Oil Transnational Crops-CSR and Env

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Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 15, 210–222 (2008) Published online 25 April 2007 in Wiley InterScience (www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/csr.143

Oil Transnational Corporations: Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Sustainability Felix M. Edoho* College of Business and Professional Studies, Lincoln University, Jefferson City, MO, USA

ABSTRACT Corporate social responsibility (CSR) occupies the center stage of the debate on the operations of transnational corporations in the developing countries. The quest for profit maximization as the overriding value at the expense of corporate social responsibility puts some transnational corporations on a collision path with their Niger Delta host communities, who are demanding environmental sustainability. Militant groups have shut down flow stations and taken oil workers hostage. Unresponsiveness of oil firms to community demands for CSR is heightening the volatility of the Nigerian oil industry. The problem will intensify until oil firms initiate authentic CSR strategies to address the environmental havocs emanating from their operations. At the core of such strategies is recognizing the host communities as bona fide stakeholders and addressing their socioeconomic needs. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment. Received 31 July 2006; revised 21 December 2006; accepted 9 January 2007 Keywords: Nigeria; transnational corporations; social responsibility; environmental sustainability; militancy

Introduction

C

ORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) OCCUPIES THE CENTER STAGE OF THE DISCOURSE ON THE operations of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the extractive industry in the developing countries (Cragg and Greenbaum, 2002; Wheeler et al., 2002; Jenkins, 2004; Kapelus, 2002). The ease of access to information and communication technologies in this age of globalization has galvanized community groups, environmentalists and human rights entities across national borders to challenge the social performance and environmental records of TNCs in developing countries. The crusade against TNCs hinges on the claims that they undermine environmental laws in the developing countries (Aiyede, 2004; Phillips, 1999). Oil firms are particularly notorious for violating environmental laws in Nigeria and fostering unsustainable development (Boele et al., 2001a, 2001b). They have been accused of ‘taking away the peoples oil and polluting the environment without giving them anything in return’ (Okonta, 2000). This paper examines CSR relative to the operations of oil firms in the Niger Delta region (NDR) of Nigeria. Neglect of environmental sustainability by oil TNCs has spurred their host communities into social movements and militant actions. As an analytical device, a CSR framework could help oil firms to understand how their

* Correspondence to: Felix M. Edoho, Ph.D., Dean/Professor of Management, College of Business and Professional Studies, Lincoln University, Jefferson City, MO 65102, USA. E-mail: [email protected] Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

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unresponsive posture could trigger militancy against them. CSR is a useful conceptual framework for probing corporate attitudes of firms towards stakeholders (Wheeler et al., 2002). Corporate attitudes determine the nature of the relationship between oil TNCs and their host communities (Anderson and Bieniaszewska, 2005; Jenkins, 2004), and whether such a relationship is harmonious or antagonistic. For communities in the NDR, CSR constitutes a frame of reference for addressing environmental problems and socioeconomic dislocation caused by the operations of oil transnational corporations.

Conceptual Framework: Clarifying CSR The literature on CSR is extensive (see, e.g., Carroll, 1979, 1991, 1999, 2004). For this paper, we use the conceptualization endorsed by the World Business Council on Sustainable Development (WBCSD): CSR is ‘the continuing commitment by business to behaving ethically and contributing to economic development while improving the quality of life of the workforce and their families as well as of the community and society at large’ (Holmes and Watts, 2000). This approach has an affinity with the earlier views of CSR as ‘the managerial obligation to take action that protects and improves both the welfare of society as a whole and the interests of the organization’ (Davis and Blomstrom, 1975, p. 6), or the obligation of business to contribute to social welfare beyond their role of producing goods and providing services (Frederick, 1994). Evidence in the literature suggests two opposing views of CSR. First is the conventional view that considers CSR a ‘misguided virtue’ (Henderson, 2001). This view is vehemently opposed to CSR, and advocates a limited role for business in society. The conventional view is widely embraced by TNCs operating in the developing countries. In Nigeria, the Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) has stated that our most significant contribution comes from carrying out our direct business activities efficiently, profitably and to high standards. It also comes from the sizeable investments we make. These create wealth for the nation, through the substantial amounts of taxes and royalties generated, and the direct and indirect employment created (SPDC, 2003, p. 4). Until recently, oil TNCs were vehemently opposed to suggestions that they helped to provide infrastructures for socioeconomic development of their host communities in Nigeria ‘on the ground that it was not their responsibility to do so’ (Idemudia and Ite, 2005, p. 3). In fact, Shell had argued that its subsidiaries ‘do not hold the solution to community demands for more amenities, more development, more employment and more control over oil revenues. That is primarily a government responsibility’ (Shell International, quoted by Boele et al., 2001a, p. 75). The second is a contemporary view of CSR that advocates social contributions, in addition to an economic role, of firms in society based on social contract. This view stems from the knowledge that the conventional view recognizes only shareholders, while ignoring other key stakeholders (Michael, 2003). The importance of recognizing host communities as stakeholders is articulated by Ken Saro-Wiwa, who can be called the first ‘environmental martyr’ in Nigeria: We refuse to accept that the only responsibility which Shell-BP owes our nation is the spoliation of our lands. . . . We shall continue to appeal to the . . . government . . . to . . . take cognizance of our desires with regard to companies prospecting or operating on our soil (quoted by Boele et al., 2001a, p. 76). Thus, for communities severely affected by oil spills and pollution, Shell’s contribution to the federal revenue base alone is insufficient to grant it social legitimacy in its operating environment. Firms in the extractive industry face questions of legitimacy regarding how they address CSR through strategic initiatives (Wheeler et al., 2002). Firms must address the welfare of all parties affected by their decisions and operations (Cragg and Greenbaum, 2002; Freeman, 1984). This is crucial because firms coexist symbiotically with other parties in a complex web of interlocking and mutually dependent relationships, reciprocal exchanges and expectations, and shared interests. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

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CSR brings into sharp focus how the aggregate costs and benefits of resource exploitation are distributed among the stakeholders (Cragg and Greenbaum, 2002). In the oil industry, CSR would entail ‘balancing the diverse demands of communities and the imperative to protect the environment with the ever present need to make profit’ (Jenkins, 2004). CSR strategies can help oil firms in the NDR to re-evaluate their behavior towards their stakeholders in order to foster healthy relationships (Idemudia and Ite, 2005).

Macro-Context and an Overview of the Nigerian Oil Industry Shell-BP commenced oil production in Nigeria in 1958, with crude oil export of 5000 barrels per day (bpd). When, in the 1960s, Gulf, Mobil, Agip, Elf, Chevron, Texaco and other oil prospecting TNCs joined Shell-BP in producing oil, Nigeria was ‘ushered onto the international oil stage’ (Pearson, 1970, p. 15). Nigeria is the largest oil producer in Africa, the fifth largest among the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the fifth largest crude oil supplier to the US. At present, oil production averages about 2.5 million bpd. Proven oil reserves are estimated at 35.3 billion barrels, while natural gas reserves are estimated at 176 trillion cubic feet (tcf ), placing Nigeria ninth in the world (US DOE, 2005). Thus, oil and gas will continue to dominate the Nigerian economy for decades to come. The worldwide oil crisis of the 1970s contributed to increases in the prices of Nigeria’s premium crude oil. From a mere 0.7 percent of the total exports in 1958, oil accounted for 15.2 percent of total exports in 1964, surging to 73 percent in 1971 and over 97 percent in 1985. Export earnings rose over sixfold, from a mere US$4 billion in 1975 to a staggering US$26 billion in 1980, while per capita income skyrocketed from US$360 to over US$1000 (World Bank, 1989). The importance of oil to Nigeria’s economic life is reflected in Table 1. In 1988, oil revenues accounted for 72 percent of total revenues; this leaped to 93 percent in 1990, but declined to 77 percent in 2001. During 1990–2000, the oil sector on average accounted for 73 percent of the total revenues. At present, the oil sector accounts for nearly 80 percent of government revenues, 96 percent of export revenues, over 95 percent of foreign exchange earnings and 40 percent of GDP (US DOE, 2005; SPDC, 2004). Cognizant of the criticality of oil to its survival, the state has appropriated the oil industry as its exclusive domain of accumulation (Edoho, 1992). The Land Use Act vests all lands and mineral resources in the state, while the Petroleum Act gives the state the power to seize any land needed for oil activities. In the 1970s, the state used

Year

Total revenue (million US$) (1)

Oil revenue (million US$) (2)

(2) as % of (1)

1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

27-595 47-798 69-788 100-992 190-453 192-769 201-911 459-988 520-190 582-811 463-609 949-188 1906-110 2-231-533

19-832 39-131 65-216 82-666 164-078 162-078 160-192 279-902 408-783 416-811 324-311 724-423 1591-676 1-707-513

72 82 93 82 86 84 79 79 79 72 70 76 84 77

Table 1. Contribution of oil revenue to Nigeria’s economy Source: Central Bank of Nigeria Annual Report and Statement of Account (several years). Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

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indigenization policies to nationalize the oil sector, paving ways for it to enter into joint ventures (JVT) with oil TNCs (Boele et al., 2001a). The Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) was established in 1977 to manage the JVT between the state and oil TNCs. As a proxy for the state, the NNPC is the senior partner in all JVT arrangements, holding an average of 59 percent share. By law, the agency is responsible for the enforcement of the environmental policies in the oil industry. As the sole owner of oil and gas, the state collects mining rents, royalties and petroleum taxes. Massive oil revenues led to bureaucratic centralism and corruption. A World Bank report, published in 2004, indicated that one percent of the population appropriated up to 80 percent of the oil revenues (US DOE, 2005). ‘Nigeria’s politics revolve about the distribution of the oil money, whether officially . . . or unofficially . . . and as long as the oil flows it will be difficult to change this legacy’ (HRW, 1999). In Nigeria, where the state is the ‘major avenue for private wealth and the instrumentalities of state are used to grant favors, politics becomes a zero-sum game’ (Edoho, 1992, p. 107). Williams (1976, p. 43) had analyzed the dysfunctional Nigerian political economy in which the ‘ethics of business penetrated politics, the ethics of politics penetrated business, and the ethics of gangster penetrated both’. Oil firms are aware that they can buy off officials and ignore the environmental laws with impunity. Thus, systemic corruption contributes to the cavalier attitude of oil TNCs towards environmental sustainability in the NDR.

Niger Delta Region: CSR and Environmental Sustainability The NDR is the actual goose that lays the golden egg for Nigeria, the cash cow for its economy and the source of enormous profits for oil TNCs. The region comprises several ecological zones: sandy coastal ridge barriers, brackish or saline mangroves, freshwater permanent and seasonal swamp forests, and lowland rain forest. Its area of 70-000-km2 is considered the world’s third largest wetland, after Holland and Mississippi. The region’s population of 20 million is composed of over 40 different ethnic groups, who speak 250 different dialects, and live in 3000 communities that traverse nine states (Abia, Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Cross River, Delta, Edo, Imo, Ondo and Rivers) out of Nigeria’s thirty-six states. Subsistent trading, farming and fishing are the major occupations. Rich in biodiversity, the NDR boasts various species of rare and endangered flora and fauna. The ecosystem is very sensitive to changes that can trigger a disequilibrium. The area is prone to a high incidence of tropical diseases. Early Europeans explorers dreaded the region and dubbed it the ‘white man’s graveyard’ (Ibeanu, 2000). However, since the discovery of the black gold in 1956 in the region, the white man’s graveyard has become the white man’s gold mine. The region has witnessed exponential growth in the number of oil fields, from 78 in the 1980s to over 606 now. It hosts over 18 oil TNCs and many service firms. The SPDC is the largest and oldest oil and gas firm. It controls over 43 percent of Nigeria’s oil production as well as 53 percent of the country’s hydrocarbon reserves. This corporate leviathan boasts over 6000-km of pipelines and flow lines, 87 flow stations, eight gas plants and more than 1000 producing oil wells, all in an area around 31-000-km2, representing about 44 percent of total area of the NDR (SPDC, 2003). As the pioneer of the Nigerian oil industry, Shell’s continued dominance is attributable to the first mover advantages (Frynas et al., 2000). Although oil revenues from the NDR have transformed the Nigerian economy, paradoxically, however, the region itself remains the most underdeveloped and backward in terms of human capital, industrial infrastructure and basic social services. Comprising mostly ethnic minorities, the NDR suffers from severe economic deprivation and political marginalization. These have been exacerbated by environmental degradation and pollution by oil firms that have turned farmlands into wastelands. Loss of farmlands means loss of income and source of livelihood and sustenance. The region is a classic case of blatant neglect in the midst of its phenomenal oil wealth. A World Bank (1995) study catalogued the depth of poverty in the region thus: GNP per capita is below the national average of US$280; health indicators rank worse and lag far behind the national average; fatality rates from water-borne diseases, malnutrition and poor sanitation, among other causes, are disproportionately high, and only about 20–24 percent of rural communities and fewer than 60 percent of urban communities have access to safe drinkable water, while less than 20 percent of the region is accessible by a good road, even during the dry season. Similarly, a columnist wrote ‘the Delta has become a killing field . . . The people have no roads, no portable water, they are unable to enjoy like other compatriots, even the pleasure of peaceful sleep at night. Oil exploration Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

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companies have overrun the Niger Delta. They are destroying the land, polluting the air and the sea’ (Vanguard, 1999). The irony is that, while oil has been a blessing to Nigeria, it has been a curse to the NDR (Nnadozie, 1995). The inhabitants of the Niger Delta live in a Hobbesian state where life is brutish and short. People who protest against oil spills, gas flaring and pollution are routinely killed by the security operatives retained by oil TNCs, troops dispatched by the state or blowouts/pipeline explosions. Various NGOs have documented the gruesome details of human rights abuses and repressive tactics by the agents of the oil TNCs and the state (ND-HERO, 2000; HRW, 1999; Essential Action, 2000). The operating standards of the oil TNCs in the NDR have been determined to be below accepted international norms. Despondency and desperation in the region make headlines in the media, attracting international outcry and solidarity from the NGOs, who are united in condemning oil firms for ruining the Niger Delta environment without helping to improve the socioeconomic conditions of the people in the region (Okonta, 2000).

Magnitude of Oil Spills and Pollution in the Niger Delta Region Oil exploration is a risky venture, and oil spill is one of the acceptable risks. However, the frequency and quantum of oil spills in the NDR by oil TNCs border on ecocide. It has been estimated that the actual quantities of oil spilled in the 1970s totaled more than ten times that of the Exxon Valdez tragedy in 1989 in the US (Watts, 1997). A study by Environmental Resource Management (ERM, 1997) indicated that during 1976–1996 there were 4835 oil spill incidents, which resulted in the discharge of 2-446-322 barrels of oil, of which 1-896-930 (77%) were lost to the environment. Data collated by the Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR, 1997) from oil TNCs indicate that over 6000 oil spill incidents had been recorded during the 40 years of oil exploration in Nigeria, with an average of 150 spills per year. During 1976–2000, 5733 oil spill incidents occurred, resulting in the discharge of over 2-567-966 barrels, of which 549-060 barrels were recovered while 1-820-411 barrels were lost to the environment (Table 2). It is imperative to note that the number of spill incidents and the corresponding volumes of oil indicated in the table do not actually represent the true picture. This is because the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) petroleum inspectorate guidelines classify spillage into minor, medium, major and disaster. Minor spill occurs when oil discharge is less than 25 barrels in inland waters or less than 250 barrels on land, offshore or coastal waters that does not threaten public health or welfare. In the case of medium spill, the discharge must be 250 barrels or less in inland water or 250–2500 barrels on land, offshore or coastal water. Major spill involves a discharge of oil in excess of 250 barrels into the inland waters or 2500 barrels on land, offshore or coastal waters. Finally, disaster refers to any uncontrolled well blowout, pipeline rupture or storage tank failure that poses an imminent threat to public health or welfare. Unfortunately, this classificatory scheme provides convenient excuses for oil firms to ignore some oil spill incidents on the basis that the volumes discharged were insignificant. Thus, not all spillages are reported for documentation (Tolulope, 2004). Ikein (1990, pp. 171–175) analyzed oil production and pollution distribution by the NDR state. The data indicated that oil spills and pollution distribution are most severe in the Bendel1 and Rivers2 states. The two states account for over 92 percent of total number of oil spills, and approximately 91 percent of the volumes of oil involved. Ikein (1990, p. 170) noted the correlation between intense oil production and the number of oil spill incidents. The number of oil spill incidents and ecological catastrophe in Bayelsa and Delta states largely account for increased violence and heightening militancy against oil TNCs in the NDR. These are demonstrated by hostage-taking, pipeline sabotage, shut-down of flow stations, blockade of oil rigs and deadly shootout with security operatives. A study by ERM (1997) identified various sources of oil spills: corrosion (33%); equipment failure (38%); blowout (20%); accident from third party (1%); operator or maintenance error (2%) and natural (3%). Overall, over 90 1 Bendel State ceased to exist in 1991 after it was split into Delta and Edo states by the Babangida regime. Although disaggregated data of oil spills for the two states are not available, it is likely that most of the oil spills occurred in the Delta State because of extensive exploration and intensive drilling there. 2 Bayelsa State was created out of Rivers State in 1996 by the Abacha regime. Similarly, disaggregated data of oil spills for the two states are not available; but it is likely that most of the oil spills occurred in the Bayelsa State.

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Year

Number of spills

Quantity spilled (barrels)

Quantity recovered (barrels)

Net loss to the environment (barrels)

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total

128 104 154 157 241 238 257 173 151 187 155 129 208 195 166 258 378 453 515 417 430 339 390 198 219 4-647

26-157.00 32-879.25 489-294.75 64-117.13 600-511.02 42-722.50 42-841.00 48-351.30 40-209.00 11-876.60 12-905.00 31-866.00 9-172.00 5-956.00 14-150.35 108-367.01 51-187.90 8-105.32 35-123.71 63-677.17 399-036.67 59-272.30 98-345.00 29-337.00 11-542.00 2-567-966.34

7-135.00 1-703.01 391-445.00 63-481.20 42-416.83 5-470.20 2-171.40 6-355.90 1-644.80 1-719.30 552.00 6-109.00 1-955.00 2-153.00 2-092.55 2-785.96 1-476.70 2-937.08 2-335.93 3-110.02 11-838.07 N/A N/A N/A N/A 549-060.38

19-021.50 31-176.75 97-849.75 630-635.95 558-094.19 37-252.30 40-669.60 41-995.40 38-564.20 10-157.30 12-358.00 25-358.00 7-207.00 3-830.00 12-057.80 105-912.05 49-711.20 6-632.11 32-787.78 60-568.15 387-198.60 N/A N/A N/A N/A 1-820-410.50

Table 2. Oil spill data in Nigeria, 1976–2000 N/A = not available. Source: Department of Petroleum Resources (various years).

percent of oil spills are preventable. Most of the oil pipelines were laid in the 1970s. They have not been properly maintained or replaced in a timely manner. The same study indicates that 60 percent of total spills during that period occurred offshore, 25 percent in swamp and 16 percent on land. ERM (1997) and ERA (1998, 2005) have documented cases of rampant blowouts at oil wells and the estimates of the quantities of oil discharged into the environment. The 1970 blowout at the Bomu oil field destroyed many acres of fertile, cultivable land. Between September 1974 and October 1975 there were 17 major fire outbreaks in 18 wells at Afam oilfield. The January 1980 offshore well blowout involved at least 200-000 barrels of oil spewed into the Atlantic Ocean from a Texaco Faniwa oil well. Shell’s Awoba flow stations (Bille I and II) are notorious for blowouts, pipeline leakages and explosions. There was a blowout there on 20 January 1997, two blowouts in January and August 1998 and four blowouts in 1999 (HRW, 1999). Each of these incidents involved large quantities of oil spewed into the environment, causing damages to the farmlands, rainforest, mangroves, creeks and ponds.

Environmental and Economic Impacts of Oil Spills and Pollution Oil spills and pollution have adverse effects on farmlands, food security, marine life and health. The 1980 offshore well blowout at the Texaco Faniwa oil well released over 400-000 barrels of oil into the environment and destroyed Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

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over 340 hectares of mangroves (ERM, 1997). The 12 January 1998 oil spill from ExxonMobil’s ruptured pipeline affected some 200-km of coastline, from Akwa Ibom State in the east to Lagos State in the west (Post Express, 1998). The spillage severely threatened the livelihood of various communities in Akwa Ibom State, particularly in Eket, Esit Eket, Ibeno and Ikot Abasi local government areas. The 21 October 2000 oil spillage in Batan manifold disrupted economic life in over 200 communities. The 30 November 2000 oil spill from Texaco oil pipe at Funtwa Five platform spread to lands and creeks of the Nun River, Sanagana River and Fishtown River and destroyed the livelihood of several communities (The Guardian, 2000). Oil spills are detrimental to marine life, devastating the livelihood of the communities dependent on subsistent fishing. In communities surrounding the ExxonMobil areas of operation, crawfish, crabs and periwinkles – major sea foods for the locals – have died out. Akinmalodun (1976, p. 374) noted the ‘nostalgia in many part of the oil producing area to think of fresh fish soup. Even fishermen in the area have come to depend on the frozen fish from the supermarkets and from foreign countries’. Oil spills have devastated crops and economic trees and deprived farmlands of vital nutrients. Reduced sedimentation, caused by the construction of dams, also contributes to decreased fertility. Yam productivity in the oil producing areas has reportedly fallen in weight and size, corn is often found with empty cobs, cassava have mere fibrous roots, with little or no starch, and cocoyams and red species of cocoyams are extinct, thus wiping out not only food supply for families, but also sources of incomes to meet household financial needs. The oil industry is highly capital intensive, and cannot absorb unskilled dislocated farmers and fishermen whose livelihoods have been devastated by frequent oil spills. Loss of livelihood means parents cannot feed and clothe their families and pay school fees for their children. As a result, young girls have resorted to prostitution as an economic necessity. Oil workers heavily patronize the emerging prostitution industry (Essential Action, 2000). Some young boys have become street hawkers, while others are engaged in deviant behavior, such as cultism, and criminal activities, such as armed robbery. For Nigeria as a whole, the economic costs of environmental degradation are also significant. Evans Aina, former head of the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA), noted that ‘Losses due to environmental degradation have been put at N25 billion [about US$1.5 billion, 13 percent of GNP] while 50 million Nigerians are at risk due to environmental degradation’ (quoted by Ayeni, 1992, p. 750).

Health Hazards of Oil Spills and Pollution Crude oil contains thousands of different chemicals, many of them toxic and some known to be carcinogenic with no determined safe threshold for human exposure. Dangers and fear of diseases threatening the oil-producing communities are palpable. A two-year (January 1998–January 2000) empirical study and scientific analysis by Akpofure et al. (2000) concluded that ‘[t]he effects of the crude oil on the impacted victims were enormous as was verified by our biochemical analysis of soil and water sampling from six different points’. The effects of acid rain from gas flaring are unbearable. A study by the Nigerian Environmental Study Action Team (NEST, 1991) found increased ‘discomfort and misery’ due to fumes, heat and combustion gases as well as increased illnesses. Higher rates of certain diseases, such as bronchial asthma, respiratory diseases, gastro-enteritis, bronchitis, tuberculosis, malaria, cholera and cancer as a result of the oil industry have been reported among the people in the NDR (Essential Action and Global Exchange, 2000). Oteri (1981) indicated that groundwater contamination from hydrocarbon spills is widespread. Olusi (1981) documented the negative impact of oil pollution on health. For example, following a major Texaco spill of 1980, 180 people died in one community as a result of the pollution (Fekumo, 1990, p. 268). In January 1998, about 100 people from the communities affected by the major ExxonMobil spill on 12 January 1998 were hospitalized as a result of drinking contaminated water. In another community in 2000, 20 persons between ages 5 and 17 were reported dead after drinking contaminated water following an oil spill in Bayelsa state. A state legislator from the area lamented that ‘floating crude oil from the spill had polluted the rivers and streams, the only sources of drinking water in the Niger Delta area, thereby constituting serious threat to aquatic and human lives’ (The Guardian, 2000). In the regulatory guideline, the DPR sets a limit of 20-ppm hydrocarbon contamination for effluent discharge to near-shore waters and 10-ppm for inland waters, while the FEPA’s limit is 10-ppm for near-shore waters. In Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

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April 1997, samples taken from the water used for drinking and washing were analyzed in the US. A sample taken from Luawii in Ogoni had 18-ppm of hydrocarbon in the water, 360 times the level allowed in drinking water in the EU. A sample from Ukpeleide in Ikwerre contained 34-ppm – that is, 680 times the EU standard (Kretzmann and Wright, 1997, p. 6). Evidently, oil TNCs routinely ignore these guidelines. Both the state and corporate attitudes toward the needs of the NDR have forced the people to resort to violence against the oil firms and state interests. Several plausible reasons explain the failure of the federal government to implement its environmental regulatory policies. First is the fact that the NDR is marginalized in national politics. The region lacks political leverage because oil and gas resources, which would have given the NDR competitive advantage, are, by law, owned and controlled by the federal government. Second, the laxity in enforcing the existing environmental regulations may be due to the fact that the federal government is heavily dependent on oil revenues, and cannot afford to do or say anything that would tend to discourage the operations of the oil firms. Moreover, the government does not want oil firms to question its lukewarm commitment to alleviating problems in the NDR, given the glaring neglect. Third, Ile and Akukwe (2001) have argued that the ‘inability of the Federal government to meet its cash call and other statutory obligations in the joint ventures with the oil and gas companies further eroded its regulatory authority’. Finally, the lack of regulatory enforcement may also be blamed on endemic corruption. Oil firms are aware of the vulnerability of Nigerian officials, who can easily be bought off.

Mobilizing for CSR and Environmental Sustainability The unresponsiveness of oil TNCs to the demands by the locals for CSR and environmental sustainability in the NDR has engendered militancy and violence. The following are just a few of the violent actions by militant groups against oil firms in the past several years. • In March 1997, youths captured a barge delivering goods to a Chevron facility. The crew of 70 Nigerians and 20 expatriates were held hostage for three days on the vessel. • In August 1997, the Iyokiri community in Rivers State blocked access to Shell employees who sought to repair a pipeline leak. The community closed down three flow stations for days. • In September 1997, the 10-000-bpd Diebu flow station was closed for several weeks by the Peremabiri community demanding compensation for fishing nets damaged by an oil spill. • In November 1997, Nigerian opposition radio reported that about 3000 people from Ekakpamre village in Delta State had forced the closure of a flow station for several days, demanding N20 million (US$222-000) compensation for encroachment on their land, a new access road and other projects. Shell confirmed that about 6500-bpd had been shut in by the protest. • From 25 November to 23 December 1997, Tunu and Opukoshi flow stations, together pumping 80-000-bpd, were closed by villagers, forcing Shell to declare on 19 December that it would be unable to meet all commitments on time at its Farcados terminal for about three weeks. • In January 1998, Odeama Creek flow station, pumping 18-000-bpd, was closed for several days by youths who demanded environmental tests, a reduction of gas flaring, clean water supply etc. • In January 1998, Texaco’s offshore Funiwa platform was occupied for a week by youths from the neighboring Koluama community, shutting in 55-000-bpd. • In March 1998, Shell reported that it had shut in 200-000-bpd at its Tora manifold in the Nembe area after youths had protested for compensation, jobs and development projects. • In March 1998, Texaco’s Funiwa platform was again occupied for over a week by youths, causing an 11-day stoppage in the export loading schedule from the Pennington terminal. • In July 2002, a group of 100 women occupied ChevronTexaco’s export terminal, making several demands, including provision of clean water. They held up 500-000-bpd over a 10-day period. • In March 2003, the militants attacked oil installations, cutting off 800-000 barrels of oil, representing 40 percent of Nigeria’s daily production. As such, Nigeria could not take advantage of OPEC’s suspension of the production quota to meet the shortfall in the world supply due to the US invasion of Iraq. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

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Responses to Militancy in the Niger Delta Region Responses by oil TNCs to the militant groups demanding environmental stewardship have been a mixture of carrot and stick. Oil TNCs have employed oppressive strategies to emasculate groups that protest against farmland destruction, environmental pollution and water contamination. In certain cases, confrontations have been deadly. The atrocious activities and human rights abuses by oil TNCs and the Nigerian state against the Niger Delta people have been extensively documented by various NGOs (see, e.g., Essential Action, 2000; ERA, 1998, 2005; HRW, 1995, 1999; ND-HERO, 2000). Oil TNCs have belatedly formulated and implemented CSR strategies to potentially pacify their enraged host communities. Between 1994 and 1998, Elf invested US$13.78 million in different community causes and US$13.48 million between 1999 and 2000. Table 3 shows that Elf invested a total of US$27.26 in community assistance projects during 1994–2000 (Okafor, 2003a). The projects included road construction, building of market stalls, water projects and provisions of school buildings and health care facilities. From 1991 to 2002, ChevronTexaco invested US$56 million in community development projects. By 2003, the company reported that the total amount it had invested in community causes since 1992 had increased to US$90 million (Okafor, 2003b). ExxonMobil spent US$12 million in community development projects in 2001. Shell invests significantly in the socioeconomic projects in the NDR. Between 1997 and 2004, its expenditure in community development projects was US$361.8 million. The highest expenditure (US$67 million) occurred in 2002, while the lowest (US$25 million) in 2004 (SPDC, 2002, 2003, 2004). Shell has entered into partnerships with international organizations and agencies such as the US Agency for International Development (USAID), Africare, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the International Institute for Tropical Agriculture (IITA) to engineer sustainable development in its operating environment in the NDR. In its 2000 annual report, Shell acknowledged that ‘by recognizing and helping to meet the broader needs and aspirations of the community where we work, we will earn their support for peaceful and stable environment for our business’ (SPDC, 2003, p. 18). Thus, Shell’s commitment to CSR has evolved from being a defensive strategy to strategic initiatives. This evolution has been dubbed ‘Shell’s Damascene conversion on the road to corporate social responsibility’ (Wheeler et al., 2002, p. 300). Three phases of the evolution can be identified. The first phase, 1960–1997, was community assistance (CA). This focused on traditional corporate philanthropy, which emphasized one-time grant-making for education, agriculture and health. Internal review revealed that the approach did not foster sustainability (SPDC, 2003). In the second phase, 1998–2003, Shell moved from CA to community development (CD). In this phase, the emphasis

Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Subtotal 1999 2000 Total

Major project1 (US$)

Sundry works2 (US$)

Pit fencing3 (US$)

MTCE/guards4 (US$)

Total

1.91 1.22 1.49 1.60 1.55 7.77 2.88 5.44 16.09

0.10 0.33 0.18 0.25 0.26 1.12 0.32 0.37 1.81

0.06 0.07 0.22 0.14 0.25 0.74 0.10 0.21 1.05

– 0.28 0.93 1.48 1.46 4.15 1.77 2.39 8.31

2.07 1.90 2.82 3.47 3.52 13.78 5.07 8.41 27.26

Table 3. Community related costs, 1994–2000 Source: Okafor (2003a). 1 This represents major infrastructural projects. 2 These are petty jobs involving public relations, small project site clearing and other menial tasks. 3 Expenses on fencing burrow pits arising from company’s operations. 4 MTCE is an abbreviation of maintenance. MTCE/guards are expenses on maintenance of community projects and security guards. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

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was on community empowerment, capacity- and confidence-building, participation and partnership. Communities were empowered to assess their own needs and produce community development plans (CDPs) with the assistance of Shell’s Community Development Advisers (CDAs). Finally, in the third phase, 2003 to the present, Shell transitioned from CD to sustainable community development (SCD). This involves a thematic approach to economic empowerment, human/social capital development, entrepreneurship, basic services and infrastructure (SPDC, 2003, 2004). Programs such as micro-credit, logistics and business development are all intended to leverage skills and foster synergies. Shell’s SCD strategy offers a model for other TNCs for several reasons. The shift to an SCD paradigm is an acknowledgement of the inadequacies of the traditional approach to CSR. Emphasis on community empowerment, human and social capital development and entrepreneurship is a significant departure from the traditional approach that viewed host communities as passive beneficiaries of corporate benevolence. Increasingly, oil TNCs have come to recognize the importance of bottom-up development planning that seeks not just the input from their host communities but their active engagement in the sustainable development planning process. The SCD model will deepen long-term corporate involvement in their host communities and institutionalize the process of sustainable development and livelihoods.

Conclusion Effective solutions to deplorable human tragedies in the NDR require strategies that recognize the vital interests and needs of the major stakeholders in the Nigerian oil industry: the federal government, oil TNCs and host communities. Although the interests of these stakeholders are not mutually exclusive, they are not necessarily the same. The various interests must be balanced and accountability located.

Federal Government While the state appropriates oil revenues, it has failed in governance – particularly in the areas of environmental sustainability and provisions of infrastructure for socioeconomic development of the NDR. As one environmental activist puts it, ‘because the people at the end of the burning sticks are so oppressed, they question the legitimacy of the government under which they are forced to live’ (Bassey, 2001). The state, as the senior partner in all JVT with oil TNCs, must demand environmental stewardship from oil firms, by enforcing existing environmental policies. The state must address the developmental challenges in the region by providing adequate funding (ThisDay News, 2003a, 2003b). Beyond this, however, the NDR wants to participate in the management and decision-making process in the oil industry. The reason is to ensure environmental accountability and sustainability by the oil firms.

Oil TNCs Oil TNCs and the NDR are worlds apart. Oil TNCs see themselves as doing legitimate business in the NDR, fulfilling their CSR in terms of the revenues they generate for the state (SPDC, 2003). Because of this reasoning, they alienate their host communities, mismanage their relationships with their host communities and fail to engage them. As Boele et al. (2001b) have noted, ‘effective management of relationships is not the same as effective stakeholder engagement’ (emphasis in original). The absence of commitment to effective stakeholder engagement meant that projects initiated were more often in response to crisis on hand, than a genuine interest in social contribution to sustainable development. As a result, projects were often ad hoc in design and haphazard in implementation. It can be argued, as Wood (1990, p. 136) does, that ‘[a] piecemeal approach to social responsibility and responsiveness will not protect a firm’s legitimacy. Responding to a few stakeholder challenges or environmental conditions but failing to have an integrated plan for achieving social and economic aims leaves the firm vulnerable to attack from all quarters’. Shell provides a template of sustainable development initiatives that other oil TNCs should emulate. Shell’s efforts notwithstanding, oil TNCs need to do much more to alter their negative images in the NDR given their Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd and ERP Environment

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abysmal past records of neglect, environmental destruction and human rights abuses. Oil TNCs should obey environmental laws even if the state is wanting in regulatory enforcement. They must curtail oil spills, given the fact over 90 percent of the oil spills in the NDR are preventable. Where oil spills occur, they should take steps immediately to contain them to avoid severe environmental damage. Oil firms need to maintain and update their pipelines, equipment and facilities. Portraying themselves as victims in the present climate in view of the enormity of cumulative environmental havoc they have unleashed in the NDR for over 40 years of their operations would be most unhelpful. Working with their host communities with a view to empowering and engaging them in sustainable development projects will foster cordial relationships between them.

Host Communities Aggrieved by successive corrupt governments and arrogant oil TNCs, the Niger Delta communities are suspicious of both. They believe oil TNCs have worked in concert with successive oppressive regimes to appropriate their lands for oil exploration; yet, they have deprived them of the benefits of oil extracted from their lands (ND-HERO, 2000). Militants are aware that the state is dependent heavily on oil revenues. Thus, disrupting oil production poses a financial threat to the state. However, Niger Delta communities should be more strategic in venting their frustrations. They should not engage in any action that would cost them international support that they have built up over the years by publicizing the environmental atrocities and human rights abuses by oil TNCs. Traditional rulers should warn their communities to avoid the areas where leaks occur for several reasons. Their presence in the disaster areas might be misinterpreted as deliberate acts of sabotage. Moreover, they need to avoid the disaster areas for their personal safety. In all cases, the Niger Delta communities should explore and pursue avenues for constructive dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflicts.

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Corp. Soc. Responsib. Environ. Mgmt. 15, 210–222 (2008) DOI: 10.1002/csr