Occasionalism: From Metaphysics to Science (Age of Descartes) (English and French Edition) [Bilingual ed.] 9782503578170, 2503578179

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The Age of  Descartes Descartes et son temps 2 Centro Dipartimentale di Studi su Descartes e il Seicento ‘ Ettore Lojacono’ Università del Salento

SERIES EDITOR Giulia Belgioioso (Università del Salento) EDITORIAL BOARD Igor Agostini (Università del Salento) Roger Ariew (Tampa University, Florida) Jean-Robert Armogathe (EPHE, Paris) Carlo Borghero (Università di Roma, La Sapienza) Vincent Carraud (Université Paris-Sorbonne) Alan Gabbey (Barnard College) Daniel Garber (Princeton University) Tullio Gregory (Accademia dei Lincei) Jean-Luc Marion (Académie française)

THE AGE OF DESCARTES DESCARTES ET SON TEMPS

OCCASIONALISM FROM METAPHYSICS TO SCIENCE Edited by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano

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© 2018 Brepols Publishers n.v., Turnhout, Belgium

All rights reserved. No part of  this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of  the publisher.

D/2018/0095/260 ISBN 978-2-503-57817-0 e-ISBN 978-2-503-57818-7 DOI 10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.114482 Printed on acid-free paper

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, Emanuela Scribano Introduction 7

I. GOD AND THE WORLD Cecilia Martini Bonadeo God’s Q udra (Power) and Natural Causality: Between Falsafa and Islamic Occasionalism 21 Tad M. Schmaltz Continuous Creation and Cartesian Occasionalism in Physics 41 Sukjae Lee Conservation as Continuous Creation: Just Like Creation but Not Necessarily Recreation 61 Andrea Sangiacomo Neither with Occasionalism nor with Concurrentism: The Case of  Pierre-Sylvain Régis 85

II. CAUSALITY AND THE LAWS OF  NATURE Mariangela Priarolo Force de Loi: The Debate on the Laws of  Nature and Malebranche’s Occasionalism 107 Nicholas Jolley Malebranche, Occasionalism, and the Janus Faces of  Law 127

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III. MINDS AND BODIES Sandrine Roux Des trois notions primitives à Dieu : Le problème corps-esprit chez La Forge et chez Cordemoy 149 Steven Nadler La Forge’s Mind-Body Problem: A Guide for the Perplexed 169 Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero The Direction of  Motion: Occasionalism and Causal Closure from Descartes to Leibniz 195

IV. MALEBRANCHE RECONSIDERED Thomas M. Lennon The Motivation of  Malebranche’s Occasionalism 223 Denis Moreau Extensions du domaine de l’occasionalisme : Les miracles de l’Ancien Testament et la distribution de la grâce dans le Traité de la nature et de la grâce de Malebranche 243 Emanuela Scribano Connaissance et causalité : Les adversaires de Malebranche 269 INDEX 289

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MATTEO FAVARETTI CAMPOSAMPIERO, MARIANGELA PRIAROLO, EMANUELA SCRIBANO

INTRODUCTION

The question of  whether finite beings have the power to bring about changes and new states of  affairs in the world, and related questions concerning the autonomy of  nature from divine causality, are rooted in the very idea that the world was created from nothing by an omnipotent God.  In  this sense, it can be said that occasionalism, as the view that natural events are mere occasions for the exercise of  the only real and effective causal power, i.e. God’s power, is a genuine philosophical offspring of  monotheism and has therefore been a constant presence on the philosophical scene nourished by this religious belief.1 From the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, Christian philosophy generally viewed occasionalism as a threat, which appeared more dangerous and treacherous as it came to be supported by theological reasons that even the most orthodox thinkers had to share. As a reaction to the occasionalist threat, Christian thought made a formidable effort to develop systematic theories aimed at saving both God’s omnipotence and the causal agency of  finite beings.2 The reason for this deep concern is not difficult to understand. Considered from the ethical point 1 See Taneli Kukkonen, “Creation and Causation”, in The Cambridge History of  Medieval Philosophy, edited by Robert Pasnau, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 232–246. 2   For a clear review of  positions on the causal relationship between God and creatures, see Gloria Frost, “Peter Olivi’s Rejection of  God’s Concurrence with Created Causes”, British Journal for the History of  Philosophy, XXII (2014), pp. 655–679.

Occasionalism. From Metaphysics to Science, ed.  by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano, Turnhout, Brepols, 2018 (DESCARTES, 2), pp.  7–17    FHG    10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.117382

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of  view, the occasionalist ascription of  every change and event to divine causality alone entails the most serious difficulties concerning not only individual agency and moral responsibility, but also the theodicean problem of  justifying God.3 In the eyes of  its enemies, occasionalism seems to turn the labyrinth of  free will and predestination into a dead end. If  it is God who does everything, how can His goodness be reconciled with the existence of  evil in the world? Furthermore, the very fact that many prominent Christian thinkers endorsed some version of  Aristotelian-inspired naturalism acted as a barrier to the most radical occasionalist doctrines, such as the doctrines cultivated in some areas of  Islamic philosophy. Thomas Aquinas’s attitude towards Islamic occasionalism is emblematic in this respect.4 Whereas Medieval Christian philosophy tended to reject occasionalism, in the seventeenth century a new attitude towards the doctrine arises. In the early modern and especially post-Cartesian era, occasionalism ceases to represent either a perilous temptation or a threat and becomes a widespread “official” position, vindicated by means of  an impressive panoply of  arguments. The undisputed champion of  early modern occasionalism, Nicolas Malebranche, is adamant in arguing for the theological respectability and soundness of  this doctrine. If  the Christian God is to be conceived according to the Exodus description of  Him as “all being” (tout être), then it is necessary 3 See Matthews Grant, “Aquinas on How God Causes the Act of  Sin Without Causing Sin Itself ”, The Thomist, LXXIII (2009), pp. 455–496; Brian J. Shanley, “Divine Causation and Human Freedom in Aquinas”, American Catholic Philosophical Q uarterly, LXXII (1998), pp. 99–122. 4 See William Courtenay, “The Critique of  Natural Causality in the Mutakallimum and Nominalism”, in Covenant and Causality in Medieval Thought, London, Variorum Reprints, 1984; Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism and Its Critique by Averroës and Aquinas, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1958; Alfred J. Freddoso, “God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation is Not Enough”, Philosophical Perspectives, V (1991), pp. 553–585; Freddoso, “God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Pitfalls and Prospects”, The American Catholic Philosophical Q uarterly, LXVIII (1994), pp. 131–156; and Freddoso, “Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case Against Secondary Causation in Nature”, in Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics of  Theism, edited by Thomas V. Morris, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1988, pp. 74–118.

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to fully recognize the infinite gap that lies between the nothingness of  creatures and the source of  all reality. First of  all, it is necessary to admit that causal powers, too, are concentrated on one side of  the gap: the side of  infinite being. This is why Malebranche can recommend occasionalism as the only true Christian philosophy, which finally and definitively rejects the intrinsic paganism of  those who follow Aristotle in crediting nature with a causal power separated from God’s power and in competition with it. Such an overt vindication of  occasionalism represents the emancipation from a centuries-old taboo. Far from being feared, the uniqueness of  divine causality is proudly asserted as the genuine albeit long-repudiated core of  the philosophical revolution generated by creationism and monotheism. This drastic reversal of  the attitude towards occasionalist theories inevitably leads to the question of  the specificity and novelty of  early modern views with respect to Medieval thought. Is occasionalism to be viewed and discussed as a typical and somehow exotic product of  a specifically post-Cartesian philosophical era or rather as a trans-historical option that reappears in various guises but preserves its theoretical core throughout the ages? Traditional scholarship frequently opted for the former alternative. Many scholars have focused on the birth of  early modern occasionalism, by asking to what extent the most representative of  modern philosophers, René Descartes, may have contributed to the revival and success of  this doctrine in the second half  of  the seventeenth century. In fact, this is not a question of  mere genealogy, for it directly concerns the overall interpretation of  occasionalism and the identification of  its genuine philosophical core. In  traditional scholarship, the reference to Descartes as the forerunner of  occasionalism went hand in hand with the presentation of  this doctrine as a response to the new challenges of  substantial dualism. Descartes’s claim that mind and body are two distinct substances that have no common features is often mentioned as a good reason for maintaining that Cartesian philosophy paved the way for occasionalism. Of  course, it would be difficult to deny that affirming the absolute heterogeneity of  thought and matter raised the problem of  accounting for their interaction. 9

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Fénelon’s recourse to occasionalism, for instance, is introduced along these lines.5 From this perspective, it seems very plausible that the secret of  the success of  occasionalism was Cartesian dualism, with its deeply anti-interactionist consequences.6 However, the picture of  occasionalism as simply a response to the mind–body problem may have its roots not so much in the internal history of  the doctrine as in late-seventeenth- and earlyeighteenth-century debates on Leibniz’s system of  pre-established harmony and its asserted or denied superiority over the system of  occasional causes in explaining the union of  soul and body.7 These debates, along with the influence in Germany of  Clauberg’s quasi-occasionalist account of  the soul–body union,8 strongly conditioned the German reception of  occasionalism. In the long-dominant Wolffian school, occasionalism was presented along with physical influx and pre-established harmony as one of  the only three “systems” or hypotheses available for saving both dualism and the phenomenon of  “mind–body commerce”.9 Although both Bilfinger and Wolff  were well aware 5  Cf. François de Salignac de la Mothe-Fénelon, Démonstration de l’existence de Dieu, in Œuvres, edited by Jacques Le Brun, Paris, Gallimard, 1997, II, p. 550. 6  See Rainer Specht, Commercium mentis et corporis. Über Kausalvorstellungen im Cartesianismus, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1966. 7  Even François Lamy’s adoption of  occasionalism as an account of  the otherwise inexplicable soul-body union (cf. Fred Ablondi, “François Lamy, Occasionalism, and the Mind-Body Problem”, Journal of  the History of  Philosophy, XLVI [2008], pp.  619–629) belongs to this historical context. As is well known, Lamy was among the first to refute pre-established harmony. Cf. Leibniz, Réponse aux Objections contre le Systeme de l’harmonie préétablie qui se trouvent dans le livre de la Connoissance de soy-même, in Die philosophischen Schriften, edited by Carl Immanuel Gerhardt, Berlin, Weidemann, 1875–1890, vol. IV, pp. 590–595. 8 Cf.  Johann Clauberg, Corporis et animae in homine conjunctio, in Opera omnia philosophica, vol. I, Amstelodami, 1691 (repr. Hildesheim, Olms, 1968), pp.  209–276. On German Cartesianism, see Francesco Trevisani, Descartes in Germania. La ricezione del cartesianesimo nella Facoltà filosofica e medica di Duisburg (1652–1703), Milano, Franco Angeli, 1992. 9 See especially Georg Bernhard Bilfinger, De harmonia animi et corporis humani, maxime praestabilita, ex mente illustris Leibnitii, commentatio hypothetica, Francofurti et Lipsiae, 1723, §§  64–85; Bilfinger, Dilucidationes philosophicae de Deo, anima humana, mundo, et generalibus rerum affectionibus, Tubingae, 1725, §§  333–335; and Christian Wolff, Psycho-

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of  the wider scope of  occasionalism, which aimed at denying any efficacy to secondary causes,10 in the wake of  Leibniz they mainly focused on the denial of  mind–body interaction and on the role ascribed to God’s miraculous assistance. A similar focus was consequently adopted also by the then-nascent German historiography of  philosophy.11 In the mid-nineteenth century, mind–body issues still played the most prominent role in Bouillier’s influential reconstruction of  post-Cartesian occasionalism.12 Later, this became the received view not only in textbooks and general histories of  philosophy, but also in some areas of  specialized scholarship.13 Albeit prima facie appealing, this interpretation has its limits when it comes to accounting for the extreme generality of  the occasionalist denial of  causal interactionism; for it is more difficult to maintain that a doctrine originally intended to solve the early modern mind–body problem (be it “our” mind–body logia rationalis, methodo scientifica pertractata, Francofurti et Lipsiae, 1734, §§ 589–541. 10   See, for instance, Bilfinger, De harmonia animi et corporis humani, § 72: “Dicitur hoc Systema occasionale, quoniam secundis agentibus sive caussis virtus omnis activa, sive ex se illam, sive ex divina communicatione habeant, penitus denegatur”. 11  See e.g. Johann Jacob Brucker, Historia critica philosophiae, vol. IV/2, Lipsiae, 1744, p. 266, p. 592, who accordingly mentions La Forge as the first author of  the system of  occasional causes. 12  Francisq  ue Bouillier, Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne, 2  vols, Paris–Lyon, 1854. 13  See the remarks and bibliographical references by Steven Nadler, “The Occasionalism of  Louis de la Forge”, in Causation in Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Steven Nadler, University Park (PA), Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993, pp.  57–73, 72–73; and Nadler, “Occasionalism and the Mind-Body Problem”, in Studies in Seventeenth-Century European Philosophy, edited by Michael Alexander Stewart, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp.  75–95. Among twentieth-century studies that endorse this perspective, Nadler refers to Richard A. Watson, The Breakdown of  Cartesian Metaphysics, Atlantic Highlands (NJ), Humanities Press International, 1987; and Daisie Radner, Malebranche: A  Study of  a Cartesian System, Assen, Van Gorcum, 1978, pp.  10–12. Further noteworthy examples can be found especially in Clauberg scholarship – which is quite understandable, given the very limited scope of  Clauberg’s occasionalism. See, for instance, Albert G. A. Balz, “Clauberg and the Development of  Occasionalism”, in Cartesian Studies, New York, Columbia University Press, 1951, pp.  158–194; and Winfried Weier, “Der Okkasionalismus des Johannes Clauberg und sein Verhältnis zu Descartes, Geulincx, Malebranche”, Studia Car­tesiana, II (1981), pp. 43–62.

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problem or something comparable to it) was then further applied to all domains of  reality and eventually transformed into a total denial of  the causal efficacy of  all finite beings. At least, no convincing story has been advanced so far to explain this alleged shift from “local” to “global” occasionalism. The growing awareness of  this difficulty is certainly one of  the main reasons for the substantial reassessment that occasionalism has undergone in recent years.14 Many scholars have shifted the focus of  their investigations from the mind–body problem to body–body issues or even to the problem of  causation as such. Indeed, the very arguments used by occasionalists to deny real causation among material entities are so specific to the domain of  bodies that they could hardly be considered a by-product of  the reflection on the relationship between body and mind. As a result, occasionalism now appears less and less a cheap solution to the mind-problem and more and more a family of  theories on causality, which share the fundamental claim that God is the only real causal agent. On the other hand, such a reframing of  occasionalism in the context of  the broader philosophical problem of  causality has raised with more force and relevance the question of  its connection with early modern thought. If  seventeenth-century occasionalism is not an entirely new doctrine but rather represents the most spectacular emer14  Occasionalism has so far been the subject of  important but nonetheless infrequent studies. Despite the growing interest in occasionalism on the part of  historians of  philosophy and science, the number of  book-length contributions entirely devoted to this topic is still very limited. Recent monographs and collections of  studies include Nadler (ed.), Causation in Early Modern Philosophy; Nadler (ed.), Occasionalism: Causation among the Cartesians, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010; Dominik Perler and Ulrich Rudolph, Occasionalismus, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 2000. Among the shorter expositions see Radner, “Occasionalism”, in The Renaissance and Seventeenth Century Rationalism, edited by George Henry Radcliffe Parkinson, London, Routledge, 1993, pp. 320–352; Jean-Christophe Bardout, “Occasionalism: La Forge, Cordemoy, Geulincx”, in A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, edited by Steven Nadler, Boston, Blackwell, 2002; and Sukjae Lee, “Occasionalism”, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, URL = . On the metaphysics of  causality, an important contribution is offered by Vincent Carraud, Causa sive ratio. La raison de la cause, de Suarez à Leibniz, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 2002 (see especially ch. IV, on Malebranche and occasional causes).

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gence of  “perennial” occasionalism, why did this phenomenon take place precisely in the post-Cartesian era? The present volume aims to establish and further develop this innovative trend in research by asking anew what substan­ tive reasons prompted philosophers to adopt occasionalism and why it was only in the early modern period that they finally coalesced so as to form a coherent and widely accepted system. A preliminary step towards answering these questions consists in ascertaining and analyzing the various ways in which different authors conceived of  the scope and limits of  occasionalism. Once our consideration is free from the privilege traditionally attributed to the mind–body problem, we might discover that “occasionalism” should properly be inflected in the plural.15 This is primarily because of  the impressive variety of  arguments used to support the key claim that God is the only efficient cause. There seems to be no single set of  arguments for occasionalism that is unanimously upheld by all its supporters, so that occasionalism appears to be motivated by different and sometimes radically divergent reasons in each case. For instance, Cordemoy’s arguments are only partially in keeping with Malebranche, and this could reveal some more fundamental divergence in their respective motivations for endorsing occasionalism. The circumstance that the same key claim was in fact adopted for a variety of  mutually independent reasons complicates or, let us say, enriches our picture of  a phenomenon that the singular label “occasionalism” tends to present as uniform and internally consistent. As shown by the essays collected here, this new awareness of  the wide range of  justifications invoked to support occasionalism makes the question of  the authentic roots of  this doctrine and its specifically “modern” component even more legitimate and intriguing. Descartes still appears as a key figure in the process of  depriving finite beings of  all their causal powers, but his role is no longer restricted to the imposition of  mind–body dualism. Indeed, the followers of  Descartes appear from the beginning 15  As reads the title of  an article by Delphine Kolesnik-Antoine, “Les occasionalismes en France à l’âge classique. Le ‘cas’ arnaldien”, Revue de métaphysique et de morale, XLIX (2006), pp. 41–54.

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to have trouble admitting causal interactions among material beings, for reasons that are specific to the domain of  bodies and different from those used to rule out mind–body causation. Sometimes, as in the case of  the transmission of  motion, one even has the impression that causal relations among heterogeneous substances are deemed problematic because this is how causal relations among homogeneous beings appear, and not the reverse. The paradigmatic function assumed by body–body contact in the construction of  a metaphysics of  causality could turn out to be the decisive and specifically early modern factor that determines the sudden success of  occasionalism. If  we compare the versions of  Islamic occasionalism confronted by Thomas Aquinas with early modern Christian versions of  the doctrine, we notice both striking similarities and differences. As for the similarities, they mostly pertain to the theological background. Both Medieval and modern occasionalisms share a radical conception of  God’s omnipotence, which has always been suspected of  threatening the autonomy and moral responsibility of  finite beings. On the other hand, the most salient differences concern the systematic recourse to scientific or science-inspired justifications that characterize only modern formulations of  the doctrine. Two examples may suffice. First, it is only in early modern and specifically Malebranchian occasionalism that the concept of  the law of  nature assumes a central role in the account of  divine causation. Second, the traditional but problematic interpretation of  continuous creation as recreation can be recast in a new, “scientific” framework in virtue of  the connection established by Descartes between continuous creation and the laws of  nature. Thus, if  post-Cartesian occasionalism is a typically modern phenomenon, its “modernity” is to some important extent an outcome of  modern science.16 However, this is not the whole story, as the alliance with physical science is not by itself  sufficient to explain every aspect 16  Walter Ott, Causation and Laws of  Nature in Early Modern Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009; Andrew Platt, “Divine Activity and Motive Power in Descartes’s Physics”, British Journal for the History of  Philosophy, XIX (2011), pp. 623–646 and 849–871; and Thomas M. Lennon, “Occasionalism and the Cartesian Metaphysics of  Motion”, Canadian Journal of  Philosophy, suppl. 1 (1974), pp. 29–40.

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INTRODUCTION

of  the modern success of  occasionalism. We should also take into serious consideration Malebranche’s proud claim to represent the real and radical break not only with paganism as such but also with the pagan theoretical remains that survived in traditional Christian philosophy; for it is such an anti-pagan mission that makes it possible to fully grasp the historical situation of  modern occasionalism in the long-term perspective that relates to its theological roots. Indeed, a further outcome of  the studies collected here is the confirmation that the goals and aspirations that animate the various trends of  occasionalism are far from being harmonious with one another. On the one hand, if  occasionalism can take advantage of  the connection between continuous creation and the Cartesian deduction of  the laws of  nature, it is only by subscribing to the project of  a mechanist foundation of  physics in God’s attributes. On the other hand, some occasionalists appear committed to a sort of  intelligentdesign worldview, which is precisely the kind of  cosmogonic picture challenged by Descartes with his investigation of  the origin, order, and functioning of  the universe. Each of  these two rival traditions has its modern advocates, but it is possible to find both of  them assumed by one and the same author. Once again, the case of  Malebranche is emblematic. This unprecedented association of  teleology and mechanism offers a hint of  the real enemy of  occasionalism and the polemic force that pervades many occasionalist works. The target of  these authors is Renaissance vitalism and in general all the various historical manifestations (from Aristotle to the modern medical tradition) of  a tendency that Malebranche deems essential to paganism, namely the tendency to ascribe autonomy and causal powers to nature. Thus, no reconstruction of  the rise and development of  early modern occasionalism would be complete without mentioning that its success is also to be understood as a reaction to the recent, mighty revival of  this rival theory in both its moderate and extreme versions, which upheld the independence of  natural agents from divine control and the outright divinization of  nature, respectively. In spite of  their rejection of  pagan philosophy, occasionalists are not entirely free from links to ancient sources. On the contrary, some of  them still draw on various pre-Christian 15

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views. In  particular, this is true of  the claim that nature must be conceived not as a self-sufficient or self-directed entity but as governed by a higher intelligence that remains distinct from it, for this claim unequivocally reveals the deep Platonic core of  occasionalism. However, this commitment to Platonism has two specific implications. On the one hand, it joins forces with the scientific revolution and provides new “metaphysical” fuel for the well-known anti-Aristotelian attitude displayed by modern science. On the other hand, it openly contradicts the anti-teleological teachings of  Descartes himself. For too long we have been thinking of  occasionalism as a wholly and exclusively Cartesian movement. What we discover is that, in fact, the occasionalist philosophy of  nature was also able to harbor some radically anti-Cartesian ideas. In light of  the above considerations, the early modern age, with all its undeniable peculiarities, appears as the scene of  an epochal showdown between the partisans of  the autonomy of  nature and those of  divine omnipotence. Thus, both the occasionalist and anti-occasionalist fronts deserve careful consideration – but also in order to avoid hasty simplifications and to recognize both the inner conceptual intricacy of  the topics discussed and the refinement attained by early modern argumentative strategies. Indeed, in spite of  this clear opposition of  the two main fronts, the range of  positions actually held by their respective supporters is very wide. This book aims to provide a detailed map of  this complex landscape, with a special focus on the doctrines and debates of  seventeenth-century philosophers. These include not only canonical authors such as Cordemoy, La Forge, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Leibniz, but also historical figures such as Clauberg, Clerselier, Fénelon, Jean Fernel, Pierre-Sylvain Régis, and Henricus Regius, who are less frequently mentioned in the history of  occasionalism. This is not, however, the only period covered. The reader can also find in-depth investigations of  further crucial but largely ignored periods in the history of  occasionalism, such as the treatment of  causality by occasionalist-minded Arabic philosophers (in the first place, al-Ghazali); the remote sources of  the principle that causal agency implies knowledge of  the means of  the action; the influence exerted by some Scholastic doctrines on the early 16

INTRODUCTION

modern reflection on secondary causes; Malebranche’s impact on later thinkers such as Berkeley and Hume; and the post-Leibnizian reconstruction of  occasionalism that took hold during the early German Enlightenment. Furthermore, the interest in studying occasionalism transcends both the temporal horizon of  the seventeenth century and the limits of  purely historical exegesis, for at least some of  the theoretical issues raised and discussed at the time also influenced later philosophical developments and are still present in current debates, such as post-Humean reflections in the metaphysics of  causality. The present volume aims to improve our understanding of  this fascinating part of  our history without renouncing the contribution of  philosophically committed perspectives, in the belief  that a plurality of  approaches may reveal more of  the complex phenomenon that occasionalism represents.

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I.

GOD AND THE WORLD

CECILIA MARTINI BONADEO

GOD’S Q UDRA (POWER) AND NATURAL CAUSALITY: BETWEEN FALSAFA AND ISLAMIC OCCASIONALISM

Islamic Occasionalism, according to which only God can be considered the sole agent and the only necessary cause of  everything in the world and every secondary cause must be rejected, offers contrary arguments with respect to those elaborated in the Arabic philosophical thought which is the core of  my studies. From al-Kindī in the IX century to the Averroistic and post Avicennian traditions in the XIII century, the falāsifa focused on the basic original agreement of  Aristotle’s Metaphysics with the assumptions of  the Platonic theology of  Timaeus, i.e. causation, and aimed to analyze the nature of  the first cause, and its relationship with the more or less numerous secondary causes. According to the first teacher (almu‘allim al-awwal), Aristotle, to know a thing, means to know its causes. Hence in falāsifa’s opinion, causation is needed in order for man to have access to a rationalist knowledge of  the truth. I would like to divide my paper into two sections: i. on a brief  general account about the development of  Islamic speculative theology (kalām) and in particular on the mutakallimūn’s dispute on the causal power of  God and his relationship to the world; ii. on the analysis of  al-Ġazālī’s The Incoherence of  the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-falāsifa), mas’ala XVII, entitled On causality and miracles, the closest comparison between the assumptions of  the Islamic Occasionalism and the natural causality described by the falāsifa, probably one of  the most studied text in the history of  Islamic-Arabic Philosophy and Theology, and the one which received Occasionalism. From Metaphysics to Science, ed. by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano, Turnhout, Brepols, 2018 (DESCARTES, 2), pp.  21–40    FHG    10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.114986

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the most divergent interpretations in the classic and recent bibliography.1

I. Islamic Occasionalism finds its origins in the theological discussions about one of  the most important attribute of  God, God’s power (qudra).2 In the Koran God, who is in his essence one and indivisible, does not fail to manifest himself  to creatures with a multiplicity of  names (asma’) which arise from his relationship with the Creation. Through these names God makes himself  known to the creatures. The theologians derive from these names the Divine attributes (s. ifāt) and divide them in those, which refer to God’s transcendence (such as wuğūd-Existence; qidam-Eternity; baqāʿ-Permanence; muḫalafa Divine Dissimilarity to Created Things) and those, which are related to God’s actions (such as qudra-Power; irāda-Will; ‘ilm-Knowledge; hayat-Life; kalām-Speech and so on).3 In  the Koran God’s power is said to be over everything (inna Allāha ʻalā kulli šay’in qadīrun): see for example Koran, The Cow, 2.106 “Know do not that God is powerful over everything?”,4 but there are many similar statements in 2.20, 3.26, 14.27; 22.14, 29.20; 36.82, 57.1–2, 65.12, 85.16. From all these kinds of  statements the thesis derives that God is the only cause of  everything. With some exceptions the Islamic theologians hold that God recreates at

  Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique by Averroes and Aquinas, London, Allen & Unwin, 1958. Dominik Perler and Ulrich Rudolph, Occasionalismus. Theorien der Kausalität im arabisch-islamischen und im europäischen Denken, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000 (Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Göttingen, PhilologischHistorische Klasse, Folge 3, Nr. 235), in particular pp. 71–73 where Rudolph critically presents the different interpretations of  al-Ġazālī’s text. 2  Olga Lizzini, “Occasionalismo e causalità filosofica: la discussione della causalità in al-Ġazālī”, Q uaestio, II (2002), pp. 155–183. 3 Cf.  Zeki Saritoprak, “Allah”, in The Q  ur’an: An Enciclopedia, edited by Oliver Leaman, London-New York, Routledge, 2006, pp.  33–41. Daniel Gimaret, Les noms divins en Islam, exégèse lexicographie et théologique, Paris, Les éditions du Cerf, 1988 (Patrimoines. Islam, 2). 4  The Koran Interpreted, translation by Arthur John Arberry, New York, Simon & Schuster, 19962. 1

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every moment the world, which is composed of  atoms and accidents through which the atoms differ from one another.5 From the perspective of  the historical development of  the theological Islamic tradition, as rightly pointed out by many scholars, the first important moment occurred during the first centuries of  the ʿAbbāsid caliphate, approximately between VIII and IX centuries, when many translations of  philosophical texts from Greek into Arabic were made.6 The need to translate Greek philosophical texts was the result of  both the Muslim conquest of  the regions of  the Eastern Roman Empire, whose intellectual life was well developed, and of  the political and religious situation of  the Muslim world between the VIII and IX centuries. The ʿAbbāsid caliphate endorsed Muʿtazilite theology,7 namely, the first attempt to check Islamic dogma against human rationality: the caliph al-Maʾmūn, raised it to a State doctrine in 827. Muʿtazilite theology had five doctrinal tenets: 8 1. the oneness of  God and the subsequent negative theology; 2. the creation of  the Koran in time (the holy book, manifold 5   Abdelhamid  I. Sabra, “Kalam Atomism As an Alternative Philosophy to Hellenizing Falsafa”, in Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy. From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of  Richard M. Frank, edited by James E. Montgomery, Leuven, Peeters, 2006 (Orientalia Lovaniensa Analecta, 152), pp. 199–272. 6 Cf. Gerhard Endress, “Die Wissenschaften”, in Grundriß der Arabischen Philologie, edited by Wolfdietrich Fischer, Wiesbaden, Reichert Verlag, 1992, Band III Supplement, pp. 1–152; Dimitri Gutas, Greek Thought, Arabic Culture. The Graeco-Arabic Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early ʿAbbasid Society (2nd–4th/8th–10th centuries), London-New York, Routledge, 1998. 7  On Mu‘tazilite theology and its founder Wāṣil ibn ‘Aṭā’ (d. 748 or 749) see Albert N. Nader, Le système philosophique des Mu‘tazila (premiers penseurs de l’Islam), Beyrout, Les Lettres Orientales, 1956; Daniel Gimaret, “Mu‘tazila”, in The Encyclopaedia of  Islam, New Edition, edited by Peri J. Bearman et al., Leiden, Brill, 1993, VII, pp. 783–793; Richard C. Martin, Mark R. Woodward, and Dwi  S. Atmaja, Defenders of  Reason in Islam: Mu‘tazilism from Medieval School to Modern Symbol, Oxford, Oneworld, 1997. On the different trends of  the Mu‘tazilites teachers see Joseph van Ess, Une lecture à rebours de l’histoire du Mu‘tazilisme, Paris, Librairie orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1984. The reference text on this religious movement and thought is Joseph van Ess, Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert Hidschra: eine Geschichte des religiösen Denkens im frühen Islam, I–VI, Berlin, W. de Gruyter, 1991–1997. 8  Georges Chehata Anawati, “La teologia islamica medievale”, in Storia della Teologia, a cura di Giu­lio D’Ono­frio, Casale Monferrato Piemme, 1996, vol. I., pp. 591–668.

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in its parts and inherent in a particular historical moment, can not be considered the very nature of  God and co-eternal with him) and the subsequent possible exegesis of  the Koran by Muʿtazilite theologians; 3. divine justice (ʻadl), according to which God wants the true good, ordered towards an end established by Him; evil is produced by human beings, as well as the good on the other hand, because he is the creator of  all his actions, both good and evil. Indeed, the human being produces his own actions, thoughts, volitions and bodily movements with complete freedom.9 He will necessarily receive a reward for his good deeds and punishment for the evil; 4. the doctrine of  the promise and the threat (waʻd wa-l-waʻīd), i.e. the different eternal destination of  the believers, the sinners and the infidels; and 5. the respect of  the divine order of  commanding the good and forbidding the evil (al-amr bi l-maʻruf  wa l-nahy ʻan al-munkar). In  addition, the second important moment of  theological development within the Islamic tradition occurred with al-Ašʻarī (d.  935), the founder of  Ašʻarite school, born in Baṣra in 873 and, for about forty years, a follower of  al-Ğubbā‘ī, the leader of  the Muʿtazilites. Al-Ašʻarī, after an enthusiastic adhesion to the Muʿtazilite theology, began to critically consider it.10 According to some traditions he was illuminated by a dream in which the Prophet Muḥammad urged him to leave the Muʿtazilite theology for the true doctrine; according to other traditions he found al-Ğubbā‘ī weak in terms of  argumentation on the problem of  divine justice and the human being’s freedom: does human action limit divine power? 11 According to al-Ašʻarī’s doctrine God has all the power and He creates also the power (kasb) by which the human being performs each of  its actions.12

9  See Richard Frank, “The Autonomy of  the Human Agent in the Teaching of  ʿAbd al-Ğabbār”, Le Muséon, XCV (1982), pp. 323–355. 10  Daniel Gimaret, La doctrine d’al-Ash‘arī, Paris, Les éditions du Cerf, 1988 (Patrimoines. Islam). 11  Daniel Gimaret, Théories de l’acte humain en théologie musulmane, Paris, Vrin, 1980 (Études musulmanes, 24). 12 See Richard Frank, “The Structure of  Created Causality according to al-Ash‘ari”, Studia Islamica, XXV (1966), pp. 13–76.

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Al-Ašʻarī, and after him al-Baqillānī (d.  1013), gave complete formulation to the Ašʻarite “philosophy of  nature”.13 The atomism in the Ašʻarite school seemed to be the perfect doctrine to save the dogma of  the absolute power of  God, the sole agent. According to the Ašʻarite school the creation is made of  indivisible atoms (al-ğawāhir al-afrād). To exist every atom must have an accident (ʿarāḍ). Juxtaposed atoms give rise to the substance which is always material (ğism muʾallaf ). The atoms are contingent as the accidents; consequently the bodies, which are formed by atoms, are contingent too. The bodies are created directly by God, starting from their atoms and accidents, and they are created in every single moment, because their existence lasts only one instant. It follows that there is always a beginning of  things, and creation ex nihilo is therefore established. An opposite accident corresponds to every accident; two opposites accidents cannot coexist, but nothing prevents that an accident whatever follows any other accident, because among them there is not any necessary connection, any necessary sequence, nor intrinsic relationship. As stated by Georges Anawati, it is only at the price of  this hard Occasionalism that Ašʻarite theologians, driven by an apologetic concern, think they can save the divine omnipotence. Of  course the first consequence of  this atomism is that there is no law of  nature that derives from stable nature in the Aristotelian sense: God is not bound to laws of  nature. If  there are certain habits/patterns in the succession of  accidents, these are not at all determined: God can at any moment break up these habits, and He can replace an accident with another. This is the case of  a miracle. There is no causality, 13  It is well known the passage in Muqaddima of  Ibn Ḫaldūn, the Tunisian socio-historian of  the XIV century where we read: “He (i.e. al-Baqillānī as leader of  the Ašʻarite school) affirmed, for instance, the existence of  the atom (al-jawhar al-fard) and of  the vacuum. He made statements such as ‘An accident cannot sustain another accident’, and ‘An accident does not persist two moments’.” (Ibn Khaldûn, The Muqaddimah. An Introduction to History, translated from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal, Princeton, N.J., Princeton University Press, 19802, vol. III, pp. 50–51). Richard J. McCarthy, who edited and also translated some of  al-Baqillānī’s texts suggested that this testimony has to be read with caution because atomism was keenly discussed by the Muslim scholastic theologians long before al-Baqillānī: see Richard  J. McCarthy, “al-Bakillānī”, in Encyclopaedia of  Islam. New Edition, edited by Peri J. Bearman et al., Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1960, vol. I, p. 959.

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but simple succession, and we can say that all that is conceivable is also possible on the same basis.14 To sum up, Islamic Occasionalism in the complete formulation that the kalām gave of  it at first with al-Ašʻarī, and then with al-Baqillānī and al-Ğuwaynī (d.  1085) limits agency to God alone: God is the only one cause, God’s power cannot be limited by anything and for God nothing is impossible. Ulrich Rudolph, in his fundamental volume devoted to the analysis of  the origins of  Islamic Occasionalism and its developments, derives from this main doctrine four theses.15 i. Any other cause must be rejected: Ašʻarite mutakallimūn target the Aristotelian tenet that the natural elements and bodies have causal power in virtues of  their specific natures. There isn’t any true potentiality outside God. ii. For the same reason no causal power can be ascribed to human beings: it is God who creates in the human being a specific temporary power to act through which the human being generates a specific action at a particular time. That action belongs to that human being only temporarily. iii. What happens arises from the habit of  God and, therefore, God can at any moment break up this habit (ḫarq al-ʻāda), and He can intervene in the usual course of  things by replacing an accident with another. The divine intervention is guaranteed also by the fact that God can act in contrast with his habit (ḫilāf  al-ʻāda). The miracle is nothing but breaking the habit. iv. The accidents have a punctual duration, and they need to be created anew every moment because everything in every moment depends from God the Almighty.

II. As well known, the closest comparison between the assumptions of  the Islamic Occasionalism and the causality described by the falāsifa is in al-Ġazālī’s The Incoherence of  the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-falāsifa), mas’ala XVII, entitled On causality and miracles. Few texts have been so celebrated in the history of  Islamic-Arabic Philosophy and Theology and have received   Anawati, “La teologia islamica medievale”, pp. 31–33.   Perler–Rudolph, Occasionalismus, pp.  59–60; Lizzini, “Occasionalismo e causalità filosofica”, p. 155. 14 15

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such divergent interpretations.16 The main problem concerning this text is to decide whether al-Ġazālī (d. 1111), the great philosopher and theologian of  the Ašʻarite school, is a supporter of  a “theological” solution to the problem of  causality according to the lines of  the Ašʻarite thought as stated in some interpretations such as in Marmura’s studies,17 or is he a supporter of  a thesis that sympathizes with Neoplatonism and reinterprets the causality of  the falāsifa, first of  all of  Avicenna’s necessarianism, without denying it as suggested by other studies until the more recent ones by McGinnis and Griffel.18 The mas’ala XVII opens with a famous passage where al-Ġazālī presents the so-called “no necessary connection” argument and seems at first glance to present a thesis in complete agreement with tenet iii. of  the Ašʻarite doctrine. “The connection (al-iqtirām) between what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary (ḍarūryan), according to us. But [with] any two things, where ‘this’ is not ‘that’ and ‘that’ is not ‘this’ and where neither the affirmation of  the one entails the affirmation of  the other nor the negation of  the one entails the negation of  the other, it is not a necessity of  the existence (wuğūd) of  the one that the other should exist, and it is not a necessity of  the nonexistence (ʻadam) of  the one that the other should not exist – for example, the quenching of  thirst and drinking, satiety and eating, burning and contact with fire, light and the appearance of  the sun, death and decapitation, healing and the drinking of  medicine, the 16  For the history of  studies on this text and a brief, but accurate survey of  all the different scholars’ opinions see Perler–Rudolph, Occasionalismus, pp. 71–73; Lizzini, “Occasionalismo e causalità filosofica”, pp. 155–183. 17 See Michael Marmura, “Al-Ghazālī’s Second Causal Theory in the 17th Discussion of  His Tahāfut”, in Islamic Philosophy and Misticism, edited by Parviz Morewedge, Delmar, N.Y., Caravan Book, pp. 85–112. 18  William  J. Courtenay, “The Critique on Natural Causality in the Mutakallimun and Nominalism”, Harvard Theological Review, LXVI (1973), pp.  77–94; Lenn  E. Goodman, “Did al-Ghazālī deny Causality?”, Studia Isla­mica, XLVII (1978), pp.  83–120; Ian Alon, “Al-Ghazali’s on Causality”, Journal of  the American Oriental Society, C (1980), pp.  397–405; Rudolph, Occasionalismus; Jon McGinnis, “Occasionalism, Natural Causation and Science in al-Ghazālī”, in Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy, pp. 441–463; Frank Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology, New York, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 123–234.

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purging of  the bowels and the using of  a purgative, and so on to [include] all [that] is observable among connected things in medicine, astronomy, arts, and crafts. Their connection is due to the prior decree (taqdīr) of  God, who creates them one alongside the other (ʻalā al-tasāwuq),19 not to its being necessary in itself  (ḍarūrī fī nafsi-hi), incapable of  separation. On the contrary, it is within divine power (fī l-maqdūr) to create satiety without eating, to create death without decapitation, to continue life after decapitation, and so on to all connected things. The philosophers denied the possibility of  [this] and claimed it to be impossible”.20

God habitually creates two concomitant events, which seems to us to be in a sequence and He creates a confidence in us that this habitual sequence will continue. But its continuation depends on Gods’ command (taqdīr): He can break this habit or act in contrast with it. The examples are those which the philosophers believe to be the natural causality of  everyday life experience and the causality of  human beings’s actions (see the reference to arts and crafts). When we take two things, which do not imply one another because they are ontologically distinct, the connection of  what we consider the cause between them and of  what we consider the effect is not necessary in itself  and so can be ruled out. The two things merely coexist, but, for example, the effect can exist without the cause. For instance, a contact between fire and cotton is possible without burning, and it is possible that cotton becomes burnt ashes without fire. If  the philosophers consider this connection necessary in itself  it is because they maintain the logical necessity between what is truly a cause and what is truly its effect. Al-Ġazālī considers the causal connection 19 Cf.  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of  the Philosophers: A  Parallel English-Arabic Text, translated, introduced, and annotated by Michael  M. Marmura, Provo, Utah Brigham Young University Press, 2000, p. 240 note 3: “ʻAlā al-tasāwuq: ‘side by side’ or ‘one alongside the other’, but not ‘one following the other’ and not ‘in a successive order’. What al-Ghazālī is talking about is concomitance, where the priority is not temporal. His critique is of  Avicennian concept of  essential cause, where cause and effect are simultaneous”. On the contrary Rudolph, Occasionalismus, p. 74, translates “nacheinander”; Lizzini, “Occasionalismo e causalità filosofica”, p. 160 and note 19, translates “in connessione con”. 20  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of  the Philosophers, p. 166.1–12 (the English translation is partially modified).

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necessary only between God and creation: no cause other than God can necessitate its effect. Al-Ġazālī goes on in his discussion following three subsequent steps. First al-Ġazālī proceeds to a radical confutation of  natural causality. The philosophers maintain that the agent of  the burning is the fire alone, which is an agent by nature and not by choice, that is to say it is incapable of  refraining from acting according to its nature. Al-Ġazālī replies: “The one who enacts the burning by creating blackness in the cotton, causing separation in its parts and making it cinder or ashes is God, either through the mediation of  his angels or without mediation. As for fire,21 which is inanimate, it has no action. For what proof  is there that it is the agent [of  the burning cotton]?” 22

The philosophers have no proof  (dalīl) other than the observation of  the simultaneity and concomitance of  burning and fire: there is burning when there is contact, not because there is contact. Observation, as sense perception, does not give any testimony of  the causal connection between the two. That something exists in concomitance with a thing does not prove that it exist because of  that thing. Al-Ġazālī makes two examples. Let us read the second, which is related to vision according to the Aristotelian intromission theory: “If  a person blind from birth, who has a film on his eyes and who has never heard from people the difference between night and day, were to have the film cleared from his eyes in daytime, [then] open his eyelids and see colors, [such a person] would believe that the agent [causing] the apprehension of  the forms of  the colors in his eyes is the opening of  his sight and that, as long as sight is sound, [his eyes] opened, the film removed, and the individual in front of  him having color, it follow necessarily that would see, it being incomprehensible that he would not see. When, however, the sun

21  On the possible influences in al-Ġazālī of  Greek scepticism’s discussion on whether fire has a burning nature see Richard Sorabji, Time, Creation and the Continuum, Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages, Chicago, University of  Chicago Press, 20062, pp. 300–302. 22  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of  the Philosophers, p. 167.7–9.

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sets and the atmosphere becomes dark, he would then know that it is sunlight that is the cause for the imprinting of  the colors in his sight”.23

In  commenting this passage Rudolph observes that al-Ġazālī criticizes sense perception as a proof  for causal connections and natural laws, two basic assumptions of  Aristotle’s philosophy of  nature and he states the necessity of  “a cause beyond what we observe”.24 This is the reason why the most insightful philosophers (al-muḥaqqiqūn) have agreed on the bestower of  form (wāhib al-ṣuwwar; dator formarum), which is one of  the angel, and said: “The imprinting of  the form of  color in the eye comes from the bestower of  forms, the sun’s appearance, the healthy pupil and the colored body being only ‘readiers’ and preparers for the receptacle’s acceptance of  these forms”.25   Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of  the Philosophers, pp. 167.20–168.5.   Rudolph, Occasionalismus, p. 79. 25  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of  the Philosophers, p.  168.14–16. Olga Lizzini states that Avicenna’s doctrine here is not reported properly, because in Avicenna it is the intelligible and not the image to be received from the dator formarum (Lizzini, “Occasionalismo e causalità filosofica”, p.  167, note 44); Marmura goes further and observes that in Avicenna the wāhib al-ṣuwwar, usually the active intellect, bestows forms on matter, but Marmura adds that Avicenna’s discussion in his Metaphysics, however, pertains to ontology, not to epistemology. He wrote “Though it is true that, in Avicenna’s epistemology, the human rational soul receives forms from the active intellect, these are the intelligibles, not the particulars perceived by the senses. These latter are caused by the particulars of  sense. If  al-Ghazālī’s statement above is intended as referring to an Avicennian causal theory, this would not be accurate. If  al-Ghazālī did not have Avicenna in mind, where did he get this idea? Were there philosophers advocating such a view, which would be quite close to occasionalism? Averroës does not shed much light on this question” (Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of  the Philosophers, pp. 240–241, note 8). I think that the source could be the Letter on the Intellect by al-Fārābī where not only he states that when the light of  the Sun, a metaphor of  the Active Intellect, comes about in vision, the forms of  visible things come about in it, but he writes: “These forms are indivisible in the Active Intellect but divisible in matter. It is absolutely undeniable that the Active Intellect, which is indivisible or which is itself  indivisible things, gives matter the images (ašbāh) of  what is in its substance, but matter receives it as something divisible. […] Or we might say that all of  these forms are in the Active Intellect potentially, but when we say ‘potentially’ here, one should not understand it in the sense that the Active Intellect has the Potentiality to receive these forms so that they would be in it in the future, We mean instead that it has a potentiality to put them in matter as forms, where this is the potentiality 23 24

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Al-Ġazālī passes to the second step of  his discussion describing the solution of  those philosophers, i.e. the falāsifa of  ArabicIslamic tradition, in primis Avicenna, who ascribe to divine causality the primary role, but who assign to the natural world the capacity to contribute to the effects produced by the divine causality. “The second position belongs to those who admit that these temporal events emanate (tafiḍu) from the principles of  temporal events but that the preparation for the reception of  the forms comes about through these present, observed causes – except that these principles are also [such that] things proceed from them necessarily and by nature, not by way of  deliberation and choice, in the way [that light] proceeds from the sun, receptacles differing in their reception because of  the differences of  disposition. […]  [In  all this, they maintain that] the principle is one but [that] the influences (aṯār) differ because of  the differences of  the disposition in the receptacle”.26

These falāsifa concede that there is a first agent, but argue that the things of  the world flow from the principle in the different ways in which matter is prepared to receive forms (al-istiʻdād li-qubūli l-ṣuwwar). In  fact, in the world we see multiplicity and yet if  we recognize that the principle is one and that from one derives only the one, then multiplicity must depend on the different dispositions of  matter to receive the one. Al-Ġazālī observes immediately that in this doctrine, divine causality is not free, but rather it is subordinate to natural causality because matter constrains the reception of  one form or another. In this philosophical theory the principle does not choose and so it is actually necessitated. Even the view of  these philosophers thereto act upon something else; for after all it is the Active Intellect that puts them in matter as forms” (alfarabi, Risalat fi’l-‘aql, Texte arabe Intégral en partie inédit, établi par Maurice Bouyges, S.J., Beyrouth Imprimerie Catholique, 1938, pp. 29.6–30.1, 30.8–31.3; al-Fārābī, On the intellect, in Classical Arabic Philosophy. An Anthology of  Sources, translated with Introduction, Notes, and Glossary by Jon McGinnis and David C. Reisman, Indianapolis, IN, Hackett, 2007, pp.  75–76; the English translation is partially modified and the Arabic term is added). 26  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of  the Philosophers, pp. 168.19–23, 169.3–4 (the English translation is partially modified).

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fore limits the divine omnipotence and does not give room to the miracle. Al-Ġazālī makes this conclusion with an example from Koran where God says for the benefit of  the prophet Abraham who was thrown into the flames “O fire, be coolness and safety for Abraham!” (Koran, The Prophets, 21.51).27 “Based on this notion, they denied the falling of  Abraham in the fire without the burning taking place, the fire remaining fire, and claimed that this is only possible by taking the heat out of  the fire – which makes it no longer fire – or by changing the essence and body of  Abraham into a stone or something over which fire has no effect. But neither is this [latter] possible nor is that [former] possible”.28

Here al-Ġazālī introduces the miracle by giving two different solutions to the problem and on these two different solutions there is an open debate among the scholars whether al-Ġazālī is a consistent occasionalist according to the Ašʻarite school or he is not. The first solution is totally in agreement with Ašʻarite’s thought. God acts by choice and voluntarily. For this reason, if  we state that the Agent creates the burning through His will when the piece of  cotton comes into contact with the fire, it becomes possible for Him and conceivable for us that He decides to not create the burning, as in the case of  Abraham. There is no necessary connection between what we consider cause and what we consider effect, because God creates everything from nothing instant by instant. The miracle is only the break of  the habit with respect to which God creates everything. But, to this thesis, al-Ġazālī anticipates the most forceful objection of  the philosophers against his criticism of  natural causality with which they could easily ridicule this solution: in a word created by God instant by instant, everything is unpredictable and man becomes incapable of  knowledge and consequently of  moral action.29 27  The Koran Interpreted, translation by Arthur John Arberry, New York, Simon and Schuster, 19962. 28  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of  the Philosophers, p. 169.8–12 (the English translation is partially modified). 29 On the relation between the Agent and human agency in al-Ġazālī

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“For if  one denies that the effects follow necessarily from their causes and relates them to the will of  their Creator, the will having no specific designated course but [a course that] can vary and change in kind, then let each of  us allow the possibility of  there being in front of  him ferocious beasts, raging fires, high mountains, or enemies ready with their weapons [to kill him], but [also the possibility] that he does not see them because God does not create for him [vision of  them]. And if  someone leaves a book in the house, let him allow as possible its change on his returning home into a beardless slave boy – intelligent, busy with his tasks – or into an animal; or if  he leaves a boy in his house, let him allow the possibility of  his changing into a dog; or [again] if  he leaves ashes, [let him allow] the possibility of  its change into musk; and let him allow the possibility of  stone changing into gold and gold into stone. If  asked about any of  this, he ought to say: – I  do not know what is at the house at present. All I know is that I left a book in the house, which is perhaps now a horse that has defiled the library with its urine and its dung, and that I left in the house a jar of  water, which may well have turned into an apple tree. For God is capable of  everything, and it is not necessary for the horse to be created from the sperm nor the tree to be created from the seed – indeed, it is not necessary for either of  the two to be created from anything. Perhaps [God] has created things that did not exist previously–”.30

Al-Ġazālī’s answer against all the impossibilities (muḥālāt) of  this objection is to imagine that God creates for human beings, through a continuous habit of  occurrences of  phenomena and events, a science according to which some phenomena and events do not happen because this is God’s choice and command (potentia Dei ordinata). In other words, man in front of  all the possible phenomena and events receives from God a science according to which he considers some of  these phenomena and events possible – i.e. actually achievable – and others not. see Thérèse-Anne Druart, “Al-Ghazali’s Conception of  the Agent in the Tahafut and the Iqtisad: Are People Really Agents?”, in Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy: From the Many to the One: Essays in Celebration of  Richard M. Frank, pp. 425–440. 30  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of  the Philosophers, pp. 169.19–170.11.

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So also if there is nothing to prevent a thing being possible, within God’s power (potentia Dei absoluta), by His pre-knowledge God knew that He would not do it at certain times, despite its possibility. And God creates for us the knowledge that He will not create it at that time. Frank Griffel writes: “It is within God’s power to change book into horses. But God operates consistently and does not alter his operation by whim or caprice. […] God will not interrupt the habitual operations of  what appears to be cause and effect without good reason. The only reason why God would suspend the habitual relationship between causes and effects – so it seems in the seventeenth discussion – is the confirmation of  one of  His prophets. If  God’s pre-knowledge includes the enactment of  a miracle, He suspends His habit”.31 This finds correspondence in what the philosophers also admit about the Prophet’s knowledge of  the non-occurrence of  a possible event. The science that comes to human beings from God through a continuous habit of  occurrences of  phenomena and events, has the same origin and the same certainty of  the knowledge of  the prophets that there will be an interruption or an exception in the course of  natural phenomena and events: both find in God the only necessary cause. But the question is: is this true knowledge for a philosopher? Is this what they mean “to know the truth by knowing the cause”? According to the second solution which al-Ġazālī presents, although there are boundaries of  natural laws, God’s action is free: He can change the natural becoming by altering the quality of  things. Fire is fire and burns cotton, but God – through Angels’ mediation – can change the quality of  the fire to burn or the quality of  the cotton to be burnt in a miracle. “[…] fire is created in such a way that, if  two similar pieces of  cotton come into contact with it, it would burn both, making no distinction between them if  they are similar in all respects. With all this, however, we allow as possible that a prophet may be cast into the fire without being burned, either by changing the quality of  the fire or by changing the quality of  the prophet. Thus, there would come about either from God or from the angels a quality in the fire which   Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology, p. 155.

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restricts its heat to its own body so as not to transcend it (its heat would thus remain with it, and it would [still] have the form and true nature of  fire, its heat and influence, however, not going beyond it) […]. Among the objects lying within God’s power there are strange and wondrous things, not all of  which we have seen. Why, then, should we deny their possibility and judge them to be impossible?” 32

If  we then admit that natural alteration (istiḥāla) is according to Aristotle the qualitative change of  the substratum from one quality to another in time, because as al-Ġazālī states “matter is receptive of  all things”, God can change the necessary temporal duration for natural alterations. “Why, then, should the opponent deem it impossible that it lies within God’s power to cycle matter through these stages in a time shorter than has been known? And if  this is possible within a shorter time, there is no restriction to its being [yet] shorter”.33

So while in nature we observe that through natural alteration from the elements derive the plants, which, eaten by the animals, become blood, which in animal body becomes sperm, which can develops in a new animal, God’s miracle changes Moses’ staff  into a snake. To admit that there are natural laws, but God can change the natural becoming for example by altering the quality of  things, or by changing the necessary temporal duration for natural alterations, means that on one side the natural laws are saved and on the other so are miracles and God’s qudra. Every created thing has a created nature, which causes a proper effect (the burning of  fire), but this nature and causation come from God and are subordinated to God’s qudra. This solution is the most convincing for a philosophical reader because “the kinds of  explanation proposed in this Second Approach are not disruptions of  the physical course of  events. Here prophetical ‘miracles’ are merely understood as marvels, seemingly wondrous events that, if  all

  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, pp. 171.13–18, 172.2–3.   Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of  the Philosophers, p. 172.8–10.

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factors are taken into consideration, can be explained as effects of  natural causes”.34 In the third step of  mas’ala XVII al-Ġazālī faces the discussion of  God’s qudra from a logical perspective: God can create what is possible and He cannot create what is impossible. If  every possible is in God’s power, while impossible is not in it, what is the definition of  impossible? “It may be said. We (i.e. the philosophers) help you by maintaining that every possible thing is within the power of  God (inna kulla mumkinin maqdūrun li-llāh), while you (i.e. the theologians) help us by maintaining that whatever is impossible is not within divine power (inna kulla muḥālin fa-laysa bi-maqdūrin). There are things whose impossibility is known and there are things whose possibility is known, while there are things the mind confronts undecided, judging them neither to be impossible nor possible. Now, then, what, according to you, is the definition of  the impossible?” 35

If  the impossible is reduced to the principle of  non-contradiction, the combining of  negation and affirmation in one thing at the same time, then the theologians can say that “in the case of  two things, where ‘this’ is not ‘that’ and ‘that’ is not ‘this’, the existence of  the one does not require the existence of  the other”.36 Consequently God can create separately without infringing the principle of  non-contradiction. But the philosophers observe that this leads to absurdities, which are listed in the text. “That  […] God can create knowledge without life; that He can move a dead man’s hand, seating him and with the hand writing volumes and engaging in crafts, the man being all the while open-eyed, staring ahead of  him, but not seeing and having no life and no power over [what is being done] – all these ordered acts being created by God together with the moving of  [the man’s hand], the moving coming from the direction of  God. By allowing the possibility of  this, there   Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology, p. 157.   Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of  the Philosophers, p. 174.9–13, I added the transliteration of  the Arabic term. 36  Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of  the Philosophers, p. 174.9–10. 34

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ends the distinction between the voluntary movement and the tremor. […] [God] ought then to be able to change genera. He would thus change substance into accident, knowledge into power, blackness into whiteness, sound into smell, just as He had been able to change the inanimate into the animate and stone into gold, and there would follow as necessary consequences impossibilities beyond enumeration”.37

Al-Ġazālī answers to the philosophers by expanding the principle of  non-contradiction. “The impossible is not within the power. The impossible consists in affirming a thing conjointly with denying it, affirming the more specific while denying the more general, or affirming two things while negating one [of  them]. What does not reduce to this is not impossible, and what is not impossible is within power”.38

Al-Ġazālī gives examples of  impossible, which seem to imply something beyond that God’s action does not go out from the logical possible. For example, to combine blackness and whiteness is impossible because by the affirmation of  the form of  blackness in the receptacle we understand the negation of  the appearance of  whiteness and the existence of  blackness. Once the negation of  whiteness is understood from the affirmation of  blackness, then the affirmation of  whiteness together with its negation, becomes impossible. Then, it is impossible for an individual to be in two different places; it is impossible to create knowledge in inanimate matter which does not apprehend, for, if  it apprehends, it is no more inanimate; it is impossible for God the changing of  genera even if  some theologians think that it is in God’s power, but to concede this is to give up the principle of  intelligibility of  the world. Al-Ġazālī argues the impossibility of  the changing of  genera because according to many scholars he follows the Aristotelian hylemorphism and his doctrine of  the qualitative alteration, so, since between two genera there is no common matter that remains and serves as a   Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, pp. 174.16–20, 175.1–3.   Al-Ghazālī, The Incoherence of  the Philosophers, p. 175.5–7 (the English translation is partially modified). 37 38

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receptacle such as in the alteration, the transformation of  two genera one in another is impossible.39 Griffel observes that the word ağnās, genera, describes for al-Ġazālī not the Aristotelian classes of  beings but two traditional classes of  beings according the Ašʻarites: bodies which consists of  atoms and accidents that subsist in bodies. Transformation between bodies and accidents is impossible.40 Mas’ala XVII ends with al-Ġazālī’s considerations on this amplified notion of  impossible. It includes not only the principle of  non-contradiction, but also some natural laws (the impossibility of  changing genera for example). It does not imply that God’s moving the hand of  a dead man, which writes in beautiful handwriting, is impossible and leads to the fact that there would be no difference between tremor and the voluntary movement. We apprehend this difference in ourselves thanks to a knowledge which God creates in man, through a continuous habit of  occurrences of  phenomena and events, by which we know the existence of  one of  two possible alternatives, but by which the impossibility of  the other alternative is not shown. This difficult text leaves us with a bitter taste because it does not present a clear thesis which al-Ġazālī fully endorses, but rather a continuous movement between the affirmation of  the absolute power of  God and that of  a natural causality. Al-Ġazālī seems at work to solve first of  all an epistemological problem of  his theological school. He desperately searches for a compromise solution which, by saving the divine omnipotence and thus the possibility of  miracle, does not limit human beings to an experience of  unintelligibility of  the world. For this reason he tries to regain space to a natural order that God created as such and which He decides sometimes to change towards an end of  absolute good. According to this thesis, however, human knowledge is reduced to a customary understanding, created by God, of  how the world mostly runs. Is this true knowledge? It hardly seems so. This will be exactly Averroes’ criticism to al-Ġazālī’s doctrine. According Averroes if  any occasionalism is accepted, there is no possibility for human knowledge.

  See for example Goodman, “Did al-Ghazālī deny Causality?”, p. 118.   Griffel, Al-Ghazālī’s Philosophical Theology, p. 159.

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“For true knowledge is the knowledge of  a thing as it is in reality. ‘And if  in reality there only existed, in regard both to the substratum and to the Agent, the possibility of  the two opposites’ there would no longer, even for the twinkling of  an eye, be any permanent knowledge of  anything, since we suppose such an agent to rule existents like a tyrannical prince who has the highest power, for whom nobody in his dominion can deputize, of  whom no standard or custom is known to which reference might be made. Indeed, the acts of  such a prince will undoubtedly be unknown by nature, and if  an act of  his comes into existence the continuance of  its existence at any moment will be unknown by nature. Ghazali’s defence against these difficulties that God created in us the knowledge that these possibilities would be realized only at special times, such as at the time of  the miracle, is not a true one. For the knowledge created in us is always in conformity with the nature of  the real thing, since the definition of  truth is that a thing is believed to be such as it is in reality”.41

If  the natural causality is denied, there is no certain knowledge of  anything, while certain knowledge is to know the thing according to what it is in itself. For the same reason the philosophers do not discuss miracles rationally, because they are beyond any natural knowledge as all the supernatural events. “Logic implies the existence of  causes and effects, and knowledge of  these effects can only be rendered perfect through knowledge of  their causes. Denial of  cause implies the denial of  knowledge, and denial of  knowledge implies that nothing in this world can be really known, and that what is supposed to be known is nothing but opinion, that neither proof  nor definition exist, and that the essential attributes which compose definitions are void. The man who denies the necessity of  any item of  knowledge must admit that even this, his own affirmation, is not necessary knowledge”.42

Averroes goes even further and accuses al-Ġazālī and the theologians of  kalām to follow a circular reasoning: the doctrines 41  Averroes’ Tahāfut al-Tahāfut (The Incoherence of  the Incoherence), translated by Simon van den Bergh, Luzac, London, 19692, (E.  J.  W. Gibb Memorial Series, New Series, 19), vol. I, p. 325. 42  Averroes’ Tahāfut al-Tahāfut, p. 319.

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which the theologians maintain, such as atomism, occasionalism, etc. are not obtained through rational inquiry and they are not chosen because they are true in themselves, but because they are the best doctrines to confirm the claims of  the Koran and to defend the principle from which the theologians depart. But the price is high: the unpredictability of  the world and, therefore, the silence of  the philosophers.

Abstract Islamic Occasionalism finds its origins in the theological discussions about one of  the most important attributes of  God: power (qudra). In the Koran God’s power is said to be over everything. During the ʿAbbāsid caliphate, al-Ašʻarī (d. 935) and al-Baqillānī (d. 1013) developed the Ašʻarite “philosophy of  nature”, which coupled atomism with occasionalism to save divine omnipotence and the dogma that God is the only Agent. In every single moment, God directly creates indivisible contingent atoms. The closest comparison between the assumptions of  the Islamic Occasionalism and the natural causality described by the falāsifa is presented in al-Ġazālī’s The Incoherence of  the Philosophers (Tahāfut al-falāsifa), mas’ala XVII, On causality and miracles. This text swings back and forth between the affirmation of  the absolute power of  God in an Ašʻarite perspective and that of  a natural causality. Al-Ġazālī tries to regain space to the natural order that God created as such and which He decides sometimes to change towards an end of  absolute good. According to this thesis, however, man’s knowledge is reduced to a customary understanding, created by God, of  how the world mostly runs. Is this true knowledge according the falāsifa? Keywords: God’s Power (Q udra), Causation, Miracle, Natural laws, Science (Falsafa).

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CONTINUOUS CREATION AND CARTESIAN OCCASIONALISM IN PHYSICS

In  his Essais de Théodicée, Leibniz considers an argument, drawn from the work of  Pierre Bayle, that infers an occasionalist account of  causation from the fact that God conserves the world by “re-creating” it at each moment. I begin with a consideration of  this “Baylean” argument, which has a surprisingly complicated history (thus the scare-quotes; more on this in due course). Subsequently, I propose to examine whether a similar sort of  argument provides a source for occasionalism in Cartesian physics. As we will discover, the notion of  divine conservation is indeed a central one for Descartes’s own physics. Moreover, his account of  this conservation is founded on his view in the Meditations that it follows from the fact that time is divisible into distinct parts that “the same power and action are needed to conserve a thing at each singular moment of  its existence, as would be required to create that thing anew if  it did not yet exist”.1 On a prominent reading of  his doctrine here of  “continuous creation”, Descartes is assuming that the conservation of  a body over time just is a re-creation of  it at successive moments. There is admittedly some question whether Descartes himself  embraced an occasionalist account of  the body-body interactions with which his physics is concerned. However, there is a passage in the work of  his early follower Louis de la Forge that

1  René Descartes, Œuvres, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 11 vols, Paris, J. Vrin, 1964–1974, vol. VII, p. 49.

Occasionalism. From Metaphysics to Science, ed. by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano, Turnhout, Brepols, 2018 (DESCARTES, 2), pp.  41–60    FHG    10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.114987

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seems to proceed from the fact that the conservation of  bodies consists in their re-creation at each moment to the conclusion that God alone can determine bodily motion. La Forge’s fellow Cartesian Nicolas Malebranche appears to make the related claim that God completely determines motion simply by re-creating bodies in different positions at different times. One could be excused for thinking that there is a clear Cartesian basis for taking Descartes’s re-creationist account of  divine conservation to provide support for the occasionalist conclusion in La Forge and Malebranche that God alone can be the cause of  bodily motion. One could be excused, but as I hope to show, one would also be seriously mistaken. I  argue initially that Descartes did not in fact endorse the view that divine conservation consists in a series of  acts of  re-creation. Rather, he identified such conservation with the mere continuation of  God’s initial act of  creation. Secondly, I contend that a closer consideration of  the relevant passage from La Forge reveals its explicit limitation to the case of  the divine conservation of  resting bodies. It also turns out that what he says about the “determining force” responsible for the direction of  motion not only involves a significant qualification of  his occasionalism, but also conflicts with a re-creationist account of  divine conservation. Finally, though Malebranche clearly endorsed the view that God completely determines the states of  bodies at each moment, he also distinguished the “motive power” by which God moves bodies from the power by which God creates and conserves the material world. I take this distinction to provide powerful reasons to conclude that Malebranche joined Descartes and La Forge in rejecting the identification of  divine conservation of  the world with God’s re-creation of  it at each instant.

1. The “Baylean” Argument In the Théodicée (1710), Leibniz cites the argument in Bayle that since God must re-create the world at each moment in order for it to remain in existence, “the creature is produced anew at each instant”, where this instant is conceived as an indivisible part of  temporal duration. But since God acts alone in producing 42

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creatures at the first instant they exist, the creatures themselves “can concur [concourir] with God in none of  the following moments, either to produce themselves, or to produce any other thing”.2 Given the fact that conservation consists in re-creation, then, God alone can be a true cause. Leibniz’s assumption is that Bayle is the source of  this argument. However, it turns out that its origin is less than straightforward. Leibniz is drawing from Bayle’s citation, in the second part of  his Réponse aux questions d’un provincial (1706), of  a summary of  the argument in the anonymously published Avis sur le Tableau du socinianisme (1690).3 Though Leibniz speculates that Bayle was the author of  the Avis,4 in fact, as Bayle well knew, the text is the product of  his rationalist opponent, Isaac Jaquelot. Moreover, Jaquelot himself  offered this argument as a reductio ad absurdum of  the position in Pierre Jurieu’s Tableau du socinianisme (1690) that without God’s “conserving power” (vertu conservatrice), all creatures “would return forthwith to nothingness”.5 The passage from Jaquelot that Bayle cites emphasizes the difference between various “instants” involved in God’s creation and conservation of  the world. Moreover, just prior to the passage from the Réponse  I have cited, Bayle refers to the fact that “we are pulled into nothingness at each moment of    Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Essais de Théodicée, Paris, Flammarion, 1969, §§ 387–388. 3  Pierre Bayle, Réponse aux questions d’un provincial II, 141, in Œuvres diverses de M. Pierre Bayle, 9 vols, reprint, Hildesheim, G. Olms, 1964–1990, vol. III, pp. 787–788. For the original passage, see the Avis sur le Tableau du socinianisme, n.l., n. pub., 1690, 36. 4 Cf. Leibniz, Essais de Théodicée, § 383. 5  Tableau du socinianisme, The Hague, Troyel, 1690, 30. Jurieu is countering the Socinian position that matter has an eternal existence independent of  God. In responding to Jurieu, Jaquelot is not defending the Socinian position, but merely emphasizing that tolerance of  different theological views is warranted given that the orthodox position that Jurieu defends has its own problems. For further consideration of  the debate among Jurieu, Jaquelot and Bayle, see Jean-Luc Solère, “Création continuelle, concours divin et théodicée dans le débat Bayle-Jaquelot-Leibniz”, forthcoming in Leibniz et Bayle: confrontation et dialogue, edited by Christian Leduc, Paul Rateau and Jean-Luc Solère, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner Verlag. I have consulted the online version of  this chapter at https://www2.bc.edu/~solere/docs/PAPERS/Solere%20_BayleJaquelot-Leibniz.pdf  (accessed 15 May 2015). 2

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our duration”.6 However, we will discover that Bayle elsewhere explicitly rejects a re-creationist understanding of  divine conservation,7 and it is indeed difficult to find either in Jaquelot’s Avis or Jurieu’s Tableau any explicit endorsement of  the sort of  temporal atomism that such an understanding requires. With respect to this point, it is interesting that in his discussion in the Théodicée, Leibniz introduces the issue of  temporal atomism when considering not Bayle’s remarks, but rather the claim of  the German mathematician and philosopher Erhard Weigel – which Weigel purportedly “communicated to his friends” – that “God resuscitates, so to speak, all things external to him at each moment” since “as they fall at each moment, it is always necessary for someone to resuscitate them, which can be no one other than God”.8 After introducing this point from Weigel, Leibniz subsequently folds it into the argument for occasionalism that he finds in Bayle. In the Théodicée, Leibniz begs off  any evaluation of  Weigel’s re-creationist understanding of  divine conservation on the grounds that that this understanding broaches “difficulties concerning the composition of  the continuum”, and that “this is not the place to enter into this labyrinth”.9 Nonetheless, Leibniz clearly takes Weigel’s understanding to reflect a standard Cartesian position. Thus in a 1699 letter to De Volder, Leibniz attributes to “the Cartesians” the view that “God creates all things continually”, and thus that “moving something is nothing but reproducing it in successively different places”.10 Leibniz adds the Cartesians hold this view “not badly” (non male), and indeed there are places where he himself  embraces a re-creationist account of  conservation. In a 1705 letter to the Dowager Electress Sophie, for instance, Leibniz writes that

6  Bayle, Réponse aux questions d’un provincial II, 140, in Œuvres diverses, III, p. 785b. 7  See the discussion below in note 25. 8   Leibniz, Essais de Théodicée, § 384. 9  Leibniz, Essais de Théodicée, § 384. 10  Die philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, edited by Carl Immanuel Gerhardt, 7 vols, reprint, Hildesheim, G. Olms, 1978, vol. II, p. 193.

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“the duration of  things, or the multitude of  momentary states, is the accumulation of  an infinity of  rays of  divinity, of  which each instant is a creation or reproduction of  all things, there being no continual passage, properly speaking, from one state to another subsequent one. Which proves exactly this celebrated truth of  Christian theologians and philosophers, that the conservation of  things is a continual creation”.11

The argument for occasionalism in the Théodicée thus would seem to combine the argument from Jaquelot directed against Jurieu that Bayle summarized, on the one hand, with a re-creationist account of  divine conservation from Weigel that Leibniz attributes to the Cartesians and that he himself  sometimes finds to be plausible, on the other.12 We can call this the “Baylean” Argument, to indicate both Leibniz’s understanding of  its source and the problematic nature of  this understanding. But though its connection to Bayle’s own views is far from clear, it might be thought that this argument is linked in a significant manner to Cartesian physics. For the notion that conservation consists in continuous creation is central not only to Descartes’s physics, which some commentators have taken to have occasionalist overtones, but also to the occasionalist physics of  his followers, La Forge and Malebranche. If  these Cartesians understood continuous creation to consist in a continual re-creation, then we would have the very connection of  continuous creation to occasionalism that the “Baylean” Argument requires. Our task is to consider whether there is any such connection in the work of  these three Cartesians.

2. Continuous Creation in Descartes’s Physics In  his Principles of  Philosophy, Descartes claims that God is “the general cause of  all motion” insofar as he “created matter 11  Philosophische Schriften, VII, p.  564. I  owe this reference to Solère, “Création continuelle”, p. 17 n. 57. 12  For discussion of  Leibniz’s view of  the doctrine of  continuous creation, see Jean-Pascal Anfray, “Le labyrinthe temporal: Simplicité, persistence et création continuée chez Leibniz”, Archives de Philosophie, LXXVII (2014), pp. 43–62.

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together with motion and rest in the beginning, and through his ordinary concurrence alone, conserves just as much of  the total quantity of  motion and rest as he put in [the world] then”.13 Descartes’s account of  God’s “ordinary concurrence” relies on the view of  conservation in the famous passage from Meditation III that I mentioned at the outset. This text, which I will call the Conservation-Is-Creation Passage, is as follows: “[S]ince the whole time of  life can be divided into innumerable parts, each single one of  which depends in no way on the remaining, from the fact that I was shortly before, it does not follow that I must be now, unless some cause creates me as it were anew at this moment [me quasi rursus creet ad hoc momentum], that is conserves me. For it is perspicuous to those attending to the nature of  time that entirely the same force and action [eadem (…) vi et actione] plainly is needed to conserve a thing at each single moment during which it endures, as would be needed to create it anew, if  it did not yet exist; to the extent that conservation differing solely by reason from creation [conservationem sola ratione a creatione differre] is also one of  those things that is manifest by the natural light”.14

Thus “the nature of  time” is said to reveal that conservation differs “solely by reason” from creation, that is to say, that conservation is simply a continuous creation. But what does this mean? According to the “Baylean” Argument, it means that God conserves an object at different moments by creating that object anew at those moments. Descartes may seem to indicate the same meaning when he claim that the conserving cause “creates me as it were anew” (me quasi rursus creet) at each moment I  exist. There is the “quasi” qualifier, but one might simply discount this and find in the Conservation-Is-Creation Passage a straightforward identification of  conservation with re-creation. Indeed, this is how Descartes’s view is often interpreted. Thus Jonathan Bennett has claimed that Descartes is committed to the view that “the continual preservation of  things through time […] is really the   Descartes, Principia philosophiae II, 36, in Œuvres, VIII-1, p. 61.   Descartes, Œuvres, VII, p. 49.

13 14

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continual creation of  successors to them”.15 This is not simply an idiosyncratic reading of  Descartes, for one can find a similar interpretation in Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons, Martial Gueroult’s influential 1953 commentary on the Meditations.16 The prominence of  Gueroult’s reading is indicated by the comment of  Yvon Belaval, in 1960, that “everyone knows that time is discontinuous” in Descartes’s philosophy.17 Though the Conservation-Is-Creation Passage may seem initially to support this reading, Descartes indicates elsewhere that we are to take the quasi qualification seriously. There is, for instance, his important exchange with Gassendi concerning this passage. Gassendi objected that God does not need to create us anew in order for us to continue to exist, since our continued existence is ensured by the lack of  some intervening destructive cause.18 In response, Descartes insists that the fact that conservation requires the “continual action of  the original cause” is “something that all Metaphysicians affirm as manifest”, citing in particular a passage from the Summa Theologiae of  Thomas Aquinas.19 In that text, Thomas makes clear that divine conservation does not consist in a series of  acts of  re-creation. For he responds to the objection that conservation cannot add anything to the creature not already provided by creation by noting that God conserves creatures “not by a new action, but by a continuation of  that action whereby he gives being”.20 15  Jonathan Bennett, Learning from Six Philosophers: Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2001, vol. I, p. 98. 16 See Martial Gueroult, Descartes selon l’ordre des raisons, 2 vols, Paris, Aubier, 1953, vol. I, pp. 272–285. 17  Yvon Belaval, Leibniz: critique de Descartes, Paris, Librarie Gallimard, 1960, p. 149. Since this time, however, there has been a very influential challenge to Gueroult’s interpretation of  Descartes’s account of  time; see JeanMarie Beyssade, La philosophie première de Descartes, Paris, Flammarion, 1979, pp. 16–19, 140–142, 296–301. 18  Descartes, Œuvres, VII, pp. 301–302. 19   Descartes, Œuvres, VII, p.  369. Citing Thomas Aq uinas, Summa Theologiae, 61  vols, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964–1981, Part  I, quest.  104, art. 1. 20  Summa Theologiae, Part I, quest. 104, art. 1, ad 4. In a later development of  this position, the early modern scholastic Suárez concludes that there is only a “distinction of  reason” (distinctio rationis) between conservation and creation, thus anticipating Descartes’s position in Meditation III that conservation

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In  appealing in his response to Gassendi to an account of  conservation that “all the Metaphysicians affirm as manifest”, Descartes is in fact invoking the Thomistic view that the act of  conservation is token-identical to the initial act of  creation, contrary to the re-creationist position. This impression is confirmed by Descartes’s earlier endorsement in the Discourse on the Method of  “an opinion commonly received among the Theologians” that “the action by which [God] now conserves [the world] is entirely the same as [toute la même que] that by which he has created it.” 21 This same theological opinion backs his later claim in his Principles that “the world now continues to be conserved by the same action [eadem actione] as [God] created it then”.22 Both passages reveal the relevance of  Descartes’s Thomistic conception of  divine conservation for his physics. In  the Discourse, he takes the fact that God conserves the material world by means of  the same act by which he created it to show that “having established the Laws of  Nature, [God] has lent his concurrence [concours] in order for [nature] to act as it is accustomed”.23 Similarly, in the Principles he appeals to the identity of  the action by which God conserves the world with the one by which he created it in support of  the consequence of  his third law of  nature that “the motion he conserves is not always fixed in given parts of  matter, but mutually transferred from one to the other”.24 I have noted that Leibniz attributes to Bayle an argument for occasionalism that assumes a re-creationist understanding of 

differs only sola ratione from creation. See Francisco Suárez, Disputationes Metaphysicae, 2 vols, reprint, Hildesheim, G. Olms, 2009, vol. I, p. 791. 21  Descartes, Œuvres, VI, p. 45. 22   Descartes, Principia II, 42, in Œuvres, VIII-1, p. 66. It might seem that the Conservation-Is-Creation Passage requires the real distinction of  different parts of  temporal duration. However, I argue elsewhere that these parts are only modally, and not really, distinct features of  the attribute of  duration. Moreover, I claim that for Descartes, the single act by which God creates and conserves this attribute serves to explain the existence of  an object during the modally distinct parts of  its duration. See my Descartes on Causation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, § 2.2. 23  Descartes, Œuvres, VI, p. 45. 24  Descartes, Œuvres, VIII-1, p. 66.

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conservation. However, Bayle himself  endorsed a view of  divine conservation that is closer to what we find in Descartes. Thus in his Dictionnaire historique et critique (1st edition, 1697), Bayle takes it to be a “most manifest notion” that a creature “can continue to exist only by the same power [vertu] as produced it in the beginning: […] that is to say, it exists at each moment only because God continues to will what he willed when this being began to exist”.25 In contrast, we have seen that in his 1705 letter to Sophie, Leibniz holds that the “celebrated truth of  Christian theologians and philosophers, that the conservation of  things is a continual creation” consists in the claim that conservation of  the world is “a creation or reproduction of  all things”.26 There is thus some reason to think that the “Baylean” Argument is more Leibnizian than Baylean. Bayle indicates at one point that though Malebranche’s theory of  occasionalism has its difficulties, it nonetheless is to be “preferred to the common hypothesis” concerning causation.27 One can find in Bayle a combination of  occasionalism and a Thomistic account of  continuous creation that we will later discover in Malebranche himself. However, the link of  this account of  continuous creation to occasionalism is less clear in Descartes’s physics. For one thing, there remains a continuing controversy in the literature over whether Descartes accepted the occasionalist conclusion that divine act of  creation/conservation produces all the effects of  bodily collisions.28 I  myself    Bayle, Dictionnaire historique et critique, reprint, Geneva, Slatkine, 1995, “Rodon”, rem. D. 26  See the passage cited in note 11 above. 27  Bayle, Réponse aux questions d’un provincial II, 141, in Œuvres diverses, III, p. 789b. Here, as elsewhere in Bayle, it is somewhat difficult to pin down his own attitude toward a philosophical position he is considering. Bayle emphasizes in this text that his concern is not to develop a particular philosophical system, but rather to emphasize the difficulty of  reconciling the goodness and power of  God with the presence of  evil in his creation. Moreover, Bayle declares soon after this passage that “I am not a Malebrancheist” (ibid., p. 790a), and in fact his reaction to Malebranche’s occasionalism is not simply one of  acceptance. For a comprehensive discussion of  Bayle’s complex relation to Malebranche, though one that is conditioned by the controversial view that Bayle is committed to a kind of  “Stratonian” atheism, see Gianluca Mori, Bayle philosophe, Paris, Honore Champion, 1999, ch. 3. 28  For examples of  occasionalist readings of  Descartes’s physics, see, Gary Hatfield, “Force (God) in Descartes’ Physics”, Studies in History and Philoso25

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take it to be significant that the Discourse passage mentions the customary action of  nature, and that the discussion of  the third law in the Principles refers explicitly to the powers for proceeding and resisting (vires ad pergendum and ad resistendum) in bodies that determine the nature of  the transfers of  motion in collision.29 But I will not be concerned here to defend my own non-occasionalist reading of  Descartes’s physics.30 Instead, I  want to draw attention to the fact that even if  Descartes were ultimately committed to some form of  occasionalism in physics, it would not be because he adopted the position – as Bennett has described it – that the continual preservation of  creatures through time consists in a continual creation of  their successors.

3. Determining Force in La Forge’s Physics In chapter XVI of  the Traité de l’esprit de l’homme of  Louis de la Forge, there is a text – which I  label the Divine-Placement Passage – that has featured prominently in discussion in the literature of  his occasionalism. In this passage, La Forge writes: “I hold that there is no creature, spiritual or corporeal, that can change [the place of  bodies], nor any of  its parts, in the second instant of  creation if  the Creator has not done it himself, since it is he who had produced this part of  matter in place A. For example, not only is it necessary that he continue to produce it if  he wants it to continue to exist, but also, since he cannot create it everywhere, nor create it outside of  every place, he must himself  put it in place B, if  he wants it there, for if  he were to have put it somewhere else, there is no force capable of  removing it from there”.31 phy of  Science, X (1979), pp. 113–140, and Daniel Garber, Descartes’ Metaphysical Physics, Chicago, The University of  Chicago Press, 1992, pp. 293–305. For different non-occasionalist readings, see Alan Gabbey, “Force and Inertia in Seventeenth Century Philosophy: Descartes and Newton”, in Descartes: Philosophy, Mathematics, Physics, edited by Stephen Gaukroger, Sussex, Harvester Press, 1980, pp. 230–320, and the text cited in note 30. 29  Descartes, Principia II, 40, in Œuvres, VIII-1, p. 65. 30  For a defense of  this reading, see my Descartes on Causation, ch. 3. 31  Louis de La Forge, Traité de l’esprit de l’homme, in Œuvres philos-

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According to Daniel Garber, La Forge argues here from the premise that “God causes motion in the material world by recreating bodies in different places at different times” to the conclusion that “only God can move a body”.32 Garber is in good company in reading the passage in this manner. For Steven Nadler also takes this passage to indicate the argument in La Forge that since “God is causally responsible at each instant not just for the existence of  body, but also for its modes or properties”, he “is the sole causal agent for all motions in the material world”.33 However, this passage must be read with care. For there La Forge raises the issue of divine conservation only in the context of the hypothetical situation in which God “has removed all motion” and thus rendered nature “in this indefinitely extended chaos”.34 In this particular case, God merely conserves matter at rest. In initially reducing matter to the chaos of  rest, God must create all of  its parts in their particular places. But if  he continues to create only matter at rest, he continues to create its parts in the same places they originally occupied. It is in this case that no spiritual or corporeal creature can move the resting body from the place where God has created and continues to conserve it. Note that this result would follow even if  God conserves the resting body not by re-creating it in its particular position, but rather by merely continuing the act of  creating it in that place. To be sure, La Forge does claim in the Divine-Placement Passage that though God originally created a body at rest in ophiques, avec une étude bio-bibliographique, edited by Pierre Clair, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1974, p. 240. 32  Daniel Garber, “How God Causes Motion: Descartes, Divine Sustenance, and Occasionalism”, first published in 1987, republished in Descartes Embodied: Reading Cartesian Philosophy Through Cartesian Science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 191. 33  Steven Nadler, “Louis de la Forge and the Development of  Occasionalism: Continuous Creation and the Activity of  the Soul”, first published in 1998, republished in Occasionalism: Causation among the Cartesians, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p.  128. Indeed, Nadler goes further, claiming that La Forge’s account of  divine conservation “leads to a thoroughgoing occasionalism with respect to both minds and bodies” (“Louis de la Forge”, p. 141). 34  La Forge, Traité, p. 239.

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place A, “he must himself  put it in place B, if  he wants it there”. The suggestion may seem to be that whether a body is moving or at rest, God alone can create it in its particular position. Given this suggestion, we would have the result, which Garber attributes to La Forge, that “only God can move a body”. However, the context of  this remark indicates that it is restricted to the case of  God’s initiation of  motion. Indeed, the claim that only God can initiate motion seems to be simply a corollary of  the position that in the case where God creates a body at rest in a place, no creature can move the body from that place. For if  no creature can change the state of  a body at rest, God alone can bring it about that a resting body initially occupies a different place. Yet while it may be that only God can initiate motion by initially putting a body in a different place, it does not seem to follow that God alone can put a moving body in the places where it exists successively. A further complication is La Forge’s insistence in the Traité that “we must distinguish  […] the cause of  motion from the cause that determines it”.35 On a re-creationist understanding of  divine conservation, God’s causation of  motion would itself  fully determine the positions that moving bodies occupy. However, the indication in La Forge is that the force that moves (call this motive force) is distinct from the force that determines the direction of  the motion (call this determining force). La Forge accepts a strong version of  Descartes’s conservation principle, according to which God alone can have motive force.36 However, La Forge also explicitly allows in the Traité that the human mind, at least, has determining force with respect to certain motions in the body to which it is united. Thus he claims that though “the mind does not have the power to augment or diminish the motion of  the spirits that leave the [pineal] gland”, nonetheless it does have the power, in

  La Forge, Traité, p. 237.   There is reason to think that Descartes in fact accepted a weaker version of  this principle insofar as he allowed that finite minds can add to the quantity of  motion in the material world. For a defense of  this reading of  Descartes that includes a discussion of  the relevant secondary literature, see my Descartes on Causation, pp. 171–177. 35 36

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virtue of  its union with the human body, “to determine them, that is to say, to bend them toward the side where it is necessary that they go in order to execute its will”.37 In  the case where the human mind determines the direction of  the motion of  the gland, what Garber says of  Descartes would be true of  La Forge as well, namely, that “although God sustains bodies that have place, it is not the act of  sustaining them that gives them place”.38 The Divine-Placement Passage indicates that God conserves this matter at rest merely by continuing to create bodies in their same places. Given that God does only this, no other creature can bring about a change in the material world. But in moving matter, God must in addition apply his motive force to bodies. At least initially, God must also be the determining force of  motion insofar as only he can initially place bodies in different positions. On La Forge’s official position, however, human minds also have determining force, and so can contribute to determining the positions moving bodies occupy.39 We will see that Malebranche rejects the suggestion in La Forge that finite minds have a genuine power to determine the direction of  motion. Nonetheless, we will also discover in Malebranche a version of  the suggestion in La Forge that the divine production of  motion involves the application of  a power that is distinct from the divine power involved in the creation and conservation of  matter at rest.

  La Forge, Traité, p. 246.   Garber, “How God Causes Motion”, p.  201. In  “Louis de la Forge”, Nadler endorses Garber’s reading of  Descartes, but also argues that it cannot apply to La Forge. 39  At times La Forge suggests that bodies as well as minds have a determining force that consists “in determining and obliging the first cause to apply his force and motive power to bodies on which he would not have exercised them without them” (Traité, p. 242). This may seem to be a rather deflationary view of  determining force, especially given La Forge’s claim that bodies cannot have forces distinct from the modalities of  extension those forces produce. However, it is noteworthy that in this passage La Forge also refers to the fact that when our mind applies its determining force, God acts “following the extension of  the power he has willed to accord to [our] will” (ibid.). He does not seem to have the same basis that he has in the case of  bodies for concluding that our mind cannot have such a power. 37 38

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4. Motive Power in Malebranche’s Physics It is in Malebranche, rather than in La Forge, where we find an explicit commitment to a thorough-going occasionalism in physics. After all, Malebranche embraces the strong conclusion that God is the only genuine cause. In the Recherche de la vérité, he offers this conclusion as an alternative to “the most dangerous error of  the philosophy of  the ancients”, and in particular to the erroneous claim in Aristotelian philosophy that creatures are real causes of  natural change.40 According to Malebranche, creatures can serve only as “occasional causes” that “determine the efficacy” of  divine action.41 In  the particular case of  the bodily communication of  motion, Malebranche holds that it is divine action alone that brings about a law-like re-distribution of  motion on the occasion of  the collisions of  bodies. He further adds, in an “Éclaircissement” of  this portion of  the Recherche, that the “moving force” of  bodies “is only the will of  God, always necessarily efficacious, which conserves them successively in different places”.42 Initially, the claim here about the successive conservation of  bodies in their particular places may seem to be similar to the claim in La Forge’s Divine-Placement Passage that God conserves a body by creating it a particular place. However, we have seen that La Forge’s claim concerns primarily the specific case of  God’s conservation of  a body at rest. There is no similar restriction in Malebranche. Indeed, in the text I have cited he is concerned to explain motion by appealing to God’s conservation of  a body in different places over time. This conservation may seem to be nothing more than a series of  re-creations of  40  Nicolas Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité, VI-2, 3, in Œuvres complètes de Malebranche, 20 vols, edited by André Robinet, Paris, Vrin, 1958– 1984, vol. II, pp. 309–320. 41  See Malebranche’s claim in the Traité de la nature et de la grâce that God establishes occasional causes “to determine the efficacy of  general laws [pour determiner l’efficace des lois générales] by which he executes his designs in a manner worthy of  him” (Traité de la nature et de la grâce, I, §  14, in Œuvres complètes, V, p. 30). As I indicate below, I think we need to take quite literally the indication in Malebranche that occasional causes determine the efficacy of  laws. 42  Malebranche, Éclaircissement xv, in Œuvres complètes, III, p. 240.

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the body in those different places. This would yield an inference from a re-creationist understanding of  the divine conservation of  the material world to the conclusion that God alone has the force not only to move a body – as La Forge allowed – but also to direct that motion.43 As in the case of  La Forge, however, the view that Malebranche is simply assuming a re-creationist account of  divine conservation can be challenged. An initial point is that Malebranche explicitly rejects the sort of  temporal atomism that many have taken Descartes’s version of  this account to require. For there is the claim in the Recherche that “there are no instants in duration, as there are no atoms in bodies”.44 Yet even if  there were a version of  the re-creationist account that does not require temporal atomism, I  think there would still be reason to refrain from attributing that version to Malebranche. This reason emerges from an interesting portion of  the last chapter of  the Recherche that I  will henceforth call the Two-Powers Passage. The text is as follows: “[T]he idea of  matter in motion certainly includes two powers or efficacies to which it is related, to wit, what created it, and further, what activated it. But the idea of  matter at rest includes only the idea of  the power that created it, without the necessity of  another power to put it at rest, since if  we simply conceive of  matter without considering any power, we will necessarily conceive of  it at rest”.45

On any re-creationist account, it seems that the same power of  conservation suffices to explain both motion and rest. There is motion when God re-creates bodies with different relations of  distance from moment to moment, and rest when he re-creates them with the same relations of  distance over time. Thus, apparently, the very same power or efficacy – namely, the power of  43  For an interpretation of  Malebranche on which he infers occasionalism from a re-creationist understanding of  conservation, see Andrew Pyle, Malebranche, London, Routledge, 2003, pp. 35–36. 44  Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité, I, 8, § 2, in Œuvres complètes, I, p. 104. 45  Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité, VI-2, 9, in Œuvres complètes, II, p. 429.

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re-creation – is involved in both cases. But this is precisely what Malebranche appears to be denying in the Two-Powers Passage: To create or conserve a body is one thing, to “activate” it by setting it in motion, quite another. What then of  the previously cited suggestion in Malebranche’s Éclaircissement that God causes motion merely by conserving bodies “successively in different places”? I take the Two-Powers Passage to indicate that this suggestion must be interpreted with care. Indeed, the very same Éclaircissement that includes this passage also reveals that this suggestion is a short hand for a more complex account of  God’s production of  motion. After all, Malebranche notes in this text that God “positively wills through the first of  the natural laws [viz., the law concerning rectilinear motion], and consequently produces, the collision of  bodies; and […] he then makes use of  this collision, which obliges him to vary his action due to the impenetrability of  bodies, as the occasion to establish the second law of  nature, which regulates the communication of  motions; and thus the actual collision is the natural or occasional cause of  the actual communication of  motions, by which God without changing his conduct produces an infinity of  admirable works”.46

Thus, the additional powers or efficacies involved in motion are to be associated with certain laws that God superadds, as it were, to his act of  creating matter. The power associated with the first of  the laws determines that unimpeded motion is rectilinear. Since the material world is a plenum, however, the rectilinear motion required by this law will bring a moving body into contact with other bodies. In Malebranche’s terms, the claim is that the nature of  body “obliges” God to “vary his action” in the case of  collisions.47 This variation subsequently prompts the   Malebranche, Éclaircissement xv, in Œuvres complètes, III, pp. 217–

46

218.

47  For Malebranche, the fact that the bodily features that oblige God to vary his action do not themselves determine the particular nature of  that variation serves to show that they are causally inefficacious. For further discussion of  this view in Malebranche, see my “Causation and Mechanism: Fontenelle’s Objec-

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establishment of  a law that requires a particular re-distribution of  motion. We have seen that La Forge attempted to allow room for the position that human minds can determine the direction of  motion that God has created and conserved. However, for Malebranche this possibility is ruled out by the nature of  divine conservation. As he notes in his Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, in the case of  the conservation of  a particular body, such as a chair, “God cannot will that this chair is, and not will at the same time that it is there or there, and by his will not place it there”.48 In conserving the chair and all other surrounding bodies from moment to moment, God must cause them to exist in the precise positions they occupy at each moment. There is no room here for the determining forces that La Forge attributes to our mind: God alone can determine the direction of  bodily motion. The fact that La Forge wants to distinguish the cause of  the quantity of  motion from the cause of  the determination of  the direction of  that motion tends to undermine a re-creationist interpretation of  his account of  divine conservation. But since Malebranche does not need this distinction for his account, one might wonder whether he adopted something like the recreationist position after all. Indeed, on the basis of  the passage from the Entretiens that I have just quoted, among others, Nadler has argued that Malebranche is committed to the view that God wills the existence of  the body in a place at any particular moment by means of  “a discrete and temporalized volition with a particular content (e.g., ‘Let this body move now thus’)”. Such volitions are general simply in the sense that they are in accord with certain law-like generalizations, in contrast to anomic particular volitions.49 In Nadler’s view, then, Malebranche is closer than I have allowed to a re-creationist account of  divine conservation, and thus closer to the version of  occation to Malebranche”, British Journal for the History of  Philosophy, XVI (2008), pp. 293–313. 48  Malebranche, Entretiens, VII, § 6, in Œuvres complètes, XII, p. 156. 49  Steven Nadler, “Occasionalism and the General Will in Malebranche”, first published in 1993, republished in Occasionalism, p. 62.

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sionalism that we find in the “Baylean” Argument that Leibniz considers in his Théodicée.50 There is the difficulty of  Malebranche’s rejection of  temporal atomism, but Nadler could perhaps deny that the discrete and temporalized volitions are indexed to indivisible temporal instants.51 Moreover, there may be a way of  qualifying Nadler’s position that Malebranche takes God to conserve the world by means of  “discrete” volitions in order to accommodate Malebranche’s own claim in the Entretiens that “creation does not pass, the conservation of  creatures being, on the part of  God, only a continued creation, only the same volition that subsists and operates unceasingly”.52 For instance, Andrew Pessin has proposed on Nadler’s behalf  that Malebranche takes the different discrete and temporalized divine volitions to be combined into a “one simple, eternal ‘act’ of  volition” that “refers to many states of  affairs and times”.53 This is a clever move, but I  have my doubts that it fully captures the spirit of  Malebranche’s view – carried over from Descartes – that the very same volition involved in creating a thing is also involved in conserving it in existence. For it seems to be only a portion of  the volition – namely, that portion indexed to an event at a particular time – that is directly responsible for the production of  the event at that time. But in one sense, Pessin’s proposal seems to unify divine volitions too much. The suggestion in Malebranche’s Two-Powers Passage is that God produces motion by means of  a power that is distinct   Cf.  Nadler’s claim: “At every moment God must recreate the universe in order to maintain it in existence. Now, this continuous creation of  the universe involves a continuous creation of  every object therein. Hence, God must constantly will that our billiard ball exist; otherwise, it would cease to exist” (“Occasionalism and the General Will ”, p. 42; my emphasis). 51  Thus, any portion of  time that corresponds to the divine volition is divisible into sub-portions of  the time that correspond to sub-portions of  the volition, and so on without end. 52  Malebranche, Entretiens, VII, § 10, in Œuvres complètes, XII, p. 160. 53  Andrew Pessin, “Malebranche’s Distinction between General and Particular Volitions”, Journal of  the History of  Philosophy, XXXIX (2001), p. 90. As Pessin indicates, he is here developing the claim in Nadler that Malebranche could consider discrete and temporalized divine volitions to be “comprehended by God in the eternal present” (“Occasionalism and the General Will ”, p. 63). 50

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from that by which he creates and conserves matter at rest. So there is not a single complex conjunction of  volitions here, but rather one volition involved in the creation and conservation of  matter at rest, and a distinct volition involved in the production and conservation of  motion.54 We have seen that Leibniz found in Bayle a Cartesian argument from continuous creation to the strong occasionalist conclusion that God is the only cause. In fact, there is in Malebranche an argument from continuous creation to an occasionalist account of  causation in the material world. In contrast to the case of  the “Baylean” Argument, however, the route from continuous creation to occasionalism in Malebranche’s argument does not pass through the identification of  divine conservation with continual re-creation. Rather, the link in Malebranche is provided by the view – to be found neither in La Forge nor, I would claim, in Descartes – that the distinct powers by which God creates bodies and sets them in motion jointly determine all natural changes that occur due to bodily collision.

Abstract Leibniz reports an argument from Pierre Bayle that proceeds from the identification of  God’s conservation of  the world with his recreation of  it at each moment to the occasionalist conclusion that God is the only true cause. This argument would seem to have a significant Cartesian pedigree. For there is a prominent reading of  Descartes on which he did indeed endorse a re-creationist understanding of  divine conservation. Moreover, there are texts in which later Cartesians such as Louis de la Forge and Nicolas Malebranche seem to appeal to just this understanding of  divine conservation in support of  the conclusion that God alone can be a cause of  bodily motion. Nonetheless, I argue that Descartes’s own treatment of  54  Since the volition to create/conserve matter is not identified with a law the efficacy of  which is determined by occasional causes, it cannot count as a general volition, for Malebranche. Rather, this volition is particular, which explains why Malebranche takes creation/conservation to be miraculous. For more on Malebranche’s view that the creation of  matter is prior in nature to the establishment of  laws governing bodies, see Marie-Frédériq ue Pellegrin, Le système de la loi de Nicolas Malebranche, Paris, Vrin, 2006, pp. 134–140.

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divine conservation belies the claim that he understood this in recreationist terms. I also conclude that initial appearances notwithstanding, a re-creationist account of  divine conservation informs neither the account in La Forge’s physics of  God’s production of  motion, nor the occasionalist form of  Cartesian physics that we find in Malebranche. Keywords: Continuous Creation, Descartes, Occasionalism, Physics, Re-creation.

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CONSERVATION AS CONTINUOUS CREATION: JUST LIKE CREATION BUT NOT NECESSARILY RECREATION

As he opens his marvelous paper Continuous Creation, Ken Winkler raises a thought-provoking puzzle about Berkeley’s endorsement of  the continuous creation thesis, one that he describes as follows: “If  Berkeley believes in the continuous creation of  bodies, it seems that he should also believe in the continuous creation of  human minds. […] Berkeleyan minds are, like bodies, finite things, and if, as finite things, they depend on an infinite God for their existence, it seems that God should be, by parity of  reasoning, the only cause of  their successive existence in the parts of  their unfolding lifetimes. […] But in the case of  minds, Berkeley emphatically repudiates occasionalism. How can continuous creation lead him to occasionalism in one case if  it does not lead him to it, as it did Malebranche, in the other?” 1

A  central assumption behind this puzzle is that Berkeley endorses the continuous creation thesis across the board, as it were, applying it equally to minds and bodies, an assumption Winkler explicitly acknowledges. In  a different paper, I  argue that there are good reasons to question this assumption, and go on to suggest that Berkeley held a rather nuanced attitude with regard to the scope of  the continuous creation thesis.2 My main 1   Kenneth Winkler, “Continuous Creation”, Midwest Studies In Philosophy, XXXV (2011), pp. 287–309. 2  See my “Berkeley on Continuous Creation: Occasionalism Contained”, Research in Philosophy and Phenomenology, LXV (2014), pp. 71–102. This paper was reprinted with minor revisions in Berkeley’s Three Dialogues: New Essays, edited by Stefan Storrie, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 106–122.

Occasionalism. From Metaphysics to Science, ed. by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano, Turnhout, Brepols, 2018 (DESCARTES, 2), pp.  61–83    FHG    10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.114988

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point in that paper is that we ought to take Berkeley’s bifurcated attitude toward the causal activity of  minds and bodies to indicate a limited endorsement of  the continuous creation thesis, an endorsement that applies, on my reading, only to bodies and not to human minds. This approach, I suspect, will draw a critical response from Winkler as well as others. For my approach seems to rely on there being a rather tight connection between continuous creation and occasionalism, a connection that Winkler and others find suspect. Why? As is widely known and as Winkler well points out, the vast majority of  the theist philosophers in our time period endorsed the continuous creation thesis, but very few of  them were occasionalists. This peculiar fact is behind why, after raising the aforementioned puzzle for Berkeley, Winkler goes on to generalize the puzzle. As he puts it, “[w]hy, indeed, did so few of  them [i.e. the theistic philosophers who endorse continuous creation] so much as struggle with an acrossthe-board occasionalism”, when they all endorsed continuous creation? 3 Winkler’s paper is an insightful and probing account of  how this majority can do without this struggle, an account that I hope to examine in more detail in this paper. I begin, however, by voicing a broader dissent, one against this general description of  the situation. While it might be the case that Winkler’s description is apt for the late Scholastics, who indeed seemed to endorse continuous creation without any particular worry about occasionalism, the situation appears markedly different by the time of  Descartes, with the ambiance slowly shifting toward more turbulence. And, with the emergence of  Malebranche, the reverse current seems rather strong, and struggles explicitly emerge for the likes of  Leibniz and Berkeley. That is, Leibniz and Berkeley seriously appear to worry whether one can consistently maintain continuous creation while affirming the causal efficacy of  secondary substances, in no small part, due to Malebranche’s contributions. This diagnosis, of  course, relies on the assumption that Malebranche’s argument from   Winkler, “Continuous Creation”, p. 288.

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continuous creation to occasionalism provided a rather powerful impetus, one that was capable of  moving Leibniz and Berkeley, an assumption that will be more closely examined as we proceed. Engaging in such an examination is closely linked with two central points of  Winkler’s paper that are of  particular interest to me. First is his critical analysis of  Malebranche’s main argument for occasionalism presented in the Dialogues, where Winkler takes care to reveal what he takes to be its shortcomings. The second is Winkler’s own rendering of  how the continuous creation thesis might pack the most punch, as it were, and make a persuasive case for occasionalism. On both of  these points, I  do not find myself  convinced, and, in this paper, I  will try to articulate my hesitation about the account that Winkler is providing. And using this critical examination as a pivot, I  will go on to present an alternative account of  how to best think of  the relation between continuous creation and occasionalism. Here is a brief  summary of  the main contents of  the paper. First, I  will question whether the passage Winkler focuses on for his analysis of  Malebranche’s argument of  occasionalism best brings out Malebranche’s central insight. While the portion of  Dialogue  VII in the Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion 4 that Winkler highlights – Dialogues, pp. 115–116, to be more precise – clearly provides textual basis for Winkler’s reconstruction of  the continuous creation argument, I think a different passage in Dialogue VII – Dialogues, p. 112 – brings out the main thrust of  Malebranche’s argument in a more charitable and persuasive manner. This suggestion goes hand in hand with my way of  identifying the main philosophical intuition behind the continuous creation argument, which, unsurprisingly, is different from what Winkler thinks provides the most intuitive pull. In fact, there is reason to think that Winkler’s way 4  Nicolas Malebranche, Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion (1688), VII, § 10, in Œuvres complètes de Malebranche, edited by André Robinet, Paris, Vrin, 1958–1984, tome XII, p. 160. For its English translation, see Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, edited by Nicholas Jolley and translated by David Scott, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997. Hereafter abbreviated as Dialogues.

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of  rendering the intuitive pull is in part due to his rejection of  my reading, one which I  had presented in earlier work.5 For, in discussing my reading, Winkler provides some thought-provoking criticisms against it.6 But  I am not convinced that my reading ought to be abandoned, and I  will present some reasons why Winkler’s criticisms might not be as damaging as one might think. As for Winkler’s second, positive point – briefly put, that continuous creation needs to be understood as continuous recreation for it to be the most persuasive platform for occasionalism – I do not, once again, find myself  experiencing the same guttural pull. We will take a closer look at this “instinctive reaction” of  Winkler’s, but, roughly put, Winkler’s suggestion is that the most serious threat that the continuous creation thesis poses to the advocates of  secondary causation is its making the alleged creaturely cause “ineligible to participate” in the causal process. For if  creatures are continuously recreated, any alleged cause ends up being “produced at the same time as the effect”.7 That is, continuously recreated creatures fail to satisfy a critical condition of  being a cause, i.e. that of  existing prior to the effect. As Winkler himself  acknowledges, however, even this way of  thinking about continuous creation – taking continuous creation to be continuous recreation – is far from winning the day for the occasionalist. For the vast majority of  theists who endorse genuine secondary causation can shrug off  this challenge by holding continuous creation to be more like maintenance than recreation. That is, they need not accept that continuous creation is continuous recreation, but insist that it is more like a continual, sustained maintenance of  the creature’s existence. Moreover, the recreation reading has independent problems of  its own, which further damages its intuitive pull, such as facing an uphill battle in accounting for the transtem5  Sukjae Lee, “Necessary Connections and Continuous Creation: Malebranche’s Two Arguments for Occasionalism”, Journal of  the History of  Philosophy, XLVI (2008), pp. 539–565. 6  Winkler, “Continuous Creation”, pp. 296–302. 7  Winkler, “Continuous Creation”, p. 299.

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poral identity of  creatures. Given such weaknesses, I am of  the view that interpreting continuous creation as recreation is far from being the most charitable reading of  the thesis. Against this recreation reading, I will suggest that the issue of  whether continuous creation is continuous recreation or not is somewhat of  a red herring in the overall dialectic. Instead  I will attempt to bolster the reading I had presented earlier, one that takes the continuous creation thesis to propound, as its basic point, the idea that conservation and creation are qualitatively identical in terms of  divine and creaturely causal contribution. To put this central point differently, I think Malebranche would have no problem accepting that conservation is continuous maintenance and nonetheless uphold occasionalism on this basis, as long as the maintenance on the part of  God is understood in the proper way. I will close with some comments on Leibniz and how to think of  his reaction to the continuous creation thesis.

I. Let us begin with a closer look at how Malebranche argues for occasionalism on the basis of  the continuous creation thesis. Winkler calls our attention to the following, famous passage from the Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion: “Creation does not pass, because the conservation of  creatures is – on God’s part – simply a continuous creation, a single volition subsisting and operating continuously. Now, God can neither conceive nor consequently will that a body exist nowhere, nor that it does not stand in certain relations of  distance to other bodies. Thus, God cannot will that this armchair exist, and by this volition create or conserve it, without situating it here, there, or elsewhere. It is a contradiction, therefore, for one body to be able to move another. Further, I claim, it is a contradiction for you to be able to move your armchair […] The proof  of  this is clear. For no power, however great it be imagined, can surpass or even equal the power of  God.  Now, it is a contradiction that God wills this armchair to exist, unless He wills it to

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exist somewhere and unless, by the efficacy of  His will, He puts it there, conserves it there, creates it there. Hence, no power can convey it to where God does not convey it, nor fix nor stop it where God does not stop it, unless God accommodates the efficacy of  His action to the inefficacious action of  His creatures”.8

This is an odd passage. I will return to why it is odd soon enough, but let us first take a look at how Winkler reconstructs Malebranche’s argument here. 1.  The conservation of  creatures is a continuous creation. (“[T]he conservation of  creatures is  […] simply a continuous creation”.) 2.  God creates by willing, and in order to will he must conceive what he wills. (“God can neither conceive nor consequently will”.) 3.  God cannot conceive a body’s existing unless he conceives it to exist in a particular place. (“God [cannot] conceive […] that a body exist nowhere”.) 4.  Hence, God cannot will a body to exist unless he wills it to exist in a particular place. (“God cannot conceive nor consequently will that a body exist nowhere”.) 5.  No power can surpass the power of  God. (“No power can surpass or even equal the power of  God”.) 6.  Hence, there is no body able to move another body. Nor is any mind able to move a body. (“It is a contradiction […] for one body to be able to move another. Further, […] it is a contradiction for you to be able to move your armchair”.) 7.  Therefore, a body or mind can only occasion the motion of  a body. (Nobody or mind can determine the motion of  a body “unless God accommodates the efficacy of  His action to the inefficacious action of  His creatures”. To say that God “accommodates his efficacy” to the inefficacious actions of  creatures is to say that God allows those creatures [as Malebranche elsewhere puts it] to “determine” [that is, adapt or specify, in something like the way an input or argument deter8  Malebranche, Dialogues, VII, § 10, pp. 115–116, my emphasis (Œuvres complètes, XII, p. 160).

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mines, non-causally, the output or value of  a function] his will. This is occasionalism.) 9 I had just noted that the passage is odd, and I think Winkler’s reconstruction does a good job in revealing why. First of  all, the key claim (4) – that if  God is to cause a body to exist at all, then God must cause both the being and modifications of  bodies – seems anchored in what God conceives, namely, the content of  his volition, and this volitional content in turn seems to be determined in part by a basic nature of  bodies, namely, that bodies must exist with fully determinate modes i.e. their relations of  distance. God cannot cause merely the being or esse of  given body, leaving its modal features or relations of  distance undetermined. For, given the very nature of  bodies of  having to be fully determinant with regard to its properties or modes, it is metaphysically impossible for bodies to exist generally, as it were, without its full set of  determinate modal features. And presumably whatever is impossible would be inconceivable even for God, and God cannot will an inconceivable state of  affairs. Bracketing the persuasiveness of  this chain of  reasoning, my initial response is something like the following: what do these facts, that is, facts about the nature of  bodies and the operational conditions of  divine volitional activity have to do with continuous creation? More pointedly, is the continuous creation thesis doing any real work here in establishing the occasionalist thesis? If  it is due to the nature of  bodies that whatever brings them into being must also bring their modifications into being, could not this occasionalist thesis be established without relying on continuous creation at all? And this is not the only oddity. The claim about other creatures not being able to move or interfere with God also seems excessive, since who would have thought that creatures would have to be endowed with such extraordinary powers, powers to surpass God’s power, in order for them to be causally efficacious? Would any concurrentist admit such powers in creatures? Furthermore, we wonder again what this

  Winkler, “Continuous Creation”, p. 294.

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issue about the scope or reach of  creaturely powers has to do with continuous creation thesis. These questions, in my view, leave us to wonder whether this passage best represents Malebranche’s attempt to pivot occasionalism on the continuous creation thesis. As I noted earlier, in my view, another passage, the one from Dialogues, VII, §  7, p.  112, better reveals Malebranche’s method in using the continuous creation thesis to argue for occasionalism. We will take a closer look at this passage later, but let us first move on to Winkler’s critique of  this passage from Dialogues, VII, § 10, pp. 115–116. His criticism points to two main issues. The first is “the apparent assumption that if  God must conceive of  the chair in all of  its determinacy, then he must be the cause of  the chair in all of  its determinacy. The concurrentist may object that God need not be the cause of  all that he conceives”.10 I am a bit puzzled by this criticism of  the argument, since I did not take Malebranche to be arguing that God must cause all that he conceives. Malebranche’s God conceives of  a great many things, such as multiple possible worlds with less simple laws, but he obviously does not cause these worlds. Rather, the premise Malebranche needs is that God cannot cause a chair without all of  its determinacy. But this premise, I took it, was secured by the fact that God could not conceive of  such a chair. For it is not possible for there to be such a general, indeterminate chair, as it were. If  divine causal activity is restricted to what God can conceive – say, because divine causal activity is not blind and must be intentional in character – and, if  what God can conceive is restricted to what is metaphysically possible, then it seems to follow that it is impossible for God to cause the existence of  the chair without its full, determinate modes. And this, I take it, is why if  God is to cause a chair at all, he cannot not cause what God conceives as a chair. Be that as it may, the main point I want to highlight against Ken’s selection of  this passage is the question I  raised earlier: what does this point of  connecting divine causal activity to divine conceivability and possibility have to do with continuous   Winkler, “Continuous Creation”, p. 296.

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creation? It almost seems as though premise (1) could be left out altogether, as long as we replaced (2) with something like, (2)*: “God acts by willing, and in order to will he must conceive what he wills”. The argument would still go through, it would seem, and the continuous creation thesis would play no genuine role in this case. This gives me pause as to how representative we ought to take this passage as revealing the role of  the continuous creation thesis for Malebranche in arguing for occasionalism, an issue to which I shall return later.

II. We move on to Winkler’s second worry. The second worry focuses on what Winkler describes as the “exclusion principle” (hereafter abbreviated as ‘EP’): “if  God is the cause of  something, nothing else can be even a partial cause of  it”.11 I agree that EP plays an important role in Malebranche’s overall argumentative strategy, though it is also noteworthy that neither he nor any other participant in the debate even goes so far as to acknowledge EP. Why is EP relevant, and why cannot EP just be assumed? Even if  one were to grant that God is the total cause of  a creature and its fully determinant states, it still seems possible for some other creaturely cause to be at least a partial cause of  the effect in question. For the effect or some part or aspect of  it could have been causally overdetermined by both God and the creature. That is, until overdetermination is ruled out, hence establishing EP, one cannot move from the fact that God is the total cause of  the creature and its states to the occasionalist thesis that God is the only cause. Winkler proceeds to examine three “foundational principles” that Malebranche might invoke in order to rule out overdetermination and support EP. Since I basically agree with Winkler that the other two founda11  Winkler goes on to point out that “in the argument as Malebranche presents it in the Dialogues, the exclusion principle is made to rest on the claim that another being can be the cause of  some determination only if  its power surpasses that of  God” (Winkler, “Continuous Creation”, p. 295). This justification of  EP seems rather weak, but Winkler is charitable enough to consider other foundational principles that Malebranche might be able to tap into.

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tional principles are somewhat shaky and will not do the job of  excluding overdetermination, allow me to proceed to the third foundational principle, which, thanks to Winkler’s paper, I now realize as being closest to what I had assumed to do the work of  excluding overdetermination in previous work.12 This third foundational principle, on the basis of  which one might try to support EP, exploits what I have argued in earlier papers as the “metaphysical identity” 13 or “causal identity” 14 between creation and conservation. Winkler describes this idea of  “metaphysical” or “causal identity”, which on reflection might be better coined as “strict qualitative” identity, as follows: “[i]f  the two acts are one and the same, then anything true of  one must be true of  the other. Thus, if  the act of  creation was unaccompanied and at the same time responsible for every determination, the act of  conservation must also be unaccompanied, […] equally responsible”.15 This way of  putting it is a bit too strong from my point of  view,16 but what is important for our purposes now is why Winkler is not happy with this principle. Here is his reason: “But I do not see why one and the same act could not vary, over time, both in its isolation from other causes and in its degree of  responsibility for determinacy. Perhaps I am being too loose about what counts as one act, but I do not see why an enormously complex volition, with temporally indexed 12 I  should note that Winkler quotes a passage from my paper to be expressing the first foundational principle, one that bans overdetermination on the basis that it conflicts with God’s purposes and wisdom. In fact, however, in writing that passage he quotes, I actually had in mind what is much closer to Ken’s third foundational principle, one that relies on the “mere conceptual difference” between creation and conservation. As I make clear in the paper, creation and conservation are “metaphysically identical”. See Winkler, Continuous Creation, p. 297. 13  See my “Necessary Connections and Continuous Creation”, p. 555. 14   Sukjae Lee, “Leibniz on What God and Creatures Cause”, in Natur und Subjekt: IX. Internationaler Leibniz-Kongress, Vorträge 2. Teil, Hannover, 2011, pp. 591–601, p. 597. 15  Winkler, “Continuous Creation”, p. 297. 16  For one thing, even on my reading, not everything that is true of  the act of  creation is true of  the act of  conservation, since the fact that creation is the initial act of  God is not true of  God’s conserving acts, since they are acts subsequent to creation.

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component volitions, could not qualify as one and the same throughout, especially if  all the components subserve (as for Malebranche, they do) a single aim, the manifestation and glorification of  God”.17

The spirit of  Winkler’s objection is to suggest that the identity in question need not be the strict qualitative identity I had in mind, since the numerical identity of  conservation and creation can be maintained even though qualitative identity is not. That is, the opponents of  occasionalism can easily respond by adopting this looser criterion concerning the identity of  acts, thus refusing to grant EP to Malebranche. I  will have more to say in response to this objection to the “strict qualitative identity” (between creation and conservation) as support for EP. But  I would like to postpone this discussion for now, until we have had a chance to consider Winkler’s positive proposal as to wherein lays the real intuitive pull of  continuous creation thesis.

III. Winkler begins the process of  introducing why the continuous creation thesis holds sway over him if  at all, by quoting the following passage from Leibniz’s Theodicy. In this passage, it is Bayle, rather than Malebranche, who is presenting the interesting inference to occasionalism on the basis of  continuous creation: “It is […] impossible for [creatures] to co-operate with God for the production of  any other thing […] Since their conservation is a continued creation, and since all human creatures in the world must confess that they cannot co-operate with God at the first moment of  their existence, either to produce themselves or to give themselves any modality, since that would be to act before being (observe that Thomas Aquinas and sundry other Schoolmen teach that if  the angels had sinned at the first moment of  their creation God would be the author of  sin […]; it is a sign that they

  Winkler, “Continuous Creation”, p. 297.

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acknowledge that at the first instant the creature cannot act in anything whatsoever), it follows manifestly that they cannot co-operate with God in any one of  the subsequent moments, either to produce themselves or to produce any other thing. If  they could co-operate therein at the second moment of  their existence, nothing would prevent their being able to co-operate at the first moment”.18

How is Bayle’s argument distinct from Malebranche’s, and why might it be better? Here is how Winkler parses the difference: “The worry here is not that God’s responsibility for the effect preempts the alleged cause from participating in the effect, but that the alleged cause, because it is produced at the same time as the effect, is not eligible to participate in the first place, because it is not on hand when it needs to be”.19

Noting this difference, Winkler goes on to summarize why the continuous creation thesis holds sway over him, if  at all: “I am therefore left thinking that what gives continuous creation its hold over me is the threat it presents to the preexistence of  substantial causes. Even if  God’s causal role […] leaves a place for a collaborating finite being, I have trouble seeing how a finite substance that comes into being at the same very moment as the effect can be a productive cause of  it”.20

Notice that this way of  accounting for the intuitive hold of  the continuous creation thesis strongly pushes one to take continuous creation to be continuous recreation. Why? For the threat to work, it must be the case that at any given instance of  conservation, no creaturely cause can be around, as it were, to concur with God. That is, a world that is created anew at each 18  Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of  God, the Freedom of  Man, and the Origin of  Evil, §  387, p.  357 in the translation by E. M. Huggard (La Salle, IL, Open Court, 1985), which is based on Die Philosophischen Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, edited by Carl Immanuel Gerhardt, vol. VI (Berlin, Weidmann, 1885). Hereafter abbreviated as Theodicy, followed by the article number and page number of  Huggard’s translation. 19  Winkler, “Continuous Creation”, p. 299. 20  Winkler, “Continuous Creation”, p. 299.

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moment of  conservation from a void of  existence is a world in which no substance preexists as a potential source of  collaborative causal activity. Winkler affirms as much when he states, “continuous creation threatens the causal power of  finite substances only if  it is construed as continuous recreation – as the rescue or rehabilitation of  substances that have descended into nothingness”.21 The downside to this approach, however, is that one can simply resist the recreation construal, as Winkler acknowledges. As an alternative to repeated recreation, one might take continuous creation as continuous maintenance, a response that Winkler attributes to Leibniz. On this maintenance reading, continuous creation is not God’s repeatedly recreating of  the world out of  the void, but God’s sustained maintenance of  the world in existence, keeping it from falling into the void of  nothingness. Thus Winkler goes on to argue, “I am therefore inclined to think that Leibniz was less deeply troubled by arguments from continuous creation than some of  his commentators have supposed. Sukjae Lee, for example, argues that Leibniz was driven to regard finite substances as providers of  final causes rather than as genuinely productive causes precisely because he thought arguments from continuous creation undercut the latter possibility. […] It seems to me, on the contrary, that Leibniz found it relatively easy to avoid occasionalism because he did not take continuous creation to imply constant resuscitation or reentry into being”.

So let us briefly summarize, and see where Winkler’s claims leave us. According to Winkler, Malebranche’s argument for occasionalism from continuous creation is best presented in Dialogues, VII, § 10, pp. 115–116, but this argument is plagued with a fundamental problem in that it relies on EP. The best hope one could have to justify EP would be to uphold a somewhat strict criterion of  qualitative identity between creation and conservation, but this strict criterion need not be adopted by the advocates of  genuine secondary causation. Bayle’s version

  Winkler, “Continuous Creation”, p. 301, my emphasis.

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of  denying the preexistence of  collaborative creaturely causes is intuitively more promising, but in the end fares no better, since the opponents of  occasionalism can reject continuous recreation for continuous maintenance.

IV. I begin my critical examination of  Winkler’s account with a closer look at the proposal to take continuous creation to be continuous maintenance. The first thing to notice is that merely avoiding continuous recreation does not by itself  entail that we have avoided occasionalism. A  lot depends on how God continuously maintains, and, properly specified, continuous maintenance itself  could secure an occasionalist conclusion. If  God maintains the world in the very same fashion in which he created the world – that is, in conserving the world, God is the total cause of  all created substances along with all of  their modifications – then, barring overdetermination, God would be the unique cause in the history of  the world, both at creation and at moments subsequent to creation, entailing occasionalism. Thus, while one might think that continuous recreation is sufficient for occasionalism, it need not be the case that recreation is necessary for occasionalism – I also call attention to the fact that, interestingly enough, in his response to Bayle, as we shall see, Leibniz goes out of  his way to show that even continuous recreation need not entail occasionalism insofar as a certain priority in explanation is maintained throughout the recreation. This, I take it, suggests whether continuous creation is recreation or not is somewhat of  a red herring. More importantly, as I have just suggested, the continuous maintenance occasionalist is able to present a viable challenge to the advocates of  the secondary causation as long as she had a way to justify EP. This brings us back to the task of  justifying EP, especially in light of  the objections raised by Winkler. In response, I would like to make two points with regard to this issue. I would first like to suggest that we think more about the actual implications of  overdetermination for our case. So the overdetermination scenario in question is something like this. At some subsequent point of  conservation, say, at time t. 1, both God and some cre74

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ated substance cause, say, a body to exist with its full battery of  determinate extensional properties. Now given the traditional theological constraints against created substances being the source of  the esse or being of  the body in question, the relevant causal overdetermination going on in our case would have to be causal overdetermination in the production of  the determinant modes of  the body in question. What does it mean to say that the modes are causally overdetermined? None other than the creaturely cause and God each are sufficient in themselves to bring about the modifications such that even if  one of  the causes were absent, the modes would still occur. But this way of  cashing out overdetermination is rather problematic, since it entails that the creature has a power, independent of  God, to bring about a certain effect in the world. For it is the possession and exercise of  such a power on the part of  the creature that accounts for why the effect in question – the creaturely modifications, in our case – is overdetermined. In  fact, the model of  overdetermination we are envisioning here seems to presuppose a conservationist account of  creaturely powers, one that was universally regarded as incompatible with theological orthodoxy. According to “mere conservationism”, while God must conserve a creature at every moment of  its existence, by directly bringing about its esse along with its causal powers, in exercising these powers, the creature goes about it alone, and alone is the immediate cause of  various modifications.22 That is, in the production of  the modifications, God at most plays an indirect causal role, and the creaturely powers are sufficient to bring them about insofar as the creature is conserved in existence with its powers. In our overdetermination case, similarly, the creature possesses a power to bring about the relevant modifications on its own in the sense that were God not to bring about the modifications, the modifications would still occur. Particularly relevant here is the fact that the borderline demarcating those who remained on the side of theological orthodoxy 22  For an illuminating discussion of  these issues, see Alfred Freddoso, “God’s General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why Conservation Is not Enough”, Philosophical Perspectives, V (1991), pp. 553–585, p. 554.

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and those who transgressed the boundaries and followed the infamous proponent of  conservationism, Cardinal Durandus, was whether one endorsed continuous creation or not. Those who endorsed the continuous creation thesis did so on the very basis that admitting such independent, sufficient powers in creatures went too far, in rendering divine causal activity too remote and indirect in the exercise of  creaturely powers. If  so, it seems as though the very suggestion that creatures have overdetermining powers itself  is incompatible with one of  the basic motives behind holding the continuous creation thesis, namely, that God’s power permeates ubiquitously, even into the powers exercised by creatures. Now one might respond that this critique results from the way the model of  overdetermination has been construed. But if  the model presented above, where each cause independently and sufficiently brings about the effect twice over, as it were, is not appropriate, I am not sure I understand how overdetermination becomes a challenge to EP. And, if  overdetermination does have these conservationist overtures, it should not be surprising that the participants involved in the debate failed to rule out this option explicitly. Causal powers endorsed by conservationism would have been a non-starter. The second point I wish to make with regard to EP concerns Winkler’s response to the strict qualitative identity criterion I had presented. If  the criterion for identity is looser in the way that Winkler suggests, then it will indeed allow for a volition intricate enough to fulfill the function needed – that is, while God is the sole productive cause at the moment of  creation, this initial creative activity somehow morphs into a conservative activity which allows for creaturely input, while maintaining its identity as a single action over time. I do not mean to suggest this morphing itself  is mysterious. For we can easily think of  someone going for a walk, first at a brisk pace then slowing down. Within a single act, I fully grant that there is nothing odd with an agent doing more or less over the duration of  the act. But a similar variation in what God does from creation to conservation does raise worries in a different way. For if  God’s causal activity does vary in this way, we cannot but wonder whether the claim that creation and conservation is merely conceptually 76

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distinct or that the distinction is merely an “extrinsic designation” can be maintained, a claim to which Suárez, Descartes, Leibniz, Berkeley, as Winkler points out, are all committed. For if  divine contribution can be watered down in this manner when God conserves the world, then there now does seem to be good reasons to resist the claim of  mere conceptual or extrinsic difference, since it no longer seems to be the case that “the dependence being is as great afterwards as at the beginning, the extrinsic designation of  being new or not does not change the nature”.23 Any difference in what or how much the agent does seems to be as much of  an internal or intrinsic difference as one might envision in considering the identity or non-identity of  actions within a metaphysics of  causal agency. What this suggests is that adopting a looser criterion of  identity might not be as easy a response to present against the strict, qualitative identity account of  creation and conservation. One could do it, but this would come at the price of  rejecting, or at the least, having to massage the wide-spread view that takes the difference between creation and conservation to be merely conceptual or extrinsic. Moreover, in a way, I think that one of  Malebranche’s central contributions to the overall debate concerning secondary causation in our time period precisely is the challenge that he presents to the advocates of  creaturely causation on the basis that this strict qualitative identity reading is the proper reading of  the continuous creation thesis. Recall the puzzlement we had faced when examining the argument that appeared in Dialogues, VII, §  10, pp.  115–116, which Winkler had reconstructed in detail. It seemed as though the continuous creation thesis hardly played a central role, and the main work was done by considerations about how divine volitional activity is not blind and how extended substances are fully determinate with regard to their modes. While  I do not have a good story to tell about why this is happening at Dialogues, VII, § 10, pp. 115–116, I do think there is a different bit of  text that better reveals how Malebranche intended to utilize the continuous creation thesis in establishing occasion  Leibniz, Theodicy § 385, p. 356.

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alism. The passage I  have in mind occurs earlier in the Dialogues, where continuous creation actually gets introduced for the first time: “ ‘The moment of  creation has passed! ’ But if  this moment does not pass, then you are in a spot, and will have to yield. Therefore take note. God wills that a certain kind of  world exist. His will is omnipotent, and this world is thus created. Let God no longer will there to be a world, and it is thereby annihilated. For the world assuredly depends on the will of  the creator. If  the world subsists, it is because God continues to will its existence. Thus, the conservation of  creatures is, on the part of  God, nothing but their continued creation. I say on the part of  God who acts. For on the part of  creatures there appears to be a difference, since by the act of  creation they pass from nothingness to being, whereas by the act of  conservation they continue to be. But in essence the act of  creation does not cease, because in God creation and conservation are but a single volition which, consequently, is necessarily followed by the same effects”.24

A  couple of  things stand out in this passage. First is the fact that Malebranche is making the very point that is central to the qualitative identity reading: from our creaturely perspective, whether one comes into being from nothingness or continues one’s earlier existence might seem to be an importance difference, but from the perspective of  the divine agent, the difference is merely conceptual or extrinsic. Why is the difference not essential? The qualitative identify account has a ready answer: in terms of  what God is doing, there is no real, qualitative difference. Second, I find the natural reading of  this passage to suggest a picture much closer to the continuous maintenance view than the discontinuous, recreation view. As Malebranche makes clear, if  God ceases to will, then the creature will naturally be annihilated. But insofar as God continues to will, then the creature will continue to exist, seemingly without interruption.25 That is, the natural reading of  the passage 24  Malebranche, Dialogues, VII, § 7, p. 112, my emphasis (Œuvres complètes, XII, pp. 156–157). 25  In fact, it looks as though the recreation view might have more of  a dif-

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suggests that God’s continuous willing is the default position, such that the annihilation of  the world requires God to alter his default mode of  causal behavior of  willing the world and stop willing its existence. If  so, the understanding of  continuous creation is distinctively not one in which the divine volition of  willing the world’s existence expires immediately after it has been issued, as it were, such that the world by default falls automatically into non-existence, requiring a new divine volition to create the world anew, the very picture underlying the continuous recreation view. That is, the natural reading of  this passage seems to far from one which takes the presumably singular volitional act of  creation and conservation to be embedded with infinitely many discreet volitions that all issue in momentary existence followed by annihilation. Lastly, the last sentence, which I  emphasized, also seems to support the interpretation I am advancing, i.e. that Malebranche seems to be taking the continuous creation thesis to support a strong identity between creation and conservation in that the effects are necessarily identical, given that the causal input or contribution is identical on the part of  God. It is on these grounds that the passage above strongly seems to be support the interpretation that Malebranche seems to be endorsing something closer to the continued maintenance view rather than the continuous recreation view. This way of  reading the continuous creation argument – that is, a reading that (1) takes the identity to be grounded in the qualitatively identical content of  divine causal contribution, and (2) is not only consistent with the continuous maintenance view but rather inclined towards it – is what I take to be the best way of understanding and interpreting what Malebranche was trying to do by calling our attention to the continuous creation thesis. And given my earlier efforts to diffuse the concerns about EP, I  think this reading of  the continuous creation argument can emerge as being much stronger than Winkler’s critique would have us think. In fact, I think that this reading can even be applied ficulty in maintaining the continuity between the divine volitions, since all of  them issue in a sliver of  momentary existence followed by the subsequent annihilation of  the world.

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to the key text from Leibniz’s Theodicy that Winkler took to provide support for recreation reading.26 Recall Bayle’s argument. Roughly put, here is how Winkler interpreted the argument: Our intuitions are clear in the case of  creation ex nihilo. There are literally no creatures around to engage in causal activity at the initial moment of  creation. So if  creatures are continuously recreated in the sense that they must be continuously resuscitated out of  existence, this implies that prior to their existential resuscitation they do not exist, and hence must be recreated anew with their modifications. But this means that at every moment of  conservation, i.e. moment of  recreation, no creature is around, as it were, to participate in causal activity, since they simply do not exist. Creatures cannot be causes because they do not possess the critical requirement that they exist prior to the effect. Occasionalism follows. But is this the only way that this passage could be read? Might we not think of  Bayle’s point in a different way? Here is an alternative reading. We know that at creation there was no creaturely causal cooperation, since there was no creature around to participate in this collaborative activity. This much is certain. But, on my alternative reading, what Bayle is trying to convey is the following point: since conservation is continuous creation, this important feature – that the creature makes no causal contribution – is carried through. That is, the relevant feature that is carried through in the identity claim between creation and conservation is that God alone is the cause. In contrast, Winkler takes the relevant feature to be that God is alone staring into the empty void, thus needing to revive the whole world again after its complete annihilation. If  we read Bayle’s point in the way I  am suggesting, he is basically continuing Malebranche’s strategy, by presenting an argument that trades on the strict qualitative identity view, namely the fact that in both creation and conservation, divine causal contribution is the only activity operative. Lastly, recall the last statement from Bayle: “if  they could co-operate therein at the second moment of  their existence, nothing would prevent   Leibniz, Theodicy § 387, p. 357.

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their being able to co-operate at the first moment”. This is a rather telling claim. If  the looser, mere numerical identity criterion were at work here, this would be an odd statement to be making, since everyone would know that it would be wrong to think that Bayle could move from conservation to creation in this manner. To return to the analogy presented earlier, if  the numerical identity of  the walk I took were all that was at issue, it would not do to infer from the fact that I was walking at a pace of  4 kilometers per hour at the end of  the walk to the fact that I was walking at that leisurely pace at the beginning of  the walk. Bayle’s inference only makes sense if  we take the identity to be that of  strict qualitative identity. This brings me to the last topic I wish to discuss, albeit briefly. Given our discussion, I think we are in the position to reexamine Leibniz’s response to the challenge presented by Bayle. Why did he not simply point out that Bayle is misguided, and should not think of  conservation as being qualitatively identical? Why did he not respond by pointing out that continuous creation is based on a loose, numerical identity such that even if  at the moment of  creation God is the unique causal agent, this need not be the case in subsequent moments of  conservation? That Leibniz did not take this route is all the more interesting, if  we consider Winkler’s diagnosis that Leibniz was not bothered by the continuous creation argument on the grounds that there was no reason to accept the recreation picture. Here is Leibniz’s actual response: “When God produces the thing he produces it as an individual and not as a universal of  logic (I admit); but he produces its essence before its accidents, its nature before its operations, following the priority of  their nature”.27

Here Leibniz fully seems to grant that in conserving the world God is the full and only cause of  the individual along with its modes or accidents, for he seemingly is acknowledging that when God produces the creature, God does not merely bring it about as a being in general (a “universal of  logic”), just pro  Leibniz, Theodicy § 390, p. 358.

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ducing the esse of  the creature while leaving undetermined its particular features or modifications. Leibniz proceeds to point out that, even if  this is the case, the priority relation between the essence and accidents of  the individual provides sufficient grounds to avoid the occasionalist conclusion. Why resort to such an antiquated scholastic distinction to secure creaturely activity,28 when a relatively easy and more powerful response is at hand? Why did not Leibniz simply resist the strict, qualitative identity claim? This response that Leibniz provides to Bayle, I  take it, is initial evidence for four hypotheses: (1) the issue for Leibniz is not whether continuous creation is recreation or maintenance, but whether one can secure creaturely activity in the face of  the seemingly occasionalistic conclusion that God is the unique productive cause; (2) Leibniz’s attempt to solve such a formidable challenge is predicated on the fact that he found the claim that God does produce everything real in the creature rather persuasive; (3) the persuasiveness of  this claim is most naturally supported by the strict qualitative identity reading of  the continuous creation argument; (4) to avoid a deeply schizophrenic Leibniz, the claims about enduring natures and genuine activity in such important works as De Ipsa Natura should not be read as Leibniz rejecting occasionalism on the grounds that occasionalism is unwarranted in espousing continuous recreation, as Winkler suggests. But whether these hypotheses will survive further scrutiny is a task I leave for a future occasion.29

28 See Leibniz, Theodicy §  388, pp.  357–358, and Leibniz’s use of  the scholastic notion of  “priority in nature” or “anteriority in signo rationis”. 29  Earlier versions of  this paper were presented at the American Philosophical Association, Central Divison Meeting (February, 2015) and Simon Fraser University (July, 2015). I wish to thank my co-presenters and the audience for their helpful comments, questions, and criticisms. I also wish to thank the organizers and participants of  the Venice Conference on Occasionalism (April, 2015) – in particular, Maria Emanuela Scribano and Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero – for providing the wonderful occasion to begin writing this paper and thinking about related issues. Lastly, I wish to thank the Foundation Academia Platonica for their generous research support.

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Abstract This paper defends an alternative reading of  Malebranche’s continuous creation thesis by critically examining and responding to some central claims presented by Ken Winkler (2011). The author first questions Winkler’s focus on Dialogues 115–116, and argues that Dialogues 112 brings out Malebranche’s argument in a more persuasive, charitable manner. Second, he considers Winkler’s interpretation of  continuous creation as continuous recreation, and argues that it is more plausible to take the continuous creation thesis to be holding that conservation and creation are qualitatively identical in terms of  divine causal contribution. Thus, the author argues, Malebranche would have no problem accepting that conservation is continuous maintenance – in contrast to recreation – while still upholding occasionalism, as long as the maintenance on the part of  God is understood properly. That is, if  God is maintaining the world by doing as much, qualitatively speaking, as when God created the world ex nihilo, then the central occasionalist thesis can be well maintained. The paper closes with some brief  comments on Leibniz’s reaction to the continuous creation thesis. Keywords: Occasionalism, Continuous Creation, Conservation, Causation.

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NEITHER WITH OCCASIONALISM NOR WITH CONCURRENTISM: THE CASE OF  PIERRE-SYLVAIN RÉGIS *

1. Looking for a Fourth Way In order to oppose Aristotelian natural philosophy, twelfth-century Islamic theologians defended the view according to which God is the only cause constantly operating in nature, while finite creatures do not have any causal power.1 This position is usually labelled “occasionalism”. In order to oppose Islamic occasionalist, Aquinas and the majority of  scholastic authors developed an alternative account in which both God and creatures cooperate together to produce finite effects. This view is generally named “concurrentism” and grants to occasionalist that God is immediately involved in operations of  natural beings, although it denies that this immediacy entails a dismissal of  finite causal powers. For instance, Aquinas suggests that immediacy can be understood in two ways (De Potentia, VIII.3). The first is what will be called immediacy of  suppositum, which is the kind of  immediacy that an agent has with respect to the patient in which it elicits directly its own effect. Following the general Aristotelian account of  causation, Aquinas presupposes that for an agent to produce an effect means to produce a change in some patient. *  This paper is part of  my VENI research grant “Occasionalism and the secularization of  early modern science: Understanding the dismissal of  divine action during the scientific revolution” funded by the Netherlands Research Council (NWO) and based at the Faculty of  Philosophy at the University of  Groningen. 1 See Dominik Perler and Ulrich Rudolph, Occasionalismus. Theorien der Kausalität im arabisch-islamischen und im europäischen Denken, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2000. Occasionalism. From Metaphysics to Science, ed. by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano, Turnhout, Brepols, 2018 (DESCARTES, 2), pp.  85–103      FHG     10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.114989

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The agent has an immediacy of  suppositum if  it directly influences the patient. However, Aquinas claims that there is also another way to understand causal immediacy, which will be called immediacy of  power. An agent has immediacy of  power if  its own power is the most fundamental and immediate source of  causal efficacy for the production of  the effect. In this case, what matters is not whether the agent directly influences the patient (i.e. whether it has immediacy of  suppositum), but only whether the agent’s power is directly responsible for the production of  the effect or if  it depends in turn on the power of  some higher agent. Yet, Aquinas’s concurrentism is not without its problems. Authors such as John Olivi (1248–1298) and Durandus of  Saint-Pourçaint (1275–1334) attacked concurrentism by denying that God acts immediately in nature in any sense. This view is usually called “mere conservationism”,2 although I will refer to is as “mediationism”. As it is well known, seventeenth-century natural philosophy tends to be highly critical of  Aristotelianism and seems to create ideal conditions for a revival of  occasionalism. Several of  Descartes’s disciples (such as Geulincx, Cordemoy, La Forge and Malebranche) actually branded occasionalism as an inevitable output of  Cartesian physics. Nonetheless, occasionalism was far from being unanimously accepted even within the Cartesian camp. Pierre-Sylvain Régis (1632–1707) is a good example of  a committed Cartesian who was also a fierce enemy of  occasionalism. Since occasionalism, concurrentism and mediationism are usually regarded as the only three accounts of  secondary causation available, it seems plausible that insofar as Régis rejected occasionalism he must have endorsed a modified version of  either concurrentism or mediationism. In  this Chapter  I argue that Régis himself  understood his account of  secondary causation as a fourth way, different from the three scholastic alternatives mentioned above. From a historical point of  view, this analysis reveals the complexity of  2  Tad M. Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation, New York, Oxford University Press, 2008, pp.  19–24; Gloria Frost, “Peter Olivi’s Rejection of  God’s Concurrence with Created Causes”, British Journal for the History of  Philosophy, XXII (2014), pp. 655–679.

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the scholastic debate and challenges the tendency to consider occasionalism, concurrentism and mediationism as three welldefined and mutually exclusive accounts.3 In particular, against what has been recently argued by Walter Ott,4 I  contend that the fact that Régis aims to reject occasionalism does not commit him to revive Aquinas’s concurrentism. In this Chapter, my reasons for defending this view are mainly textual and rely on Régis’s own attack to the two main varieties of  concurrentism circulating at his time.5 In section two I introduce the two main varieties of  concurrentism that were developed by Thomists and Jesuits between fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. In section three I present how Régis explicitly rejects both these accounts. In  section four, I focus on Régis’s reasons to reject occasionalism.

2. Varieties of  Concurrentism: Thomists vs. Jesuits Jacob Schmutz provided a valuable reconstruction of  how the debate on God’s concursus in nature evolved between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries.6 Despite the variety of  different positions that were elaborated during this period, the majority of  the authors attempted to provide revised versions of  Aquinas’s concurrentism that countenanced secondary causes as per se causes, but without falling in the mediationist model. Since Régis explicitly engaged with Thomist and Jesuit interpreters of  Aquinas’s account, I shall outline in this section the main features of  their respective views. 3   See e.g. Alfred J. Freddoso, “God’s General Concurrence With Secondary Causes: Why Conservation Is Not Enough”, Philosophical Perspectives, V (1991), pp. 553–585. 4  Walter Ott, “Régis’s scholastic mechanism”, Studies in History and Philosophy of  Science, XXXIX, (2008), pp.  2–14, and Causation and Laws of  Nature in Early Modern Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. 112–130. 5 I  offer further conceptual discussion of  Régis’s account of  secondary causation and of  its relationship with scholastic debates in  Andrea San­ gia­como, “From secondary causes to artificial instruments: Pierre-Sylvain Régis’s rethinking of  scholastic accounts of  causation”, Studies in History and Philosophy of  Science, XL (2016), pp. 7–17. 6  Jacob Schmutz, “La doctrine médiévale des causes et la théologie de la nature pure (xiiie–xviie siècles)”, Revue thomiste, CI (2001), pp. 217–264.

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Several Thomists tried to defend and elaborate Aquinas’s claim that God acts with secondary causes with an immediacy of  power rather than an immediacy of  suppositum. Francesco Silvestri of  Ferrara (1454–1528), for instance, advanced this view in his widely read commentary on Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles. First, Silvestri rejects the (occasionalist) position according to which only God is properly active in nature and secondary causes do not have any causal efficacy on their own.7 Then, he reproduces Aquinas’s distinction between immediacy of  suppositum and immediacy of  power in order to defend the claim that God does act immediately in nature, but only with immediacy of  power and without undermining the causal efficacy and involvement of  secondary causes.8 According to Silvestri, this distinction also provides a good answer to the objection that might be made by a supporter of  Durandus’s view, according to which if  God uses secondary causes to bring about an effect, then he must be only mediately involved in the causal process. Yet, Silvestri contends, God’s immediacy of  power entails that the subordinated secondary cause can act only because it is determined by God’s own power, in such a way that the secondary cause retains its immediacy of  suppositum, while it has only a mediacy of  power (since it could not act without being moved by the power of  the first cause).9 Silvestri explicitly admits that God cannot have both kinds of  immediacy. If  this were the case, then secondary causes would be ruled out of  the causal process: “in fact, if  God were an immediate agent with immediacy of  suppositum in all the effects of  the other causes, the other causes would not act with immediacy 7  Francesco Silvestri (Ferrariensis), Commentaria in Libros Q uator Contra Gentiles, Roma,  Sumptibus Et Typ.  Orphanotrophii A  S.  Hieronymo Aemiliani, 1900–1902, 3.69, pp. 386–398. 8  Silvestri, Commentaria, 3.70, p.  399: “actio inferiori agentis fit ab eo non solum per propriam virtutem, sed etiam per virtutem omnium superiorum agentium. […] Non est inconveniens eundem effectum a Deo et inferiori agente immediate produci, licet alio et alio modo, a Deo scilicet, immediatione virtutis, ab inferiori vero agente, immediatione suppositi agentis”. 9  Silvestri, Commentaria, 3.70, p.  401: “cum dicimus virtutem unius agere per virtutem alterius, intelligimus ipsius virtutem ab alterius virtute tamquam ab agente, sive tamquam a superiori forma dependere, inquantum ab ipsa suam operationem movetur”.

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of  suppositum”.10 This point reinforces the idea that secondary causes act “in God’s own power” (“in virtute ipsius Dei” – ST, I, q. 105, a. 5) in the sense that God’s concursus with secondary causes consists in his bestowing a causal influx that enables the secondary causes to act. During the sixteenth century, several Thomists defended this reading in the context of  the theological debate concerning grace and under the pressure that Lutherans and Protestants exercised upon the Catholic Church. Domingo Báñez (1528– 1604), Diego Álvarez (1550–1635) and Tomás de Lemos (1550– 1629) are some of  the most prominent authors who contributed to develop the view labelled “physical premotion”, according to which the principal agent (God) communicates its power to the secondary cause, which then applies such power to bring about the effect.11 Theological and moral complications aside, the main goal of  this view was that of  clarifying how God’s immediacy of  power should be understood, without denying a positive causal involvement of  secondary causes, which would amount to holding God as the only real agent responsible for the production of  every effect (a position which is not only dangerously close to occasionalism, but – even worse, from a Catholic perspective – close to Lutheran and Calvinist claims). Nonetheless, the Thomist doctrine of  physical premotion might seem to concede too much to God by compromising the real efficacy of  secondary causes. This was the concern raised by several Jesuits who developed an alternative model based on the idea of  a “simultaneous concursus” between God and secondary causes. Pedro de Fonseca (1528–1599) was among the first to formulate this alternative view, followed by his incredibly influential fellows Luis de Molina (1535–1600) and Francisco Suárez (1548–1617). Since Suárez offers one of  the most extensive and widely read discussions of  simultaneous concursus outside the

10  Silvestri, Commentaria, 3.70, p.  403. My translation: “si enim Deus esset immediate agens immediatione suppositi in omnibus effectibus aliarum causarum, aliae causae non agerent immediate immediatione suppositi”. 11 Concerning Báñez and Álvarez, in particular, see Miguel Alonso, “Teoria  sobre la causalidad instrumental en los profesores dominicos de la Universidad Salmantina”, Archivio Teologico Grandino, IV (1941), pp. 23–41.

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theological dispute regarding grace, I  shall focus on his treatment.12 The simultaneous concursus model entails that God acts immediately in the production of  the effect of  the secondary cause rather than on the secondary cause itself  in order to determine it to produce the effect. From this point of  view, this model accepts (to some extent) that God and the secondary causes act as partial causes of  their joint effect.13 More precisely, the first cause and the secondary causes are total causes with respect to their own ontological order (i.e. they are two concurring total causes), although they act as two partial causes from the point of  view of  the production of  the resulting effect (i.e. the effect cannot be ordinarily brought about by just one of  the two concurring causes, but both are required for its production). Suárez explicitly defends that this account is the only one able to avoid both occasionalism and mediationism, and he contends that the Thomists view represented by Silvestri and others is in fact doomed to collapse into Durandus’s position. Suárez’s main argument is based on his previous discussion of  the issue of  creation and conservation in which he established (Disputationes Metaphysicae 21.2.3) that every created thing constantly depends on God’s immediate action in order to be preserved in its own esse. As Suárez contends: “[I]f  the cause depends on God for its esse, then the effect will, too, since both are beings-through participation. Therefore, just as the cause is dependent at the instant at which it acts, so too the effect is dependent at the instant at which it comes to be, since they are both being-through12  Hattab provided a detailed discussion of  the Jesuit account of  secondary causation, including their rejection of  occasionalism and of  the concurrent Thomist views. See Helen Hattab, The Origins of  a Modern View of  Causation: Descartes and His Predecessors on Efficient Causes, Ph.D. diss., University of  Pennsylvania, 1998. 13  Schmutz, “La doctrine médiévale des causes”, pp. 251–262, stresses how this position derives from Scotus. Anfray discusses this point in the specific case of  Molina’s debt to Scotus’s account of  divine concursus (see Jean-Pascal Anfray, “Molina and John Duns Scotus”, in A Companion to Luis de Molina, edited by Matthias Kaufmann and Alexander Aichele, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2014, pp. 325–364). Concerning the impact of  Molina’s though in the seventeenth century, see Francesco Piro, “The Philosophical Impact of  Molinism in the 17th Century”, in A Companion to Luis de Molina, pp. 365–403.

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participation at that instant as well. Therefore, every effect of  a secondary cause depends on God for its being-made, and as a result a secondary cause can do nothing without God’s concurrence”.14

God and secondary causes are both immediately and synchronically involved in the production of  a given effect but at different levels, insofar as God acts mainly by supplying the esse and the secondary causes by determining it in a specific way.15 Against Durandus, Suárez contends that he agrees on the fact that secondary causes are “principal causes in their own order” (i.e. that they are per se causes), although “it does not follow that if  they are principal causes, then they are also independent in acting, since, as is evident per se, much more perfection is required for the latter than for the former”.16 Suárez argues that one cannot consistently combine the following three claims, namely, that (i) creatures qua entities need God’s conserving causation, (ii) the effects brought about by secondary causes are entities of  some kind, and (iii) the creature’s causal powers are causally sufficient to bring about their effects. According to Suárez, Durandus’s mediationism is committed to hold these three claims at the same time. Suárez argues that the third is at odds with the first and the second taken together because once we have recognized that creatures need God’s conserving causation they can no longer be considered “independent in acting”, i.e., sufficient to bring about their own effects. On this basis, Suárez also dismisses Silvestri’s use of  the distinction between immediacy of  power and immediacy of  suppositum by taking issue with the Thomist model as unable to 14  Disputationes metaphysicae 22.1.7 Translation in Francisco Suárez, On Creation, Conservation, and Concurrence. Metaphysical Disputation 20–22, translation and introduction by Alfred J. Freddoso, South Bend, St. Augustine’s Press, 2002. 15  Disputationes metaphysicae 22.1.12. 16  Disputationes metaphysicae 22.1.14. The rejection of  Durandus’s position was common among Jesuits. See, e.g., Pedro de Fonseca, In Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae libros Tomi Q uatuor, Coloniae, L.  Zetner, 1615, lib. 5, cap. 2, q. 9, pp.  119–134; Conimbricenses [Manuel de Goìs], Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu In octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, 1593. Reprint, Hildesheim, Georg Olms Verlag, 1984, lib. 2, cap. 7, q. 12, art. 1, p. 362.

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really provide an alternative to mediationism. Suarez argues that “one should say simply that God acts with all created agents by an immediacy of  power and by an immediacy of  suppositum”.17 As Suárez explains: “[T]he action in question does not proceed immediately just from a power diffused by God – that is, from a created power – since to say this would be to fall into Durandus’s opinion; therefore, the action proceeds immediately from the uncreated power that exists in God himself; therefore, he also acts by an immediacy of  suppositum. […] It is one thing for a secondary cause to cooperate with the First Cause and another thing for it to mediate between the First Cause and the effect. The former is true, but the latter is false”.18

Suárez contends that the only way to secure God’s immediacy is to grant that God and secondary causes operate on two distinct although convergent tracks.19 Suárez is well aware that in dismissing the claim that God acts only by immediacy of  power, he must show the compatibility between God’s immediate involvement in the causal process and the fact that instrumental causes are per se causes. The solution is provided by the “simultaneous concursus” model: God and secondary or instrumental causes 17  Disputationes metaphysicae 22.1.17. Suárez presents Silvestri’s view in Disputationes metaphysicae 17.2. 13, pp.  25–26, and he discusses it more at length in 22.1.16, pp.  158–163. He makes clear that the axiom “a secondary cause does not act unless it is moved by the first cause […] is false when interpreted in that peculiar sense according to which, in order to act, a [secondary] cause needs, over and beyond its esse and all the connatural power it has for acting, an additional true and real motion which it receives within itself” (Disputationes metaphysicae 22.2.47, p. 200). Suárez also contends that his reading is more consistent with the intended meaning of  Aquinas’s original distinction between immediacy of  power and suppositum (Disputationes metaphysicae 22.1.19). 18  Disputationes metaphysicae 22.1.19. Suárez presents and develops his argument against the Thomist model and the fact that it would collapse in Durandus’s view in Disputationes metaphysicae 22.2.3–14. 19  The rejection of  Silvestri’s claim that God acts immediately only with immediacy of  power (and not with immediacy of  suppositum) was standard among Jesuits: see, e.g., Fonseca, In Libros Metaphysicorum, lib. 5, cap. 2, q. 7, p. 103; Conimbricenses, In Libros Physicorum, lib. 2, cap. 7, q. 14, art. 1–2, pp. 370–371; Antonio Rubio, Commentarii in octo libros Aristotelis de Physico auditu una cum dubiis & quaestionibus hac tempestate agitari solitis, Lyon, Johannes Pillehotte, 1611, lib. 2, tract. 4, q. 7, pp. 274–275.

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really cooperate as two different causes, each of  them concerned with the production of  a specific feature of  the resulting effect (i.e. God by producing esse, and the secondary or instrumental cause by determining this general esse). According to Suárez, “[A]n instrument, insofar as it is an instrument and through the action that it exercises as an instrument, attains immediately and per se to the principal agent’s effect to the extent that this effect is attainable or producible per se. And, indeed, there is hardly any other way to preserve the notion of  a natural instrument”.20

According to Suárez, instrumental causes are surely causes per se and not per accidens. He contends that “in the most proper sense, an instrumental cause is said to be a cause that concurs in, or is elevated to, the production of  something more noble than itself”,21 which again sounds like a loyal defence of  Aquinas’s own view. The difference is that Aquinas, in order to explain how both God and the instrument can be immediately involved in the production of  the effect, claimed that God can have immediacy of  power and not of  suppositum. Suárez refrains from making this move since it would support the “physical premotion” model, which in turn is doomed to collapse in Durandus’s mediationism. To provide an alternative, Suárez stresses that once it has been established that God has an immediacy of  both power and suppositum concerning the esse of  a secondary cause, then it follows that God will maintain the same immediacy in every effect that this cause will bring about, that is, also in the cases of  “instrumental” causality. God has to immediately and constantly conserve the secondary cause’s esse, otherwise the secondary cause would be annihilated. This is sufficient to grant that both God and the instrumental cause concur “simultaneously” as two causes that join their respective causal efficacy to bring about the same effect.

20  Disputationes metaphysicae 17.2.12. Translation in Suárez, On Efficient Causality. Metaphysical Disputations 17, 18 and 19, transl. by A. J. Freddoso, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994. 21  Disputationes metaphysicae 17.2.17.

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In this sense, Suárez maintains that God and the secondary cause are both partial causes of  the whole effect: “if  one considers absolutely the whole of  the efficient causality that is necessary for the relevant effect, then neither of  the causes supplies all of  that causality. Instead, the whole causality arises from the convergence of  the two of  them, and so each is said to contribute partially on the side of  the cause”.22 Yet, Suárez immediately remarks that it would be more appropriate to deny that God and secondary causes are partial causes because “given that the two causes in question belong to diverse orders, they are not properly said to constitute a single total cause; rather, each is a complete cause within its own order. This way of  speaking seems more commendable”.23 Nonetheless, what both descriptions have in common is that they must be used to stress the fact that both God and the secondary cause are causally active in the process of  eliciting the effect and “each is a complete cause within its own order”.

3. Régis’s Rejection of Physical Premotion and Simultaneous Concursus By the end of  the seventeenth century, the debate between the supporters of  physical premotion and those of  simultaneous concursus was extremely lively, and it had generated a variety of  different intermediate positions. To focus just on the debate in France, for instance, François de Salignac de La Mothe-Fénelon (1651–1715), bishop of  Cambrai, defended a version of  physical premotion in which (in the context of  human actions) God would exercise his “physical premotion” only at the moment in which the will elicits its act. Although the action intended by the will could not be brought about without God’s bestowing its power in actu secundo (this is the way in which Fénelon’s view tries to incorporate the Thomist position), God does not interfere with human will in actu primo, and thus God and the human will can be seen as two concurrent causes of  the final   Disputationes metaphysicae 22.1.22.   Disputationes metaphysicae 22.1.22.

22 23

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effect. Interpreted in this way, the distance between physical premotion and simultaneous concursus appears significantly reduced.24 On the contrary, Laurent-François Boursier (1679– 1749) exploited occasionalist arguments that echoed those of  Malebranche – despite Malebranche’s own protests against such a move 25 – in order to rephrase the Thomist claim that secondary causes can operate only under the immediate influence of  God’s power in an occasionalist fashion. Earlier in the century, the Capuchin theologian Louis Béreur de Dole (born 1590) tried to avoid both Thomist and Jesuit alternatives by defending a kind of  mediationism inspired by Durandus.26 Given the variety of  positions on the table, it is no surprise that Régis decided to take a stance in this debate in his L’usage de la raison et de la foy (1704) 27 in order to show the advantages   Sylvio Hermann De Franceschi, “Fénelon et la notion thomiste de prémotion physique; Le thomisme moderne au tribunal du molinisme”, Revue de l’histoire des religions, CCXXVIII (2011), pp. 37–70, provides ample discussion of  Fénelon’s view and explains how it has to be understood as an effort to distance the Thomist model of  physical premotion from Calvinist and Jansenist positions concerning predestination. 25 See Laurent-François Boursier, De l’action de Dieu sur les créatures, traité dans lequel on prouve la prémotion physique par la raisonnement des esprits et à la grace, Paris, P. Babuty, 1713, I, sect. I, ch. 1, pp. 8–12. For Malebranche’s refutation of  Boursier, see Œuvres complètes de Malebranche, edited by André Robinet, Paris, Vrin/Cnrs, 1955–1965, tome XVI. 26 Although Louis Béreur de Dole (Disputatio Q uadripartita Concuruum Dei et Creaturae, Lyon, Iacobi et Petri Prost Frat., 1634) focuses mainly on the issue of  future contingents, he also discusses the ontological problem of  secondary causality by positively defending the view according to which “creatura operetur peculiarem suam actionem veluti causa totalis, et adaequata illius, ad quam Deus non concurrat proximè, sed solùm remotè, ac mediate conferendo, conservandóque, virtutem, potentiam, facultatem, propensionem, ac vires ad ореrаndum opportunas” (I, ch. 2, p. 25). He claims that this kind of  “mediationism” would be the most faithful reading of  Aquinas’s own view (IV, ch. 4, pp. 250–261) by thus reconciling Aquinas with Durandus (IV, ch. 6, pp. 277– 286). Concerning Durandus’s reception in seventeenth century, see Giuliano Gasparri, “Notes on the Legacy of Durand in the Early Modern Era”, in Durand of  Saint-Pourçain and his Sentences Commentary. Historical, Philosophical, and Theological Issues, edited by Andreas Speer et  al., Leuven-Paris-Walpole, Peeters, 2014, pp. 385–422. Concerning more specifically Leibniz’s discussion of  Durandus’s views, see also Francesco Piro, “Lo scolastico che faceva un partito a sé (‘faisant band à part’). Leibniz su Durando di San Por­ziano e la disputa sui futuri contingenti”, Medioevo, XXXIV (2009), pp. 507–543. 27  Pierre Sylvain Régis, L’usage de la raison et de la foy ou l’accord de la foy et de la raison, Paris, Jean Cusson, 1704. 24

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of  his own account of  secondary causality over the main later scholastic alternatives. In the Usage, Régis presents the guidelines of  his account of  secondary causes already discussed in his Cours entier de philosophie, ou Systeme general selon les principes  de  M.  Descartes (1691).28 In  particular, he stresses that while God creates immediately the essences of  modal entities (i.e. finite things) insofar as he creates the substances in which they inhere as modes, God creates their existence only mediately through other secondary causes. For brevity sakes, I shall leave aside Régis’s discussion of  how God concurs with human souls in order to focus on the case of  bodies.29 Régis explains: “It must not be imagined that God ever produces anything successive immediately by himself. […] It is glaring that he does not produce immediately any mode in particular either in body or in the mind. He does not produce modes in the body because all the modes of  bodies can be reduced to particular figures or movements; and God does not produce in bodies either their figure or their particular movement, since their particular figure depends on the surrounding bodies, and their movement depends (in order to be such and such) on their own nature, or on that of  the bodies that move them”.30 28  Régis, Cours entier de philosophie, ou Systeme general selon les principes  de  M.  Descartes, Amsterdam, Huguetan, 1691. For further discussion of  Régis’s Cours and his view about secondary causation see Andrea Sangia­ como, “Divine Action and God’s Immutability: A  Historical Case Study on how to Resist Occasionalism”, European Journal of  Philosophy of  Religion, VII (2015), pp. 115–135. 29  The only difference is that the human will acts in virtue of  the power it receives in itself  from God, while bodies act in virtue of  movement received by external bodies acting upon them: see Régis, Usage, livre I, partie II, ch. 28, p. 180. 30  Régis, Usage, livre I, partie II, ch. 11, p. 135. “Il ne faut pas s’imaginer que Dieu produise jamais rien de successif  par lui-même immediatement. […] Il est évident qu’il ne produit immediatement aucun mode dans le corps ni dans l’ame en particulier. Il n’en produit pas dans le corps ; car tous les modes des corps se peuvent reduire à des figures ou à des mouvemens particuliers : Et Dieu ne produit pas dans les corps leur figure ni leur movement particulier, car leur figure particuliere dépend des corps qui les bornent, et leur mouvement dépend pour estre tel ou tel, de leur propre nature, ou de celle des corps qui les font mouvoir”. Concerning the idea of  successiveness and the fact that the duration of  all created things is successive, cf. Cours, p. 106.

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God does not produce finite effects immediately, since all the modifications of  a specific body always depend on external bodies. God produces only efficient movement, which is general, and which is specified and channelled by modal entities on the basis of  their specific physical features. The fact that bodies do not have motion per se entails that they cannot be causes per se, since they cannot operate on the basis of  a power (i.e. force of  movement) intrinsic to their own nature. This point suggests that Régis cannot endorse a form of  mediationism. Although Régis emphasises that God cannot operate immediately in nature, the main concern behind Durandus’s mediationism was the necessity to preserve per se causal efficacy in secondary causes, which is exactly what Régis denies. Leaving mediationism aside, thus, Régis claims that the “physical premotion” and the “simultaneous concursus” could be reinterpreted in accordance with his own account of  secondary causality. Regarding simultaneous concursus, Régis argues that this doctrine can be better understood provided that we reject the idea according to which “God and the human being can be considered as two separated causes that must concur to determine human will, more or less as we observe that two horses concur to pull a cart”.31 Although this explanation concerns mainly the case of  human will, Régis conceived of  the case of  bodies and minds in analogy, in such a way that it would be equally wrong, in Régis’s view, to say that God and bodies concur as two partial causes to bring about a physical effect.

31  Régis, Usage, ch. 32, p. 192. “Dieu et l’homme peuvent estre considerez comme deux causes separées qui doivent concourir à la determination de la volonté, à peu prés comme l’on voit que deux chevaux concourent à tirer un carrosse”. Same claim in Usage, livre I, partie II, ch. 29, p. 183. Cf. Cour, p. 215 : “Nous ne dirons pas non plus que Dieu concourt avec la volonté quand elle se determine, au moins si le mot de Concourir est pris à la regueur, etant qu’il suppose deux actions separées, qui contribuënt à la production d’un même effet, car nous sommes assûrez qu’il n’y a point dans la volonté d’action qui soit separée de celle de Dieu, ayant esté prouvé que Dieu est la cause efficiente premiere de tout ce qu’il y a de réel et de positif  dans la volonté. Mais si par le mot Concourir on veut entendre seulement que Dieu agit dans la volonté comme cause efficiente premiere, et que les idées de l’entendement y agissent comme causes efficientes secondes ; nous tomberons d’accord qu’en ce sens-là Dieu concourt avec la volonté”.

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In the previous section I explained that the reason why Jesuit defenders of  simultaneous concursus accepted the possibility of  considering God and secondary causes as two partial causes cooperating to bring about the same effect is due to their interest in fully preserving the role of  secondary causes as per se causes. The account of  simultaneous concursus defended by authors such as Molina and Fonseca might appear significantly similar to Régis’s position insofar as these Jesuit authors claimed, following a certain reading of  Aquinas’s own texts, that secondary causes “determine” the general influence bestowed by God’s primary causation.32 However, Régis rejects the idea of  cooperation between two causes (i.e. God and the secondary cause) because he is committed to the claim that secondary causes modify the general power of  God by contributing to bringing about specific effects without relying on any intrinsic causal powers embedded in their own nature. Régis’s disagreement with the supporters of  the simultaneous concursus model is driven by his claim that secondary causes are not per se causes. This claim is also at the root of  his reformulation of  the physical premotion model. Régis contends that in order to make sense of  the Thomist view, “it is enough to substitute for a quality that is unknown, and that God would always produce for nothing, that movement that God produces in matter, because it is certain that this movement has priority of  nature over all the particular movements”.33 Physical premotion fits more easily into Régis’s account of  secondary causes, since by stressing the fact that God has immediacy of  power it 32 See, e.g., Ludovicus de Molina, Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Praedestinatione, et Reprobatione, Concordia, Antuerpiae, ex Officina Typographica Ioachimi Trognaesij, 1595, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 25, p.  110: “Deus namque generali concursu influit ut causa universalis influxu quodam indifferenti ad varias actiones et effectus, determinatur verò ad species actionum et effectuum a particulari influxu causarum secundarum qui pro diversitate virtutis cuiusque ad agendum diversus est”. Cf. Fonseca, In Libros Metaphysicorum, t.  2, lib. 5, cap. 2, q. 9, p.  149: “Deum uniformiter operari omnia, diversitate autem effectorum esse a causis secundis”. Cf.  Aq uinas, SCG, III, 66 discussed in section 3.1. 33  Régis, Usage, ch. 32, p. 190. “Il ne faut pour cela que mettre à la place d’une qualité qu’on ne connoit pas, et que Dieu produit toujours à propos de rien, le movement que Dieu produit dans la matiere; car il est certain que ce movement precede d’une priorité de nature tous les mouvemens particuliers”.

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might suggest that secondary causes do not have any intrinsic power through which they cooperate to produce the final effect. However, this was not the view defended by the scholastic supporters of  the physical premotion model, who (following Aquinas) consistently maintained that secondary causes are per se causes and God’s “influx” enables the secondary cause to bring about an effect that it would not be fully able to produce on the basis of  its own power alone. For instance, as noted in the previous section, Silvestri even departed from Aquinas’s original use of  the distinction between the two kinds of  immediacy and claimed that God can have only immediacy of  power in order to fully preserve per se causation in secondary causes. Aquinas and his followers, despite their divergences, consistently maintained two fundamental claims: (1) God operates immediately in the production of  finite effects; and (2) secondary causes are per se causes, namely, they are endowed with real causal powers responsible of  a real contribution to the causal process. Régis’s account of  secondary causation dismisses both these claims.

4. Régis’s Rejection of Occasionalism This divergence between Régis’s view and that of  his scholastic interlocutors is confirmed by the way in which he rejects occasionalism. As Régis explains: “To reject this opinion [i.e. occasionalism], it is enough to show the difference between an occasional cause and an instrumental cause. The difference is this: we call occasional cause that which determines a free agent to act, but which does not contribute in anything to the agent’s action. On the contrary, we call instrumental cause that which is determined to act by a principal cause, but in such a way that it modifies the action of  the principal cause. […] This being said, it will be easy to show that all secondary causes are instrumental causes in relationship to the first cause”.34 34  Régis, Usage, livre I, partie II, ch. 36, p. 205. “Pour refuter cette opinion, il suffit de faire voir quelle est la difference qui se trouve entre la cause occasionnelle et la cause instrumentale. Or elle consiste cette difference, en ce qu’on appelle cause occasionnelle celle qui détermine un agent libre à agir, mais qui ne

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Régis understands occasional causes as extrinsic conditions for the production of  the effect, that is, as causes that are not directly involved in the causal process. In Régis’s view, instrumental causes are instead determined by the power of  the first cause to directly produce specific effects. In other words, while occasional causes determine the first agent to directly produce a certain effect, instrumental causes channel and determine the action the first agent who uses them in order to bring about the effect. For instance, specific bodies modify God’s general movement by making possible specific effects in other bodies. Régis is explicit regarding the real point of  disagreement between him and his occasionalist opponents: “the question is not whether bodies can move themselves, since it has been proved that movement depends on God alone. It is matter only of  knowing whether bodies modify the movement that God communicated to them”.35 According to Régis, the fact that God’s effect can be only a general effect and that specific effects cannot be understood without relying on the particular nature of  secondary causes is sufficient to rule out the “no-necessary-connection” argument used by Malebranche to show that secondary causes cannot have any power to directly bring about finite effects and thus must not be considered real causes.36 In Régis’s view, secondary causes have a necessary connection with their effects since the fact that they have specific physical features entails that they will produce specific modifications of  God’s efficient movement.37 In this sense, they are different from occasional causes, and it contribue rien à son action ; et on appelle au contraire cause instrumentale, celle qui est déterminée à agir par une cause principale, mais de telle sorte qu’elle modifie elle-même l’action de cette cause principale. […] Or cela posé, il sera aisé de faire voir que toutes les causes secondes sont des causes instrumentales à l’égard de la cause premiere”. Analogous view in Cours, p. 110. 35  Régis, Usage, livre I, partie II, ch. 36, p. 206. “Il n’est pas question si les corps se peuvent mouvoir d’eux-mêmes, car il a esté prouvé que le mouvement depend de Dieu seul. Il s’agit seulement de sçavoir s’ils modifient le mouvement que Dieu leur communique”. 36  Concerning Malebranche’s use of  the “no-necessary-connection” argument and its medieval forerunners (especially Al-Ghazali and Nicholas of  Autrecourt), see Steven Nadler, Occasionalism: Causation Among the Cartesians, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 165–188. 37 See Régis, Usage, livre I, partie II, ch. 36, p. 206.

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is possible to defend that there is a real necessary connection between secondary causes and their effects.38 However, this is not due to any intrinsic power that secondary causes would have per se, and only in that sense Régis would join his occasionalist opponents against the scholastic authors discussed in this section. In Régis’s view, secondary causes have to be understood as instrumental causes, which are real causes (rather than mere occasional causes), although they do not have any causal power embedded in their own nature. Régis’s point is that in order to have real causal efficacy, it is enough to grant a necessary connection between the features that define the nature of  a given cause and the features of  the effects that would follow from it. However, the existence of  a necessary connection does not presuppose or establish that there must be a corresponding causal power embedded in the nature of  the cause itself. As Régis explains in the Usage: “Concerning the source of  the secondary causes’ efficacy, we agree that it consists in those faculties that God assigned to them as he wanted; but since these faculties are something that is truly real and positive, which is not in God but in creatures themselves, we will say that beyond God’s power that is extended to everything, it must be admitted in creatures a proper and particular efficacy that corresponds to the effects that God produces by using secondary causes as his own instruments”.39

Although this passage may seem to contradict Régis’s claim that secondary causes do not have per se efficacy, a close reading reveals that it simply restates the same view in a different way. Régis agrees with his occasionalist opponent on the fact that the source of  the secondary causes’ efficacy has to be traced back to God. However, he also claims that there is something that truly belongs to secondary causes and that cannot be possibly located in God, namely, those specific faculties (facultez) of  modal entities that allow them to produce specific effects. These faculties

 See Régis, Usage, livre I, partie II, ch. 36, p. 208.   Régis, Usage, livre I, partie II, ch. 36, p. 208.

38 39

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are not real causal powers embedded in the nature of  secondary causes, but rather dispositions that secondary causes have in virtue of  their own physical structure (i.e. in virtue of  their specific esse, to use a scholastic terminology). When these faculties are activated by God’s own power, then secondary causes can produce certain specific effects. Arguably, examples of  these faculties are shape, size, configurations of  inner parts and texture that different bodies have. This is sufficient to consider secondary causes as real causes although their efficacy relies on the fact that God uses them as instruments, that is, bestows on them his power in order to let them operate. In  other words, Régis holds that (i) secondary causes have to be considered real causes on the basis of  some faculties that pertain to their nature, and (ii) secondary causes are not per se causes because the power through which they act is nothing but God’s own power. The first point works against occasionalists while the second is the result of  Régis’s dismissal of  Thomist and Jesuit versions of  concurrentism. The result of  this discussion is the claim that real causation does not necessarily entail causal power embedded in the nature of  the cause itself. Surely, God is a per se cause and God’s power is essentially embedded in its own nature. However, Régis contends that God is the only cause of  this kind,40 although he warrants that this does not amount to dismiss secondary causality altogether. To conclude, Régis’s position underscores that both Aquinas and his followers, on the one hand, and their occasionalist opponents, on the other, share an important assumption, namely, that only per se causes (which have causal powers embedded in their own nature) can count as real causes. In fact, it is because of  this assumption that the scholastic authors I discussed were so concerned with defending the per se efficacy of secondary causes. This is also the reason why the occasionalist strategy to deny that secondary causes were per se causes at all consists in denying the reality of  causal powers embedded in their nature. Régis defends a different account by dismissing the shared assumption at the basis of  the scholastic debate, and by admitting that causes do not need to have the power that  See Régis, Usage, livre I, partie II, ch. 28, p. 179.

40

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lets them operate embedded in their own nature. By renouncing to understand proper causation in terms of  powers embedded in substances, Régis’s account move away from a fundamental assumption shared among scholastics philosophers by introducing a new way of  conceiving of  causation based rather on relationship between agents and events.41

Abstract Seventeenth-century natural philosophy tends to be highly critical of  Aristotelianism and seems to create ideal conditions for a revival of  occasionalism. This chapter discusses how the leading Cartesian Pierre-Sylvain Régis advanced an account of  secondary causation able to resist occasionalism while offering an alternative to scholastic accounts of  secondary causation developed by Thomists and Jesuits between fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Keywords: Causation, Concurrentism, Occasionalism, Régis.

41  For the reception of  Régis’s view in the early modern debate on causation see Sangiacomo, “Divine action and God’s immutability”.

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II.

CAUSALITY AND THE LAWS OF  NATURE

MARIANGELA PRIAROLO

FORCE DE LOI: THE DEBATE ON THE LAWS OF  NATURE AND MALEBRANCHE’S OCCASIONALISM

Introduction In the last twenty years, while criticizing the traditional thesis according to which occasionalism was born in order to solve the mind-body relationship, scholars have focused their attention on several arguments used by Nicolas Malebranche for establishing occasionalism. Occasionalism is grounded on Malebranche’s analysis of  causation,1 on the doctrine of  continuous creation,2 on the notion of  law and general will,3 and, last but not least, on the quod nescis principle, or broadly, on the argument of  “defaut de connaissance”.4 With regard to the latter, it has been demonstrated that this “epistemic condition of  cau1 See Thomas Lennon, “Occasionalism and the Cartesian Metaphysics of  Motion”, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 1  (1974), pp. 29–40; Steven Nadler, “Malebranche on Causation”, in The Cambridge Companion to Malebranche, edited by Steven Nadler, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 112–138; and Tad Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. 2  Sukjae Lee, “Necessary Connections and Continous Creation: Malebranche’s Two Arguments for Occasionalism”, Journal of  the History of  Philosophy, IV (2008), pp. 539–565; Nadler, “Occasionalism and General Will in Malebranche”, Journal of  the History of  Philosophy, XXXI (1993), pp. 31–47. 3  See Nadler, “Occasionalism and General Will”, and Nicholas Jolley, Causality and Mind. Essays in Early Modern Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014. Jolley’s essay was originally published in 2002. See Jolley, Causality and Mind, p. v. 4  The term is used by Delphine Kolesnik-Antoine, L’homme cartésien: la “force qu’a l’âme de mouvoir le corps”, Rennes, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2009. On this argument see Sandrine Roux, “La physiologie contre l’expérience: l’argument du ‘défaut de connaissance’ de Malebranche”, Philon-

Occasionalism. From Metaphysics to Science, ed. by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano, Turnhout, Brepols, 2018 (DESCARTES, 2), pp.  107–126    FHG   10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.114990

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sality” derived from Galen’s De foetuum formatione, who used the quod nescis principle also to support a conception of  nature according to which it is the upshot of  an intelligent design.5 Therefore, in this principle Malebranche – who was deeply interested in physiology (like his mentor, Descartes) and committed with theocentrism (contrary to Descartes) – can find a very good argument in favour of  a thesis, which he pleaded all along his writings, and which is at the basis of  occasionalism: the complete dependence of  nature on God. The enquiry into the historical sources of  occasionalism has appeared to be very fruitful for comprehending not only Malebranche’s doctrine and the conceptual framework in which it took place, but also the connections between early modern thought and its past. In this sense, it has to be remarked that even if  Malebranche accepted and endorsed the new vision of  nature as a mechanical and so to speak mindless system of  extended bodies ruled by necessary laws, a vision which was proposed for instance by Descartes, he refused to expel God from the world. In Pascal’s words, Malebranche did not just allow God “a flick of  his fingers to set the world in motion”,6 like Pascal’s Descartes. Such a refusal did not lead the philosopher to propose again a vitalistic conception of  nature, typical of  the Renaissance and later, in a certain sense, of  Leibniz, nor to suppose a “busybody God”,7 who intervenes at every moment in human or natural affairs. As it is well known, Malebranche’s God acts through general laws, which are the instruments of  God’s general will.8 But it is also well known, as the debate between Nicholas Jolley and Steven Nadler on this topic attests, that the relationship between general will and general laws, as well as the nature of  general will, is far from being clear. Does God’s general wills sorbonne, VIII (2014), pp.  47–73; Emanuela Scribano, “Q uod nescis  quomodo fiat, id non facis. Occasionalism against Descartes? ”, Rinascimento, LI (2011), pp. 63–86. 5 See Scribano, “Q uod nescis quomodo fiat, id non facis”. 6   Pascal, Pensées, Lafuma 1001. 7 See Jolley, Causality and Mind, p. 93. 8  See for instance Traité de la nature et de la grâce, Premier Eclaircissement: “Je dis que Dieu agit par des volontez generales, lors qu’il agit en consequence des loix generales qu’il a etablies”, in Nicolas Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, Paris, Vrin/CNRS, 1958–1967, 20 tomes and 2 vols, tome V, p. 147.

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contain particular volitions or do they not? And more generally, what does it “acting through general laws” mean? Now, it seems to me that a light might be indirectly shed on these problems by analyzing the debate on the conception of  the laws of  nature, which began at the end of  the thirteenth century and in some respects continues also today.9 This debate looks particularly promising for a better understanding of  Malebranche’s occasionalism because, as we will see, one of  the point at issue is precisely the key point of  the quod nescis principle: the, so-to-speak, “ignorance” of  nature. Therefore, if  my reading makes sense, the notion of  law of  nature could be the middle term that could unify Malebranche’s argument from ignorance and the argument from general will. This essay will be divided into two parts. In the first part I will present the key points of  the debate on the nature of  law, in particular Aquinas’s notion of  natural law and Suarez’s criticism toward it. In the second I will dwell on Malebranche’s notion of  law, trying to clarify the connections it has with the debate aforementioned.

1. Do the Laws of  Nature Exist? In  early modern time the concept of  law was one among the main characters on the intellectual scene.10 The discussion of  the nature of  laws, of  their foundation (or lack of  foundation), and of  what kind of  modality they have, became central both in the domain of  jurisprudence and within the field of  natural philosophy. It is very difficult to clearly outline the relationship between the juridical and the physical notion of  law,11 but as it 9  For a reconstruction of  the history of  the notion of  law of  nature and an outline of  the present debate see Mauro Dorato, Il software del­l’universo. Saggio sulle leggi di natura, Milano, Bruno Mondadori, 2000. 10  An important collection of  studies on this subject is Natural Law and Laws of  Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy, edited by Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis, Farnham, Ashgate, 2008. 11 On this relationship see Paolo Casini, “La Loi naturelle: réflexion politique et sciences exactes”, Studies on Voltaire and Eighteenth Century, CLI (1976), pp. 417–432.

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has been remarked, most likely there is a common theological background.12 A good start for an inquiry on this topic is Thomas Aquinas, who specifically dedicated a large part of  his Summa theologiae, the quaestiones 90–108 of  the Ia IIae, to the analysis of  law. In Aquinas’s view,13 law is first of  all an “external principle of  action”, a feature which it shares with the Devil and God. While the Devil is “the external principle inclining to evil” (ST Ia IIae q. 90), law is an external principle used by God to move human beings to good. Also because of  this, as Aquinas states in the first of  the four articles of  quaestio 90, law is something which pertains to reason, a rule, i.e. a norm, which obliges people to act in a certain way: “Law is a rule and measure of  acts, whereby man is induced to act or is restrained from acting: for ‘lex’ [law] is derived from ‘ligare’ [to bind], because it binds [obligat] one to act. Now the rule and measure of  human acts is the reason, which is the first principle of  human acts  […] since it belongs to the reason to direct to the end, which is the first principle in all matters of  action, according to the Philosopher (Phys. ii). Now that which is the principle in any genus, is the rule and measure of  that genus […]. Consequently it follows that law is something pertaining to reason” (q. 90, a. 1, resp.).

12 See Jean-Robert Armogathe, Deus Legislator, in Natural Law and Laws of  Nature, pp.  265–277, but also Armogathe, La nature du monde. Science neuve et exégèse au xviie siècle, Paris, PUF, 2007. The theological origin of  the modern notion of  law of  nature was contested by Jane Ruby, who sees in Roger Bacon’s studies on optics the first occurence of  the concept (see Jane Ruby, “The Origins  of  Scientific Law”, Journal of  the History of  Ideas, XLVII (1986), 3, pp.  341–359). However, the theological origin will be supported again, and with good reasons, by John Milton, “Laws of  Nature”, in The Cambridge History of  Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, edited by Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp.  680–701, and Francis Oakley, Natural Law, Laws of  Nature, Natural Rights: Continuity and Discontinuity in the History of  Ideas, New York-London, Continuum, 2005. 13  For an analitical commentary of  Aquinas’s treatise of  law see J. Budziszewski, Thomas Aquinas’s Treatise on Law, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2014. The English translations of  Aquinas’s quotations present in the main text come from here.

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It is important to note that in the same article Aquinas denies that law derives from the will (ob. 3). Even if, generally speaking, reason receives from will its power to move, a law is a law if  and only if  “the volition of  what is commanded” is “in accord with some rule of  reason” (q. 90, a. 1, ad 3). According to Aquinas, the will by itself  can produce only arbitrary command, which does not possess the features of  law, i.e. the rationality and generality implied in the definition of  law as “a rule and a measure of  acts” (regula… et mensura), as well as the connection with the good.14 Only if  these conditions are satisfied, and then the will of  the legislator is driven by reason, are we allowed to say that “the will of  sovereign has the force of  law [my emphasis]” (vigorem legis): “otherwise the sovereign’s will would savor of  iniquity rather than of  law” (ad 3). In this sense, according to Aquinas, the foundation of  obligation is the rationality of  the norm, more than the command imposed by the will. This idea is bolstered by two other features of  the law, both implying a reference to reason: a) a law must be promulgated, i.e. those who are under its power must know it,15 and b) it must be directed to the “common good”.16 But if  law pertains to reason, and it is something which concerns only rational, and namely good, deeds, can we properly speak of  laws of  nature? In  order to understand Aquinas’s answer to this question, we must first consider his classification of  laws. The theologian 14  As Budziszewski observes, “to say that law is a rule of  acts is to say that it tells us what to do; to say that it is a measure of  acts is to say that it presents a standard with which our acts can be compared and by which they can be evaluated. But following a rule and measuring ourselves according to a standard are operations of  reason”, Budziszewski, Aquinas’s Treatise on Law, p. 19. 15  “[…] a law is imposed on others by way of  a rule and measure. Now a rule or measure is imposed by being applied to those who are to be ruled and measured by it. Wherefore, in order that a law obtain the binding force which is proper to a law, it must needs be applied to the men who have to be ruled by it. Such application is made by its being notified to them by promulgation. Wherefore promulgation is necessary for the law to obtain its force” (q. 90, a. 4, resp.). 16  Since the law is supposed to drive human acts to the good, and the last end of  human act is happiness, “the law must needs regard principally the relationship to happiness. Moreover, since every part is ordained to the whole, as imperfect to perfect; and since one man is a part of  the perfect community, the law must needs regard properly the relationship to universal happiness” (q. 90, a. 2, resp.).

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distinguishes four kinds of  law: a) the eternal law; b) the natural law; c) the human law; d) the divine law.17 For our subject, the most important kind is the first one, the eternal law, which is “the very Idea [ipsa ratio] of  the governement of  things” (q. 91, a. 1, resp.). This means that, according to Aquinas, the eternal law is “the rational pattern by which God, having created things and endowed them with natures, now directs each one toward the goods that are proper to it”.18 The eternal law represents not only the divine wisdom as it is related to the world, and thus the divine providence, but also the track impressed by God in the world, or in other terms, the rational structure of  the world. Since this rational pattern is a law, it has a normative weight. Consequently, God’s wisdom does not only lay out the universe, but obliges universe to act in a certain way. As we read in the q. 93, a. 1, “Wherefore as the type of  the Divine Wisdom [ratio divina sapientia], inasmuch as by It all things are created, has the character of  art, exemplar or idea; so the type of  Divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end, bears the character of  law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing else than the type of  Divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and movements”.

God, then, models the universe according his ideas – the archetypes of  creation – and, at the same time, gives a precise direction to the behavior of  every being. But, as Aquinas explains, since to give a law is to give a rule to act, to give a law is like to impress “a kind of  inward principle of  action” on the subject of  that law. So, through the creation, “God imprints on the whole of  nature the principles of  its proper actions. And so, in this way, God is said to command the whole of  nature, according to Ps. 148:6: ‘He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away.’ And thus all actions and movements of  the whole of  nature are subject to the eternal law. Consequently irrational creatures are subject to 17  To these we could add a fifth one, the so-called law of  sin, which is not a law in the strict sense, but the effect of  the violation of  the Divine Law (q. 91, a. 6). 18  Budziszewski, Aquinas’s Treatise on Law, p. 65 (my emphasis).

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the eternal law, through being moved by Divine providence; but not, as rational creatures are, through understanding the Divine commandment” (q. 93, a. 5, resp.).

The law of  nature is then identified by Aquinas by the operations that every creature does by itself  and accordingly to its specific nature. Therefore, when a being does what is due to its nature, it is following the law of  God.19 As a result, the eternal law is a law even for irrational creatures, and it is thus a law of  nature. In  this sense, when we describe the physical structure of  the universe, what we find is not only the way of  act of  the beings, but also the way in which the beings have to act. In other words, the laws of  nature are not merely descriptive, but are also prescriptive.20 However, as we have seen, according to Aquinas, the normativity of  the law derives more from its rationality than from an explicit command, and since the rationality of  the law of  nature, as well of  nature in general, is a consequence of  its foundation in God’s wisdom, it follows that also the normativity comes from there.21 Now, as Jean-Robert Armogathe underlined,22 the Parisian comdemnation of  1277 involved every thesis that could be supposed of  immanentism.23 Among these were included all the 19  In this sense, the natural law (q. 94) prescribes to human beings to follow their nature, i.e. to act according to reason, and to pursue their proper end, i.e. happiness, which consists of  seeing God. See Summa theologiae, Ia IIae, qq. 1–3 and Ia, q. 12. An echo of  Aquinas’ conception of  law of  nature is still present in the (negative) expression “against nature”. 20  For this reason the distinction traced by Withehead between the doctrine of  law of  nature as immanent and the doctrine of  law of  nature as imposed (see Alfred Whitehead, Adventures of  Ideas, New York, Macmillan, 1933, part II, chap. VII) appears less sharp than what Whitehead thought. Whitehead’s classification of  the doctrines on laws of  nature was a key point of  Oakley, Natural Law.  Moreover, it seems clear that in Aquinas the laws of  nature are not conventional, but represent the real structure of  the universe. On this distinction see Dorato, Il  software del­l’universo, Introduzione; and Casini, “La Loi naturelle”, pp. 426–427. 21  See Anthony Lisska, “Right Reason in Natural Law Moral Theory: Thomas Aquinas and William of  Ockham”, in Reason, Religion and Natural Law: Plato to Spinoza, edited by Jonathan Jacobs, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2012, pp. 155–174. 22 See Armogathe, Deus Legislator, pp. 266 ff. 23  The text of  the Parisian comdemnation with a commentary is now in David Piché, La comdamnation parisienne de 1277, Paris, Vrin, 1999.

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conceptions of  the nature that seem to lead to the autonomy or, even worse, the independence of  the world from God. The analysis presented by Aquinas in the treatise of  law – even if  it can be seen as a “compromise solution” 24 because of  the role granted to God’s will in an intellettualistic context – was not considered sufficient to avoid the dangers of  immanentism. If  the lex aeterna is in God and thus it is God, but at the same time represents the structure of  the world, how is it possible to separate God and the world? Also for this reason, many theologians, most of  all Franciscans, answered by stressing the role of  God’s will in the relationship between Him and nature, giving rise to a debate that continued in the following centuries and led to the denial of  the statute of  law to the laws of  nature. As we read, for instance, in Bartolomeo Mastri da Meldola, one of  the most important figure of  seventeenth-century Scotism,25 “The law […] of nature is not strictly speaking a law, and does not have the force of  obligation to the law, because it does not command, but only indicates, and it is a rule to which the act must conform […]; but the rule is the judgement of  that intellect which is the misure of  all the nature”.26

When we speak of  laws in regard to nature, wrote Mastri, we are not talking of  real law, because they do not possess that “vim legis […] obligantis” which defines a law. Therefore, according to Mastri, the law of  nature is indeed a rule, as Aquinas stated, but not a law. It is not a law because it does not prescribe something to created (and irrational) beings, but it is a rule because the nature and the deeds of  these beings correspond (“indicans”) to what it is in the mind of  God (“judicium intellectus illius, qui est mensura totius naturae”).

  The expression is Armogathe’s: Armogathe, Deus Legislator, p. 266.  On Mastri see Marco Forlivesi, Scotistarum princeps: Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) e il suo tempo, Padova, Centro Studi Antoniani, 2002. 26  “Lex […] naturae non est proprie lex, neque vim legis habet obligantis, quia non est imperans, sed tantum indicans, et est regula, cui actus conformari debet […]; haec vero regula est judicium intellectus illius, qui est mensura totius naturae”, Bartolomeo Mastri, In  secundum librum sententiarum, disputatio VI, q. III, Venetiis 1731 (first edition Venice 1659), p.  304, my translation. 24 25

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Mastri’s opinion does not only represent the position of  the Scotists, but was also widespread in contexts less devoted to Duns Scotus, even if  influenced by him. This was the case of  Francisco Suarez, the author of  a Tractatus de legibus, which was written about fifty year before the work of  Mastri and reprinted seven times between 1612 and 1679.27 From the beginning of  his treatise Suarez contest Aquinas’ definition of  law, because it is “too broad and general”.28 According to Suarez, what defines law and unifies its different kinds is obligation. Law “in the proper sense of  the term” is conceived as “the regulation of  an inferior by a superior, through the direct command of  the latter”.29 But for the command to make sense, the inferior must be able to understand it, and, thus, must be provided with reason. As a consequence “that law whereby God is said to govern natural or irrational things, is metaphorically called a law or a precept […] for the subordination and subjection of  irrational creatures to God is but losely and metaphorically called obedience, since it is more properly a kind of  natural necessity; while, on the other hand, the eternal law, in so far as rational beings are thereby governed as moral beings as members of  society, has the true nature of  law, and obedience in the true sense is paid to it”.30

Eternal law is then present only in rational beings as the moral law – the only law that can be called “natural” – but not in the nature, because “the efficacy of  divine power, and the natural necessity resulting thereform in this connexion, are metaphorically given the name of  law”.31 Since obligation is the main fea27 See John Doyle, “Francisco Suarez S.J. (1548–1617) On the Interpretation of  Laws”, The Modern Schoolman, LXXXIII (2006), pp. 197–222. 28  De Legibus, bk 1, chap. 1, 1, Francisco Suarez, De legibus, Madrid, CSIC, 8. Vols, 1944, vol. II, p. 21. 29   De Legibus, bk II, chap. 2, 9, vol. II, p. 157. 30  De Legibus, bk II, chap. 2, 13, vol. II, p. 159 (my emphasis). See also bk I, chap. 3, 8: “ ‘law’ is to be attributed to insensate things, not in its strict sense, but metaphorically […] Not even brute animals are capable of  [participating in] law in a strict sense, since they have the use neither of  reason nor of  liberty; so that it is only by a like metaphor that natural law may be ascribed to them”, vol. II, p. 41. 31  De Legibus, bk 1, chap. 1, 1, vol. II, p. 22.

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ture of  every law, only rational beings can thus be subjected to law. Therefore, compared to Aquinas, in Suarez rationality appears to be a condition more of  the subjects of  law, than of  the law itself.32 As a consequence “laws of  nature” can be used only as a metaphor. Far from being limited to the theological milieu, Suarez’s position does not disappear in the seventeenth century, and will survive in unexpected places. We will find it, for instance, in the writings of  Robert Boyle, whose conclusion, however, is quite different from Suarez’s. In the Christian virtuoso (1690) we read: “I look upon a Law, as a Moral, not a Physical, Cause, as being indeed not a Notional thing, according to which, an intelligent and free Agent is bound to regulate its Actions. But inanimate Bodies are utterly incapable of  understanding what a Law is, or what it injoyns, or when they act conformably or unconformably to it; and therefore the actions of  inanimate Bodies, which cannot incite or moderate their own actions, are produced by real power, not by Laws”.33

According to Boyle, since laws cannot drive nature, for reasons very similar to those posited by Suarez, we must suppose in it a “real power”, which is the power of  God, the only and true responsible of  natural phenomena. We cannot examine here to what extent Boyle is committed with occasionalism,34 but 32  This does not mean that Suarez completely share a “positivist” conception of  law, but it has to be remarked that in Scotist school, by which Suarez was influenced, as well as in Ockham’s, the accent on the obligation goes hand in hand with the accent on the will at the expense of  the rationality of  law. As a result – in regard, for instance, to the extent of  natural law – what the law prescribes it is right and not vice  versa. See on this Lisska, “Right Reason”. The difference between Ockham and Aquinas on this point will reappear in the seventeenth century in the “debate” between Hobbes and Locke (or Pufendorf  and Leibniz). See René Sève, Leibniz et l’école du droit naturel, Paris, Puf, 1989. 33  Robert Boyle, The Christian Virtuoso, St. Paul 1690, § III, pp. 36–37. My emphasis. 34  On this subject it is very important to consult Peter Anstey, “Boyle on Occasionalism: An Unexamined Source”, Journal of  the History of  Ideas, XL (1999), pp. 57–81, in which an interesting manuscript by Boyle on occasionalism is also published. Anstey, who supports the thesis of  Boyle’s occasionalism, dedicated a monograph to Boyle: Anstey, The Philosophy of  Robert Boyle, London-New York, Routledge, 2000.

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it is important to emphazise the connection he put between the denial of efficacity to laws of nature and the need of God’s intervention in nature. As we mentioned, this denial derives from a conception of  law which underlines, on one hand, as in Aquinas, the rationality requested by the laws, and, on the other, as in Suarez, the normativity of  the law. But, as we will see in the next pages, these are the main features of  the law also in another seventeenth-century philosopher, who reach a similar conclusion, occasionalism, for very different reasons: we are talking, of  course, of  Malebranche.

2. From Law to Laws Even if  it is perhaps excessive to define the concept of  law as “the general Malebranchian principle”, the weight it has in Malebranche’s philosophy is undeniable.35 In  many respects, this is not surprising: Malebranche is a devoted and loyal son of  the Scientific Revolution and its spirit, which marked the passage, in Koyré’s words, from the world of  the “more or less” to the universe of  precision.36 Malebranche’s Cartesianism leads him to see the physical world as governed by laws of  nature, and Malebranche’s “Malebranchism” to state as ruled by laws also the (supernatural) world of  grace. The pervasiveness of  laws in Malebranche’s system relies on two convictions closely related to each other: a) a wise God makes everything in the world and b) to act wisely is to act through laws. These are the central theses, for instance, of  the Traité sur la nature et la grâce, in which Malebranche explains God’s behavior in regard to the creation 35 See Marie-Frédériq ue Pellegrin, Le système de la loi de Nicolas Malebranche, Paris, Vrin, 2003, p. 23. Several years ago Giambattista Gori suggested that Malebranche’s interest in law derives from the juridical studies he would have made during his youth. See Gori, “Malebranche ‘avocat’? ”, Rivista critica di storia della filosofia, XXXV (1980), 2, pp. 127–152, and Id., “Onnipotenza divina e obbligazione nella prima filosofia di Malebranche”, in Potentia Dei. L’onnipotenza divina nel pensiero dei secoli XVI e XVII, edited by Guido Canziani, Miguel  A. Granada, Charles Yves Zarka, Franco Angeli, Milano, 2000, pp. 467–481. 36 See Alexandre Koyré, Du monde de l’à-peu-prés à l’univers de la précision (1948), in Etudes d’histoire de la pensée philosophique, Paris, PUF, 1966, pp. 341–362.

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and the governement of  the world. As we read at the beginning of  the Traité (I disc., § 13): “An excellent workman should proportion his action to his work; he does not accomplish by quite complex means that which he can execute by simpler ones, he does not act without an end, and never makes useless efforts. From this one must conclude that God, discovering in the infinite treasures of  his wisdom and infinity of  possible worlds (as the necessary consequences of  the laws of  motion which he can establish), determines himself  to create that world which could have been produced and preserved by the simplest laws, and which ought to be the most perfect, with respect to the simplicity of  the ways necessary to its production or to its conservation”.37

As Malebranche explains in the Ninth Dialogue on Metaphysics, God can “not act” but if  he act “He cannot but regulate Himself  in accordance with Himself, with the Law which He finds in His substance”.38 This “Law”, the “inviolable rule” 39 of  God’s will, is what Malebranche called since 1678 the Order, which is defined in many writings as the relation among the perfections of  God, or the relations between God’s ideas,40 or even as the Word.41 The Order plays a pivotal role in Malebranche’s philosophy, not only because it is the law that guides God himself, but also and

37  Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, V, p.  28, Treatise on Nature and Grace, translated with and introduction and notes by Patrick Riley, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1992, p. 116. 38  Malebranche, Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, IX, § 8, in Œuvres complètes, XII, p. 210. 39   See e.g. Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, XII, p. 303. 40  Since the first edition of  the Search after Truth, Malebranche defines God’s ideas as the “perfections of  God”. See Malebranche, De la recherche de la vérité, I, 13, § 4, in Œuvres complètes, I, p. 157: “les idées qui nous représentent les créatures, ne sont que les perfections, qui sont en Dieu”. For a survey of  the occurences of  the term Order in Malebranche’s writings see André Robinet, “Ordo/ordre dans l’oeuvre de Malebranche”, in Ordo. II Colloquio Internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo, edited by Marta Fattori e Massimo Bianchi, Roma, Edizioni del­l’Ateneo e Bizzarri, 1979, pp. 347–424. 41  “Je suis [the Word is speaking], comme tu sçais, la Raison, la Vérité, l’Ordre immuable et nécessaire: je suis la sagesse de Dieu et sa loi involable. Dieu ne fait rien san moi: il m’aime invinciblement”, Méditations chrétiennes, XIX, § 6, in Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, XI, p. 217.

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above all because all the other laws, and therefore God’s action, depends on it: “God has two kinds of  laws which rule him in his conduct. The one is eternal and necessary, and this is Order; the others are arbitrary, and these are the general laws of  nature and of  grace. But God established the latter only because order required that he acts in that way”.42

Even if  the laws of  nature and of  grace are not necessary by themselves, but depends on God’s decisions (and in this sense they are “arbitrary”), they have to follow the dictates of  the Order. This means that, since the Order describes the nature of  the most intelligible entity – God – and represents the relations among his perfections and/or ideas, the laws of  nature and of  grace are intrinsically rational. Moreover, as Malebranche underlines especially since the Traité de morale, the Order plays a normative role, “it has the force of  law”,43 and inasmuch as it prescribes the rules (the laws), both natural and supernatural kingdoms must follow.44 This point will be clearly stated in the last work of  Malebranche, the Réflexions sur la prémotion physique, in which the philosopher uses the thomistic expression “eternal law” rather than the term “Order” precisely to stress this aspect.45 The relations between the divine perfections, which are “moral relations”,

  Méditations chrétiennes, VII, in Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, X, p. 73. 43  Traité de morale, in Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, XI, p. 68, Treatise on Ethics, translated and edited by Craig Walton, Dordrecht, Springer, 1993, p. 80. 44 See Martial Gueroult, Malebranche, Paris, Aubier-Montaigne, 1955– 1959, 3 vols, vol. II, p. 33. See also Gori, “Malebranche ‘avocat’?”. 45  By the way, in the Méditations chrétiennes Malebranche already equates the Order and the Eternal law: “tous les rapports de perfections qui sont en moi [the Word is speaking], sont l’Ordre nécessaire, la Loi Eternelle, la Régle immuable de tous les mouvemens des esprits créés” (Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, X, p. 41). For both these reasons it is very difficult to share Riley’s opinion that the expression “eternal law” in the Réflexions comes from Leibniz: see Paul Riley, “Malebranche and Natural Law”, in Early Modern Natural Law Theories. Contexts and Strategies in the Early Enlightenment, edited by Tim J. Hochstrasser and Peter Schröder, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2003, pp. 53–87, p. 107. 42

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“are not simple truths, but […] also have the force of  laws; for one must esteem all things in proportion as they are estimable and lovable; in proportion as they participate in the divine perfections. And since the nature of  God is immutable and necessary, and since God can neither see nor will that two times two be equal to five, how can it fail to be perceived that God can neither see nor will that the idea of  man which he has participate less in his perfections than that of  the beast? that, as a consequence, he can neither see nor will that it be just to prefer, or rather will to prefer, one’s horse to one’s coachman, simply because one can or wants to? Power or will adds nothing to the eternal law, to the relations of  perfection which subsist between the eternal and immutable ideas”.46

In  this sense, the eternal law is “the essential justice, and the foundation of  every fair and reasonable law”,47 not only of  the (good) human laws,48 but also of  the laws of  nature. Recalling – but modifying – a Cartesian argument, Malebranche underlines that these laws derive from a divine attribute – therefore an element of  the Order –, the immutability, and that for this reason their scope is not merely physical, but moral too: “As I proved elsewhere, this attribute [= immutability] is one of  the foundations of  the laws of  nature, that is, of  the general Laws of  the ordinary Providence, according to which it could happen that one day a monster will be produced. But these general Laws are not established in order to generating monsters: they are established in order to produce the better effects, the ordinary effects which are worthy of  His wisdom and His goodness”.49

As a consequence, according to Malebranche, the laws of  nature are not mere rules for the behaviour of  the bodies, as in Descartes, but are the instruments of  God’s Providence, as in   Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, XVI, p. 99.   Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, XVI, p. 82. 48  It is important to remark that for this reason according to Malebranche we can refuse to obey to laws which are unfair. See André Robinet, “L’attitude politique de Malebranche”, xvii e Siecle, XXXVIII (1958), pp. 1–27. 49  Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, XVI, p. 103. 46 47

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Aquinas. As he writes in the Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, “ordinary Providence resolves itself  mainly into two things: into laws of  the communication of  movement, since everything in bodies is effected by means of  movement, and into the wise combination which God has contrived in the order of  His productions at the time of  their creation, that His world should be preserved by the natural laws which he has resolved to follow”.50

Nevertheless, since in Malebranche the bodies are bare configuration of  extension devoid of  any power, in Aquinas’ words of  any “inward principle of  action”,51 in his account it is the laws of  nature, and not as in Aquinas the created beings, which produces all the natural effects and are, thus, efficacious: “God created the world because He willed it […]; and He moves all things, and thus produces all the effects that we see happening, because He also willed certain laws according to which motion is communicated upon the collision of  bodies; and because these laws are efficacious they act, whereas bodies cannot act”.52

Even if  the laws of  nature (and every laws in nature) 53 become effective only by means of  the occasional cause,54 which “par50  Malebranche, Entretiens, X, §  14, in Œuvres complètes, XII, p.  243. The “wise combination” refers to the preformation theory. See Entretiens, X, § 3: “il est nécessaire que chaque semence contienne toute l’espece qu’elle peut conserver; que chaque grain de bles, par exemple, contient en petit l’épi qu’il pousse dehors, dont chaque grain renferme de nouveau son épi, sont tous les grains peuvent toûjours être féconds aussi-bien que ceux du premier épi”, Œuvres complètes, XII, p. 229. 51  Aquinas, ST, Ia-IIae, q. 93, a. 5, resp. 52   Malebranche, Recherche de la verité, VI-2, 3, in Œuvres complètes, II, p. 314, English translation Search after Truth, edited by Thomas M. Lennon and Paul J. Olscamp, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 449. 53  Malebranche distinguishes five kinds of  laws: see Entretiens sur la métaphysique, XIII, § 8, in Œuvres complètes, XII, pp. 319 and ff. 54  See for instance Entretiens sur la métaphysique, X, § 14: “You know quite certainly – Theodore, Malebranche’s spokesman, is talking to Ariste – that God alone sets bodies in motion, that He accomplishes everything in them by means of  motion, that He only communicates motion from one body to another according to certain laws, whatever those laws may be, and that the applica-

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ticularize” the general instructions given by God to the nature, it is up to the laws to oblige nature to act in a certain way. But since these laws derive from the main – and eternal – law, the Order, which is God, their normative and causal power come from there. In  short: the efficacity of  the laws is due to the efficacity of  God.55 Therefore, Malebranche appears to overturn Boyle’s reasoning, and stating that it is because laws of  nature are not only metaphorical, but real laws, i.e. legislative instruments stated by a lawmaker, that we must suppose a “real power” in the nature. In this sense, as in Boyle, in Malebranche’s occasionalism can be read also as a consequence of  a certain conception of  the laws of  nature, even if, as we have seen, this conception is completely different from Boyle’s. Contrary to Boyle (and Suarez), and like Aquinas, Malebranche claims that the rationality is a condition of  the law and not of  its subjects, and this because it is the rationality of  the Order the source of  all the norms. Consequently, as the quod nescis argument suggests, the “ignorance” – intrinsic, as in the ignorance of  bodies, or just inevitable, as in the ignorance of  human beings – is far from being an argument against the normativity of  law, and is instead an argument in support of  its causal power. As Malebranche underlines in the Search after Truth, while refusing the soul to animals and evoking the argument of  “intelligent design”, “everything regular signifies [intelligence]. […] The movement of  animals and plants indicates intelligence, but this intelligence is not material; it is distinct from animals, as the intelligence that arranges the wheels of  a watch is distinct from the watch. For at bottom this intelligence appears infinitely wise, infinitely strong, and is the same one that formed

tion of  such laws comes from the encounter of  bodies. You know that collision of  bodies is in consequence of  their impenetrability, the occasional or natural cause which determines the efficacy of  the general laws” (Malebranche, Oeuvres complètes, XII, p. 244). 55  See on this Jolley, Causality and Mind, § 3. For this reason it seems to me that the two kinds of  necessitation distinguished by Tad Schmaltz – causal necessitation and conceptual necessitation – tend to overlap. See Schmaltz, “Occasionalism and Mechanism: Fontenelle’s Objections to Malebranche”, British Journal for the History of  Philosophy, XVI (2008), pp. 293–313, p. 300.

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us in our mothers’ womb and gives us growth to which we cannot, by all the efforts of  our mind and will, add a cubit”.56

Concluding Remarks In the Introduction, I suggested that the inquiry on the debate on the laws of  nature and on Malebranche’s conception of  law could shed light not only on occasionalism, but also on the meaning of  the expression “to act through general will”. It is well-known that Malebranche’s insistence on this point has been the favorite target of  his critics, from Arnauld to Fénelon and Régis, who mainly saw in it a denial of  Providence. The supporters of  the “particular content” interpretation of  Malebranche’s general will claim that his critics actually misunderstood him.57 In fact, Malebranche would have stated that to act through general will only means to act in accordance with (general) laws, and thus not randomly. But if  to act through general will is just to follow general rules, it does not exclude but, on the contrary, implies individual volitions. This means that when, for instance, someone steps on my foot, God makes me feel pain through an individual volition (something like: “I want that P in this moment experiences pain”), but according to the law of  the mind-body union (“at every time t in which there is a certain modification of  X’s body, X must experience pain”).58 56  Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité, VI-2, 7, in Œuvres complètes, II, pp. 393–394, transl. Search after Truth, p. 494. See also Méditations chrétiennes, V, 8: “Or la force mouvante n’est point dans les corps mûs, mais uniquement en Dieu, puisque ce n’est que l’action de Dieu qui les crée, ou qui les conserve successivement en differens lieux, les corps ne peuvent donc communiquer une force qu’ils n’ont point, mais une force qu’ils ne pourroient même communiquer quand ils l’auroient; car les corps qui se choquent se communiquent leur mouvement avec une régularité, une promptitude, une proportion digne d’une sagesse et d’une puissance infinie, cela n’est que trop évident” (Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, V, p.  50). I  would like to thank Emanuela Scribano for bringing this passage to my attention. 57  For a list of  the supporters of  the “general content” interpretation and of  the “particular content” interpretation see Eric Stencil, “Malebranche and the General Will of  God”, British Journal for the History of  Philosophy, XIX (2011), pp. 1107–1129, p. 1111, note 14. 58  One of  the passage evoked is the following: “Now it is clear that God does not at all act by particular volitions in the sense that I have often explained where he acts by general laws. When a thorn procks me, God makes me feel

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On the other side, the supporters of  the “general content” interpretation deny individual volitions and claim that in the same circumstances God does not want directly my pain, but only the general law which causes it. In this interpretation, the general laws are not mere rule for God’s conduct, as in the “particular content” interpretation, but real and efficacious means for achieving actions.59 Now, it seems to me that both interpretations meet some problems, not only for textual reasons, which especially face the “particular content” intepretation,60 but also for conceptual ones. Very briefly: the main problem of  the “particular content” interpretation concerns, in my opinion, theodicy. Let us take one of  Malebranche’s favorite exemples: monsters. If  the “particular content” interpretation is true, then God would want specifically that monster, which, of  course, it is the upshot of  a general law, but it is nevertheless a monster directly wanted by God. In this case, how can God be justified for evil? On the other hand, the main problem of  the “general content” interpretation concerns the relationship between God’s action and the world and can be summarized as follow: if  God’s commitment with the world consists only in general laws, how can Malebranche’s God escape from the charge of  indifference, ascribed to him for instance by the Jesuit Boursier? 61 For both questions occasionalism could help. In regard to the first interpretation, it can be observed that it is the occasional cause which particularizes – in Malebranche’s words, “determines” – the laws and therefore God’s general will. In this sense, when God states the laws, he certainly knows pain as a consequence of  the general laws of  the union of  mind and body according to which he ceaselessly acts in us”, Réponse aux Réflexions d’Arnauld, in Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, VIII, p. 651. 59 See Jolley, Causality and Mind, p. 96. 60  Even if  he defended himself  from the charges which Arnauld and the others ascribed to him, Malebranche always denied that God acts through particular volitions. See the passage quoted in note 58. 61 “Est-ce donner à Dieu le caractère qu’il doit porter au milieu de l’immense région des esprits que de le réduire à ne s’interesser dans leur conduite, que pour en être le froid spectateut”, Boursier, De l’action de Dieu sur les créatures, quoted in Malebranche, Réflexions sur la prèmotion physique, in Œuvres complètes, XVI, p. 206.

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all the effects which they will produce in the different circumstances, but it is the complex “laws plus effects (through occasional causes)” that he (generally) wants and not the individual effects.62 Consequently, with the (capital) exception of  the ontological status of  evil, which Malebranche considers real, the world of  Malebranche seems not really different from the world of  Leibniz.63 In regard to the second interpretation, occasionalism underlines that the presence of  God in the world through laws is not at all external, because the efficacy of  the laws derive to them from God. For this reason, occasionalism allows Malebranche to overcome Suarez’s criticism to Aquinas’ definition of  laws of  nature. As we have seen, it is because in Aquinas the laws of  nature correspond with the intrinsic nature of  creatures – which, in the end, as Suarez notes, is nothing but the natural necessity – that, according to Suarez, they cannot be counted as true laws, but only as metaphorical ones. In  Malebranche, on the contrary, the laws of  nature are true and real laws in a Suarezian sense, because it is God, through his laws, who obliges nature to act in such and such a way. Occasionalism, by stressing the active role of  God in natural regularities, is then the key to recovering an univocal definition of  law, which can be applied also to the universe. The laws of  nature are real, efficacious, laws because they are God in the nature. But if  it is so, we understand why Malebranche was often compared to Spinoza, since his conception of  the relationship between God and the nature can be charged of  immanentism much more than Aquinas’s which gives nature autonomy towards God.64 And although this comparison was the worst possible offence for Malebranche,65 by a twist of  fate, it is Malebranche, more than Spinoza, who will provide eighteenth-cen  See the passage in the main text, whose reference is indicated in note 49.  See Scribano, “False Enemies: Malebranche, Leibniz, and the Best of  All Possible Worlds”, Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, I  (2003), pp. 165–182. 64   Here, I think, lies the very concerns of  Leibniz towards occasionalism: if  the nature has not its own power, a power different from God’s, the ghost of  Spinoza will reappear. 65  As it is known, Malebranche devoted a lot of  efforts to refuting this charge in his correspondence with Dortous de Mairan (now in Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, XIX, pp. 852 ff.) 62 63

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tury Deism with the conceptual tools to fight the traditional notion of  God as a trascendent being and, thus, of  traditional religion.66

Abstract In  line with the spirit of  the new science, Malebranche stated that God acts through general laws, which are the instruments of  His general will. Nevertheless, the meaning and nature of  this kind of  action is far from clear, as attested by the disagreement among scholars: does God’s general will contain particular volitions or not? The essay addresses this question and, more generally, Malebranche’s conception of  law, through a historical reconstruction of  the Scholastic, and late Scholastic, debate on the definition of  the law of  nature. From this survey, Malebranche’s occasionalism will appear as the key to recovering a univocal definition of  law, which can also be applied to the universe. Keywords: General and Particular Content Interpretation, Order, Thomas Aquinas, Francisco Suarez, Robert Boyle.

66  See on this Ferdinand Alq uié, Le cartésianisme de Malebranche, Paris, Vrin, 1974, p. 484, and Alquié, Malebranche et le rationalisme chrétien, Paris, Seghers, 1977, and, more recently, Gianni Paganini, Introduzione alle filosofie clandestine, Bari, Laterza, 2008, p. 113.

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MALEBRANCHE, OCCASIONALISM, AND THE JANUS FACES OF  LAW *

Occasionalism should be an easy doctrine to understand: the thesis that God is the sole true cause may be highly counterintuitive, but on the face of  it, it does not seem particularly obscure. Yet, like Spinoza’s parallel doctrine of  substance monism, Malebranche’s doctrine of  causal monism, as it were, has prompted remarkable differences of  interpretation. On the one hand, Steven Nadler and Walter Ott advocate what has been called the traditional and even Leibnizian interpretation: God not only wills the laws of  nature through his general volitions, but through a series of  particular volitions ensures that bodies and minds behave in accordance with these laws or general volitions. On the other hand, Charles McCracken, Desmond Clarke and myself  have argued for an “Arnauldian” or what I  call a minimalist interpretation of  God’s role according to occasionalism: God is the sole true cause of  everything that happens in the universe simply by willing the laws and the initial conditions. The second, minimalist reading of  God’s role according to occasionalism seems philosophically more attractive than the so-called traditional reading associated with Leibniz, according to which God is a divine busybody. Moreover, such an interpretation of  occasionalism is favoured by Malebranche’s insistence that the laws of  nature that God wills are efficacious and that God always acts in the simplest ways. But the minimalist reading has been thought to run into textual difficulties posed by Male*  I am grateful to participants in the conference on occasionalism at the University of  Venice, April 2015, for helpful comments on an earlier version of  this paper. Occasionalism. From Metaphysics to Science, ed. by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano, Turnhout, Brepols, 2018 (DESCARTES, 2), pp.  127–145    FHG   10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.114991

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branche’s “divine concursus argument” for occasionalism – that is, his argument from the doctrine of  continuous creation; it has been claimed that the minimalist reading cannot be reconciled with this argument. Moreover, it has been objected that there are philosophical problems surrounding Malebranche’s claim that laws are efficacious if  it is taken literally: if  laws are propositional contents of  divine volitions, then it is difficult to see how they can be causally efficacious, for propositions would seem to be abstract entities, and abstract entities appear to be unable to cause anything. These problems of  interpretation – especially perhaps the problem of  consistency with the argument for occasionalism from continuous creation – have recently been pressed by Walter Ott in his book Causation and Laws of  Nature in Early Modern Philosophy; 1 in this work Ott advocates a return to the traditional or Leibnizian reading of  God’s role in occasionalist teachings. In this paper I have two main goals. In the first half  of  the paper I shall argue that all Ott’s main objections to the minimalist interpretation can be answered; there is no obvious philosophical or textual pressure to return to the so-called traditional interpretation of  occasionalism. In the second half  of  the paper, however, I shall change gear somewhat: drawing on some of  the results of  Ott’s own work I shall argue that it is difficult to be dogmatic about the correct interpretation of  God’s role according to occasionalism, because the concept of  law, which is at the heart of  this doctrine, is so unstable in seventeenth-century philosophy. As Ott shows, at the dawn of  the period the concept of  law was a prescriptive one that was at home in a divine command theory of  ethics; as a result of  the work of  Descartes and others a descriptive concept of  law emerged in connection with the new physics. The question arises, then, whether this transformation or evolution is complete by the time of  Malebranche’s major works. We cannot dismiss out of  hand the possibility that in Malebranche the concept of  a law of  nature retains traces of  the old prescriptive concept found in Scholastic writings. It is this transformation in the concept of  law that makes the interpretation of  Malebranche’s occasionalism so difficult. In the second 1  Walter Ott, Causation and Laws of  Nature in Early Modern Philosophy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009.

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half  of  the paper I am thus arguing that the current debate really needs to be reoriented towards a discussion of  Malebranche’s concept of  law.

I. One main difficulty, then, for the minimalist interpretation of  Malebranche’s occasionalism is its supposed inconsistency with his argument for occasionalism from God’s continuous creation of  the world. The argument is particularly prominent in a relatively late work such as the Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion where it largely replaces the ingenious and influential argument from necessary connection found in The Search After Truth.2 According to the doctrine of  continuous creation as Malebranche expounds it, God does not just will that bodies and minds continue to exist, and then leave it up to them to determine their specific properties. Rather, God has volitions that are fully determinate with respect to such variables as location, time, and velocity: God wills that body b be at place p at time t. Since this is the case, there is no room for secondary causality or genuine causal powers on the part of  creatures. The attribution of  such further powers to creatures would imply that there is causal overdetermination, and such overdetermination is ruled out by the fact that God always acts in the simplest ways. In  Occasionalism and Efficacious Laws in Malebranche  I argued that Malebranche’s version of  the doctrine of  continuous creation can be reconciled with the minimalist reading of  God’s role according to occasionalism. The strategy behind such a reconciliation is to propose a reductive analysis of  the continuous creation doctrine: to say that God continuously creates bodies, for instance, with their determinate location and velocity and so on is just to say that the states of  these bodies depend on God’s volitions as a sufficient condition; the contents of  the divine volitions in question are the laws of  nature and the initial 2  For a discussion of  this issue see Sukjae Lee, “Necessary Connections and Continuous Creation: Malebranche’s Two Arguments for Occasionalism”, Journal of  the History of  Philosophy, XLVI (2008), pp.  539–565. Lee perhaps exaggerates the extent of  the change: vestiges of  the argument from necessary connection are found even in the Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion.

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conditions of  the universe. It is this attempted reconciliation of  the argument from the continuous creation doctrine with the minimalist reading of  God’s role that is the target of  Ott’s major criticisms. Before we turn to these criticisms, it is important to be clear about what is and is not at issue in the debate. One thing that is not in question is the nature of  God’s relationship to time. It is easy to be misled here. It might be said that, in expounding the doctrine of  continuous creation and the associated argument for occasionalism, Malebranche suggests that God acts in time to conserve and re-create bodies; in other words, God is now – at this very moment – conserving my arm in existence by recreating it in a different position (supposing that I now will to raise it). Mutatis mutandis the same might be said of  how God acts with regard to the behaviour of  billiard balls. On this basis it might then be argued that this is decisive evidence in favour of  the traditional reading according to which it is not enough that God from all eternity wills the initial conditions and the laws of  nature through general volitions; in addition he must implement these laws through a series of  particular volitions. In fact, however, such a strategy of  argument for the traditional, Leibnizian reading is misguided; indeed, it is repudiated by advocates of  the traditional reading, who are prepared to concede that Malebranche’s God is outside time altogether; he does not will in time the movement of  the billiard balls following the collision. Thus Nadler notes that Malebranche is not as careful or as explicit on this issue as he should be; he is insensitive to the question of  God’s relationship to time. Indeed, Nadler remarks that “there is no indication that the “temporal” problem of  the causal activity of  an eternal God ever occurred to Malebranche (or his critics, as far as I can tell)”.3 Nonetheless, Nadler agrees that Malebranche’s doctrine of  continuous creation has no tendency to imply that God acts in time; in other words, in some sense God from all eternity has the temporally indexed volition that my arm rise at place p at time t. According to Nadler, God 3  Steven Nadler, “Occasionalism and General Will in Malebranche”, in Id., Occasionalism: Causation Among the Cartesians, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 63.

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indeed has particular volitions regarding billiard balls and acts of  arm-raising by means of  which he executes or implements the laws of  nature, but these particular volitions are not in time. Nadler and his allies thus wish to forgo any argument for their interpretation from Malebranche’s apparent claims that God acts in time. As they see matters, their thesis does not require such feeble support; it can easily be formulated in terms of  a God all of  whose volitions are outside time. Thus the atemporality of  all God’s volitions is common ground between the parties to the debate. Let us now turn to Ott’s objections to the attempt to reconcile the minimalist reading with the argument from continuous creation (or from divine concursus).

The Indeterminacy Objection One objection that Ott makes seems rather puzzling. Ott writes that the reductive analysis of  the continuous creation doctrine sketched above “does indeed capture a notion of  dependence that would be acceptable to Malebranche. But it goes no distance at all toward allowing us to understand how God can will to create the billiard ball and all its states in a given location and time without having a fully determinate p-volition. In other words, Jolley has given us a way to think of  the billiard bal­l’s states as the effects of  God’s activity, whereas what is needed is a way to think of  the contents of  God’s will as leaving indeterminate the location of  the ball”.4

This is a prima facie puzzling objection since the minimalist interpretation seeks to show precisely how on a reductive analysis of  the continuous creation doctrine God’s volitions can be seen to be fully determinate with regard to the location of  the billiard ball. The whole goal of  the reductive analysis of  the doctrine is to show how God can have a volition that fully determines the states of  the ball without having a series of  particular volitions. Thus it is not clear why, according to Ott, we need   Ott, Causation and Laws of  Nature, p. 104.

4

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a way of  thinking about the contents of  God’s will as leaving indeterminate the location of  the ball. Perhaps Ott’s point is that by virtue of  the claim that God just wills the laws and the initial conditions the minimalist interpretation is committed to saying that the contents of  God’s will do leave indeterminate the location of  the ball, and that I have not explained how God could have such indeterminate volitions. But I deny that the minimalist reading is committed to any such claim. By virtue of  what I call his single, compound volition – that is, of  the initial conditions and the laws of  nature – God wills all the states of  the billiard balls in all their determinacy. Here God’s omniscience is helpful. God’s compound volition of  the initial conditions and the laws of  nature logically determines all the states of  the billiard ball, and by virtue of  his omniscience God knows, as a finite observer might not, what these logical consequences are in all their fine detail. So it can be said that God wills all the consequences of  the initial conditions and the laws of  nature: if  God wills that p, and if  p together with the laws of  nature entails q, it can be said that God wills that q.5

The Bundling Objection The second difficulty that Ott finds might be called the “bundling objection”. Ott rightly notes that on the minimalist interpretation of  occasionalism God does not just will the laws of  nature; he also wills the initial states of  the universe, thus giving rise to what I call a single compound volition on the part of  God. The inclusion of  initial states of  the universe in the divine volition is necessary to give us a workable or coherent account of  the continuous creation doctrine on the minimalist reading. To such a proposal Ott objects: “If  Jolley is willing to bundle initial conditions into God’s volitions, why not allow the particularist reading full stop?” 6 My response to this objection is twofold. First, the minimalist reading of  God’s role that I propose does justice, as the particularist reading does not, to 5 See Ott’s discussion of  divine omniscience, Causation and Laws of  Nature, p. 109. 6  Ott, Causation and Laws of  Nature, p. 107.

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the principle that God always acts in the simplest ways. (It is common ground between Ott and me that Malebranche subscribes to this principle.) Of  course, leaving out the initial conditions from the divine volition would be simpler still; perhaps it would be more in harmony with the doctrine of  divine simplicity.7 But simplifying the divine volition in this way would not explain the occurrence of  particular events in the world; as Bennett nicely says, “if  a particular clap of  thunder were necessitated by the laws of  physics, there would be thunder everywhere and always”.8 Secondly, my interpretation of  God’s single compound volition does justice to Malebranche’s claim that God acts by general volitions, whereas the particularist reading does not, or at least is forced to put a strained interpretation on this claim.

The Anachronism Objection Ott’s final main objection is that the minimalist reading of  God’s role offers an anachronistic account of  the laws of  nature: “Jolley’s view is anachronistic in so far as it presupposes that once God wills a law of  nature it continues to ‘govern’ events on its own, as an autonomous feature of  the universe (albeit one with a source in God). It is not enough simply to will conditional claims; one must also bring it about that their consequents come to pass when their antecedents are fulfilled. To suppose otherwise is to suppose, in Cudworth’s mocking phrase, that the laws of  nature could ‘execute themselves’ ”.9

The response to this objection is again straightforward. On the minimalist interpretation the laws of  nature, for Malebranche, are not in any sense autonomous features of  the universe; indeed, they are not features of  the created universe at all. If  the laws of  7  The issue of  divine simplicity as a problem for the Nadler-Ott Leibnizian reading is emphasized by Desmond Clarke, “Malebranche and Occasionalism: A Reply to Steven Nadler”, Journal of  the History of  Philosophy, XXXIII (1995), pp. 499–504. 8  Jonathan Bennett, A Study of  Spinoza’s Ethics, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, p. 113. 9  Ott, Causation and Laws of  Nature, p. 105.

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nature were such autonomous features, they could not be causally efficacious as Malebranche insists they are; it is a constraint on any interpretation of  occasionalism that no feature of  the universe is a genuine cause. We must be careful not to interpret the laws of  nature, for Malebranche, in such a way as to smuggle genuine causality into the created universe by the back door. Fortunately, the minimalist reading of  God’s role is in no danger of  falling into such a trap. Remember that on the minimalist reading of  God’s role, the laws of  nature are propositional contents of  divine volitions; the laws of  nature are in God, and nowhere else. Of  course, since they are causally efficacious, the laws of  nature have a bearing on what happens in the universe; together with God’s volition of  the initial conditions, they cause particular events. But to say that they are causally responsible for events in the universe is obviously not to say that they are in any sense in the universe. Thus Ott’s charge of  anachronism in this instance on these grounds seems misguided and can be answered. Indeed, in my judgment none of  Ott’s objections we have considered cuts any ice against the minimalist interpretation of  God’s role.

II. Ott’s objections can, I think, be answered, but I recognize that there are problems in interpreting teachings about laws of  nature in seventeenth-century philosophy. Let us begin by returning to one constraint on the interpretation of  Malebranche’s occasionalism: an account must be given of  what Malebranche means by his talk of  “efficacious laws” that satisfactorily explains how laws can be efficacious. Ott approaches the problem by saying that Malebranche offers two analyses of  law in his philosophy. On one analysis, the weak one, laws for Malebranche are general conditional statements; although Ott does not say so, they presumably support counterfactual conditionals. On this analysis, according to Ott, laws can only be occasional, not real causes.10 10  It seems curious of  Ott to speak of  laws for Malebranche as occasional causes. Surely for Malebranche only particular finite events can be occasional causes. Ott does not seem to provide any textual support for his claim.

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On the second analysis, the strong one, laws are to be reduced to the individual, particular volitions by means of  which God conserves objects.11 On this latter analysis laws can indeed have genuine causal efficacy, but only because these laws are not really laws at all but rather convenient ways of  talking about God’s behaviour. In this way Ott seeks to rescue the coherence of  the doctrine of  efficacious laws, but he does so at a heavy price by admitting that the laws are not really laws at all. Thus Ott seems to have gained a Pyrrhic victory. By contrast, I try to give a sense to the claim that laws are efficacious while still recognizing that they are laws – that is, universally quantified conditional propositions which arguably support counterfactual conditionals. The minimalist interpretation too pays a price: it involves the ascription of  causal powers to the propositional contents of  the divine volitions. Such propositional contents are presumably abstract entities, and it is of  course difficult to see how abstract entities can have causal powers. I attempt to solve the problem, at least as a plausible interpretation of  Malebranche, by noting his parallel argument in the case of  efficacious ideas. That is: 1. Ideas are in God. 2. Everything in God is efficacious. 3. Therefore, ideas are efficacious. So by parity of  reasoning: 1. Laws are in God. 2. Everything in God is efficacious. 3. Therefore, laws are efficacious. This solves the problem of  interpretation in a way that uses resources that Malebranche himself  offers us, but to most readers the solution will not be philosophically satisfying. Let me now explain why it is difficult to be confident about the interpretation of  Malebranche in this area. This will involve making some concessions to my critic.12   Ott, Causation and Laws of  Nature, p. 108.  In  the case of  efficacious ideas it seems that there is no question of  offering a normative or prescriptive analysis. See, however, Andrew Pessin, 11 12

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One of  the great virtues of  Ott’s book is that it throws a flood of  light on the origin of  the concept of  a law of  nature and its transformation in early modern philosophy. As Ott points out, prior to Descartes expressions like “lex naturalis” had a use primarily in the context of  divine command theory. A  law of  nature was a normative claim that had its source in the divine will.13 Now, as Ott notes, traces of  this normative or prescriptive concept of  law can be found among major seventeenth-century philosophers, even when they are writing about science or natural philosophy. Thus Ott himself  quotes Boyle as criticizing Descartes’ concept of  a law of  nature in the following terms: “To speak properly, a law being but a notional rule of  acting according to the declared will of  a superior, it is plain that nothing but an intellectual being can be properly capable of  receiving and acting by a law”.14

Samuel Clarke writes in a similar vein: he observes that “Matter is evidently not capable of  any Laws or Powers whatsoever any more than it is capable of  Intelligence”; again, “dull and lifeless Matter is surely incapable of  obeying any Laws or being indued with any Powers”.15 To modern readers it can be both puzzling and even distressing to see distinguished intellects such as Boyle and Clarke saying such things, for it seems today that they are guilty of  a gross muddle that any moderately intelligent freshman could expose. But this kind of  reaction betrays an anachronistic perspective, for writers such as Boyle and Clarke are bearing witness to the birth pangs of  the modern scientific concept of  law. The question, then, for the interpreter of  Malebranche is whether he has emancipated himself  from the older normative or prescriptive concept of  law.16 “Malebranche on Ideas”, Canadian Journal of  Philosophy, XXXIV (2004), pp. 241–285. 13  Ott, Causation and Laws of  Nature, p.  1. Of  course the concept of  a law of  nature, or natural law, plays a major role in the political philosophies of  Hobbes and Locke. 14   Q uoted in Ott, Causation and Laws of  Nature, p. 5. 15  Q uoted in Ezio Vailati, Leibniz and Clarke: A  Study of  their Correspondence, New York, Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 141–142. 16  Suarez is sometimes credited with being the first philosopher clearly to articulate the distinction between the prescriptive and descriptive concepts of 

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In one way it would not be surprising if  Malebranche were working with an older conception of  law. If  Ott is indeed right that Descartes is responsible for introducing the descriptive concept of  law into natural philosophy, then by employing a prescriptive concept Malebranche would be in a sense undoing the Cartesian revolution in this area. Now it is generally agreed that in his theory of  mind and knowledge Malebranche is intent on returning to a pre-Cartesian conception of  ideas; it is Descartes who first employs the term “idea” to denote mental events or at least the contents of  the human mind.17 Malebranche, by contrast with Descartes, seeks to go back to the older, Augustinian conception of  ideas as archetypes in God’s understanding according to which he creates the world.18 Now, as we have already seen, in Malebranche’s philosophy laws of  nature in one sense run parallel to ideas: they play the same kind of  role in his occasionalism as ideas do in his theory of  vision in God. And in the case of  both laws and ideas Malebranche makes the puzzling claim that they are efficacious. Thus it would be in the spirit of  Malebranche’s philosophy as a whole if  in each case he were seeking to go behind the Cartesian revolution and return to an older tradition. Since Malebranche is a creative philosopher we would not expect that such a return would be philosophically unmotivated; in other words, we would not expect a case of  mere unthinking reaction. On the contrary, if  Malebranche is indeed returning to a pre-Cartesian theory of  law, it would be natural to suppose that there will be some philosophical advantages to law. See Vailati, Leibniz and Clarke, p. 142 and Catherine Wilson, “De Ipsa Natura: Sources of  Leibniz’s Doctrine of  Force, Activity, and Natural Law”, Studia Leibnitiana, XIX (1987), p. 162. However, Dr. Priarolo’s essay in the present volume suggests that Suarez is more accurately regarded as distinguishing between strict and non-strict senses of  the term “law”. 17 See Anthony Kenny, Descartes: A Study of  his Philosophy, New York, Random House, 1968, p. 96. 18 In  controversy with Arnauld (e.g. Nicolas Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, directed by André Robinet, 20 tomes, Paris, Vrin, 1958–1967, tome VI, p.  217) Malebranche sometimes writes as if  he is merely following in Descartes’ footsteps or at least picking up a strand in Descartes’ theory of  ideas, but it is generally thought that such claims are misleading. See Nicholas Jolley, The Light of  the Soul: Theories of  Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, Ch. IV.

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doing so. In the case of  his theory of  ideas there are several, even numerous ones. The issue here is somewhat complicated by the fact that ideas, for Malebranche, function in his theories of  both abstract thought and of  sense perception. In his theory of  abstract thought Malebranche’s return to the Platonic-Augustinian tradition allows him to explain, in a way that Descartes arguably cannot, how concepts can be eternal: it allows him to do justice to the intuition that the idea or concept of  a triangle did not come into existence when someone first thought of  a triangle, and that it will not go out of  existence after the last triangle-thinker has expired. In his theory of  sense perception Malebranche’s return to the older tradition allows him to do justice to the intuition that when you and I perceive the table in front of  us, for instance, our minds immediately perceive numerically the same object; ideas, for Malebranche, are public entities, not ones that are private to individual minds, as they are for Descartes.19 Thus if  Malebranche is indeed seeking to undo the Cartesian revolution with regard to laws we would expect, or at least hope for, some comparable philosophical advantages to the move. If  we cannot find such advantages, then that should at least give us pause; it will give us some reason, though certainly not a conclusive reason, to doubt whether Malebranche is indeed returning to the older conception of  law. There is, in other words, a defeasible presumption that any return to an older conception of  law will yield philosophical gains. As we shall see, it is not clear that there are philosophical advantages or benefits in seeking to undo the Cartesian revolution in this area. Is there any solid textual evidence that Malebranche employs a prescriptive concept of  law when writing about occasionalism? Perhaps surprisingly, the answer is “yes”. Steven Nadler cites a passage from Malebranche’s response to Arnauld’s Reflexions on the Treatise on Nature and Grace. Nadler’s primary aim here is to defend his core Leibnizian interpretation against the minimalist reading: he seeks to emphasize that laws guide God’s activity, and that God must further implement these laws through a series of  particular, individual volitions, but he is prepared to recognize that in this passage they have a prescriptive   On these issues see Jolley, The Light of  the Soul, Chs. 4 and 5.

19

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aspect: “Order requires that [God] follows the laws which he has prescribed to himself  so that his conduct may bear the mark of  his attributes”.20 There is a comparable passage in a more prominent place. In  Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, VII, one of  Malebranche’s principal discussions of  occasionalism, Theodore tells Aristes: “God communicates His power to creatures and unites them with one another, only because He establishes their modifications, occasional causes of  the effects which He produces Himself  – occasional causes, I say, which determine the efficacy of  His volitions as a consequence of  the general laws He has prescribed to himself, in order to make His conduct bear the mark of  His attributes and to spread throughout His work the uniformity of  action necessary both to unite together all the parts that compose it, and to rescue it from the confusion and irregularity of  a kind of  chaos in which minds could never understanding anything”.21

The idea of  divine self-prescription is employed in the same way in this passage. One of  the most intriguing passages that bear on the issue of  the Malebranchian conception of  law is found in the Treatise of  Nature and Grace itself  (I, § 37). Here Malebranche is comparing divine wisdom with human political wisdom to the disadvantage of  the latter: “The great number of  laws of  a state is often a sign of  the lack of  penetration and mental capacity in those who have established them; it is more the experience of  need than a wise foresight that has ordained them. God, whose wisdom has no limits at all, must then make use of  very simple and very fertile means in the formation of  the future world. He must not multiply his volitions, which are the executive laws (loix executrices) of  his designs except insofar as necessity obliges him to do so. He must act by general volitions 20  Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, VIII, p. 651; my emphasis; translation modified. 21  Malebranche, Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, VII, § 10, in Œuvres complètes, XII, pp. 160–161; transl. in Dialogues on Metaphysics and on Religion, edited by Nicholas Jolley, translated by David Scott, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 116 (translation modified).

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and establish thus a constant and regulated order, according to which he has foreseen by the infinite extent of  his wisdom that a work as admirable as his is, must be formed”.22

This passage is particularly intriguing and relevant because the laws of  the state in question are obviously prescriptive in form. Thus if  Malebranche is comparing like with like, the divine laws at issue must be prescriptive in form as well. Of  course, as the passage shows, the divine laws evince a wisdom that is superior to that of  the human laws of  the state. But for all that, we should not expect the comparison to be vitiated by an equivocation on the term “law”: the laws that Malebranche is discussing can be compared on a common scale. Intriguing as it is, the passage is not conclusive, unproblematic evidence for the prescriptive reading of  the Malebranchian conception of  law; in fact, frustratingly, it seems to point in opposite directions. For notice that Malebranche writes of  divine laws as executive (executrices) of  God’s plans or designs.23 On the face of  it, such a phrase supports the descriptive reading of  laws that is at the heart of  the minimalist interpretation of  occasionalism that I have defended; according to this interpretation as we have seen, laws are literally efficacious in the sense that, in conjunction with God’s volition of  the initial conditions, they bring about particular events in the world. By contrast, on the prescriptive reading of  laws, it would seem that laws are not “executive”; rather, they themselves stand in need of  execution. It is, however, possible to give some sense to the claim that laws are “executive” on the prescriptive reading. Let us return to the helpful comparison with laws of  the state that Malebranche introduces. A  king’s laws might at least be loosely said to be executive of  his plans or designs by giving them determinacy. Suppose, to use a rather hackneyed example, that a king plans to improve safety on his roads, and he sees that the way to do this is by ensuring that all traffic drives on the same side of  the road. He then introduces a law that gives determinate shape to   Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, V, p. 46; translation mine.  In the Méditations chrétiennes et métaphysiques, VII, § 24 (Œuvres complètes, X, p. 81) Malebranche similarly discusses the issue of  whether laws are executive. 22 23

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his plan or design by saying: “All traffic shall drive on the right hand side of  the road”. We could say, I think, that this law is “executive” of  his plan or design. In  the same way God may have the design of  creating a world that is worthy of  him and that bears the mark of  his attributes, as Malebranche would say; God executes this plan by creating a world in which there are simple and fertile laws such as the law of  inertia and the laws of  the communications of  motions. Of  course there is a possible disanalogy between the two cases. The king’s vague plan of  improving traffic safety may be prior in time to the law he introduces and promulgates; by contrast, in the case of  God, who is outside time, there is no such temporal priority. Nonetheless, we can see how in both cases the prescriptive laws might be described as executing a plan or design. It may still be said that it is more natural to interpret Malebranche’s talk of  “loix executrices” in terms of  efficacious laws, but enough has been said to show how some sense can be given, on the prescriptive reading, to the claim that laws are “executrices”. Some of  the evidence for the prescriptive reading is thus not conclusive, but there is at least enough such evidence to make it worthwhile to ask how the prescriptive concept of  law would work in the discussions of  occasionalism. It seems clear that even the prescriptions God makes to himself  are not self-executing; as Leibniz notes, there must be some means by which such prescriptions are realized in the world.24 But, as Boyle and Clarke observe, matter is not capable of  understanding laws conceived in this fashion, for matter on the Cartesian conception to which Malebranche subscribes is entirely devoid of  intelligence and sense. Matter is not capable of  “obeying” divine prescriptions in the way the subjects of  a king are capable of  obeying his prescriptive laws. If  bodies behave according to laws for Malebranche, they must do so by virtue of  some further divine volition which ensures that they follow the laws (on the additional assumption that no creatures, such as angels could play such a 24  Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, De Ipsa Natura, in Die Philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz, edited by Carl Immanuel Gerhardt, 7 vols, Berlin, Weidmann, 1875–1890, vol.  IV, pp.  506–507; Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Indianapolis-Cambridge, MA, Hackett, 1989, p. 158.

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role). By means of  such volitional activity God would execute his prescriptions so that bodies behave in accordance with the law of  inertia and the law of  communication of  motions. The attempt to understand how a prescriptive concept of  law would work in an occasionalist context invites two questions. In the first place, if  laws are prescriptive – indeed prescriptions that God gives himself  – then in what sense can they still be said to be efficacious? It is true that this claim, which is troublesome on any reading, now has to be given a purely deflationary interpretation. Presumably, to say that the laws of  nature are efficacious would be simply to say that (miracles aside) God will never fail to execute the prescriptions that he gives to himself; he will ensure, by some form of  volition, that on any given occasion an unsupported body falls to the ground. Here there is an obvious contrast with human volitions. On New Year’s Eve I resolve to go running at least once a week in the year ahead; I prescribe myself  a rule of  action, but alas!, I often fail to follow it. A second issue that the prescriptive reading raises is likely to occur to many readers: it may seem that the prescriptive reading simply reinstates Nadler’s Leibnizian, “divine busybody” interpretation of  occasionalism. Now it is no part of  Nadler’s intention to highlight the distinction between descriptive and prescriptive conceptions of  law, and he does not claim to be attributing to Malebranche a consistent adherence to a purely prescriptive concept. Nonetheless, he is willing to say that, in contrast to Descartes: “for Malebranche the laws of  nature, while they describe how God acts, do so because they are also prescriptive for God, a God who chose to create this world rather than any other possible world just because its laws – the laws He has bound himself  to follow – were the most simple of  all”.25

As we have seen, Nadler is prepared to cite the passage in reply to Arnauld where Malebranche talks of  God as prescribing laws to himself; Nadler clearly thinks that such passages are grist to his mill. But it would be a straightforward mistake to sup25  Nadler, “Occasionalism and General Will in Malebranche”, Postscript, p. 68.

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pose that a prescriptive reading of  the concept of  law simply reinstates Nadler’s Leibnizian interpretation of  occasionalism. For even if  we construe the laws of  nature as divine self-prescriptions, which stand in need of  a further act of  execution, it does not follow that there must be a series of  particular, individual volitions for each event in the world. On the contrary, it is logically possible that God executes the prescriptions that he gives to himself  by means of  a further volition that is entirely general in nature. Nadler’s overall Leibnizian interpretation of  occasionalism is consistent with a prescriptive reading of  divine laws, but it is not entailed by it. As we have seen, the case for attributing to Malebranche a consistently prescriptive concept of  law would be strengthened if  we could point to philosophical advantages comparable to those that are striking in his return to the pre-Cartesian theory of  ideas. But here the situation seems rather murky. For most readers today the descriptive theory of  law that Ott attributes to Descartes will seem like a definite philosophical advance; to view the laws of  nature in prescriptive terms will seem merely quaint or muddled. Of  course the prescriptive concept of  law allows Malebranche to exploit the new concept of  matter as inert, passive stuff, lacking in soul or even force, in favour of  occasionalism; on this conception of  matter, if  laws are indeed prescriptive, then on further assumptions that Malebranche would certainly grant, God is needed to execute laws in the world. But the new, Cartesian conception of  matter seems to give us no clear reason to prefer a prescriptive concept of  law to a descriptive one. Perhaps it will be said that the prescriptive concept of  law has one philosophical advantage where Malebranche’s system is concerned: on this reading we are no longer forced to interpret the doctrine of  efficacious laws in such a way that it involves the attribution of  causal powers to abstract entities. But two points must be made in reply to such a claim. In the first place, of  itself  the descriptive reading of  law does not oblige us to interpret the doctrine of  efficacious laws in this way. Like Nadler we could say that the laws are not literally efficacious; rather, it is really God’s particular volitions that are causally responsible for bringing about events in the world. Secondly, the prescriptive reading of  143

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the concept of  law cannot yield a fully satisfactory interpretation of  the doctrine of  efficacious laws; at most it can give us only a deflationary account of  how laws can be said to be efficacious. We have seen, then, that there is enough evidence in favour of  the prescriptive reading to make it worth exploring. However, it has to be said that passages which speak of  God as prescribing laws to himself  are far outnumbered by passages which speak of  God as establishing laws, and these latter claims are certainly compatible with a purely descriptive reading; they are simply neutral between the two interpretations. On the present survey of  the evidence it seems safest to regard those places in which Malebranche speaks of  God as giving prescriptions to himself  as simply unassimilated relics of  a pre-Cartesian conception of  law; they do not seem like deliberate, self-conscious attempts to return to an older conception of  the sort we find in the case of  Malebranche’s theory of  ideas. For these reasons I am not yet prepared to say that the kind of  analysis I proposed in Occasionalism and Efficacious Laws in Malebranche should be abandoned. But the issue of  the nature of  Malebranche’s concept of  law certainly deserves further investigation. My present conclusion is that it is difficult to be dogmatic about this topic, for the concept of  law in the period was in the process of  transformation or evolution. Another, more general way of  making the point is by saying that seventeenth-century philosophy is Janus-faced: with one face it looks back to the Scholastics and the Aristotelian tradition, and with the other it looks forward to modern philosophy. This of  course is one of  the major sources of  its fascination, but it does make life difficult for interpreters who cannot be sure which of  the two faces they are seeing at any given time.

Abstract Occasionalism should be an easy doctrine to understand: the thesis that God is the sole true cause does not seem particularly obscure. Yet, Malebranche’s doctrine of  causal monism has prompted remarkable differences of  interpretation. According to some commentators, God not only wills the laws of  nature through his general volitions, but through a series of  particular volitions ensures that bodies and minds behave in accordance with these laws. According to others,

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God is the sole true cause of  everything that happens in the universe simply by willing the laws and initial conditions. This minimalist reading has recently been criticized by Walter Ott. The first half  of  this paper argues that Ott’s main objections to the minimalist interpretation can be answered. The second half, however, argues that it is difficult to be dogmatic about the correct interpretation of  occasionalism because in seventeenth-century philosophy the concept of  a law of  nature was undergoing a process of  transformation from a prescriptive to a descriptive concept. This Janus-faced character of  the concept of  a law of  nature is the real source of  the difficulty in interpreting Malebranche’s occasionalism. Keywords: Efficacious, Executive, Walter Ott, Prescriptive, Volitions.

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MINDS AND BODIES

SANDRINE ROUX

DES TROIS NOTIONS PRIMITIVES À DIEU : LE PROBLÈME CORPS-ESPRIT CHEZ LA FORGE ET CHEZ CORDEMOY

L’occasionnalisme a longtemps été présenté comme une solution ad hoc à la difficulté soulevée par le « dualisme » cartésien concernant les relations âme-corps : comment deux substances aussi distinctes que la res cogitans et la res extensa peuvent-elles agir l’une sur l’autre, comme cela semble se produire dans le mouvement volontaire et les sensations 1 ? Contre cette interprétation, plusieurs études ont montré que la doctrine des causes occasionnelles répondait à un problème de la causalité qui n’est pas propre aux relations âme-corps, mais qui touche également les corps 2. Les raisons avancées pour rejeter les interactions causales entre l’âme et le corps sont d’ailleurs souvent dérivées d’arguments qui excluent également les interactions causales entre les corps ; et lorsqu’il existe des arguments spécifiques aux relations âme-corps, ils n’ont pas trait au dualisme ontologique de Descartes 3. Pour les représentants les plus importants de l’occasionnalisme, la difficulté associée à ce dualisme n’existait tout simplement pas. C’est en ce sens que 1 Sur ce «  mythe  » associé à l’occasionnalisme, voir Steven Nadler, Occasionalism  : Causation Among the Cartesians, New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 2–4 et pp. 6–7. 2   Voir par exemple Thomas M. Lennon, « Occasionalism and the Cartesian Metaphysic of  Motion », Canadian Journal of  Philosophy, 1 (Suppl.) (1974), pp. 29–40 ; Louis E. Loeb, From Descartes to Hume : Continental Metaphysics and the Development of  Modern Philosophy, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1981, pp. 217–220 ; Jean-Christophe Bardout, « Occasionalism : La Forge, Cordemoy, Geulincx », in A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, dir. Steven Nadler, Oxford, Blackwell, 2002, pp. 140–151. 3 Voir Nadler, Occasionalism, p. 9.

Occasionalism. From Metaphysics to Science, ed. by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano, Turnhout, Brepols, 2018 (DESCARTES, 2), pp.  149–168    FHG   10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.114992

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Steven Nadler affirme, par exemple : « The mind-body problem played no role at all in motivating the occasionalisms of  Malebranche, Cordemoy, and Geulincx » 4. La présente contribution se propose de revenir sur ce problème à partir duquel l’occasionnalisme a longtemps été compris, et dont l’importance ne doit pas être minimisée. Il s’agira plus particulièrement d’examiner la façon dont La Forge et Cordemoy se sont emparés de la difficulté liée à l’interaction entre l’esprit et le corps après Descartes, pour souligner la distance qui sépare leurs analyses de celle de Descartes sur ce sujet. En effet, même si elle ne saurait suffire à rendre compte de la transition du cartésianisme à l’occasionnalisme, cette distance est sans aucun doute un facteur essentiel de l’évolution des idées cartésiennes à l’âge classique, à laquelle La Forge et Cordemoy ont amplement contribué. Précisons que cette thèse ne revient pas à rétablir l’interprétation selon laquelle l’occasionnalisme se serait développé, chez les cartésiens, pour résoudre le problème corps-esprit, et uniquement pour cela. Nous rejoignons, s’agissant de La Forge et de Cordemoy, les études mentionnées ci-dessus : pour ces deux auteurs, le problème de l’hétérogénéité des substances mis en avant par les premiers lecteurs de Descartes n’en est pas un, et le rejet des interactions réelles entre l’âme et le corps (du moins chez Cordemoy 5) n’est pas motivé par la difficulté que soulevaient Gassendi ou Elisabeth dans leurs objections adressées à Descartes. Néanmoins, qu’il n’y ait pas de problème corps-esprit pour La Forge et pour Cordemoy n’exclut pas que cette difficulté ait joué un rôle déterminant dans leur réflexion sur

4  Ibid. Pour l’auteur, qui défendait alors la thèse d’un occasionnalisme partiel de La Forge, la position de ce dernier constituait un argument supplémentaire en faveur de l’idée que l’occasionnalisme n’est pas d’abord une réponse au problème corps-esprit  : «  Some Cartesians call upon occasionalism only in order to answer questions about interaction between bodies. Louis de la Forge […] insists that ‘the will can well be the efficient cause of  all the things we notice to depend on it in this alliance [between mind and body]’ […]. It is only when he comes to the question of  how one body moves another body that he employs the constant and necessarily efficacious activity of  God » (Nadler, Occasionalism, pp. 8–9). 5  Ce rejet est moins évident chez La Forge, dont la position concernant les relations âme-corps continue d’être débattue.

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la communication du mouvement entre les corps et sur la causalité, qui conduit à distinguer l’évidence de la cause et celle de l’effet, et à mettre au premier plan cette cause imperceptible des effets sensibles qu’est Dieu. La position que nous souhaitons défendre est précisément la suivante : la difficulté éprouvée par les lecteurs de Descartes au sujet de l’interaction âme-corps, loin d’être secondaire, commande les analyses de La Forge et de Cordemoy sur la cause du mouvement des corps, et c’est cette difficulté supposée qui exigeait de réexaminer des questions qui aboutiront à la généralisation du problème de l’interaction causale, avec la solution que l’on connaît. Après avoir relevé quelques-uns des éléments textuels qui viennent à l’appui de cette position, nous nous intéresserons à ce qui distingue les réflexions de La Forge et de Cordemoy de celle de Descartes sur le problème corps-esprit : l’accent sera mis sur le point de divergence fondamental, dont dépend la différence des solutions.

I. Chez La Forge et chez Cordemoy, la difficulté associée aux relations âme-corps est abordée dans le cadre des développements consacrés à la manière dont ces deux substances agissent l’une sur l’autre : il s’agit respectivement du chapitre XVI du Traité de l’esprit de l’homme, et du cinquième des Six discours sur la distinction et l’union du corps et de l’âme 6. Il  existe de prime abord une différence importante entre les textes des deux auteurs, eu égard à la façon même  dont la matière et les sujets se trouvent distribués 7 : dans les Six discours 6  Louis de La Forge, Traité de l’esprit de l’homme, de ses facultés et fonctions et de son union avec le corps suivant les principes de R.  Descartes, dans Œuvres philosophiques, éd.  par Pierre Clair, Paris, PUF, 1974  ; Géraud de Cordemoy, Six discours sur la distinction et l’union du corps et de l’âme, dans Œuvres philosophiques, éd. par Pierre Clair et François Girbal, Paris, PUF, 1968. 7 Outre la différence des positions théoriques. En effet, Cordemoy distingue clairement l’« occasion » et la « cause », et écarte toute action réelle de l’esprit sur le corps (même s’il demeure possible d’affirmer que l’esprit meut le corps, comme il est possible d’affirmer que les corps meuvent les corps, à condition de bien entendre ce que l’on dit ; voir le Discours IV, p. 138 et p. 142,

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de Cordemoy, la question de la cause du mouvement n’est pas seulement traitée, comme c’est le cas chez La Forge, à l’occasion de la réflexion relative à l’interaction entre l’esprit et le corps ; elle est abordée pour elle-même dans le quatrième Discours, où Cordemoy entend montrer que c’est le « même Esprit, qui a commencé à mouvoir les Corps, qui continue de les mouvoir » 8. Cette cause spirituelle de tous les mouvements est Dieu. Pourtant – et ce point est essentiel –, cela ne sera précisé que dans les dernières lignes du Discours, qui indiquent que « si l’on voulait trouver la véritable cause [du mouvement], il faudrait toujours remonter à Dieu » 9. Cela nous paraît aller dans le sens de la thèse avancée supra concernant l’importance du problème corps-esprit  : il est remarquable que les démonstrations du Discours IV ne fassent jamais explicitement mention de « Dieu », Cordemoy préférant recourir aux termes de la distinction opérée par Descartes entre la substance pensante et la substance étendue. On se reportera aux axiomes et aux conclusions de la démonstration qui ouvre le Discours : selon le troisième axiome, « on ne peut concevoir que deux sortes de substances, savoir l’Esprit (ou ce qui pense) et le Corps », qui doivent donc être considérés « comme les causes de tout ce qui arrive » 10. Il en résulte que ce qui ne peut venir des corps devra être attribué à un esprit. Les conclusions III (« Ce ne peut être qu’un Esprit qui soit premier moteur ») et IV (« Ce ne peut être que le même Esprit qui a commencé à mouvoir les Corps, qui continue de les mouvoir ») laissent peu de doute quant à l’identité de la véritable cause du mouvement. Mais Cordemoy ne se réfère pas à «  Dieu  », privilégiant les notions de « premier moteur » et d’« esprit » 11.

et le Discours V, p. 149 et p. 151), alors que La Forge insiste sur le fait que ses thèses ne doivent pas conduire à refuser à l’esprit et au corps le statut de causes, «  équivoques  » ou «  particulières  », et à nier que l’esprit et le corps agissent « véritablement » l’un sur l’autre (voir le Traité, p. 213, p. 242 et p. 245). 8  Cordemoy, Six discours, p. 136. 9   Cordemoy, Six discours, p. 144. 10  Cordemoy, Six discours, p. 135. 11  Voir le Discours IV, dans Cordemoy, Six discours, p. 136. Bien entendu, l’usage de ce terme général est ce qui permet de procéder à une recherche concernant la cause du mouvement des corps, dans laquelle pourront être pro-

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Il en ira de même dans la suite du Discours IV, qui fournit une nouvelle démonstration de la quatrième conclusion, dans laquelle on pourra en effet « trouver plus de difficulté » que dans les propositions précédentes ; Cordemoy l’explique de la façon suivante : « parce que l’on est persuadé qu’un corps en peut mouvoir un autre ; et l’on s’imagine que, pourvu que l’esprit, qui a été reconnu dans la troisième proposition, pour premier moteur, ait une fois agité certaines portions de la matière, elles en ont pu mouvoir d’autres » 12.

Si on laisse de côté la fin du Discours, il ne sera pas non plus explicitement question de Dieu dans cette seconde démonstration, mais seulement d’« esprits » et de « corps », puis, pour ce qui est de l’esprit qui doit causer le mouvement des corps, d’« un premier Esprit » 13, pour n’en venir que dans un dernier temps à Dieu. Remarquons, dans la même logique, que les lignes introductives du Discours IV en résument le propos en indiquant simplement que « si l’on veut trouver la véritable cause du mouvement des corps, il faut aller au-delà des corps » 14 : « cette découverte », dit Cordemoy, « est l’une des plus importantes et des plus difficiles que l’on puisse tenter », ce pourquoi « il n’y faut aller que pas à pas » et suivre la méthode des Géomètres 15. Mais l’auteur aurait pu être plus précis dans ces premières lignes, en affirmant par exemple, comme il le fera dans la conclusion du Discours, que pour trouver la véritable cause du mouvement des corps, il faut remonter à Dieu ; la « découverte » sur laquelle il insiste ne fait pourtant pas allusion à la première cause du mouvement, comme si ce qu’il y avait de plus difficile à démontrer n’était pas que Dieu est la seule cause de tous les mouvements (et non pas seulement premier moteur des corps), mais le fait qu’un corps puisse être mû par autre chose qu’un corps – et en l’occurrence gressivement exclus différents candidats possibles au rang de cause spirituelle du mouvement, parmi lesquels nos esprits. 12  Cordemoy, Six discours, p. 137. 13   Cordemoy, Six discours, p. 143. 14  Cordemoy, Six discours, p. 135. 15  Ibid.

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par un esprit, puisque ce qui ne peut venir de l’une des deux sortes de substances qu’il est possible de concevoir «  se doit nécessairement attribuer à l’autre » 16. Cela tient bien sûr à la force de notre préjugé causal concernant les corps : nous sommes convaincus qu’un corps peut en mouvoir un autre, ce qui nous empêche de voir que la cause qui a produit le mouvement doit continuer à le produire (voir supra). Mais la formulation retenue pour présenter le contenu du Discours  IV est très certainement dictée également par cet autre préjugé que tout ce Discours s’attache à combattre en recourant aux termes de la distinction cartésienne entre le corps et l’esprit : celui qui consiste à croire que seuls les corps peuvent mouvoir les corps, à l’exclusion des esprits, ou que l’incorporel ne saurait mouvoir le corporel. Certes, Cordemoy montre aussi, dans ce Discours IV, que nos esprits ne sauraient être la cause des mouvements corporels que nous avons coutume de leur attribuer 17. Néanmoins, nous avons déjà affaire à une réflexion sur la question des rapports entre corps et esprit, dont les conclusions iront à l’encontre de l’idée selon laquelle l’action des esprits sur les corps est « plus malaisée » à concevoir que celle des corps sur les corps 18, et qui permettra d’affirmer, dans le Discours V, qu’il n’y a pas moins lieu de dire que les esprits meuvent les corps, que de dire qu’un corps en meut un autre (à condition de bien entendre ce que l’on dit dans les deux cas) 19. Un parallèle peut à cet égard être établi entre la logique des Discours IV et V, et celle qui est à l’œuvre dans le chapitre XVI du Traité de La Forge 20. Ce chapitre est directement consacré au problème des rapports entre corps et esprit, qui en est le premier objet, même si la résolution de ce problème suppose, comme chez Cordemoy, de se rendre attentif  à la façon dont un corps   Selon le troisième axiome mentionné supra.   Discours IV, dans Cordemoy, Six discours, pp. 140–142. 18   Voir à ce propos le Discours V, dans Cordemoy, Six discours, p. 149. 19 Voir le Discours  V, dans Cordemoy, Six discours, p.  151, et le Discours IV, p. 142. 20  Au-delà, insistons-y, de la différence des positions et de l’argumentation qui permet de dissoudre le problème de l’hétérogénéité des substances (par exemple, cela ne passe pas, chez La Forge, par une critique de l’idée de cause appliquée à la volonté, telle que celle développée par Cordemoy dans le Discours IV, dans Six discours, pp. 139–142). 16 17

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peut en mouvoir un autre. La fin du premier paragraphe du chapitre XVI indique d’ailleurs que s’il est nécessaire de parler de la « cause universelle » du mouvement, c’est « pour ôter de l’esprit de plusieurs cette malheureuse prévention, de croire que si leur âme n’était corporelle, elle n’aurait pas la force de mouvoir le corps, parce, disent-ils, qu’elle ne le saurait faire sans le toucher, et que selon le dire du Poète, Tangere nec tangi nisi corpus nulla potest res » 21.

Tel est donc l’objectif  du chapitre XVI du Traité : nous défaire du préjugé qui amène à penser – contre Descartes – que l’esprit doit être corporel pour pouvoir mouvoir le corps. La suite du chapitre confirme cette interprétation. Venons-en au parallèle qu’il est possible d’opérer entre les textes de Cordemoy et de La Forge, en laissant de côté les différences théoriques : dans ce chapitre XVI, tout comme dans le quatrième des Six discours, la démonstration relative à l’impuissance des corps, qui aboutit à la conclusion que «  Dieu est la cause première, universelle et totale du mouvement  » 22, est moins directe que l’on ne pourrait s’y attendre. Elle comporte des étapes intermédiaires, qui permettent d’insister sur la distinction radicale de la matière qui est mue et de la force qui meut. La différence cruciale n’est pas alors celle qui interviendra dans un second temps de la démonstration, entre le Créateur et les créatures, mais celle qui existe entre les deux substances que Descartes avait distinguées en sa métaphysique. C’est ce qui ressort du premier moment de la démonstration, où il n’est pas fait mention de Dieu : après avoir posé la nécessité de « distinguer le mouvement d’avec sa détermination, et la cause du mouvement d’avec la cause qui le détermine » 23, La Forge en vient à la définition du mouvement comme mode qui « n’est point distingué du corps auquel il appartient, et qui 21  La Forge, Traité, p. 236. L’auteur se réfère au De rerum natura (I, vers 304) de Lucrèce, sur lequel s’appuyait Gassendi dans les Cinquièmes Objections contre les Méditations  : voir René Descartes, Œuvres de Descartes, éd.  par Charles Adam et Paul Tannery, 11 vol., Paris, Vrin-CNRS, réimp. au format de poche, Paris, Vrin, 1996, vol. VII, p. 341. 22  La Forge, Traité, p. 241. 23  La Forge, Traité, p. 237. Voir Descartes, Principes de la philosophie, II, art. 41 (Œuvres, vol. VIII, p. 65/IX-2, p. 87).

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ne peut […] passer d’un sujet dans un autre » 24. La distinction de la force qui meut et de la chose qui est mue, associée à l’idée que « rien ne peut être mû que ce qui est corps », conduit à l’affirmation que « nul corps ne peut avoir la force de se mouvoir de lui-même ». Or, dit La Forge, « si un corps ne peut se mouvoir », il est « évident qu’il n’en saurait mouvoir un autre ». Ainsi – telle est la conclusion de ce premier raisonnement  –, «  il faut que tout corps qui est dans le mouvement soit poussé par une chose entièrement distinguée de lui, laquelle ne soit pas corps » 25. La Forge envisage alors une objection : c’est peut-être sans raison que l’on a supposé que « la force qui meut doit être différente de la chose qui est mue » 26. Sa réponse consiste à s’appuyer sur l’idée de l’étendue inerte, qui ne contient aucune notion de force. La force qui transporte les corps ne peut donc convenir aux corps, ce qui nous ramène à la précédente conclusion, que La Forge reformule en faisant plus directement allusion à la distinction cartésienne de la substance pensante et de la substance étendue : « Et ainsi, nous avons lieu de croire que la force qui meut n’est pas moins distinguée réellement de la matière que la pensée, et qu’elle appartient aussi bien qu’elle à une substance incorporelle » 27. Cette conclusion sera reprise au terme des deux grands moments de la démonstration, incluant celui dans lequel La Forge propose de supposer que Dieu fait cesser le mouvement de toutes les parties de l’univers, pour considérer «  la Nature dans ce chaos indéfiniment étendu  » et voir «  si entre toutes les parties de cette masse informe, il y en a quelqu’une qui se puisse mouvoir d’elle-même, ou mouvoir sa voisine » 28. Dans la première conclusion qu’il tire de ces analyses, La Forge 24  La Forge, Traité, p. 238. La Forge se réfère plus loin à la lettre de Descartes à Morus d’août 1649, qui va dans ce sens (voir Descartes, Œuvres, vol. V, p. 404). 25  La Forge, Traité, p. 238. 26   Ibid. 27  Ibid. 28  La Forge, Traité, pp. 239–240. Notons que cette supposition n’est pas d’abord destinée à prouver que Dieu est cause universelle du mouvement, mais à rendre « plus intelligible » ce qui a été montré précédemment, à savoir que la force mouvante des corps ne saurait être un corps, mais seulement une substance incorporelle (voir p. 239).

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revient sur l’impuissance des corps à se mouvoir et à en « pousser » d’autres – la démonstration de ce point aura en principe supprimé le préjugé selon lequel le mouvement ne peut se communiquer « que par le moyen de l’attouchement » 29 – et sur le fait que la force qui meut un corps doit par là même « appartenir à quelque autre substance » 30. Cette substance sera Dieu, comme l’indique la conclusion suivante, qui résume les acquis du second moment de la démonstration  : «  Concluons secondement  », écrit La Forge, « que c’est Dieu qui est la cause première, universelle, et totale du mouvement » 31. Mais il était important de ne pas en venir directement à ce point, et ce pour procéder à une première démonstration dont les conclusions viennent prendre le contrepied de la thèse selon laquelle un corps ne peut être mû que par un autre corps, d’une façon qui exclurait donc toute vertu de mouvoir des esprits. Pourquoi cela était-il nécessaire ? Non pour prouver que Dieu est la véritable force mouvante des corps (le premier moment de la démonstration n’était pas requis pour en venir à cette conclusion), mais pour ôter des esprits la « malheureuse prévention » consistant à croire que si l’âme n’était pas corporelle, elle n’aurait pas la force de mouvoir le corps. Ce préjugé ne serait pas véritablement combattu si l’on s’en tenait aux arguments permettant de conclure que Dieu est la cause universelle du mouvement, arguments qui semblent d’ailleurs exclure que les esprits aient véritablement la force de mouvoir les corps 32. En revanche, insister sur la différence de   Selon les termes du début du chapitre XVI du Traité (p. 236).    La Forge, Traité, p. 241. 31  Ibid. 32  Voir l’argument de la création continuée, qui exclut la possibilité pour les créatures spirituelles ou corporelles de mouvoir la matière « si le Créateur ne le fait lui-même » (La Forge, Traité, p. 240) – même si La Forge précisera qu’il ne laisse pas de « reconnaître les corps et les esprits pour les causes particulières » du mouvement, qui « [déterminent et obligent] la cause première à appliquer sa force et sa vertu motrice sur des corps sur qui elle ne l’aurait pas exercée sans eux, suivant la manière dont elle s’est résolue de se gouverner avec les corps et les esprits, c’est-à-dire pour les corps, suivant les lois du mouvement […], et pour les esprits suivant l’étendue du pouvoir qu’il a voulu accorder à leur volonté » (p. 242). L’« étendue » de ce pouvoir nous paraît moins renvoyer à une véritable force de mouvoir que Dieu aurait accordée aux esprits, qu’aux modalités de l’action des esprits sur le corps, telles qu’elles se trouvent décrites 29

30

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nature entre la matière mue et la force qui meut aura contribué à combattre la croyance à l’origine de la difficulté traditionnelle concernant l’esprit et le corps  : en effet, si la «  force de mouvoir » ne peut être rapportée à aucun corps, mais seulement à une substance aussi radicalement distincte de la matière que notre esprit, alors l’hétérogénéité de nature entre la substance pensante et la substance étendue ne peut plus être vue comme un obstacle à l’action de l’esprit sur le corps. C’est ainsi (chez La Forge) la possibilité d’une causalité « équivoque » qui a été prouvée 33. Cela allait davantage de soi dans le cas du chapitre XVI du Traité de La Forge que dans le cas du quatrième Discours de Cordemoy, mais le point sur lequel nous voulions insister est que la difficulté associée à la relation âme-corps est omniprésente dans les deux cas, guidant la nouvelle réflexion sur la cause du mouvement. Cela ne revient pas à affirmer que les thèses occasionnalistes qui y sont défendues sont une réponse ad hoc au problème corps-esprit, puisque ce n’est pas pour résoudre ce seul problème que Cordemoy et La Forge ont recours à Dieu, en faisant respectivement des esprits et des corps des «  occasions » plutôt que des « causes », ou des « causes particulières » du mouvement. Mais les considérations qui aboutissent à faire de Dieu la seule véritable force mouvante des corps sont loin d’être étrangères à la difficulté que soulevaient les lecteurs de Descartes au sujet de l’interaction entre l’âme et le corps. On peut à cet égard se demander si en l’absence d’une telle difficulté, les deux auteurs se seraient consacrés comme ils l’ont fait à la question de la cause du mouvement des corps. Ce n’est pas du tout certain, et peut-être n’y aurait-il eu ni de quatrième Discours, ni de chapitre XVI du Traité de l’esprit de l’homme 34. à la fin du chapitre XVI. Selon cette lecture, l’étendue du pouvoir accordé à nos esprits consisterait à n’avoir d’autre puissance que celle de «  déterminer  » le mouvement des esprits animaux (p. 246), à n’avoir d’influence directe que sur certains mouvements du corps et non pas sur tous (ibid.), à ne pouvoir mouvoir les membres du corps que par l’entremise de la glande pinéale (p. 245), etc. 33  Sur cette causalité qui concerne aussi bien l’action des esprits sur les corps, ou des corps sur les esprits, que l’action de Dieu dans le monde, voir La Forge, Traité, p. 213. 34  Du moins le chapitre XVI du Traité aurait-il peut-être simplement porté sur la façon dont l’esprit et le corps agissent l’un sur l’autre, avec les développe-

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II. Venons-en au problème corps-esprit lui-même, tel qu’il est vu par La Forge et par Cordemoy, pour souligner ce qui distingue leurs analyses de celle de Descartes sur ce sujet 35. Comme nous l’avons indiqué, cette différence est à notre avis essentielle pour comprendre la transition du cartésianisme à l’occasionnalisme, dans laquelle les réflexions de la Forge et de Cordemoy ont bien un rôle crucial à jouer. Nous mettrons l’accent sur ce qui conduit à une prise en charge non cartésienne du problème chez ces auteurs, au sens où elle diffère de la manière dont Descartes s’est emparé de la difficulté relevée par ses lecteurs concernant la « force qu’a l’âme de mouvoir le corps ». En effet, il faudra désormais recourir à Dieu pour concevoir l’action des esprits sur les corps et celle des corps sur les esprits, et non plus à la notion primitive de l’union de l’âme et du corps. Comment expliquer ce changement ? L’un des éléments importants concerne l’origine du problème corps-esprit, qui n’est pas exactement la même pour les deux cartésiens et pour Descartes. On sait que pour ce dernier, la difficulté relative à l’action de l’âme sur le corps provenait de la confusion des notions ments de la fin du chapitre relatifs au mode d’action de l’esprit et du corps de l’homme. Q uant au quatrième Discours, il n’aurait peut-être contenu que les premières démonstrations, dans lesquelles il aurait été directement question de Dieu – ces premières démonstrations conduisent en effet nécessairement à Dieu et pourraient y conduire en l’absence du problème corps-esprit, même si elles en sont à notre sens indissociables chez Cordemoy –, sans que la quatrième conclusion donne lieu à une critique explicite de l’idée de cause appliquée aux corps et aux esprits. 35  Si cette distance est clairement assumée par Cordemoy, qui affirme presque être le premier à avoir résolu l’énigme des interactions âme-corps (voir le Discours V, p. 145, et Henri Gouhier, La Vocation de Malebranche, Paris, Vrin, 1926, p. 99), La Forge est quant à lui plus soucieux de rester fidèle à Descartes, et estime l’être pleinement dans sa manière de traiter la question de l’interaction entre les corps et entre les esprits et les corps (voir le Traité, pp. 242–244). C’est en un sens le cas, puisque les thèses et les arguments relatifs à la force mouvante des corps s’enracinent dans la « physique métaphysique » de Descartes, pour reprendre une expression de Daniel Garber (Descartes’s Metaphysical Physics, Chicago/London, The University of  Chicago Press, 1992, trad. par Stéphane Bornhausen, La Physique métaphysique de Descartes, Paris, PUF, 1999). Néanmoins, la façon dont La Forge s’empare de la difficulté à concevoir l’interaction âme-corps pour la résoudre est très éloignée de celle de Descartes lui-même.

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distinguées dans la lettre à Élisabeth du 21 mai 1643 36 : nous cherchons à «  concevoir la façon dont l’âme meut le corps, par celle dont un corps est mû par un autre corps  » 37, ce qui consiste à penser la première action, qui concerne l’âme et le corps ensemble, à partir de notions qui ne conviennent pas, en l’occurrence, celles qui sont relatives au corps seul et dépendent de la notion primitive d’étendue. C’est ce qui amène à demander que l’âme ait la capacité de toucher le corps pour le mouvoir, ainsi que cela est requis pour qu’un corps agisse sur un autre, alors que l’on a affaire, dans un cas, à une substance incorporelle, et dans l’autre, à une substance corporelle, dont les modes d’action diffèrent nécessairement. Concernant plus précisément l’action de la substance incorporelle sur la substance corporelle, nous avons une « notion particulière » pour la concevoir, selon Descartes 38. Rappelons que la troisième notion primitive, celle de l’union de l’esprit et du corps, revient à mettre au centre l’expérience sensible pour ce qui est de la connaissance des choses qui appartiennent à cette union : comme l’indique la lettre à Élisabeth du 28 juin 1643, ces choses « ne se connaissent qu’obscurément par l’entendement seul, ni même par l’entendement aidé de l’imagination  ; mais elles se connaissent très clairement par les sens » 39. Il  est important de remarquer qu’il n’y a pour Descartes aucun problème de la communication du mouvement entre les corps, aucune nécessité de se référer à Dieu pour concevoir l’action de l’âme sur le corps ou du corps sur l’âme 40, et aucun rejet de l’expérience sensible pour la connaissance de la façon dont un corps peut en mouvoir un autre. S’agissant de ce dernier point, Descartes indique simplement, dans la lettre à Élisabeth   Descartes, Œuvres, vol. III, p. 665.   Descartes, Œuvres, vol. III, p. 666. 38   Descartes à Élisabeth, 21 mai 1643 (Descartes, Œuvres, vol. III, pp. 667– 668). 39  Descartes, Œuvres, vol. III, pp. 691–692. 40  Descartes ne se réfère à Dieu en ce sens qu’une seule fois, pour mettre en avant le fait que raison et conscience sont « d’accord pour montrer que l’action d’une substance spirituelle sur une substance matérielle n’est ni obscure ni confuse  », ainsi que l’écrit Henri Gouhier dans La pensée métaphysique de Descartes, Paris, Vrin, 1999, 4e éd., p. 337 : voir la lettre à Morus du 15 avril 1649 (Descartes, Œuvres, vol. V, p. 347). 36 37

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du 21 mai 1643, que « l’usage des sens nous a rendu les notions de l’extension, des figures et des mouvements, beaucoup plus familières que les autres », ce pourquoi « nous voulons ordinairement nous servir de ces notions pour expliquer les choses à qui elles n’appartiennent pas » 41. Il ne dit pas que le modèle de la communication du mouvement entre les corps dont on part pour concevoir l’action des esprits sur les corps est erroné, et que nous avons tort de nous fier ici aux sens 42. Si l’on en croit les analyses de La Forge et de Cordemoy, ces réponses n’étaient toutefois pas suffisantes pour résoudre la difficulté liée à l’interaction entre l’âme et le corps. Les deux auteurs ont en effet senti la nécessité de s’y attacher à nouveaux frais, non pas seulement pour expliquer comment l’âme agit sur le corps et le corps sur l’âme, mais aussi pour montrer – d’une autre façon que ne l’avait fait Descartes – qu’il n’est pas plus difficile de concevoir l’action de l’âme sur le corps, ou celle du corps sur l’âme, que l’action d’un corps sur un autre corps 43. Cette association des questions portant sur l’interaction âme-corps et sur l’interaction entre les corps doit être mise en relation avec les présupposés à l’origine du problème de l’hétérogénéité des substances : s’il est difficile de concevoir l’action de l’âme sur le corps, c’est parce que le mode d’action d’un corps sur un autre corps nous apparaît de son côté parfaitement clair et évident, et qu’il constitue même le modèle à partir duquel nous pensons couramment le premier type d’action. Telle est bien, selon Cordemoy, l’une des principales sources des difficultés rencontrées à ce sujet : «  Ce qui nous rend plus inconcevable [l’action des esprits sur les corps, ou celle des corps sur les esprits, que l’action   Descartes, Œuvres, vol. III, p. 666.   C’est en partie sur ce point que porte la critique de Daniel Garber dans « Comprendre l’interaction. Ce que Descartes aurait dû dire à Élisabeth », dans Corps cartésiens. Descartes et la philosophie dans les sciences [« Understanding Interaction  : What Descartes Should Have Told Elisabeth  », dans Descartes Embodied  : Reading Cartesian Philosophy Through Cartesian Science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001], trad. par Olivier Dubouclez, Paris, PUF, 2004, p. 225 sqq. 43  Sur ce thème récurrent dans les analyses de La Forge et de Cordemoy, et sur ses différentes formulations, voir respectivement le Traité, p. 235, p. 236, p. 242, et le Discours V, p. 149, p. 150 et p. 151. 41 42

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des corps sur les corps] c’est que nous voulons concevoir l’une par l’autre, sans considérer que, chaque chose agissant selon sa nature, nous ne connaîtrons jamais l’action d’un agent, quand nous voudrons l’examiner par les notions que nous avons d’un autre agent de nature toute différente » 44.

Ainsi, comme le disait en substance Descartes, nous confondons des notions qui doivent au contraire être distinguées, puisqu’elles renvoient à des agents « de nature toute différente ». Mais ce qui est crucial est que, pour Cordemoy comme pour La Forge, le problème ne se limite pas à cette confusion de notions – ce pourquoi il serait insuffisant de « bien distinguer ces notions », en « n’attribu[ant] chacune d’elles qu’aux choses auxquelles elles appartiennent » 45. Il a d’abord trait au modèle à partir duquel nous raisonnons : nous croyons, comme l’affirme La Forge, qu’il est « aussi aisé d’apercevoir comment un corps en meut un autre, qu’il est facile de voir comment il le touche » 46, confondant l’évidence de la cause avec celle de l’effet 47. C’est ce qui conduit à penser que l’action des corps sur les corps ne comporte rien d’obscur et qu’elle est plus aisée à concevoir que l’action des esprits sur les corps, alors qu’il n’en est rien. Citons le chapitre XVI du Traité de La Forge : « Mais quoi, me dira-t-on, n’est-ce pas une chose claire et évidente, que les choses pesantes se meuvent en bas, que les légères montent en haut, et que les corps se communiquent leur mouvement l’un à l’autre ? Je l’avoue, mais il y a bien de la différence entre l’évidence de l’effet, et celle de sa cause, l’effet est ici fort clair. Car qu’est-ce que nos sens nous montrent plus manifestement que les divers mouvements des corps  ? Mais nous font-ils voir quelle est la cause qui porte les choses pesantes en bas, et les légères en haut, et comment un corps a la puissance d’en mouvoir un autre ? Nos sens nous apprennent-ils comment le mouvement peut passer d’un corps dans un autre ? Pourquoi il n’y en passe qu’une partie, et pourquoi un corps ne peut communiquer son mouvement, de même qu’un maître communique sa   Cordemoy, Discours V, p. 149.   Descartes à Élisabeth, 21 mai 1643 (Descartes, Œuvres, vol. III, p. 665). 46  La Forge, Traité, p. 236. 47  La Forge, Traité, p. 235. 44 45

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science, sans perdre ce qu’il donne ? Ce n’est donc pas une chose si évidente qu’on pourrait bien penser, que la cause du mouvement des corps, et c’est la raison pourquoi j’ai dit au commencement qu’il n’était pas plus difficile de concevoir comment l’esprit meut le corps, que de savoir comment un corps en meut un autre » 48.

Dans le cinquième des Six discours, Cordemoy affirme de même que « l’action des corps sur les corps ne nous [est] pas mieux connue que celle des esprits sur les corps, ou des corps sur les esprits  » 49. Cela ne veut pas dire que nous n’avons nulle connaissance de ces différents types d’actions mais que, contrairement à ce que nous croyons, la notion que nous avons de l’action des corps sur les corps ne contient rien de plus clair que celle de l’action des esprits sur les corps, et la seconde, rien de moins clair. C’est ce qui ressort du passage de la seconde partie du Discours V où Cordemoy propose de comparer « ce que fait [un] corps B sur un] corps C, quand on dit qu’il le chasse de son lieu  », et «  ce que fait l’esprit sur le corps, quand on dit qu’il l’agite » : « Tout ce qui est clair » dans le premier cas, écrit-il, « c’est que B était mû, que C l’est maintenant ; et que le premier demeure à l’endroit que le second occupait avant lui : nous ne voyons que cela, tout le reste nous le conjecturons  » 50. Q u’en est-il à présent de la relation entre l’esprit et le corps ? «  Tout ce qui est clair, c’est que l’esprit veut que le corps soit mû en un sens, et que ce corps en même temps est mû d’un mouvement conforme au désir de cet esprit : nous ne nous apercevons que de cela ; tout le reste nous le conjecturons » 51.

« Tout le reste », c’est-à-dire notamment la croyance que ce ne peut être que notre volonté qui est cause du transport du corps qui la suit toujours « de si près » 52.   Ibid. Nous soulignons.   Cordemoy, Discours V, pp. 149–150. 50   Cordemoy, Discours V, p. 150. 51  Ibid. 52 Voir Cordemoy, Discours IV, en particulier pp. 139–140. 48 49

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Notons que nous avons affaire, avec ce second examen, à une analyse critique de l’expérience sur laquelle s’appuyait Descartes pour dire que l’âme a la force de mouvoir le corps – expérience qualifiée de « certissima et evidentissima » dans la lettre à Arnauld du 29 juillet 1648 53, et dont Descartes affirmait, dans son entretien avec Burman, qu’elle est « si claire » qu’il n’y a pas moyen de nier les interactions entre l’âme et le corps 54. Or la clarté et l’évidence de cette expérience se trouvent considérablement réduites chez Cordemoy : Descartes aurait ainsi renvoyé ses objecteurs à une expérience qui ne contenait pas véritablement ce qu’elle était supposée contenir, ou qui ne contenait en tout cas rien qui permette d’affirmer que l’esprit meut réellement le corps ; le poser reviendrait à quitter l’évidence de l’expérience pour faire une conjecture qui n’est pas soutenue par cette expérience même, comme lorsque l’on suppose que c’est le corps B qui donne son mouvement au corps C 55. Pour Cordemoy, la comparaison des deux expériences montre que « les choses sont égales » ici et là : il n’y a rien de plus qui soit perçu, ou rien de plus clair, dans le cas des deux corps B et C que dans le cas de l’esprit et du corps. En outre, ce qui est clair dans chaque cas ne renferme rien d’inconcevable : ce que font les corps (se mouvoir ou demeurer en repos) est conforme à leur nature de corps, et ce que fait l’esprit (vouloir que le corps soit mû de telle ou telle façon) est conforme à sa nature d’esprit 56. Les choses sont donc « égales », au sens où elles sont également concevables, la seule différence étant que l’on a affaire, dans un

  Descartes, Œuvres, vol. V, p. 222.   À Burman qui interrogeait Descartes sur la façon dont l’âme peut « être affectée par le corps, et réciproquement, puisqu’ils sont de nature entièrement différente  », ce dernier faisait la réponse suivante  : «  Rien de plus difficile à expliquer, mais l’expérience ici suffit, qui est si claire qu’il n’y a pas moyen d’assurer le contraire, comme il apparaît dans les passions, etc. » (L’entretien avec Burman, trad. et notes par Jean-Marie Beyssade, Paris, PUF, 1981, p. 88). 55 Voir Cordemoy, Discours IV, p. 137. 56  Citons Cordemoy : « […] jusqu’ici les choses sont égales : car si dans le premier exemple, les corps B et C nous ont paru et en mouvement et en repos ; c’est qu’ils sont capables de ces deux états. Et dans le second exemple, si nous disons que l’esprit a voulu qu’un certain corps, qui se mouvait déjà, fût dirigé d’une certaine façon, c’est qu’il pouvait le vouloir  ; et si le corps a été ainsi dirigé, c’est que cela était suivant sa nature » (Discours V, p. 150). 53 54

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cas, à l’étendue et à ses modes, et dans l’autre, à la pensée et à ses modes, autrement dit à des corps ou à des esprits (des agents « de nature toute différente »). Q u’est-ce qui peut dès lors mener à la croyance que l’action de l’esprit sur le corps est plus malaisée à concevoir que celle d’un corps sur un autre corps ? La difficulté surviendra si l’on va au-delà de ce qu’il y a de clair dans l’expérience, à la fois de l’action des esprits et de celle des corps. Le problème ne tient pas uniquement au fait que nous raisonnons alors, pour ce qui est de l’action des esprits sur les corps, à partir de notions qui conviennent aux corps seuls (et non à l’esprit et au corps ensemble), mais à partir de notions qui sont en outre viciées, puisque nous continuons à considérer comme clair et comme concevable ce qui ne l’est plus, pour La Forge et pour Cordemoy. Telle serait la source des difficultés relatives à l’interaction entre l’âme et le corps : d’une part, nous imaginons savoir clairement comment un corps en meut un autre, comme s’il s’agissait là d’un fait d’expérience, alors que nous quittons en réalité l’évidence sensible dont il a été question lors de l’examen des deux corps B et C 57 ; d’autre part, nous éprouvons de la difficulté à concevoir l’action de l’esprit sur le corps, comme s’il y avait davantage d’obscurité ici que là. Mais cela vient de l’erreur commise concernant ce qu’il y a de clair et d’évident dans l’action des corps : confondant « l’évidence de l’effet, et celle de sa cause » 58, nous pensons ne pas avoir à rechercher d’autre cause du mouvement du corps C que le corps B, et ainsi que « le mouvement ne se [peut] communiquer que par le moyen de l’attouchement » 59 et qu’il n’y a que les corps qui puissent mouvoir les corps. C’est ce qui conduit à vouloir que l’esprit soit lui-même corporel pour pouvoir mouvoir le corps, en le touchant. 57 Le paradoxe est que nous nous en tenons néanmoins à ce que nous voyons dans notre identification des causes du mouvement (voir Cordemoy, Discours  IV, p.  137  : nous attribuons «  tous les effets qui nous sont connus aux choses que nous apercevons : sans prendre garde que souvent ces choses sont incapables de produire de tels effets, et sans considérer qu’il peut y avoir mille causes qui, tout imperceptibles qu’elles sont, peuvent produire des effets sensibles »). 58  La Forge, Traité, p. 235. 59  La Forge, Traité, p. 236.

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Or, du point de vue de La Forge et de Cordemoy, cette exigence ne revient pas seulement à demander que l’âme agisse sur le corps à la façon d’un corps, mais d’une façon qui est inconcevable et impossible pour les corps eux-mêmes, si l’on n’a pas recours à la première cause du mouvement. Notre méprise concerne donc fondamentalement la cause du mouvement des corps. Résoudre la difficulté soulevée par l’interaction âmecorps suppose dès lors de s’attacher à cette cause du mouvement et de rectifier nos erreurs touchant le rôle du choc dans la communication du mouvement entre les corps. Dieu sera cette cause du mouvement des corps, et la même cause à laquelle il convient de se référer pour comprendre comment les esprits peuvent agir sur les corps. Car il ne suffit pas d’écarter le problème de l’hétérogénéité des substances – en posant que le mouvement requiert une cause qui ne soit pas elle-même corporelle –, pour faire concevoir positivement la façon dont les esprits «  meuvent  » les corps. Comme le montre l’analyse critique de l’expérience chez Cordemoy, le quomodo de cette action (au sens de ce qui explique le passage de la volonté au mouvement) n’est pas plus clair dans le cas de la relation entre l’esprit et le corps que dans celui de l’action d’un corps sur un autre corps. Aussi est-il nécessaire de recourir à la raison plutôt qu’aux sens 60, raison qui fait découvrir, chez Cordemoy, que la volonté n’est qu’une « occasion » à la puissance qui meut déjà le corps (Dieu) «  d’en diriger le mouvement vers un certain côté répondant à cette volonté  » 61. Pour La Forge, c’est également en se référant à la première cause que la vertu de mouvoir des esprits, tout comme celle des corps, peut être rendue concevable – l’une et l’autre chose étant également concevables lorsque l’on se réfère à Dieu –, même si la force de mouvoir qui revient à l’esprit de l’homme exigera des développements propres, pour rendre compte des modalités de l’action de l’esprit uni au corps 62. Insistons, pour terminer, sur le fait que ce nouveau problème corps-esprit, selon l’analyse qu’en proposent La Forge  Voir Cordemoy, Discours IV, p. 138.   Cordemoy, Discours V, p. 151. Voir également le Discours IV, p. 142. 62  Voir la fin du chapitre XVI de La Forge, Traité, pp. 244–246. 60 61

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et Cordemoy, ne saurait être résolu en opérant simplement la distinction des notions en laquelle consistait, pour Descartes, « toute la science des hommes » 63. Et pour cause : ces notions, moins primitives que Descartes ne le pensait, ne permettent plus de concevoir la façon dont les esprits meuvent les corps et dont les corps meuvent d’autres corps. Par ailleurs, rapporter uniquement chaque chose aux idées qui conviennent nous maintiendrait dans l’erreur s’agissant de la cause du mouvement des corps. Si l’on adopte la perspective de La Forge et de Cordemoy, le tort de Descartes serait ainsi de ne pas avoir assez rappelé « l’origine des choses » 64, dans le cadre d’une réflexion qui l’exigeait pourtant et qu’il aurait pu développer, comme le suggère La Forge dans le chapitre XVI de son Traité  65. Descartes n’aurait fait qu’« alléguer l’occasion pour la cause », ce qui est certes souvent suffisant « pour nous faire entendre » 66 ; selon Cordemoy, c’est même ce qui est le «  plus raisonnable  » lorsque l’on ne cherche pas l’origine des choses 67. Mais peut-être était-il requis de revenir à cette origine à un moment où la distinction radicale du corps et de l’esprit ne permettait plus de comprendre le « merveilleux rapport de nos mouvements et de nos pensées » 68, au point de compromettre cette distinction même. On peut supposer que, pour Cordemoy, ce n’est qu’une fois l’explication donnée (à partir de la vraie cause de toutes choses) qu’il aurait été possible de retourner, comme Descartes invitait à le faire dans sa lettre à Élisabeth du 28 juin 1643, à l’usage « de la vie et des conversations ordinaires » 69, pour affirmer que les corps ou les esprits meuvent les corps, en entendant clairement ce que l’on dit 70.

  Descartes à Élisabeth, 21 mai 1643 (Descartes, Œuvres, vol. III, p. 665).   Cordemoy, Discours IV, p. 142. 65  Voir en particulier La Forge, Traité, pp. 242–244. 66   Cordemoy, Discours IV, p. 139. 67  Cordemoy, Discours IV, p. 142. 68  Cordemoy, Discours V, p. 145. 69  Descartes, Œuvres, vol. III, p. 692. 70  Selon ce que Cordemoy affirme qu’il faut «  entendre  » dans le Discours IV, p. 142, et dans le Discours V, p. 151. 63 64

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La Forge et Cordemoy s’éloignent en ce point de Descartes, dont la philosophie demeure à cet égard une philosophie de l’expérience – celle avec laquelle l’occasionnalisme se devait précisément de rompre.

Abstract This paper offers a substantial reevaluation of  the real connection between the emergence of  the mind-body problem and the origin of  occasionalism – a connection that many scholars have called into question over the past twenty years. The author focuses on Louis de La Forge’s and Géraud de Cordemoy’s recognition of  the common difficulty to conceive how the mind can move the body, given that the latter is extended and the former unextended. She argues that this difficulty played indeed a major role in both La Forge’s and Cordemoy’s reflections on the true cause of  motion and the necessity of  referring to God in order to understand both body-body and mind-body relations. Furthermore, the paper emphasizes an important difference between, on the one hand, La Forge’s and Cordemoy’s approaches to the mind-body problem and, on the other hand, Descartes’s approach. The conclusion advanced by the author is that this difference should be considered as one of  the crucial factors that determined the transition from Descartes to occasionalism. Keywords : Occasionalism, Mind-Body Problem, Descartes, La Forge, Cordemoy.

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LA FORGE’S MIND-BODY PROBLEM: A GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED *

It is difficult to overstate the importance of  the Traité de l’esprit de l’homme of  Louis de la Forge (1632–1666) for the history of  occasionalism in the seventeenth century.1 There are, of  course, occasionalist or occasionalist-like works appearing around the same time as, and even before, La Forge’s Traité. The most notable example is Géraud de Cordemoy’s Le Discernement du corps et de l’âme, which was also published in 1666, but it seems clear that La Forge’s treatise was more influential than Cordemoy’s in the development of  occasionalism. Cordemoy’s argument for occasionalism is highly idiosyncratic. His appeal to the nature of  agency and his account of  the individuation of  action do not appear in any other occasionalist works, as far as I can tell. By contrast, the main arguments that La Forge employs, including the one based on divine continuous creation, reappear as Malebranche’s central arguments; and it is hard not to believe that La Forge was Malebranche’s inspiration here. After all, it was Malebranche’s reading of  Clerselier’s 1664 edition of  Descartes’s Traité de l’homme, with La Forge’s extensive commentary, that “caused him such palpitations of  the heart that he *  My thanks to Tad Schmaltz for his comments on an early draft of  this essay, and to the participants of  the occasionalism conference in Venice for their insightful suggestions. 1  See Pierre Clair, “Louis de la Forge et les origines de l’occasionalisme”, Recherches sur le XVIIème siècle, I  (1976), pp.  63–72, Heinrich Seyfarth, Louis de la Forge und seine Stellung im Occasionalismus, Gotha, Emil Behrend, 1887, and Joseph Prost, Essai sur l’atomisme et l’occasionalisme dans la philosophie cartésienne, Paris, Henri Paulin, 1907. Occasionalism. From Metaphysics to Science, ed. by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano, Turnhout, Brepols, 2018 (DESCARTES, 2), pp.  169–194    FHG   10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.114993

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had to stop reading in order to recover his breath” (according to Malebranche’s early biographer 2). Can there be any doubt that when La Forge’s own Traité de l’esprit de l’homme, conceived as a follow-up to Descartes’s treatise and a completion of  that project, came out two years later that Malebranche rushed out to purchase it and re-live the excitement? Indeed, as expected, there is a copy of  the Traité among the books in Malebranche’s library. In terms of  seventeenth-century occasionalism, I should also mention Johannes Clauberg, whose Corporis et animae in homine conjunctio was also published in 1664. Clauberg’s account of  the mind-body relationship has often been read as occasionalist, although I think this is a misleading way to characterize Clauberg’s view. And then there is Arnold Geulincx’s Ethica and his Metaphysica vera, which clearly do propound occasionalist theses; but Geulincx’s works were of  very limited influence in this period, especially the Metaphysica vera, which was not published until 1691. Neither Clauberg nor Geulincx – nor, for that matter, Cordemoy – played the kind of  role in the development of  seventeenth-century occasionalism that I believe La Forge’s Traité played.3 My goal in this essay, however, is not to argue this point. Rather, I  would like to examine, once again, the nature of  La Forge’s occasionalism.4 In particular, I continue to be puzzled over how exactly to understand his account of  the causal 2  Yves André, La vie du R.  P.  Malebranche, prêtre de l’Oratoire, Paris, Poussielgue, 1886, p. 12. 3  On Cordemoy, see Jean-François Battail, L’avocat philosophe Géraud de Cordemoy, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. On Clauberg, see Winfried Weier, “Der Okkasionalismus des Johannes Clauberg und sein Verhältnis zu Descartes, Geulincx, Malebranche”, Studia Cartesiana, II (1981), pp.  43–62. On Geulincx, see Alain De Lattre, L’Occasionalisme d’Arnold Geulincx, Paris, Editions de Minuit, 1967. 4 See Steven Nadler, “The Occasionalism of  Louis de la Forge”, in Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony, edited by Steven Nadler, University Park, PA, Penn State Press, 1993, pp. 57–74, and Nadler, “Continuous Creation and the Activity of  the Soul: Louis de la Forge and the Development of  Occasionalism”, Journal of  the History of  Philosophy, XXXVI (1998), pp. 215–231. Both of  these articles are reprinted in Nadler, Occasionalism: Causation Among the Cartesians, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011.

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relationship between mind and body, and whether or not it is indeed a thorough-going occasionalist account. By “thorough-going occasionalism”, I  mean the doctrine associated most prominently with certain Cartesian philosophers in the seventeenth century, according to which all causal efficacy in the universe belongs uniquely to God. God is the sole causal agent of  all phenomena. Natural substances, such as minds and bodies, have no true causal powers. Bodies are not real causes of  motion or rest in other bodies, nor do they cause any events in human minds. And human minds do not cause motions in bodies or even mental events within themselves. The states of  bodies and minds are only so-called secondary causes which “occasion” or incite the primary cause, God, to act. Thus, one billiard ball is not the true cause of  the motion of  another billiard ball that it strikes, but only the occasion for God to move the second ball (and, correlatively, bring the first ball to rest). The damage to my skin by a needle is not the true cause of  the pain I experience, but merely the occasion for God to cause a painful sensation in my mind. And my volition to raise my arm does not itself  efficaciously bring about the rising of  my arm, but only serves as the occasion for God to make the arm rise (as well as to bring about any intermediate neurological and muscular events that are a part of  that process). On the most extreme version of  the doctrine, the mind does not have even the power to cause its own ideas. In all of  these contexts – body/body, body/ mind, and mind alone – God’s unique and ubiquitous causal activity is not ad hoc, arbitrary and unpredictable, but proceeds in accordance with certain divinely preferred laws of  nature. The laws of  physics, for example, specify when and how bodies are to move when they collide with other bodies; psycho-physical laws, governing mind-body relations, specify what correlations are to obtain between events in the human body and events in the human mind, perhaps with a view toward the preservation or convenience of  human beings. God, then, ordinarily does not cause a pain sensation in the mind unless the body is affected in a certain way; nor will God move a body or bring it to rest unless it comes into the appropriate contact with some other body. In this essay, I proceed in the following manner. First, I set out what is absolutely clear and non-negotiable in La Forge’s 171

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account of  natural causation, and this concerns the apparent interaction between bodies. Second, I explain what seems, prima facie, to be La Forge’s views on the reciprocal relations between the mind and the body. Finally, I consider a number of  confusions in La Forge’s account of  the relationship between mind and body and review what, in fact, La Forge is justified in claiming and what he is not justified in claiming – in other words, I  try explain what La Forge should say about the causal relations between mental states and bodily states. The result of  my inquiry will, I hope, be utter and possibly hopeless confusion.

I. Let us begin with what seems perfectly clear about La Forge’s occasionalism. Bodies, understood as Cartesian bodies, that is, as individual parcels of  extension in a plenum and distinguished from each other only by relative motions, are, as pure extension, causally inert. They have no real causal efficacy or active powers to cause effects in themselves or in other bodies; God is the only true causal agent responsible for the motion and rest of  bodies. In the realm of  bodies, La Forge is, without a doubt, a true occasionalist. “C’est Dieu”, he says, “qui est la cause premiere, universelle, et totale du mouvement”, and the local contact of  one body with another is only an occasion for God to modify the motion of  the first body and to put the second body into motion, as dictated by the laws of  nature.5 This reading of  La Forge on body-body relations is not controversial, and is clearly supported by his arguments to the effect that bodies have no motive force, no power to cause or sustain motion either in themselves or in other bodies. First, our clear and distinct concept of  body, which includes only extension and its properties, represents body as purely passive and does not contain any notion of  active force or power. In  fact, we cannot conceive or imagine how such a force or power could be included among or derived from the modes or

5  Louis de La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, edited by Pierre Clair, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1974, p. 241.

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properties of  extension, which include only size, shape, internal figure, divisibility, and mobility.6 Second, the force that moves something must be distinct from the thing moved. Thus, the force that moves a body must be distinct from the body being moved. But this means that no body can put itself  into motion. And if  a body cannot put itself  into motion, it cannot put another body into motion. “Si la force qui meut est distinguée de la chose qui est meüe, & si rien ne peut estre meu que ce qui est Corps, il s’ensuit manifestement que nul Corps ne peut avoir la force de se mouvoir de luy-mesme; Car si cela estoit, cette force ne seroit pas distinguée de la chose à laquelle est apartient. Q ue si un Corps ne peut pas se mouvoir, il est à mon avis évident qu’il n’en sçauroit mouvoir un autre”.7

Thus, La Forge concludes, “tout Corps qui est dans le mouvement, soit poussé par une chose entireement distinguée de luy, laquelle ne soit pas Corps” 8 – that is, it must be moved by a mind. Third, even if  motive force could be a mode or property of  bodies, that would not help explain how one body moves another. The mode of  a body is not distinct from the body to which it belongs; and on the Cartesian metaphysics of  substance, a mode cannot pass from the substance to which it belongs to some other substance. Thus, one body cannot move another by transferring its motive force to the other body. (This likewise rules out one body causing motion in another through real transitive causation, whereby one body would communicate its motion to another body.) Nor could one body could put another body in motion by producing a new motive force in it. This would be to attribute to bodies a power of  creation ex nihilo, which La Forge considers an obvious absurdity.9 One argument in particular seems to be La Forge’s most important and powerful argument for his thesis: the famous

  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, pp. 237–238.   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 238. 8  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 238. 9  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, pp. 238–239. 6 7

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“argument from continuous creation”. La Forge, like Descartes and many other philosophers before him, claims that God is required not just to create the world, but also subsequently to sustain it in existence from moment to moment by a kind of  continuous production of  its reality.10 Were God to withdraw this ongoing conservational activity, the world would reduce to nothing. This divine conservation principle applies, as well, to each and every particular substance in the world. No body or mind persists in being unless God continues to actively preserve it in being. Now when God creates or sustains a body at any given time, God must do so in some relative place or another, in some specific relation of  distance to other bodies; God cannot just conserve a body in abstracto, without conserving it somewhere, relative to other bodies. It follows, then, that a body is in motion just in case it is being sustained or re-created by God from one moment to the next in different successive relative places, and it is at rest if  it is being conserved or re-created in the same relative place. The force that moves that body, therefore, is and can be only the will of  God. “Je soustiens encore qu’il n’y a point de Creature Spirituelle ou Corporelle, qui luy en puisse faire changer, ny à aucune de ses parties, dans le second instant de leur Creation, si le Createur ne le fait luy-mesme; car comme c’est luy 10  Continuous “creation” need not imply a continual re-creation of  things from moment to moment, as if  they go out of  existence and are immediately brought back in to existence. A philosophically less problematic scenario is that God’s initial act of  creation is sustained, and so the activity of  conservation does not differ in reality from the act of  creation but is just a continued exercise of  it. As Descartes puts it in the Meditationes, “the same power and action are needed to preserve anything at each individual moment of  its duration as would be required to create that thing anew if  it were not yet in existence. Hence the distinction between preservation and conservation is only a conceptual one” (René Descartes, Œuvres, 12 vols, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, Paris, J. Vrin/CNRS, 1964–1976, vol. VII, p. 49). Malebranche is even more clear on this point: “La conservation des créatures n’est donc de la part de Dieu que leur création continuée […] Dans le fonds la création ne passe point, puisqu’en Dieu la conservation & la création ne sont qu’une même volonté, & qui par consequent est nécessairement suivie des mêmes effets” (Entretiens sur la métaphysique, VII, § 7, in Nicolas Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, 20 tomes, edited by André Robinet, Paris, J. Vrin, 1972–1984, tome XII, pp. 156–157).

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qui a produit cette partie de la matiere dans le lieu A. Par exemple, non seulement il faut qu’il continuë à la produire, s’il veut qu’elle persevere d’estre; mais encore, comme il ne peut pas la creer par tout, ny hors de tout lieu, il faut qu’il la mette luy-mesme dans le lieu B s’il veut qu’elle y soit; car s’il la mettoit par tout ailleurs, il n’y a point de force qui fust capable de l’en oster”.11

This argument, which also appears in Malebranche (in the Entretiens sur la métaphysique, VII), is as strong an argument as one could hope for that bodies have no power to move themselves or other bodies, and that God is the primary cause of  the motion and rest of  bodies. It is an unequivocal statement of  occasionalism in the context of  the relations between bodies. (In fact, as we shall see, it may be too strong an argument, if  La Forge does want to reserve some causal power for the human mind.)

II. Thus, in the realm of  bodies, La Forge is a thoroughgoing occasionalist. As for the mental realm alone – the power of  the mind to generate its own thoughts – and reciprocal relations between minds and bodies, things are not as clear cut. However, here is what La Forge seems to want to say. The mind, as an active substance, has a real and efficacious power to bring about its own mental states. La Forge identifies this power as the mind’s “faculté de penser”, and it is the “cause prochaine & principale” 12 of  all of  the mind’s ideas. Sometimes the activation of  this power or faculty follows the will; this is what occurs in those acts of  pure rational thinking and imagination that occur voluntarily and spontaneously. La Forge does call the will a “cause efficiente  […] pour toutes les Idées des choses ausquelles nous ne pensons que parce que nous y voulons penser”, and describes it as “une puissance active [dans l’Esprit] qui produit & forme les idées dont il s’aperçoit volontairement”.13 However, a more precise description of  what   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 240.   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 181. 13  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, pp. 93–94. 11 12

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happens in the case of  voluntary thoughts would seem to be that an act of  will is the occasion for the mind’s faculty of  thinking in the understanding to generate an idea. Thus, La Forge says that in such cases “dans le mesme temps precisement que la Volonté se determine, & qu’elle applique l’Entendement à penser à une telle chose il en forme l’Idée”.14 More often, however, the activity of  this faculty of  thinking in the understanding is occasioned not by the will but by an event in the body. There is an undeniable correspondence between certain bodily motions and certain thoughts (pensées) in the mind. When an external material object communicates motions through a material medium, these motions eventually strike the sense organs. The sense organs, in turn, communicate the motions, via the nerves and the animal spirits, to the brain; all of  this takes place in an occasionalist manner, since it involves only matter and motion. When the motions reach the brain, they are followed by certain sensory ideas. This correlation between bodily states and mental states is constant, law-like, universal, and involuntary. But what explains this correlation? What is the relationship, in causal terms, between the motions in the body and the subsequent corresponding thoughts in the mind? La Forge’s considered view seems to be a non-occasionalist one. He distinguishes between two kinds of  causes of  ideas in the mind: the principal and efficient cause, and the remote (“éloignée”) and occasional cause. The principal and efficient cause of  any idea is, he says, the mind itself  and its faculty of  thinking. Q ualitative sensations and ideas of  extension occur involuntarily (“sans le concours de nostre volonté”) when the senses are at work, normally on the occasion of  the presence to our body of  some external material object. What happens, according to La Forge, is that the motions 14  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p.  178. In  fact, it is a little more complicated than this. What happens, apparently, is that the will to think of  something is followed by a certain motion of  the pineal gland, which in turn is followed by patterned motions of  the animal spirits as they exit the gland toward nerve openings in the brain, and the resulting “espece corporelle” on the gland is the occasion for the understanding to generate the appropriate idea (La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, pp. 222–223).

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communicated to the brain by the object, which motions are the remote and occasional cause of  the sensible idea, give the principal and efficient cause – the mind – occasion to produce an idea. “Bien que l’on puisse dire que les Corps qui environnent le nostre, & generalement tout ce qui peut nous obliger à penser à des Corps, ou mesme à des Esprits, quand cela ne vient pas de nostre volonté, sont en quelque façon la cause des Idées que nous avons pour lors, parce que nous ne les aurions pas dans toutes les circonstances que nous les avons s’ils n’avoient agi sur nostre Corps; Toutesfois parce que ce sont des substances materielles, dont l’action ne s’estend pas jusqu’à l’Ame, en tant qu’elle est simplement une chose qui pense: mais en tant qu’elle est unie à un Corps […] ils n’en peuvent estre tout au plus que la cause éloignée & occasionelle, laquelle par le moyen de l’union de l’Esprit & du Corps oblige la faculté que nous avons de penser, & la déterminer à la production de ces idées dont elle est la cause principale et effective”.15

La Forge later claims that “toutes nos Idées considerées en elles mesmes en tant que ce sont seulement des differentes façons de penser, n’ont pas besoin […] d’autre cause qui les produise que nostre Esprit”. The mind, with its faculty of  thinking, contains within itself  (and he insists that he is speaking here of  something “dedans l’Ame”) the sole efficient cause of  its ideas, “celle qui ait le pouvoir de determiner sa pensée, de luy donner une forme”.16 La Forge recognizes that he is using, almost verbatim, the same explication of  the origin of  ideas that Descartes offers in his response to Regius in the Notae in programma quoddam.17 To his mind, it is the orthodox Cartesian explanation of  the causation of  ideas. Despite La Forge’s use of  the phrase “cause occasionelle”, this account of  the causation of  sensory ideas in the mind is not occasionalism. Notice that the motions in the brain do not occasion God to do any immediate and direct causal work; rather, they serve the mind or soul itself. God is, of  course, responsible   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 176.   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 177. 17  Descartes, Œuvres, VIII-2, p. 360. 15 16

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for this set-up in the first place. God established the relationship of  the body and mind in such a way that on certain bodily occasions the mind does ordinarily generate certain mental states; this is what La Forge means when he says that “ l’Auteur de l’union de l’Ame & du Corps” is one of  the “trois causes principales qui déterminent nostre Esprit à produire l’Idée qui nous doit representer une telle chose plustost qu’une autre dans une telle circonstance du temps”.18 (Presumably, God likewise created the mind in such a way that certain acts of  volition occasion the mind to generate particular voluntary thoughts). But the soul, for La Forge, is active here, endowed with real causal powers. It generates its own modifications: its ideas, as well as its volitions. Or so it seems. The other side of  the relationship between mind and body concerns the voluntary movements of  the body. And here too, although certain aspects of  La Forge’s account of  the agency of  the mind on the body are somewhat confusing, he seems to want to avoid occasionalism and grant to the mind a true causal efficacy upon the body, by way of  the will. On several occasions, La Forge explicitly recognizes in the soul “une force de mouvoir le corps” (also described as “une puissance de mouvoir [le corps]” 19), and grants to the will “le pouvoir d’unir nos pensées à des mouvements qui ne leur ressemblent point”.20 The mind moves the body by exerting this power over the position of  the pineal gland, which in turn controls the direction or course (but not the speed) of  the animal spirits. While the mind apparently cannot create or introduce motion into matter, it can determine vectorally the motion that exists therein. “L’Ame n’a pas la puissance d’augmenter ny de diminuer le mouvement des Esprits qui sortent de la glande, mais seulement de les determiner, c’est à dire, de les fléchir vers le costé où il est necessaire qu’ils aillent pour executer sa Volonté”.21 There is no indication that this is anything but a real causal relationship, with the mind being the efficient cause of  the movement of  the gland – and   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, pp. 177–178.   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, pp. 145, 152, 244. 20  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 163. 21  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, pp. 245–246. 18 19

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thus, ultimately, of  the motion of  the body’s limbs. As La Forge claims, “[la] Volonté peut bien estre la cause efficiente de toutes les choses que nous remarquons dans cette alliance dépendre immediatement d’elle”.22 Because La Forge’s Cartesian soul is an active substance, it may not be thought surprising that it can act on and move the body. On the other hand, because the soul is not extended or spatial, there are the old concerns about the “mind-body problem”, and thus there is some prima facie credibility to the question of  how the unextended mind can “push” or move an extended body. La Forge basically assures his readers not to worry about such matters. He says that he is explaining things the way he does “pour oster de l’Esprit de plusiers cette malheureuse prevention, de croire que si leur Ame n’étoit Corporelle, elle n’auroit pas la force de mouvoir le Corps, parce, disent-ils, qu’elle ne le sçauroit faire sans le toucher, & que selon le dire du Poëte, Tangere nec tangi nisi Corpus nulla potest res. Comme si le mouvement ne se pouvoit communiquer que par le moyen de l’attouchement”.23

It is, La Forge insists, an instance of  equivocal causation (“des causes equivoques”), a causal relationship involving things that are ontologically unlike each other – mental cause and material effect – as opposed to univocal causation (“des causes univoques”), which occurs between items of  the same ontological kind, “quand l’effet ressemble à sa cause”.24 What do we have so far, then? La Forge is an occasionalist when it comes to the domain of  bodies alone, but he seems not to be an occasionalist when it comes to the mental realm alone and the reciprocal relationship between mind and body.

  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 227.   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 236. 24 See La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 213. 22 23

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III. However, La Forge appears to be caught in a bit of  a philosophical bind. If  he does indeed want to say that the mind is the true and efficacious cause of  its own ideas (both on the occasion of  bodily motions and for voluntary ideas of  reason and the imagination), and that the mind is the true and efficacious cause of  the motion of  the body with which it is united, then he faces a number of  serious problems, problems internal to his system that he probably should have recognized. We examined above the continuous creation argument that La Forge uses to demonstrate an occasionalist thesis about bodybody relations. But, one may now ask, does the continuous creation thesis apply to the soul as much as to the body? Of  course it does – it applies to all created natural substances. Descartes, La Forge’s mentor in all things philosophical, explicitly says in the Third Meditation that God’s continuous activity is required to conserve him, as a thinking thing, in existence from moment to moment. La Forge clearly follows him on this point, and says as much: “[L’Esprit & le Corps] n’estant rien de soy, & chacun d’eux ayant besoin que l’Estre souverain les produise, non seulement au premier instant de leur creation, mais encore dans tous les momens qu’ils perseverent d’estre, leur durée ne peut-estre autre chose qu’une continuelle réproduction, au moyen de laquelle ils perseverent dans leur existence autant de temps qu’il plaist au Createur de les conserver”.25

On this basis, it can be argued that La Forge is not entitled to claim that the mind is or can be the efficacious cause of  its own ideas, whether sensory ideas on the occasion of  bodily motions or intellectual ideas in voluntary thoughts. That is, the Cartesian who adopts the doctrine of  divine conservation cannot consistently hold, at the same time, that the soul, unlike the body, is active with real causal efficacy. God must be the cause of  all mental states, just as God is the cause of  all bodily motions.26   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 199.   For a more extensive argument on this point, see Nadler, “Continuous Creation and the Activity of  the Soul ”. 25 26

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Remember that God causes the motions of  bodies by conserving them in particular extensional modalities. That is, God gives bodies their particular modifications precisely through his activity as their sustaining cause. At every moment God must sustain a body in some particular relative place; and from moment to moment, the body is either conserved in the same relative place (and thus is at rest) or conserved in different successive relative places (and thus is in motion). La Forge thus explicitly identifies God’s sustaining causal activity with God’s causal activity with respect to all modes or properties. God brings about the particular motive properties of  a body just by conserving it in the same or different relative places. It is God’s continuous activity of  sustaining a body that gives it its specific place(s) and kinematic properties – indeed, presumably thereby accounting for all of  its properties. Now there is no reason why this same argument should not carry through to the case of  the soul. It would seem that, in the same way that only God can cause a body to be in motion or at rest, so only God can cause a soul to have the particular thoughts it has, by conserving it in this or that mental state. The divine modus operandi as conserver of  things would be the same in the case of  the mind as it is in the case of  bodies. But then God must be responsible for bringing about the mental properties of  a soul just by conserving it in one thinking state or another. A  mind is a thinking substance. The modes of  a mind are its ideas (including sensations) and volitions. Just as a body in motion undergoes from moment to moment a series of  modes each of  which consists in spatial contiguity to other bodies, so a mind over time undergoes (or experiences) a series of  ideas and volitions. What brings it about that one idea or volition either persists through a time segment or succeeds and is succeeded by another is simply that at every moment God must sustain a soul either with the same particular idea or volition from the previous moment or with a different idea or volition. Thus, the soul can be no more active with respect to its modes than the body is with respect to its own. How, then, can the soul really be the true efficient cause of  its ideas on the occasion of  bodily motions or acts of  will? 181

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Now if  the soul cannot efficaciously cause its own modifications, it is very hard to see how it could be the active cause of  modifications in the body. So it seems, in the end, that La Forge faces a conundrum. He appears, at least in the Traité, to want to reserve to the human soul some element of  causal efficacy, at least with regard to its own ideas and apparently also with regard to a power to move the body with which it is united. However, given his commitment to a particularly strong version of  the doctrine of  continuous creation, he is not entitled to this causal efficacy in the soul. The same argument that renders a body causally inert, incapable of  causing motion in itself  or in another body, and that reserves all causal efficacy for God would seem also to render the soul causally inert, incapable of  causing its own mental states. There may be an additional, related problem in La Forge’s apparent attempt to reserve some causal efficacy for the soul in its relationship with the body. Like the problem of  how the soul could possibly be the cause of  its own ideas on the occasion of  bodily motions, this new problem also arises because of  La Forge’s commitment to a particularly strong version of  the continuous creation doctrine, but in a different way. La Forge has established through his use of  the continuous creation doctrine that no created thing can move a body, and that only God can move a body, by conserving it in different successive relative places. But it would seem to follow obviously from this that no human soul can move a body, any body, not even the body with which it is united. The continuous creation argument should preclude any ability the soul might be granted to cause motion in its body. Even if  the soul did have some real causal powers – for example, a power to cause its own mental states – the exceedingly strong argument for occasionalism with respect to bodies that La Forge employs would render the body immovable by anything except God. Basically, Malebranche got it right: if  you use continuous creation to prove body-body occasionalism (as he does, in the Entretiens, and as La Forge does in the Traité), then you are also committed to a thoroughgoing occasionalism in the context of  mind-body relations, as well as in the context of  mental events alone. Here is how Malebranche puts it in the Entretiens, just after laying out the continuous conservation argument: 182

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“Vous voila dans le monde sans aucune puissance, immobile comme un roc, stupide, pour ainsi dire, comme une souche. Q ue vôtre ame soit unie à vôtre corps si étroitement qu’il vous plaira, que par lui elle tienne à tous ceux qui vous environnent, quel avantage tirerez-vous de cetter union imaginaire? Comment ferez-vous pour remuer seulement le bout du doigt, pour prononcer seulement un monosyllabe? Helas! si Dieu ne vient au secours, vous ne ferez qu de vains efforts, vous ne formerez que des desirs impuissans”.27

Thus, it appears that what is supposed to be a small-scale commitment to occasionalism in one domain actually gets out of  control and bleeds across the entire realm of  mind-body relations. And this seems, on first glance, to be contrary to what La Forge wants or intends. If  this is right, then La Forge is just plain inconsistent.

IV. However, it is not obvious that La Forge does intend only a partial occasionalism. That is, it is not so certain that he does want to say that the mind really is the true and efficacious cause of  its own ideas (voluntarily or on the occasion of  bodily motions) or that the mind is the true and efficacious cause of  the motion of  the body with which it is united. After all, when he begins the treatise’s discussion of  causation in Chapter 16 (“Comment l’Esprit & le Corps agissent l’un sur l’autre; Et comment un corps en meut un autre”) with the claim that “il n’est plus difficile de concevoir comment l’Esprit de l’Homme sans estre estendu, peut mouvoir le Corps, & comment le Corps, sans estre une chose Spirituelle, peut agir sur l’Esprit, que de concevoir comment un Corps a la puissance de se mouvoir, & de communiquer son mouvement à un autre Corps” 28, his point is not that in both cases we can understand clearly how a real and efficacious causal relationship obtains. Rather, he means that in both cases there is equal difficulty and equal opacity, and that it is 27  Entretiens sur la métaphysique, VII, §  13, in Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, tome XII, p. 165. 28  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 235.

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only a prejudice to think that we understand body-body causation better than mind-body causation. His point, that is, is that “dans l’un & dans l’autre il faut recourir à la mesme cause universelle” – that is, God. Consider the case of  the mind’s action on body. There are, admittedly, many occasions where La Forge speaks as though the mind has a real, active, efficient causal power to move the body (by redirecting the motions of  the pineal gland). However, his considered and metaphysically informed position may very well be that the mind has no more power to move a body than any body has to move another body. It is difficult to believe that La Forge himself  did not recognize the difficulties raised for mind-to-body causation by the continuous creation argument. Of  course, one must be careful not to read the history of  philosophy backwards and anachronistically. It was only with and after La Forge that the continuous creation argument took on its importance as a powerful argument for occasionalism, at least in Western European philosophical literature; 29 it is not as if  there were a precedent in the form of  the kind of  thoroughgoing occasionalism that we find in Malebranche to which La Forge had access and to which he could turn for guidance and inspiration. Moreover, there continues to be intense scholarly debate recently over whether the continuous creation argument necessarily implies an occasionalist account of  causation, and with good reason: after all, Leibniz adopted divine conservation in a version that did not, to his mind at least, have occasionalist ramifications.30 Still, La Forge was no philosophical slouch, and given what he sees as the occasionalist implications of  the continuous creation argument in the realm of  bodies alone, its ramifications for the causal efficacy of  finite minds relative to bodies could not have escaped him. After all, as we have seen, he introduces the con29  In fact, an extremely robust form of  the continuous creation argument was the basis for an occasionalism in medieval Arabic thought. For a study of  this tradition, see Majid Fakhry, Islamic Occasionalism and its Critique by Averroës and Aquinas, London, George Allen & Unwin, 1958. 30  See, for example, Andrew Pessin, “Does Continuous Creation Entail Occasionalism? Malebranche (and Descartes)”, Canadian Journal of  Philosophy, XXX (2000), pp. 413–440.

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tinuous creation argument by noting that “je soustiens encore qu’il n’y a point de Creature Spirituelle ou Corporelle, qui luy en puisse faire changer, ny à aucune de ses parties, dans le second instant de leur Creation, si le Createur ne le fait luy-mesme” (my emphasis). But what, then, are we to make of  La Forge’s use of  the words “puissance” and “force” to describe the soul’s causal relationship to the body, and especially its capacity to move the body’s limbs? The locus of  this power is, he says, the will. La Forge explains that the will does not directly guide the body’s animal spirits, which are aimed by the pineal gland as they flow out of  the brain down the nerves and into the muscles. Rather, what the mind does is “decide” or think of  something which is “naturellement” joined with the motions appropriate for this bodily effect. Just after saying that “si nous en croyons nostre conscience nous ne douterons point non plus que la force de mouvoir le Corps ne soit aussi un apanage de l’Esprit & de sa Pensée”, he goes on to note that this power “semble principalement dépendre de la volonté”. But it is also the case, he says, that the will does not move the body’s limbs “immédiatement & par elle mesme”; otherwise, if  the will were the direct cause of  the body’s motions, since there is no one who does not have a will, there would be no one suffering from paralysis. He concludes, then, that Descartes was correct to claim that “nostre Ame ne conduit pas directement par sa volonté les Esprits animaux dans les lieux où ils peuvent estre utiles ou nuisibles, c’est seulement en voulant ou pensant à quelqu’autre chose, avec laquelle les mouvements propres pour cet effet sont naturellement joints”.31

In the continuation of  this passage, La Forge explicitly endorses Descartes’s conclusion that the soul has the power to determine the motion of  the animal spirits to flow towards one muscle rather than another (although La Forge states that he will deal more particularly with this power in a later chapter). Notice, however, that La Forge uses the words “puissance” and “force” also to describe what one body can do to another,   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 152.

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although it is certain that this bodily “power” is not a real causal efficacy. What this suggests is that the “puissance” or “force” of  the mind to move the body is on a metaphysical par with the “puissance” or “force” of  one body to move another. And what this power or force amounts to is nothing more than the regular, law-like correlation between the states of  one and the states of  the other, a correlation established and maintained by the efficacious and ubiquitous causal activity of  God. La Forge makes this fairly explicit in the Traité: “Et bien que de cette façon Dieu soit la cause universelle de tous le mouvements qui se font au monde, je ne laisse pourtant pas de reconnoistre les Corps & les Esprits pour les causes particulieres de ces mesmes mouvements, non pas à la vérité en produisant aucune qualité impresse, de la maniere que l’Ecole l’explique, mais en déterminant & obligeant la cause premiere à appliquer sa force & sa vertu motrice sur des Corps sur qui il ne l’auroit pas exercée sans eux, suivant la maniere dont, elle s’est resolue de se gouverner avec les Corps & les Esprits, c’est à dire pour les Corps, suivant les loix du mouvement, lesquelles sont si bien expliquées dans le second Livre des Principes de Monsieur Descartes, & pour les Esprits suivant l’estendue du pouvoir qu’il a voulu accorder à leur Volonté”.32

Clearly here the “pouvoir” or “puissance” that the soul, via its will, has to move the body is reduced to the fact that God moves the body on the occasion of  an act of  volition that the body should move – just as the “puissance” or “force” that one body has to move another body is reduced to a similar divine activity in the realm of  bodies. He concludes, with respect to these correlations maintained by God in a law-like way, that “c’est en cela seul que consiste la vertue que que les Corps et les Esprits ont de mouvoir”.33 Similarly, right after noting that “vous ne devez pas neanmoins dire que c’est Dieu qui fait tout, & que le Corps et l’Esprit n’agissent pas veritablement l’un sur l’autre”, La Forge explains that when natural substances “agissent veritablement” upon each other, this “action” really consists only   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 242.   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 242.

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in the relationship of  law-like conditionality between the states of  one substance upon the states of  the other. He expresses this conditionality by way of  a counterfactual: “Car si le Corps n’avoit eu un tel mouvement, jamais l’Esprit n’auroit eu une telle pensée, & si l’Esprit n’avoit eu une telle pensée, peut estre aussi que le Corps n’auroit jamais eu un tel mouvement”.34 It is God, however, who actually and causally brings about the relevant consequent states when the appropriate conditions obtain. Even when La Forge says that there are certain bodily movements “qui dépendent directement de l’Ame, & dont elle est absolument la maistresse quand le Corps est bien disposé”,35 it seems that all that he means is that the only relevant condition that determines what motion the body is to take, when God moves it, is a volitional state of  the soul; he need not mean that the soul and its will is the real efficacious cause of  the body’s motion.

V. A  potential complication for the occasionalist reading of  La Forge on mind-to-body causality presented in the previous section, however, emerges in a letter that Claude Clerselier, Descartes’s friend and literary executor, wrote to La Forge in December 1660 and that he included as the final letter in the third (1667) volume of  his edition of  Descartes’s correspondence. The occasion for their exchange was La Forge’s work for Clerselier’s edition of  Descartes’s Traité de l’homme. The exchange includes a discussion about the causal relationship between mind and body, but only Clerselier’s letter from this correspondence is extant, and so we do not know what La Forge had to say on this matter in his letter. Clerselier notes that the two men agree that “le principe du mouvement est hors du corps” and must lie in a mind or soul.36 But what kind of  soul:   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 245.   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 246. 36 Letter CXXV in René Descartes, Lettres de Mr.  Descartes, Paris, Charles Angot, 1667, Tome III, p. 641. 34 35

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infinite or finite? Clerselier definitely appears to be disagreeing with something that La Forge had said in his prior letter when he (Clerselier) insists that while a finite mind (the human soul) certainly has the power to “determine” the motions of  the body and change their direction, only an infinite mind can cause or introduce motions into body.37 He even considers a hypothetical reponse by La Forge (“Vous me direz peut-être […]”), whereby La Forge would argue in turn that since motion is only a mode of  a material substance, it does not require the divine creative power. This suggests that La Forge had argued in his initial letter that the human mind does indeed have a real power to cause (generate) motions in the human body, and not just re-direct them. Now La Forge was already working on his own Traité when he wrote his lost letter, and perhaps Clerselier’s reply had some effect. As we have seen, in the Traité La Forge insists on the fact that the soul “n’a pas la puissance d’augmenter ni de diminuer le mouvement des esprits qui sortent de la glande [pinéale], mais seulement de les déterminer, c’est-à-dire, de les fléchir vers le côté il est nécessaire qu’ils aillent pour exécuter sa volonté”.38 Apparently La Forge changed his mind on the nature of  the causal power of  the soul with respect to motion based on what Clerselier had to say on the way in which the soul does act on the body – by determining the direction of  its motion without adding anything “de réel dans la nature”.39 Did he believe this more limited re-directing power, like the generative power he had earlier argued for but now rejects, to be a real causal efficacy?

VI. Turning from the mind-to-body relationship, let us consider what the Traité has to say about the mind’s “power” to cause its own mental states, both voluntarily and on the occasion of  bodily motions (the body-to-mind direction). Does he   Descartes, Lettres, pp. 641–642.   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, pp. 245–246. 39  My thanks to Sandrine Roux for calling this to my attention. 37 38

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really mean for this to be a real causal efficacy in the mind with respect to its own modes, despite the problems we have examined; or is La Forge, in fact, a willing occasionalist in this domain as well? This is admittedly a more difficult case, at least if  we want to say that La Forge intends an occasionalism when it comes to the generation of  sensory ideas in the mind on the occasion of  bodily motions and imaginative or intellectual ideas on the occasion of  an act of  will. It may be that, if  we consider the continuous creation argument as applied to the soul, La Forge is committed to occasionalism in this context despite himself. However, there are also some considerations in the Traité itself  that point – albeit speculatively – in the direction that La Forge knew that the mind was not and could not be the efficacious cause of  its own sensory ideas. La Forge speaks of  two mental faculties that belong to us as human beings; both are “inseparables” from the mind and “lui conviennent essentiellement”: the understanding and the will.40 And despite the fact that La Forge refers to the “operations” of  the mind that result from our “faculté de penser” and “la puissance que nous avons d’apercevoir”, it is clear that, strictly speaking, only the operations of  the will are real actions. “La principale difference que je remarque entre les fonctions de [l’entendement] & de [la volonté], est que generalement parland tout les operations de l’Entendement, & toutes les autres sortes de perceptions ou de connoissances qui se trouvent en nous peuvent estre prises pour des passions de l’Ame, comme au contraire on peut nommer ses actions toutes les operations de la volonté”.41

For La Forge, as for Descartes, the soul is an active substance. And the activity of  the soul lies not in the understanding – which, he says, is passive – but in the will, in volitional mental events. “Nous n’avons pas seulement la faculté d’apercevoir, qui est une puissance passive, mais nous en avons encore une autre   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 145.   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 150.

40 41

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active que nous apellons la faculté de vouloir […] L’essence de cette faculté consiste premierement en ce que c’est le principe actif  de toutes les actions de l’Esprit”.42

But this would seem to mean that if  the mind is actually the efficient cause of  anything, it has to be by virtue of  this faculty of  willing. “La volonté” would have to be the locus of  any of  the mind’s causal efficacy and power. And the only things causally produced by a Cartesian faculty of  willing are volitions, judgments, and other attitudinal inclinations. As La Forge defines the will, it is “cette Puissance active & élective, par laquelle l’Esprit se détermine librement à faire ou à ne faire pas une telle chose, à affirmer ou nier”.43 And here is the problem: the sensory ideas that appear in the mind on the occasion of  bodily motions are not volitional acts at all; they are not even voluntary – they are involuntary. As La Forge himself  puts it, “nous ne sommes pas [les Maistres] ainsi de l’Entendement, pour apercevoir tout ce que nous voudrions, ou n’apercevoir precisément que ce que nous souhaiterions”.44 So if  La Forge wants the mind to be a true active cause of  its ideas, he appears to be stuck in a dilemma: either he must say that all of  the mind’s ideas, including sensory ideas, are volitional acts; or he must say that the “faculté de penser” that belongs to the understanding is an active power to cause ideas that is distinct from the active power of  the will. The first option is clearly false, and the second option would seem to be problematic, given La Forge’s philosophy of  mind. In  fact, La Forge seems committed to the denial of  both. As we have seen, he claims that sensory ideas are not under the control of  the will (which is supposed to be the cause only of  “les Idées des choses ausquelles nous ne pensons que parce que nous y voulons penser”). And he says that the will is the only causally active part of  the mind. Thus, it seems that the mind cannot be the true efficient cause of  sensory ideas on the occasions of 

  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 182.   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 183. 44  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 196. 42 43

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bodily motions, nor even of  voluntary ideas on the occasion of  an act of  will; it must be that God is the true efficient cause of  all ideas, acting in an occasionalist manner, just as He does in other causal contexts. At most, the mind (through the will) would be the true active and efficient cause only of  its own volitional acts – and, as we have seen, the continuous creation argument renders problematic even this reduced causal efficacy by the mind. Can it be that La Forge did not realize all this? 45 To be sure, the suggestion of  an occasionalist reading of  the body-to-mind relationship in La Forge may be mistaken. Perhaps when La Forge says that the will is the active part of  the mind and the understanding is the passive part, his intent is not to reserve causal efficacy for the former and deny it to the latter. Rather, it may be that what he means is that in sensation the understanding does efficaciously cause ideas (through its “faculté de penser”) but only when occasioned to do so by some event in the brain; and in voluntary thinking the understanding efficaciously causes ideas but only when it is occasioned to do so by an act of  will – thus the “passivité” of  the understanding. By contrast, the will has a spontaneity (an “activité”) lacking to the understanding insofar as it causes its volitional acts without any stimulus external to it. In  La Forge’s account of  sensory perception, presented above, he certainly does seem insistent on the fact that the faculty of  thinking in the understanding is “la cause principale et effective” of  sensory ideas on the occasion of  the appropriate motions in the pineal gland. It is interesting to note in this connection, however, that just a few years before completing the Traité, La Forge had in fact explicitly argued that the mind cannot be the cause of  the succession of  its own ideas. Jacques Gousset relates that in conversation with La Forge in the late 1650s, La Forge denied that there is a “potentiam inharentem Menti ad novas cogitationes 45  Desmond Clarke claims (correctly, in my opinion) that “La Forge took the first tentative steps toward occasionalism, without realizing the revolutionary implications of  what he believed was a restatement of  the philosophy of  Descartes”; see Desmond Clarke, “Louis de La Forge”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of  Philosophy (Spring 2014 Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, URL = ‹http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/la-forge/›.

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formandas”, although apparently not on the basis of  the continuous creation argument. La Forge’s argument, as reported by Gousset, is premised on the ontological simplicity of  the soul and a principle of  inertia. A  power to move itself  from one occurrent thought to another cannot be in the soul. The presence of  any given singular thought or idea, La Forge apparently told Gousset, exhausts the active thinking power of  the mind (exhaurit vim activam ejus) at the moment that thought is occurring; there is, in addition to the power of  thinking that one thought, no additional power to move to a second thought. But a thought is, like the motion or figure of  a body, a modification of  the respective substance, and any change in thinking (like any kinematic change in a body) requires some cause. Therefore, it must be a cause external to the mind that brings about the mind’s transition to a new idea. As Gousset reports La Forge’s reasoning, “it is a law common to all things that any thing, insofar as it is simple and indivisible, and insofar as it is considered by itself, remains always in the same state nor undergoes any change except by an external cause”. That external cause of  the mind’s sequence of  ideas is, La Forge told Gousset, God.46

VII. So where, in the end, does all this leave us? The answer is not entirely clear. La Forge is certainly an occasionalist when it comes to the causal relations among bodies alone. He seems, on first glance, not to be, nor did he intend to be, an occasionalist within the mind itself  and when it comes to the reciprocal relationship between mind and body. La Forge appears to want to say that the soul is the efficacious cause of  its own sensory ideas, on the occasion of  bodily motions; that the soul is the efficacious cause of  voluntary ideas; and that the soul is also the efficacious cause of  motions of  the body, by directly moving the pineal gland through its own power. However, there may 46  Jacq ues Gousset, Causarum primae et secundum realis operatio rationibus confirmatur et ab objectionibus defenditur, Leuwarden, François Halma, 1716, pp. 6–7.

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be serious problems in attributing real causal powers to the human soul for La Forge, given both his commitments about the nature of  activity in the soul and his commitment to the continuous creation argument for an occasionalist account of  bodily motions. What we have in the late 1650s is La Forge saying to Gousset that the mind cannot even cause a change in its own thoughts; then in 1660, in a lost letter to Clerselier, claiming that the mind can in fact introduce motion into body; then in the Traité, completed by the end of  1661, he is insisting either that the mind can only re-direct motion in the body or that the mind has no true causal efficacy over the body at all but is only an occasional cause for God’s ubiquitous activity. While La Forge does on occasion use some strong interactionist language, it also seems that this language can (like the use of  “force” with respect to bodies) be explained away in a reductive manner. Perhaps La Forge is, after all, as some commentators have claimed, a thoroughgoing occasionalist, appealing to this doctrine in the mind-body domain and in the purely mental domain, as well as in the bodily domain, but the evidence is at best ambiguous.47

Abstract It is difficult to overstate the importance of  La Forge’s Traité de l’esprit de l’homme (1666) for the history of  occasionalism in the seventeenth century. The goal of  this paper is to examine, once again, the problematic nature of  La Forge’s occasionalism. In  particular, there is still puzzlement over how exactly to understand his account of  the causal relationship between mind and body, and whether or 47 See Prost, Essai sur l’atomisme et l’occasionalisme dans la philosophie cartésienne, p.  503, p.  513; Charles McCracken, Malebranche and British Philosophy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983, p.  95; and Thomas  M. Lennon, “Philosophical Commentary”, in Nicolas Malebranche, The Search After Truth, edited by Thomas M. Lennon and Paul Olscamp, Columbus, Ohio State University Press, 1980, p. 811. For a contrary interpretation, according to which La Forge’s occasionalism is only partial, see Ludwig Stein, “Zur Genesis des Occasionalismus”, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, I (1888), pp. 53–61, p. 55, and Seyfarth, Louis de la Forge und seine Stellung im Occasionalismus, chapter 3. This was the interpretation I originally took in Nadler, “The Occasionalism of  Louis de la Forge”.

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not it is indeed an occasionalist account.  First, the author sets out what is absolutely clear and non-negotiable in La Forge’s account of  natural causation, and this concerns the apparent interaction between bodies. Second, he explains what seems, prima facie, to be La Forge’s views on the reciprocal relations between the mind and the body. Finally, he considers a number of  confusions in La Forge’s account of  the relationship between mind and body and review what, in fact, La Forge is justified in claiming and what he is not justified in claiming. In other words, the paper aims to explain what La Forge should say about the causal relations between mental states and bodily states. Keywords: La Forge, Causation, Cartesianism, Mind, Body.

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THE DIRECTION OF  MOTION: OCCASIONALISM AND CAUSAL CLOSURE FROM DESCARTES TO LEIBNIZ *

1. Introduction One of  the most popular aspects of  occasionalism is its peculiar account of  voluntary human motions. Part of  the prominence that this side of  the mind-body problem has acquired in the received picture of  occasionalism is certainly due to Leibniz’s presentation of  this system, which he perceived as the direct rival of  his own harmonism. When pre-established harmony was criticised for adding nothing to the doctrine of  the Cartesians, Leibniz replied that there was in fact a crucial difference in their respective accounts of  voluntary motions: “[…] the Cartesians recognize, of  course, that the force of  bodies is not changed by the soul, since the same force is always conserved in bodily nature; but they hold that the direction of  bodies is changed according to the soul’s desires, whereas the inventor of  the new system of  pre-established harmony does not even need this change; on the contrary, he also proves on the basis of  the rules of  motion that it must not be admitted […]”.1 *  I  owe many thanks to Dan Garber for comments on an earlier draft. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are mine. 1 Leibniz to Wolff, 18 November 1708, in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz and Christian Wolff, Briefwechsel, edited by Carl Immanuel Gerhardt, Halle, Schmidt, 1860, p. 104. The passage is from Leibniz’s addendum to a draft of  Wolff’s review of  a book by the French mathematician Antoine Parent, who criticised pre-established harmony for saying nothing more or even something less than “the Cartesians” (i.e., the occasionalists): see Antoine Parent, “Analyse des conjectures du Pere Tournemine, sur l’union de l’ame et du corps”, in Occasionalism. From Metaphysics to Science, ed. by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano, Turnhout, Brepols, 2018 (DESCARTES, 2), pp.  195–219    FHG   10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.114994

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Here, Leibniz ascribes to the Cartesians a version of  what is now called the change-of-direction account of  voluntary motions. Elsewhere, he attributes a similar account to Descartes himself  – which has fostered discussion on whether this ascription is historically or at least theoretically warranted.2 On the other hand, the ascription to “the Cartesians” appears to be more justified; as some scholars have noted, the change-of-direction account (or something close to it) was actually endorsed by some of  Descartes’s followers. Thus, most commentators agree that Leibniz did not invent the account but found it widespread in the Cartesian milieu, so that he took it to be part of  Descartes’s genuine doctrine. So far, however, scant attention has been devoted to the early history of  the change-of-direction account. Why did the Cartesians advance it, and in what forms and by what arguments? How was its introduction related to the origin and development of  occasionalism? The following reconstruction shows that the change-of-direction account appeared first in an interactionist version, was then recast in strict occasionalist terms, and was eventually superseded by Leibniz’s pre-established harmony with its constraints of  causal closure. Thus, the rise and fall of  the change-of-direction account may reveal something essential about the confrontation of  interactionism, occasionalism, and harmonism, given their incompatible views on the causal structure and autonomy of  the physical world.

Recherches de mathématique et de physique. Tome II ou suite de la III partie, Paris, Jombert et Delaulne, 1705, pp. 241–256. Parent rejected Father Tournemine’s concession that pre-established harmony represented an improvement over occasionalism: cf. René-Joseph de Tournemine, “Conjectures sur l’union de l’ame et du corps”, Mémoires pour l’histoire des sciences et des beauxarts, 1703, pp. 864–875, p. 868. Wolff  informed Leibniz about Parent’s attack on 6 November 1708 (cf. Leibniz and Wolff, Briefwechsel, p. 100). The final version of  the review including Leibniz’s addendum appeared in Actorum Eruditorum Supplementa, Tom. IV, Sect. 1, pp. 22–29. 2  In  recent times, the debate has been renewed mainly by Peter Remnant, “Descartes: Body and Soul ”, Canadian Journal of  Philosophy, IX (1979), pp.  377–386; and Daniel Garber, “Mind, Body and the Laws of  Nature in Descartes and Leibniz”, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, VIII (1983), pp. 105– 133. Additional literature is cited below.

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2. No New Motion Leibniz’s writings often relate the following account: 3 Descartes resorted to the change-of-direction account to solve the potential conflict between his interactionist account of  voluntary motions and his famous conservation principle, stating that the total quantity of  motion in the physical world cannot change (referred to as the first conservation principle). Of  course, the key elements that make up Leibniz’s story are genuinely Cartesian: the first conservation principle; the distinction between the quantity of  motion and its direction; and the mind’s ability to direct the course of  the animal spirits by means of  the pineal gland.4 Descartes, however, does not clearly enunciate the change-of-direction account, although some passages can suggest it, for he never explicitly asserts that the soul can only determine but cannot produce bodily motions. Most importantly, he never states or suggest anything like this account as a consequence of  the conservation principle. As some scholars have remarked,5 an unequivocal statement of  the change-of-direction account appears in Clerselier’s December 1660 letter to La Forge, in which the author argues that “the principle of  motion is outside the body”,6 for both the force that sets the body in motion and the force that merely determines its direction can and indeed must belong to an incorporeal, spiritual substance:

3   See, e.g., Leibniz to Arnauld, 30 April 1687, in Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 1923 ff., series II, vol. 2, pp. 180–181; Eclaircissement du nouveau système, in Philosophische Schriften, edited by C. I. Gerhardt, Berlin, Weidemann, 1875–1890, vol. IV, p. 497; Théodicée, § 60, in Philosophische Schriften, VI, p. 135. 4 See René Descartes, Principia philosophiae, II, § 36, in Œuvres, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, Paris, Vrin/CNRS, 1964–1974, vol. VIII, pp.  61–62; Principia philosophiae, II, §  41, pp.  65–66; Q uartae responsiones, in Œuvres, VII, p. 229. On the conservation principle and the determination of  motion, see Pierre Costabel, “Essai critique sur quelques concepts de la mécanique cartésienne”, Archives Internationales d’Histoire des Sciences, XX (1967), pp. 235–252. 5 Cf. Garber, “Mind, Body and the Laws of  Nature”, p. 130, who credits the suggestion to Alan Gabbey. 6  Claude Clerselier, Lettres de Mr Descartes, vol. III, Paris, Angot, 1667, p. 641.

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“Ie trouve comme vous que la force qui meut, et mesme celle qui ne fait que determiner à son gré et comme il luy plaist le mouvement, ne dit rien en soy de corporel, et partant ie ne trouve point d’inconvenient qu’elle puis­se appartenir à l’Ame. Bien plus, ie trouve que cette force n’est point du tout du ressort du corps, mais qu’elle doit necessairement venir d’ailleurs, pour avoir son effet dans le corps”.7

Since there are two kinds of  spiritual substances, the infinite and the finite, the next step is to specify their respective forces. Clerselier maintains that only the infinite substance has unrestricted causal powers over motion, whereas the power of  finite spiritual substances is limited to the determination of  motion: “Ie dis qu’il n’y a que l[a substance] infinie seule qui soit capable d’imprimer le premier mouvement au corps, mais que la finie, comme l’Ame de l’homme, peut seulement estre capable de determiner le mouvement qui est desia”.8 This restriction of  mind-to-body causation is in itself  identical with the restriction imposed by the change-of-direction account. Clerselier’s motivation, however, is quite different from what we might expect in the light of  the story told by Leibniz. The human soul cannot bring about new motions, not because this would infringe the conservation principle and therefore conflict with God’s immutability, but because no motion can be added to the world without being created from nothing, and only the infinite substance has the power of  creating something real. In  Clerselier’s reformulation, the Cartesian distinction between motion and its determination becomes an instance of  the ontological gulf  between what requires creation from nothing in order to exist and what does not, because it does not count as a real, distinct entity.9

  Clerselier, Lettres de Mr Descartes, III, p. 641.   Clerselier, Lettres de Mr Descartes, III, pp. 641–642. 9 See Clerselier, Lettres de Mr Descartes, III, pp.  642–643. Cf.  Daniel Garber and Margaret Wilson, “Mind-Body Problems”, in The Cambridge History of  Seventeenth-Century Philosophy, vol. I, edited by Daniel Garber and Michael Ayers, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp.  833–867, p. 866 n. 7 8

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Moreover, Clerselier’s primacy appears seriously challenged by further discoveries. As Dan Garber first pointed out,10 Henricus Regius already endorsed the change-of-direction account in the first general exposition of  his natural philosophy, the Fundamenta physices (1646). Here Regius maintains, first, that the quantity of  motion in the world, as with the quantity of  matter, remains constant, so that no new motion ever arises and no existing motion ever ceases.11 Second, he argues that a sudden movement by a previously resting animal cannot be considered as the production of  a new motion, since it simply derives from the permanent agitation of  the animal spirits.12 Finally, in the section on the human being, Regius explains that: “in voluntary motion, as also in spontaneous motion, no new motion is excited, but there only happens a new determination of  the spirits, set in motion more vigorously by the subtle matter, in one or another direction […]. Although the mind does not have the force of  moving the body from one place into another, it does have by itself  the force of  determining in this or that direction the spirits set in motion [vim spiritus motos in hanc vel illam partem determinandi], just as it has by itself  the force of  understanding and willing”.13

Garber correctly notes that “Regius doesn’t explicitly relate this change-of-direction account to the conservation principle”.14 Nevertheless  I think that the mention of  spontaneous motion suggests an intended if  not wholly explicit link between these two doctrines, for as we have seen, Regius stresses the fact that, on his account, the spontaneous motions of  animals pose no threat to the conservation principle. 10 Cf. Garber and Wilson, “Mind-Body Problems”, p. 856; and p. 866 n., which notes occurrences in non-occasionalist authors such as Henry More and Spinoza that cannot be discussed here. 11  Henricus Regius, Fundamenta physices, Amstelodami, Elzevir, 1646, pp. 7–8. 12   Regius, Fundamenta physices, p. 8. 13  Regius, Fundamenta physices, p.  298. I  have modified the translation by Garber, “Spinoza’s Cartesian Dualism in the Korte Verhandeling”, in The Young Spinoza: A Metaphysician in the Making, edited by Yitzhak Y. Melamed, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015, pp. 121–132, p. 130. 14  Garber, “Spinoza’s Cartesian Dualism”, p. 131.

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3. Clauberg’s Moral Causality A more explicit use of  the first conservation principle to establish a version of  the change-of-direction account can be found in Clauberg’s work.15 Asking whether and how the mind can move the body, Clauberg denies that the human mind is the physical cause of  bodily motions, insisting that “God is the truly efficient, procreating and conserving cause of  every motion”.16 While Clauberg agrees with Clerselier in ascribing to God alone the power of  creating and conserving motion, his arguments are different from Clerselier’s. To reinforce the view that “motion itself  does not depend on the force and efficacy of  our will”, Clauberg adduces his argument from a recalcitrant or unresponsive body. Ordinary experience shows all of  us that when our limbs are “tired, drained of  all spirits, or afflicted by arthritis”, they do not yield to our volitions.17 However, Clauberg’s main argument is from the first conservation principle: “If  you maintain that the soul really produces new motion in the body, you infringe the physical principles, which state that in the whole universe, some parts whereof  are human bodies, there exists constantly the same quantity of  motions”.18 As concerns the conservation principle, Clauberg refers the reader to his Physica contracta, where the principle is deduced first from God’s immutability: “And God conserves matter and motion by the same will by which he created [them], since he is always the same”.19 Second, the Physica contracta features an argument from order, in which the conservation principle is inferred by modus tollens on a counterfactual: 20 15  The first to draw attention to Clauberg’s account was Norman Kemp Smith, Studies in the Cartesian Philosophy, London, Macmillan, 1902, p. 83 n. 16  Johann Clauberg, Corporis et animae in homine conjunctio (1664), ch. 16, in Opera omnia philosophica, Amstelodami, Blaev, 1691, repr. Hildesheim, Olms, 1968, I, p. 221. 17  Clauberg, Corporis et animae in homine conjunctio, p. 221. 18   “Si statuas novum in corpore motum ab anima reapse produci, adversaris principiis Physicis, quae in toto Universo, cujus portiones sunt humana corpora, eandem perpetuò motuum quantitatem existere tradunt […]” (Corporis et animae in homine conjunctio, p. 221). 19  Clauberg, Physica contracta, § 147, in Opera omnia philosophica, I, p. 6. 20  On the validity of  this inference pattern (if  it were the case that p, then

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“If  this latter were omitted [i.e. the law that, when two bodies collide, the one of  them loses as much motion as it gives to the other], then motion could increase or decrease beyond the boundary; and from this it would eventually follow that the order of  the world would be troubled, provided that the world itself  would be protected from destruction. For if  motion were so increased that all parts of  the world would be moved at very high speed, then what would all things be, if  not a single flame? Conversely, if  motion were so reduced that all things would be at rest, then what would there be, if  not pure ice everywhere?” 21

Any change in the overall quantity of  motion would undermine the world’s order, triggering a sort of  entropic process that could result in apocalyptic consequences. Thus, only the perpetual conservation of  this magnitude can preserve the world from disorder and destruction. By using the argument from the first conservation principle, Clauberg does not aim to deny every kind of  interaction between body and mind, but rather to establish a sort of  restricted interactionism, which is not far from the position that Leibniz ascribes to Descartes in several passages. Although the mind cannot be the physical cause of  motion, it can nevertheless exert a “moral” causality that consists in governing and directing some bodily motions that “are already there in the body”.22 This concession implies that once a body is set in motion, any change in its direction requires no truly efficient cause, but only a moral cause. The claim may appear counterintuitive, but consider that the mind is said to be the moral cause of  the motion of  its body in the same sense in which a driver can be deemed as the moral cause of  the motion of  her vehicle. Indeed, to clarify the distinction between the physical and the moral cause, Clauberg compares the soul to the driver of  a chariot, the motion of  it would be the case that q; but it is not the case that q, hence it is not the case that p) see David Lewis, Counterfactuals, Oxford, Blackwell, 1973, p. 36. 21  Clauberg, Physica contracta, § 168, p. 7. 22  “Mens autem humana motuum in Homine corporeorum causa ejusmodi Physica non est, sed Moralis tantùm, quatenus illorum aliquos duntaxat gubernat ac regit, facitque ut illis motibus, qui jam sunt in corpore, modò hoc, modò illud membrum agitetur” (Clauberg, Corporis et animae in homine conjunctio, p. 221).

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which is physically caused by a horse; by guiding the horse, the driver can determine the motion of  the chariot.23 Since the very same comparison appears in one of  Leibniz’s formulations of  the change-of-direction account, Clauberg is very likely to have been at least one of  Leibniz’s direct sources.24 The comparison with the charioteer confirms that Clauberg endorses an interactionist version of  the change-of-direction account, whereby the human mind exerts an immediate, if  only “moral”,25 causal power over its body: the power of  determining the direction of  some motions. One interesting consequence of  this position is that no room is left for God’s causal agency in the mind-to-body action. Of  course, all motions are created and conserved by God, but they are not created on the occasion of  some volitions; rather, they are already present in the body before the mind wants to move a limb. Such pre-existing motions originate a voluntary motion only because of  the new direction impressed upon them, a direction that is given by the mind. If  this is so, then the physical implementation of  a mental volition requires no special assistance by God, who neither changes the quantity of  motion, for it cannot be changed, nor its direction, for it is the mind that does that. Thus, this interactionist version of  the change-of-direction account actually blocks the path to full-fledged occasionalism. What Clauberg leaves unclear is by what means the mind can govern the direction of  motion. Here the equestrian comparison obviously fails, for between the mind and its body there is nothing corresponding to the horse’s bridle. Occasionalism solves this problem by charging God with directing bodily motions so that they execute mental volitions. However, if  not Clauberg, then who is the first to strip the mind of  the power of  directing 23  “Similem propè in modum auriga currui jungit equum, quem ad motum stimulat, huc illuc flectit, atque ita regit motum currus, quem equus verè producit ut causa Physica” (Clauberg, Corporis et animae in homine conjunctio, p. 221). 24  As suggested by Tad  M. Schmaltz, Descartes on Causation, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 173. Cf. Leibniz, Théodicée, § 60, in Philosophische Schriften, VI, pp. 135–136. 25  Needless to say, by describing the mind’s governance of  its body in terms of  “moral” causality as Clauberg does, one can also forestall objections concerning the agent’s moral responsibility for her body’s behaviour.

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motion? It is not even La Forge, who remains reasonably close to Clauberg’s position.

4. La Forge’s Worries about Conservation and Force On the one hand, La Forge clearly rejects unrestricted mind-tobody causation, for he is adamant that the mind has no force to move the body. On the other hand, he allows the mind the power of  influencing the direction of  the animal spirits. Let us consider these two points in turn. In Chapter 16 of  his Traité de l’esprit de l’homme, La Forge addresses both mind-body and body-body causation.26 As to the cause of  motion, he endorses the occasionalist account: “[…] c’est Dieu qui est la cause premiere, universelle, et totale du mouvement”.27 Plausibly taking up Clerselier’s suggestion, he compares the production of  motion with the creation of  nature from nothingness, for both acts require omnipotence.28 Of  course, bodies and minds are recognized as the particular causes of  these motions (“les causes particulieres de ces mesmes mouvements”), but only in the sense that they determine “la cause premiere à apliquer sa force et sa vertu motrice sur des Corps sur qui il [i.e. God] ne l’auroit pas exercée sans eux”.29 Here, the role of  secondary causes is characterized in counterfactual terms that are clearly reminiscent of  the traditional sine qua non causality, the antecedent of  occasional causes. Most important for our issue, La Forge perceives Descartes’s conservation principle as a potential threat to the occasionalist doctrine that all motive force belongs to God. He appears to realize that the Cartesian principle must be interpreted care26   The title of this chapter reads: “Comment l’Esprit et le Corps agissent l’un sur l’autre; Et comment un Corps en meut un autre”; in Louis de La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, edited by Pierre Clair, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1974, p. 235. 27  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 241. 28  “[…] comme il a esté necessaire qu’il employast sa parole toute Puissante pour tirer du neant toute la Nature, c’est aussi par le moyen de cette parole qu’il a tiré cette mesme Nature du chaos, en produisant en elle le mouvement” (La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 241). 29  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 242.

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fully, for otherwise it could reinforce exactly the view that resists occasionalism. Some of  Descartes’s disciples, writes La Forge, “se sont trompez lourdement dans la maniere dont ils conçoivent ce qu’il dit de la force qui meut la matiere, à cause qu’il a escrit que Dieu conservoit en l’Univers la mesme quantité de mouvement qu’il y en a mis d’abord en le creant: Car ils se sont imaginez cette force comme un accident ou une qualité reelle, à la façon de l’Ecole […]”.30

Such unorthodox Cartesians advance a dynamic interpretation of  the conservation principle, for they think that the quantity of  motion remains constant because of  the motive force that God has bestowed upon the world, as though force were an entity “distinct from the motive cause” 31 with its own existence among creatures. According to La Forge, the genuine meaning of  Descartes’s principle is simply that God always exerts the same force on the physical world, so that the total amount of  force neither increases nor decreases, and the transfer of  force from one body to another takes place simply because God applies that force successively to different parts of  matter. The question arises of  the identity of  these Descartes’s disciples. My suggestion is that the primary target of  La Forge’s warning is Henricus Regius. Given that Regius is also the plausible inventor of  the change-of-direction account, this identification makes the whole affair more intriguing. In  the Fundamenta physices of  1646, Regius presents the conservation and the transfer of  motion as the sides of  the same coin; since motion never begins or ends, it can only migrate from one body to another.32 This conservation principle, however, is not derived from God’s immutability, but from the “law of  the   La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 242.   “[…] ils ne peuvent pas […] reconnoistre que cette force soit distinguée de la cause motrice, sans s’écarter des Principes de Monsieur Descartes, dont la pensée est que Dieu conserve la mesme quantité de mouvement dans toute la Nature, parce qu’il se sert tousiours de la mesme force, sans l’augmenter ny diminuer; et que cette force passe d’un Corps à un autre, parce que Dieu l’aplique successivement aux diverses parties de la matiere” (La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, pp. 242–243). La Forge refers to Descartes, Principia philosophiae, Part 2, art. 36. 32  Regius, Fundamenta physices, pp. 7–8. 30 31

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immutability of  nature”, that is, from the principle of  inertia.33 Regius is far from denying natural causes; on the contrary, he characterizes nature as “the internal and corporeal principle” of  action and passion.34 The naturalistic character of  his project becomes more and more evident in the two revised editions of  the work under the title Philosophia naturalis. In 1654, the previous doctrine of  motion is complemented with a doctrine of  the impetus of  motion, characterized as a force existing in the body and making it move.35 Accordingly, both conservation and transfer no longer concern motion. As is made fully clear in 1661, it is the impetus of  motion that never begins or ends but is simply transferred from one body to another.36 Before Leibniz then,37 Regius reformulates the conservation of  the quantity of  motion as conservation of  the quantity of  33  This “general law of  nature” is formulated in Regius, Fundamenta physices, p. 1; the conservation principle is derived at p. 7. Friedrich Steinle, “From Principles to Regularities: Tracing ‘Laws of  Nature’ in Early Modern France and England”, in Natural Law and Laws of  Nature in Early Modern Europe: Jurisprudence, Theology, Moral and Natural Philosophy, edited by Lorraine Daston and Michael Stolleis, Farnham, Ashgate, 2008, pp. 215–232, incorrectly identifies the lex immutabilitatis naturae with the conservation principle of  matter (p. 217); in fact, the conservation principle of  matter and the conservation principle of  motion are both derived from the lex immutabilitatis naturae. 34   “Natura est internum corporeumque agendi, patiendi, et cessandi principium” (Regius, Fundamenta physices, p. 1). 35  Regius, Philosophia naturalis. Editio secunda, Amstelodami, Elzevir, 1654, p. 11: “Motus verò est corporis de loco in locum, sive ex viciniâ quorundam corporum, in aliorum viciniam, per impressum et inhaerentem impetum, translatio. Per impressum et inhaerentem impetum intelligo vim in corpore, quod movetur, existentem, quâ illud, quamdiu haec vis in ipso existit, de loco in locum transfertur”. 36  Regius, Philosophia naturalis; in qua tota rerum universitas, per clara et facilia Principia, explanatur, Amstelaedami, Elzevir, 1661, p.  14: “Ut materia universi, à Deo creata, in eo statu, in quo est, ex lege immutabilitatis naturae, perpetuò manet; ita motûs impetus, in creatione, nobis in Sacris revelata, variis materiae universae partibus certa quantitate inditus, perseverat, ex eadem lege, in eodem quantitatis gradu. […] Ex his patet, nullum novum unquam motûs impetum gigni; nec ullum etiam perire: sed motûs impetum de uno corpore in aliud tantùm transire”. In the 1654 edition, by contrast, the subject of  the latter sentences is still motion: “Ex his patet, nullum novum unquam, ratione istius impetûs, gigni motum; nec ullum etiam perire: sed motum de uno corpore in aliud tantùm transire” (p. 12). 37 Cf.  Leibniz, “Brevis demonstratio erroris memorabilis Cartesii”, Acta Eruditorum, March 1686, pp.  161–163. I  cannot exclude the possibility that

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motive force. The dynamic entity that he calls impetus is further described as an “accident” that “can migrate from subject to subject”,38 which roughly corresponds to the position criticized by La Forge. Indeed, Regius has come to conceive of  the motive force as a real entity existing in bodies – a cause of  motion distinct from God and remaining constant because of  the immutability of  nature. In 1654, rest is explained as the effect of  an “inherent brake”, a force that exists in the body and keeps it in its place,39 and by 1661 even the change-of-direction account of  voluntary motions is rephrased accordingly. In the updated version, what the mind cannot produce is a new impetus of  motion.40 The reason why La Forge might have felt concerned about Regius’s attempt to interpret the conservation principle as establishing a sort of  dynamic autonomy of  nature is not difficult to understand. If  interpreted along Regius’s lines, the Cartesian principle would contradict the occasionalist rejection of  natural efficient causes. Thus, La Forge concentrates on showing that Descartes never meant anything of  the kind. In  addition to the mandatory reference to Principia philosophiae, Part 2, art. 36, he quotes the famous letter to Henry More of  August 1649, where Descartes explains that “The power causing motion [vis movens] may be the power of  God himself  preserving the same amount of  transfer in matter as he put in it in the first moment of  creation, or it may be the power of  a created substance, like our mind, or

Regius’s reformulation had some connection with Huygens’s simultaneous work on collision, which later inspired Leibniz’s correction of  the conservation principle (cf.  Garber, “Leibniz: Physics and Philosophy”, in The Cambridge Companion to Leibniz, edited by Nicholas Jolley, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995, pp. 270–352, p. 279). 38  Regius, Philosophia naturalis, ed. 1654, p. 13. 39  “[Q uies] est corporis, per inhaerens sufflamen, in eodem loco permansio. Per inhaerens sufflamen intelligo vim in corpore existentem, quâ illud in eodem loco, vel magis, vel minùs, retinetur” (Regius, Philosophia naturalis, ed. 1654, p. 42). 40  Regius, Philosophia naturalis, ed. 1661, p. 486 (“in motu voluntario […] nullum novum excitari motus impetum”). Cf. Philosophia naturalis, ed. 1654, p. 412 (“nullum novum excitari motum”).

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of  any other such thing to which he gave the power to move a body”.41

This passage is often cited as evidence that Descartes was willing to ascribe motive force even to some created substances, such as our minds, and therefore that he was not an occasionalist with respect to mind-body action.42 It is noteworthy that La Forge, after citing the passage, provides a slightly paraphrasing translation that distorts its meaning on a crucial point: “Mais la force qui meut peut estre considerée ou comme apartenant à Dieu, ‘lequel conserve dans les parties de la matiere autant de transport ou de mouvement qu’il y en a mis en la creant (Sçavoir, en continuant de les mouvoir avec une égale force), ou comme apartenant à une substance creée, par exemple, à nostre Ame, ou à telle autre chose que ce puisse estre, à qui Dieu a donné la force de mouvoir le Corps (non pas en produisant un nouveau mouvement dans l’Univers; mais en determinant seulement la premiere cause à exercer sa force sur un tel sujet) […]’ ”.43

41  Descartes, Œuvres, V, pp.  403–404; The Philosophical Writings of  Descartes. Volume  III: The Correspondence, translated by John Cottingham et al., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 381. 42  See, e.g., Garber, “Descartes’ Physics”, in The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, edited by John Cottingham, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 286–334, p. 321; Garber, “Descartes and Occasionalism”, in Causation in Early Modern Philosophy: Cartesianism, Occasionalism, and Preestablished Harmony, edited by Steven Nadler, University Park (PA): Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993, pp. 9–26, p. 17; and Michael Della Rocca, “ ‘If  a Body Meet a Body’: Descartes on Body-Body Causation”, in New Essays on the Rationalists, edited by Rocco J. Gennaro and Charles Huenemann, New York-Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp.  48–81, p.  61. However, the issue is open to debate: “Just what such passages amount to is unclear” (Kenneth Clatterbaugh, The Causation Debate in Modern Philosophy 1637–1739, New York-London, Routledge, 1999, p. 36). In my view, Descartes’s ambiguity on this point is indirectly confirmed by the opposed post-Cartesian interpretations that we are considering. 43  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, pp. 243–244. The position of  the quotation marks in the original (‘…’) suggests that La Forge did not mean the whole passage to be a literal translation. In spite of  this evidence, Clarke’s translation of  La Forge’s Traité simply reproduces Descartes’s text, thereby suppressing not only La Forge’s tacit interpolations but also his express additions (signalled by italics and parentheses): see Louis De La Forge, Treatise on the Human Mind (1664), translated by Desmond M. Clarke, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 1997, p. 149.

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Whereas Descartes writes that the motive force can belong either to God or to a created substance, La Forge translates this as force can be considered as belonging either to God or to a created substance. Furthermore, where Descartes mentions the “moving force” given by God to the created substance, La Force specifies that this power is not capable of  producing new motion in the world but only of  (occasionalistically) determining the application of  God’s force.44 I take this passage to show that La Forge is not committed to real, unrestricted mind-tobody causation. By contrast, his main concern is to secure the principle that the exercise of  motive force is the privilege of  God alone. Somewhat paradoxically, La Forge’s account of  mind-tobody causation is in itself  not different from Regius’s view. Both deny that the soul has any moving force or power of  initiating a new causal chain of  motions, both argue that such a possibility would infringe a conservation principle, and both admit some restricted mind-to-body causation to the effect that the mind has the force or power of  directing the animal spirits: “ l’Ame n’a aucun pouvoir de mouvoir les membres du Corps que par son entremise [i.e., of  the gland], en déterminant le mouvement de la glande et le cours des esprits animaux vers le costé des ventricules du cerveau par où ils doivent sortir pour descendre dans la partie qu’elle veut mouvoir. […] l’Ame n’a pas la puissance d’augmenter ny de diminuer le mouvement des Esprits qui sortent de la glande, mais seulement de les determiner, c’est à dire, de les fléchir vers le costé où il est necessaire qu’ils aillent pour executer sa Volonté”.45

In  the eyes of  the early occasionalists or quasi-occasionalists, the change-of-direction account introduced by Regius has the merit of  depriving the soul of  any moving force, which is 44  La Forge’s reading of  the passage might have influenced its later reception by Wolff, who rejects the interactionist interpretation and maintains that by vis movens Descartes means “non vim productivam, sed exigitivam”, that is, an occasional cause: Christian Wolff, Psychologia rationalis methodo scientifica pertractata, Francofurti et Lipsiae, Renger, 1734, § 597 n. 45  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, pp. 245–246.

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why they confidently adopt it. The problems begin when force, after being removed from the soul, is ascribed to bodies and nature, as with Regius, instead of  to God, as it should be done according to La Forge. As detailed above, Regius’s late work made available not only the change-of-direction account of  voluntary motions but also a “naturalistic” interpretation of  all motions (included the voluntary ones) as actually caused by a physical force. As concerns the directing force ascribed to the soul, La Forge offers in fact only two arguments for his account. The first is the argument from the first conservation principle.46 The second is a counterfactual argument 47 which is reminiscent of  Clauberg’s a posteriori argument from recalcitrant or unresponsive bodies: “[…] si la Volonté avoit le pouvoir d’augmenter ou de diminuer le mouvement des esprits animaux selon son gré, nous ne serions pas soûmis comme nous sommes à une infinité d’accidens ausquels nous sommes sujets; car par exemple, nous pourions veiller et dormir quand bon nous sembleroit, et nous délivrer par ce moyen d’une infinité de fâcheuses maladies”.48

However, what both arguments conclude is only that the mind does not have the power of  moving the body; by no means do they support the positive claim that the mind has the power of  directing some motions. Moreover, the second argument could even inspire an analogous argument concluding that the mind has no power at all over its body, even a directing one. In fact, Cordemoy provides an argument of  just this kind, thus recasting the change-of-direction account into a full-fledged occasionalist framework.

46  “Cela paroist clairement en ce que nous avons desia dit que Dieu conservoit la mesme quantité de mouvement qu’il a mis dans la Nature, sans l’augmenter ny diminuer” (La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 246). 47  By “counterfactual argument” I  mean an argument whose crucial step consists in deriving the consequences of  a hypothetical state of  affairs. 48  La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 246.

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5. Cordemoy’s All-doing God In  the fourth of  his Discours sur la distinction et l’union du corps et de l’âme, Cordemoy advances four arguments against the erroneous belief  that the human will can be a real cause of  motion and thus make the body move. Two of  them – the second and fourth – are especially relevant to our concern. The second argument suggests that Cordemoy has some (direct or indirect) acquaintance with the anti-interactionist strategy adopted by Clauberg in both works cited above. Indeed, Cordemoy’s second argument merges the standard argument from the first conservation principle with Clauberg’s argument from order and for the conservation of  motion. If  our will could set bodies in motion, the total amount of  motion would change, but since the actual order of  nature can only result from the given amount of  motion, any such dynamical change would derange that order: “Secondement, si nous pouvions à nôtre gré faire de nouveaux mouvemens, il s’ensuivroit que le mouvement pourroit croître en la nature, et qu’ainsi, l’ordre en seroit troublé. Car, s’il n’a fallu de mouvement, que jusqu’à un certain point, pour établir cet ordre; il n’en faut justement que la même quantité, pour le conserver”.49

Thus, the conservation principle is not deduced from God’s immutability, but from the world’s stability. The fourth argument, on the other hand, shares the core of  both Clauberg’s and La Forge’s arguments from recalcitrant or unresponsive bodies. If  our will could move the animal spirits, it could also make them move faster or slower, but some ordinary experiences show that the motion of  the animal spirits is causally independent from our will. Cordemoy, like La Forge, cites our lack of  voluntary control over wakefulness and sleep as examples of  such experiences. He further observes that old people cannot walk as fast as they wish and that drunk people cannot walk in a straight line, try as they might. Other patho49  Gerauld de Cordemoy, Œuvres philosophiques, edited by Pierre Clair and François Girbal, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1968, pp. 140–141.

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logical phenomena afflicting our brain also testify to the utter ineffectiveness of  our will. Contrary to Clauberg and La Forge, however, Cordemoy uses this argument to deny not only that our will changes the speed of  the animal spirits, but also that it can change their direction: “Enfin, tous ces mouvemens convulsifs, et ces transports subits et mortels, qui nous assaillent le cerveau, marquent bien que nôtre volonté ne donne pas le mouvement à ces particules (que leur subtilité fait nommer les esprits) et même qu’elle n’est pas la maitresse de leur route; puisque dans ces occasions, elle ne les peut empêcher de courir, où leur impetuosité les emporte”.50

“Elle n’est pas la maitresse de leur route”: the will does not even direct the spirits. One could object, however, that this inability only concerns the specific pathological states under consideration, as though the mind had temporarily lost control of  its body. In fact, the same holds generally for the entire fourth argument. The empirical evidence provided so far only shows that in some specific situations our body fails to perform the voluntary motions intended by the mind. That is why Cordemoy points to a most ordinary fact in order to argue for the generality of  his claim. He observes that the motion of  the heart is not subject to the will; since the motions of  the animal spirits follow from the motion of  the heart, he concludes that there is no need for the soul to move animal spirits. This is consistent with his general claim that the parts and fluids of  the body are already in motion before any voluntary motion is performed. A voluntary motion is not a new chain of  motions, but merely the continuation of  an existing chain in a new, voluntary direction. Is this new direction given by the will? Not in the usual sense: “Il est bien vray, qu’étant déjà émûës, lors qu’elles passent dans le cerveau, quelques-unes d’elles peuvent être dirigées selon ses souhaits; c’est-à-dire, que si-tôt qu’elle desire que   Cordemoy, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 141.

50

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le corps, auquel elle est unie, se porte vers un côté, la puissance, qui meut toutes ces particules, les meut d’une façon répondante à ce desir”.51

Although no additional argument is provided to make this further point, Cordemoy’s position is clear: the power of  directing the animal spirits must be removed from the soul and ascribed to God. Moreover, it appears that God’s “occasioned” intervention in the world is reduced precisely to such changes of  direction. In the case of  voluntary motions, as in the case of  body-body collisions, God intervenes to impart a new determination to some bodies: “Donc, s’il reste quelque lieu de dire que l’ame meuve le corps; c’est au même sens, qu’on peut dire qu’un corps meut un corps. Car, comme on dit qu’un corps en meut un autre, lors qu’à cause de leur rencontre, il arrive, que ce qui mouvoit le premier, vient à mouvoir le second; on peut dire, qu’une ame meut un corps, lors qu’à cause qu’elle le souhaite, il arrive que ce qui mouvoit déja ce corps, vient à le mouvoir du côté vers lequel cette ame veut qu’il soit mû”.52

In its full-blown occasionalist version, the change-of-direction account allows for a uniform treatment of  both mind-to-body action and body-body collisions. All that happens in the world are changes of  direction, and God is their unique efficient cause. Whereas according to Clauberg’s and La Forge’s interactionist versions God is left with no role to play in voluntary motions, in Cordemoy’s occasionalist version God accomplishes everything even in voluntary motions, which solves the problem of  explaining how the immaterial mind could change the direction of  material entities such as the animal spirits or the pineal gland. Thus, my first conclusion is that the endorsement by any given author of  either the interactionist or the occasionalist version of  the change-of-direction account can be taken as an indi-

  Cordemoy, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 142.   Cordemoy, Œuvres philosophiques, p. 142.

51 52

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cator of  the real extent of  her commitment to occasionalism. Clauberg’s and La Forge’s pronouncements on mind-to-body causation appear so puzzling precisely because of  the residual interactionism that characterizes their versions of  the changeof-direction account, although it does not prevent them from being occasionalist enough to deny that the human mind can ever act as a cause of  motion. On the other hand, if  Cordemoy appears more uncompromisingly committed to occasionalism, it is because he devolves to God even the task of  directing motions.53

6. Causally Open vs. Causally Closed Systems The change-of-direction account also appears crucial for comparing the (post-)Cartesian and Leibnizian worlds. As is well known, Leibniz pointed out that the account of  voluntary motions in terms of  changes of  direction introduces an anomaly into the physical world, for any such change would violate a further conservation principle, stating that “matter also conserves the same total direction” 54 (referred to as the second conservation principle). According to Dan Garber, the deepest difference between pre-established harmony and occasionalism lies precisely in their outlook on physical laws: “For the occasionalist, just as for the direct interactionist, every voluntary action would seem to violate some law of  nature. Not so for Leibniz’s pre-established harmony”.55 In Leibniz’s world, physical laws hold universally, whereas Descartes and the occa53  Malebranche’s position is more difficult to assess. In the fifteenth Éclaircissement, he of  course maintains that only God and not our soul can determine the motion of  the animal spirits (cf. Nicolas Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, tome III, Paris, Vrin, 1976, pp. 225–228). However, he is reticent on the issue of  conservation, perhaps also because of  his well-known controversy with Leibniz on the measure of  force. In the Entretiens, VII, § 11, he writes that God “ne change à la rencontre des corps la direction de leur mouvement que le moins qu’il est possible, et je croy qu’il ne change jamais la quantité de la force mouvante qui anime la matiere” (Œuvres complètes, tome XII, Paris, Vrin, 1991, p. 162 n.); but the passage disappears from the third edition (1696). 54  Leibniz, Monadology, §  80, in Philosophical Papers and Letters, translated by Leroy E. Loemker, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 19892, p. 651. 55  Garber, “Mind, Body and the Laws of  Nature”, p. 110.

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sionalists are willing to countenance exceptions in order to account for the behaviour of  animate bodies. However, the fact that some early occasionalists developed the change-of-direction account precisely by arguing from the first conservation principle shows that they did not in fact want voluntary motions to elude the universal laws of  nature. Leibniz’s attack against occasionalism in the name of  his second conservation principle is devastating precisely because its presupposition is shared by the occasionalists themselves: the presupposition that physical laws must hold for the entire physical world, including animate bodies. Leibniz’s move consists simply in using against the “Cartesians” an updated version of  the same argument that they invented against interactionism. Garber is right, nevertheless, in maintaining that Leibniz’s refutation of  the change-of-direction account is revealing of  a radical divide between the Cartesian-occasionalist and the Leibnizian worlds. This boundary between the two, however, is not precisely where Garber situates it. In  my view, it does not concern the physical laws, but the more fundamental principle described below. Challenging the interpretation of  Garber and others, McLaughlin has argued that Leibniz was substantially correct in ascribing the change-of-direction account to Descartes. This reading is based on the assumption that Descartes no less than Leibniz was committed to the principle of  the causal closure of  the physical world.56 According to McLaughlin, the first conservation principle already provides a statement of  causal closure, and Leibniz’s second conservation principle merely places an additional constraint on the Cartesian closed world.57 The problem with this reading is that the change-of-direction account, in both its interactionist and occasionalist versions, 56 Cf.  Peter McLaughlin, “Descartes on Mind-Body Interaction and the Conservation of  Motion”, Philosophical Review, CII (1993), pp. 155–182, pp. 158–159. 57  Cf. McLaughlin, “Descartes on Mind-Body Interaction”, p. 164: “Leibniz […] added a second system conservation law for the vector quantity now called momentum, so that the causal closure of  the world came to be determined by two laws […]. This puts additional constraints on causal closure and prohibits Descartes’s solution”.

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is definitely inconsistent with causal closure, even before the discovery of  the conservation of  the vector of  motion. If  changes in the direction of  motion are “causally relevant”, as even McLaughlin must admit,58 then it seems that no immaterial entity could bring about such changes without violating the causal closure of  the physical. Moreover, Leibniz himself  never suggested that Descartes was seriously concerned about causal closure. Of  course, Leibniz says that Descartes introduced his conservation principle as a “general and exception-free law”,59 but he also describes Descartes as willing to make part of  human bodily behaviour depend on the soul.60 This latter point implies that Leibniz did not take Descartes’s conservation principle as a statement of  causal closure. On the contrary, Leibniz openly blamed Descartes and the Cartesians for not respecting the fundamental law that a body can change its motion only if  impelled by another moving body. This law expresses a genuine, albeit very strict, principle of  causal closure – the principle that physical changes can only be the effects of physical causes – whereas the first conserva­tion principle does not. It is precisely this law that, according to Leibniz, both interactionism and occasionalism must inevitably infringe, in spite of  their respect for the first conservation principle: “Ce Systeme [de l’Harmonie préétablie] a encore cet avantage, de conserver dans toute sa rigueur et generalité ce

58  Cartesian changes in the direction of  motion are “dynamically neutral” insofar as they require no additional force; nevertheless, they are “of  course causally relevant” (McLaughlin, “Descartes on Mind-Body Interaction”, p. 160). In spite of  this admission, McLaughlin maintains that the principle of  causal closure rules out changes of  direction by non-material entities only by virtue of  the second conservation principle, that is, only if  the total direction of  motion must remain constant (p. 164). 59  Leibniz to Simon Foucher, 14 April 1687: “Mons. Des Cartes pose pour loy generale et sans exception que Dieu conserve tousjours dans la nature la même quantité de mouvement” (Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, II, 2, p. 160). The universality of  this law is soon stated again: “[…] et par consequent cela se peut dire absolument de tous les corps de l’univers” (ibid.). 60 Cf.  Leibniz, Théodicée, §  60, in Philosophische Schriften, VI, p.  135: “M. Descartes a voulu capituler et faire dependre de l’ame une partie de l’action du corps”.

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grand principe de la physique, que jamais un corps ne reçoit un changement dans son mouvement, que par un autre corps en mouvement, qui le pousse. Corpus non moveri nisi impulsum a corpore contiguo et moto. Cette Loy a esté violée jusqu’icy par tous ceux qui ont admis des Ames ou d’autres principes immateriels, y compris même tous les Cartesiens”.61

Leibniz saw his second conservation principle as a confirmation on empirical grounds of  the general physicalist principle, for if  not even the overall direction in the physical system can change, then absolutely no extra-physical causation can take place. Thus, he praises pre-established harmony as the first and only dualistic system that is consistent with causal closure, for it makes even voluntary motions result from purely mechanical causal chains, which are contrived by God in such a way that animate bodies perform the very actions that their conscious minds want them to perform, without any extra-physical causation. This is where Leibniz most radically parts ways with Cartesianism and occasionalism. On a par with the materialist world,62 the Leibnizian physical world is causally closed. By contrast, the Cartesian-occasionalist world remains to some extent open to causation from without.

7. Dynamic Occasionalism Retrospectively, the history of  the change-of-direction account appears as the gradual emergence of  causal closure, finally 61  Leibniz, Considérations sur les principes de vie, in Philosophische Schriften, VI, p. 541. 62 Leibniz claims that this principle has been respected only by “[l]es Democritiens, Hobbes et quelques autres materialistes tout purs, qui ont rejetté toute substance immaterielle” (Considérations sur les principes de vie, p. 541). In a later draft of  this article, the principle is described as an “axiome ancien”: “Axiome, que tous les Philosophes qui ne sont pas entierement Materialistes, jusqu’à moy, avoient abandonné en quelques rencontres, savoir par rapport à leur[s] substances immaterielles, ce qui rendoit ces substances suspectes” (p.  552). On this point of  agreement between pre-established harmony and materialism see Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, “La chaîne des causes naturelles. Matérialisme et fatalisme chez Leibniz, Wolff  et leurs adversaires”, Dix-Huitième Siècle, XLVI (2014), pp. 381–398.

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achieved by Leibniz’s refutation of  the account itself. However, there is an instructive sequel to this story. By subscribing to the change-of-direction account, occasionalism becomes vulnerable to the objection taken from the second conservation principle. This can partly explain the centrality ascribed to the change-of-direction account by Christian Wolff’s reconstruction of  occasionalism; stressing this weak point is an easy way to guarantee the victory of  pre-established harmony. A  further reason, however, should not be overlooked. What Wolff  offers in his discussion of  the system of  occasional causes is, in fact, a revised and radically domesticated version, which purges the system of  its intolerable error of  depriving finite substances of  any intrinsic force.63 In  Wolffian occasionalism, both souls and bodies have their own forces from which all their activity flows. God’s intervention serves only to preserve the parallelism between bodily and mental events by adjusting the chain of  motions according to the soul’s volitions and the chain of  mental representations according to the brain’s state. This intervention, however, does not produce new motions or representations, for God merely determines the substance’s own force – and as we know it, determination is the key concept of  the change-of-direction account, used by Wolff  to explain not only mind-to-body but also body-tomind causation: “I have already incidentally mentioned that we can very much improve Descartes’s system if  we ascribe to the soul a force that brings about all that happens in the soul itself  in a natural way, just as Descartes has already ascribed in fact to the body its own force, which brings about the motions in the body, insofar as he assumes that the animal spirits in the brain, which by flowing in the muscles make motion happen, are already in motion and that this motion is not produced just now by God. However, just as he assumes that only God determines the animal spirits and thus the force of  the body to flow in the appropriate muscles in order for 63 See Favaretti Camposampiero, “Rational Reconstruction and Hermeneutic Equity: Christian Wolff’s Interpretation of  Occasionalism”, in Christian Wolff  e l’ermeneutica del­l’Illuminismo, edited by Ferdinando Luigi Mar­co­lungo, Hildesheim, Olms, 2017, pp. 37–57.

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the motion to take place that executes the decision of  the soul, so one can only posit that God determines the soul’s force to produce just these and no other sensations: namely, the sensations that represent the beings outside the soul that produce changes in the sense organs”.64

What is left for God to do in Wolff’s “improved” occasionalism is merely to change the direction of  some bodily motions and the direction, as it were, of  some mental activities.65 Thus, I think that Wolff  put so much stress on the change-of-direction account because it made it possible to reconcile occasional causality with the ascription of  force and activity to created substances, which appeared to him as the best antidote to Spinozism.66 Let us recall La Forge’s worry about the possible consequences of  Descartes’s conservation principle, which could mislead some Cartesians (like Regius if  my hypothesis is correct) into thinking that motive force in fact belongs to nature, so that God is not the only causal agent. These later German developments show that La Forge’s fear was well-founded. The conservation principle, by imposing the change-of-direction account, eventually made those consequences real. In  Wolff’s parallelist version of  Cartesian occasionalism, God has lost his monopoly on causal agency and force, acting only as the regulator of  two clocks.

Abstract Leibniz ascribed to Descartes a version of  what is now termed the change-of-direction account of  voluntary motions, according to which the soul can only determine the body’s motions by changing their directions. In spite of  some recent discoveries, the history of  this doctrine remains largely unknown. Sections 1 through 5 reconstruct the development of  the change-of-direction account among early 64  Wolff, Anmerckungen über die vernünfftigen Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt, Franckfurt am Mayn, Andreä, 1724, § 276. 65  See the detailed account in Wolff, Psychologia rationalis, § 597–601. 66 Cf. Wolff, Anmerckungen, § 269; and Psychologia rationalis, § 605 n.

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Cartesians (Regius, Clerselier, Clauberg, La Forge, and Cordemoy) and conclude that the different versions of  this account advanced by these authors reveal their different degrees of  commitment to occasionalism. Section 6 discusses Garber’s and McLaughlin’s interpretations, concluding that the change-of-direction account prevents the occasionalist world from being causally closed – which indeed constitutes the major divide between occasionalism and Leibnizian harmonism. In section 7, Christian Wolff’s attempt to revise occasionalism by reinforcing the change-of-direction account suggests a reassessment of  its real import and implications. Keywords: Causation, Direction, Motion, Occasionalism, Pre-established Harmony.

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MALEBRANCHE RECONSIDERED

THOMAS M. LENNON

THE MOTIVATION OF  MALEBRANCHE’S OCCASIONALISM

When philosophers construct arguments for their views, they are not surprised by the conclusions they draw from their premises. Arguments serve primarily to get others to see what they already see. Arguments are the expository scaffolding that shows what depends on what, how things hang together. Some might look to arguments for justification in holding a view, but what dialectically motivates the view in the first place comes from elsewhere. My concern in this paper is the dialectical motivation for occasionalism. When Leibniz, for example, said that occasionalism was an ad hoc effort to solve the Cartesian mindbody problem, he had the same kind of  concern.1 David Hume took occasionalism to be a doctrine of  Cartesianism, not just typically but essentially. “Descartes”, he said, “insinuated that doctrine of  the universal and sole efficacy of  the Deity, without insisting on it. Malebranche and other Cartesians made it the foundation of  their philosophy”.2 But recently, Tad Schmaltz has proposed that, “as in the case of  Cartesianism itself, we must speak not of  a single Cartesian occasionalism, but 1  This once accepted view, that the occasionalist God was a deus ex machina, is now discredited. See, e.g., Nicholas Jolley, The Light of  the Soul: Theories of  Ideas in Leibniz, Malebranche, and Descartes, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990, p.  107. On the other hand, Leibniz’s quip to Arnauld that occasionalism invokes a miracle that is no less miraculous for being constant has a point to it. 2  David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sec. 7. Pt. 1, note; in David Hume, Essays and Treatises on Philosophical Subjects, edited by Lorne Falkenstein and Neil McArthur, Peterborough, Ontario, Broadview, 2013, p. 135.

Occasionalism. From Metaphysics to Science, ed. by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano, Turnhout, Brepols, 2018 (DESCARTES, 2), pp.  223–242    FHG   10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.114995

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rather of  various Cartesian occasionalisms”.3 The differences among them, we might say, are no less instructive than their family resemblances. The same might be said about their motivations; but here I shall be arguing only the more limited case, that Nicolas Malebranche had a dialectical motivation different from other Cartesian occasionalists.4 The motivation for their occasionalism lay with the implications of  the metaphysical doctrines of  substance and causation found mainly in Descartes’s Third Meditation and the First part of  his Principles. Such would be the earliest of  the Cartesian occasionalists such as Gerauld de Cordemoy, Louis de La Forge, and perhaps Clauberg and, later, Pierre-Sylvain Régis. They would be good illustrations, if  there are any, of  Leibniz’s claim that occasionalism was invented to secure the mind-body interaction, particularly the freedom of  the mind to move the body that is otherwise impossible given Cartesian dualism. Although Malebranche had a very different kind of  motivation from these Cartesians, there is an overlap among them with respect to the arguments they deployed. Malebranche, notably, is no less a Cartesian than any of  those mentioned, and so he is happy to appropriate arguments he found in La Forge, Cordemoy and Descartes himself. But he deployed them to a different purpose, for his foremost loyalty is to Augustine of  Hippo. Malebranche’s commitment to Augustine is fully evident right at the outset of  his Search After Truth. He cites Augustine for the view that, by contrast to the mind’s union with the body, its union with God is “natural, necessary, and absolutely indispensable”.5 “Through it, the mind receives its life, its light, 3  Tad Schmaltz, “Cartesian Occasionalisms: Clauberg and Arnauld”, American Philosophical Association Symposium, December 2014. 4  The difference in kinds of  motivation, it seems to me, reflects the doctrinal distinction drawn by Steven Nadler between occasional causation and occasionalism. Steven Nadler, “Descartes and Occasional Causation”, British Journal for the History of  Philosophy, II (1994), pp. 35–54; reprinted in his Occasionalism Among the Cartesians, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 28–47. 5  Nicolas Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité, Preface, in Œuvres complètes, edited by André Robinet, Paris, 1958–1984, tome I, p.  10; The Search After Truth, trans. Thomas  M. Lennon and Paul  J. Olscamp, Columbus, The Ohio State University Press, 1980, p. xxxiv.

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and its entire felicity”.6 This union, obviously, is one of  total dependence – for existence, for knowledge, for happiness of  every sort. This inter-connected sort of  dependence is found in the book’s central chapter, book four, part two, chapter six, in which Malebranche sets out his vision of  all things in God. The chapter concludes: “Let us hold this view, then, that God is the intelligible world or the place of  minds, as the material world is the place of  bodies; that from His power minds receive their modifications; that in His wisdom they find their ideas; that through His love they receive their orderly impulses, and because His power and love are but Himself, let us believe with Saint Paul, that He is not far from any of  us, and that in Him we live and move and have our being”.7

With this perspective, it will be plausible to see that his concern was not freedom or any other aspect of  the mind-body problem; rather it was the special version of  dependence called divine providence, which he perceived to be under threat from various quarters. In one way or the other, I want to argue, it is Providence that drives his dialectic of  his occasionalism. As we shall see, however, two prominent critics of  his occasionalism, Antoine Arnauld and François de La Mothe Fénelon, argued that it is precisely as a ground for Providence that Malebranche’s view fails, that it is precisely as a block to an incipient deism which denies Providence that his view comes up short. But in arguing the absence of  any logical connection of  support between occasionalism and Providence, they nonetheless evidence the motivational connection in Malebranche. Arnauld and Fénelon were disappointed and even dismayed at Malebranche’s perceived failure because they had a deep stake in Providence. But support for Providence is not necessary to an appreciation of  its connection to Providence. Without examining the case further, we can note in passing that Hume took 6  Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité, Preface, in Œuvres complètes, I, p. 9; Search After Truth, p. xxxiii. 7  Non longe est ab unoquoque nostrum, in ipso enim vivimus, movemus, & sumus. Acts 17: 28. Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité, III-2, 6, in Œuvres complètes, I, p. 447; Search After Truth, p. 235.

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over important arguments of  Malebranche against necessary connections between finite agents and their putative effects. But he did not proceed to Malebranche’s second premise that only God can stand in such connections, thus suggesting the slogan version of  his view that in this domain Hume is Malebranche without God.  Now, it is not by accident that Hume is no less famous for his subversion of  traditional views of  Providence; so in terms of  motivation, a more precise slogan might be that Hume is Malebranche without Providence. To begin, consider what the Augustinian Malebranche thought when he read, as he must have done, Descartes’s claim, by way of  explanation of  the actual world, that “by the operation of  the laws of  nature matter must successively assume all the forms of  which it is capable”.8 To be sure, the claim is made in the context of  a false assumption, viz. that, contrary to the Church’s doctrine, the world was not created more or less fully formed. However, the drift is unmistakably toward what might be variously described as Stoic necessitarianism, pantheism, Spinozism, or in short, incipient deism, already too evident elsewhere in Descartes. Probably, Malebranche silently turned the page, chagrined but determined to produce a different account.9 An appeal to occasionalism as a block against necessitarianism was not without precedent. In  the twelfth century, the Ashirite al-Ghazali had argued against the Mutazilite view, derived from Avicenna, that the world is eternal, necessary, and thus uncreated. The issue is complicated, but part of  his response was an appeal to occasionalism. One of  the complica8  René Descartes, Principles  III, 47, in Œuvres de Descartes, edited by Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, 12  vols, Paris, J.  Vrin/CNRS, 1964–1976, vol. VII, p. 103; The Philosophical Writings of  Descartes, translated by John Cottingham et al., 2 vols, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984, vol. II, p. 258. 9  Part of  the view of  the world as uncreated that was criticized by the occasionalist Ghazali is that if  a temporal body proceeds from an eternal being, it can do so only by the mediation of  an “everlasting rotary motion”, which resembles the eternal but also a temporal body in that “every conceivable part of  it comes into being after having not been” (al-Ghazali, Al-Ghazali’s Tahafut al-Falasifah, trans. Sabih Ahmad Kamali, Lahore, Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1963, p. 34). Of  this, more immediately below.

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tions relates to the theme of  my paper, namely the motivation for his view. In  particular, is his denial of  necessary connections among created things a premise or one of  his conclusions? Steven Nadler takes the denial to be prior to any theological application, with the result that Ghazali fits tightly into a trajectory through Malebranche to Hume, which denies necessary connections, but on philosophical, rather than theological grounds.10 Either way, there is a close connection here between Ghazali’s theological and philosophical views. One issue connected with both is the seventeenth of  his twenty Refutations, which demonstrates against the Mutazalites that there are no necessary connections in nature if  and only if  miracles are possible. The divine intervention in nature signaled by miracles is an indication of  Ghazali’s concern with Providence, evidenced by several other of  his Refutations as well.11 Like Ghazali, Malebranche makes room for Providence by a wholesale removal of  causal power from anything but the deity. God is the only cause of  all that happens, of  what happens according to general laws no less than the exceptions to them. Everything happens as a direct result of  God’s will. Occasionalism includes all of  grace and all of  Providence. Nor is this result entirely surprising. According to Andrew Platt, the view that divine concurrence itself  is a grace was a view held by Thomas Aquinas and others.12 Malebranche introduces his doctrine of occasionalism almost incidentally, in a chapter from the second half  of  book six of  the

10  Nadler, “No Necessary Connection: The Medieval Roots of  the Occasionalist Roots of  Hume”, The Monist, LXIX (1996), esp. pp. 455–458. 11  Refutation X asserts that God is a creator; XI–XIII that he has knowledge of  particulars; XIV–XV that motions of  the heavens show purpose. The Tahafut begins: “In the name of  God, the Compassionate, the Merciful”. The Metaphysics has an intriguing line: “[…] primus est volens, et est ei voluntas, et cura”, Algazel’s Metaphysics, trans. J. T. Muckle, Toronto, St. Michael’s College, 1933, p. 73. 12  Andrew Platt, “Defending a “Compatibilist” Reading of  Descartes on the Will”, American Philosophical Association Symposium, Philadelphia, December 2014. Malebranche divides grace into two sorts. One is the Creator’s grace, which involves features that God must bestow, e.g. illumination in the human soul. It would seem to qualify as grace only insofar as the act of  creation itself  is unconstrained. Thus the relevance of  Leibniz’z quip.

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Search After Truth.13 The motivation for the view that he himself  identifies is that it serves as a block against idolatry, which he thinks results from the failure to observe the general rule that we should reason only on the basis of  clear ideas. He thinks that the failure to observe the rule led the scholastics to hold that bodies have real causal qualities. A more dangerous error was the idolatry found in the ancient world, whose genesis, according to Malebranche was as follows. It is difficult not to love and fear things that are thought to act upon us, rewarding us with pleasure and punishing us with pain; but love and fear are true adoration, and so at least to some extent we adore such things. However, the realization that created things are only occasions for the operation of  the one true cause alters our attitude toward them. The Israelites in the desert would not have missed onions and leeks so much “had they not imagined themselves happy because of  their enjoyment of  them”; 14 drunkards would not love wine so much if  they knew that the real source of  their pleasure actually commands temperance in its use. We know, and Malebranche might have known, that the ancient Egyptians actually worshipped onions. But even granting the perennially central place of  onions in French cuisine, onion worship was not an issue in seventeenth-century France. Sensuality, however, i.e. the worship of  the body, was an issue, especially for Malebranche who was outraged that libertines should exploit what are really only occasionalist causes by indirectly requiring God to provide them with the pleasures He expressly forbade. However, as Arnauld argued, the subtlety of  an occasionalist denial of  real causal efficacy of  material things is not likely to have much practical effect. Occasionalism as a deterrent to sensualist idolatry seems far fetched. Some other motivation must be afoot.

13  On the other hand, he gives evidence of  his occasionalism earlier, when first considering the alternatives to his vision of  all things in God. He rejects the hypothesis that the soul produces its own ideas, on grounds that later support occasionalism. Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, I, p. 422 ff. See Marian­gela Priarolo, Visioni divine. La teoria della conoscenza di Malebranche tra Ago­ stino e Descartes, Pisa, Edizioni ETS, 2004, pp. 41–43. 14  Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, II, p. 312; Search After Truth, p. 447.

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The worry seems theological, at least. In  the same chapter, Malebranche appeals to another, deeper, and more familiar theme, when he argues that not just bodies but even the most noble minds lack true causal efficacy. “They can know nothing unless God enlightens them. They can sense nothing unless God modifies them. They are incapable of  willing anything unless God moves them toward good in general, i.e. toward Himself”.15

Moreover, we are dependent on God not just for enlightenment (the doctrine of  the vision of  all things in God) and causal effic cacy (the doctrine of  occasionalism), but for goodness. And this additional dependence is the significance of  the idolatry theme to which Malebranche returns near the end of  the chapter. “All these insignificant pagan divinities and all these particular causes of  the philosophers are merely chimeras that the wicked mind tries to establish in undermining worship of  the one true God in order to occupy the minds and hearts that the Creator has made only for Himself”.16

Needless to say, proper worship of  the one true cause is also in our interest, so the doctrine of  occasionalism is doubly connected to Providence. It is in the one true cause that our happiness consists, and knowledge of  the truth of  occasionalism motivates us to achieve that happiness. Our ultimate happiness consists in the satisfaction of  the will, the impulse we have toward good in general. This impulse is fully and permanently satisfied only by the Beatific Vision, that is, by salvation. So Malebranche’s conception of  Providence crucially involves his doctrine of  grace, which might have originally motivated his doctrine of  ideas and much else, perhaps the whole, of  the Search After Truth.17

  Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, II, p. 314; Search After Truth, p. 449.   Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, II, p. 318; Search After Truth, p. 451, slightly modified. 17  Malebranche, Réponse à la dissertation, 7, §  1, in Œuvres complètes, VII, p. 512; Réponse aux réflexions, II, 3, in Œuvres complètes, VIII, p. 723. 15 16

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Such was Malebranche’s thought in 1675.18 Later, the connection between occasionalism and Providence was made even clearer. By 1686, Providence had become a central issue in his protracted debate with Arnauld. In  the Second Letter of  that year, by way of  reply to Arnauld’s Réflexions philosophiques et théologiques, Malebranche provided an abregé of  his concept of  Providence. He begins with an application of  occasionalism: the secondary causes, both necessary and free, by which God governs the world have no efficacy of  their own, and contribute to Providence only through general laws, all of  whose possible consequences are known to God, for His Providence is not in the least blind or subject to chance.19 Two years later (1688), we have, in the Dialogues on metaphysics and on religion, the most extensive and best argued accounts both of  occasionalism and of  Providence as such. A  striking text in this regard is an effort at reconciling Providence with the existence of  monsters and other imperfections that appear in the world. The first premise of  this reconciliation is the occasionalism which had already been introduced earlier in the work. That there is a connection between it and Providence then becomes obvious in the sequel. The question for us is whether occasionalism was introduced primarily for this purpose, or whether its role with respect to Providence was a happy accident. In any case, the views set out had appeared, at least in seed and often fully developed, eight years earlier, in the Traité de la nature et de la grace. 18  The application of  occasionalism to the distribution of  grace is developed at length in Elucidation XV of  the Search, which appeared in the third edition, of  1677–1678. Although Providence as such is not mentioned, all the elements for it are there. In the crescendo of  argument both for occasionalism, and for it as the only Christian philosophy, we find this: “It is an incontestable truth, a natural opinion, even a common notion that we should love the cause of  our pleasure, and should do so in proportion to the felicity that it does or can make us enjoy […]. Thus, following [occasionalism] we should love only God […]. [Occasionalism] teaches us, as does Scripture, that it is God who provides the rain and regulates the seasons, who gives to our bodies their food and fills our hearts with joy, that only He does us good, and that He never ceases to witness thereby what He is, although in past ages He suffered all nations to walk in their own ways” (Éclaircissements, XV, in Œuvres complètes, III, p. 245; Search After Truth, p. 681. Acts 14: 15–16). 19  Malebranche, Réponse aux réflexions, II, 3, in Œuvres complètes, VIII, pp. 716–717.

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In  this Treatise on Nature and Grace (1680), Malebranche takes it as Scripturally given both that God wills all men to be saved, and that not all men are saved. Malebranche’s explanation of  the discrepancy is that God’s power is such that He could save everyone, but God’s wisdom dictates that He save only by appropriate means. According to Malebranche, only the simplest means would be appropriate. If  God acted with particular volitions, suited to the needs of  everyone individually, all would be saved, but in a way unworthy of  His wisdom. As he often says in one fashion or other, God loves His own uncreated wisdom more than He does corrupted creatures, for he loves nothing with a blind love. Thus it is not Paul as such whom He saves or Peter as such whom He damns, but both as part of  the best system to achieve His ends. God saves all whom He is able to save in this, the best of  all possible worlds.20 A doctrine of  particular Providence enters his discussion only rarely and with a certain discomfort, and we can see why. The doctrine seems liable to the following reductio ad absurdum: it relies on particular volitions, which would entail, contrary to fact, either arbitrary divine volitions or the salvation of  everyone.21 Providence in the first instance can only be general. When in discussing miracles in the strict sense, which involve particular volitions, his discomfort is palpable. Grace is gratuitous not as the effect of  an “indifferent or bizarre” volition on God’s part, but as determined by the relation between “wisdom and fecundity”, i.e. by the appropriate means to His specific purpose in creating, which is the establishment of  His Church, yielding the salvation of  the saints. Such grace seems gratuitous only in that it is not determined by our merits (which in his view would be Pelagianism 22). Yet it is not a “hard” doctrine (la predestination n’a rien de dur); nor is it a cause for despair, for God showers grace on us beyond our needs, and those who fail to be saved are those who fail to avoid 20  That is, the best world in relation to God’s ends, as opposed to Leibniz’s absolutely best possible world. 21  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grace, Éclaircissement  III, § 25–26, in Œuvres complètes, V, pp. 186–187. 22  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grace, Éclaircissement  III, § 26, in Œuvres complètes, V, pp. 190–191.

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resisting it.23 (The tortured syntax, found also in Malebranche, reflects the tortured effort to have it both that the damned are excluded from election and yet that they are responsible for their damnation.) God’s general purpose in creating is His glory, which involves, but is not identical to, the salvation of  the chosen. Nor is their salvation simply the sum of  those individuals. Each is a part of  a transcendent structure – the Church, which is “the mystical body of  Christ”.24 It is through this entity, with Christ as its head, that grace is distributed. Christ both merits the grace as a real cause, and distributes it as an occasional cause. This dual role reflects Christ’s dual nature as both divine and human, which places certain qualifications on what is achieved in relation to what could be achieved if  God acted directly as such, independently of  the structure of  the Church. Malebranche acknowledges that his account of  how this system of  occasional causes in Christ actually works might lack a certain clarity, and presents it only as a (more or less) likely story. What is important to him is the occasionalist schema itself. One might think of  it as follows. As collisions occasion the distribution of  motion in bodies, so Christ’s volitions occasion the distribution of  grace in souls. The systems of  both natural and moral causes are each comprised of  a set of  laws based on divine wisdom. Each places the event in time, making it a part of  history. If  God acted directly, with a general will but without occasional causes, creation would static in every respect. Materially, there would be no motion and no differentiation of  bodies. Spiritually, there would be no applicable concept of  Providence, apart from the act of  creation itself. Even miracles are structured by occasionalism. Providence, says Malebranche, is a matter of  divine decrees or volitions. He draws the traditional distinction between ordinary or general Providence, and particular Providence. General Providence is evidenced in general laws, which depend on a general volition of 

23  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grace, Éclaircissement  III, § 26, in Œuvres complètes, V, p. 187. 24  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grace, II, §  15, in Œuvres complètes, V, p. 74.

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God that is constrained by His attributes and by His purpose in creating. Most instances of  what we take to be miracles are really only surprising events that occur according to a general system of  occasional causes that are not obvious to us, such as the volitions of  angels.25 Miracles properly speaking are exceptions to the general laws. Malebranche’s notion of  a miracle is that with a slight exception to the general laws, the same purpose served by the general laws would be better served. We can never be sure that they are miracles in this sense, and they are, as a mater of  fact, very rare. They occur when “the immutable Order of  justice that God owes Himself  and His attributes demands or permits that He act sometimes by particular volitions”.26 There is a big difference between saying that miracles are demanded and that they are permitted. Indeed, the whole debate with Arnauld, certainly that part of  it concerned with Providence, turns on just this distinction. On this, more below. Meanwhile, here, the suggestion is that God has an option that might or might not be exercised, indifferently, in the way that He has an option in creating in the first place. As Malebranche puts it, in bringing about miracles, “God acts sometimes one way, sometimes another”.27 But this cannot be correct, because creation for him is the only instance of  such divine indifference. The whole drift of  Malebranche’s thought is that, although for somewhat different reasons, miracles are no less necessary than what occurs according to natural laws. They all result from the same calculus of  divine attributes combined with God’s purpose in creating. The circumstance of  the exception and its consequences are foreseen from all eternity no less than the general laws and their consequences. He does say that these exceptional circumstances “should not be called occasional causes in the same sense that the collision of  bodies is of  the communication of  motion, because God does not enact general laws for the uniform regulation of  the efficacy of  His volitions by the

25  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grace, I, § 20 ff., in Œuvres complètes, V, p. 34 ff. 26  Malebranche, Réponse aux réflexions, II, 3, in Œuvres complètes, VIII, pp. 716–717. 27  Ibid.

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occurrence of  these circumstances”.28 But this is not to say that the exceptional circumstances are not occasional causes in some other sense. A miracle is a singularity resulting from a volition governing only it; so, because it is not an instance at all, what occasions that particular volition is not an instance as collision is an instance of  what occasions the communication of  motion. (He makes the same point when he says that if  God acted only by particular volitions there would be no miracles.29) Rarity is thus a necessary feature of  miracles; but it is not its defining characteristic. (Recall again Leibniz’s quip about occasionalism being no less miraculous for being constant.) Malebranche is clear that whether rare or common, an effect is miraculous if  God does not produce it as a result of  His general laws. So, rather than infrequency, unpredictability by us would be the defining characteristic of  a miracle. We just do not know what the occasions are for the exercise of  a particular volition, because they involve the divine calculus in a way beyond our ken. This is why Malebranche insists so often that in the end Providence is incomprehensible. This must be what Malebranche has in mind when he says that there cannot be a general law involved because in these exceptions, “God acts sometimes one way, sometimes another”. He cannot mean that God acts randomly, because God always acts according to His attributes, i.e. because of  who He is.30 In any case, the key premise of  occasionalism, that only God is a true cause, is no less operative with 28  Malebranche, Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, VIII, § 3, in Œuvres complètes, XII, pp. 177–178. 29  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grace, I, § 59, in Œuvres complètes, V, p. 63. 30  This line of  interpretation seems confirmed by what he says later, in the Dialogues, where he repeats the claim that the circumstances of  a miracle are not occasional causes in the same sense that collisions are for the communication of  motion. For in these cases, God acts “sometimes in one way, sometimes in another”, depending on which one of  his attributes is, “as it were, most valuable to Him at that moment” (Malebranche, Entretiens, VIII, § 3, in Œuvres complètes, XII, p.  178; trans. David Scott, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1997, p. 131). There is no way we could know what that balance is, as we can sometimes know that with respect to natural communication of  motion, economy of  means is always operative. Note, too, that in ruminating on the divine attributes, Malebranche’s spokesman is immediately led here to the Pauline text, “In him we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28).

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respect to miracles. Because of  divine causation, miracles are no less (but no more) providential than natural events. Malebranche’s occasionalism had many critics. Having digested Malebranche’s distasteful theory of  ideas, Arnauld found his Traité de la nature et de la grace even less appetizing. In fact, he thought that it “undermined everything, as far as I can judge, that has always been believed by the true religion”.31 Malebranche led Arnauld to believe that it can only be as a general cause, with a general volition, that God acts as the only real cause in response to the appropriate occasional cause. And so, Arnauld, to defend Providence, which he thinks involves particular volitions on God’s part, attacks Malebranche’s form of  occasionalism. But there is no reason a priori why God could not act as the only real cause with a particular volition every time He acts. Interestingly, Moreau very deliberately leaves open the question whether Arnauld himself  attributes real causal efficacy to secondary causes,32 which is to say that on the issue of  principal concern here, there might in fact be agreement between the disputants. Whatever might be said about the real causal efficacy of  secondary causes, however, Arnauld argued that construing God as the only real cause does not secure Providence as Malebranche thinks it does. As he aphoristically puts it, “it is not enough that God should act; He must act as God [en Dieu]”.33 That God should be the only agent is not enough for a true idea of  Providence; in addition, we must know “that He does nothing, especially in human affairs, except as the sovereign Moderator, having in all that He does ends worthy of  Him, of  His goodness, of  His mercy, and His justice”.34 So far, there is not much to distinguish the disputants except, perhaps, in their emphasis on different divine attributes.

31   Antoine Arnauld, Œuvres, Paris-Lausanne, 1775–1783, vol. XXXIX, p.  545. For an insightful account of  the whole debate between Arnauld and Malebranche, especially on the topic under discussion here, see Denis Moreau, Deux cartésiens: La polémique Arnauld-Malebranche, Paris, J. Vrin, 1999, pt. 4. 32  Moreau, Deux cartésiens, pp. 235–236, esp. p. 235, n. 2. 33  Arnauld, Réflexions sur la nature et la grace, I, 13, in Œuvres, XXXIX, p. 279. 34  Ibid.

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Arnauld immediately gives an analogy, however, that is stunningly revelatory of  what he takes to be Malebranche’s dialectical motivation. He thinks that Malebranche in his adoption of  occasionalism is like an Epicurean who seeks to “diminish the impiety” of  his doctrine by saying that the atoms do not move by themselves but only by the motion that God continuously gives them, “not with the particular aim of  doing this or that”, however, but only a motion that leaves it to the collisions among them to form what they may. (Might the Epicurean be the Cartesian heretic Cordemoy? we might ask.) Such a scenario, according to Arnauld, is not Providence, even though God is its general cause, because He does not choose one formation rather than another. In fact, chance (le hazard) plays a role no less real than God’s in whatever eventuates. In  this, and in other respects,35 Malebranche is an Epicurean malgré lui. The chance that Arnauld ascribes to Malebranche’s system is not the inexplicable clinamen, the primordial swerve in the downward course of  the atoms through the void, which has no cause and which as such is the ultimate source both of  the formation of  successive universes and of  human freewill. Arnauld and Malebranche are in agreement that the universe does have a cause, namely God and, in any case, that human freedom is not of  this libertarian sort. Instead, the chance that Arnauld has in mind has to do with the intersection of independent chains of  causation. To take his example, thirty men board a vessel that is soon shipwrecked. The men board the vessel freely; the storm occurs according to a general volition, which is to say, according to causal laws and without any miracle. The coincidence may be foreseen by God, but, according to Arnauld, it is thereby no less fortuitous. “For according to you, [Malebranche,] it is not because it is foreseen that the shipwreck occurs, but because it must occur that it is foreseen”.36 Since neither the storm, nor the boarding, nor their conjunction occurs by a particular voli-

35  Arnauld also viewed Malebranche as advancing materialism (intelligible extension in God makes Him material) and hedonism (there is only one kind of  pleasure and only it motivates us or makes us happy). 36  Arnauld, Réflexions I, 13, in Œuvres, XXXIX, p. 291.

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tion, the deaths of  the thirty occur by chance, even with regard to God – “even though Christian ears can hardly stand to hear a proposition so contrary to the most common sentiments of  all religion”.37 Arnauld has a different notion of  Providence.38 Providence is “not just an act of  the understanding, but of  the will”; because foreknowledge by itself  is not Providence. Even events occurring “by chance or blind fate” could be foreknown, but they need not, in fact cannot be, providential. Nor is it enough that God should do something for it to be providential, for sometimes he only permits things such as sins. What is important is that He have a purpose, a good purpose, e.g. Paul’s survival of  a shipwreck because he has further work to do, viz, the establishment of  the Church in Rome. The picture that Arnauld invites is that of  a God who responds ad  hoc to unpredictable contingent events, as we all do. In a couple of  dozen irresistible pages, Moreau engages in the kind of  dialectical motivation that interests us here, suggesting that it is precisely the picture of  God that separates Malebranche and Arnauld.39 Arnauld’s God is one who speaks to Moses from the burning bush, who so loves the world that he sends his only begotten son for our salvation, who is addressed as “our father”, a God who, in short, is a personal God. According to Moreau, Arnauld acknowledges that Malebranche would not say anything to the contrary; 40 but he insists nonetheless that the Oratorian produced a system that leads to a very different picture of  God, the picture found among eighteenth-century deists, who eliminated the very Providence that Malebranche’s occasionalism was intended to secure. Theirs is a picture of  a God who creates the world, but who as far as we are concerned has no care for it. That the world should be run by impersonal laws was an aspect of  Malebranche’s system that could be taken over wholesale by such readers of  Malebranche as Voltaire,   Ibid.   Arnauld, Réflexions, I, 13, in Œuvres, XXXIX, p. 280. 39  Moreau, Deux cartésiens, pp. 239–262. 40  So, as Moreau points out (Deux cartésiens, p. 236, and passim), Arnauld rejected Malebranche’s motive for advancing occasionalism, that is was a block against idolatry, as pious nonsense. 37 38

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Diderot, and others.41 God comes to be seen as operating only mechanically, as the maker of  the Laplacian world that runs like a clock, with no difference whether it runs forward or backward, whereas it makes all the difference in the world, at least in the Providential world of  a Jansenist, whether Christ comes before or after Adam.42 The fact that this cosmology came to pass in the Enlightenment, that Arnauld’s fear was in fact realized, is a strong argument for accepting Moreau’s interpretive suggestion. Whatever its unintended consequences, Malebranche’s occasionalist account of  Providence is a form of  theological determinism. As he puts it in the Dialogues, “our salvation is assured in the chain of  causes, whether free or necessary”.43 With Fénelon, a superficially similar, but fundamentally very different account is to be found. Fénelon is no less a would-be Augustinian than is Malebranche. His long-held ambition, never realized however, was to write an Augustinus that, among other things, would correct the mistakes that he perceived in the Augustinus of  Jansenius. In addition, like Malebranche, he sought to give a Cartesian version of  Augustine at the same time that he gave an Augustinian version of  Descartes.44 Meanwhile, it should be noted that Fénelon criticized Malebranche’s occasionalist account of  Providence on grounds similar to those cited by Arnauld.45 This is not to say, however, that Fénelon accepts Arnauld’s Jansenist account of  Providence. On the contrary, he thinks that the Jansenists share with Malebranche the same fundamental mistake of  treating Providence 41 See Ferdinand Alq uié, Le cartésianisme de Malebranche, Paris, J. Vrin, 1974, pp. 309–311. 42  Thus what Moreau describes as the “fury” in Arnauld’s treatment of  Malebranche, evidencing a “cold determination, a rage applied in an effort at meticulous destruction” (Moreau, Deux cartésiens, p. 239). 43   Malebranche, Entretiens, XI, §  5, in Œuvres complètes, XII, p.  257; transl. Scott, p.  199. By a “free cause” Malebranche means a volition, which itself  is caused, not an uncaused cause of  the Molinist sort. 44 See Gouhier’s account; Henri Gouhier, Fénelon: Philosophe, Paris, J. Vrin, 1977, esp. pp. 19–32. 45 Fénelon claims, incredibly, not to have read Arnauld on this topic. Fénelon, Œuvres, ed. Jacques Le Brun, Paris, Gallimard, 1983, vol. II, p. 333; see also p. 388.

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as a causal question, a mistake which upsets not only divine freedom, but human freedom as well. Laurence Devillairs describes Fénelon as “second-hand version of  Malebranche” (Malebranchisme d’occasion). To make this identification, she focuses on what the Search After Truth shares with Descartes’s Third Meditation, namely, the philosophical centrality of  God as an infinite being.46 Her view is, as the title of  her book has it, that Fénelon advances a philosophy of  the infinite. Like both Descartes and Malebranche, Fénelon establishes the priority of  the perception of  the infinite over that of  the finite. There is much to be said for her thesis. Consider the following. After some rumination about being, reality, universality and particularity, Fénelon concludes: “It is in God’s light that I see all that can be seen”. How so? “I know nothing, I  distinguish nothing, I  am certain of  nothing except through my ideas”. In the knowledge even of  individuals, in which God is not the immediate object of  my thought, I depend on God making what I perceive intelligible and my intelligence actual. He summarizes and clarifies his position in provocatively Malebranchian terms: “Thus I see God in everything, or, more precisely, it is in God that I see all things”.47 It is in God that I see all things. Moreover, in a footnote, Devillairs notes that “Fénelon seems to borrow elements of  the doctrine of  occasionalism […]. What depends on God for its being depends on Him for its modifications. Thus God is the real and immediate cause of  all the configurations, combinations, and motions of  all the bodies in the universe”.48

As we shall see, however, Fénelon’s occasionalism is only partial, limited to the account of  change in material things. 46  Descartes, Œuvres, VII, pp.  45–46; The Philosophical Writings of  Descartes, II, p. 31. Malebranche, Recherche de la vérité, III-2, 6, in Œuvres complètes, I, p. 441; Search After Truth, p. 232. On the other hand, Devilllairs comments that the only systematic relation Fénelon assumed with Malebranche was one of  rejection. Laurence Devillairs, Fénelon: Une philosophie de l’infini, Paris, Editions du Cerf, 2007, p. 48. 47  Fénelon, Démonstration, in Œuvres, II, p. 641. 48  Fénelon, Démonstration, in Œuvres, II, pp. 570–571. Devillairs, Fénelon, p. 50 n. 3.

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But overall, it is difficult to classify Fénelon as a Malebranchean, and in the end Devillairs does not do so. For the fact of  the matter is that Fénelon’s first major philosophical work was a Réfutation de Malebranche, published posthumously, and written at the behest of  Bossuet, when, before the explosion of  the Q uietist affair, he and Monsieur de Meaux still enjoyed a friendly relationship. Bossuet was astonished by such views as that of  Christ as the occasional cause of  the distribution of  grace. (Later, when Malebranche sided against the Q uietists, Bossuet’s opinion of  him improved.) Like Arnauld, Fénelon in the Réfutation worries about incipient deism, based on what he takes to be a faulty conception of  Providence; again like Arnauld, he thinks Providence is very different from general laws dependent on general volitions; instead, it depends on particular volitions. “The philosophers who have denied Providence have never denied that God has established general rules for the course of  nature, but they have believed that once the laws have been established, God regarded all the rest with indifference, letting everything go its way without concerning Himself  about the particular effects that issuing from this assemblage of  causes”.49

This is a clear statement of  not only the perceived threat of  incipient deism, but also of  why Fénelon thinks that Malebranche in trying to avoid it ended by succumbing to it. Fénelon had two major objections against Malebranche, each reflecting the misgivings of  Bossuet. One, which occupies 32 of  the Réfutation’s 37 chapters, attacks Malebranche’s conception of  order as requiring God to create in only one way if  He creates at all. Such a conception, according to Fénelon, would destroy the idea of  possibility and with it God’s freedom. The divine perfections cited by Malebranche to show that there is only one world that God can create would also show, according to Fénelon, that it is impossible for Him not to create at all. Existence is no less a perfection than wisdom, for example; the upshot is a kind of  ontological argument for the existence of  the otherwise most perfect world. And if  the world must exist, then it always   Fénelon, Œuvres, II, p. 410.

49

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has existed, and there can be no creation, at least none in time. In short, though the word is not used by Fénelon, Malebranche is a Spinozist.50 Part of  this implicit charge of  Spinozism is that Malebranche upsets central doctrines of  the Church because of  his elimination, or at least circumscription, of  particular volitions. Prayer, for example, becomes useless as a petition, since all benefit that might thereby be obtained is already contained in the order of  nature.51 Even granting the divinity of  Christ, the redemptive significance of  the Incarnation is lost if  it is conceived as a necessary feature of  this world.52 Most importantly here, Providence has no place in this Spinozist conception of  order. Moreover, the conception of  God found in Malebranche’s occasionalism negates human freedom no less than divine freedom. The causal order of  which human volitions are a part dictate precisely them no less than it does creation itself. The critiques of  Arnauld and Fénelon came from very different perspectives, the one a Jansenist, the other a Molinist; but they raised essentially the same sort of  objection to Malebranche’s occasionalism. Malebranche may or may not have been able to respond to them. Whether he has a response is irrelevant to this paper, for two reasons. First, it is not to occasionalism as such that these two critics object, but only to Malebranche’s version of  it. Second, the whole discussion itself  corroborates the paper’s main point, which is that Malebranche’s concern in proposing occasionalism was, no less than that of  his critics, with Providence. 50  The elimination of  possibility as tantamount to Spinozism was a concern of  those who, like Fénelon, emphasized divine freedom and power, to the point of  adhering, as Desgabets and Régis did, to Descartes’s doctrine of  created truth. Later, Fénelon explicitly attacks Spinozism as such, in the Démonstration de l’existence de Dieu, first published at the end of  1712 (Fénelon, Œuvres, II, pp.  623–631); by then, however, Malebranche was no longer intended as the principal proponent of  the views he was attacking. For more on Fenelon’s critique of  Malebranche on this point, see Jean-Christophe Bardout, who convincingly arrives at a similar conclusion: “Malebranche et les mondes impossibles”, Revue philosophique, CXL (2015), pp. 485–490. 51   Fénelon, Réfutation, ch. 15, in Œuvres, II, p. 392. 52  Fénelon, Réfutation, ch. 20 and ff. Among other inconveniences, according to Fénelon, Adam’s sin becomes necessary to the divine essence. Ibid. ch. 23.

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Abstract Q uite aside from the arguments designed to justify occasionalism, why would anyone want to hold such a view, or even take it seriously? For purposes here, the dialectical motivations for occasionalism might be seen as of  two, overlapping sorts. First, the metaphysical motivations found especially among the earlier Cartesians: Cordemoy, La Forge, perhaps Clauberg and, later, Régis and others moved by issues in Descartes’s metaphysics. Second are the motivations of  later thinkers who were moved primarily by theological issues. The thesis of  the paper is that theologically motivated occasionalism is driven by a concern with Providence, specifically with the threat to it posed by incipient deism. The most obvious instance of  this sort of  motivation is Malebranche. Grosso modo, Providence for him just is occasionalism. Keywords: Malebranche, Providence, Fenelon, Deism, Miracles.

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DENIS MOREAU

EXTENSIONS DU DOMAINE DE L’OCCASIONALISME : LES MIRACLES DE L’ANCIEN TESTAMENT ET LA DISTRIBUTION DE LA GRÂCE DANS LE TRAITÉ DE LA NATURE ET DE LA GRÂCE DE MALEBRANCHE

La réflexion qui suit est consacrée à un auteur dont la théorie occasionaliste est dans l’ensemble bien connue et étudiée, à un tel point qu’il représente, pour la postérité, le prototype même du penseur occasionaliste  à l’âge classique  : Nicolas Malebranche. Je n’entends pas donner un nouvel exposé général de la théorie de la causalité de l’oratorien et je n’ai pas de thèses à proprement parler originales à proposer sur ce sujet. Je souhaiterais en revanche étudier deux lieux où Malebranche déploie sa vision occasionaliste de la réalité et que les nombreux travaux et recherches consacrés depuis une vingtaine d’années à l’occasionalisme ont dans l’ensemble moins abordés que les questions désormais canoniques des relations causales de corps à corps, de corps à âme ou d’âme à corps : il s’agit d’une part du thème de la distribution de la grâce, tel qu’il est abordé par Malebranche dans les deux premiers discours du Traité de la nature et de la grâce, paru en 1680, puis fréquemment réédité et augmenté (la septième et dernière édition date de 1712) ; et d’autre part du thème des miracles, que Malebranche intègre explicitement à sa vision occasionaliste du monde dans le quatrième et dernier éclaircissement ajouté à ce Traité lors de sa quatrième édition en 1684. L’examen de ces deux champs où Malebranche déploie sa conception occasionaliste du monde de façon quelque peu dépaysante pour les modernes que nous sommes permettra de préciser certains traits et enjeux de l’occasionalisme malebranchiste, y compris dans les domaines où il a été académiquement plus étudié. Occasionalism. From Metaphysics to Science, ed. by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano, Turnhout, Brepols, 2018 (DESCARTES, 2), pp.  243–267    FHG   10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.114996

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Je procéderai en quatre temps. Je commencerai par rappeler très rapidement les grands principes qui innervent et justifient l’occasionalisme en général tel qu’il est compris par Malebranche, ainsi que ce qu’il est convenu d’appeler les trois premières lois de l’occasionalisme. J’examinerai dans un second temps ce que le IVe Éclaircissement du Traité de la nature et de la grâce dit des anges comme causes occasionnelles des miracles rapportés dans l’Ancien Testament. J’étudierai ensuite comment, toujours dans le Traité de la nature et de la grâce, le Christ est présenté comme cause occasionnelle de la distribution de la grâce. Je proposerai enfin quelques réflexions et conclusions générales auxquelles conduit l’étude de ces deux derniers thèmes.

1. Généralités Ce qui spécifie l’occasionalisme malebranchiste n’est pas vraiment le fait qu’il soit une théorie de la causalité. C’est, d’une part, qu’il constitue une théorie globale de la causalité c’est-àdire que, dans notre monde, toutes les relations de causalité efficace repérables soient de type occasionnel ; et, d’autre part, que cette théorie est appuyée sur une substructure métaphysique originale innervée par principes rigoureux, que voici pour rappel (je synthétise ici les éléments essentiels du Premier Discours du Traité de la nature et de la grâce). 1) Le premier principe, qui est comme la charte fondamentale de l’occasionalisme généralisé de Malebranche, stipule que Dieu seul est cause efficace. Ce principe est par exemple dégagé et établi de façon détaillée et multiforme dans le xve Éclaircissement de la Recherche de la vérité. 2) Le second principe est celui qu’on a pris l’habitude d’appeler (à strictement parler, le syntagme ne se trouve pas à ma connaissance sous la plume de Malebranche) «  principe de la simplicité des voies  ». La Sagesse de Dieu lui prescrit en effet d’agir par des « volontés générales », c’est-à-dire, si l’on considère la façon concrète dont ces volontés organisent notre monde, par les lois les plus simples possibles. Le Dieu malebranchiste combine donc, de façon complexe, d’une part la simplicité des 244

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voies ou des lois qu’il met en œuvre, et d’autre part la perfection du monde que ces volontés et lois produisent. 3) Le troisième principe est celui qui permet d’articuler sur le plan causal l’un et le multiple, ou bien si l’on préfère d’une part la cause « générale » et « véritable », Dieu, et d’autre part les « causes particulières » et « naturelles » 1. Ce principe stipule que «  Dieu ne communique sa puissance aux créatures, et ne les unit entre elles, que parce qu’il établit leurs modalités causes occasionnelles des effets qu’il produit luimême ; causes occasionnelles, dis-je, qui déterminent l’efficace de ses volontés en conséquence des lois générales qu’il s’est prescrit, pour faire porter à sa conduite le caractère de ses attributs » 2. 4) Enfin, la détermination concrète de la nature des lois de l’occasionalisme ainsi entendu s’opère par la conjugaison de deux mouvements. En premier lieu, un mouvement déductif, a  priori, qui prend pour point de départ la notion que nous avons de Dieu, notre «  idée vaste et immense de l’Être infiniment parfait » 3. Ce mouvement aboutit à la position de ce qu’on pourrait appeler la forme légale de la structure générale du monde, à l’affirmation du fait que ce dernier est organisé par des lois simples. En second lieu, un ensemble de constats, opérés a posteriori, qui permettent de remplir la forme-loi de la loi avec le donné empirique, expérientiel, dont nous disposons sur la nature des causes occasionnelles, sur les types de connexions causales à l’œuvre, bref, sur le contenu des lois qui organisent notre monde. Voici donc, pour achever ce rappel, les trois « premières » lois de l’occasionalisme. On peut parler de «  premières  » lois par commodité et parce que c’est dans cet ordre que Malebranche 1  Nicolas Malebranche, Méditations chrétiennes et métaphysiques, V, §  14, dans Œuvres complètes, dir. André Robinet, 21 volumes, Paris, Vrin, 1958–1970, tome X, p. 53. 2  Malebranche, Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, VII, § 10, dans Œuvres complètes, XII, pp. 160–161. 3  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grâce, I, § 11, dans Œuvres complètes, V, p. 26.

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les présente dans le remarquable exposé synthétique des lois de l’occasionalisme qu’on trouve à l’article 9 du treizième des Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, que ce tableau abrège et qui fournira son fil conducteur à la présente réflexion. Mais il faudra revenir sur la question du sens de cet ordre de présentation des lois de l’occasionalisme. Les lois de l’occasionalisme malebranchiste (Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, XIII, §  9, dans Œuvres complètes, XII, p. 319 : « Voici, Ariste, les lois générales selon lesquelles Dieu règle le cours ordinaire de sa providence ») Lois de l’occasionalisme

Domaine de la réalité

Causes occasionnelles

Élément constaté a posteriori constituant le contenu de la loi formellement déduite

1. Lois générales des communications des mouvements

Corps

Chocs des corps

Expérience (physique expérimentale)

2. Lois de l’union de l’âme et du corps

Homme

Modifications de l’âme et du corps

Expérience psycho-physique (par ex volonté, sensation)

3. Lois de l’union de l’esprit avec la Raison Universelle

Esprit (connaissance)

Attention

Vie intellectuelle (expérience de l’idéation consécutive à l’effort d’attention)

Les deux premiers groupes de lois sont, à des degrés et sous des formes divers, présents chez la plupart des théoriciens de l’occasionalisme. La troisième est plus original. C’est lui qui spécifie les modalités d’effectuation de ce que la tradition a retenu sous la spectaculaire dénomination (elle aussi non malebranchiste, stricto sensu), de « vision en Dieu » : en l’occurrence, à l’occasion de cet effort, de cette tension intellectuels qui s’appelle «  attention  ». Si l’on considère la nature des substances mises en rapport par cette troisième loi de l’occasionalisme, on n’est pas, bien sûr, dans le cadre d’un rapport de corps à corps. On n’est pas non plus – même si 246

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Malebranche a pu écrire de belles pages sur les répercussions somatiques de l’effort d’attention – dans le cadre d’une relation de corps à esprit ou d’esprit à corps. On est avant tout dans le cadre d’une relation d’esprit à esprit, c’est-à-dire entre l’esprit divin et l’esprit humain dont l’attention est la cause occasionnelle de la production, par Dieu, du phénomène d’idéation. Cette relation causale occasionnelle de type esprit-esprit mérite d’attirer, si je puis dire, l’attention, dans la mesure où elle a été quelque peu négligée dans le renouveau contemporain des études sur l’occasionalisme, qui se sont surtout focalisées sur les cas des relations corps-corps et esprit-corps.

2. Occasionalisme et angélologie : sur le Q uatrième Éclaircissement du Traité de la nature et de la grâce Une des conséquences marquantes du thème de la simplicité des voies et des volontés générales divines est la tendance malebranchiste à essayer de diminuer le nombre de miracles entendus, stricto sensu, comme des dérogations aux lois générales organisant la nature, c’est à dire les résultats de ce que Malebranche appelle des «  volontés particulières  » divines. Sans pour autant nier qu’il puisse exister, dans quelques rares circonstances, de véritable miracles, Malebranche met ainsi en œuvre, au grand dam d’Arnauld et de Bossuet 4, différentes tactiques de réduction, c’est-à-dire de réinscription dans un cadre légal et général, des événements qui peuvent de prime abord nous apparaître comme miraculeux 5. On peut considérer que Sainte-Beuve, dans son Port-Royal (VI, ch. 5), n’a pas fondamentalement tort lorsqu’il affirme, de façon quelque peu 4  Du premier voir par exemple Lettre à Du Vaucel du 24–08-1685, dans Antoine Arnauld, Œuvres, 43 tomes, Paris et Lausanne, 1775–1783, tome II, pp.  553–554  ; de Bossuet, voir Lettre au marquis d’Allemans du 21–05-1687 (donnée en Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, t. XVIII, pp. 443–448). 5  Outre les textes cités ci-dessous, voir notamment Méditations chrétiennes et métaphysiques, VII et VIII ; et Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, XII.

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brutale : « Malebranche essaie de rester chrétien avec le moins de miracles possible ». Le IVe Éclaircissement du Traité de la nature et de la grâce s’inscrit dans cette atmosphère générale de déflation marquée en matière de miracles, mais présente l’intérêt d’opérer ce mouvement déflationniste en contexte proprement occasionaliste. Malebranche avoue en effet que l’objection lui a été faite  : il semble y avoir dans l’Ancien Testament beaucoup trop de miracles pour un Dieu qui agit habituellement par volontés générales. «  Le dessein de l’Éclaircissement, c’est de répondre à cette objection. Pendant le temps de l’Ancien Testament les miracles étaient fort fréquents, puisque les biens temporels étaient proportionnés à l’obéissance que les Israélites rendaient à la loi. Or tous les miracles sont faits par des volontés particulières de Dieu. Donc Dieu agit souvent par des volontés particulières » 6.

Mais cette critique vient selon l’oratorien d’un malentendu sur le statut de l’occasionalisme et du principe de la simplicité des voies, que les objecteurs ont en l’occurrence conçus de manière réductrice, en en limitant le domaine d’application aux lois qui régissent le monde physique et sans comprendre qu’il s’agit d’une théorie d’extension universelle : « Je ne vois pas encore que cela [les miracles rapportés par l’Ancien Testament] combatte mes sentiments, si ce n’est qu’on veuille supposer que je ne reconnais point d’autres lois générales selon lesquelles Dieu exécute ses desseins que celles de la communication des mouvements » 7.

Si miraculeux que paraissent les événements dont il est ici question (par exemple, parmi les présumés miracles dont parle Malebranche dans ce IVe Éclaircissement, la donation de la manne aux hébreux, l’imprévisible défaite du roi Assy6  Malebranche, Réponse à la Dissertation, V, § 3, dans Œuvres complètes, VII, p. 503. 7  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grâce, IVe Ecl., dans Œuvres complètes, V, p. 197.

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rien Sennachérib face aux hébreux suite au fléau qui frappa son armée assiégeant Jérusalem, la peste que David attira sur les hébreux pour avoir voulu les dénombrer) 8, il faut donc penser – car la raison et les résultats philosophiques du malebranchisme l’exigent 9 – qu’ils sont, comme les autres événements, les effets de volontés générales divines déterminées par des causes occasionnelles. À  l’issue de ce premier moment qui constitue le mouvement déductif  a  priori de la pensée de Malebranche, il reste à déterminer quelles sont ces causes. On peut alors passer au deuxième moment, celui du constat a  posteriori, de la colligation d’expériences. L’Écriture joue ici le rôle tenu par l’expérience au sens standard lorsqu’il s’agit de déterminer le contenu des volontés-lois qui régissent le mode physique : elle nous apprend que Dieu agit souvent par le ministère des anges 10. Il faut à ce stade se garder de négliger le principe fondamental de l’occasionalisme, faute de quoi nous retomberions dans l’erreur spontanée de la philosophie commune, qui attribue aux créatures une efficace propre en oubliant que « Dieu exécute toujours, comme cause véritable, ce que les créatures font comme causes occasionnelles, auxquelles Dieu a communiqué sa puissance selon certaines lois générales  » 11. Cette précaution prise, on peut formuler les lois de l’occasionalisme que la sommation du déduit et du constaté a permis de construire. Il s’agit des : 8  Voir respectivement : Exode, 16 ; Rois II, 18, 13–19, 37 et Isaïe, 36–37 ; Samuel II, 24, 1–25 et Chroniques 1, 21, 1–25. 9  Sur le caractère impératif  de cette exigence, voir Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grâce, IVe Ecl., dans Œuvres complètes, V, p. 198 : « Je suis persuadé que la plupart des effets miraculeux de l’ancienne Loi se faisaient en conséquence de quelques lois générales, puisque que la cause générale ne doit point exécuter ses desseins par des volontés particulières ». 10 Voir Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grâce, IVe Ecl., dans Œuvres complètes, V, p. 200 : « Il y a dans l’Ancien Testament une infinité de passages qui prouvent clairement que les Anges avaient soin des Israélites  ; qu’ils récompensaient les observateurs de la Loi, et punissaient les autres  : il n’est pas nécessaire que je les rapporte ». 11  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grâce, IVe Ecl., dans Œuvres complètes, V, p. 201.

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«  lois générales qui donnent aux Anges bons et mauvais pouvoir sur les corps. […] C’est par l’efficace de ces lois que les anges ont gouverné le peuple Juif .[…] Les causes occasionnelles de ces lois sont leurs désirs pratiques » 12.

On peut encore améliorer la formulation de cette loi en regardant l’Écriture de plus près. On y voit que parmi les anges, l’archange Michel occupe une place privilégiée. On posera donc que : « Dieu a gouverné le peuple Juif  par des lois générales dont l’efficace était déterminée par l’action de saint Michel et de ses Anges » 13.

Ce qui, appliqué à la question qui a motivé ce développement, permet de conclure : « Les miracles de l’Ancien Testament ne sont que des suites des lois générales que Dieu s’est faites pour communiquer sa puissance à l’Archange Michel » 14. «  Dieu ne faisait la plupart de ces miracles que par l’action, c’est-à-dire selon les désirs de l’Ange que Dieu avait choisi pour conduire son peuple » 15.

L’objection initiale est ainsi résolue : Dieu n’a pas dérogé à l’exigence d’agir par volontés générales, tandis que les miracles de l’Ancien Testament sont préservés en tant qu’événements ayant réellement eu lieu, mais non pas en tant que miracles au sens strict du terme. On peut alors (en suivant toujours le texte d’Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, XIII, 9) ajouter une ligne au tableau récapitulatif  des lois de l’occasionalisme. Cet ajout marque l’entrée de l’Ancien Testament, ou de la première Alliance, dans l’orbite de la topique occasionaliste. 12   Malebranche, Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, XIII, § 9, dans Œuvres complètes, XII, pp. 319–320. 13  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grâce, IVe Ecl., dans Œuvres complètes, V, p. 205. 14  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grâce, IVe Ecl., dans Œuvres complètes, V, p. 203. 15  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grâce, IVe Ecl., dans Œuvres complètes, V, p. 20.

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Lois de l’occasionalisme

Domaine de la réalité

Causes occasionnelles

Élément constaté a posteriori constituant le contenu de la loi formellement déduite

1. Lois générales des communications des mouvements

Corps

Chocs des corps

Expérience (physique expérimentale)

2. Lois de l’union de l’âme et du corps

Homme

Modifications de l’âme et du corps

Expérience psycho-physique (par ex volonté, sensation)

3. Lois de l’union de l’esprit avec la Raison Universelle

Esprit Attention (Connaissance)

Vie intellectuelle (expérience de l’idéation consécutive à l’effort d’attention)

4. Lois qui donnent aux anges bons et mauvais pouvoir sur les corps

Événements corporels d’apparence miraculeuse de l’Ancien Testament

Textes de l’Ancien Testament

Désirs pratiques des anges (notamment Michel)

Si, du point de vue de l’histoire des idées, les anges, délaissés par Descartes 16, font ici un retour remarquable sur la scène philosophique, ces développements nous paraissent aujourd’hui quelque peu datés. Certains contemporains de Malebranche les considéraient déjà avec un étonnement goguenard. Pierre Nicole écrivait ainsi : « Ce qu’il [Malebranche] dit du choix de saint Michel […] est une chose fort plaisante, et qui peut attirer un grand ridicule. […] C’est comme s’il disait que Dieu a donné le peuple juif  à gouverner aux anges au rabais des miracles, et qu’ayant trouvé que saint Michel s’en acquitterait à un meilleur marché, il l’a préféré à tous les autres  » 17. Dans le numéro de mai 1684 des Nouvelles de la République des lettres (p. 50), Bayle 16  Nous pensons ici au texte de l’Entretien avec Burman, dans René Descartes, Œuvres, éd. Charles Adam et Paul Tannery, Paris, Vrin CNRS, 1964–1974, vol. V, p. 157, et à sa critique de l’angélologie thomiste. 17  Cité par Arnauld au début de ses Réflexions philosophiques et théologiques, dans Arnauld, Œuvres, XXXIX, p. 160.

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renchérissait : « Voilà l’hypothèse du monde la plus commode pour expliquer les effets les plus étranges ». Mais cette extension angélique est également révélatrice de certaines tendances fondamentales de l’occasionalisme malebranchisme qui, justement parce qu’elles s’investissent ici dans un domaine singulier, s’y donnent à voir de manière particulièrement frappante. 1) La matière angélique est évidemment surprenante, mais structurellement parlant, ce qui se passe dans le cadre de ces quatrièmes lois se laisse décrire comme un cas particulier, et spectaculaire, de relation entre d’une part un ou des esprits (les anges) et d’autre part des corps du monde sur lesquels ils interviennent (Malebranche précisant bien que ces « lois générales donnent aux anges bons et mauvais pouvoir sur les corps, substances inférieures à leur nature  »). Nous sommes ici face à un cas typique, et remarquablement pur dans la mesure où il n’est pas compliqué par les données phénoménologiques et affectives de la conscience que nous avons de nous-mêmes, du mind body problem (dans le sens esprit = > corps). En terrain occasionaliste et synchroniquement parlant, ces développements suggèrent ainsi la fécondité d’une opération analogue à celle mise en œuvre diachroniquement dans le domaine de la théorie de la connaissance par Desmond Connell et Emanuela Scribano 18  :  en partant du modèle angélique (modèle gnoséologique concernant Descartes et Malebranche pour Emanuela Scribano et Desmond Connell, modèle causal pour le point qui nous intéresse présentement), on dégage dans toute leur pureté les caractéristiques fondamentales – d’une opération cognitive d’après Emanuela Scribano ou Desmond Connell, d’une relation causale de l’esprit vers le corps, quelle qu’elle soit, dans le cas qui nous intéresse. 2) On prendra garde aux effets d’emboîtement, et donc de complexification, qui s’observent entre les différentes lois  : la puissance des anges ne porte peut-être que sur les corps, mais on peut supposer que ce faisant et par l’intermédiaire des lois 18 Voir Desmond Connell, The Vision in God; Malebranche’s Scolastic Sources, Louvain, Nauwelaerts, 1967  ; Emanuela Scribano, Angeli e beati. Modelli di conoscenza da Tommaso a Spinoza, Rome-Bari, Laterza, 2006.

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de l’union, elle atteint indirectement les esprits. Par exemple, quand, au Deuxième livre des Rois, 19–35, le fléau de Dieu («  l’ange du Seigneur  » dit le texte) décime le camp des assyriens qui assiégeaient Jérusalem, cela a évidemment des retentissements (la frayeur, le désespoir) sur l’état mental du roi Sennachérib et de ses troupes (dans le sens corps = > esprit) ; ces retentissements ont eux-mêmes des effets (décision de levée du siège que menaient les assyriens, fuite) dans le monde des corps (dans le sens corps = > esprit et corps = > corps) ; et ces changements dans le monde des corps engendrent eux-mêmes (dans le sens corps = > esprit) des phénomènes psychologiques joyeux chez les hébreux (soulagement, enthousiasme). Là encore, on observe de façon spécialement frappante et épurée, dans ce cas particulier, un état de fait valable pour l’ensemble des phénomènes traités par l’occasionalisme, et que les analyses séparées de chaque groupe de lois ont tendance à faire perdre de vue : chaque groupe de lois ne concerne pas de façon autonome, insulaire, compartimentée, une série de phénomènes sans rapport avec ceux qui sont pris en charge par d’autres groupes de lois. Mais il existe au contraire une très étroite intrication entre chaque groupe, par exemple, dans le cas qui vient d’être décrit, entre les premier, deuxième et quatrième. 3) Les anges causes occasionnelles tel que les présente Malebranche ont avant tout une fonction d’évitement des miracles, d’opérateurs de rigoureuse déflation dans ce domaine. Ils sont (ou pourrait-on dire « ne sont que », dans la mesure où il est vrai qu’on en reste à une angélologie purement fonctionnelle, et en tant que telle pauvre en contenu par rapport aux nombreuses questions abordées dans les grands traités d’angélologie médiévaux) des intégrateurs causaux dont la fonction est d’éviter (Malebranche écrit à plusieurs reprises « épargner ») 19 à Dieu des volontés particulières et de sauvegarder par là la simplicité des voies divines : on le voit de façon spécialement nette dans la manière dont l’oratorien explique les miracles de l’An19 Voir Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grâce, IVe Ecl., dans Œuvres complètes, V, p. 202 ; Réponses à Arnauld, dans Œuvres complètes, VII, p. 597 : « Toute la question se réduit à savoir si leur ministère [celui des anges] a pu épargner à Dieu des volontés particulières. Je le prétends, et Monsieur Arnauld le conteste ».

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cien Testament. Les anges, mais aussi, au nom des équivalences fonctionnelles entre les différents types de causes occasionnelles repérées par Malebranche, les corps et les esprits considérés en tant que causes occasionnelles, apparaissent donc comme une courroie de transmission démultipliant la généralité et la simplicité du vouloir divin en un faisceau causal qui lui permet de s’appliquer différentiellement à des événements dont la diversité et la multiplicité contredisent en apparence cette généralité et cette simplicité. Ainsi, ce texte du IVe Éclaircissement du Traité de la nature et de la grâce est peut-être celui où Malebranche, comme par anticipation, se donne le plus nettement les moyens conceptuels de répondre à une critique du type de celle que formule Leibniz, lorsqu’il voit dans l’occasionalisme une doctrine du miracle perpétuel 20. Tout au contraire, on comprend ici que l’occasionalisme malebranchiste constitue un dispositif  destiné à réduire autant que faire se peut les miracles, jusqu’à intégrer les événements d’apparence évidemment miraculeuse dans un système explicatif-causal on ne peut plus standardisé et universel.

3. La distribution de la grâce Il  s’agit à présent d’examiner les cinquièmes lois de l’occasionalisme, celles qui concernent la distribution de la grâce par Jésus-Christ. Le sujet est extrêmement complexe. Il  l’est contextuellement, puisqu’on est encore, lorsque Malebranche met au point sa doctrine en ce domaine, dans un horizon historico-idéologique où les querelles sur la grâce qui ont déchiré le Grand Siècle sont loin d’être éteintes. Il l’est aussi théologiquement, dans la mesure où, comme on l’a souvent remarqué, Malebranche avance à ce sujet des propositions sur les effets de l’ignorance ou de l’obscurité dans l’âme du Christ qui semblent audacieuses du point de vue catholique 21. 20  Voir par exemple Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Essais de théodicée, §  207 et sqq., dans Die philosophischen Schriften von G.  W.  Leibniz, éd. Carl Immanuel Gerhardt, Berlin, Weidemann, 1875–1890, vol. VI, p. 240 et sqq. ; et Réponse aux objections contre le système de l’harmonie préétablie, dans Die philosophischen Schriften, vol. IV, pp. 594–595. 21  Arnauld a largement critiqué cet aspect de la doctrine malebranchiste dans les parties II et III de ses Réflexions philosophiques et théologiques.

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Dans leur structure générale, ces cinquièmes lois de l’occasionalisme sont homologues aux quatre précédents groupes de lois – et qu’il y, ait, justement, homologie structurale entre la légalité de l’ordre de la nature et celle de l’ordre de la grâce, c’est là un fait remarquable, sur lequel je reviendrai en conclusion. Voici une restitution des grandes lignes du mouvement qui conduit à la position de ce cinquième groupe de lois. 1) Nous savons que Dieu veut le salut des hommes (cf. Première lettre à Timothée, 2, 4). Il leur accorde donc la grâce, et, comme toute action divine, cet octroi de la grâce s’opère par volontés générales et lois simples (c’est le moment déductif  a priori de la réflexion malebranchiste, présenté dans la seconde partie du Premier discours du Traité de la nature et de la grâce ; c’est là qu’on trouve notamment le célèbre parallèle entre la pluie dans le monde physique, comme phénomène météorologique, et la pluie de la grâce). 2) Il faut alors découvrir quelle est la cause « qui règle et qui détermine l’efficace de la cause générale, celle qu’on peut appeler seconde, particulière, occasionnelle  » 22. Malebranche propose à cette fin un raisonnement assez complexe 23 dont voici les principales étapes : Malebranche pose tout d’abord ce qu’on peut appeler un principe de convenance 24 occasionnelle, qui stipule qu’une cause occasionnelle doit entretenir un rapport signifiant avec la visée divine dans l’établissement du groupe de lois où cette cause intervient. « Pour peu que l’on consulte l’idée de l’ordre intelligible, ou que l’on considère l’ordre sensible qui paraît dans tous les ouvrages de Dieu, on découvre clairement que les causes occasionnelles qui déterminent l’efficace des lois générales et qui servent à les établir doivent nécessairement avoir rapport au dessein pour lequel Dieu établit ces lois. Par exemple, l’expérience fait voir que Dieu n’a point pris, et 22  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grâce, II, I, § 2, dans Œuvres complètes, V, p. 66. 23  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grâce, II, I, §  4–11, dans Œuvres complètes, V, pp. 68–71. 24  Au sens de la convenentia des scolastiques.

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la Raison convainc qu’il n’a pas dû prendre 25, le cours des planètes pour causes occasionnelles de l’union de notre âme avec notre corps. Il  ne doit pas vouloir que notre bras se remue de telle manière, ni que notre âme souffre le mal de dents, lorsque la lune sera jointe au soleil, si cette conjonction n’agit sur le corps. Le dessein de Dieu étant d’unir notre âme à notre corps, il ne peut donner à l’âme des sentiments de douleur, que lorsqu’il arrive dans le corps quelques changements qui lui sont contraires. Ainsi, il ne faut point chercher ailleurs que dans notre âme ou notre corps les causes occasionnelles de leur union » 26.

La conséquence de ce principe est (§ 5) que les causes occasionnelles de distribution de la grâce, qui concernent au plus haut point la vie de l’esprit, doivent être de nature spirituelle, c’est-àdire que « la cause occasionnelle de la grâce ne peut se rencontrer qu’en Jésus-Christ, ou en l’homme ». Or l’expérience nous apprend clairement que l’obtention de la grâce ne dépend pas de notre volonté, et donc que « nos désirs ne sont point les causes occasionnelles de la grâce » (§ 6). Donc : a) de manière résiduelle (§ 7 : « nous sommes donc réduits à dire que [il n’y a que Jésus-Christ] qui puisse fournir les occasions des lois générales, selon lesquelles la grâce est donnée aux hommes ») ; b) et en nous basant sur ce que « foi nous apprend » 27, c’està-dire sur la révélation dont on voit à nouveau qu’elle joue, 25  On notera comment, dans ce texte, Malebranche conjugue constamment les deux sources de la raison et de l’expérience. 26  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grâce, II, I, § 4, dans Œuvres complètes, V, p. 68. Au xviie siècle, les réfutations philosophiques de l’astrologie ne manquent pas (voir par exemple, dans un horizon idéologique proche de celui de Malebranche, Antoine Arnauld et Pierre Nicole, La logique ou l’art de penser, éd. Pierre Clair et François Girbal, Paris, Vrin, 21993, Discours I, p. 17). Mais il est intéressant de noter qu’on a ici une modulation spécifiquement occasionaliste de ce genre de réfutation. 27  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grâce, II, I, § 11, dans Œuvres complètes, V, p. 71 : « la foi nous apprend que Dieu a donné à son Fils une puissance absolue sur les hommes, en l’établissant chef  de son Église, et cela ne se peut concevoir, si les diverses volontés de Jésus-Christ ne sont suivies de leurs effets ».

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dans les choses ayant Dieu pour objet, le rôle de l’expérience dans les matières physiques et psycho-physiques, nous sommes conduits à conclure que « ce sont les désirs continuels de l’âme de Jésus […] que Dieu a établis causes occasionnelles de l’efficace des lois générales de la grâce » (§ 11). Ce sont là les cinquièmes lois de l’occasionalisme, celles qui marquent à présent l’entrée du Nouveau Testament, ou de la seconde Alliance, dans l’orbite de la topique occasionaliste. Le tableau récapitulatif  peut dorénavant être complété de sa cinquième ligne. Lois de l’occasionalisme

Domaine de la réalité

Causes occasionnelles

Élément constaté a posteriori constituant le contenu de la loi formellement déduite

1. Lois générales des communications des mouvements

Corps

Chocs des corps

Expérience (physique expérimentale)

2. Lois de l’union de l’âme et du corps

Homme

Modifications de l’âme et du corps

Expérience psycho-physique (par ex volonté, sensation)

3. Lois de l’union de l’esprit avec la Raison Universelle

Esprit (connaissance)

Attention

Vie intellectuelle (expérience de l’idéation consécutive à l’effort d’attention)

4. Lois qui donnent aux anges bons et mauvais pouvoir sur les corps

Événements corporels d’apparence miraculeuse de l’Ancien Testament

Désirs pratiques des anges (notamment Michel)

Textes de l’Ancien Testament

5. « Lois par lesquelles JésusChrist a reçu la souveraine puissance sur le ciel et sur la terre […] pour répandre dans les cœurs la grâce ».

Grâce

Désirs du Christ

Textes du Nouveau Testament

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Je proposerai quatre remarques avant d’en venir à des conclusions générales. a) Cette restitution du raisonnement qui conduit Malebranche à la position de ces cinquièmes lois montre bien comment s’entrelacent à différents niveaux, de façon complexe et particularisée, les deux sources (la déduction rationnelle, l’expérience sous ses diverses formes) dont la convergence fait la spécificité de la démarche malebranchiste lorsqu’elle se déploie en terrain occasionaliste. b) Cette restitution permet de mettre au jour des explications à portée générale, qui concernent aussi les autres lois de l’occasionalisme mais qui sont souvent moins explicitement dégagées dans les autres champs où l’oratorien a déterminé ces lois. C’est par exemple le cas de ce que j’ai appelé le «  principe de convenance occasionnelle  », qui vaut pour les cinq groupes de lois, mais qui n’est pas présent comme tel dans la majorité des réflexions et des exposés malebranchistes portant sur des relations causales phénoménologiquement plus immédiatement attestées, comme celles entre corps et corps ou entre corps et esprit. C’est pourquoi, outre l’aspect théologique de la question, il peut-être opportun, pour qui s’intéresse à l’occasionalisme malebranchiste en général, de se pencher sur ces cinquièmes lois  : leur caractère éminemment abstrait, extra-mondain, (désincarné, si l’on veut, même si l’expression n’est sans doute pas très heureuse dès lors que Jésus-Christ est concerné) rend plus aisément perceptibles les éléments systémiques qui les organisent. c) En terme de nature des substances en présence, on est ici, avec ces cinquièmes lois, dans le cas d’une relation d’esprit (du Christ) à esprit (humain). De ce point de vue le rapprochement se fait tout naturellement, ou tout surnaturellement, entre ces cinquièmes lois et les troisièmes  : théologiquement, comme le précise la suite du Second discours du Traité de la nature et de la grâce, ce rapprochement est celui entre grâce de lumière et grâce de sentiment, grâce du créateur et grâce de Jésus-Christ. d) Enfin, ce grand tableau synthétique de l’occasionalisme proposé en Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, 258

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XIII, § 9, ne mentionne de façon explicite et détaillée que ces cinq groupes de lois de l’occasionalisme. Cependant, Malebranche n’écarte pas totalement, dans un texte lapidaire et assez intrigant qui suit juste l’énoncé de ces cinq groupes de lois, qu’il puisse y en avoir d’autres et il indique qu’on pourrait, par analogie avec celles que nous connaissons, conjecturer ce que sont ces «  autres volontés, comme sont celles par lesquelles le feu de l’enfer a le pouvoir de tourmenter les démons, les eaux du baptême celui de nous purifier et autrefois les eaux très amères de la jalousie celui de punir l’infidélité des femmes 28, et ainsi des autres » Mais étant donné le matériel expérimental (au sens large  : expérimental et scripturaire) dont nous disposons, ces cinq groupes de lois sont les seuls que nous puissions caractériser avec précision.

4. Conclusions Je proposerai quatre remarques en guise de conclusion : 1) Le premier groupe de remarques porte sur les différentes façons de classer ces lois. Un  des intérêts de la récapitulation des lois de l’occasionalisme proposée en Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, XIII, est d’en offrir une vue synoptique et, par là, de rendre plus aisément pensables différentes façons de distinguer et combiner ces lois organisant les cinq plans de la réalité du monde selon Malebranche : plan matériel ; plan psycho-physique  ; plan psycho-intellectuel  ; plan angélique ; plan évangélique. Q uant à la distinction de ces groupes de lois, on a parfois dit que les trois premiers étaient ceux de l’ordre de la nature, les deux autres ceux de l’ordre de la grâce. Mais il faut manier cette première démarcation avec prudence : de prime abord, il n’est pas question de « grâce » dans l’ordre de la causalité angélique des quatrièmes lois ; et les troisièmes concernent non seulement les opérations d’idéation à l’œuvre dans le champ de la connaissance théorique par idée, mais aussi, explique la Seconde partie du Second Discours du Traité de la nature et de la grâce, ce que Malebranche appelle la grâce de   Pour cette allusion biblique, voir Nombres, 5, 23–28.

28

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lumière. Il convient donc – et c’est là une précaution qu’il faut généralement garder à l’esprit lorsqu’on lit Malebranche – de se garder des coupures hâtives et par trop tranchées entre nature et grâce, ou nature et surnature. À l’évidence, l’ordre de présentation de ces lois dans le texte des Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, XIII, n’est pas un ordre hiérarchique décroissant : ce n’est pas parce que les lois de la communication des mouvements sont présentées en premier qu’elles sont les plus importantes. C’est même plutôt l’inverse : dans la mesure où pour Malebranche, les esprits l’emportent sur les corps, la grâce sur la nature et la seconde Alliance biblique sur la première, on va bien plutôt, dans cet exposé, du moins important jusqu’à l’essentiel. L’ordre de présentation de ces lois dans le texte des Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion obéit plutôt à une contrainte d’ordre pédagogique identique à celle qui justifiait dès le chapitre 1 de la Recherche qu’on réfléchisse aux facultés de l’esprit humain (entendement et volonté) en les comparant aux configurations et mouvements dans le monde matériel : puisque nous sommes, depuis le péché originel, davantage captivés par les corps que par les esprits, il est gnoséologiquement bienvenu de nous introduire au domaine des seconds par analogie avec ce que se passe dans celui des premiers. Mais comme toujours chez Malebranche, il ne faut pas perdre de vue que les corps sont ordonnés aux esprits et que le sensible doit conduire à l’intelligible – c’est là le principe même de la pédagogie divine dans l’Incarnation 29. Ainsi, s’il est pédagogiquement bienvenu, pour comprendre de quoi il en retourne lorsqu’on s’intéresse à l’occasionalisme malebranchiste, de commencer par étudier les lois 1 et 2 (corps-corps et corps-esprit), on conserve une vue partielle sur cet occasionalisme en ne considérant qu’elles. Dans ces conditions, il est tentant de proposer d’autres façons de classer ces lois, c’est-à-dire d’envisager les structures fondamentales de l’univers selon Malebranche. On peut par exemple prendre pour critère les substances impliquées comme causes occasionnelles et lieux de la causation. 29  Voir par exemple Traité de morale, I, 2, § 12, dans Œuvres complètes, XI, pp. 34–35 ; et De la Recherche de la vérité, VI-1, 3, in fine, dans Œuvres complètes, II, pp. 260–261.

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Substances concernées par la relation de causalité occasionnelle

Groupes de lois

Corps et corps

1

Corps et esprit

2, 4

Esprit et esprit

3, 5

On peut également prendre pour critère la nature et par là les propriétés de la cause occasionnelle. Dans cette optique, au moins une distinction s’impose  : certaines causes occasionnelles sont de nature spirituelle, et sont par là dotées de liberté ; d’autres ne le sont pas. L’application de ce critère conduit à scinder le second groupe de lois, selon le sens (corps = > esprit ou esprit = > corps) dans lequel s’exerce la relation causale Causes occasionnelles matérielles et non dotées de liberté

1 2 (dans le sens corps = > esprit)

Causes occasionnelles spirituelles et dotées de liberté

2 (dans le sens esprit = > corps) 3 4

2) Cette présentation systématique de l’occasionalisme possède aussi une réelle puissance interprétative, en ce qu’elle permet de relire et clarifier des lieux canoniques du malebranchisme, et même du christianisme en général. Pour le malebranchisme, on peut par exemple interpréter au prisme des lois de l’occasionalisme un texte aussi central que la Préface de la Recherche de la vérité et sa présentation de la variation d’intensité des deux unions de l’esprit – à Dieu, aux corps – avant et après le péché 30. Chez Adam avant le péché, les trois premiers groupes de lois sont ainsi subordonnés dans le sens 1, 2, 3 : l’attention de l’esprit organise l’union de l’esprit et du corps, qui domine elle-même les lois du mouvements corporels. Après le péché, les trois premiers groupes de lois demeurent (et l’Ordre est donc toujours respecté, ce qui est essentiel pour Malebranche) mais leur agencement de précession est inversé : les mouvements des corps préoccupent beaucoup l’esprit, ce qui 30   À compléter, ici, par De la Recherche de la vérité, I, 5, § 1 ; et Éclaircissements, IV.

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parasite son attention à Dieu, et c’est le règne de la concupiscence. Plus largement, l’homologie et l’articulation des lois quatre et cinq permet à Malebranche de déployer par un schéma causal – ce qui est tout à fait original – le thème ultra-classique chez les auteurs chrétiens d’une correspondance réglée et d’une relation de préfiguration entre ancienne et nouvelle Alliance  : «  Saint Michel et ses Anges étaient aux Juifs ce que Jésus-Christ est aux Chrétiens » 31. 3) Ma troisième remarque porte sur la question de la systématicité, puisque l’occasionalisme apparaît comme une voie royale pour percevoir en quoi le malebranchisme est une philosophie systématique. Le tableau synthétisant le texte lui-même synthétique de Entretiens sur la métaphysique et sur la religion, XIII, §  9, manifeste bien que l’univers selon Malebranche est structurellement homogène. Q uel que soit le secteur de la réalité qu’on considère, on y retrouve à l’identique, ou presque, un même schéma d’organisation formelle : seule varie la nature de la cause occasionnelle qui détermine l’application de l’efficace divine. De là une série d’équivalences fonctionnelles remarquables puisqu’elles sont établies entre des êtres ou des éléments appartenant à des ordres à première vue totalement hétérogènes (les colonnes trois et quatre du tableau récapitulatif). On a néanmoins affaire à une systématicité souple, non brutale, adaptative. Les principes généraux organisant les cinq sphères de l’occasionalisme sont identiques, les démarches intellectuelles mises en œuvre pour constituer chacun des cinq groupes de lois sont semblables, mais Malebranche est toujours attentif  aux particularités qui affectent chacun des domaines concernés. Martial Gueroult parlait à ce sujet, et sans doute avec une nuance péjorative dans la mesure où cet état de fait affectait selon lui la cohérence du malebranchisme, d’  «  accidents  »  : «  Sans doute l’unité systématique impose-t-elle des solutions analogues dans les sphères différentes  : ainsi l’occasionalisme impose son cadre aux cinq sphères du monde. Mais ce thème 31  Malebranche, Traité de la nature et de la grâce, IVe Ecl., dans Œuvres complètes, V, p. 203.

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originel est toujours affecté d’accidents » 32. On pourrait à l’inverse suggérer que ces variations autour de thème originel repérables dans chacun des cinq sphères de l’occasionalisme n’ont rien d’accidentel – qu’on entende par là qu’elles seraient superflues ou bien architectoniquement problématiques. C’est plutôt la grandeur de Malebranche que de ne jamais succomber – alors qu’il en aurait sans doute les moyens conceptuels – à l’esprit de système, de refuser d’araser la complexité du réel tel qu’il se donne à nous par l’application mécanique et univoque de ses principes, et de nous offrir ainsi l’image d’une systématicité philosophique sans simplisme ni étroitesse. 4) Nonobstant ces contreparties et singularités, une forte homologie structurale (en l’occurrence  : légale) n’en demeure pas moins entre ce que qu’on peut appeler (et en gardant à l’esprit ce que cette coupure a de schématique) l’ordre de la nature (lois un, deux, et trois) et l’ordre de la grâce (quatre et cinq). On sait que c’est un des points qui a scandalisé Arnauld lorsqu’il a envisagé le domaine de la grâce tel qu’en a traité Malebranche : quand bien même on admettrait – illusoirement, du point de vue d’Arnauld – que l’oratorien a raison pour ce qui concerne l’organisation de l’ordre de la nature selon des lois et volontés générales, rien n’autorise à transférer de semblables principes dans celui de la grâce 33. Il y a pour Arnauld une forme de scission entre les deux ordres  : il accorde – et en cela s’exprime de façon manifeste son cartésianisme – que la nature ressortit au champ du légal, du calculable, du rationnel  ; il renvoie en revanche l’ordre de la grâce à celui de la transcendance divine, de l’impénétrabilité des desseins de ce Dieu à propos duquel saint Paul (aux Romains, XI, 33–34) s’écrie « O altitudo ! », bref  et pour ainsi dire à l’ordre du « hors la loi » (ou du moins du 32  Martial Gueroult, Malebranche, 3 tomes, Paris, Aubier, 1955–1959, tome III, p. 370. Il ajoute (p. 372) : « ces complications constituent souvent en elles-mêmes de graves difficultés » et diagnostique, tout au long de son magistral commentaire, de nombreuses « apories » dans la philosophie de Malebranche. 33 Voir Arnauld, Réflexions philosophiques et théologiques, I, ch. 1, dans Œuvres complètes, XXXIX, p. 174 : « L’ordre de la Grâce est si différent de celui de la Nature que, quand Dieu agirait dans ce dernier comme il [Malebranche] se l’est persuadé, il n’y aurait aucune raison de prétendre qu’il dût agir de la même sorte dans l’ordre de la Grâce » ; et III, ch. 9, p. 734.

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« hors des lois » que notre raison est capable de saisir). Rien de tel chez Malebranche, qui abolit cette scission au profit d’une symétrie équilibrante entre lois de la nature et lois de la grâce, dont il ne considère pas qu’elles relèvent de rationalités différentes. Comme j’ai essayé de le suggérer, parmi les différents schémas, outils, principes philosophiques dont use l’oratorien, c’est en premier lieu ceux opérant pour définir l’occasionalisme qui déterminent cet effet d’homogénéité. Il y a là quelque chose de tout à fait singulier, qui n’est, schématiquement, ni médiéval, ni moderne  : dans une vision «  médiévale  » du monde, nature et grâce sont étroitement liées mais ni l’une ni l’autre ne sont pensées dans le cadre général-légal qui va caractériser l’essor de la nouvelle science à l’âge classique  ; dans la vision « moderne », on désintrique les deux ordres que les médiévaux laissaient imbriqués, mais en faisant le plus souvent (Descartes, Arnauld) refluer l’intelligibilité rationnelle produite par la légalité de la nouvelle science du côté de la seule nature. Malebranche quant à lui, de façon remarquable, conserve, comme les médiévaux, l’imbrication des deux ordres mais, comme un moderne, les pense tous les deux dans le cadre de l’intelligibilité légale apportée par la systématique occasionaliste. En ce sens on peut dire que Malebranche anticipe l’intuition d’Henri de Lubac dans Surnaturel – un des livres-clés de la théologie catholique au xxe siècle –  quand il voyait dans une coupure trop marquée entre nature et surnature l’erreur fondamentale de la théologie depuis les xvie et xviie siècles. Dans cette optique de la réduction d’une coupure trop drastique entre nature et grâce, il serait ainsi d’un grand intérêt d’étudier de près un texte comme celui du Traité de la nature et de la grâce, II, I, § 40–44 : «  Il  faut chercher la cause [occasionnelle de la grâce du créateur] dans l’ordre de la nature. Il y a biens [des] effets naturels qu’on pourrait avec raison regarder comme des grâces. […] Comme la grâce est jointe avec la nature, tous les mouvements de notre âme et de notre corps ont quelque rapport au salut. […] Il n’y a rien de si indifférent par luimême qui n’ait quelque rapport à notre salut, à cause du mélange et de la combinaison des effets qui dépendent des lois générales de la nature avec ceux qui dépendent des lois

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générales de la grâce. […] Je crois qu’on peut donner le nom de grâce à tous les effets naturels, lorsqu’ils ont rapport au salut […] les lois générales de [ces sortes de grâce] sont les lois générales de la nature » 34.

Ainsi, le monde tel que le conçoit Malebranche n’est pas « clivé » entre nature et grâce, mais pour ainsi dire « stratifié », c’est-à-dire tel que ses phénomènes naturels peuvent être décrits simultanément du point de vue de la nature et de celui de la grâce. Dans cette ordre d’idée, un texte décisif  pour la bonne intellection du malebranchisme en général et de l’occasionalisme en particulier est les Petites Méditations pour se disposer à l’humilité et à la pénitence, qui étaient jointes aux Conversations chrétiennes en 1677. Avant même son contenu, c’est la structure de ce texte qui est déterminante. Malebranche y articule à plusieurs reprises une « considération » constituée d’une de ses thèses philosophiques à une « élévation » d’ordre spirituel. La seconde «  considération  » rappelle par exemple la façon dont les rapports de l’esprit et du corps sont conçus dans le cadre de l’occasionalisme : «  L’homme n’est que faiblesse et qu’impuissance par luimême  […] l’homme ne pourrait pas même remuer le bras  […] s’il [Dieu] ne déterminait ensuite, selon les différentes volontés de l’homme impuissant, le mouvement des esprits, en les conduisant vers les tuyaux des nerfs. […] Ainsi, c’est l’homme qui veut remuer son bras, mais c’est Dieu seul qui peut et qui sait le remuer » 35.

L’ « élévation » qui suit, et qui témoigne bien de la réception de quelque chose comme une grâce, explique alors : « Mon Dieu, que je sache toujours que sans vous je ne puis rien vouloir ; que sans vous je ne puis rien faire ; et que je ne puis pas même sans vous remuer la moindre partie de mon corps. Vous êtes toute ma force, ô mon Dieu ; je mets en vous toute ma confiance et toute mon espérance. Couvrez-moi de confusion et de honte, et faites-moi intérieurement de sanglants reproches, lorsque je suis si ingrat et si   Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, V, pp. 104–105.   Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, XVII-1, p. 392.

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téméraire que de me servir de mon bras pour vous offenser, puisque c’est uniquement par l’efficace de votre volonté, et non par l’effort impuissant de la mienne, qu’il se remue lorsque c’est moi qui le remue » 36.

Q uant à cette grande et frappante homogénéisation occasionaliste de l’univers, on a souvent dit, et en présentant généralement cela comme une critique, voire une accusation, que Malebranche « naturalisait le surnaturel » 37 – comme s’il allait de soi que le domaine où il y a proprement de la légalité est la nature et que ce n’était que de façon analogique, dérivée, secondaire que cette légalité était transposée dans l’ordre de la grâce. On repère en premier lieu une sorte de préjugé  chez ces auteurs formulant cette remarque comme une critique  : pour eux, il semble aller de soi qu’il ne serait pas bien de naturaliser le surnaturel (c’est-à-dire de penser les lois 4 et 5 à partir des lois 1, 2 et 3). Or sur le fond, ce jugement de valeur est loin d’aller de soi : il n’est pas absolument évident qu’il ne soit pas bien de naturaliser ainsi le surnaturel. Dans tous les cas, cette critique éventuelle n’atteint pas vraiment Malebranche : hormis peut-être selon un ordre pédagogique, c’est, aussi bien ontologiquement qu’épistémiquement et axiologiquement, dans le sens 5, 4, 3, 2, 1 qu’il faut envisager les lois de l’occasionalisme. C’est d’ailleurs ce que dit tout simplement la première phrase du Traité de la nature et de la grâce (du moins dans la première édition) dont il faudrait toujours se souvenir lorsqu’on travaille sur Malebranche : « Dieu ne pouvant agir que pour sa gloire  […] n’a pu  […] avoir d’autre dessein dans la création du Monde que l’établissement de son Église ». Autrement dit, c’est la cinquième loi, qui commande toutes les autres, c’est elle la plus importante, et c’est aussi si l’on peut dire la plus riche (puisqu’elle fait par exemple intervenir deux causalités par liberté et l’être humain tout entier, en tant qu’il y est affecté de plaisir) de sorte qu’il est beaucoup plus facile de passer, par soustraction, ou émondage, de cette cinquième loi aux quatre autres, que d’opérer le mouvement inverse.   Malebranche, Œuvres complètes, XVII-1, p. 393.  Voir par exemple Ferdinand Alq uié, Le Cartésianisme de Malebranche, Paris, Vrin, 1974, notamment pp. 442–452 et 478–486. 36 37

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Somme toute, aussi bien dans sa vision du monde que dans son épistémologie en général et son occasionalisme en particulier, le geste de Malebranche n’est pas de naturaliser la surnature, mais bien plutôt de surnaturaliser la nature 38. Ainsi, qui s’intéresse à l’occasionalisme malebranchiste, sous tous ses aspects, devrait toujours garder à l’esprit la phrase sur laquelle s’achève le Journal d’un curé de campagne de Georges Bernanos : « Tout est grâce ».

Abstract This paper examines two topics of  Malebranche’s occasionalism that in the last twenty years have been generally less discussed than the now canonical questions of  the causal relationships between body and body or body and mind. On the one hand, the distribution of  grace, as addressed by Malebranche in the first two parts of  the Treatise of  Nature and Grace (1680). On the other hand, miracles, which Malebranche explicitly integrates to his occasionalist vision of  the world in the fourth and final Elucidation added to the Treatise’s fourth edition (1684). First comes a quick reminder of  the principles that justify and structure occasionalism as it is generally conceived by Malebranche, including the so-called “first three laws of  occasionalism”. Second, the paper examines what the Fourth Elucidation says about angels as occasional causes of  the miracles recorded in the Old Testament; and third, how Christ is presented as the occasional cause of  the distribution of  grace. Finally, the paper offers some reflections and more general conclusions drawn from the study of  these two themes, particularly in relation to the overall structure of  Malebranche’s occasionalism. Keywords: Malebranche, Occasionalism, Miracles, Grace, Nature.

38   Ce point est très bien mis en lumière par Alain Badiou, Le Séminaire, Malebranche. L’être 2 – Figure théologique, 1986, Paris, Fayard, 2013, pp. 83–84.

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CONNAISSANCE ET CAUSALITÉ : LES ADVERSAIRES DE MALEBRANCHE

1. Malebranche, les cartésiens et le principe Q uod nescis On doit à Malebranche le succès du principe selon lequel pour être la cause d’un événement il est nécessaire de connaître les moyens par lesquels il se produit. Nous nommons ce principe Q uod nescis, suivant la formule tirée de celui qui est censé en être l’auteur, à savoir Arnold Geulincx 1. Loin d’appartenir au milieu cartésien, le principe est l’héritier d’un problème qui remonte au moins à Platon, et à l’explication des processus réguliers de la nature grâce au recours à l’existence d’une intelligence les ayant projetés et façonnés. C’est pourtant seulement durant la modernité que le principe est formulé et utilisé comme une condition de la causalité. C’est seulement à l’Âge classique que l’exigence d’intelligence et de connaissance se concentre sur les moyens nécessaires à la production d’un effet. C’est alors seulement que ce principe est utilisé dans le cadre des rapports entre l’âme et le corps. Sa modernité semble se manifester par le recours à l’anatomie, qui renforce l’invraisemblance d’une cause – y compris si cette cause est la volonté humaine – capable de mouvoir les corps vivants, tout en ignorant la complexité des organes rendant possible ce mouvement. 1   Arnold Geulincx, Disputatio physica 3, dans Opera Philosophica, 3 vol., recognovit Jan Pieter Nicolaas Land, The Hague, Nijhoff, 1891–1893, II, pp. 502–503 ; Id., Ethica, dans Opera Philosophica, III, pp. 30–37 ; Id., Annotata ad Ethicam, dans Opera Philosophica, III, pp. 203–222 ; Id., Metaphysica vera, dans Opera Philosophica, II, pp. 147–157.

Occasionalism. From Metaphysics to Science, ed. by Matteo Favaretti Camposampiero, Mariangela Priarolo, and Emanuela Scribano, Turnhout, Brepols, 2018 (DESCARTES, 2), pp.  269–288    FHG   10.1484/M.DESCARTES-EB.5.114997

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Comme j’ai essayé de le montrer ailleurs, l’origine du problème et sa mise en scène comme question fondamentale permettant d’expliquer les mouvements volontaires et involontaires du corps vivant est à lire dans un texte de Galien, De fœtuum formatione, que les vicissitudes éditoriales n’ont porté à l’attention des philosophes que dans l’editio princeps des œuvres en grec (1525) et dans une première traduction latine en 1535 2. Dans ce texte, Galien se demandait comment expliquer que l’on puisse mouvoir sa main sans connaître les muscles nécessaires à ce mouvement, ou bien encore qu’un enfant puisse prononcer un mot sans connaître les mouvements de la langue qui en rendent possible l’émission adéquate. L’originalité de ce texte de Galien est précisément d’avoir prolongé l’interrogation platonicienne portant sur l’origine de l’ordre naturel au sein d’une réflexion sur la causalité des effets naturels, et notamment des mouvements involontaires et volontaires du corps vivant. Le texte a servi d’appui afin de relancer, sous un point de vue scientifique, l’argument traditionnel consistant à remonter de l’ordre de la nature à Dieu, ainsi qu’on le voit chez Jean de Silhon – un auteur bien connu de Descartes – dans son ouvrage sur l’Immortalité de l’âme, 1634. Silhon y souligne la complexité du corps humain afin de renforcer la thèse suivant laquelle il est impossible « qu’une nature aveugle […] pût être la cause d’une chose si ingénieuse et si artiste que le Corps d’un animal […] ». Silhon fait reposer cette remarque sur une référence au De foetuum formatione dont il se prévaut pour noter que «  Galien remarque que nostre Corps [a] plus de deux cens os qui aydent à le composer, et le soustiennent et estayent ; il n’y en a pas aucun qui n’ait plus de 40 rapports pour lesquels il est tel qu’il est, et plus de 40 considérations pour lesquells il a cette grandeur, cette figure et cette force » 3. 2  Claudius Galenus, De foetuum formatione, dans Galenus, Opera Omnia, curavit D.  Carolus Gottlob Kühn, Tomus  IV, Lipsiae, literis Frider. Chr. Dürrii, 1822, pp. 652–702. Pour l’histoire de l’édition du texte de Galien, voir la très savante introduction de Diethard Nickel à Galenus, De foetuum formatione, edidit D. Nickel, Berlin, Akademie Verlag, 2001. Sur l’importance de ce texte au sujet qui nous intéresse ici, nous renvoyons à Emanuela Scribano, «  Q uod nescis quomodo fiat, id non facis. Occasionalism against Descartes? », Rinascimento, LI (2011), pp. 63–86. 3   Jean de Silhon, De l’immortalité de l’ame, Paris, Pierre Billaine, 1634,

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Mais c’est Pierre Chanet, dans un écrit qui est à l’origine d’une longue polémique avec Cureau de La Chambre à propos de l’instinct des animaux, qui utilise le principe Q uod nescis comme un argument contre la causalité des causes secondes dans les mouvements instinctifs des hommes et des animaux. Et c’est très probablement de Chanet que Malebranche tient cet argument qu’il applique aux actions volontaires humaines 4. L’argument Q uod nescis est introduit par Malebranche dans le chapitre III de la seconde partie du sixième livre de la Recherche de la Vérité : Comment pourrions-nous remuer notre bras  ? Pour le remuer il faut avoir des esprits animaux, les envoyer par de certains nerfs, vers de certains muscles pour les enfler et les racourcir […]. Et nous voyons que les hommes qui ne sçavent pas seulement s’ils ont des esprits, des nerfs, et des muscles, remuent leur bras, et le remuent même avec plus d’adresse et de facilité, que ceux qui sçavent le mieux l’anatomie. C’est donc que les hommes veulent remuer leur bras, et qu’il n’y a que Dieu qui le puisse et qui le scache remuer 5.

Cet argument, utilisé afin de contrer la prétendue causalité de l’âme sur le corps, est introduit une fois qu’a été démontré, au moyen d’autres considérations, que ni le corps ne peut mouvoir un autre corps ni l’âme mouvoir un corps. Le principe Q uod nescis n’est donc pas essentiel pour justifier l’impossibilité pour l’âme de produire un changement dans le corps auquel elle est jointe. D’ailleurs, ni La Forge ni Cordemoy, avant Malebranche, pp. 396–397. Voir Galenus, De foetuum formatione, pp. 693–695. L’écho de ce texte résonne encore dans les Dialogues on Natural Religion de David Hume. Cf.  David Hume, Dialogues on Natural Religion, edited by N. Kemp Smith, Indianapolis (Ind.), The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1980, Part XII, p. 215. 4 Voir Pierre Chanet, Considérations sur la Sagesse de Charron, Paris, C. le Goult, 1643, pp. 64–72, et Nicolas Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité, VI-2, 3, dans Œuvres complètes, éd. André Robinet, Paris, Vrin, 1958–1970, tome II, p. 315 cit. infra. Nous avons discuté ces textes dans l’article « Q uod nescis » cité dans la note 2, auquel nous renvoyons. L’étude la plus complète sur Cureau de La Chambre est encore Albert Darmon, Les corps immatériels. Esprits et images dans l’oeuvre de Marin Cureau de La Chambre, Paris, Vrin, 1985. 5   Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité, VI-2, 3, dans Œuvres complètes, II, p. 315.

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n’avaient utilisé ce principe pour nier la causalité de l’âme sur le corps. Dans sa première utilisation contre l’interaction entre l’âme et le corps, le principe Q uod nescis joue donc un rôle limité et ad abundantiam, consistant à refuser aux causes secondes un pouvoir causal 6. Il est alors légitime de s’interroger sur les raisons qui peuvent avoir poussé Malebranche à se l’approprier et à l’adjoindre à l’argument qui avait déjà établi que l’âme ne peut pas agir sur le corps, à défaut de l’intervention nécessaire d’un pouvoir infini. La question s’impose d’autant plus fermement que Malebranche n’est pas le premier cartésien à prendre partie dans ce débat, qui suit la réception du texte de Galien. Malebranche avait en effet pour prédécesseur Louis de La Forge. Dans le Traité de l’esprit de l’homme, La Forge avait jugé nécessaire de prendre position dans la polémique engagée par Chanet et Cureau de La Chambre concernant l’instinct des animaux. La Forge y avait fait référence en mettant en œuvre une critique serrée des philosophes qui attribuent la pensée aux corps, parmi lesquels il fallait sans aucun doute compter Marin Cureau de La Chambre 7. Pour mieux combattre son adversaire, La Forge utilisait le principe Q uod nescis dont il tirait une reductio ad absurdum de son adversaire : si une quelconque connaissance était nécessaire pour expliquer le comportement animal, cette connaissance devrait être supérieure à la connaissance dont l’esprit humain est doué. L’âme de l’animal devrait connaître «  non seulement les objets qui se présentent devant elles, mais encore de quelle manière elle doit mouvoir les esprits animaux, les nerfs, 6  Le principe Q uod nescis devient de plus en plus fondamental au fur et à mesure que la réflexion de Malebranche sur l’occasionalisme se précise. Dans cette évolution est fondamental le rapport de plus en plus étroit que le principe assume avec la théorie des lois générales de la nature, évident à partir des Entretiens sur la Métaphysique et sur la religion de 1688. Nous renvoyons à Ma­rian­ gela Priarolo, « Force de loi », dans ce volume. 7  Louis de La Forge, Traité de l’esprit de l’homme, dans La Forge, Œuvres philosophiques, éd. Clair, Paris, PUF, 1974, p. 120. Nous avons analysé la polémique de La Forge contre Cureau de La Chambre dans « The Return of  Campa­ nella. La Forge versus Cureau de la Chambre », dans Early Modern Philosophers and the Renaissance Legacy, edited by Cecilia Muratori and Gianni Paga­nini, Heidelberg, Springer, 2016, pp. 169–184.

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et les muscles pour l’exécution de leurs dessein  » 8. Mais nous savons que l’homme meut son corps sans que l’esprit connaisse les moyens nécessaires pour produire ces mouvements. Par conséquent, aucune connaissance n’est requise pour causer les mouvements des animaux, pas plus que pour causer les actions humaines. Dans le cas des animaux et des mouvements involontaires humains, le corps et les lois du mouvement suffisent à expliquer leurs comportements. Dans le cas des mouvements volontaires humains, seule la volonté est à même de produire les mouvements du corps. Répétons-le : pour les animaux comme pour les hommes, aucune connaissance n’est nécessaire pour causer les mouvements du corps. Il est manifeste qu’en utilisant le principe Q uod nescis dans le cadre d’une reductio ad absurdum, La Forge vise un adversaire qui n’accepte pas ce principe, et qui serait toutefois vaincu s’il était contraint de l’accepter comme étant une conséquence de ses principes. Malebranche était très certainement au fait de la réaction cartésienne de La Forge, mais, contrairement à lui, Malebranche reprend à son compte cet argument du Q uod nescis : de même que l’âme de l’homme ne connaît pas le mécanisme du corps, de même son esprit ne peut être capable de produire un changement dans le corps. Cette différence majeure entre deux cartésiens – La Forge et Malebranche –, tous deux confrontés au même problème, permet d’avancer une hypothèse. L’adversaire de Malebranche, s’il y en a un, ne peut pas être le même que celui de La Forge. Pour constituer la cible de Malebranche, son adversaire devrait adopter l’argument Q uod nescis et défendre dans le même temps que l’âme agit sur le corps. Pour vérifier cette hypothèse, il est utile d’examiner au plus près le texte de Malebranche.

2. Contre les médecins La référence au fait qu’il est impossible de mouvoir un bras si l’on ne connaît pas les nerfs, les muscles et les esprits nécessaires   La Forge, Traité de l’esprit de l’homme, p. 122.

8

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à ce mouvement s’inscrit dans le chapitre de la Recherche de la Vérité consacré à l’examen de « L’erreur la plus dangereuse de la Philosophie des Anciens ». Cette erreur consiste à supposer qu’il y a dans la matière quelque chose de distinct de la matière elle même, et qui, par son pouvoir causal, révèlerait une nature divine. L’argument que Malebranche développe dans ce chapitre succède aux arguments déployés dans le chapitre précédant, qui s’attachait à débusquer les raisonnements n’observant pas la règle de la clarté, et utilisant des termes équivoques d’origine sensible. L’obscurité de ces raisonnements conduit à envisager « quelque substance distinguée de la matière, qui est la forme de la matière » 9, prémisse qui aboutit à l’attribution à la matière d’un pouvoir causal, qui fera l’objet d’une critique dans le chapitre suivant. Dans cette attaque contre les auteurs qui violent couramment les règles du raisonnement clair et distinct, Malebranche associe par trois fois les « médecins » aux philosophes : « anciens Philosophes, ou Médecins » 10 ; « la plupart des questions des Philosophes et des Médecins  » 11  ; «  Les philosophes scolastiques ne sont pas si sujets à l’erreur que certains Médecins » 12. Le chapitre III reprend la polémique contre les philosophes «  ordinaires  » qui supposent dans le corps «  quelques entitez distinguées de la matière », qui « sont les véritables ou les principales causes des effets que l’on voit arriver  » 13. Ces entités imaginaires seraient douées d’un pouvoir d’action, et, en tant que telles, témoigneraient d’un caractère divin  : «  On admet donc quelque chose de divin dans tous les corps qui nous environnent, lorsqu’on admet des formes, des facultez, des qualitez, des vertus, ou des êtres réels capables de produire certains effets 9  Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité, VI-2, 2, dans Œuvres complètes, II, p. 307. 10  Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité, VI-2, 2, dans Œuvres complètes, II, p. 304. 11   Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité, VI-2, 2, dans Œuvres complètes, II, p. 305. 12  Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité, VI-2, 2, dans Œuvres complètes, II, p. 306. 13  Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité, VI-2, 2, dans Œuvres complètes, II, p. 309.

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par la force de leur nature  » 14. Malebranche passe ensuite en revue les arguments qui ôtent aux corps et aux esprits tout pouvoir causal. Au début de cet inventaire, on l’a vu, on trouve une référence aux doctrines des philosophes scolastiques et des médecins. Les médecins sont même censés être plus nuisibles que les philosophes : « Les philosophes scholastiques ne sont pas si sujets à l’erreur que certains Médecins qui dogmatisent, et font des systèmes sur quelques expériences, dont ils ne connoissent point les raisons » 15. Evidemment soucieux qu’on puisse ne pas bien saisir qui vise cette référence, Malebranche adjoint, dans la quatrième édition de la Recherche (1678), un adjectif  susceptible d’aider à identifier ces médecins plus dangereux que les philosophes : il s’agit de certains médecins « décisifs ». A ma connaissance, ces médecins « décisifs » dont Malebranche se révèle soucieux n’ont toujours pas été identifiés à ce jour. Q uant au caractère divin attribué aux corps en tant que doués d’une forme distincte de la matière et capable de produire leurs effets, on pourrait penser qu’il s’agit là d’une conséquence qu’il serait légitime de tirer de la thèse concernant l’efficacité des causes secondes, même si les auteurs qui la soutiennent ne le font pas explicitement. En réalité, aucun auteur scolastique n’a jamais attribué un caractère divin aux formes de la matière. Mais si l’on suppose que Malebranche avait à l’esprit le nom d’une personne illustre qui attribuait véritablement un caractère divin aux formes distinctes de la matière et que l’on joint à cette caractéristique l’allusion aux médecins « décisifs », on est alors à même de livrer au moins un nom pour l’adversaire visé par Malebranche, et qui ne soit pas une simple appellation générique comme celle de « philosophie scolastique ».

3. Un médecin « décisif » Le nom sur lequel nous proposons de concentrer notre attention est celui de Jean Fernel, médecin qui fut l’autorité de réfé  Ibid.   Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité, VI-2, 2, dans Œuvres complètes, II, p. 306. 14 15

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rence dans le domaine de l’analyse et du soin des maladies, avant l’entrée en scène de Descartes, et reconnu encore comme tel par Descartes lui-même 16, et dont la célébrité est nourrie et perpétuée par la qualité des médecins qui se réclament de lui, notamment Jean Baptiste van Helmont. Jean Fernel est l’auteur d’un texte philosophique sur les maladies, De abditis rerum causis, publié en 1548 17. Ce texte se divise en deux livres. Le premier se concentre sur la philosophie naturelle, le second sur la médecine. L’autorité dominante dans le premier livre est Aristote, dans le second Galien. Cet ouvrage met en scène un dialogue entre trois personnages, Philiatros, Brutus et Eudoxus. Eudoxe expose les thèses de Fernel lui-même, tandis que Brutus est l’opposant, qui résiste aux arguments d’Eudoxe. Dans le De abditis Fernel propose une nouvelle interprétation de la maladie. Cette dernière ne serait pas causée par un déséquilibre entre les humeurs du corps, comme Galien l’avait cru, mais par un agent « occulte » qui opère à l’intérieur du corps. La discussion entre Eudoxe et Brutus se concentre, par conséquent, sur l’existence au sein des corps vivants d’agents occultes. Pour démontrer que ces agents non seulement existent, mais qu’ils sont indispensables à la compréhension de tout phénomène concernant la vie, Eudoxe développe une théorie complexe d’inspiration platonicienne, qui assimile les agents occultes aux agents divins : « Cette petite ouvrage va examiner et cerner combien de divin, à savoir des causes occultes, se cache soit dans la philosophie naturelle soit dans la médecine » 18. La présence de 16  Descartes cite la Pathologie de Fernel dans la lettre à Plempius du 15 février 1638, et renvoie à Fernel comme à une autorité : « ut auctoritatem etiam auctoritate refellam  » (René Descartes, Œuvres, éd. Charles Adam et Paul Tannery, Paris, Vrin/CNRS, 1964–1974, vol. I, p. 533). Voir Étienne Gilson, Etudes sur le rôle de la pensée médievale dans la formation du système cartésien, Paris, Vrin, 1984, p. 52 ss. 17  Nous citons de l’édition moderne, avec traduction anglaise, Jean Fernel, On the Hidden Causes of  Things, ed. John M. Forrester and John Henry, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2005. Sur ce texte voir Hiro Hirai, « Alter Galenus : Jean Fernel et son interprétation platonico-chrétienne de Galien », Early Science and Medicine, X (2005), pp. 1–35. 18  Fernel, On the Hidden Causes, Epistola, p. 118 : « Atque ita quantum divinitatis, id est abditarum causarum, inest tum naturali philosophiae, tum rei medicae, hoc unum opusculum scrutabitur et discutiet ».

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causes divines agissant dans la nature s’explique par l’origine divine de la nature : « tout ce qui est en nous, vient de Dieu ; supposé que Dieu est le créateur de chaque chose et que chaque chose est pleine de Dieu, et que l’excellence divine et le pouvoir de Dieu se répand à travers chaque chose, et que chaque chose existe et persiste à travers son pouvoir […] y aura-t-il quelqu’un qui doutera encore qu’il y aille dans ces choses quelque chose qui est véritablement divin, et qui est dit divin ? » 19 Dans la recherche du divin au sein de la nature, le point de départ ne peut qu’être une enquête sur l’origine des formes. Les formes, dans les êtres plus évolués comme les plantes et les animaux (y compris les hommes), sont constituées par leurs âmes  : «  Puisque dans un corps naturel rien n’est supérieur à la forme simple qui n’est ni périssable ni soumise à la matière, la forme doit être le “divin” qui avait été dès le début attribué à la nature et participer à la divinité » 20. Comme la forme n’est « ni périssable ni soumise à la matière », elle est insérée dans la matière de l’extérieur 21. C’est grâce à la forme que les corps sont capables d’action : « Les pouvoirs que la forme exprime, ainsi que la forme elle même, sont manifestement divins et sont ainsi nommés » 22. Pour s’inscrire dans la matière, la forme exige la présence d’un « esprit qui se répand partout et qui est le principe de la chaleur vitale », laquelle, à son tour a une origine divine 23. Le vivant est donc doublement imprégné de divin, par l’esprit, 19  Fernel, On the Hidden Causes, p. 416 : « si quod antemeridiana disputatio confecit, ex Deo et per Deum nobis insunt omnia, si is rerum omnium conditor, omnium principium et finem mediúmque tenet  : si Deorum plena sunt omnia, divináque virtus atque potestas per omnia commeat, per quam sunt et permanent omnia : si quum Deus hanc universitatem compleret, rerum ortus perpetuos instituens, per omnes naturas propriis seminibus generatim et per species divisus est, et si tum rebus singulis vitae spiraculum indidit  : dubitabit ne adhuc aliquis illis quippiam inesse quod verè divinum et sit et appelletur ? ». 20  Ibid. : « Eu. Q uídni ? Q uum in naturali corpore nihil sit simplici forma praestantius, nihil prius : caetera verò quae ad materiam pertinent, illi substrata sint ut caduca et abiecta, consequens est simplicem rei formam, divinum id esse quod investigatur : et quicquid illius naturam refert ac exprimit, id quoque divinitatis esse particeps ». 21   Fernel, On the Hidden Causes, p. 238 : « extrinsecùs assum(i)tur ». 22  Fernel, On the Hidden Causes, p. 414 : « Vires eas quas formas profert, uti et ipsam formam, plane divinas esse atque dici ». 23  Fernel, On the Hidden Causes, p. 214.

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qui est responsable de la chaleur du corps et par la forme divine, qui assure le mouvement et le développement. Eudoxe souhaite appuyer ces thèses sur des autorités classiques, et tente ainsi de montrer qu’elles sont déjà présentes chez Galien, à la condition de prendre la peine de les lire correctement. A cette fin, dans les chapitre 3 et 6 du livre II, Fernel procède à une interprétation platonisante de Galien, en s’appuyant surtout sur le chapitre 6 du traité De foetuum formatione. Ce texte vient en effet de paraître dans une traduction latine et Fernel peut sans peine s’en servir pour son opération de platonisation de l’ensemble de la philosophie du vivant de Galien 24. Fernel reprend le texte de Galien sur l’origine du corps humain. Deux réponses sont possibles à ce sujet : soit le corps humain est l’effet du hasard, soit il résulte d’un plan intelligent. Galien rejetait comme impensable l’hypothèse atomiste du hasard, et concluait que l’origine de la formation du fœtus doit se trouver en une sagesse et une puissance suprêmes, qui ne peuvent s’identifier à l’âme ou à la nature dont parlent les Stoïciens, étant donné que la nature des Stoïciens est totalement dépourvue de raison. Q ue l’origine de la nature soit assignée à un être intelligent repose donc sur l’autorité de Galien. Sur cette base, Fernel essaye de montrer que, suivant Galien, le même principe divin qui, à l’origine, a formé le corps vivant, reste en lui pour en assurer le fonctionnement et les mouvements. C’est surtout dans le chapitre 6 du De foetuum formatione qu’Eudoxe trouve les passages les plus favorables à son interprétation. Selon Fernel, le texte de Galien établit bien l’identité de la force formatrice et de la force régente du corps. Cette force demeure tout au long de la vie dans les parties du corps, elle connaît la volonté de la force formatrice et suit ses ordres. Elle est donc la forme d’origine divine dont toute l’activité du vivant dérive. L’interlocuteur d’Eudoxe, Brutus, oppose à cette interprétation platonisante de Galien proposée par Eudoxe d’autres passages de Galien, dans lesquels le développement du corps vivant 24  Les traductions latines du De foetuum formatione datent de 1535–1536. Voir Diethard Nickel, «  Einleitung  » à Galenus, De foetuum formatione, pp. 38–39. Fernel utilise aussi le texte en grec.

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et son mouvement sont attribués à la chaleur naturelle, notamment l’écrit De semine et le livre sur les Aphorismes. Brutus prolonge l’interprétation matérialiste de Galien au moyen d’une hypothèse sur la formation du foetus, qui devrait parvenir à lever les doutes exprimés par Galien dans son texte De foetuum formatione : les pensées de la mère pendant sa grossesse seraient responsables de la formation du foetus, sans qu’il soit nécessaire de faire intervenir une présence divine. Eudoxe répond que dans les endroits cités par Brutus, Galien s’exprime de façon populaire. Contre l’interprétation matérialiste de Galien proposée par Brutus, qui explique la formation du foetus par un héritage parental, Eudoxe met en avant un autre argument de Galien qui, dans le De foetuum formatione, affirme que si l’on devait chercher chez les parents les causes de la formation du fœtus, on devrait attribuer aux parents une parfaite connaissance anatomique, ce qui est manifestement absurde 25. Toujours en référence au De foetuum formatione, Eudoxe insiste et montre que, suivant Galien, chaque fonction animale doit être exécutée non par le biais d’un équilibre des tempéraments, mais principalement par l’action d’un instrument rationnel. Cette raison, cette puissance de l’instrument, est celle-là même qui l’a façonné à l’origine. En réalité, Galien a soutenu que cette puissance productrice divine est constamment présente dans les instruments qu’elle a façonnés, et qu’elle active chaque muscle qu’elle sait être nécessaire à la production de tel ou tel mouvement. C’est celui qui a forgé ces instruments qui est seul à même de s’en servir 26. Brutus est prêt à accorder que l’art divin a façonné l’animal à l’origine, mais il hésite à admettre, comme Eudoxe le voudrait, que « l’âme qui conduit un corps déjà façonné et formé, est la même qui l’a formé autrefois, par conséquent celle-ci ne parti25  Fernel, On the Hidden Causes, p. 438–440 : « Itáne necessarium fuerit non modò mulieres, sed et omnes tum avium tum reliquorum animantium foeminas, gnaras esse et peritas anatomes, et novisse quo quaeque pars ordine fingatur ? Nulla anus tam delira est ut hoc existimet ». 26  Fernel, On the Hidden Causes, p. 466 : « Atqui quaecunque fictum iam et conformatum corpus regit anima, eadem est quae id effinxit, haec igitur non minus quàm illa divinitatis est particeps ».

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cipe pas moins de la divinité que celle-là. » Et Brutus de demander : « de quel auteur tires-tu cela ? » Et Eudoxe de répondre : de Galien, dans l’endroit (de son écrit De foetuum formatione) dans lequel il écrit : “On va l’établir par un ou deux exemple de ce qui arrive dans le fonctionnement des parties du corps”. Après il apporte des exemples pris par les enfants qui étendent ou plient chaque doigts, et qui tournent et plient leur langue, sans connaître quel muscles sont nécessaires pour chaque mouvement, et […]. il adjoint : “Parce que nous voyons des jeunes hommes qui prononcent les mots qu’ils veulent prononcer, comme ‘myrra’ ou ‘scalpellum’ ou ‘smegma’, tout en ignorant quel muscles meuvent leur langue de la façon nécessaire pour produire exactement ce son, et encore moins conscient des nerfs qui produisent le mouvement de ces muscles ; il est très probable que ce qui a formé la langue est encore présent dans les parties qu’il a formé, ou qu’il a formé ces parties de façon telle que les animaux sont conscient de la volonté de celui qui garde le pouvoir sur leurs âmes. Je vois ce qui suit de cela : qu’il y a une âme qui nous domine, et d’autres qui sont présentes dans chaque partie, ou certainement qu’il y en a une générale qui conduit chaque chose. Par conséquent je suis pris par une grande perplexité, et je ne suis capable d’atteindre quelque conclusion solide sur l’artisan qui nous a créé, si loin je suis d’atteindre une conclusion convaincante. Q uand j’entends quelques philosophes qui parlent de la matière qui possède une âme de l’éternité […] je trouve plus probable qu’il doit y avoir une seule âme qui nous a formé dans le passé et qui utilise chaque partie actuellement” 27. 27  Fernel, On the Hidden Causes, pp. 466–470 : « Eu. Animal unumquodque divinitùs est conformatum, et quae id vis effinxit, Galeno prorsus est divina. Br. Id agnosco. Eu.  Atqui quaecunque fictum iam et conformatum corpus regit anima, eadem est quae id effinxit, haec igitur non minus quàm illa divinitatis est particeps. Br. Id unde, et ex quo authore tibi assumis ? Eu. Ex Galeno, quo loco hunc in modum scribit : “Q uid autem in partium functionibus accidit, perspicuitatis quidem gratia, uno aut altero exemplo concludemus”. Deinde propo(nit) exempl(a) de pueris et infantibus qui digitum unumquemque porrigunt vel inflectunt, ac linguam variè contorquent et convolvunt in convenientem figuram concinnae vocis exprimendae, neque tamen noverunt quibus musculis ad singulas motiones sit opus. […] Haec enim videntur declarare, animam quae partibus utitur, ipsarum partium usus nosse, perinde ut si eas ipsa fecisset, non ab alio factis uteretur”. Mox dein ait : “Atque

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Dans un passage précédent, Eudoxe avait de fait souligné  : «  Il  est apparent que l’âme qui a façonné les parties une fois est toujours active dans les corps des êtres vivants : parce qu’il n’est pas possible que l’âme qui existe actuellement utilise d’une façon correcte chaque parties, tandis que l’âme qui l’a créé s’en est allé » 28. Selon l’interprétation de Fernel, la seule opinion approuvée par Galien dans ce passage est celle qui est favorable à l’existence d’un pouvoir original, ayant formé le corps dans lequel il siège, et demeurant par la suite dans chaque membre des animaux, qu’il pousse à accomplir sa tâche 29. Fernel peut conclure avec enthousiasme à un prétendu consensus de la majorité des philosophes classiques sur le fait suivant : Mais celle-ci n’est-elle pas la même opinion suivant laquelle Platon a établi que Dieu est l’artisan et le conducteur de nous mêmes ? Et la même opinion d’Aristote, que Dieu est vraiment le facteur et le conservateur de chaque chose étant le début le milieu et la fin de chaque chose  ? Et la même opinion de Théophraste, qu’il y a en fait un point de départ divin pour chaque chose, grâce auquel chaque chose existe et hac quidem ratione in animantium corporibus illa anima quae partes conformavit, adhuc videtur permanere. Neque enim fieri potest, ut quae nunc praesens adsit, ea quaque parte convenienter utatur : quae verò totum construxerit, ea fugerit”. Paucis deinde interpositis addit  : “Nam quum puellos videamus sonantes, quicquid iubentur sonare, ut myrrham, ut scalpellum, ut smegma, quum nec intelligant à quibus musculis lingua sic moveatur, ut eam vocem convenienter sonare possit, multóque minus istorum musculorum motores nervos, probabilissimum id videtur ut quisquis linguam formavit, is vel in formatis à se partibus etiamnum permaneat, vel sic eas partes fecerit, ut animalia sint gnara voluntatis eius qui nostrae animae principatum tenet. Q uum autem huius consequens esse videam, aliam esse quae principatum in nobis teneat animam, alias quae in singulis sint partibus, aut certè unam omnino quae communiter omnia dispenset, magna profectò circumvenior perplexitate, ut de opifice qui nos sit fabricatus, nihil quod consistere possit mihi in mentem veniat, tantum abest ut certam habeam cognitionem. Nam et quum audio philosophos quosdam dicentes, materiam ab aeterno animatam, defixis in ideas oculis ipsam se perfectè exornare, tum vel multò magis cogito, unam esse oportere animam, quae nos tum formarit olim, tum singulis nunc utatur partibus […] ». 28  Ibid. Le passage de Galien est transcrit en grec, et se trouve dans De foetuum formatione, chap. 6. 29  Fernel, On the Hidden Causes, p.  470  : «  Itaque Galenus eam solam opinionem probat, quae in singulis animalium particulis primam vim illam fictricem insidere et permanere, illásque ad suum opus excitare confirmat ».

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persiste ? […] Et Galien le dit plus clairement de n’importe quel autre auteur […], celui qui a façonné notre corps reste dans les parties qu’il a façonné, et les pousse à leur tache. Par conséquent, si Dieu, ou surement un pouvoir divin est celui qui nous a forgé, le pouvoir qui nous contrôle et qui règle en nous nos fonctions est divin aussi 30.

Ce pouvoir divin doit d’ailleurs être présent dans chaque membre du vivant, au-delà des muscles et de nerfs qui produisent le mouvement : « Si le pouvoir et la nature qui nous a façonné est présente dans les muscles et les nerfs, pourquoi ne devrait-il pas résider dans le reste ? » 31 On le voit, Fernel ne se limite pas à affirmer que seule une intelligence peut être à l’origine d’un organisme aussi complexe que le corps vivant, ce que Brutus serait disposé à accorder. L’autorité de Galien lui est nécessaire pour soutenir que c’est seulement à la condition qu’un principe divin et intelligent soit présent dans le vivant, que les mouvements volontaires et involontaires, ainsi que le développement du vivant, peuvent recevoir une explication satisfaisante. Le défaut dans la connaissance de l’agent constitue pour Fernel une raison supplémentaire qui autorise à recourir à l’existence d’une âme d’origine 30  Fernel, On the Hidden Causes, pp.  470–472  : «  Sed hîc te obsecro et obtestor mi Brute, id mihi paulò altius cogita quod dixit, eum qui corpus nostrum finxit, quicunque is fuerit (hunc autem coelestem mentem, nonnunquam et Deum esse profitetur) adhuc in conformatis particulis permanere et his singulis nunc uti, nónne id ipsum est quod passim vulgavit Plato, Deum et opificem et rectricem nostri causam esse ? Q uódque Aristoteles, Deum verè genitorem esse et conservatorem rerum omnium, quarum ipse principium et finem mediúmque tenet ? Nónne et quod ait Theophrastus, divinum quidem esse omnium principium, cuius beneficio et sint et permaneant universa ? Q uod etiam, sed planius, Theodoritus : “Deus creator naturae, gubernator est eiusdem, non enim quam ipse fecit naviculam destituit”. Omnium verò apertissimè Galenus, qui interpretationem subiiciens pleniorem, dixit eum qui corpus nostrum finxit, adhuc in conformatis particulis permanere, hísque nunc ad proprias functiones uti. Itaque si aut Deus aut certè divina erat vis illa nostri conformatrix, divina etiam est ea quae nos regit, et quae functiones moderatur in nobis ». 31  Fernel, On the Hidden Causes, p.  472  : «  Q uum enim suprà Galenus mentem quandam et intelligentiam admirandae virtutis in omnes terrae partes ex superioribus deduci commemoraret, et eam unamquamque particulam, quemadmodum utilitas exigit, construxisse, non musculos duntaxat aut nervos, quorum vis motus sensúsque ciet, sed reliquas partes omnes, nullo discrimine mihi certè quidem complexus videtur. Itaque si vis et natura quae nos effinxit in musculis atque nervis residet, cur non similiter in caeteris consedit ? ».

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divine, susceptible de mouvoir le corps suivant les souhaits de la volonté. La volonté humaine serait inerte sans l’aide de cette âme, qui, seule, est à même d’accomplir ce que la volonté désire.

4. Encore un médecin La divinisation de la nature opérée par Fernel n’a pas manqué d’être discutée dans les années qui suivent 32. D’ailleurs, la discussion autour du texte de Galien à l’origine du débat concernant la connaissance nécessaire à la production des mouvements du vivant ne semble pas prendre fin au cours du XVII siècle. Un médecin peut-être moins « décisif » que Fernel, mais sûrement bien connu comme Rodrigo de Castro, professeur à l’Université de Pise, voyait dans le De foetuum formatione de Galien le point de départ permettant de soutenir l’existence d’une âme du monde, interne à la nature, douée de connaissance, et capable de produire les phénomènes du vivant : « On conclut d’ici – affirme De Castro après avoir décrit la sympathie qui est en vigueur entre les parties de la nature – qu’il y a l’âme du monde qui répandue par toutes les membres pousse le tout, et se mêle au grand corps. Galenus dans le De foetus formatione, cap. ult., semble l’admettre, suivant la doctrine de Platon » 33. A  l’encontre de Fernel, Rodrigo de Castro reconnaît que Galien a accumulé les problèmes et les doutes sans parvenir à donner une solution définitive, mais il est convaincu que 32  A  titre d’exemple, nous citons un texte de Michael Maier, Symbola aureae mensae duodecim nationum, Frankfurt 1617, p.  341  : «  dans les dits livres du De abditis Fernel […] prouve ceci : chaque chose se compose d’une matière et d’une forme ; la forme possede quelque chose de divin, elle descend du ciel depuis les astres, et il n’est rien de naissant en qui la forme ne soit envoyé de l’extérieur […] », cité par Sylvain Matton, « Fernel et les alchimistes », Corpus, XLI (2002), pp. 135–197, p. 148. 33  Stephanus Rodericus Castrensis, De meteoris microcosmi libri quatuor, Florentiae, Apud Iunctas, 1621, p. 4b : « Ex his concluditur dari animam mundi, quae totos infusa per artus agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet. Hanc Galenus de foetus form. Cap. ult. Ex Platonis doctrina, aliqua ex parte, videtur admittere, cuius nos sententiam inferius, cum de formatrice facultate incidet sermo, paulo altius contemplabimur  ». Sur Roderigo de Castro voir Walter Pagel, William Harvey’s Biological Ideas, Basel-New York, S. Karger, 1958, pp. 94–103.

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toutes ses hésitations face à une nature qui conduirait le vivant sans en connaître le mécanisme peuvent être dépassées si l’on admet, avec Fernel, que le même moteur qui a donné la première impulsion à la nature reste en son sein pour la conduire : « Mais je ne vois qui empêche que ce moteur, qui a donné la première impulsion, reste le long de la vie, en produisant le mouvement […] » 34. Galien, selon De Castro, s’est trompé quand il a hésité à attribuer à l’âme individuelle la formation de l’être vivant, en raison de son absence de connaissance du mécanisme du vivant : «  Galien a cru que cette opinion n’était pas soutenable parce que l’âme ignore les parties du corps qui obéissent à ses désirs ». De Castro a en vue cette phrase du De foetuum formatione de Galien : « l’âme qui nous conduit ne semble pas être douée de la connaissance des parties du corps qui obéissent à ses ordres, et cette évidence s’oppose à cette thèse » 35. De fait – répond de Castro – ce n’est pas l’âme individuelle qui est à même d’accomplir les fonctions vitales, mais l’âme du monde, qui, contenant en soi les idées divines, est douée d’une « doctrine innée » et, par conséquent, est à même de diriger la nature 36. D’ailleurs – poursuit De Castro – on ne peut pas comprendre pourquoi Galien a ainsi hésité à attribuer à la nature la capacité de conduire le vivant, en vertu du fait qu’elle serait incapable de   Stephanus Rodericus Castrensis, De meteoris, p. 50.   Galenus, De foetuum formatione, pp. 696–697 : « Huic autem opinioni adversatur, quod, quae nos regit anima, appetitionibus ipius inservientes partes ignoret ». 36  Stephanus Rodericus Castrensis, De meteoris, p. 50b : « De his aliquid, à quibusdam philosophis, audierat Galenus, ut ipse fatetur, materiam scilicet animatam, ad illas respiciendo se ipsam excolere, atque informari. huic tamen opinioni illud adversari credebat, quod quae nos regit anima appetitionibus ipsius inservientes partes videtur ignorare. Sed cum de anima, quae ad ideas respicit, verba facientes philosophos audivit, non de peculiari cuiusque anima debuerat intelligere, sed de totius universi anima, quae à divinis ideis, ut sic dicam, ingravidata, totidem formas, seu rationes seminales concipit, dignitate quidem dispares, virtute omnes admirabiles  : Has mater foecundissima utpote quae divine providentiae proptuarium quoddam est, rebus omnibus tam inanimis, quam animatis eo ordine distribuit, ut in singulis susceptae, singulorum tum generationi, tum conservationi incumbant. unde naturalis instinctus, seu innata quaedam doctrina à plerisque, a Platone autem ars divina, ab Hippocrate natura (quamvis plura sint naturae significata) appellatur. Iamque videmur Galeno fecisse satis, qui aliquid praeter naturae nomen audire desiderabat ». 34 35

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connaissance : « je ne sais pas de qui a-t-il appris que la nature n’est pas doué d’aucune science  ». De Castro soupçonne qu’il soit possible au fond de faire valoir l’autorité d’Hippocrate, et il avance une interprétation du texte hippocratique : « Assurément pas d’Hippocrate, qui appelle la nature “indocta” parce qu’elle connaît ce qu’il faut faire se passant de n’importe quel maitre (doctor) » 37. Selon de Castro, toutes les questions que Galien a laissé ouvertes peuvent ainsi trouver leur réponse dans le Timée de Platon.

5. Conclusion L’opération double de divulgation et de platonisation du texte de Galien fournit un bon appui pour reconnaître dans Fernel un des médecins « décisifs » que Malebranche indique comme plus dangereux que les philosophes : Fernel soutient que, dans le corps, la forme s’adjoint de l’extérieur à la matière et assure ainsi le rôle actif  dans le corps. Fernel déclare que la forme est divine et finalement qu’elle est une âme qui peut agir grâce à la connaissance du mécanisme du corps vivant. Finalement, par son amour pour la tradition platonicienne renouvelée par Galien, Fernel représente bien les auteurs dont «  le coeur est chrétien » tandis que « le fond de l’esprit est payen », dont Malebranche parle dans la Recherche 38. 37  Stephanus Rodericus Castrensis, De meteoris, pp.  49–50  : «  Difficile videtur illi, vel Deum, vel naturam creatam posse formatricem causam appellari, nam natura sive illa incorporea ; seu corporea existat, cum ab omnibus nulla sapientia praedita dicatur, non potest ad tantum sapientia gradum pervenire quantum ad formationem foetuum requiritur. Verum nescio, a quo Galenus naturam nulla sapientia praeditam esse didicerit ; certe non ab Hippocrate, qui illam ideo indoctam vocat, quia absque doctore quid agendum sit cognoscit ; quinimo ipse Galenus, toto opere de usu partium, modo naturae, modo creatoris sapientiam in fingendis, accomodandisque, ad suos usus membris admiratur ». Sur la nature «apaideute » voir aussi Petrus Severinus (Peder Soerenssen), Idea medicinae philosophicae fundamenta continens totius doctrinae Paracelsicae, Hippocraticae et Galenicae, Basileae, Henr. Petri, 1571, p. 108, cité par Pagel, William Harvey’s Biological Ideas, p. 243, et Ralph Cudworth, The True Intellectual System of  the Universe (1678), Hildesheim-New York, Olms, 1977, p. 158. 38  Malebranche, Recherche de la Vérité, VI-2, 3, dans Œuvres complètes, II, p. 310.

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On est à présent à même d’avancer une réponse à la question qu’on avait ouverte au début. Malebranche s’inscrit dans le socle de l’occasionalisme d’origine cartésienne et reproduit les arguments que Cordemoy et La Forge avaient élaborés pour détruire le « préjugé » de l’action d’un corps sur un autre corps. En ce qui concerne l’action de l’âme sur le corps, il se détache de Cordemoy et de La Forge et adjoint à l’argument du manque de rapport entre la volonté et les modifications du corps, l’argument Q uod nescis, étranger au contexte cartésien, inconnu à Cordemoy et repoussé par La Forge. Q uittant ses frères cartésiens, Malebranche se range aux côtés d’un auteur étranger à la culture cartésienne comme Pierre Chanet. Le contexte dans lequel se situe l’oeuvre de Malebranche fournit de bons éléments pour comprendre les raisons de ce choix. La nécessité de la connaissance des mécanismes grâce auxquels un effet se réalise, surtout quand il est question des changements dans le vivant, est un sujet très débattu au XVII siècle. La discussion déclenchée à partir du De foetuum formatione par Galien avait aidé certains médecins-philosophes à renforcer les arguments en faveur de la présence du divin dans la nature et à s’approprier le principe qui sera plus tard nommé Q uod nescis. La polémique entre Cureau de La Chambre et Chanet était la preuve que la philosophie cartésienne n’avait pas réussit à faire taire les tenants d’une intelligence dans la nature qui soit à même d’en expliquer les effets. Face à la persistance d’une discussion qui pouvait se prévaloir de l’autorité des médecins illustres, comme Jean Fernel, on pouvait se ranger aux côtés de Descartes, comme le fait La Forge, ou l’on pouvait choisir le camp de Chanet, comme le fait Malebranche, qui, infidèle à Descartes sur ce point, trouve dans le principe Q uod nescis un plus puissant outil contre la divinisation de la nature, en faveur de laquelle s’étaient rangés certains médecins, Fernel au premier rang. La trahison de Descartes à ce sujet était presque nécessaire pour Malebranche, la trahison de fond ayant déjà été accomplie, quand Malebranche avait choisi le parti philosophique favorable à l’existence d’une intelligence et d’une finalité pour expliquer l’ordre dans la nature, dont le principe Q uod nescis n’est que le développement ultime. Contre les tenants de la divinisation de 286

CONNAISSANCE ET CAUSALITÉ

la nature qui, comme Fernel, reprenaient à leur compte le principe Q uod nescis, Malebranche s’était interdit de recourir à l’absence d’un projet intelligent à la racine de l’ordre dans la nature. Il valait mieux assumer les conséquences extrêmes de la nécessité de l’existence d’une intelligence à la racine de l’ordre naturel et les utiliser pour l’argument contraire, à savoir l’absence de toute présence du divin dans la nature pour tout rapporter à un Dieu transcendant. On pourra objecter que le principe Q uod nescis est utilisé par Malebranche surtout dans le domaine de l’interaction âme-corps mais que l’origine du principe est plus ample, et concerne l’ensemble des phénomènes naturels, et en particulier biologiques. Malebranche lui-même donne la preuve qu’il est conscient de ce contexte. Dans la sixième édition de la Recherche, après avoir reproché aux philosophes d’accorder une qualification divine à la matière, Malebranche insère une courte note parant une objection possible  : «  On dira peut-être que les formes substantielles, ces formes plastiques, par exemple, qui produisent des animaux et des plantes ne sçavent point ce qu’elles font, et qu’ainsi manquant d’intelligences, elles n’ont nul rapport aux Divinités des Payens. » 39. La sixième édition de la Recherche date de 1712. Entre-temps, Malebranche a pu lire le long résumé que Le Clerc a consacré au True Intellectual System of  the Universe de Ralph Cudworth, paru dans la « Bibliothèque choisie » en 1706, et il connaît bien la voie que Ralph Cudworth y avait empruntée afin de conférer un pouvoir à la nature sans lui accorder toutefois un caractère divin. Cudworth avait recours à l’idée d’une nature plastique capable de régler les phénomènes biologiques aussi bien que les événements réguliers de la nature, sans être nullement douée de la connaissance des moyens de les produire. C’est à la nature plastique de Cudworth que Malebranche fait visiblement allusion dans sa note. Si une nature plastique aveugle est capable de produire les phénomènes naturels, son action n’a donc rien de divin, et les tenants des formes substantielles auraient dû s’y référer pour repousser l’accusation qui leur a été faite d’avoir introduit un principe divin dans la nature.

  Ibid.

39

287

E. SCRIBANO

Contre l’hypothèse d’une production des phénomènes naturels sans connaissance, Malebranche ne peut que s’attacher fermement au principe Q uod nescis, valable pour tout événement naturel : « Mais qui pourra croire que ce qui fait des ouvrages, où il paroit une sagesse qui passe celle de tous les philosophes, les fasse sans intelligence ? » 40 L’insertion de la critique de Cudworth au début du chapitre qui ouvre sur le danger de la divinisation de la nature et qui met en avant le principe Q uod nescis pour écarter le pouvoir de l’âme sur le corps, révèle que Malebranche perçoit le principe comme un outil conceptuel qui déploie toute sa force dans le domaine entier de la science de la nature et notamment de la biologie, bien au-delà de la question de l’activité de l’âme sur le corps. En réalité, c’est sur ce terrain que la question du rapport entre science et causalité a été soulevée et s’est développée. Et c’est sur ce terrain que le choix finaliste de fond de Malebranche lui imposait de l’assumer.

Abstract In assessing the arguments on behalf  of  Occasionalism, Malebranche takes a position against the supporters of  the autonomy of  nature. The enemies of  Malebranche are usually individuated on the side of  Scholastic thought. Yet, the divinisation of  the forms which is the main target of  Malebranche critique is hardly traced in the works of  Scholastic philosophers. Malebranche mentions again and again the “physicians” who are responsible for the divinisation of  forms. This paper proposes to locate in the work of  Jean Fernel, De abditis rerum causis, the main target of  Malebranche. According to this reconstruction, Malebranche’s polemical target explains why he resorted to the principle that any effect can be brought about only by an agent who knows how to produce it. Indeed, by recasting this principle as an argument for Occasionalism, Malebranche deprived Fernel of  his main argument for the divinisation of  nature. Keywords: Malebranche, Fernel, Nature, Substantial Forms, Q uod Nescis.

  Ibid.

40

288

INDEX

INDEX

Ablondi, Fred 10n Adam, Charles 41n, 155n, 174n, 197n, 226n, 251n, 276n Aichele, Alexander 90n Alon, Ian 27n Alonso, Miguel 89n Alquié, Ferdinand 126n, 238n, 266n Álvarez, Diego 89 Anawati, Georges Chehata 23n, 25, 26n André, Yves 170n Anfray, Jean-Pascal 45n, 90n Anstey, Peter 116n Arberry, Arthur John 22n, 32n Ariew, Roger 141n Aristotle 9, 15, 21, 30, 35, 276, 281, 282n Armogathe, Jean-Robert 110n, 113, 114n Arnauld, Antoine 123, 124n, 137n, 138, 142, 164, 197n, 223n, 225, 228, 230, 233, 235–238, 240– 241, 247, 251n, 253n, 254n, 256n, 263–264 al-Ašʻarī 24–26 Atmaja, Dwi S. 23n Augustine of Hippo 224, 238 Averroes 30n, 38–39 Avicenna 27, 30n, 31, 226 Ayers, Michael 110n, 198n

Bacon, Roger 110n Badiou, Alain 267n Balz, Albert G. A. 11n Báñez, Domingo 89 al-Baqillānī 25–26 Bardout, Jean-Christophe 12n, 149n, 241n Battail, Jean-François 170n Bayle, Pierre 41–45, 48–49, 59, 71–74, 80–82, 251 Bearman, Peri J. 23n, 25n Belaval, Yvon 47 Bennett, Jonathan 46, 47n, 50, 133 Béreur de Dole, Louis 95 Bergh, Simon van den 39n Berkeley, George 17, 61–63, 77 Bernanos, Georges 267 Beyssade, Jean-Marie 47n, 164n Bianchi, Massimo 118n Bilfinger, Georg Bernhard 10, 11n Bornhausen, Stéphane 159n Bossuet, Jacques-Bénigne 240, 247 Bouillier, Francisque 11 Boursier, Laurent-François 95, 124 Bouyges, Maurice 31n Boyle, Robert 116, 122, 136, 141 Brucker, Johann Jacob 11n Budziszewski, J. 110n, 111n, 112n Burman, Frans 164

289

INDEX

Carraud, Vincent 12n Casini, Paolo 109n, 113n Castro, Rodrigo de [Stephanus Rodericus Castrensis] 283–285 Chanet, Pierre 271–272, 286 Clair, Pierre 51n, 151n, 169n, 172n, 203n, 210n, 256n, 272n Clarke, Desmond 127, 133n, 191n, 207n Clarke, Samuel 136, 141 Clatterbaugh, Kenneth 207n Clauberg, Johann 10, 11n, 16, 170, 200–203, 209–213, 224 Clerselier, Claude 16, 169, 187– 188, 193, 197–200, 203 Conimbricenses [Manuel de Goìs] 91n, 92n Connell, Desmond 252 Cordemoy, Géraud de 13, 16, 86, 150–155, 158–159, 161–170, 209–213, 224, 236, 271, 286 Costabel, Pierre 197n Cottingham, John 207n, 226n Courtenay, William 8n, 27n Cudworth, Ralph 133, 285n, 287– 288 Cureau de La Chambre, Marin 271–272, 286 Darmon, Albert 271n Daston, Lorraine 109n, 205n De Franceschi, Sylvio Hermann 95n De Lattre, Alain 170n Della Rocca, Michael 207n Descartes, René 9, 13–16, 41–42, 45–50, 52–53, 55, 58–59, 62, 77, 86, 108, 120, 128, 136–138, 142–143, 149–152, 155, 156n, 158–162, 164, 167–170, 174, 177, 180, 185–189, 191, 196– 197, 201, 203–204, 206–208, 213–215, 217–218, 223–224, 226, 238–239, 241n, 251–252, 264, 270, 276, 286 Desgabets, Dom Robert 241n Devillairs, Laurence 239–240

De Volder, Burchard 44 Diderot, Denis 238 D’Onofrio, Giulio 23n Dorato, Mauro 109n, 113n Doyle, John 115n Druart, Thérèse-Anne 33n Dubouclez, Olivier 161n Duns Scotus, John 90n, 115 Durandus of Saint-Pourçaint 76, 86, 88, 90–93, 95, 97 Elisabeth, Princess of Bohemia 150, 160, 162n, 167 Endress, Gerhard 23n Ess, Joseph van 23n Fakhry, Majid 8n, 22n, 184n Falkenstein, Lorne 223n al-Fārābī 30n, 31n Fattori, Marta 118n Favaretti Camposampiero, Matteo 216n, 217n Fénelon, François de Salignac de la Mothe 10, 16, 94, 95n, 123, 225, 238–241 Fernel, Jean 16, 275–287 Fischer, Wolfdietrich 23n Fonseca, Pedro de 89, 91n, 92n, 98 Forlivesi, Marco 114n Forrester, John M. 276n Frank, Richard 24n Freddoso, Alfred J. 8n, 75n, 87n, 91n, 93n Frost, Gloria 7n, 86n al-Ġazālī 16, 21, 22n, 26–39, 100, 226 Gabbey, Alan 50n, 197n Galen [Claudius Galenus] 108, 270, 271n, 272, 276, 278–286 Garber, Daniel 50n, 51–53, 110n, 141n, 159n, 161n, 196n, 197n, 198n, 199, 206n, 207n, 213– 214 Gasparri, Giuliano 95n Gassendi, Pierre 47–48, 150, 155n Gaukroger, Stephen 50n

290

INDEX

Gennaro, Rocco J. 207n Gerhardt, Carl Immanuel 10n, 44n, 72n, 141n, 195n, 197n, 254n Geulincx, Arnold 86, 150, 170, 269 al-Ghazali see al-Ġazālī Gilson, Étienne 276n Gimaret, Daniel 22n, 23n, 24n Girbal, François 151n, 210n, 256n Goodman, Lenn E. 27n, 38n Gori, Giambattista 117n, 119n Gouhier, Henri 159n, 160n, 238n Gousset, Jacques 191–193 Grant, Matthews 8n Griffel, Frank 27, 34, 36n, 38 al-Ğubbā‘ī 24 Gueroult, Martial 47, 119n, 262, 263n Gutas, Dimitri 23n al-Ğuwaynī 26 Hatfield, Gary 49n Hattab, Helen 90n Helmont, Jean Baptiste van 276 Henry, John 276n Hippocrates 284n, 285 Hirai, Hiro 276n Hobbes, Thomas 116n, 136n, 216n Hochstrasser, Tim J. 119n Huenemann, Charles 207n Huggard, E. M. 72n Hume, David 17, 223, 225–227, 271n Ibn Ḫaldūn 25n Ibn Khaldûn see Ibn Ḫaldūn Jacobs, Jonathan 113n Jansenius, Cornelius Otto 238 Jaquelot, Isaac 43–45 John Olivi, see Peter of John Olivi Jolley, Nicholas 107n, 108, 122n, 124n, 131–133, 137n, 138n, 139n, 206n, 223n Jurieu, Pierre 43–45 Kamali, Sabih Ahmad 226n Kaufmann, Matthias 90n

Kemp Smith, Norman 200n, 271n Kenny, Anthony 137n al-Kindī 21 Kolesnik-Antoine, Delphine 13n, 107n Koyré, Alexandre 117 Kühn, Karl Gottlob 270n Kukkonen, Taneli 7n La Forge, Louis de 11n, 16, 41–42, 45, 50–55, 57, 59, 86, 150–152, 154–159, 161–162, 165–193, 197, 203–204, 206–213, 218, 224, 271–273, 286 Lamy, François 10n Land, Jan Pieter Nicolaas 269n Leaman, Oliver 22n Le Brun, Jacques 10n, 238n Le Clerc, Jean 287 Leduc, Christian 43n Lee, Sukjae 12n, 64n, 70n, 73, 107n, 129n Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 10– 11, 16, 41–45, 48–49, 58–59, 62–63, 65, 71, 72n, 73–74, 77, 80–82, 95n, 108, 116n, 119n, 125, 127, 141, 184, 195–198, 201–202, 205, 206n, 213–217, 223–224, 227n, 231n, 234, 254 Lemos, Tomás de 89 Lennon, Thomas M. 14n, 107n, 121n, 149n, 193n, 224n Lewis, David 201n Lisska, Anthony 113n, 116n Lizzini, Olga 22n, 26n, 27n, 28n, 30n Locke, John 116n, 136n Loeb, Louis E. 149n Loemker, Leroy E. 213n Lubac, Henri de 264 Lucretius [Titus Lucretius Carus] 155n McArthur, Neil 223n McCarthy, Richard J. 25n McCracken, Charles 127, 193n McGinnis, Jon 27, 31n

291

INDEX

McLaughlin, Peter 214–215 Maier, Michael 283n Malebranche, Nicolas 8–9, 12n, 13, 15–17, 42, 45, 49, 53–59, 61–63, 65–66, 68–69, 71–73, 77–80, 86, 95, 100, 107–109, 117–125, 127–131, 133–144, 150, 169–170, 174n, 175, 182, 183n, 184, 213n, 223–241, 243–245, 247–255, 256n, 258– 267, 269, 271–275, 285–288 al-Maʾmūn 23 Marmura, Michael M. 27, 28n, 30n Martin, Richard C. 23n Mastri da Meldola, Bartolomeo 114–115 Matton, Sylvain 283n Melamed, Yitzhak Y. 199n Milton, John 110n Molina, Luis de 89, 90n, 98 Montgomery, James E. 23n More, Henry 199n, 206 Moreau, Denis 235, 237–238 Morewedge, Parviz 27n Mori, Gianluca 49n Morris, Thomas V. 8n Morus see More, Henry Muckle, J. T. 227n Muratori, Cecilia 272n Nader, Albert N. 23n Nadler, Steven 11n, 12n, 51, 53n, 57–58, 100n, 107n, 108, 127, 130–131, 133n, 138, 142–143, 149n, 150, 170n, 180n, 193n, 207n, 224n, 227 Nicholas of Autrecourt 100n Nickel, Diethard 270n, 278n Nicole, Pierre 251, 256n Oakley, Francis 110n, 113n Ockham, William of 116n Olscamp, Paul J. 121n, 193n, 224n Ott, Walter 14n, 87, 127–128, 130–137, 143

Paganini, Gianni 126n, 272n Pagel, Walter 283n, 285n Parent, Antoine 195n, 196n Parkinson, George Henry Radcliffe 12n Pascal, Blaise 108 Pasnau, Robert 7n St Paul 225, 263 Pellegrin, Marie-Frédérique 59n, 117n Perler, Dominik 12n, 22n, 26n, 27n, 85n Pessin, Andrew 58, 135n, 184n Peter of John Olivi 86 Piché, David 113n Piro, Francesco 90n, 95n Platt, Andrew 14n, 227 Plempius, Vopiscus Fortunatus 276n Priarolo, Mariangela 137n, 228n, 272n Prost, Joseph 169n, 193n Pufendorf, Samuel von 116n Pyle, Andrew 55n Radner, Daisie 11n, 12n Rateau, Paul 43n Régis, Pierre-Sylvain 16, 86–87, 95–103, 123, 224, 241n Regius, Henricus 16, 177, 199, 204–206, 208–209, 218 Reisman, David C. 31n Remnant, Peter 196n Riley, Paul 118n, 119n Robinet, André 54n, 63n, 95n, 118n, 120n, 137n, 174n, 224n, 245n, 271n Rosenthal, Franz 25n Roux, Sandrine 107n, 188n Rubio, Antonio 92n Ruby, Jane 110n Rudolph, Ulrich 12n, 22n, 26, 27n, 28n, 30, 85n Sabra, Abdelhamid I. 23n. Sainte-Beuve, Charles Augustin de 247

292

INDEX

Sangiacomo, Andrea 87n, 96n, 103n Saritoprak, Zeki 22n Schmaltz, Tad M. 86n, 107n, 122n, 202n, 223, 224n Schmutz, Jacob 87, 90n Schröder, Peter 119n Scott, David 63n, 139n, 234n, 238n Scribano, Emanuela 108n, 123n, 125n, 252, 270n Sève, René 116n Severinus, Petrus [Peder Soerenssen] 285n Seyfarth, Heinrich 169n, 193n Shanley, Brian J. 8n Silhon, Jean de 270 Silvestri, Francesco [Ferrariensis] 88, 89n, 90–91, 92n, 99 Solère, Jean-Luc 43n, 45n Sophie, Electress of Hannover 44, 49 Sorabji, Richard 29n Specht, Rainer 10n Speer, Andreas 95n Spinoza, Baruch 16, 125, 127, 199n Stein, Ludwig 193n Steinle, Friedrich 205n Stencil, Eric 123n Stewart, Michael Alexander 11n Stolleis, Michael 109n, 205n Storrie, Stefan 61n

Suárez, Francisco 47n, 48n, 77, 89–94, 109, 115–117, 122, 125, 136n, 137n Tannery, Paul 41n, 155n, 174n, 197n, 226n, 251n, 276n Theophrastus 281, 282n Thomas Aquinas 8, 14, 47, 71, 85– 88, 92n, 93, 95n, 98–99, 102, 109–117, 121–122, 125, 227 Tournemine, René-Joseph de 196n Trevisani, Francesco 10n Vailati, Ezio 136n, 137n Voltaire [François-Marie Arouet] 237 Wāṣil ibn ‘Aṭā’ 23n Watson, Richard A. 11n Weier, Winfried 11n, 170n Weigel, Erhard 44–45 Whitehead, Alfred 113n Wilson, Catherine 137n Wilson, Margaret 198n, 199n Winkler, Kenneth 61–74, 76–77, 79–82 Wolff, Christian 10, 195n, 196n, 208n, 217–218 Woodward, Mark R. 23n Zalta, Edward N. 12n, 191n

293