well as the doctrine of Buddhism, the nature demonstrates itself as the intention of the mind; it is seeing when it is at eyes and hearing when it is at ears; it talks when it is at mouths, it is capable of holding something when it is at hands, and it runs when it is at feet. The so-called “to know the nature” is just to know this nature.’ ‘Just let us go further from your view. If the nature were what you say, it would be nothing but a weighing tool or a rule without scale. As far as Confucianism is concerned, although demonstrating itself as the intention of the mind, nature cannot be obtained without being sincere; being seen when it is at eyes, nature cannot be obtained without seeing clearly; being heard when it is at ears, nature cannot be obtained without hearing sharply; as for talking out of mouths, holding with hands, running with feet and so on, the nature cannot be obtained without acting in accord with proprieties. ‘The Heavens give birth to all human beings, and there are both things and principles.’ According to your view and the doctrine of Buddhism, there are merely things with no principles. This is why Buddhism diverges from holy Confucianism. Moreover, by ‘to know nature’ Mengzi [Mencius] means to investigate things.4 This passage deals with action directly, vision and listening are perceptive activities, discussions are speech actions, and holding something or running 4 Zhu Xi 朱熹, Zhuzi yulei 朱子语类 [Zhu Xi’s Categorized Discussions] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1986), 3020–3021.

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

5

are closely related to actions in the narrow sense. “Nature” expresses universal human essence, and “norms/rules” (such as ritual regulations) can be viewed as the external expressions of this “nature.” According to Zhu Xi, Buddhism (mostly Chan Buddhism) takes function as essence, which means that all of human activity (including whatever is heard, or seen, and every external movement, no matter how accidental) is mistakenly connected to human essence (or “nature”). As Zhu Xi writes, this view of things means The dharma of mind is intangible and permeating the ten directions of space; it is seeing when it is at eyes and hearing when it is at ears; it smells when it is at noses, it talks when it is at mouths, it holds and catches something when it is at hands, and it runs when it is at feet. Originally being a distinct mind, it is divided into six sense-organs. If the mind becomes nothing, one will realize liberation everywhere.5 Here we find that actions can depart from the internal properties that define humans as human. But the human’s function, in the proper sense, is not determined by the incidental or accidental behaviors and movements that are alien to human nature. “What humans do” (i.e. action) is linked to the “is” of “it is what it is.” This is permeated and expressed by different levels of universal nature and internal properties, which means that actions have the power to constitute humans. That is, actions endow human-kind with universal regulations or certain characters of existence that differentiate them from the existence of their objects. “What it is” and “What it does” are therefore mutually determining. Whatever type of manifestation human existence has (what humans are) is related to their actual activities (what humans do). Further, manifestations of human existence (what humans are) limit the type of actions they can carry out (what humans do) Historically speaking, the process of human existence is also the process of interaction between “what humans are” and “what humans do.” As a form of human existence, action is similar to other manifestations, which are each expressed as a single essential system, and each segment of which is comprised of their interaction. In certain respects animal activities display characteristics that are somewhat similar to human action. For instance, foraging, attacking or hunting other animals, as well as defending, are, in a broad sense, conscious, thought-based activities. However, although some of their activities may seem to express traits similar to human action, overall animal activities are rooted in instinct, and do not exceed the limitations of the species. In other words, animals behave according to the needs and rules 5 Ibid. 1500–1501.

6

chapter 1

of their species. Humans, on the contrary, can demonstrate actions that are not identifiable with instinct. They are capable of casting off species limitations and have the ability to freely create. Whether it is through labor or daily activities, there is a sense in which human action is always oriented towards freedom. Because the entire process of existence has this intimate connectedness, everything from actions to daily activities can be taken to represent human existence. As an actual existence, humans are not the same as inanimate objects. Humans have a quality that allows them to create, build and produce. It can be said that they have left nature and become an “other” to it. Throughout human history, specific practical activities unfold as humans interact with nature and other humans. When the individual first comes into the world they have a considerable degree of “natural existence,” but as they take part in social activities, they gradually attain a corresponding social character, and thereby become human, properly speaking. In other words, one becomes human by engaging and participating in social activities. We can thereby see that a human’s ­actual character is established through their creating, building and producing ­activities—the content of which is linked to their place in history. 1.2

The Function of Human Action

From the perspective of human existence, the connection between “what something is” and “what it does” means that “what a human is” and “what a human does” are also internally connected. As a form of human existence, what is the nature of action itself? This question can lead to concrete interpretations of action. Actions take place in the interaction between humans and the world. They are also internally directed at making certain changes to humans and the world through their interaction. These “changes” have a two-fold connotation. Firstly, as manifestations of existence, actions themselves create and develop changes to existence. Secondly, as part of the process of the world, actions make different forms of change in humans and the world. Here, the connection between “What is it” and “What it does” is revealed in a general way: human action changes both humans and the world. Action thereby frustrates the restrictions on the human’s and the world’s manifestations of existence (what they can become). In other words, the changes, or becoming of humans and the world, cannot be isolated from human actions. This correlation gives actions and the world their actual character and is significant for ontology and axiology alike.

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

7

In its alteration of humans and the world, action is not just a mental activity, nor is it constituted only through bodily movement, but instead it represents the interaction between the body and mind. Mental activities are limited to the realm of consciousness and have no substantial influence on external ­existence—they are not actual actions. But there are also a variety of different kinds of purely physical movements. For example, there are externally compelled bodily motions, such as when external forces push or pull the body in some direction, in which case the body moves accordingly and this has nothing to do with the individual’s own will. Another type of solely physical behavior is unconscious activity. This includes reactions, or accidental motions. For instance, when the body’s motions are not decided on, or one is unaware of them, or they are compelled unconsciously. In these cases the body’s movement is neither intended nor purposeful. We can take pressing a switch as an example of the interaction between mind and body that is required to constitute an action. If someone’s hand is forced (for example, by another hand) to press a switch, then it is not an action. Although the body participated in the movement, it had nothing to do with the mind (in that it was not its wish or intent). Similarly, if one wants to press a switch but the body does not move this is also not an action. In numerous instances, the mind engages in an activity but the body does not. Only when there is an internal intention or will to press the switch, and this is combined with bodily compliance, can we say that an “action” has taken place. The later Mohists similarly defined “wei,” 为 or “action,” when writing: “Intentions that are carried out are actions.”6 Here the term “intention” “motive” or “willfulness” and “activity” explicitly suggests bodily motions. So for the later Mohists, action is understood to entail the unification of “willfulness” and “activity.” From this perspective the harmonization between mind and body is clearly an important indicator of action. The significance of an action often transcends its subject and influences society on various levels. Again, thinking or concepts alone do not constitute actions because they do not get beyond the individual’s mental realm (into the outside world). But when they are fully expressed, thoughts or intentions become actions that can be exchanged or discussed with others. These ideas, as actions, can be interpreted and communicated with others, and comprise what Habermas calls “communicative action.” Similarly, using concepts or ideas to influence society forms a type of action—such as with media or propaganda. Broadly speaking, concepts and ideas can lead to various types of developments in the world or among humans. In some respects it is the connection 6 Mozi 墨子, Mozi 墨子 [The Mozi: A Complete Translation], Translated and Annotated by Ian Johnston (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 2010), 445.

8

chapter 1

between thought and actions that expresses the social function and therefore the meaning of action more generally. One of the characteristics of action is that the mind and body are united, and this is displayed in social effects and significance in external reality. Despite its various forms and concrete manifestations, there are universal regulations that apply to action. And they are the fundamental elements of action that make up its universality. Asking what these fundamental elements are implies looking at what it means for an action to be meaningful. As a process, action can be differentiated into several systems—this complexity is due to the fact that each action system has its own attributes. The systematic nature of action also means that it can be logically broken down into parts. But each part has its own limitations, which, if surpassed, change the essential nature of the action. In this way fundamental elements of action are internally linked to specific limitations. The argument above shows that the fundamental elements of actions are inseparable from the its meaning. Therefore whether or not a movement is an action depends exactly what kind of meaning is being demonstrated. First and foremost, meaning must correspond to intention, that is, the meaning of an action has to be understood by the subject and to be consciously willed. The type of appearance a behavior takes on might have a certain meaning, but if the subject is unaware of this, it is not an action. For example, unwittingly raising one’s hand without intention is simply a bodily motion. It may, from a physiological or psychological perspective, be interpreted as having some meaning, but this meaning is not sufficient for determining whether or not it is an action. What is significant for physiological or psychological investigations may entirely lack intention and consciousness and this clearly shows that these types of studies are not focused on the same type of meaning that determines action. If someone raises their hand to express that they want to say something, then it is an action because it is a symbol full of conscious intention. This act involves the relationship between the mind and body. The internal desire to speak is an expression of the mind and where the body displays itself through the raised hand the gesture constitutes a unification of mind and body. It is a symbolic and conscious action. Meaningless motion and anything that does not represent the symbolic manifestation of “meaning” (which is a purely internal idea or concept) cannot be action. Whereas displays or symbols of meaning always have external expressions simply conscious activities do not. Therefore, if the subject is not aware of the meaning of their behavior, then it should not be considered action. From the preceding we can see that the fundamental elements of action are also the fundamental elements of meaning and that a prerequisite for

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

9

established activities, or for behaviors becoming action, is that the subject is conscious of their meaning. Of course, the emergence of meaning is also associated with a certain background and process of interpretation. This process can be related to different perspectives and a single type of action can usually be interpreted in a number of ways. However, certain meanings that the agent is aware of are only subjectively determined. For example, the activity of pressing a switch can be interpreted as “pressing a switch,” as “turning on a light,” as “brightening the room up,” and so on, and each explanation (of action) has its own definite meaning. Further, the meaning that the subject itself is conscious of is dependent on concrete conditions. Accordingly, the subject is aware that their action expresses something specific. It might simply be pressing the switch, turning on a light, or making the room bright. So long as the meaning of the activity is something that the subject is consciously aware of, there is no doubt that it is an action. Because there is so much room for interpretation, the same action can be read many different ways. Therefore the meaning of an action, as well as its significance, both contain a certain degree of openness that is displayed in their interaction and association. There is nothing contradictory about intended meaning being the fundamental element of action and the variety of meanings that an action presents. The fundamental elements of actions have relatively independent meanings that allow the relevant activity to become an action. Yet, as mentioned above, action is also systematic, and the fundamental elements of action always belong to a certain action system, making up one of its stages. Looking at the actual manifestation of action, it generally takes systems as the concrete manifestations of its existence. The fundamental elements of action must have a place in its system if it is to have a complete meaning. If raising one’s hand is a motion intended to express that one would like to speak, then it definitely comprises some kind of action. But this action is also part of a larger action system in which raising one’s hand in order to speak has to do with being in a class or a meeting, or some other type of public forum—each of these are action systems themselves. The specific meaning of raising one’s hand is comprised by the system, e.g. the education system, the academic system or whatever context of discussion the activity it based in. Furthermore, the complete meaning of the action usually contains various stages. For example, when shooting in a war the desire of the shooter is to eliminate the enemy, and this is the goal of the action as well—one chooses the most appropriate place and target, as well as the best time, and then pulls the trigger. The result is that one either hits the target or does not. These stages are all related to one another and make up the action of shooting in a war. This means that action is also a synthesized manifestation (of many stages). The action in question is not

10

chapter 1

just pulling the trigger, it also makes up part of the entire process of existence manifested by war. Logically speaking, actions can be separated into singular units, and synthesized ones. But actual actions, or ones with complete meaning, are synthesized. Contemporary analytic philosophy has already attempted many types of investigations into behavior. Overall, its theory of action or philosophy of action is mostly concerned with simple singular actions, for example, firing a gun, turning on a light or starting a car and the interpretation of action is generally restricted to these limited behaviors. For most analytic philosophers this already represents a complete system. The discussions of action is usually therefore based solely on the relationship between pulling a trigger, firing a gun and killing a person, or between pressing a switch and shutting a light, or turning a key and starting a car. In these cases (and any similar ones) the complete system of action is limited to a relatively straightforward motion conceived in isolation. Talking about actions on this level is admittedly helpful for understanding the elementary dimensions of action, but in terms of actual human processes, these discussions already contain a certain element of abstractness (since a specific action is extracted from its larger action system). If perspectives on action are thereby limited, it is definitely easy to ignore actual manifestations of action, and see any arguments related to them as vague and empty. However, using the example of firing a gun, in its synthesized reality this is usually related to an actual action process associated with something like hunting, war, or sport and its concrete or specific meaning can only be comprehended as it relates to these actual action systems. Further, this type of meaning does not just include the action’s social effects but is also related to the internal implications for the subject. Unless the broader background of an action is taken into consideration, only abstract interpretations can be given. 1.3

The Structure of Action

As synthesized and systematic manifestations of existence, actions contain an internal structure. The structure of action appears in many different areas, including in desires, evaluations, judgments, choices, and in implementing decisions. We will firstly consider how actions form desires. One of the distinguishing features of desire is that it includes the individual’s internal needs that can express either a momentary desire or a relatively enduring intention. Momentary desires usually target a certain object at a specific time and place whereas stable intentions last, or develop, over an extended period. For example, a momentary desire could include giving one’s opinion after hearing a

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

11

lecture, or the immediate desire to leave the room and smoke a cigarette. But, receiving a graduate degree or starting a company require that one has a relatively stable intention and a direction towards the future over a longer period of time. The completion of any desire is associated with an individual’s life history, their values and knowledge, as well as their specific circumstances and environment. For example, expressing one’s reaction to a presentation is related to one’s knowledge of a specific topic and this also serves as the background for understanding the lecture itself and determines whether or not one agrees with the argument presented. The scene (such as a lecture hall), is also part of what makes one form a desire (e.g. to express an opinion). Similarly, wanting to get a Ph.D. is related to an individual’s educational background, their goals in life, and their specific circumstances (in certain social environments having a Ph.D. can have a significant influence or effect on the life of an individual). We can also analyze choices and desires based on predictions and reasoning. If action is based on predictions and reasoning, then it expresses itself as a rational belief about predicted or reasoned outcomes. For instance, if an action is chosen because of a predicted outcome, then it is done in accordance with rational activity. Similarly, when one find’s oneself in basically the same situation as another who has successfully achieved something, one usually reason that that it will be advantageous to undertake the project in the same way. This is a rational assessment. It is easy to see that these kinds of rational choice scenarios are a step removed from the desires themselves. But, after further investigation, it is also not difficult to notice that even in situations such as those given above, some level of desire is also involved. Basing choices on the prediction of success, which is preconditioned on the logical desire for accomplishment, we find that choosing an action based on the fact that it worked out in a similar situation constitutes a conformity of intention or a way to avoid being unique. But these thoughts themselves also include desires. This is to say that simply basing the choice for action on predictions or reasoning is not the same as purely desire-based action. Wholly prediction or reason-based actions are logical abstractions of a sort, however, it would still be difficult to find any actual action that was completely free of desire. The function of desire in action is usually expressed through motivation. This therefore involves establishing the relationship between desire and motivation. Desires can become motivations, but not all of them will. Whether or not this will happen is determined by the appropriateness of the desire, which in turn depends on its evaluation. This requires introspection on the part of the subject of desire. In fact, the self is founded on accepting and choosing value principles or norms, and on reflecting, judging and affirming appropriateness accordingly. For the subject of desire, whatever conforms to certain

12

chapter 1

value principles or norms is deemed right, and everything else is improper. But accepted value principles or norms are often diverging from one another, and so, therefore do judgments on desires. This is to say that the same desire can have different characteristics depending on how it is evaluated. Looked at from the point of view of the relationship between actions and motivations, only desires that are approved of (deemed appropriate by the subject) can influence the motivation for action. Here it is also important to distinguish between the formation and acceptance of desires. Usually desires are not based on volition, but they do require the self’s appraisal if they are to become motivations. But these decisions are not always made explicitly, or through strict logical reasoning. Often they are the result of simple thoughts about what is right, or they are based on intuitive reactions that are given implicitly in the context of the subject’s confrontation with its desires. Logically, when desires are evaluated, this evaluation is not exclusively based on one type of value principle or norm. Further, the conditions of a specific time and place make the acceptance or affirmation of a principle relative. For example, deciding on the desire to smoke a cigarette involves at least two value principles: health and happiness. In terms of happiness, smoking is reasonable and right. It can make one satisfied and relatively (or at least momentarily) happy. But, in terms of health, this is not the case. With regards to logical possibilities, either principle can be taken as the standard for evaluation, but in a specific circumstance such as this one the subject affirms only one of the two (either being healthy or being happy). Even though contemporary theories of action are often focused on desire and confirm that they can lead to actions, some theorists still ignore the problem of the evaluation of desires. So the question still remains, “How do actions occur?” According to analytic philosophy, our actions are usually modeled on desires and beliefs. Interpretations of this relationship suggest that a subject has certain desires, and believes that certain actions will satisfy them and then that the subject will perform those actions on that basis. Thereby desires and beliefs are thought to comprise the reason for acting and their combination is expressed as the cause for action. According to this model, desire is either the direct motivation for, or is itself the cause of, action. But this perspective largely overlooks the subject’s own evaluation of their desires. We can further investigate this point by looking at Harry G. Frankfurt’s differentiation between first and second-order desires. First-order desires are often directly formed into explicit desires or wants, whereas second-order desires are desires to develop certain desires. For example, an individual who is addicted to a drug desires the drug—this is a first-order desire. That person’s attempt to give up or not use the drug is a second-order desire (which is also called “second-order volition”).

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

13

Logically speaking, second-order desires (or volitions) involve a consideration of first-order desires. Frankfurt argues that it is second-order desires that include human reflection and our ability to evaluate. This distinction is therefore directly related to the relationship between different levels of desire. For Frankfurt, although rationality is an essential part of humans, what makes them human is their will. Even though they involve evaluation, second-order desires are not formed on the basis of self-conscious rational considerations; they involve reflection and evaluation but not (necessarily) rationality.7 According to this interpretation, concerns about the origin and control of desires mostly transcend values or rational consideration. This is very different from saying that second-order desires rationally reflect on the nature of desires themselves. Nonetheless, one of the most important differences between human action and an animal’s instinctual movements is that the former’s desires often do not become motivations without first being evaluated. If this point is omitted from the interpretation of human action, then it is quite difficult to distinguish between human action and animal behavior. The relationship between desire and motivation is, of course, complex. After an individual has consciously accepted universal value principles or standards for action, and incorporated them into their knowledge and actions over a long period of time, they become “second nature.” The individual is then often able to act accordingly without further reflection (in some sense “mindlessly”). These principles and standards become something like second nature habitual concepts, and actions based on these ideas are done without thinking. For example, this happens when complying with traffic regulations. One can easily follow these rules without thinking about them. This has nothing to do with transforming desires into motivations; in fact, the motivations themselves are rather implicit. Furthermore, even in these situations one is still rationally conscious of desires and motivations. It is important to note that there is something rather special going on here: when action is based on concepts that have become “second nature,” rational consciousness directly permeates motivations. Desires, motivations and rational consciousness correspond to one another and become mutually integrated. Motivations become present and intuitive, and they emerge conspicuously. Motivations for actions themselves have an inherent purposiveness that forms the goal, end, and orientation of the action, even before it begins. Talcott Parsons has noted this point. He argues that goals always include content that

7 Harry Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person,” The Journal of Philosophy, Volume 68. No. 1 (1971): 5–20.

14

chapter 1

is connected to the future and predicted outcome.8 Therefore actualizing a goal or attaining an end means that a specific outcome was reached—an outcome that was already possible before the action began. So what is the significance of these possible outcomes for humans? The question here involves predicting the outcome of an action, and choosing as well as evaluating its goals. The same result can also have different meanings. Looked at in terms of value, it can be positive or negative. Deciding on a type of action is based on comparing and evaluating the possible significance of its predicted outcome. If there are dissimilar desires as well as related motivations then one is faced with different outcomes of action based on these motivations. One is also faced with the corresponding implications and various meanings of the possible outcome. The process of evaluation includes recognizing facts (grasping the situation, and the conditions for producing possible outcomes), and appraising value (judging the positive and negative impacts of an action’s outcome on the individual and society). In later Mohism quan 权 (“judging,” “weighing,” “measuring”) is defined as “not about right and wrong. It is about the ‘weighing’ being correct (i.e. making the correct choice).”9 Here the emphasis is on evaluation and differentiation between what is right and wrong in action. Accordingly, weighing (quan) is a part of action, and it is not just about distinguishing between what is right and wrong. Instead, it primarily relates to appropriateness. Although the differentiation between evaluation (quan) and the distinction between right and wrong can be problematic, it is here that we can see the implicit value in evaluation (during the process of action). After comparison and evaluation comes choice and decision. Choice is a confirmation of motivation, and the expected outcome. Decision implies the transition from intention and motivation to action. Here we need to pay special attention to “decision” since it means that consideration and hesitation have concluded. However, this only marks the intellectual start of the action. The next step is more substantial; it is “trying.” Trying is linked to intention, but it is not the same as intentionality itself. When one knows that something is absolutely not possible, one might still have the intention to get it done, but will not try to do it. This type of issue is conceptual and does not become actual action.10 Compared to desire on the 8

Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action volume 2 (New York: The Free Press, 1967), 837. 9 Mozi, Mozi, 581. 10 In some situations, although various facts suggest that something is not likely to be achievable, an individual may not give up. For example, if someone has an incurable disease, they themselves and their friends and family may try everything they can to discover or invent some way to be cured. So the patient and their family do not think there is no

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

15

conceptual level, trying is seen as a tendency in action. In this way although trying is not exactly the same as actual action, when compared to simply intending to or deciding it can be seen to have a much stronger impact on action. In some respects, trying is a type of transition or medium between the conceptual level, for instance intention or decision, and actual action.11 However, decision and trying to provide a definitive indication that the action was brought about by motivation, which itself is based on a certain goal that directs action. In other words, motivation is about deciding what is to be done, but it is even more closely related to the issue of how to do something or to the simple actualization of goals. The singular question of “how to do something” is often intersected and combined with “what is to be done.” For example, in the action of raising one’s hand to speak, the raising of one’s hand expresses an intention to speak, so the action itself is also how the action is done. In complex or systematized actions, the situation and circumstances are often complicated. After the decision to do something has been made, the question of how to do it—which involves the actions specific mode, method, procedure, or different stages of its potential process—still remains. If we say that the question of “what is to be done” is oriented towards value, then the question of “how to do it” is more about knowledge. As two aspects of the structure of action the questions of “what is to be done” and “how to do it” are mutually related, and at the same time they express the blend or mix of value concerns and knowledge in any action. In the process of action, intention and motivation—which relate to value orientation—are directly involved with the issue of whether or not the action is appropriate. As shown above, the appropriateness of action is related to certain value principles. When desire and motivation fit with certain value principles they are considered appropriate. In contrast, a consideration of how to do something is more about the action’s potential effectiveness (that is, whether or not it can be expected to achieve or reach the goal). This relationship between the appropriateness and the effectiveness of an action is, on a more

11

hope. The patient may display a strong drive to live, and/or the family may show their extreme love. They may even believe that a miracle is possible. This type of conscious hoping or wishing is not the same as actually knowing that something is impossible. And the distinction between the two should be clear based on the above arguments. From a broader view on action trying takes on another form as well. Firstly, trying, through certain activities or steps may lead to other types of action. This kind of trying itself is an action. Another form of trying is manifest when actions are taken and the result is uncertain. For example, when fishing whether or not one can catch a fish is fairly unsure. These two different types of trying are different in that today the first is merely one stage in a much larger system, whereas the second is in a specific or singular action.

16

chapter 1

fundamental level, the target and method employed in the process of action. The evaluation of the motivation’s value, or “what to do,” is actually a question of whether or not the goal is appropriate. The most important concern when thinking about “how to do something” is the effectiveness of the method. Thus, it is not difficult to see that in the process of action there is an internal connection between value and tools (or methods). The development from the formation of desires, their evaluation, and subsequent transformation into motivations and finally to actual decisions, takes place on an intellectual level. As a method to change both the world and people, action always transcends the conceptual level through the use of various methods to function with external objects and with the actual world. The development of systematic action is primarily involved with the relationship between goals and concrete circumstances. The specific situation can either provide the conditions for actualizing the goal of an action or not. If the necessary conditions are not provided then either the goals must be adjusted or the conditions themselves must be changed or must be created. Speaking on a more general level, this involves a correspondence between goals and the adherence to natural rules or laws (including social ones). The purpose of action is always based on desire and motivation. Action is also linked to what is actually the case and what is necessary in the real world, that is, it must correspond to the rules inherent in the natural world. The process of action is therefore constantly faced with this issue of how to unite goals with natural laws. Subjects engaging in more complex actions have not only to consider external objects, but also other people and the actions of others as well. Managing these relationships is an unavoidable problem in the process of action. Different subjects often have different intentions, their own individual goals, and have divergent value-orientations. Communication between subjects can aid in preventing conflicts that may arise from these dissimilar intentions and goals. Communication is therefore a precondition for effective action. Systematic or synthesized action often requires mutual cooperation between subjects. This includes the sphere of tacit agreements or implied understandings between different subjects. The relationship between the subject and object is the background for whether or not an action’s goals can correspond to natural laws or the particulars of the situation. Therefore it is important to understand the unity between the subject and their concrete conditions. The first problem a subject faces in their interaction with others is having to compromise between different goals and intentions. To conclude, in the process of action, uniting the subject and object and also unification between subjects are relevant.

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

17

Actions bring about specific consequences through the interaction between subjects and the outside world as well as with other subjects. Completed actions always include certain results; these outcomes often follow certain transformations in the world and in humans. However, outcomes do not necessarily indicate that an action has come to an end. As an actual manifestation, the outcome of an action has a certain meaning or significance for both the subject and society (or the community). This meaning may continue to be presented; although it is only through broad understanding and reflection that this meaning can be affirmed or acknowledged fully. For the subject, understanding and reflecting on the outcome of an action involves comparing it with desires and motivations. This evaluation influences later stages in the process of action. We can thereby see that complex or synthesized actions manifest themselves structurally. The structure of action is displayed through logical links in its different stages and aspects, as well as through the development of overall trends. In terms of these trends, the structure of action is not just shown in the intellectual activity that involves desires, evaluations, choices or decisions; it thoroughly permeates the relationship between subjects and objects and between subjects and others. 1.4

Intentionality and Normativity

Action is initially linked to the subject’s intention. In fact, intention pervades everything from the formation of desires and intentions to the interaction between the subject and object or other. One of the internal characteristics that differentiate action from other phenomena is that of intentionality. However, actions also have a specific social historical background, and they are limited, to a certain extent, by social institutions, value principles, regulations on practice, etc. This therefore demonstrates norm-based activity. The interaction between intentionality and norm-based activity is embodied in complex manifestations of action. Broadly speaking, the content of intentionality and consciousness are internally connected. On the one hand, although the specific manifestations and content of consciousness are various, consciousness always includes intentionality. On the other hand, intention is always based on the content of consciousness. This point has been discussed in the work of Franz Brentano’s. For Brentano, intention is characterized by “reference to content” and “direction to an object.” He writes, “Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgment something is affirmed or denied, in love

18

chapter 1

loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on.”12 Displays of intention are just as diverse as the content and manifestations of consciousness. First and foremost, intention that is linked to action involves purposiveness. Goals or purposes are contained in motivations and are oriented towards nonconceptual objects. Generally speaking, intention itself has a specific direction, taking purposiveness as its content. The characteristic of intention is that it is always directed at a certain goal. This differentiates action from mechanical movements and unconscious bodily motions. In fact, this is what makes action different from most things. For example, when shooting a bow and arrow, aiming at a target and hitting the target are acts that are full of intention. If one aims at a target but hits another target, this is clearly something different. Hitting the target that one aims at is a type of action, but hitting another target is not the same action. In the latter case, hitting the other target is not the intention of the subject, and should thereby not be seen as the intentional outcome—it is something else entirely. Here we see that action is quite complex and that the same phenomenon can be viewed in entirely different ways. In some sense aiming at a target and shooting is already an action, but hitting the target that one did not aim at no longer includes the intention. It is therefore not the same type of action. The difference lies in the fact that aiming at something and hitting it includes intentionality, whereas hitting a target that one did not aim at lacks this aspect. On a broader level, action and the result it brings about can be differentiated from one another. As in the previous example, taking aim at a target but not hitting that target is one type of action (since the expected goal is not actualized we can see this as an unsuccessful action), but this phenomenon reveals more than what has been discussed. Actions like this can sometimes involve much more complex circumstances. If the archer takes aim and believes that they can hit a specific target but then hits another target, what they have done is not completely without intentionality. In fact, this process is not just an incident or event; it already contains the essence of action. We can contrast this with another case, where someone aimlessly shoots but just happens to hit a moving animal. Here, the subject is conscious of the shot and the isolated movement still counts as action. However, since the animal was unintentionally hit, the second of these examples is merely an event or incident. When hunting, if one takes aim at an animal and at the same time ends up hitting an animal next to it or near it, because an animal is hit this is also an action. Here

12

Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, Translated by C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell, and Linda McAlister (New York: Routledge Press, 1995), 68.

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

19

the difference between action and a mere incident is closely related to whether or not there is intentionality. In the process of action purposiveness and expectation are difficult to separate. Goals are directed at specific targets, whereas expectation mostly involves the future. As a specific manifestation of intention, expectation also includes purposiveness as well as inferring outcomes. As mentioned above, with the evaluation of desire as it’s precondition, desire transforms into motivation. Evaluating desire involves the possible outcomes that it may produce and this is first grasped through expectation. In the development of the process of action, expectation about outcomes becomes a type of guiding intention. This connection between action and expectation comprises the difference between action proper and incidents that are merely encountered. For example, in daily action the act of driving one’s car to work includes the expectation that one will work that day; this expectation displays the intent of the action. Getting in a car accident is an unfortunate and unexpected incident but it is not the object of desire nor does it belong to expectation. Here we can easily see the difference between action and merely encountering something. It is important to note that action includes the expectation that is contained in intentionality whereas encountering something lacks this type of intentional content. On a deeper level intention is expressed as apperceptive consciousness. Here apperception means that intention is not only directed at the goal or the future, but also that the subject is consciously aware of his or her own intention. Being self-aware of an intention is not the same as being conscious of objects. In a much broader sense intention implies the self-awareness characterized by self-reflection. In dreams, humans often have bodily movement, which usually follows a type of “consciousness,” (dreams themselves are a type of conscious movement, or movement of consciousness). But, in the strict sense, the consciousness in a dream lacks apperceptive consciousness. Bodily movements in dreams are not the same as actions that contain intentionality. This is similar to sleep talking, which does not have apperceptive intentionality. Therefore talking in one’s sleep is simply not the same as a speech act. Of course, the connection between intention and apperception is not always so clear. Self-awareness of intention is not the same as having an object of consciousness, which expresses itself as the function of knowing something external. In actual manifestations of this we can see that we do not first have a certain intention and then know that we have it. In fact, self-awareness or knowing and intention are themselves integrated together as one. Thereby, apperception also composes the internal regulations of intention. The apperceptive quality of intention can be seen quite specifically in different aspects of the process of action. From the evaluation of desire to the

20

chapter 1

formation of motivation, and from confirming what to do to planning how to do it, the subject is constantly in a stage of apperceptive intention. Within the process of action apperceptive intention is specifically displayed in reflection, evaluation, choice, formation of plans, and in other stages. The reflection and evaluation of desires, weighing and choosing targets, and confirming method etc., all involve the conceptual realm. Carrying out plans or implementation is developed and displayed in the actual process of interaction between the subject and its object or between the subject and the other. By permeating these aspects of the process, intention—that is manifested in apperception—functions in the process of action. Of course, actual manifestations of action are often displayed as a system containing different stages. The relationship between action and tension is quite complex. Overall, these various stages all revolve around, develop, and are restricted, according to the intention of the action. For example, walking to school is clearly a process that is pervaded with intention but can be separated into many different steps. And not all of these stages are limited or restricted by intention. The characteristics given above are much clearer in an action whose content is not mechanically determined. For example, when an actor takes the stage they have a clear intention regarding the role they are to play. However, a role is developed and the actor may not be clear about how to play every aspect of their role. Actually, if they concentrate too closely on every detail of their movement they will not look natural and therefore the role will not be well played. Similar situations emerge in other areas, such as in the arts and in craftsmanship. It is easy to see from the above examples that although an action taken as a whole may be clearly intentional, self-conscious intentionality is not necessarily expressed in each of its stages. Intention can take different forms; it can be expressed before action or within the action itself. Intention that is manifest before an action takes place is limited to the conceptual level, yet as this follows along with the implementation of action in the actual world, this type of intention begins to transform and can then be seen within the action itself. This is the actualization of intention and it is also the way action becomes inundated with intention. The intention before action can also be stopped or terminated for various reasons. For example, one plans to take a bus to a certain place (this is an intention before action) and waits at the bus stop for a long time. After a while, one decides to take the subway or a cab instead. The intention that was formed here and that instigated the action is not the same intention that we see actually carried out in the action. Similarly, in other situations whether or not the initial intention can be carried out relies on chance. Thus relationship between action and intention is expressed in the various forms of their interaction.

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

21

Intention that appears in action itself often includes rational content. In fact, it is this rational content that allows a mere movement to be considered as an action. For example, when a small child who does not understand anything about the piano presses the keys and makes a sound, it may by chance sound like a melody or tune, but this is not the same as the act of actually playing the piano. Although the child “plays the piano” intentionally, their intention lacks any awareness of what it means to play the piano and is therefore different to the piano playing of a concert pianist. The latter understands a great deal about the principles of playing the piano, including notes, music and so on. From another perspective, the child’s action does contain some kind of self-conscious intention. They may perhaps take the piano merely as a toy that can be used to produce sound or noise. In this regard we can say that the activity can been seen as an action that does involve some kind of intentionality. But, we have to remember that this type of activity is most clearly expressed as “playing with a toy” and not as “playing the piano.” To put it briefly, when looked at from the perspective of play, the above activity includes selfconscious intention, whereas from the perspective of playing the piano this activity lacks apperceptive intentionality. Here, it is being self-conscious of the intentionality that regulates or restricts the essence of action. Internal to the process of the function of intention there is a mutual link between reason and non-reason. Intention certainly includes aspects outside of reason. These can be seen in so far as intention includes desire and wants. But, as shown above, intention is not only expressed as desire but is also linked to reflection, measuring, evaluation, and to other related activities. In this sense, intention also includes the aspects of reason that often permeate consciousness. For example, when one is willing to do something, this is predicated on an understanding of the possible outcomes of what one will or one needs to do. It is on this basis that one can be said to make a choice willingly. Therefore, the question of whether or not someone is willing to do something can only appear if the person in question has some knowledge about what they want or need to do. If one knows nothing about the possible outcome of an action, one cannot be either willing or unwilling to do it. It is then clear that “being willing to do something” is a type of intention that manifests mutual integration between unreasonable desires and reasonable knowledge. In temporal terms, the formation of intention is initially based on past conditions. Broadly speaking, these include previous life experiences, intellectual background, value ideas and so on. Since everyone has a unique past, each person’s intentions also differ (this includes differences in our conceptions of what actions to do and how to do them). When consciousness is directed at a specific goal, the intention in action always involves reference to the future.

22

chapter 1

This is the case when the intention is formed as an expression of the questions of what to do and how to do it. As one aspect of action, intention is internal to the actual process of action and is therefore expressed in a number of different stages. During the concrete development of action, intention is constantly present. Thus, intention intersects past, future, and present, and unites them. One internal characteristic of expressing intention in the actual world is uniting the rational and un-rational dimensions. So the process of intention and its realistic character represents the intersection between the past, future, and present. It is also necessary to point out that intention can be displayed in various forms. It can be the object or contents of attention, but often it is not. Morally speaking, the ideal way to act or implement our intention is without having to think or force oneself in doing so, in other words, do so more or less “naturally.” This absence of a need to think or force oneself does not imply transcending intention. It would be better to say that in the ideal scenario intention is not the object of attention. And although the intention is not the object of attention it is still able to direct consciousness; it merely does so in a more natural fashion. Generally speaking, the process of action often follows some kind of tacit knowledge. This can be understood in terms of an intention that is not the object of attention. So, although it is not something that is focused on, intention still directs conscious activity towards what is appropriate in the development of action. In addition to this, intentional action contains norms and restrictions. In a broad sense, norms contain many aspects, including value principles, regulations on behavior, and ideals, all of which are expressed in action as evaluation and direction. These normative aspects provide universal standards for action. As mentioned above, the most primordial expression of intention in action is usually desire and it’s subsequent evaluation, the latter of which implicitly involves norms. The precondition for desire to be approved and accepted as motivation is that it fits with these value principles or norms. The evaluation of desire occurs in the intellectual realm. During the development of the process of action, norms adjust action through guidance, limitations, and restrictions. As a standard for what should be the case, norms can be taken to include the connotation of a “should” or “ought.” These are then clearly related to the questions of what is to be done and how to do it. Both the ought and the should hint at some sort of guidance. In terms of the question of what is to be done, this means directing human action towards a certain orientation or goal, and with regards to the question of how to do it, it means providing guidance about the appropriate method for action. Limitations or restrictions are both the opposite of, and complementary to, direction or guidance. The latter

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

23

tells people what they should do, or how they should do it, whereas the former (limitations and restrictions) tells them what they should not do, or what methods should not be used. The restrictive component of norms means that the process of action is characterized by self-consciousness and not spontaneity. Norms are also related to the questions “what will be achieved?” and “what will become (of this)?” This is clearly expressed in the areas of morality, politics, law, science, and so on. In the realm of morality, norms restrict behavior and require that people fashion themselves according to moral principles. This gives one an ethical character. In politics and law, norms not only regulate people’s behavior but they can also help them to become conscientious and develop themselves according to political and legal principles. This is what Aristotle refers to when he calls the human “the political animal.” Similarly, scientific norms regulate and restrict activities in the scientific sphere. This is what allows certain individuals to become qualified members of the scientific community. In systematized or integrated actions, everyday activity also appears as related to plans. Generally speaking, plans for action include goals, procedures, methods etc. These create the compass for synthesis in action. Looking at the process of action as a whole; plans direct the various stages, create the initial trend towards the expected goal, and are related to the achieved outcome. Plans also form a part of the criteria used to evaluate a completed action. Determining whether or not an action achieved the predicted target is usually based on figuring out whether or not, and to what degree, the projected plan was actualized. Here, expectation takes the plan as its concrete content. It is easy to see that from establishing the goals to evaluating the outcome; the plan for action has concrete normative meaning. The connection between action and plans is, both in a broad sense and in an internal one, expressed in normativity. Looked at from the perspective of actualizing the process of action, the relationship between norms and action are often displayed in a relatively complex manner. We can distinguish between three types of connection between actions and norms. First, actions are based on an understanding of norms and carried out accordingly. This type of activity includes self-consciousness, however, it is not perfect. Based solely on a certain type of norm, initial attempts at a specific type of action may be characterized as being too rigid or two choppy. This can be seen, for instance, when one first begins to study a new art or craft. Second, the subject’s action may be in accord with norms that they are not aware and/or conscious of. Third, through repeated practice norms gradually become embedded in the subject’s mind and acting in accordance with these norms becomes something like habit. In the second and third stages, actions transcend the initial form in which they may have been done in a manner that

24

chapter 1

was too mechanical. They are therefore completed without too much thinking or effort on the subject’s part. In terms of outward appearance, the second and third manifestations of this relationship between norms and action are somewhat similar. Neither is done with too much effort or too mechanically. The former is based on repetition of actualization over a long period of time. This is why the action can be implemented without too much thinking or effort and the process of its completion has nothing to do with rational deliberation or reflection. Norms solidify set patterns in consciousness and have a fixed place in the mind. Thus there is no need to think, deliberate or to try too hard. In the second instance, namely being in accord with norms that one is unaware of, this is done spontaneously, accidentally, and/or on occasion. The third, as a result of practice over a long period, goes along with the affirmations and denials of practice. If an action fits norms then it can gain social recognition or approval and it is considered successful as a practice. If, however, society and the realm of practice deny the action, then it is counted as a failure. The only possibility for a norm to be solidified in consciousness or to have a fixed place in the mind is through interaction with the various aspects of practice during its process. In the first case, action is inappropriate if one is thought to have done too little, or too much. In terms of the second, action is often accidental. The ideal action process would involve an incorporation of the good aspects of, and an exclusion of the bad aspects of, the first two types; this would hopefully allow an achievement of a state as seamless and natural as the third type. Specific norms are broadly related to normative consciousness. Normative consciousness is often related to normative concepts and speech, both of which are used to make certain duties more specific and clear. Taking labor as an example, it is well known that “one should put on a hard hat when one enters a construction zone,” and this produces a domain of normal activity. One therefore thinks, “I should wear a hardhat because I am entering a construction zone.” Here, the norm has entered the individual’s consciousness. However, in this case, the first “should” has different connotations from the second. The “should” of “one should put on a hard hat when one enters a construction zone,” is certainly normative, however, it is universal, that is, a general duty. Whereas, the “should” of “I should wear a hardhat because I am entering a construction zone,” converts the universal or general duty into a clear and concrete manifestation. Whether this refers to the object indicated by duty or the background of duty, both of the generalized manifestations are transcended and become specific. The development of the process of action often follows the transformation from generalized norms to the individual’s normative consciousness.

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

25

The process of concretizing duties through the integration of normative concepts within the individual’s normative consciousness involves a specific practical context. The concretization of duties is based on the concretization of practical backgrounds and relations. Some philosophers do not pay enough attention to this point. In contemporary philosophy, Robert Brandom has investigated normativity in action. His investigation is concentrated on language. According to Brandom action is related to the expression of normativity, which becomes explicit and turns into a tendency. He writes: “normative vocabulary (including expressions of preference) makes explicit the endorsement (attributed or acknowledged) of material properties of practical reasoning.”13 (Emphasis original.) Here it is important to note the commitments to endorsement and acknowledgement. Since Brandom deals with normativity on the level of language, which leads him to argues that normative expressions are made in the commitment of duties. The clarity of norms is ontologically rooted in the practical background as well as being manifested in specific practical processes. The reasoning behind Brandom’s understanding is based on the desire for clarity in language. Although he refers to substance in the realm of practical reason, logically speaking, the clarification of commitment is mainly related to an understanding the subject’s self-consciousness through language. The expression of normal activity or normative concepts belongs to the clarity of commitments. But this formulation remains limited to the sphere of language and concepts and therefore does not acknowledge the actual background required by action. Social activities that are completed according to norms and are outwardly expressed are not limited to the subject’s inner consciousness. For example, as Wittgenstein argues, obeying rules does not necessarily involve choice and can be done blindly.14 Wittgenstein notices that following principles requires that one do so in practical processes, but not that one have full awareness in relation to one’s own consciousness or affirmation of the process. He thereby differentiates between abiding by principles and internal consciousness or and mental processes. He also denies the relevance of the participation of consciousness while following principles (in action). Obeying, abiding and following are not the same as not having to overthink or try to hard. As articulated above, not having to think or try too hard is achieved through consciousness but is not limited therein. Blindly following rules without choosing cannot be 13 14

Robert B. Brandom, Articulating Reason: An Introduction to Inferentialism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000), 89. Ludwig Wittgenstein. Philosophical Investigations, Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1968), 219.

26

chapter 1

had through this type of conscious process. In reality, it is difficult to differentiate between this type of action and action based on luck, chance, accident, or spontaneity. Actually, the following of norms in practice and in consciousness are not completely opposed. Whether or not one follows norms is not only based on one’s own decision or affirmation of those norms. Following norms in practice, and the knowledge or awareness of these norms, is preconditioned on consciousness of following norms. Otherwise, abiding by norms could be based on mere luck or chance and could be interpreted as merely spontaneous activity. Wittgenstein missed the significance of this point. It is also obvious here that we should differentiate between the implicit and explicit forms of practical norms. Norms can be expressed through explicit means and are often implied in the process of action or they can be made clear through action in the actual world. As made clear in the above discussion of the relationship between norms and the subject, the actualization of norms cannot be equated with the use of explicit methods to affirm that one is in accord with norms. However, if abiding by norms is not the same as action based on luck, chance, or spontaneity, this means that in the course of action the subject relies on some tacit method to confirm their accordance with norms. In sum, action includes intentionality as well as normativity. As two dimensions of action, intentionality and normativity are themselves internally related. Intention and activity are often limited by norms. Further, as argued above, acting on intention is connected to guidance and restrictions based on norms: This can be seen in the way that judgments on desires or evaluation, and decisions on goals, effect action. At the same time, the process of putting norms into practice is an intentional activity and it is through the subject’s intentional activity that norms are able to restrict or limit action. Even where plans provide guidance for action, intention is always present. In other words, in the concrete process of action, the function of intention can take on either explicit or tacit forms. The internal connection between intent and normativity is also exhibited in the process of internalizing norms. General norms gradually become internalized in the individual’s consciousness through the interaction between social education and guidance and through the individual’s own acceptance or endorsement. As such, normative ideals also come to comprise the individual’s conception of the world and are an example of how conceptual activity is intentional. The relationship, between normativity and the subject’s worldview, gives a deeper expression of the connection between intention and activity. Intentionality is usually related to the initiation of action, to its continuation, and to its general trends. This is therefore expressed throughout the process of action, from its inspiration (which begins in desire or motivation) to its

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

27

implementation and completion. Here we can see that intentionality demonstrates itself as an efficient cause. Relatively speaking, norms provide a general guarantee for the effectiveness and appropriateness of action. This is the overall tendency from normative guidance on the question of what to do, to the regulative function of norms on the question of how to do it. In fact, normativity is always demonstrated through formal connotations. This means that norms are closely related to formal causes so that the relationship between intentionality and normativity in the process of action is, on a deeper level, expressed in the interaction between formal and efficient cause. If we can say that intentionality provides action with certain types of mechanisms for motivation, then normativity gives action a conscious essence. From the perspective of the history of philosophy, Hume is more concentrated on intention and motivation whereas Kant emphasizes universal rules and their limitations on action. Due to this, Hume often overlooks the importance of formal cause and Kant sometimes mistakes the formal cause for the efficient cause.15 On this basis, it is not surprising that the different philosophers have divergent understandings of formal and efficient cause in the process of action. However, in terms of the actual manifestations of action, efficient cause in intentionality and normativity are united internally. Looked at from the perspective of the relationship between the subject and action, normativity and intentionality can be seen as different forms of the consciousness of action. Consciousness of action—as the conceptual background for action—includes the various forms of knowing: knowing that, knowing how, wanting to, and being willing to. Knowing that means an understanding of facts and this type of understanding is descriptive. Knowing how is related to the method of action and has normative significance. However, these two types of knowledge are not enough to guarantee that an action will occur. As previously discussed, what occurs in action is indiscernible from the expression of intent as desire or wanting. Knowledge of “that” is a type of intellect that includes propositions. Knowledge of “how” does not include propositions and is an expression of intensity of desire or wanting that shows itself to be different from the intellect. In the history of philosophy, these two forms of knowing are often seen as two different types of conceptual manifestations that are divided. An example of this tendency is clearly given in Hume’s 15

18th-century British philosopher, Thomas Reid, argues that we can take action principles as things that motivate us to act. In some sense he takes formal cause as efficient cause. As a representative of the school of common sense Reid’s philosophical stance is quite different from Kant’s–who focuses on a priori forms of understanding. And although Reid has a broad interpretation of motivation, it often takes formal cause as efficient.

28

chapter 1

philosophy. Moreover, from the perspective of action processes in the actual world, the intellect and desires or wanting are not clearly distinguished from one another. In fact, in the consciousness of action, the knowledge of that, the knowledge of how, and the intention to do are often interwoven. Although the issues related to consciousness and intention discussed above do not necessarily rely on a completely comprehensive or conscious manifestation within the individual before the action is carried out, the subject is nevertheless always, in some sense, conscious of how the above content comprises their consciousness of action. This type of consciousness is a synthesis of different concepts that, when combined, make up the precondition for action to occur. They also form the background for the interaction between intentionality and normativity. 1.5

Habits, Habitus and the Realm of Existence

The subject actualizes the unification of intentionality and normativity in the process of action. Actions occur and develop in the world and take the agent as the subject of their actualization. The function of this actualization is to change the world and the individual. As the subject of action, the agent has a two-fold relationship with the action. The subject makes action possible, and is the goal of action, where, in this context, the goal means an expression of action that aims at changing and improving the subject itself. From the perspective of the subject, the process of action involves the relationship between habits and habitus. Habits can be understood as actions that are habitually manifest, including daily activities. Whereas, habitus is the structure and tendency in the agent’s heart-mind, including his/her value tendencies, emotions, thought patterns, and so on. Habitus is formed through the process of habits, and, conversely, this also restricts or limits habit. Pierre Bourdieu discusses the relationship between individuality and behavior, “habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions.”16 We can see clearly from this quote that, as the internal composition and tendency of the mind, individuality forms certain orientations for action. However, while taking daily habits as its root, habitus has a certain characteristic of spontaneity (for example, in being unaware of daily activities). This forms “transposable dispositions,” that often lack self-consciousness, which means that actions cannot be based on this alone. Unfortunately, Bourdieu 16

Pierre Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice, Translated by Richard Nice (Stanford: Stanford ­ niversity Press, 1990), 53. U

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

29

does not pick up on this point: he believes that human action is primarily based on habitus. But habitus only gives people a certain type of orientation for action, and in some situations this results in spontaneously deciding on specific actions, Bourdieu comments, The conditionings associated with a particular class of conditions of existence produce habitus, systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to attain them. Objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action of a conductor.17 Accordingly, habitus becomes spontaneous as it comes to make up the internal structure of the agent. This scenario involves the question of whether or not norms are being observed. But, against the background of habitus, the identification between the subject and its norms is not necessarily realized on purpose. In fact, Bourdieu also differentiates between habitus and consciously attempting something. He argues, The theory of action that I propose (with the notion of habitus) amounts to saying that most human actions have as a basis something quite different from intention, that is, acquired dispositions which make it so that an action can and should be interpreted as oriented toward one objective or another without anyone being able to claim that that objective was a conscious design.18 Through repeated actions and conscious awareness, certain patterns of action can be formed. These do not require too much thinking or effort to carry out even though their goals are consciously chosen. Further, like their methods, they cannot be isolated from one another. This is especially true in nonsingular, complex systems of action. Bourdieu separates action tendencies related to habitus from those that are consciously chosen. This can easily lead to habitus 17 Ibid. 18 Pierre Bourdieu, Practical Reason: On The Theory Of Action, Translated by Randell Johnson (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 97–98.

30

chapter 1

being used to dispel any conscious attempts or motivations. However, this explanation of action does not grasp its true processes. In terms of its actual manifestations, action is limited by habitus, and related to self-consciousness. The unification of habitus and self-consciousness is discussed in Chinese ontology, which provides a discussion of action on at the profoundest level. Here the noumenon19 is foundationally opposed to skill. According to Wang Yangming 王阳明 (d. 1529) noumenon and skill, knowledge and action, as well as conscience are internally identical. skill broadly corresponds to action, and is related to noumenon, and can be expressed as a certain type of manifestation the psyche. The psychic substance is firstly present as the essence of the mind. This can be seen in a number of cases, from tendencies in thought to virtuous character. In the philosophy of mind, nomenon and the mind are connected to one another. We can thereby see that mental noumenon is not a simple mental structure. To a certain extent, the mental noumenon also exceeds the regulations of any specific mind, including logical ones. In fact, once the structure of the psyche is concretized, the relationship between the mind and its regulations becomes more stable, and gains a certain kind of logical significance. The actualization of the unification between the mind and logic is manifest in a way that is not a spontaneous habitus, nor is it a purely mental structure or an abstract logical form. The condensing of the content of consciousness includes mental noumenon as its universal forms and these limit people’s action in various ways. The function of mental substance is included in action, from its initial orientation (choosing a target or object, establishing a goal etc.) to the actual method employed. Through its guidance and regulation of action mental substance displays itself as an internal root of action. Synthesized or systematic action is often expressed as a successive process. The constitutive property of action unfolds in its trends, while the structure of these trends is manifested through stages. Everything, from the formation of intention (desire, motivation, purpose and so on) to the proposed plan, the implementation of plans, and the evaluation of the result, is all one series. That is, the parts that make up the action form a singular process. With regards to time, the process of action usually develops as the relation between a goal, method, and outcome. Talcott Parsons says that one specific form of sequence in action is that the goal comes before methods, which is also before the outcome. Action unfolds in time with this type of continuity and unity. Logically speaking, the continuity of the subject is a precondition for action and is expressed as 19

Translator’s note: The word being translated as “noumenon” is ben ti, which can also be rendered as “substance,” “primary substance,” “thing-in-itself,” or even “reality.”

Practical Philosophy’s Perspective On Action

31

a unity over a period of time. It is only through this continuous unity that the actions one is engaged in can have any sense of continuity. This shows that the agent dictates action. In shared action, attempting to understand other agents as subjects involves their relationship in process of action. First, there must be a mutual understanding of one another; this often centers on communication at the conceptual level and includes a general uniformity in value orientation. There should also be a shared understanding about the meaning of the action, a similar view on its procedure, its expected outcome, and so on. All this is not just formed consciously but often appears as a tacit understanding instead. This understanding and sphere of communication is one of the preconditions for successful action. Corresponding to mutual understanding is cooperation and coordination. Compared to understanding, which is done on the conceptual level, cooperation and coordination involve working together in the actual process of action. These are the two aspects of interaction that give action an internal meaning. As actions change the world they also change the humans who engage in them. Thus we have to discuss human capability and the bounds of human nature. In the broadest sense, human nature has to do with both knowledge and with the abilities that are displayed in action. This ideal is expressed in term of self-achievement, and the achieving or refining of things. Both have the function of grasping and changing the world, as well as humans themselves. But this capacity is not always expressed outwardly. It is entirely integrated into human’s entire existence, and thereby constitutes the ontological regulations. Human nature regulates human capability, and is expressed in the actual abilities of humans. Capability thereby also constitutes the internal sphere of possible conditions for action. In other words, the success of an action is directly linked to the subject’s capabilities. So the process of action can also be explained as the process in which humans engage their own capabilities.20 Moreover, through concrete use in the process of action human capability itself is not only evidenced or confirmed, but also allows the human to attain the actual preconditions for action. Thereby we can see the interaction between human action and capability. Related to human natural capability is the realm of human nature. The latter has many different manifestations. For example, within human processes in 20

Thomas Reid has made a very detailed investigation into the relationship between action and capability. He also concentrates on the relation between action and the use of capability. See Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), 2011.

32

chapter 1

the world, the human mental world has specific connotations: it corresponds to actual manifestations, and thereby gives human existence meaning. From the perspective of self-reflections on the meaning of one’s own existence, the heart of the human realm and mental world is concentrated on pursuing ideals and consciousness. Pursuing ideals follows the question of human expectation as its orientation. Consciousness is also developed in relation to the question of duty or obligation. These questions are then closely related to the form of self reflection that asks “why do humans exist?” The realm of human nature influences, chooses, and directs itself towards a value orientation. This can either limit certain processes of action or can allow one to improve as one carries out certain actions. In broad terms, human capabilities are not only expressed differently but are themselves mutually integrated within the process and development of action. Based on this unification, humans themselves gradually develop virtuosity, and come to have the ability to create things in the actual world as subjects. These arguments exhibit that the internal connection between the action and agent are deeply related.

chapter 2

Reasons, Causes and Action As a mode of human existence, action has reasons, which are related (but not identical to) the causes of action. Reasons and causes make up the basis and motivation for actions. Reasons provide the ground for action, and allow it to be understood as a possibility. As actual manifestations, multiple reasons form systems in which they are linked to one another both internally and externally. These systems involve both what is possible and actual. With the interaction between individual aspirations and rational cognition as its background, consciousness is linked to both reasons and the will (i.e. the voluntary aspect of action). When reasons become internalized as motivations, they enter into the realm of “cause and effect.” Action not only involves understanding and interpretation, it is also related to norms and guidance, which means that the causes for action are not limited to logical reasoning and therefore deserve a much broader investigation. Here, form and substance, logical relevance and actual background are internally related, and in this we see the concrete unfolding of the relationship between reason, cause, and action. In other words, we will find that the interpretation of all things as causes in the process of action includes reference to a broadly inclusive interpretation of causal relationships and their related concepts. Similarly, agents of action themselves entire into the realm of causality; and causes can be event or agent based. The former is includes the way circumstances or other external factors shape action, while the latter refers to the how the agent’s own desires, goals, and beliefs impact action. 2.1

Reasons (for) and Action

Reasons for action have various and complex meaning and connotations. Looking at the relationship between reasons and actions, the former can be seen as the foundation for action. The so-called “reason for doing something” or “reason to do something” is the foundation for doing or starting to do something. Here reasons are related to the intelligibility of an action and behavior without a reason (usually) cannot be understood well. Taking a book from a shelf in order to read it, or to find a reference, is an action with a reason; the action is oriented towards a direct target. But if one simply takes a book from the shelf, and then returns it without any goal, the action becomes a senseless movement: an action without reason. Therefore goals and the way that © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004321786_003

34

chapter 2

they orient actions form the substance of reasons. Activities that have goals are actions with a reason, and this process is objectively intelligible. On the flipside, activities without goals are behaviors without reasons and are thereby extremely difficult to explain in an intelligible manner. All of this goes to show that reasons are intimately related to the agent, or subject. In the case of a lack of reason for doing something we would say that the activity has no “rhyme or reason” and is therefore unfathomable. In this sense it is impossible to conceive of or comprehend this type of activity as something directly connected to the agent’s consciousness. The latter instance is what determines an action as irrational, since being founded upon reasons is what makes action rational and gives it the character of expressing consciousness.1 Another view of the meaning of reasons relates to having rights. The idea of having a reason to do something also suggests that the subject has the right to do something. Of course the respective scopes of reasons and rights do not completely coincide with one another. Here we need to differentiate between appropriate reasons and inappropriate ones. Generally speaking, we imagine that one only has the rights to do something that is appropriate (or is done for the appropriate reasons). In some contexts action is straightforwardly based on the appropriateness of reasons alongside assessment of whether or not the subject has the right to carry out such an act. On the most fundamental level, the appropriateness of a reason is determined by whether or not it accords with laws or ethical norms. In daily life, within the sphere of what is permitted by law or morality, the reason that an individual chooses to do this instead of that involves both rational consideration and individual interests, both of which take the above mentioned appropriateness as a precondition. It is the appropriateness of reasons and rights that allow the subject to be straightforward and maintain their course of action in the face of, sometimes unreasonable, external interference. Interestingly, in many situations, the question “what reason do I have to do this?” actually means “what right do I have to do this?”2 1 Derek Parfit has argued that reasons for action and rationality are connected, and if our beliefs are well-established then when we do what we have good reason to do our actions are rational. (Derek Parfit, On What Matters (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011)) Although whether or not something counts as a good reason and the way to judge reasons can still be discussed, as long as a particular activity has a reason then it may count as rational. We can thereby see the relationship between having a reason and rationality (framed in terms of action). 2 This is closely related to the contemporary debate on euthanasia in biomedical ethics. The background for this discussion is whether or not the individual has the right to take their own life.

Reasons, Causes And Action

35

Rights are inherently linked to responsibilities and the relationship between reasons and rights also involves responsibility. In the sphere of action, humans are faced with diverse aspects of practical life and thereby individual’s basis for choosing action can be quite different from on another. When an action is related to carrying out duties, its reasons involve responsibility. For example, a professor teaches in accordance with their syllabus—this is their everyday action—and the reason for this type of action is their responsibility. As a teacher, one is responsible for making sure that classes meet one’s requirements. We can say then, that the responsibility connotes that “this is your job” or, “you should do this.” Conversely, it could also be defined as “you have no reason not to do this.” Here, responsibility comprises the concrete reason for action: having a reason to do a certain thing means being responsible for doing it. It is not difficult to see then, that reasons are related to rights as well as responsibilities, though they are not identical. In terms of their relation to the agent, responsibilities are primarily related to universal norms or principles that place specific requirements on the subject or individual. Reasons have more to do with external factors. Rights are then based on universal norms, and can be understood as the subject’s inner wants (these are internal reasons and will be more fully explicated below). We can also differentiate between “what one should do” and “what one has reason to do.” That one has a responsibility to do something denotes that one should do it, where here “should” can also become the reason for doing a certain action. However, “reason” is not necessarily equivalent to “should.” In terms of daily life activities, being extremely hungry can be the reason to steal food, however this does not mean one should steal food. Joseph Raz comments, “Sentences of the form ‘x has a reason to Ф’ are to be regarded as predicating ‘has a reason to Ф’ of ‘x.’”3 Here we can see that “should” is related to cause. But if we think the two are equivalents then it is easy to ignore their differences. The above example of stealing food addresses the relationship between action, reasons, and the “should” of responsibility. But this investigation ought not be completed at the level of abstract formal logic; it must be connected to actual circumstances even when being analyzed. As mentioned above, the intelligibility of an action is related to its causes, and gives the action the characteristics of rationality. By contrast, if rights and responsibility are the content of the reasons for an action, then this is about appropriateness. Reasons for action that are based on responsibility are closely related to appropriateness. Responsibilities are oriented towards what one should or ought to do, and appropriateness also expresses itself as conforming 3 Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 19.

36

chapter 2

to what ought or should be done. If we say that irrational action is primarily within the realm of logic, then, appropriateness is principally related to the realm of value. Correspondingly, taking reasons as its basis, action expresses rational consciousness, and is thus endowed with appropriateness. The affirmation of value or the judgment of value itself can also become a reason for action. “Good” connotes “ought or should,” and when we judge something as positive, we simultaneously affirm it as something that is worth doing or should be done. As Raz also points out, “Values ‘control’ reasons in that one can have reasons for an action only if its performance is, or is likely to produce, or contribute to producing, good or if it is likely to contribute towards averting something bad.”4 Raz is attentive to the relationship between action and value judgments. Of course, here we need to differentiate logical from evaluative implications and/or their connotations. Logic is mainly expressed formally; the logical process of reasoning implies that there is a rational link between the components in the steps. For example, in “if A then B,” A and B are the different components, which are formally significant. However value connotations are about the relation between the values of substances. This is based on the fundamental principle that people should follow or actualize values that are positive. Logical implications in a relationship imply that there is “necessity” (the first component and the second component are necessarily connected) whereas evaluative ones include “it should be this way” as the content. That is to say, “good” implies “it should be this way.” From the perspective of action, value connotations give value judgments causal significance. As soon as something is confirmed as “good,” it provides a reason for action. In other words, affairs that are related to values regulate what the subject “should” choose and what they should actually do. In fact, the relationship between value connotations and the reasons for action can also be expressed logically in a different way. From the deductive process of “if A then B,” we can see that A expresses the reason in the deductive process. And even though the connotations between reasons in the deductive process and action are different, they are somewhat connected in terms of their implications. We can see that, as reasons for action, value judgments or affirmations have a dual character. On the one hand they unfold a connection between rights and responsibility: actions based on reasons of rights or responsibilities and value judgments are identical. On the other hand, their connotations and implications give them a logical significance.

4 Joseph Raz, Engaging Reason—On the Theory of Value and Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 47.

Reasons, Causes And Action

37

In terms of concrete manifestations, reasons for action are demonstrated in a variety of ways. Taking the ends of action as their target, reasons are often involved with the question of “why?” When the subject chooses, the “why” of an action, this is firstly related to its goal. For example, one can use health as a reason for walking everyday. Thereby, health becomes the reason for this walking. Here health is expressed as the goal, as the reason for walking. This is very different from aimless activity or behavior. Having a goal implies rational consciousness, since goals are rationally intelligible. Similarly, whether or not a goal is appropriate involves rationality in the evaluative sense. These are the characteristics of goals that make reasons demonstrable in a variety of ways. Goals are mostly related to the subject’s concepts. Reasons for action are, however, not limited to this sphere. In many cases, choosing an action is related to external rules and factors. For example, when taking an exam, once the time is up, the teacher collects the test. This collection is a type of action whose reason has two major parts: a particular rule and the facts of the situation. The rule states that tests need to be finished within a certain time period, and that particular duration constitutes a fact. The reason that the teacher collects the tests (an action) has to do with the rules and the facts. “The way things should be” is the content of rules. This includes rights (the students have the right to answer question within a certain time frame), and responsibilities (the teacher has the responsibility to collect the test when the time is up). “The way things actually are” are the facts of the situation. Facts are an important element of reasons, e.g. when the teacher collects the tests they do so according to what time it is, not how they feel. If one mainly relies on feelings instead of facts, then reasons cannot necessarily be considered rational. The precondition for these value judgments and their implied reasons is that value judgments themselves correspond to actuality. As an evaluative activity, value judgments are part of the process of understanding. This process involves both knowing and evaluating. Value judgments are thereby related to the issue of truthfulness. Value judgments are about “the way things ought to be,” and the precondition for this is the relationship between truth and values. Even though a certain society or individual may affirm certain value principles and truth as absolute, ethics are still somewhat relative. Whether or not a certain activity is in line with value principles ultimately relies on the judgment of an individual subject. This involves truthfulness. “Good” and “truth” are innately connected. Only true “goodness” tells “the way things should be;” which, in turn, can provide the reason for action. So this relationship between the “good” and “truth” is expressed as the relationship between “the way things should be” and “the way things are,” and demonstrates why it is difficult to separate normativity and factual reality in the process of action.

38

chapter 2

Relative to the individual, principles are external. Looked at from the perspective of the agent, the reasons for action usually have to be linked to aspects of their identity. In actual situations, one often chooses behavior based on how it can be recognized or approved of (which is an expression of ones own “self”). In traditional Chinese thought, the filial affection between a father and child is characterized by “loving affection” and “filial piety,” the content of which is affection and respect. The latter is expressed only through the individual’s action, which must be acknowledged by the father or son himself. Of course, the exact demonstration is determined by specific situations, which include various factors. For example, in times of extremely cold weather, affection and respect can be shown in how one makes sure the other (father or child) stays warm. Here, ensuring warmth is not just a duty from the social perspective (i.e. because one is a father or child they have this responsibility), but also involves the concrete facts of the circumstance (it is cold). Against this background we can clearly see that the reasons for choosing an action are based on both identity and external facts. Different fans watching a soccer match will cheer or boo at the same goal, which is clearly dependent on their identity (as a certain club’s fan) and the facts of the game (that a goal was scored). As the basis for action, reasons involve what “ought” to be done, and facts are “what is the case.”5 But in terms of the process of action, facts alone do not make up reasons. When actions are based on external principles and the actual situation, facts can make up key elements of reasons, and combined with principles they can even become preconditions for action but in themselves they remain insufficient. The above-mentioned example of “taking a test” demonstrates that facts can indeed contribute to reasons. Similarly, when a team scores a goal this fact becomes the reason that certain fans get excited 5 Of course, we have to differentiate between “should” or “ought” in the sense of instrumental rationality and evaluative rationality. Considered as the former, “should” is usually associated with knowing in a narrow sense, whereas the latter is directly related to values. For example, if we say “If you want to rob a bank, you should use a gun” we are using the word “should” in the sense of instrumental rationality. It expresses the method that can be used to achieve a certain goal. Now, if we say “If you want to follow the rules, you should forget about trying to rob a bank,” then the “should” here connotes value. It is a judgment about the goal itself. On further investigation, we can look at the difference between moral “shoulds” and immoral ones. If we say that one wants to “be a sincere person,” this can provide the reason for speaking the truth, and it means that when one wants to be a “sincere person” they should tell the truth. Here “should” has a moral connotation. Whereas someone who cheats in their business can ask their employees to lie, since it “should” be done. But here cheating is the reason for lying, and the type of “should” that is involved here have nothing to do with morality, or is even immoral.

Reasons, Causes And Action

39

(and others become upset). The fact that a team has scored a goal comprises a reason for cheering only for those who favor that team. Principles and acknowledgments imply the difference between the internal and external, but the two are united by facts. These different aspects show that facts can be integrated into different forms of reasons, and can express certain aspects of the diverse contents in reasons for action. Action theory often looks at the combination of desires and beliefs as the reason for action. According to this understanding, if the subject forms a certain desire and believes that some thing or affair can satisfy this desire, then they will have a reason for carrying out an action that will achieve the thing or affair that they believe can satisfy their desire. Therefore beliefs can also contribute an aspect of the reason for action. But, of course, belief itself does not necessarily comply with facts and only if beliefs are in correspondence with facts can the related action be considered rational. In the above example of a teacher who gives an exam, beliefs that do not fit with the facts cannot frustrate sensible reasons for action. Broadly speaking, the fact that an action has reasons does not necessarily mean that it is rational; there is a tension between reasons and rationalization that often forms the distance between belief and facts. We can look at an example from daily life to illustrate this point: if someone has the desire to drink alcohol and they believe that the bottle they see on a table contains wine (though it is actually an industrial chemical) then they will drink from the bottle. If we explain action as the unification of desire and belief, then of course what this person did has a reason. They had the desire to drink alcohol and believed that the bottle on the table contained wine. Therefore drinking from this bottle was certainly an action with a reason. However, because the belief did not fit the facts, this action is not necessarily a wholly rational behavior. The drinking from the bottle could still have a reason, if it were believed to be wine, even if the bottle were labeled as a dangerous chemical (making the belief, and therefore the action, an irrational one). This situation expresses the complex relationship between reasons and facts, as well as the rationality of reasons themselves. We can see that comprehending the truth of a thing or circumstances is indispensable for an action being “reasonable” or rational, rather than its merely having a reason. The example above shows that having a reason and being rational do not completely coincide with one another. As will be explored in more detail below, universal principles often offer reasons for action as well. If the subject makes a decision based on value principles or norms that they accept or identify with, then they have a reason to act in some way. Even though this reason is understood as being rational, from the perspective of the evaluation itself, not all value norms or principles are necessarily rational in terms of their factual value.

40

chapter 2

In some extreme sense only those value principles that can be identified throughout history as promoting human freedom are really rational on the level of value. The actions chosen by fascists or terrorists are undoubtedly done in accordance with their beliefs and value principles (which can also be understood as their reasons for acting in the way that they do). However, their value principles are at odds with historical trends towards human freedom, which means that these principles are not reasonable as value principles. Here it is not hard to see that having reasons does not necessarily mean being in accord with rationality on the level of values. Just as there is a gap between beliefs and facts that causes tension between reasons and rationalization, there is often a tension between value principles and value-based rationality, which often leads to the separation of reasons and value-based rationality. Theoretically speaking, having a reason expresses accordance with a form of rationality (i.e. intelligibility), however it does not necessarily guarantee that there is a rational value (i.e. the appropriateness of value factually speaking). From the perspective of its actual manifestations, action is certainly not constructed in a simple way. It unfolds through a system of interaction, links, and relationships, the various aspects of which can be understood as reasons for acting. For example, planting a tree is a type of action, which itself becomes the reason for watering the tree and other types of actions that maintain it. Similarly, going to a shop and picking out what one needs is also a type of action which comprises the reason for paying before one leaves the shop (which is itself another action). However, we need to be aware of the fact that the two examples given above are very different types of action. The relationship or connection between planting a tree and watering it is based on the tree’s own nature and natural laws. In contrast, paying for something at a store has to do with social institutions as the facts of a given scenario. So, the difference between these two types of action is that one has to do with natural laws where the other has to do with social norms or standards. Of course, these reasons are not completely dissimilar in that the reason for each has to do with the subject’s own internal attitude. One only waters a tree that one has planted if one wishes to see it grow or stay alive, in which case having planted the tree (which implies wanting it to survive) also becomes the reason for watering it. In the shop one only pays for something because one wishes to act in accord with social or economic rules, and thereby having picked out a product becomes a reason for paying. This type of attitude or commitment is not always apparent or conscious, Here we can see that the reasons for actions can be based on either natural laws or social norms that are linked to the internal attitude or commitments of the subject.

Reasons, Causes And Action

41

To look at it more abstractly, according to the above view, the connection between reasons and action is sometimes only apparent through retracing it. Certain actions provide reasons for later actions, while the initial action itself has other reasons. This type of looking back can be done indefinitely. Looking at actual manifestations, different things or affairs are certainly connected to history or the past, which is expressed in examination of the relationship between the past and present. One can thus always look backwards to find the origin of a specific action; that action always occurs in the context of a certain background. The integration of this background with the origin of an action comprises the concrete source of the action in question. Elements of history are thus functional aspects in this type of process and therefore, in theory; the investigation of the reasons for an action can be traced back endlessly. Metaphysically speaking, this succession of elements in action is related to internal as well as external factors. The internal ones require us to pay attention to the history of an action, while the external demands that we look at the actual background while investigating action. At the same time, the subject is often the direct source of action. Various historical connections come together in the subject to cause an action, while the source of the action corresponds to the actual existence of the subject. In this sense, looking for the source of reasons for an action is not necessarily an endless project. It can be limited to looking at historical connections, and the actual existence of the subject. Reasons are not demonstrated as singular manifestations: rather they unfold as a structure that includes facts, the knowledge of facts, intentions, and goals. Above we saw that goals include the mutual integration between facts, norms, the relationship between acknowledgment of one’s own identity and the facts, natural laws, social norms, and one’s internal attitude or commitments. These various aspects demonstrate that reasons for action are characterized by a systematic and structural nature. For example, there can be many reasons for bringing an umbrella when one leaves the house. It may already be raining, in which case bringing an umbrella is based on knowledge (that it is raining), or a certain type of intention or desire (e.g. to stay dry). But, again, the fact that it is raining does not comprise the reason for bringing the umbrella. Neither pure knowledge (that it is raining) nor intention (keeping dry) usually constitute the entire reason for action. The reason for bringing an umbrella is comprised of several elements. Firstly that it is raining, secondly that the subject confirms that it is raining, and thirdly that they have the intention of not getting wet. So the reason for the action here includes facts, knowledge, and desire or intent. The mutual connection between these elements is demonstrated as a single

42

chapter 2

structure.6 Here we need to differentiate between reasons for action that have an actual basis and ones that do not. Logically speaking, beliefs or desires that are not based on facts can also become reasons for action. For example, one may think or believe that it will rain and therefore use this as a reason to bring an umbrella when one leaves the house. Reasons that are not facts themselves are often not founded on sources in reality and thereby differ from reasons that have their source in actuality (i.e. facts). These two types of reasons exist equally, yet they give action different qualities. Reasons that lack a source in actuality are often ineffective or unreasonable. In the example above, when it is not raining or will not rain, and yet one brings an umbrella anyway because one believes or thinks it will rain and one does not want to get wet, we can say that the act of bringing the umbrella, at least in terms of its function, is ineffective. Similarly, if a teacher wrongly thinks that the time is up and collects the tests early, this is, in some sense, unreasonable. Reasons also include a temporal element. As discussed before, the relationship between reasons and actions is that the former provides the foundation for the latter. To this end, reasons themselves are not only based on present manifestations of the world or human beings, but are also involved in their potential development in the future. And the fact that reasons consider both the present situation as well as the future is what makes actions rational. The rational subject cannot merely seek to please a present desire as a reason for action and completely ignore the potential dangers it may carry or bring about in the future. If someone clearly understands that a certain type of action (consuming narcotics, for example) will harm them in the future, and yet still chooses to make their desire the reason for action, then there is something irrational about this reason. Here we are looking at how time plays an important role in action. The relationship between the desire for a certain action and that action’s potential results accounts for some of the concrete connotations of the reasons for action. The reasons for action also include an element of generation or production. Reasons for action are related to the specific situation, and involve the subject’s understanding of that situation as well as their internal desires and intentions. The specific situation as well as the subject’s desires and intentions are not immutable. They are, rather, in a constant state of change, which means that the reasons for action that are connected to them are also generative and changeable. The mutual interaction and integration between the specific 6 As mentioned above, the theory of action often explains reasons (for action) as desire combined with belief. And in some sense this type of explanation involves the structural nature of reasons for action.

Reasons, Causes And Action

43

situation and the subject’s understanding, intentions, and desires is what provides reasons for action. All of this occurs in concrete processes in one’s actual life. In fact, the individual’s language and behavior themselves also provide the precondition for reasons (for action). For example, when an individual makes a commitment to another individual this commitment often comprises reasons for further action. The commitment means that one “has a reason” or should carry out one’s word. This type of commitment is not the same as the more hidden one that we discussed earlier, but is conscious and observable as a language act. Here we touch on the relationship between language acts and actual behavior in terms of the agent’s creative role in the generation of reasons for action. 2.2

The Multiple Orientations of Action

Motivations are one of the most important media through which reasons influence action. I will now discuss the difference between reasons and motivations. In terms of their relationship, reasons themselves can be investigated internally or externally. The “inside” indicates an individual’s inner desires and wants, whereas the “outside” refers to external facts, such as social institutions, principles, norms etc. After the individual forms a desire, it can provide an internal reason for action. However, although logically speaking, desire certainly provides an internal basis for reasons (for action) having a certain reason based on desire does not necessarily mean it will be carried out in action. Similarly, external facts can also provide reasons for action, as in the case mentioned above: the fact that it is raining can provide the reason for bringing an umbrella. General rules or norms can also become an individual’s reason for doing something. For example, traffic rules comprise the reasons for choosing certain ways of driving or walking across the street. Facts of the situation, general rules, and norms are all external to the individual, and as reasons or foundations for action they maintain an external quality. But as mentioned above, this is not necessarily enough to direct action, even though it can provide a basis. Compared with reasons, motives have a more direct influence over actions. They are internal and include many different aspects. Firstly, there are goals. In terms of reasons, goals have to give action some direction or be conscious in order to be intelligible. However, the role goals play in motivations is much different. They are more directly expressed in value connotations. Whether or not a motivation is appropriate depends on its related goals and their qualities. Motivations also connect with self-reflection, whose function is mainly

44

chapter 2

demonstrated by the way an individual decides on their desires. Whenever desires are integrated with motivations, they go through a kind of “filter”; this is how self-reflection differs from simple desires, by introducing a conscious element. Another important aspect of motivation is intention. Desires and motivation themselves already include intentionality. In motivation, desires, and intentions are mutually integrated with one another. This means that motivations themselves have intentionality and a drive to make the subject act. Here we can see that goals, reflection, and desires link up with intention to form actual content. Motivations comprise this inner drive to act, and provide specific guidance for action. Speaking to the relationship between reasons, motivations and action, whereas reasons provide the formal basis for actions, motivations drive action in a more substantial way. In the process of implementation, the way that reasons influence action is usually by becoming motivations. This process is similar to the way that desires become motivations. Reasons can be initiated by desires but desires themselves cannot be directly equated with motivations. Desires become motivations after self-reflection and judgment. This includes decisions made concerning values, and rational investigation. For example, fame and wealth do not have any intentionality (though they do have desirability), but logically speaking they can become the reasons for choosing certain actions. But for moral individuals, desires such as money or prestige do not easily become motivations. Kongzi 孔子 (d. 479 b.c.e.) (or, Confucius) expresses this when he says, “Wealth and honor obtained through unrighteousness are but floating clouds to me.”7 Similarly, going to Mars is a very attractive idea for some people and can even become a desire. However, on the basis of current technology, even if this desire is held, it cannot easily become an actual motivation because interplanetary travel is presently impossible. These situations, the one mention by Kongzi and going to Mars, are quite different from one another, yet they both involve the relationship between reasons based on desires and actual motivations. They also both include value judgments and rational considerations, which make up the preconditions for reasons becoming motivations. In everyday life we can see the difference between merely “wanting to do something” and “actually deciding to do something.” The former is often based on desire while the latter on actual motivations for action. “Wanting to do something” can provide some sort of internal reason for action; however, it is not the same as “actually deciding to do something.” The desire that fuels 7 Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 32.

Reasons, Causes And Action

45

“wanting to do something” can only become an actual motivation for action after it becomes “actually deciding to do something.” The conclusion of the transformation from “wanting to do something” to “actually deciding to do something” is what is mentioned above as a process of evaluation and rational consideration. Here it is easy to see that desires and reasons are quite different from actual motivations for action. Reasons based on desire are internal, whereas their external forms are usually linked to social values, or norms. Whether or not these reasons become actual motivations is dependent upon a number of factors. General principles definitely provide reasons or foundations for action; however, when these principles are merely external forms, they do not inspire action. It is only when these principles are consciously known and understood, and also confirmed, accepted, and acknowledged that they influence an individual’s actions. As opposed to merely understanding or knowing principles, their confirmation, acceptance, and acknowledgment permeates into an individual’s attitude and outlook, which includes their being adopted on an emotional level and being taking on by the will. Part of the process of taking on by the will is the connection from “I think” to “I want.” “I think” is largely a mental activity, whereas “I want” is not only mental but also becomes an direction for activity that is not necessarily self-conscious or self-aware. (This issue will be readdressed in chapter 8.) General principles only lose their externality through being accepted emotionally, or decided on by the will, which involves the transition from “I think” to “I want.” In this way the boundary between the agent and general principles can be crossed. In other words, these principles become internalized. In terms of the relationship between reasons and motivations, this means that reasons are based on general principles that are transformed by being oriented at specific motivations to act. But the internalization and transformation are really just two aspects of the same process.8 Here we can see that only after reasons for actions have transformed into motivations can they entice action, but this rests on specific conditions. Reasons can be based on desires. However, as reasons systematically unfold, desires do not make up the entirety of their content. As mentioned above, the desire to gain fame or wealth often provides a certain type of internal reason for choosing specific types of action. The issue here is not just the unification of desires and beliefs, but also desires themselves as the content of reasons as 8 This process of transformation is related to what we have called the above “the concretization of duties.” The trend or orientation of reasons for general principles becoming motivations for specific actions, and norms being being united with the consciousness of the individual and it’s concretization as specific duties, are the same.

46

chapter 2

well as self-reflection and examination. These types of rational investigations and evaluations or judgments comprise the preconditions for reasons becoming motivations. Analogously, reasons based on general principles also require certain conditions if they are to become motivations. These include rationality and acknowledgement as well as choice and acceptance. Bernard Williams famously discusses the difference between external and internal reasons. He proposes that internal reasons are related to feelings and subjective motivations, whereas external reasons have to do with rational consideration. Williams also argues that an agent’s “subjective motivational set” can help initiate reasons for action. However, he includes desires as a form of reason.9 This assumption has led many scholars to overlook the difference between desires and actual motivations, and even to become suspicious about the external nature of reasons. In other words, some have become doubtful about whether or not rational considerations can become motivations for action.10 From this latter perspective Williams argues that without entering the agent’s “subjective motivational sets” pure rational beliefs cannot directly entice or bring about action. However, it is important to note that when the agent has rationally grasped certain principles, they remain external unless they are incorporated into these “subjective motivational sets.” And yet there is no fixed boundary for what counts as being internal or external from the perspective of the sets themselves. Rational beliefs, emotional acknowledgment, and intentional choices are not mutually exclusive. So it is difficult to guarantee that so-called external reasons remain outside of motivations. In terms of implementing our morality, when ethical norms are external for the individual, they do not become motivations for action. But if the individual emotionally acknowledges these norms, and chooses or accepts them, they are (at least to some extent) integrated with the individual’s motivation for action. Consequently, when the individual acts according to these ethical norms, they are demonstrating their internal choice of motivation. From a more substantial point of view, reasons for action involve more than just the issue of whether or not they are internally recognized. As mentioned above, internal reasons or the internal dimension of reasons is connected to the individual’s desires and wants, and thereby is voluntary. When reasons are based on desires, they provide the voluntary precondition for action. And although these desire-based reasons go through the individual’s rational selfreflection in order to become motivations, they are at the same time adopted 9 10

Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 103. Ibid., 101–103.

Reasons, Causes And Action

47

voluntarily. Here, the transformation into motivation and action gaining a voluntary property are somewhat similar. The external dimension of reasons can be seen as providing the basis for actions that originate in general norms or principles. After these principles or norms are known and understood, they provide action with a foundation. William Frankena argues that obligation is independent from the agent’s desires.11 In the moral sphere, duty becomes acknowledged through general norms. Formally speaking, general norms can be disputed by the individual on an important point—the former have an external quality that, when they become the source of action, provide reasons and produce external manifestations. The knowledge and understanding of general principles and norms is expressed as a type of rational self-consciousness, which means that action itself takes on the quality of self-consciousness. The transformation from reasons for action based on external norms to actual motivations has rational comprehension, as well as emotional identification and acceptance as its preconditions. However, these types of reasons regulate the self-conscious nature of action in some ways. Norms involve the way things should be—which (as discussed above) usually take duty as their content when implemented. Similarly, comprehending and taking on one’s duty can also be seen as a reason for action. If the individual takes on a certain duty they then have reasons to act on that duty; and this is another way that action includes self-consciousness. When implemented solely on the basis of internal desires, actions are selfconscious, but they can often remain at least somewhat irrational (this can clearly be seen when something is done solely based on a desire deemed “impulsive”). When actions are completely based on knowledge and understanding of universal norms and principles, their process is rational, though not always voluntary.12 If we say that the connection between internal desires and reasons provides preconditions for voluntary trends in action, then reasons based on universal principles or norms have a self-conscious connotation as well. And this provides a guarantee that, to some extent, action is self-conscious. Here 11 12

William Frankena, “Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy,” in Perspective on Morality, ed. K. Goodpaster (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 51. Here it is important to point out that there is a difference between internal willingness and pressure to do something. When someone lends a helping hand out of the goodness of their heart this is an internal willingness to act. And this is quite different from when someone is forced or pressured to help others. And even though in the latter situation one still is “willing” to do something, it is not the same type of willingness that comes solely from within. Perhaps one only helps others to protect their image or name, this is a type of willingness that comes from the external world and not from the individual’s own self, and it is not really voluntary in the same manner as the individual’s willingness.

48

chapter 2

it is easy to see that the most substantial question that emerges after the issue of external and internal properties of reason is whether or not action is in fact rational, self-conscious, and voluntary. Where reasons transform into motivations these issues are expressed in different ways. As mentioned, this transform into inner motivation for actions has rational self-reflection as its precondition, and the significance of this process is that rationality comes to guide or lead desires, also preventing desires from becoming irrational or impulsive. Similarly, emotional acknowledgment and voluntary acceptance are indispensable for reasons based on universal principles to become motivations for actual actions. This avoids simplifying action into self-consciously complying with rational principles, thereby also endowing actions with their voluntary characteristics. In other words, both the internal and external forms of reasons are expressed through the unification of rationality and irrationality, as well as consciousness and volition in the process of action. Internal and external forms of reasons can be investigated through their potential and their actual manifestations. Whether they are based on desire, universal principles or norms, reasons only have actual manifestations insofar as they dictate action. The possible manifestations of reasons involve aspects connected to formal dimensions as well. Formally speaking, the characteristics of these manifestations are expressed as the logical relationship between reasons and action. For example, if a certain food is healthy, then its benefit for people is a fact. Assuming everyone wants to be healthy, they should eat it. The connection here is a type of logic. Accordingly, food has a function, and becomes the reason for action (i.e. choosing or eating). This type of reason is based on formal deduction. Logically, it can become the reason for action or possible reason for action (although it is not necessarily the actual reason for action.) In the above-mentioned example, if the healthy food does not taste good then people will not necessarily choose it, so its health benefits do not become an actual reason for action. Similarly, if an individual develops a specific desire that some certain action can realize, logically speaking, the person will be likely to choose that action. Of course, if there is some sort of conflict between this reason (the desire) and the person’s beliefs or value principles, then the action may not be implemented. The reasons for actions in the above situations include internal and external dimensions. Externally, facts are the preconditions for reasons and the internal form can be seen as reasons based on wants. Looking at the function of reasons for actions, it is worth noting that they contain the relationship between potential and actual manifestations. The possible manifestations provide the basis for the actual ones and are related to formal logical reasoning, while at the same time representing the orientation for action. This also provides a

Reasons, Causes And Action

49

space for the unfolding of action, but whether or not such reasons will actually be accepted as a source for action is unpredictable. It is this uncertainty that accounts for the face that action can have a variety of potential orientations. A reason’s transition from possible to the actual is concretely related to the interaction between rational investigation, emotional acknowledgment, and voluntary acceptance. 2.3

Interpretations of Action and Norms

The process of action does not only relate to reasons but also to causes. The relationship between causes and reasons is a complex one. In some respects, reasons provide the primary basis for understanding action. But on a deeper level, the difference between reasons and causes is also important for understanding the relationship between actions and their normative significance. In terms of the relationship between reasons and action, reasons are the basis of action and also the prerequisite for deduction, which is connected to demonstration or proof. We can also look at whether or not there is a reason for a given action, and this determines whether or not it can be understood as intelligible. Actions without reasons are usually irrational. Reasons themselves must have some rational characteristics. This clarifies the potential divergence between rational explanation and action. Further, when we say that an individual has reasons for acting as they do, we are, at the same time, confirming that there is a rational explanation or way to interpret their action. Looked at from another perspective, the rational explanation of an action provides a medium for its interpretation because, as Donald Davidson writes, “justifying and explaining an action so often go hand in hand.”13 There are different ways to interpret the specific connotations of the reasons for action, which may themselves be different from one another as well. But it cannot be denied that there is an internal link between why an action occurs and the reasons for action. If the reasons for an action are revealed and explicated then this is a confirmation of the rationality of the reasons, and a type of interpretation for why the action occurred. Joseph Raz’s understanding is definitely based on this type of relationship between reasons and actions.14 Logically, an interpretation of an action depends on the fact of the action having already occurred. Only after an action has actually taken place can 13 14

Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays, Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). Joseph Raz, Practical Reasoning (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 2.

50

chapter 2

interpretations be formed. At the same time, reasons provide the basis for interpreting something that has already happened and they are also are significant as the prior incentives for the occurrence of any action. The question of why an action has occurred is related to the cause of action. This also involves the relationship between actions and their reasons, but is a somewhat distinct issue. Causes include various elements that entice action, and reasons make up some of these elements. As mentioned above, reasons are comprised from different concepts (such as wants, beliefs, accepted principles) as well as non-conceptual elements (e.g. external facts). And they have influences on different­parts or aspects of reasons and limit what kind of actions will actually be carried out. So the function of reasons here is significant for causes. In terms of actual manifestations reasons and causes are quite intimately connected. Davidson has already made a quite detailed investigation of the connection between reasons and causes. According to him using reasons to explain actions is a type of rationalization, a type of “cause and effect” understanding. He explicates two important aspects of reasons. Firstly, they provide an attitude that maintains a certain type of action (here reasons can include wants, needs, impulses, and goals). Secondly, he asserts that beliefs also belong to this category of “primary reasons.” Further, Davidson writes that “The primary reason for an action is its cause.”15 The type of attitudes and beliefs mentioned here are related to mental activities—the appropriateness of which also rests on the assertion that the content of these activities can actually become causes for action. For actual manifestations reasons for action have logical significance and mental content. While the former are linked to the process of interpretation and deduction (since reasons provide them with a logical basis), the latter are expressed in the concrete unfolding of action (with concepts constituting the internal causes for action). Unfortunately, Davidson mainly focuses on the interpretive significance of reasons and his account of the relationship between reasons and causes is chiefly focused on interpretation. These points of focus appear to be based on the view that rationalization is a type of cause-effect interpretation. Understanding is important for interpretation, and as far as action is concerned the most important question is how to understand action. Davidson’s theory about action is, in a broad sense, related to the approach taken by analytic philosophers. In fact, in action theory this are is often oriented towards interpretation and understanding. Normativity is mentioned in this context, however the “norms” described therein are not those that substantially initiate or limit action. Instead they are often simply restricted to normative language or concepts and how best to use 15

Donald Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays.

Reasons, Causes And Action

51

them. But the issue remains at the level of linguistic interpretation. But in terms of their real—world existence and consequences, human actions are not just about understanding or interpretation—one is also faced with real normative problems in this substantive sense. The problem is therefore that interpretations of action are focused on grasping actions logically, and here reasons for actions provide a logical basis for interpretation. As actual guides for action, it is rather practical norms that determine the reasons involving the issues of what to do and how to do it. The relationship between reasons and causes occurs at a deep level. Taking reasons as the causes for action as an interpretive pattern, reasons can be understood as being the basis for an action’s occurrence. Accordingly, one only has to comprehend the reasons for an action in order to logically interpret said action. Although this model includes causes, these are basically identified with reasons. The occurrence of an action is seen as coming from a certain reason, which contains a supportive attitude (including wishes, needs, goals etc.) and certain beliefs. In other words wishes, needs, and goals, along with beliefs, are the special content of reasons that can bring about action. The interaction between the various wishes, needs, goals, and beliefs constitute reasons that lead to various types of corresponding actions. Here actions are mainly involved with appropriateness and its, often problematic relationship, with various forms of desire. The appropriateness of reasons regulates the appropriateness of corresponding actions. The ability to assure the appropriateness of action then, at least in some respects, is about guiding wishes, goals, value concepts, and rational beliefs themselves. This involves being conscious of what occurs in the formation of the historical background, as well as consciousness itself in its process of self-reflection, and evaluation. And this already extends beyond the ground of reasons. In other words, from the perspective of action, norms contribute to motivation only after reasons, and in this secondary sense they become internal causes that bring about or limit action. But reasons themselves can only form the most basic foundation for action. In deciding on what action should be done one must also face the issue of being appropriate in terms of social structures and norms. Another issue that cannot be ignored for a theory of action is how reasons can come to guide action in a way that is in accordance with norms. In other words, how does, or can, desire become normatively appropriate? And this guidance goes beyond the realm of reasons to include the broader backgrounds for and the more complex internal conditions for action. Similarly, this involves the issue of how to make the individual wishes, goals, value concepts, and beliefs sturdy enough in their relationship with one another to concrete historical background and various other necessary foundations. We can readily find this in everyday experience.

52

chapter 2

For example, in shopping malls we often find numerous advertisements, which can inculcate a desire to spend money in some people. This provides the context in which this type of desire can turn into action. The historical background for these advertisements is a specific time, social background, and set of values to which they conform, and which allows them to influence people’s ideas. Taking revolutionary periods as another example, the specific historical and social settings instigate the formation of certain ideas that can produce a strong influence on reasons for action. When hotheaded young people sometimes choose to sacrifice their lives for a revolution or similar activity, their reasons for doing so are often governed by the historically situated intellectual environment or atmosphere of the time. We can see that reasons for action are often demonstrated as a complex system of contributing factors. In the process of actualizing action, reasons and causes permeate and integrate with one another to comprise a broad influence. The interpretation of all things as causes in the process of action includes reference to a broadly inclusive interpretation of causal relationships and their related concepts. The cause-and-effect relation is the necessary connection between things and affairs. Hume looks at this issue empirically and argues that the cause-and-effect link is based on a mental habit formed on the basis of our perception of a sequence of phenomenon. For Kant, cause-and-effect is an a priori concept that conditions the possibility of all empirical phenomena, therefore making causality universally necessary. So whereas for Hume, the relationship between cause-and-effect has to do with empirical things themselves, for Kant it is a necessary a priori law conditioning that empirical reality. The two therefore have their own respective views on cause-and-effect which approach different angles of this topic. However, for our purposes, it appears that analyzing the relationship between reasons and causes will be necessary for comprehending cause-and-effect in the specific context of action. Investigating cause-and-effect from the perspective of action requires an analysis of the relationship between agents and causes. Interpreting something that has already happened is always done from the perspective of an onlooker and the derivation of causes for action is also based on the investigator. Broadly speaking, there are two perspectives in various situations: on the one hand, agents often believe themselves to have reasons to do something, or, when explaining why an agent did something, an onlooker or interpreter affirms certain reasons for it. The former case involves the agent themselves, while the latter is an explanation given by others. The interpretation of the causes is based on observation, and that of internally experienced reasons is based on the agent. In this way the the two positions are inherently connected, as they are both the subject’s perspective. The type of analysis conducted by

Reasons, Causes And Action

53

analytic philosophers is usually limited to looking at the relationship between reasons and actions, or actions and cause-effect relations, from the standpoint of this external objective investigation or that of the observer.16 But in the process of actualizing actions, the real meaning of reasons is not only that from the perspective of an investigator or observer, but also of the subjective experience of the actual participant. Being a participant is what provides the possibility of action, and is arguably the central influence on the development of action. Through one’s own knowledge and action one can produce certain concepts and affairs, which themselves can become causes, and can thus further influence and/or restrain later actions. Based on these dimensions agents and causes should form the preconditions for investigations of the reasons for actions. Reasons for limiting actions (including the individual’s desires, goals, value ideas, and beliefs, which are the condition of the individual’s history) and action norms are based on the fact that the agent is rarely an investigator of the causes of action. The individual is the participant, functioning as a cause himself or herself. It is evident then that the multiple dimensions of being both an investigator and participant are essential for grasping the causeeffect relation in the process of action. By participating in and influencing action, the agent also enters into the realm of causality. Causes can include event-causation and agent-causation. The former is the influence that external things have on action, while the latter is the way the agent’s own desires, goals, and beliefs impact action. Both serve to guide or limit actions. In their concrete process, actions are never purely external, nor do they ever originate directly from the agent’s own ideas. The tendency in action theory towards simply looking at agent-causation therefore often cannot escape a wayward understanding, while event-causation (alone) has difficultly in comprehending autonomy and subjective meaning. In the actual process of action, objective factors restrain the individual’s from potential waywardness, and agent-causation limits the externality of affairs. The interaction between event-causation and agent-causation shows the unification of causality and autonomy in the process of action. It also allows for multiple 16

Analytic philosophy does mention “first-person authority,” but this is mainly focused on the individual’s mental conception of themself, conscious or conceptual descriptions, and interpretation. Logically, if the focus is solely on description and interpretation, then one does not concentrate on whether or not they should choose a certain type of action, or how to do it. The question is merely, “do I have sufficient reasons for choosing this type of action?” But we are compelled to ask: if this is all that is investigated, then what type of relationship exists between the individual’s desires, beliefs and reasons? After all, this type of concern begins from a logical analysis of the relationship between actions and their reasons, and has not left the perspective of the onlooker.

54

chapter 2

causes to expand beyond their theoretical or potential forms and become concretely manifest. Agent-causation involves the relationship between reasons, motives and causes. The agent’s initiation of action is firstly expressed through the relationship between reasons and actions. As mentioned, it is only after reasons transform into the agent’s motivations that they function to instigate action. Here we must distinguish between actual or true reasons and non-actual or erroneous ones. In some situations an individual can announce that they have done something for certain reasons, but this is not necessarily their actual or truthful reasons. Tautologically speaking, only reasons that are the true reasons are ever the true motivations for action. When reasons are not “true reasons” they cannot become motivations, and it is of course logically impossible for them to become influential causes for human action. Here we can see that in order for reasons to have the quality of a cause and motivation they are also, at least in themselves prior to interpretation, truthful in this straightforward sense. Confucianism differentiates between actions done “for others” and those done “for oneself.” Actions done for others are praised by others and are in accordance with moral norms. Those done for oneself are actualizations of one’s own moral principles. When the orientation is towards oneself, there exists a tension between reasons and motivations. The agent’s true motivations are praised if the reasons for action that they express are concentrated on moral principles. Therefore, if acting “for oneself” is the goal, reasons and motivations are united. In acting for others, complying with external moral principles only has a formal significance for the reasons for action. Their function is to provide a logical explanation. In acting for oneself, reasons are motivations and become the inner cause for action. Here we can see that simply concentrating on interpretation makes it difficult to grasp the actual relationship between reasons and causes.

chapter 3

On the Weakness of Will From the perspective of the unfolding of the process of action, reasons and causes are intimately connected to the ground and source of an action’s occurrence. Negatively speaking, actions are often faced with the problem of the weakness of will.1 In terms of the relationship between knowledge and action, weakness of will can be expressed as “not doing what one knows they should do,” or as “not stopping when one knows that they should.” It can also be understood in terms of the tension between reason (rationality) and desires. In metaphysical terms, weakness of will is ontologically conditioned by the various possibilities at a person’s disposal. In other words, the various possibilities and contingencies in a situation have an important role to play in any analysis or understanding of the weakness of will. To understand and respond to the weakness of will demands dealing with each these various issues. This chapter will also look closely at overcoming the weakness of will. 3.1

Desires, Emotions2 and Rationality

Donald Davidson characterizes the weakness of will by saying that, “An agent’s will is weak if he acts, and acts intentionally, counter to his own best judgment.”3 One’s best judgment can be rationally inferred. It is not something that one can become spontaneously conscious of, nor is it an irrational impulse. Rather, it is founded on self-reflection, comparison, and evaluations. When something is done that is not in alignment with a good judgment, it means that in some sense there is a departure from rational consciousness. The question then becomes, why do something that is not accord with rational judgment? Or, why do rational demands fail to be implemented in action? 1 This concept can be traced back to what the ancient Greeks called akrasia. Akrasia can mean “lack of strength or power,” or the lack of ability to control something, which is why it can be understood as “weakness.” (Also see David Pears, Motivated Irrationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 23) In current philosophical discourse weakness of will is also discussed in relation to rationality and to rational elements in the process of action (and moral action in particular). 2 Translator’s note: The author does not distinguish between emotions and feelings, so the terms will be used interchangeably throughout this chapter. 3 Davidson, Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays, 21.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004321786_004

56

chapter 3

These issues are primarily determined by the relationship between rationality and desire in the process of action. The implementation of action is always influenced by human consciousness and this is what differentiates it from mechanical or “automatic” bodily movement. The structure of human consciousness includes both rational and irrational aspects, which serve to restrict action in different ways. Rational judgments certainly provide reasons for action, but these reasons do not necessarily become actual motivations. In fact, when desires become intense enough, rational judgments are often pushed aside by consciousness, making it difficult for them to be realized in the process of action. Taking an example from everyday life, the practice of smoking is often understood as having some type of value. For instance, some believe that smoking calms one down or that it is “cool” or fashionable. However, from the standpoint of health, smoking is extremely harmful to one’s body. When people come to know this fact, and realize that it does more harm than good, they often believe that they should or will quit smoking. This is a rational judgment or valuation. But when someone’s desire to smoke is extremely strong they will smoke despite the fact that they are conscious of its harmful effects. Here we see that desires can sometimes overcome rationality. Desires can proactively dominate rational judgments, or it can negate them. We can also look at the example of harmful actions in society. Someone could consider very carefully and comprehensively a plan to steal or rob, and then decide to carry it out, only to give up the plan upon realizing that the consequences may include an investigation and therefore the possibility of getting caught. The considerations and plans that such a person makes are rational activities and the fear of being chased or prosecuted is a type of emotion (including desires, i.e. the desire not to get caught or go to jail). Making a plan based on evaluation and judgment, only to later change one’s mind based on fear, is a second case where rationality is being dominated by emotions (again related to desires). From the perspective of values, not quitting smoking and giving up a plan to commit robbery are substantially different. The former includes a decision that was positive, but then overruled and turned out to be a negation of a particular action. The second is the opposite, where a negative decision is overturned by a positive one, resulting in a positive action. So we can see that the faculty of desire or emotion can have a similar function, while having different significance in terms of value. When desires prevail over rationality, in some sense we can say that the weakness of will is being expressed as a weakness of rationality. Irrational (or a-rational) desire and emotions, passions, or feelings are on the same level and the restrictions placed on rationality by desires in the process of action can be seen as something like what Hume called the priority of emotions

On The Weakness Of Will

57

over rationality. Hume’s basic understanding of the function of reason is as follows—“that reason is perfectly inert, and can never either prevent or produce any action or affection.”4 Contrary to this, happiness and other similar feelings are able to directly drive action: Nothing can be more real, or concern us more, than our own sentiments of pleasure and uneasiness; and if these be favourable to virtue, and unfavourable to vice, no more can be requisite to the regulation of our conduct and behaviour.5 The distinction between happy and unhappy emotions is linked to the affirmation or denial of desires. Taking this as the only condition for action, would mean that desire (outside of rationality) forms the foundational motivation for action. Although this is related to the issue of good or bad actions, it also includes a general interpretation of the process of action. It is not difficult to see that although Hume did not discuss the weakness of will directly, his theory on the relationship between rationality, desires, and actions relates in an important way to the issue of weakness of will. The ­actual process of action is more complex than Hume assumes, it involves rational analysis, comparison, weighing issues, judgments and so on, which are also related to irrational desires and feelings. The question of how rational evaluations can change human action must therefore be based on the interaction between the rational and the irrational. In instances where there is a tension or conflict between rational judgments and desires or emotional intentions, the ability of rational judgments to transform action is often obstructed. Whether or not rationality can overcome this obstruction depends on its own power, as well as the force behind the irrational tendency. For Hume, rationality has no initiative force, but this claim overlooks the motivational power of rationality itself. At the very least we can say that rational judgments are able influence the individual’s decisions, and that this can also serve to initiate action. Thereby, desires, emotions and other irrational aspects of consciousness often restrict rationality through their interaction with rational motivations. From the perspective of their actual manifestations, desires and feelings often demonstrate the quality of immediacy. Whether in the direct desire of an object or in the form of the happy or unhappy feelings that Hume talks about, our desires are characterized by an immediacy that is tied to immediate circumstances. In contrast, reason and rationality express an orientation towards the future. 4 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 458. 5 Ibid., 469.

58

chapter 3

Rational judgments often extend beyond our immediate desires to include the future possible outcomes of action. The quality of immediacy in immediate desires and feelings means that the actions they give rise to are chosen in a more direct manner. In this way, desires and feelings have a much more primal or intimate relation to human life and human existence. This present character is what allows desires and feelings to have a much stronger power in motivating action. The relationship between orientation to the present and orientation to the future also explains the conflicts between rational judgment and desires and feelings, where the latter often take precedence as motivations for action. Here, the “weakness” of rationality or its lack of power, and the strength of desire or emotions form two different temporal aspects of the same motivational process.6 The weakness of will is connected with the issues of formal and substantial rationality. In terms of the latter, the mutual involvement of rational judgments and value judgments is expressed as an identity between the two (in other words, they are often not differentiated). Affirming that a type of action is good or beneficial or another type of action is bad or harmful is a type of value judgment. It is on the basis of this type of evaluation that doing what is considered good or beneficial, and rejecting what has been called bad or harmful is considered a way of acting in accord with rational values. If one decides that something that is good or beneficial, but chooses the bad or harmful option, the choice is evaluated as an irrational one. With this understanding we can say that when smoking is rationally affirmed as harmful, but emotions or desires overcome this judgment and one continues to smoke, the impotence of rationality or weakness of will is expressed. (In this example the weakness of will and impotence of rationality overlap, but the power of desire is also at work. Weakness of will itself can be manifest in other forms, as will be expressed below.) When desires have taken the reins actions we are often faced with a problem of autonomy. When actions express the desires of the agent this seems to demonstrate autonomy, at least formally. But, as Kant points out, when the agent is directly influenced by desires or impulses, we can say that their actions have been decided prior to an autonomous decision (since they are entirely controlled by said desires and impulses). This makes it difficult for there to be truly autonomous action that is motivated by direct desire. In this way, when 6 What I’m talking about here, in a broad sense, is the weakness of will. As mentioned above when speaking of the future, the internal quality of the weakness of will is a lack of a certain type of power to control. When desires, or feelings are stronger then rationality we find weakness of will in the process of action.

On The Weakness Of Will

59

desires form the fundamental motivation for action, it is difficult for them to escape the apparent contradiction between formal autonomy and the substantial absence of autonomy. In terms of the actual (complex) process of action, individual choices include a variety of different value positions and orientations. Looking at these orientations, the individual can give priority to desires, or to the value of rational judgments. These different value preferences usually delimit the individual’s decisions. If rational judgments are given a higher value then when there is a tension between the rational and irrational (or desires), the individual will often do what is rational.7 孟子 (d. 289 BCE) writes that the ideal person is, one whose heart cannot be dissipated by the power of wealth and honors, who cannot be influenced by poverty or humble stations, who cannot be subdued by force and might.8 On the other hand, if desires are given an evaluative preference, when there is a tension between desires and rational judgments the individual is likely to be swayed by the former. These evaluative preferences explain the difficulty of implementing rational judgments. Here we can see that in the process of action when desires become a guiding force (through evaluative preference) we have an expression of the weakness of will. Ontologically, the relationship between rationality and desires or feelings (irrationality) also involves the difference between the mind and body. As opposed to the mind, the body is expressed as an emotional existence, and desires are its most primal form of expression. Desires for food, clothing and shelter are all based on affective existence. Hume’s discussion of happy and unhappy emotions is another expression of this type of existence. From this understanding of the body we can see that it is directly linked to human desire and affectivity. The mind, contrary to the body, is more involved with thinking and analysis, or other types of rational activity. As two related aspects of human existence the body and mind are not parallel existences, but are constantly engaged in an interactive process. In some respects the function of the mind is to make the body express more than just its natural state. But the 7 Translator’s note: In some sense being “rational” means going beyond immediate desires. According to Yang Guorong there are at least two levels of rationality, one defined in terms of values, and the other logical. In his book The Mutual Cultivation of Self and Things: The Genesis of a World of Meaning he gives a detailed discussion of the conditions that define rationality. 8 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 72.

60

chapter 3

body’s primary position also means there to be a closer tie between desires or feelings and human tendencies in the process of action. As previously stated, the more powerful status of emotional existence is connected with the immediacy of desires and feelings. Their respective functions also interact and overlap with one another. This type of interaction not only serves to intensify the influence that desires and feelings have over action, but it also serves to demarcate the possible functions of rationality. It is clear from what has been said that the weakness of will in the process of action expresses the relative strength of desires, emotions and other types of irrationality, which also implies the relative weakness of rationality, although it is not thereby limited. This is also, in some sense, an expression of Hume’s distinction between emotions and rationality, where Hume’s idea that rationality has absolutely no active role can also be explained in terms of the relative impotence of rationality. The relative weakness of rationality is directly connected to the immediacy of desires and emotions, as well as their intimate relationship with bodily existence. This is what allows them to exert a strong influence over action and is also what demarcates the comparative weakness of rational motivation. In the process of action, this weakness of rationality often leads the actions themselves towards irrationality. Furthermore, the potential shifts in power and influence between rationality and affective existence are based on different value orientations. Although desires and feelings have an immediacy and directness that often gives them priority, whether or not desires and emotions can actually take an authoritative position is often determined by value orientation. Ontologically speaking, the distinction between rationality and irrationality involves the relationship between the body and the mind. The body privileges bodily desires and emotions, and forms the basis of their immediacy, and this limits the possibility for rational judgments to be implemented in action. 3.2

The Distinction between Knowledge and Action

In another sense, on the conceptual level, the restraint imposed on rationality by desires and emotions is expressed in terms of weakness of will. As an internal orientation in the process of action, the weakness of will involves more than the simple form of consciousness or basic conceptuality. In terms of rationality, it functions at the level of knowledge and evaluation. Whereas knowledge is directed towards grasping facts, evaluative judgment takes values as its content. Understood broadly, the two both belong within the realm of knowledge. One form of the weakness of will is expressed when the agent

On The Weakness Of Will

61

knows and evaluates what they should do and how they should do it, and yet does not carry out this understanding. Here we see the internal connection between knowledge and action. The weakness of will speaks to their separation as knowing something, and even valuing something as good, without acting on it.9 In the history of philosophy a number of thinkers have been suspicious about the weakness of will or the separation between knowledge and action. Plato’s own perspective is representative of this. In the Protagoras he writes, Then if the pleasant is the good, no one who either knows or believes that there is another possible course of action, better than the one he is following, will ever continue on his present course when he might choose the better. To ‘act beneath yourself’ is the result of pure ignorance; to ‘be your own master’ is wisdom.10 According to this view, a person only does something they should not do because they do not know what they should do: if one knew what one should do one would do it. In other words, knowledge necessarily leads to action, and there are no instances in which one could know something, properly speaking, and not act on it. Looking at the relationship between knowledge and the weakness of will, Plato might argue that the weakness of will is actually a state of not genuinely knowing (which is why it does not correspond to action). Aristotle’s perspective on this point is quite similar to Plato’s. He writes, it will make a difference whether, when a man does what he should not, he has the knowledge but is not exercising it, or is exercising it; for the latter seems strange, but not the former.11 This so-called “not exercising it” just means that one does not genuinely hold this type of knowledge (it may seem that they do but they actually do not) and “exercising it” means that one genuinely has this type of knowledge. In other words, corresponding to Plato’s position, nobody actually knows something and then goes against it. 9

Robert Brandom calls this “knowing the better and doing the worse.” (Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 207) In some sense this perspective already understands the weakness of will and separation of knowledge and action. 10 Plato, The Collected Dialogues of Plato, Translated by Edith Hamilton (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 348–349. 11 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1040.

62

chapter 3

Aristotle differentiates between two kinds of reasons or causes for doing something that is bad or incorrect. In the first situation, he says that the agent has reasons based on universals and not specifics; in this way one’s actions may be in conflict with their knowledge.12 Although there is a tension between knowledge and action here, the inappropriateness of action is still based on a lack of appropriate knowledge. In the second situation, although the agent does have the appropriate type of knowledge they do not have the understanding to put this into action. For example, when someone is asleep, insane, or inebriated they may have a certain type of knowledge but not be able to use it or to adequately implement it in action.13 In this instance the agent may have knowledge but they may as well not have it due to their particular circumstances, so again this is also a type of lack of genuine knowledge (in a practical sense). When an agent is in either of these positions, they may find themselves doing what they know is incorrect, but this is not the same as the case of the weakness of will because the agent still does not have fully realizable and genuine knowledge. Aristotle also believes that the passions can strongly influence people, and that if someone is sleeping, crazed, or drunk, their anger and related impulses may not only control their body but can actually cause them to lose their wisdom.14 Therefore Aristotle’s understanding of the emotion’s ability to overcome rationality is quite similar Hume’s argument. However, compared to Hume’s affirmation of the emotions, Aristotle would rather emphasize their negative aspects. Aristotle’s claim is that even though an agent may know something, this type of knowledge is not always demonstrably realized.15 The logical precondition for both Plato and Aristotle’s view is that knowledge necessarily guides action. Accordingly, the understanding of facts and value judgments are completely in line with choices for action. If knowledge of facts and value judgments both count as knowledge, then choices for action bring about action, and knowledge necessarily guides action. This would mean that there is no way that the weakness of will can exist as “knowing what 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid., 1041. 14 Ibid. 15 Aristotle’s perspective on action is someone identified with akrasia. The original meaning of this term is that the subject lacks the power or lax control over something, in the type of situations that Aristotle mentions, including being crazy or drunk, the agent is unable to control their bodily actions because of how certain elements have restrained of them. These phenomena are related to the type of action expressed by akrasia. Accordingly, Aristotle denies the weakness of will, well granting a similar type of phenomenon, i.e. the type of action explained by akrasia.

On The Weakness Of Will

63

should be done but not doing it.” However, it is not difficult to see then that the relationship between knowledge and action is too simplified here. The understanding of facts and value judgments are connected to investigations of “What is it?” and “What does it mean?” The question “What is it?” involves the properties of the object, as well as action procedure. The second question, “What does it mean?” is related to the object and/or action’s value. In terms of factual knowledge, understanding “What is it?” does not naturally bring about action. Whether one grasps the object’s stipulations or properties, or one understands the methods or regulations of actions, this is all within the realm of “knowing.” But even if one completely acquires this type of knowledge, there is no guarantee that it will become action. Logically speaking, what something is does not connote what should be. Pure knowledge does not include a goal for action nor does it provide action with motivation, though it can comprise the precondition or conditions for the unfolding of action. However, if one stops at the level of pure knowledge itself, this condition or precondition cannot be realized in actuality. For knowledge of facts to turn into action there also needs to be goals, motivations, and desires in order to provide the appropriate conditions for motivation of action. It is therefore not difficult to see that the knowledge of facts itself does not necessarily bring about action. We can therefore see that the situation is much more complex, knowledge in this sense is not enough to motivate action. In terms of value judgments, the relationship between knowledge and action is a complex one. Taking the question of the meaning of value judgments as a focus point, value judgments are concentrated on ensuring that affairs and behaviors are given an evaluative meaning. The value of a thing or affair is connected to human needs or requirements. The judgment of an action’s value involves whether or not it is appropriate in this context. Positive value means that a thing or action is, in a broad sense, good. Logically, if something is affirmed as something humans should do, it has a positive value. As soon as a positive value judgment is made it also entails that the thing judged as positive should be actualized. Accordingly, one can say that good connotes what should be the case and that “What is good?” and “What should be done?” are implicitly connected to one another. From an alternative perspective we can say that only things that express positive value should be done, and that things that are negative should not be done. Although benefit and harm or good and bad value judgments connote and at the same time demand what should or should not be done respectively, there is still a difference between this and the form of knowledge that necessitate action. For example, in terms of moral practice, knowing what action is good does not guarantee that it will be carried out in the actual world. Often there is a logical gap between knowing what is right

64

chapter 3

and doing what is right. In the moral realm, weakness of will is often displayed as knowing what is right and knowing what should be done but not doing it. Here it is not difficult to see that there is a separation between knowledge, evaluations of activity and practice. Understanding and evaluation constitute knowledge in a broad sense, and do actually provide the conditions for the unfolding of action. But knowledge itself cannot constitute the sufficient condition for action. The transformation from knowledge to action includes external elements. In terms of factual knowledge, knowing the properties, laws, or relations of a thing or situation allows people to understand how or why something is what it is. This first order understanding can then be combined with certain goals or motivations to produce intentions or judgments about action that may lead to actual actions. For example, it is widely known that “fruit contains vitamins that human beings need” but this knowledge alone does not include any requirements for action. Only when this is combined with desires and motivations, such as “maintaining or increasing health,” can the knowledge be said to contribute to the intention that “one should eat fruits.” Strictly speaking, weakness of will cannot occur at the level of factual knowledge. So weakness of will—where someone knows what should be done and yet does not do it—is not possible. The situation at the evaluative level is dissimilar from that at the level of factual knowledge. Whereas factual knowledge engages in understanding how something is what it is or why it is so, evaluative knowledge engages in knowing what should be the case. This enterprise is much more intimately connected to human action. However, in the process of realizing actions, knowledge of what is and knowledge of what should be are often closely related. Although value assessments provide an important basis for choosing action, there is no way to guarantee that the action chosen is in line with the value judgment. In fact, the weakness of will often expressed when there is a tension between value judgments and chosen actions. This exemplifies the problem of knowing but not acting accordingly. Logically, whether or not something that is known can be transformed into actual action depends on emotional approval and willful acceptance or choice. In the previous example knowing that fruit is healthy and knowing that fruit contains essential vitamins are distinct. The latter is factual understanding whereas the former is a value assessment. So the former judgment includes the idea that one should eat fruit. But, if someone really dislikes the taste of fruit or does not care much for being healthy, although they recognize the fruit is healthy, they may not choose to eat it. In this case not liking the fruit is an emotional acknowledgment and the lack of care for being healthy relates to willful choice. Clearly, the development from knowing to acting on what is known is constrained by rational guidance as well as

On The Weakness Of Will

65

emotional acknowledgment and acceptance or choice by the will. However, as a form of the concrete manifestation of weakness of will “knowing but not acting accordingly” is based on a lack of emotional approval and or acceptance or choice by the will.16 3.3

The Metaphysical Dimension of Weakness of Will

As a type of phenomenon in the process of action, weakness of will not only involves rationality and desires, feelings, or other irrational aspects on the conceptual level, but also relates to the external circumstances in which knowledge and action interact. This means that weakness of will also involves the metaphysical dimension. The weakness of will has its own ontological precondition that is linked to space and time. There are a number of stages between the formation of value judgments and the choice of a particular action. But importantly, these stages always exist within a particular socio-historical environment. Value appraisals often provide reasons for a certain type of action, but these reasons are not necessarily connected to, nor do they always become, motivations. There is therefore a logical distinction to be made between reasons for actions and motivations for action (and temporal intervals are often involved here). Ontologically speaking, time is what provides the context that allows for the occurrence of the weakness of will in the process of action. Using smoking as an example, we often find that when an individual judges that smoking is harmful for the body their evaluation provides the basis for a certain type of action (namely, not smoking). However, due to a variety of possible causes, this type of reason may never become an actual motivation. The lack of unification between reasons in the realization of actual motivations for action is one form of weakness of will. There are many reasons that this lack of unity can occur, but the ontological precondition is that reasons and motivations exist at different times. If the reasons for actions and the actual motivations for actions coincided in time their divergence would be impossible.

16

Here it is not difficult to see that will and emotion have their own respective significance in the process of action. In terms of the relationship between rationality and emotions, when desires and feelings override rational thought this often leads to the weakness of will—that is, a relative powerlessness of rationality. And when emotional affirmation or the acceptance of the will is lacking, this leads to weakness of will, wherein one knows but does not act accordingly.

66

chapter 3

Relatedly, there is a temporal distinction between choosing or deciding on an action and the action itself. Even though an individual may have formed intentions regarding a certain action, and decided or chosen what to do, they may not implement it. This situation is often conceived in terms of a weakness of will. To continue with the example of smoking, after one has decided that smoking is harmful, reasoning may not turn into motivation, and one might not quit smoking. So decisions about action, prior to their implementation, do not necessarily equate with actions themselves. In the time between the decision and implementation of a decision in action there are diverse elements that may influence the individual to give up what they have decided on doing. For example, a person may simply change their mind and decide to do something else (and actually do the alternative). This phenomenon constitutes a change in the plan of action, and is not exactly the same as weakness of will. If an agent decides on something and then later changes their mind, but still believes that they should carry out the original plan, then this is a form of weakness of will. This can be called “deciding on something but not implementing it.” Additionally, based on the separation in time during the course of action, it is only when the temporal gap exists between the decision and the implementation of an action that we can see the weakness of well characterized by “deciding on doing something but then giving up.”17 For the agent, the importance of time expresses itself in the difference between presents desires and future considerations. Whether in relation to objective benefit and harm or subjective ideals or wishes, both have an immediacy that simultaneously involves the future. If the agent is only concerned with satisfying present desires or with harms and benefits in the here and now, they may overlook or ignore the future. In instances where rational considerations for the future and immediate desires are in conflict with one another, and the latter overcomes the former, there is no longer any basis for implementing choices made through rational consideration for the future. Again taking smoking as an example, the decision to quit smoking is based on longterm health considerations. But when the desire to smoke overcomes these considerations, the choice to give up smoking encounters a weakness of will. This involves the difference between rationality and desire but is also related to temporality, in terms of the present and future distinction.

17

This gap between intention and implementation has been noted by John Searle in his investigations on the process of action. But he does not give an account of time nor does he discuss the ontological significance of time intervals. (John Searle, Rationality in Action (Cambridge: mit Press, 2001)).

On The Weakness Of Will

67

The process of action does not develop in a vacuum but is based on actual existing circumstances or conditions. These circumstances always include multiple possibilities, which can unfold in a myriad of different orientations and at the same time they function so as to regulate the process of human action. After making a decision, or forming an intention or choice for a certain type of action, the individual is often faced with a variety of different possibilities. It is this wider context of possibility that provides the conditions for the agent to choose something other than what they had initially decided, chosen, or intended. In fact, the various possibilities in a situation are also internally connected to possible actions. When a willed action is not implemented this involves the interaction between rationality and irrationality, and is also based upon different actual possibilities. It is these possibilities that account for the possibility of “stopping in one’s tracks” or choosing something and then doing something else. Therefore knowing something but not doing it, and other types of weakness of will have a significant ontological basis in the external sphere of possibilities. If there were only one type of possibility in actuality, then the individual and their appraisals and decisions would not have to face the problem of new choices. Similarly, it is difficult to stray from original choices and decisions for action and its process. External reality includes many different possibilities and there can therefore be a multitude of changes to intention or conceptual activities within the course of an action. So the weakness of will, as an expression of these types of changes, is based on external conditions of possibility. Another everyday situation can express this point. Imagine that an individual wants to lose weight and therefore considers controlling what they choose to eat and drink. After making this decision, they find themselves in a variety of situations. For example, one of their friends may suddenly show up, and in order to be a good host this person may have to offer them food and drinks, and they themselves may have to engage in eating or drinking that might go against their original plan. Otherwise they might happen by a food store and see something that produces a desire in them that cannot be controlled. These possibilities exist under a multitude of different circumstances and mean that the implementation of the decision to control one’s eating or drinking habits faces many possible obstructions. In this instance, whether or not the individual expresses the weakness of will is intimately connected to the various possibilities that they confront in different circumstances. From this we see that the ontological precondition for the weakness of will is composed by the various possibilities in the situation that action occurs. (In other words, without external possibilities there is no choice, and the individual acts merely out of necessity, so there can be no weakness of will.)

68

chapter 3

Also connected to the various possibilities that exist within external circumstances is the contingency included in choices for action. Ontologically, contingency and possibility are connected. Hegel notices this point and argues that possibility can become external contingency. This so-called external contingency can be understood as contingency in concrete circumstances. In terms of action, the existence of a variety of possibilities in external reality connotes a trend towards contingency, and this type of contingency is primarily expressed in the process of choosing actions. In actual life one often encounters this type of situation: at first one plans to work on an essay in the afternoon, but suddenly and unexpectedly one finds oneself reading a really good book. And so instead of working on the essay one just continues to read. These adjustments of one’s plans for the day are due to situational changes. Perhaps as one was working one just happened to see the book, and the interest arose. In this type of situation and with these types of changes, the weakness of will is not in play. It is entirely possible that the person in question had an essay deadline and in order to complete the essay on time they needed to work on it that afternoon, and yet being fully aware of this they still choose to read instead. If this is the case, then the fact that the person gave up their plan after simply seeing an interesting book could be, in some broad sense, construed as a weakness of will. But we need to differentiate between two types of situations. Firstly, where the idea about a course of action is changed or a plan is adjusted and then carried out. And secondly, where, due to contingent factors, one does not implement one’s initial plans. Properly speaking, weakness of will, can only be found in the second of these two instances. Many scholars have overlooked this important background to the process of action. R.M. Hare, in his Language of Morals, writes, If we assent to a statement we are said to be sincere in our assent if and only if we believe that it is true (believe what the speaker has said). If, on the other hand, we assent to a second-person command addressed to ourselves, we are said to be sincere in our assent if and only if we do or resolve to do what the speaker has told us to do; if we do not do it but only resolve to do it later, then if, when the occasion arises for doing it, we do not do it, we are said to have changed our mind; we are no longer sticking to the assent which we previously expressed. It is a tautology to say that we cannot sincerely assent to a second-person command addressed to ourselves, and at the same time not perform it, if now is the occasion for performing it and it is in our (physical and psychological) power to do so. Similarly, it is a tautology to say that we cannot sincerely assent to a statement, and at the same time not believe it. Thus we may characterize provisionally the

On The Weakness Of Will

69

difference between statements and commands by saying that, whereas sincerely assenting to the former involves believing something, sincerely assenting to the latter involves (on the appropriate occasion and if it is within our power), doing something. But this statement is over-simplified, and will require qualification later.18 According to this view, as long as certain conditions exist (including external circumstances and the agent’s own capability), and the agent makes a sincere decision or choice about action, then the action will be carried out. This type of understanding assumes that as long as a sincere choice for action can coincide with actual actions, and different possible orientations for action do not exist in the relevant situation, then there are no contingencies. This means that choices for action have no changeability. So this perspective does not acknowledge the weakness of will, as it is expressed in “wanting to do something but not doing it,” or “deciding to do something but not doing it.” On the ontological basis of possible orientations and contingency, the weakness of will is often displayed in exactly the way that Hare’s perspective does not allow. As a type of phenomenon in the process of practice, the weakness of will both ontologically reflects a manifold of possibilities in external reality, and also conceptually expresses the changeability of an individual’s intentions and desires. Importantly, there is a significant amount of interplay between possible orientations in existence and the changeability of these internal intentions and desires. This interplay is what endows choices for action with contingency. If the external did not include a variety of possibilities, and the individual’s intentions could not change, there would be a fixed relationship between choices for action and their implementation. In other words, it would be a necessary relationship. To deny the significance of weakness of will not only causes one to overlook the various possibilities presented in actual situations, but logically this also means ignoring contingency in the process of action. If this happens, action can easily be oversimplified as being “determined” or “fated.” 3.4

Thinking, Desiring, Being Pleased and Embodied Knowing

As a phenomenon that occurs during the process of action, weakness of will cannot be denied. But affirming that it exists does not mean it is something that should happen. Contingency in the process of action is simply something 18

R.M. Hare, Language of Morals (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 20.

70

chapter 3

that cannot be dispelled and the variety of choices in everyday activity are what constitute this fact. At the same time, in order to reach a practical goal one often has to overcome the problem of weakness of will. The question then arises, how to face the reality of weakness of will while simultaneously overcoming its negative effects on practice? This is an issue that a theory of action cannot ignore. As discussed, the weakness of will is primarily connected to the individual’s conceptual world. It is concretely expressed in the tensions between rationality and desires or emotions. Overcoming the weakness of will therefore involves harmonizing rationality and emotion. It is well known that Kant identified three faculties of the human mind, namely “The faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the faculty of desire.”19 The faculty of knowledge is related to conceptual activity, the faculty of desire is expressed as a self-imposed demand20 and the feeling of pleasure or pain involves aesthetic identification and emotional acceptance. Whereas the faculty of knowledge is linked with rationality, the feeling of pleasure of pain and the faculty of desire are irrational. Kant writes, since pleasure or displeasure is necessarily combined with the faculty of desire (whether, as in the case of the lower faculty of desire, it precedes the principle of that faculty or, as in the case of the upper, it follows only from the determination of that faculty through the moral law), it will likewise effect a transition from the pure faculty of cognition, i.e., from the domain of the concepts of nature, to the domain of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical use it makes possible the transition from understanding to reason.21 Here Kant identifies a level of communication between knowledge, morality, and aesthetics, which includes the interchange between different conceptual activities and mental orientations. He affirms that desires have the function of joining things, and it is worth pointing out that there is an internal expression of the integration between cognition and the mind more generally.

19 20 21

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Judgment, Translated by J.H. Bernard (New York: Hafner Publishing, 1951), 13. For Kant desires in the realm of practical reason are linked with autonomy, and are thereby different than emotional desires. Immanuel Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, Translated by Eric Mathews and Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 66.

On The Weakness Of Will

71

Viewing what Kant says here from the perspective of the agent can make for a more expansive investigation. Here, the faculty of knowledge is expressed as rational functions, and can be understood as “I think,” and demands on oneself can be see as “I want,” while the feelings of pleasure or pain are “I am pleased (or not).” These three exist within the same subject, and interact with one another. Connected to this is the relationship between rationality and irrationality (desires/feelings) in action. This relationship is concretely expressed as “I think,” “I want,” and “I am pleased (or not),” and these aspects are involved in overcoming the weakness of will in action. While investigating morality Mengzi also discusses various forms of these relationships. When he talks about the similarities and differences between the eyes, ears and mind he points out that Therefore I say there is a common taste for flavor in our mouths, a common sense for sound in our ears, and a common sense for beauty in our eyes. Can it be that in our minds alone we are not alike? What is it that we have in common in our minds? It is the sense of principle and righteousness [yili 义理moral principles]. The sage is the first to possess what is common in our minds. Therefore moral principles please our minds as beef and mutton and pork please our mouths.22 His so-called “commonality in our minds” lays stress on “I think,” whose specific content is morality and principles and other universal rational concepts or principles. For Mengzi, “I think” is unified with the moral demands on oneself of “I want/desire.” He explains, I also wish to rectify men’s hearts and to put an end to those perverse doctrines, to oppose their one-sided actions and banish away their licentious expressions;—and thus to carry on the work of the three sages. Do I do so because I am fond of disputing? I am compelled to do it.23 Here the substantial content of “wanting” or “desire” is goodness, “One who commands our liking [because of his virtue] is called a good man.”24 There is a connection between “I want/desire” and “my mind is pleased,” neither are the same as pure rational thinking. Being pleased can be expressed 22 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 56. 23 The Four Books, Translated by James Legge (Hong Kong: The International Publication Society, 1955), 151. 24 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 82.

72

chapter 3

as a type of emotional acknowledgment or acceptance. For Mengzi thinking is done through the mind in order to grasp universal moral principles. And desiring or wanting are born from the demands of moral principles and displayed as moral intention. Thinking is what the heart-mind identifies with, or what pleases the heart-mind, and the demands of “I want/desire.” Thinking also conforms to the subject’s aspirations, which bring out feelings in the person. So “I think,” “I want/desire,” and “I am pleased” are internally united with one another. Accordingly Mengzi explains moral consciousness and practice. On the level of consciousness, Mengzi’s notion of pleasing the mind is similar to Kant’s practical rationality—which involves some type of moral common sense.25 This involves thinking that it is oriented towards practical demands on oneself and encompasses feelings such as being pleased. Here we can see that rationality and irrationality, universal moral guides and concrete emotions are integrated with one another. In an ethical sense this type of interaction is sort of uniting of Kant’s practical reason and Hume’s moral emotions.26 Confucian philosophy has its roots in this type of unification; scholars in this tradition seek to combine beauty and goodness. Practically speaking, “I think,” “I want/ desire,” and “I am pleased” are expressed as the uniformity between rational conscious judgment and moral demands. When action is based on rational consciousness and comes up with voluntary demands through emotional acknowledgment or recognition and is oriented towards reaching what is good, then any desires that are in oppositions to this can be restrained from interfering or influencing action. Speaking of this type of behavior Mengzi remarks, “the result will be like fire beginning to burn or a spring beginning to shoot forth.”27 The burning of a fire or gushing of a spring is natural, and cannot be constrained. Morally, not being able to constrain oneself means that there are some aspects of the weakness of will play. So we can see that although Mengzi never mentions the weakness of will, his theories do somewhat involved this issue. In a broader sense the process of practice or action “I think” is expressed as rational understanding, evaluations and judgments. And “I want/desires” 25

In the Critique of Judgment Kant discusses common sense. (Kant, Critique of Judgment, 75) This “common sense” is related to aesthetic consciousness. In this present work the understanding of “common sense” is seen is initiating a type of use or usefulness, which is already a much broader examination than Kant gives. See chapter 7. 26 Although, Kant is fairly concentrated on emotions in the aesthetic realm, he does not give them much appreciation in the realm of morality. 27 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 66.

On The Weakness Of Will

73

is connected to choices and decisions about action, which are based on rational judgments and originated from irrational desires. As mentioned above, the weakness of will is often expressed as a tension between rational judgments and irrational desires or feelings, where the latter are able to overcome the former. Here we can see that overcoming the weakness of will is internally connected to dissolving the tension between rationality and irrationality. And their actual manifestations, “I think” and “I want/desire,” are not necessarily that isolated from one another. Abstractly, manifestations of “I want” can certainly come from simple emotional impulses. However, when the “I want/desire” has passed through “I think,” then its content and orientation are changed in some ways, and it is no longer a simple emotional impulse. Furthermore, under certain conditions rational judgment can bring about desires. When an individual who has accepted social value concepts acts in a way that can be rationally analyzed and judged as something that society would affirm or praise, they may still do so under the influence of desire. In the practice of political or moral processes, rational beliefs can also arouse desires for action. Someone who maintains certain political ideas or believes often forms choices based on these ideas. This phenomenon, in some sense, can be called “I think therefore I want/desire.” In another sense, “I want/desire” can also promote or drive “I want/desire.” After a certain desire is produced, it is often driven by certain values and practical evaluations and considerations.28 “I am pleased” is connected to “I think” and “I want/desire.” And this “I am pleased” deserves special attention. As noted above, Kant discusses the feeling of pleasure and pain and its connection to the faculty of knowledge and the faculty of desire. The practical significance of “I am pleased” is first and foremost an emotional acceptance or acknowledgment. And these are not external restraints nor are they brought about internally. They are not a passive following of rational demands, and differ from spontaneously according to emotional impulses. They take universal moral principles as their content and contain feelings. When “I think,” “I want/desire,” and “I am pleased” are united with one another, then rational valuations and understanding begin to integrate with an individual’s desires and their subjective feeling of happiness. The tension between these two is thereby dissolved. Taking quitting smoking is an example, when it is merely a rational demand it is difficult to 28

In his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality Rousseau argues that if someone does not have desires they will not waste their time reasoning. (see Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Translated by Donald Cress (New York: Hackett Publishing, 1992)) In other words, he is negatively noting the relationship between “I want/desire” and “I think.”

74

chapter 3

actually stop and overcome the desire or addiction. But when the decision is more than just a rational health judgment, and it is something that will make one pleased then the tension between rational demands and irrational desires can be controlled. And the stalemate between the two can be called off. The rational judgment “I shouldn’t smoke” and the desire “I want to smoke” are mixed in with the happiness that will come from quitting smoking, and so the active smoking becomes difficult to coincide with feeling of happiness. Here we can see that the unification of “I think,” “I want/desire,” and “I am pleased” provides an internal basis for overcoming the type of weakness of will characterized by desires ruling out over rationality. Here there is a distinction between “I am pleased” and emotional types of happiness. In his aesthetics Kant notes that the happiness that comes from the connection of “I think” and “I desire” is not the same as the happiness that comes from “I am pleased.” Confucianism also notes a similar phenomena with the idea of “the contentness of Kongzi (Confucius) and Yan Hui.” According to this tradition as soon as one is fixed on the way (dao 道) then no matter how difficult their life circumstances maybe they can always find a type of mental or spiritual pleasure in their lives. The Lunyu 论语 (Analects of Kongzi) records, Admirable indeed was the virtue of Hui! With a single bamboo dish of rice, a single gourd dish of drink, and living in his mean narrow lane, while others could not have endured the distress, he did not allow his joy to be affected by it.29 This type of life attitude is similarly expressed in Kongzi’s own pursuit of morality, “With coarse rice to eat, with water to drink, and my bended arm for a pillow; I have still joy in the midst of these things. Riches and honors acquired by unrighteousness are to me as a floating cloud.”30 The word described here as “joy” is what later Confucians called “the contentness of Kongzi and Yan Hui.” It is important here that there is something beyond just emotional demands and wants. This type of contentness has to do with pleasing one’s mind in a type of spiritual happiness. And even though this includes intensifying rational possibilities, the type of happiness that accords with one’s emotional dimensions of happiness will not be confirmed. This “I am pleased” this permeated with rationality and more than just an emotional happiness. And the tension that exists between emotional manifestations is rationally permeated by contentedness, which is often able to control action decisions on a deep 29 30

The Four Books, 41. Ibid., 50.

On The Weakness Of Will

75

level. Historically, the notion in China that “a scholar would rather be killed than humiliated” displays a type of value orientation and action choice that shows the tension between the existence of emotional manifestations and contentness. Being humiliated means that the individual has lost their dignity or honor, which is also at odds with rational contentness. In some situaitons contentness is not compatible with the individual’s dignity, and the scholar pursues the protection of their honor and rational contentness. And in China’s history we often find that moral exemplars will calmly meet death for the sake of an ideal. In this type of life “I think” (rational considerations), “I want/desire” (voluntary choices) and “I am pleased/content” (emotional acceptance) are mutually integrated with one another. When Tan Sitong 谭嗣同 (d. 1898) (a famous political reformist and martyr in the Qing dynasty) bravely went to his execution, his conviction was permeated with firm rational belief, which is also an expression of emotionally calm optimism. Moral exemplars such as Tan, are able to live without nobly sacrificing themselves, but this type of existence is difficult for them to rationally accept.31 And it would be difficult for this person to be pleased or content with themselves. The unification of “I think,” “I want/desire,” and “I am pleased” also means overcoming the one-dimensionality of conscious activities. Investigating this from the singularity of rationality, choosing a type of action is not always entirely reasonable or conscious. But if one considers various related circumstances, including possible orientations (objective) and the strength of different desires (subjective) then what might be formed into choice for action is not necessarily for simple rational consideration. A type of consideration that synthesizes these various aspects looks at the interactions between understanding, intention, attitude, desires, feelings and so on. Decisions, choices, and the implementation of action based on these considerations is usually expressed as a transformation from purely conscious activity. From the perspective of actual processes of action, choices for action that are based on singular conscious activities are often never carried out in actuality because they are not synthesized with external factors. And when this happens the so-called “weakness of will” often appears. Here the interaction between “I think,” “I want/desire,” and “I am pleased,” does not directly overcome the weakness of

31

Translator’s note: For example, some of Tan’s friends allegedly made a plan to escape to Japan, whose government was supportive of Tan’s views. However, Tan believed that his execution would be helpful in motivating people to revolt against the Qing government. In some ways there are parallels between the situation Tan found himself in and Socrates’ in Plato’s Apology.

76

chapter 3

will, it is only after they have been sublated (aufhaben) by singular conscious activity that are able to avoid weakness of will. Another form of the weakness of will in the process of action was expressed earlier as a disconnect or separation of knowledge and action. One can know and not act according to knowledge or “know what should be done and not do it.” To overcome this type of weakness of will there needs to be an understanding of the difference between knowledge and action. Or, more concretely there needs to be a sublimation (aufhaben) of the separation between knowledge and action. To avoid the phenomenon of knowing but not acting according to this knowledge, we first have to look at how to understand knowledge. When Xunzi 荀子 (d. 238 b.c.e.) talks about “studying/learning” he writes, The learning of the gentleman enters through the ear, is stored in the mind, spreads through the four limbs, and is visible in his activity and repose. In his softest word and slightest movement, in one and all, the gentleman can be taken as a model and pattern. The learning of the petty man enters the ear and comes out the mouth. Since the distance between the mouth and ear is no more than four inches, how could it be sufficient to refine the seven-foot body of a man! In antiquity men undertook learning for the sake of self-improvement; today people undertake learning for the sake of others. The learning of the gentleman is used to refine his character. The learning of the petty man is used like ceremonial offerings of birds and calves.32 Here “studying/learning” are broadly related to knowledge. And the “learning of the gentleman” is what Xunzi argues knowledge should be, while “spreading through the four limbs” involves the body, and is related to action. This kind of study/learning is compared with that of the petty person, which is limited to words (either said or heard), and do not become motivation for actually improving oneself. The Song dynasty scholar Wang Yangming made a detailed investigation of this idea. Speaking broadly on the relationship between knowledge and action, he differentiates between those who study in words only, and those who actually their body and heart-mind to learn: There are two ways to pursue learning. Some pursue it with their bodies and minds and some with their mouths and ears. Those who pursue it 32 Xunzi 荀子, Xunzi 荀子 [Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works], Translated by John Knoblock (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 140.

On The Weakness Of Will

77

with their mouths and ears grope and imagine; they seek after what is apparent. Those who pursue it with their bodies and minds act with understanding and do so habitually with examination; they sincerely and concretely realize the Way in themselves.33 He writes more concretely on the characteristics of studying with one’s tongue and ears alone (words): Nowadays, people who pursue what I call the learning of the i­ nvestigation of things still for the most part fall into mere talking and listening. How much less can those who pursue learning by talking and listening return to the investigation of things? The refinement and subtlety of the ­Principle of Nature and selfish human desires are such that one must make a constant effort at self-examination and self-mastery before he can gradually see it. Now if one just talks, even though he talks only about the Principle of Nature, without his realizing it, there is already in his mind, even for a short moment, a certain amount of selfish desire, for it does secretly arise without our knowing it. It is not easy to discover even if one examines it with great effort. How can one expect to know all by merely talking?34 Here the word “mouth” means speaking, and “ears” mean listening, but this involves language analysis, and the goal is to come up with a clear understanding of the words. So the subject often hears, and can even repeat what they have “learned,” but this does not transform them into moral persons. Limited in this way, one may know linguistically, but still cannot carried out the relevant actions. This is compared with someone who “sincerely and concretely realize the Way in themselves,” which means that moral understanding of oneself surpasses words. Concrete application is found in an individual’s actions, which sublimates the distinction between knowledge and action. According to Wang Yangming’s division between the learning of tongue and ears versus one’s body and mind, we can say that there is “genuine knowledge” and “not genuine knowledge.” So genuine knowledge is always performed in action, and if it is not, then that means it is not really genuine knowledge. For Wang “genuine knowledge” is characterized by being expressed in action, he

33 34

Wang Yangming 王阳明, Instruction for Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings, Translated by Wing-tsit Chan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963), 159. Ibid., 54.

78

chapter 3

writes “Knowledge in its genuine and earnest aspect is action.”35 Here “action” means “actual,” and this how one is “genuine and sincere” in knowledge. It is not exactly the same as Plato or Aristotle’s understanding of knowledge. For Wang it is not pure grasping of facts, nor is it simple valuation. In some sense he views genuine knowledge as the integration of knowing facts, evaluating, emotional identity, and voluntary choice. He argues, Therefore the Daxue 大学 (Great Learning) points to true knowledge and action for people to see, saying, they are ‘like loving beautiful colors and hating bad odors.’ Seeing beautiful colors appertains to knowledge, while loving beautiful colors appertains to action. However, as soon as one sees that beautiful color, he has already loved it. It is not that he sees it first and then makes up his mind to love it. Smelling a bad odor appertains to knowledge, while hating a bad odor appertains to action. However, as soon as one smells a bad odor, he has already hated it. It is not that he smells it first and then makes up his mind to hate it.36 Loving beauty and hating the ugly have to do with emotional identity (or acknowledgement), and touches upon a willful acceptance or rejection. Here it is worth noting that one does not act according to loving beauty or hating the ugly although knowledge is connected to these feelings and their acknowledgments, acceptance, or rejection. It is the intersection between the two that provides the conditions for knowledge to become action in reality. So here overcoming the type of weakness of will characterized by knowing but not doing can be done if knowledge is understood as linked to emotional acceptance or acknowledgments and willful choices, the so-called “genuine knowledge.” Thus there is a communication between knowing facts evaluations and willful choices. We can see that the weakness of will (the type where one knows but does not act accordingly) is characterized by a gap between knowledge and practice. Knowledge of the tongue/ears and knowledge of the body/mind are important for overcoming this type of weakness of will. Ontologically, the important feature of body/mind knowledge is that it is an integration of the body and mind. This “knowledge” permeates the agent, and is internalized in their existence. It is not an abstract concept but actualized through the body, and manifest as embodiment. This type of knowledge is expressed as the unification of factual understanding, evaluations, and intentions in action. It also 35 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 681. 36 Ibid., 669.

On The Weakness Of Will

79

includes understandings of “what is it” and “what should be done” as well as intentions, all of which are expressed in actual processes. This type of knowing is not the same as understanding or evaluating before action, but rather mixed-up as an integral stage of action. So “knowing” is no longer pre-action or an abstract concept external to action, it permeates reality and participates in the process of action. And from this perspective we can begin to interpret what Wang means by “genuine knowledge” The genuine body-mind knowledge often takes a moral formation. It is fixed on an orientation towards what is good and includes the ability to know what is good and the intention to do good. This includes analyzing the situation, and making use of norms in moral measurements, and judgments made by the will. Here there is an intention to do good, an emotional acknowledgment of the good, and a rationality synthesis and mental manifestation of it. This, through moral measurements, choices, and evaluations, is what restrains and controls the process of moral practice. When the subject makes a specific moral choice it includes a trend for further decisions, and a will to restrict external influences or interferences. Setting a fixed trend for doing good, the capacity to know what is good, and the intention to do what is good have interactive functions with one another. And this is what allows the moral knowledge of what should be done to transform into actual moral action. From what is given above it is not difficult to notice that once this type of knowledge is fixed on morality it can provide some type of guarantee for (one following through with) moral action. We can also say that this body-mind knowledge is a synthesized manifestation of what is mental or spiritual and practiced or actual. And if the other type of knowledge, namely that of the tongue and ear, stops at language and concepts then the knowledge of the body-mind is more unified with the individual in its existence. This is especially true as this type of knowledge is expressed through the unification of the body and mind, knowledge and virtue, ability and intention, whereas the knowledge of the tongue and ear basically means activities of mere speech, analysis, or concepts. The former is a process that takes the latter and transforms it into an unification with the body and mind and thereby puts it into action. As a unification of the body and mind this type of knowledge regulates human activity on various levels. Using the example of quitting cigarettes again, this type of knowledge is not just expressed as “smoking is harmful to health” or other types of rational judgments, but also includes “I should stop smoking” as a demand on oneself and a decision to quit smoking. This includes firm ideas to decrease the temptation to smoke. When these are integrated and become solidified as a body-mind knowledge the idea that “smoking is harmful” becomes something that functions on the individual’s

80

chapter 3

desires and feelings, and makes them actually quit smoking.37 In other words, as a synthesized manifestation, this type of knowledge can comprise the internal bases for overcoming “knowing but not acting accordingly.” In order to understand the process of action more deeply we still need to investigate the relationship between analyzing situations and overcoming the weakness of will. But the circumstances that surround action involved various types of contingency and possibility. There are also specific changes to the environment or situation during the process of action. And when a certain situation around action changes, the original plan also needs to be adjusted appropriately. So the analysis of the situation is important. It includes communicating between universal principles norms and the particular circumstances, and is also related to adjustments of the self in the process of action. These adjustments themselves are necessary for the efficacious realization of action in actuality. And this is very different from the weakness of will as it is displayed as knowing what should be done and not doing it, which is based on the tension between rationality and irrationality. But overcoming this type of weakness of will does not mean denying or rejecting analysis of the situation in which action unfolds. Action is always conducted in a specific situation. And if the subject does not respond to the changes in the situation, which can require adjustments or changes to their original plans, or ideas about what should be done, then this lack of situation analysis results in the weakness of will. In other words, as a phenomenon within the process of action, the weakness of will is based on a conceptual tension between rationality and desires or emotions, and it is related to the difference between knowledge and acting. On the metaphysical level this weakness is ontologically founded upon the situation’s various possibilities and contingencies. The question then becomes how does one control the negative influence of the weakness of will on the process of action? This problem involves the interaction between “I think,” “I want/ desire,” and “I am pleased.” And this is also related to the process of tongue and ear knowledge becoming body and mind knowledge. And these two provide the internal preconditions for overcoming the weakness of will.

37

Hegel also notices a similar point. He argues that the practical spirit can be differentiated from the theoretical spirit. However, he also sees this practical spirit as having a will, “that spirit is in the first instance intelligence, and that the phases, through which it passes in its development, namely from feeling, through imaginative thinking to thought, are the way by which it produces itself as will, which, in turn, as the practical spirit in general, is the most direct truth of intelligence.” (See Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Translated by S.W. Dyde (New York: Dover Publications, 2005), 30.)

chapter 4

Shi,1 the Background for Practice Weakness of will is an internal limiting or controlling element that has power over the process of action. But action and practice are not only related to internal mechanisms, they also unfold against specific backgrounds. In Chinese philosophy the background for practice or action is understood, in concrete terms, as shi 势.2 This is a well-known concept in Chinese philosophy that can have implications for more universal theory. The meaning of shi is linked to the process of human action or practice. On the ontological level, it is demonstrated in the various possible orientations that exist in any given situation. It can also be understood to designate the conditioning circumstances in which human action and practice unfold. The importance of this notion first became apparent in pre-Qin philosophy and has continuously featured as a prominent concept in Chinese thinking since. The various interpretations of shi given by different schools or philosophers provide the historical context for understanding it’s significance for action. 4.1

Shi in the Process of Action

In the social sphere shi is first and foremost connected to the individual’s position in society, which is clearly expressed in politics. The Guanzi 管子(Book of Guan Zhong) notes,

1 Translator’s note: Shi is a complex philosophical concept that has no equivalent in English. Although in certain contexts there are appropriate terms, such as force, power, influence, situation, form, posture, potentiality, tendency, there is no single word that expresses its richness. In what follows I will simply not translate the term, however I will include notes in parenthesis to inform the reader about its relevant primary connotation. There are also places where multiple shis interact with one another. For instance, the shi of the individual in terms of potentiality has a significant role to play in how they are influenced by external forces (also shi). 2 The most general meaning of shi in this chapter is situation, but not a static one, it is dynamic and has force or power, and can be influenced, utilized, or even created by humans. As such shi is the concrete background, or the general background for practice. It includes different aspects and is holistic—it does not focus on one particular part of the background, but all its various elements. The goal of this chapter is to develop the meaning of shi based on classical texts and accounts of this term.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004321786_005

82

chapter 4

What makes a prince of men a prince is always his position of authority [shi]. Therefore, if he loses this position of authority [shi], his ministers will control him. When the position of authority [shi] rests with his subordinate officials, the prince is controlled by his ministers, whereas when it rests with the sovereign, the ministers are controlled by the prince. Therefore, when the prince and his ministers exchange positions, authority [shi] rests with his subordinates.3 This example shows that shi can be used to indicate a position or status in the interaction between the ruler and minister. This is not a fixed relationship, but rather a set of somewhat variable conditions formed through the course of their interactions. These conditions circumscribe the political interaction, and also influence circumstances at the individual level. In terms of the static elements of the relationship between ruler and minister, the ruler is undoubtedly superior to the minister, but in the process of their interaction it is possible that the minister can take on a position that is superior to the ruler. The positions they take vis a vis one another are what compose the shi that unfolds in political practice, and also determine the practical background for their actions. According to traditional Chinese philosophy emperors throughout history have been restricted by shi. The Lü Shi Chunqiu 吕氏春秋 (The Annals of Lü Buwei) records, If despite their worthiness, Tang and Wu still had to avail themselves of the power [shi] inherent in their having fiefs, how much more is this the case for those who are no match for Tang and Wu.4 For the Legalists, laws, methods, and shi were seen as important strategic issues and as necessary conditions for establishing and maintaining political power. Legalism concentrated on how shi relates to a given position or status in political practice. In traditional society, political position was also considered shi. The problem of how a ruler was to maintain their superior position (shi) was seen as a crucial aspect for the effective political practice. As the background for rulership, shi is linked to the concrete circumstances as well as the conditions of political practice. 3 Guanzi 管子, Guanzi 管子[Book of Guan Zhong], Translated by W. Allyn Rickett (Princeton: Princeton University, 1985), 259. 4 Lü Buwei 吕不韦, Lü Shi Chunqiu 吕氏春秋 (The Annals of Lü Buwei) [The Annals of Lü Buwei], Translated by John Knoblock and Jeffrey Riegel (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000), 430.

Shi, The Background For Practice

83

Political practice also involves navigating the relationship between the individual and external shi. In other words, the shi (status) of one’s political position is influential for the individual’s shi (external power), but it is usually not enough to rely on this predetermined status. When Mengzi talks about the relationship between an exemplary ruler and an exemplary scholar he writes, The able and virtuous monarchs of antiquity loved virtue and forgot power [shi]. And shall an exception be made of the able and virtuous scholars of antiquity, that they did not do the same? They delighted in their own principles, and were oblivious of the power [shi] of princes. Therefore, if kings and dukes did not show the utmost respect, and observe all forms of ceremony, they were not permitted to come frequently and visit them. If they thus found it not in their power [shi] to pay them frequent visits, how much less could they get to employ them as ministers?5 Here there is a discussion of the relationship between internal virtuosity and external influence, power, or position—all being descriptions of shi. Mengzi’s line “The able and virtuous monarchs of antiquity loved virtue and forgot power [shi]” shows that one should respect the other’s inner virtuosity, not relying on their political position to judge their worthiness. This type of interaction therefore includes ethical content and is not limited to a narrow understanding of political practice. Shi does however make up some part of the practical background for interaction. In the above passage Mengzi emphasizes the importance of inner virtue and ethical behavior in responding to the given structure of external shi. The relationship between “position” and “shi” is determined within social life. Mengzi writes, Kung-sun Ch’ow said, ‘Why is it that the superior man does not himself teach his son?’ Mencius Mengzi replied, ‘The circumstances [shi] of the case forbid its being done. The teacher must inculcate what is correct When he inculcates what is correct, and his lessons are not practiced he follows them up with being angry When he follows them up with being angry, then, contrary to what should be, he is offended with his son. At the same time, the pupil says, “My master inculcates on me what is correct, and he himself does not proceed in a correct path.” The result of this is, that father and son are offended with each other. When father and son come to be offended with each other, the case is evil. The ancients exchanged sons, 5 The Four Books, 304.

84

chapter 4

and one taught the son of another. Between father and son, there should he no reproving admonitions to what is good. Such reproofs lead to alienation, and than alienation, there is nothing more inauspicious.’6 Here we see an argument about education and the daily interactions between fathers and sons. The father does not educate his child based on shi (the power of circumstances). The circumstances are that the father and the son are both related by blood and also that they are expected to fulfill specific social (ethical) positions. According to Mengzi’s understanding, this is what determines that it would be inappropriate for them to enter, for example, the studentteacher relationship. As an expression of both natural blood ties and sociopolitical relationships shi’s significance is not limited to the realm of political practice. In the process of education, it is important for the students to go from ignorance or error to knowing or having the correct knowledge. This requires norms, regulations, and restrictions or restraints that often give rise to tensions between the educator and the educated. If this happens to a father and his child, it could negatively impact their emotional ties. So this type of shi comprises the concrete background for the unfolding of interaction in a specific realm. Similarly shi is connected to the circumstances where practice or action occurs.7 This type of situation is not the same as the above-mentioned social, political or ethical ones. Using relatives as an example the Huainanzi 淮南子 discusses this, When the filial son serves his father, with pleasing expression and submissive posture he offers him his sash and lays out his shoes. But if the father is drowning, he grabs him by the hair and pulls him [out of the water]; this is not because he is presuming to be arrogant or haughty but because he means to rescue his father from death. Thus, when a father is drowning, to grab him by the hair and, when a ruler is celebrating, to call him by name—these things derive from the power of circumstance [shi] and so cannot be otherwise.8 6 The Four Books, 173. 7 Translator’s note: Shi constitutes the background of action as an integral part of circumstance, but being a broader concept it is not limited to circumstance, and thereby is linked to it as well. This relationship will be made more clear in the following pages. 8 Liu An 刘安, Huainanzi 淮南子 [The Huainanzi: A Guide to the Theory and Practice of Government in Early Han China], Translated by John S. Major (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 507.

Shi, The Background For Practice

85

In everyday life a child should be respectful, caring, filial and obedient to their relatives (especially their parents). For example, if one’s father accidentally falls into water one may grab them and push them onto the shore. This type of action can be seen as “violent,” but actuality it is respectful. Due to the specific situation in which the action occurs one may be fierce involuntarily, and this may be appropriate. If one does not behave like this one may not be able to save the father. This is what is meant by the saying “shi (circumstances) force specific ways [of doing things]” (shi bu de bu ran 势不得不然). So shi is also expressed as a guide for action in a unique type of situation. Shi not only involves the specific situation in which an individual acts, but also implies normal everyday human life and the process of practice more generally. Xunzi makes a distinction between “shi-based disgrace” and “moralbased disgrace.” He writes, When a person is wayward and abandoned, base and reckless, when he offends against the divisions of society and brings chaos to rational order, when he is proudly arrogant and cruel with a rapacious appetite for profits—these are disgraces that come from within, and precisely these are what is meant by disgraces that derive from a person’s morality. Vilified and insulted, dragged about by the hair and beaten, whipped and cudgeled, kneecaps shattered or legs amputated, decapitated, quartered or hacked apart and made into diced dried meat, chained and fettered, with tongue split in two—these are disgraces that come from without, and precisely these are what is meant by disgraces that derive from a person’s circumstances [shi]. Such are the two principles of honor and disgrace. Thus, although it is possible that the gentleman should incur disgrace through personal circumstances [shi], it is not possible that he should incur disgrace from what derives from personal morality.9 The so-called “moral-based disgrace” is disgrace that arises when an individual does not abide by mores, or violates the types of moral principles and norms recognized by society. “Shi-based disgrace” is imposed from external influences, including violence, force, and other similar methods that may cause an individual to be dishonored. This is something one has no control over, whereas following moral norms depends on the individual. From a moral perspective, when an individual has not chosen an action themselves it is difficult to hold them responsible for it. But if one has selected a mode of action one can be held responsible for it. In other words, one can avoid the kind of dishonor that 9 Xunzi, Xunzi, 46–47.

86

chapter 4

comes from the actions that they chose, but when someone is compelled to do something against their will, one does not have the power to avoid potentially being disgraced. And this is what Xunzi means when he says that the sages can be disgraced through shi-based means, but that they would never bring it upon themselves. Here “shi” is conceived as an external background or circumstance that cannot be controlled in the course of action. Actual processes (of practice) are based on present circumstances, as well as the predicted orientation of how things and affairs may turn out—which is also related to shi. In fact, examined from an internal perspective, shi is constituted by the orientation of processes and their changes within in historical development. For instance, Liu Zongyuan 柳宗元 (d. 819) argues that feudal societies in ancient China were not necessarily want the ruler wanted, but they could not get do any with them.10 As a certain type of institution, feudalism does not depend on a single individual’s aspirations, but rather the evolution of history. Contrasted with individual aspirations, “shi” entails the objective progression of history. In Chen Di’s 陈第 (d. 1617) study of the pronunciation of Chinese characters he notes, With regards to time there is past and present, with regards to place there is north and south, [Chinese] characters are innovated, and pronunciation changes, this is necessary because of shi.11 The way characters are pronounced is a socially determined phenomenon that is closely linked to the human cultural context. Changes in pronunciation over time also have to do with a hidden shi that can be understood as the orientation of historical development. Shi can therefore be taken to mean both social “position” and the orientation of history, but these manifestations are linked to one another as well. As “status” it is understood in a dynamic way as constantly in motion, and as a historical tendency it is conceived as a course or procedure. These two meanings of shi are thus linked in terms of their dynamic interaction. Shi also includes a temporal dimension. More specifically, shi and time are linked in two ways.12 Shi is always considered to be unfolding during a certain 10 11 12

Liu Zongyuan 柳宗元, Liu Zongyuan Ji Jiao Zhu 柳宗元集校注 [The Complete Annotated Works of Liu Zongyuan] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2013). Chen Di 陈第, Maoshi Guyi Kao 毛诗古音考 [Study on the Pronunciation of Ancient Characters] Edited by Kang Ruicong 康瑞琮 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2011), 183. Translator’s note: This temporal aspect is also linked to circumstances, as the latter are constituted by a particular conditions existing for a specific time. Again, shi is a broader concept than time, but include temporal aspects.

Shi, The Background For Practice

87

time, and it is also expressed as a tendency in development that includes time. The Huinanzi remarks on this point, “He relies on timeliness and utilizes the power of circumstance [shi] in order to win over the hearts of the people.”13 Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 (d. 1692) makes an even more detailed comment, “Times are different and shi is different, when shi is different patterns/principles are different as well.”14 Here “time” is temporal and historical. For Wang, changes in “shi” are linked to time. Shi is in accord with the passing of time, and historical conditions and transitions. The shi (orientation) of history results in corresponding changes. In contemporary Chinese shi and time are often coupled, which is a confirmation of the link between the orientation of social development and the passage of time. As the historical tendency for the development of things or affairs understood more generally, shi comprises an important background for the unfolding of practice. Time and history are like directions on a plane. And if they are thought of as horizontal lines then shi can be viewed as vertical in its interaction with things. We can also say that things coordinate or interact with one another to comprise shi. Additionally, shi also indicates two types of opposing powers that reject one another. In the Lü Shi Chunqiu the author mentions fights between the state of Wu and Yue, “We [Wu and Yue] cannot both exist [as powerful (shi) countries].”15 Here the text actually literally says that the shi (power) of both nations cannot be established. This is a unique political structure or relationship that uses negative means to demonstrate the connection between things. Changes formed by the interrelation between things—in the development of their structures—often constitute the specific circumstances within which individual or social practices unfold. The context of these situations is therefore given in the interaction between different things, aspects of the thing, or powers. And this provides the background for an individual’s action or social practices to develop. As the background and conditions for social practices, these circumstances are not controlled or chosen by a person. These conditions also correspond to different practical targets, and can therefore be expressed as either positive or negative expedients. The Shang Jun Shu 商君书 (The Book of Lord Shang) remarks that shi can bring about order or chaos in the world.16 The argument is that shi indicates political structure at a certain time. And different

13 14

Liu An, Huainanzi, 279. Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, Songlun 宋论 [Song Theory], Edited by Liu Shaojun 刘韶军 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju 2013), 875. 15 Lü, Lü Shi Chunqiu, 594. 16 Shang Yang 商鞅, Shang Jun Shu 商君书 [The Book of Lord Shang], Edited by Shi Lei 石磊 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju 2011), 170.

88

chapter 4

types of shi can constitute favorable conditions for bringing about order in the world, or alternatively creating chaos. These different types of practical shi also include differences between strong and weak shi, as well as superior and inferior shi, all of which can be concretely manifested. Strong and weak shi can be expressed in different social realms including one’s position or status in political, economical, cultural contexts. They can also be expressed in certain social structures at a given time. As mentioned above, shi itself can be linked to social status: the shi of rulers or ministers is an expression of this point. Individuals or groups that have political, economic, or cultural resources often hold strong (shi) positions; while those that lack these resources are said to reside in a weak shi position. The former also has superior shi, and a beneficial practical background, whereas the latter’s is weak since they have inferior shi. In terms of the social structures of a particular time period, strong shi expresses the orientation for development through strength and robustness. And weak shi is exhibited as weakness and powerlessness. The different manifestations of strong and weak shi in social structures also express certain practical backgrounds that provide specific influences and functions in human activity. In sum, shi is expressed in the synthesized manifestations of practical conditions and backgrounds. These involve time and place. Historical conditions give the substantial content of shi its temporal sense (in the way that it relates to action). Space or place, as it relates to action, is manifest through social structures and circumstances. Further, fixed historical conditions, social structures and contemporary circumstances interrelate and are dynamically unified to make up a synthesized background. Shi is based in reality and takes existence as its concrete substance. Liu Xie 刘勰 (d. 520) writes on shi, Human feelings are different; the modes of composition are diverse. A genre is chosen according to the feeling expressed; style takes shape according to the genre. Style, therefore, emerges by taking advantage of the situation [shi]. Like the arrow that shoots a straight line or the mountain stream that curves and winds, style is the result of a natural tendency.17 Although Liu is mainly concerned with literature, his point also relates to the broader understanding of shi. He is arguing that shi is not reliant upon nothing, and has its own unique substance. This “substance” can be manifested as social 17

Liu Xie 刘勰, Wen Xin Diao Long 文心雕龙 [Dragon-Carving and the Literary Mind], Translated by Yang Guobin 杨国斌 (Beijing: Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, 2003), 421.

Shi, The Background For Practice

89

relations, for example, rulers and ministers, or transitions in the historical process, specific action situations (such as when one’s father needs help and one has to do something extreme) etc. Substance embodies shi as actuality, and this makes shi a concrete manifestation of synthesized practical backgrounds. 4.2

The Interaction between Humans and Shi

Shi does not naturally arise nor is it an external power that humans are completely uninvolved in. Whether it is expressed as a situation, power or position in socio-political structures, or as specific circumstances and actions, as the connection and interaction between different things, or in historical tendencies, its formation always includes human participation, and its significance is formed in practical processes. Shi also influences and limits human practice in a variety of ways. Even though shi and humans are mutually involved, humans cannot easily control this relation. In fact, once shi has been formed in specific circumstances, it takes on the capacity of an actual situation and formative power. This is something humans need to confront and respond to throughout the process of action. Sunzi, famously approaches shi from many different angles in his book The Sunzi. Speaking about the relationship between humans and shi in war he writes, Thus one who excels at warfare seeks [victory] through the strategic configuration of power [shi], not from reliance on men. Thus he is able to select men and employ strategic power [shi].18 Here shi indicates the concrete positions and situations of two armies. Understanding of shi can therefore be used to establish fighting tactics and methods, and well as the appropriate times to implement them. In this sense, shi is chiefly based on objective conditions, rather than human judgment and ability. Therefore shi is more related to objective laws. The Huainanzi notes, Yu diverted the Yangzi and cleared the Yellow River in order to bring great benefit to the world, but he could not get the water to flow westward. Lord Millet extended arable land and reclaimed grasslands so the people could devote their strength to agriculture, but he could not get grain to 18

Sun Wu 孙武, Sunzi Bingfa 孙子兵法 [The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China], Translated by Ralph D. Sawyer (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 166.

90

chapter 4

grow in winter. Is it that the efforts of these men were inadequate? [No.] The natural propensity [of water and grain] made it impossible.19 The idea here is that the course of human conduct and natures spontaneous functioning express certain environmental or historical objective principles and limitations for action. Interpretations of shi after the Huainanzi focus on its objective orientation. This tendency is derived from the Huainanzi’s line “The advantage of terrain overcomes Heaven and time; clever tactics overcome the advantage of terrain; force overcomes people.”20 Here natural conditions are given as “advantage of terrain,” and “Heaven and time,” while human functions are “clever tactics.” Truly human action can overcome natural conditions, but they are still established against objective shi. Mengzi investigates the relationship between humans and shi on a general level, borrowing a common saying during his time he writes, A man may have wisdom and discernment, but that is not like embracing the favorable opportunity. A man may have instruments of husbandry, but that is not like waiting for the farming seasons.21 “Wisdom” here refers to a human’s broader knowledge or ability to know about the world, and instruments refers to pieces of farm equipment. In actual practice, knowledge and tools are subjective conditions, and Mengzi is arguing that they should both be used with a concern for their objective background, namely with reference to shi and to time. As an external force shi can influence human action. Various elements can interact to form a type of momentum or imposing force that can either positively trigger or drive human action, or rather negatively restrict it. When the trends of the time are difficult to oppose, there might be sparks of emotional defiance, but they are usually stifled by rationality. Viewed in a more positive light, the trends of the time can also represent historical courses that provide the impetus for action. At turning points in history we often find that new emerging forces topple the old. And this type of shi, meaning historical course or the spirit of the times also provides the setting for human action. The instances given above provide examples of how shi restrains or overpowers humans, and those that survive do so by following along with shi. This

19 Liu, Huainanzi, 309. 20 Ibid. 602. 21 The Four Books, 58.

Shi, The Background For Practice

91

is not merely a passive position, but is also related to being in line with dao22 and to acting in accordance with nature or natural laws. This is what the Daoist classic the Daodejing means by “doing non-doing” or “acting non-assertively.”23 The “non-doing” aspect of “doing non-doing” is not a passive “not doing anything,” but rather a method of doing. It is a unique type of action that is in accord with nature or natural laws, where one does not seek to interfere. (It is also somewhat similar to Hegel’s line “Reason is as cunning as it is mighty.”)24 “Non-doing” does not refuse activity but rather aligns the whole process of behavior with nature. Human accordance with shi is expressed when actions are oriented or in line with shi. We can also say that this type of accordance is “charioteering” or “riding” on shi. Throughout Chinese history there has been an emphasis on this point, but also an affirmation of human ability as well. Xunzi comments about the connection between shi and humans, To obtain a position of power that allows one to dominate others and so to carry out the way of domination that no one in the whole world feels resentment—such as Tang and Wu. To obtain a position of power that allows one to dominate others and not avail oneself of the way to domination and, although one’s position of power is more substantial than that possessed by any other position in the world, to be unable even to find a place as a desolated poor wretch— such as Jie and Zhou Xin. This is the case, it is far better to possess the way of domination than to win a position of power that permits one to dominate others.25 The shi that overpowers or overcomes humans is positively expressed as the background for practice, whereas possessing the way of domination involves methods for human practice. Xunzi believes that winning a position of power to dominate others without possessing the way of domination can often lead to negative outcomes. Shi’s function is actualized through human activities. The development of history attests to this as an example of shi’s development. In this vein Ye Shi 叶 适 (d. 1223) argues that shi is influential for historical developments. For example, if one wants to bring about order then one must comprehend the shi of the course of history. He thinks that shi is the necessary course of history, 22 Translator’s note: Dao 道 in this context can be simply understood as “nature” or “natural.” 23 See the third and sixty-third chapters of the Daodejing. 24 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, 284. 25 Xunzi, Xunzi, 241–242.

92

chapter 4

which is not completely subject to human influence, but is also not something that humans are powerless to change. Once shi has been comprehended it can be utilized to certain ends. In this way shi is not governed by humans, but people can still comprehend and thereby “charioteer” shi for the purposes of action. He also says that shi is in humans and not things. In other words, the way people use shi for action can be seen in revolutions based on social needs, it is thereby the people and not the needs themselves that contain shi. This use is also expressed in morality, politics, law making, and other social activities. Acting by charioteering shi is the only way, according to Ye Shi, that the world can be ordered by man. He interprets Chinese history accordingly. However, if shi is not taken up actively, that is, if it is left in things, and not incorporated within oneself, then it is difficult to avoid failure or demise. From the above we see that in some respects shi provides the objective background for action and is something beyond human control. In other ways shi is only actualized through human action. When Chen Liang 陈亮 talks about historical heroes he mentions shi as an important factor. “Ancient so-called heroes were not [deemed heroic] because of their own credit, wisdom, or bravery, but rather because they acted according to shi.”26 Even though Chen is not saying that shi is an important characteristic of a hero, he is arguing that the interaction between the human and shi is involved in heroism. The question then becomes, how can a unification of the shi in things and the shi in humans be achieved? Actualizing the subject’s autonomy is indispensible for this issue. The interaction between humans and shi is also reflected in the relationship between people’s activity and their environment or the objective laws that govern it. This is the basic form of the relationship between the shi of things and the shi of people in their interaction, and the effective approach for this relationship involves being in line with laws and goals. Action entails being yes but faced with the problem of “waiting for the right time to seize the moment,” and involves an attempt to unite laws and goals within its actual processes.27 (This will be discussed in more detail below.)

26 27

Chen Liang 陈亮, Chen Liang Ji 陈亮集 [The Works of Chen Liang] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1983), 637–638. Francois Jullien, in his investigation of shi, says that it can generally be regarded as a type of “efficacy.” (see François Jullien, The Propensity of Things: Towards a History of Efficacy in China, New York: Zone Books, 1995.) His study is basically looking at the function of shi, and neglects other important aspects, including how it interacts with, and can be changed by humans.

Shi, The Background For Practice

93

From another perspective, the interaction between shi and human action expresses the former’s generative qualities. As a historical trend, shi is dynamic that involves pre-given states of affairs. However, as mentioned above, shi is not a natural state (of affairs), and human participation is integral to the process of its formation. This endows shi with generative properties. When the legalist philosopher Hanfeizi 韩非子 (d. 233 b.c.e.) talks about shi he writes, “The term shi is generic. Its covers innumerable varieties.”28 Here “varieties” is related both to transitions in and to the generation of shi at different times and under different circumstances. In some contexts, the meaning of shi can be diverse, whereas in others, especially where it follows temporal changes, shi is expressed in singular or unique ways. The generative quality of shi means that humans can create shi as well. This type of human creation forms the background and orientation for the unfolding of beneficial practices, as well as for avoiding or changing harmful situations. Xunzi writes, “When men are ‘trained,’ the ruler gains authority [shi]; when they are not, he loses authority.”29 The so-called “gaining of authority” means that shi can sometimes correspond to the particular action or its pattern. Humans can create a certain type of situation through their own action, and they can also miss or lose a particularly beneficial shi formation due to their own inappropriate behavior. In sum, humans can create shi, bringing about a particular shi formation that goes on to influence and regulate further activities. Hanfeizi makes a clear distinction between shi and what is necessary due to nature. He writes, “If the term shi is restricted to what is entirely due to nature, then there will be no use in disputing about it. The shi I am talking about is created by man.”30 Here the idea of what is necessary due to nature could suggest that shi is completely outside the realm of human action, and that humans cannot be involved in its construction. However, there is also another type of shi that is established by humanss. For example, looked at from the perspectives of social institutions and individual action, we can create certain political conditions that can form political structures or backgrounds. These may, in turn, present restrictions on both individuals and collectives in the political context. The Shang Jun Shu notes this point remarking that there may be “shi [that make it so that] nothing bad can be done.”31 28 Hanfeizi 韩非子, Hanfeizi 韩非子 [The Book of Master Hanfei], Edited by Chen Bingcai 陈秉才 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2007), 235. 29 Xunzi, Xunzi, 159. 30 Hanfeizi, Hanfeizi, 235. 31 Shang, Shang Jun Shu, 97.

94

chapter 4

Wang Fuzhi looks more broadly at shi, explaining its relation to principles and affairs. He argues that states of affairs are different from things (or objects). Whereas things exist objectively—that is, independently from human activity—states of affairs are expressions of human activity. To a degree, affairs are restricted by natural principles and by dao (the natural course of the world). States of affairs can create shi, in fact, that is exactly what they do: they produce shi. In this process they become necessary and constitute restraint on action. They thus have the positive effect of outlining principles for what people can do, but they are negative in that they provide the limits for what cannot be done as well. So, looking at human action, the issue arises of whether or not our actions are in accord with these principles. If we do achieve this accord it is likely that we also will be able to achieve the goals of our actions, but if not this is unlikely. Here we can see that shi created by humans and shi formed by states of affairs are internally connected to natural principles (which are related to dao, the natural course or way of the world). These two types of shi are themselves established on the basis of certain pre-existing laws—they are therefore not brought about arbitrarily or at random. Whether it is the shi that is formed by states of affairs, or the shi that regulates action, shi itself is always related to and also determinative for various strict principles. Through positive impetus and negative limitations, these principles exercise their function as influencing and controlling both kinds of shi. As laws of existence, principles are usually expressed as necessity. So the connection between shi and principles means that shi includes necessity. Ye Shi explains When force cannot be stopped, movement does not [sustain or come from] oneself… When one does not know why it is the case, but it is indeed the case, that can be called shi.32 Here shi is an external power that can overcome individual volition and is also expressed as that which cannot be stopped and is simply the case (or “the way things are”). The interconnection between shi and principles here does not mean that they are in complete unison or equal to one another. Shi involves more aspects than principles. However the most important expressions of principles are the trends included in or composed by shi.

32

Ye Shi 叶适, Ye Shi Ji 叶适 [The Collected Works of Ye Shi], Edited by, Liu Gongchun 刘公 纯, Wang Xiaoyu 王孝鱼, and Li Zhefu 李哲夫 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju 1983), 731.

Shi, The Background For Practice

95

In its role as a synthesized practical background for action, the content of shi is not just necessary principles, but also includes various contingent factors. Discussing this relationship, Jin Yuelin 金岳霖 (d. 1984) makes a very important point. He writes, “Principles are certain, but shi are often uncertain.”33 The uncertainty Jin identifies has to do with an individual’s own action. If we expand on this point we see that shi also relates to cause-and-effect. So some aspects of principles are constituted by the limitations put on things in varying scenarios by cause-and-effect. By definition, wherever there is some cause, then there must also be the corresponding effect. But while shi as cause does produce changes in things and in affairs, shi and things are not in a direct cause-effect relationship. Also, causes do not necessarily bring about certain shis since a single object can be controlled by various causal relationships, but exactly which ones actually obtain in any given scenario depends on the concrete contextual conditions. On this basis and in accordance with the idea that “principles carry certainty,” we can still argue that “no matter what changes or actions are taken by the individual we can always understand [that their success is not a question of necessity].”34 However, according to the idea that shi is not necessary, we may conclude that “no matter how well we understand something, we can never fully grasp an individual’s changes.”35 The relationship between the two ideas (understanding and unpredictable changes) shows the individual’s uniqueness as well as the function of contingency. Further, the orientation of processes alone is never the definitive deciding factor in the individual’s changes. The existence of things and of affairs includes a necessary trend toward development, but this development itself will also transform, have ups and downs, and generally fluctuate. Shi can include a certain directionality, but it is not a clear orientation toward a specific goal.36 As a synthesis, shi includes diverse aspects, including universality, necessity, uniqueness and contingency. The intersection of these opposing aspects means that no matter whether one forms shi through affairs, or rides on a given shi in action, one needs to pay attention to both the necessities and the contingencies at work in any given scenario.

33

Jin Yuelin 金岳霖, Lun Dao 论道 [Discussions on Dao] (Beijing: Renmin Daxue Chubanshe, 2010), 201. 34 Ibid., 167. 35 Ibid. 36 It is worth noting here that Jin Yuelin’s discussion of “Principles are certain, but shi is not necessarily the same,” is not entirely comprehensive. It is somewhat limited to the individual, whereas my aim is to look at shi on a much broader scale.

96 4.3

chapter 4

Waiting to Seize the Moment: Returning to the Background for Practice

From the perspective of practical activity shi includes different aspects, orientations, and varying interactions between different parts of reality. This network of relationships is expressed through the manifestation of synthesized circumstances and situations. Here shi provides the background for the unfolding of activities, as well as a perspective from which to interpret various practical behaviors. The link between shi and activity makes the measuring, calculating, and examining of time, for example in “waiting to seize the moment” (shi) indispensible. Looked at more broadly, measuring, calculating, and examining time and shi (“waiting to seize the moment”)—which are used as guidance action—is completed in relation to an understanding of the synthesized background for activity. As a background context for action shi is not abstract. Rather it develops in concrete circumstances, and corresponds to specific, complex manifestations. For example, the levels of status in the political realm result in a certain type of political shi (situation/condition). In military activities the divide between sides also results in a shi (also situation or condition) where each compete for dominance. The same can be said of every aspect of life: from broad social institutions to the circumstances met in everyday existence: shi is linked with concrete activities and manifest as something specific. So varying shis in different spheres of society each have their own unique characteristics, and different backgrounds have their own particular place and time. Nevertheless, shi always includes a universal orientation. Under specific conditions, shi can also be quite active. In traditional societies rulers maintained a certain shi (their political position), which can be seen as one condition for the successful implementation of their governance. In some sense every practical process has a unique background, and yet all of these processes share universal dimensions. The relationship between shi’s unique and universal properties is what endows the background of any action with its actual properties. Grasping these characteristics therefore becomes necessary for examining (the right) time and for seizing the (right) moment. As noted, shi is determined according to differing actual circumstances, and it also becomes the condition for the development that connects the past to the present. Shi is not static and it is not limited to present states. It also cuts across the present and points out towards the future. As a historical orientation, shi depends on past affairs and in this way it produces present conditions, and is related to future developments. With regards to its connection with time and with the development over time, shi relates to the way a thing or affair is

Shi, The Background For Practice

97

manifest in the present, as well as to its future potential. Essentially the future development of some thing or affair is related to its possible manifestations. Thus, corresponding to potentiality, shi is an orientation that expresses directionality–albeit one that is not fixed on any clear goal or target. So there is a tension between the orientation in development and ends, which are varied. Measuring, calculating or examining shi therefore means investigating history–what has already been formed–in addition to present conditions as well as possible future orientations–what will or can be formed. This means being able to judge and predict what might come about in the future. As a synthesized background shi is not an individual thing or affair. It is usually therefore defined as the system between or circumstances amongst multiple things or affairs. Chen Liang calls this “a form of shi” that can determine potentialities for specific actions.37 Here “determining potential for actions” means that deciding on a course of action is based on knowledge of the synthesized background. In contemporary Chinese “form of shi” is a common phrase. For instanced, we talk about the “form of shi” in politics, economics, international relations etc., in these contexts it also means the different systems of practical processes. In these systems, certain aspects of shi are directly related to present activities, while others are indirectly connected to their development of the system over time. For instance, in military activities, the relative differences in weaponry and size of troops between two sides can directly influence warfare, and can indirectly impact the societies these two armies represent as well (e.g. in terms of production needs). Plans for practical activity should therefore focus on both the direct and indirect elements. This background also influences the examining and measuring of time and determines the right time for seizing the moment (shi). Comprehending the complexity of shi therefore means unifying the investigation and also having a deep understanding of the specific set of facts that come in to view in a given practice. In the relationship between principles and shi the latter’s synthesis of various elements becomes overt. As stated, shi includes necessity; the historical orientation that it expresses refers to a type of necessity. Further, as also discussed above, shi is comprised of multiple elements, including different types of contingencies. Things or affairs that appear in a particular situation are not always necessary since the process that brought them about includes contingent changes. Therefore one needs to comprehend necessary elements while paying full attention to contingent ones as well. This means to say that shi, as a background for action, cannot provide mechanical or necessary conditions or regulations for action. For example, in the evolution of society, from traditional 37 Chen, Chen Liang Ji, 4.

98

chapter 4

social forms to modern ones, there is always a contextual shi and even though different groups can share similar shi formations, or even develop from the same one, contingent elements are what then accounts for their having dissimilar institutions and structures. Necessary orientations and contingent changes are interwoven with one another, and make shi complex, so that in order to grasp it one needs to examine both shi and related temporal aspects, this is what is meant by the phrase: “seize the (right) moment.” The relationship between contingency and necessity is concretely expressed as the interaction between shi and opportunity. Ye Shi investigates opportunity (i.e. chance coupled with temporal aspects) in his discussion of shi. He believes that “chance” and “time” are only expressed and actualized through human action and he criticizes those who discuss either issue from a perspective that is removed from this perspective. He argues that shi is related to both “time” and “chance,” but that the two both basically mean opportunity. As a condition for practice, opportunity can be either negative or positive, and is contingent. ­However, social opportunities are different than natural ones insofar as the former are only concretely actualized in the process of human action–usually inline with shi. If we talk solely about waiting for an opportunity–without its b­ eing taken up in actual practice—then opportunity loses its significance. Those who are passive in general rarely encounter opportunity. Similarly, opportunity is the “site” for conditions, or for the collection and converging of conditions for action. Opportunity therefore encompasses the intersection of various conditions against a particular background, which creates the chance for success. However a chance or an opportunity is often fleeting and rarely grasped. But clearly the grasping of an opportunity at the appropriate time is extremely important for action. As opposed to not acting, or not doing, acting in line with shi means taking advantage of the situation and using the conditions provided to reach a one’s goals. Being in line with shi can therefore be expressed as accordance with the mutually interactive relationship between necessity and the grasping of contingency in the form of opportunity. In another sense this entails the unification of shi and opportunity. The latter is itself connected to examining, measuring, and calculating time and shi. Shi is the orientation of developments, and composes the historical background of activities in practice. Opportunity then means to charioteer shi in order to act, and this provides a convergence between being in line with shi and actualization. Through understanding shi, and investigating time (as a site of opportunity) humans are given the preconditions for unfolding the process of practice. Of course opportunity itself is often a positive value, but it can also be neutral. Further, in the context of a specific practical background certain oppurtunities can be changed from harmful to positive or even beneficial if they are

Shi, The Background For Practice

99

handled in the correct way. However, if opportunities are misused this may lead to negative or harmful developments. Therefore the subject’s accurate assessment and corresponding practice can determine the value that an opportunity holds. In this way positive meaning can be added, or the negative avoided and this is the essential meaning of the wisdom of “waiting to seize the moment.” Later we will look at this practical wisdom in the political context in order to discuss how it is expressed in that arena. To summarize, shi involves the specific backgrounds for actions, and is also demonstrated as the content of actuality. It is based on both present and former manifestations, and also expresses the future orientation for the development of things or affairs. It is directly related to action and indirectly influences the elements of action. It includes necessary principles while at the same time participating in various forms of contingency. It is thereby expressed through various aspects, and is the synthesized and systematized background for practice. As a concrete background, shi is always expressed in reality as a situation. When we investigate something from the perspective of shi this means that we look to the background of the actions that are unfolding. On a deeper level, investigating action or practice from the perspective of shi leads us to the point of origin in a manner whereby we do not have to look at a singular causal relation and are still able to appreciate the synthesis of various conditions. In the process of investigating action and practice, if we depart from shi as a synthesis, then it is easy to stop at simple causation, and ignore many aspects, and the complex network of real causal backgrounds. This is also what brings about abstract interpretations of action. So looking at shi and facing the preconditions of actual practice make up two sides of the same process.38 Understanding a particular shi involves knowledge of a number of aspects and is quite different from abstract knowledge about an action. One of the most important characteristics of understanding shi is to comprehend the synthesized nature of an actual background. This synthetic comprehension includes perception, rational analysis, reasoning, comparison, weighing, as well as further forms of understanding. Comprehension of relevant facts of experience relies upon perception and the senses as well as making predictions about the 38

When Jullien talks about shi (which he calls “efficacy”), he points out that Chinese scholars are generally uninterested in causation. He writes, “instead of the explanation of causes, we have the implication of tendencies.” (Jullien, The Propensity of Things: Towards a History of Efficacy in China, 221.) From this perspective there is a difference between abstract causation and shi. But to think that shi and causation are opposed is going too far. In fact, the opposite of shi is singular, one directional causation, not causation in general. As a synthesized background shi itself becomes some type of basis or even cause for action.

100

chapter 4

trends or developments that extend from them (which requires reasoning). It also involves explicating the relationship between necessity and contingency, which is aided by analysis and comparison. Understanding shi then also has to do with the relationship between the knowledge of facts and evaluation or values. The combination of all of these things develops the understanding of shi, which, as a synthesis, cannot be grasped through a one-sided understanding, or through one in which the above factors are separated from one another. The fullness of them can only be appreciated or shown through their connection in synthetic comprehension. The above characteristics and judgments associated with understanding shi are not an exhaustive listing. The method for knowing, or grasping objects, and judgment relies on the interplay between perception, rationality, imagination, intuition, and investigation as its precondition. And this is expressed as the unification of analysis, comparison, reasoning, confirmation, decisions and other activities. As a method one of the most important characteristics of judgment is the unification and communication between these factors. The content of judgment is a link between concepts and external objects. Accordingly the link between general essences and specific manifestations, as well as that between the different properties of things and states of affairs, can be comprehended. And it is through this process that subjects can form complex understandings of things in their various dimensions. The above characteristics given to these judgments make them different from merely analyzing objects from a purely logical viewpoint. Knowing shi becomes a process that is expressed through the synthesis of different types of “knowing” activities. In terms of its actual manifestation, this form of judgment includes a variety of content, and propositions are only its logical form. The difference between propositions and these knowing activities can be seen through the difference between concrete philosophy and analytic thought. If we say that Kant’s philosophy is more concentrated on judgments, then analytic philosophy is more concentrated on propositions. But shi cannot be comprehended by relying on propositions alone: judgments and other forms of understanding need to be synthesized together for a truly accurate account of shi. In fact understanding shi is also a way of judging a particular shi and waiting for the right moment to act is effected through judging a particular shi and coming up with a strategy for action. Accurate judgments of shi are an important precondition for success. If one accurately judges historical evolution then one can avoid running counter to historical trends. For example, in science being accurate can provide guidance for conducting the right type of scientific research. But on the other hand, mistaken judgments can cause big problems. These types of judgments require various kinds of knowledge that

Shi, The Background For Practice

101

are often expressed through a creative process. For example, understanding simple causation can help one know something about one’s experience, but comprehending shi, cannot be limited to simple perception, nor can it rely on simple processes of deduction. Instead, it requires creativity as well as the different types or forms of knowledge and understanding. As mentioned above, shi is not passive; it interacts with humans and is displayed through various functions. In positive terms, it can imply actualized power in the process of action.39 But it can also be negative, indicating a lack of power or even a form of negative power. Positive shi can provide a motivation for action, and this function is expressed in two general ways. Firstly, shi can initiate action before it has happened. And secondly, it can help an action that has already begun to be brought to fruition. In order for shi to help initiate or advance action it has to be aligned with the goals of that action. So-called “ being in accord with shi,” “riding shi,” or “charioteering shi,” are all expressions of this identity and this is precisely how shi becomes a type of power. However, if one goes against shi it will become a negative (restraining) force. For example, if one were to have been fixed in the use of manual labor during the industrial age and to have ignored advancements in machinery it would have been difficult to maintain competition. Similarly, in politics once the democratization process has begun, if one attempts to install older institutions of monarchic rule it will be very difficult likely fail. History provides numerous such examples to prove this point. The power that is displayed by shi shows its dynamic nature. And as a power shi is not external to action, nor is it merely the precondition for action. Shi actively takes part in and permeates the process of action. Here we can see that in the interplay between humans and shi: humans become (part of) shi through action, and inversely that shi shows its power through unity with the goals and methods of human action. 39

Translator’s note: This is especially evident in Sunzi the Art of War.

chapter 5

Ji, Shu and Yun1 in Practice Shi is not the only background for activity. The interaction between humans and the world also plays an important role in action. Ontologically, this involves what is actual, possible, necessary and what is contingent. The latter three serve as limitations or restrictions on action. There is no way to separate them from human action and they are not external regulations or orientations. In the context of their Chinese equivalents we can label potentiality or possibility as ji 几,2 necessity as shu 数,3 and contingency as yun 运.4 These three determining factors are widely discussed in Chinese philosophy. Examining this background will provide a historical context for understanding their significance in human action. 5.1 “Ji”: Trends towards Actual Possibilities In the interplay between humans and the world, “ji” plays an important role. As an internal regulation of this process, ji closely relates to human action. In the Yizhuan we find it written, “Those springs are the slight beginnings [ji] of movement, 易传 and the earliest indications of good fortune (or ill). The superior man sees them [i.e. the ji], and acts accordingly without waiting for (the delay of) a single day.”5 Here ji is not only related to things or objects, but to affairs (complex relations between things) as well. The category of things can be divided into two types of manifestations: those that are already in the sphere of human knowing and doing, and those that are not. Whereas humans make continual use the former, the latter appear naturally, and can be characterized by their not being involved with human activity. On the one hand, passively speaking, states of affairs can be seen as 1 Translator’s note: These terms will be explained in detail throughout the chapter. 2 Translator’s note: Ji can also mean “an indication of a trend,” “almost/nearly,” “close to,” “achievement” or “how many.” 3 Translator’s note: Shu can also mean “a few,” “method,” “reason,” and “number.” 4 Translator’s note: Yun can also mean “distant,” “use,” “transport,” and “luck.” 5 The Sacred Books of China, Part ii: The Yi King, Translated by James Legge (Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1882), 392.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004321786_006

Ji, Shu and Yun in Practice

103

when something enters the realm of human knowledge and behavior. On the other hand, affairs can be understood actively as being linked with knowledge. In this sense, the connection between things and human beings is built upon affairs. As affairs unfold, things transition from their natural state and enter into the realm of knowing and doing. In terms of ji, both things and affairs are concretely expressed in the process of change or development necessitated by action. The original meaning of ji, given in the quote above, unfolds through this type of development and change in things and affairs. As an aspect of the process of change and development, ji refers to the initial manifestation of things or affairs in their development. Above we saw that the Yizhuan records, “Those springs are the slight beginnings [ji] of movement, and the earliest indications of good fortune (or ill).” These “slight beginnings,” or ji, are related both to initial movements as well as to outcomes and outcomes are given meaning when compared with an initial manifestation before change. Similarly, the second part of the quote, “The superior man sees them [i.e. the ji], and acts accordingly without waiting for (the delay of) a single say,” refers to both the development in the process of change in things or affairs as well as their outcomes. In other words, as situations progress hints are given that tell the situation might unfold and potential subsequent outcomes. So ji can also be used to indicate some phenomenon that, unknown in the initial stages, comes to be known at the end. This indication provides a passive understanding of ji, but there are other elements of ji which are more active. In terms of the more proactive aspects of ji, we can view it within the process of change, and as expressed as the orientation of development. In other ways ji is understood to imply a readily apparent hint or an omen regarding possible outcomes. So even in its more active displays it still connotes some sense of passivity, it that it is only a hint in indication. When ji is not fully formed it has numerous hidden elements, but as a clue for development and change, there are many aspects of it that are nonetheless obvious and external. In sum, as something that will be complete, but is still in the process of completion, ji is active and passive, hidden and apparent. In terms of things, ji relates to the transformation of them. Zhang Zai 张载 (d. 1077) investigates this when he says that: The Great Harmony is called the Way [dao]. It embraces the nature which underlies all counter processes of floating and sinking, rising and falling, and motion and rest. It is the origin of the process of fusion and intermingling, of overcoming and being overcome, and of expansion and contraction. At the commencement, these processes are incipient,

104

chapter 5

subtle, obscure, easy, and simple, but at the end they are extensive, great, strong, and firm.6 Here Zhang is describing metaphysical changes and transformations of objects. For him qi 气 (“air/gas,” “vital breath”) is the substance of everything and this includes the substance of the transformation of things. Therefore the accumulation and dispersion of qi, which forms the processes of completion and destruction, are connected and interrelated. When qi is in the initial stages of transformation, it is manifest as “incipient, subtle, obscure, easy, and simple” and later it develops into what is “extensive, great, strong, and firm.” Wang Fuzhi, commenting on Zhang Zai, argues that ji is the initial movement of qi.7 For Wang ji is therefore interpreted ontologically as the origin of the development of things.8 There are ways in which affairs and things are opposed. Kong Yingda 孔颖达 (d. 648), in his commentary to the Yizhuan looks closely at the relationship between ji and affairs. There he argues that affairs, as opposed to things, are more directly connected to human activity. The heart-mind is also linked with affairs. On the level of affairs, ji primarily relates to the development of action, and action itself forms the process of pursuing values. Therefore in the process of the development of affairs, ji is often expressed as the initial inklings or hinting of (or inclinations towards) a certain orientation, which can also be evaluated in terms of a trend towards a particular a value. Although it is primarily dependent on the past evolution of things and affairs, ji is also relevant for the relationship between the present and the future in the development of things and affairs. The interplay between the basis and conditions for the development of things and affairs produces certain types of indications (ji). However, although ji exists in the initial state of the development of things and affairs, it is not limited to this type of manifestation and it also contains the trajectory for the future. More substantially, ji influences and can dictate later stages in the development of things or affairs; relatedly it also 6 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 500. 7 Zhang Zai 张载, Zhang Zai Ji 张载集 [Collected Works of Zhang Zai] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju 1978), 16. 8 Fang Yizhi 方以智 (d. 1671) later differentiates between zhice (质测 “material measurement”) and tongji (通几 “thorough ji”). Accordingly, he finds that ji indicates the origin of changes in the world, and tongji means metaphysically comprehending these origins. This is somewhat similar to Zhang Zai’s understanding of ji, however, as will be explained below, Zhang also looks at ji in terms of human action. For Fang Yizhi the difference between zhice and tongji is that the former describes ji with metaphysical connotations, whereas the latter has not direct involvement with human action.

Ji, Shu and Yun in Practice

105

allows for prediction (to some degree) of their development. For instance, under the right conditions a seed can determine the way the plant, its branches and leaves (flowers, fruit, etc.) will grow. So it is with ji. In fact, the ontological significance of ji is directly linked to the trajectory and development of things or affairs. This trajectory then provides the practical basis for the different types of choices humans can make in action. This leads us to the question “How can ji predict the trajectory of development?” and this line of inquiry brings us to the meaning of ji itself. Already we’ve mentioned that ji is a type of initial manifestation, state, or “indication” that is linked with the very way a thing or affair exists. The method for its existence, looked at more substantially, is closely linked to possibility and actualization. Whenever a thing or affair is developing it is presented with a number of opportunities, not all of which will be actualized. Only those opportunities based on actual conditions can become realized, and in this way the transformation unfolds as a process from beginning to end. Taking this as the background, we can grasp the ontological essence of ji even better. Ji is not a simple or pure possibility, nor is it completed actualization; it represents the most fundamental states of possibility becoming realized. Thus we can say that ji’s being an inclination, inkling, sprout, or hint explains how it is both hidden and apparent—and active while also passive. Therefore ji can be seen as the beginnings of potentiality becoming actualized, or is the name for this trajectory itself. This is, of course, different from the final or complete manifestation of any thing or affair. However it is like a miniature form, showing the orientation of development. As regulation for change, ji is expressed as the possibility of realization as well as the initial states of transformation, which makes it internally connected to the process of transformation. The transformation from possibility to actuality is established upon internal foundations, and depends on many factors and conditions, but it is difficult to predict exactly when and how these factors and conditions will be formed. And so ji is also somewhat unpredictable. Broadly speaking, ji denotes a turning point in the process of transformation, but exactly when this will happen, or how, is unpredictable. But this does not mean that ji cannot be known. The indications of development, and the first stages of changes provide the foundation for the prospects of any thing or affair’s. After comprehending these initial inklings one can then deduce from them the future trends for development. Kong Yingda argues that the exemplary person or sage is a master at predicting circumstances according to barely perceptible formations of ji. Accordingly, “predicting” here means inferring or forecasting, and is related to knowledge of ji. This knowledge is characterized, not only by grasping the initial stages of change, but also by predicting later

106

chapter 5

changes. Zhu Xi expresses the connection between knowing ji and inference in relation to human activity. He argues that before something is done it is possible to predict the outcome, and this prediction is based on understanding ji. Abstract inference about the development of things and affairs is indispensible for knowing ji, and this becomes an integral part of human action. Similarly, grasping the turning point in change can only be done against the background of certain practical requirements or conditions. These turning points themselves are not regulations on objects; their significance corresponds to the internal requirements of the process of practice. But exactly how and when a particular turning point will appear is impossible to infer. Since the unfolding of practice has various influences on these turning points, concentration on both the implicit and explicit elements of transformations can aid in understanding them more thoroughly. Furthermore, through the investigation of an actual situation and its conditions, humans can have a better prediction as to where and when certain turning points may appear. All of this implies knowledge of ji. This type of knowledge and prediction is normally had through understanding various minute or subtle aspects. In Classical Chinese philosophical terms we can say that the “root” (mo 末) of the issue can achieved by way of its “branches” (ben 本). The “root” is something beyond the phenomenon’s appearance of the being or its subtle conditions. Understanding the initial stage (ji) of a thing or affair allows for a better grasp of its “roots,” and this is achieved through knowledge of the connection of its “branches” and “roots.” Here “roots” has to do with the more fundamental mode of beings, and with the relationship between their substance and function, as well as the possible basis or foundation for their existence. Knowing ji through knowing “roots” means inferring the development of things or affairs (through understanding of their initial states and transformations). Compared with inference that is based on the external properties of a phenomenon, getting at the “root” through understanding ji (by grasping the orientation of a thing’s or affair’s development) is a more internal perspective. Ji’s ontological significance is seen through the manifestation of possible orientations and the contributing factor of initial transformations. We find the more concrete manifestations of ji in its relation with humans. In the Yizhuan Ji is linked to “fulfilling one’s duties” (or “undertakings”). The (operations that form the) yi are the methods by which the sages searched out exhaustively what was deep, and investigated the minutest springs [ji] (of things). ‘Those operations searched out what was deep:’— therefore they could penetrate to the perspective of all under the sky

Ji, Shu and Yun in Practice

107

(Tian). ‘They made apparent the minutest springs of (things):’—therefore they could bring to a completion all undertakings under the sky. ‘Their action was spirit-like:’—therefore they could make speed without hurry, and reached their destination without travelling.9 Zhang Zai explains that here “undertakings” (or “duties”) are defined as “affairs” in the form of human activities.10 We can also see here that “investigating the minutest springs (of things)” is related to the existence of humans, and its purpose has to do with action. In comprehending ji it is not necessary, or desirable, to be comported towards knowledge itself, rather one’s goal should be to “bring to a completion all undertakings under the sky.” Appropriateness (or yi 义) is the medium for connecting ji and human action. Zhang Zai argues that when ji is understood then appropriateness (yi) becomes clear.11 Appropriateness is what should be the case. As a regulatory concept it involves choices for action (including what should be done, and how it should be done). The idea that appropriateness becomes clear after understanding ji (in Zhai above) shows that grasping ji is also a way of knowing what should be the case. This means that ji connotes the basis for a thing’s or affair’s development, and indicates its trajectory. So acting according to ji means being aligned with the way that things and affairs develop. This explains how knowing ji makes “what should be the case” clear. When this knowledge is expressed in the realm of actual activity, it involves making what is actually the case (in terms of a trajectory) into what should be the case. Understanding appropriateness (or yi) through knowing ji encompasses the relationship between ji and “what should be the case.” The further step after knowledge of “what should be the case” is knowledge of the universal way (things should be), which is the ultimate goal of knowing ji. Ji itself is the starting point for practice, and in terms of their principles, ji and the way (dao) are connected to one another. Wang Fuzhi points this out, saying that investigating ji alone is not enough; one must also know that substance and function are interdependent and co-arise.12 Understanding ji is not just about incipient phenomena; it also entails investigating the relationship between substance and function, as well as comprehending its basis. Revealing the relationship between substance and function is another step towards alignment with 9 10 11 12

The Sacred Books of China, Part ii: The Yi King, 370. Translation modified. Zhang Zai, Zhang Zai Ji, 201. Ibid., 16. Wang Fuzhi 王夫之, Zhouyi Neizhuan 周易内传 [Zhouyi Inner Changes] (Henan: Yuelu Shushe 1996), 556.

108

chapter 5

the universal way (dao). Texts uncovered at the Guodian site in 1993 record “If one uses a prediction [ji] and understands it, this is Heaven[ly].”13 Here comprehending ji and being in accord with the way are internally united. In fact, making things into what they should be means that knowing ji is a process directed towards original laws, and alignment with nature or what is natural. So when one acts according to ji it is not waywardness or simple spontaneity, but is based on the more general laws of existence. The development of affairs or things can express different forms of value. Ji, as the initial stage of potential developments, cannot express either positive or negative values. In order to really know why one should understand various value connotations, from the standpoint of implementation, one should first actualize what is positive; this is, of course, intimately connected with human participation. Zhang Zai writes specifically about the connection between ji and human action. He argues that exemplary people know ji, and they follow it, which allows them to predict fortune and misfortune. The fact that ji has in helping people to understand good or bad outcomes stems from the fact that it contains these different values. Humans should work to actualize the positive ones. In fact, ji (as “possibilities”) are established through a “way” that is relative to humans. Just as the natural manifestations of the way are expressed as laws or principles, ji (as “possible expressions of the way”) is also mainly displayed through natural regulations. Only with human existence, and with the unification knowledge and action as its background, can the value of ji be formed or be made apparent; and only through actual human activities can this type of value be implemented. As a value regulation, ji is not often completely exposed, and knowing ji is based on the past, present and expectations for the future. Historically, the establishing of new practices or movements is often initiated through understanding and acting in accordance with ji. The development of the positive aspects of things and affairs is a process. Here knowing ji and acting in accordance with it can only be completed through human effort. This very same knowing and acting also functions negatively as cautioning against or restricting erroneous or bad aspects while they are still in their initial stages. This brings us to the relationship between “doing” and “prevention.” For example, when something positive is done it can also be viewed from the inverse perspective—as the restricting or preventing of other negative things. These are two aspects of the same process, and are mutually dependent. Wang Fuzhi clarifies this by noting that doing does not deviate from the principle of prevention, and that prevention, as a form of knowing 13

Mark Csikszentmihalyi: Material Virtue: Ethics And The Body In Early China (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 308.

Ji, Shu and Yun in Practice

109

ji and acting accordingly, does not hinder doing.14 In other words, these are the two ways that knowing ji and acting accordingly are expressed, positively as the implementation of the values related to aspects of development, and negatively as the prevention of bad or erroneous tendencies. Within this process, it is important to make timely discoveries and to fully comprehend the orientation of the development of things or affairs. When certain crucial aspects emerge during the development of things or affairs, this provides opportunity for human beings in their activities. Therefore understanding ji is always connected with time and timely realization. Ji represents the initial manifestations of transformation or change in the development of things or affairs, but at the same time it represents opportunity or turning points in action. Only through grasping these opportunities and turning points, and acting in line with shi, can the positive values of ji be cultivated and the negative aspects be avoided. Zhang Zai talks about this as well where he emphasizes the connection between knowing ji and acting in accordance with it in a timely manner.15 5.2 “Shu”: Necessity and Space-Time The emergence of ji depends on certain internal foundations, which are ontologically linked to the universal way (dao). This “way” is a principle or law— outside of space-time—that also regulates human action. Chinese philosophy has also developed the concept of shu,16 which is a perspective that is aligned with the way. Shu includes an orientation towards necessity, while being related to a specific space-time. We can say that it is necessity that is expressed in a certain place and at a certain time—so shu’s “necessity” is not abstract, but rather it is imbedded in human action. Shu is a type of trend in the development of things and affairs, although it is not a general way or principle, it is established upon them. The way and its principles are universal laws, and they endow shu with its necessary ­nature— which is seen in the processes of nature, Xunzi writes “Heaven possesses a constant Way [dao]; Earth has an invariable size [shu]; the gentleman has 14 15 16

Wang Fuzhi, Zhouyi Neizhuan, 419. Zhang Zai, Zhang Zai Ji, 222. Translator’s note: Here shu primarily means “necessity” but it can also mean “a few,” “method,” “reason,” “number,” or “calculating.” The author’s intention is to explain the wide range of shu’s connotations, so no direct translation will be made, and its broad meaning will be clarified below.

110

chapter 5

­constancy [shu] of deportment.”17 The statement “Earth has an invariable size” is related to “Heaven possesses a constant Way,” and the former expresses necessity. Similarly, shu is found in the realm of social history. When Xunzi talks about the history of famous rulers, he writes “Hence, that for four consecutive generations there have been victories is due not to mere chance good luck but to method and calculation [shu].”18 “Four consecutive generations” refers to dukes or kings that helped make the state of Qin powerful. Under these rulers Qin grew ever stronger, and Xunzi notes that this was not by chance, but can be attributed to shu (necessity). From the perspective of the citizens themselves and their relationship to each other, there is also an aspect of necessity. The Xunzi records, “Two men of equal eminence cannot attend each other; two men of the same low status cannot command each other—such is the norm [shu] of Heaven.”19 Two people who are of similar social status (eminence) often have difficulty getting along with one another (e.g. attending to each other). The assurance given here (necessity) has a natural (tian) element. This is what Xunzi means by “the norm of Heaven,” which can be interpreted as a principle of natural or heavenly shu (tian shu 天数). The above description of shu shows that necessity also relates to a certain place and time. In fact, shu itself can be interpreted as an expression of necessity in a certain place and time. This kind of relationship is not just expressed abstractly. In fact, it contains specific times and places and their concrete conditions. We can take the transformation from one season to another as an example: Although winter comes at different times to different parts of the globe, and can vary in its affects, we can be sure that temperatures will tend to be lower during the winter than they are in the summer (at least on average). This is a type of necessity. But exactly when the temperature will drop, and by how much, has to do with weather conditions, in a given place at a given time. The particular temperature at a particular place during a particular time is what we would call shu, understood as a concrete manifestation. The universal laws that govern the relationship between the earth and the sun regulate this type of shu. These universal laws differentiate shu from pure contingency; while specific conditions mean that it is not absolute necessity. Shu in society has the same characteristics. The state of Qin, previously mentioned, which was able to align itself with social shi (“power,” “situation,” or “tendency”). This means that it followed some type of necessary orientation in history. Exactly how this happens, is determined by each leader or ruler of the state, and this 17 Xunzi, Xunzi, 17. 18 Ibid., 247. 19 Ibid., 96.

Ji, Shu and Yun in Practice

111

expresses particular conditions in the given place and time. It was by fusing these two major aspects together the Qin state was able to conquer others and to thrive. We can call this its particular shu—since it had this potentiality, and was simply guided towards realizing it. However, shu is not mysterious, magical, or mystical (as it has often been read in the Chinese tradition). It is the unification of necessary orientation. We can also differentiate between what is universal within the context of particulars, and necessary to particularized universals. In other words, the way (Dao) exists is in particulars, and is in relation to space-time, but its relationship to space-time is necessarily always in the context of particulars. Likewise shu is characterized by a unity with universality, necessity and space-time conditions. It is through the integration of these aspects that universality and necessity can gain a “particular” manifestation. Shu itself is the particularization of universality, and in this way it is expressed concretely as an orientation or manifestation. It is first and foremost expressed as universality, and manifests as necessity. The Zhouyi comments, Hence that which is antecedent to the material form exists, we say, as an ideal method, and that which is subsequent to the material form exists, we say, as a definite thing.20 It also records, “The successive movement of the inactive and active operations constitutes what is called the course (of things).”21 Through the interplay between particularized universality (the shi of necessity) and a specific place and time, shu highlights the directionality of the process of things and of affairs. The way (Dao) cannot be separated from a particular function or use, however it cannot be thereby identified either. Particular functions or uses are expressions of the universal way. Shu cannot be inferred through universals, necessity or particular space-time conditions, taken individually, but only through their interaction and interplay with one another. Shu itself can be manifested in different ways. Jin Yuelin describes the difference between “shi” (as power, situation, or tendency) “shu” and “principle shu.” The former has to do with the individual’s development, while the latter are linked to the development of categories or kinds.22 However, both also relate 20 21 22

The Sacred Books of China, Part ii: The Yi King, Translated by James Legge, Oxford: the Clarendon Press, 1882, 377. Ibid., 355. Jin Yuelin 金岳霖, Lun Dao 论道 [Discussions of Dao] (Beijing: Shangwu Yinshuguan 1987), 175–176.

112

chapter 5

to necessity as well as space-time. The use of natural energy resources is a good example here. We can estimate how much oil will be used in the world each year by human beings, and if we were able to accurately estimate the amount of oil in the earth, we could guess when we might run out. In this example, the exhaustion of oil represents a type of shu in the interactive process between humans and nature. The scenario includes a type of necessary trend as well as a relationship with concrete space-time conditions. However, here the relationship to space-time is the given on quite a broad scale.23 In contrast, we have the individual shu (shi shu), which exists within a specific category of things and is expressed through particular individual existences. The fact that all people eventually die is universal and necessary, but when exactly a particular individual will perish depends on concrete spacetime conditions—including their genes, environment, lifestyle, whether or not they get into an accident and so on. When a particular person dies at a certain time this can be seen as a type of shu in their life process. This form of shu is concretely expressed when we say “people must die,” and thereby characterize death as a necessary orientation that is interwoven with concrete space-time elements. Of course, the degree or scale of space-time here is much smaller than in the discussion of natural phenomena above. The relationship between space-time and particular things or events serves as a limitation on the evolution of those things and events. In the example given above the idea of a particular place (earth), and a certain time (whenever it is that humans exhaust oil), entails that the resource takes on a necessary orientation or direction, i.e. that it will (of necessity) eventually be used-up. Similarly, the space-time environments in which the individual exists also has a particular shu, which forms a directionality through their genes, environment, and lifestyle, as well as the many other factors that limit an individual’s life-span. The type of necessity expressed by shu is integrated with certain space-time conditions that make it somewhat different from purely logical necessity. The latter is characterized by its formal nature by which it transcends space-time. One formation of this type of logic is the relationship between propositions and conclusions in deductive reasoning. The relationship between the two is necessary in a way that does not relate to time. But the type of necessity in shu is expressed as a trend or orientation in the real world. The above examples (of natural resources and human life) express necessity in the physical world. Whether it terms of categories or individuals existences, shu is always involved 23

When Jin Yuelin discusses “principle shu” he uses a similar example. (Jin, Lundao, 176).

Ji, Shu and Yun in Practice

113

with particular space-time contexts. It is in this way that the necessity in the development and process of things and affairs differs from logical necessity. Even though the necessity of shu differs from logical necessity, it is still comprehensible. The Yizhuan gives an account of the relationship between shu and knowledge: The exhaustive use of the numbers (that turn up in manipulating the stalks) [shu], and (thereby) knowing (the character of) coming events, is what we call prognosticating; the comprehension of the changes (indicated leads us to) what we call the business (to be done).24 According to the Yizhuan, shu already includes necessity, which is what makes it so powerful. This reference to “the exhaustive use of the numbers” in order to “know (the character of) coming events” means grasping shu to calculate future events. Shu includes a necessary orientation, and at the same time is related to a specific place and time. Necessity here implies an association with universal laws (i.e. the way, or its principles), and a specific time and place connotes concrete conditions. Theoretically, if both necessary laws and concrete conditions are both well comprehended then the shu of the development of things or affairs can be grasped as well. For example, once one knows the necessary shu of changing weather patterns, as well as its relationship to a specific place, then one can predict with a degree of accuracy what the weather will be. The accuracy of this prediction is closely linked to the knowledge of the necessary laws and space-time conditions; the more these are understood the more accurate weather can be predicted. So we can say that predictions about weather have to do with understanding shu. Using shu to predict the future is significant in that it provides a basis for choices of action. The practical processes surrounding action are complex and involve principles, the way (dao), and specific things and affairs. Whereas the former two are forms of universal law or universal necessity, the latter relate to space-time conditions. Universal laws do function to bring about action in human beings, but logical necessity itself is a universal pattern, and in this sense its ability to incite action is abstract. Affairs and things, which always exist in a certain place and time, are thereby limited by their relationship to space-time and cannot easily be expressed as a universal trend. Shu can therefore be understood as necessity in the context of a specific place and time. This characteristic is what allows for predictions based on shu to be endowed 24

The Sacred Books of China, Part ii: The Yi King, 356–357.

114

chapter 5

with their concrete content. As mentioned above, the fact that the temperature goes down in winter is a type of necessary orientation or trend, but just understanding this does not allow one to predict the temperature. This necessary tendency must also be synthesized with an understanding of the specific time and place that one wishes to make a prediction about and this is what will allow one to make a relatively specific or accurate prediction. Xunzi comments on how shu is related to human action where he says, So that with certainty the harvest surplus will be stored up at the proper season is called the ‘art of calculating [shu] what fits each respective station.’25 This basically means that human production (or action) should be founded upon natural changes and necessary laws as well as the comprehension of space-time conditions and this is what it means to be in accord with the process of shu. Here we can see that Xunzi understands the significant effect that shu can have on human practice. 5.3 “Yun”: And Human Existence Knowledge of the necessary orientation or tendency of shu is often expressed in a form of certainty. Practical activities in the real world are sometimes relatively certain, but at other times they face the problem of uncertainty. Uncertainty is concretely manifest in yun,26 which is primarily linked to contingency. In many different ways yun influences, restricts or limits practice. Yun itself can be understood as contingency in the process of human existence or human activity. It is an important element that influences action in a way that can either be beneficial for the conditions of action, or not. Compared with the relative certainty of shu, yun is uncertain. The types of changes associated with yun are not based on its formation or disappearance but rather transformations that occur in yun itself. In contemporary Chinese is common to say “When the time comes yun will change.” In this context change can also mean the transition from nothing to something, or it can be from a negative to a positive manifestation. The transformation of yun is intimately intertwined 25 Xunzi, Xunzi, 123. 26 Translator’s note: As opposed to shu, yun is being used primarily to indicate “contingency.” However, as noted above, it can also mean “distant,” “use,” “transport,” and “luck.” Like ji and shu this term will be fully explicated below.

Ji, Shu and Yun in Practice

115

with time or timing. The transformation of yun therefore takes place “when the time comes” and this appropriate time is its precondition. Here time or timing entails both the continuous nature of time as well as the development of concrete historical conditions. With contingency as the substantial content of yun, the continuous nature of time in the development of historical conditions is indispensable for its transformation. As a type of contingency that can itself transform, yun is different from both pure necessity and absolute impossibility. Pure necessity has no way of changing, and absolute impossibility has nothing to do with actual occurrence or transformation. As something between these two, yun takes on the form of possibility. In fact, contingency and possibility or potentiality are themselves interrelated. This point is mentioned in the third chapter above with regards to Hegel, who thought that potentiality could be understood as external accident or chance. Similarly the form of contingency in yun can be seen as the manifestation of potentiality. In the historical transitions this type of expression can appear (which is not the same as absolute impossibility) or not appear (which is different from pure necessity). This connection between yun and possibility conveys the uncertainty of the future. Taking contingency and potentiality as its content, yun not only suggests both negative and positive qualities, but also provides regulations for measurement and we can investigate yun on this level. What we often call probability or chance is a reference to the measurement of yun. Probability is given as a real number between zero and one, and grasping probability means confirming the possibility, in numeric terms, that something will happen or occur. Something that will never occur has a probability of zero whereas something that must occur is one, but most things are somewhere in between. Although yun cannot of necessity be calculated from probability (since it is neither necessary nor impossible) it nevertheless relates to probability or the question probability. Understanding yun in measurable terms has a positive effect for the unfolding of activities. Yun cannot be fully measured, but we can think of it in terms of probability, and as something that is loosely measured. Of course the probability of yun does not mean that humans can predict it. In fact, as something contingent yun is characterized by uncertainty—it cannot be planned on nor can it be accurately predicted. It is something with a certain degree of randomness and ambiguity. In that it connotes a lack of stability, uncertainty is also somewhat negative. But in terms of actual practice yun is not only negative. Human action and practice first and foremost involve choices and decisions that do not only stem from human values or goals, but that also take into consideration the concrete background and circumstances in which they occur. The world, and the development that takes place within

116

chapter 5

it, always includes both necessary and contingent factors. In actual practice yun is a type of “variable,”it is an unpredictable element that does nevertheless serve to restrict or to guide action. If one only concentrates on necessary orientations and ignores the contingent elements associated with yun, then when something changes or goes wrong it is easy to revert to passivity and thereby lose out on any potential benefit. If, however, one fully considers contingent elements of the world and action, then one is more likely to be able to deal with and adapt to variance as it arises. This allows us to remain proactive. Thinking about the worst possible situation before beginning to act is often referred to as, “preparing for the worst,” In fact, this just means taking into consideration possible variations. The contributing things that bring about action happen before it occurs; once an action is completed various types of results are formed that will also influence the meaning of the action itself, the agent, and other individuals or groups effected by it. This relates to the question of responsibility for action. Usually if the agent instigated the action then they should be held responsible for its outcome. Both the action itself and the agent are limited by various contingent yun. For example, genes regulate an agent’s intelligence and physicality, and this is a type of yun. Social background—from both broad and narrow perspectives—is also restricted by yun. So action itself, as it concretely unfolds is influenced by a great number of unpredictable elements. In the process of action an individual’s capabilities—including intellectual and physical ­elements—are things that can be understood and predicted, and can therefore influence the way an individual chooses to act, or what type of activities they decide to participate in. For example, the height that an individual grows two is an expression of their genes, as well as yun (in the sense that it depends on nutrition as well). The way that height influences their capabilities has a certain degree of predictability. But the type of society that someone is born into, the state of that society, and its institutions are all things that cannot be decided by that individual, and their effects on the individual provide a degree unpredictability. In the political sphere, yun functions through its combination with various social elements. It is not just expressed in unpredictable random elements since political outcomes are not fully outside of individual contro and therefore political agents must take responsibility for these results as well.27 27

On the other hand, the predictability here makes sure social justice necessary and possible to implement. Innate individual differences, social backgrounds etc. are certainly accidental yun, but their influence on the individual can be predicted. So one type of social justice comes through making socials institutions and systems account for individual differences due to yun. When John Rawls discusses justice he brings up this point,

Ji, Shu and Yun in Practice

117

Here we should differentiate between different types of yun: there is yun that is hard to predict, contingent, and random, and yun that can be called contingent on some levels, but is not the same as pure contingency. Whereas is difficult to blame the agent for the outcome of their action if is has been heavily influenced by the first type of yun, if action is based on the second type then the agent has a higher degree of responsibility. For example, if someone is driving and there is suddenly an earthquake and a passenger dies, this is not the driver’s fault; if a basketball player cannot block a shot and the other team scores we should not blame him or her for not being tall enough. Even though the type of body one has is contingent yun, this yun is something that the one has had to deal with; the basketball player should practice and have experience in games, so that this yun becomes a predictable element. In this way the fault here is not based entirely on yun but the individual must shoulder responsibility as well. Related to these issues is that of interpreting and understanding action. Yun, as an expression of contingency in the process of action provides a basis for explaining and evaluating action. In actual life, moral persons often feel frustrated, whereas immoral people are often in power or have the upper hand. How can we understand this phenomenon? Zhu Xi uses the term “timely yun” to explain this.28 Here yun, or “timely yun,” can be seen as either a cause or result of action. In terms of actual circumstances, whatever someone encounters in society is always governed by a great number of factors, including things that the individual can comprehend as well as contingent elements that they have no way of controlling. Zhu Xi uses “timely yun” to explain that the things that a person’s actions may not always reflect the various aspects of their processes in the world because more abstract qualities are in play. But one also needs to pay attention to the function of contingent elements in bringing about action and this can provide a basis interpreting the outcome of action. Yun is certainly significant for bringing about practice or action, but practice or action cannot completely depend or rely upon yun. As a random

28

for him differences in individual capacity and the influence of their social backgrounds are accidental, and thereby should not be the basis for the distribution of social resources. Someone does not deserve social resources or high social status simply because of inborn advantages. (John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 101–105) Similarly, he argues, “The arbitrariness of the world must be corrected for by adjusting the circumstances of the initial contractual situation.” (Ibid., 141). Here arbitrariness is linked to individual talent, their economic situation and other contingent elements. Rawl’s “difference principle” is related to overcoming the effect on social justice contingent factors may have. Zhu Xi, Zhuzi Yulei, 312.

118

chapter 5

phenomenon yun is not something people can predict with complete accuracy nor is it something that they can control. If actual practice were based purely on yun then whether or not an action was successful would be based entirely on a person’s strengths and external factors. In this way confirming the potential influence that yun has over practice, and mastering this in the course of action at the same time require surpassing yun, which means avoiding possible flukes. Accordingly, the process of exceeding yun and the function of the human are internally related. In the realm of moral practice, a subject may unconsciously or unknowingly do something moral. For example, while driving someone may accidentally go onto the sidewalk and kill a thief who was intending to rob and murder an innocent person. Consequentially speaking, in that the driver prevented this, their action is undoubtedly morally beneficial. This type of action, which itself is an expression of contingency, can be called “moral luck.”29 But actions that are caused by moral luck should not be seen as being genuinely moral. Strictly speaking, only things that are done consciously, with a realization of their moral value, or those that extend from one’s character are genuinely moral. The early Confucian text Xing Zi Ming Chu 性 自命出 remarks that if something is done without the intention of the heart or mind then it is not valuable.30 Flukes based on yun are entail doing something without the participation of conscious decision. We can now see that in the process of practice one needs to pay attention to the influence that yun has on action, while not totally allowing action to be based on yun. These two aspects involve the relationship between necessity and contingency, and are related to conscious decisions, preparative understanding and our internal ability to overcome contingent luck. In terms of their relationship to practice, shu and yun are inseparable. In terms of their manifestations, shu and yun are different from pure necessity or pure contingency. They are both expressed in human existence as part of the process of knowing and acting accordingly, particularly in relation to time. In the process of activity, shu and yun are usually integrated with one another. The term “yun-shu” is one expression of this association. This implies that in 29

30

Strictly speaking “moral luck” comes from Bernard Arthur Owen Williams and Thomas Nagel’s ethics. Williams discusses the connection between moral values and good or bad luck. He argues that people have internal luck, for instance talents, as well as external luck, like what one happens to encounter. Both types of luck influence the way someone talks as well as their consideration of values. My use of “moral luck” should be understood more broadly. Just as given in the example above, I want to use the term to discuss a type of function that contingent elements can have on action. Xing Zi Ming Chu 性自命出 [Human Dispositions Arise from Destiny] (Beijing: Wenwu Chubanshe 2002), 60.

Ji, Shu and Yun in Practice

119

the ­actual world existence and developments always intersect with necessary  trends and contingent changes. Actual manifestations and their subsequent transformations can be seen as the products of this relationship. Looking at the various periods of order and chaos throughout China’s history “yun-shu” can be used to explain the co-dependent functions of necessity and contingency in their interactions with one another, and transformations in history can be seen as a result of these processes. Of course, this is a fairly abstract interpretation of history, but from it we can also see that historical changes have their own internal trajectory as well, which involves both necessity and contingency. Further, the various circumstances that individuals will encounter throughout their lives are mainly due to “yun-shu.” Thinking that people are completely helpless in the face of “yun-shu” is a rather negative perspective, but it is worth pointing out that the intersection between contingency and necessity in the world is not the product of human activity nor is it something that humans can fully control. Acknowledging this allows humans to determine the limits of their own control and to act according to (albeit imperfect) predictions. Here we should also analyze destiny, which is often thought to be something mysterious. But if we put aside the idea of mystery, and approach it from a different angle, we can see that one’s fate is a combination of destiny and yun. In terms of how they are related to necessity, destiny and shu are somewhat similar. However, shu is expressed in a certain time and place, whereas destiny is seen as a more broad or abstract orientation. Relative to destiny, yun is more involved with contingency. The fact that certain seeds produce certain crops connotes a type of necessity-oriented destiny. And just how well a crop does, is dependent on various conditions, including sunlight, water, nutrients in the soil etc. all of which are contingent (they also express yun). In this sense destiny is responsible for the type of plants that one intends to grow, and yun decides just how they will turn out. The combination of the two factors, or what we call “fate,” is thus a synthesis of necessary trends and contingent factors or elements with regard to our own character and development. In terms of change or development, the initial manifestation of the blend of yun and shu is what was described in the beginning of this chapter as ji. This is also the turning point of change or transformation in things and affairs. Knowing ji means comprehending positive value orientations and achieving related targets. The formation of ji indicates the moment at which that possibility in the development of things and affairs has already started to become actualized. This type of transformation is established on actual necessary trends, and is also restricted by various types of contingent factors. In the manifestation of ji the transformation of possibility into actuality is only in its initial stages, but from beginning to end the process continues to interact with shu and yun.

120

chapter 5

Shu is united with a particular place and time, and forms an orientation for the development of things or affairs. Yun, understood to designate the unpredictable contingent elements, comprises the variable nature of this development in actual terms. The two (shu and yun) can thus be seen to influence and restrict the development of affairs and things from different angles. For instance, seeds turn into sprouts, this is based on the “law” of how plants grow, it is also dependent on weather conditions, soil etc.—which represent contingency. The fact that the tree begins as a small sprout can be seen as the ji of its growth, but whether or not it matures and flourishes is not just dependent upon its laws of development but includes many contingent factors as well. For example, if there is severe draught, a forest fire or some other natural disaster then even though the seed has sprouted it may still die. These contingent factors can effect or disrupt how the rule or law of growth is actualized. For humans, comprehending necessary trends while paying attention to unpredictable contingent factors (and leaving room to deal with them in their plans) is the best way to deal with the world. We can thereby see that an understanding of the interplay between ji, shu and yun comprises the precondition for effective action or practice.

chapter 6

Practical Reason and Its Principles Human practice is not only controlled and regulated by forms of possibility, necessity, and contingency, there is also an internal element of normativity as well. Normativity is involved with the issues of what should be done, and how they should be done. Normative questions are related to practical reason, which deals with the relationship between existence, human ideals, and reasonable human needs. Practical reason is expressed in many different areas, from formal appropriateness to substantial goodness, and from value contents to the method of implementing values. It therefore involves desires and needs, as well as what is actual, what should be the case, and what is necessarily the case. These are expressed through the principles of rightness, of pursuing what is good, and of effectiveness. 6.1

Practical Reason: A Broader Perspective

Aristotle distinguishes between different types of thinking and knowledge, namely theoretical, practical, and productive knowledge. He writes, “For the end of theoretical knowledge is truth, while that of practical knowledge is action.”1 Kant moves a step further by separating pure reason from practical reason. He then goes on to investigate each of them, arguing that pure reason is a theoretical function whereas practical reason has to do with pragmatic functions. For Kant, practical reason is primarily linked to the realm of morality, which he investigates in terms of the principles of duty.2 Accordingly, practical reason lays emphasis on what should or ought to be the case and the difference between practical and theoretical reason is understood as the difference between what should be the case and what is the case. Furthermore, Kant thinks that practical reason is linked to the faculties of the mind. In the third chapter we’ve already seen that he mentions three faculties, “The faculty of knowledge, the feeling of pleasure and pain, and the faculty

1 Aristotle, Metaphysics, The Basic Works of Aristotle, Translated by W. Rhys Roberts and Ingram Bywater (New York: Random House, 1941), 778. 2 Kant, Immanuel. Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, Translated by James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 29–35.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004321786_007

122

chapter 6

of desire.”3 The faculty of knowledge has to do with thought activities, the faculty of desire expresses itself through the requests that the will makes of the self, and the feeling of pleasure or pain is linked to emotional acknowledgment and acceptance of ends in the realm of aesthetics. So the faculty of desire is primarily involved with practical reason. When Kant discusses the practical function of reason, he says that it is related to the individual’s desires.4 Later we will analyze how desires in the realm of practical reason are primarily displayed in the will’s self-rule, which is what establishes a difference from emotional desires. Aristotle and Kant both differentiate between various types of reason on multiple levels, according to function, method, etc. But the practical manifestation of reason is involved with their respective interpretations of practice. The type of practice that Aristotle discusses is limited to social ethics, politics and other public spheres. He distinguishes practice from production, saying that practice is found in social ethics or political action. Kant basically follows this trend (which began with Aristotle and had been carried down in much of western philosophy), in linking the practical and the moral realm. But this understanding of practice ignores much of its rich content. As a basic function of human existence practice is expressed in the social realm as human interaction, and it unfolds as a human function amongst other things, including natural objects. This latter aspect influences and changes humans as well as their inner world. Practice not only helps humans achieve themselves but also the world. In fact, practice can also be seen as the process of achieving an actualization of oneself or of the world. Taking this as the main orientation for practice, practical reason becomes the condition for these types of achievements. The method of practical reasoning is also different from theoretical reason in that it is expressed through the relationship between humans and the world. For theoretical reason the important question is whether or not human understanding is in accord with external existence; including whether or not this understanding is accurate. In this way its orientation is the opposite of practical reason, where the challenge is to have existence fit in with human ideals or rational needs. This means that existence must somehow be changed through human practice and activity. This directionality means practical reason becomes concentrated on the process of human action or activities. It is through norms that action and practice can make objects conform to human ideals or reasonable needs, which is a major characteristic of practical reason. This also 3 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 13. 4 See Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason, Translated by Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 17–18.

Practical Reason And Its Principles

123

means that practical reason is primarily concerned with pursuing what is good and not necessarily the truth, as human ideals and reasonable needs belong to the realm of value. Manifestations of value that have “goodness” for their content can be expressed on either the formal level or on a more substantial level. Below we will discuss the principle of rightness more specifically as a display of practical reason on the formal level. This principle connotes conforming to certain value principles or practical norms and can thus be considered appropriate and in line with moral norms.5 Moral reason itself is expressed as the principle of goodness, which has to do with whether or not an action fulfills the subject’s rational needs—which means that goodness has been actualized.6 Here “reasonable” means something that is of positive value for the existence or development of a person. A “reasonable need” is something that someone needs to fulfill these developments. One of the most basic needs is to preserve life, so reasonable needs might be expressed as preserving oneself in terms of food, clothing and shelter, but on the more complex levels these needs for development may include making one’s clothing aesthetically appealing, or requiring that food is not only nutritious but tastes good as well. These needs have to do with the actual content of action or practice; there are also methodological aspects that are important as well. Here practical reason entails the principal of effectiveness—which is related both to conforming to what is actual, as well as to what should be (i.e. principles). If we say that the principle of rightness and the principle of goodness are primarily determined by values formed in reason and in its practical application, then the principle of effectiveness is more closely related to the methods and procedures expressed in the manifestation of rational performances. The rational character of action and practice is primarily shown through the way that they conform to social norms, display rational needs, and rely on natural laws.

5 Here “appropriate” is taken in the broad sense that includes “right,” but is not the same as being “legitimate,” in either the legal or political understanding. Being “legitimate” means conforming to the law, where as being “right” means being correct. Of course, on a much deeper level being legitimate in either the legal or political sense means conforming to a specific law or political standard, so it is not totally different from being “correct.” But here I am taking right to be ethical, in the same way that William David Ross does. (See D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1988.) This will be further detailed below. 6 In the realm of morality “goodness” is primarily related to an individual’s moral character, though this is a narrow view of the term. In terms of the principle of goodness, “goodness” is much broader, and not limited to morality. In this sense it connotes “positive values.”

124

chapter 6

Practical reason is directed toward human freedom, and in this context relates to the principles of rightness, goodness, and effectiveness. As Kant has already noticed, on a conceptual level practical reason is involved with human desires. In the moral sphere, as soon as goodness and desires are identified with value principles or norms, action becomes characterized as not exceeding what the heart desires, and the moral subject thereby enters the realm of human freedom. When the mutual integration of the subject’s desires and rational needs are also united with actuality and with principles, then the subject has become fully free. Here we can see that freedom in the realm of morality is established on the basis of the harmonizing of desires with principles. We can therefore say that freedom in the interaction between humans and the world relies on the unification of desires and needs with principles as well as a reconciliation with actuality and necessity in the practical sphere. In this sense the principles of rightness, goodness, and effectiveness interact with desires and needs, as well as what should be the case, what is the case, and what must be the case. These interactions and connections are what allows practical reason to endow human action or practice with freedom proper. When Kant discusses practical reason he argues that the autonomy of the will is an expression of practical reason in the sphere of morality, and that this form of reason is also therefore a precondition for freedom. As Kant writes, “We have finally traced the determinate concept of morality back to the idea of freedom.”7 Here Kant is concerned with the relationship between the will and universal law, where the latter is seen as a product of the individual’s own self-legislation. He notes, “the will is nothing but practical reason.”8,9 Kant’s account of the connection between practical reason and human freedom highlights clarifies the distinction between practical reason and theoretical reason. However, according to Kant, human freedom that is directed or enticed by practical reason. This is inherently linked to his theory of epistemology and his stance on metaphysics. In terms of both his epistemology and his metaphysics, Kant emphasizes the need to differentiates between phenomena and things in themselves, arguing that sphere of human knowledge can only ever properly conceive empirical phenomena, which are limited by causation and therefore do not face the sphere of freedom. In terms of human existence, Kant also thinks that senses belong to the realm of phenomena and are also limited by causation, whereas reason is the faculty capable of exceeding this limited empi­ rical context. Thus Reason extends beyond the phenomenal realm and toward 7 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 51. 8 Ibid., 23. 9 Ibid., 53.

Practical Reason And Its Principles

125

the noumenal realm of things in themselves and of free will. We can therefore say that practical reason is oriented toward things in themselves in that its sphere of influence exceeds the realm of human understanding, whereas Kant writes: Even with regard to himself, a man cannot presume to know what he is in himself by means of the acquaintance which he has through internal sensation.10 Here “a man…himself” is conceived of in a similar way to things-in-themselves. Kant’s point here is that just as things-in-themselves cannot be known in the theoretical realm, they cannot be known in the practical one either. In the relation between practical reason and freedom, the subject of practical reason is understood to be in the same category as things-in-themselves, which is what allows them to move beyond causation and attain freedom. Here practical reason is built on a transcendent foundation, and to this extent is figured in somewhat abstract terms. Practical reason also has its ontological basis, but this is not limited to the Kantian explanation. Metaphysically, humans exist in the world by constantly pursuing what should be the case. They are limited by necessary laws, and thus exist in a necessary world, but at the same time they are surrounded by possibility. Humans use their own knowledge and actions to create value in the world, and thus also to establish their own freedom. Humans display practical reason by have intentions for what should be the case and also aiming to choose what is good. Relying on necessary requirements and specific abilities, the former (intentions) involve more formal value principles whereas the latter aim is concretely concentrated on values, facts, and principles in the real-world context. Although this form of ability is expressed through practical reasoning, and therefore differs from sensual experience, it is not a purely mental skill, and cannot be separated from actual knowledge or the process of action. As an expression of practical reason, this human ability comprises the internal basis for freedom in this sense is at once both historical and concrete. The concrete character of practical reasoning, which describes human existence in the sphere of action, is different from what Kant conceived as the thing-in-itself. Practical reason, as the practical function of reason, is oriented differently to theoretical reason. The major target of the latter is to explain the world, and its related activity is knowledge or understanding, and this process is descriptive. Practical reasoning is then directed at changing the world, and it’s related 10 Ibid.

126

chapter 6

activity has to do with actualizing values, and is characterized by normativity. On the normative level, reason involves making goals and their methods conform to rationality. The former (conforming goals) connotes rightness, while the latter (conforming methods) is directed towards the effectiveness of action. The dual concentration of these aspects is one reason why practical rationality differs from theoretical rationality. Kant also writes, “for in the final analysis there can be only one and the same reason.”11 As different manifestations of the same rationality, practical reason and theoretical reason cannot be completely separated from one another. In fact, explaining the world and changing the world are related. If the goal is to change the world, that world must first be understood. Similarly, interpreting the world always carries value connotations. On an even more fundamental level, the link between practical reason and theoretical reason appears in the connection between truth and goodness. 6.2

Practical Reason and Laws

The meaning of practical reason primarily appears in the most fundamental laws of reason, and it is here that the normative significance of practical reason is concretely displayed. In describing how practical reason is limited to the sphere of morality, Kant concentrates on rational maxims and rational laws. In the realm of practical reason, Kant introduces universal laws, where moral action is based on a requirement that one “act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”12 Kant also calls this the “categorical imperative,” and writes that it is, “the ground of all practical legislation lies objectively in the rule and in the form of universality.”13 Kant’s extrapolation on universal principles is primarily formal. In fact, as stated, for Kant universal laws and the form of universality are interlinked with one another. He gives universal principles the highest position in moral practice, which represents an attempt to guarantee that moral action can be reasonable, and moral procedures rationally constructed. Accordingly, the universalization of action is the precondition for moral practice, and this universalization itself originates in the guidance and limitations of regulations and laws. The most important function of reason is to provide this type of law 11 12 13

Ibid., 4. Ibid., 30. Ibid., 38.

Practical Reason And Its Principles

127

or regulation, what Kant calls the “legislation of human reason.”14 From the perspective of society, universal principles of action allow individuals to avoid conflict, and thereby provide a guarantee for producing moral procedures. Unfortunately, because of this emphasis on formal universality, Kant’s universal principles often appear devoid of substantial content. As mentioned above, in the realm of practical reason norms are (and should be) given in a broader account, namely as the principles of rightness, goodness, and effectiveness. (1) The Principle of Rightness Practical reason firstly involves the principle of rightness. In the realm of practice whether or not an action is “right” or not is basically the same as it being “correct” or not. The standard for judgment is whether or not it conforms to related principles or norms. In this sense “right” is related to an action’s ethical, political or legal characteristics. “Correctness,” in this broad sense, also relates to practical issues. Here “rightness” and “correctness” have to do with social acknowledgment on two levels, namely social approval and practical approval. An action’s being “right” therefore means that it conforms to certain social standards, principles or norms, and has been accepted by society. Likewise, an action’s being “correct” means that it is in line with the relevant principles and standards, like meeting production requirements, regulations for technological work, or essential drills in the military—or, simply meeting the expected targets. The content of this form of principle is much more concrete than Kant’s universal principles. Principles and norms that constrain action are not given a priori, instead they are formed through social practice. As a product of social history, principles and norms emerge within a long period of human practice, and are further solidified by historical wisdom. The acceptance and acknowledgment of these principles and norms rests on their being confirmed in experience. Here the scope of the term “society” is quite broad and it involves many manifestations, including universal social regulations. Historically emergent ­principles and norms then provide the basis for an individual’s choice about action. They define what should and should not be done, as well as the types of methods and procedures that can be taken. When an individual’s actions are in line with these principles or norms they are considered right, or “correct.” If we say that this rightness is an expression of social acknowledgment, then “correctness” displays acknowledgement or confirmation in practice. 14 Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, Translated by N.K. Smith (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1965), 643.

128

chapter 6

A community’s actions transcend contingency insofar as they are based on principles and norms, and are a manifestation of orderliness. Since norms are characterized by universality and certainty they are not limited to specific situations or contingencies—they are gradually formed within practice. Also, individuals are continuously engaged in a process of integration into society, and this is how their actions become accepted. Generally speaking, practical activities and actions include the participation of individuals, which means that they always contain a dimension of individuality. But whether practice and action is directed towards objects in the external world, or interaction between humans, there is always a social element. As a principle of practical reason, rightness refers to universal principles and norms but these are nonetheless characterized by their being acknowledged by a social community, which means that they are conditioned and therefore not absolutely a priori. So, in the realm of practical reason, principles and norms can come to guarantee an action’s universality—but only through a confirmation of this universal meaning in the social sphere. Here social nature is not limited to involvement in society, but also includes links to historical experience and wisdom. In other words, social acceptance itself is connected to approval in practice, which determines the stages, methods, and procedures of action as reasonable, and thereby in accordance with the principle of rightness. In sum, rightness is inline with the requirements of universal norms, which themselves are accepted by society. The principle of rightness provides the basis for choosing an action in concrete processes by providing guidance for the implementation of universal regulations about what to do, and how to do it. (2) The Principle of Goodness In the sphere of practical reason, the principle of goodness also has an important role to play. Here “goodness” is not limited to its ethical meaning. As a positive value it can also imply the formal scenario of meeting reasonable standards. In Chinese philosophy it is defined in the following way: “One who commands our liking [because of his virtue] is called a good man.”15 “Liking” here is not mere “desire.” Rather it means something that is worth pursuing, or something that humans actually need. So the pursuit of goodness is about making sure the outcome of an action responds to a reasonable need. As opposed to relative desires or wants, needs constitute the actual conditions for human existence and/or human development. This can be a bodily requirement like food and water, which are things humans objectively need, but it also 15 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 82.

Practical Reason And Its Principles

129

includes spiritual and moral needs, such as the requirement of freedom. Both forms are similar to each other in terms of their ability to assist in achieving potential determinations of the self or specific states of affairs. Achieving the self here includes the value of the individual, and achieving states of affairs means transforming natural objects and scenarios in order to fit reasonable human needs. These reasonable needs are related to an individual’s existence and development, as well as a background of specific historical conditions. In this sense needs are not merely an existential background or form of expression. They are concrete and objective. In their relation to practical reason, the principles of rightness and goodness both include evaluative significance, but their respective forms and substances differ. Being oriented towards social and practical acceptance, the principle of rightness is in line with socially determined shared principles and norms. The latter make up the standard by which actions are judged right or “correct.” This represents the formal expression of the relationship between action and norms. Here rightness is basically defined in the same way that yi 义 (‘obligation’ or ‘duty’) is in Chinese philosophy. The latter connotes being suitable, fitting or appropriate, as well as “what should be the case.” So an action’s “rightness” entails its correspondence with norms and with what should be the case. The principle of goodness, on the other hand, is oriented towards a more substantial (normative) value confirmation. This is what Chinese philosophy calls “the way of ren 仁 (‘humaneness’),” which aims at differentiating humans from other things based on their moral nature. The way of humaneness is established on the basis practical needs and in relation to specific backgrounds. It is therefore not an abstract form since as it relies on concrete circumstances to determine its substance. From this we can say that the difference between the principle of rightness and the principle of goodness comes down to the difference between the abstract (formal correctness) and the substantial (normative appropriateness) which, in Chinese philosophy, amounts to the same as the difference between yi and ren. Kant focuses on the moral dimension of practical philosophy. When highlighting universal principles, he emphasizes that humans should act in such a way that you [they] treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means.16

16 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 36.

130

chapter 6

This practical imperative is established on the basis of his understanding of humans as ends in themselves, which means that they have internal value. With Kant however, this principle appears separated from the actual process of human action because the directing and meaning-giving focus on the outcome of action is suspended. He believes that moral action is evaluated based on moral imperatives, and that these have nothing to do with outcomes. But if principles and outcomes are separated in this way then the principles themselves are relegated to the status of empty forms. Kant sees his conviction that humans are ends in themselves as a universal principle because it can be universalized, and thereby become a principle of practical reason. At the same time, universality is what means that such principles lack any substantial content.17 Correspondingly, Kant sees the subject of practical reason as a thing-in-itself, which omits actual characteristics, and thereby suspends the concrete circumstances of practical activities, making both human beings and their environments abstract. So Kant’s principle that humans should be treated as ends in themselves, while being capably of indicating substantial value, nevertheless lacks concrete content. In fact, the principle of goodness in practical reasoning is quite different from Kant’s argument. Concentrating on reasonable needs, the principle of goodness not only includes actual values, but is also based on actual human existence, including its social and historical dimensions and it is expressed in the pursuit of concrete value goals. This makes it impossible to separate this principle from the process of practice or action, and its outcomes. As an expression of practical reason, the principle of goodness is not just related to the questions, “What should be done?” and “How should it be done?” but also to the issue of what the action itself means. It is this latter concern that includes an expectation and evaluation of the action’s outcome. The principle of goodness simultaneously requires an examination of the value of concrete situations and action, in contrast to Kant’s abstractness. The utilitarian perspective on an action’s value is basically the inverse of Kant’s own view. Jeremy Bentham writes: By the principle of utility is meant that principle which approves on disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; 17

Ibid., 36.

Practical Reason And Its Principles

131

and therefore no only of every action of a private individual, but of every measure of government.18 John Stuart Mill also shares this view with his “Greatest Happiness Principle.” He comments, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion’s they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.19 Mill’s focus therefore on the outcomes of action, which become the standard for value. Compared with Kant, this concept addresses the more substantial aspects of action. In terms of its affirmation of substantial aspects, the principle of utility is similar to the principle of goodness. However, on further investigation of values their differences emerge. Generally speaking, utilitarianism implies a form of empiricism, and Bentham is clear about this when he writes: Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other, the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off your subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. The principle of utility recognises this subjection, and assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric of felicity by the hands of reason and of law.20 Happiness and sadness are not limited to the realm of emotions, and Bentham’s distinction between quality and quantity makes this clear. However, from the perspective of their initial manifestations, happiness and sadness are linked to emotional experience, and since the principle of utility is established on their basis, this gives them priority. The principle of goodness’ basis for value judgments lies in the subject’s reasonable needs, which include considerations of 18

Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (New York: Hafner Publishing Co, 1948), 2. 19 John Mill, Utilitarianism (London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1972), 6. 20 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1.

132

chapter 6

their freedom, their development, as well as material, spiritual, emotional and rational demands. In other words, reasonable needs are not limited to emotional experience. The principle of utility is also orientated towards maximizing benefit. Bentham’s idea is that increasing benefit and reducing harm should be the standard for choosing an action, and Mill essentially agrees in his “greatest happiness” principle. Derek Parfit, a contemporary utilitarian, emphasizes this. Parfit argues that in choosing a course of action one should attempt to produce the best possible outcome and that everyone has good reason to act this way. Parfit’s view is not just focused on the direct effect of an outcome, though he basically agrees with maximizing benefit.21 In terms of value orientation, maximizing benefits can include “concern[s] about our own future well-being.”22 Mill makes a similar point when he explains that utilitarianism is not necessarily limited to maximizing the agent’s own individual benefits. Unfortunately however, when benefits or happiness are the most important targets, other functions of “goodness” are often ignored. As noted “goodness” is linked to wider conerns of human needs—such as freedom and overall development—but singular focus on benefits or happiness often push these aside. Compared with the principal utility, the principle of goodness is established on a much broader understanding of human value. If maximizing benefit is the goal, then we must ask how can this be done? And how do we judge or confirm that benefit is maximized? Bentham proposes that if an action creates more pleasure than pain then, overall, it is beneficial.23 However, pleasure and pain are not always necessarily measurable. Bentham’s claim that we can measure their accumulation against one another requires an impossible calculation. Broadly speaking, it is difficult to completely quantify pleasure or value itself, so the idea of “maximizing” is already too abstract. Further, and relatedly, it is difficult to define what the maximum benefit is and figure out precise guidelines for how to implement maximum benefit. These issues show that, despite the utilitarian focus on concrete contexts, the maximizing principle is 21

See (Parfit, On What Matters, 250–255). It is also worth noting that Parfit is in agreement with Henry Sidgwick as well. Although Parfit criticizes some aspects of Sidgwick, insofar as the latter is a utilitarian they are in agreement. Although Parfit uses consequentialism in his arguments (and differentiates between act and rule consequentialism), theoretical points of intersection between utilitarianism and consequentialism can still be drawn out. In terms of their specific characters, Sidgwick is often seen as a utilitarian, while Parfit a consequentialist, and based on the above discussions this demonstrates the similarity between the two ideologies. 22 Parfit, On What Matters, 136. 23 Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, 31.

Practical Reason And Its Principles

133

also abstract. The principle of goodness, on the other hand, is established on certain values in specific conditions, which are linked to the relevant subject’s reasonable needs and their practical background, including his/her environment and historical context. This principle is therefore oriented towards more than just utility, and does not take maximizing happiness or pleasure as an absolute target. In other words, it focuses on various dimensions of value, while recognizing that there is more than just one way to implement these values, which requires investigating, weighing and judging the unique contexts of specific practical subjects and their backgrounds. So if we say that maximizing benefits is an abstract pursuit, then the principle of goodness tends towards confirming concrete values in a more effective way. In addition to maximizing benefits or pleasure, the utilitarian principle focuses on the “greatest number of people” as well. Mill writes, “what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge [is] that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent’s own happiness, but that of all concerned.”24 Upon further consideration we find that “all concerned” is an extremely abstract concept as well. It also includes ignoring certain people, which is why John Rawls criticizes utilitarianism. Additionally, as Bentham admits, it tends towards creating a “fictitious body,” or an abstract interpretation of the individual. The principle of goodness differs in that subjects are expressed in socio-historical spheres as concrete beings, which entails that they are conceived as individuals in a group that assume specific values depending on their backgrounds. As an individual within a group they cannot ignore others when they express their own values, and according to their backgrounds the content of their values is related to their specific understanding of their circumstances. Clearly it is difficult to separate the concrete nature of practical subjects themselves from the concrete nature of this type of value. The former’s concreteness is primarily displayed through in the way humans exist, whereas the latter’s is by regulating the origin of values and needs. Human needs have both emotional and rational dimensions, and can be related to external or internal things. Needs in different areas or on different levels express distinctive forms of values. As Mengzi writes: There is not a part of the body that a man does not love. And because there is no part of the body that he does not love, there is not a part of it that he does not nourish. Because there is not an inch of his skin that he does not love, there is not an inch of his skin that he does not nourish. 24 Mill, Utilitarianism, 16.

134

chapter 6

To determine whether his nourishing is good or not, there is no other way except to see the choice he makes for himself. Now, some parts of the body are noble and some are ignoble; some great and some small. We must not allow the ignoble to injure the noble, or the smaller to injure the greater.25 .

Here “good” is both positive and affirmative. The act of determining whether “his nourishing is good or not” means acknowledging different values. The socalled “noble” and “ignoble” and “great” and “small” Mengzi mentions also indicate the various values included on any area or level and their hierarchy. Later in the text Mengzi discusses dissimilar values more explicitly. In one of his most famous passages he writes, I like fish and I also like bear’s paw. If I cannot have both of them, I shall give up the fish and choose the bear’s paw. I like life and I also like righteousness. If I cannot have both of them, I shall give up life and choose righteousness. I love life, but there is something I love more than life, and therefore I will not do anything improper to have it. I also hate death, but there is something I hate more than death, and therefore there are occasions when I will not avoid danger. If there is nothing that man loves more than life, then why should he not employ every means to preserve it? And if there is nothing that man hates more than death, then why does he not do anything to avoid danger? There are cases when a man does not take the course even if by taking it he can preserve his life, and he does not do anything even if by doing it he can avoid danger. Therefore there is something men love more than life and there is something men hate more than death. It is not only the worthies alone who have this moral sense. All men have it, but only the worthies have been able to preserve it.26 Fish and bear paws are representative of distinct emotional values, whereas righteousness (yi 义) and life involve rational responsibility and burdens, as well as protecting life. This discussion also includes an analysis, comparison and weighing of different values according to particular backgrounds. Determining value based on this understanding of goodness means one first carefully investigates concrete factors. For Mengzi righteousness takes priority, and is expressed as a focus on rational responsibilities, however, the preconditions 25 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 58–59. 26 Ibid., 57.

Practical Reason And Its Principles

135

for Mengzi’s decision is analyzing, comparing and weighing various value interpretations. This is a much different approach than Kant’s suspension of substantial value considerations, and the utilitarian’s singular pursuit of maximizing pleasure or benefit. Xunzi, though opposed to Mengzi in some ways, expresses a similar concern for particulars. The two both concentrate on substance and concrete factors, though they promote values differently. Xunzi writes: When a man sees something desirable, he must reflect on the fact that with time it could come to involve what is detestable. When he sees something that is beneficial, he should reflect that sooner or later it, too, could come to involve harm. Only after weighing the total of the one against that of the other and maturely calculating should he determine the relative merits of choosing or refusing his desires and aversions. In this fashion, he will regularly avoid failure and being ensnared by what he has chosen.27 Here “desirable” and “detestable” are broadly differentiated as positive and negative values. In terms of action or practice, this type of value involves the subject and object of behavior, as well as the particular environment or situation. Xunzi especially emphasizes concrete investigations of necessity, which he calls “reflecting,” “weighing,” and “determining.” He also talks about comprehending various aspects of subjects, objects and environments in order to determine values. He further argues that this is the precondition for choosing how to act. From the above, it is clear that the principle of goodness, as an e­ xpression of practical reason, takes substantial values as its content. Actions or ­practices that are grounded in this principle are expressed as pursuing and i­ mplementing these substantial values. The values themselves are based on reasonable human needs, and actual circumstances. At its extreme, these needs are expressed as human freedom, and the overall manifestation of ­internal needs, which are demonstrated through various forms in the process of human existence. This is then shown when humans act from an understanding of innate human value, or when grasping the subject, object or situation as the precondition for action. The principle of goodness is thereby not only oriented towards substantial values, but also concrete ones, which goes beyond Kant’s formalistic values, and rejects the abstract values of utilitarianism. 27 Xunzi, Xunzi, 180.

136

chapter 6

To implement values on the substantial (or real-world) level requires reflection on methods, procedures and styles. Broadly speaking, the way of implementing goodness stems from practical reason, in the form of the principle of effectiveness. As mentioned above, the principle of rightness requires that actions conform to universal principles and norms, and is thereby able to support assessment of whether or not they are appropriate, right or correct. The principle of effectiveness is related to methods and processes used to implement values, and provides an effective guarantee for concrete value goals. The notion of fulfilling or enacting values encompasses many different aspects of the process of action or practice. Action or practice is forms a process towards a particular goal, and at the same time its unfolding is based on the laws of existence itself. These laws are both natural and social. The formation of practical plans, procedures, or methods relies on such laws of existence, where these laws can be seen as the unification of what is the case with what is necessary. It is only by being based on these two factors that practical activities can be effective in reaching their expected targets. Effectiveness is not limited to the relationship between goals and methods. When considerations are made on the level of this relationship alone, the only issue is whether not the methods can serve the proper function to reach the goals. At the same time, on the level of practical reason, the principle of effectiveness must take also into account the relationship between practical processes and the actual state of affairs or existence. On this level, effectiveness has to do with the relationship between mental objects and actual objects, so that action and practice can correspond not only with the realm of knowing and doing but also with their actual background/circumstances. From this perspective, the implementation of certain methods is only useful or functional if the methods employed already conform to the laws of existence. The unification of the process of action or practice and laws of existence also serves demonstrate the ontological dimension of the principle of effectiveness. As the unification of the actual and the necessary, laws of existence comprise the ontological basis for practice. In the dimension of human understanding the apparent distinction between actuality and necessity is expressed as the difference between “things or affairs” and “principles.” The comprehension of these two is indispensable for the principle of effectiveness. In fact, the formation of plans, affirmation of procedures, or choice about methods are all based on an understanding both “things or affairs” and “principles.” As discussed above, Kant is primarily concerned with the link between practical reason and the faculty of desire. The latter is formed internally as intention, but in terms of actual human existence, it is also linked to objective needs; although in some sense desires themselves can be seen as an expression

Practical Reason And Its Principles

137

of subjective wants. Since the principle of rightness includes constraining and guiding desires, and the principle of goodness is involved with satisfying reasonable needs, the two are expressions the faculty of desire in distinct forms. However, practical reason cannot simply be equated with the faculty of desire. As argued above, it is also based on the unification of actuality and necessity as expressed in laws of existence. But since ignoring these laws means that the rationalization of actual processes becomes impossible, Kant’s perspective needs to be reconsidered. In the realm of ethics, Kant is very much concerned with human autonomy, a concern through which, in some sense, he therefore neglects the significance of the laws of existence. Corresponding to this focus, in discussion of practical reason Kant heavily emphasizes the autonomy of reason, and thus continues to ignore the importance of actuality in the formation of moral principles. His interpretation therefore suspends the importance of the practical background, including socio-historical factors, and cannot avoid establishing a tension between the spheres of autonomy and actual existence. Although Kant’s understanding of practical reason is mainly limited to the ethical realm, logically speaking, if this argument were extended to the more general practical sphere, then actuality and necessity would be problematic as well. Here we can see that the formation of norms the implementation of values would have no basis in human existence. The principle of effectiveness is therefore required in order to overcome the abstract interpretation of practical reason. Taking its direction towards conformity with the laws of existence, the principle of effectiveness attempts to correct Kant’s abstract formulation. The principles of rightness, goodness, and effectiveness do not control human action in same aspect at the same time. In the actual processes of action or practice, these principles often interact with or overlap one another, and they thereby influence various aspects of human activity through their interplay. Generally speaking, the principle of rightness is expressed through social procedures, which reflect historical developments as well as the universal dimension of specific social backgrounds (for instance, the universal characteristics of human activity). The principle of goodness is primarily related to substantial values. It finds expression in the various value goals and ideas that humans use in action. Practical processes also rely on specific social procedures as their background, while at the same time implementing concrete value objectives. The connection between these two principles means that the principle of rightness and the principle of goodness are inseparable from one another. The principle of effectiveness relies on the relationship between social requirements, value goals and the laws of existence to provide the preconditions for practical activity. The interaction between these three principles

138

chapter 6

is what makes the unfolding of practical activity possible, and also controls human processes on the formal and substantial level. 6.3

Practical Reason and Practical Processes

As mentioned above, as the various expressions of practical reason the principles of rightness, goodness, and effectiveness cannot be separated from one another. The unfolding of practical activities is related to rightness (or “correct” and “incorrect”) and benefit (as goodness and/or value). Whether or not a value is actualized depends on the effectiveness of an action. In this way the link between the three principles is established on the most fundamental level. The interplay between principles of practical reason is a result of their more foundational identity. The most basic requirement of the principle of rightness is that actions correspond to universal principles or norms. Only if an action can be identified with a certain principle or norm is it “right.” But this is mainly an expression of formal values. From a more substantial perspective, concern for rightness also leads to an orientation towards human freedom and overall development, which is displayed in the principle of the good. It also becomes the specific contents of the principle of goodness. In the end this is all based on actual things or affairs and principles, and their connection is ­expressed through the principle of effectiveness. Since morality, things or affairs and principles are all intimately linked, the principles of rightness, goodness and effectiveness share an immediate connection with one another. As stated, the content of the principle of goodness is fulfilling reasonable needs, which means implementing values on the substantial level. The principle of effectiveness is then involved with the method or process of this implementation. Neither the affirmation of value goals nor their actualization can be distinguished from value principles and norms themselves. Evaluations about needs rely on certain value principles and the methods for implementing the valued goals, which are based on both what is necessary and what is moral. The principle of rightness provides a formal guarantee for the benefits and effectiveness of action. Additionally, this principle is not limited to itself, since this would render it empty and abstract. The principles of goodness and effectiveness, give practical processes substantial content, which in turn frees the principle of rightness from being purely abstract. If we say that the principle of rightness guarantees what is “good” by what is “right” then the principles of goodness and effectiveness are mostly expressed as using the “good” (substantial value) to verify “right” (formal appropriateness). In sum, it is only by expressing goodness that the principle of rightness can move

Practical Reason And Its Principles

139

beyond its abstract meaning. Being beneficial or good means conforming to rightness, and this is the only way that value goals are not restricted to individual, one-sided needs, and are able to overcome contingency and disorder. In other words, the principle of rightness and the principle of goodness must be internally unified for their respective practical application. If we say that the principle of goodness primarily appears through practice conforming to goals, and that the principle of effectiveness appears through practice conforming to laws, then the principle of rightness endows both with rightness on the social level. In some ways morality (conforming to norms or needs) and necessity (conforming to laws) are internally united, while in another sense pursuing values (actualizing reasonable needs or goals) and establishing action on necessity (relying on laws) and rightness (conforming to norms) are mutually integrated. Practical reason takes this as its orientation, and thereby reveals its concreteness. However, the principles of rightness, goodness, and effectiveness are not completely identical with one another which is evidenced in the fact that there are often tensions between them. In the process of practice, a particular action may fit some principle or norm, and therefore be “right,” but nevertheless not necessarily express substantial value. For example, in some traditional societies it used to be considered virtuous for a widow never to remarry, to the point that some would even commit suicide to preserve chastity. So there is a conflict here in that this type of action would conform to a certain type of (social) rightness, and yet be negative in terms of the valuing of one’s own life. Opposite cases exist as well, where a certain action may be substantially valued and yet not fit with universal principles or norms. Lying is a good example. It is a good universal rule not to lie, and yet if lying is able to save an innocent person’s life, then it would express substantial value while not fitting the general ethical standard, or lacking rightness. Solving these tensions relies on a close investigation of the concrete situation in which the action takes place, as well as the status of any practical principles involved. In terms of the latter aspect, attention must be paid to the various connotations of the principles involved with the rightness of the situation. Processes of practice are revealed in differing spheres, and involve differing hierarchies, and the principles and norms are correspondingly complex. In the example of a widow’s chastity above, the principle (that might recommend choosing death over remarriage) involves particular historical conditions (in which the wife belongs to the husband) and distinctive attitudes to the value of human life. In terms of human existence more generally, life is obviously much more important and significant than a wife belonging to her (dead) husband. From the perspective of the principle of rightness, preserving life is more universal as the norm for action, or exists

140

chapter 6

on a more fundamental level than the value of chastity. Logically (in terms of logical priority), when encountering the tension between historical conditions and the more fundamental norm that calls for preserving life, actions should be chosen that are in line with the latter. Here the rightness of an action and its value on the substantial level are not at odds with one another. We can thereby see that through exposing a differentiation of various levels and their regulatory significance, the tension between the rightness of action and its value can be resolved with reference to primary principles. In connection with the hierarchy of the normative system is the relativity of values. Previously the example was given where one lies to a criminal in order to save another person’s life. This entails insincerity in social communication as well as the preservation of life. Generally speaking, maintaining sincerity forms the precondition for the smooth functioning of social procedures, but when truth telling endangers another person’s life, this principle must be altered accordingly. Again, the mitigating circumstance for this type of change is that human life, under these conditions, has a much more fundamental value significance than telling the truth. From the perspective of the relationship between the principle of rightness and the principle of goodness, affirming life realizes value on the substantial level, and it is also in line with the universal principle or norm that calls for taking humans as ends in-themselves. Typically, when actions with different value meanings come into conflict with one another, choosing one does not have to mean rejecting either the principle of goodness or the principle of rightness. From the perspective of practical reason, if, in a particular situation, rightness and goodness are in tension with one another, then the problem can be solved when considered from the more fundamental or universal level according to circumstances. The principle of rightness also involves both the principles of goodness and the principle of effectiveness. A precondition for reaching goals is having rightness and effectiveness in line with on another. In terms of their realworld manifestations, practical principles can display themselves in different ways, but it is important to look firstly at the relationship between righteousness and benefit. The most basic difference between the two is that the former can be expressed as a general moral principle whereas benefit connotes more specific conditions. The particular methods or procedures employed in actualizing benefits are concretely related to effectiveness. But when this pursuit conflicts with moral principles, there can be a tension between effectiveness and rightness. However, there is another side to this issue. Practical processes often involve the relationship between established norms of action and the effectiveness of actualizing goals in a particular setting, which is especially true when

Practical Reason And Its Principles

141

the object of these processes is in the external world. Practical processes exist in connection with regulations for labor. As an expression of necessity, these regulations make practical processes “right” in terms of normative value, and also make them effective for reaching practical goals. In some cases, the development of practical activities embodies rules and regulations that have no way of fitting the requirements of new processes. In order to improve the effectiveness of producing processes, they must therefore be adjusted or extended according to the needs of the practice as well as any related principles. If limited to the regulations that are already in place, practical processes will not be able to improve or develop. In fact, advancements and technologies for productive activities show that old regulations and procedures must often be adapted. The explanation above clearly shows that practical processes are always related to the method of actualizing value, which also involves the relationship between the principle of goodness and the principle of effectiveness. Under specific conditions, the role of effectiveness is to provide a guarantee for achieving value goals, and in this way effectiveness serves goodness. Of course, the relationship between pursuing effectiveness and actualizing values is often complex. Values can be either positive or negative and the principle of goodness is supposed to be oriented towards positive values. However, under certain conditions, the methods chosen for activity may express negative value meanings. For example, when powerful weapons are in the hands of fascists or terrorists there is certainly a conflict between the principles of goodness and effectiveness. Accordingly, in terms of practical reason, confirming positive value targets is relatively more important than methods for implementation. At the same time this implies that the principle of goodness has priority over the principle of effectiveness. One of the most difficult problems for practical philosophy is identifying the most primary principles of practical reason. In contemporary philosophy Derek Parfit has attempted to provide a link between Kant’s practical philosophy and consequentialism. According to Parfit, Kant’s ethics and consequentialism are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and they can be integrated with one another. He focuses closely on the concept of universal rules in Kant, and argues that the requirement that choices be universalizable is similar to contractualism. Parfit also thinks that contractualism and consequentialism are remarkably similar, and that Kantian contractualism can be understood as a form of “rule consequentialism.” He defines rule consequentialism as involving principle that everyone should follow, and if universally accepted, would result in the best state of affairs. According to Parfit’s understanding, rule consequentialism and Kantian contractualism can be integrated with one another

142

chapter 6

to create a form of Kantian rule consequentialism where ethics would be based on “the only principle that everyone could rationally will to be universal law.”28 Theoretically, there are a number of problems with Parfit’s attempt to reconcile the Kantian and consequentialist ethical approaches. Firstly, universal principles in Kant’s philosophy and the problem of universality in contractualism belong to different spheres. For the latter, universality is expressed through individual choices, perspectives, and attitudes, whereas for Kant universal principles themselves are determined a priori. When Parfit discusses the integration of universal principles and universal agreement he does not pay adequate attention to this dissimilarity. Furthermore, the principle of maximizing benefit in consequentialism is often related to weighing and judging experience, which Kant purposefully transcends with his universal laws. It therefore seems difficult to argue for a Kantian form of consequentialism. Moreover, according to Parfit’s perspective, the characteristic of rationality is that it is based on good reasons for action, so if someone does something with good reason then we can say that the action is rational. However, as we move beyond Kant we find that insofar as reasons always involve concrete circumstances, in order to judge with practical reasoning such judgment must be embedded in a specific situation. This is precisely opposed to Kant’s understanding of universal law. Similarly, reasons are often related to the outcome of action as well (i.e. reasons for action often include expectations for their outcome), but as mentioned above, Kant’s practical philosophy suspends consideration of the outcome of action. So taking reasons as a starting point for interpreting action is evidently at odds with Kant’s perspective on practical rationality. It is clear that Kant’s universal laws are quite different from the consequentialist principle of maximizing benefit, and establishing an integration of the two would be a difficult task. A better way to tackle this issue would therefore be to concentrate on the links between the principles of rightness, goodness, and of effectiveness. By looking at the integration of the principle of rightness with the principle of goodness Kant’s universal principles can be endowed with substantial value connotations. The problematic formalization or abstract tendency of Kant’s theory would thereby be constrained. Similarly, utilitarian value principles could be understood more deeply and broadly. In this context, substantial value principles would not be limited to pursuing specific beneficial targets, but would instead confirm the universal value of human existence. By the integration with these practical principles, namely rightness and goodness, the negative aspects of Kant’s philosophy and of the utilitarian approach would both be rejected while the positive ones would be embraced. 28 Parfit, On What Matters, 411.

Practical Reason And Its Principles

143

Also, the difference between the principles of rightness and goodness allow expression of, respectively, the more formal and the more substantial values associated with rationality. Related to this is the involvement of logic in the principle of effectiveness, especially if we take its orientation to be towards methods and procedures in the process of action. Here we encounter the function of rationality proper, which the integration of the principles of rightness, goodness, and effectiveness allow practical reason to display. Upon further investigation we find that “right” in the principle of rightness is also related to authority. In fact, this is not just on the linguistic level: “right” itself cannot be clearly separated from authority. If someone does something that is right then this often implies that they have the “right” (authority) for doing so and also therefore implies that they should do it. In the modern legal system the protection of “rights” is usually related to the protection of an individual’s right (authority). Keeping this in mind, we find that the investigation of the relationship between the principles of rightness and goodness reveals that they express “rightness” and “goodness” in the same way, and that “rights” and “goodness” are similar in this regard. As is well known, the disputes between liberalism and socialism are important today, and one of the more pressing issues here is establishing whether rights should take precedence over goods or vice versa. But the proper integration of the principle of rightness and the principle of goodness can be utilized to overcome this difficulty. As an expression of practical rationality the principles of rightness, goodness, and effectiveness consider different aspects of practicality in order to provide a guarantee for the unification of concepts in action. While investigating theoretical reason, Kant affirms universal forms of understanding. For individual subjects, practical reason directly encounters internal desires, which are expressed in various ways. If these desires cannot find a way to compromise with one another or unite together then it is difficult to implement reasonable actions. Here, practical rationality includes value principles and related categories of the intellect. Under the control and restraints of value principles, different desires may be either restricted, affirmed, given a leading role, or considered subordinate; which is how various desires are compromised or unified with one another. In some sense Kant also recognizes this function of practical reason. He affirms the connection between practical reason and the human faculty of desire, while at the same time differentiating between higher and lower levels of desire. Kant writes: […] since pleasure or displeasure is necessarily combined with the faculty of desire (whether, as in the case of the lower faculty of desire, it

144

chapter 6

precedes the principle of that faculty or, as in the case of the upper, it follows only from the determination of that faculty through the moral law), it will likewise effect a transition from the pure faculty of cognition, i.e., from the domain of the concepts of nature, to the domain of the concept of freedom, just as in its logical use it makes possible the transition from understanding to reason.29 Here the so-called lower levels are related to emotional desires, whereas the upper are identified as goodwill—which can also be understood to mean practical reason. In this way, according to Kant, the function of rationality can be identified with the function of higher desires. A concrete example would be autonomy. The autonomy of the will expresses the moral individual’s own desires or needs. Another characteristic of rationality is that it is able to control or constrain desires that depart from norms. Kant holds universal norms in high regard because they can be restricted and demarcate limitations on desires. On a broader level, the principles of rightness, goodness, and effectiveness are also related to desires and needs. The principle of rightness, from its formal, to universal, to social aspects, always regulates and draws boundaries for human desires. At the same time it requires that actions conform to universal principles and norms. By restricting any desires that are not in line with principles or norms it serves to adjust desires themselves, and thereby the moral subject’s own desires conform to its guidance. On the substantial level, the principle of goodness regulates the value goals of reasonable needs (i.e. “goodness” in general) while at the same time confirming values themselves at different levels. This makes the pursuit of values ordered and systematized. The principle of effectiveness controls methods for responding to desires or needs, as well as achieving value goals. This process also provides a certain orientation for the way that desires and needs are met. So it is a way of looking at these principles of practical rationality from different angles to provide a guarantee for the unification of concepts and actions in actual processes. Looked at from the perspective of the history of philosophy, the role that universal principles play in normalizing (moralizing) and integrating desires (with ethics) is often overlooked. Hume is a good representative of this issue. In his “farmer’s dilemma” he discusses the relationship between obligations and self interest. The example is about two farmers who expect their crops to be ripe at different times. They each require the other’s help to ensure that they get a full harvest. But they both realize that whoever is helped first may not necessarily return the favor. Even though they made a promise, the first farmer 29 Kant, Critique of the Power of Judgment, 66.

Practical Reason And Its Principles

145

would no longer have anything to gain once he has provided help. The result is that neither helps the other.30 In this example desires are able to spontaneously govern human action. But in reality, human desires are always regulated or limited in some way. Certainly someone may desire to get help and not return the favor, but this type of desire goes against our everyday norms. On a conscious level, if one has promised to help another but does not want to, then their desire and the principal of sincerity are in conflict. In every day activity, promises provide the principal or norm that governs or restrains human desire, and it is often actually difficult to go back on one’s word (despite lack of motivation to fulfill such promises). Here it is easy to see that value principles can and do often adjust or control desires. Moreover, rational principles can also make desires themselves transform. In the example above, honoring one’s word, or returning a good deed are principles or norms that people consciously acknowledge, and the desire to uphold these principles or norms is often greater then the desire to break them. Hume therefore vastly overlooks the fact that the universal principles of practical reason are able to internally control and limit desires. To summarize, practical rationality and theoretical rationality are intimately involved with one another, and the former is expressed through rational practice. Practical rationality, in its relation to the practice of transforming existence to meet human ideas or rational needs, is not only involved with the process of human existence itself, but also with the transformation of objects in the world. As an expression of rationality in the real world, practical rationality is not limited to what is formal in the Kantian sense, nor is it bound by the utilitarian focus on benefit. When practical rationality is generally oriented towards goodness, it is expressed in the principles of rightness, goodness, and effectiveness. 30 Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, 520–521.

chapter 7

Practical Activities, Communicative Action and the Rationality of Practical Processes Practical rationality takes the principle of rightness, the principle of goodness, and the principle of effectiveness, as it’s concrete content; as such it permeates and guides practical processes. Broadly speaking, practical human activities take place in different spheres, and appear in various manifestations. Unlike original existence, practical activities are a mode of human function in the external world, which includes interaction with others. Correspondingly, there is an overlap between activities that include the transformation of others and those that involve interaction between different people. As a form of conscious action, practical activities unfold while we are simultaneously engaging in rationality and rationalization. From a broader perspective, the correspondence between what must be the case and what should be the case with the rationality or rationalization of practical processes, also displays a blend of “emotions” and “reason.” 7.1

Practical Activities and Communicative Actions

From the human perspective, the spheres of practical activity can be broadly classified as either natural or social. In the natural sphere there are natural objects, whereas the social sphere includes different institutions, and the lifeworld at large. Natural objects include more than just original existences, they also include what humans have changed or modified. The latter can be further broken down into two kinds: those that have the brand or mark of humans but are somewhat in conflict with natural human life, and those that have provided the space for human existence, and are used by humans. Practical activities are expressed as the process of taking some original existence and making it useful for oneself.1 Taking the alteration of natural objects as its content, even 1 Looked at from the perspective of the relationship between humans and nature, the transformation of an original existence to something someone can use is not only just changing what is natural to fit human needs, it also includes protecting the natural environment and ecology (e.g. protecting forests). Even the situation where humans protect nature still expresses the way that humans use the natural world: human protection or maintenance of nature or the ecological world is already different from its naturally existence, it already has the mark

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004321786_008

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

147

the types of practical activities that unfold in the natural realm, such as those mentioned above, are characterized by the objectifying of things. It is important to note that the so-called “activities in the natural realm” therefore involve more than natural objects. In reality, the unfolding of these processes is inseparable from social reality. Confirming a practice as being within the natural realm is therefore mostly just indicative of the action’s orientation (that it has the change, transformation or alteration of an object as its content). The foundational manifestation of practical activity in the natural realm is labor. In terms of its goal, labor is directly oriented at natural objects, and it is concretely expressed in the interaction between nature and humans. Here labor is firstly formed negatively: the function of labor is to change objects from their natural state so that they may conform to various human requirements. This is a form of the denial of a thing’s original state. But something even more complex is going on. In fact, when labor changes a thing to meet human needs, it also creates a certain type of link between human beings and objects, and through this process the humanized world is established. Even with the transformation of objects as its general orientation, labor is not solely limited to the relationship between subjects and objects. Habermas argues that there is a difference between labor and communicative action. Labor, he says, is teleological and mainly involved with subject-object relations, whereas communication is about the interaction between subjects.2 However, this understanding of labor seems a little too simple. In terms of its real-world manifestations, labor is certainly oriented at transforming objects, but its process cannot be completely disconnected from human social interactions, and the two are closely related Labor itself therefore cannot be conceived of in isolation nor is it the activity of individuals. From the use of tools, to divisions of labor, labor involves various interactions with other subjects. Xunzi notes that this is the characteristic difference between the actions of humans and animals: Humans…do not have the power of oxen, nor are they as fast as horses, but they can use both oxen and horses, why? [Because] humans can form societies/group, and oxen and horses cannot.3 may divide humanity. As the object of human use that which is protected is still different from that which is naturally it’s self in that humans take it as something for themselves. 2 See Jugen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Translated by Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984). 3 Wang Xianqian 王先謙. Xunzi Jishi 荀子集釋 [Collected Commentaries on Xunzi] (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 2013), 194.

148

chapter 7

Making use of horses and oxen can be seen as a concrete example of how people use nature, and how natural things are changed in labor. For Xunzi “grouping” (qun), which is the precondition for society, is what distinguishes humans from animals. “Grouping” refers to the connection and interaction between humans. This interaction is not completely cut off from the transformation of natural things but is instead conceived as a condition for using nature. Therefore, according to Xunzi’s understanding of “grouping,” there is no clear distinction between subject-object relations and the relations between subjects. This can help to give a new perspective on labor that is not limited in the way that Habermas sees it, namely, as being founded exclusively on individual subject-object relations. Compared with natural objects, society obviously has a much closer connection to human beings. As a manifestation of social reality, society itself includes several characteristics that differentiate it from the sphere of natural objects. First and foremost, it takes on a form and function that is closely related to the existence of human beings themselves. In the natural realm objects can exist outside of human knowledge or action, but this is not possible in the social realm, where everything is known to humans as part of their sphere of activity. Taking institutions and organizations as examples of social manifestations, social reality also expresses historical content and is thereby relatively stable. Its numerous concrete appearances include the economy, politics, law, the military, education, culture, and so on. In modern society the economy then includes within it everything from production to sales, and trade to investment; it exists in factories, companies, markets and banks, all of which constitute economic organizations. In terms of political institutions, countries, parties, the government, etc. are each examples. Militaries similarly have many branches that form armed organizations. In education colleges and universities, high schools, middle schools, elementary schools, and even tutoring centers, be they public or private, are educational institutions. For culture, publishers, media outlets, actors and all kinds of artists are either organizations or institutions of culture. Society exists in relation to human concepts and ideas as well as their practical applications. From the perspective of actual processes, practical activities, and social reality have a specific form of interaction. On one hand the existence of society is not an original existence in the same sense that natural things are, but rather something artificially established, and as such it can never be separated from practical human activities. But on the other hand practical activities themselves are developed within and against the background of social reality. In other words, the operations of social institutions and organizations can likewise never be separated from practical processes. The operations of the

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

149

government and its functions are completely dependent upon the political activities of the government’s various branches and offices. A company’s function and economic marketplace is displayed through activities such as production and sales. Other social institutions and organizations function similarly; they are all intimately tied to practical activity. In terms of such activities themselves, practical processes that are oriented towards social objects are closely related to practical processes that unfold in the social realm, and their relationship involves two distinct layers. Institutions and organizations transcend (individual) human beings, and yet cannot be separated from them. Institutions in themselves have no life and their operations cannot be entirely separated from the interactions between human beings that constitute them; in this sense we can say that humans constitute the background for the existence of institutions. In a similar fashion the interaction between humans and society is always linked to interactions between humans themselves. In this way social institutions also form the background for practical activities, and interaction between subjects cannot be ignored. Therefore the significance of social reality is not just some abstract, social reality exists as something material as well. The government has its own buildings, and methods for guaranteeing and implementing social policies. Businesses have factories, machinery, products and the like. Armies have military equipment and weapons. There are schools, offices and campuses that make up the education system. These buildings, machines, and pieces of equipment are what make social reality distinct from a purely conceptual world. They also provide social reality with certain objective and object-related characteristics. Similarly, practical activities within the realm of society are at the same time involved with subject-object relations. If the orientation of these activities is towards altering nature, which includes subject-object interactions built upon subjects relationships with one another, then taking social reality as the background for practical activities demonstrates the interactions between subjects, while confirming subject-object relations. But people do not exist exclusively within social institutions and organizations; their lives are also lived out in everyday activities, which constitutes an additional form of the manifestation of social reality. From a philosophical perspective, daily activities are primarily connected to individual existence. The most fundamental manifestation of these activities is displayed in the daily habits and practices that are firstly directed towards biological needs. Eating and drinking are necessary daily activities, and are the most elementary conditions for staying alive. Having children, and taking care of them, is also a basic part of continuing life. However, daily activities are not limited only to these basic needs, in a broader sense human existence is also a social or

150

chapter 7

cultural existence. If bodily needs are met then language and practical activities are required as they form the necessary communication required between individuals so that they can reproduce. Society and culture therefore provide the necessary precondition for reproduction as well. Taking daily activities as its content, the lifeworld is where humans exist, and it comprises the most basic context for their dealings, and practical activities. The Chinese philosophical tradition has a long history of interest in understanding the lifeworld with reference to daily activities, and is especially concentrated on the question of how habits become practical activities. From eating and drinking to cleaning, from family life to interaction with neighbors, from recreational activities to discussions, daily activities in the lifeworld are multifarious. These sets of activities are the conditions of possibility for ­individual life as well as for reproduction. They are oriented towards the arrangement of the lifeworld, and harmonizing with it. In terms of the most fundamental manifestations, daily activities can basically be broken down into two categories. First there are material and cultural activities, and secondly various types of social communication and interactions. The level of ­material and cultural consumption involves sustenance, living quarters, as well as ­cultural materials and products. Social interaction is expressed through the communication between individuals, and their dealings with one another. In constituting the lifeworld, these two categories are often related; material and cultural aspects coincide with the interaction between individuals. Social interaction can thereby also take on various forms depending on material and cultural elements. The lifeworld takes the above-mentioned practical activities as its content, and at the same time in endows practical activity with its distinctive characteristics. Compared to individuals or communities, materials needed for sustaining life or cultural products exist as objects. The use or consumption of these objects forms parts of the relationships between subjects and objects and between subjects and subjects. The communication between individuals, and their interaction is also based on the relationship between subjects. In this way, even though the lifeworld contains daily activities and indicates activities directed at natural objects as well as those expressed through social institutions, it is also concerned with the relationships between subjects and subject-object relations. It is clear from the above that practical activities are displayed in three different spheres: the natural realm, social institutions, and the lifeworld. These domains are sustained in correspondence with one another, while manifesting differences in content from one another. Practical processes in the natural realm are primarily involved with effective transformations of nature (as their

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

151

goal). Within social institutions, practical activities are displayed according to the operations of these institutions and are oriented towards actualizing social ideals. In the lifeworld, daily routines and habits are mainly apparent in dayto-day practices. The goals of these processes are directed towards changing human existence. Ethically speaking, if successes are measured by the degree of change in objects within a subject-object interaction; these practices are aimed at making objects conform to human needs and ideas. Practical activities conducted within institutions are intended to create more ideal social spaces through the operations of those institutions. Through harmonious interactions between subjects in the lifeworld humans establish the public context in which they live. Of course, it is worth pointing out that the difference between realms of existence and practical states is somewhat relative. Different spheres of practice and practical activities express unique characteristics, but they cannot be completely separated from one another. Habermas has closely investigated processes in these different areas as well as their unique characteristics and he distinguishes them mainly on the basis of teleological and communicative actions. He argues that practice related to the natural realm is a teleological form of action.4 This involves subject-object relations targeted at achieving a certain goal. However, actions in the lifeworld are mainly expressed as communicative. This means that they take place in the interaction between subjects, and are oriented towards understanding and awareness of each other. Therefore, while Habermas is focused on spheres of practice, and the unique characteristics of different types of practical activities, he does not look at their similarities. Metaphysically speaking, the natural realm, social institutions, and the lifeworld are all expressions of human existence. Even though processes in the natural realm display an object’s characteristics, the fact that they have been worked on by humans means they are already changed from their natural state, which converts them into a humanized existence. While humans act based on knowledge and social realities, they live their lives within the actualization of these institutions, thus exhibiting some level of unification with these institutions themselves. Similarly, practical activities that are expressed in different realms have their own unique contents, but these spheres and their substance cannot be completely separated from one another.5 4 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 138. 5 Additionally, actions that target success, are related to Heidegger’s “calculative thinking” or instrumental rationality, which takes the mutual understanding of subjects as the orientation of communicative action. This is linked to value rationality. The difference between teleological actions and communicative ones contains a logical distinction of these types of reason

152

chapter 7

As mentioned above, practical activities that work on natural objects, such as labor, are primarily involved with the interaction between subjects and objects. However, this type of interplay takes on different forms of subject-object relationships as its actual background. Similarly, practical activities based on social reality, including institutional practices and daily behaviors in the lifeworld, are not definitively distinct from the communication between subjects. But as actual processes there is no way to absolutely differentiate them from subject-object relations. Therefore in terms of modes of action, activities directed towards natural objects are not limited in the manner that Habermas’s description suggests. They do not only accord with natural laws, but with social norms as well. Actions that transform natural objects express themselves through effective processes that rely upon actuality, and they also involve issues such as ways to avoid harming the environment. Protecting the environment also has to do with both natural laws and moral norms.6 Similarly, practical activities in the social realm (including both the lifeworld and social institutions) take social norms as their basis, and also follow the laws of existence. Institutions, as established social realities, are, in some sense, founded and sustained though actions that conform to norms. However, social realities also have their own essential aspects, which allow them to simultaneously express a natural historical process. Activities associated with social realms such as economic, political, and military ones, all include necessary rules, meaning that practical activities never depart fully from the laws of existence. In the 1950’s China attempted the Great Leap Forward, which had extremely negative results due to its violation of economic rules. This exemplifies the connection between practical activities that work on natural objects and successful (and value rationality). Thereby, from the perceptive of actual manifestations, just as practical activities in different areas cannot be completely detached from on another, the different forms of rationality in practical processes are inseparable. In his investigations of reason, Robert Nozick points out this connection. According to his arguments, instrumental rationality also has intrinsic value, and it can be an extension of ourselves, and even come to make up an important part of our identity and being. (See: Robert Nozick, The Nature of Rationality (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 136). The very phrases “extension of ourselves” and “our identity and being” include value connotations. The interaction between this and instrumental rationality displays the connection between instrumental rationality and value rationality. In fact, as a part of human existence and development, instrumental rationality has its own degree of value and correspondingly cannot be differentiated from value rationality. This time of connection expresses the unification of reason, and shows that human action and practice really have different forms, though their boarders are not easily demarcated. 6 In fact, these issues are found in ancient texts as well. For example, both the Liji and the Mengzi note that trees should only be cut down at the appropriate times.

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

153

transformation (of those objects). Such processes also involve understanding and communication between subjects. Through natural activities this type of communication forms the precondition for an activity’s success. In a similar manner, practical activities based on social realities (including communicative actions) are related to understanding and communication between subjects. The latter are neither abstract issues nor can they be based solely on the individual. Rather, they develop according to the effective operations of institutions, to lifeworld arrangements, and to their order and harmony. Here effectiveness, arrangements, order, and harmony determine, in a broad sense, the measure of success or of achieving goals. The differences between forms of practice mentioned above does not entail that they are completely separate from one another. Looked at from another angle the definition and demarcation of the lifeworld is relative. Activities in the lifeworld are not limited to bare necessities, nor even to basic social interactions. According to its connotations, the lifeworld is related to space and time dimensions. This means that the lifeworld is involved in the individual’s ongoing actions, and includes all of their activities. In this way it forms part of any work space, productive labor, public management, the market, political planning, and also cultural and scientific areas. In fact, when individual reproduction is understood from a cultural perspective, it forms a mode of production that is not unrelated to other types of labor, social and cultural arenas. Here it is not difficult to see that the lifeworld can be understood in both the broad and narrow sense. The narrow determination is directly linked to satisfying basic life necessities. More broadly speaking, the lifeworld includes dealing with daily activities in cultural and social areas, and relates to more complex affairs and objects. Broadly speaking, the lifeworld provides the specific background for understanding practical processes. Habermas pays close attention to these broader interpretations.7 The system of knowledge composed by culture is, in the widest sense, the condition for the subject’s understanding. The process of understanding itself takes the productions of culture as its concrete content. Society is expressed as legal order, and its system of norms guarantee that society is a cohesive whole. Individuals become socialized through processes of participating and interpreting, and this is displayed in the content of their speech and actions, which also provides the precondition for individual identity. It is easy to see that the lifeworld, understood in this way, includes various realms of existence related to practical activities, and is therefore logically connected (as a precondition) to a wide variety of actual real-world manifestations. 7 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 138.

154

chapter 7

Habermas’s understanding of the lifeworld examines culture, society and individuals mostly in the communication between subjects. For him everything from cultural production, social unity to individual socialization processes is based on understanding and communication between subjects as developed in language. Habermas writes, “There is an internal connection between structures of lifeworlds and structures of linguistic worldviews.”8 Accordingly, communication in the lifeworld is mainly aimed at reaching a common understanding. Therefore, “we even have to suppose a consensus formation among participants that is in principle of a linguistic nature.”9 So language and speech acts function as a guiding factor for communication acts in the lifeworld. Habermas himself sees language as the core of communication acts, arguing that “formal pragmatics reconstructs universal and necessary conditions of communicative action.”10 From this perspective, agents in the lifeworld can present various types of criticism through their mutual communication, including discussions, debates and disagreements. In this way participants can come to a common understanding. To put it briefly, speech, criticism, and mutual understanding are each ways of reaching common ground and this comprises the most significant content of Habermas’s theory of communication acts. As forms of action that include social aspects, practices are never devoid of communication between subjects, and language is therefore an especially important aspect. Further, equality between subjects in discussing different ideas is not only helpful for mutual understanding between the participants, but also for positively influencing their cooperation and coordination with one another. In this regard it is clear that Habermas investigates language and speech acts from a pragmatic perspective. By affirming the communicative function of speech acts Habermas makes understanding and consensus the goals themselves, but thereby sidelines other significant forms of practical action. This is quite clear in his writings where he argues that actions are related to the world as “symbolic interactions,” I shall distinguish from actions the bodily movements and operations that are concurrently executed and can acquire the independence of actions only secondarily, through being embedded, for instance, in play or teaching practices.11 8 9 10 11

Ibid., 124. Ibid., 94. Ibid., 139 Ibid., 96.

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

155

Looking at their real-world manifestation, actions involve intention, motivation, ideas, and concepts that can be expressed in language and bodily motions. The association here expresses the unification of the mind and body. The mind or body alone cannot comprise actual action. But through focus on language, Habermas separates action from bodily activity and therefore basically accounts for action only abstractly. In fact, even speech acts cannot be completely separated from bodily activities. Of course Habermas understands the significance of bodily activity in the actual manifestation of action to some degree. The most substantial question then, is about the relation between language and action. As shown above, Habermas distinguishes between teleological actions and communicative ones. The former are oriented towards transforming objects, while the latter are directed at subjects reaching an understanding and consensus with one another. As actions directed at changing an object, teleological actions include displaying activities of the body. Understanding and consensus between subjects is largely based on language exchange, which means that the distinction between these categories mainly relates to the difference between language and embodied action. But from the perspective of subject-object interactive practical activities, language and action, or speaking and doing cannot be completely separated from one another. In terms of transforming existence, speech leads to action. Similarly, speech and action are mutually related in communication acts between subjects. These actions involve more than just listening to what someone says; one must also pay attention to their actions. In fact, the exchange, understanding, and common consensus achieved through speech acts are not the entire content of communication. If people cannot actualize in action the understanding or consensus they reach in language, then the exchange between subjects are internally limited. Habermas sees speech acts as the core of communication between subjects, thereby distancing bodily activities and operations from concrete practical processes. Logically this means separating, or at least the possibility of separating, speech and action, or speaking and doing. The problems facing speech acts go well beyond those related to the relationship between language and embodied action. Other issues include the distinction between names and actuality (or things and affairs). Understanding language also involves knowing whether or not language and action are identifiable with one another, which has to do with the correspondence between names and actualities (i.e. actual things and affairs). The term actuality here does not only indicate natural objects, but also things in the social realm, such as social positions and attitudes towards values. “Things” are therefore related to two further questions: firstly to the question of how to say something, which

156

chapter 7

is primarily connected to the mode of speech, and its procedures, and secondly to the question of what to say, which has to do with the content and object of speech. The former displays the formal dimension of speech, whereas the latter expresses aspects related to its substance. Habermas sees speech acts as the heart of communication between subjects, and at the same time pays close attention to the procedure of speech acts and their formal dimension. Besides broad requirements like truthfulness, appropriateness, sincerity, and understandability, Habermas also introduces a concentration on the rules governing speech. For instance, that the speaker should not say contradictory things, that they should express an idea that they believe, and that everyone who has the ability to speak and act has the right to participate in discussions.12 These issues all emphasize linguistic procedures, and in this way Habermas separates ethics from both cognitivism and universalism.13 As a mode of communication between people, speech is undoubtedly inseparable from procedures, thereby, dismissing the issue of what to say and concentrating solely as aspects of how to say something makes it difficult not to see language as something rather empty and abstract. Only by simultaneously looking at what to say can language become something more than a purely formal procedure and have something to do with actual relationships between people in society in term of the cognitive comprehension of objects and various value positions, and attitudes. In other words, this is what gives language substantial content. In terms of speech, subject-object relations, relations between subjects, formal procedures, actual cognitive content, and value orientations, are all connected to one another. Habermas affirms consensus and conceives theoretical as well as practical debates as related to one another. He also sees that theoretical debates involve actual laws, while practical debates have to do with what is ethically good. However, the overall orientation Habermas takes is one that emphasizes theoretical aspects and value, in terms of how to say something and its procedural significance. Thus he does not pay enough attention to the issue of what is said and its substantial content.14

12 13 14

Jurgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, Translated by Christian Lenhardt (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), 108. Ibid. 122. Here the question of what is said is not limited to the content of speech, or of what can or cannot be said. Instead this phrase is used to indicate that while concentrating on the mode of speech, one should also investigate the content, significance, and meaning of speech as objects of discussion and understanding, in order to avoid making speech acts seem empty or merely formal.

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

157

In sum, practical processes unfold in different areas, and correspond to various spheres of existence. These processes themselves, have their own respective points of emphasis that are expressed in their backgrounds, targets, and methods. Furthermore, taking the interaction between humans in the world as their substantial content, the different manifestations of practical processes are mutually connected. Habermas differentiates between teleological actions directed at objects and communicative actions that unfold between subjects. This undoubtedly demonstrates a difference between the orientations and characteristics of practical processes. However, the difference demarcated in practical processes by distinguishing between transforming objects and understanding and consensus between subjects has its own internal limitation based on the difference between object-orientation and inter-subject relations. Communication between subjects penetrates and is expressed through the natural realm, social institutions and the lifeworld. If actions are separated from concrete processes then they ever unfold in the world. Actions are thereby not isolated manifestations, they happen within the lifeworld. An over-emphasis on communicative action, coupled with the distancing from the relationship between speech and action, as well as names and actuality is, logically speaking, likely to make the understanding of practical activity problematically abstract. 7.2

The Various Relationships in Practical Processes

As a mode of existence, the unfolding of practical activities involves multiple forms of relationships. The interaction between humans and the world is primarily expressed in the way subjects use objects, which has to do with the relationship between them. With the social realm as its context, practical activities are in accord with the relationships between subjects. Within practical processes, subjects are not only involved with objects and with other subjects, but must also face themselves, and the relationship between the subject and itself is also important. The aforementioned relationships are manifest in a number of ways, and their interaction and mutual influence comprise the precondition for the unfolding of practical activities, and endow these processes with their practical quality. From the perspective of practical action, the relationship between subjects and objects itself is formed in the subject’s use of objects. This relationship does not have specific natural characteristics and their connection is established in the way the subject uses the object. In general, subjects aim at transforming or changing objects as a way of actualizing their own ideas. One major

158

chapter 7

entailment of this process is that the natural object becomes an object in the subject-object sense. Additionally, this relationship itself is brought into the interaction between methods and goals when transformation of the object becomes the method by which the subject actualizes their (often value-laden) ideas. The subject’s use of the object transforms the latter from a natural existence to a humanized one. In addition to the subject-object relation there is the interrelation between subjects. The former is primarily involved with humans and objects or things, whereas the latter has to do with humans alone. This second set of relationships is not merely expressed as a passive coexistence, but more importantly through the unfolding of interactive processes. In general, practical activities not only have to confront objects, but also have interactions between subjects as their context and precondition. The relation between subjects and objects is mostly displayed through the effective pursuit of a goal and comparatively speaking, there is also a dimension of this in the relation between subjects. As the background for practical activity, the relationship between subjects can be understood in various ways. As mentioned above, Habermas links the relationship between subjects themselves to the lifeworld, and sees the interaction between subjects as mediated by language in which subjects take understanding and consensus as the basis for their interactions. However, the relationship between subjects in practical processes is not actually formed solely, or even largely, on the interpretation of speech acts or consensus. There are other important forms that are expressed in various aspects of daily life, including cultural, economic, and political ones. These are concrete socio-historical backgrounds that show that the relationship between subjects is not limited to language as a mediator for rational communication. For example, this relation simultaneously contains value connotations that directly or indirectly involve a relationship of benefit. However, the rational communication of language does not include these value benefits. In terms of the daily existence of subjects, value promises that are merely linguistic can allow for a certain type of understanding or even consensus. But this form of communication is still abstract. Real-world interactions between individuals always include certain benefits, which are a concrete aspect of such relationships, and often serve as the grounds of inter-subject relations. Habermas argues that the interaction between subjects also involves validity claims or discussion, and that consensus is reached through language. But again this fails to account for concrete social content. In terms of benefits, consensus through language is not the same as both parties “winning” actual benefits. Rather this “winning” is actualized in practical processes, and cannot be limited to the realm of language nor is it restricted to speech acts.

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

159

Originally inter-subjective relationships unfold in a social context, and this already involves both internally directed as well as externally directed aspects. Social existence, or what Xunzi calls “grouping,” shows that subjects are not isolated individuals. The existence of the subject therefore cannot be separated from other subjects or society. Accordingly, subjects display a form of there internal relationship to themselves in their relationships with one another. The internally facing aspect in these relationships shows a degree of dependence on the inter-subjective context. There are other aspects of subjectivity that cannot be completely assimilated or dissolved into the relationship itself. Relative to the individual, the relationship with other subjects also exists for the individual. Additionally, there are certain limitations between individual subjects that are concretely expressed, such as the differences between thinking and benefits. Moreover, an individual subject can be replaced in terms of their specific social roles, however their specific existence itself is irreplaceable. The difference between existence and roles in subjectivity entails that the subject cannot be completely assimilated into relationships with others. This shows an aspect of external relation in the relationship between subjects. This substantial expression of the external relation between subjects is also connected to the above-mentioned concrete internal world of relationships related to inter-subjectivity. The mutual understanding and communication between subjects requires that they open their inner worlds to one another, but there is nevertheless always something that remains hidden. The aspects of the self that are closed off cannot be subsumed by the relationship, but they nevertheless comprise the conditions of possibility for understanding and communication. When the self is completely open and fully corresponds to objects, the understanding between subjects themselves no longer exists. At the very least communication between subjects includes being understood by others, and understanding others, but if we only look at the form of being understood by others, then the self becomes a type of being-for-others. Therefore if openness to others is the most significant dimension of communication this still only expresses the essence of being-for-others. In other words, communication and understanding involve compromises in actions, as well as a resistance that remains within the stable inner world. But if we only focus on the former it is difficult to avoid envisioning subjects as something like mere tools. In this regard Habermas’s perspective includes the issues that need to be concentrated on. In terms of the overall orientation of his thought, when emphasizing intersubjectivity, he downplays the significance of subjectivity. Accordingly, Habermas sees language as the mediator or intermediary for communication and argues that language itself can satisfy the conditions of

160

chapter 7

truthfulness, appropriateness, and sincerity.15 Here it is especially important to pay attention to truthfulness. The concrete requirement of truthfulness is that language truthfully expresses an individual’s opinions, intentions, feelings, desires, and any other relevant mental state. The truthfulness of communication between subjects is obviously useful for their mutual understanding and includes an aspect of the openness of one’s inner world towards another subject. Habermas argues that individuals do have a “subjective world,” and that there is “something in the subjective world (as the totality of experience to which a speaker has privileged access and which he can express before a public).”16 But for Habermas the subjective world is always related to actions in a play or performance, which are done in front of an audience. The performativity of this determination of the subjective world shows it is confined to externality. He writes, “Processes of reaching understanding are aimed at a consensus that depends on the intersubjective recognition of validity claims; and these claims can be reciprocally raised and fundamentally criticized by participants in communication.”17 Consensus itself, which is had through mutual criticisms and approvals, then tends towards dissolving the difference between individual’s ideas. The openness of the individual’s inner world to the community, as well as the consensus with others that either dismisses or integrates their ideas in public, is therefore inclined towards the eradication of subjectivity. But even language, for the subject, is not only something that has meaning in dialogue with others, there can also be private language—which in turn also affects the relationship between subjects. Habermas focuses on dialogue much more than private language. In the realm of ethics, he uses conversation to prove the rationality of norms and directives, seeing conversation as a basic presupposition for ethics.18 But from the perspective of real manifestations, the subject’s process of existence cannot really avoid private language. For example, knowledge is not limited to linguistic exchange and morality is developed, at least in part, from reflecting with and on one’s self. Both knowledge and morality then have to do with some form of private language. In a broad sense the practice of private language with the self actually takes the self as an object, and is a form of speech that lacks sound. Of course the individual still uses language and knowledge of former activities when thinking or realizing something, which establishes a link to the outside world. However, at the same time that an individual is in the process of thinking they are also 15 Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, 89–100. 16 Ibid., 120. 17 Ibid., 136. 18 Ibid.

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

161

considering the ideas of others in the manner demanded by communication, therefore the practice constitutes conscious speaking that lacks sound. As an internal thought process, the abovementioned form of language is directed towards the self and is not the same as the discussions between subjects that take place in public. Concretely speaking, as forms of private language “thinking” and self-reflection signify the process through which the subject internalizes social or cultural issues, and thereby tries to actualize an ideal self or potential self. Speaking to oneself, or reflection, also makes the individual gradually question their carefree everyday state, they go from being merely conscious of their own existence to existing for-themselves. In terms of linguistic communication, the communication that happens between subjects is about clarifying meaning, whereas private language plays a significant role in the creation of meaning. The same word, phrase, or expression can have a different significance for individuals whose background, knowledge, intentions, and desires are dissimilar. Language exchange that happens between subjects is always expressed through the unification between the clarification of meaning and understanding of internal significance. The connection that exists between dialogue and inner communication shows some aspects of the blended relationship between subjectivity and intersubjectivity. The subjectivity that appears in communication between subjects is not only inner language, but also forms of internal desire or emotion. These are spheres of meaning that restrict communication processes in different ways. The process of outward speech itself incorporates meaning outside of words, including emotional aspects. For example, in some situations a subject’s eyes alone can transfer deep and significant meaning in a manner more powerful than words alone. Undoubtedly, human coexistence often revolves around communication of emotions, and this sphere of inner life is not always transferred through language. The other must relate to the feelings or emotions of the subject, which is a form of inner understanding that goes beyond linguistic interpretation or explanation. This form of emotional communication that happens when people coexist allows them to really feel and experience things like friendship and affection, or their opposites. For example, individuals in close physical proximity with one another can feel as though they are far apart, and those who may be spread over different parts of the globe can still feel extremely close due to emotional ties. Here the subject’s inner world, including feelings and emotions, are not necessarily open to the external world. Therefore their relationship is founded upon an internal sense that does not necessarily involve speech. Additionally, we see that if the subject does not reflect on their inner thoughts and feelings, it becomes difficult for them to communicate deeply with others.

162

chapter 7

Communication also involves the correlation of language and meaning. As with language, meaning understood more broadly can also indicate significance, and both have value connotations and emotional associations. Implications and overtones in speech are also connected to emotional content, and can be discerned in their full richness by subjects with a close emotional connection or shared history. Here meaning exceeds the external forms of language, and this correspondingly exposes the link between language and consciousness. The transformation from subjectivity to intersubjectivity is often accompanied by a concentration on consciousness and a turn towards language. For example, this move is quite clearly made in Habermas’s work. Starting from the concentration on intersubject communication, Habermas’s focal point is mainly speech acts. He argues that contemporary philosophy has experienced a shift from the study of consciousness to language analysis. He states, “the transition from the philosophy of consciousness to language analysis that was accomplished by formal semantics in the wake of Frege and Wittgenstein is, to be sure, only a first step.”19 From this perspective, the shift from the philosophy of consciousness to language philosophy constructs a historical precondition for the superiority of studying language. One of the theoretical implications included in this precondition is that language itself dissolves meaning. This point can be clearly noted in Wittgenstein’s work. In his later writings and lectures Wittgenstein connects language operations with the meaning of language, understanding the operation of language within the community as a type of “game.” These so-called “language games” take place in the context of ways of life or social interaction. As a game that takes place in a community, language is primarily something public. By emphasizing the public elements of language Wittgenstein expresses suspicion regarding consciousness or mental procedures. For him internal processes require external norms, and the human body therefore provides the best picture of the human soul. Understanding is not a mental procedure, even though the rules that language follows are actualized by the subject, and have nothing to do with its conscious bodily activities. Wittgenstein thereby distinguishes between two forms of grammar, namely object and subject grammar, arguing that the “I” in the second form lacks a corresponding object. His theory expresses a trend towards suspending talk of the subject’s inner consciousness beyond the limits of what can be meaningfully understood. When Habermas discusses subjectivity and emphasizes the limits of the philosophy of consciousness, he does so in a manner similar to the later Wittgenstein. However, this interpretation of language (and its limits) needs to be further investigated. 19 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 386.

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

163

Clarity and tacit understanding in the process of interpretation is related to language and meaning. In the communication between subjects, linguistic expression is oriented towards clarity, so the process of interpretation is not limited to linguistic clarity, but is also often permeated by a tacit understanding that cannot be clearly delineated. Tacit understanding is characterized by this opacity. We can therefore say that tacit understanding and clear linguistic expression make up two distinct forms of knowledge or interpretation. Tacit understanding participates in the process of interpretation from start to finish. It is also part of the composition of the subject’s inner world as it is integrated with thinking and feeling. Furthermore, intersubjective emotional communication involves elements of tacit understanding. Yet Habermas does not seem to pay much attention to these themes, instead holding that commonality in intersubjective communication is more closely related to language. He writes: The fact that the intersubjective commonality of a communicatively achieved agreement exists at the levels of normative accord, shared propositional knowledge, and mutual trust in subjective sincerity can be explained in turn through the functions of achieving understanding in language.20 Accordingly, drawing on language can hope to achieve universality or commonality in intersubjective communication. But this also means that the universal content in the process of communication can never go beyond language. Logically speaking, if the interactions between subjects are limited to the level of speech acts, then it is easy to ignore or overlook evident aspects of real communicative processes. In this way the communication and interaction between subjects can no longer be realistically accounted for. By extension, the subject’s inner world, which contains tacit consciousness, is often concretely manifest in the subject’s own personal character. Therefore there can be different interpretations of personality itself. Habermas affirms that personality is an important aspects of the lifeworld, however, while emphasizing that the lifeworld is the proper field for intersubjective communication, he sees the prominent function of personality as actualizing the socialization of an individual. For Habermas the socialization of the individual appears through individuals fitting into society. The orientation here is therefore from the subject to society. In this sense, the notion of personality and the idea that subjects open their inner world, are logically identical. Their major 20 Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, 308.

164

chapter 7

point of similarity is that both emphasize intersubjective relationships and deemphasize subjectivity. The view outlined is very different from the traditional Chinese Confucian recommendation of practicing self-restraint. The Da Xue 大学 (Great Learning) records: When the inferior man is alone and leisurely, there is no limit to which he does not go in his evil deeds. Only when he sees a superior man does he then try to disguise himself, concealing the evil and showing off the good in him. But what is the use? For other people see him as if they see his very heart. This is what is meant by saying that what is true in a man’s heart will be shown in his outward appearance. Therefore the superior man will always be watchful over himself when alone [that is, practice self-restraint].21 A similar idea is found in the Zhong Yong 中庸 (The Doctrine of the Mean): Therefore the superior man is cautious over what he does not see and apprehensive over what he does not hear. There is nothing more visible than what is hidden and nothing more manifest than what is subtle. Therefore the superior man is watchful over himself [practice self-restraint] when he is alone.22 The meaning of these two passages is more or less the same. They both speak to the simple fact that in everyday life we are not always in company and we need to be mindful even when alone. When alone, our concern for the opinions of others is, at least temporarily, suspended and actions are therefore hidden. Here the individual is faced with his or her own self. But in solitude the problem of universal moral principles still exists, although it no longer includes the possibility of showing or practicing ethics for others. In other words, the problem is no longer related to blame or reputation and praise. Rather, it becomes oriented towards actualizing one’s own moral character or ideals. The practice of self-restraint is also confronted with the boundaries of the self. Even while the individual internally maintains moral principles, solitude allows for the subject’s reflection or return from their social existence. In the absence of society the subject is able to realize the personal constitution of his or her self more profoundly. 21 Chan, A Source Book In Chinese Philosophy, 90. 22 Ibid., 98.

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

165

The subject’s inner world—that is, manifestations of their personality and spirituality—certainly includes external aspects such as society, culture, and norms, which correspondingly also provide the basis for the individual’s process of socialization as well as self-acknowledgment and self-actualization. Socialization appears in the individual’s orientation towards society and selfacknowledgement connotes an affirmation of social elements that can be seen as a return from the perspective of society to that of individual existence. The mutual connection between these three elements signifies the duel affirmation of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. Looking solely at the sphere of an individual’s self-recognition and ignoring their socialization will always alienate aspects of intersubjectivity and social expectations. Similarly, emphasizing socialization alone fails to account for the subject’s self-recognition and actualization of his or her self, and therefore results in the general dismissal of subjectivity. Habermas’s philosophy basically amounts to an expression of this latter orientation. The expectation of universal consensus is connected to the socialization of the individual. For Habermas, interactions between subjects are a display of mutual understanding and communication that is directed towards achieving such consensus. Epistemologically, consensus implies the unification of concepts and perspectives. Its logical tendency is directed towards overcoming differences in knowledge and perspectives. The process of communication between subjects is therefore directed towards similarity, but still has to reconcile itself with the unique existence of subjects–including different understandings and perspectives, as well as value orientations and positions. If the goal were purely to achieve consensus, then the desire for similarity would result in dismissing the unique character of individual existences. Also, due to these differences, in terms of the process of expressing knowledge or understanding, following any one specific procedure for dialogue, criticism, or discussion would not guarantee the achievement of an accurate impartial perspective on any particular thing or affair. Furthermore, the values agreed-upon by a community in a certain time are not necessarily appropriate, and oftentimes not rationally considered. When the desire for unanimity overwhelms difference in existence, values can easily become epistemologically arbitrary, or take the form of moral totalitarianism. From the perspective of communication the achievement of consensus is often related to a weakness in the significance of each subject’s inner world (i.e. a weakness of will). When consensus becomes the priority for interaction between subjects, the sphere of independent consciousness and subjective evaluation is dissolved in the search for unified awareness or understanding. Broadly speaking, both subjectivity and intersubjectivity in practical processes correspond with the relationship between the public and private sphere.

166

chapter 7

According to contemporary philosophy these realms are often seen as distinct. The public realm is understood as linked to universal norms or procedures whereas the individual has to do with one’s beliefs, moral character, and personality. Intersubjectivity is mainly understood to relate to the public sphere while subjectivity is primarily understood as an issue in the private sphere. The association between intersubjectivity and the public sphere has been noted by philosophers such as Habermas and John Rawls. Others, such as Martin Heidegger, focus instead on the task of comprehending the individual’s own being or authentic existence. The latter philosophical perspective sees the public realm as signifying a falling or sinking into the “they” or “them” (as in the work of both Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre). This orientation then implies that the self, individual consciousness, and moral character are not essentially related to the public sphere. The distinct public sphere then includes things like language, norms, and procedures. Accordingly, the interaction between subjects is primarily based on these public aspects of life. Naturally, after separating subjectivity and intersubjectivity, a tension between the public and private spheres arises. However, in terms of their real-world manifestations, individual aspects such as the self, consciousness, and moral character are impossible to separate from the public sphere, especially insofar as they rely on linguistic communication, social norms, and restrictions. Furthermore, the public sphere itself cannot be completely isolated from the same subjective aspects. In fact, the operation of language and norms and the function of social procedures all actualized in connection to the self, consciousness, and moral character. Therefore subjectivity and intersubjectivity are intimately related to one another. On the practical level, the relationship between subjects and objects, and between subjects themselves, as well as that between the subject and its self, are each involved with objectivity, subjectivity, and with intersubjectivity in action. Understanding real-world processes as the regulatory context for intersubjective relations highlights what should be the case. Simultaneously this distances us from the intimate connection between what is the case and what should be the case. Habermas’s emphasis on normativity in communicative action suspends the objective standpoint in practical processes. However, focusing on the relationship between subjects and objects (in ­relation to intersubjectivity) can also have the alternative result of ignoring subjectivity. This tendency can be seen in the emphasis of public aspects of ­language over individual experience, the preference for intersubjective ­consensus over individual consciousness, and in the priority of universal ­procedures over autonomous choice. Practically speaking, the historical development of processes requires an appropriate positioning of the relation between intersubjective relationships and the subject with his or her own self.

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

7.3

167

Conforming to Reason and Emotions

Practical processes also unfold through various relationships in which they face the problem of rationalization or are confronted with demands of reason. Rationalization and reason have slightly different connotations. Their distinction can be understood at the levels of values or methods, or can be investigated in terms of their involvement in different practical relationships. In simple terms, rationalization is not merely concerned with what is reasonable but also includes emotional elements. Looking at this issue with regard to the interaction between knowledge and action, the rationalization of practical action is primarily involved with knowledge (in the broadest sense of both having and gaining it). Rational knowing is directed at cognition and also relates to evaluation. Whereas cognition itself is targeted at knowing the truth about the world and oneself, evaluation is chiefly involved in grasping values, and is concentrated on rational human needs. Additionally, evaluation is based on judgments of benefit or harm, and good or bad, as well as confirming and choosing “the good.” Although benefit and harm, and good and bad each have relative historical contexts, in terms of accepting and confirming specific rules for judgment, the only rational action is the selection of the good. Conversely, knowing that something is harmful or bad but still choosing it is irrational. It is not difficult to see then that there are rational elements in knowledge and value claims. Both the reasonableness and rationality of practical actions are based on the aforementioned requirements. Unification of the rational aspects of knowledge and value claims are ­directed at the relationship between the goals of particular methods. As the fundamental elements of practical processes, goals and methods are either reasonable or not. However, exactly what this reasonableness connotes can refer to different conditions. The formation of goals is based on human need, desire, as well as real-world possibility. Whether or not goals are appropriate is directly determined by the reasonableness of these needs and desires. Only an orientation towards conforming to human freedom can make these needs and desires reasonable. The latter can also provide a guarantee for the appropriateness of goals and in this way goals acquire their reasonableness. Relative to this, the significance of methods is mainly determined by whether or not they can actualize goals. Here we can distinguish between practical effectiveness and logical validity. The possibility of discussing or criticizing an issue is a major aspect of logical validity, as is the relationship between preconditions and conclusions, but it can also include various other concerns. Practical effectiveness is confirmed through the effects achieved in practical action, and judged according

168

chapter 7

to whether or not the goal is reached. As argued above, practical effectiveness itself is based on finding out the truth and knowing what is good. By being oriented towards appropriate goals and effective means, the rationalization of practice is concretely constituted in the unification of truth and the good. Practical effectiveness and logical validity each embody difference aspects of rationalization. In contemporary philosophy scholars that focus on language acts tend to prioritize logical validity and do not give practical effectiveness the appropriate amount of attention. Habermas is one representative of this problem. By putting communicative action at the core conceives the rationalization of action by looking at its involvement in validity claims; consensus and mutual understanding in criticism, dialogue, discussion, and argument are able to determine these claims. Additionally, validity claims and r­ ationalization here are mainly logical, whereas effective actions are outside rationalization. But this understanding fails to grasp the entire content of rationalization. From the perspective of the subject-object dichotomy, the rationalization of practical processes is determined by reason. In terms of its real-world application, reason is not just involved with understanding or evaluation, but also with objects in the world. In this sense it connotes both what is necessarily the case and what should be the case. Corresponding to reason in practical processes therefore means complying to both laws of existence and social norms. The correspondence to practical processes means that practice conform to logical correctness, whereas the latter compliance to laws of existence and social norms speaks to normative appropriateness. Similarly, practical actions oriented towards establishing or operating in social systems comply to norms as well, which are already also internally united with the laws of existence. This guarantees that the action is both correct and appropriate. It is clear then that on the level of conforming to what is necessarily or what should be the case, that the reasonableness or rationalization of practice connotes concrete correctness and appropriateness. Compared with what should be the case, what ought to be the case is more closely linked to values. The content of values themselves are displayed in concrete manifestations and procedures. Within the sphere of procedures, reasonableness is often formal. When Habermas talks about communicative actions in the lifeworld he criticizes the influence of money and power “as a technicizing of the lifeworld.”23 This technicizing occurs when money and power become principal mediators in the lifeworld. Money and power not only usurp rationalization, but also make communicative actions less rational. Here what is rational includes value content, and is related to substance. 23

Ibid., 183.

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

169

Upon further investigation it is not difficult to notice that according to Habermas’s theory, irrationality is essentially mutually constituted by two relative aspects within formal rationalization: the value of money and power. Actions and rationality are mediated by language for Habermas, so it follows that when money and power are mediators that permeate the communicative action in the lifeworld, these actions have left the general orientation of speech acts. This leads to the irrationality in communicative actions. However, communication through language brings about rationalization, which is especially significant on the formal level. In fact, as mentioned above, Habermas links the rationality of communicative action with truthfulness, appropriateness, sincerity, and comprehensibility, which make up a procedural requirement. They first involve linguistic forms (how is it said) and non-linguistic content (what is said) so that the former is the formal procedure that determines the latter. In this way although he moves beyond the positive value orientation expressed by money and power in the lifeworld, Habermas pays strict attention to the formalized rationalization of practical actions. Rawls’s approach to the investigation of communicative rationality differs from Habermas in that he differentiates between the rational and the reasonable. Rawls argues that individuals, or even groups, act in a way that is oriented towards a particular self-identified goal and judgment of benefit. Further, he believes that the priority of goals and benefits is established by reason. It is also reason that determines, according to Rawls, the most effective method for reaching the goal, or “the more probable alternative.”24 Even though the entire content of morality is not contained in what is reasonable—“it includes the part that connects with the idea of fair social cooperation”25—only the reasonable individual will always “take into account the consequences of their actions on others’ well-being.”26 Rawls’s “rational” and “reasonable” distinction is comprised of a division of the individual and community. These distinct notions also depend on the difference between utility concerns and moral consciousness. In some respects this has to do with the relationship between instrumental and evaluative rationality. Undoubtedly, when Rawls makes this distinction between what is reasonable (including moral content) and what is rational, which considers advantage and efficacy, he dismisses certain orientations towards rationalization on the level of utility. At the same time what is called “reasonable” and “rational” are primarily interconnected to the subject’s own ability, so they involve what is reasonable and rational both in practical 24 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 51. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid., 49.

170

chapter 7

processes and in the individual themselves. In this case the agent becomes an internal obstruction to on the very possibility for what is reasonable or rational. The question remains: what is the significance of the reasonable and rational? Or rather, how can we describe them? Rawls says that the two are distinct and largely independent of one another, but also rely on each other to some extent. Trusting in what is reasonable alone leaves the agent with no hope of reaching their goal through a just means. But if one only complies with what is rational one will not have a sense of justice.27 In other ways, Rawls gives more precedence to the moral in determining what is reasonable. He writes, It is useful, then, to use “reasonable” and “rational” as handy terms to mark the distinction that Kant makes between the two forms of practical reason, pure and empirical. The first is expressed as an imperative in the categorical imperative, the second in the hypothetical imperative.28 As is well known, in Kant’s philosophy pure rationality plans a dominate role in experience, and the categorical imperative is absolute. Compared with this, Rawls certainly allows what is reasonable to play an important role in his theory. Even though he connects moral feeling with a sense of justice, and differentiates between rational utility and the realm of values, in a pure sense his counterpart to the categorical imperative—reasonableness—is the main focus of formal analysis. In this regard Rawls is somewhat similar to Habermas. The rationalization of practical processes undoubtedly includes procedures and manifestations, but at the same time the importance of its substantial content should not be overlooked. In this regard, the rationalization of practical processes is also about what is reasonable and plausible or what is inline with qing 情 (“concrete or true state of affairs,” “things” or “human feelings/ emotions”).29 The type of qing mentioned here implies what is actual, and it is related to true states of affairs, and circumstances. In fact, in Chinese philosophy qing is primarily related to actuality. When the Mengzi talks about “things” he always links them to qing. For example, “It is the [true] nature of things [qing] to be unequal.”30 According to Mengzi, being “unequal” implies that 27 28

Ibid., 52. John Rawls, “Themes in Kant’s Moral Philosophy,” in Kant’s Transcendental Deductions, ed. E. Foster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), 88. 29 Translator’s note: Due to the dual meaning of this term, and the author’s use of both in his discussion, the term qing will not be translated. Below there will be a more detailed description of this term and its connotations below. 30 Chan, A Source Book In Chinese Philosophy, 70.

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

171

things have differences between them, and that this is their genuine or natural state of being. The Mozi 墨子 (Book of Mohism) also understands qing in terms of the true or actual differences between things, it records: [In what the sages transmitted] with regard to Heaven and earth, they spoke of upper and lower. With regard to the four seasons, they spoke of Yin and Yang. With regard to people’s feelings [qing], they spoke of male and female. With regard to birds and beasts, they spoke of male and female animals and birds. Truly these were things bestowed [their nature/qing]31 by Heaven which the former kings could not change.32 There are always both superiors and inferiors, the four seasons can be understood in terms of yin and yang, and animals have the distinction between male and female. Here qing can be used to classify these dissimilarities. Later Xunzi extends this argument, looking at things from the perspective of the difference between humans and the heavens: Accordingly if you cast aside the concerns proper to Man in order to speculate about what belongs to Heaven, you will miss the essential nature [qing] of the myriad things.33 The qing of things is their actual manifestation, therefore qing is the actuality of a thing and refers to its existence. Similarly the Zhouyi 周易 (Book of Changes) says “The (intimations of) good and evil vary according to the place and nature [qing] (of the lines).”34 Here good and evil denote the various values in the results of action. According to the Zhouyi these values originate in the differences between concrete situations. Qing involves both actual things in the world, as well as social objects. This is clearly given in the Mengzi: “so a superior man is ashamed of a reputation beyond his merits [qing].”35 Here qing has to do with the concrete aspects of the social realm (including everything done by particular subjects), accordingly, a real sage needs to avoid situations that do not match up to their name. Or, more concretely, to the reputation or status they have built. As it relates to a specific subject, qing has to do with 31

Translator’s note: Here qing is used to describe both human emotion and the actual state of things. 32 Mozi, The Mozi, 47. 33 Xunzi, Xunzi, 21. 34 The Sacred Books of China, 405. 35 Legge, The Four Books, 186.

172

chapter 7

particularity. In sum, on the ontological level, qing primarily refers to the various principles of actuality, including existence, uniqueness, and difference. Compared with this description of qing, li 理 primarily denotes universal principles, rules or norms.36 Practical processes unite qing and li, meaning that a scenario complies both with universal rules and norms, and fits in to the principles of particular practical situations. The fusion of these aspects comprises one of the concrete manifestations of rationalization in practical processes. Habermas has discussed the issue of circumstances. However, in his understanding circumstances are related to the background of rules and norms. He writes: […]the validity claimed for propositions and norms transcend spaces and times, but in each actual case the claim is raised here and now, in a specific context, and accepted or rejected with real implications for social interaction.37 For Habermas, the important point of focus here is not universal principles, nor is it composed of the analysis of situations while operating within them, but rather the mode of demonstrating norms themselves against different backgrounds. This has already been mentioned above with respect to how language mediates communicative action. Similarly, norms and the structure of language have a special significance, and he emphasizes universality and certainty. He argues that for anything to be constituted or structured effectively in language “mutual understanding in language constitute[s] something that cannot be gotten around.”38 Here structure is seen as a guiding factor in terms of formal universality. This view is clearly different from the interaction between universal li and qing. One of the other foundational connotations of qing is human emotion.39 Feelings have substantial value significance. If universal principles and norms 36

37 38 39

Translator’s note: Like qing the word li will remain untranslated in this section. The term originally means texture or grains (for instance the grain of wood), but its philosophical sense has to do with “rationality,” “reason,” “pattern,” or “principle.” It has often been translated simply as “reason” but due the various connotations that will be expanded on below, it will not be translated here. Jurgen Habermas, Postmetaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays, Translated by William Mark Hohengarten (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), 139. Ibid., 139–140. In the evolution of the word qing, [which is part of the word for “feelings” or “emotion”] connotations denoting human experiences developed somewhat later then those related to actual affairs.

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

173

express certain value orientations on the formal level then emotions expose concrete knowledge of values. Mengzi notes: In regard to [inferior] creatures, the superior man loves them but is not humane to them (that is, showing them the feeling due human beings). In regard to people generally, he is humane to them but not affectionate. He is affectionate to his parents and humane to all people. He is humane to all people and feels love for all creatures.40 Here humaneness, affection, and love are directed at various objects and these objects differ for each form of emotion. Humaneness is a broad emotion associated with the human realm and is primarily apparent in the interactive processes between human beings. Affection is based on familial relations and feelings, and is expressed in relationships between parents and children. Love is an expansive cherishing or caring, and can be found in the way people treat numerous things. As intentions towards practical things and relations, these feelings are not purely rational plans or based in argument, rather they are internal concerns that penetrate the emotional level. At the same time the variety of emotions given above all have some link to the specificity and actuality of qing. In some respects the genuine nature and concreteness of emotions expresses substantial value content. Conforming to qing is also indicative of a certain value orientation, unlike being “reasonable,” which entails corresponding to a formal value principles. The two endow practical activities with appropriateness, which itself conforms to reasonable and rationalized values. The communication between subjects is based on emotions, not only linguistic activities that allow parties to reach an understanding of one another. In speech, one not only needs to be aware of li, but also needs to behave according to the appropriate emotions and qing. The listener can be persuaded by rationality, or logical power, but also by emotional changes. In a positive sense, qing is often linked to happiness or pleasure. This emotional characteristic also provides a basis for communication between people and can produce internal influences in the context of communication between subjects as well. Relying solely on rationality and the power of logic renders speech a cold and dry institution. It is only in the communication of sincerity and honesty that can speech can make people believe it or be convinced by it. Additionally, there should be sympathetic understanding and intention in both the speaker and listener’s attitudes. This includes trust that the other is sincerely after the truth, which also means looking at a given problem from the other’s viewpoint. 40 Chan, A Source Book In Chinese Philosophy, 80–81.

174

chapter 7

In fact, the communication and understanding between subjects often begins with qing. In terms of mutual understanding, qing is the most primordial and directly relevant aspect of inner consciousness in the process of communication. Once mutual understanding based on qing is established, the relationship between two individuals can develop into one of dutiful concern. Here duty refers to what rationally should be the case in our actions towards others. Starting with qing and ending with obligation also means that qing provides the basis for our sense of duty. This discussion is also relevant for the sentiment between people. In Chinese philosophy sentiments have to do with the co-utility of things or objects. The Zhouyi records, “heaven and earth exert their influences [sentiment], and there ensue the transformation and production of all things.”41 Here the pervasiveness of sentiment is apparent. Ultimately, the human ability to tap into sentiment is what allows them to understand things in the world. The Zhouyi continues, “[Human sentiment] it penetrates [comprehends] forthwith to all phenomena and events under the sky.”42 Here we find that humans are said to penetrate or comprehend the world and others through sentiment. The link with a broader notion of sentiment is established in the previous quote, where everything is connected to the sentiment of the heavens and earth. This notion of human’s penetrating or comprehending not only means grasping or understanding rationally, but also includes the emotional level, as evidenced by its connection to sentiment. Concretely speaking, achieving a level of comprehension through sentiment is also the process of achieving the self and things. Attainment and understanding of the world and others is not limited to rational argument or to the realm of linguistic communication. There is also substantial content, including knowledge and action, as well as the union of qing and li. This is not simply a rational process; getting at li through qing (which combines them) relies on people’s mutual sensitivity to emotions, which is seen in any reasonable communication processes. The next step in the mutually sympathetic understanding between subjects is empathy: placing oneself in another’s position. When Kongzi discusses how to be completely humane he argues: A man of humanity, wishing to establish his own character, also establishes the character of others, and wishing to be prominent himself, also

41 Legge, The Sacred Books of China, Part ii: The Yi King, 238. 42 Ibid., 370.

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

175

helps others to be prominent. To be able to judge others by what is near to ourselves may be called the method of realizing humanity.43 Here “judging others by what is near to ourselves” means placing oneself in another’s position. There are two necessary two preconditions for this process: first, the subject must have an ability to reason logically; secondly, have a feeling of concern for the other. With the union of these two aspects, there can be a concrete outward extension of one’s feelings. Mengzi advances on this theory as well, he writes: Treat with respect the elders in my family, and then extend that respect to include the elders in other families. Treat with tenderness the young in my own family, and then extend that tenderness to include the young in other families.44 This involves an empathetic rational deduction, as well as the emotional communication between subjects. Pure rational deduction is primarily a logical activity, and it therefore does not necessarily contain substantial content. But its rationality can be demonstrated by two means. Firstly, it can be based on the extension of feeling-based communication. Secondly, it can be seen in a rational form. For example, it can be deduction, and include value content (like humaneness or love). Rationalization in this way also demonstrates a substantial significance. In Confucianism moral practice is based on this form of deduction. Mengzi argues: Children carried in the arms all know to love their parents. As they grow, they all know to respect their elder brothers. To have filial affection for parents is humanity, and to respect elders is righteousness [obligation]. These feelings are universal in the world, that is all.45 Affection towards parents and respect towards elders are moral feelings that include ethical content and are also instinctual. Saying that they are universal in the world is the externalization of these primordial feelings (especially in terms of their ethical content). As a method of expressing values such as humanity or duty, these feelings concretely constrict practical activities.

43 Chan, A Source Book In Chinese Philosophy, 31. 44 Ibid., 61. 45 Ibid., 80.

176

chapter 7

Concretely speaking, qing and li do not only unite in rationalization processes, but they are also essentially united with one another as well. In some respects conforming to necessity and what is the case in terms of li implies both major connotations of qing, namely, in terms of the actual state of affairs as well as the qing of feelings or emotions. In fact, conformity to necessity and to what is the case is based upon a familiarity and comprehension of the actual state of affairs, which, in turn relates to the internal human emotions as they are constituted by a search for the truth and goodness. In other respects, feelings themselves, and not just the actual state of affairs are also guided by li. From the perspective of concrete practical processes, the interaction between qing and li includes numerous aspects. In the social realm, practical activities that conform to qing and rely upon li can become reasonable. Li is thus a term used to indicate the principles of value and principles that govern existence itself, as well as those related or given in a particular time and place. The reasonable and appropriate manifestation of action can then only be displayed when the laws of what should and what is the case, or the actual state of affairs, are both followed. This can be seen as the concrete revealing of humane governance. In society political practices often revolve around changes in benefit and harm, and if these activities are not contrary to natural patterns then they demonstrate compliance with qing and li. The union between qing and li, mentioned above, permeates practical activity, and the metaphysical precondition for this is the connection between the actual state of affairs and qing. Kant makes a distinction between rules and principles. He argues that rules are related to structures of knowledge, while principles are related to rationality. Although structures of knowledge form a unity with various emotions through concepts, there are still limitations imposed by these structures. Through concepts rationality is directed at different targets, which limit the union of knowledge in certain realms. If this argument is suspended in the concept of rules and principles invoked, then there is a link established between rules and rationality that gives principles a much broader connotation. And this includes both qing and li. In this way, only rational rules and not violating rationality demonstrate rational character. Abiding by broad principles shows the integration of penetrating and comprehending the qing of the world (i.e.  the way things are and the way they should be) and not violating its li, which is the real achievement of the appropriate way of acting. Principles, in contrast to rules, are related to li in that they have to do with the mind. This is not the same as particular rational regulations, nor is it an a priori law. Rather these li are linked to innate human consciousness and concepts. Substantially speaking, human assimilation to li is universal, and expressed as a form of common sense, which is not limited to what Kant calls

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

177

aesthetic consciousness, but is given as a value orientation.46 Mengzi argues, “What is it that we have in common in our minds? It is the sense of principle [li] and righteousness [or obligations].”47 The content of li and duty can be seen as universal value orientations expressed by common feelings. Human assimilation to li takes universal li as its object, and this process expresses the union of qing and li through the integration of communication and universal principles. This process itself, and the form of consciousness of the human who undergoes it, require a more detailed explanation. The reasonableness of practical processes encompasses communication between subjects as well as practical activity on a broader level. As a concrete existence, practical subjects encompass diverse rules. The relationship between rationality, emotions, and intention then comprises the full manifestation of their spirit.48 Traditional Confucianism differentiates between the mind of a human and his/her moral mind.49 The mind is formed by natural dispositions in that it provides internal rules, but the moral mind is an expression of the character of natural disposition. A person’s mind is displayed through feelings, emotions, intentions, and desires. Neo-Confucians, such as Zhu Xi argue for the need to align the human mind with the mind of the world, or its natural principles (li). Morals (included in natural principles) guide a person, and their own feelings and emotions may need to be disregarded in some respects. In other worlds, Neo-Confucians explicitly address the tension between rationality and emotions. Reasonableness and rationality are expressed in healthy spiritual manifestations. When rationality and emotions are at odds with one another the subject has difficulty demonstrating a healthy reasonable character. Thereby, a healthy character requires the combination of rationality (moral mind) and emotions (human mind), and this is manifest in the subject. In practical processes human nature has a dual significance. Firstly, it comprises the deployment of internal conditions and corresponding functional characteristics in practical activities. Secondly, it is the goal of practical processes. On the substantial level, practical processes are directed at achieving the self and things, where the latter is about the world, and the former refers 46

For Kant, common sense is primarily linked to aesthetic activities, and characterized by the involvement of feelings. The universal communicability of feelings is premised by common feelings, which Kant then differs from common understanding. He argues that the latter does not come from feelings, but is always a judgment made through concepts. (Kant, Critique of Judgment, 75–77). 47 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 56. 48 Translator’s note: “Spirit” here could also be understood as “personhood.” 49 Translator’s note: This “moral mind” is probably best understood as “moral aspects of the mind.”

178

chapter 7

to the subject. The reasonable development of practical activity requires procedures and methods that conform both to what should be the case and what is the case. This process has to do with conforming to li and qing, and is mainly concerned with investigating the rationalization of practical process in terms of the relationship between subjects, and their natural dispositions. Conformity to li and qing is associated with the relationship between the objective and the subjective, and their related practical activities. The love of people and things, mentioned above, is about cherishing and caring for objects. If we say that loving people is a practical principle about how to treat people, and that it is expressed through relations with others or a group, then loving things is expressed in the relationship between people and things (or nature). It is also a principle that discloses itself as guidance for how people should treat things and nature. Zhang Zai argues: Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I finds an intimate place in their midst. Therefore that which fills the universe I regard as my body and that which directs the universe I consider as my nature. All people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions.50 Zhang sees the entire world as one big family and is concerned with both how people treat each other and things (including objects and affairs). Although the description is similar to Mengzi’s, the feelings mentioned here are somewhat different. The later Confucian tradition has further developed the idea that the humane persons is unified with the heavens, earth and all things,51 which builds on concepts from both Mengzi and Zhang Zai. Contemporary notions of environmental ethics are of course relevant here. The idea that the humane person becomes unified with the heavens is also about cherishing the environment, protecting nature, and being conscious of ecology. So environmental ethics also deals with with situations (the qing of things) as well as feelings (the qing of humans). Reasonableness incorporated in processes of changing objects conforms to rational plans and calculations and concentrates on the concrete practical environment, as they are built upon an alignment with qing. The reasonableness and rationalization in practical processes engages formal dimensions, and substantial aspects. On this level rationalization is comprised of both li and qing. The rationalization of practical activities means 50 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 497. 51 Translator’s note: This is exactly what is mentioned above with regards to Neo-­ Confucianism and the moral mind.

Practical Activities, Communicative Action

179

conforming to li and qing, and “conforming” here is a mix of both universal lis (such as laws of existence or social norms) and concrete circumstances. This is shown as the unification of feelings of care with formal rational procedures and the communication of emotions. These implications of rationalization are identical to those of practical rational principles. If we say that practical rationality expresses the principle of rightness as li (norms that speak to what ought to be the case), and that the principle of goodness requires conformity to qing (this is the value orientation of human feelings), then the principle of effectiveness indicates conformity with li as well as a tendency toward combining with qing.52 Similarly the reasonableness and rationalization in practical processes expresses common characteristics on the substantial level, with practical wisdom, which will be discussed in the following chapter. Practical wisdom itself is then focused on the combination and union of qing and li at the conceptual level. Relatively speaking, rationalization in practical processes often unfolds as a unified way in external activities. The flip side of this, the violation of li and qing is how we determine what is irrational or unreasonable. To summarize, just as the understanding of the process of understanding itself must overcome a purely abstract interpretation, so must rationalization in practical processes. Conforming to qing and li makes up the concrete content of this process. Unfortunately these implications of rationalization often do not get discussed in contemporary philosophy. Habermas’s communicative action is an example of this oversight. His theory relies on the rationalization of communicative processes, but there is a tendency to link action and language and therefore rationalization is primarily lumped in with reasonableness, for example, with procedures that comply with norms. This perspective emerges as an extension of Kant’s project, and fundamentally ignores the union of complying with both li and qing. Comprehending rationalization in practical processes requires starting from a more general point a view as well as paying close attention to both li and qing.

52

For a closer look at the concrete implication of practical rational principles see chapter 6 of this book.

chapter 8

Practical Wisdom Practical rationality and the rationalization of practical processes can expose different aspects of the internal orientation of action. On a deeper level, the unfolding of practical processes also involves practical wisdom in the philosophical sense.1 According to its original meaning, wisdom (in the philosophical sense) itself requires concrete manifestation in human practice. Wisdom therefore provides different levels to the internal limitations of practical activity. As the expression of wisdom in practice, or its concrete manifestation, practical wisdom takes the form of the internal conceptualization as applied in outward practical processes. Practical wisdom condenses the value orientation of moral character, as well as the knowledge and experiences of the individual and the world, which combine to make up a person’s abilities Value orientations include rules about what should be the case. Rules about what should be the case and principles about what must be the case permeate practical wisdom, resulting in the latter’s manifestation as moral norms. In the process of self-actualization and the constitution of things in the world, achieving oneself and things,2 practical wisdom is linked to explanations and transformations of the external world. The rational investigation of what is and what should be, as well as ethical concerns regarding what we can do in the pursuit of the latter, are all unified. These various concerns endow wisdom with practical aspects and oppositely imbue practice with its connotations of and associations with wisdom.

1 As a philosophical category, “practical wisdom” can be traced back to phronesis in ancient Greek. Phronesis involves the connection between intelligence and soundness of judgment in a practical context. The discussion of “practical wisdom” given here is related to phronesis, and is not limited to the realm of philosophical theory. It will also examine ethical theory on a more substantial level. 2 Translator’s note: The phrase “achieving oneself and things,” literally cheng ji cheng wu 成己 成物, is the title of Yang’s first book in this series outlining his concrete metaphysical philosophy. It is borrowed from the Liji 礼记 (Book of Rites), where the terms cheng ji 成己 and cheng wu 成物 are described as humane or moral (ren 仁), and knowledge or wisdom (zhi 知) respectively. Yang’s own use refers to how cultivation of oneself can literally change the significance of things in the world.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���6 | doi 10.1163/9789004321786_009

Practical Wisdom

8.1

181

Explaining and Transforming the World: Towards a Fusion

In terms of its actual manifestations, practical wisdom is primarily expressed as a process of interaction between humans and the world. From this perspective, humans have various methods for understanding and explaining the world, and they also continually change the world to fit it to their needs. This includes, in a broad sense, the difference between knowledge and action. More substantially, practical wisdom concerns the relationship between explaining and transforming the world. Explaining the world is linked to the investigation of “what is the case,” which has to do with knowledge and experiences of the world. Transformations of the world are based on the question “what should be the case,” which permeates the orientation of different values and is related to the question “what should be done.” Pure theoretical rationality and even concrete knowledge and experience are often concerned with the question “what is the case,” while pure practical reason and ethics also concentrate on the primarily question “what should be the case.”3 In practical wisdom, then, all three questions are no longer separate from one another. It is worth noting that the communication between these questions is related to Hume’s skepticism regarding the deduction of “ought” from “is.” The relation between the two is, for Hume, primarily a logical one, and this is what he sees as problematic. However, in the realm of practical wisdom “what is the case,” “what should it become,” and “what should be done” are not limited to a logical relationship. From a logical perspective, “is” and “ought” do not imply any association with one another. There is no way to tease out the normative from the descriptive. In terms of ethics, however, there is a connection between the two in that whatever has real value is what should be actualized. When something is judged as having value this judgment itself already implies that it should be implemented in the world—that is, the relevant manifestation or value should be actualized. To put this another way, if some action is good or positive (in terms of value) then it should be done. Here, taking value connotation as a precondition, “what is the case,” “what should be the case,” and “what should be done” cannot be substantially separated from one another. Max Scheler has noticed this and discusses the “ideal ought” to make a similar point. He writes, “[I]f I immediately and fully know what is good, such feelingknowing immediately determines my willing without my having to go through

3 According to Kant practical reason is first and foremost concerned with the question, “What should I do?” and in a broader sense, including in the realm of ethics, “What to do” and “What to become” (or what type of person one is to become) are linked.

182

chapter 8

an ‘I-ought-to’.”4 Speaking broadly, the relationship between knowledge and action is based on practice and aims at achieving things and oneself. Relating the practical content of intention to values makes knowledge of descriptive reality continuously present choices for action concerning normative reality while also providing the basis for these choices. The communication and connection between what is the case, what should be the case and how this can be realized, in explaining and transforming the world is also subject to sublation (aufhaben). The theoretical precondition for transforming the world is its explanation, and the historical necessity of transformation also provides internal motivation for explaining the world. In essence, the practice of transforming the world indicates a theoretical explanation of the world. These changes, which are in turn informed by theoretical concepts, comprise the inherent character of practical wisdom. In this interaction, practical wisdom is also linked to explaining and transforming the world. From the viewpoint of human action and practical processes, the discussion of practical reason depends on practical wisdom. Moreover, this interdependency is not limited to an orientation from “explaining the world” to “transforming the world.” Practical wisdom and practical reason share similar characteristics and address related points.5 However, in terms of its deeper connotation, the internal features of practical wisdom take wisdom itself as the major factor in question. Philosophically speaking, wisdom is primarily related to knowledge. Looking at the relationship between humans and the world, knowledge focuses on classification and categorization in order to grasp particular objects in the realm of experience, whereas wisdom is directed at fuller understanding of the world as a whole. Wisdom’s internal spirit or dimension of consciousness includes differing aspects of knowledge, and may involve reason, while also relating to feelings, intention, intuition, imagination, and so on. The spiritual world of humans unfolds as the manifest integration of these various aspects. Wisdom thus not only includes a theoretical dimension, but also expresses itself in practice. The theoretical aspect of wisdom is not the same as knowledge, which grasps particular objects of experience. The former is more oriented toward metaphysical explanation. Whereas, the practical dimension of wisdom expresses itself as a process of transforming the world. On this basis, the metaphysical explanation can be identified as “metaphysical wisdom,” whereas the process that includes transforming the world can be termed “practical wisdom.” Each has their own respective emphases while 4 Max Scheler, Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Value (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 210–211. 5 For a more detailed analysis of practical reason see chapter 6 of this book.

Practical Wisdom

183

also being connected to the process of achieving the self or things.6 Connected to the grasping of the entire object is the concrete expression of wisdom in practical processes as a perspective on the world. Similarly, our well-balanced views of the world compose the conceptual background for the application of wisdom in concrete processes. This results in a blend between wisdom and the analysis of concrete circumstances, which is conducted through the use of du 度 (“degree,” “proper measure”). Founded upon the conglomeration of the internal spiritual world, a detailed discussion of du will follow below. This informs the directionality of practice that conforms to principles. Given the above delineation of the relationship between practical reason and practical wisdom, it is clear that the former can appear in the operation of practical processes in the world, which can be seen as a rational and concrete display of practical wisdom. Thereby wisdom is exemplified in well-rounded views of the world, and practical reason expresses itself as the thorough understanding of norms and principles related to practical processes. Wisdom is therefore quite attune to the diversity of the unfolding of actions. At the same time, the divergent aspects of the spiritual world witnessed in practical wisdom entail the formulation of judgments and deductions based on practical reason, and have rational activity as their content. The latter’s defining characteristic is not the manifestation of human abilities, but, rather more primarily, interpreting these abilities on the rational level. Here the focus is on the corresponding expression of rational principles and norms. As an example, Kant’s categorical imperative maintains a special place (in his philosophy). In sum, although the two emphasize different aspects, practical wisdom and practical reason display the comingling of explanation and transformation of the world, which is connected to abilities as well as principles and norms. Looking more broadly at the interaction between knowledge and action, explanation and transformation of the world have separable characteristics. In the latter, metaphysical wisdom and theoretical knowledge are guided in their investigation by the question of what is the case. This question is oriented towards the truth, and even though it is does not directly aim at changing the world, we still cannot say that it is only interested in deepening or expanding 6 Aristotle differentiates between philosophical wisdom and practical wisdom, and argues that the former concerns “things that are highest by nature.” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, The Basic Works of Aristotle, 1027.) In this context wisdom that is oriented towards theoretical aspects, or “metaphysical wisdom,” is related in certain ways to Aristotle’s philosophical wisdom. Of course, Aristotle also emphasizes that philosophical wisdom involves a blend of scientific knowledge and intuitive reason. Here we will be looking more closely at the connection between metaphysical and practical wisdom.

184

chapter 8

factual knowledge of the world. Understanding also implies altering the world (“achieving things”). In fact, the unification of metaphysical and practical wisdom affirms the precondition for the relative uniqueness of both metaphysical and theoretical wisdom (which is what allows them to be combined rather than being identical). This all amounts to the claim that the unification of explaining and transforming or achieving the world (i.e. “achieving things”) is expressed in practical wisdom, which is nevertheless not dismissive of the relative uniqueness of metaphysical wisdom and theoretical reason. Humans are not just related to the world through their knowledge and action, they are also faced with the problem of knowing themselves and transforming (and becoming) themselves. Chinese philosophy affirms the connection between knowing oneself and knowing others by placing special importance on actualizing oneself and the contribution of the self to the mutual actualization of others. This connects with the issue of knowing oneself and knowing others which takes the forms of both knowing oneself as an individual and knowing humanity (as a collective or as humans in general). Actualizing oneself and actualizing others is also a concrete expression of the question regarding what should (or what should I) become. One of the major themes of traditional Confucianism is the differentiation between humans and animals, which asks the question “how should one be(come) human?” Of course, the understanding of humans (attempting to comprehend what is the case about people) is a prerequisite to the investigation of how humans should exist and what type of person one should aim to become. This constitutes the unfolding of the character of practical wisdom on the level of human existence. In its orientation toward the actualization of the self and the world, practical wisdom also possesses metaphysical foundations. Discussing practical wisdom Aristotle writes: It follows that in the general sense also the man who is capable of deliberating has practical wisdom. Now no one deliberates about things that are invariable, nor about things that it is impossible for him to do.7 The content of deliberation here is what Chinese philosophy calls the “transforming of things,” which, according to Aristotle, is the key the function of practical wisdom. He writes, “practical wisdom on the other hand is concerned with things human and things about which it is possible to deliberate.”8 This implies that practical wisdom can be seen in the transformation of things and people 7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, The Basic Works of Aristotle, 1026. 8 Ibid., 1028.

Practical Wisdom

185

themselves. Moreover, the actualization of these changes is founded in the changeable nature of these things and of humans. Upon further investigation it is clear that the changeability of things and humans expresses a certain ontological rule, the value of which can only be actualized in practical processes. In terms of influence and function in practical activities, the ontological basis for practical wisdom and its value connotations exhibit a demonstrable connection. Basically, the question of what should be the case is related to both value orientations and the affirmation of oneself. Value orientations themselves are then concretely realized in specific value-laden aims, and they therefore guide the subject’s choice of action. With regards to the relationship between individuals and groups, individuals that affirm and concentrate on the value of the group usually do not choose anything that would harm the group. Selfidentification thereby includes two aspects: firstly, general acknowledgement, which includes recognizing that one is a “person” (not only as a isolated individual, but also a member of this category, i.e. human being) as well as recognizing oneself as an integral part of a specific society; secondly, identifying with specific relationships and roles in certain circumstances, such as being a teacher, student, father or son. The former expresses that one belongs to a society, while the latter signifies a role and relationship-based identity. Choosing certain actions or decisions on the basis of value orientations, and judgments directed towards practicality, thereby echoes individual norms. In this way selfidentification provides the basis for actualization as it decides action in various spheres of life. For traditional Chinese society, family relationships, values, ethical practice, the value principle affirmed by humaneness (which posits innate human value) and self-identification are all associated with being a member of a society and with one’s position in the community. This is concretely expressed through examples pertaining to a father’s love towards his son and the latter’s filial piety in relation to the former.9 These feelings take universal innate human value as their precondition. At the heart of humaneness in Confucianism is a confirmation that humans are intrinsically more valuable than things. These values are based on the different social roles and identities (e.g. father or son), which determine the orientation of our sense of goodness, and therefore also determine the method for taking what we deem to be appropriate actions. Here there is an intersection between the orientation toward universal values, specific circumstances, and the person as a human being, 9 Translator’s note: The word being translated as “love” is ci 慈, which is used specifically for describing the love a superior feels for an inferior. Similarly “filial piety” or xiao 孝, indicates the love an inferior feels for a superior. These terms themselves thereby affirm the argument here that values and morality are based on particular social roles and relationships.

186

chapter 8

as well as an individual constituted by specific social relationships, roles, and historical background. Practical wisdom is an expression of the concrete comprehension of these various factors. This understanding then also serves as a limitation on practical choices regarding what should be done. Aristotle expounds on the implications of practical wisdom in great detail. He writes, “Practical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods.”10 Here he argues that practical wisdom expresses an understanding of what is beneficial to oneself and to people in general. It also involves conforming to logic and involves actions that help others. Similarly Aristotle thinks that practical wisdom points to “the good life in general.”11 Conforming to logic, expresses rational characteristics, and acting for the good of others is a practical orientation linked to value pursuits. It aims at operating in the world according to the needs of others, and necessarily also implies transforming the world. It is not difficult to see then that the above interpretation of practical wisdom is concentrated on an internal connection between explaining the world and transforming it. In other words, it addresses the questions of what is really the case and of what should be done. As it is directed at transforming the world, practical wisdom involves teleological issues. After confirming and idea of what should be done, the secondary question that arises is why should the thing chosen be done, which itself is implicitly teleological. Therefore transforming the world is based on specific targets (ideals), which are simultaneously expressed as relations to value goals. Like value goals, the composition of practical wisdom is not the same as theoretical reason. On the most general level, practical wisdom points to value targets, and this is concretely expressed through the achievement of the self and of things. The achievement of self means becoming an individual or person (actualizing social values and cultivating oneself). The achievement of things refers to transforming original existences to conform to human needs, including changes in the social realm. However, in different contexts the target orientation of practical wisdom will be different. In the social realm, both actualizing the self (as an individual) and actualizing group identity (actualizing social ideals) become important goals for action. In the relationship between humans and things, transforming a mere thing into objects with a meaning for oneself is a primary motivation for action. The purposiveness of action has been understood differently throughout the history of philosophy. In the realm of ethical practice, deontology emphasizes 10 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, the Basic Works of Aristotle, 1026–1027. 11 Ibid., 1026.

Practical Wisdom

187

moral principles as the starting point for action, and does not consider their outcomes. In this way the end of an action is outside the scope of moral deliberation. Any discussion of ends is, for the deontologists, a deviation from the moral realm, strictly speaking. Although it is not the same as the deontologist attempt to move beyond discussion of ends, pre-Qin Chinese Daoism also tends to discount the importance of the ends of action. For example, the Zhuangzi 庄子 (Book of Master Zhuang) notes, “To act without taking an [unassertive] action means Nature.”12 Here action that is not unassertive is primarily contrasted with teleological requirements, which are characterized by their dependence upon being orientated toward a particular end. According to the Daoists, the best type of action is one where one is unconscious of one’s own movements, which means there is no goal or particular intention (i.e. action is non-assertive). This overcomes the debate about what is harmful or beneficial, and instead takes natural principles as primary in its treatment of teleological ideas. Other philosophical approaches express much more concern for ends than Daoism, utilitarianism being a prime example. According to the utilitarian model, ends or results are the single most important factor in moral calculation. However, in terms of the relationship between goals and actions, utilitarianism expresses a dual nature. On the one hand, pleasure or other benefits are taken to be the goal of actions, and in this way the goals of utilitarianism are consistent. Nevertheless, there are discrepancies in the theory about what constitutes or counts as pleasure in concrete situations. In some versions of the theory ends themselves can be accidental or external to a certain extent, i.e. they are not the self-conscious goal of one’s action, and realized only once the action has been completed. According to more extreme forms of utilitarianism, anything beneficial or pleasurable can be a potential target for action. Turning goals into something accidental and external, logically speaking, could be viewed as opportunism. In other words, any action, so long as it brings about a beneficial end, could potentially be tolerated. The view of ends from the perspective of practical wisdom’s is not the same as the utilitarian’s view, and also differs from either deontological or naturalist dismissal of the importance of ends. According to practical wisdom, ends play a role in the achievement of the self and of things. This is founded on the idea that humans have innate value. Accordingly, Aristotle, for example, thinks that people with practical wisdom are not limited in the way they understand values, and express skill through focus on “the good life in general.”13 Practical

12 Chan, A Source Book In Chinese Philosophy, 205. 13 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, The Basic Works of Aristotle, 1026.

188

chapter 8

wisdom thereby takes a different approach to ends that does not categorize them as accidental or external. The process value acknowledgement is a demonstration of the orientation of practical wisdom toward ends. In and of themselves, ends and ideals are internally connected with each other, and they can overlap in a number of ways. For example, ideals can gain concrete expression in different forms of ends, and likewise ends themselves can express or become ideals. In fact, in many situations goals and ideals intersect and coincide with one another, such as in cases of unity between an individual’s life goals and their ideals. The achievement of goals and ideals occurs in relation to particular value orientations, and is founded on concrete understanding and grasping of reality. People with dissimilar values often pursue different ideals and realize different goals. In differing practical contexts or particular actions, goals acquire distinct connotations. Affirming the intrinsic value of human beings can be seen as a basic underlying value, the concrete expression of which is treating people as ends rather than as means. It also implies that one acts for oneself (in completing and actualizing one’s self) and in so doing one transcends the tendency toward existing merely for others (e.g. looking solely for the approval of others). The concrete content and expression of goals and ideals in this sense, arises in the context of social realities, which vary throughout history. Theoretical teleology and practical processes have a substantial connection to one another, which is expressed in the relationship between goals and laws. Here, practical processes are oriented towards goals and based on the laws of existence (e.g. cause-and-effect). Purposiveness (or teleological thinking) then endows practical processes with assertiveness, or intentionality. Goals make practical processes aware of their orientation towards a particular target, which gives them directionality and allows the individual to actively work towards that goal. Compliance with laws (of existence) means that the subject avoids acting merely out of their own internal intentions. Simply emphasizing assertive or intentional actions could be understood as adhering to purposiveness while ignoring laws of existence. At the same time, emphasizing merely non-assertive action could develop into passive compliance with the laws of existence and would therefore be purposeless. Practical wisdom is its ability to fix our tendency to focus too much in either direction and also resolves the tension between assertive and non-assertive action. In effect it unites these opposing aspects in concrete situations. Logically, practical wisdom involves different operations and orientations, which are linked to values. In terms of their actual manifestations, values usually imply positive or negative judgment, or affirmation or condemnation. Similarly, differing value orientations include dissimilar implications. As a core

Practical Wisdom

189

aspect of practical wisdom, value orientation regulates the direction of action and therefore governs the essence of practical wisdom itself. Just as knowledge can be used for the realization of positive or negative value goals, practical wisdom also play a role in their achievement. Here practical wisdom clearly has a positive role to play in the practical realization of values. From the above, it is clear that practical wisdom is not the same as skillbased or operative knowledge. Skill-based and operative knowledge have specific formulas or main requirements that must be applied consistently in the context of specific actions. Even though understanding such requirements does not mean that something has been done well, complying with them is still the precondition for the effective application of skill-based and operative knowledge. In contrast, practical wisdom, cannot be regulated through universal formulas or predetermined requirements. Skill-based and operative forms of knowledge are often used to complete a specific plan. While practical wisdom deals with concrete problems encountered in specific situations, which can also involve planning, it is more focused on implementation and, crucially, on solving unforeseen issues. Skill-based and operative knowledge are usually built upon past experiences, which are of primary importance for their proper application. Practical wisdom is also related to past experiences, but remains vigilant in its concern for new situations and the perpetual uniqueness of present conditions. Its effective application is therefore directly based on the analysis of particular circumstances, which will be discussed in more detail below. For practical wisdom, universal principles only become meaningful when adapted to specific circumstances. As stated, skill-based and operative knowledge are both directed towards explicit outcomes, and they are required to conform to certain standards or norms. For example, manual labor needs to conform to whatever is being done, and the same goes for any other skill-based knowledge. In contrast, practical wisdom is involved with creative functioning in diverse circumstances. Additionally, skill-based and operative knowledge focus on the relationships between people and objects, whereas practical wisdom recognizes these as interactive components of a broader process. 8.2

Using Principles and Analyzing Circumstances

Practice and activity are oriented toward goals and therefore require the use of practical wisdom. From the perspective of the relationship between the mind and things, goals are concerned with the interaction between knowledge and action. Goals require the implementation of certain methods, and they determine our values and judgments when considering what should be done. Since

190

chapter 8

they are directed toward the achievement of goals, one of the most important elements of methods themselves is the manner in which or how they should be implemented. Logically speaking, the questions of what should be done and how should it be done are necessarily connected insofar as action implies implementation. However, the former voices a rational concern, while the latter is an expression of our rational consideration of concrete issues. Within practical reason itself, the rational value connoted in the question of what should be done displays connections with the more instrumental form of rationality and corresponding calls for reflection on the question of how a thing should be implemented. The connection between what should be done and how is made through the use of practical reasoning. This type of reasoning differs from the question of what is the case. In terms of the method of reasoning itself, the development from goals to methods not only exhibits procedural processes in a formalistic sense, but also includes the analysis of actual particular circumstances. In fact, one of the distinguishing characteristics of practical reasoning, in terms of the orientation of the reasoning itself, is that it does not take explanation of the world as an aim. However, we should note that the method of reasoning itself is not bound by formal logic since it also involves substantial conditions and contexts. The distinction between reasoning based on substantial conditions, or “material inference,” and formal reasoning can be made here. Formal reasoning is founded on a logical connection between conditions (propositions) and conclusions, whereas material inference is instead based on the rules or laws of existence and their related concepts. Robert B. Brandom has pointed this out in his work. According to Brandom material inference is a type of “content-based reasoning” that is connected to ontology. He argues that it does still involve concepts and content that connect preconditions with conclusions but is not necessarily logical in the stricter, and is even logically incorrect in some instances.14 The content of anti-logical concepts, and the rules related to them, are concerned to the link between preconditions and conclusions. In everyday life this is often the case, for example, in the common reasoning that “lightning will soon be followed by thunder.” This type of deduction falls under the category of material inference. It is founded on the conceptual relationship between the two in terms of formal logic, but even more so it involves the actual content of the meaning of “thunder” and “lightning.” Material inference recognizes that in the real world lightning and thunder are connected. In the social realm, we can also find instances where material inference includes value connotations. For example, people often say that bad deeds will catch up to one sooner or later. This deduction is not limited 14

Robert B. Brandom, Making It Explicit (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), 102.

Practical Wisdom

191

to formal logic; it also includes substantial content. The concrete connotations of the notion “bad deeds” and “catching up” are related in terms of their actual existence. “Bad deeds” are often understood as actions that depart from certain social or generally accepted norms. Since they are not condoned in society people generally reject them. The result is that one who commits these deeds is often scorned by others, and so “retribution” follows. When practical reasoning considers concrete topics its connection with material inference is obvious. Of course this does not mean that practical reasoning and formal logic are not also connected to one another. In fact, even though practical reasoning is not the same as purely formalistic inference; practical needs to simultaneously indicate the logical connection between related segments in a formal sense. The choice of method in implementation cannot be made without the use of practical wisdom. Aristotle refers to this in saying that “practical wisdom makes us take the right means.”15 Accordingly, material inference is employed to establish the connection between goals and methods, which expresses a core characteristic of practical wisdom. Material inference can also be understood to provide subjective preconditions for deciding on goals. Goals are often initially subjective. For instance, Hegel writes, “The end is at first merely something internal to me and subjective.”16 This subjectivity can, however, be overcome through the process of practical realization. As a concrete way or mode of actualizing goals, methods indicate the appropriate practical processes for this. In fact, the process of actualizing goals is also the process of sublating the subjectivity of goals. When practical activities involve acting on or transforming objects, these objects often express their original nature. In this way, using a particular method or certain means to develop practical activities achieves a dual meaning. Firstly, it sublates a thing’s original nature in order that the object can be transformed to fit subjective requirements. Secondly, it sublates the subjectivity of goals, causing their transformation into practical existence. This dual sublation is a process of material inference that proceeds from concepts to activities that is also the very function of practical wisdom. The dual sublation confirms the target of material inference as transforming the world while at the same time giving the “practical” aspect of practical wisdom its concrete expression. Additionally, methods themselves provide the preconditions for the sublation of the subjectivity of goals. However, these methods are also restricted by the nature of the goals in question. Goals with positive value connotations 15 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, The Basic Works of Aristotle, 1034. 16 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, Translated by S.W. Dyde (Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books, 2001), 35.

192

chapter 8

always require that the methods are restricted to a reasonable degree, and that they do not involve unscrupulous tactics. In some situations, abnormal ­methods—ones that may depart from accepted norms—may be required in order to achieve otherwise appropriate goals. Yet even in these situations the unconventionality of methods is also limited in some ways. If the goal is appropriate then there is more flexibility about the choice of abnormal methods in the processes of practice. However, the methods themselves should never violate basic value principles. In essence, the processes of practice generally require that appropriate goals be met with suitable means. Conversely, immoral methods can be a reflection of inappropriate goals. Here practical wisdom expresses both the sublation of the subjectivity of goals as well as the reasonableness of choices regarding methods brought about by appropriate goals. As mentioned, goals are built on certain value principles and reveal specific value orientations. In this way they are closely related to the engagement of value-based rationality as with the choosing of methods for their realization. However, the methods themselves are directly expressed in whether or not they successfully actualize goals. This is also related to the operation of instrumental rationality. The primary issue in value-based rationality is whether or not something is appropriate. We can also ask whether or not the judgment about goals is appropriate. Instrumental rationality is more directly oriented toward issues of efficacy—something we are very much concerned with when considering or choosing among various methods. In sum, when methods and goals are in communication with each other, we find that practical wisdom addresses the questions of what should be done and how should it be done in conjunction. Additionally, value-based rationality and instrumental rationality also begin to display their relationship. Value principles, as the basis for goals, often include universal content. However, the concrete utilization of methods relies on specific circumstances. Therefore, the interaction between goals and methods also involves the relationship between the universal and the particular. Practice directed toward concrete goals cannot be separated from universal concepts or norms, including general value principles and theories. These theories, concepts, norms, and rules provide different aspects of guidance in the processes of action. From the perspective of the practices that actualize goals, the subject’s social relations and the environment that they face are always different. All types of action, whether it is revolutionary action at the group level or more straightforward interactions between people, unfold against the background of concrete, complex and ever-changing circumstances. Norms and principles can never exhaustively account for the myriad of factors and changes in action itself and the circumstances in which it occurs. This being the case, how then should

Practical Wisdom

193

universal principles and norms be applied in particular concrete situations? This is where the relationship between utilizing principles and the analysis of circumstances occurs. In concrete processes of action the relationship between utilizing principles, the analysis of circumstances, and judgments are combined as the preconditions for choices and determining the appropriate mode of action. The communication between these transforms constantly, and often appeals to practical wisdom. Specifically, this appears in the accordance with actual circumstance while utilizing certain principles. For example, truth telling is a rule that requires consideration of the concrete situation. There are limits to the rule: for example, one should not always tell a terrorist the truth. However, the exception does not mean one can simply negate commonly accepted principles. Clearly, in some situations not telling the truth actually means being in accord with even more basic principles, such as (perhaps when dealing with a terrorist) in saving a life. This shows the need for appropriate limitation of certain otherwise universal principles based on concrete circumstances. It also exhibits that the identification of exceptions must be founded in concrete circumstances, and that the adaptable standard for certain actions must be incorporated in the exercise of universal principles, which guide human activities.17 The unfolding of this process itself demonstrates the concrete context for the use of practical wisdom. The relationship between universal principles and particular circumstances is reflected in the notion “there is one principle but many manifestations.” This concept was an especially important topic in Song-Ming period philosophy. 17

In his essay “On A Supposed Right To Lie From Altruistic Motives” Kant argues that, no matter the situation, lying is never allowable. He reasons that lies always harm someone, and if they do not harm some individual, then they harm humanity itself because it violates the source of the law itself. This argument relies on two points. Firstly, one of the primary reasons one should not lie is that lying hurts others or humanity, and secondly, lying harms others because it violates the source of the law itself. The first point expresses the principle of humanity, which is related to Kant’s argument that people are ends, but if a lie can save someone’s life it seems to go against the idea that people are ends to tell the truth. The very basis of the rule “Always tell the truth” is not harming people. The second point does not deal with the issue of whether or not rules should be constructed, but rather their implementation and priority. As a moral principle, not lying expresses a requirement for truthfulness in communication. When a terrorist poses a threat to others, protecting people, who are ends, is a universal moral principle, and this should have priority over abstaining from lying. Thus Kant’s unconditional rejection of lying is clearly in tension with treating people as ends. See Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy, Edited and Translated by Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), 346–350.

194

chapter 8

It was first used to describe moral relationships, but as it developed with SongMing Neo-Confucianism its meaning was no longer limited to the ethical realm. The idea that “there is one principle” implies universal principles, whereas “many manifestations”18 relates to the variety involved in particular situations. Theoretically speaking, the suggestion here is that general principles are absolutely necessary, but that grasping the fundamental principle alone without recognizing the particularity of multiple manifestations can result in empty abstract notions that are difficult to implement. The Neo-Confucian concentration on this complexity is a good example of how classical Chinese philosophy has a deep understanding and appreciation for the requirements of practical wisdom. In modern philosophy, Kant concentrates heavily on the normativity of action, which is most prominently expressed in the realm of moral practice. With regard to the most basic moral laws he proposes that people “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”19 He thereby also argues that, “the ground of all practical legislation lies objectively in the rule and in the form of universality.”20 Universal moral norms are given as formal causes that emphasize the normativity of action. Kant sees formal causes (what he calls “the form of universality”) as the motivating cause of action and argues that moral actions are determined by moral laws. This affirmation of the normativity of action is, without a doubt, brought about by necessary norms for practice. However, Kant does not give enough attention to the circumstantiality or specificity of practice. As an unconditional (or “categorical”) imperative, Kant’s moral law does not consider circumstantiality. This is unfortunate, since moral principles, while they should be abstractly coherent, in terms of their actual use are always implemented in particular concrete situations. Judgments and affirmations of what should be done and how it should be done therefore implicitly require consideration of particulars. When principles depart too much from concrete circumstances they become impossible to actualize. The relationship between principles and real-world circumstances means that practical wisdom dispenses with the problematic extremes mentioned above. Supposedly universal principles are often only universal in an abstract sense, and therefore are not implemented or implementable in concrete situations. Such principles are not only abstract, but can easily provide the basis 18

Translator’s note: Yang is using the term li yi fen shu 理一分殊 commonly used to describe Song–Ming-period scholars. 19 Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, 30. 20 Ibid., 38.

Practical Wisdom

195

for dogmatic perspectives with little or no regard for actualization. Therefore their implementation is difficult to realize. If problems in particular situations rely solely on experience for their resolution, then the result is often based only on a reflex reaction and therefore uninformed. When universal principles themselves are used in specific circumstances to guide people in solving issues they show themselves to be overly abstract and often transgresses the limits of what can take place in reality. Our responses to particular situations move from spontaneity to self-consciousness under the regulation of universal principles. Here practical wisdom exhibits a special ability to negotiate with the abstract dogmatization of universal principles. This allows it to acquire concrete applicability and realistic estimations. Where Aristotle describes the benefits of practical wisdom he claims that it is “concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience.”21 Overall, the benefit of practical wisdom does express an understanding of universal value principles. Therefore it can be said that practical wisdom is directed at negotiating the requirements for dealing with concrete particulars and that this also implies communication between universal principles and specific circumstances. In fact, experience itself also already involves negotiating the abstract nature of universal principles. Hegel writes of a universal principle that, “if it is to be realized, it must be given a particular content.”22 In this context he links universal value-based principles and duties. In much the same way the idea that realizing principles implies that they “must be given a particular content” entails concretizing our understanding of universal principles and duties. In the same vein, when speaking of practical knowledge, Hans-Georg Gadamer also concentrates on the connection between problems arising from the recognition of universal principles and their relationship to the analysis of concrete situations. Gadamer argues of practical knowledge that, “Primarily […] it is directed towards the concrete situation. Thus it must grasp the ‘circumstances’ in their infinite variety.”23 In their divergent ways Aristotle, Hegel, and Gadamer each recognize practical wisdom as characterized by the communication between universal principles and various situations. According to its purest manifestation, practical wisdom differs from the implementation of accidental intentions (such as in spontaneous, reflex, or uninformed actions) in that it includes the recognition and acceptance of universal principles and norms. This acknowledgment then forms a basis for the internalization of 21 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, The Basic Works of Aristotle, 1030. 22 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 114. 23 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 19.

196

chapter 8

knowledge and action, which constitutes the subject’s acquisition of practical wisdom. This process itself shows that practical wisdom has significance both as for a subject’s own understanding and judgment, as well as for providing the foundation for communication between universal principles and concrete circumstances. At the broader level, the relationship between universal principles and particular situations is not only apparent in general interactions. Just as knowledge and action often emphasize different areas, the relationship between the two can have different focuses as well. For example, when explaining the world is the goal of theoretical activity, the process of recognition is concentrated on moving from the particular to the universal. In fact, the formation of universal principles and norms always follows a negotiation between particular and general rules. Furthermore, in practical activities directed at transforming the world, universal principles and norms often have to deal with going from the universal to the more specific (which includes concrete application). The “specification” mentioned above means that when universal principles are used in particular situations they are always conditional. By its introduction to real situations, “specification” expresses the concretization of abstract theoretical universal principles. Here special attention needs to be paid in engagement with conditions. In the process of practice, the introduction of conditions is what allows for the process itself, as well as its method, to be concretely realized. For example, we might ask, is rain helpful or harmful for human activity? From an abstract perspective the question is ambiguous, but if certain conditions are introduced, such as a drought, then the answer becomes quite clear. Similarly, many questions can only be answered with reference to concrete conditions. The application of principles to concrete circumstances comprises the major internal requirement of practical wisdom. In this application, judgments conform to the regulations supplied by principles as they become concretized and practical. Based on what has been said, the regulative significance of these principles on action can be neither purely rational nor purely based on particular situations. These judgments can be seen as the mode of expression of practical wisdom in the interaction between universals and particulars. In sum, universal principles require specification in concrete practical processes, and specific experiences need to be universalized. Kant distinguishes between two ways that judgments are used. Given the preconditions set by universals (such as rules, principles or laws), judgments are expressed through generalization based on the reflection of particulars. When there are only particulars, judgments require something universal. The first type of manifestation is a judgment with a rule-based character, and the second involves more

Practical Wisdom

197

detailed reflection.24 The specification of universal principles is connected to Kant’s classification of judgments with a rule-based character, which is notable in that it takes the universal as governing the particular. The universalization from specific experiences is linked to what Kant identifies as reflective judgment. This type of judgment involves discovering exactly which particulars belong to which universal principles. The unification of universal principles and specific circumstances is a precondition for the completion of practical processes. In the interaction between the universal and the concrete, the abstractness of universal principles is rejected. And it is through engagement with this process that our experiences, under the guidance of universal principles, gradually gain self-awareness. Generally speaking, the process of practice incorporates theoretical and practical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge is concerned with “knowing that” or “knowing what” and its content is often not limited to specific circumstances in action. Practical knowledge is more directly involved with “knowing how” or with “what should be done.” The content of practical knowledge is of course closely related to the circumstances revolving around action. Although there is also a universal connotation here, practical wisdom often entails the analysis of specific situations, and this in combination with the application of related knowledge or understanding that can be brought to bear on the circumstances. Theoretical and practical knowledge are not, in themselves, a rejection of one another. In fact, when theoretical knowledge is used in a concrete situation, it takes on a realistic character and is endowed with practicality. This is what Feng Qi 冯契 calls “theory becoming a method,” and the implication is that through the unification of theory and concrete practical circumstances theoretical knowledge of “knowing that” or “knowing what” is converted into the practical knowledge of “knowing how” or “what should be done.” Broadly speaking, theory, as emerging from empirical reality, begins in the actual and also governs it. Theory is therefore not simply a cognitive notion of organizing thoughts and concepts. Because theoretical regulation provides the norms for action it can also be used to transform reality. The orientation of practical wisdom towards analyzing specific situations continually dissolves the presumed tension between theoretical and practical knowledge. In some ways the combination of theories that originate in actuality and their governing of reality is necessary for the actualization of practical wisdom. Further, it is through actualization in concrete circumstances that practical wisdom itself takes on a more concrete form. 24 Kant, Critique of Judgment, 15.

198

chapter 8

Investigating the relationships between universal theories and particular circumstances from the perspective of practical wisdom involves idealization. Whether it is the actualization of the self or of things in the world, practical activity always requires overcoming the specificity of circumstances in a movement toward the ideal, and in this way practical activity includes ideality. In fact, when universal theories are used to provide concrete plans for activity, ideality is embedded in practical content. Yet at the same time, the specific contexts for practices, and the unique problems such scenarios involve, are of course various. Therefore practical wisdom needs also to grasp the concrete and specific and cannot rely solely on idealization. Here some attention needs to be paid to the difference between idealism and idealization. The latter uses theoretical methods to grasp the world. Examples of idealization can be seen in the methods employed by the natural sciences. But these omit certain regulations and connections, and investigate objects only by looking at pure conditions (i.e. isolating variables). This idealization is also used in other areas, for instance, analytic philosophy often discusses thought experiments, and these are related to idealization (at least in their abstractness). The so-called “suspension of judgment” in phenomenology is also a form of idealization since it is an interruption of particular considerations and a disturbance of concrete existences. These examples all provide expressions of abstraction. But they get the actual background in various regulations and connections which means that the relevant object is treated abstractly. Theoretically speaking, idealization is necessary for investigating the world, and in the sciences we have a clear example of this method.25 From a more practical perspective, concrete manifestations of existence make up the starting point for actualization. What is required then is not an idealized avoidance of various factors, but on the contrary, concentration on regulations and connections in their actual contexts. It is therefore not difficult to see that idealism and idealization in practical processes are distinct from one another, and dissolving this potential tension cannot be done without the utilizing practical wisdom. While providing the basis to affirm idealism, practical wisdom is also critical of excessive idealization, and works from the idea to the actual. In other words, the formation of ideals relies on necessary conditions of actuality that also permeate human values. Once this connection has been established, it implies an acceptance of the universal laws of existence and value principles; similarly, the affirmation of idealism implies simultaneously confirming universal value principles. 25

Thought experiments in analytic philosophy and the suspension of judgment in phenomenology are examples of idealization that abstract and thereby give a one-sided view. They are limited in how they explain the world because of this idealization.

Practical Wisdom

199

The above description of idealization, including the suspension of the various regulations and connections that inhere in actual circumstances, means that any critical analysis of idealization must pay close attention to the concrete. To sum up, the distinction between idealization and idealism is built upon distinct orientations towards explaining and transforming the world. The abstract and the concrete, or the one (universal principle) and the many (various circumstances), rely on practical wisdom to dissolve their tensions. 8.3

Du 度 (“Proper Measure”) and the Middle Way

Practical wisdom, is oriented towards a union of explanation and transformation of the world and therefore, internally speaking, is about comprehending du (“proper measure” or “the appropriate degree or limit”).26 As a philosophical concept, the most fundamental meaning of du is a combination of quality and quantity. Hegel gives a systematic account in the concept of measure; “As the unity of quality and quantity, measure [du]27 is thus also completed being.”28 From this we can extrapolate that du also indicates a particular thing’s related conditions, and therefore the concrete combining of related factors. Additionally, this entails that a thing is always placed in the most fitting conditions. Going beyond a certain limit is what causes the thing to change, and this limit is identified by Hegel as the “Nodal line.”29 However, du also has practical significance. Judgments and choices in practical activities are based on the limitations (du) of existence. The next step in grasping du is therefore to understand how it can be used, in practical wisdom. The practical considerations of practical wisdom include utilitarian considerations and conformity to laws in action, as well as their goals and methods, along with the use of universal principles, practical and theoretical knowledge, and analysis of particular circumstances. These various aspects are given in action as unchanging standards, the position and negotiation of which cannot be had without a firm grasp of du (standards, limitations). In fact, du, as utilized in practical wisdom, is primarily expressed in the rational managing of the above 26

Translator’s note: Du can have various connotations depending on the context; including “degree,” “limitation,” “convention,” “rule,” or “size” and “measurement.” It is a major theme for this section, and given the complexity of the term it will remain untranslated, though relevant English equivalents will be given in parenthesis where fitting. 27 Translator’s note: Hegel’s “measure” is translated as du in Chinese. 28 Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, 170. 29 Ibid., 160.

200

chapter 8

issues. Various aspects of the situation need to be negotiated, separated from each other, opposed, and put into communication, which is why recognizing the importance of du is so important. The question then arises, what is the best way for various aspects of a situation to communicate? This requires figuring out concrete limits (du). Such limitations (du) are best understood through concrete analysis of particular practical conditions, circumstances, laws of existence, and universal principles. In Classical Chinese philosophy the Dao Yuan 道源 (Original Dao) mentions “[One should] grasp the Dao and observe the regulations [du].”30 The Dao can be understood as the combination of principles, and grasping it refers to our basing knowledge and action on it. Whereas, observing regulations (du) is primarily related to standards and norms. On the ontological level, du is connected to the actual manifestations of things as well as connecting to methods of understanding them. We can say that a thing is what it is only because of specific du (limitations, regulations, and conventions), and only when it stays within these limits is it that thing. Once the particular du has been surpassed the thing becomes something different. Also, when a thing’s internal order is stable this is due to du (regulations, measurement), but only within a particular configuration of du does it remain stable. In this way du encompasses the limitations and boundaries of a thing. When Xunzi talks about the function of ritual he writes about the important function du has to play: How did ritual principles arise? I say that men are born with desires which, if not satisfied, cannot but lead men to seek to satisfy them. If in seeking to satisfy their desires men observe no measure [du] and apportion things without limits, then it would be impossible for them not to contend over the means to satisfy their desires. Such contention leads to disorder. Disorder leads to poverty. The Ancient Kings abhorred such disorder; so they established the regulations contained within ritual and moral principles in order to apportion things, to nurture the desires of men, and to supply the means for their satisfaction. They so fashioned their regulations that desires should not want for the things which satisfy them and goods would not be exhausted by the desires. In this way the two of them, desires and goods, sustained each other over the course of time. This is the origin of ritual principles.31

30

The Yellow Emperor’s Four Canons, Translated by Leo S. Chang and Feng Yu (Changsha: Yuelu Publishing House, 2006), 163. 31 Xunzi, Xunzi, 55.

Practical Wisdom

201

Here measure and limitations (du) denote a thing’s specific limits or boundaries, as well as the scope of its transformation. In the social sphere the distribution of resources has its own du (regulation, measurement, rule, convention), without which things become chaotic. The function of ritual is thus to arrange for boundaries between social members, which allow them to collect resources according to their standing in society and thereby guarantee stability and order. It is clear that Xunzi, in his understanding of social structure, and its limitations and boundaries, concentrates on the significance of du. On the practical level the grasping of du involves a clear understanding of the limitations of things. Practical wisdom must avoid surpassing boundaries and creating disorder by maintaining the appropriate limitations of things whenever it transforms them. As an expression of practical wisdom, du is also related to “the middle way” (zhong 中).32 Classical Confucianism employed this concept very early on. For example Mengzi writes, “He [the superior man] there stands exactly in the middle of the path.”33 Likewise, Xunzi states, Hence, with regard to what is good when judged by the standard of the Way, follow what perfectly coincides with the Way; what departs from it by bits and fractions should not be done.34 Here “what perfectly coincides” is a reference to “the middle way.” Being in line with “the Way” is thereby integrally related to practicing the middle way. Xunzi does not only speak to the determination of appropriate amount or quantity, but also of adherence to the middle way. The “middle” in this context entails the middle point between two extremes. In Chinese philosophy the middle is a principle of managing and coordinating relations in practical processes. Looked at from the perspective of the attempt to harmonize various aspects of a situation or process, the “middle” is found in making compromises between divergent things that comprise a whole. Here the perspective emerges in which everything exists in one system as a harmony of differences. So if each diverging aspect is put in the appropriate place and each properly fulfills its function with respect to the whole, then the harmonizing of the “middle” has been achieved. The middle way is also relevant for the process of transformation, 32

Translator’s note: While for scholars familiar with Eastern philosophies “the middle way” congers associations with Buddhism, there is a long tradition in Chinese Confucianism— before it was influenced by Indian thought, which already uses a similar notion. 33 Legge, The Four Books, 325. 34 Xunzi, Xunzi, 21.

202

chapter 8

and is the principle behind effective development: having to do with stages in the transformation processes, and dealing with how they are coordinated. Whether it is in figuring out the appropriate place for things, or coordinating phases in a process, there is no one set rule or procedure for achieving the middle. In this sense, it requires going along with and grasping practical situations on the way. The function of this type of arranging and positioning has to do with the du of practical wisdom. The middle way, as itself a form of practical wisdom, unfolds in a multitude of ways. In terms of the spiritual life of the individual, emotions like happiness, anger, sadness and pleasure all require finding the middle and staying within proper limitations (du) in order for them to be beneficial. Overdoing it, or not having enough, are both examples of the spirit not being in harmony, and the opposite, being well organized, represents du. Here the middle way and conforming to du are both manifest as a representation. Their combination is expressed in the behavior of a person who has cultivated practical wisdom. The middle way also denotes alignment with the Way (Dao), and here the Dao refers both to the laws of existence (as the most fitting manifestation of the process of existence, the middle way is identical with the laws of existence) and to universal value principles. Relatedly, the union between the middle way and conformity with du is also entails the alignment with laws of existence and universal value principles. In Chinese philosophical thought the middle way is often understood through the terms jing 经 (“normal/regular,” “classical texts,” or “principle”) and quan 权 (“expedient,” “plan,” “scale/weigh”). Jing denotes the universality of principles, and their absoluteness, whereas quan speaks to their flexibility and versatility. The latter depends on the investigation of concrete circumstances. Through this type of analysis (of concrete situations) jing and quan can reach a fitting compromise with one another. This is one form of the “middle way.” Kongzi is recorded as having said, “A superior man in dealing with the world is not for anything or against anything. He follows righteousness as the standard.”35 Righteousness originally means the way things should be, but when it is connected with “not being for or against anything” it also implies propriety. Faced with complex arrangements of things and relationships, people should not be too stubborn about a particular way of doing things, or too quick in their rejection of alternative ways. They should act according to the situation, and choose a contextually appropriate method of action. This is what it means to not be “for or against anything.” Practical wisdom is therefore manifested in keeping to the middle-way between extreme alternatives. This 35 Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, 26.

Practical Wisdom

203

middle is found when one grasps du by holding to the position between being for or against things. In practical activity, comprehending du requires use of the power of rationality, as well as imagination, intuition, and insight. The action that makes use of these powers is not some logical or rational method of thought, but requires grasping events and things in the world through the unification of rationality, imagination, intuition, insight and other relevant abilities. Imagination is primarily characterized by having foundational knowledge in actual experience and also entails a movement beyond actual manifestations to discover a realm of broader possibilities. Directed at the realm of possibility, imagination thus provides the space for grasping the world in a creative way. Through a dialectical process of thought the simple act of investigating the segments of experience forces people to move beyond certain prescribed limitations based on prior experience. Thereby new understandings and realizations about the world and people themselves are achieved through a means that is neither deductive nor inferential. Both imagination and intuition are related to insight, which looks more closely at things themselves and their determinate aspects and regulations. At the same time it endows understanding with it’s holistic and collective traits. In judgments, human abilities are expressed in a more synthesized manner. Judgments are built upon various human abilities and reconcile various aspects of knowledge. This displays the synthetic nature of practical wisdom (in the case of judgment) in a general way. Specifically, judgments rely on the combination and interaction of rationality, perception, imagination, intuition, insight, and so forth as their precondition. Judgments themselves involve the union of sense perception, analysis, comparison, deduction, and decision-making. As a synthesized ability, judgment rely on the concreteness of humans themselves, including the person’s body, heart and mind, individual regulations, and social dimensions, as an ontological precondition. In terms of the methods for utilizing their function, the use of judgments involves the joining and coupling of the various abilities that constitute them. They take the manifestations of concepts in external objects as their content. In other words, the communication between universal principles and specific circumstances mentioned above involves the synthesis of various abilities. Even though grasping du in practical processes can be demonstrated in seemingly immediate or unexpected ways, substantially speaking, it still requires a synthesized use of various abilities. As a concrete functional method of practical wisdom, understanding du contains value orientations and value-oriented goals, and is built on knowledge, interpretation and judgment of the world. Knowledge, interpretation

204

chapter 8

and judgment come together in practical wisdom as expressions of human abilities. The actualization of the self and of things in the employment of practical wisdom reveals the internal significance of this ability. 8.4

“True Understanding is Application”36

The understanding of du, as a concrete demonstration of practical wisdom, cannot be separated from the knowledge and actions of the subject. The compromise between jing and quan requires actualization through the subject’s own knowledge and practice. The Zhouyi mentions a special aspect of human activity saying, The transformations and shaping that take place are obtained from the changes (of the lines); the carrying this out and operating with it is obtained from the general method (that has been established). The seeing their spirit-like intimations and understanding them depended on their being the proper men.37 First two lines of this quote have to do with practice. The main implication of “spirit-like intimations and understanding” is a thorough grasp of the abovementioned process (e.g. relationship between jing and quan). The idea that “this depends on their being the proper men” emphasizes that the subject completes these processes through application of knowledge. The inseparability of practical wisdom and the character of the subject means that the investigation of practical wisdom cannot ignore the subject itself.38 Aristotle also speaks to the unique characteristics of practical wisdom; for example, he writes:

36

Translator’s note: This section title has been modified from the original. The title in Chinese is the line “shen er ming zhi, cun hu qi ren 神而明之,存乎其人,” which comes from the Zhouyi. It appears in the last line of the extended quote in the first paragraph of this section. 37 Legge, The Sacred Books of China, Part ii: The Yi King, 378. 38 John McDowell argues “Occasion by occasion, one knows what to do, if one does, not by applying universal principles but by being a certain kind of person: one who sees situations in a certain distinctive way.” (John McDowell, Mind, Value, and Reality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 73) This perspective concentrates on the guiding factors in action, which includes a concrete grasp of particular conditions of action.

Practical Wisdom

205

But yet it is not only a reasoned state; this is shown by the fact that a state of that sort may be forgotten but practical wisdom cannot.39 The rational manifestation of practical wisdom is primarily about the connection between “knowing that,” and concrete knowledge. Once this link has been formed it is often suspended in the development of knowledge. At the same time practical wisdom is related to the ability to “know how,” which not only forms the knowledge basis for action, but also actually exists in various states of affairs in the world, and is therefore learned in the processes of knowing and acting. As the actual power of the combined processes of knowing and action, practical wisdom becomes concretized in regulations for human existence. Furthermore, practical wisdom cannot be neglected precisely because it exists with, and as a part of human subjectivity. Practical wisdom’s actualization and metaphysical regulations that guide it are coincidental. Their correlation thus constitutes the precondition for the function of practical wisdom, and they are combined in human existence, so that practical wisdom concretely regulates and influences practical processes. Elements of the practical subject must also be synthesized in practical wisdom. Even as a purely rational manifestation practical wisdom already has a variety of conditioning content, the most important of which is moral character. Aristotle points this out in commenting that, “practical wisdom is a virtue.”40 Here “virtue” or moral character has an ontological significance and includes value connotations. Ontologically, moral character can be interpreted as an innate human regulation, and it is valued. In terms of its latter significance, it is inseparably interconnected with human ability. As opposed to value orientations, abilities are more direct expressions of the actualization of the self and of the world. Rationality, perception, imagination, and judgments, mentioned above, are different manifestations of ability. When moral character and ability are in union with one another, and this is displayed in action, there is a concrete display of practical wisdom. This also creates the possibility of communication between value-based rationality and instrumental rationality. If we say that practical rationality regulates moral character by causing it to maintain a constant concern for values, then ability in this context is intimately bound to transforming things and actualizing the self. Moreover, moral character, as it relates to value concerns, has to do with “what should be done,” and is demonstrated in the activity that that transforms the world and the self.

39 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, The Basic Works of Aristotle, 1027. 40 Ibid.

206

chapter 8

There is, however, a logical disparity between the choice of action and that action’s taking place. Deciding on an action based on specific value principles and orientations does not mean that it can or will be carried out. The ability to implement a chosen action does not just speak to the individual’s choice or intention. When moral character and ability match up in the subject there will be no separation between the choice and enacting it. In other words, the connection between what should be done and how it should it be done is based on the combination of moral character and ability. In choosing and implementing an action the relationship between knowledge and practice is important. As the orientation toward practice, practical wisdom primarily displays itself in guiding knowledge to go beyond itself and to become practice. In this process the individual is the subject of both knowledge and practice, and the relationship between the two is only had through the individual. Humans are not often conscious of their dual nature (as the subjects of both knowledge and action). Of course, when a person has practical wisdom then then knowledge and action, as well as theory and practice, are linked. The substantial content of practical wisdom here is the union of moral character with ability, or theoretical and practical reason.41 In this way practical wisdom permeates our interpretations of the world and our practical intentions. Under the guidance of practical wisdom, the connection between knowledge and action is established on the unity in the ontological subject of both knowledge and practice. As the concrete manifestation of practical wisdom, the integration of moral character with ability, and of theoretical reason with practical reason, are expressed in the actions of individuals. The Zhuangzi famously addresses the ­importance of action in integrating theoretical and practical knowledge: In making a wheel, if you work too slowly, you can’t make it firm; if you work too fast, the spokes won’t fit in. You must go neither too slowly nor too fast. There must be co-ordination of mind and hand. Words cannot explain what it is, but there is some mysterious art herein.42 Here the “coordination of the mind and hand” expresses the collaboration and synchronization between theoretical and practical knowledge, which is 41

The theoretical and practical reason mentioned here are related to Kant’s, but are broader. For instance, the former is not limited to universal necessities, but includes a more holistic understanding of the entire world. 42 Zhuangzi, Chuang Tzu: Mystic, Moralist, and Social Reformer, Translated by Herbert A. Giles (London: Bernard Quaritch, 1889), 171.

Practical Wisdom

207

not just founded upon theoretical plans. Simply following pre-set notions and procedures can lead to inflexibility and rigidity in one’s thoughts. The idea that one must “go neither too slowly nor too fast,” and that “there must be coordination of mind and hand” are used to show that external “skills” or “techniques” as well as universal norms and procedures have already been internalized by the individual. These then become guidelines for action and their manifestations in human action are expressions of practical wisdom. Similarly, shu43 is not only the orientation of action on an ontological level, but is also codified in practical wisdom. The Zhuangzi also famously records stories where people have achieved such a high skills that they move effortlessly through tumultuous waters, or carve an ox seeming to use almost no effort. In these analogies the author says that the spiritual state these people reach is attained to the extent that they “conform to heavenly patterns” (yi hu tian li 依乎天理) and “go with what is already there” (yin qi gu ran 因其固然). The type of shu noted in reference to the wheel-maker in the passage above expresses the union between what the object already has, or how it exists (it’s li 理) and modes of action of the subject. Practical activities encompass different stages, and experience different segments. The stages of practice have an interactive relationship. Differing but interactive stages include stabile objects and backgrounds, but also the subject themselves as an ontological basis. The continuity-in-diversity of action relies on the continuity of the subject. Additionally, this continuity is dependent upon the realistic methods that establish and confirm the subject’s own identity and continuity. The interconnection and succession between phases of practice are therefore a sign of the subject’s singular character (or self-established identity). In turn, the subject’s own identity and continuity are formed in a dialectical process that involves abstractness, and forms the concrete manifestations that provide the ontological foundation for the individual, and influence and limit the possibilities of individual action. Practice is not just the activity of an individual; it encompasses relations between people as well. In the social realm, practical processes require conceptual understanding and communication between individuals. First the target of social practice needs to be confirmed. Participants in practical activities need to come up with some target, and reach a shared opinion about it; otherwise it is difficult for them to share coherently in a given action. After a practical target has been affirmed, the next question of how to achieve it arises. The latter has to do with planning, and subjects must agree on this 43

Translator’s note: Shu can mean “a few,” “method,” “reason,” and “number.” For a more thorough discussion on shu refer to chapter 5.

208

chapter 8

as well. Before practical targets are actualized and plans implemented, both exist as ideas, and their link to the subject’s awareness of them exists at the conceptual level. The communication that takes place on this level requires that advocates lead and convince others, and that participants understand and accept certain ideas. This necessitates that the parties involved are able to clearly exchange ideas, and come up with an understanding or agreement, that is not always necessarily explicit, but exists at least tacitly. The process of social action is not just about logical debate or analysis, in many ways it is also about practical wisdom. Whether it is in the convincing of others of practical targets, or in the understanding of plans for action and their acceptance, all stages of this process take the connection between explaining and transforming the world as their precondition. The coherent exchange of ideas and the agreements made between the parties involved are then also built upon this prior link. Compromises and cooperation in action are linked to understanding and communication on the conceptual level. As processes that encompass multiple stages and elements, many forms of practical activity rely on the collaboration between individuals. Of course, there are various forms of such collaboration between subjects, but they all share in exhibiting some degree of compromise and cooperation. In actions where multiple subjects participate, compromise is often founded upon common understanding and implicit agreement. The former is largely established on the linguistic level through dialogue and discussion, whereas the latter, which takes the former as a precondition, is often not expressed in language at all. As opposed to the obviousness of common (shared) understanding, implicit agreements are given in the process of action itself. In fact, implicit agreements on the conceptual level, and in action, are necessarily related. Common understanding does not necessarily get directly realized in action, it can exist prior to or separate from action. Whereas, implicit agreements are generated in the process of action, and are thereby more closely aligned with specific instances of action and the particulars of the environment. Common understanding entails the social sharing of ideas. Implicit agreements also rely on the mutual understanding between subjects, and takes social interaction as their pre-condition. Relatedly, implicit agreements are inseparable from certain social relationships within a community, and the elementary foundation for these connections cannot be strictly described in rational terms. Being a form of conceptual communication between subjects, common understanding implies that such understanding is always self-consciousness. Conversely, implicit agreements are often natural compromises, which can, but do not always, include self-consciousness or awareness of these agreements. Implicit

Practical Wisdom

209

agreements are then sometimes established on common understandings, which is how they are stabilized and can be made to endure. Only when common understanding is converted into the more pragmatic form of implicit agreement can it make action reach the more perfect result. There are a number of communicative aspects involved here, including collaboration through language, and cooperation that is reached without expressive language, also social connections, rational consciousness, and natural cooperation between parties. The proper utilization and management of these cannot be had without practical social wisdom. In fact, the compromise and cooperation involved in social action, is not only expressed as in practical procedures, it also require the concrete utilization of subjective practical wisdom. In the unfolding of practical processes, the conditions of action, and their respective backgrounds are various and unstable. So how can one decide on fitting steps, or appropriate methods and on adequate ways of compromising with others? To answer this requires concrete analysis, measurement, and judgment, all of which are involved practical wisdom. Communication between facts of the matter and normative assessments as well as between decisions on a course of action and how it should be undertaken make up the substantial content of practical wisdom. This communication in turn also provides an internal basis for choosing and judging actions based on concrete circumstances. However, some procedural activities need to be utilized by practical wisdom. Practical wisdom then can be concretely demonstrated through various aspects of the subject’s knowledge and action, in areas from understanding and mutual agreement on the conceptual level, to practical compromise and cooperation. In practical activity the transformation of objects and actualization of the self often comprise two aspects of a single process. The collaborative character of much practical activity also means that it this is intersubjective from the beginning. But such activity is also based on goals and methods. Individuals relate to themselves and to each other as ends (or goals). This is the most basic orientation that differentiates humans from animals. The interaction between subjects is therefore an interaction between ends. Confucianism discusses this with notions like “achieving the self and others,” or “grounding the self and others.” Here, the process of achieving an individual self is not based on the individual alone. The achievement of the self involves various preconditions, including actions of, and relationship with, others. From the perspective of actualizing the self as a goal, which is treated as an end in-itself, other subjects represent a method for that actualization. In this way the relationship between subjects is one of interactive means. Hegel writes about the interaction between the self and others in the following way:

210

chapter 8

I acquire from others the means of satisfaction, and must accordingly fall in with their opinions. At the same time I am compelled to produce the means for the satisfaction of the wants of others. One plays into the other; and the two are interdependent. Everything particular becomes in this way social.44 According to this understanding the means-based interaction between oneself and others is expressed socially. To a certain extent, we see other people as ends in their own right, while we also see them as providing the conditions for our self-actualization (and therefore as means to our own ends). Thus the relationship between subjects has a dual nature: it is an interaction of both ends and means. However, in the interaction between subjects that treat one another as means, other subjects are nevertheless not valued on the same level as objects. When subjects interact as means, they are both at work in the actualization each other, whereas with objects the orientation is only ever one-sided. The mutual actualization of subjects in their interaction with one another as means is not limited to strictly teleological forms (or the negative associations with such forms.) From the perspective of practical wisdom, the above-­ mentioned means-based relationship is founded on a blend of value-based rationality, instrumental rationality, as well as theoretical and practical reasoning. When this blend is given practical content, we find that ends are achieved as part of means. Here, it is not difficult to see that means do not express only the negative character of use-value. In fact, means take ends as their orientation, and therefore comprise an inherent and implicitly crucial role in the achievement of ends. These two (ends and means) therefore penetrate one another in the actualization of the self and of things. In terms of practical wisdom, the distinction between ends and means makes the concrete content and practical significance of practical wisdom apparent. Practical wisdom is oriented toward the actualization of the self and things, which means that it is used in the same way as metaphysical knowledge or wisdom, although the two are operate on distinct registers. In connection with this, practical wisdom blends theoretical and practical reason, and expresses the unification of describing and changing the world. In terms of regulating practical processes, practical wisdom is integrally related to value questions, such as what should be the case and how it should be brought about, that are based on rational judgments. Practical wisdom is also involved with knowing what a thing is and knowing how things can be done. Based on the concept of du, practical wisdom focuses on measurement and demarcation, which allows 44 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 161.

Practical Wisdom

211

it to build a bridge between the guidance of universal theories and analysis of concrete circumstances. This is what makes practical wisdom a unique methodology. Related to the unification of virtues (moral character) with ability, practical wisdom takes the existence of the practical subject as the precondition for its own ontological status. Thus it co-exists with human subjectivity. We can therefore see that in practical wisdom our value orientations, knowledge, experience, and tendencies are all united to form a dynamic and effective conceptual pattern. This means that the principles that govern existence are condensed and reiterated in the practical activity of the knowing subject. While giving human wisdom its pragmatic character, practical wisdom also provides an inherent guarantee that practical processes can unfold according to reason.

Index A priori 27, 127–128, 142, 176 Abstract 10–11, 30, 41, 73, 78–79, 96, 99, 106, 109–10, 113, 117, 119, 125, 129–30, 132–33, 135, 137–39, 142, 149, 153, 155–158, 179, 194–199, 207 Action theory 1, 39, 50, 52 Actuality 37, 42, 63, 67, 75, 80, 85, 89, 99, 105, 119, 124, 136–137, 152, 155, 157, 170–173, 198 Aesthetic(s) 70, 72, 74, 122 Affairs (shi 事) 36, 41, 52–53, 63, 86–87, 93–97, 99–100, 102–104, 106–109, 111, 113, 119, 120, 129, 136, 138, 141, 153, 155, 170, 172, 176, 178, 205 Analytic philosophy 1, 10, 12, 53, 100, 198 Appropriate 9, 12, 15, 51, 62, 69, 85, 123, 129, 136, 165–166, 168, 191–192, 201–202, 209 action 15, 22, 34, 176, 185, 193, 202 emotions 173 goal(s) 16, 37, 167–168, 192 knowledge 62 limitation 193, 199, 201 motivation 43 reasons 34 time 89, 98, 115, 152 Aristotle 3, 23, 61–62, 78, 121–122, 183–184, 186–187, 191, 195 Attitude 40–41, 45, 50–51, 74–75, 139, 142, 155–156, 173 Autonomy 53, 58–59, 70, 92, 124, 137, 144 Bentham, Jeremy 130–133 Body 7–8, 56, 59–62, 65, 76–80, 117, 133–134, 155, 162, 178, 203 Bourdieu, Peirre 28–29 Brentano, Franz 17–18 Buddhism, see “Chan Buddhism” Cause, of action 12, 33, 35, 41, 49–55, 194 and effect 33, 50, 52–53, 95, 131, 188 and reasons 33, 40, 49–52, 54, 62, 65 efficient, material, formal, final 27 Chan Buddhism 4–5 Chen Di 陈第 86 Chen Liang 陈亮 92, 97

Common sense 27, 71–72, 176–177 Communication 2, 16, 31, 70, 78, 100, 140, 147, 150, 152–163, 165–166, 169, 173–175, 177, 179, 181–182, 192–193, 195–196, 200, 203, 205, 207–209 Community 17, 128, 160, 162, 169, 185 norms or values of 2, 165 scientific 2, 23 Confucianism 4, 54, 74, 175, 177, 184–185, 194, 201, 209 Confucius, see Kongzi Consciousness 23, 25, 27–28, 30, 32–34, 48, 51, 55–57, 162–163, 165–166, 174, 176–177, 195, 208 and intention, intentionality 8, 17–19, 21–22, 27–28 and language 162 moral 72, 169 and norms or normative 24–27, 45 and spontaneity 23 rational 13, 36–37, 47–48, 55–57, 72, 60 realm of 7 Consequentialism 132, 141–142 Contractualism 141–142 Contradiction 59 Contingency 68–69, 80, 95, 98–100, 102, 110, 114–115, 117–121, 128, 139 Continuity 30–31, 207 Correctness 127, 129, 168 Csikszentmihalyi, Mark 108 Dao 道 (the way) 74, 91, 94–95, 103, 107–109, 111, 113, 200, 202 Dao Yuan 道源 (Original Dao) 200 Daodejing 道德经 (The Classic of the Way and Virtue) 91 Daoism or Daoist 91, 187 Davidson, Donald 49–50, 55 Daxue 大学 (Great Learning) 78 Dependence 159, 187 Desire 9–22, 25–28, 30, 33, 39, 41–48, 51–53, 55–60, 63–67, 69–75, 77, 80, 121–122, 124, 128, 135–137, 143–145, 160–161, 165, 167, 177, 200

214 Development 2, 7, 16–17, 19, 22, 24, 32, 42, 53, 64, 80, 86–88, 91, 95–100, 103–109, 111, 113, 115, 119–120, 123, 128–129, 132, 137–138, 141, 152, 166, 178, 190, 202, 205 Diversity 133, 183, 207 Du 度 (“degree,” “proper measure”) 183, 199–204, 210 Effectiveness 27, 121, 141, 153, 167–168 of action 15, 27, 121, 126, 138, 140 of method 16 potential 15 the principle of 123–124, 127, 136–146, 179 Emotion 56, 65, 70, 161, 171–173 Environment 80, 92, 112, 192, 208 intellectual 52 natural 146, 152, 178 specific social (social-historical) 11, 65, 133, 135, 178 Environmental ethics 178 Equipment 90, 149 Essence 4–5, 18, 21, 27, 30, 105, 159, 182, 189 Existential 129 Experience 51, 53, 99, 101, 117, 125, 127–128, 131–132, 142, 160–161, 166, 170, 181–182, 195, 203, 207, 211 External 53, 67, 69, 79, 86, 102–103, 106, 115, 118, 133, 159, 187–188, 203, 207 appearance, movement, expression 4–5, 8, 45, 47, 179 contingency 68 demands 41 existence, objects 7, 16 forces, facts, factors, power 7, 33–35, 37–38, 41, 43, 48, 50, 64–65, 68–69, 75, 81, 83, 85–86, 89–90, 94, 101, 118 principles, norms 38–39, 43, 45–47, 54, 162, 165 reality, existence, world 8, 19, 67–69, 100, 122, 128, 141, 146, 161, 180 reason, reasons 46–48 restraints 73 Fang Yizhi 方以智 104 Feng Qi 冯契 197 Filial piety, affection 38, 84–85 Frankena, William 47 Frankfurt, Harry 12–13

Index Freedom 6, 13, 40, 70, 124–125, 129, 132, 135, 138, 144, 167 Frege, Gottlob 162 Gadamer, Hans-Georg 3, 195 Good 36–37, 57–58, 61, 63, 67, 71–72, 79, 84, 102–103, 108, 112, 118, 121, 123, 125, 128, 132–134, 138, 139, 142, 145, 156, 164, 167–168, 171, 181, 186–187, 194, 201 Goodness 2, 37, 71–72, 121, 123–124, 126, 128, 132, 134, 136, 138, 142–144 the principle of 123–124, 127–133, 135, 137–146, 176, 179, 185 Guanzi 管子 (Book of Guan Zhong) 81–82 Habermas, Jugen 7, 147–148, 151, 153–160, 162–163, 165–166, 168–170, 172, 179 Hanfeizi 韩非子 93 Happiness 12, 57, 73–74, 130–133, 173, 202 Hare, R.M. 68–69 Harmony 103, 153, 201–202 Hegel, G. W. F. 68, 80, 91, 115, 191, 195, 199, 209–210 Heidegger, Martin 151, 166 Huainanzi 淮南子 (The Huainanzi) 84, 87, 89–90 Human nature 5, 31–32, 177 Hume, David 27, 52, 56–57, 59–60, 62, 72, 144–145, 181 Ideas 52–53, 73, 79–80, 95, 137, 145, 148, 151, 154–155, 157–158, 160–161, 187, 208 and actions 13, 52 and concepts 7 value 21, 53 Ideal, ideals 22, 31, 75, 111, 151, 181, 198 action 22, 24 of goodness 2 person or self 59, 161 Identity 38, 41, 58, 78, 152–153, 185–186, 207 Imagination 100, 182, 203 Insight 203 Integration 41, 42, 70, 78, 111, 142–143, 176–177, 182, 206 between facts and norms 41 of body and mind 78 of concepts and consciousness 25 of desires and knowledge or reason 21, 42–43, 124 of the individual and society 128

Index Intention 4, 7–8, 10–11, 14–15, 17–22, 26–28, 30, 41, 44, 64, 66, 67, 72, 75, 79, 109, 118, 136, 155, 173, 177, 182, 187, 206 Intentionality 14, 17–21, 26–28, 44, 188 Intersubjectivity 159, 161–162, 165–166 Internalization 45, 195 Irrational 34, 36, 39, 42, 47–49, 55–59, 65, 70, 73–74, 167, 179 Jin Yuelin 金岳霖 95, 111–112 Judgment 17, 36–38, 44, 55–56, 58, 60, 63–64, 72–74, 89, 100, 127, 142, 167, 169, 177, 180–181, 188, 192, 196–198, 203–204, 209 Jullien, Francois 92, 99 Justice 116–117, 133, 170 Kant, Immanuel 27, 52, 58, 70–74, 100, 121–122, 124–131, 135–137, 141–145, 170, 179, 183, 193–194, 197 Knowledge, and actions 13, 21, 27, 30, 47, 53, 55, 60–65, 69–70, 76–80, 99, 107, 125, 148, 151, 167, 174, 181–184, 189, 196–197, 203–206 and culture 153 and emotions 78, 121–122 and human nature 31 and language 160–161, 163, 165 and values, norms, or morality 11, 26–27, 47, 62, 64, 70, 79, 107, 125, 151, 160, 163, 167, 173, 180, 182, 189 as reasonable 21 factual or pertaining to facts 11, 15, 27, 41, 63–64, 78, 84, 90, 97, 99–100, 105–107, 113–114, 124–125, 181–184, 195, 205 practical or “how to” 15, 27–28, 62, 79, 121–122, 189, 195, 197, 199, 205–206 tacit 22 Kong Yingda 孔颖达 104–105 Kongzi 孔子 (Confucius) 44, 74, 174, 202 Labor 1–3, 6, 24, 101, 141, 147–148, 152–153, 189, Language 25, 43, 50, 77, 79, 150, 154–156, 158–163, 166, 168, 169, 172, 179, 208–209 Law 109, 120, 123, 126, 131, 176 a priori 52 and politics 2, 23, 34, 92, 148 moral 70, 144 universal 113, 124, 126, 142, 193–194

215 Learning 76–77 Li 理 (“principle,” “pattern,” “coherence”) 172–174, 176–179, 207 Lifeworld 146, 150–154, 157–158, 163, 168–169 Liji 礼记 (Book of Rites) 152, 180 Limits 94, 119, 162, 193, 195, 200–201 of affairs 53 of habit 28 of human practice 89, 114 of rational judgments 60 Liu Xie 刘勰 88 Liu Zongyuan 柳宗元 86 Lü Shi Chunqiu 吕氏春秋 (The Annals of Lü Buwei) 82, 87 Mencius, see Mengzi Mengzi 孟子 (or, Mencius) 4, 59, 71–72, 83, 90, 133–135, 152, 170, 173, 175, 177–178, 201 the Mengzi 孟子 (Book of Mengzi) 170–171 Metaphysics 124 Mill, John Stuart 131–133 Mozi 墨子 (Book of Mohism) 7, 14, 171 Music 21 Nature 2–6, 8, 13, 31–32, 40–42, 46–47, 57, 70, 77, 91, 93, 99, 101, 103, 108–109, 112, 115, 120, 128–129, 131, 133, 144, 146–150, 170–171, 173, 177–178, 185, 187, 191, 206, 210 Needs 50–51, 63, 93, 121, 124, 128, 133, 135–136, 139, 144, 149, 167, 186 of animals 5 of humans 63, 121, 123, 129, 132–133, 135, 146–147, 149–151, 167, 181, 186 of individuals 10, 21, 40, 144 of production 97 moral 129, 139 practical, of practice 129, 141, 191 rational, reasonable 122–124, 129–133, 137–139, 144–145, 167 social, of others 93, 186 Neo-Confucianism 178, 194 Norms 5, 22–29, 33–35, 39–41, 43, 45–51, 53–54, 79–80, 84–85, 122–124, 127–129, 136–140, 144–145, 152–153, 160, 162, 165–166, 168, 172, 179–180, 183, 185, 189, 191–197, 200, 207 and value principles 11–12, 22 of a community 2

216 Noumenon 30 Nozick, Robert 152 One-sided 71, 100, 139, 198, 210 Openness 9, 159–160 Order 85, 87–88, 91, 119, 153, 200–201 Other, the, others 2, 5–6, 16–17, 20, 31, 38, 40, 83, 110, 116, 131, 135, 145, 147, 151, 157, 159, 164, 170, 173, 175, 178, 188, 192, 200, 209–210 Parfit, Derek 34, 132, 141–142 Parsons, Talcott 13–14, 30 Particularization 111 Passions 56, 62 Pears, David 55 Perception 52, 99–101, 203, 205 Plato 61–62, 78, 187 Possibility 33, 52–53, 56, 60, 67–68, 80, 102, 105, 115, 119, 121, 125, 150, 155, 159, 164, 167, 170, 203, 205 Powers 87, 203 Practical reason 25, 70, 72, 121–130, 135–141, 143–145, 170, 181–183, 190, 206, 210 Practical processes 25, 89, 97, 113, 136–138, 140–141, 146, 148–150, 152–153, 155, 157–158, 165–168, 170, 172, 176–180, 182–183, 185, 188, 191, 196–198, 201, 203, 205, 207, 209–211 Prediction 11, 105–106, 108, 113–114 Psychological 8, 68 Purpose 16, 29–30, 107 Qi 气 (“air/gas,” “vital breath”) 104 Qing 情 (“concrete or true state of affairs,” “things” or “human feelings/emotions”) 170–174, 176–179 Qun 群 (“grouping”) 148, 159 Rawls, John 116–117, 133, 166, 169–170 Raz, Joseph 35–36, 49 Reason 11–12, 21, 25, 33–34, 35–51, 55, 57, 65, 70, 72, 91, 102, 109, 121–133, 135–146, 151–152, 167–170, 172, 175, 181–184, 186, 190, 206–207, 210–211 Reasonable 12, 21, 39–40, 75, 121–123, 126, 128–133, 135, 137–139, 143–144, 167, 169–170, 173–174, 176–178, 192 Reid, Thomas 27, 31, 117, 201

Index Ren 仁 (“humaneness”) 129, 173, 175, 180, 185 Resources 1, 88, 112 Rightness 126–129, 139–140, 142–143 the principle of 121, 123–124, 127–129, 136–140, 142–146, 179 Rights 34–37, 143 Ritual 5, 200–201 Ross, William David 123 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 73 Rules 5, 13, 16, 25, 27, 29, 37–38, 40, 43, 141, 152, 156, 162, 167, 172, 176–177, 180, 190, 192–193, 196 Sartre, Jean-Paul 166 Scheler, Max 181–182 Science 2, 23, 100 Searle, John 66 Self-awareness 19, 197 Shang Jun Shu 商君书 (The Book of Lord Shang) 87, 93 Significance 1, 7–9, 14, 17, 26–27, 30, 36, 48–50, 54, 56, 65–66, 69, 73, 81, 84, 89, 98, 102, 105–106, 126, 129, 137, 140, 149, 155–156, 159, 161–162, 165, 167, 170, 172, 175, 177, 180, 196, 199, 201, 204–205, 210 Species 5–6 Spirit 107, 182, 202, 204 Hegel’s notion of 80 of the times 90 Spiritual 79 as personhood 177 happiness 74 manifestations 177 needs, demands 129, 132 world 182 Spontaneity 23, 26, 28, 108, 195 Structure 10, 15, 17, 28–30, 41–42, 56, 83, 87, 172, 201 Subject 3, 7–12, 16–20, 26–30, 34–37, 39–42, 44, 62, 71, 77, 79–80, 92, 118, 124–125, 130, 135, 147–152, 155–164, 166, 168, 171, 175, 177–178, 182, 188, 204–205–207, 211 Subjectivity 159–162, 164–166, 191–192, 205 Sublation (aufhaben) 182, 191–192 Sun Wu 孙武 89 Sunzi Binfa 孙子兵法 (The Art of War) 89

217

Index Tacit 26 agreements 16 consciousness 163 knowledge 22 method 26 understanding 31, 163 Tan Sitong 谭嗣同 75 Technology 3, 44 Tool, tools 4, 90, 147, 159 Truth 2

Virtue(s) 57, 71, 74, 79, 83, 128, 205, 211

Understanding 4, 10–11, 17, 21, 23, 25, 27, 31, 33, 37, 39, 42–43, 45, 47, 49–51, 53, 55, 57–59, 61–64, 69–70, 72–73, 75–79, 81, 83–84, 88–89, 95–104, 106–109, 113–115, 117–118, 120, 122–123, 125, 130, 132–137, 141–144, 147–148, 150–151, 153–163, 165–166, 168, 172–174, 177, 179, 181–184, 186, 188–189, 194–197, 200–201, 203–204, 206–210 Universal 30, 71–72, 81, 96, 107, 108–113, 127–128, 137, 140, 142–144, 154, 163, 165–166, 172, 175–177, 179, 185, 189, 192, 196–198, 206, 211 duty 24 regulations, rules 5, 8, 27 value principles, standards, norms, laws 13, 22, 35, 47–48, 72–73, 80, 113, 124,  126–130, 136–142, 144–145, 164, 166, 172,  177, 185, 189, 192–200, 202, 204, 207 Utilitarianism 246, 249

Xing Zi Ming Chu 性自命出 (Human Dispositions Arise from Destiny) 118 Xunzi 荀子 76, 85–86, 91, 93, 109–110, 114, 135, 147–148, 159, 171, 200–201

Wang Fuzhi 王夫之 87, 94, 104, 107–109 Wang Yangming 王阳明 30, 76–79 Williams, Bernard 46, 118 Wisdom 61–62, 90, 92, 99, 127–128, 179–189, 191–199, 201–211 Wittgenstein, Ludwig 25–26, 162 Wuwei 无为 (“Non-doing” or “Non-assertive action”) 91

Ye Shi 叶适 91–92, 94, 98 Yi 义 (“obligation,” “duty,” “righteousness,” or “appropriateness”) 106–107, 129, 134 Yizhuan 易传 (The Great Commentary of the Book of Changes) 102–104 Zhang Zai 张载 103–104, 107–109, 178 Zhong Yong 中庸 (The Doctrine of the Mean) 164 Zhouyi 周易 (Book of Changes) 171, 174, 204 Zhu Xi 朱熹 4–5, 106, 117, 177 Zhuangzi 庄子 (Book of Master Zhuang) 187, 206–207