Northern Ireland and the European Union: The dynamics of a changing relationship 9781526111616

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Northern Ireland and the European Union The dynamics of a changing relationship Ma ry C . Mu r p h y

Northern Ireland and the European Union

Northern Ireland and the European Union The dynamics of a changing relationship

Mary C. Murphy

Manchester University Press Manchester and New York distributed in the United States exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan

Copyright © Mary C. Murphy 2014 The right of Mary C. Murphy to be identified as the author of this work has been ­asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by Manchester University Press Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9NR, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk Distributed in the United States exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA Distributed in Canada exclusively by UBC Press, University of British Columbia, 2029 West Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for

ISBN

978 0 7190 7982 5 hardback

First published 2014 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not g­ uarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or ­appropriate.

Typeset by Special Edition Pre-Press Services

For my brother, Declan Murphy Jnr

Contents

List of tables

page viii

Abbreviations

ix

Acknowledgements

xi

1 Introduction

1

2 Northern Ireland and the European Union: the context

22

3 Northern Ireland and the European Union: the economic dynamics

37

4 Northern Ireland and the European Union: the political dynamics

66

5 Northern Ireland and the European Union: the internal dynamics

95

6 Northern Ireland and the European Union: the external dynamics

131

7 Northern Ireland and the European Union: the policy dynamics

155

8 Northern Ireland, regional governance and the European Union

177

Bibliography

193

Index

211

List of tables

3.1 Northern Ireland structural fund programmes 1989–2006

page 48

3.2 Northern Ireland EU structural fund allocations 2007–13

48

3.3 EU Peace programmes in Northern Ireland 1995–2013

52

4.1 The EU and constitutional/political initiatives in Northern Ireland 1972–95 

74

4.2 Overview of Northern Ireland’s political parties 

79

4.3 Percentage of share of votes by party, 1998–2011 

80

5.1 Northern Ireland’s government departments 

103

6.1 North–South cooperation 

140

6.2 Meetings of the NSMC in SEUPB sectoral format 

146

8.1 Turnout in Northern Ireland elections 2003–11

188

[viii]

Abbreviations

APNI Alliance Party of Northern Ireland BIC British-Irish Council BIS Department of Business, Innovation and Skills (UK) CAP Common Agricultural Policy CoR Committee of the Regions COSLA Convention of Scottish Local Authorities CRC Conflict Resolution Centre DARD Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (Northern Ireland) DCAL Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (Northern Ireland) DECLG Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (Ireland) DEFRA Department for Food, Environment and Rural Affairs (UK) DEL Department for Employment and Learning (Northern Ireland) DETI Department of Enterprise, Training and Investment (Northern Ireland) DFP Department of Finance and Personnel (Northern Ireland) DOE(NI) Department of the Environment (Northern Ireland) DSD Department of Social Development (Northern Ireland) DUP Democratic Unionist Party EAGGF European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund EC European Community ECHR European Convention on Human Rights Ecosoc Economic and Social Committee ECU European Currency Unit EEC European Economic Community EP European Parliament EPCU European Policy and Coordination Unit ERDF European Regional Development Fund European Social Fund ESF FIFG Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance FMD Foot and Mouth Disease FP7 EU’s 7th Framework Programme for Research and Technological [ix]

x GAA GATT GDP GLA GVA IFA IFB IFI IRA IRep JMC[E] MAFF MEP MLA MLG MOU NGO NI NICE NICS NILGA NIO NITF NRP NSMC OFMDFM ONIEB PfG QUB R&D RDP RPA SDLP SEA SEM SEUPB SNP TEU TUV UFU UKRep UUP

Abbreviations Development Gaelic Athletic Association General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross domestic product Greater London Authority Gross value added Irish Farmers’ Association Intermediary Funding Body International Fund for Ireland Irish Republican Army Irish Permanent Representation Joint Ministerial Committee on Europe Multi-annual financial framework Member of European Parliament Member of the Legislative Assembly Multi-level governance Memorandum of Understanding Non-Governmental Organisation Northern Ireland Northern Ireland Centre in Europe Northern Ireland Civil Service Northern Ireland Local Government Association Northern Ireland Office Northern Ireland Task Force National Reform Programme (UK) North-South Ministerial Council Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister Office of the Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels Programme for Government Queen’s University Belfast Research and Development Rural Development Programme Review of Public Administration Social Democratic and Labour Party Single European Act Single European Market Special EU Programmes Body Scottish National Party Treaty on European Union Traditional Unionist Voice Ulster Farmers’ Union United Kingdom Permanent Representation Ulster Unionist Party

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my colleagues in the Department of Government, University College Cork, for their support and encouragement. A special thanks to all who gave of their time and insights during interviews for this book. Their contributions have been of immense value and have greatly enhanced the breadth and depth of the analysis. I am also grateful to the anonymous reviewer for valuable advice and guidance. Thank you too to colleagues in the profession who advised (and often reassured) me. The students whom I have met and taught down through the years also provided ideas and inspiration. Friends, particularly in Cork and Belfast, were hugely supportive especially during the final stages of writing this book. I am also grateful to the team at Manchester University Press, particularly Tony Mason and Corinne Orde. A final word of thanks to my parents and family for their love, friendship and support. A special mention for my youngest brother Declan Murphy Jnr. Declan has an enormous interest in politics and follows my work closely. Indeed, I think he might just be my biggest fan! He in turn, for all sorts of reasons, is my biggest inspiration and to him I dedicate this book. Mary C. Murphy Cork, Ireland

[xi]

1

Introduction

In the years since the United Kingdom (UK) joined the European Union (EU) in 1973, Northern Ireland has endured bloody conflict, confronted profound poli­ tical challenges and, more recently, experienced remarkable change. The journey from violent political conflict to a tentative peace has been long and arduous. It has demanded great compromise and sacrifice of all sections of Northern Ireland society. The result has been the removal of large-scale and widespread violence and the creation of new and legitimate devolved political institutions built around consociational principles. This process of peace-building has been accompanied by improved community relations and some degree of economic progress. The precise start date of this journey of change is difficult to pinpoint, but it has been visibly underway since the 1994 paramilitary ceasefires and the signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement.1 This same twenty-year period coincides with an era of wider change across Europe. The widening and deepening of the European integration process has been apparent since the drive to complete the single market intensified from the late 1980s. Subsequent treaty revisions, the introduction of the single currency, the enlargement of the EU and the ongoing politicisation of the European project followed. These developments also marked a turning point in relation to theorising the EU. No longer did the claims of either neofunctionalists or intergovernmentalists fully capture EU events. Alternative tools and approaches emerged to challenge these once dominant theoretical interpretations of the EU. Multi-level governance (MLG) was born during this period. First articulated by Marks (1992), the model drew on insights from the study of domestic/ comparative politics and international politics (Bache 2012: 629). MLG emphasises the multi-level nature of EU politics and attaches significance to the role played by subnational units and supranational institutions in the policy process. The governance component of the model offers a specific conception of EU politics based on an altered relationship between state and non-state actors, where the latter have become increasingly influential. MLG, however, has been subject to some criticism. Questions concerning the conceptual clarity of the model have been voiced by a number of analysts (see for example Jessop 2005 and Warleigh 2006). A key criticism has been the suggestion that MLG understandings of governance are not sufficiently robust and rigorous to sustain the contention that power has slipped away from the central state. Moreover, the

2

Northern Ireland and the European Union

notion that MLG identifies a normatively better process of EU decision-making as proposed by Marks and Hooghe (2004: 16) is problematic. This particular view overlooks the potentially damaging impact of emerging governance structures on the democratic credentials of modern political decision-making processes (see Peters and Pierre 2004). Similar to the way in which MLG proposes new forms of governance, the UK devolution project is likewise construed as heralding the emergence of a ‘new politics’ based on ‘a more cooperative style of inter-party relations than that at Westminster’ and ‘policy innovation’ (Bradbury and Mitchell 2001: 257). Implicitly, this ‘new politics’ alludes to a new style of governing, which differs from the traditional Westminster-style British model and embraces elements of ­‘governance’ articulated first by Rhodes (1996) and later Marks and Hooghe (2004). According to Mitchell (2010: 86), devolution offers the scope to embark on ‘different trajectories’, despite being the ‘offspring of Westminster’. Carter (2013: 392) identifies other elements of the ‘new politics’ scenario, including ‘norms of openness, participation and power-sharing’. This study marshals evidence from Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU during the contemporary devolved era, and against a backdrop of change at the EU and subnational levels, to produce an analysis which determines if new devolved structures and processes conform with the features of governance (and ‘new politics’) as propounded by MLG theorists. The changing dynamics of Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU provide a ready case-study with which to test and examine the conceptual tenets of the MLG model. Today, Northern Ireland is not dissimilar from other EU regions.2 It may have a unique and unenviable history, but in adapting to an evolving EU political and economic environment, the region faces the same challenges as many other parts of Europe. The introduction of devolved powers in 1999 (following the signing of the Belfast Agreement) firmly placed Northern Ireland in a category of European regions with advanced decentralised powers. The region may have its specific idiosyncrasies in terms of history, economy and society, but its darkest days appear to be confined to the past. Moreover, the expansion of the EU to incorporate new and less advanced regions to the East is a reminder that Northern Ireland’s historic experiences of conflict are no longer unusual (Cyprus is a specific case in point here). Now, during the post-conflict period in Northern Ireland, less politically charged economic and political challenges dominate and have replaced those of a constitutional and security nature. In contemporary Northern Ireland, the relative normality and mundaneness of current policy issues are those which are common to many European regions. In confronting this new policy environment, the EU is an important arena. Northern Ireland’s interactions within this domain are not wholly unique or distinctive. On the contrary, Northern Ireland operates in the same crowded EU arena as all other European regions. It has developed internal structures aimed at optimising EU advantages. It struggles with similar EU policy dilemmas. It jostles for access and influence in Brussels. It engages in lobbying and negotiation within the state and with the EU. For all its sorry history

Introduction

3

and contemporary problems, its situation – as a region of the EU – is remarkably similar to that of other European regions. For this reason, the relevance of this study of Northern Ireland and the EU is not one which stands alone; instead, it offers analytical potential for generalisability. The region’s treatment of EU issues and its interactions with Brussels provide observations which have resonance beyond Northern Ireland. In other words, this study of Northern Ireland and the EU starts from the contention that Northern Ireland does not constitute a sui generis case-study; rather, the region represents an important and telling casestudy with which to interrogate the MLG model. The use of the MLG conceptual framework makes it possible to unpack the detail, limits and potential which the EU offers its constituent regions. The focus here is ostensibly on the governance component of MLG and its application in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland peace settlement has experimented with novel forms of governance. The extent to which the EU supports or undermines supposedly new governance structures and processes is examined in some detail. This allows for judgements to be made as to how well the EU affects a shift from government to governance at the subnational level, or indeed whether the reverse is in fact the case. This methodical examination of the detail, dynamics and dimensions of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU since 1999 produces a wealth of unique data and provides important insights as to the intellectual rigour of the MLG model. It produces an authoritative account of the detail and dynamics of an evolving EU–subnational relationship. It uncovers new political and administrative developments; identifies key state and non-state actors; tracks EU policy progress; and charts new relationships and linkages across and within state boundaries. It seeks to clarify elements of the conceptual confusion which critics of MLG have voiced and simultaneously streamline and normalise the study of Northern Ireland politics. Using the analytical tools which MLG offers, the research produces findings which validate some elements of the model, but it also identifies developments and outcomes which do not neatly fit MLG categorisation. In short, the MLG model may not sufficiently accommodate some of the internal constraints, complexities and divisions which are characteristic of Northern Ireland’s recent political experience and which are reflected in the region’s evolving relationship with the EU. The central MLG argument that state power is undermined does not find strong endorsement here. Interestingly, the features of Northern Ireland’s EU experience which question aspects of the MLG model are more to do with the dynamics of decentralised power than with the supposedly unique (conflict-related) features of Northern Ireland’s political history. The key contention of this study is that the EU policy arena is certainly evolving, but that this is not necessarily happening in the ways proposed by MLG proponents. To put it succinctly, the changing multilevel character of the EU policy process is not matched by comparable changes in the nature of contemporary governance. This finding is consequential because it proposes a more nuanced understanding of the dynamics of MLG generally. This, in turn, is theoretically significant and necessarily important for all other regions of the EU.

4

Northern Ireland and the European Union

The research objective Northern Ireland has long attracted the attentions of scholars. The bulk of this attention has traditionally been focused on the conflict which formed the primary backdrop against which studies of the region have been conducted. As one of the most researched conflicts in the world, the length and intensity of what has been termed Northern Ireland’s ‘Troubles’ and their one-time seemingly intractable nature have spawned much research and commentary. The overwhelming focus has been on attempts to identify the roots of the conflict and possible solutions (see Carmichael and Knox 2004). The outbreak of conflict in Northern Ireland began in the late 1960s, a period which coincided with the start of UK and Irish negotiations aimed at securing membership of the then European Economic Community (EEC). Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU has enjoyed some limited academic commentary. An edited volume by Kennedy (2000a) stands out for its impressive breadth and depth. Much of the literature on Northern Ireland and the EU has, however, focused on examinations of the role of the EU vis-à-vis the Northern Ireland conflict. The emphasis has been on the ability of the EU to diminish national identity; to promote cross-border relations; to (financially) support the peace process; and to provide a model for conflict resolution (see for example Buchanan 2008; Hayward 2006; McCall and O’Dowd 2008; Meehan 2006; and Tannam 2007). Although such studies of Northern Ireland may have touched on wider debates concerning European integration, they tend to be narrow in focus and do not connect fully with broader debates about European integration and European governance. This can be readily explained by a widespread view of Northern Ireland as unique, distinct and incomparable. Even today, over a decade and a half after the signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement and 20 years since the calling of paramilitary cease-fires in 1994, there remains a tendency to treat Northern Ireland as being removed from wider literatures on governance. Indeed, studies of territorial politics in the UK have often excluded considerations of Northern Ireland (see for example Bulmer et al. 2002). This study of Northern Ireland contends that in a wider EU context, treating Northern Ireland as distinct is no longer warranted or justified. In reality, all regions of the EU are unique and distinctive in their own right. The Report of the Northern Ireland Taskforce (NITF) noted this explicitly by assessing Northern Ireland relative to other comparable European regions: looking at the position of other small regions in the EU, Northern Ireland demonstrates certain key strengths in terms of economic growth, employment, population growth and the educational attainment of its labour force. (European Commission 2007: 21)

Like regions elsewhere, Northern Ireland can tell us much about the EU and the nature of European governance. Using Northern Ireland as a case-study also dovetails with wider developments in the study of territorial politics and its implications for the EU (and vice versa). Recent discourse and literature on EU regions have been fuelled by an understanding that there are

Introduction

5

numerous ways in which the EU remains highly important for regions, and in which regional politics plays a significant role in shaping the nature and direction of European integration. (Elias 2008: 487)

The final element in the implementation of the 1998 Belfast Agreement – the ­devo­lution of justice and policing powers – has been achieved. It is therefore an opportune time to approach studies of Northern Ireland with a fresh focus and an open mind, based on a broader consideration of the internal and external ­dynamics of Northern Ireland politics. This book is a first step on that road. Since 1998, Northern Ireland’s politics have evolved in ways once believed unlikely, if not impossible. The achievement of a functioning power-sharing Northern Ireland Executive is remarkable. Although this outward image of progress should not disguise ongoing internal difficulties and tensions, there is no denying that change has come and has touched every facet of domestic politics, albeit to differing degrees. Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU has been subject to that change. Consideration of how that relationship has changed and what its impact has been on Northern Ireland governance, and thereafter on conceptions of European governance, is the subject of this book. The central research question asks if Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU has a governance like character, as per the MLG discourse, which equates to a diminishing role for the state and a movement away from government. In addressing this question, the research examines the impact of Europe at the domestic level on administrative change, political party dynamics, public opinion, civil society, cross-border and trans­national relations, networking, interregional linkages and relations with Brussels. By extension, conclusions can be drawn as to how identifiable changes and developments fit broader conceptual understandings of the EU. Does the Northern Ireland experience correspond to MLG accounts of the EU? Can we identify different forms of ‘new politics’ and governance in Northern Ireland which are attributable or connected to a new relationship with the EU? Does the devolution of powers facilitate different and/or improved governance in Northern Ireland vis-à-vis the EU? Or on the contrary, has devolution reinforced the traditional role and power of the central state as a key EU actor? Has the UK state founds ways and means of mediating the effects of subnational mobilisation at the EU level? Do internal political and ideological divisions limit the extent to which the EU can energise and galvanise EU regions? And moreover, does this evolving political and administrative landscape produce unintended or unanticipated consequences in terms of undermining democratic accountability, inclusiveness and pluralism? Are civil society actors the unexpected casualties of this new EU policy environment? Uniquely, this study of Northern Ireland uses an MLG (European) frame of analysis to disentangle and map a specific (European) aspect of the region’s poli­ tical journey post-1998. An important part of this analysis is its European flavour and its connection to broader questions concerning the governance concept. The merit of this approach is that it places Northern Ireland in the European mainstream and, in so doing, it tells us much about the nature of the EU’s evolving relationship with the subnational unit.

6

Northern Ireland and the European Union

Northern Ireland: an overview In the wider European context, Northern Ireland, like the Spanish Basque Country and the French island of Corsica, is somewhat unusual in having experienced a sustained and serious conflict. The region’s experience of violence has marked its history in brutal and destructive ways. Approximately 3,700 individuals lost their lives during the period 1966–2003 (see McKittrick et al. 2004). It is estimated that over 40,000 people, equating to three per cent of the Northern Ireland population, have been injured during the conflict (Hayes and McAllister 2001: 902). The impact on society as a whole has been far-reaching. Suspicion, fear and mistrust between communities bred and promoted division. Indeed, the very existence of political violence fostered support for further violence as expressed through ongoing support for paramilitary organisations (Hayes and McAllister 2001: 916). Political violence also altered political behaviour and beliefs, and disrupted democratic political institutions: ‘violence reinforces ethnic antagonism, suspicion and mistrust, and inhibits conflict-resolution’ (O’Leary and McGarry 1996: 44). The violence associated with the Northern Ireland conflict has also resulted in heavy economic costs. The financial burdens placed on both the Irish and British governments, primarily in the form of security costs, have been substantial. Indirect financial costs, linked to the physical destruction of land, property and infrastructure, and the associated loss of output, investment and employment, are similarly burdensome. Northern Ireland public services have also experienced pressures and stress as a consequence of violence. Paramilitary protection rackets adversely affected private sector profitability, while insurance costs generally have traditionally been higher in Northern Ireland (see O’Leary and McGarry 1996: 44–50). In truth, the region’s recent past continues to have an impact on Northern Ireland’s economy, politics and society. The violence may have dissipated, but underlying distrust and antagonism remain, as illustrated by the continuing segregation of communities and recent political impasses related to the Orange Order marching season, how to mark the past and honour victims of the ‘Troubles’ and the flying of flags and use of other symbols. Indeed such characteristics of post-1998 Northern Ireland can be linked to ongoing constitutional and socioeconomic challenges, as well as continuing political and cultural tensions, all of which will likely take generations to overcome. Society Northern Ireland is a small region situated on the Western periphery of Europe with a population of approximately 1.81 million (NISRA 2012a: 2). This figure corresponds to approximately 2.8 per cent of the total UK population and 0.003 per cent of the entire EU population. The Northern Ireland population has been on an upward trajectory for some time and is predicted to continue increasing for a number of years to come. The religious breakdown of Northern Ireland society, as recorded by the 2011 census, reveals that the gap between the sizes of the Pro­testant and Catholic populations is diminishing. In 2011, 45 per cent of the population were Catholic (an increase of 1 per cent from 2001) and 48 per cent

Introduction

7

were Protestant (a drop of 5 per cent from 2001) (NISRA 2013a: 28). The religious breakdown of society provides a loose basis for understanding the conflict. Roman Catholicism is generally associated with nationalism, while the Protestant faiths are generally linked to unionism. This is not to imply that the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ were wholly religious in character. The role of religion should not be discounted, but it is less significant than other, more politically charged factors. The conflict was primarily constructed around competing political aspirations linked to identity: Northern Ireland can be seen as a place where the British and Irish nations overlap and their co-nationals, British unionists and Irish nationalists, aspire to be part of two different states. (Dixon 2008: 2)

Interestingly, the 2011 census reveals the apparent ‘rise of the Northern Irish’ with just over one-fifth identifying as Northern Irish only (NISRA 2013a: 62). The significance of more fluid attitudes towards national identity is unclear and has been questioned. Aughey (2012: 154–155) proposes that an increased attachment to a Northern Irish identity does not mute traditional forms of British and Irish national identity because ‘the pull of national identity remains strong, especially when put to the test in moments of sectarian crisis or provocation’. The implications of this division extend to all aspects of society. The Peace III Operational Programme 2007–2013 outlines the many ways in which Northern Ireland’s two communities live separately (Northern Ireland Executive 2007a). High levels of segregation have traditionally been evident in relation to residential patterns3 and education,4 and the result is a lack of shared services, such as schools, community health centres, job centres and public transport. In the past, sections of Northern Ireland society experienced only minimal contact with the other community: ‘The current levels of segregation mean that many people can live comfortably with little interaction with the “other”’ (Jarman 2005: 3). The second Northern Ireland Peace Monitoring Report (Nolan 2013: 5) notes that the number of single-identity electoral wards is reducing for the first time in decades. In addition, mixed-identity electoral wards have increased in number, as have neutral urban spaces. The same report, however, observes a ‘resectarianisation’ of politics in Northern Ireland and an alienation of sections of working-class loyalism as evidenced by an increase in civil disturbances related to protests concerning the flying of flags and the contested marching season. Reflecting and arguably exacerbating the segregated nature of society, interface barriers remain a presence in many urban areas. Indeed, the number of barriers has increased since 1998 (see Ramsey 2013: 168–169). Limited contact between the two communities has also long been evident in relation to social, leisure and sporting activities (see Sugden and Bairner 1993) and it continues to form a basis for segregating Catholics and Protestants.5 In Northern Ireland, division runs deep. Economy Economically, Northern Ireland lags behind the more advanced regions of the UK and the EU. Typically, the region’s gross value added (GVA)6 per head lags

8

Northern Ireland and the European Union

behind that of the UK average by approximately 20 per cent. For the ten year period 2000–10, Northern Ireland records a consistently lower level of GVA than most other UK regions (Northern Ireland Assembly 2012: 14). In 2011, it stood at 79.2 per cent of the UK average (Office for National Statistics 2012: 2). Relative to other parts of the EU, Northern Ireland’s GDP per capita was 86 per cent of the EU27 average in 2010 (Eurostat 2013: 7). Lower GVA figures are related to lower productivity rates. In Northern Ireland, labour productivity has weakened since 1997 and continues to diverge (HM Treasury 2011: 8). The Northern Ireland regional economy relies heavily on service provision, which has replaced manufacturing as the region’s key economic mainstay. In 2008, services accounted for 64 per cent of Northern Ireland’s GVA and are the main source of employment in Northern Ireland (Northern Ireland Assembly 2012: 15, 22). Within this category, tourism has become an increasingly important industry. It accounts for 3.7 per cent of Northern Ireland’s GVA and employs over 32,000 people (Bonner and Rea 2009: 62). The decline of manufacturing has disproportionately affected traditional industries, such as textiles and shipbuilding. However, aerospace, machinery and equipment manufacturing, chemicals and food processing have proved resilient. Overall, the manufacturing industry has witnessed a shift towards high-tech, capital-intensive industries, although not even this has been sufficient to shield the industry from the worst effects of the global economic recession. For example, employment in manufacturing fell by over ten per cent in the year to 2010 (Smyth 2010: 11). Industry in Northern Ireland is also hamstrung by its low levels of expenditure on research and development (R&D) as a percentage of GDP. The region’s spend is comparatively lower than that of the rest of the UK, the Republic of Ireland, the EU15 and the EU27 (European Commission 2008: 10). Significantly, Northern Ireland’s expenditure on R&D and innovation is especially low by comparison with successful small economies in Europe, several of which are in more peripheral locations than Northern Ireland (HM Treasury 2011: 9). Comparatively high levels of unemployment (and particularly long-term unemployment) have traditionally been problematic in Northern Ireland (Borooah 1993: 5–6). However, unemployment figures began to decline during the 1990s and continued to do so until 2007. Indeed between 1995 and 2006, the number of people unemployed in Northern Ireland halved (representing an unemployment rate of approximately 4.3 per cent) (European Commission 2008: 11). Since 2007, the unemployment rate has crept upwards – a development in line with trends elsewhere. The unemployment rate in Northern Ireland has climbed above six per cent in recent years, reaching 7.1 per cent in 2010, but remains below the UK average (see NISRA 2012b: 5). In 2012, the Northern Ireland unemployment rate was 6.9 per cent (Northern Ireland Assembly 2012: 18). The regional unemployment figure would likely be even more pronounced, were it not for the comparatively large size of the public sector in Northern Ireland: ‘The public sector has a dominant role within the Northern Ireland economy’ (Northern Ireland Executive 2007b: 17). Almost one-third of the Northern Ireland workforce is employed in the public service. This has generally been viewed as a

Introduction

9

problematic feature of the regional economy and one which is exacerbated by the introduction of devolution: the public spending that maintains employment, income and consumption has come under increasing pressure as the British exchequer moves Northern Ireland to a revenue sharing model that is more population-based and less needs-based. (O’Hearn 2008: 104)

Despite some anomalies, the Northern Ireland economy is not unique. The region encounters economic problems and challenges which are common to many other parts of the EU. Northern Ireland’s recent embrace of new and novel political structures and the heightened responsibility and accountability which accompany this provide a stronger basis for tackling many of those economic challenges. HM Treasury (2011: 7–9) has identified a number of strengths of the Northern Ireland economy and, in particular, noted some progress already made by the Northern Ireland Executive in relation to increased expenditure on R&D. Political system In a political context, Northern Ireland acquired devolved status within the UK, in the wake of multi-party talks which resulted in the 1998 Belfast Agreement. Since 1999 therefore, Northern Ireland has had its own regional political institutions with executive and legislative powers in a range of policy areas. A series of suspensions did interrupt the rolling out of devolution in Northern Ireland between 1999 and 2007, but since May 2007, in the context of agreements between the two largest political parties, Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the exercise of devolved power has proved reasonably stable. Agreement on the devolution of policing and justice powers was reached in March 2010.7 This move is widely regarded as effectively completing the devolution of powers from Westminster to Stormont. According to the then UK Prime Minister, Gordon Brown: ‘The completion of devolution [justice and policing], supported by all sections of the community in Northern Ireland, is the final end to decades of strife’ (RTE News, 9 March 2010). A further important dimension to Northern Ireland’s regional political system is the region’s relationship with its land neighbour, the Republic of Ireland. This relationship is complicated by a national identification by Northern Ireland nationalists with their counterparts south of the border. In contrast, unionists have long been suspicious of their Southern neighbours. The 1998 Belfast Agreement institutionalised elements of the North–South relationship. The resulting novel and unconventional formal links between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and also between the UK and the Republic of Ireland, are a direct response to the conflict and a mark of particular distinctiveness. Despite its unusual features and characteristics across a range of demographic, political and economic indicators, Northern Ireland faces similar challenges as other European regions in defending and advancing its regional profile. With respect to its key political and economic characteristics, Northern Ireland is leaning towards the European mainstream. To what extent the region’s future will

10

Northern Ireland and the European Union

converge further with other European regions remains to be seen, but signs are that the EU is increasingly recognised as a potentially important arena for the pursuit of a wide range of key Northern Ireland interests.

Northern Ireland and the EU: an introduction The EU has experienced considerable change since the creation of its forerunner, the EEC, in the 1950s. Much of this change has been concentrated in the period since the 1980s. Among the EU’s key achievements are the (near) completion of the Single European Market (SEM), the introduction of the single currency and the expansion of the EU into Central and Eastern Europe. Despite such developments however, the EU has also experienced serious difficulties in further progressing the European integration process. The ‘politicisation’ of the EU from the early 1990s onwards has revealed volatile public support for the continued widening and deepening of the EU. The rejection of the Treaty of Nice in 2001 by the Irish electorate was followed by the French and Dutch rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in 2005 and, more recently, the Irish no vote on the Lisbon Treaty in 2008. The global economic crisis of the late 2000s has also tested the capacity of the EU to deal with unprecedented developments. The wider UK political environment has also changed in recent years. Following the 2010 general election, a hung parliament resulted in the emergence of a Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government – a political arrangement with which the UK has traditionally been unfamiliar. With the new government came a change in the tenor of the UK’s relationship with the EU. This was evident in late 2011 when the UK’s Prime Minister, David Cameron, refused to back the EU’s Fiscal Treaty. It was even more dramatically obvious when Cameron announced his intention to hold an in–out referendum on UK membership of the EU following the next UK general election (and assuming the Conservative Party is returned to power). This apparent reluctance to remain at the heart of the EU has damaged the UK’s reputation among other EU member-states. The likelihood is that any such referendum would, at a minimum, endorse renegotiation of UK membership, if not full withdrawal from the Union. The question of UK membership of the EU will also figure in discussions and debate concerning the Scottish independence referendum scheduled to take place in late 2014. The volatility of the UK’s relationship with the EU has rarely been more pronounced. It is against these European and UK backdrops that Northern Ireland’s experiment in regionalisation has taken place. The introduction of devolution may be primarily related to attempts at conflict resolution, but it is nevertheless in keeping with similar trends across Europe. A majority of EU member-states have, during the course of the last three to four decades, embarked, to varying degrees, on processes of regionalisation. Paradoxically, the emergence of regionalisation (and regionalism) in Europe has been accompanied by greater European integration. Some commentators view the wider process of regionalisation across Europe as being in part a response to the increasing policy load and competence of the EU. The fears of being subsumed into a perceived monolithic and homogenous trans-

Introduction

11

national union have prompted some regions to seek greater levels of autonomy and independence. Concerns aside, however, it is clear that the EU is an important policy-making arena for the regions of the EU: It seems commonsensical that SNAs [subnational authorities] will seek to engage with and influence European decision-making processes to the extent that those processes impinge on their internal functions and responsibilities, however broad, narrow, extensive or inconsequential these might be. (Marks et al. 1996a: 58–59)

In the wake of devolution in Northern Ireland, this factor has been recognised, more acutely than before, by Northern Ireland politicians who have been charged with governing the region. Speaking at a Northern Ireland conference on the Future of Europe in 2002, the then Junior Minister James Leslie remarked: Decisions of the EU have a considerable impact on the activities of this administration. The way those decisions are taken, and our opportunities as a region for influencing the shape of them, are of the utmost importance and of great interest to us. (OFMDFM press release, 27 June 2002)

More practically, one Northern Ireland Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) suggested that: ‘up to 60 per cent of our legislation comes from Europe, and 80 per cent of the policies in our Programme for Government relate to, or originate from, European Union policies’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002). Similar figures were repeated during a Northern Ireland Assembly debate in January 2010 when the Chair of the Committee of the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM), Danny Kennedy, advised: ‘European policies [affect] 80 per cent of the Programme for Government’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 26 January 2010). The First Minister, Peter Robinson, and Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuiness, have also recognised the need for Northern Ireland to engage constructively with the EU: When the Executive first began the process of building a stronger dialogue and engagement with Europe, it was clear that this would need to be a two way process. We were keen to play a full role, to avail of European support; but also to contribute where we have developed skills and expertise. (Northern Ireland Executive 2008a: 1)

There are of course many considerations for the devolved Northern Ireland region in its engagement with Europe. In the immediate aftermath of the devolution of powers to the constituent units of the UK, the EU was regarded as one of the more complex and potentially divisive policy aspects of the new regional political arrangements. The House of Commons Scottish Select Affairs Committee recognised that: ‘Nowhere is the reliance of the whole devolution package on compromise, goodwill and reasonableness so apparent, as is in respect of relations with the EU’ (quoted in Burrows 1999: 126). In the absence of such a spirit of cooperation, there exists a potential for conflict between the UK central government and the devolved administrations. In instances where regional political preferences clash with those of the centre, relations may become antagonistic and tense. The

12

Northern Ireland and the European Union

limited life-span of the Northern Ireland devolved administration has not yet occasioned such a scenario. This does not imply, however, that such a possibility is either unlikely or improbable. The example of agriculture in Northern Ireland – where Northern Ireland and UK preferences diverge – provides a potential basis for conflict. A further complicating matter is the North–South nature of the devolution experiment in Northern Ireland, possessing as it does cross-border institutions which also have a role in the executive administration of EU related policies on the island of Ireland. Moreover, Northern Ireland’s more positive predisposition towards the EU is at odds with the negativity which infuses the broader UK (or English) perspective on Europe. The terms of the devolution package are also constructed in such a way that they limit the extent to which the devolved units of the UK can exploit the EU arena to their own advantage. Regions are still manifestly required to conduct their EU business in ways which do not conflict with national UK priorities. Concordats and memorandums of understanding define the responsibilities of both the national and regional levels within the UK – where conflict arises, the national level dictates. Dealing with EU policies is also a complex task for Northern Ireland politicians, who were initially unfamiliar with the practical operation of the EU and its institutions, and often ill-acquainted with the means of accessing and influencing EU policy. Compounding this problem has been the fact that political parties in Northern Ireland have been slow to engage fully with the EU. Invariably, considerations of the EU tend to constitute an ‘add-on’, rather than a central plank of party policy for the majority of Northern Ireland political parties. EU initiatives and policy developments are not simply a matter of passive reception for Northern Ireland, and the regions of the EU generally. It is just as importantly, if not more so, a matter of successful and effective regional policy preference projection, particularly in the early stages of the EU policy process. For regions seeking to optimise their effectiveness in this regard, there are both formal and informal channels at their disposal. Therefore, the onus is on regional authorities and actors to be aware of EU policy developments which impinge upon their subnational responsibilities and interests, and have a capacity to respond effectively and constructively. This requires appropriate administrative capacity and skilled personnel. It also demands an engagement with the national political administration, civil society actors and other EU regions via the development of networks and links. The myriad of functions now devolved to the Northern Ireland administration place strains on the extent to which a small unit within the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) can fully manage and police what is a vast and complex area of public policy. In effect, the dynamics of Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU are affected by a range of factors including the terms of the devolution arrangements; available resources (including finance, personnel and independent expertise); institutional capacity; political leadership; civil society input; linkages and networks; and cultural predispositions towards the EU. This book presents a systematic examination of the EU in Northern Ireland which addresses all of these

Introduction

13

dimensions. Behind this account of the evolving relationship between Northern Ireland and the EU lies an analytical debate. MLG maps the influence of different jurisdictional and sectoral levels and proposes that the power of the central state has been undermined and that this has occurred in tandem with a shift from government to governance. Disentangling the detail of the Northern Ireland–EU relationship allows these propositions to be tested and facilitates a more empirically focused commentary which is well placed to contribute to wider theoretical debates on EU governance.

Theories of EU governance Theoretical discourse on the EU traditionally concentrated on the European integration process. Studies of the integration process were heavily focused on the effects of progressively closer cooperation between sovereign states, and the possibility of the evolution of a supranational entity. Such studies were dominated by two theories – neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. These competing theories of European integration led the way in describing and accounting for the process of European integration; in explaining the role and functions of key institutions and actors; and in predicting the likely evolution of the integration process. Neofunctionalism, pioneered by Haas (1958) and Lindberg (1963), rested on the notion of ‘spill-over’ where integration in one specific policy field would invariably lead to integration in another. The emerging political system would yield an increasingly important and significant role for supranational EU institutions at the expense of nation-states. Paradoxically, early intergovernmentalists regarded the process of European integration as a process which has, if not strengthened the state, at least not diminished its relative power. Hoffmann (1966, 1982) and more recently Mann (1993), Moravscik (1991, 1993, 1998) and Milward (1992) have ardently disputed talk of the demise of the nation-state and suggest instead that the member-state is, and will remain, the primary unit of power and authority within the EU political system. However, as the integrative process progressed, a dilemma began to emerge. As Wallace (1999: 300) succinctly notes, EU theorists were faced with the reality that if countries had full autonomy and capability, European integration would be redundant. On the other hand if national politics were irrelevant European integ­ ration would not be so contested a process.

The problem was further complicated by the slowing down and stagnation of the integration process during the 1970s. The failure of neofunctionalism to explain or account for this development meant the theory ‘fell into disfavour and was all but abandoned in the mid-1970s’ (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991: 2). Intergovernmentalism therefore became the primary theoretical model for describing the process of European integration. Its primacy, however, was eventually challenged by the emergence, from the 1970s onwards, of rival theories, models and conceptions of European integration and the EU ‘political system’. The renewed optimism and impetus lent to the process of European integration

14

Northern Ireland and the European Union

in the 1980s and 1990s with the launch of the single market and the signing of the Maastricht Treaty encouraged the development of more sophisticated, complex and often specific studies (in terms of policy and time) of the integrative process. The reinvigoration of the integration process thus resulted in a simultaneous renewal of theoretical discourse on the subject. Interestingly, however, it has not resulted in the identification or articulation of one grand theory of European integ­ration, although this is, generally, not regarded as problematic: ‘a “theory of European integration” is neither feasible nor desirable’ (Jachtenfuchs 2001: 259). In any case, Jachtenfuchs continues: ‘European integration as a coherent field of study is disappearing’ (p. 255). This is not to suggest that the battle between supranationalism and intergovernmentalism is moribund. On the contrary, it continues, but it is no longer the dominant structure shaping theoretical and conceptual accounts of the EU. Examining the EU by using the tools of traditional political analysis began with Wallace et al. (1977) and was later developed by Bulmer (1983). Both studies used domestic political analysis to explain the process of policy-making at the EU level, stressed the importance of national governments in EU policy-making and posited that domestic politics could not be divorced from the EU policy process. The treatment of the EU as a ‘political system’, in its own right, was pioneered by Hix (1994, 1998, 1999) and drew heavily on the comparative political science perspective. International relations (IR) and comparative politics theories certainly have merit in animating our understanding of the EU integration process and the dynamics of the EU polity. However, they are limited in what they tell us about the governance of the EU. This ‘gap’ in the literature has been filled somewhat by the emergence of new models and theories which can be bracketed under the ‘governance approach/turn’ label. This approach draws on both IR and comparative politics and considers the EU as neither a traditional international organisation nor as a domestic ‘political system’, but rather as a new and emerging system of ‘governance without government’. (Pollack 2005: 36; emphasis in the original)

Rhodes (1996) was among the first to produce a systematic examination of the term ‘governance’. In so doing, he identifies a range of different meanings associated with the term, and then proceeds to propose a single meaning: ‘governance refers to self-organizing, interorganisational networks’ (p. 660). This definition incorporates four shared characteristics, namely: interdependence between organisations which includes non-state actors; continuing interactions between network members who need to exchange resources and negotiate shared purposes; ‘game-like interactions’ based on trust, regulated by rules and agreed by network members; and a significant degree of autonomy from the state. Governance thus blurs the distinction between the state and civil society, and for this reason can lead to difficulties in relation to the achievement of democratic accountability. Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (2006: 33–37) identify the key features of EU governance as comprising a multi-level nature with a key role for supranational actors

Introduction

15

and a dominance of regulatory politics or public–private networks. The multilevel character of EU governance, in particular, also highlights ‘the consequences of European integration for domestic political institutions and policy processes captured by the concept of “Europeanization”’ (p. 38). Furthermore, such studies provoke questions and provide insights into the effects of changing forms of EU and domestic governance on democratic legitimacy (see Scharpf 1999). A diverse literature has thus emerged which broadly fits within a governance approach to European integration. Diez and Wiener (2009: 11–12) propose that MLG, policy networks, new institutionalisms and social constructivism all fit within this ‘governance’ turn. Kohler-Koch and Rittberger (2006) add Europeanisation to this list, while Pollack (2005: 42) proposes that what he terms ‘reform tracks’ – i.e. parliamentarisation, constitutionalisation and deliberation – can also be considered elements of the EU governance turn. Clearly, there are many strands and streams to the study of EU governance, but what all of these conceptual tools purport to recognise is that ‘the EU is the place where fundamental developments that are transforming the possibilities of effective and responsible governance are probably stronger than elsewhere’ (Jachtenfuchs 2001: 260). MLG conceptions of governance tend to be vaguely defined. Nevertheless, MLG appears to propose that governance entails a lessening of executive and political power, or a movement away from government (see Keating 2008; also Goetz 2008 and Peters and Pierre 2004). The model rests on the notion of sharing authority and policy-making influence between different levels of government – the supranational, the national and the subnational – and has three key features (see Marks et al. 1996b: 346): 1. Decision-making competencies are shared by actors at different levels rather than monopolised by state executives. 2. Collective decision-making among states involves a significant loss of control for individual state executives. 3. Political arenas are interconnected rather than nested. MLG views the EU policy process as involving varied and complex interactions between supranational, national and subnational levels which impact (sometimes negatively) on the sovereignty of the central state. State executives, however, despite a perceived diminishing role, remain the primary actor within the multi-level system (Marks et al. 1996b: 346). The MLG model is not without its critics (see Warleigh 2006 for an overview). Olsen (2008: 16) highlights the ambiguity which surrounds the EU system of governance generally: ‘there is disagreement among policy-makers, citizens and scholars concerning how the EU system of governance works and how it has changed over time’. Boussaguet et al. (2010) warn against drawing simplistic distinctions between old and new patterns of governance in the EU. Others share this concern. Keating (2008) and Goetz (2008) have criticised MLG for relying on a vague interpretation of governance which conceives governance as being ‘new’, in that it is more reliant on civil society input and informal networks than other, older forms. In this way, it is characterised as constituting a movement away from government. It is claimed that the evidence used by propo-

16

Northern Ireland and the European Union

nents of the model to prove such a shift is somewhat crude and unconvincing. These criticisms of MLG forced a degree of reassessment and some reformulation of the original model. Although the identification of two distinct types of MLG (see Hooghe and Marks 2001 and 2003; and Marks and Hooghe 2004) may better illuminate the complex nature of contemporary governance, some authors remain dubious. Keating (2008: 76) continues to question the conceptual rigour of MLG, and in particular its interpretations of governance: The sense in which the term [governance] is used by the MLG theorists seems to be … that [it represents] a move away from government to governance. This raises the old problem of how to use a new concept to analyse a new phenomenon and compare it to what went before. If there is no conceptual continuity between past and present, how can we compare them?

From this perspective, new conceptions of governance cannot be wholly distinguished from traditional conceptions of government. This dichotomy of views – Marks and Hooghe (2004) on the one hand and Goetz (2008) and Keating (2008) on the other – produces conflicting interpretations about the forces which govern the actions and behaviour of contemporary states and regions. The former regard new forms of governance as having a dramatic impact on states, whereas the latter manifestly disagree. MLG has also been criticised for some of the assumptions it makes. Papadopoulos (2010) contends that the more cooperative style of policy-making, which is a feature of the model, can have negative and dubious consequences for democratic accountability. Focused on the role of networks, he proposes that some of the properties of MLG, including the poor visibility of governance networks; the ability of networks to sideline parliament; the sometimes un-inclusive composition of policy networks; and the potential for the multi-level character of the EU to further aggravate accountability lines, all contribute to a deficit in democratic accountability. Indeed, this is one of the more serious criticisms levelled against EU governance. Harlow and Rawlings (2007: 562) refer to ‘the acknowledged problems of accountability associated with the rise of multilevel governance in Europe’. Bovens (2007) argues for the development of new forms of accountability, alongside traditional forms, to enhance formal and informal checks and balances and thus alleviate (at least in part) accountability deficits in EU governance. Tatham (2011: 56) has queried other aspects of the MLG model, namely ‘the misleading expectation that greater devolution increases by-passing of, and conflict with central government abroad’. In a detailed study of 304 regions, he finds that these units constitute important domestic players whose salience and influence in the EU policy cycle may be better accommodated by the liberal intergovernmentalist, rather than the MLG, analytical framework. Increasingly numerous and sophisticated theoretical discussions of the EU have been influenced by a range of empirical developments. The widening and deepening of the EU integration process is one such factor. So too is the de­centralisation of power which many EU states have adopted since the 1980s. This duo of actual (and seemingly paradoxical) political developments – at the

Introduction

17

EU and state-level – forms a clear and ready basis for testing theoretical reflection. This study of Northern Ireland and the EU contributes to that discussion and does so using the following structure.

Chapter outlines The process of dissecting and disentangling the dynamics of Northern Ireland’s changing relationship with the EU requires both a historical and a contemporary overview of the regional polity. It also demands an examination of the different dimensions of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU: political, economic, social and cultural. Chapter 2 sets the context for later chapters by mapping the historic and contemporary Northern Ireland political landscape. It includes an overview of Northern Ireland’s political history, incorporating the first experiment in devolution in the UK from 1921 to 1972, the subsequent direct rule period from 1972 to 1999 and finally, the introduction of devolution again (albeit in a different form) after 1999. The UK’s EU accession process, which occurred at the most volatile and dangerous period in Northern Ireland’s recent history, is examined in some depth. It reveals that the limited, and often hysterical, responses from some political quarters to the prospects of UK membership were rooted solely in domestic considerations of the EU’s impact on UK and Irish national sovereignty. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) was the only Northern Ireland political party which viewed the prospect of EU membership positively. Other political parties and the Northern Ireland general public were somewhat disinterested and did not greet EU accession as enthusiastically as the SDLP. Whilst this may have been unsurprising in view of the many difficulties Northern Ireland faced at this time, the context has changed considerably in recent decades. Today, the region grapples more determinedly with the possibilities inherent in UK membership of the EU. The introduction of devolution provides a possible avenue within which new opportunities can be explored and has altered the nature and tenor of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the outside world, and the EU in particular. This chapter depicts the broad context of Northern Ireland’s evolving relationship with the EU over time and this satisfies calls within the governance literature for a more systematic and thoughtful consideration of the changing role and place of regions within the EU. Chapter 3 is focused on a study of Northern Ireland’s economic experience of the EU. The economic and financial aspect of Northern Ireland relations with the EU has arguably been the most substantive aspect of the region’s engagement with Europe. The chapter identifies and discusses four key ways in which UK membership of the EU has had economic implications for Northern Ireland – the structural funds (and related EU initiatives); the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP); completion of the SEM; and the attraction of inward investment. It also notes the Europe 2020 agenda and the Single Market Act and their very recent consideration by the devolved Northern Ireland administration. Additionally, the impact of the EU on economic relations and cooperation with the Republic of Ireland has been

18

Northern Ireland and the European Union

important. The EU’s economic involvement in Northern Ireland, particularly via the structural funds, has altered, to some extent, the mechanics of governance in the region. In other words, the closer involvement of ‘new’ actors (civil society) and institutions (devolved and cross-border) in the distribution and expenditure of EU finance has produced forms of consultation, decision-making and implementation which are novel and innovative. This new policy environment, however, continues to be one which is largely based on traditional governmental forms, as opposed to being one which displays features associated with governance, or one which produces decidedly different policy outputs. The involvement of civil society is more than balanced by the heightened involvement of devolved government actors, subsequent to the devolution of powers. These actors operate within the confines of the UK state and so minimise the context within which regional autonomy can be exercised. Chapter 4 examines the explicitly political interactions between Northern Ireland and the EU. The chapter explores the different ways in which the EU has been associated with addressing the Northern Ireland conflict and notes the means by which the EU has been considered a model for conflict resolution and/ or an active participant in conflict resolution. The chapter also considers the view that the EU has improved British–Irish relations to the point where the search for a political resolution was made more achievable. It similarly contemplates whether the process of European integration has moderated attachment to identity in ways which have also facilitated the peace process and determines if the institutional structures of the EU bear resemblance to those of the devolved Northern Ireland. The chapter argues that the EU’s role and response to the Northern Ireland conflict is one which studiously respects the independence of the member-states involved. The EU has thus ostensibly promoted a response to the conflict which privileges the position of the Irish and UK states. Paradoxically, despite its reputation as an advocate and example of new forms of governance, the EU has, in this context, been among the least enthusiastic supporters of experimenting with non-state forms of governance. An in-depth account of the current devolved arrangements for managing EU affairs in Northern Ireland forms the focus of Chapter 5. The devolution of powers, the creation of new political institutions and the subsequent alterations to devolved administrative structures have meant changes to the way in which EU policy is managed at the regional level. The adaptation to these new arrangements has been reasonably straightforward. Indeed, many of the more formal aspects of the devolution process – particularly those of a cross-border nature – are merely an official recognition of previously informal practices and arrangements. Notwithstanding the apparent ease of the transition from direct rule to devolution, there have been some important and interesting developments: novel systems and procedures have evolved; additional actors are involved in the EU policy process; and regional political direction is evident to a greater extent than previously. None of these developments, however, have served to radically undermine or challenge the existing political or administrative environment within which policy is pursued. The UK central government maintains a gate-keeper position at the heart

Introduction

19

of Northern Ireland’s engagement with EU. In Northern Ireland itself, the devolved political and administrative structures and mechanics have not produced a new consensus-driven political environment capable of producing markedly different policy outputs. Indeed, the greater institutionalisation of regional politics has, to some extent, stymied the capacity for the regional political system to embrace Bradbury and Mitchell’s notion of ‘new politics’. The relationship between devolution and governance, it seems, does not favour the latter. Political parties and interest groups have traditionally been important players in Northern Ireland politics. Chapter 6 examines the main Northern Ireland political parties and policy communities and determines the ways in which their actions and behaviour vis-à-vis the EU have been modified, subsequent to the introduction of devolution. Despite very different perspectives on the EU, the policy area has not exposed serious tensions between the main political parties. In truth, the EU does not register as an important policy concern for parties. It is only minimally considered, and even then, it is invariably used to further domestic objectives and interests. Nevertheless, it may be the case that the EU has provided a forum within which some form of cross-party political consensus can be achieved. In some minimal ways therefore, a more cooperative style of politics is evident, although it is largely confined to non-contentious issues which serve to benefit Northern Ireland as a whole. Similar cooperation between the political class and interest groups is less apparent. There is only very limited evidence to suggest the emergence of a distinct EU territorial policy community in Northern Ireland. There exists no institutional means of facilitating the type of negotiation and dialogue between government and interest groups with which a territorial policy community is associated. The consociational character of the political settlement in Northern Ireland is explicitly and determinedly focused on the exclusively political realm. Devolution has to some extent elevated political parties, and simultaneously demobilised civil society. A governance perspective does not accurately capture this scenario. Chapter 7 details the extent to which the increasing policy competence of the EU impacts on the policy remit of the Northern Ireland devolved unit. The Northern Ireland response to this new political and policy environment is identified via an examination of the content and intent of a series of official documents produced by the Northern Ireland Executive, Northern Ireland Assembly and the European Commission since 1999. An overview of EU-related policy developments and achievements allows for some observations to be made in relation to the achievement of policy divergence subsequent to the devolution of powers. Some degree of policy divergence is evident, particularly in policy areas where capacity has traditionally existed, such as agriculture and fisheries. In other policy areas, however, the achievement of anticipated divergent policy outcomes has not been borne out in practice. Constrained by institutional obstacles, limited civil society input and a lack of decisive political leadership, the possibilities inherent in the devolution of powers to the new Northern Ireland administration have been only minimally tested. The institutionalisation of regional politics, occasioned by the devolution of powers, has not been a catalyst for the emergence of a more

20

Northern Ireland and the European Union

dynamic or decidedly different policy output environment. Chapter 8 takes stock of the empirical data and proposes three key conclusions. It reiterates the central argument that equating devolution with a more governance-inspired EU policy arena is misleading. The treatment of EU-related policy matters in Northern Ireland, in the period after 1998, does not suggest a substantially altered or more dynamic policy environment. In relation to a variety of political, economic, social and cultural indicators, traditional power relations remain largely intact. The UK central state maintains a core involvement in Northern Ireland’s relations with the EU. At the regional level, the inclusion of additional actors, via new and devolved institutions, has diversified the policy process, and indeed the nature of governance in Northern Ireland has changed. Crucially, however, this does not mean that new arrangements have produced a categorically different policy environment based on a more cooperative style of politics capable of producing more diverse and better tailored policy outputs. The institutionalisation of politics, which devolution entails and consociationalism demands, has lent greater power to political actors. This has manifested itself in the marginalisation of other, mainly civil society, actors. In the EU policy domain, it appears devolution has involved more government, as opposed to more governance. This should not be read as a negative feature of the devolution settlement; rather, it suggests the ‘messiness’ of MLG’s conception of governance, as alluded to by Keating (2008) and others.

Methodology The analysis which informs this book relies on both primary and secondary data. The secondary data used here encompasses a wide variety of sources. In addition to the usual academic sources, official documents and websites, political speeches, press releases, newspaper and periodical commentaries, Hansard records of Northern Ireland Assembly and committee debates (and to a lesser extent blogs and WikiLeaks) have been important sources of information. The study of official documents has involved a largely qualitative form of content analysis. This material has been supplemented by a series of semi-structured interviews. The relative ‘infancy’ of the new political arrangements in Northern Ireland required a direct engagement with a selection of political, administrative and civil society actors, in an attempt to identify and map the key operational characteristics of devolution. Interview data was collected continuously over a five-year period from 2008 to 2012. Primary research relied on elite interviews with approximately 20 interviewees drawn from the Northern Ireland Civil Service (NICS), Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), regional Ministers and civil society. A small number of key political and administrative figures in Brussels and the Republic of Ireland were also consulted. The choice of interviewees was based on an assessment of those with most contact and interest in EU issues as a consequence of their work remit. As such, it attempted to achieve a balanced perspective among civil servants, politicians and other interested parties.

Introduction

21

Notes 1 The Belfast Agreement (or simply the Agreement), also commonly referred to as the Good Friday Agreement, is a reference to the peace document agreed following extended multi-party talks in 1998. It is formally titled ‘The Agreement: Agreement reached in the multiparty negotiations, 10 April 1998’. The term ‘Belfast Agreement’ is the formal designation used in the legislation embodying the provisions of the document i.e. the Northern Ireland Act (1998).   2 The term ‘region’ is used here in a generic sense. It refers to a geographic area of subnational extent. This usage is consistent with its traditional meaning and in contrast to the contemporary usage of the term by some social scientists, who refer to a geographic area of continental proportions. In this book, the word region and terms subnational authority (SNA) or subnational unit are used intermittently. All are presumed to represent the same entity.   3 It is estimated that approximately 90 per cent of public sector housing has been segregated (BBC News, 14 February 2005). In a broader study of segregation in Belfast, Shirlow (2006: 228) found that: ‘the majority of Catholics and Protestants, and those whose community background is either Catholic or Protestant, live in places that are at least 80 per cent Catholic or Protestant’.   4 Approximately 94 per cent of all school children in Northern Ireland are educated separately (McGlynn 2011: 18).   5 For example, the Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) has a very large number of Catholic members but few Protestant ones. In contrast, rugby, cricket and hockey tend to be played by a disproportionate number of Protestants. Soccer, although it is played by both communities in Northern Ireland, engenders much division. Different soccer teams attract either exclusively Protestant or exclusively Catholic supporters.   6 Gross value added (GVA) is gross domestic product (GDP) less taxes plus subsidies.   7 The Northern Ireland Assembly voted in favour of the devolution of justice and policing powers on 9 March 2010. 88 of the 105 votes cast supported the vote. The Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) was the only party to reject the proposals. The new Department of Justice (Northern Ireland) came into existence on 12 April 2010 and is led by Alliance Party Leader, David Ford, MLA.

2

Northern Ireland and the European Union: the context Introduction Northern Ireland has experienced a complex and troubled political history. In recent years, however, its political form has stabilised and today the devolved Northern Ireland administration functions and enjoys a degree of cross-­ community legitimacy. The roots of Northern Ireland’s community division are complex and multifaceted and lie in the ‘social, economic, cultural and geographical structure of Northern Ireland’ (Darby 1976: 196). The traditional intensity and complexity of the division meant that Northern Ireland was long considered to be an example of an intractable conflict (see Rose 1976). The achievement of a ‘solution’ is therefore all the more remarkable. Over the course of the twentieth century and beyond, the dynamics of the conflict evolved and developed. During an era marked by two devastating world wars and the most profound global political change, Northern Ireland’s domestic political fortunes were tied up in a struggle between Britain and Ireland, between North and South and between Protestant and Catholic. The discontent and disagreement which marked Northern Ireland’s history have also marked its politics. The passion and intensity which the internal conflict evoked were largely unperturbed by the transformative events taking place across the world. The region remained resolutely inward-looking. Acutely and intensely focused on its own affairs, it typically remained aloof from the world beyond its own borders. Speaking in the House of Commons in 1922, Churchill conveyed it most effectively when he surmised: Then came the Great War. Every institution, almost, in the world was strained. Great empires have been overturned. The whole map of Europe has been changed ... The modes of thought of men, the whole outlook on affairs, the grouping of parties, all have encountered violent and tremendous changes in the deluge of the world. But as the deluge subsides and the waters fall short, we see the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone emerging once again. The integrity of their quarrel is one of the few institutions that has been unaltered in the cataclysm which has swept the world. (quoted in Gilbert 2012: 163)

His words are equally, if not more, applicable to the period after the Second World War when the intensity and ferocity of the Northern Ireland conflict became even

The context

23

more pronounced. As former enemies began to slowly rebuild Europe from the 1950s onwards with a new collective sense of purpose, the Northern Ireland ‘Troubles’ were about to embrace their darkest days. Northern Ireland’s isolation from the rest of the world has largely been a function of its own internal battles. This self-inflicted isolation has in turn impacted on its relationship with the rest of the world, not least the EU. The region’s engagement with the EU – practically and figuratively – has in the past been marked by, at best, indifference and, at worst, ignorance. Historically, the conflict has served to promote this muted attitude towards the outside world. In the years since the 1970s, Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU has evolved. During the 1990s, the peace process and the introduction of devolution marked a turning point for Northern Ireland. A new-found responsibility for subnational policy issues and an altered political and economic landscape have occasioned a shift in the nature of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU. Today, the region is not unlike many other EU regions and nor is it exempt from processes and developments affecting other parts of Europe. Northern Ireland’s journey over the course of a century has produced a complicated political experience and has shaped the parameters of its contemporary political structures and its relations with the outside world. Understanding Northern Ireland’s history is therefore crucial in comprehending its present.

Northern Ireland’s political history Northern Ireland’s political system has shifted and changed over time, with its form and composition having evolved in response to internal political disputes and pressing security concerns. The changing nature of its political system combined with the resilience of its domestic concerns has structured and framed its politics in ways which have kept wider political and policy debates at bay. Devolution in Northern Ireland: an early experiment The view that Northern Ireland’s devolved system produced an archaic and antiquated form of politics during the period 1921 to 1972 was unfair. Northern Ireland represented ‘the first practical trial of devolution’ (Mansergh 1936: 323). Plans for using a system of devolution can be dated to the nineteenth century, when the concept was first articulated in the context of Irish home rule.1 The first Home Rule Bill for Ireland, tabled in 1886, proposed a hybrid form of federalism and devolution for the island of Ireland as a whole but was defeated by Westminster. A second and similar Home Rule Bill was tabled in 1893, but it too was rejected. The outbreak of the First World War suspended the imposition of the third Home Rule Bill (1912), which was due to be introduced by default after four years, despite its rejection by the House of Lords three times in succession. The failure of the British government to act within the agreed time-span led to violence in Ireland, as proponents of home rule sought to achieve it by physical force. The 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin, which the British government decisively quelled, was a direct response to British inactivity on the Irish home rule question. The

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Northern Ireland and the European Union

manner in which the British authorities dealt with the Irish combatants hardened Irish public opinion against the British state and led to an increase in support for the home rule cause.2 The seeds of dissent had thus been sown and the following decade was to mark a violent and bloody period in the history of Ireland. The response of the British government to the subsequent serious and violent political and civil disorder in Ireland was the partition of the island. The 1920 Government of Ireland Act contained provisions for two parliaments on the island of Ireland: a Belfast parliament with jurisdiction over the six counties of Northern Ireland and a Dublin parliament with powers to legislate for the remaining 26 counties of Ireland. Despite the devolution provisions of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, the new political arrangements came into being only in Northern Ireland.3 The new Northern Ireland entity was a less than cohesive unit. Composed of six counties, Northern Ireland contained a Protestant majority, although the Catholic minority was sizeable (approximately one-third). Mansergh (1936: 316) captures it well when he states: Northern Ireland is not in any sense a natural economic or administrative unit. It comprises, not an historic nation bounded by a traditional frontier as Scotland or Wales, but only the six north-eastern counties of a province of Ireland marked off from the remainder of the country by a straggling, entirely artificial land frontier. It is a political creation designed to answer the necessities of a pressing political problem.

The introduction of devolution in Northern Ireland in 1921 was welcomed by neither the unionist nor the nationalist community. Unionists opposed devolution fearing it to be the beginning of home rule for the entire island of Ireland, while nationalists broadly favoured the concept of home rule, but only in the context of Ireland as a whole (see Arthur 1977). Nevertheless, despite opposition to its introduction, powers were devolved to the local Northern Ireland parliament. The system of government thus created was a ‘system of legislative devolution in which a range of responsibilities was devolved from Westminster to Stormont’ (Birrell and Murie 1980: 50). In keeping with the key principle of devolution, the Westminster parliament remained the supreme authority but delegated unspecified devolved powers to the new Northern Ireland parliament (otherwise known as the Stormont parliament). The legislative responsibilities of parliament were confined to Northern Ireland matters only. This policy remit covered a wide and varied range of policy areas, including the preservation of law and order, public health, hospitals, social services and other social benefits, education, roads, railways and other internal transport services, agriculture, industry and trade, housing, planning and local government (Wilson 1989: 65). Under the provisions of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act, however, Westminster retained the power to override any decisions made by the devolved Northern Ireland government, a key characteristic of devolution. During the 1960s, the nationalist community in Northern Ireland grew increasingly dissatisfied with the regional devolved political system. The most damning criticisms centred on allegations that the system institutionalised unfair treat-

The context

25

ment for Catholics in terms of education, housing, employment and voting rights. According to Maguire (1992: 13), At the worst of times, the unionist majority in the province governed in its own interest and to the detriment of the minority. At the best of times, the devolved institutions lacked the political consensus across the historical community divide to sustain them. For over fifty years, allegations of discrimination and bias against, and repression of, the minority were widespread, and many of these allegations were justified.4

The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement emerged in the late 1960s to oppose the political system they saw as discriminating against the minority community. Opposition centred on the Ulster Unionist Party’s (UUP) uninterrupted control of Stormont over a 50-year period, which was viewed as having produced a longevity of Unionist cabinets, a weak parliamentary opposition and evidence of legislative stagnation (see Wallace 1971 and Arthur 1977). The initially peaceful civil rights movement, however, was overtaken by the emergence of intercommunal violence and elements determined to execute change by violent means. This resulted in a breakdown in civil society and a serious security situation. By 1972, the system of devolution came to an abrupt end when the Northern Ireland parliament was suspended, in response to a situation which was threatening to edge Northern Ireland towards civil war. The inability of the devolved political system to respond adequately or effectively to the crisis unfolding around it meant that the only option for the British government was to assume full and direct responsibility for Northern Ireland affairs. This entailed the suspension of the Stormont parliament in 1972 and its proroguing by Westminster the following year. The actions of the British government in dismantling Stormont were ‘because it had ceased to deliver ruling class dominance and the subordination of the masses’ (Bew et al. 1979: 162). For these reasons: ‘It could not be said … that the [Northern Ireland] experience in devolution had manifestly succeeded’ (Wallace 1971: 179). The opportunity to address the inadequacies and problems inherent in the first devolution attempt in the UK would not materialise again for almost 30 years. In the intervening period, direct rule was imposed. Direct rule: an interim arrangement The imposition of direct rule coincided with the beginning of what was to become a sustained and bloody conflict in Northern Ireland which lasted until 1994, when both republican and loyalist terrorists called cease-fires. For almost 30 years, however, the conflict was waged on the streets of Northern Ireland5 and involved paramilitary organisations on both sides of the political divide. Direct rule meant that politics in the region came under the direction of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who was a member of the UK cabinet and was assisted by a team of Junior Ministers drawn from Westminster. The operation of direct rule was unsatisfactory, to the extent that it removed local political power from local politicians. Knox (1999: 313) refers to

26

Northern Ireland and the European Union the existence of a public administration system characterised by serious problems of accountability. The priority status accorded to constitutional, political and security matters in Northern Ireland … allowed public policy to rest with unelected civil servants or politicians who have no electoral constituency in Northern Ireland.

No member of any of the ministerial teams under direct rule ever had a local political mandate and few had any local knowledge of Northern Ireland.6 Rather, they were national UK politicians and members of national political parties which did not have constituency bases in Northern Ireland. The Secretary of State and colleagues were perceived as ‘part-time’ Ministers who relied to an abnormally great extent on the skills and knowledge of local civil servants. The Northern Ireland Office (NIO), part of the UK home civil service, was also created at this time to take over the law and order functions of the former devolved polity. Additionally, the NIO was responsible for ‘general advice to the Secretary of State on the overall political situation’ (Connolly and Erridge 1990: 23). During this period, the NICS played a key role in the legislative process, scrutinising UK legislation and drafting specific legislation for Northern Ireland. In the absence of local political direction, the civil service in Northern Ireland essentially became a quasi-policy-maker throughout the direct rule period (see Carmichael 2002; and Morison and Livingstone 1995). A reliance on national UK ministerial direction, which was invariably unfamiliar with the needs and interests of the region, allowed the local civil service disproportionately more flexibility and discretion in the administration of the region. In effect, they were not a civil service in the traditional sense, having instead a more political role than that allowed to civil services elsewhere. The lack of control which Northern Ireland citizens had over UK government ministers (and civil servants) was problematic and, according to Knox (1999: 315), constituted ‘a system of unaccountable public administration in Northern Ireland’. This less than satisfactory form of governance led to wider and justifiable claims that Northern Ireland politics suffered from a ‘democratic deficit’ (see Carmichael 1999 and Knox 1999). To some extent, the voluntary and community sector played some role in alleviating the democratic deficit in Northern Ireland during the period of direct rule (see Morison 2006). According to McCall and Williamson (2001: 364), ‘the voluntary and community sector participated in the governance of the region to a degree that is unusual, if not unknown, elsewhere’. In specific terms, the voluntary and community sector populated political and economic spaces in Northern Ireland via their role in the delivery of services or as alternative sites for political activism (Cochrane 2006: 256–257). For all the criticism of the local political arrangements during the years of direct rule, however, the social fabric of society remained intact, and for the most part the real business of government continued, thanks in no short measure to the role of the civil service. Likewise, the close involvement of the voluntary and community sector in the governance of the region was not a universally accepted or welcomed development, but it was an arguably necessary factor in sustaining public services at a time of hostile community relations. Interestingly, many of the characteristics

The context

27

of Rhodes’ (1996) definition of governance are present in Northern Ireland during the period of direct rule. There is a clear degree of interdependence between state and civil society in terms of the delivery of public services. As a consequence, there exists some blurring of the distinction between the two sets of actors. These links however, existed against the backdrop of the conflict, which meant that the issue of trust – an important feature of governance – was often problematic. Birrell (2009: 242–244) notes other features of the direct rule period which fit loosely with the governance perspective, including the promotion of cross-border cooperation and the achievement of coherent and joined-up government. Features of governance, however, co-existed with features of a democratic deficit. In common with other regions of the UK, issues around representation, accountability and transparency were often problematic. Despite such flaws Birrell nevertheless concludes that direct rule succeeded in providing ‘elements of good governance which devolution, on evidence to date, will struggle to meet’ (2009: 245).

Northern Ireland and UK accession to the EU: contextual change The UK acceded to the then European Economic Community (EEC) on 1 January 1973. Membership of the Community came just nine months after the introduction of direct rule in Northern Ireland.7 The accession process for the UK and the Republic of Ireland began in 1969 when the Hague Summit agreed the commencement of membership negotiations. Intensive discussions and negotiations continued for a period of almost two years, during which time the Northern Ireland conflict intensified. The bid for UK and Irish membership of the EU therefore took place against the backdrop of serious violence and loss of life on the streets of Northern Ireland.8 However, for all the political manoeuvring, dialogue and negotiation around EU membership, there was no attempt by UK, Irish or European political actors of the day to link the resolution of the conflict to the EU context. Apparently, neither Irish nor UK authorities viewed accession to the EU as having any significant direct impact on the Northern Ireland conflict (see Kennedy 2000b). According to Hainsworth (1983), there was a perception among key political figures in Northern Ireland that the UK authorities were keen to avoid any discussion of the Northern Ireland situation in relation to EU accession negotiations. Consequently, the deteriorating situation in the region at that time was allegedly viewed by the British Prime Minister, Edward Heath, as ‘an irritant’ in the context of securing UK membership of the EU (or at least this was the perception). The Northern Ireland Prime Minister at the time, Brian Faulkner, believed that Prime Minister Heath was: anxious that nothing should happen in Northern Ireland to interfere with his European policy. Already embarrassing questions had been raised by EEC colleagues and on security, in particular, the Ulster situation had involved the United Kingdom Government internationally in a difficult defence of … policy. (Bleakley as quoted in Hainsworth 1983, p. 54)

If the reaction of the UK, Irish and European political elite to the impact of EU membership on the Northern Ireland conflict was muted, the response of domestic

28

Northern Ireland and the European Union

Northern Ireland politicians was less restrained. Both republicans and Paisleyites9 were ardently opposed to EU membership, viewing it as at variance with their respective political ideals. In the Stormont debating chambers, there was some discussion of matters European prior to UK accession, but these were invariably coloured by domestic political considerations or ‘channelled into traditional arguments’, as was (and is) the case in many other regions of Europe (Hainsworth 1983: 56). The SDLP was the only Northern Ireland political party to engage early and positively with the prospects of EU membership (see McLoughlin 2009). In contrast, the UUP largely ignored the new European context, making only scant reference to the EU in its 1973 election manifesto (Murphy 2009: 594). This indifference was also apparent beyond party politics. Guelke (1988: 155) has concluded that ‘there was a relatively muted reaction in the province to actual entry to the Community’. The view that the EU may empower the Northern Ireland region was not appreciated. Sovereignty and national identity were the filters through which hardened political positions on Europe were articulated. These views did not engender an open-minded disposition towards the EU, or the capacity to consider the potential of the MLG promise and its possible impact. Elsewhere, however, there was some discussion of the effect of UK and Irish EU membership on the Northern Ireland conflict. Writing in 1972, Garrett Fitzgerald (1972: 103) suggested that: ‘Membership of the European Communities may well prove to be the most important single factor influencing events in a positive direction in the years ahead’. The author’s reference to a ‘positive direction’ was one he equated with the creation of a united Ireland. The logic behind this assertion was based on the belief that ‘the economic rationale for partition w[ould] not exist within the EEC’ (1972: 105). Moxon-Browne (1992: 49) noted that there was some evidence prior to, and in the early years after, accession, that the removal of barriers between states would facilitate improved relations between the North and the South of Ireland. This would be achieved as a consequence of increased UK– Irish governmental contact in the Council of Ministers, a development which had the potential to help ameliorate strained relations. In addition, Moxon-Browne noted that the European post-war experience of peaceful co-existence with former enemies was perceived as being an example to Northern Ireland in attempts to resolve the conflict (1992: 49). For the most part, however, these early predictions about the impact the EU might have on the Northern Ireland conflict proved inaccurate. Attempts to link the EU to the resolution of the Northern Ireland conflict were generally unpopular and invariably unsuccessful (see Chapter 4). They were focused on elite views, national political reconfiguration and economic logic and they did not connect with wider governance issues. As one of the more peripheral parts of the EU, Northern Ireland’s physical and psychological distance from the European centre may have contributed to minimal levels of engagement with the EU for much of the period since 1973. A resolute focus by Northern Ireland political representatives on constitutional and security matters further minimised the space for discussion or consideration of other policy issues. The conflict and the absence of local political responsibility effectively cushioned many Northern Ireland political actors from grappling with

The context

29

a wide range of day-to-day policy issues. McGarry (2004: 344) refers to ‘the political vacuum that preceded devolution’, which limited debate on socio-economic and related issues. With specific reference to the EU and Northern Ireland political parties, Murphy (2007: 298) concludes that ‘in terms of a hierarchy of policy prio­ rities, issues around the EU languished at the very bottom’. In Northern Ireland during this period, the EU was a peripheral political issue. The relentlessness and awfulness of the ‘Troubles’ disproportionately occupied the minds of politicians and public alike. Discussions concerning the EU’s supposed potential to challenge this environment were little in evidence. In the only comprehensive study of Northern Ireland and the EU pre-devolution, Kennedy (2000c: 15) concluded that ‘neither the economic and social, nor the political problems of Northern Ireland have faded away within a benign European embrace’. In other words, the EU (contrary to the expectations of some early commentators) did not prove capable of solving Northern Ireland’s many economic, social and political problems. According to Kennedy, the fate and fortunes of the region remained largely unchanged during the first 25 years of UK membership of the EU. This blanket conclusion – however accurate – does nevertheless conceal some important sector-specific developments which have been to Northern Ireland’s benefit. The persistent focus of Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU throughout the period of direct rule remained resolutely fixed on economic considerations. Financial support from the structural funds, Peace programmes and Community Initiatives have been welcome in Northern Ireland, whilst the support from the CAP has assisted the local agricultural industry. The 1990s, however, marked a change in the context within which Northern Ireland might engage with EU issues. The absence of large-scale violence, new devolved arrangements and the ongoing evolution of the EU set the scene for new possibilities and opportunities.

The new context: a return to devolution In 1999, and for the second time in a century, Northern Ireland embraced devolution. In the same way as devolution had previously sought to resolve the ‘Irish question’, the reintroduction of devolution in Northern Ireland at the close of the twentieth century was a response to conflict. The 1998 Belfast Agreement – which is synonymous with the devolution exercise – creates a devolved political system, the features of which are designed to accommodate two opposing communities. Against this delicate and politically charged backdrop, considerations of good governance were inevitably secondary to practical concerns around the very achievement of an agreed settlement. In many ways, it mattered not what was agreed; rather, it mattered that there was agreement. If judged by the influences which guided its creation and by the complex and unusual institutional set-up it creates, devolution in Northern Ireland is distinct from devolution in other parts of the UK. However, in terms of its basic principles, devolution in Northern Ireland is no different from that in Scotland or Wales. Similar to its previous incar-

30

Northern Ireland and the European Union

nation, devolution in Northern Ireland today is a specific form of regionalisation which involves the transfer of powers from a superior to an inferior political authority. More precisely, devolution may be defined as consisting of three elements: the transfer to a subordinate elected body, on a geographical basis, of functions at present exercised by ministers and Parliament. These functions may be either legislative, the power to make laws, or executive, the power to make decisions within a primary legal framework still determined at Westminster. (Bogdanor 1999: 2–3; emphasis in the original)

The supremacy of the national parliament is upheld under arrangements for devolution, and the devolved parliament or assembly is in effect a subordinate institution. ‘Transferred’ powers are delegated to the new, devolved parliament and assemblies by Westminster, which can retrieve them at any time. This latter point specifically marks devolution out as distinct from federalism. Under current UK devolution arrangements, central government retains legislative responsibility in a series of ‘excepted’ policy areas including the constitution, foreign affairs, defence, national security, fiscal and monetary policy. A number of policy areas are also ‘reserved’ to central government, including ‘relations with the EU’. In the case of ‘reserved’ matters, the devolved legislatures can legislate, but only with the consent of their respective Secretary of State.10 The key principles and features of the devolution arrangements for Northern Ireland are found in the Belfast Agreement and, subsequently, in more detail in the 1998 Northern Ireland Act. O’Leary (1998: 3) has described the Belfast Agreement in the following terms: the Agreement is an agreement to establish an internal consociation built within overarching confederal and federal institutions; it has imaginative elements of co-sovereignty; it promises a novel model of ‘double protection’; and it rests on a bargain derived from diametrically conflicting hopes about its likely long-run outcome, but that may not destabilise it.

The delicate political equilibrium which the Agreement promotes is sustained by a form of devolved consociationalism which seeks to manage difference in Northern Ireland.11 The key features of consociationalism respond to community division by seeking to guarantee the rights and aspirations of all: The features of grand coalition, minority (and mutual) veto and segmental autonomy could be seen as positive developments, designed to foster societal reconciliation within a secure state, free from political violence. (Tonge 2005a: 37)

Consociationalism is not universally viewed as constituting the most effective means of pacifying warring societies. In Northern Ireland’s case, however, it is generally regarded by leading scholars as an appropriate, if less than perfect, response to the conflict (see for example Coakley 2009; and McGarry and O’Leary 2009). Its emphasis on the management, as opposed to the resolution, of conflict finds explicit expression in the institutions created by the Belfast Agreement. In institutional terms, the Belfast Agreement creates three primary bodies.

The context

31

These are situated within a wider political framework involving police reform, accelerated prisoner releases, the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, the creation of an independent Human Rights Commission and a review of the criminal justice system. Equality is guaranteed and reinforced by the inclusion of a Bill of Rights and the creation of an Equality Commission. The establishment of a civic forum (now defunct) was intended to ensure a form of representation for other minorities not represented formally within the system (O’Leary 1998: 8–9). Strand 1 (Paragraph 1) of the Belfast Agreement provides for: a democratically elected Assembly in Northern Ireland which is inclusive in its membership, capable of exercising executive and legislative authority, and subject to safeguards to protect the rights and interests of all sides of the community.

The Assembly has 108 members elected on the basis of proportional representation with a single transferable vote (PR-STV). The institution has responsibility for passing primary legislation in devolved areas. The decision-making process within the Northern Ireland Assembly has a number of inbuilt safeguards to ensure equality of representation. In agreeing legislation, decisions may be taken on a cross-community basis. This is achieved via ‘parallel consent’ or a ‘weighted majority’ (Strand 1, Paragraph 5(d)). MLAs are required to register a ‘designation of identity’ – nationalist, unionist or other. This provision is for the purposes of measuring cross-community support when the parallel consent or weighted majority voting mechanisms are used.12 The system is not without its critics. Farry (2009: 175–176) suggests that it can be described as ‘institutionalising divisions’ and preventing ‘the emergence of non-communalbased parties’. This perceived cementing of division does not imply that the roots of the conflict will be overcome in the longer-term and thus begs questions as to the sustainability of the peace process, the stability of the devolved consociational political system and even the future of Northern Ireland (see Aughey 2012). From the ranks of the Assembly, the Executive Committee is chosen. The Executive is headed by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, whose appointments are agreed using parallel consent. As such, they enjoy the support of a majority of both unionist and nationalist members within the Assembly. Both individuals stand jointly for election and, likewise, should one resign, the other is obliged to follow. Furthermore, all actions by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister – be they addressing the Assembly, attending committee meetings or making policy statements – are, theoretically, conducted by both individuals jointly. The allocation of departmental ministerial posts is decided using the d’Hondt system, which ensures each party is allocated ministers on the basis of their share of Assembly seats. This likewise facilitates the power-sharing features of the system. The resulting Executive Committee is effectively a coalition government, but one that is not based on a coalition agreement. Wilford (2007: 167) has labelled it ‘a confected grand coalition’, which during the early period of devolution from 1999–2002 resembled ‘a loveless marriage’. All executive authority in devolved areas is discharged by the Executive Committee. By necessity, however, there has

32

Northern Ireland and the European Union

been no adherence to the principle of collective responsibility, and Ministers effectively enjoy substantial individual powers in the discharge of their duties. This element of the Belfast Agreement has been criticised: There has been a strong tendency for government ministers to act on an individual basis, often adopting communal interests. Ministers control their own ‘fiefdoms’; they protect their budgets and develop policies in isolation from those of other departments, thereby creating a silo mentality. (Horgan and Gray 2012: 470)

This feature of the consociational settlement has been addressed, at least partially, by the St Andrews Agreement (2006). Under new provisions, the Northern Ireland Assembly can now refer individual decisions by Ministers back to the Executive Committee for consideration. The work of Ministers is also monitored by corresponding Assembly committees. Their role is to scrutinise, to initiate and develop policy and to consult. A potentially more problematic feature of the Executive Committee power-sharing arrangement is that it effectively rules out the existence of a strong opposition. The five largest political parties in Northern Ireland sit around the Executive table, meaning that the opposition is composed of small parties and few MLAs. The resulting absence of a credible alternative government or government-in-waiting is unusual – Wilford (2010: 138) subtly hints as to the possible effect: ‘the Assembly supplies a corrective to Sir Ivor Jennings’ dictum: “If there be no Opposition there is no democracy”’. The creation of new internal institutions with a range of powers and responsibilities has handed a measure of power to democratically elected representatives. Where previously a democratic deficit was perceived to exist, the allegation is less fitting today. The denser institutional environment and the more crowded political arena have, to some extent, normalised Northern Ireland politics by lending it democratic credentials and greater political legitimacy. Such a development is welcome, but it may not accommodate the governance agenda in that it has handed substantial power and autonomy to the local political elite (and away from civil society) and has formally tied Northern Ireland to the central state under the legislative terms of the devolution settlement. The North–South Ministerial Council (NSMC) (Strand 2) provides the ‘Irish dimension’ to the Agreement. The purpose of the institution itself is (Paragraph 1) to bring together those with executive responsibilities in Northern Ireland and the Irish Government, to develop consultation, cooperation and action within the island of Ireland – including through implementation on an all-island and cross-border basis – on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the administrations North and South.

In O’Leary’s analysis (1998: 9), the creation of the NSMC constitutes ‘an allIreland confederal relationship’. Both legislatures are distinct political institutions but can collectively make decisions, particularly in the context of the all-Ireland implementation bodies,13 effectively meaning that the NSMC enjoys executive functions. The NSMC is a unique institution which formalises relations and cooperation between the Republic of Ireland and a region of the UK. This represents

The context

33

an interesting, if somewhat imbalanced, relationship in terms of the sovereignty and autonomy enjoyed by each participating unit. It is also a politically sensitive institution which is naturally more attractive to nationalists than to unionists. Its early years were marked by a fitful work schedule occasioned by suspensions of devolution and a failure by the DUP to participate. In recent years, however, the status of the NSMC has stabilised. There is an apparently abiding emphasis on functional cooperation and mutual benefit. The unique nature of the NSMC and its transnational character potentially lend it some significance to wider debates concerning contemporary governance. Strand 3 of the Belfast Agreement has an East–West component and creates structures which link the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK. The result is the creation of the British–Irish Council (BIC) (Strand 3, Paragraph 1), which promotes ‘the harmonious and mutually beneficial development of the totality of relationships among the peoples of these islands’. The Council brings together representatives of the British and Irish governments, and of devolved institutions in Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales, in addition to representatives of the Isle of Man, Channel Islands and Guernsey. Other appropriate institutions, should they emerge, will also be included within the framework. The Council is essentially a forum for discussion but marks a new era of institutional cooperation in Anglo-Irish relations. Reflecting its less contentious character, the BIC is not central to the Agreement as it is not tied to any of the other institutions in the same way as the Assembly and NSMC are mutually interdependent. In governance terms, its ‘autonomy from the state’ is subject to checks. A lack of executive powers and the involvement of two states – the UK and the Republic of Ireland – potentially undermine the independence and clout of the institution. Additionally, and like the NSMC, the BIC’s early years were low profile and largely unproductive. The institution has since matured and meets regularly to discuss a relatively wide range of areas of common interest. Although the BIC represents an institutional innovation and demonstrates some features of the governance perspective, its membership and consultative, as opposed to executive, character may be limiting. Its early history has not suggested that it constitutes a dynamic addition to the reformed political and institutional landscape. The sum of these institutional arrangements creates a complex regional political system which is required to deal with controversial and sensitive policy reforms including, but not confined to, those explicitly detailed in the Belfast Agreement. This complexity is compounded by the ambiguity of the text of the Agreement, which has meant that implementation of its complicated terms has not been straightforward. According to Dixon (2008: 278–279), a number of issues within the document were left open to interpretation and negotiation in order to provide political elites with the ‘creative ambiguity’ and ‘wriggle room’ to allow the Agreement and peace process to survive and evolve.

The vagueness of the Agreement, however, was not always opportune. The devolved Northern Ireland administration experienced a series of suspensions

34

Northern Ireland and the European Union

during the years after 1999 (see Murphy 2007: 302 for an overview). The most prolonged and most serious period of suspension lasted almost five years from October 2002 to May 2007. Gormley-Heenan and Devine (2010: 143) suggest that ‘the stunted progress made between 1998 and 2007 was in large part blamed on the absence of trust between the key political protagonists’. Others contend that the explanation for the ongoing political instability in Northern Ireland during this period can be blamed instead on the structural shortcomings of the institutions created by the Belfast Agreement combined with the limited leadership, vision and skills of Northern Ireland’s politicians (Wolff 2005: 45). In his analysis of the peace process and the Belfast Agreement, Dixon criticises the reliance on consociationalism. He claims that it is ‘overly focused on the “institutional fix”’ and shows ‘little realism in its understanding of what was “the art of the possible”’ (2008: 319; see also Dixon 2002a and 2007). Others too have found fault with the consociational ‘solution’, claiming that the Agreement undermines democratic principles, further consolidates divisions within society, polarises support for hard-line and more extremist political parties and has, in some ways, intensified, if not the extent, at least the ferocity of the conflict (see for example Cadogan Group 1998; Gilland Lutz and Farrington 2006; O’Neill 2007; Ruane and Todd 1999). The Agreement may indeed have its flaws, but those who defend it point to the progressive achievement of, admittedly fitful, peace and stability in Northern Ireland. There is too some recognition that The Good Friday Agreement is not a permanent settlement. It manages and harnesses divisions and places them within institutional frameworks. It may, however, lead to a reconciliation. The difficulty for the Agreement’s critics is in devising an alternative with sufficiency of consensus. (Tonge 2002: 199)

Negotiations aimed at overcoming continuing difficulties during the 2000s culminated in the St Andrews Agreement (2006),14 which clarified elements of the Belfast Agreement and eventually led to the restoration of devolution on 8 May 2007. On this date, the DUP and Sinn Féin assumed the posts of First Minister and Deputy First Minister respectively. Almost three years later in April 2010, the devolution of justice and policing powers was achieved under the terms of the Hillsborough Agreement (2010). Over a decade after the signing of the Belfast Agreement, it can be reasonably maintained that the Northern Ireland devolved political system has reached some form of sustainable equilibrium. In the absence of other viable alternatives, the outputs of the peace process and the Belfast Agreement are notable. Despite the continuing threat from dissident paramilitary groups, large-scale and widespread political violence is no longer the case in Northern Ireland. Political parties – particularly the DUP and Sinn Féin – have moved towards the centre. Local politicians and civil society have engaged with the new devolved institutions and public support for devolution is steady. Coakley (2008) argues that a return to bloodshed in Northern Ireland is unlikely and that Northern Ireland’s devolved political institutions are well-placed to survive in the long-term. He credits the Belfast Agreement with providing a workable framework for power-sharing and acknowledges the manner in which

The context

35

agreement was achieved over time. He concludes: ‘the Northern Ireland example shows that even apparently hopeless conflict zones may, given appropriate conditions, be converted into stable, peaceful democracies’ (2008: 111).

Conclusion Despite Northern Ireland’s isolation, troubled history and problematic politics, the introduction and implementation of devolution in the region mark a definitive break with the past. In common with many other regions of Europe, Northern Ireland is today governed according to the terms of an advanced form of regionalisation. The signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998 and the introduction of devolution in 1999 may have been a direct response to the conflict, but they simultaneously created regional structures and processes which are, in some ways, comparable to those found in other European regions. Northern Ireland is therefore no longer entirely removed from wider European developments and debates. The region is – in theory – better placed to act more strategically in optimising its experience as a small peripheral region within an expanding and increasingly diverse EU. The changed political and institutional context which devolution facilitates provides an arena within which EU opportunities can be explored and exploited. Northern Ireland’s tentative movement towards the political mainstream, however, is not total. Although the region bears a closer resemblance to other EU regions, Northern Ireland’s political system continues to mark the region out as distinct. The consociational peace settlement, novel political institutions and power-sharing practices are unique to Northern Ireland. They institutionalise and formalise a series of transnational, intranational and cross-party relationships. Their distinctiveness potentially heralds in a new era of governance in Northern Ireland involving as it does new participants and participative practices, and a consensus-driven policy process. It is the aim of the following chapters to determine the truth or otherwise of this view with respect to Northern Ireland’s interactions with the EU under the terms of the devolution project. The region represents a surprisingly appropriate and revealing case-study for establishing whether recent developments signal the consolidation of new forms of governance which satisfy MLG accounts of the contemporary EU.

Notes   1 Dudley Edwards (1992) provides an interesting historical outline of the general development of the devolution concept.   2 Sixteen of the leaders of the Easter Rising were executed by the British Army, including all seven signatories to the Proclamation of a Republic for all Ireland, which had been read on the steps of the General Post Office in Dublin during the rising.   3 The South of Ireland secured first dominion, then free state status, before eventually becoming the Republic of Ireland in 1949.   4 Although the nature and extent of discrimination in Northern Ireland during this period have been the subject of debate and dispute, most commentators agree that discrimina-

36

Northern Ireland and the European Union

tion did exist and that it was disproportionately experienced by the Catholic community (see for example Darby 1976 and Whyte 1983 and 1990).   5 Dublin, London and other parts of the UK and Europe were sporadically targeted by terrorist bombings and shootings during the direct rule period.   6 Brian Mawhinney, originally from Northern Ireland, was a Conservative Party MP for the constituencies of Peterborough and, later, North West Cambridgeshire. He served as a Junior Minister and Minister of State in the Northern Ireland Office during the 1980s and early 1990s.   7 Direct rule from London was initiated on 24 March 1972.   8 1972 was the worst year of the ‘Troubles’ if judged in terms of the number of casualties. Almost 500 lives were lost, including fourteen on Bloody Sunday in January 1972.   9 Paisleyites was the name given to those who supported the Revd Dr Ian Paisley, leader of the DUP. 10 Other ‘reserved’ matters include immigration; macro-economics; trade; transport safety and regulation; policing, penal matters and the legal system (in Wales only); employment legislation (in Scotland and Wales only); and the civil service (in Scotland and Wales). 11 Although pessimistic about its prospects, Lijphart (1975) was the first to apply consociationalism to a study of Northern Ireland. McGarry and O’Leary (see for example 2004) have since written extensively on the application of consociationalism to Northern Ireland. 12 Parallel consent requires agreement to be achieved on the basis of a majority of those present and voting, including a majority of both unionist and nationalist designations present and voting. A weighted majority implies that of those present and voting 60 per cent must support the legislative proposal before the house before it can be passed. In addition, the support of 40 per cent of nationalists and 40 per cent of unionists is also necessary to deem a proposal passed. For the purposes of voting, the parallel consent procedure must be attempted first and then followed by the weighted majority procedure. Decisions requiring cross-community support must be designated in advance but include the election of the Chair of the Assembly, First Minister and Deputy First Minister, standing orders, budget allocations and the Executive’s Programme for Government. In other cases, the use of parallel consent or a weighted majority can be triggered by a petition from 30 of the 108 members of the Assembly. 13 Six cross-border implementation bodies have responsibilities in the areas of inland waterways; food safety; trade and business development; special EU programmes; language; and aquaculture and marine matters. Areas identified for cooperation using existing bodies include agriculture; transport; education; health; environment; and tourism. 14 Key measures contained within the document included: a timetable for the devolution of policing and criminal justice; endorsement of the Executive by the Assembly no longer required; revised pledge of Ministerial office; creation of a statutory Ministerial code; MLAs no longer permitted to change community designation during the Assembly term (unless they changed party); repeal of the UK government’s power to suspend devolution; specific policy commitments by the UK government in relation to social inclusion, victims and language policy.

3

Northern Ireland and the European Union: the economic dynamics Introduction Northern Ireland’s political environment has clearly been subject to immense changes in recent decades. The Northern Ireland economy has been similarly responsive to a range of different forces. Factors influencing Northern Ireland’s economic fortunes include the broader EU and UK economic context and, more recently, international economic developments and the global financial crisis. The conflict and the peace process have also impacted on the Northern Ireland economy. Although the EU context has been less financially significant than the domestic (Gudgin 2000: 38), the economic context of Northern Ireland’s relations with the EU has arguably been the most substantive aspect of its engagement with Europe. As one MLA has remarked (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002): ‘Most [Northern Ireland-EU] contacts have centred on the financial largesse of the EU in its funding of agricultural, structural or peace and reconciliation schemes’. The receipt of funding from Europe has typically enjoyed positive publicity in Northern Ireland. However, it is only one of a number of ways of judging the economic impact of the EU on the region. Gudgin (2000: 39) identifies four key ways in which UK membership of the EU has had economic implications for Northern Ireland – the structural funds (and related EU initiatives); the CAP; completion of the SEM; and the attraction of inward investment. More recently, Europe 2020 and the Single Market Act have required economic action on the part of member-states and their constituent units. Additionally, the EU influence promotes cross-border cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, and much of this is driven by financial aid. In the same way as Northern Ireland’s political history is unusual, so too is its regional economy. Despite some important regional economic strengths, the region’s economic fortunes have been heavily and negatively affected by a range of domestic structural and socio-political factors, and more recently the global economic downturn (HM Treasury 2011: 7–9). This forms the backdrop against which Northern Ireland has experienced the economic implications of UK membership of the EU. In order to best judge the nature, extent and reasons for economic change in Northern Ireland since UK accession, it is necessary to appre-

38

Northern Ireland and the European Union

ciate the specific dynamics of the regional economy. This chapter identifies and discusses the peculiarities and the broad challenges facing the Northern Ireland economy. The chapter also acknowledges that the introduction of devolution in 1999 occasioned some change in the manner of economic governance in Northern Ireland. This has altered Northern Ireland’s engagement with the UK, and also the EU, on matters economic and financial. For the structural funds, the most pronounced component of Northern Ireland’s economic relationship with the EU, a broad range and number of actors and interests at multi-levels have participated in the policy arena since the 1990s. This resilient pattern of multi-level, multisectoral and multi-actor engagement – which pre-dates the introduction of devolution in 1999 – reflects many of the elements of the governance turn. Nevertheless, some adjustment occurred during the 2000s. The involvement of civil society is now more than balanced by the heightened involvement of devolved government actors. These latter actors operate within the confines of the UK state and this potentially minimises the extent to which regional autonomy can be exercised. In addition, the Northern Ireland devolved administration’s capacity to identify and exploit opportunities related to other key economic aspects of the EU’s activities is not uniform across the policy spectrum. For CAP and the structural funds, the level of awareness and engagement across the political, administrative and civic spectrum is high. The region has long been proactive in seeking to influence developments and implement initiatives – in these policy realms, central state dominance is less vigorous. For other policy domains, however, specifically the SEM, Single Market Act and the Europe 2020 strategy, equivalent levels of awareness and capacity did not exist and they have only lately been cultivated. Pre-1999, such initiatives were traditionally led by the UK state with little input from Northern Ireland. The promise of direct financial aid has forced some innovative developments in Northern Ireland, but even here, a decisive shift from government to governance during the era of devolved power is not obvious. Where direct economic assistance is not available, as is the case for the Europe 2020 strategy, high levels of interdependence, resource exchange and a sense of shared purpose fuelled by trust have only very recently materialised and are predominantly due to the influence of the Northern Ireland Taskforce (NITF), sponsored by the European Commission.1 Indeed for all EU policies with a strong economic component, the dynamics of devolution, the requirement to abide by the UK line and the limited domestic enthusiasm for experimenting with non-traditional forms of governance, mediate the potentially more profound effects of Northern Ireland’s evolving economic relationship with Europe.

The peculiarity of Northern Ireland’s economy Any examination of the Northern Ireland regional economy must be approached cautiously. Its position within the UK (and the EU) must be the context within which assessments and observations are made. According to Birnie (2000: 95),

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39

In fact, a case could be made for doubting the intellectual worth of considerations of the Northern Ireland economy as a separate region given the degree of openness to and integration with the rest of the UK … Certainly it would be a mistake to analyse the regional economy as if Northern Ireland were a quasi-independent state.

Conceptions of there being a distinct Northern Ireland ‘economy’ are probably related to its geographical separateness from the rest of the UK, and also from its experience of devolved power between 1921 and 1972, which lent it some uniqueness within the broader UK context. Nevertheless, it is clear that in many significant ways, the Northern Ireland economy is distinct, and thus there is merit in examining it through a regional lens. The Northern Ireland regional economy traditionally enjoyed largely positive economic circumstances and experiences, at least relative to the rest of the island. During the early half of the twentieth century, shipbuilding and the syntheticfibre industry were of particular importance. Despite an economic crisis during the 1930s and some reductions in industrial output after the Second World War, production continued to grow. The 1950s and 1960s, in particular, saw changes in the structure of employment which attracted overseas inward investment and resulted in impressive growth in manufacturing production (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988: 72). This trend, however, was not to last. During the 1970s, the global recession and the outbreak of the ‘Troubles’ had negative effects on Northern Ireland’s economic situation. Inward investment dried up and unemployment rose, developments which were arguably exacerbated by the conflict and violence on the streets. During this period, the economy was effectively sustained by the rise in public sector jobs which were financed by a massive subvention from the UK central government: As it was, modest economic activity was maintained at the cost of a huge sub­vention from the British exchequer; equal to more than a third of regional gross national product (GNP) (not including the cost of maintaining the British security forces). (O’Hearn 2008: 103–104)

In effect, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed ‘a dramatic reversal of fortune’ for the Northern Ireland economy (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988: 79). A prolonged indus­trial crisis, coupled with serious political instability, resulted in long-term economic stagnation. The result has been that for much of its recent history, Northern Ireland has been one of the most economically disadvantaged regions within the UK. This status is closely related to consistently high unemployment rates, which also exposed the sectarian divide in Northern Ireland: ‘Employment opportunities for Catholics in Northern Ireland were restricted by discrimination, lack of education and skills and the location of industry’ (Rowthorn and Wayne 1988: 106). Comparatively high unemployment rates and a heavy reliance on public sector employment have traditionally been the most problematic features of the Northern Ireland regional economy. Since the 1990s, however, Northern Ireland’s economic situation has changed for the better. According to Wolff (2002: 105),

40

Northern Ireland and the European Union Sustained economic growth in Northern Ireland since the early 1990s has not only been reflected in actual GDP growth figures, but has also had a positive impact on unemployment, pay increases, and economic confidence among businesses in the region.

Such developments have been linked to the notion of a ‘peace dividend’. According to O’Hearn (2000: 183), the ‘peace dividend’ promises an opportunity to participate to a greater degree in ‘normal’ economic activities – trade, investment, and entrepreneurship – that, supposedly, were discouraged by conflict. The implication is often that the lack of economic activity is a result of war rather than of the structural inequalities that preceded war, or that conditions changed during the course of war to such a degree that the marginalized community can now participate more fully in regional economic activities.

Some observers – most notably the media and Irish, British and US governments (see O’Hearn 2008: 110) – have drawn connections between the calling of paramilitary cease-fires in 1994 and a simultaneous influx of inward investment, growth in the tourism and retail sectors, and a housing boom. However, despite positive signs of growth, the ‘peace dividend’ appears to be somewhat mythical: Far from a peace dividend based on a rising, productive economy in the most modern manufacturing and service sectors, the rise of employment under peace has been irregular and based primarily in construction and real estate, which are a shaky basis for long-term development. (O’Hearn 2008: 106)

Although the impact of peace on the fortunes of the Northern Ireland regional economy may be dubious, the introduction of devolution and its potential to produce change is less disputed. The 1998 Belfast Agreement makes explicit reference to a regional economic strategy document, which the Northern Ireland Assembly will consider and agree (p. 19). Beyond this, the Northern Ireland adminis­tration is charged with managing a range of devolved policies. Significantly, this means direct and immediate responsibility for the management of the block grant from the UK central government. In practical terms, it was anticipated that this would facilitate speedy distributional adjustments between departments and ‘quicker and more flexible decision-making’ (Birnie and Hitchens 1998: 770). The interrupted nature of the devolution project, however, has been problematic in developing an economic strategy for the region. Nevertheless, in 2012 the Northern Ireland Executive launched an Investment Strategy for Northern Ireland 2008–2018.2 The Executive has also produced successive budgets. The current budget covers the period 2011–15 and was drafted against the backdrop of the global economic crisis and the resultant reduction in financial resources from the UK central government. Devolution requires that the regional political system take primary responsibility for the production of these documents and for all decisions in relation to resource allocation at the regional level. The requirement that the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly debate and agree broad economic priorities and reach collective decisions in relation to capital

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investment, budgetary allocations and resource-sharing hints at the political and democratic positives of the devolution experiment. However, in real terms, the actual detail of key economic documents and initiatives does not necessarily signal significant divergence vis-à-vis the pre-devolution period. Critically, the Northern Ireland Executive can only operate in the context of what it receives from Westminster via the block grant. This amount has been falling progressively in recent years. In response to the global economic crisis and in an attempt to secure national economic stability, the UK coalition government produced proposals to reduce public spending. The Spending Review (2010) has clear implications for Northern Ireland and details ‘a real terms reduction in resource DEL (Departmental Expenditure Limits) of 8 per cent, and a real-terms reduction in capital DEL of 40 per cent by the end of the Spending Review period’ (Northern Ireland Executive 2011b: 6). The Prime Minister, David Cameron, and former Northern Ireland Secretary of State, Owen Paterson, have also emphasised their intention to grow the private sector in Northern Ireland and in that respect are committed to turning Northern Ireland into an ‘enterprise zone’. This is significant as it points to a serious re-orientation of the Northern Ireland economy away from a traditionally large reliance on public sector employment. It was anticipated that this would involve changes to the regime for determining Northern Ireland’s corporation tax rate, including the possibility of the devolution of this power to Northern Ireland. This, however, has not materialised. Were such a power available to the Northern Ireland administration, the region may be able to manipulate its competitiveness by lowering its corporation tax rate and bringing it into line with the rate available in the Republic of Ireland.3 The implications of devolving this power, however, would entail costs for Northern Ireland. EU rules dictate that any reduction in corporation tax must be accompanied by a reduction in the size of the block grant from the UK central government to Northern Ireland. The reduction in overall expenditure available to Northern Ireland, the UK government’s desire to structurally diversify the economy and the current inability to vary tax rates limit the degree of economic autonomy available to Northern Ireland’s regional authorities. This restricts the extent to which the Executive can be innovative and radical (should it so wish) in tackling regional economic challenges. Despite the introduction of new devolved powers and responsibilities, the national domain remains the most important context within which to understand the dynamics of the Northern Ireland economy. This effectively means that the ability of the devolved administration to affect change to Northern Ireland’s domestic economic situation is constrained by its position within the UK, and the constraints are of both a financial and a political nature. These obstacles, however, can sometimes be mediated and, if regional authorities are willing and able to exploit the opportunities, the EU often provides the context.

Northern Ireland and the SEM: overlooked and under-exploited? The original motivation and rationale for UK (and Irish) membership of the EU in 1973 was to gain access to the SEM and to reap the anticipated economic

42

Northern Ireland and the European Union

benefits. The single market aims to maximise growth and competitiveness across the EU and is premised on the achievement of the ‘four freedoms’ – i.e. the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital. According to Gudgin (2000: 67–68), the most profound effects of the SEM occurred during the early years of UK membership when tariffs were initially reduced or removed and resulted, in part at least, in a significant increase in Northern Ireland exports. The real impact of membership of the SEM is offset somewhat by the view that such gains may have been achieved anyway in the context of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) liberalisation. The later drive to complete the SEM by 1992 placed further competitive pressure on Northern Ireland businesses. The opening up of European markets represented ‘a positive shock to Northern Ireland companies as they [were] spurred on to upgrade products and processes to meet higher external standards’ (Birnie and Hitchens 1999: 100). Public utilities in Northern Ireland have also been affected by the SEM. In terms of their management, funding and delivery, processes of privatisation and rationalisation across the UK and Ireland, driven by EU state aid and competition rules, have opened up and diversified fields of economic activity which were once protected. A new emphasis on the development of EU energy and environmental policies during this period also prompted economic consequences for member-states and regions alike. It was recognised from the outset, however, that elements of the 1992 SEM project might not be to the advantage of peripheral regions. In 1988 therefore, the EU committed to providing increased levels of structural fund expenditure to support lagging regions. No dedicated study on the broad effects of the SEM in Northern Ireland has been conducted, and thus no sound or definitive conclusions can be drawn here. There are also inherent problems in attempting to link the performance of the Northern Ireland economy to UK membership of a free trade area. The lack of a counterfactual perspective combined with the problem of how to determine the economic effects of other developments (such as GATT, WTO, national economic measures and the Northern Ireland peace process) means that it is difficult to isolate the real impact of the SEM. Aside from recognising that the liberalisation of trade with the EU has had a positive impact on output and exports, little else can be concluded (Gudgin 2000: 68). More reliable observations can be made, however, in relation to the impact of the SEM on Northern Ireland’s ability to attract inward investment. According to Birnie and Hitchens (1999: 100), at least some of the foreign direct investment in Northern Ireland has been attracted to the province by virtue of the UK’s membership of the EU and hence the single market.

In other words, access to a large European market arguably provided the stimulus for firms from outside the EU to locate in the region. Here again, however, it is unclear how decisive a factor the SEM was in providing the impetus for inward investment in Northern Ireland. Additional factors such as, for example, relatively cheap labour, a young, educated and English-speaking workforce, grant support

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43

and the embryonic peace process may have been as, if not more, important in determining location. EU regulation has also had economic implications for Northern Ireland. Birnie and Hitchens (1999: 101) identify two forms of EU regulation which affect the region – firstly, labour, health and safety issues; and secondly, the environment. As part of the SEM programme, harmonisation of domestic policy has been pursued with the purpose of creating a level playing field for all member-states and regions. This has required the development of common EU-wide policies and approaches to social legislation and environmental regulation. Northern Ireland lies somewhere in the middle of the regulation spectrum, and thus the evolution of harmonised and regulated EU policy sectors places a financial burden on the region in its attempts to comply with EU legislative requirements. This is explicitly noted in Northern Ireland’s Draft Investment Strategy (2011): ‘Meeting the requirements of the EU Nitrates and EU Water Frameworks … has financial repercussions’ (p. 13). The costs are linked to the need for Northern Ireland to become more energy-efficient by switching fuels, changing transport modes and replacing inefficient infrastructure. The SEM is a central component of the EU. The introduction of the ‘four freedoms’ has been a long and sometimes protracted process. Indeed, elements of the SEM project have proved difficult to implement and remain incomplete. This prompted the EU to once again renew the drive to complete outstanding aspects of the single market. Following a wide public consultation, in April 2011 the European Commission published Single Market Act: Twelve Levers to Boost Growth and Strengthen Confidence. The document outlines twelve measures aimed at relaunching the SEM by 2012 (the twentieth anniversary of the 1992 SEM programme). The UK contributed to the European Commission’s consultation (see Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) 2011). The submission makes no reference to the devolved administrations of the UK. Considering that devolution is now an established aspect of the UK territorial and political landscape, it is curious that there is no acknowledgement of the role of the devolved units in operationalising elements of the Single Market Act. Moreover, the act addresses a range of policy areas where devolved units may have legitimate concerns and interests. Some of these are considered by the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) in its direct contribution to the European Commission-led public consultation. No Northern Ireland (or Welsh) body formally contributed to the consultation process. The Single Market Act has been discussed at an intragovernmental level in the UK in the context of meetings of the Joint Ministerial Committee on Europe (JMC[E]) (see OFMDFM Committee, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 23 June 2010). Much of the emphasis during these meetings has focused on the possibility of introducing regional variations in taxes. In Northern Ireland, there has been little formal discussion of the Single Market Act by either the Northern Ireland Assembly or its constituent committees. It is briefly alluded to during an OFMDFM committee evidence session. A senior OFMDFM official advises that in relation to the non-devolved status of issues related to the SEM and Single Market Act, Northern Ireland authorities are

44

Northern Ireland and the European Union

obliged to work in partnership with Whitehall. Specific reference is made to state aids and the complexity and intricacy of pursuing Northern Ireland interests: We have always found that our communication with DETI here, BIS and the UK representation on issues such as state aid has been very good. The end product of that process is to get a Commissioner to agree a favourable position on state aid for us. That requires slightly more communication, but the UK representation is at our disposal. However, where there are issues on which the UK position does not align with ours, we find that they may not be just as amenable. (OFMDFM Committee, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 16 February 2011)

There are important issues at stake here for a region such as Northern Ireland. Unlike other devolved regions of the UK, Northern Ireland shares a land border with another member-state. Issues around the SEM and Single Market, including the free movement of services across borders and plans to create a single EU market in energy,4 are therefore particularly relevant to Northern Ireland. Issues around competitiveness and employment find expression in the Northern Ireland Executive’s (2011c) European Priorities 2011–2012: Winning in Europe where explicit reference is made to the Europe 2020 strategy. This EU initiative aims to increase growth across the EU via the achievement of specific targets in relation to employment, innovation, education, social inclusion and climate change/ energy by 2020. Individual member-states have primary responsibility for implementing national reforms which are intended to boost overall growth. As part of this agenda, the UK produced Europe 2020: UK National Reform Programme 2011 (NRP) (2011). The document details the actions to be pursued by both the UK central state and the devolved administrations in addressing five key ‘bottlenecks’ to growth in the UK.5 The Europe 2020 strategy explicitly recognises that regional or local authorities have a central role in ensuring the success of Europe 2020, as many have responsibility for policy areas linked to the strategy. In the case of the UK devolved administrations, these areas include employment, education, climate change/energy, social exclusion and innovation (see HM Government 2011). The European Commission (2010: 29) mirrors this view and explicitly notes that All national, regional and local authorities should implement the partnership, closely associating parliaments, as well as social partners and representatives of civil society, contributing to the elaboration of national reform programmes as well as to its implementation.

The UK government abides by this philosophy and the NRP document outlines the ways in which the devolved administrations contribute to the achievement of the Europe 2020 strategy. Northern Ireland’s engagement with the process has been less assiduous than that of Scotland or Wales. Scotland has been particularly active – the EU and External Relations Committee in the Scottish Parliament produced a report on Europe 2020 in May 2010; Scottish Ministers appeared before the committee on a number of occasions in 2010 and 2011; and the strategy was debated in the parliament. The EU and External Relations Committee in the Welsh Assembly also discussed the Europe 2020 strategy in March 2010 and the Welsh government convened a stakeholder event on the NRP the same month.

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Northern Ireland’s engagement with Europe 2020 and the NRP has not been as emphatic. The Northern Ireland Executive’s European Priorities 2011–2012: Winning in Europe (2011c, Foreword) acknowledges the strategy: Our proactive and forward-looking engagement in European policies, funding programmes and knowledge networks will help us meet the challenges in the Executive’s Programme for Government – and the delivery of the European Union’s 2020 Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth.

Thereafter the document identifies the different Europe 2020 initiatives and flagships which feed into Northern Ireland’s EU priorities. This has largely been prompted by the work of the NITF and the need for Northern Ireland to proactively cooperate with the initiative. This cooperation has only recently been cemented. Although there is little in the way of critical discussion of Europe 2020 here, and certainly nothing which equates to the depth of consideration afforded the strategy by either the Scottish or Welsh administrations, it does signal some progress on the part of the devolved administration. The lack of an EU and External Relations Committee in the Northern Ireland Assembly may account for this. Aside from a small number of questions to Ministers, predominantly tabled by SDLP MLAs and inquiring about progress in relation to specific Europe 2020 flagship initiatives, the Assembly and its committees have not engaged comprehensively with the Europe 2020 debate – it has largely been pioneered by the Northern Ireland Executive. A senior Northern Ireland civil servant noted that Ministers and MLAs ‘do not possess the capacity to contribute to important EU debates on, for example, Europe 2020’. This appears to be changing somewhat. The Northern Ireland devolved administration is complying with the terms of the NRP and Europe 2020, even though it is doing so in a reactive way which is premised on following the lead provided by central government and taking guidance from the NITF. The Europe 2020 strategy is a substantial initiative which addresses the profound economic challenges facing the EU. It is couched in terms of Europe facing ‘a moment of transformation’ (European Commission 2010: 5) and is focused on securing the long-term vitality of the EU economy. The Northern Ireland devolved administration’s belated engagement with the strategy is worrisome. The economic implications of Europe 2020 (and other related initiatives such as the SEM and Single Market Act) for Northern Ireland are multifaceted. For example, Europe 2020 includes headline targets in relation to employment rates, R&D expenditure, carbon emissions and more. These targets are applied at a national level but clearly impact on the regions and demand some level of action. The previous absence of measured deliberation on matters such as these highlights some of the weaknesses in Northern Ireland’s EU capacity. Admittedly, some of these limitations are being addressed and the NITF has provided some impetus in this respect. The Office of the Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels (ONIEB) has been to the forefront of this capacity-building exercise by increasing staffing numbers and expertise in the Brussels-based office in an attempt to allow for a broader and more strategic pursuit of Northern Ireland interests.6 In addition, the Northern Ireland administration has lately considered Europe 2020 in the context

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Northern Ireland and the European Union

of preparations for the 2014–2020 EU funding round. A reflection exercise initiated in 2012 by the Department of Finance and Personnel (DFP) invited views on ‘the strategic direction that the Northern Ireland Executive should set for using future European Funding for which Northern Ireland might qualify in the period 2014–2020’ (see DFP 2012: 4). The consultation emphasises the need for all future funding programmes to ‘demonstrate a close alignment with the principles and goals of the Europe 2020 strategy’ (p. 4). This explicit reference to Europe 2020 in the Northern Ireland consultation document is prompted by the European Commission’s drive to integrate the Europe 2020 targets with all EU funding initiatives. In other words, it is a formal requirement that all funding programmes post2014 comply with Europe 2020. Northern Ireland consideration of Europe 2020 has been forthcoming in this specific context – i.e. an attempt to maximise future funding from the EU. It is not based on an innate grasp of the potential meaning, significance and impact of Europe 2020 for a peripheral region of the EU such as Northern Ireland. Thus even where some level of engagement with EU-wide economic initiatives is present, it may still possess a flavour of superficiality. This limited degree of prioritisation and engagement may be symptomatic of the indirect financial and economic implications of Europe 2020. However, it also suggests limited political and administrative capacity and resources for dealing with EU policy issues of this nature. Engagement with civil society interests is evident but not extensive. Approximately 300 organisations were invited to respond to the 2012 EU future funding reflection exercise – only 12 chose to do so. A broadening of the arena within which consideration is given to such issues has not materialised. In turn, a more cooperative policy-making style has not emerged. The devolution of powers has neither prompted nor cultivated a more diverse approach to EU economic governance in Northern Ireland. Overall, it is clear that there is some willingness on the part of the Northern Ireland administration to allow the UK central government to pursue and dominate many policy areas, Europe 2020 included, without pushing or promoting Northern Ireland input. This is somewhat justified – the Europe 2020 initiative and structural fund negotiations with the EU do not strictly constitute transferred matters. Such a scenario does not, however, disallow the devolved administrations from seeking to influence the positions adopted and the actions pursued by the UK central government. The Northern Ireland administration has not fully capitalised on the range of possibilities here. Indeed the Northern Ireland approach demonstrates little in the way of interdependence, resource exchange or negotiated shared purposes with central government, nor has the devolved administration engaged non-state actors in an extensive or innovative manner. The approach to consultation is also uninventive, particularly when compared with Scotland. The Scottish administration’s consultation on future EU funding is utilising a range of approaches to connect with interested organisations and civil society, including online surveys, road shows and working groups.7 The administration is also communicating progress regularly and directly via a dedicated blog. Staff from the Scottish Government’s European Structural Funds Division use the Future of the Funds Blog (see http://goo.gl/1rj3qz) to post details of talks with both

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the UK government and the European Commission on the future of structural funds in Scotland. In contrast, the tendency in Northern Ireland is conservative and passive and does not make similar use of new technologies and innovative consultation mechanisms. Fuelled by limited political capacity and stymied by a narrow political interpretation of Northern Ireland’s EU interests, there is little to suggest that processes synonymous with ‘new’ governance are being genuinely tested or exploited. The indirect financial and economic implications of the Europe 2020 strategy are a factor here. The impact of such an initiative is less immediate and less tangible than the structural funds or CAP, which involve direct economic interventions at the regional level. These financial transfers have traditionally provided the most visible manifestation of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU. It is here too that we see the devolved administration experiment with more novel and innovative processes of governance, particularly in terms of programme delivery.

Northern Ireland and EU structural funds: financially and politically significant The accession of the UK and Ireland to the EU in 1973 provided much of the rationale for the creation of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in 1975. The intention of this regional policy instrument was to assist the development and restructuring of Europe’s poorer regions, some of which were located in the UK (particularly Northern Ireland) and the Republic of Ireland. Since UK accession, Northern Ireland has benefited from a wide range and number of EU funds. In addition to the ERDF, the region has received substantial payments from the European Social Fund (ESF), the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) (Guidance Section) and the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG), all of which have been delivered through multi-annual funding programmes (see Table 3.1). Even before the extensive reform of the structural funds in 1988, Northern Ireland was treated as a priority region for EU structural fund assistance (see Trimble 1990). The 1988 reforms, however, amongst other developments, resulted in the classification of Northern Ireland as an ‘Objective 1’ region, a title it retained until 1999. Objective 1 status applies to EU regions whose GDP per capita is less than 75 per cent of the EU average. Although Northern Ireland’s GDP per capita was above this ceiling throughout the period, the region nevertheless secured priority status on the basis of the so-called ‘special circumstances’ pertaining to the region. This was a reference to the impact of the conflict on Northern Ireland’s socio-economic position. In 2000, Northern Ireland lost its Objective 1 status but continued to receive high levels of EU funding until 2006 under the status of ‘transitional Objective 1’, a classification allowing former Objective 1 regions access to the structural funds but on a declining basis. This approach assumed that by the end of the funding period, the region in question would have adjusted to the lower and more limited financial support likely to be made available to an Objective 2 region. Indeed, the increasing prosperity of the region since the 1990s has meant

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Northern Ireland and the European Union

Table 3.1  Northern Ireland structural fund programmes 1989–2006 Programme

Funding period

Priorities

EU allocation

Community support framework

1989–93

793 million Improvement of the physical and ECUa social environment Reducing the effects of peripherality Diversifying and strengthening of the industrial and tradeable services sectors of the economy Development of agriculture and tourism Human resource development

Single programming document

1994–99

€1,233 million Economic development and competitiveness Investing in communities and people Reducing the effects of peripherality Fisheries, agriculture and the rural economy Protecting and enhancing the environment

Building sustainable prosperity

2000–6

Economic growth and competitiveness Employment Urban and social revitalisation Agriculture, rural development, forestry and fisheries Environment

€890.5 million

Data collected from various sources including: Department of Finance and Personnel (DFP) (1994, 1999) and Commission of the European Communities (1990). a  Prior to the introduction of the euro, EU allocations were based on the European Currency Unit (ECU).

Table 3.2  Northern Ireland EU structural fund allocations 2007–13 Programme

Funding

Managing authority

European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)

€211 million

Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment (Northern Ireland)

European Social Fund (ESF) €114 million

Department of Education and Learning (Northern Ireland)

Peace III

€333 million

Special EU Programmes Body

Cross-border territorial cooperation programme (INTERREG IVA)

€256 million

Special EU Programmes Body

Source: Department of Finance and Personnel (Northern Ireland) (www.dfpni.gov.uk/index/finance/ european-funding.htm).

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that for the funding period 2007–13, Northern Ireland did not receive the highest levels of financial support available from the EU. Structural funding allocations to Northern Ireland for the 2007–13 financial period were worth almost €1 billion under four EU funding programmes (see Table 3.2). Structural fund allocations to Northern Ireland have traditionally been used to support a range of economic activities. These include investments in infrastructure, promotion of economic development and competitiveness, job creation, support for the rural economy (including agriculture and fisheries) and environmental improvements (see Table 3.1). In this way, the EU structural funds aim to ameliorate the economic situation of peripheral regions and to close the gap between the poorer and more prosperous regions of the EU. The economic impact of the structural funds is therefore an important means of judging the success of EU financial assistance. There are some indications that Northern Ireland has fared well. In real terms, the structural funds comprised ‘around two per cent of Northern Ireland’s public expenditure through the 1980s and 1990s rising to three per cent in the 1990s’ (Gudgin 2000: 49). The 2000–6 Structural Funds package is estimated to have enhanced Northern Ireland’s GDP ‘by more than the 3.5 per cent recorded in 1993’ (DFP 2000: 84). Of particular significance is that the impact of the structural funds to Northern Ireland is disproportional to its size, and therein lies its key value: This increase in GDP [3.5% in 1993] is considerable particularly when the Structural Funds package over this period totalled only £500m in aggregate terms (smoothed over the 1989–93 period this is equivalent to just 1% of annual GDP). (DFP 2000: 84)

The positive economic impact of EU structural fund contributions to Northern Ireland has not been without ambiguity. Successive programmes have been subject to controversy and dispute. Some disquiet has been expressed in relation to the size of Northern Ireland’s EU financial receipts. Relative to its Southern neighbour, the Republic of Ireland, Northern Ireland has benefited less on a per capita basis. For the two funding periods, 1989–93 and 1994–99, the Republic of Ireland secured twice as much EU structural fund assistance per capita as Northern Ireland (Kennedy 1994: 174). The figures are less dramatic during the 2000s when strong economic growth in the Republic of Ireland diminished the country’s structural fund eligibility. In the context of the EU’s 2014–20 multi-annual financial framework, the availability of structural fund assistance is set to decrease further. The UK government argued for a reduction in the size of the EU budget during budgetary negotiations in 2013. The agreed EU budget for 2014–20 reflects the UK position. This effectively means that the amount of EU structural funding for which Northern Ireland will be eligible during the 2014–20 funding period will diminish. This exposes an anomalous situation. Northern Ireland is tasked with protecting and advancing its EU financial interests via a UK government that is not committed to a negotiating position which facilitates those interests. A more serious criticism of EU structural funds, however, has been in relation to the principle of ‘additionality’. The principle implies that all structural fund

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transfers to the regions (including those under the Peace programmes) must be in addition to existing government expenditure. The rationale is such that, if EU expenditure is merely a substitute for government spending, then the net benefit of financial transfers is called into question. In the Northern Ireland case, it was persistently claimed that governments did not treat EU funds as additional in this way (Bew and Meehan 1994: 105). More recently, the problem has been noted by the Northern Ireland Assembly’s Committee for Finance and Personnel. In their 2000 Inquiry into European Union Structural Funds: The Peace II Programme, they call on the DFP to issue guidance to departments to ensure that structural funds moneys are not … used as a budgetary resource to finance their departmental programmes and thus uphold the principle of additionality. (Section 4, Paragraph 4.2.10)

However, determining the extent to which additionality exists, or not, is a somewhat dubious exercise. A 1992 Northern Ireland Economic Council (NIEC) report concluded that it did, but downplayed its significance suggesting that ‘despite the perennial problem of additionality, the funds are potentially of vital importance in promoting the development of the Northern Ireland economy’ (p. 70). Furthermore, Tannam (2007: 350) has concluded that the problem of additionality was eventually overcome with the 1997 election of the Labour government, which pursued a more strident interpretation of the additionality principle. Problems aside, the purely economic benefits of structural fund allocations to Northern Ireland are, however, only one means of judging the benefits of EU financial assistance. Successive programmes may have explicitly aimed to improve economic performance, but they also sought to achieve political and social benefits. The latter intentions were related to the evolving peace process in Northern Ireland during the 1990s and drew a link between economic progress and healing community division. The 1994–99 Structural Funds Plan stated: Positive action is … needed to overcome community alienation by promoting reconciliation between communities in Northern Ireland and by tackling sources of disadvantage, which sustain community divisions. (HMSO 1993: 73)

In this context, the drafting, agreeing, managing and implementing of structural fund programmes in Northern Ireland relies on inputs from a wide range of actors, including Northern Ireland government departments, devolved political institutions, interest groups (in particular the community and voluntary sector), Whitehall and the European Commission. In other words, the structural fund programmes in Northern Ireland demonstrate: the multi-layered character of the decision-making process, requiring participation through the full policy cycle by local, social, regional, and national partners, as well as the [European] Commission itself. (Hodgett and Meehan 2003: 138)

The involvement of such an array of actors diversifies the EU funding process and seeks to make it more inclusive and accessible. In the Northern Ireland setting, bringing regional, national and EU levels together and engaging with non-

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state actors promotes cross-community contact and dialogue. In attempting to underpin domestic efforts at economic development and community reconciliation therefore, the EU has sought to promote new forms of governance. This type of engagement and the collective actions they facilitate fit with the interdependency and shared purposes which governance suggests. They also seek to nurture some degree of trust between participants – an outcome which has particular meaning and significance in Northern Ireland and hints at a form of governance which may indeed signal a new type of politics. Interestingly, however, the structural funds pre-date the devolution period so the relationship between devolution, the EU and new forms of governance is opaque. The EU has clearly been the spur for experiments in governance vis-à-vis reconciliation initiatives, but to what extent this has been further enhanced by devolved structures is questionable. The Peace programmes may provide some clues.

Northern Ireland and the EU peace programmes: ‘new’ governance in action? Peace III builds on the first two Peace8 programmes. All three programmes were conceived as a means to ‘complement the mainstream (political) efforts at peace-building but also were a specifically designed conflict transformation tool’ (Buchanan 2008: 387). The original Peace programme was initiated by the then President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, in 1995. That programme was distinct from other structural fund programmes in Northern Ireland (or elsewhere), as its strategic aim was ‘to reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation’ (European Commission 1995: 31). At the launch of the initiative, Delors stated (European Commission 1994): We should seize the new opportunities for action in Northern Ireland and address the additional needs arising out of the peace process. This must be done now, to convince those on the ground that the peace process can yield real dividends to their lives.

All three Peace programmes involve support for bottom-up actions rooted in local and regional partnership arrangements, and based on the close and heavy involvement of civil society. The programmes have largely focused on addressing specific problems, of an economic and social nature, which are linked to the legacy of the conflict. In this way, the programmes have financed a range of measures including economic regeneration, social inclusion and reconciliation (see Table 3.3). Aside from the unique purpose of the Peace programmes, they are innovative in other ways too. Specifically, they have pioneered a new approach to the process of programme delivery. According to Williamson et al. (2000: 53): ‘At an early stage in the negotiations about the shape of the [first] Peace programme, the Commission agreed to prioritise innovative means to deliver it’. The result was the three-way division of implementation responsibility between government, District Partnerships and Intermediary Funding Bodies (IFBs) (see McCall and Williamson 2000). Corresponding geographically to District Council areas,

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Table 3.3  EU Peace programmes in Northern Ireland 1995–2013 Programme

Funding period

Priorities

EU allocationa

Peace I

1995–99

Employment Urban and rural regeneration Cross-border development Social inclusion Productive investment and industrial development District partnerships Technical assistance

€400 million

Peace II

2000–6 b

Economic renewal Social integration, inclusion and regeneration Locally based regeneration and development strategies Outward- and forward-looking region Cross-border cooperation

€425 million

Peace III

2007–13

Build positive relations at the local level Acknowledge the past Create shared public spaces Develop key institutional capacity for a shared society

€333 million

a  Relates to Northern Ireland allocations only and does not include funding for the border counties of the Republic of Ireland. b  Initially programmed to run over the period 2000–4, Peace II was extended in early 2005 until the end of 2006.

the District Partnerships were composed of members drawn equally from local government, the community and voluntary sector and other interests such as business, trade unions and local statutory agencies. Each Partnership was allocated a financial package which they distributed within their local areas. This approach to programme delivery differed from traditional practice when government would have had dominant responsibility for the delivery of funding. Furthermore, the unique significance of the District Partnerships was the way in which they sought to foster and encourage cross-community cooperation. Members of Partnerships were drawn from all sectors of society and frequently contained individuals ‘whose political sympathies and affiliations are diametrically opposed, [and] who otherwise would never have considered working with each other’ (Williamson et al. 2000: 54). IFBs – like District Partnerships – also have responsibility for disbursing funding. They represent a range of different voluntary and community sector bodies (including, for example, the Community Relations Council, Cooperation Ireland and the Northern Ireland Voluntary Trust). The IFBs are charged with delivering some of the priorities and measures of the Peace programmes, as per their area of expertise. McCall and Williamson (2000: 403) highlight the success

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of the IFBs in ‘engaging grassroots voluntary and community organisations in the developmental process set in train by the peace and reconciliation initiative’. The Peace II and III programmes have seen a further diversification in the management and delivery of funding with the involvement of the Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB), one of the implementation bodies created under the terms of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. The extent to which the Peace programmes have assisted in the process of reconciliation; in empowering communities; and in overcoming community divisions has been disputed (see Byrne and Irvin 2001; Byrne et al. 2009a; and Racioppi and O’Sullivan See 2007). Partly in response to criticisms and consequent to evaluations of earlier programmes, the Peace III programme recognised that the process of peace-building is slow and acknowledged too that Northern Ireland remains a polarised society. Notwithstanding the inherent difficulties in promoting and measuring peace and reconciliation, the emphasis within Peace III remained focused on reconciliation and contributing to a shared society. The notion of partnership governance is alluded to throughout the Peace III operational programme. The merits and benefits of partnership, as pioneered by the District Partnerships, are highlighted, while the principle itself remains a central theme and strategic guideline in the implementation of Peace III. Such approaches are viewed as complementing devolved power-sharing structures in Northern Ireland. The Peace III Operational Programme states: One of the main outcomes of the Peace Programmes to date has been encouraging the development of new ways of working together among different stakeholders. While the District Partnerships (DPs) in Northern Ireland supported under the PEACE I Programme were not without their difficulties, they established a genuine bottom-up involvement in the delivery of the Programme. The DPs provided the first opportunity in many cases for representatives of the four main political parties to sit together with representatives of the social partners and other statutory bodies. On this basis, the PEACE I Programme foreshadowed the key element of partnership which was included in the Good Friday Agreement. (Northern Ireland Executive 2007a: 27)

The use of partnership as a mechanism via which to deliver programmes has generally been regarded as one of the most significant aspects of the Peace programmes. The involvement of a wide range of actors has been remarkable, particularly when one considers the divided nature of Northern Ireland society. The EU has been particularly influential in promoting and facilitating this type of approach: The influence of the EU was particularly important in terms of programme design (widespread consultations), implementation (decentralised delivery mechanisms) and activity type (social inclusion agenda). Moreover, bottomup co-operative partnership arrangements and increased involvement of civil society were fundamental values it wanted to promote. (Buchanan 2008: 393)

Interestingly, although the EU influence is clear, the direct role of the EU vis-àvis the Peace programmes has diminished over time and the European Commission has been a key casualty (Tannam 2010: 159). Specifically, Tannam (2007:

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351) notes that Peace II was a more centralised programme than its predecessor, while the incorporation of the SEUPB into the policy frame has sidelined the European Commission, particularly in relation to implementation. Furthermore, the creation and operation of the SEUPB has institutionalised earlier informal cooperation arrangements between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland (Coakley et al. 2006: 15). Peace III provides for even further centralisation and institutionalisation as it marginalises the role of IFBs and enhances that of local authorities and the SEUPB (Buchanan 2008: 405). The voluntary and community sectors do, however, retain an involvement in Peace III. The role of the UK central government is not pronounced in this policy realm. There is some sense in which the Northern Ireland authorities are ‘left to their own devices’ in devising and implementing successive Peace programmes. What has materialised is a situation whereby the EU has facilitated new approaches to governance in Northern Ireland. Given the centralising tendency of devolution, however, the sustainability and durability of partnership arrangements are not necessarily assured. The involvement of the devolved administration has also further diversified and complicated the partnership approach by including the regional political level more closely in the process of programme consultation and implementation. Tensions between the SEUPB and the Northern Ireland Executive were initially problematic during the Peace II funding period. The Northern Ireland Executive also replaced the Northern Ireland Partnership Board9 to the consternation of some. In addition, public sector organisations and some political figures appear to have been somewhat flippant in relation to promoting wide and diverse involvement in the programme. Furthermore, the Peace II funding period was affected by long periods of suspension, which posed many operational challenges: Stalemate at this elite level undermined the sustainability of local and regional cross-border partnerships and the building of a strategy for peace and reconciliation because political elites and their institutions are intrinsic to such a strategy. (McCall and O’Dowd 2008: 49)

The involvement of government, in all its guises and at all levels, is central to the success of funding programmes such as the Peace programmes. Their ‘absence’ or reluctance hinders progress. The participation of other actors is similarly important, but only under circumstances where it complements the efforts of the political elite and their institutions. Moreover, it is important to acknowledge that although the EU has promoted a more diverse policy arena in Northern Ireland (at least with respect to the structural funds), this has not been at the expense of the strength of traditional modes of government. Government and the state, whether it be at regional or national level, remains very much at the heart of the new governance arrangements insofar as they pertain to EU funding. Indeed in Northern Ireland, the creation of devolved structures has seen the new regional government adopt a more prominent and increasingly central role in managing and directing structural fund expenditure. The presence and involvement of other policy actors is facilitated but may be less apparent than was the case pre-1999. The traditionally strong role enjoyed by civil society has been somewhat under-

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mined by the creation of devolved political institutions in Northern Ireland. Crucially, however, this has not challenged the underlying ethos and spirit of the EU’s approach to assisting Northern Ireland. Structural fund assistance to the region continues to be seen as beneficial to all. This is significant as it has meant that the negotiation and implementation of successive programmes has not been plagued or seriously hampered by communal tensions. This in turn has facilitated constructive participation by a broad and multi-level spectrum of economic, political and social actors. Key elements of governance as outlined by Rhodes (1996) are present, including multi-level interdependency, mutual trust and a sharing of purpose and resources. An enthusiasm for such approaches is unsurprising. The devolved Northern Ireland administration will not jeopardise financial assistance by rejecting the ‘partnership’ requirements of EU structural fund regulations. In the absence of the EU’s financial carrot, however, these types of structures and practices are vulnerable, as are the genuinely consensus-driven and participative politics they embody. Some have already been rolled back and resisted by the devolved administration. As devolution beds down, it is apparent that the type of governance which MLG proposes is less in evidence. A culture and practice of wide consultation and diverse participation conducted on the basis of resource-sharing, trust and interdependence has not characterised the later years of Peace funding. The devolution of power, it appears, has not strengthened or reinforced a form of governance which was heralded as ‘new politics’ in pre-1999 Northern Ireland.

The CAP: an established policy The CAP is a further consideration in any economic assessment of Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU. It is a vital source of financial assistance for the Northern Ireland agriculture sector. According to Gudgin (2000: 65): The value of EU assistance to Northern Ireland agriculture has averaged around 70 per cent of total farm incomes since the late 1970s and in several years of low incomes has been 100 per cent.

In purely financial terms, this corresponds to average annual CAP assistance to the region of approximately stg £130 million during the 1990s (European Commission 1999: 20). Between 2000 and 2006, the sector received approximately €334 million annually under the Single Payment Scheme (European Commission 2008: 25–26). However, despite high EU CAP transfers to Northern Ireland, farmers have not traditionally fared especially well under the regime. The numbers employed in the sector have fallen progressively since the UK joined the EU, as has the contribution of the industry to Northern Ireland’s GVA. Farm incomes have also remained volatile (Gudgin 2000: 64) and the industry has been hit by a series of crises over the past decade, including mad cow disease (BSE), foot and mouth disease (FMD) and the horsemeat scandal. These difficulties, however, do not detract from the continuing importance of agriculture to the Northern Ireland economy. Employing almost 50,000 people and contributing stg £378 million GVA to the

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Northern Ireland economy, the agricultural industry has experienced growth in recent years: At a time when other business sectors are in decline or stasis, the agri/food sector appears to be growing within Northern Ireland, a situation borne out by the fact that total income from farming grew by 19 per cent in real terms within Northern Ireland between 2009 and 2010, whilst contracting by 4 per cent for the UK as a whole. (Northern Ireland Assembly 2011: 1–2)

The ongoing reform of the CAP, which was instigated during the 1980s, has potentially serious implications for the Northern Ireland agricultural industry. The spiralling cost of maintaining EU-funded price support mechanisms has meant that price support has been progressively replaced. Farmers are now paid direct subsidies. This new payment mechanism has helped to reduce the levels of EU expenditure on agricultural policy.10 As reform continues, this figure will diminish further as a percentage of total expenditure. Such a development will inevitably impact on Northern Ireland’s agricultural industry and that impact is likely to be negative. In addition to the UK receiving a lesser financial CAP allocation, which will then be re-allocated to the devolved administrations, proposed legislative reforms may further diminish Northern Ireland’s CAP entitlements. Compounding the Northern Ireland situation is the fact that the region fares disproportionately better in terms of receipts from the CAP than other parts of the UK.11 Within the domestic setting, the existence of devolved units empowers UK regions to fight their case and to argue for more favourable policy and financial outcomes – both in terms of the allocation of the UK CAP spend and in terms of the projection of preferences to Brussels via the UK central government. Scotland and Wales are pushing at the national level for fairer terms under the new CAP regime post2014, which will address current imbalances between the constituent units of the UK. An overriding and even more challenging problem is the distinction between Northern Ireland and UK central state preferences in relation to CAP reform. A senior official captured this dilemma during evidence to the OFMDFM committee: Our interests as a region may not align with the UK position in a number of areas. Agriculture is one where, quite evidently, the UK position on the common agricultural policy may not, on the face of it, be to our advantage. (OFMDFM Committee, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 16 February 2011)

The necessity for creative and consistent engagement with Brussels and other non-UK interests is substantial here. The Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) and successive Northern Ireland Agriculture Ministers have been particularly prudent in maintaining an ongoing presence in Brussels and in nurturing relations with key officials there (see Chapter 5). They are assisted in this endeavour by the ONIEB, which has always had a dedicated Agriculture Desk Officer. Northern Ireland’s response to the CAP reform agenda has been led by DARD. The department initiated a consultation process in November 2011, seeking stake-

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holder views and preferences. The Minister with Responsibility for DARD, Sinn Féin MLA Michelle O’Neill, engaged directly with the EU Agriculture Commissioner at a meeting in November 2011, which was also attended by her Scottish and Welsh counterparts and the UK Secretary of State at the Department for Food, Environment and Rural Affairs (DEFRA). She has emphasised the importance of this direct approach: ‘I have maintained from the outset of the CAP reform process that it will be important for our views to be put directly to the European Commission’ (Sinn Féin 2011). The Minister’s contact with Northern Ireland’s three Members of European Parliament (MEPs) has also been regularised in an attempt to foster good working relationships and to support MEP involvement in the reform process. This type and level of engagement was also pursued by previous Northern Ireland Agriculture Ministers (see McGowan and Murphy 2003; and Murphy 2007). Considering the importance of agriculture to the Northern Ireland economy, such approaches and efforts to minimise the worst effects of proposed CAP reforms are considered vital to the continuing vibrancy of Northern Ireland’s agricultural sector. The CAP is not the sole means by which the EU influences the rural economy in Northern Ireland. The region has also benefited from structural funding support in the form of a series of Leader programmes. Similar to its predecessors, the Northern Ireland Rural Development Programme (RDP) 2007–13, which delivers the EU’s Leader initiative, aims to improve economic, social and environmental conditions in rural areas throughout Northern Ireland. The Leader programmes are jointly funded by the EU and DARD. They aim to encourage and diversify economic activity in rural areas, and funding is delivered via local action groups. Although the outputs from different Leader programmes may not be extensive in Northern Ireland, they have nevertheless, in a broader context, delivered valuable opportunities for local communities (Scott 2004: 57–58): Increasingly, local action groups have developed new possibilities and ways of working through a discursive, interactive process, which has emerged as a key feature of Leader in Northern Ireland.

Similar to other structural funding programmes in Northern Ireland, the longterm and lasting impact of EU-supported rural development programmes has been their contribution to local capacity-building, partnership and community relations. Even though the economic outputs of successive Leader programmes have been less than anticipated, they are not insignificant. The Leader II Initiative 1994–99 supported over 2000 projects and created over 200 new businesses (European Commission Office in Northern Ireland, 2004). The Leader+ programme 2000–6 had a total value of over stg £20 million. The 2007–13 Rural Development Programme is one of the largest investments of its kind in rural Northern Ireland and is worth stg £100 million over the seven-year funding period. In the context of CAP and support for rural development, the dynamics of the relationship between Northern Ireland and the EU are changing. The economic importance of both has always been apparent and remains so today. However, the

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political dynamics of how agricultural and rural policies are directed in Northern Ireland has changed consequent to the introduction of devolution. The addition of a regional tier of devolved governance has added new actors to the mix. This has been accompanied by greater direct engagement between the Northern Ireland devolved administration and Brussels. Devolution has also contributed to enhanced and regular contact with Whitehall and the Welsh and Scottish devolved administrations. In terms of the Leader initiatives, direct engagement with local communities is similarly facilitated. Public consultation has also been an important feature of the agricultural policy process in Northern Ireland. The 2011 consultation on CAP reform attracted 56 responses drawn from a wide number and range of agriculture interest groups, local councils, political parties and environmental groups. It was supplemented by a DARD sponsored conference on CAP reform in December 2011, which attracted 150 farming and environmental stakeholders. This represents some broadening of the manner via which Northern Ireland’s agricultural preferences are negotiated and achieved. Indeed, the mechanics of the policy domain demonstrate many of the characteristics associated with governance as defined by Rhodes (1996). The substantial economic dimension to the CAP provides an important basis for promoting constructive relations between Northern Ireland, Brussels, Whitehall, devolved administrations in Scotland and Wales and key local stakeholders. Agriculture, however, has traditionally been among the more outward-looking of Northern Ireland policy areas in terms of the links which have long been fostered between Northern Ireland and London and Brussels. A traditionally cohesive and focused approach in defending the region’s agricultural interests has been facilitated by the absence of communal tension around agricultural issues. Similar to the structural funds, when financial aid (which benefits both communities) is at stake, the incentives for positive engagement at a range of levels and involving a broad spectrum of actors are apparent. The introduction of devolution has further enhanced this governance based approach and has been to the benefit of Northern Ireland agricultural interests. Indeed, the addition of enhanced multi-level interactions between political and civil society figures since 1998 and the inclusion of more ‘government’ has produced positive effects. For example: In contrast to the 2001 [FMD] outbreak, the Northern Ireland administration reacted swiftly and effectively to the [2007 FMD] crisis … The protection of Northern Ireland agricultural interests against FMD was afforded high political priority and was based on strong cross-party political and public support … The Northern Ireland administration succeeded in convincing the European Commission that the region was free from the disease and Northern Ireland was consequently exempted from the restrictions on trade imposed on Great Britain. (Murphy 2011: 560–561)

Constructive relations have also been established between Northern Ireland agricultural interest groups and the Sinn Féin Agriculture Minister who (similar to her predecessor) meets regularly with Ulster Farmers’ Union (UFU) representatives. During her first visit to UFU headquarters in October 2011, the President of the UFU noted:

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Overall, the meeting with Minister O’Neill was very positive. I am encouraged by her commitment to the agriculture industry and especially her recognition of the agri-food industry as a key element of the Northern Ireland economy. (UFU 2011)

Farm interest groups in Northern Ireland represent distinct sectoral and geographical enclaves which are often communally distinctive (see Keating et al. 2009: 61). The UFU and Sinn Féin are not natural allies. The UFU’s membership is drawn largely from the Protestant/Unionist community. Nevertheless, constructive relations have developed between the Minister and the organisation. This is significant because it means that the pursuit of policy is not hampered by politically charged sensitivities. Other noteworthy changes relate to the broader orientation and focus of interest group activities since 1998. Keating et al. (2009: 61–62) note that, since 1998, the UFU has diverged on certain issues with its sister organisation in Britain whilst developing closer links with the Irish Farmers’ Association (IFA) and Europe. The traditional working dynamics of this specific policy field have therefore changed somewhat, but crucially, beneficial outputs have resulted. The combination of financial reward, an existing policy capacity and the absence of communal tension have proved important contexts within which the governance of Northern Ireland’s agricultural policy domain has developed. The introduction of devolution has not unsettled this context, rather it has subtly reinforced and strengthened it.

North–South economic relations and the limits to economic and political change North–South relations in Ireland have traditionally been difficult. Recent political developments, however, have lessened the tension and hostility which marked cross-border relations on the island of Ireland. Aside from historic political and cultural objections to North–South cooperation, opposition to cross-border cooperation was also driven by practical economic considerations. Tannam (1999: 200) characterises the economic cross-border relationship as a complex one: ‘[t]here are grounds for cooperation, but there are also differences which may impede cooperation’. Both economies are very different in nature and this produces real obstacles to cooperation. Moreover, there is no consensus on what the impact of cross-border economic cooperation might be. Birnie and Hitchens (2001: 15) suggest that the economic benefits of cooperation have been and will continue to be small. Diez and Hayward (2008: 57) point to the negative implications of the SEM and EU programmes for some local businesses in the border region. Notwithstanding the potentially limited benefits of increased cross-border activities and cooperation, Coakley and O’Dowd (2007: 882) note that: ‘even prominent figures from a unionist background [extol] the virtues of cross-border cooperation, especially as regards the economy’. Against the backdrop of the 1998 Belfast Agreement and the institutionalisation of cross-border relationships via the NSMC and the implementation bodies, the Irish and UK governments jointly published a Comprehensive Study on the

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All-Island Economy. The report aims to support the creation of ‘a world-class allisland economy which manifests itself in comparable levels of economic dynamism and performance in both parts of the island’ (InterTradeIreland 2006: 6). Areas targeted for economic cooperation include infrastructure, trade, tourism, enterprise promotion and the environment. Trade has traditionally formed the key basis for cross-border contact and cooperation, but it is now complemented by new joint interests. Importantly, however, these new areas of cross-border activity have strong economic credentials and cooperation is deemed mutually beneficial to both parts of the island: What is clear in relation to the development and evolution of cross-border economic relations is that they are heavily influenced by a practical and functional logic. (Murphy 2010a: 406)

For unionists in particular, the strict application of this apolitical logic is paramount. Cross-border cooperation is viewed with some suspicion by the unionist community and regarded as a potential means of nurturing Irish unity. Consequently, unionists remain guarded in their support for the development of closer relations between North and South. However, similar to the structural funds and Peace programmes, cross-border cooperation has a strong economic logic and the EU plays a role in facilitating this. The European context is an important context within which to fully understand the changing dynamics of cross-border relations. Laffan and O’Mahony (2008) view British and Irish EU membership as being an important arena within which North–South relations have evolved. Key documents associated with the Northern Ireland peace process hinted at a role for the EU in facilitating cross-border relations in the broadest sense. The 1995 Frameworks Documents signalled the possibility that ‘EU programmes and activities could be a key way to deepen political and economic ties between the North and South of the island’ (Teague 1996: 550). It is clear that EU-sponsored financial aid programmes to Northern Ireland have nurtured and cultivated cross-border relations. The EU’s Interreg programmes have an explicitly cross-border character. The initiative funds and supports strategic cross-border, transnational and interregional cooperation aimed at promoting the development of a more prosperous and sustainable border region. The programme is strongly focused on supporting cooperation between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, but it also includes support for cooperation with Western Scotland. Like other structural fund initiatives, Interreg has political undertones. Successive programmes ‘intensified transnational support for a settlement [to the conflict] in conjunction with ongoing Third Sector funding’ (O’Dowd and McCall 2008: 87). Features of Interreg such as these are compatible with the governance turn and are particularly evident in terms of support for innovative cross-border activities which closely involve civil society in the delivery of projects. In this way, the EU’s support for cross-border cooperation has helped ‘to foster an alternative culture of partnership and peace-building’ and has strengthened ‘bodies, structures and activities that cross [North–South and communal] divides’ (Diez and Hayward 2008: 56). The Interreg (and also Peace programmes) have been

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welcomed for this type of positive contribution to cross-border relations. In a 2007 speech, the then Irish Finance Minister, Brian Cowen (2007) stated: I think it is very important to emphasise the positive impact of the cross-border nature of the Interreg and Peace programmes. The fact that they are cross-border programmes has helped to change the mindset of people on both sides of the border. They have helped to forge new links between communities and they have encouraged greater tolerance for diversity. Thousands of projects have been supported and many thousands of people have engaged at grass roots level in the job of peace building and reconciliation.

In practice, elements of the Interreg programme have been criticised (see study by Laffan and Payne 2001) and there have been problems too in relation to the timely and efficient delivery of funding by the Northern Ireland administration. One MLA has referred to the ‘slowness and apparent lethargy of this process’ (Committee for Finance and Personnel, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 14 September 2011). However, notwithstanding these issues, the substance of Interreg programmes has played a useful and beneficial role in assisting the development of cross-border relations: Cross-border trade and partnership have been a good ‘trial run’ for EU-fostered networks and programmes because they are seen as having clear, beneficial and neutral ends (i.e. economic development). (Hayward 2007: 691)

An overt focus on potential economic gains has prompted novel experimentation with cross-border and interregional networks, partnerships and collaborations. The European Commission has also been closely involved, but decreasingly so since the signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. In terms of the cross-border dimensions of successive Peace programmes, The demands of both British-Irish and Northern Irish party preferences, rather than the European Commission, have determined levels of regional or local influence. When the Commission did appear to exert influence on the role of partnerships and local actors, it was because it was allowed to do so by British and Irish governments. (Tannam 2010: 159)

Here again, using financial enticements, EU cross-border initiatives create a space within which governance-style innovations can be tried and tested. Interestingly, however, this seemingly more diverse and inclusive style of cooperation has not undermined government involvement or oversight. Indeed, new and formal crossborder institutions – particularly SEUPB, which has responsibility for managing Interreg IVA – lock the state more closely into the EU cross-border and interregional domain. Traditional governmental structures, namely the Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly and the government of the Republic of Ireland, as well as related cross-border bodies, have not been sidelined since the devolution of power. Indeed it is conceivable that cross-border relations and initiatives have become increasingly complex and perhaps subject to even higher degrees of centralisation since the introduction of devolution. The creation of devolved institutions in Northern Ireland has added a new insti-

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tutional layer to the rolling-out of EU policies and programmes. Key characteristics associated with a governance approach are embodied in cross-border bodies and EU funding programmes, and the funding domain has subsequently become more diverse since the introduction of devolution. Some institutionalisation is evident and the vibrancy and frequency of cross-border initiatives continues. As was the case with other economically driven EU initiatives, the principle of mutual benefit – be it cross-party, cross-community or cross-border – is the baseline for the pursuit of North–South and interregional interests. The introduction of devolution has added a political regional layer to these developing (economic) relationships. The impact of this development has not been destabilising, but it has modified cross-border relationships and practices to the point where there has been a small shift from governance to government.

Conclusion There is little doubt that the EU’s impact on Northern Ireland has traditionally been most keenly felt in relation to matters economic. The peculiarities of the Northern Ireland economy aside, the EU has had consequences for Northern Ireland in terms of the SEM, inward investment and changing trade patterns. On balance, the impact has generally been positive. Maximising the positive impact of the SEM is key to Northern Ireland’s long-term economic health. Recent initiatives such as the Single Market Act and the Europe 2020 strategy aim to reinvigorate the EU’s economic development against the backdrop of the global economic crisis. Northern Ireland engagement with these initiatives has been sketchy and somewhat reliant on following the UK lead. Unlike agriculture and structural funding, these do not constitute areas of devolved responsibility, making it difficult for the Northern Ireland devolved administration to infiltrate the policy domain and exercise influence. Engagement has largely been pursued through formal UK channels such as the JMC[E]. Admittedly, regional capacity in this policy realm is developing and being driven by ongoing financial incentives. The relevance of these developments for Northern Ireland’s long-term economic situation is increasingly resonating with both administrative and political figures and prompting more decisive action at the regional level. For much of the period before and after the introduction of devolution, the economic focus of Northern Ireland engagement and interaction with the EU has revolved around funding support. This support – running to billions of Euros – has been channelled via CAP and a range of different structural funds. Financial transfers from the EU to Northern Ireland have undoubtedly been an important (albeit diminishing) source of revenue for the region. More interestingly, however, the structural funds, Peace programmes and other EU initiatives are significant, not merely for their financial value, but also in the context of their impact on political and communal relations. Traditional methods of programme creation and implementation have been modified and replaced by new models of delivery which are based on greater interdependency, inclusiveness and the promotion of dialogue and trust between the EU and political and civil representatives in

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Northern Ireland. Notably, the start of this process pre-dates the introduction of devolution. The promise of financial reward – which benefits both communities and/or North and South – has allowed the EU to act as a catalyst for experimenting with new forms of political deliberation and funding delivery in Northern Ireland. Of course, the creation and subsequent involvement of devolved institutions in EU-funded programmes has added an additional governmental layer to the policy and funding process. Interestingly, however, the broad parameters of the preexisting approach remain relatively intact. The number and profile of participants in the process has changed, as indeed have the manner and tenor of interactions between the participants. However, this can best be described as a modification and refinement of the system as opposed to constituting a transformative change. In terms of the funding dimension of Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU, there is now a more evenly balanced relationship between the state and civil society, although the role of the European Commission has been undermined since 1999. In the context of the CAP, the change is arguably more profound and involves a more substantial multi-level character which sees regular direct engagement between Belfast and Brussels in particular, but also involves other levels and relevant sectoral interests. The context here is slightly different, however. Agricultural policy is one of the devolved policies where political, administrative and civil society capacity is most advanced, and here again, this capacity pre-dates the introduction of devolution. In matters economic, direct financial incentives embracing agricultural and structural fund support have proved critical and have allowed the EU to promote new and novel ways of doing business in Northern Ireland. Additionally, EU funding programmes and the CAP are not subject to communal tensions, and the principle of mutual benefit is broadly accepted. This shared overview removes some of the potential complexity which afflicts other policy areas in Northern Ireland and thus further facilitates enthusiasm for innovative forms of cooperation. In contrast, indirect financial gains from the SEM and Europe 2020 strategy have not prompted the same type of inventive approaches when the financial incentive is more opaque. Engagement has been slow and limited, and influence minimal. Interestingly, devolution has not been a catalyst for engagement. Instead, stimulus has come from the NITF, which has proved influential in matching Northern Ireland interests with the Europe 2020 agenda and in pushing elements of an MLG agenda (see Chapters 4 and 7 for a broader discussion of the NITF). In instances where innovations are evident, this is not indicative of an innate faith in the merits of more governance-inspired mechanisms and practices. Rather, the devolved administration has responded and reacted to the financial incentives offered by the EU. The involvement of directly elected representatives in the process of implementing and managing structural funds is to be welcomed in that it points to the improved democratic credentials of the broad policy arena. In contrast to reservations expressed by some commentators in relation to the proposed negative impact of MLG on democratic accountability, this charge does not find strong endorsement here. Of central importance is the fact that all financial or economic programmes

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and the governance structures they spawn – whether extensive or otherwise – do not seriously undermine the dominance of the central state. Somewhat paradoxically, ‘the state’, if viewed in terms of the new devolved structures it creates and the gate-keeping capacity it has generated, is more connected than ever to the detail and the dynamics of the UK’s broad economic relationship with the EU. The constraints the devolved region faces in arguing, for example, against CAP reform or in favour of regional variations in taxation provide a clear basis for this observation and are explored further in the following chapters. In the context of its economic and financial impact, the EU has permeated Northern Ireland in interesting and sometimes innovative ways, but not to the point where it has prompted a definitive move from government to governance or facilitated advanced multilevel interactions.

Notes   1 The NITF was created in 2007 and was an initiative of European Commission President José Manuel Barroso. The taskforce was an explicit attempt to support the re-introduction of devolved power in 2007. It works to facilitate and enhance Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU by directly and closely supporting Northern Ireland officials in their interactions with the EU policy and funding arena (see Chapters 4 and 7 for a more detailed overview).   2 The Investment strategy for Northern Ireland 2011–2021: Building a Better Future was launched by the Northern Ireland Executive in October 2012. It updates the earlier 2008 investment strategy. The revision of the 2008 document was as a consequence of the Spending Review (2010), which reduced the amount of investment capital available to finance the original Northern Ireland strategy.   3 The 2012 UK budget announced a reduction in the UK corporation tax rate to 22 per cent by 2014. The corporation tax rate has been progressively reduced in recent years, but it is still larger than the 12 per cent corporation tax which applies in the Republic of Ireland.  4 Plans to create an all-island single electricity market on the island of Ireland are advanced.   5 The five bottlenecks to growth are: the high general government deficit; the lack of stability of the financial sector; household and government sector indebtedness; limited private investment; and the limited ability of the education system to improve human capital formation (see HM Government 2011).   6 The ONIEB has appointed four Thematic Desk Officers, each dedicated to one of the four priorities outlined in the Northern Ireland Executive’s (2011c) EU Priorities 2011– 2012: competitiveness and employment; innovation and technology; climate change and energy; and social cohesion. These bear a close resemblance to the key themes contained in Europe 2020.   7 On 8 August 2012, an online survey was issued to 1,450 direct contacts with a generic link to the survey on the dedicated website. Stakeholders were encouraged to share this with their own contacts.   8 The full title of the original Peace programme, or Peace I as it has become known, is: ‘The Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland’.  9 The Northern Ireland Partnership Board was constructed on the basis of the same

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representational mix as District Partnerships, but it assumed accountability for strategy, monitoring and funding the sub-programme. 10 During the 1970s, CAP expenditure accounted for 70 per cent of the total EU budget. Today the figure is closer to 35 per cent. 11 Northern Ireland fares well in relation to other constituent parts of the UK given that the average per hectare values are €125 for Scotland, €263 for Wales; €303 for England; €372 for Northern Ireland; and €247 for the UK as whole (Northern Ireland Assembly 2011: 5).

4

Northern Ireland and the European Union: the political dynamics Introduction In the years since the creation of the EU, the polity has changed substantially in terms of its size, shape, remit and powers. Northern Ireland too has experienced profound political change during the period of its association with the EU – i.e. since UK accession in 1973. Where the EU of today bears little resemblance to the EEC created in 1957, Northern Ireland is similarly different from its 1970s form when direct rule was in place. The changes experienced in Northern Ireland since 1973 have been influenced by a range of factors, including external ones. The most prominent external political influences include the British and Irish governments and the United States of America (USA). The EU has never played a direct political role in Northern Ireland politics, but it has used its resources to subtly influence change. Driven primarily by economic and financial interventions, the impact of EU involvement has been tacitly political. Successive structural fund and Peace programmes used EU financial aid to bolster the peace process and to promote reconciliation. The EU’s role in Northern Ireland, however, has not always been entirely under-stated. On occasion, the EU has been explicitly used by a variety of actors as a forum, facilitator, model or example for conflict resolution and devolved governance in Northern Ireland. The EU is a distinctive hybrid polity which defies neat categorisation. It is also the most profound example of how governance arrangements are changing. In other words, the EU is constantly changing what it does, and also how it performs its governance functions (Peters and Pierre 2009: 98). It therefore, arguably, provides an instructive context within which to consider possible means to addressing and resolving the Northern Ireland conflict. Insofar as the EU has been involved in promoting particular approaches to the governance of Northern Ireland, to what extent have these been driven by new conceptions of governance, or more specifically, has the EU influenced the emergence of new forms and styles of governing in Northern Ireland? This chapter explores the different ways in which the EU has been associated with Northern Ireland politics in the broadest sense – i.e. how it has contributed to addressing the conflict and also its impact on political parties, interest groups and notions of identity. Some contend that the EU has improved UK–Irish relations to the point where the search for a political resolution was made more achievable,

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and furthermore that the process of European integration has moderated attachment to identity in ways which have also facilitated the peace process. Parallels have also been drawn between the institutional structures of the EU and those of the devolved Northern Ireland polity, with some suggestion too that the EU has (in part at least) stimulated the regionalisation process in Northern Ireland and across the UK more generally. The precise nature and extent of the EU’s contribution to Northern Ireland politics is contested. For the most part, those of a unionist persuasion minimise the impact of the EU, while in contrast, nationalists discern links between recent political developments in Northern Ireland and the influence of Europe. The EU’s impact can be captured in terms of both ideological and institutional influence. From the governance perspective, this equates to the construction of institutions which support the multi-level character of EU governance, including key roles for non-state actors. The introduction of devolution and the new institutions created by the 1998 Belfast Agreement bear witness to some of the features associated with EU governance. However, they also formalise, institutionalise and perhaps even strengthen state involvement in the process of regional governance. Suggestions therefore, that the EU has assisted in the promotion of ‘new politics’ in Northern Ireland may be premature.

The EU and UK–Irish relations Northern Ireland’s troubled history lends it an unusual and contested position in the context of the broader UK–Ireland relationship. The decision by the UK and the Republic of Ireland to join the then EEC on 1 January 1973 notionally implied some repercussions for Northern Ireland in terms of altered relations between the neighbouring member-states. For the UK, EU membership was seen as a means to arrest domestic economic decline and to enhance the UK’s international influence. Ireland’s decision to seek membership was part of a wider process of economic and social modernisation. In reality however, Ireland’s application was intrinsically linked to that of its neighbour. Economic and trade ties with the UK effectively dictated that Irish membership of the EU was contingent on UK membership. Accession to the EU promised many benefits to Ireland, not least a lessening of the state’s dependence on the UK. However, the anticipated impact of membership of the EU was expected to embrace more than just the economic dimension of the Irish–UK relationship. It was also expected to impact on the political, social, cultural and possibly even psychological dimensions of Irish–UK relations. In the context of any shifts in the dynamics of the broader Irish–UK relationship, Northern Ireland is intrinsically implicated. The economic relationship between Ireland and the UK has changed quite dramatically since 1973. Reliance on the UK market diminished substantially during the first 25 years of EU membership. In 1971, the UK market absorbed 61 per cent of Irish exports. By the mid-1990s, this figure had fallen to 25 per cent (McAleese 2000: 82). Ireland’s economic situation improved further during the 2000s, the period of the so-called Celtic Tiger. For much of this decade, Ireland’s

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economic performance outstripped that of the UK as its GDP per capita hovered near the top of the EU league table. Ireland’s new-found wealth and prosperity, however, hinted at a deeper political development. In essence, the eradication of traditional economic inequalities signalled a more equal relationship between the two states. This evolving relationship, based increasingly on equality, was further strengthened by the political structures of the EU. Guelke (1988: 163) points to the enhanced international status which EU membership afforded Ireland. Within the Council of Ministers and European Council, both states have full memberstate status and are therefore, equal in principle. The political impact of UK and Irish membership of the EU has, according to some commentators, conceivably served to improve the old, client-state relationship which had previously soured relations between the neighbours (Kennedy 1994: 177). The tangible impact of these developments has helped to promote dialogue between Ireland and the UK on the Northern Ireland issue. Meetings of the European Council have traditionally involved bilateral meetings on Northern Ireland issues taking place between the Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister) and the UK Prime Minister on the margins of EU business. So commonplace was this arrangement that both Irish and British officials regarded the meetings as a routine component of European Council summits (Laffan and O’Mahony 2008: 201). Informal contact of this nature nurtured productive and constructive relations between key officials and political figures in Ireland and the UK in attempts to address the conflict. Meehan (1999: 29) argues that this type of contact helped both states ‘to co-operate in dealing with the disputed territory of Northern Ireland and its competing nationalisms’. Interestingly, both governments did not use the EU itself as a forum within which to address Northern Ireland matters. A clear distinction was drawn between EU business and bilateral UK–Irish affairs. Meehan is among the most strident in advocating the more direct and positive role EU membership may have played in ameliorating relations between Ireland and the UK. She suggests (2006: 341) that it should be noted that the GFA [Good Friday Agreement] reflects the culmination of new relations between Ireland and the UK initiated by their rapprochement under the umbrella of EU membership.

Former Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald shared her view. He believed that political settlement in Northern Ireland was ‘facilitated by common Irish and British membership of the EU’ (2005: 19). Dixon (2006: 421) disagrees with this analysis. He notes that British–Irish cooperation in relation to Northern Ireland predated EU membership, and subsequent to 1973, the relationship between the two governments experienced ‘cooling’ periods (particularly during 1974–79). He is also of the view that the impact of external influences on the Northern Ireland peace process is exaggerated. Indeed, he asserts that developments within, rather than outside of, Northern Ireland explain the trajectory and the dynamic of the process of conflict resolution (see Dixon 2002b). Tannam (2009: 22) is less sceptical, but she too expresses reservations about the impact of the EU’s consensual model on facilitating cooperation between Ireland and the UK. However, although

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the impact of the EU may be disputed, the very fact of Irish and UK membership certainly brought the states into close contact with each other. The bilateral meetings between the Irish Taoiseach and UK Prime Minister were forums within which the Northern Ireland conflict was discussed. During this period, and in particular from the 1980s onwards, the UK began to cooperate more closely with the Republic of Ireland in addressing the Northern Ireland conflict. At the very least, it is conceivable that Irish and UK membership of the EU facilitated these developments, although its role may not have been a determining or decisive one. What this reveals is that the EU provided an opportunity whereby two states were enabled to develop a better understanding of each other. This in turn facilitated improved communication and cooperation on the vexed question of Northern Ireland. The long-term effect was the promotion of leading roles for both states in the peace process. In this instance, the EU served to support the role of the state (its politicians and officials) in the search for a settlement in Northern Ireland. In this specific example of bi-national cooperation, the state is at the forefront. It owes its position there, at least in part, to the facilitating role of the EU. The nature of the EU’s involvement therefore is limited. It was not based on any high degree of interdependence in that the EU does not constitute a necessary or (for some Unionist observers) even a legitimate actor in the process. There is little to suggest therefore that the EU’s role fits with the governance view which emphasises interdependency and the autonomous role of non-state actors. The EU was a marginal player which facilitated interstate interactions on the question of Northern Ireland. Attempts to involve the EU directly in the process of conflict resolution were rarely met with universal enthusiasm.

The EU and its influence on conflict resolution in Northern Ireland The UK’s membership of the EU has certainly broadened the context within which possible resolutions of the Northern Ireland conflict might be framed and implemented. A range of proposals, many with a nationalist slant, have sought to link the resolution of the conflict to either the benign example or the direct involvement of the EU. The ‘Europe of the Regions’ model has been employed by Kearney and Wilson (1994) in their submission to the Opsahl Commission.1 They articulate a particular view of the EU which privileges regional units. Their vision is of a federal Europe of the regions in which European integration and enlargement is marked by a progressive transfer of power down to regions from ‘nation-states’, as much as by a transfer of power upwards through economic and monetary, and political union. This new European ‘architecture’ would be buttressed by a filling of the ‘democratic deficit’ at the heart of the EC [European Community] and a new concept of European citizenship underpinned by human rights guarantees overseen by pan-European institutions. (Kearney and Wilson, 1994: 53)

To facilitate this, they argue that new democratic structures in Northern Ireland would facilitate greater local autonomy, including direct Northern Ireland repre-

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sentation to the EU institutions. The former SDLP party leader and MEP, John Hume, has also been a supporter of the Europe of the regions model (see Hume 1988). The SDLP (and in particular Hume) warrants particular mention, not just in the context of the party’s support for European integration (see below), but also its active encouragement of a European dimension to conflict resolution in Northern Ireland. Hume’s support for an EU role in Northern Ireland substantially pre-dates the period when the Europe of the regions model was de rigueur during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Indeed, Hume’s references to the EU as a model for conflict resolution can be dated to pre-EU membership days in 1971 (McLoughlin 2009: 604). Such views and rhetoric were frequently articulated throughout Hume’s political career, often to the point where they antagonised unionist rivals. In 1983, Hume was persuasive in convincing the European Parliament (EP) to examine the Northern Ireland situation. The Political Affairs Committee of the EP did so and produced A Report Drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee on the Situation in Northern Ireland (1983).2 The EP’s intervention was unprecedented. And indeed it was highly unusual for the EU to ‘interfere’ in the internal affairs of a member-state (Kennedy 1994: 179). The document, however, was not especially radical either in terms of its interpretation of the problem or in its proposed remedies. Guelke notes that the document was ‘studiously moderate in its analysis of the conflict and in its political prescriptions’ (1988: 160). The report proposed that any changes, any reforms and any improvements in the overall political situation in Northern Ireland should be planned and executed by the responsible UK authorities with the consent of the peoples of Northern Ireland and with the fullest possible cooperation with the Republic. (Haagerup 1984: 72)

The report thus stressed that both the UK and Irish governments had a role to play in resolving the Northern Ireland conflict. Explicitly, the report suggested that an Irish–UK consensus on addressing the conflict must provide ways and means as to how the Irish dimension of Northern Ireland could find many more legitimate and visible expressions than is the case today, even including the establishment of joint British–Irish responsibilities in a number of specified fields. (Haagerup 1984: 73)

This emphasis on an ‘Irish dimension’3 was particularly noteworthy because it legitimised a disputed aspect of the conflict and one about which Unionists harboured serious reservations. The report was endorsed by an EP resolution, although without the support of the UUP and DUP parliamentary representatives. Indeed, so incensed were unionists by the Haagerup Report that the then Northern Ireland Assembly4 passed a motion urging the UK government to prevent the publication of the document (Hayward 2006: 269). All UK Conservative MEPs, except Lord Bethell who supported the report, abstained from voting. Those who abstained did so reluctantly (Guelke 1988: 160). The key problem for Conservative MEPs was that although many supported the spirit of the report, they were

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unhappy with what they construed as the EP’s interference in the internal affairs of the UK (Moxon-Browne 1992: 51). British Labour Party EP representatives endorsed the report alongside all but one Irish MEP.5 A few years later, the SDLP again looked to Europe in its prescriptions for resolving the Northern Ireland conflict. On this occasion during the Brooke initiative talks in 1992, the SDLP proposed a direct role for the EU in Northern Ireland. The party proposed that effective power in Northern Ireland be held by six commissioners: three directly elected from Northern Ireland and one each nominated by the Irish and British governments and the European Community. In addition, a new Northern Ireland Assembly would be modelled on the EP’s structures, practices and powers, while a North–South Council of Ministers would also be created (Hainsworth and Morrow 1994: 10). The proposals were roundly rejected by the other talks’ participants, particularly unionists, who balked at the idea of direct EU involvement in Northern Ireland politics. Unlike the EP, the European Commission has been reluctant to interfere in the domestic politics of a member-state. Jacques Delors, former President of the European Commission, rejected a European role in Northern Ireland when he asserted: I don’t feel that the European Commission has a duty to interfere in the internal problem of a country, of a province. The European Commission will follow with friendship and enormous interest the evolution of events in the province and we are ready to help but not to be a substitute for those responsible for the province. (Irish News, 4 November 1992)

This view reflects the UK government’s opposition to outside interference in the domestic affairs of the country. Such sentiments were particularly apparent during the premierships of Margaret Thatcher and John Major. Objections to European Commission interest in Northern Ireland however, diminished after 1997: The victory of the Blair government … injected renewed vigour to the peace process, providing greater opportunity for the [European] Commission to be proactive. (Tannam 2007: 350)

Since the 1990s, the European Commission’s influence in Northern Ireland has largely been channelled through the structural funds and other EU funding initiatives. Financial aid has been levered to encourage improved cross-community relations and to contribute to reconciliation. The Commission’s role in designing and monitoring the use of structural fund instruments in Northern Ireland is, however, less pronounced than it once was. During the course of the last decade, the devolved administration has assumed greater responsibility for the management of EU expenditure in the region, and this has been at the expense of Commission involvement (see Chapter 3). More recently, the European Commission has experimented with non-financial initiatives to support the peace process in Northern Ireland. The creation of the NITF in 2007 is a case in point. The Taskforce is apolitical and financially neutral, although this neutrality masks what are effectively its socio-economic intentions – i.e. to assist the modernisation of the Northern Ireland economy. The work and outputs of the NITF suggest that

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the EU (and particularly the European Commission) has adapted its approach to conflict resolution to one which is based on ‘enabling and empowering the region to adapt economically and politically to the demands and rigours of the postconflict period’ (Hayward and Murphy 2012: 440). Again, the European Commission’s role in Northern Ireland can be characterised in terms of its indirectness. And crucially, its impact is dependent on the ‘reciprocity’ of the Northern Ireland administration (see Hayward and Murphy 2012). In other words, the full extent and reach of its influence is neither automatic nor guaranteed but reliant on the willing cooperation of those at whom it is targeted. Domestic initiatives and proposals to end the conflict in Northern Ireland were rarely explicit in containing a European dimension. Initial experiments in resolving the conflict during the 1970s largely ignored any possible EU component. The 1980s and 1990s saw some recognition of a European dimension in Northern Ireland. This is evident in relation to the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985), which noted the EU in its preamble. Despite the very limited references to Europe in the document itself, Guelke (1988: 161) has observed that the Anglo-Irish Agreement drew heavily on the findings, recommendations, language and spirit of the Haagerup Report. Likewise Moxon-Browne claims, ‘it is no accident that the Anglo-Irish Agreement … incorporated many assumptions already made explicit in the Haagerup Report the previous year’ (1992: 51). Both the Council of Ministers and the EP formally welcomed the Anglo-Irish Agreement in 1985 and the EC paid 15 million ECUs into the International Fund for Ireland (IFI) in 1989. The EP’s support for the Anglo-Irish Agreement was important in that it lent international support and approval to home-grown efforts at resolving the conflict. It also made it extremely difficult for either Britain or Ireland to renounce the pact unilaterally (Moxon-Browne 1992: 52). The EP’s welcome for the AngloIrish Agreement also helped to maintain the agreement against sustained and intense unionist opposition. By the 1990s, the international context within which the Northern Ireland conflict might be settled becomes more prominent (see Table 4.1). Particularly interesting are the Frameworks Documents (1995). These are part of a continuing Anglo-Irish effort to resolve the conflict and they contain novel ideas in relation to how Northern Ireland as a region might relate to the EU (Kennedy 2000b: 160). They effectively propose that EU programmes and activities provide a ready basis for deepening political and economic ties between the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (Teague 1996: 550) The EU is worthy of consideration in relation to the process of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, although there is clearly some disagreement in relation to how and to what extent that influence has manifested itself. Anderson (1998: 134) has concluded that: ‘the UK’s and the Irish Republic’s joint membership of the European “Common Market” did not “dissolve” the national conflict or the Irish border’. Others share this view (see Kennedy 2000b: 163–167; and Teague 1996: 550). Hayward and Murphy (2012) suggest that the creation of the NITF represents a more direct approach to assisting the consolidation of peace in Northern Ireland. They note, however, that Northern Ireland receptiveness to this initiative was slow

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to emerge. It is true that the EU has never had a formal or official role in brokering a peace settlement in Northern Ireland. Insofar as the EU may have facilitated dialogue between protagonists and provided an example to domestic Northern Ireland peace brokers, this role was informal in nature and sometimes resisted (by the UK government and Unionists in particular). Any influence has necessarily been discrete and guarded. The EU has not demonstrated any strong desire to be a central player in the process of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland. As indicated in Chapter 3, it has used its financial capacity to tacitly influence political and communal relations in Northern Ireland. However, this cannot be construed as either a direct or an indirect challenge to the central role and authority of the British and Irish states in the process of conflict resolution. Indeed, the EU has been assiduous in its attempts not to offend national sensibilities. External involvement in attempts to address the conflict has been pragmatic, sensitive to charges of interference, predominantly focused on the financial and, ultimately, subject to local acquiescence. In Northern Ireland, the EU’s conflict resolution role has been limited, hampered by an unwillingness to disturb state domination of key conflictrelated issues. Little sign here of new modes of governance in action.

The EU and devolution in Northern Ireland: a benign influence The EU’s subtle manner of influencing Northern Ireland’s politics may be discernible in other – even more indistinct – ways. Some authors claim that the increased interest in devolution can be explained with reference to the ‘European’ factor. John suggests that: ‘the devolution of power since 1997 in Scotland and Wales partly came about from the way in which regionalist/nationalist parties played the European card as a resource’ (2000: 884; see also John 1999). The Scottish National Party (SNP) was particularly successful in this regard when in 1988 the party launched its ‘independence in Europe’ policy. The policy was based on the belief that ‘Europe offered a means of making independence both electorally possible and more economically viable’ (Mitchell 1998: 121). The SNP’s policy stance was in keeping with developments elsewhere in Europe. The strengthening of the European integration process during the 1980s involved the emergence of an increasing number of EU policies of relevance to the regions of the EU, notably in the area of the SEM and structural funds. This development encouraged regions to engage more positively with the EU and use it as a potential means of ‘influencing or bypassing the exercise of domestic political power’ (Morison and Livingstone 1995: 236–237). As Keating and Elcock (1998: 4) point out: those [regions] with their own historic, cultural or national identities even began to see [the EU] as an opportunity to increase their own autonomy, to pursue their own distinct interest, and to project themselves as more than mere dependencies of the state.

The SNP was swift to realise the potential leverage such a policy position would allow them in selling the notion of Scottish independence to the electorate. The campaign was successful and further improved the electoral fortunes of the party,

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Table 4.1  The EU and constitutional/political initiatives in Northern Ireland 1972–95 Direct rule imposed (1972) Proposals  Devolution suspended and power returned to Westminster. The Secretary of State for Northern Ireland assumes responsibility for the region. European dimension  Coincides with UK and Irish accession to the EU. Analysis  New arrangements initially regarded as temporary. Outcome  Remained the form of governance in Northern Ireland between 1972 and 1999.

Sunningdale Agreement (1974) Proposals  Establishment of a power-sharing executive in Northern Ireland and recognition of the ‘Irish dimension’ in the form of a Council of Ireland, which was to have ‘executive and harmonising functions’. European dimension  Suggestion that proposed Council of Ireland, as part of its harmonising and consultative role, might undertake ‘important work relating, for instance to the impact of EEC membership.’ Analysis  The Council was effectively devoid of any significant powers and in any case was vehemently opposed by the unionist community, the proposed Council of Ireland being particularly controversial. Outcome  The Ulster Workers Council May 1974 strike brought Northern Ireland to a standstill. In the face of intimidation, hostility and outright opposition to the new power-sharing experiment, the Agreement collapsed.

Northern Ireland Assembly (1982–86) Proposals  Created as an attempt at ‘rolling devolution’, the Assembly had 78 membersa with an initially consultative role. This was later expanded to include executive responsibilities if 70 per cent of members petitioned Westminster for a devolution of power. European dimension  The Assembly did engage in some discussion of EU issues but this was largely minor and ineffective.b Analysis  No discussion of Anglo-Irish relations being treated as the potential key to achieving peace was permitted. The ‘Irish dimension’ was therefore overlooked and in its absence the likelihood of the Assembly producing settlement proposals acceptable to the nationalist community was non-existent.c Outcome  The Assembly met but the SDLP refused to participate. Lacking a political consensus, it was never considered anything more than a talking shop and any hopes of achieving full-scale devolution had faded by 1986 when the institution was dissolved.

New Ireland Forum (1983–84)d Proposals  The New Ireland Forum created a deliberative body of elected representatives from the four main constitutional nationalist parties on the island of Ireland.e The forum drafted proposals on how peace and stability might be achieved via democratic means and outlined possible future structures and institutions. European dimension  The New Ireland Report contains no discussion of a European context to the Northern Ireland conflict.f Analysis  The Forum ‘was innovatory in that it moved the debate from the aspirational to the operational and considered alternative models to Irish unity such as federalism/confederalism and joint authority’ (Arthur 1994: 224). Outcome  The forum produced a report, which commanded international intention and was adopted as policy by the Irish government. The report was not greeted with enthusiasm by the Northern Ireland unionist community, or indeed the British government. Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985) Proposals  The Anglo-Irish Agreement formalised the relationship between the Irish and UK governments in any attempt to resolve the conflict and marked the beginning of official British and Irish cooperation on Northern Ireland.

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European dimension  The preamble of the Agreement refers explicitly, if broadly, to the European context.g Analysis  The Agreement was essentially a cautious document although it did acknowledge the relevance of the ‘Irish dimension’ by providing for the creation of the Anglo-Irish Secretariath and so giving the Irish government a consultative voice on certain Northern Ireland policy matters. Outcome  Unionists were vehemently opposed to the recognition and role afforded the Irish government. The signing of the Agreement was greeted with mass protests and strikes across Northern Ireland. It survived, however, until the Belfast Agreement repealed it in 1998.

Downing Street Declaration (1993)i Proposals  A political statement of intent, the Declaration was an attempt by the Dublin and London governments at achieving ‘the development of an agreed framework for peace’ (Paragraph 1) European dimension  The Declaration acknowledges the EU, but references are brief and low-key, and the document is not explicit in detailing how proposed new approaches might develop and what common interests they might serve.j Analysis  The document was cautiously welcomed by key Unionist and Nationalist political parties in Northern Ireland and marked a turning-point in moves towards initiating a real and lasting peace process. Outcome  The Declaration pre-empted the 1994 paramilitary cease-fires and definitively set the scene for the realisation of a sustainable and inclusive peace process.

Frameworks for the future (1995)k Proposals  The Frameworks for the Future represented an attempt by the Irish and UK governments to explain their ideas on what kind of settlement they perceived as possible and favourable in Northern Ireland. European dimension  References to Europe are plentiful, interesting and relatively substantial, displaying a radical new approach to how Northern Ireland might relate to the EU.l Analysis  The Joint Frameworks Document was greeted cautiously by the broad political community in Northern Ireland. Outcome  The documents paved the way for a new series of talks involving all of the Northern Ireland political parties, except the DUP, which opted out of the process at an early stage refusing to negotiate with Sinn Féin.  The 78 members of the Northern Ireland Assembly were elected by proportional representation.  According to Hainsworth (1990: 85): ‘[W]hen the Unionist-dominated body … and its specialised committees did discuss EC policy, an anti-NIO, anti-British government stance was evident’. The bulk of discussion was confined to two contentious areas of Assembly deliberations, namely the question of structural fund ‘additionality’ and the issue of agriculture. c  From 1982 to 1986 the initiative enjoyed the active support of then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Jim Prior. However, the Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, was against the idea. She was opposed to experiments in devolution for fear they would impact on dormant calls for devolution in Scotland (Young 1991: 467). d  The New Ireland Forum was not a Northern Ireland initiative but an Irish Government initiative. It is included here because of the participation of Northern Ireland actors. e  These parties included the SDLP, Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael and the Irish Labour party. f  Europe warrants only a fleeting mention in the opening paragraphs of the document, and only then in the context of a conflict which has raged long after other European countries have put quarrels behind them. g  Specifically, the preamble states ‘[W]ishing further to develop the unique relationship between their peoples and the close co-operation between their countries as friendly neighbours and as partners in the EC’. h  The Belfast-based secretariat was composed of senior British and Irish civil servants. i  Also referred to as the Joint Declaration. j  Paragraph 3 of the Downing Street Declaration states that ‘the development of Europe will, of itself, require new approaches to serve interests common to both parts of the island of Ireland, and to Ireland and the UK as partners in the European Union’. This vagueness is again repeated in paragraph 9, which relates to the creation of cross-border institutions via dialogue, which may fall against a greater European backdrop. k  Also referred to as the Joint Frameworks Documents. l  Paragraph 28 of ‘A Framework for Accountable Government in Northern Ireland’ is devoted to ‘relationships with the European Union’. Specifically, it suggests that any new institutions created in Northern Ireland would have responsibility for implementing EC legislation and programmes. In addition, any new structures would be charged with ‘developing Northern Ireland’s views on EU issues and representing them to the UK government and in any new North/South institutions’. These provisions are again repeated, in greater detail, in paragraph 26 of ‘A New Framework for Agreement’. a b

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thereby forcing their political rivals to react to new European and constitutional realities. The Labour Party did so by further embracing devolution during the 1990s, as they continued to lose ground to their Scottish and Welsh nationalist opponents. Northern Ireland, however, represents a different case-study. The achievement of devolution there involved a different rationale from that in Scotland and Wales. Moves towards devolution in the region were designed primarily as a means to allow the region to escape the violence and intercommunal ethno-national conflict that has troubled it since the late 1960s and also to return democratic and accountable government after almost three decades of direct rule. Most commentators agree that: ‘the principal aim of the Agreement has been to secure peace’ (Cadogan Group 1998: 23), and although the outcome has been a form of devolution, this was not necessarily given when the peace process was initiated. The novel nature of the agreed devolved system, as detailed in the 1998 Belfast Agreement, is a direct response to the conflict and not the result of any other circumstances. The political predisposition of successive Irish and UK governments and local political actors towards some form of devolution as a viable means of alleviating or overcoming the Northern Ireland conflict is interesting. The difficulties in relation to the previous attempt at devolution (during the period 1921–72) might suggest some aversion to revisiting the same constitutional option. According to Maguire (1992: 17–18), however, there are a number of reasons why devolution is viewed as an acceptable form of regional governance in Northern Ireland. In the first instance, ‘devolution would restore accountable government to the province’ and would, therefore, lend itself to the creation of government which would be more responsive to the specific needs of the region. It would further allow the regeneration of the political process in the region. Politics in Northern Ireland was traditionally dominated by constitutional and security issues; devolution would permit the opportunity to address ‘bread and butter’ issues. The majority of Northern Ireland political parties have at some point supported the devolution option, although Sinn Féin remained ardently opposed prior to the signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. Successive Irish and UK governments similarly supported such prescriptions as evidenced in documents including the New Ireland Report (1984), the Downing Street Declaration (1993) and the Joint Frameworks Documents (1995). The likelihood of a constitutional settlement grounded in the language of devolution was, therefore, relatively high. Any consideration of the broader European context to this position is largely absent. When compared with similar debates in Scotland which were animated by the European dimension, the lack of same in Northern Ireland is patent. Additionally, and most crucially, although the ‘principle’ of devolution was broadly acceptable to the key protagonists, the precise details of the political formula which would activate and sustain devolution were substantially more controversial. Despite the difficulty in linking the achievement of Northern Ireland devolution to the EU, there are nevertheless suggestions that the spirit of the 1998 Belfast Agreement draws strongly on the spirit of EU cooperation. O’Donnell points out that one of the striking features of the Agreement is that it was obviously drafted by

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individuals who were familiar with the EU system. He suggests that the mechanics of the new institutions reflect the reality of institutional practice and experience at the EU level (1999: 70): Making institutions interdependent and interlocking is very similar to the way the [European] union was designed. Placing heavy emphasis on consensus and agreement – indeed unanimity – is another feature of the European model of institutional policy coordination.

O’Leary (1998: 9) has likewise suggested that in particular, the North–South Ministerial Council is likely to operate in much the same way as the Council of Ministers in the EU as Ministers of the Northern Ireland Executive will enjoy some discretion in reaching decisions, but will nevertheless remain accountable to their respective legislatures. Similarly, Tannam has referred to evidence of the EU model of consensus decision-making in the Agreement (1999: 29). SDLP ‘Europeanist thinking’ is also manifest in the Belfast Agreement, most notably with respect to the insistence on the use of the d’Hondt procedure to select members of the Northern Ireland Executive (McLoughlin 2009: 612–613). This mechanism is used to allocate political offices in the EP. One SDLP interviewee also alluded to parallels between the role and function of Commissioners’ cabinets and that of the Ministerial Advisors to Northern Ireland Ministers. Northern Ireland’s political fortunes owe substantially more to choices and compromises made within Northern Ireland, and supported by the Irish and UK governments, than they do to external EU influences. Some similarities between EU and Northern Ireland devolved institutions may be discernible, but there is little to definitively suggest that these are anything more than coincidental. Evidence that the European dimension was a key consideration in arguing for the introduction of devolution is largely absent. And in the same vein, the EU’s backing for devolution in Northern Ireland has always followed and reinforced the preferences of the key protagonists. EU support for a response to conflict built around a devolved consociational settlement has emerged in response to homegrown formulas. The European example was not harnessed by local actors in their attempts to sell the devolution option. The EU is clearly sympathetic to the primacy of other national and regional actors in considering their own political future. Europe’s (ambiguous) role here may be inoffensive, but it is also peripheral.

The EU and Northern Ireland political parties: light bonds and low priority Of all the areas where the impact of devolution has been most profoundly felt across the UK, it is in relation to the fortunes of political parties. The introduction of devolution represented a considerable challenge to both national and regional political parties. Research demonstrates that in both Scotland and Wales: ‘there is a clear pattern of dual voting which favours statewide parties … in UK elections, but nationalist parties – SNP and Plaid Cymru – in devolved elections’ (Jeffery and Hough 2006: 255). This pattern is further evident subsequent to the

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2010 Westminster election and the 2011 Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly elections. The new regional electoral landscape which devolution has occasioned has seen established national political parties – Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat – face more pronounced challenges from nationalist political parties at the regional level. In 2011, the Scottish National Party (SNP) emerged as the clear victor in elections to the Scottish Parliament, winning 69 of the 129 seats. Similarly in Wales, the nationalist Plaid Cymru made considerable electoral advances. Northern Ireland is somewhat removed from this evolving pattern of electoral change across the UK. This is due to the fact that national UK political parties did not traditionally organise or contest elections in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, since the signing of the 1998 Belfast Agreement and the subsequent introduction of devolution, the Northern Ireland party system has similarly been subject to change. In contrast to the rest of the UK, the party system in Northern Ireland is based on competition between a large number of regionally specific political parties, some of which have proved more resilient over time than others. For most of its recent history, however, the Northern Ireland party system has been dominated by five political parties – the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI), DUP, SDLP, Sinn Féin and the UUP. The DUP and UUP are avowedly pro the Union with the UK, whilst the SDLP and Sinn Féin aspire to the achievement of a united Ireland. In the past, the key distinction between the SDLP and Sinn Féin centred on how to achieve a united Ireland. Whereas the SDLP supports exclusively peaceful means, Sinn Féin has been supportive of the Irish Republican Army’s (IRA) armed campaign against what they deemed ‘British occupation’. The distinction between the DUP and UUP is more complex and revolves around issues related to identity, ideology and strategy (see Tonge 2005a) (Table 4.2 provides an overview of Northern Ireland’s five largest political parties). The nature of competition between Northern Ireland’s political parties is not conventional. Party politics is polarised around a profound constitutional cleavage – i.e. support for a united Ireland versus support for maintenance of the Union with the UK. With the exception of the APNI (and other smaller parties such as the Green Party), the remaining four largest political parties draw electoral support (near exclusively) from either the nationalist or the unionist community. This has produced a party system where ‘party competition occurs within nationalist and unionist blocs’ (Evans and Duffy 1997: 47). The political party system is thus premised on the relative absence of interbloc competition, although intrabloc competition is intense. Attempts to win votes from the ‘other’ community are often viewed with suspicion by voters, and parties may be punished rather than rewarded for any such reconciliatory moves. This type of competition has been an enduringly distinctive feature of the Northern Ireland party system since the 1980s, and despite some substantial changes to the fortunes of the largest political parties, this dual-ethnic character of the system persists. Following the 2010 Westminster election, Tonge (2010: 26) noted that: ‘the communal pillar electoral model remained intact, despite much chatter to the contrary and amid a greater focus on non-constitutional issues’. This configuration, however, masks consid-

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Table 4.2  Overview of Northern Ireland’s political parties Party

Founded

Political ideology

Position on the EU

EP groupa

Alliance

1970

Liberal

Pro-EU

European Liberal and Democratic Reform Party

DUP

1971

Centre-right Eurosceptic

Non-aligned

Sinn Féin

Early 1970s b

Democratic socialist

Eurosceptic

European United Left/Nordic Green Left

SDLP

1970

Social democratic

Pro-EU

Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats

UUP

1905

Conservative Eurorealist c

European Conservatives and Reformists

a  Not all of Northern Ireland’s political parties enjoy representation in the EP, but most have formal links with European political groupings. b  Sinn Féin’s origins can be dated to 1905. However, the emergence of the contemporary Sinn Féin party is associated with the early 1970s. c  This term was coined by the UUP MEP Jim Nicolson. It characterises the UUP position on Europe as being based on support for ‘cooperation between free nations for mutual advantage’ (see Murphy 2009: 593). It might be construed as a mild form of Euroscepticism.

erable change within each bloc where competition between parties is vigorous. The worsening fortunes of the moderate SDLP and UUP are in stark contrast to the electoral gains which have recently been enjoyed by their respective opponents within each bloc, namely Sinn Féin and the DUP. Table 4.3 demonstrates the extent to which the electoral fortunes of the parties within each bloc have effectively switched since the early 2000s. Following the 2011 Assembly and local elections, the positions of the SDLP and UUP have become even more insecure. A continued drop in support for both parties has been accompanied by further seat gains for the DUP and Sinn Féin. Attempts by the SDLP and UUP to avert these developments have met with little success. An ill-fated UUP alliance with the Conservative Party was short-lived and judged to have been a mistake, while a possible SDLP alliance or merger with a political party in the Republic of Ireland has not materialised.6 The turbulence which the Northern Ireland party system has experienced in recent times, however, conceals some interesting developments. The 2011 Assembly and local elections were widely billed as being the first elections in Northern Ireland where ‘the main issues w[ould] be the real issues that face people in their everyday lives’ (Robinson 2011). In other words, Northern Ireland elections are becoming less about political and constitutional questions, and increasingly about economic and social issues. Some political scaremongering continues to surface – for example the 2011 Northern Ireland Assembly election campaign involved some commotion about the prospect of a Sinn Féin First Minister, and there was too some emphasis by the DUP, SDLP and UUP on structural reform of elements of the Northern Ireland power-sharing arrangement (see Matthews 2012). For the most part, however, ‘bread and butter’ issues have increasingly

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Table 4.3  Percentage of share of votes by party, 1998–2011 Election date

Election type

June 1998

A

June 1999

E

May 2001

W

May 2001

L

Nov. 2003

DUP

TUVa

UUP

APNI

SDLP

Sinn Féin

18.1

–

21.3

6.5

22.0

17.6

28.4

–

17.6

2.1

28.1

17.3

22.5

–

26.8

4.8

21.0

21.7

21.4

–

22.9

5.2

19.4

20.7

A

25.7

–

22.7

3.7

17.0

23.5

June 2004

E

31.9

–

16.5

–

15.9

26.3

May 2005

W

33.7

–

17.7

3.9

17.5

24.3

May 2005

L

29.6

–

18.0

5.0

17.4

23.2

May 2007

A

30.1

–

14.9

5.2

15.2

26.2

June 2009

E

18.2

13.7

17.1

5.5

16.2

26.0

May 2010

W

25.0

 3.9

15.2

6.3

16.5

25.5

May 2011

A

30.0

 2.5

13.2

7.7

14.2

26.9

May 2011

L

27.2

 2.0

15.2

7.4

15.0

24.8

Type of election: A, Assembly; E, European Parliament; L, Local Council; W, Westminster Parliament. Source: Adapted from Dixon (2008: 11) and www.ark.ac.uk/elections/. a TUV denotes Traditional Unionist Voice.

become the focus of recent elections. This shift towards engagement with a new type of electoral politics focused on policy concerns is undeniably welcome. It has been accompanied to some small degree by a unity of purpose and a shared perspective among former political foes about the focus and direction of specific policies and positions. The combined response of the Northern Ireland Executive to the 2010 UK Spending Review is a case in point. The type of political party consensus on policy displayed in this instance, however, is not typically the norm. Tensions in relation to the development of policy exist between parties and include, for example, education policy and language policy which spark intense political dispute between political blocs and political parties alike. In general, Northern Ireland political parties have responded to devolution by developing their policy platforms. Prior to the introduction of devolution, parties did not explicitly profile themselves according to the left-right spectrum or nonconstitutional policy positions. Although electoral manifestos made reference to economic and social policy issues, they were not normally the focus of electoral campaigns. As Wilson and Fawcett noted with reference to the 2003 Assembly election: ‘The Assembly election coverage was in many respects a policy-free zone’ (2004: 62). In recent years, the ‘absence’ of policy has been less pronounced. Parties have developed their manifestos and produced more robust policy platforms.7 Much of this has been a consequence of the economic impact of the global financial crisis and the need for Northern Ireland politicians to defend the region against annual threats from the UK exchequer to cut public funding and services. Northern Ireland political parties have contested EP elections since the first

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direct elections in 1979, and many have links to European political groupings (see Table 4.2). Some have been assiduous and conscientious in developing their EU positions and in modifying party programmes and party organisations to reflect their engagement with the EU – the SDLP is a clear case in point here (see McLoughlin 2009). Such developments and processes point to a process of Europeanisation of political parties (see Ladrech 2002 for a full discussion). Recent research on political parties on the island of Ireland concludes that some Europeanisation has taken place (see Murphy and Hayward 2009). Although the trigger for processes of Europeanisation in Northern Ireland is unclear, with the introduction of devolution came responsibility for a large number of policies with an EU dimension. This effectively demands that local political parties provide the electorate with positions, perspectives and views on a wide range of EU-related issues. This has been forthcoming. The UUP has considered EU issues in increasing depth, and recent party manifestos ‘make specific recommendations in relation to best representing Northern Ireland’s [EU] interests’ (Murphy 2009: 594). During the 2009 EP election campaign, the DUP considered the EU’s working-time directive, the economic impact of enlargement and the CAP. Focusing on these issues was considered ‘somewhat unusual for Northern Ireland campaigns’ (Hainsworth and McCann 2010: 306) and certainly marked a break with previous election campaigns when DUP discourse and discussion was dominated to a greater extent by domestic and constitutional concerns. Sinn Féin’s EU policy focus has also shifted: The increasing sophistication of Sinn Féin’s European message is clear: it no longer wants to be seen as a Eurosceptic party, much less as anti-European, but is keen to maintain some distance from other parties on a number of key issues. (Maillot 2009: 566)

Despite the development of policy positions, Northern Ireland political parties are not necessarily ‘Europeanised’ in the truest sense of the term (see Murphy and Hayward 2009). In the case of a majority of Northern Ireland political parties – the DUP, Sinn Féin and the UUP – their stance on the EU was traditionally negative and it remains so. It must be recognised, however, that previous to the introduction of devolution, the EU rhetoric espoused by parties was not tested by their involvement in either national or regional government. There was little opportunity for words to be matched by action. Devolution has changed the setting and the new reality has had some discernible impact on political parties. In the context of their participation in Northern Ireland’s devolved political institutions, and in contrast to party objections to or reservations about the EU, consideration of the EU has deepened and engagement with Europe has been more constructive than might have been anticipated. In the context of UK membership of the EU, party political objections to the Union on the part of regional political parties must necessarily be put aside. This has transpired into a situation whereby, regardless of stated positions on the EU, engagement with Brussels is pursued. In Northern Ireland, the multi-party devolved administration is focused on achieving benefits for the region across an

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array of policy areas and funding possibilities. It appears that a direct involvement in the process of governing Northern Ireland has prompted some party elites to engage with the EU more frequently and energetically (see Murphy and Hayward 2009; and also Chapter 5). Interestingly, and in contrast to experience elsewhere in the UK (see Hepburn 2009), devolution does not appear to have hardened opposition to the EU among Northern Ireland parties. Both the DUP and Sinn Féin have modified their opposition to the EU and become more engaged with Brussels subsequent to taking the reins of power in Northern Ireland (for the DUP see Ganiel 2009; and for Sinn Féin see Maillot 2009). This is readily explained by the benefits Northern Ireland has accrued via practical, financial, diplomatic and symbolic EU assistance, particularly since 1995. No Northern Ireland politician will wilfully jeopardise or undermine the tangible support which emanates from Brussels. Some Northern Ireland political parties are effectively treading a delicate path which sees them remain critical of the EU yet simultaneously benefit from the EU. The situation is further complicated by the power-sharing arrangement which requires that the Northern Ireland Executive is composed of parties which are both critical and favourable to the EU. The need to respect and accommodate the interests of all political parties will not always produce optimal policy positions and actions. Indeed, in relation to the NITF, tensions between the DUP and Sinn Féin were primarily to blame for the slow response to possibilities offered by Brussels (see Chapter 7). Overall however, this less hostile approach to matters European, requires qualification because such developments are conditional, selective, pragmatic and calculated on the basis of domestic advantage: the stimulus for the acceptance of Europeanization is to be found within the requirements and needs of the party at a particular point rather than from anything that occurs at the EU level. (Murphy and Hayward 2009: 426)

A similar pattern is revealed in relation to the actions of MEPs. Former Northern Ireland MEPs – the SDLP’s John Hume and the DUP’s Revd Dr Ian Paisley in particular – do not share similar views either on Northern Ireland’s constitutional position or on the EU. However, both men worked together in a spirit of cooperation at the EU level in their attempts to secure benefits for Northern Ireland (Bew and Meehan 1994: 102). This tradition of cooperation, however, has not endured. It was interrupted by the change of personnel which resulted after the 2004 election of then DUP MEP, Jim Allister, and Sinn Féin MEP, Bairbre de Brún. Allister abandoned the party whip shortly after his election and went on to found the Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) party. His actions were in direct response to the DUP decision to participate in the Northern Ireland Executive alongside Sinn Féin – a decision which he vehemently opposed. However, Allister did not hold his seat in the 2009 EP election; it instead returned to the DUP. Sinn Féin, in contrast, did maintain its seat in 2009.8 Cooperation between the three MEPs – representing the DUP, Sinn Féin and UUP – is limited and hostilities exist. These were plainly evident at the 2009 EP election final declaration when the DUP’s Diane Dodds and the TUV’s Jim Allister refused to shake hands with Sinn Féin’s Bairbre de Brún. Relations between the DUP and Sinn Féin are strained in Brussels. Much of

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the animosity has a historic basis and relates to domestic political issues and the differing constitutional preferences of both parties.9 This type of rancour between Northern Ireland’s EP representatives was not evident during earlier parliamentary terms before Sinn Féin and the TUV secured seats. Clearly, devolution has changed the dynamics of the party system and this has been borne out at the European as well as at the national and subnational levels. The increased European electoral success of Sinn Féin and unionists once opposed to the Belfast Agreement contrasts with earlier periods when the SDLP enjoyed representation. The changed EP electoral landscape has diminished the possibilities for high-level cooperation between Northern Ireland’s MEPs. It is clear that long-standing animosity between some parties at the domestic level is maintained at the European level. Devolution has not promoted more consensual relations at the EU level; rather, the party system which has developed since the introduction of devolution has in fact undermined relations between MEPs. The new forms of party competition (and cooperation) which have emerged are not, however, a consequence of the European electoral setting and EU policy debates. Instead they mirror similar patterns of emerging party competition at the subnational level. The EU dimension of the devolved political environment has not altered the traditional positions of political parties on the EU, nor has it moderated the intensity of party competition. The demands of political office may have occasioned some closer consideration of and engagement with the EU by Northern Ireland political party elites. Fundamentally, however, it is domestic and electoral priorities, as opposed to any innate attachment to the EU, which predominantly explain the evolution of political parties vis-à-vis the EU in Northern Ireland. Developments at the EU level have an incidental impact on change within and between parties, as opposed to a decisive one. The crucial difference in the era of devolution is that political parties occupy a more substantial position within the broader political system. Indeed, a key effect of devolution has been to elevate political parties. The consociational features of the 1998 Belfast Agreement place an onus on political parties – they are the basis for determining the power-sharing arrangement. In this way, political elites are effectively granted a dominant role. The extent to which a role is dominant is of particular importance here. Proponents of MLG emphasise that political parties are not the only intermediary between state and society. In other words, Northern Ireland political parties are not the sole go-betweens in the region’s relationship with the EU. Civil society and interest groups also play a role. However, in the context of the elevation of political parties, is it correct to assume that the position of civil society has suffered and therefore that the shift from government to governance may be occurring in reverse?

The EU and Northern Ireland civil society: devolution casualties? Conflict societies tend either to be devoid of civil society or to possess a strongly polarised one. The intensity of the Northern Ireland conflict has produced a model of civil society which has traditionally been segregated and divided. Indeed, the

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levels and intensity of division are as apparent in the civil society sphere as they are in other more formal features of the political system (Little 2004: 122). This unusual situation, however, did not preclude the voluntary and community sector from playing an important, substantial and unusual role in Northern Ireland during the period of direct rule (from 1972 to 1999) (McCall and Williamson 2001: 364). Against the backdrop of the conflict, allowing the voluntary and community sector a role in the governance of Northern Ireland was, in effect, a means of facilitating the delivery of key services and of alleviating the existence of a democratic deficit (see Morison 2006). In the context of securing long-term stability in Northern Ireland, Wolff (2002) argues that the divided nature of civil society must be eliminated and that the role of civil society generally must be restored to one which complements rather than replaces conventional political and governmental activities. In essence, this tallies with the broader governance perspective which emphasises the role of non-state actors. Although the Belfast Agreement does contain some provisions which fit with such views, civil society has encountered some marginalisation since 1998 and it is evident in the EU policy arena. The consociational nature of the Belfast Agreement, with its emphasis on a central role for political elites, effectively limits the extent to which an engagement with civil society can be supported. Aughey (2005: 93) makes reference to the creation of the now defunct Civic Forum: ‘Incorporated within the strong top-down consociationalism of the Agreement, then, was this concession to the bottom-up civil society approach’. The 60 member consultative Civic Forum last met in 2002 and was composed of representatives of business, trade unions, farmers and the voluntary sectors. Its creation was the subject of some dispute. The most vocal opposition to what was regarded as a ‘monster quango’ came from the DUP (see Bell 2004). However, even amongst those political parties which did support the creation of the Forum, their backing lacked intensity and conviction. Guelke has referred to the ‘low profile’ of the institution (2003: 68), while Taylor claims it ‘lacked influence’ (2006: 222). The explanations for its poor performance lie in its composition being heavily influenced by the First and Deputy First Minister and thus not controlled directly by the institution itself. It also experienced difficulties in positioning itself between the Assembly and society in general. Additionally, politicians and civil servants displayed animosity and hostility towards the institution, further hampering its capacity to influence (see Taylor 2006). A review of the Civic Forum was launched in 2008 but did not result in the revival of the institution. The EU has sought to respond to a perceived ‘gap’ in Northern Ireland’s civil society capacity which consociationalism appears to cultivate. Primarily via the Peace programmes, the EU aims to foster civil society and the non-state sector more broadly: [the Peace programmes] sought to harness the potential of the voluntary and private sectors to stimulate the involvement of citizens at the grassroots levels and to complement political efforts at consociationalism through a complex scheme of funding. (Racioppi and O’Sullivan See 2007: 371)

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In so doing, the EU recognises that Northern Ireland has long been characterised by a ‘thriving civil society sector but one that is scarred by tensions and divisions along the traditional communal lines’ (Little 2004: 116). Alleviating these divisions is seen as a means to consolidate and stabilise Northern Ireland in the longer term. This rests on an interpretation of peace-building which owes more to a civil society approach than to one which is reliant on consociationalism: ‘advocates of the civil society approach advocate the mobilisation of the people and civil society as a tool of social transformation’ (Dixon 2012: 112). The EU has implicitly activated and practically supported the civil society approach via the Peace programmes. The delivery mechanisms created to distribute financial support, in the form of IFBs and District Partnerships for example, have relied on the involvement and cooperation of civil society groups in a spirit of reconciliation. The success of this approach, however, is unclear. It may invigorate and even sustain some thirdsector activity in Northern Ireland, but in terms of transforming the basis for the conflict, its impact is unclear: ‘It is difficult to determine the extent to which the EU’s influence has meaningfully promoted the emergence of a less divided civil society’ (emphasis in the original) (Murphy 2010b: 185). Evaluations of successive Peace programmes reveal some dissatisfaction with the allocation, transparency and outputs of the funds (see Byrne et al. 2009b). The EU’s financial assistance has not been a ‘panacea’ in terms of relieving tensions between communities and encouraging reconciliation on a large scale. This begs questions as to civil society’s role in the post-conflict era and its ability to meet the expectations of the civil society approach to conflict resolution. A further and more compelling complication is the evolving focus of the Peace programmes. Acheson and Milofsky (2008: 76) observe that: In the period before Peace II there was, in effect, a division of labour between the political task of achieving viable institutions of representative democracy in Northern Ireland which would allow erstwhile enemies to cooperate in the running of Northern Irish society and the community based task of achieving peace and reconciliation between local communities. During Phase II, these two separate spheres of activity became merged and local community activity became subordinated to locally elected representatives. These locally elected representatives have, for the most part, their power base in electoral politics based on what has been referred to as sectarian headcounts.

The vibrancy of civil society may have been stimulated by successive Peace programmes, but not to the point where the non-state sector has been able to resist the strength and dominance which political parties enjoy under the terms of the consociational political package. The European Commission has not overtly challenged this shift away from the non-state sector. A renewed emphasis on labour market integration and employment programmes during the post-Maastricht period resulted in a movement away from a previous focus on social inclusion. This shift in emphasis was to be to the detriment of the voluntary and community sector generally (Acheson and Milofsky 2008: 74). Regardless of this additional complication, however, the bigger challenge for civil society in Northern Ireland lies closer to home in that there is a clear resistance on the part of the regional

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political elite to a ‘sharing’ of roles and responsibilities with the third sector. Notwithstanding its limited success in alleviating the segregated character of civil society in Northern Ireland, the EU has arguably had some impact in more indirect ways. Use of public consultation processes are a feature of the Northern Ireland political landscape and increasingly so since the 1990s. Of particular note is the legal requirement for the Northern Ireland administration to conduct public consultation in the context of the mainstreaming of equality legislation. In relation to the EU, there are similar legal requirements for the Northern Ireland administration to consult with the public. In a survey of public consultation in Northern Ireland between 2000 and 2004, Murray et al. (2009: 560–561) found that 58.3 per cent of respondents cited the need to meet EU requirements as the single most important reason for initiating public consultations. The SEUPB has conducted a number of public consultation exercises on EU initiatives and structural fund programmes, while various Northern Ireland government departments have done likewise in relation to a variety of different EU directives and funding programmes. In all cases, there is a legal requirement to engage directly with civil society. Northern Ireland has had a mixed experience of the consultation process. Chapter 3 notes the inconsistent and sometimes low levels of engagement with some EU public consultations and observes that the conduct of consultations does not demonstrate any high degree of ingenuity or innovation on the part of the devolved administration. While Peace programmes have generally attracted a high degree of input from civil society (see Buchanan 2008), this experience is not evident for all consultation exercises. The review of the CAP reform agenda in 2011 may not have been as inventive as the Scottish government’s 2012 consultation on future EU funding, but it did see greater engagement by stakeholders than the 2012 EU future funding reflection exercise in Northern Ireland. In a comparative study of stakeholder participation in the implementation of the EU’s water framework directive, De Stefano (2010: 1336–1337) found that in Northern Ireland ‘existing participatory instruments were perceived to be inadequate’ and local environmental Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) were ‘often overwhelmed by the work related to consultation exercises’. Even more damning is the recent challenge to the legality of the Northern Ireland administration’s approach to the implementation of the EU’s strategic environmental assessment directive. The legal challenge relates specifically to the nature of the consultation procedure created by Article 6(3) of the directive. It concerns questions about the manner in which the consultation process was conducted and is focused on the contested role that the Department of Environment (Northern Ireland) (DOE(NI)) played in that process. The case reflects deeper divisions about environmental governance in Northern Ireland (see Turner 2012). All of this suggests that devolution has not necessarily qualitatively changed or improved the process of engaging with stakeholders. Moreover, many of the perceived flaws of successive Peace programmes have not been fully corrected following consultation processes. Indeed, reservations linger about the rigidity of the funding application process; the balance between single identity and cross-community projects; and the measurement of ‘reconciliation’ (see Byrne et al. 2009b). In this context, there exist legitimate

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reservations about the quality and impact of public consultation processes. The one-dimensional approach to consultation does not bode well for the role of civil society. Without adequate resources and opportunities to contribute to a meaningful exercise in participation and consultation, policy arenas are effectively dominated by political parties and the civil service. The Northern Ireland administration has not seriously sought to facilitate an enhanced role for civil society by experimenting with EU consultation processes. This harks back to the old tensions which exist between the political elite and the third sector. It also reflects the vagaries of the consociational political system which accentuates the political class. Murray et al.’s (2009: 568) broader study of consultation processes bears out this view. They conclude that for all forms of consultation in Northern Ireland, there is little to suggest ‘any significant emergence of “governance without government”’. The quality of participatory instruments can be enhanced by the existence of a vibrant and vocal policy community. Here too, however, Northern Ireland is found wanting. The broad Northern Ireland policy environment is based on ‘a relatively small policy community’ and ‘a lack of research institutes, policy networks and deliberative forums’ (Birrell 2012a: 318). This is clearly evident in relation to the EU policy arena in Northern Ireland, which suffers from an absence of strong policy networks. In the past, the Northern Ireland Centre in Europe (NICE)10 (through its bases in both Belfast and Brussels) provided a dedicated EU service for a range of Northern Ireland interests. The activities of NICE included bringing key stakeholders together to consider EU issues; convening conferences; producing regular briefing documents; and facilitating visits to Brussels. Its closure and effective replacement by the ONIEB (which is situated within OFMDFM) in the early 2000s did not facilitate a continuation of this policy network. Another leading policy think-tank in Northern Ireland, Democratic Dialogue, which produced some commentary on Northern Ireland–EU issues also closed its doors shortly after the introduction of devolution.11 European Liaison, which is run by Queen’s University Belfast (QUB), remains as a primary focus for neutral and critical discussion of the EU in Northern Ireland, although its outputs have diminished in recent years. It attempts to bring together groups, organisations and individuals with a direct interest in the EU and its impact on Northern Ireland. The aim is to encourage systematic examination and discussion of European questions; to stimulate public interest in EU issues; to promote the exchange of information; and to encourage research into European issues as they impact on Northern Ireland (see http://goo. gl/XFDRoA). The abolition of the Northern Ireland Civic Forum has also limited the platform available to Northern Ireland sectoral and socio-economic groups with an interest in the EU. The fewer opportunities open to Northern Ireland interest groups and civil society to discuss and consider EU issues are in contrast to the practical and symbolic support shown to them by the EU authorities. It appears that the political system which has developed since the introduction of devolution has not facilitated the emergence of a broad and neutral discussion space. Indeed, the number and quality of such spaces has diminished since the politicos took office, and this is potentially problematic. There are some tentative signs that the Northern Ireland Executive is keen to tackle this. In May 2012, the

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Northern Ireland European regional forum was launched and was attended by Ministers of the Executive. It is led by Belfast City Council and brings together local government, business, academics and the public. It aims to improve communication between sectors on EU matters and to elevate the quality of discussion and discourse. The forum is at an early stage of development and few events have been held. The initiative, however, does signal some enthusiasm for developing Northern Ireland’s EU policy community. Börzel and Heard-Lauréote (2009: 142) refer to ‘the human dimension of policy networks’, where direct personal contacts ‘may facilitate the de-politicisation of issues and the creation of particular understandings of policy issues and measures to resolve them’. Such features of policy networks and communities have special resonance for a post-conflict society such as Northern Ireland, where the development of cross-community understanding and trust is crucial. Despite the EU’s insistence on engagement with local communities and stakeholders in Northern Ireland, no new culture of participation has emerged. This is arguably a legacy of the direct rule period, when politicians were sidelined, and civil servants and interest groups elevated. Now that the tables have turned so to speak, the elite nature of the consociational settlement has effectively resulted in a greater absence of meaningful forms of participatory governance. This has potentially damaging political implications. The vitality of the new devolved arrangements is not necessarily assured without reference to broader civic considerations: the psychocultural and political borders and boundaries both real and imagined that separate both communities may become less divisive as cross-community contact is nurtured and relationships are cultivated, and a peace for all creates a new vibrant civic culture in Northern Ireland. (Fissuh et al. 2012: 261)

The reluctance of the devolved administration to foster such relationships is at odds with the EU’s support for participation. The devolution era, it appears, has not balanced the relationship between traditional government and state structures, on the one hand, and civil society and interest groups on the other. As a consequence, the EU has encountered difficulty in persuading the Northern Ireland regional political elite to involve civil society more closely in the policy process. The EU has not, therefore, been a force which has contributed substantially to the type of blurring of distinction between the state and society which governance proposes. Indeed, its efforts to achieve otherwise have been resisted by the new political dispensation in Northern Ireland. In contrast to what proponents of governance might have anticipated following the introduction of devolution, the distinction between state and civil society has become less rather than more blurred and has shifted in the direction of the former with political parties being to the forefront of that shift. Demonstrably more democratic it may be, but the extent to which it is more inclusive is questionable.

The EU, national identity and public opinion in Northern Ireland In deeply divided societies, issues around identity are intensely complex. In

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Northern Ireland’s case, the primary source of the conflict can be linked to ‘profoundly conflicting patterns of national identity’ (Coakley 2007: 574). In a crude sense, the Protestant community is generally seen as possessing a unionist and British identity, whereas Catholics identify themselves as nationalist and Irish. These identity labels are, in turn, reflective of often opposing views in relation to constitutional preferences, political aspirations and values, symbols, security issues, and even socio-economic questions. Although national identity in Northern Ireland is contested, the competing versions of it are nevertheless based on an attachment to the state – either Ireland or the UK. The strength of this form of identity, linked to state, has proven resilient in Northern Ireland – most especially during the period which coincided with the ‘Troubles’. The subsequent peace process acknowledged the issue of identity, and the 1998 Belfast Agreement contains measures to manage and/or defuse the potency of Northern Ireland’s communal identities. The EU represents an additional tier of governance beyond the state but one which may potentially be a neutralising force capable of loosening attachment to national identity in favour of a broader and less antagonistic European identity and citizenship (see Meehan 1993). This view fits with the civil society perspective on conflict resolution. Advocates hold that identities can be reconstructed into less troublesome forms. In contrast, consociationalists have a ‘primordialist view of national identity’, and this explains their emphasis on segregation (Dixon 2012: 108). The relationship between identity and governance is complex. Hooghe and Marks (2009: 2) claim that identity is ‘decisive’ for MLG. In this context, they propose that governance is more than merely ‘a means to achieve collective benefits by co-ordinating human activities’, but also ‘an expression of community’. However, they recognise that: The challenge for a theory of multi-level governance is that the functional need for human cooperation rarely coincides with the territorial scope of community. Communities demand self rule, and the preference for self rule is almost always inconsistent with the functional demand for regional authority.

The suggestion that (shared) identity is central to governance has particular resonance for the Northern Ireland case-study, where identity is disputed. It is important to acknowledge therefore that identity can change, but it is equally important to note that there are limits to the extent to which it can be reshaped. In Northern Ireland, identity has shifted (Farry 2009: 171): There is increasing evidence from opinion polls, fair-employment monitoring, and the census that some people are shaking off traditional notions of identity and presumptions over their background, and resent being pigeonholed into rigid and exclusive communities.

Dixon (2012: 103) similarly identifies an increasing tendency among people to identify themselves as ‘other’ rather than ‘unionist’ or ‘nationalist’. A further clear example of this was revealed by the results of the 2010 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey (see http://goo.gl/foC2Pm), which show that just 33 per cent of

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Catholics want a united Ireland. This figure contrasts with the 1998 survey, which found that 49 per cent of Catholics favoured Irish unity. This drop in support for Irish unity among Catholic respondents represents a sharp change in attitude on an issue where identity is a salient factor and attitudes were traditionally viewed as fixed and unalterable. In all of these examples, however, there is little to suggest that a shared public identity or ‘a dominant sense of an overarching community’ (Farry 2009: 1717) has resulted. Moreover, the greater attachment to a Northern Irish identity (as revealed in the 2011 census) often conceals differing interpretations and meanings for Protestants and Catholics, and so is not necessarily synonymous with the emergence of a shared identity (Aughey 2012: 155). Attitudes towards the EU in Northern Ireland are related to national identity and have also demonstrated some change over time.12 They are also informed by knowledge of the EU, or indeed lack of it. Using data from the 2002 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, McGowan and O’Connor (2004) point to increasing awareness of the EU among the Northern Ireland public, although they qualify this assertion by pointing to significant differences across socio-economic, gender and educational groups. A later Eurobarometer (2007: 64) study noted that interest among Northern Ireland respondents in European, as well as domestic, current affairs is high at 51 per cent. An important question, however, is: what prompts this interest in the EU? Northern Ireland voters tend to judge the EU on economic terms – 73 per cent of survey respondents either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ that ‘money from the EU is extremely important for Northern Ireland’s economy’ (McGowan and O’Connor 2004: 37). The same survey also revealed that of those with an interest in the EU (less than one-tenth of respondents), 22 per cent were focused on EU finances/grants/funding (2004: 34). On the basis of their research and survey findings, McGowan and O’Connor (2004: 33–4) conclude that Northern Ireland citizens have, therefore, a utilitarian as opposed to an affective interest in the EU. It is unlikely that this type of interest in the EU can spurn a deeper identification with Europe which might defuse communal identities at the regional level. The prospects for the Northern Ireland public to develop a more deep-rooted or socio-psychological attachment to the EU are diminished by the fact that despite having some appreciation of the advantages of EU membership, the Northern Ireland electorate is under-informed when it comes to understanding the EU and its dynamics. In their study of public knowledge of the EU in Northern Ireland, McGowan and O’Connor (2004: 33) concluded that: ‘Overall, the individual responses provided a clear indication of the confusion and the extent of the information deficit that prevails on the EU’. This situation is arguably affected by the frequency and quality of media coverage of the EU. Jim Dougal, a Northern Ireland journalist who served as Head of the European Commission Representation in Northern Ireland and later the UK, once noted that press coverage of the EU in the UK was infused by ‘a culture of misrepresentation’ (2003: 29). The impact of this type of distortion of public knowledge and perceptions of the EU has been damaging. Gillespie (2000: 87) has noted that a Eurosceptic British media mindset in relation to the EU has ‘profoundly shaped British attitudes to European

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integration’. In Northern Ireland, 40 per cent of citizens believe that British press coverage of the EU is too negative (Eurobarometer 2007: 35). Northern Ireland’s regional press is not as ardently Eurosceptic as the mainstream British press. However, the circulation figures for Northern Ireland’s three regional newspapers – Belfast Newsletter, Belfast Telegraph and Irish News – have been declining and are ‘struggling to compete with local editions of British “red top” titles the Sun and Daily Mirror’ (McLaughlin and Baker 2012: 296). The latter are traditionally more Eurosceptic newspapers. Against this backdrop, the appeal of the EU is questionable. And yet, Northern Ireland citizens are the most pro-EU of all UK citizens. According to the results of the 2007 British Household Panel Survey, 45 per cent of Northern Ireland respondents view the EU as ‘a good thing’ (see Clements 2010: 404). This finding is similar to that produced by other survey analyses since the 1990s (see McGowan and O’Connor 2004; and Smith 2000). The utilitarian emphasis is clear here – Northern Ireland citizens view EU membership as having provided material benefits including improved human rights, access to the single market, better working conditions, environmental advances, and a greater say for the UK in trade negotiations (see Eurobarometer 2007). Positive attitudes towards the EU and an appreciation of the benefits of EU membership, however, do not reflect a strong identification with the EU. In 2002, 67 per cent of Northern Ireland respondents indicated that they never think of themselves as European (McGowan and O’Connor 2004: 30). This finding masks some interesting, if perhaps unsurprising, distinctions between the two communities in Northern Ireland: A higher percentage of those who identify as nationalist (38 per cent) than unionist (23 per cent) always or sometimes identify themselves as European (McGowan and O’Connor 2004: 30). This mirrors a similar finding in relation to party identification with the EU and arguably fits with the suggestion by Hooghe and Marks (2009) that political parties provide voters with ‘cues’ in relation to support or opposition to the European project. The political elite appears to exercise some sway over citizens’ attitudes towards the EU. Unsurprisingly, Clements (2010) has concluded a series of links between national identity in Northern Ireland and the propensity to support or oppose the EU integration process. His research suggests that: ‘Those who feel more Irish or Northern Irish are more likely to hold supportive views towards the integration process’, and ‘those who feel more British are more likely to be opposed to the integration process’ (p. 398). He is keen to note, however, that in contrast to earlier similar studies (see Carey 2002), the link between national identity and support for the EU is not as pronounced as previously. Devolution may have softened the intensity of the bond between national identity and support or opposition to the EU. Clements (2010: 409–410) concludes that deep-rooted group identity is but one of a number of factors which affects attitudes towards the EU in Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland, identity remains intensely complex. Despite some shifts in attachment to national identity, the consociational character of the 1998 Belfast Agreement has not enabled a shared public identity to materialise. Indeed according to critics of consociationalism, the opposite may in fact be true. The ‘them’ and ‘us’ mode of identification appears to be resilient. And the EU has not

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seriously challenged this pattern. It has not been a critical force in moderating or loosening traditional attachments to identity in Northern Ireland. No overarching European identity has emerged. Political parties continue to ‘cue’ voters, and in turn, public attitudes towards the EU remain influenced by the strength and intensity of two opposing national/political perspectives. Here again, the EU does not serve as a panacea for addressing some of the more problematic legacies of the conflict. One wonders if this undermines its ability to encourage new forms of governance and a type of ‘new politics’ in Northern Ireland. The strength of historic markers of identity in Northern Ireland, and the way in which these dovetail with political party identification, minimises the neutralising impact of the EU and limits the extent to which experiments in governance might be tested.

Conclusion Northern Ireland’s political engagement with the EU has taken many forms – at times astute, at times futile. In terms of its response to the ‘Troubles’, the EU’s ­position has respected the independence of the member-states involved. EU leaders never envisaged a direct role for the Union in ameliorating the Northern Ireland situation. The EU has ostensibly promoted political responses to the conflict which privilege the position of the Irish and UK states. Its key input has come in the context of the peace process and has been economically driven and supportive of civil society. It is an approach which bears some resemblance to the civil society approach to conflict resolution. This corresponds with many features of governance including interdependence, trust, shared purpose and resources between state and non-state actors at multi-levels. Others, the SDLP most prominently, have also sought to use the EU as a novel means by which to promote new forms of governance in Northern Ireland. The party’s attempts to pursue such an approach via conflict resolution proposals have been resisted by both the UK and Irish governments, and by local Unionist opponents. Nor has the party been able to capitalise, in electoral terms, on its support for the EU. The SDLP’s seat in the EP was lost to Sinn Féin in 2004, and relations between the three Northern Ireland MEPs have become more antagonistic. It is also clear that political parties in Northern Ireland have assumed a greater role subsequent to the introduction of devolution. This too has undermined the extent to which a more governance-inspired system is even achievable. The consociational nature of Northern Ireland devolution restricts the role and influence of civil society and privileges political elites. Northern Ireland political parties have been quick to capitalise on this possibility and civil society has been the victim. With some limited success, the EU has sought to challenge this feature of the new devolved dispensation via financial inducements and public consultation exercises which promote and encourage a role for civil society. These initiatives and instruments have not remedied continuing concerns about the marginalisation of civil society. The EU has also been largely ineffective in terms of undermining or lessening national identity bonds in Northern Ireland. The resilience of these attachments is related to the consociational prescription, but clashes with the civil society

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approach favoured by the European Commission. For all its efforts, the EU has not been able to surmount these obstacles to the achievement of a shared public identity, or an agreed European identity. Paradoxically, therefore, despite its reputation as an advocate and example of new forms of governance, the EU has been among the least enthusiastic supporters of a direct role for itself in Northern Ireland. Its attempts to infiltrate Northern Ireland in positive ways have produced mixed and sometimes contradictory results. Its support for civil society has not maximised the role of the third sector in Northern Ireland. The terms of the consociational settlement have limited the possibilities here. Indeed, the role of the state and political parties in Northern Ireland have been harnessed, as opposed to diminished, in the period since the devolution of power. The EU has not been an instrumental force in advancing a more governance-driven approach to Northern Ireland politics. When it comes to the political dynamics of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU, the achievement of greater interdependence, interaction, and even trust, between multi-level and horizontal actors is simply not evident.

Notes  1 The Opsahl Commission was a non-governmental initiative and consultative body set up in 1992 in Northern Ireland. Funded by various trust funds, the Commission took submissions from all groups throughout Northern Ireland in early 1993 before producing a final report on possible solutions to the Northern Ireland conflict.   2 The report is more commonly known as the Haagerup Report, after the Danish Chair of the Political Affairs Committee.   3 The ‘Irish dimension’ is a term used to describe the belief (primarily amongst the nationalist/Catholic population) that the Northern Ireland conflict can never be adequately resolved without recognition of the right of the nationalist community to identify with the Republic of Ireland and its citizens and the right of the Republic to have an influence over and play an active role in any resolution of the conflict. The ‘Irish dimension’ was actively recognised and accepted in negotiations leading to the Belfast Agreement.   4 The Northern Ireland Assembly, which operated between 1982 and 1986, was populated only by unionists, as nationalists abstained from participating in what they viewed as a sham political institution.   5 The independent Irish MEP Neil Blaney voted against the report.   6 An SDLP merger or alliance with either Fianna Fáil or the Irish Labour Party has been mooted, but has not been explicitly pursued by any party.   7 For example, in the DUP’s 2011 Assembly manifesto, Moving Forward, the largest section was devoted to the economy and the document also contained ‘a roadmap to create a single education system’. The UUP manifesto, It’s Time to Make Stormont Work – For You, also contained detailed sections on the economy and education. Leadership Across Ireland, Sinn Féin’s manifesto, explored similar themes albeit with an all-island focus. The SDLP manifesto, Uniting People, Building Prosperity, pledged to deliver a ‘reconstructed budget’ and contained proposals to reform Northern Ireland’s consociational political system (see Matthews 2012 for an overview of the Northern Ireland Assembly election campaign).   8 Sinn Féin MEP Bairbre de Brún, stepped down from the EP for health reasons in 2012.

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She was replaced by Sinn Féin MLA, Martina Anderson.   9 In 2011, for example, Diane Dodds MEP claimed to have been successful in blocking a Hunger Strike commemoration exhibition from being held in the open exhibition space of the European Parliament building. The exhibition was being hosted by Sinn Féin MEP Bairbre de Brún (Belfast Newsletter, 24 June 2011). 10 NICE was a membership-based NGO created in 1991 to act as an informal and un­official regional representation office. Members including Northern Ireland Government Departments, the 26 Northern Ireland district councils, private sector organisations, and voluntary and community sector bodies collectively financed the running of the organisation’s two offices – one in Belfast and one in Brussels (see Murphy 2011 for a full overview of NICE). 11 Democratic Dialogue produced the following publications and reports: Continentally Challenged: Securing Northern Ireland’s Place in the European Union (1997) and Structurally Unsound: The Northern Ireland Bids for Further EU Monies (2000). 12 The ability to track public opinion and attitudes towards the EU in Northern Ireland is difficult: ‘studies of citizens’ attitudes towards the EU tend to focus on the member state level and neglect to examine patterns and determinants of opinion amongst sub-state regions’ (Clements 2010: 393). The primary sources of public opinion survey information are Eurobarometer and the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey. These sources of data however, do not present a full and complete picture of public attitudes towards the EU in Northern Ireland. In the case of the Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, the most recent survey of attitudes to the EU in Northern Ireland was in 2002. In the case of Eurobarometer, surveys typically focus on national attitudes and opinions. However, in a special Eurobarometer survey in 2006, regional attitudes to the EU in the UK were measured. The availability of up-to-date survey data is therefore limited and it restricts the comprehensiveness of any examination of identity in Northern Ireland as it pertains to the EU.

5

Northern Ireland and the European Union: the internal dynamics Introduction The introduction of devolution in 1999 was part of a broader UK constitutional reform programme pioneered by the Prime Minister at that time, Tony Blair. The programme was extensive and potentially radical.1 Of all the constitutional proposals it contained, however, ‘the issue with the most urgency and perhaps the most far-reaching consequences [wa]s the reform of territorial government’ (Keating and Elcock 1998: 1). According to O’Neill (2000: 92), ‘devolution is un­doubt­edly a radical project in relation to the historic British experience’. The broad sweep and content of Blair’s constitutional reform programme has been criticised, with the devolution project being subjected to specific admonishment. A purported ‘lack of coherence’ in the New Labour Government’s approach to constitutional reform was ‘reflected in its devolution programme’, a project which owed its existence to a series of ‘pragmatic responses to political pressures and perceived problems, [pursued] on an ad hoc, incremental basis’ (Mitchell 2010: 85, quoting Oliver). Although there may have been logical political justifications for embarking on the devolution path, the development of the system since 1999 exposes some of its idiosyncracies, shortcomings and accomplishments. The creation of devolved political arrangements and institutions suggests new and possibly improved opportunities for the regions of the UK to develop a more customised approach to regional governance than was possible hitherto. However, for Northern Ireland, the devolution of powers is not simply a politico-administrative development, it is a vital component in the attempt to achieve a permanent resolution to the conflict. The result is a consociational style devolved political system. How compatible this system is with practically meeting the demands and interests of the region is an important question. Has it enhanced opportunities for the achievement of good governance, ‘new politics’ and a different and better style of governing? Or do its unconventional roots and character undermine and diminish its capacity for autonomous action? Has devolution proved to be a radical project? The structure, operation and outputs of the internal devolved political institutions, and the civil administration which serves them, provide some answers to these questions. The formation of devolved political institutions in Northern Ireland has been accompanied by the creation of new administrative structures and mechanisms.

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These changes have contributed to altering the dynamics of Northern Ireland’s engagement with EU matters. Although ‘relations with the EU’ remain a reserved matter for the UK government, the pervasiveness of EU policies and the involvement of regional administrations in the implementation of EU legislation requires that devolved units in the UK are equipped to engage with the EU system. This chapter traces the ways in which Northern Ireland’s devolved administration has adapted at the domestic level to new responsibilities vis-à-vis the EU. The devolved Northern Ireland Executive and Assembly (and its constituent committees) play an active role in EU affairs, whilst a number of new arrangements and processes have come courtesy of the UK central government. These new mechanisms and procedures are aimed at managing intergovernmental relations within the UK in ways which are coherent and constructive and which minimise conflict. Northern Ireland government departments have also experienced reform subsequent to the introduction of devolution. Of specific interest here are the roles played by the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, and in particular the European Policy and Coordination Unit (EPCU), in directing and managing Northern Ireland’s EU agenda. This chapter facilitates an improved understanding of how devolution has changed the ways in which Northern Ireland is governed. The involvement of new regional devolved institutions, and their members, potentially produces a basis for the development of greater interdependence, both horizontally, between the structures of the state and civil society, and vertically, between the regional, national and EU levels. The creation of a broader and more diversified institutional and public policy environment in Northern Ireland may be compatible with the features of an emerging system of MLG.

Devolution and the EU: the UK still at the helm The framework for relations between the Northern Ireland administration and London is dictated by the terms of the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and a range of supplementary agreements.2 The memorandum does not have a legal basis but is instead ‘a statement of political intent and should not be interpreted as a binding agreement’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Written Ministerial Statement, 26 March 2010). The MOU outlines arrangements for communication, cooperation and confidentiality between the four administrations (UK, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland). It commits the UK government to involve the devolved administrations as closely as possible in discussions about the formulation of a UK policy position on all policy issues which touch on devolved matters. Intergovernmental relations have thus been formalised in order to accommodate this commitment. The key arena within which this objective is to be achieved is Joint Ministerial Committees (JMC). JMCs exist in sectoral format and focus on different areas of public policy. In general terms, they have had a chequered history: No one knew what they were for. When there was political congruence between governments it was often better to co-operate as need be bilaterally, and iron out any problems politically. (Gallagher 2012: 201)

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The JMC on Europe (JMC[E]) however, has had a less fraught evolution than other JMC configurations. It is composed of the relevant UK government, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland Ministers and forms the basis for formal intergovernmental relations on issues related to the EU. The revised 2010 MOU outlines the practice whereby meetings of the JMC[E] are to be held in advance of each scheduled European Council meeting. It is anticipated, however, that the bulk of coordination is likely to be pursued and achieved via either bilateral or multilateral contact between the lead Whitehall Department and the relevant devolved government departments. The 2010 MOU also contains new arrangements in relation to the avoidance and resolution of disputes between the four administrations. The JMC[E] allows for an element of central coordination to be introduced to the process of discussing and agreeing EU policy issues at the domestic level. It is ‘a consultative body rather than an executive body and so will reach agreements rather than decisions’ (Supplementary Agreements, Paragraph A1.10). Essentially, it is intended to function as a discussion forum where interadministration disputes over UK EU policy can be brokered (Bulmer et al. 2006: 80). Some might interpret the addition of another institutional provision, in the form of the JMC[E], as an unnecessary complication. However, the potential for the policy position of a devolved unit to conflict with the broader UK position was recognised at an early stage. The logic for its creation thus reflects the desire in 1999 (at the start of the devolution experiment) that devolution would not inhibit the development of a coherent and robust UK EU agenda. Additionally, by involving the devolved administrations in the formulation of UK EU policy positions, it is anticipated that the process of policy implementation might be smoother. This latter function is the specific responsibility of both the Scottish and Northern Ireland administrations since 1999. Since the Northern Ireland Executive was reconvened in May 2007, the JMC[E] has met regularly (on average four times annually). Its timetable and work are driven by European business. The work and deliberations of the Committee are difficult to monitor as all documents pertaining to it are of a confidential nature (see MOU, Paragraph A1.11). Communiqués are usually produced after meetings, but they invariably lack detail and tend to outline what was discussed without revealing what was agreed (see for example JMC Annual Report 2009–10). In the past in Scotland, there has been criticism of this lack of transparency and ‘the closed nature of JMC meetings which fail to allow even Parliamentary access to its minutes’ (Sloat 2000: 97). The practices of the JMC[E] have been clarified further in the 2010 version of the MOU. Future meetings of the JMC[E] will be scheduled on the basis of a forward timetable. In addition, the devolved administrations will have a clearer role in agreeing the JMC[E] agenda and will have access to documentation in advance of meetings (see Supplementary Agreement A: Concordat on Coordination of European Policy Issues: Common Annex, Paragraph B4.7). This new provision serves to clarify the frequency and procedures of JMC[E] meetings. In many ways, this formalises a pattern which emerged not long after the publication of the 2001 MOU. The JMC[E] has been the most active of all JMCs, having established early on a regular schedule of meetings timed in advance

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of each European Council summit (see Horgan 2004: 116; and Burch et al. 2005: 471). Despite some initial scepticism about the merits of the JMC[E] on the part of key figures within the devolved Northern Ireland administration, a more accommodating position has emerged. Former Junior Minister Gerry Kelly conceded: I remember that, way back, my impression was that our attending the JMC Europe meetings was simply a rubber-stamp exercise. Substantial lobbying has been done by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister to try to make it effective, and that continues. (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 23 June 2010)

That being the case, some policy areas are nevertheless distinct in terms of the conception of how useful the JMC structure is. In the case of agriculture, for example, a senior DARD official suggests that links between Whitehall and Northern Ireland were well established and numerous previous to devolution. For this specific policy area, the JMC[E] is not a necessarily useful institutional innovation. This type of advanced relationship between the devolved unit and central government, however, is not mirrored across the public policy spectrum in Northern Ireland (or indeed in other devolved administrations) (Bulmer et al. 2006: 82): In the fields of agricultural policy and fisheries policy … there had been a longstanding interaction between Whitehall officials and their counterparts in the devolveds, whereas there was minimal tradition of this in relation to environmental policy.

In Northern Ireland, this pattern continued after the devolution of powers in 1999. Turner (2006: 69) notes that the regional administration’s ability to exert influence on the evolution of UK environmental policy was limited by the sometimes dubious quality of contact and relations between Whitehall and the DOE(NI). The JMC[E] provides an opportunity to lend more weight to the Northern Ireland position by virtue of the involvement of political figures in deliberations and discussion. Meetings have included discussion of environmental issues, specifically climate change and the EU energy strategy, both of which have been included on the agenda of a number of JMC[E] meetings since 2009 (see JMC Annual Reports 2009–10, 2010–11 and 2011–12). The value of discussions at this level is unclear. One of the key problems inhibiting the pursuit of environmental priorities by the environmental NGO sector in Northern Ireland has been the political persuasion of successive Northern Ireland Environment Ministers and the power-sharing character of the Northern Ireland administration. All Northern Ireland Environment Ministers pre-2011 were unionists, with the DUP occupying the portfolio between 2007 and 2011. Barry (2009: 52) notes the poor record and calibre of the first two Northern Ireland Ministers for the Environment both of whom were UUP members: While Foster [first Northern Ireland Environment Minister] was at best ineffective and uninspiring, his party colleague presided over an environment ministry which appeared to privilege development over sustainability and environmental governance.

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Turner (2009: 157) notes the DUP’s ‘antipathy’ to the issue of environmental protection and ‘its total disinterest in a process of participative, transparent or reasoned decision-making about this shared resource’.3 The DUP’s views and perspectives on the environment have acted as a serious obstacle to the reform of the governance regime in Northern Ireland (see Turner 2009 and 2012). It is unlikely that the DUP pursues a more enlightened position during intergovernmental discussions, particularly if proposals and plans entail a financial cost and/or offend the Northern Ireland agricultural lobby (a key DUP electoral constituency). Furthermore, although both the First Minister and Deputy First Minister attend the JMC plenary, this is not replicated for the JMC[E], when just one Northern Ireland Minister attends. The JMC[E] therefore is different from other intergovernmental forums (such as the NSMC and BIC, explored in Chapter 6). These forums involve two Ministers – one unionist and one nationalist. This means that some of the perceived troublesome aspects of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing arrangements, namely the autonomy afforded individual Ministers, is replicated rather than challenged by the JMC format. Therefore, although the JMC system facilitates intergovernmental relations, Northern Ireland’s experience of the forum is distinctive. It is marked by the uniqueness of the consociational power-sharing political system and the party political incongruence between Northern Ireland and UK political parties (see Birrell 2012b). The creation of the JMC[E] and the consequent formalisation and institutionalisation of intergovernmental relations in the UK has diversified governance structures. However, it has not altered policy outcomes in any decisive fashion for the devolved units. Admittedly, the JMC system is not primarily concerned with promoting better outcomes for Northern Ireland or any other region. Its primary role is to address the disputes, interdependencies and spillover effects resulting from constitutional overlaps, as well as the need to confront policy problems that defy competence divisions, and to develop common positions in advance of EU negotiations. (McEwen et al. 2012: 323)

Even in this context, however, the structure of intergovernmental relations has, on occasion, been tested and found wanting. In December 2011, the UK government failed to adequately use the JMC format to prepare a common EU position in advance of an EU summit. Unhappy about the possible impact of proposals to deal with the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, Prime Minister David Cameron vetoed the proposed Fiscal Compact as an EU agreement at the December summit.4 His actions were greeted with dismay by a number of nationalist political figures in Northern Ireland. SDLP MLA Margaret Ritchie labelled the Prime Minister’s actions ‘regrettable’ and ‘disrespectful’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 12 December 2011). During the same Northern Ireland Assembly debate, Sinn Féin and APNI representatives lamented the absence of consultation and lack of consideration of the impact of the veto on the devolved regions. Unionist MLAs, however, commended and congratulated the Prime Minister for using the veto. The differing responses from nationalist and unionist politicians do not just reflect their respective positions on the EU, but are also linked to their domestic

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constitutional preferences. In contrast, the Scottish Parliament response to the December 2011 EU summit was more emphatic. The European External Relations Committee of the Scottish Parliament took a particularly dim view of how the UK government managed communication with the devolved units before and after the summit. Although the committee respects the importance of the JMC[E] for facilitating political engagement between the UK government and the devolved units, dissatisfaction in relation to the summit was clear: The Committee believes that the level of communication between the UK Government and the devolved administrations in advance of the important December Council discussions fell short of the communication necessary to ensure that the views of the Scottish Government was [sic] adequately understood and appreciated by the UK government. There is little doubt that such failure, were it to be repeated, could materially impact upon the ability of the UK Government to articulate the Scottish Government’s legitimate EU interests. (European External Relations Committee (Scottish Parliament) 2012: 12)

In short, the JMC[E] continues to evolve. Its operation has not produced a wholly reliable and satisfactory means of involving the devolved regions or of communicating their preferences. This is particularly applicable to what might be termed ‘high politics’ decisions at the EU level. In the context of the more mundane elements of EU business – e.g. ‘operational problems’ or ‘breaching conventions’ – the JMC format works (Gallagher 2012: 210). Even in this context, however, it is difficult to view intergovernmental arrangements as facilitating a more governance-inspired approach to EU issues. New vertical links between the regions and UK central government are very much dominated by the latter. And furthermore, the presentation of a single and coherent Northern Ireland line – i.e. one which enjoys the collective backing of the Northern Ireland Executive – is not always evident at meetings of the JMC[E]. The articulation of a unified view may strengthen Northern Ireland’s position at intergovernmental forums. The peculiarities of Northern Ireland’s power-sharing system, however, are facilitated and not challenged by intergovernmental mechanisms, and this may not be to the advantage of the regional unit. Like the MOU, the terms of the Concordat on Coordination of European Union Policy Issues are not legally enforceable. The document details the specific arrangements for coordinating EU business between the Northern Ireland Executive and the UK government. It refers to the provision of information, formulation of a UK policy position, attendance at Council of Ministers and related meetings, implementation of EU obligations and infraction proceedings. Much of the detail outlined in the concordat is simply a statement of what went before in terms of bilateral relations between government departments in Northern Ireland and Whitehall. In his early critique of the concordats, Scott (2001: 33) concludes that ‘the provisions of the concordats effectively curtailed the sovereignty of the devolved administration and its legislature’. The concordat has, however, introduced a number of new arrangements when compared with the pre-devolution period. Devolved administrations are now liable, solely or partially, for any financial penalties against the UK in the case

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of a failure to implement EU law, for which a devolved administration may be responsible. The concordat also grants the Northern Ireland administration the right to establish a regional office in Brussels so long as it is consistent with overall UK government responsibility for EU relations. This is supplemented by the stipulation that the powers and functions of the UK Permanent Representation to Brussels (UKRep) remain unchanged. The concordat also allocates responsibility for nominating Northern Ireland’s representatives on the Committee of the Regions (CoR) and the Economic and Social Committee (Ecosoc) to the devolved administration. The debate in the Northern Ireland Assembly relating to the introduction of the MOU and concordat in 2000 was drawn out and colourful. After it, the members took note of both documents, but not without voicing their opposition to a number of provisions contained within (see Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 5 June 2000). During the debate, the then DUP leader, Revd Dr Ian Paisley, interpreted the documents as being attempts to ‘strengthen the hold of the two First Ministers on the levers of government’. In defence of the new arrangements, UUP MLA Esmond Birnie suggested that the provisions before them offered ‘the potential for those administrations [Scotland, Wales], including our own, to have a greater input in the formation of central United Kingdom Government policy’. The system via which the UK arrives at EU-related policy decisions has certainly become more complex since the introduction of devolution. The formalisation and institutionalisation of relations between the devolved Northern Ireland administration and the UK central government via the JMC system and other bilateral and multilateral structures has had a two-fold and somewhat paradoxical effect. On the one hand, the new arrangements have produced more numerous opportunities for Northern Ireland to formally infiltrate the policy area. During interviews, regional politicians and officials alike welcomed these increased possibilities for influencing the UK line. On the other hand, however, the existence of these links does not always translate into influence. Turner (2006: 69) notes that in the case of environmental policy, certain conditions must be met if such new arrangements are to be effective. Good working relations between DOE(NI) and DEFRA, which are premised on a constructive attitude among DEFRA officials to discussion with the devolved administrations, is imperative. The quality of this engagement is, however, to some extent, dependent on the level of policy expertise within DOE(NI). Where this is wanting, the apparently more favourable and inclusive arrangements under devolution do not always produce optimal outcomes. However, even in instances where policy expertise is advanced and bilateral relations are healthy, there is no guarantee that the regional policy position will be favoured or adopted, particularly in instances where it clashes with the broader UK national policy position. There is specific evidence of this happening when EU matters concerning spending questions are under negotiation (Burch et al. 2005: 472). What is perhaps more troubling, however, is that even in instances where the UK national line might be considered benign, Whitehall has sometimes been slow to push the regional line. The reason for Whitehall’s reticence is, according to some Northern Ireland politicians and officials, related to the weak capacity

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and sometime inability of Northern Ireland political leaders to pursue Northern Ireland interests. On occasion, Northern Ireland has been overlooked by UKRep (see Kennedy and Murphy 2001). In this context, a senior UUP MLA suggested during interview that working via national government can sometimes be ‘unsatisfactory’. The devolved administration, for reasons of politics and/or poor capacity, are sometimes ill-equipped to manipulate and manoeuvre the possibilities implicit in the new arrangements.

The new Northern Ireland administrative landscape Immediately after the devolution of power in 1999, the newly created Northern Ireland Executive replaced the six direct-rule government departments with ten new government departments and a central department, the OFMDFM. In 2010, the Department of Justice was created after the eventual achievement of political agreement on the devolution of policing and justice powers (see Table 5.1). Much political wrangling has accompanied the determination of new Northern Ireland administrative structures. In 1999, arguments about the number of government departments were heavily linked to the perceived potential for political gain in terms of ministerial seats and portfolios. As Wilford (2001: 235) notes: the rather arbitrary manner by which the six direct rule departments were reconfigured into eleven [reflected] a redesign that owed considerably more to political arithmetic than administrative calculation.

Unionists (in particular the UUP) pushed for the maintenance of the pre-1999 status quo. Nationalists, on the other hand, recognised that more government departments would allow them a greater hand in the regional political administration. The new government departments vary in size. The Department of Social Development (DSD) employs the most staff (approximately 7,400) while the Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL) employs the least (less than 300) (NISRA 2013b: 3). Although the size and number of government departments altered subsequent to the devolution of powers, the new arrangements reflect a reconfiguration of past responsibilities among a larger number of administrative units. The only truly new departments are the OFMDFM and the Department of Justice. There is no pre-devolution equivalent for either of these units. OFMDFM has responsibility for a range of functions and areas, many of which were not previously the responsibility of any single Northern Ireland government department. Among the responsibilities of the new department is the EU and international affairs, which had previously been allocated to the DFP during the period of direct rule. The work and responsibilities of the NICS, however, did not undergo radical change as a consequence of devolution. Aside from changes to its organisation, the NICS is as it was pre-devolution – not just geographically and politically detached from the rest of the UK, but also administratively distinct. The crucial difference is that it is now under the political management of the Northern Ireland Executive and the Northern Ireland Assembly.

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The internal dynamics Table 5.1  Northern Ireland’s government departments Department

Minister/s

Party

Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM)

Peter Robinson (First Minister) Martin McGuinness (Deputy First Minister)

DUP Sinn Féin

Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD)

Michelle O’Neill

Sinn Féin

Department of Culture, Arts and Leisure (DCAL)

Carál Ní Chuilín

Sinn Féin

Department of Education (DENI)

John O’Dowd

Sinn Féin

Department for Employment and Learning (DEL)

Stephen Farry

Alliance

Department of Enterprise, Training and Investment (DETI)

Arlene Foster

DUP

Department of the Environment (DOE)

Mark A. Durkan

SDLP

Department of Finance & Personnel (DFP)

Simon Hamilton

DUP

Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS)

Edwin Poots

DUP

Department of Justice (DOJ)

David Ford

Alliance

Department for Regional Development (DRD)

Danny Kennedy

UUP

Department for Social Development (DSD)

Nelson McCausland

DUP

Data as of December 2013.

Northern Ireland Executive: where policy meets politics OFMDFM is led by two Ministers – the First Minister and Deputy First Minister – whose political complexion is not uniform. The first devolved Northern Ireland Executive was led by a UUP First Minister and an SDLP Deputy First Minister. Since 2007, that political complexion has changed. The current Northern Ireland Executive, in post since 2011, is composed of a DUP First Minister and a Sinn Féin Deputy First Minister. In essence, the distinction between the First and the Deputy First Minister is artificial, as all decisions must be jointly supported by both individuals. Both Ministers are assisted by two OFMDFM Junior Ministers who share responsibility for, among a range of other policy areas, European matters. The Junior Ministers share the political hue of their more senior ministerial colleagues within OFMDFM. Northern Ireland Ministers enjoy relatively substantial decision-making auto­ nomy. The 1998 Belfast Agreement states that Ministers will have full executive authority in their respective areas of responsibility, within any broad programme agreed by the Executive Committee and endorsed by the Assembly as a whole. (Strand 1, Paragraph 24)

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Ministers therefore have the capacity to exercise a relatively high degree of autonomy in areas where a decision does not require legislation and is not, as a consequence, considered a key decision. In such cases, there is no requirement for cross-community voting. In effect, this means that in the making of decisions on given issues, Ministers are not required to adopt the positions of their relevant committee or even of the Assembly itself.5 Despite this autonomous power being confined to decisions which do not result in a legislative outcome, it does nevertheless underline the room for manoeuvre which a minister may, on occasion, enjoy in terms of directing a policy portfolio. All Northern Ireland Ministers have some EU angle to their portfolios. The EU dimension, however, is most pronounced in the case of DARD (agriculture and rural development issues), DFP (structural funding) and DOE (environmental policy). The creation of the Northern Ireland Taskforce has sought to reinforce the need for all other Northern Ireland government departments to be cognisant of EU opportunities and responsibilities: the region needs to do more to address the weaknesses of a socio-economic nature, and here a deeper involvement with EU policies, and with the services of the Commission represented in the NITF, are a source of support. (European Commission 2008: 3)

The amount of time and resources dedicated to the EU by a Department and its Minister has generally tended to be proportional to perceived financial benefit or penalty. The sectoral government departments’ interests in the EU are invariably dictated by single policy interests – e.g. structural fund negotiations, CAP payments or dealing with environmental policy infraction proceedings. In terms of combatting the one-dimensionality of this type of engagement, OFMDFM – one of the newer government departments – plays an important role. Its emphasis is broad and multifaceted and focused on promoting a more joined-up and cohesive approach to Europe, in partnership with other components of the devolved administration. The influence of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister is notable. Their respective positions on the EU, their openness to engagement with Brussels and their willingness to cooperate with each other set the broad template for the depth of OFMDFM’s role vis-à-vis the EU. Both Ministers have publicly engaged with the EU via visits to Brussels and they have also hosted visits by European Commissioners and key EU officials to Northern Ireland.6 Since 2007 – a year which coincided with the restoration of devolution and the creation of NITF – the focus for this type of high-level engagement with Brussels has been the work of the Taskforce. However, the significance of this development should not be overstated: On the face of it, outward signs of a willingness to engage with the EU on the part of the most senior political level within the Executive signals some enthusiasm for building EU networks and for developing a strategic engagement with Europe. However, on closer inspection, this seeming eagerness to nurture an EU agenda in Northern Ireland is rather shallow in nature. In practice, the pursuit of a Northern Ireland EU agenda post-2007 has not been approached with any

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degree of vigour or urgency by key Northern Ireland political figures. (Hayward and Murphy 2012: 449)

Signs of this sometimes ambivalent approach to the EU are evident in a number of ways. One senior European Commission official criticised the ‘infrequent engagement by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister in Brussels’ (on average once a year). He did acknowledge that the OFMDFM Junior Ministers were more frequent visitors to Brussels, but was equally clear that their junior position does not guarantee them access to the European Commission President and other senior Commission figures. A further perceived difficulty relates to the EU responsibilities of the Junior Ministers, which are altogether vague in nature. A 2009 Written Question to OFMDFM, which queried how relations between the Northern Ireland Executive and the EU are managed, elicited an unambiguous response: ‘We [First Minister and Deputy First Minister] take lead responsibility for coordinating engagement with Europe on behalf of the Executive’ (Northern Ireland Assembly AQW 2183/09). The two Junior Ministers do, however, represent Northern Ireland on the JMC[E], chair the interdepartmental NITF Working Group and visit Brussels, where they have engaged with key EU figures. In contrast, under the previous SDLP/UUP devolved administration, the two Junior Ministers were effectively ‘Europe’ Ministers, albeit informally (McGowan and Murphy 2003: 86–87). A senior OFMDFM official suggested that the latter situation lent itself to greater clarity relative to current arrangements. He also pointed out that the political persuasion of the current incumbents produced a less harmonious relationship between the Junior Ministers, whilst the Eurosceptic stance of their respective political parties was sometimes a hindrance to the development of an EU agenda. The ambiguity which attends OFMDFM ministerial engagement with Brussels does not affect the Executive as a whole. Other sectoral Ministers have displayed a greater cognisance of the EU arena and a willingness to engage with it. In particular, successive Agriculture Ministers have participated regularly in Council of Ministers meetings. All Northern Ireland Agriculture Ministers have been frequent visitors to Brussels. SDLP Minister Bríd Rodgers attended 10 out of 12 Council of Ministers meetings (missing two due to the Foot and Mouth crisis) between 2001 and 2002 (Committee of the Centre 2002: 204). Her successor, Sinn Féin’s Michelle Gildernew, adopted a similar policy in relation to pursuing a regular presence in Brussels.7 The current Sinn Féin Agriculture Minister, Michelle O’Neill, has also been a regular Brussels attendee. By October 2011, the ONIEB had facilitated 41 ministerial programmes in Brussels – 19 of these related to DARD and the Agriculture Minister (Committee for Employment and Learning, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 5 October 2011). Since 2011 all Northern Ireland Ministers are offered a focused ministerial programme in Brussels based upon their EU priorities (Northern Ireland Executive 2012c: 13). It should be noted, however, that the right of any regional Minister to attend a Council meeting must be with the agreement and consent of the UK central government, as detailed in the Concordat on the Coordination of European Union Policy Issues.8 In effect, the parameters of regional ministerial engagement with

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the EU have not altered substantially with the introduction of devolved power. The right to sit at the Council table existed pre-devolution for NIO Ministers, who were entitled to participate in Council of Ministers meetings when permitted by the lead UK Minister. This right, however, was, and still is, a strictly limited privilege, for it only allows a minister to present the UK line, as opposed to a specific regional line. Attendance at Council meetings is a useful opportunity to engage in networking, to build relationships and to potentially influence EU and other national and regional actors. The former Agriculture Minister, Michelle Gildernew, was clear that she saw her role as being one which must acknowledge, utilise and, where possible, exploit to Northern Ireland’s advantage the EU dimension: Since I came into office the development of a more direct relationship with Europe has been an important objective of mine. I am working to widen our influence in Brussels and have personally lobbied the European Commission on key local matters. (Northern Ireland Assembly 2009, AQO 448/09)

A tangible example of this stated approach was the Minister’s direct engagement with the European Commissioner for Agriculture, John Dalli: I was also delighted to welcome Commissioner John Dalli ... Over breakfast, I had the opportunity to raise issues with the Commissioner. I consider that meeting to have been the start of a very positive working relationship with him and his cabinet. (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 15 June 2010)

Her successor has similarly sought to develop a direct relationship with the European Commission. Following a trip to Brussels, Minister Michelle O’Neill noted: The Commission is in listening mode. It was made clear to me that Brussels is keen to identify how the forthcoming [CAP] reforms can be best implemented in ways that specifically suit the various regions of the EU. On that basis I now firmly believe that Northern Ireland’s farming sector will have a key role in determining its own future, courtesy of the upcoming CAP negotiations. (Farming Life, 21 April 2012)

The level of ministerial activity in Brussels on the part of all Agriculture Ministers is considerable. Comparable levels of engagement are not evident for other sectoral policy areas. During his evidence to the OFMDFM Committee’s Inquiry into EU issues, UUP MEP Jim Nicholson remarked: I do not want to be critical of you, Mr Chairman, or of the Committee, but you have been up and running for some time now, and you have visited Brussels only once, and we hardly ever see an Executive Minister. (Committee of OFMDFM Hansard, 12 December 2008)

In the same session, the MEP clarified his point by suggesting that Northern Ireland Ministers are ‘not there [in Brussels] often enough’. He was also specifically critical of the Northern Ireland Environment Minister (Committee of OFMDFM Hansard, 12 December 2008):

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For instance, an important Council … meeting has just taken place to deal with matters such as climate change and European carbon footprints. Did Northern Ireland have an input to those discussions? Was the Assembly’s Minister of the Environment there to represent our interests? Members have demanded that the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development be there to represent the fisher– men, but the Minister of the Environment should also be at the table representing Northern Ireland on such big issues.

The Head of the ONIEB appears to implicitly accept this view. He has been keen to encourage Ministers to visit Brussels: The first thing that I would recommend to every Minister is that they come out to Brussels … Attending Council [as you know from your experience] is also an opportunity to exert informal influence. Although there are protocols that constrain us to the UK line, attending Council is an opportunity to discuss informally with other Ministers issues that are of concern to us. We encourage Ministers to attend Council, and we support that. (Committee for Employment and Learning, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 5 October 2011)

Similar views are implied in the 2010 report by the OFMDFM Committee on its Inquiry into Consideration of EU issues. Recommendation nine urges the Northern Ireland Executive to (p. 9): continue to be proactive in seeking opportunities for its Ministers to be actively engaged with European business affecting their interests including attendance at the European Council of Ministers.

Of note here however, is the clear similarity between this 2010 recommendation and a 2002 recommendation contained in the Committee of the Centre’s Inquiry into the Approach of the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Devolved Government on European Union Issues. Recommendation three states (p. 3): The Committee recommends that a higher priority is given to the attendance of Northern Ireland Ministers at relevant Council of Ministers meetings in Europe particularly when policy or legislation is being proposed which will have a distinct impact on Northern Ireland.

The absence of devolved power during the period 2002–7 provides some explanation for the limited progress in activating a more frequent and strategic engagement with Brussels by Northern Ireland Ministers. There are other factors too – of a more politically charged nature – which account for the slow nature of adaptation to the realities (if not the necessities) of effective regional engagement with the EU. Every Northern Ireland Environment Minister, bar two, have been of a unionist persuasion. No unionist Environment Minister visited Brussels in an official ministerial capacity. This pattern was disrupted in March 2012 when then SDLP Environment Minister, Alex Attwood, became the first Northern Ireland Environment Minister to attend the EU Environment Council (see Northern Ireland Executive 2012d). The implied suggestion, however, that a reluctance to engage directly with the EU is a consequence of negative party political views of the EU is misleading. During an extensive fact-finding mission to Brussels in June 2007,

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the former UUP leader and Minister of Employment and Learning met with senior EU figures, including: the President and Secretary General of the European Commission; the European Commissioner for Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities; and the Director General of Education, Youth and Culture. During his visit, the Minister commented: There is a wealth of experience across the EU and I am keen that we learn from the work being done by others to allow us to put in place projects and policies that have proved successful. Northern Ireland has the potential to be a region of ‘best practice’ in Europe and I intend to make the most of that opportunity. (DEL Press Release, 13 June 2007)

In 2010, Sir Reg Empey met with the Irish European Commissioner for Research, Innovation and Science, Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, in Brussels. During their meeting, the Minister and Commissioner discussed the participation of Northern Ireland organisations in the EU’s 7th Framework Programme for Research and Technological Development (FP7) (European Commission Representation in Ireland 2010). The UUP does not demonstrate a favourable ideological disposition towards the EU, but this has not prevented that party from developing a pragmatic approach in instances where EU policies impinge on Northern Ireland interests (see Murphy 2009). Furthermore, the agricultural portfolio in Northern Ireland is held by Sinn Féin. Like the DUP and UUP, the party is not a strong proponent of the EU, yet successive Agriculture Ministers (like their pro-European SDLP predecessor) have engaged frequently and directly with the EU in seeking to protect and advance Northern Ireland interests. The former Sinn Féin Transport Minister Conor Murphy also engaged with Brussels. In March 2010, the Minister addressed a seminar on sustainable transport (organised by the ONIEB to coincide with EU Sustainable Energy Week) and also used the opportunity of his visit to ‘gain support from EU officials for [Northern Ireland’s] vision of the future of transport’ (Department of Regional Development (Northern Ireland) News Release, 24 March 2010). Despite some activity, however, the overall pattern of high-level ministerial engagement with Brussels is patchy and sporadic. So what explains the limited propensity on the part of many Northern Ireland Ministers to pursue their EU policy responsibilities more vigorously? It is clear that a Minister’s propensity to engage with the EU is influenced by their portfolio. In the case of agriculture, policy has long been directed, to a very large extent, by the EU. Coupled with this, there exists a strong regional agricultural lobby and a pre-devolution government department which had developed important links with Brussels. These pre-existing circumstances created an expectation that under devolved power, a similar (if not enhanced) level and intensity of engagement with Brussels would necessarily be maintained. In contrast, the Northern Ireland Department of the Environment was long blighted by a necessity to deal with the immediate and the urgent – i.e. potentially costly infraction proceedings linked to the incomplete or late transposition of EU environmental Directives. Devolution, and in particular the threat of large EU fines (for which the devolved Northern Ireland administra-

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tion would be liable), did provide a spur to deal definitively with the transposition backlog and to reform elements of environmental governance in Northern Ireland (see Turner 2006). The relationship which has developed between the EU and the devolved DOE(NI) is largely reactive and has not yet extended to the point where the Minister and Department have the space and luxury to prioritise Northern Ireland’s role in the early stages of the EU legislative process – a situation which would likely compel greater ministerial engagement with Brussels. The former Sinn Féin Junior Minister Gerry Kelly also hints at a further explanation for Northern Ireland’s uneven engagement with the EU. He has admitted that the levels of knowledge of the EU within the Northern Ireland Executive have been wanting, and that grappling successfully with EU issues has involved a steep learning curve: ‘The Executive as a body, is, I suppose, young enough and came into being without a great knowledge of Europe. As Junior Ministers, we had a lot to learn’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 23 June 2010). These sentiments are echoed, even more vociferously, by European Commission officials and senior civil servants in Northern Ireland, and indeed a number of local politicians across the political spectrum. One senior Northern Ireland civil servant claimed that ‘Northern Ireland Ministers do not possess the capacity to contribute to serious and important EU debates in relation to, for example, EU2020 and the budgetary review’. A senior SDLP MLA was similarly critical of what he termed (perhaps unsurprisingly) ‘the poor calibre of Ministers’. Commentators too have been scathing in relation to the inability of Ministers to make tough decisions: the DUP are afraid of making tough decisions because they are looking over their shoulder at rival unionist Jim Allister’s Traditional Unionist Voice party. As for Sinn Féin, they are not prepared to talk about education or any other key issues because I think they know in their heart of hearts that they don’t really know what they are doing. So nothing is happening and no decisions are taken. I’m almost at the point where I would say bring back direct rule because at least we would get some decisions. (Smyth quoted in O’Connor 2009)

There are clear explanations as to why Northern Ireland Ministers (and indeed MLAs) have limited interest, knowledge and experience of the EU. The almost wholesale focus of politicians on the constitutional question over a period of many decades left many political figures ill-equipped in EU policy terms. Furthermore, the period of devolved power has been persistently and continuously dogged by other more politically charged and sometimes more pressing internal matters. For example, policing and justice powers were only finally devolved in early 2010; the threat to political stability posed by dissident paramilitary activity persists; disagreements in relation to honouring the past; the serious contention (and often violence) which surrounds the annual parades and marching season sporadically reignites old political hostilities; and ongoing disputes around the display of flags and symbols hint at deeper political challenges. These developments have led to growing tensions between the DUP and Sinn Féin and threaten to challenge the stability of the political process. Such is the seriousness of this situation that the Northern Ireland Executive invited US diplomat Richard Haas to Northern Ireland

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in late 2013 to convene all-party talks with a view to resolving these contentious issues. In the context of this tense internal political environment, attempts to agree progress on EU-related issues have sometimes been sidelined and, at worst, used as a political football in the pursuit of outcomes vis-à-vis internal matters. The NITF’s support for the creation of a Centre for Conflict Resolution (CRC) in Northern Ireland is a case in point. The 2010 Hillsborough Agreement details the provisions for activating the transfer of policing and justice powers to Northern Ireland. Section 4 of that document requires that the Northern Ireland Executive will develop: ‘a programme of work detailing how any remaining outstanding issues will be resolved’ (p. 20). Decisions in relation to the creation of a centre for conflict resolution in Northern Ireland were among the most contentious and controversial. In evidence to the OFMDFM Committee in mid-2010, an OFMDFM official confirmed that: the retained and listed buildings on the [Maze Prison] site could be used for a conflict resolution centre. That is something that Ministers are deeply involved in, but no decision has been made about the location of any such centre. (OFMDFM Committee, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 2 June 2010)

In a contribution to the same committee evidence session, SDLP MLA Dolores Kelly, pointed out that: it is pretty depressing that another two years have passed and we are discussing the same issues. It is even more depressing that £12 million of public money has been spent thus far on Maze/Long Kesh and we have a nice new set of gates and a flattened landscape … The stalling point … seems to be the political will.

In a separate press release, the same MLA suggested that the lack of decisionmaking on this issue was jeopardising stg £20 million of Peace III funding. The seeming inability and unwillingness of the Northern Ireland Executive to agree a business plan for the creation of a conflict resolution centre was regarded as underlining the ‘dysfunctionality’ of the Northern Ireland system of governance (SDLP Press Release, 2 June 2010). The proposed Conflict Resolution Centre was loosely tied up in deeper and highly sensitive questions around the disputed Programme for Cohesion, Sharing and Integration (OFMDFM 2010). The programme aimed to agree a shared future for all in Northern Ireland and it exposes serious ­differences between the parties – Sinn Féin and the DUP in particular – about how (or indeed if) the two communities can or should be integrated (see Knox 2011). The CRC debacle touches on related difficulties about how to acknowledge and remember Northern Ireland’s past. In particular, it concerns questions about whether to create a conflict resolution centre; what it should record and memorialise; and where it should be. The latter question has been the most controversial. Locating any such centre on the site of the Long Kesh/Maze Prison – the setting for the IRA Hunger Strikes in the early 1980s – was offensive to many of a unionist per­suasion. TUV MLA Jim Allister talks about the site being ‘a shrine to terrorists’ and thus ‘contaminated’ by its own history. He views the location of the CRC at the Long Kesh/Maze Prison site as a ‘mechanism for rewriting history’ and sees

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it as ‘something that will never deliver … neutrality and objectivity’. He accused the DUP of agreeing to the proposed CRC because the party seeks to ‘keep Sinn Féin happy’ in order that the DUP can keep their positions at the heart of the Executive (see Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 25 October 2011). He and the UUP were largely alone in propagating such views although their interpretations were increasingly shared by key DUP figures. The DUP’s support for the project was only belatedly assured in 2011, when guarantees about the proposed CRC and its location were agreed between Sinn Féin and the DUP. First Minister Peter Robinson ­categorically assured members of the Northern Ireland Assembly that: ‘every effort will be made to ensure that the functions and remit of the centre will not be offensive to those who have suffered’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 25 October 2011). During the same debate, he expressed faith in Sinn Féin’s support for this position; emphasised the socio-economic benefits to be accrued from the development of the site; and committed OFMDFM to be fully accountable for all elements of the project. DUP support for the proposed CRC however, did not endure. In August 2013, the party withdrew its approval for the construction of the CRC citing dissatisfaction with Sinn Féin’s insensitivity towards IRA victims and Unionist culture.9 Following the DUP decision, the construction of the CRC was no longer viewed as viable and in October 2013 EU funding was withdrawn. Since the CRC project was first proposed, it has been beset by wholly domestic problems built around tensions between parties within Northern Ireland. Although the EU was providing a carrot in terms of the promise of funding, the European Com­mission had no legitimate or useful role in helping to surmount internal political difficulties. The strength and intensity of Northern Ireland history and the legacy of the conflict proved too raw and too politically charged for the EU to be afforded any mediating role. This episode also provides some insight into the problematic features of the Belfast Agreement and the consociational institutional architecture it creates. The power-sharing arrangement requires some degree of trust among its participants in order to function fully and effectively. This is not always forthcoming and was clearly evident in relation to the CRC. A lack of interparty trust has led political parties to adopt some unsatisfactory practices in other contexts too. A tendency towards indecision and disagreement reflects deep tensions between Executive partners – the DUP and Sinn Féin in particular – and it also exposes how the autonomy afforded to individual Ministers can be divisive and problematic. In a specifically EU context, the extent of ministerial autonomy was revealed during the consultation process for allocations to Local Strategy Partnerships under Peace II. DFP rejected the principal concern raised by the Committee for Finance and Personnel (which like all committees has a crossparty membership) in its response to the consultation exercise (see Committee of the Centre 2002: 231). Environmental policy has also fallen victim to the effects of ministerial autonomy. In 2008, the then DUP Environment Minister, Arlene Foster, opted to reject the creation of an independent Environment Agency. This decision was contrary to the recommendations of a review process which had been launched by the previous direct rule Environment Minister. The review involved

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Northern Ireland and the European Union an extensive process of public consultation which revealed cross-community support for far-reaching reform spanning the spectrum of political, industry and public opinion, and almost unanimous support for independent regulation. (Turner 2009: 157)

However, in the absence of the issue being deemed a cross-community one, and therefore being subject to weighted voting, the Minister was legitimately able to exercise political autonomy and, in so doing, she chose to protect the interests of a key DUP constituency, the UFU. This position provoked widespread anger and dismay among other political parties and environmental NGOs. In her examination of the transposition of an EU environmental Directive into Northern Ireland law during the early years of devolved power, Turner (2006: 64) identifies a stand-off between the DOE(NI), its Minister and the Committee, which, she suggests, ‘brought into sharp focus the underlying political mistrust between the Northern Ireland parties and the weaknesses inherent in power sharing as a basis for government’. There are many examples too where agreement on policy has not been forthcoming, or has been excessively slow to emerge. The political and symbolic significance which attends many policy issues in Northern Ireland means that compromise is often unthinkable. The CRC is a clear example, but it is evident too in relation to OFMDFM’s Programme for Cohesion, Sharing and Integration (2010) which has been judged ‘a woolly benign document’ that is ‘the product of a political consensus between the DUP and Sinn Féin replete with good intentions but lacking in specificity’ (Knox 2011: 551). The consequence of these types of scenarios has been that the current Northern Ireland governance arrangements have sometimes hindered policy development because they do not force compromise or compel cooperation. Ministerial autonomy effectively cushions any necessity to be conciliatory, and political tensions and mistrust can be intense. Of course, what all of this masks is a lingering unease, acutely felt by the DUP, about the very principle of power-sharing, and particularly power-sharing with Sinn Féin. Wilford (2010: 147) refers to very palpable tensions within the Executive which, among other things, have led to a dearth of policy initiatives and something of a legislative famine for much of the period since 2007.

Examples where policy progress has been encumbered in this way include the Review of Public Administration (RPA),10 attempts to expand the use of the Irish language11 and the future of post-primary education in Northern Ireland. These stalled policy issues expose profound political tensions between Northern Ireland’s political parties. Education policy in Northern Ireland, and the future of postprimary education in particular, have proved to be among the most divisive policy issues tackled by the devolved administration and have resulted in ‘a worrying division of attitudes ... along party political and sectarian lines’ (McKeown et al. 2006: 183). The former DUP leader Revd Dr Ian Paisley suggested that the proposals being mooted by the RPA were ‘a clear attempt to split the Province – nationalists w[ould] be able to develop their United Ireland policy in the coun-

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cils that they dominate[d]’ (quoted in Knox 2009: 445). Unionist opposition to moves to expand the Irish language tend to be grounded in ‘the belief that the Irish language is an integral part of the ideology of Irish Republicanism and Nationalist separatism’ (MacGiolla Chríost 2000: 46). Differing attitudes towards the Irish language was one of the issues at the centre of the stand-off between Sinn Féin and the DUP which prevented Executive meetings for a period of five months in 2008. Although the EU, in and of itself, does not constitute a policy issue which, in practice, exposes serious communal tensions between Northern Ireland political parties, it has fallen victim to the problems associated with sharing political power. The EU-supported CRC is a case in point. The controversy it created was intense; the process of achieving agreement was politically fraught; and ultimately unsuccessful. The overall outcome is that ‘With many policy challenges going unaddressed, this does suggest that progress is only happening on the basis of the lowest common denominator’ (Farry 2009: 177). It effectively means that examples of policy innovation are few. Although Northern Ireland’s EU agenda may be partially subject to this fate, there are nevertheless some signs that positive progress is being made with respect to the development of administrative structures and the political maturation of the Northern Ireland Assembly and its members. In practice, a distinctly different Northern Ireland approach to the EU (when compared with the pre-devolution period) and the development of regionally refined EU objectives has only slowly emerged. The initially under-developed character of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU agenda post-1999, and the NITF in particular, is symptomatic of broader difficulties related to the nature of the devolved political system; strained relations between political parties; a degree of political apathy; and limited administrative resources and capacity. The Northern Ireland Executive has a particular form and character which might lend itself to new forms of governance and state bypass. The latter strategy may be attractive to the devolved administration, as it potentially permits an opportunity to present the regional case directly to Brussels. Such an approach may be especially appealing when the UK and Northern Ireland position do not coincide or when Northern Ireland is seeking to attract funding. In effect, however, this avenue of influence is policed by the terms of the MOU and concordat, which emphasise central state oversight. Some opportunities have been exploited by Northern Ireland Government Ministers, but the inability of the Northern Ireland Executive – Sinn Féin and the DUP in particular – to work closely and constructively with each other has limited the exercise of regional autonomy and the pursuit of potentially more fruitful forms of EU activity. Political division and tension continue to sour relations and have effectively narrowed the space for innovative and creative engagement with new forms of governance. Connections with Brussels have been enhanced and some greater cognisance of EU issues has transpired, but these developments do not demonstrate any serious departure from pre-­devolution practice. Lingering hostility between political parties curbs the extent to which new policies and processes might be exploited. The system of government in Northern Ireland may have changed, but there has been no equivalent change in the system of governance.

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OFMDFM: administrative advance The OFMDFM has responsibility for a wide range of policy areas, including the EU and international affairs. Within the Department, this work is concentrated in the EPCU and the ONIEB. Collectively, both units constitute the European Division of OFMDFM. This entails providing a central policy and coordination role on EU matters and helping Northern Ireland ‘fulfil its EU responsibilities and develop a positive approach to participation in the European Union’ (http://goo.gl/tIJJDv). The creation of the European Division within OFMDFM represented a shift of strategic policy responsibility for EU matters from DFP, which had assumed this responsibility during the period of direct rule. Hitherto, the allocation of an EU coordination role to DFP reflected the financial focus of Northern Ireland’s dealings with the EU. The transfer of this role to OFMDFM suggests a subtle shift in emphasis. The move also entails placing responsibility for EU strategy under the direction of the two most senior Northern Ireland Ministers and their junior colleagues. The present situation, whereby a central policy and coordination role vis-à-vis the EU, is situated at the heart of the devolved system, represents a certain recognition by political actors that the EU is a matter of some strategic policy significance for the region. The European Division in OFMDFM is led by the Director of the ONIEB, who is based in Brussels. The EPCU employs a relatively small staff in Belfast. Prompted by an increased work-load (a consequence of devolution) and coupled with political pressure from the Committee of the Centre as highlighted in their 2002 European Inquiry, there was a tangible sense that the size and scope of the tasks facing the unit warranted greater resources. In a Northern Ireland Assembly debate, one MLA made this point quite forcefully when he suggested: ‘a budget of £163 000 and four staff working under a director who has other responsibilities is insufficient to enable the unit to carry out its duties’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002). The size of the unit has increased and it is currently led by a Head of Unit (who reports to the Head of Division), who is supported by two Principal Officers and two Administrative Officers. The central coordination role of the EPCU involves the following activities (http://goo.gl/tIJJDv): 1. Leading on the development of the Executive Committee’s strategic approach to Europe. 2. Maintaining effective liaison arrangements with Whitehall, the Scottish and Welsh devolved administrations, the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of the Taoiseach and across NICS departments on European matters. 3. Monitoring the transposition of European directives. The means by which the unit delivers these outputs is detailed in Taking Our Place in Europe 2006–2010 (OFMDFM 2006: 18–19): The European Policy and Coordination Unit (EPCU) works closely with Whitehall, especially the Cabinet Office and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office

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(the key departments of the Westminster Government for European policy), as well as the Scottish and Welsh devolved administrations. EPCU provides support to Northern Ireland’s European representatives and monitors the transposition of directives. It promotes European networking and supports dialogue with civil society to provide for an exchange of views, enhanced awareness of and participation in European matters.

The remit of the unit is clearly broad and its work-load is potentially immense. In the early stages of its existence, the EPCU itself identified over 100 Northern Ireland policy areas with an EU dimension (Committee of the Centre 2002: 273–275). The practical need to prioritise and concentrate efforts in areas of most significance to Northern Ireland interests was recognised early on. In a contribution to a Northern Ireland Assembly debate on EU matters, one UUP MLA stressed ‘the need to focus selectively on areas in which results can be obtained’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002). The task of condensing the EU focus of OFMDFM, and by extension the EPCU, was wrought with potential difficulties. The pervasiveness of EU policies and their presence in all Northern Ireland government departments required that the EPCU consider matters of cross-departmental strategy and coordination. This task was made difficult by the variety of existing approaches to the EU which had been developed (and under-developed) by individual government departments. Some departments had created and operationalised sound working practices vis-à-vis the EU (such as DARD and DFP), others were facing difficult challenges and were subject to high pressure from the EU (for example, DOE and the threat of infraction proceedings), while remaining government departments possessed minimal, and often no EU capacity. An effective approach to strategy and coordination therefore required constructive two-way communication between OFMDFM and individual government departments, the free-flow of information and a sensitivity to individual departmental capacity. During the first three years (1999–2002) of its existence, the key outputs of the EPCU included the opening of the ONIEB, the drafting of a Framework Strategy Document and the convening of a conference on the Convention on the Future of Europe. Such outcomes may appear minimal over this time period; however, three temporary suspensions of devolution, one of them sustained, affected the continuity and fluency of institutional adaptation to the rigours of the new devolved arrangements. Additionally, the constraints posed by the cross-party nature of OFMDFM and the need for joint First Minister and Deputy First Minister agreement on policy matters limited progress. The EPCU received some criticism of its early operation in the 2002 Committee of the Centre European Inquiry. The Committee criticised the poor response of the unit, and OFMDFM generally, to issues of strategy and planning, and explicitly endorsed a more balanced, informed and rounded approach to engagement with the EU. This, the report suggested, would involve closer relations and contact between OFMDFM, local government, the non-government sector and key EU actors, including MEPs and members of Ecosoc and CoR. For the most part, the SDLP and UUP Junior Ministers of the day accepted the recommendations

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contained within the report, and although they did not vow to implement all of them, they did accept that a more streamlined and strategic approach was required and would be developed. During the debate, UUP Junior Minister James Leslie stated: ‘the Committee is right to say that specific priorities need to be identified, and we will be working on that and liaising with the Committee’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002). In the years after 2002, the EPCU developed a clearer focus, built up an impressive level of in-house EU expertise and established a stronger identity for itself. It also created a durable and stable infrastructure for dealing systematically with EU issues. This means that on a day-to-day basis, administrative business of an EU nature continues. In that context, local working groups were created, relations with Whitehall strengthened and regular communication with the Irish Government established. Considering the limited personnel and resources available to the unit during this period, these are notable achievements. The skills and expertise found within the EPCU are not evident across the NICS. One SDLP MLA suggested that, despite some notable exceptions in OFMDFM, DARD and DFP, ‘an EU knowledge and enthusiasm gap’ exists among a majority of civil servants. Both the 2002 and the 2010 EU Inquiries implicitly acknowledge this via their support for more staff training and secondments. On the issue of secondments, some progress is evident. In early 2012, four Thematic Desk Officers were appointed to the ONIEB from across the NICS. In addition, opportunities exist for NICS staff to be seconded to the European Commission and other EU institutions. A budget of stg £400,000 per annum has been dedicated to supporting this initiative and it will be reviewed after two years. The support and advice emanating from the NITF has been a key context within which this approach has been rolled out. An added difficulty exists with respect to relations between the civil service and their local political masters. Bradbury and Mitchell refer to the ‘“bureaucrats v. democrats” tension which afflicts all executives’ (2001: 273). This is particularly marked in Northern Ireland, where hostility between the twin pillars of politics and administration was traditionally problematic. It also reflects similar tensions between politicians and civil society which have undermined the scope for characteristics associated with governance to emerge (see Chapter 4). Like their political masters, Northern Ireland civil servants face a steep learning curve in adapting to the demands and rigours of the new, devolved political dispensation. A fifty-year history of one-party rule, eighteen years of Conservative Party rule in the UK, a lack of local political accountability, a relatively free hand in the quasi-political management of the region and, arguably, a lack of innovation and imagination have all marked the culture of the civil administration in Northern Ireland. The 2002 EU Inquiry was quite vocal on the issue of the need for civil service reform in general. The report recognised that ‘the experience of direct rule may have had a negative impact on the skill levels within individual Northern Ireland departments’, and that all departments ‘must address the growing need for a radical change in organisational culture to meet the demands of the devolved administration’ (Committee of the Centre 2002: 28). Birrell (2012a: 318) has referred to ‘a

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generally weak policy-making capacity in Northern Ireland’, which afflicts not just Northern Ireland civil servants but also the Northern Ireland Assembly committees and other public bodies. One of the rationales for the creation of the NITF is the view, implicit in the report and confirmed during interviews with EU officials, that the NICS needs to develop its EU capacity. Similarly negative views of the NICS were also evident in the Republic of Ireland and revealed by WikiLeaks. The website published a US Embassy cable quoting top Irish civil servants, who labelled Northern Ireland civil servants (and politicians) as ‘inexperienced’ and lacking capability in international affairs (Rutherford and Phelan, 3 June 2011). Many Northern Ireland civil servants were, initially at least, nervous of the prospects of working directly with local political masters who may have harboured a certain level of resentment towards them. As a former senior Northern Ireland civil servant has commented: Politicians on all sides are resentful of NICS. They are on the outside looking in. After years of direct rule, it will be difficult for many civil servants to adjust to the new circumstances. (Spence as quoted in Carmichael 2001: 37)

A current senior OFMDFM official echoed these sentiments and referred to attempts by some politicians ‘to put manners on civil servants’. He accepted, however, that this tension between politicians and civil servants has dissipated over time and referred to positive comments by senior Northern Ireland figures about their relations with the NICS, and with the EPCU and ONIEB in particular. The former TUV MEP and Eurosceptic Jim Allister noted that he ‘always found the [ONIEB] helpful’ (Committee for Employment and Learning, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 5 October 2011). The European Division of OFMDFM has sought to develop a new approach to Northern Ireland engagement with the EU. Most recently, it has been helped in that task by the NITF. The renewal of the Taskforce in late 2010 provided a vital context within which EPCU could advance. The appointment of key officials (including staff seconded from the European Commission) with valuable knowledge and expertise was crucial to activating and progressing the opportunities offered by the NITF. These opportunities included ‘unprecedented access’ to senior Brussels officials; strengthened management and coordination structures across the NICS; support for four thematic policy areas (closely aligned to the Europe 2020 targets); and the development of relations with the Irish Government, particularly in the context of the Irish Presidency of the EU during the first six months of 2013 (see OFMDFM Committee, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 4 July 2012). One MLA notes that: ‘The Barroso connection [NITF] allows Northern Ireland to have … access and to punch above its weight’ (ibid). The overall result of these developments has been some streamlining of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU. A broader relationship with Brussels has also been fostered in terms of engaging with EU officials across the policy spectrum and drawn from a variety of Directorates-General. The frequency of engagement has increased – officials and politicians are adamant that the NITF facilitates improved access to key EU decision-makers. It is equally clear, however, that all of these recent developments

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assiduously respect the primacy of the UK central state. For example, relations with the Irish Permanent Representation in Brussels (IRep) are seen to complement rather than challenge or undermine relations with UKRep: ‘we [EPCU] have the advantage of having briefings from the Ireland permanent representation and the UK permanent representation and we can benefit from that’ (OFMDFM Committee, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 4 July 2012). What has been crucially important in terms of allowing these recent developments to transpire has been the evolving political context and the attitude of the UK central government which has not interfered in the work of the NITF but instead has been keen to foster and encourage its work (Hayward and Murphy 2012: 448–449): the Northern Ireland government and departments have effectively been given ‘free rein’ to pursue the NITF interests and agenda. This is partly because the President of the European Commission himself has sponsored and facilitated the work of the NITF. This unusual openness of UKRep to direct engagement between the Commission and Northern Ireland administration is seen to be a concrete gesture on the part of the UK government to support Northern Ireland’s regional ‘empowerment’ rather than as a by-passing of the UK state.

Tensions within the Executive continue to hamper some developments, namely the establishment of the CRC. However, in relation to less politically-charged and day-to-day EU matters, there is according to First Minister, Peter Robinson, a sense of being ‘in a new era, trying to move forward’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 25 October 2011). The innovative nature of the NITF and Northern Ireland’s engagement with it, coupled with the acquiescence of the UK government and the (sometime) support of the Northern Ireland Executive, has been the backdrop against which advances in Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU have ­materialised. The process of developing a more robust approach to EU responsibilities, however, has not been straightforward and despite their apparent novelty, the advances which have been achieved do not suggest a system which fits neatly within the MLG framework. Elements of governance are present. Continuing interaction between actors at multi-levels is established and normalised, and Northern Ireland is permitted a degree of autonomy. However, none of this is pursued in defiance of the central state; rather, it happens with the UK government’s approval and support. Instead, devolution appears to have produced a more shrewd approach to the EU on the part of the Northern Ireland administration. It may not be ‘new politics’ per se. However, the potential for Northern Ireland policy innovation and distinctiveness in the EU realm to emerge is perhaps as high as it has ever been.

Northern Ireland Assembly and the Committee of OFMDFM: new institution, old practices? The Northern Ireland Assembly has a distinct role to play in the discussion and deliberation of EU issues. It is, however, not a role it has relished during the course of its existence. Debates on issues of European relevance have largely been confined to those with a financial dimension, including for example debates on

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the structural funds, the Peace programmes and agricultural issues. MLAs have also debated the recommendations contained in a variety of EU-related reports produced by Assembly committees. The chamber has too considered other aspects of the EU, where the powers of the Assembly are strictly curtailed or non-existent. This somewhat curious approach has included plenary debates on, for example, the Convention on the Future of Europe; the possibility of a UK referendum on the Lisbon Treaty; dual currency status for the Euro in Northern Ireland; and UK withdrawal from the December 2011 EU summit.12 In general, the majority of debates have been relatively harmonious matters, with division at a minimum and a largely pragmatic approach discernible. Nevertheless, on ideological issues, such as the single currency, the Future of Europe and EU treaties, the emergence of predictable partisan positions is obvious. On the issue of the Euro, unionists and Sinn Féin adopted a more Eurosceptic approach than their SDLP colleagues.13 In relation to the Future of Europe debate, unionist contributions, unlike those of the SDLP, stressed the primacy of the nation-state, while Sinn Féin MLAs were conspicuous by their absence.14 During the debate on the Lisbon Treaty, the DUP, Sinn Féin and the UUP supported the motion, which called on the UK government to hold a referendum on the new EU Treaty. Their positions reflected their ideological reservations and objections to the deepening of the European integration process. Despite the Europhile character of the APNI, that party too supported the proposition, leaving the SDLP as the only party speaking against the motion. It should be noted, however, that the high level of political party support for the motion was not based on a high level of consensus between the parties as to the reasons for advocating a UK-wide referendum. The DUP and Sinn Féin outlined their express opposition to the proposed evolution of the EU, as outlined in the Treaty. The UUP MLA Danny Kennedy stressed the need for a national debate on the Lisbon Treaty, without making it clear that a No vote would be desirable. The APNI were more openly supportive of the European integration process, but as in the UUP, the party supported the view that a referendum would be appropriate and valuable. The debate on the UK Prime Minister’s decision to withdraw from the December 2011 EU summit was tabled by the SDLP. As outlined earlier, the plenary discussion followed a predictable pattern. Unionist parties supported the Prime Minister’s actions, the SDLP and APNI questioned the wisdom of his decision, while Sinn Féin’s position was more ambiguous. The party condemned ‘the obsequious endorsement of David Cameron’s position’ by unionist members stating that such support does no good for the economy here. It makes no contribution whatsoever. It simply encourages more of a drift away from the ability to influence decisions that affect our communities.15 (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 12 December 2011)

Aside from debates which expose the ideological preferences of Northern Ireland’s political parties, Assembly business in relation to EU policy more generally tends to attract a high degree of cross-party consensus. The former SDLP Junior Minister Denis Haughey noted:

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Northern Ireland and the European Union Despite the range of views in the Assembly and in the community about European integration, a positive feature of our approach has been cross-community cooperation on European issues. (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002)

This was a view shared by a UUP MLA who, during the same Assembly deliberations on the Committee of the Centre’s European Inquiry, identified ‘a great deal of cross-party agreement and cooperation’. More recently, the former Sinn Féin Junior Minister Gerry Kelly remarked on this feature of Assembly business: ‘We have strong cross-party support for enhanced European engagement across the political spectrum’ (OFMDFM Committee Hansard, 23 June 2010). A UUP member of the OFMDFM Committee revealed that within the committee, crossparty consensus on the contents of the Committee’s 2010 European Inquiry was evident, although he was keen to point out that aspects of the Committee’s deliberations were on occasion subject to votes. The most substantive discussions on Europe, or rather the development of an overall Northern Ireland–EU framework or strategy of engagement and cooperation, has largely been pioneered by the Assembly’s OFMDFM Committee.16 The Committee is a statutory committee and, as such, it shadows the OFMDFM.17 The committee has traditionally operated in a relatively cohesive manner and has largely been free from the political bickering which has been a feature of other Assembly committees. Since achieving statutory status, the Committee has the power to (Belfast Agreement 1998, Strand 2, Paragraph 9): •  Consider and advise on departmental budgets and annual plans in the context of the overall budget allocation •  Consider relevant secondary legislation and take the Committee Stage of relevant primary legislation •  Call for persons and papers •  Initiate inquiries and make reports •  Consider and advise on matters brought to the committee by its minister. For the initial period of the existence of the original Committee of the Centre, EU issues had a low profile. It was overshadowed by a focus on other issues for which the Committee was responsible. Indeed, it was responsible for over a dozen areas of policy, including poverty and human rights. The then Committee Chair admitted that the committee ‘found it impossible to devote sufficient time to EU affairs’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002). Nevertheless, the latter half of 2001 saw the committee adopt a more proactive approach to European matters as it embarked on a European Inquiry which concluded with the production of a report in 2002 (see Chapter 7). This strategy largely followed the example of the Scottish European Committee, which embarked on a similar course of action the previous year (see European Committee, Scottish Parliament 2001). There was also a clear alignment with Scotland in the positions the committee adopted, the approaches they followed and the manner of their engagement with the reporting process. One of the distinctions between Scotland and Northern Ireland was the

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decision in Northern Ireland not to establish a dedicated European Committee (McGowan and Murphy 2003: 90). Later, however, an EU subcommittee was established within the Committee of the Centre. In practice, the operation of the subcommittee was initially problematic, specifically with reference to obtaining a quorum to carry out its business (see Committee of the Centre Minutes, 12 June 2002). The Committee’s 2002 European Inquiry Report recommended the creation of a Standing Committee on EU Affairs, but acknowledged that further work was needed on its remit, workload, membership and quorum (Committee of the Centre 2002: 3). The key problem in operationalising this recommendation was the difficulty of securing MLAs with the necessary time, energy and expertise to serve on an additional Assembly Committee (most MLAs serve on at least two committees) (see Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002). The 2010 EU Inquiry by the OFMDFM Committee did not support the creation of a dedicated European Committee. Instead, the Committee favoured the continuation of its responsibility for European issues, although it does commit to reviewing the situation at a later stage (OFMDFM Committee 2010: 2 (Action 1)). The OFMDFM Committee, however, is not the only committee within the Northern Ireland Assembly to have an active interest in EU issues. Indeed, for most Assembly committees it can be assumed that there is some European dimension to their business. The 2010 EU Inquiry by the OFMDFM Committee makes specific reference to the responsibilities of other Assembly statutory committees. Action two states that: ‘The Assembly’s statutory committees will be responsible for the scrutiny of all European issues of relevance to the committee’ (OFMDFM Committee 2010: 15). It proceeds to advise that all statutory committees will be requested to provide a report of their activities on EU issues to the OFMDFM Committee annually. The contributions will then be discussed collectively during a plenary debate (subject to the agreement of the Assembly Business Committee). Action 8 (p. 17) of the report commits the OFMDFM Committee to assisting statutory committees in the performance of their EU duties, while Action 9 (p. 18) advocates the fuller involvement of Departmental officials in briefing statutory committee members on EU matters. Further related action points recommend closer relations between the OFMDFM Committee and Northern Ireland’s MEPs, members of CoR and Ecosoc, NILGA, NGOs and the holder of the EU Presidency. The Committee anticipates that the development of such relations will be on the basis of structured and regular engagement (which in the case of Northern Ireland’s MEPs would be timed to coincide with the annual publication of the European Legislative and Work Programme). The Committee also urges the Northern Ireland Assembly Commission to appoint a parliamentary officer to be based in Brussels; to explore opportunities for staff of the Assembly to go on secondment to the various EU institutions; and to develop training programmes for staff and MLAs. These action points are an attempt to address the limited interest and expertise on EU matters as demonstrated by statutory committees and MLAs. During the course of its inquiry, a number of statutory committees ‘stated that they had no remit on European issues or did not respond’ (OFMDFM Committee 2010: 17).

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Subsequent correspondence between committees, however, revealed that this was an inaccurate outlook on the part of those same committees. A key example of the potentially negative impact of this situation was noted by a number of contributors to the EU Inquiry: The Assembly and Committees [were] not becoming involved in directives at an early enough stage to be able to make a change/to influence a directive. All too often the directive had already been agreed and had to be implemented or the member-state would be into infraction proceedings. (OFMDFM Committee 2010: 20)

The lack of engagement by statutory committees and MLAs on issues of EU strategy reflects a similar problem evident among Northern Ireland Ministers in relation to their poor knowledge and interest in the EU. During the Northern Ireland Assembly debate on the 2002 Committee of the Centre EU Inquiry, this hindrance to the pursuit of a coherent and effective EU strategy was explicitly recognised. One MLA suggested that ‘members should receive EU familiarisation training specifically based around their statutory committee responsibilities’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002). In their submissions to the 2002 EU Inquiry a number of statutory committees identified a lack of information on EU matters as impeding their wholehearted engagement with the EU dimension of their work. More recently, one SDLP MLA suggested that this problem was a continuing one, which served to facilitate the existence of what he termed ‘a culture of self-pity and dependency’ among MLAs, when it comes to EU issues. This perspective, he suggested, produced an overly narrow EU policy outlook by limiting the nature and extent of political discourse on the EU within the Northern Ireland Assembly. Evidence of this outlook is clear from a question posed to the Deputy First Minister by a UUP MLA: Does that mean that nothing new is coming from the European Union; that we have only a limited window of, perhaps, the next four to five years in which to get some funding drawn down from the EU; and that we will have to rely much more on our own resources? Is that not a very worrying trend, in that, as Europe looks more eastwards, we can be almost forgotten about and streamlined? (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 21 April 2009)

Questions of this nature, which are overtly focused on what Northern Ireland can financially receive from the EU, are not unusual. Deliberations and discussions of this nature largely reflect the broad tone and tenor of Assembly discourse on the EU. This restricted outlook on the EU by MLAs is reasonable. In a society where electoral battles have traditionally been fought around constitutional as opposed to policy questions, there is limited incentive for elected representatives to invest time and energy in other policy issues, unless there exists a clear (invariably financial) domestic gain. The EU fits within this category. An emphasis on financial receipts, coupled with a largely resolute focus on internal (as opposed to external EU) policy issues, is a logical strategy for any MLA seeking re-election. Northern Ireland’s political culture may have evolved in positive ways in recent years, but it

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has not yet reached the point where politicians can take their eyes completely off traditionally troublesome constitutional, political and now economic issues, and fully embrace new and less electorally rewarding priorities. The limited propensity of Northern Ireland MLAs to engage with the EU is further evident in relation to the small number of visits to Brussels undertaken by statutory committees. The OFMDFM Committee held its first meeting outside Northern Ireland in Brussels during a two-day visit there in June 2010 (although members of the Committee did visit Brussels in June 2008). Not all Assembly committees, however, have chosen to engage directly and frequently with Brussels. In addition, Wilford (2007: 169) notes Committees’ reluctance to practice ‘outreach’ by seeking and taking evidence off-site from the wider community. Although committees, including the OFMDFM committee, have engaged with civil society (primarily in the context of inquiries and reviews), the approach has not been especially inventive or blatantly inclusive. Clearly, the creation of the Northern Ireland Assembly and its constituent committees is a significant political development. In EU terms, progress has been slow and limited – the 2002 and 2010 EU Inquiry Reports bear close similarities. However, some developments are noteworthy. The approach to EU affairs as advocated in both inquiries complements that being pursued by OFMDFM. The recommendations emphasise the benefits of a coordinated approach to the EU – one which harnesses the energies of all Assembly Committees and better manages their work by insisting on regular reporting and closer more regularised contact with key Northern Ireland officials, MEPs, interest groups and others. Direct engagement with Brussels has also commenced, and cooperation with other ‘European’ committees in the UK and Republic of Ireland is on the agenda. The Assembly, however, is hamstrung by political factors and cannot be as dynamic as its counterpart in, for example, Scotland. Once again, the nature and operation of devolved governance in Northern Ireland acts as a constraint on the actions of the Assembly. The devolved political system is dominated by the Northern Ireland Executive. Such is the strength of the bonds of party loyalty in Northern Ireland that MLAs will not readily challenge Ministers from the same party. This has been to the detriment of backbench and by extension Assembly committee dynamism : In a divided society the premium on party (for which read communal) loyalty is paramount, such that the bonds between MLAs and ministers belonging to the same party are especially strong. This has the effect of inhibiting the exercise of independent mindedness among ‘backbench’ members who felt obliged to defend ‘their’ respective ministers. (Wilford 2007: 169)

The consequence is that any inclination to pioneer specific issues or to oppose party positions on particular initiatives is weak among MLAs who unfailingly take their cue from party headquarters. The political culture which sustains the Assembly does not depart significantly from the traditions of the Westminster model where party loyalty is paramount (see Wilford 2010: 138). Indeed, according to Mitchell (2010: 87), this observation can be applied broadly across the UK: ‘Despite the rhetoric of “new politics”, the devolved institutions exhibit the pull of their genealo­gical [Westminster] roots’. Nevertheless, relative to other

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UK devolved regions, Northern Ireland is further distinct. As a consequence of its consociational basis and the requirement that power is shared at the Executive level, the Northern Ireland Assembly does not contain a sizeable or influential opposition. At one point in the lifetime of the current Assembly, the five largest political parties accounted for 105 of the 108 MLAs. Furthermore, the D’Hondt rule dictated that these same parties were represented on the Executive Committee,The ‘opposition’, therefore, constituted the three MLAs who were not linked to the five largest political parties. These MLAs however, have no official status, resources or parliamentary speaking rights and they were effectively too small to be relevant (although some might regard TUV MLA Jim Allister as a maverick). There is also the anomalous situation which permits parties within the Executive to agree to proposals only to vote against them on the floor of the Assembly. Despite the tendency for MLAs to behave as ‘true party animals’ (Wilford 2010: 138), the Assembly committees do provide some opportunities for politicians to flex their political muscles and possibly correct some of the imbalances of Northern Ireland’s devolved political system. This is in the context of committees possibly constituting the ‘loyal opposition’ within the Assembly. In practice, however, a system whereby committees act in opposition mode has not materialised. Osborne (2002: 296) notes that in the context of its engagement with the review of student finance, the Employment and Learning Committee ‘transformed the debate’. However, the committee’s unity and resolve eventually faded when other (mainly party) political pressures were applied. Turner (2009: 160) has similarly noted that the cross-party nature of the Environment Committee is ‘likely to prevent meaningful pressure from being exerted on the Minister’. Committees have also been somewhat thwarted by civil service resistance to requests for information, whilst in the same context, civil servants have been accused of being overly conservative (see Knox 2009: 436–437). The volume of scrutiny and investigation to which Assembly committees are committed is also problematic and has sometimes slowed the legislative and policy process (Wilford 2007: 169). The OFMDFM Committee is subject to many of the same challenges encountered by other Assembly committees, and is further hampered by the extensive range of issues for which it has responsibility. It has not been a thorn in the side of the Northern Ireland Executive and it has not sought to enhance its own EU presence. There have been no cross-committee inquiries on key EU issues such as, for example, Europe 2020. There is no Northern Ireland equivalent of the Scottish Parliament’s response to the December 2011 EU summit. There has been no attempt to cooperate actively with other EU committees in the UK and, for example, produce joint reports on issues of mutual interest. Targeted and regularised direct engagement with Brussels is also under-developed. The decision not to appoint a Brussels Liaison Officer for the Assembly is a case in point. The ‘bypassing’ of the UK central state which engagement with Brussels may signal is not to the liking of all political hues. Constructive and coordinated engagement with the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) is similarly lacking. Developing relations with the Oireachtas has obvious political connotations with which Unionist MLAs may be uneasy. Equivalent relationships,

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however, have been cultivated between officials and Ministers in the context of North–South institutions. If this type of cross-border contact and cooperation is permissible, then presumably the Northern Ireland Assembly should be similarly enabled to explore mutually beneficial relations with a neighbouring parliamentary institution, the Oireachtas. The external focus and wide breadth of much of the work of the OFMDFM Committee also lend themselves to wide and regular engagement with civil society. This has been accomplished in the context of calling witnesses to give evidence to the committees and seeking their input through consultation processes. Devolved parliamentary politics in Northern Ireland clearly exhibits some features of the Westminster model. The influence of ‘old politics’ remains evident and a reliance on traditional styles of governing as opposed to new modes of governance is strong. Even where elements of Westminster practice are absent (for example, a parliamentary opposition), there is pressure for them to be developed. In 2007, the Sinn Féin President, Gerry Adams, urged the SDLP and UUP to consider taking up positions on the opposition benches (see McGarry and O’Leary 2009: 79). He argued that such a move would allow both parties to more effectively hold the Executive to account. More recently, some within the UUP, including the unsuccessful contender for the UUP leadership in 2012, John McCallister, demonstrated some keenness for the UUP to consider an opposition role for the party. This view was echoed in a Belfast Telegraph editorial (20 March 2012): there is no doubt that the UUP could be seen as more relevant as an opposition party, challenging the main power bloc and putting an end to the deals done behind closed doors which seem so prevalent in the current administration.

The activities of the OFMDFM Committee vis-à-vis EU affairs reinforce the traditionalist approach associated with Westminster-style politics and undermine any prospects for the development of more governance and less government. The strength of party political loyalty is especially notable in facilitating the dominance of the Executive Committee – a feature common to many Westminsterstyle systems. Moreover, when it comes to consideration of the EU, the Northern Ireland Assembly is not engaged in a multi-level exercise. Relations with Brussels and other UK and Irish institutions are limited and resisted by some. Agreement on two committee reports does demonstrate some willingness to engage more strategically with the EU agenda. However, despite the achievement of cross-party support for the proposals contained within both documents and the apparent support emanating from the Northern Ireland Executive,18 the operationalisation of recommendations has been slow. No radical innovations or grand achievements stand out. The limited degree of progress aside, however, what is perhaps most significant about the activities of the Northern Ireland Assembly is the gradual acceptance on the part of MLAs that engaging proactively and creatively with the EU is necessary for a subnational unit. In this context, the primary contribution of the Assembly committees has been to broaden the basis for political discussion of EU matters as they pertain to Northern Ireland. This is a welcome development and one which, although it has not (as yet) prompted significant

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innovation and dynamism, has begun the process of creating and promoting an infrastructure within which such features might in time be achieved. The approach may not depart substantially from established Westminster-influenced modes of governing, but nevertheless there is some evidence of political maturation and an openness to exploring new ways. Given time, the limits of possibility may indeed be tested.

Conclusion Northern Ireland’s internal institutional landscape has changed substantially since 1998. The Belfast Agreement prescribes what these new institutions are and outlines the basis for their operation. Their consociational nature was determined during the course of the peace talks process and reflects the power-sharing undertones of that process. During the period pre-2007, the institutions encountered problems in the form of ardent opposition from some and sporadic suspensions. Since 2007, however, their continued existence and stability appear to be more secure. Coakley (2011: 18) proposes that: ‘the future of the innovative institutions of 1998 may be secure, adding to the small number of cases of apparently successful consociational government’. Northern Ireland’s adaptation to new internal institutional arrangements has been reasonably straightforward. Despite ‘some reduction and redeployment within the direct rule machinery’, for the most part the actual mechanisms for service delivery remained initially intact (Morison 1999: 1611). Some of the more formal aspects of the devolution process are merely an official recognition of previously informal practices and arrangements – for example, bilateral intergovernmental relations. Relations between the devolved units and the UK central state have been formalised and regularised via the MOU, concordat and related institutional developments such as the JMC[E]. The impact of these developments vary according to policy. Some policy sectors, namely agriculture, have been more adept at manipulating relations with the centre and using the Brussels arena to pursue Northern Ireland interests. Others, including environmental policy, are constrained by limited civil service capacity and the consociational character of power-sharing which allows a high degree of ministerial autonomy. This effectively means that a Minister can represent the Executive by presenting the party line, as opposed to an agreed Executive policy position. Northern Ireland’s ability to interrupt the central state’s control and dominance of the EU agenda is, therefore, muddied by two factors: the terms of the MOU and concordat, and Northern Ireland’s internal political dynamics which do not always permit a fully coherent and unified regional position. Nevertheless, as devolution has bedded down subsequent to 2007, some distinctions, when compared with the previous direct-rule regime, are evident. This is especially so in terms of central coordination by OFMDFM of an agreed and more sophisticated and streamlined EU–Northern Ireland strategy. This has been aided by the creation of the NITF which has facilitated and fostered closer relations between Northern Ireland civil servants and their EU counterparts;

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broadened the focus of Northern Ireland’s EU priorities; and encouraged relations with the Republic of Ireland. The impact has been felt across the NICS and has, to some extent, harnessed ministerial capacity too. This has led to the gradual emergence of a more dynamic culture in relation to the EU across the NICS. And furthermore, the focus of Northern Ireland Assembly EU business has similarly stressed the necessity for cross-sectoral coordination. Progress aside, however, the Assembly is not yet fully rehearsed in all of the possibilities which devolution offers in terms of engagement with Brussels, other regions and the Irish Oireachtas. This examination of the internal dynamics of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU reveals an interesting picture. A process of identifying regional priorities has developed and a programme for pursuing those priorities has evolved. To differing degrees, Northern Ireland’s approach to the EU has witnessed some dynamism on the part of the Northern Ireland Executive, Assembly and civil service, and has been aided and abetted by the NITF. It is, nevertheless, a dynamism which is checked by the central state via the MOU, concordat and JMC[E]. Multi-level interactions are in evidence (particularly for agriculture), but they are based on terms set by the central state. Where the region enjoys ‘free rein’, for example, in relation to the NITF, it is with the agreement of the central state – bypassing the state it is not. The cultivation of relations with key EU officials and decisionmakers, which the NITF facilitates, does suggest a more innovative approach to governance. Relationships are in their early days, but they do involve the sharing of resources and a joint purpose. It can be tentatively assumed too that they are based on trust between Northern Ireland and EU participants. The question of interdependency is less clear. The NITF is a time-limited exercise which serves Northern Ireland more than it does the EU. The fostering of relations with other non-state actors, be they other UK or EU regions, the Republic of Ireland or civil society, is less evident. Where EPCU has been proactive in seeking to harness relationships with others, the Northern Ireland Assembly has not been as assiduous. Political concerns about the integrity of the UK state inhibit some MLAs from pursuing relations with actors outside Northern Ireland. Furthermore, Northern Ireland’s devolved institutions operate according to existing political institutional practices in the UK. The pull of the Westminster model appears to be powerful, placing it in conflict with the model of governance espoused by proponents of the concept and advocates of MLG. Northern Ireland’s EU agenda has evolved, albeit slowly. It has benefited from EU assistance, in the form of the NITF, and has, on occasion, challenged party political difference. It has required some development of capacity among Ministers, MLAs and civil servants. Where all of this has been achieved, the introduction of devolution has coincided with some changes to Northern Ireland’s approach to EU matters. It may not be categorised as an explicit example of governance à la Rhodes (1996) or ‘new politics’ as suggested by Bradbury and Mitchell (2001), but that does not imply that progress has been completely absent.

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Notes   1 It included plans to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into UK law; to agree a Freedom of Information Act; to reform the House of Lords; to modernise the House of Commons; and to create a Scottish Assembly, a Welsh Assembly, a Greater London Authority (GLA) and directly elected Regional Assemblies in England, if supported by regional referendum. In addition, the New Labour manifesto contained a commitment to support the peace process and devolution in Northern Ireland.   2 The current MOU, which was agreed in March 2010, is a revised version of Command Paper, Cm 5240, published in December 2001.   3 DUP MLA Sammy Wilson was formerly Northern Ireland’s Environment Minister. He is sceptical about climate change, claiming that it is caused by nature and not human activity. In 2009, he banned the screening of television adverts in Northern Ireland warning of the effects of climate change (see McAdam 2009).   4 On 30 January 2012, 25 EU member states agreed to the intergovernmental Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. The UK and the Czech Republic are not party to the treaty.   5 An early and controversial example of Ministerial autonomy arose in 2000 and related to the provision of maternity services to one of two hospitals in the Belfast area. The Sinn Féin Minister for Health, Bairbre De Brún, made a decision which was at odds with that of the Health Committee and the Northern Ireland Assembly.  6 The European Commissioner for Research and Innovation, Irish woman Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, was in Northern Ireland in June 2012 and met with members of the Northern Ireland Executive. In December 2010, the First Minister, Deputy First Minister and Junior Minister Newton visited Brussels to officially open the new premises of ONIEB. During their visit, they met with the President of the European Commission, the President of the European Parliament, the Commissioner for Regional Development and the Commissioner for Research and Innovation. In January 2008, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister were again in Brussels to meet with the European Commission President and the European Commissioners for Regional Policy, and Agriculture and Fisheries. In 2007, the Minister for Finance and Personnel hosted a visit to Northern Ireland by the European Commissioner for Regional Policy and in 2009 the Deputy First Minister visited Brussels accompanied by the two OFMDFM Junior Ministers.  7 Minister Gildernew travelled to Brussels to participate in negotiations around the December 2008 Fisheries Council just two months after giving birth to her daughter in October 2008. She stated that: ‘The Council lasts for three or four days, so I can’t leave [the baby]. If I am in discussions, she will have to be too, so needs must. The council is very important for the fishing industry and I want to be representing our fishermen at the council’ (Belfast Telegraph, 18 October 2008).   8 According to the terms of the concordat ‘Decisions on Ministerial attendance at Council meetings will be taken on a case-by-case basis by the lead UK Minister. In reaching decisions on the composition of the UK team, the lead Minister will take into account that the devolved administrations should have a role to play in meetings of the Council of Ministers at which substantive discussion is expected of matters likely to have a significant impact on their devolved responsibilities’ (Paragraph B4.13).   9 In a letter to DUP MPs, MLAs and MEP, the party leader, Peter Robinson, outlined his rationale for the policy reversal: ‘But events of recent months and in particular the insensitive attitude displayed by Sinn Féin towards the innocent victims of IRA

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terrorism has seriously damaged community relations and set us all back in terms of promoting genuine reconciliation and building a shared future. This includes the Sinn Féin promoted decision to remove the Union Flag from Belfast City Hall on all but designated days; the Sinn Féin led decision to name a children’s play park in Newry after a dead IRA terrorist who was convicted of possession of a weapon used in the Kingsmill massacre; the admission by Sinn Féin that they have lobbied the Parole Commissioners to seek the release of dissident republican terrorist prisoners; Sinn Féin’s provocative and aggressive behaviour towards unionist culture and loyal order parades and latterly and most recently, the disgraceful decision by Sinn Féin to hold a coat-trailing parade in Castlederg to glorify IRA terrorism and deliberately cause further hurt and pain to the families of the 29 innocent victims murdered by PIRA in that area. These actions expose a lack of maturity and commitment to genuine reconciliation’ (Belfast Newsletter, 15 August 2013). 10 The terms of reference for the RPA were: ‘To review the existing arrangements for the accountability, administration and delivery of public services in Northern Ireland, and to bring forward options for reform which are consistent with the arrangements and principles of the Belfast Agreement, within an appropriate framework of political and financial accountability’ (RPA 2003: 39). 11 In August 2013, the UK government criticised the Northern Ireland Executive for failing to provide information on the promotion and protection of minority languages in Northern Ireland (i.e. the Irish language and Ulster-Scots) for inclusion in a major European report on minority languages. The executive was unable to agree a common approach on Northern Ireland’s minority languages and so no information was forwarded to the UK government (BBC News, 6 August 2013). 12 Although matters such as these do not constitute transferred matters, the Northern Ireland Assembly nevertheless has the authority to debate non-transferred issues which are of interest and relevance to the devolved administration. 13 The motion ‘That this Assembly calls on the UK government to make the necessary legal and financial arrangements for the Euro to be officially recognised as a second currency alongside sterling in Northern Ireland after 1 January 2002’ was negatived (see Northern Ireland Assembly, 4 December 2001). 14 The motion ‘That this Assembly notes the Laeken Declaration and the subsequent establishment of a Convention on the Future of Europe’ was endorsed (see Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 5 June 2002). 15 In the context of Sinn Féin’s subsequent campaigning for a no vote in the referendum on the Fiscal Compact in the Republic of Ireland, this response to the Prime Minister’s withdrawal from the EU summit appears curious. 16 On 12 June 2007, the Assembly approved a motion to change the name of the committee from Committee of the Centre to Committee for the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. 17 In its previous incarnation as the Committee of the Centre, it had a non-statutory status. This meant that, theoretically, it was not as powerful a political animal as its statutory counterparts. In practice, however, the implications of non-statutory status were minimal, although it did mean that the membership of the committee was able to numerically surpass the limit of eleven applied to statutory committees. The committee was at one time the largest within the Northern Ireland Assembly and included a number of high-profile politicians from almost all parties. It did, however, have a troubled political past, and initially, there were doubts about its cohesion. In the early days of its existence, there were serious tensions between the DUP Chair and Sinn Féin

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members of the committee. The chair refused to address or cooperate with his Sinn Féin colleagues. The tension resulted in the abandonment of a series of committee meetings. The situation was only finally resolved when the chair was changed. 18 The Assembly debates on the 2002 and 2010 EU Inquiries resolved to approve the reports produced by each inquiry (see Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002 and 26 January 2010).

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Northern Ireland and the European Union: the external dynamics Introduction Devolution has altered the dynamics of the internal political and policy process in Northern Ireland. The region’s approach to the EU has been affected by this changed environment. A similar observation can be made in relation to the dynamics of Northern Ireland’s engagement with actors outside the region – i.e. other parts of the UK, the Republic of Ireland and Brussels. Prior to the introduction of devolution, external relations tended to focus on the USA and were typically dominated by the conflict and related economic issues (see for example Cronin 1987, O’Cleary 1996 and Wilson 1995). After 1998, the Belfast Agreement provided some basis for broadening and institutionalising Northern Ireland’s engagement with the rest of the world. The external dimensions of the Belfast Agreement are arguably among its most novel features. The NSMC institutionalises cross-border relations on the island of Ireland. It was created to respond to issues which lay at the heart of the Northern Ireland conflict – i.e. consideration of the ‘Irish dimension’ and nationalist calls for recognition of their special link with the Republic of Ireland. It also spawned the establishment of a series of Implementation Bodies, one of which has an EU remit. The SEUPB has responsibility for the management of cross-border EU Structural Fund programmes in Northern Ireland, the border region of Ireland and parts of Western Scotland. The BIC brings together representatives from eight administrations across the UK and Ireland and is a forum for the development of broader relations on an East–West basis. The introduction of devolution also facilitated a direct Northern Ireland engagement with Brussels, when the devolved administration opted to establish a regional office there. The ONIEB is part of the European Division within OFMDFM and operates under the UKRep umbrella. This chapter examines these new relations and the institutions which embody them and analyses how they contribute to Northern Ireland’s evolving EU agenda. The introduction of devolution in Northern Ireland has clearly broadened the range of avenues available to Northern Ireland in seeking to represent interests, influence decisions and secure favourable outcomes. The executive and advisory functions, which are variously exercised by bodies such as the NSMC and BIC, provide different institutions with varying capacities to meet Northern Ireland’s primary interests vis-à-vis the EU. But has Northern Ireland fully harnessed these opportunities to connect with the rest of the UK, Ireland and Brussels? Political

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problems related to the consociational nature of the devolved political system and lingering party tensions have sporadically afflicted the operation of internal components of the Northern Ireland administration. The sensitivity which attaches to cross-border relations, in particular, suggests that tensions here may be even more pronounced. The focus of the NSMC, ONIEB, SEUPB and BIC is explicitly outward-looking. This mix of institutions fosters cross-border, cross-national and transnational relations. For this reason, they instinctively lend themselves to MLG interpretations of the EU and suggest new and innovative modes of governance. In practice, however, a number of them are subject to the involvement of, and sometimes oversight by, the UK central Government. They are also dependent on the support of the Northern Ireland devolved administration and its willingness to engage. This has not always been available. Party political objections have, at times, frustrated the operation of certain institutions and the achievement of outputs. Some of these institutions are also challenged by their distinctive composition and unique remit. This has sometimes led to difficulties in cementing the roles and identity of individual institutions and in allowing them the space and freedom to grow and mature. Governance is a complex phenomenon which is linked to the cultivation of interdependent relations, and resource and information sharing between state and non-state actors. The potential for Northern Ireland’s external focus to be based on such a model is patent. However, the evidence suggests caution. Despite the existence of dedicated institutions and novel modes of external engagement, Northern Ireland may not epitomise the rudiments of the MLG model.

ONIEB: A bypass … of sorts The question of regional representation in Brussels is usually one of the immediate ways in which a newly politicised region seeks to assert its identity and its ‘autonomy’. It is in many ways a symbolic exercise, an attempt by formerly centrally governed regions to assert their relative independence from national masters. According to Marks et al. (1996b: 44): the decision to open and maintain an office in Brussels is not simply a decision to extend representation to an additional arena, but a decision to do so independently of the central state. Regional representation in Brussels has, therefore, an expressly political logic having to do with the interaction, friction or even conflict that may arise between regional governments and central governments in a multi-level polity.

There is little question but that this was the case for Northern Ireland. The creation of a Northern Ireland regional representation in Brussels was an early priority for the new Northern Ireland Executive. After a visit to Brussels by the then First Minister, Deputy First Minister and Minister for Finance and Personnel in June 2000, the Deputy First Minister, Seamus Mallon, conveyed to the Northern Ireland Assembly details of discussions with the then European Commissioner for Regional Policy, Michel Barnier (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 26 June 2000):

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We discussed our aim of developing our links with Brussels. This includes the opening of an office and increasing the exposure of Northern Ireland officials to the European institutions.

This was shortly followed by an official commitment in the 2001 Programme for Government (PfG). The creation of the office, however, was to experience a series of problems which delayed its opening and engendered scepticism among Northern Ireland politicians. From the outset, the office was expressly presented as a resource for the Northern Ireland Executive: ‘[The office] will assist Ministers and their departments in ensuring that Northern Ireland’s interests are represented as European policy is agreed’ (Northern Ireland Executive 2001: 59). The exclusive nature of the proposed Executive office caused consternation among Northern Ireland’s MLAs and other EU interests in the region. One DUP MLA articulated this concern by calling for the creation of ‘an office for Northern Ireland, not simply an office for the Executive’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002). This reflected concerns about an overly narrow approach to regional representation which potentially excluded MEPs, MLAs, local government and other non-governmental organisations. Initial concerns about the nature of the ONIEB, however, arguably masked deeper political considerations. The DUP were not alone in condemning the narrow remit of the office. Other party representatives, including those from the APNI and Sinn Féin, also lamented the limited representative character of the Brussels office. Unlike the SDLP and UUP, these three parties did not at the time have political representation within OFMDFM – the government department with responsibility for ONIEB. Led by a team of SDLP and UUP Ministers, the regional administration had a disposition towards the EU which was at odds with both the DUP and Sinn Féin’s traditional opposition to Europe. Perhaps more significant, however, is the wider political context. The transfer of devolved power in 1999 formed the backdrop against which the ONIEB was created. The emergence of a cross-party power-sharing political administration in Northern Ireland was an achievement of immense proportions. A political executive composed of four politically and ideologically diverse parties faced a formidable task in cementing its authority and legitimacy. The creation of an exclusively Northern Ireland Executive office in Brussels, however, appeared to be a logical means of communicating the emergence of a new and stable Northern Ireland administration which was open and ready for business. Such a message was politically and economically important in the context of rebuilding the Northern Ireland polity and economy post-conflict. The initially exclusive nature of the ONIEB was thus intimately related to wider political and economic considerations aimed at engendering international confidence in Northern Ireland’s future. Concerns about the narrow remit of ONIEB were also linked to controversies surrounding the future of the Northern Ireland Centre in Europe (NICE). NICE was a non-governmental membership-based organisation which brought together a range of actors, including the private sector, government departments, district councils and the voluntary and community sector. With offices in both Belfast and

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Brussels, it acted as an informal and unofficial regional representation office (see Murphy 2011). Hostilities between ONIEB and NICE emerged during the early years of devolved power and reflected wider political and administrative tensions inherent in the transition from direct rule to devolved power. One APNI MLA alluded explicitly (and angrily) to these tensions when he stated: Over the years NICE has built a substantial foundation of contacts, information, skills and knowledge that has been put at the disposal of the public and private sectors in Northern Ireland. The benefits from the organization continue, yet there has not been a single contact from the head of the Executive’s Office in Brussels to discuss that experience or to seek benefit from it, despite the clear reassurances given by the First Minister and Deputy First Minister at the official opening. They stated clearly that the office would work in an open manner, co-operating and communicating with all sectors, and yet … there has been absolute silence. That silence sends a clear and resounding message. How loudly it speaks of the attitude of some in the Civil Service … The attempt that was made to bury that work and cast NICE aside was despicable. It is time for officials in that area to cease their petty-minded approach and meet with the staff of NICE. (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002)

Although among the most strident in defending NICE, the sentiments of the MLA were expressed by other political party representatives, albeit not quite as vociferously. Such views hint at the difficulties and frustrations faced by politicians when working with what may have been construed as resistant civil servants, who were perceived as being slow in adapting to the demands and preferences of new political masters. There was, however, a further dimension to the controversy surrounding the future of NICE. The centre was ostensibly a cross-party initiative supported by four of the five main Northern Ireland political parties – APNI, DUP, SDLP and UUP. All four political parties were represented on the Board of Directors of NICE. The cross-party nature of support for the centre, however, appears to have been rather superficial in nature. According to a number of key political figures and senior civil servants in Northern Ireland, the organisation was regarded as being politically partisan and linked to the pro-EU outlook of the SDLP. Supporting a perceived partisan organisation of this nature was an unacceptable prospect for more than one party around the Executive table. It was viewed as potentially undermining the development of a single voice for Northern Ireland in Brussels, and as pushing an agenda which all but one party within the executive was supportive of. An additional and related consideration was the absence of Sinn Féin’s involvement in NICE. In the context of the emergence of a cross-party Northern Ireland Executive in which Sinn Féin participated, support for an organisation exclusive of Sinn Féin was unacceptable. In deciding on its own version of a Brussels-based regional representation, the Northern Ireland Executive considered a number of possible models and eventually decided on an Executive Office in Brussels (this is similar to the Scottish Government EU Office in Brussels; Wales opened a Welsh Assembly Office). The ONIEB has three strategic priorities (http://goo.gl/wfqord):

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•  To support Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU. •  To ensure that Northern Ireland has the opportunity to engage in policymaking with the EU institutions. •  To raise the positive profile of Northern Ireland. The ONIEB places particular emphasis on achieving these objectives by engaging with government departments and other Northern Ireland organisations. Practically, this involves hosting and supporting Northern Ireland officials and ministers in Brussels. The office has also facilitated Northern Ireland Assembly committees conducting fact-finding visits to the EU institutions. On a day-to-day basis, the office acts as an information source and support mechanism for government departments working on EU-related policies. Contrary to early concerns among MLAs about the perceived ‘exclusiveness’ of ONIEB, the office has also assisted a wide range of Northern Ireland private, public and voluntary sector organisations in engaging with Brussels.1 Civil society interests, however, are not fully integrated into the work of the ONIEB as they were during the NICE era. This contrasts somewhat with the arrangement in Scotland. Scotland Europa is a similar organisation to NICE. It brings together a wide range and number of Scottish civil society groups and bodies and promotes their interests in Brussels. It shares premises (Scotland House) in Brussels with the Scottish Government EU Office and the Highlands and Islands European Partnership. Although it is a separate organisation, its proximity to other Scottish organisations facilitates communication, cooperation and collaboration. This type of institutionalisation of external interests fits with the governance perspective in that it lends itself to interdependence, resource and purpose sharing, regular interaction and the nurturing of trust between political and civil society interests. Such a pattern of Brussels-based cooperation between the ONIEB and civil society is not similarly evident. Originally, the ONIEB was a relatively small operation comprising just two senior civil servants supported by two local administrative staff. The capacity of the office to undertake a varied range and number of activities represented a formidable task for the small Brussels-based team. In recent years, and particularly since the reintroduction of devolution in 2007, the office has grown in size and stature. The strategic appointments of four Thematic Desk Officers (focused on the Europe 2020 priorities) in early 2012 were additional to existing posts and effectively doubled the ONIEB’s staff complement. The office has also appointed a Visits and Events Officer. The creation of the office may be symbolically important, but it too has produced some tangible benefits for Northern Ireland. Marks et al. (2002: 4–6) suggest that regional representation offices have four key functions – information gathering, networking, liaising between the region and the EU, and influencing policy. The evolution of the office in recent years has seen it develop the capacity to fulfil this range of functions. The achievement of a policy-influencing role is the most challenging objective for any regional representation. In the case of Northern Ireland, this is so because the degree to which the office might operate in a wholly autonomous and independent manner is checked by the UK central government. In common with equivalent Scottish and Welsh offices, the ONIEB operates under

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the UKRep umbrella: great care was taken to stress that these [Scottish, Welsh and Northern Ireland] offices were part of the overall ‘family’ of the UKRep, rather than being independent agencies advocating a specific Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish view of EU legislative proposals. (Bulmer et al. 2006: 83)

The regional offices are effectively viewed as supporting the work of the permanent representation, and this is stipulated in the MOU and concordat. This arrangement serves to avert attempts by regional units to pursue positions at variance with the official UK position. There are no objections by either UKRep or the ONIEB to the nature of this arrangement. For ONIEB, the national context is considered crucial, particularly in terms of the access it provides to ‘inside’ information. This applies to UK government and EU documents, but also to attendance at UKRep meetings and other Council and comitology meetings. The nature of relations between UKRep and the ONIEB have been classified as ‘functional rather than friendly’ by a former ONIEB official (Murphy 2011: 558). Some dissatisfaction with the manner of cooperation between the two units was expressed by another ONIEB official who pointed to the limited propensity on the part of UKRep to always consider and/or include Northern Ireland. He suggested that ‘Northern Ireland could shout louder and UKRep could listen harder’. This reflects a similar view that UKRep has on occasion been remiss in exerting itself in defence of Northern Ireland interests, and indeed in knowing what those interests might be (see McGowan and Murphy 2003: 88). A senior European Commission official has also hinted that, in his view, ONIEB is sometimes ‘constrained by the UKRep relationship’. During questions to the First Minister in 2008, the UUP Chair of the OFMDFM Committee asked the then First Minister: what steps has the First Minister taken to engage Northern Ireland as a region within Europe and create direct links with the EU, as opposed to national links through Whitehall, which have not always served Northern Ireland well? (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 3 March 2008)

The relationship between Northern Ireland and the central state via UKRep has encountered tensions, although these may be dissipating as the arrangement beds down. It is also the case that as the relationship develops, all those party to it become better acquainted with its dynamics. Nevertheless, when judged against pre-devolution possibilities, the tying of the Northern Ireland administration to UKRep has weakened Northern Ireland’s capacity to independently pursue its preferences – at least when compared with NICE. The latter was not subjected to the type of national constraints imposed by the current official (and policed) requirement to follow the UK line. There are lingering concerns too that the ONIEB does not adequately represent Northern Ireland’s interests. TUV MLA and former MEP Jim Allister has accused the office of being a ‘closed shop’. In evidence to the OFMDFM Committee’s EU Inquiry, he asked ‘whether [the office] exists primarily as a PR shop window for OFMDFM, or whether it exists to proactively promote Northern Ireland plc’

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(OFMDFM Committee, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 12 December 2008). This view harks back to some of the early concerns about the Executive focus of the office. During the same evidence session, the UUP MEP, Jim Nicholson, did not openly share his colleague’s views of the ONIEB. His (ambiguous) response to a direct question about whether the ONIEB has performed effectively in Brussels was: ‘The Executive office has improved substantially over the years. However, it is only as good as the remit that it is given to deliver’ (OFMDFM Committee Hansard, 12 December 2008). The 2010 OFMDFM Committee EU Inquiry contains some acknowledgement of this view with a recommendation that the First Minister and Deputy First Minister: carry out a review of the work of the Office of the Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels to ensure that it is being carried out in the most economic, efficient and effective way. Funding of the Office should also be reviewed to ascertain whether it is sufficiently resourced to enable it to perform productively and keep abreast of all policies relevant to Northern Ireland. (OFMDFM 2010: 10)

The ONIEB has grown in both size and stature in recent years and the NITF has been a catalyst in this regard. The appointment of new Thematic Desk Officers is a positive development which assists Northern Ireland in capitalising on the opportunities available under the NITF. The cultivation of closer relations between Northern Ireland and EU officials is at the heart of the work of the Taskforce. Placing ONIEB officials in close proximity to their counterparts in Brussels – those in both UKRep and the European institutions – elevates the quality and frequency of evolving relationships. The Deputy Permanent Secretary of the DEL underlines the importance of these new posts for his government department and all other departments in Northern Ireland: We need to establish networks, we need to be known, and we need to have a visible presence. This is the first step in that. I think that all Departments would say that this is a very significant step forward, because it is very difficult to do this from Belfast. (Committee for Employment and Learning, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 5 October 2011)

The new strategic appointments in the ONIEB also concentrate the work of the office and mean a closer match between the evolving EU agenda (particularly Europe 2020), the European Commission’s forward strategy and the Northern Ireland Executive’s EU priorities (see for example Northern Ireland Executive 2012b). There is a collective focus on four policy areas which cut across all Northern Ireland government departments, noting that ONIEB is a unit of OFMDFM. This reflects the strengthening of ‘management structures and processes for coordinating Departments … to fully exploit the Barroso taskforce initiative [NITF]’ (OFMDFM Committee, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 4 July 2012). In reflecting these priorities and simultaneously taking advantage of strengthened management structures, the ONIEB is involved in exploring opportunities and possibilities in, for example, the transport, tourism, regional aid and youth employment sectors. This involves the office engaging in a range of undertakings including research, filtering information, identifying partners, promoting

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and facilitating networks and lobbying. In the case of the latter, the ONIEB was plugged into the negotiation process around the 2014–20 multi-annual financial framework (MAFF). This complements work being carried out by DFP in terms of its parallel negotiations with the UK lead department. There is an emerging pattern here of cooperation, coordination and complementarity across the NICS in their dealings with EU issues. This was not always evident during the early years of devolved power. It is further complemented by closer relations between the ONIEB and Northern Ireland’s three MEPs. Contact has been regularised and strengthened. A tangible example of the benefits of this relationship was identified by the Head of the ONIEB: For example, Mr Nicholson [UUP MEP] introduced amendments to legislation on pet legislation, and that was to our advantage in allowing us not to have the same restrictions on the movements of pets across borders. This is an example of our having direct input through our MEPS. (Committee for Employment and Learning, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 5 October 2011)

The ONIEB’s relationship with the Republic of Ireland has also been cultivated in Brussels. The Irish Presidency of the EU during the first half of 2013 provides much of the recent context for this relationship, although the parameters of cooperation and contact with IRep are much broader. The ONIEB draws on the advice and experience of IRep. Officials in IRep meet with Northern Ireland Ministers and officials when requested and Northern Ireland officials have access to the Irish Department of Foreign Affairs’ six-monthly EU Presidency briefings. The ONIEB also works closely with colleagues in the Irish Regions’ Office and has access to research and briefings drafted by colleagues there. The Head of the ONIEB views the relationship with Irish officials in Brussels as being important in that it provides an ‘extra insight in addition to that which we get from our colleagues in the UK permanent representation’ (OFMDFM Committee, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 4 July 2012). A source in the IRep expresses similar satisfaction with the relationship and is happy for it to be extensive and comprehensive. In an earlier study of the ONIEB, Murphy (2011: 563) notes that The pursuit of specific policy objectives in relation to agriculture, regional aid and relations with the Republic of Ireland has been facilitated by a presence in Brussels. Positive achievements and outcomes can be identified.

She qualifies this conclusion by confining it to a small number of cases. Following the reinvigoration of the NITF and the Northern Ireland Executive’s commitment to capitalising on what the Head of the ONIEB has persistently labelled a ‘time-limited’ opportunity, the number and frequency of gains won via the ONIEB may expand further. This does not deny that the key determinant of EU policy outcomes remains the national level of government, as administered via UKRep. However, when Northern Ireland maximises its skills and resources effectively and engages proactively with key EU decision-makers, it can manipulate the Brussels arena for domestic advantage whilst simultaneously respecting the UK line. The NITF has provided a crucial stimulus for the enhancement of Northern Ireland

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relationships with Brussels and for the strengthening of its representative base there. The might of the NITF, and in particular the central role played by European Commission President, José Manuel Barroso in activating the Taskforce, has neutralised domestic political objections to deepening relations between Belfast and Brussels. Of all the examples of new approaches and practices which devolution has spawned, the cultivation of closer relations between Northern Ireland and Brussels officials has been particularly interesting. It encompasses many of the features of MLG in terms of the interconnection of multi-level arenas and the sharing of competencies by different actors. It does not, however, equate with high levels of autonomy from the state which the governance agenda proposes. The UK line is studiously respected by ONIEB, and the actions of its officials are always within limits set by UKRep – this includes the autonomy it has been afforded in engaging directly with the European Commission and the NITF, and the freedom it is allowed in pursuing relations with IRep. Relations with civil society have also been developed, although they do not enjoy the strength of representation enjoyed by Scottish civil society under the umbrella of Scotland Europa. The closing of NICE may in fact mark a backward step in allowing any such scenario to flourish. Northern Ireland’s recent experience nevertheless points to the ways in which a European region can manipulate its environment, exercise real impact and produce tangible outputs. With the help of its friends in Brussels, the region is playing clever, but only because it is allowed to do so by its friends in London.

North–South cooperation and the EU: potentially novel, politically hampered The NSMC institutionalises cross-border relations on the island of Ireland and is one of the central components of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. The Council brings together representatives from the Irish Government and the Northern Ireland Executive to discuss matters of mutual interest. It meets in both plenary and sectoral formats and is assisted by a North–South secretariat. The plenary NSMC meets annually and usually brings together all Irish and Northern Ireland Ministers, including the Taoiseach and the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. The plenary meeting generally focuses on forward plans for North–South cross-border cooperation (Coakley 2009: 398). When meeting in sectoral format, the NSMC is composed of the relevant Irish and Northern Ireland Ministers. In order to fulfil the power-sharing requirement, the Northern Ireland Minister is accompanied by a Minister representing the ‘other’ – i.e. Unionist or Nationalist – community. Different NSMCs oversee six implementation bodies. The implementation bodies are focused on cooperation in functional fields of activity, including inland waterways, food safety, trade and business development, and EU programmes. Outside of the Implementation Body framework, both governments also cooperate in additional policy areas, but within a framework provided by existing government departments. In this guise, cooperation on agriculture, education, environment, health, tourism and transport is pursued (see Table 6.1). The work of the NSMC does not touch on sensitive constitutional, security or political issues. The focus is

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Table 6.1  North–South cooperation North–South implementation bodies

North–South areas of cooperation

Waterways Ireland

Agriculture

Food Safety Promotion Board

Education

Trade and Business Development Board (InterTradeIreland)

Environment

Special European Union Programmes Body

Health

The Language Body (An Foras Teanga – North–South Body o Leid)

Tourism

Foyle, Carlingford and Irish Lights Commission

Transport

Source: www.northsouthministerialcouncil.org/index.htm.

very much on cross-border cooperation which has ‘a clear functional logic’ and is mutually (and economically) beneficial to both sides of the border (see Murphy 2010a). This is crucial in that it means that the work of the NSMC does not offend the Unionist community. Like the Northern Ireland Assembly, the NSMC was subject to periodic suspension during the period 1999–2007, and it has also been affected by the DUP’s less than committed attitude to North–South cooperation during the period 1999–2002, when the party opted not to participate in NSMC meetings. Since then, however, the NSMC has settled into a low-key institution which manages regular and structured cooperation between the two administrations, North and South, and is guided by practical, functional and mutually beneficial objectives. Achievements of the NSMC to date include cooperation on, for example, developing a common animal health strategy; agreeing a joint cross-border tourism marketing strategy; and enhancing cross-border mobility for nursing and social work staff. Similar patterns of success, however, do not uniformly affect all policy areas. While cooperation on tourism has been relatively successful (Tannam 2006: 270), the same cannot be said for InterTradeIreland. Its work has not seen a marked increase in levels of cross-border trade (Roper 2007: 569–570). Nevertheless, despite uneven achievements and notwithstanding the controversy which surrounded initial agreement on the NSMC, the institution has evolved into a relatively low-profile political development. Coakley suggests that by 2004, just five years after their contentious creation, the cross-border bodies ‘appear to be largely taken for granted as part of the institutional landscape’ (2005: 131). The evolution of the NSMC and associated bodies, to the point where they are viewed as functional components of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the Republic of Ireland, is a particularly interesting development. The lure of possible economic gain, including that available from cross-border structural and fund programmes and EU initiatives such as Interreg, has proved compelling. The readi­ness to grasp such opportunities has been helped by changing public attitudes towards cross-border relations and the gradual waning of the political sensitivity of the relationship (see Murphy 2010a). From the Unionist perspective, the work

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of the NSMC has not energised calls for a united Ireland. The result has been the relatively harmonious development of the North–South relationship under novel cross-border institutional arrangements. The exercise has enhanced the level and intensity of contact between officials North and South and has normalised political relations on the island. The EU dimension of this relationship, however, has not been without difficulty. In a specifically European context, the NSMC has a general remit to ‘consider the European Union dimension of relevant matters, including the implementation of EU policies and programmes and proposals under consideration in the EU framework’ (Belfast Agreement 1998, Strand 2, Paragraph 17). The same paragraph also lays down that arrangements are to be made to ensure that the views of the Council are taken into account and represented appropriately at relevant EU meetings. For Northern Ireland, this arrangement constitutes: a series of quite distinct relationships with another sovereign state, namely the Republic of Ireland … which take on a particular significance with regard to, for example, European Union matters where the United Kingdom and Irish governments may espouse different policy preferences. (Hadfield 2001: 97)

Hadfield is alluding to two features of EU cross-border cooperation on the island of Ireland. The first concerns policy management and implementation and is coordinated by the SEUPB – one of the six implementation bodies created under the terms of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. The second relates specifically to Hadfield’s cautious observation concerning attempts at EU policy influence, and the related possibility of disagreement and disharmony between Ireland, North and South, and the UK. Both administrations North and South cooperate bilaterally in relation to EU policy developments and this takes place outside of other established UK–Irish political and official channels. Discussions generally focus on EU sectoral policies, including agriculture, environment and transport, where Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland may share interests. To date, the pronouncements of the NSMC when meeting in SEUPB sectoral format have been largely anodyne in nature (see for example SEUPB Joint Communiqués 2000–, available at http://goo.gl/EsQGke). Joint Communiqués contain progress reports from the SEUPB, but point to little evidence of debate, discussion or disagreement between the two administrations. In practice of course, the operation of the SEUPB is not as bland as the NSMC Joint Communiqués might suggest (see below). When the NSMC meets in policy mode, it invariably addresses matters of mutual interest, and both administrations tend to view each other as allies. This format can therefore expose, and potentially exacerbate, policy conflict, between Northern Ireland and the UK. It is in the realm of EU policy areas, that this potential is most apparent. Following the last major suspension of devolved power in Northern Ireland, Meehan (2005: 153–154) pointed out that: Northern Ireland has not yet tested … the use of the North/South Ministerial Council as a means by which a putative all-island EU interest might be pursued, though the first steps had begun to be taken before suspension of the Assembly in 2002.

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The NSMC is not bound by the type of constraints which the ONIEB faces in terms of its relationship with UKRep. The North–South body is largely removed from direct UK government control, in that no member of that government participates in the forum. The Northern Ireland ministerial members, as locally elected representatives, have a duty to protect Northern Ireland interests. In these circumstances, not all Northern Ireland Ministers will feel obligated to voluntarily follow the UK line if the consequences are to be disadvantageous to Northern Ireland. The principle of mutual (for which read economic) advantage has been central to the development of North–South relations to date. This outlook may conceivably extend to the areas of CAP reform, the EU’s MAFF and responses to the global financial crisis. For these policy areas, Irish preferences may line up more closely with Northern Ireland preferences than do the UK’s. The articulation of common all-island positions, however, has not transpired. In the event that they may emerge, the stimulus is likely to come not from the institutionalised North–South relationship – i.e. the NSMC’s SEUPB format – but from other EU-related sectoral formats and policy modes. Should such a scenario materialise, it would mirror some of the central tenets of governance as espoused by Rhodes (1996) and would conceivably constitute a particular type of ‘self-organizing, inter­organizational network’ (p. 660) with a significant degree of sovereignty from the state. Simultaneously, however, it may also antagonise other relationships, particularly those with the UK central state, and this may undermine other elements of the governance approach, including interdependence between actors based on agreed rules and a shared purpose. Despite the apparently more autonomous position the NSMC enjoys, at least relative to other institutions like the ONIEB and the BIC (see below), the consociational features of Northern Ireland’s devolved system, the political divisions it sustains and the fears which Unionists attach to North–South cooperation, mitigate against the NSMC fully testing the limits of its own autonomy.

SEUPB: special by name, not so special by nature The SEUPB is one of the six Implementation Bodies created under the terms of the 1998 Belfast Agreement and is directly accountable to the NSMC. Its primary function is to manage cross-border EU structural fund programmes in Northern Ireland, the border region of Ireland and parts of Western Scotland (http://goo. gl/J5e7Yo). For the 2007–13 programming period, this entailed managing two programmes – Peace III and Interreg IVA. The SEUPB also facilitates project participation in the Interreg IVB transnational programmes, which are relevant to Northern Ireland and the border region of Ireland, and the Interreg IVC programme, which is open to projects across the EU. Prior to the current programming period, the SEUPB had responsibility for Interreg III, Leader+, Equal, Urban II and, most notably, the cross-border aspects of the Peace II programme. It also played a key role in monitoring and promoting the implementation of the Common Chapter on all-island development, which is included in the regional development plans for the two parts of the island of Ireland. The SEUPB has a staff of 65 who work across three offices – headquarters in

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Belfast and offices in Omagh and Monaghan. It is led by a chief executive and not a board of directors and therefore enjoys greater autonomy than many of the other Implementation Bodies (Tonge 2005a: 5). The initial creation of SEUPB by the two administrations was a slow process. This related to strategic issues linked to the participation of two governments in a process of institution-building and has been described by Laffan and Payne (2001: 134) as having constituted a ‘difficult and uncertain beginning’ for the SEUPB. An ‘absence of continuity at the leadership level’ (due to the suspension of both the NSMC and the Chief Executive of the SEUPB) was problematic during the early years of its creation, as was the recruitment of staff due to different labour laws in the jurisdictions north and south (Laffan 2005: 166). Much of the work currently managed by the SEUPB had previously been handled by the DFP in Belfast and the Department of Finance in Dublin. The former was unsupportive of the new body and challenged its authority during the early years (McCall and O’Dowd 2008: 38). The former Minister of Finance and Personnel Mark Durkan noted the challenges inherent in shifting responsibilities to a single institution: The body [SEUPB] is new and has to establish itself and bring together a variety of tasks within a novel structure. The programmes are also new, and there are many issues of communication, expectation and interpretation (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 13 November 2001)

Problems in relation to staffing and leadership of the SEUPB have in recent years been resolved. That notwithstanding, the body continues to encounter challenges in fulfilling its remit and meeting broader public and political expectations of its role. In particular, there has been some concern with the manner and lack of speed with which the SEUPB has processed applications for funding under the Interreg IVA programme. Five local authority-based partnerships expressed no confidence in the SEUPB during this period. Their dissatisfaction led to a motion calling on the Minister for Finance and Personnel to remedy the situation. The motion was agreed to during a 2010 Northern Ireland Assembly debate.2 The Assembly debate exposed a high degree of dissatisfaction, among MLAs of all political persuasions, in relation to the management of Interreg IVA and, in particular, the local authority element of that programme (which accounts for approximately 25 per cent or stg £55 million of the total funding available). The Peace III programme has also been criticised for delays in the release of funding to projects. The Department of Environment, Community and Local Government (DECLG) in the Republic of Ireland is implicated here. By mid-2012 overdue payments from the department, to the tune of stg £28 million, were outstanding. Many of these projects were capital build projects, and the delay in releasing funding meant potentially serious implications in terms of employment, planning and other technical issues. In evidence to the Assembly’s Committee for Finance and Personnel, the Head of SEUPB assured MLAs that he had received strong commitments that once internal departmental budgetary issues had been resolved, the monies would be released from DECLG (see Committee for Finance and Personnel, Northern Ireland Assembly, 13 June 2012). In defence of the SEUPB, its Chief Executive has alluded to the complexity

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and uniqueness of the task facing the body and of how steep a learning curve the organisation faced: ‘We were all learning as we were going along’ (Committee for Finance and Personnel, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 6 January 2010). His remarks echo those of the former Minister of Finance and Personnel Mark Durkan, when he stated: ‘People should appreciate the complexity and diversity of working demands that the body will face’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 3 July 2001). The SEUPB is a unique body – there is no obvious precedent for its operation. It is charged with the challenging task of working between the EU, one sovereign member-state and a devolved region of another sovereign member-state. In practical terms, this means that the SEUPB is required to work alongside existing government departments in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. This amounts to 16 government departments in total across the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, and each of these is involved in decision-making (see Committee for Finance and Personnel, Northern Ireland Assembly, 13 June 2012). The SEUPB also has direct dealings with the European Commission, engages with MEPs and has developed relations with Ecosoc and CoR. In addition, the body manages public consultation processes for the programmes for which they have responsibility, including most recently Peace IV. The SEUPB also avails of the services of independent consultants. The Chief Executive of the SEUPB has acknowledged that: ‘dealing with such a mix is a challenge’ (OFMDFM Committee, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard 10 June 2009). In addition to working closely with a wide variety of different institutions North and South, the SEUPB has a range of functions: [the SEUPB] are policy implementers and policy advisors. For example, in the design of programmes, SEUPB was the leader in examining options for the content and delivery mechanisms of particular programmes. We consult widely, make recommendations to the two member states and engage in discussions with them. After that, we change, draft and implement the agreed structures. Therefore, we have an opportunity to influence how things are done. (OFMDFM Committee, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 10 June 2009)

The creation of a novel transnational body of this nature suggested ‘innovation in island of Ireland governance’ (McCall and O’Dowd 2008: 38). The practical difficulties faced by the SEUPB during its early years, however, were immense and constituted a serious challenge to the development and consolidation of the new institution. Despite some progress and improvements, the body continues to experience difficulties in asserting its role and position as an innovative and effective institution. Controversy surrounding the receipt of funding from DECLG and concerns about the delays in approving Interreg applications are a consequence of the difficult environment in which the SEUPB finds itself. As the effective manager of cross-border funding arrangements, the body is dependent on the cooperation of other institutions. Sometimes, it is the scapegoat for the oversights, lapses and errors of other units. Moreover, delays in processing applications are, in part, occasioned by the ‘constraints of the accountability requirements in Northern Ireland

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and in the Republic of Ireland’ (Committee for Finance and Personnel, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 13 June 2012) and reveal the challenges and complexities when operating across two jurisdictions. Laffan and Payne (2001: 136) noted over ten years ago that: ‘the success of the SEUPB depends on moving away from the hierarchical approach conventionally favoured by government towards one of managing the networks in its domain’. In other words, the proposed role of the SEUPB is compatible with a shift from government to governance and the body has certainly sought to achieve this outcome, but its progress has been stymied by a variety of factors. The new approach to managing EU funding which the SEUPB embodies has proven to be exceptionally challenging. It represents a break from previous established practice – when government departments, North and South, cooperated directly with each other – and implies the adoption of a new and very different style of governance. This challenge impacts not just on the SEUPB but also on those required to engage with the new body. The Chief Executive of the SEUPB has consistently referred to this feature of the body’s operation: ‘There were new lessons to be learned for everyone of us who are engaged in the process, and there was a new way of doing things’ (Committee for Finance and Personnel, Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 6 January 2010). The operation of the SEUPB is also complex in that it operates at a transnational level and requires interactions with a wide variety of actors. The Chief Executive has referred to the: ‘differences in culture, procedures and practices between Northern Ireland and Ireland’ (Committee for Finance and Personnel Hansard, 6 January 2010). There is the added difficulty of the SEUPB operating in a politically sensitive arena which involves the development and management of cross-border relations. Some political figures, including Jim Allister, then a Northern Ireland MEP, argued in favour of stopping the cross-border agenda of Peace III in favour of a closer relationship with Scotland (Lefebvre 2006: 5). Such calls undermine the role of the SEUPB and highlight the absence of widespread political support for the body. This is also evident in terms of the limited engagement by political parties with the activities of the body. Only two Northern Ireland political parties – Sinn Féin and the DUP – took part in the Peace III public consultation run by the SEUPB. According to one commentator, this situation raises questions about the interest of the other parties in the EU, which is the largest and the most consistent funder in Northern Ireland and in the border counties. It also shows a certain indifference towards the voluntary sector, the local economy and peace building in general. (Lefebvre 2006: 5)

By extension, it also demonstrates a worrying apathy towards the work and endeavours of the SEUPB. There is also some evidence that the two governments – Irish and UK – have been less than fully committed in relation to supporting the work and endeavours of the SEUPB. The NSMC met in SEUPB sectoral format in November 2007 (approximately six months after the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly was lifted in May 2007). A number of subsequent meetings were cancelled in 2008 and 2009 due to pressures in the Republic of Ireland around the Lisbon Treaty refer-

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Table 6.2  Meetings of the NSMC in SEUPB sectoral format Date

In attendance

7 Nov. 2007

Minister for Finance (ROI), Brian Cowen Minister of Finance and Personnel (NI), Peter Robinson Minister for Social Development (NI), Margaret Ritchie

8 Sept. 2009

Minister for Finance (ROI), Brian Lenihan Minister of Finance and Personnel (NI), Sammy Wilson Junior Minister in OFMDFM (NI), Gerry Kelly

17 Feb. 2010

Minister for Finance (ROI), Brian Lenihan Minister for Finance and Personnel (NI), Sammy Wilson Minister for Social Development (NI), Margaret Ritchie

13 Jan. 2011

Minister for Finance (ROI), Brian Lenihan Minister for Finance and Personnel (NI), Sammy Wilson Minister for Social Development (NI), Alex Attwood

18 July 2011

Minister for Finance (ROI), Michael Noonan Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform (ROI), Brendan Howlin Minister for Finance and Personnel (NI), Sammy Wilson Junior Minister (NI), Martina Anderson

21 Nov. 2011

Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform (ROI), Brendan Howlin Minister for Finance and Personnel (NI), Sammy Wilson Minister of the Environment (NI), Alex Attwood

4 May 2012

Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform (ROI), Brendan Howlin Minister for Finance and Personnel (NI), Sammy Wilson Junior Minister OFMDFM, Martina Anderson

10 May 2013

Minister for Public Expenditure and Reform (ROI), Brendan Howlin Minister for Finance and Personnel (NI), Sammy Wilson Junior Minister OFMDFM, Jennifer McCann

NI, Northern Ireland; ROI, Republic of Ireland.

endum and emergency budget business. In Northern Ireland, failure to schedule meetings was a consequence of the Northern Ireland Executive not meeting over a period of time in late 2008. There was therefore a gap of almost two years before the NSMC, meeting in SEUPB sectoral format, met again in September 2009. In all, just eight meetings have taken place in the six-year period since May 2007 (see Table 6.2). This frequency of meetings is less than that for the period 2000–2, when the NSMC met at least twice a year. This uneven pattern of engagement by the governments signals some disregard for the work of the institution. The difficulties, challenges and battles which the SEUPB has faced during its lifetime mean that it needs support and leadership. The NSMC is a potentially vital crux for a body struggling to establish its identity and role. The council’s cross-border and cross-party political composition lend it high legitimacy and, by extension, its backing for the SEUPB would potentially do likewise for that body. Concerns too about the equitable distribution of funds between the two communities in Northern Ireland have continually animated discussions about

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EU funding and the role of the SEUPB (see for example contributions to the Northern Ireland Assembly debate on 8 March 2010; and the Minutes of Evidence from the OFMDFM Committee on 10 June 2009). A large commitment of EU funding to the value of stg £900,000 was awarded to the Orange Order in 2012 and has taken some of the sting out of this argument.3 The SEUPB has also been unfairly perceived as responsible for, what some view as, undesirable changes to the Interreg programme. Interreg IIIA funded approximately 300 projects, whereas Interreg IVA is funding fewer than 100 projects (albeit on the basis of higher levels of funding per project). Reducing the number of projects is aimed at coaxing applicants into adopting a more strategic outlook which better considers the long-term impact of funding. This new approach is one which was not solely instigated by the SEUPB; rather, it was agreed by the European Commission and the Northern Ireland administration and Irish government. The SEUPB consulted with key stakeholders, contributed to discussions and may have influenced decisions, but it did not make those decisions. This is a case of the SEUPB bearing the blame for unpopular decisions which are not entirely of its making. It reflects some degree of understandable confusion about the mechanics of how the body works and about the precise nature of what is a novel institution. All in all, the first decade or so of the SEUPB’s operation has been difficult and challenging. The body has battled to establish and consolidate its role as a novel transnational institution which embodies many of the elements associated with innovative governance. The complexity and uniqueness of the environment within which it operates exposes the inherent difficulties in pursuing new forms of governance in Northern Ireland. The SEUPB has functioned against a troubled political backdrop where key public and political actors have experienced difficulty in adapting to new relationships and the new funding environment. Furthermore, the political elite in Northern Ireland have been in some cases unsupportive, and in others apathetic, towards the body. The drive to garner broad public and political support for the SEUPB, which would enable it to truly develop the characteristics of an innovative and successful experiment in transnational governance, has to date been only partially successful. For all its difficulties, however, the work and potential of the SEUPB to develop in this direction should not be discounted. The body is one of broad political significance, representing as it does one of the most interesting and innovative aspects of the 1998 Belfast Agreement. The SEUPB creates formalised links between the Northern Ireland regional administration and the Irish Government. This institutionalisation of relations has undoubtedly complicated the delivery of EU funding, and revealed some dissatisfaction with the operation of the SEUPB. However, according to Tonge (2005b: 14), ‘the placement of [EU] all-island activities under the auspices of the NSMC and an executive cross-border body is of more than mere symbolic importance’. It has political and economic significance too. Magennis et al. (2006: 31) suggest that a central objective of all cross-border bodies (including the SEUPB) is to ‘provide the context in which civil society, business and politicians can make North–South and cross-border cooperation work better for mutual benefit’. This view fits neatly with the governance perspective. Never-

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theless, the extent to which the SEUPB has pioneered new forms of governance per se is unclear. It has certainly maintained and promoted wide involvement in the EU funding process on the island of Ireland through its cooperation with IFBs, NGOs and the public and private sectors. It has similarly encouraged a partnership approach to implementation, and in a related sense has engaged in widespread consultation. A continued emphasis on the achievement of reconciliation has animated its work. The nature of the body is novel and unique, and it is clear that its very existence (and survival) is of symbolic importance. Its central role in the administration and implementation of EU funding in Ireland is also undisputed. However, the extent to which the SEUPB has altered the traditional dynamics of the EU funding process is open to question. Many of the EU programmes for which the SEUPB has responsibility pre-date its existence. The extent to which the body has qualitatively or substantially changed the manner in which these programmes were previously delivered is unclear. Problems persist and challenges remain – not least in relation to the processing of applications and the release of funds. The European Commission and the member-states continue to play central roles in determining the size and parameters of EU funding programmes and in leveraging that funding. The SEUPB’s role is effectively confined to that of policy implementer – a point to which its Chief Executive has explicitly alluded. In that context, the SEUPB constitutes an additional layer of bureaucracy, which, in addition to diversifying governance in Northern Ireland, may also have complicated it further. The Strand 2 institutions of the 1998 Belfast Agreement have created new forms of cross-border cooperation. In the case of the EU, these are especially complex, involve numerous actors and elicit only lukewarm political support. It is a case of much has changed, and yet little has changed. The dynamics are clearly different but the outputs are not similarly so. The mere creation of novel institutions does not guarantee the achievement of either ‘new politics’ or new outputs, nor does it signal the emergence of a shift from government to governance. Key features of governance are absent here. No strong sense of interdependence has developed between actors; the support shown by the Irish and UK governments does not demonstrate a clear sense of shared purpose; and the sharing of resources – financial and political – has been problematic. Both governments maintain a hold over the dynamics of this experiment in cross-border governance. The hand of the state is omnipresent.

The British–Irish Council and the EU: a minor player Relative to the NSMC, the East–West structures formed by the British–Irish Council have generally been regarded as less significant. Indeed the very creation of the BIC has typically been viewed as a political trade-off. For unionists, the institutionalisation of East–West relations was ‘a counterbalance to Strand II North-South relations’ (Birrell 2009: 181). The BIC brings together eight administrations encompassing:

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two sovereign states (the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom), three devolved administrations within the UK (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland), and three adjacent autonomous crown territories (the Isle of Man and the Channel Islands of Jersey and Guernsey). (Coakley 2010: 399)

It is a less developed institution than its North–South equivalent (the NSMC) in that it lacks executive and legislative powers and does not have its own budget. The key purpose of the BIC is ‘to exchange information, discuss, consult and use best endeavours to reach agreement on cooperation on matters of mutual interest within the competence of the relevant Administrations’ (Belfast Agreement 1998, Strand 3, Paragraph 5). The Agreement stipulates that the BIC will operate on the basis of consensus among all participating administrations (Paragraph 7), but also includes the proviso that members may choose not to participate in specific common policies or actions (Paragraph 6). The BIC usually meets biannually in summit format, when the Heads of each of the eight administrations attend. In addition, the BIC meets in different workstream formats. The number of work streams has changed and increased over time. Currently, the BIC is focused on eleven work streams of mutual interest.4 Each work stream is led by a lead administration and it is the responsibility of that administration to take forward work in that area (in terms of scheduling meetings, preparing agendas and documents, exchanging information and sharing expertise).5 The list of possible areas of mutual interest has not been exhausted. At its first summit in December 1999, the BIC highlighted areas of mutual interest which may be brought forward in the future. Included in the list were agriculture, energy, education, cultural issues, sporting issues and regional issues, in addition to ‘approaches to EU issues’. The latter area of cooperation is also outlined in the Belfast Agreement (Strand 3, Paragraph 5). According to Walker (2001: 136), ‘the objective appears to be the construction on an islands-wide basis of a common voice in European matters, and the exertion of greater influence within the EU’. To date the BIC has not chosen to dedicate a work stream to this specific area. However, a number of existing work streams have a strong EU dimension, in that they are areas where EU policy is developed. These include transport (which is led by the Northern Ireland administration), energy and the environment. Both transport and the environment have been on BIC’s agenda since it first met in 1999. Energy was only adopted as an area of mutual interest for BIC members in 2009. The energy work stream is focused on two areas: the electricity grid aspect is led by the UK government and the marine renewables aspect is led by Scotland. In a number of these policy areas, meetings of the BIC have included explicit discussion of the EU context, and it is the clear intention of the institution to seek to utilise the BIC forum to influence EU developments and to leverage EU funding. According to the Northern Ireland Minister of Enterprise, Trade and Investment, Arlene Foster, BIC discussions concerning electricity grid infrastructure in 2010 highlighted an intention to work together ‘to exert greater influence on the direction of emerging EU policy on grid infrastructure and to leverage maximum EU funding’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 20 April 2010). This is an appealing feature of involvement in the BIC for those members who do not benefit from full

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EU membership. The marine renewables subgroup has engaged directly with the European Commission. In 2010, the subgroup wrote to the EU Energy Commissioner to highlight and promote their work (BIC Communiqué, 13 January 2012): The letter included a request for Commission officials to engage with BIC officials to consider what support the EU could offer to the further development of this sector.

The subgroup is also working collaboratively with EU organisations, including the EU Ocean Energy Association and Marine Energy Interest Group, to increase the profile of marine renewables with the European Commission. The BIC’s direct engagement with the EU represents an additional route of influence for the UK’s devolved units. It is not a path which has been extensively exploited by the BIC, and even where it has been utilised, it is difficult to measure the impact of this uneven and infrequent type of intervention. The early operation of the BIC was problematic. Meetings were sporadically abandoned and postponed, the institution enjoyed little public attention and political engagement with it was patchy. During the period 1999–2002, the two DUP Ministers and members of the Northern Ireland Executive did not attend Executive meetings and refused to participate in North–South meetings. In retaliation, they were prevented from participating in East–West institutions by the other Ministers (Wilford 2009: 180). Many unionists were unhappy with ‘disparities in progress and resources between the BIC and NSMC’ (Lynch and Hopkins 2001: 755). These characteristics of its early operation gave the institution the reputation of failing to meet even modest expectations. However, the institution has matured in recent years, and perhaps particularly so since the reintroduction of devolution in May 2007. The number of work streams has expanded. A permanent BIC Standing Secretariat was opened in Scotland in early 2012. The institution now meets regularly in both summit and sectoral format. Politicians in Northern Ireland, particularly those of a unionist persuasion, have engaged more deliberately with the BIC since 2007. The DUP, having initially been dismissive, is now a champion of the East–West relationship. The former First Minister, Revd Dr Ian Paisley, has stated that ‘the BIC can have a powerful role in making life better for us all’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 18 September 2007). More recently, his successor, Peter Robinson, has referred to the ‘considerable development of the East–West axis’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 23 March 2009). However, the enthusiasm with which the DUP has pursued the ongoing development of the BIC since 2007 has aroused the suspicions and frustrations of many nationalist politicians. During a 2008 Northern Ireland Assembly debate, SDLP MLA Alex Attwood contrasted the ability of the BIC to agree and advance new work streams with ‘the impediments that are placed in the way of initiating and agreeing new work streams in other areas of the North/South architecture’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 21 October 2008). As with other aspects of the Northern Ireland experiment in devolution, the limits of the BIC have not been fully tested. There exists the very real potential for disharmony both among Northern Ireland political parties and between the

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member units of the council. On EU-related issues, the possibility for discord is even more pronounced. Agriculture, particularly reform of the CAP, provides a prime example of the differing perspectives of Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Republic of Ireland and the UK (see Chapter 3). However, there are no current plans to create an agriculture work stream. Under the environment work stream, some tension has surrounded questions of nuclear energy, safety and waste, with much of that discussion focused on the Sellafield nuclear power plant situated on the east coast of England. The Republic of Ireland advocates closure of the plant and is opposed to the building of new nuclear power plants in the UK (see Irish Government Press Release, 2 June 2006). In 2011, and in cooperation with the Manx government, Irish officials prepared a discussion paper examining operations and safety at the Sellafield plant, the disposal of radioactive waste and the control of environmental discharges. The issue of Sellafield divides the Northern Ireland political parties. During Assembly questions to former OFMDFM Junior Minister Robin Newton, he alluded to his support for nuclear energy (see Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 14 September 2010). The Junior Minister’s position reflects that of his party, the DUP, and is also close to that of the UUP position on nuclear energy. This means that he and other unionists are at odds with nationalist Northern Ireland political parties (both the SDLP and Sinn Féin oppose nuclear energy), the Irish government and other BIC members. To date, the BIC has not provided an arena wherein the Sellafield issue has been satisfactorily addressed and resolved. In terms of its membership, the BIC is clearly an innovative institution. This innovation, however, is simultaneously problematic. In addition to the facility for members to opt out of common BIC policies and actions, the choice of work streams has been selective and has not grappled with areas of potential conflict. Differences in the size and competence of the member administrations are also problematic and undermine the ability of the institution to achieve uniform outputs (Lynch and Hopkins 2001: 756). The institution is politicised in the context of its being a source of tension between nationalists and unionists in Northern Ireland. These features of the BIC suggest that it is not an institution which fits with contemporary accounts of governance. Its multi-level nature aside, the institution does not enjoy legislative or executive powers; it does not have a capacity to problem-solve; it lacks (enthusiastic) cross-party political support; and its autonomy from the state is restricted. Coakley (2010: 399) has referred to the BIC as having only achieved ‘modest progress’ during the first decade of its existence. However, there are some signs of it consolidating its identity, expanding its interests and engaging its members (see also Birrell 2012c: 221–222). Nevertheless for some Northern Ireland interests, the motivation for enhancing the BIC may have all to do with constitutional political objectives (i.e. tying Northern Ireland more closely to the UK), and little to do with the potential for the institution to produce new and novel means of achieving optimal policy outputs synonymous with a shift from government to governance. The EU does appear to provide some incentive for the BIC to explore the broader possibilities of the institution. The environment work stream’s direct engagement with the EU and the intention of

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the energy work stream (specifically the electricity grid infrastructure subgroup) to use the BIC as a means to influence EU policy are an interesting development. However, over ten years after its creation, it remains unclear how the BIC might practically achieve this objective outside the traditional state parameters within which all its members operate.

Conclusion Northern Ireland’s relations with the world beyond its borders have clearly developed with some vigour since the devolution of powers in 1999. A previous emphasis on the US connection is no longer privileged, and other international links, predominantly those with the EU, have been enhanced. The manner in which they have developed has been via a number of new institutions. Foremost amongst these is the ONIEB which, perhaps more than any other recent institutional creation, has qualitatively changed the frequency, the tenor and the focus of Northern Ireland’s relationship with Brussels. The appointment of new staff, with the support of the NITF, has brought additional personnel and skill resources. A change in wider management structures within OFMDFM has refined the focus of the office and connected it to the broader Northern Ireland EU agenda (as agreed by the Executive) and the European Commission’s forward work programme. Relations with key EU decision-makers in Brussels have been fostered, again with assistance from the NITF, and contact with Northern Ireland Ministers, MLAs, MEPs, civil society, IRep and other regional offices has been furthered. The ONIEB’s relationship with UKRep is paramount and the office respects its links with the central state. However, it has learned to maximise its benefit to Northern Ireland within the parameters and confines of its relationship with UKRep. In this way, it may be an example of governance in action. It has cultivated relationships with a wide range of actors representing the UK, the Republic of Ireland and the EU, and it has drawn too on its links with Northern Ireland officials, Ministers, MLAs and civil society. The importance of being plugged into networks is recognised and there is extensive reliance on discussion, negotiation and informationsharing, particularly between ONIEB and EU officials. This arrangement is again facilitated and encouraged by the NITF and enjoys the approval of the Northern Ireland Executive. By activating an outlook and modus operandi which is built around interdependent relationships and shared purposes, the ONIEB has perhaps found a way to work to full and effective capacity. The political backdrop is clearly important. The UK has allowed Northern Ireland some space and capacity to engage directly with the European Commission via the NITF. Northern Ireland has too been able to draw on support from the Republic of Ireland. And crucially, via the Taskforce, the European Commission has granted Northern Ireland privileged, albeit time-limited, access and contact. These circumstances, along with the ingenuity of the office itself, have produced a regional representation which speaks to the governance agenda. Other institutional creations are less Europe-focused or have a more narrowly defined relationship with the EU. Despite their uniqueness, they do not demon-

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strate features of governance in the same way as the ONIEB does. The distinction between the ONIEB on the one hand, and the NSMC, SEUPB and BIC on the other, is that the Brussels office has enjoyed broad political support and commitment across multi-levels. The same cannot be said for other institutions. The NSMC has had an interrupted history and has been the subject of political controversy. Unionists fear its perceived worst effects – i.e. a united Ireland – and so there is a resilient focus on practical and functional cooperation. Moreover, in securing this outlook, the consociational system facilitates lukewarm Unionist support for extending North–South cooperation to embrace less functional and more political forms of cross-border cooperation. The SEUPB has had a difficult existence. Its early years were marked by discontinuity, practical difficulties in working across jurisdictions, personnel changes and poor participation by some Unionists. Today, the body operates in a highly composite cross-border funding environment. The complexity of that environment and the SEUPB’s dependence on the cooperation of other bodies, North and South, and in Brussels are not based on a healthy interdependence with other actors. The SEUPB is in the process of cementing its identity and role, but it continues to face an uphill struggle to prove its merits as an innovative experiment in cross-border governance. The BIC is the least EU-focused of all the institutions created by the 1998 Belfast Agreement. Its membership is highly unusual and it lacks legislative and executive powers. Its engagement with EU policy is largely limited to the environment and energy work streams and its contact with Brussels has been infrequent and patchy. The BIC may have a distinctive profile and membership, but it has not produced distinctive EU outputs. It is not an institution which is central to the consociational architecture created by the Belfast Agreement – at least not in the ways that the Northern Ireland Assembly and NSMC are – and for that reason, political participants have been slow to engage fully with it and to test its furthest limits. It is a potentially interesting and novel approach to cross-national governance, but it remains a marginal player vis-à-vis Northern Ireland’s EU agenda. The Northern Ireland institutions which facilitate and manage the region’s external relationships do not have a long history. Their novelty and uniqueness meant that many had difficult early experiences and struggled to meet public and political expectations. In recent years, however, they have settled into a pattern of existence which is less politically controversial and focused on strategically pursuing Northern Ireland’s functional interests. Much has been achieved since 1998, and it is to the credit of these institutions that they have stabilised and, in some cases, flourished. To some extent, the EU has provided them with the means to do so, by providing a legitimate and neutral testing ground for operationalising new and innovative forms of cross-border, cross-national and multi-level governance.

Notes  1 Examples include the Northern Ireland Local Government Association; European Commission Office (Belfast); Police Service of Northern Ireland; Belfast City Council; UFU; Harland and Wolff; Northern Ireland Housing Association; Queen’s University

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Belfast; Greenmount Agricultural College; and the Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation (see http://goo.gl/srqO57).   2 The motion; ‘That this Assembly notes the long and continuing delays with the Special European Union Programmes Body (SEUPB) in processing applications for project funding under the European Union INTERREG IVA programme, especially for those projects relating to enterprise, tourism, energy and telecoms, for which DETI [Department of Enterprise, Trade and Investment] is the accountable Department; and calls on the Minister of Finance and Personnel to continue to work with the Minister of Enterprise, Trade and Investment and SEUPB to progress applications without further undue delay to enable good quality projects to be implemented quickly for the benefit of local communities’ was resolved (see Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 26 April 2010).  3 The Stepping Towards Reconciliation in Positive Engagement (Stripe) project will help address the legacy of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland’s Protestant community. It will be focused specifically on those who lived at sectarian interfaces and border areas, which suffered disproportionately during the conflict.  4 These eleven work-streams are: collaborative spatial planning; demography; digital inclusion; early years policy; energy; environment; housing; indigenous, minority and lesser-used languages; misuse of drugs; social inclusion; and transport. Past work streams included knowledge economy; e-health/telemedicine; and tourism.   5 Northern Ireland leads three work streams: collaborative spatial planning, housing and transport.

7

Northern Ireland and the European Union: the policy dynamics Introduction Northern Ireland’s political history has traditionally been heavily focused on the constitutional question, on security issues and on resolving the ‘Troubles’. An overwhelming emphasis on addressing and resolving the conflict distracted Northern Ireland political parties from substantively considering other public policy issues. The necessity for parties to do so was further undermined by the dynamics of the direct-rule system, which effectively placed no requirement on parties to articulate developed public policy positions. Furthermore, by its very nature, the direct-rule system provided insufficient means for the development of specifically targeted and responsive Northern Ireland public policies. The result was a trend towards public policy in Northern Ireland, during this period, which was based on a pattern of policy convergence with the UK (see Birrell 2009). Devolution fundamentally changes the nature of the policy-making and policyimplementing process in Northern Ireland and provides, at least in theory, opportunities for a more objective approach to the development of public policy at the regional level. In policy terms, the introduction of devolution to Northern Ireland (and other constituent parts of the UK) was accompanied by expectations in relation to its likely effect: In Northern Ireland, devolutionists … hoped to develop a policy framework removed from direct UK control that carried at least a legitimising level of local cross-community support. (Bradbury and Mitchell 2001: 257)

The 1998 Belfast Agreement outlines the parameters of Northern Ireland’s policymaking capacity and confers legislative and executive authority on the Northern Ireland devolved administration. The production of different policy outputs for Northern Ireland is conceivable under the terms of the devolved settlement. Furthermore, the exercise of this authority is to be based on cross-community decision-making processes which enjoy heightened legitimacy and achieve higher degrees of regional political accountability. Northern Ireland’s interrupted experience of devolution, particularly from 2002 to 2007 curtailed policy development, outputs and achievements. However, even taking its sporadic existence into account, the accomplishments of the Northern Ireland administration have none-

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theless been limited (Wilford 2010: 147). The operation of the Northern Ireland Executive, in particular, has been hamstrung by the existence of tensions between the parties, particularly the DUP and Sinn Féin. These tensions have curbed and delayed progress in relation to a host of policy areas, including education policy (most notably the question of academic selection), Irish language policy, community relations policy, a single Equality Act and a Northern Ireland Bill of Rights. Despite having first been proposed in 1998, political agreement on these policies has been difficult and protracted. Policy gaps between political parties are sometimes profound and not readily overcome. In contrast, difficulties are less evident in relation to the development of, and agreement on, Northern Ireland’s EU strategy, and related sectoral public-policy areas including agriculture, fisheries and the environment. Successive Northern Ireland administrations have produced policy documents, proposed strategies, and articulated vision statements on Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU. Initially, these were slow to emerge. Progress was negatively affected by a continuing concentration on leftovers from the peace process, namely disagreements on the devolution of policing and justice powers. Poor knowledge and capacity in relation to the EU policy environment, evident among both politicians and officials, also stymied progress. More recently, progress has been steady. Recent Northern Ireland pronouncements on EU issues have been prompted by the NITF. The capacity-building process which the NITF is pioneering requires the Northern Ireland administration to produce annual statements, updates and implementation plans. In terms of impact, however, it appears that general political agreement on the broad parameters of a Northern Ireland strategy vis-à-vis the EU may not necessarily be synonymous with the achievement of a distinctively different EU policy environment in Northern Ireland which displays characteristics associated with governance. This chapter details the growing pervasiveness of EU policies and outlines the extent to which the increasing policy competence of the Union impacts on the policy remit of the Northern Ireland devolved unit. The region’s response to this new political and policy environment is identified via an examination of the content and intent of a series of official documents produced by the Northern Ireland Executive, Northern Ireland Assembly and the European Commission since 1999. An overview of EU-related policy developments and achievements allows for some observations to be made in relation to the achievement of policy divergence subsequent to the devolution of powers. The focus in this chapter is ostensibly on words, and specifically those contained in policy documents which consider Northern Ireland’s EU strategy. The words demonstrate the gradual evolution of some adherence to broader governance principles on the part of Northern Ireland actors. The process of turning words into actions, however, reveals some of the persistent challenges faced by the devolved administration in activating a different approach to politics. Institutional obstacles, limited civil society input and enduring political tensions between parties check the extent to which words and intentions can be operationalised.

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The policy remit of the EU Since its creation during the 1950s, the policy remit and competence of the EU has developed extensively. Originally, the EU policy agenda was focused expli­ citly and wholly on economic matters. The creation of first a customs union, and then a common market, was the central objective of the founding Treaty of Rome in 1957. Since that period, the Union has gradually assumed differing degrees of responsibility for an increasingly broad range of policies. The Single European Act (SEA) (1986) outlined a role for the EU in relation to a number of new policy areas, including environmental policy, research and technological development, and economic and social cohesion. The Treaty on European Union (TEU) (or Maastricht Treaty) (1993) contained a timetable for the achievement of the single currency and further developed policies introduced by the SEA. The treaty also made reference to policies including education, public health, consumer protection and transport, but EU powers in these areas were highly restricted. The Amsterdam Treaty (1999) is acknowledged as having been a ‘revising rather than a pioneering treaty’ (Nugent 2006: 95). It created few new policy competences for the EU. A new Employment Title (VIII), however, signalled a commitment to develop the social dimension of the European project, albeit in the context of a voluntaristic approach on the part of member-states. The EU’s foreign policy was also extended to include the progressive framing of a common defence policy, and a general flexibility clause permitting closer cooperation among a subset of member-states also featured in the treaty document. The Nice Treaty (2003) preceded the 2004 enlargement of the EU. The treaty sought to streamline the Union in preparation for the addition of ten new member-states and included a series of mainly institutional reforms. Further treaty reform proposals followed shortly afterwards in the form of the now defunct Constitutional Treaty. The Constitutional Treaty merged existing treaties into a single text and assigned legal personality to the Union. In this respect, the Constitutional Treaty attempted to enhance the identity, efficiency and transparency of the EU and was, arguably, ‘a harbinger of better governance’ (Dinan 2005: 182). The Constitutional Treaty, however, did not garner adequate public support and was effectively abandoned in 2005 following failed referendums in France and the Netherlands. The document was eventually replaced by the Lisbon Treaty (2007). In terms of content, the Lisbon Treaty does not depart substantially from the Constitutional Treaty. The former preserves most of the content of the latter. The Lisbon Treaty outlines the exclusive policy competences of the EU, but does not add to these. Shared EU–member-state competences are similarly detailed, and some new joint competences are introduced in the areas of energy, environment and public health. In policy terms, the remit of the EU is broadened and to some extent strengthened – agricultural policy, immigration, asylum, judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters, and measures relating to the single market become subject to the EU’s co-decision procedure. The UK is not party to the most recent EU treaty – i.e. the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union. This intergovernmental agreement is a direct response to the financial crisis. It attempts to buttress the

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single currency by creating new provisions to safeguard the stability of the Euro area. It is clear that the policy remit of the EU has developed substantially since the creation of the EEC in the 1950s. A Community which was initially focused on a narrow range of economic policies is today a Union with differing degrees of involvement in a host of different policy areas. In acknowledging the growing policy competence of the EU, it is nevertheless important to note that there remain a large number of policy areas where the Union has little or no competence. In areas such as health, education and welfare provision, the role of the EU is largely non-existent. These policy areas, which typically account for the bulk of European national budgets, remain the exclusive competence of the member-states. Although the influence of the EU can rightfully be regarded as pervasive, it is not all-encompassing. In Northern Ireland, government spending on health, social care, education and learning typically account for almost 70 per cent of total spending (Northern Ireland Executive 2001: 7). Of course the level of funding does not necessarily dictate the level of engagement or the priority afforded a policy area. A heavy emphasis on ‘growing a sustainable economy’ in the current PfG (see Northern Ireland Executive 2012a) and a related engagement with Europe 2020 (see Northern Ireland Executive 2011c and 2012b) mean that a significant proportion of Northern Ireland’s devolved responsibilities have a strong EU context.

Northern Ireland and EU strategy: a policy without a vision The development of public policy generally in Northern Ireland has traditionally been obstructed by two key factors – firstly, a political preoccupation with addressing the constitutional question and ending the conflict, and secondly, the dynamics of direct rule. Both factors diminished the extent to which other public policy matters were either prioritised or addressed. The majority of political parties in Northern Ireland have been founded on the basis of their support for a united Ireland, or the maintenance of the constitutional link with the UK. Unusually therefore, the Northern Ireland party system is built around a strong constitutional cleavage. In the further context of a volatile and dangerous security situation, it is unsurprising that matters of a constitutional nature tended to dominate party discourse during the ‘Troubles’. The nature of the dual-ethnic party system facilitated this overriding focus on constitutional issues. Northern Ireland’s political parties primarily reaped electoral rewards on the basis of their position on the constitutional question. This served to minimise the necessity or desirability for parties to exploit other socio-economic cleavages and to contribute to broader policy development. Only limited attention, therefore, was afforded other policy dimensions of political life in Northern Ireland, and even here, positions were under-developed. McGarry (2004: 344) has referred to the period that preceded the introduction of devolution in 1999 as constituting a ‘political vacuum’, whereby debate on socio-economic and related issues was minimal. This situation was arguably aggravated by a second factor, namely the

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direct-rule arrangements, which further negated the need for local political figures to engage with bread and butter issues: During direct rule the local political parties contributed little to policy formulation as distinct from the search for political agreement and making representations on security policy. (Birrell 2009: 239)

In policy terms, the period of direct rule is associated with moves towards greater policy convergence with Britain. In other words, policy in Northern Ireland increasingly reflected that in Britain: The trend to parity in legislation was particularly obvious in the areas of employment law, industrial relations, financial and consumer law and disability but has covered at times all transferred areas. (Birrell 2009: 231)

The direct-rule provisions for governing Northern Ireland were not conducive to the development of divergent legislation for the region. Admittedly, not all areas of public policy warranted provisions specific to Northern Ireland’s circumstances. Nevertheless, the almost wholesale reliance on a British policy lead in developing Northern Ireland policy was not always appropriate. A key factor in preventing the development of better adapted Northern Ireland policies was the insufficient treatment of Northern Ireland business at Westminster. Limited time and inadequate procedures did not provide a satisfactory means for considering, scrutinising or amending legislation (Birrell 2009: 40–68). A related problem was the politically sensitive nature of some policy areas, which meant that the British government was reluctant to develop policy or legislation. Education – in particular the 11+ exam and academic selection – expose serious differences between the two communities in Northern Ireland (see Donnelly et al. 2006). Successive British governments typically shied away from tackling such issues, such were (and are) the tension and division which surround them. The British government’s position was also informed by the view that matters of this nature were best addressed by a Northern Ireland administration. Irish language legislation has been subject to a similar fate. Prior to the signing of the Agreement, commentators were calling for action in relation to the different status afforded the Welsh, Scots Gaelic and Irish languages but progress has been slow and contested (MacGiolla Chríost 2000: 50). Turner (2006: 57–58) has pointed to the negative legacy of the direct rule period on environmental governance in Northern Ireland: direct rule Ministers and senior civil servants viewed environmental protection as a luxury that Northern Ireland could not afford, and consequently, neither its political nor administrative classes came to view the environment as an important public interest to be protected by the regional public service.

Financial constraints also challenged the capacity of central government to deal fully with a range of policy issues. The cost of the security operation in Northern Ireland had consequences for many other policy sectors. The first Northern Ireland PfG (Northern Ireland Executive 2001: 16) alludes to the effect of this situation:

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Northern Ireland and the European Union Considerable investment is needed in our infrastructure. Over recent decades, such investment has not been given the required priority and we now have major deficiencies in key areas, such as our roads, public transport, water and sewerage infrastructure and social and affordable housing.

The economic situation has worsened since the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008. The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition, which came to office in 2010, has imposed harsh public spending cuts (see HM Treasury (2010) and Chapter 3) which affect Northern Ireland’s capacity to deal with policy challenges. Despite ongoing financial difficulties, however, the introduction of devolution provides an opportunity and capacity for the trend towards policy convergence with Britain to be challenged. Elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly force political parties to articulate positions on a wide range of policy issues for which the devolved administration has responsibility. The policy demands which devolution brings are very different from those which Northern Ireland political parties have traditionally grappled with: Assembly members have up to now been in a permanent opposition mode. They have not had to confront the hard decisions associated with priority-setting and resource allocation. The primary motivation of Assembly members will be to seek advantage for their particular constituencies rather than advancing the interests of the region as a whole. (Quoted in Wilson 1999: 40)

Party manifestos from 1998 onwards demonstrate a greater consideration of bread and butter policies (Gilland Lutz and Farrington 2006: 723). However, despite apparent progress in articulating party policy positions on a wider range of public policies, the quality and substance of party claims and promises have been underwhelming: the way the election was not only called but framed by the media left little space for serious consideration of the ‘bread and butter issues’. In so far as these were mentioned, it was mostly to convey populist claims by the parties which were rarely subjected to critical or expert analysis. (Wilson and Fawcett 2004: 5)

In addition, the nature of Northern Ireland’s devolution project produces an unusual context for the pursuit of policy. The consociational principles enshrined in the Belfast Agreement require that policy and legislative initiatives command cross-community consensus. The challenge for the Northern Ireland administration is, therefore, to develop ‘common, cross-community agendas on non-constitutional or conflict-related issues’ (Tonge and Evans 2002: 66). This will invariably occasion that party policy preferences are put aside in the Assembly chamber and around the Executive table. Compromise and consensus are key requirements in producing agreed policy positions which will enjoy the support of both communities. They are also principles linked to the governance agenda. An examination of key official documents provides some insight into how the Northern Ireland devolved administration has met this challenge in relation to policies with an EU dimension.

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Devolution and EU policy priorities: where words and actions gradually coincide Northern Ireland PfG (2001) The first Northern Ireland PfG (Northern Ireland Executive 2001) provides some very limited early indications of the new Executive’s intentions in relation to the pursuit of relations with the EU and the development of policies with an EU dimension. In general terms, Wilford (2010: 143) has described the first PfG as ‘a sprawling and overwhelming compilation of departmental wish-lists’. Within the document, references to relations with Europe, or to the EU dimension of policy, are scant. A number of specific actions are outlined, including plans to establish an office in Brussels and an intention to organise a regular forum involving all major Northern Ireland organisations and political actors involved in EU issues (Northern Ireland Executive 2001: 69). However, the document is less detailed and less prescriptive in relation to the management and advancement of policies with an EU dimension. It outlines an intention to ‘develop strategies as appropriate in key areas such as Structural Funds, agriculture, competition, the internal market, environment and the single currency’; Further we will seek to ensure that our interests in European Union issues are effectively represented in Whitehall, Brussels and Strasbourg. (Northern Ireland Executive 2001: 69–70)

A similarly vague pledge is made in relation to capacity-building. The Executive promises to help build and develop knowledge, expertise and experience of European issues across all relevant sectors of the economy and society, so as to build the capacity to deal with the challenge of being part of the European Union. (Northern Ireland Executive 2001: 70)

The document also makes reference to developing and strengthening Northern Ireland’s engagement with EU funding programmes, including specific mention of the intention to launch a regeneration initiative targeted at inner North Belfast under the Urban II programme (p. 23) and the creation of locally based partnerships to administer the Peace II programme (p. 25). The EU similarly forms the backdrop against which Northern Ireland’s environmental policy agenda will be pursued: ‘We will not only fulfil our EU obligations but also seek to ensure that development takes place in a sustainable way’ (p. 33). Two key objectives include the maintenance of requirements for EU recognition of the region’s low incidence of BSE (p. 33), and the progressive elimination of the backlog in transposing and implementing EC directives on air, land and water quality (p. 33). Support for Northern Ireland’s fishing industry included plans to participate at the European level in efforts to ensure the recovery of Irish sea cod (p. 61). What is striking about the Northern Ireland Executive’s engagement with the EU, as outlined in its first PfG, is how lacklustre it is. Many of the commitments articulated in the PfG are there because they constitute formal requirements of

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the newly devolved Northern Ireland administration (for example, the transposition of EU legislation). The overall tone and approach towards the EU are largely reactive and focused on implementation, as opposed to the earlier stages of the policy process. Beyond vague commitments to engage with Europe, there is little sense that those responsible for drafting and agreeing the first PfG have any clear vision of how Northern Ireland can best exploit its new-found status as a devolved European region. This reflects earlier observations about the steep learning curve facing both officials and politicians in managing responsibility for EU policy issues and in defining a vision for Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU. The Committee of the Centre’s EU inquiry (2002) The omissions in the first PfG were, to some limited extent, addressed by the Northern Ireland Assembly. Unlike the Executive, the first Assembly was not as heavily focused on resolving ongoing political impasses related to decommissioning – an issue which antagonised relations between Executive members and limited the breadth of their deliberations. Instead MLAs demonstrated a desire to see practical cooperation on ‘non-constitutional’ matters and increasing focus on economic and social issues. This aspiration stood out as the most consistently identified first priority for the Assembly. (Wilson 1999: 43)

In this context, the Northern Ireland Assembly produced some interesting and creative views on the devolved administration’s approach to engaging with the EU. In September 2001, seven months after the publication of the first PfG, the Assembly’s Committee of the Centre launched a major inquiry which sought to produce an evaluation of the effectiveness of the current approach of the Northern Ireland Assembly and devolved government in the engagement of Northern Ireland with the institutions of the EU. (Committee of the Centre 2002: 9)

The inquiry led to the publication of a committee report in 2002. The methodology employed by the committee in conducting the inquiry and producing the report was extensive and signalled a commitment to the production of a sophisticated contribution to official discourse on Europe in Northern Ireland. The inquiry was based on widespread consultation, analysis of other regions, bench-marking and best practice, visits to Brussels (including the ONIEB and key EU institutions) and Westminster, and the appointment of a Specialist Advisor to assist the committee (see Committee of the Centre 2002: 9). The work of the committee also benefited from the formal involvement of senior UK academic figures specialising in research on UK and Scottish devolution respectively (Professor Simon Bulmer, University of Manchester and Professor James Mitchell, University of Strathclyde). The inquiry and subsequent report represented a significant and important contribution to official discourse on the nature and future direction of Northern Ireland engagement with the EU (Murphy 2007: 307). DUP MLA Ian Paisley Jnr heralds the report as one of the most far-reaching reports published by the Assembly to date. It serves as an example of how an Assembly Committee – a non-statutory committee,

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by the way – holds the government to account. More importantly, it finds the Government wanting on the key issues that they ought to have been dealing with in the past three years. (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 8 April 2002)

In contrast to the content of the first PfG, the committee report demonstrates a more rounded and developed understanding of the possibilities available to Northern Ireland as a devolved region of the UK. Where the Northern Ireland Executive is overtly cautious and conservative in its consideration of matters European, the Committee of the Centre is considered and resourceful. The report recognises and acknowledges the limitations imposed by the devolution arrangements, but nevertheless displays a willingness to explore the new opportunities available to the region: The degree to which Northern Ireland can influence EU policy depends primarily on its links with London. However, most of the evidence shows that informal networks and inter regional alliances could complement the formal channels to London. These are important tools in influencing policy at an early, discussion stage in Brussels. Limited resources mean that it is important to have a small number of clear and focused priorities where it is expected that some return can be had and measured. (Committee of the Centre 2002: 7)

The approach being advocated here is more proactive than reactive, and this is further evident in the detail. The 43 recommendations produced by the committee propose ways and means of better pursuing Northern Ireland interests in Europe in the context of the enhanced opportunities which the devolution of powers potentially entails. Key proposals include: the creation of a Standing Committee on EU Affairs in the Northern Ireland Assembly; the establishment of an Assembly Information Desk in Brussels; the enhancement of Assembly Library and Research Services on EU policies and legislation; the streamlining of OFMDFM EU-related priorities; more frequent attendance by Northern Ireland Ministers at relevant Council of Ministers meetings; EU familiarisation training for MLAs; and the development of a Secondment Strategy for Northern Ireland civil servants. The practical and proactive orientation of the recommendations is in contrast to the aspirational and vague content contained in the PfG. The possible pursuit of the committee recommendations by the Northern Ireland Executive was, however, curtailed by the suspension of devolution just seven months after the production of the report. Taking our place in Europe 2006–10 The removal of the devolved tier of government in Northern Ireland in 2002 and the subsequent imposition of direct rule did not result in serious change to Northern Ireland’s administrative arrangements. The structures created under the terms of devolution were neither abandoned nor reversed. In other words, OFMDFM was maintained and in practice, its remit and work programme continued to be more or less dictated by the agenda of the previous devolved administration. In these circumstances, it is unsurprising that the ‘objectives’ outlined in the first PfG, and the recommendations contained in the Committee of the Centre’s European

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Inquiry, are developed further by the Northern Ireland European Strategy Document, Taking Our Place in Europe 2006–2010, which was produced by OFMDFM (2006). The ongoing suspension of devolution meant that the public consultation on the document was launched by the NIO, and not the devolved Northern Ireland administration. The final document too was also produced by the NIO, and thus agreement on its content was overseen by the then Minister of State for Northern Ireland with responsibility for Europe, David Hanson. Despite the timing of its publication – during a period of direct rule – the strategy reflects the priorities that were already under development by the devolved administration in the months before the suspension of devolution. Taking Our Place in Europe 2006–2010 is both a vision and a strategy document. The vision claims that Northern Ireland will participate in Europe in a positive, outward and forward-looking manner, to become a preferred region of choice for partnership working and within which to live, work, study and invest. (OFMDFM 2006: 2)

The strategy ‘map[s] out a framework for Northern Ireland’s engagement in Europe’ (OFMDFM 2006: 2). Specifically, this involves identifying what Northern Ireland wants to achieve and how it will go about doing so. Three objectives provide the focus for the Northern Ireland strategy and involve the promotion of Northern Ireland interests within the EU, raising a positive Northern Ireland profile throughout Europe and encouraging awareness and participation in European matters at home. In terms of promoting Northern Ireland’s interests within the EU, the strategy identifies eleven areas of EU policy considered to be of greatest importance to the region.1 This implicitly responds to a central recommendation in the earlier 2002 Committee of the Centre report which advocated the prioritisation of key Northern Ireland EU-policy interests. In pursuing these interests, the document advocates a proactive approach and places a heavy emphasis on the necessity to route influence via UK channels, specifically Whitehall and UKRep. Emphasis is also placed on promoting and defending Northern Ireland interests which are ‘in line with agreed UK policy’ (p. 3), effectively ruling out the pursuit of regional interests which may differ from those of the UK as a whole. The fact that the document is sponsored by a member of the central UK executive means that such an emphasis is unsurprising. The stress placed on the UK context, however, does not preclude the use of other avenues of influence, including the ONIEB, Northern Ireland’s representatives in the EU’s institutions, direct official Northern Ireland contact with the European Commission Services, and via the structures of North– South cooperation on the island of Ireland. Utilising these alternative means to influence EU policy proposes that Northern Ireland mobilise in Brussels and Dublin, as well as London. The overriding focus with respect to engagement is on the necessity for Northern Ireland to be proactive, in more creative ways than previously, in the pursuit of its key interests. The document also advocates a strategy which promotes projection – i.e. building a positive Northern Ireland profile in Europe. This is to be achieved via the devel-

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opment of links with other European regions and member-states; participation in interregional and transnational networks; continued financial and infrastructural support for EU trade and tourism; and the promotion of developmental opportunities for NICS staff (e.g. EU training, study-visits to Brussels, secondments to EU institutions). Participation is a further theme which can be identified within the document. The strategy contains a commitment to promoting awareness of the EU within Northern Ireland and to supporting participation by civil society in EU matters. This latter theme hints at a possible broadening of the participative context to policy-making in Northern Ireland and reflects a central element of the governance concept. Coupled with an approach which targets multi-jurisdictional levels, the European strategy document stands out for a more creative and innovative approach to EU-subnational engagement and governance. The Taking our Place in Europe 2006–2010 strategy is far more focused and ambitious than any previous document of its kind. The emphasis on regional proactivity, projection and participation implies that, notwithstanding the need to respect broader UK parameters, devolution nevertheless provides new and useful opportunities for Northern Ireland to better pursue its interest in Europe, and in this respect, some clear and practical action points are articulated. Crucially, however, the implementation of the strategy is dependent on other Northern Ireland government departments, which are required to set out detailed actions in their individual business plans. These are then monitored by a senior civil service policy group. The reinstatement of devolution in May 2007, however, interrupted this monitoring process. Northern Ireland Programme for Government (2008–11) In January 2008, the new Northern Ireland Executive published the 2008–11 PfG. The political landscape differed substantially from the earlier period. The new Executive installed in 2007 was led by the DUP and Sinn Féin – two parties less well-disposed to the EU than their predecessors, the UUP and SDLP. This PfG is a shorter and more concise document than its 2001 predecessor. Its brevity is well reflected in the consideration afforded to ‘International Relationships’. Reference to the EU in the body of the text is based on the following single inclusion: We need to engage positively in the European Union and to build on existing partnership and collaboration across key policies and programmes. A European Commission Taskforce, created by the EU President, José Manuel Barroso, is considering how our region can participate more effectively in EU initiatives, both financial and non-financial. The Taskforce will deal with a broad range of policy issues, including sustainable development, employment, rural development, fisheries, urban development and the environment. (Northern Ireland Executive 2008d: 20)

The absence of detail in relation to the achievement of such goals is somewhat addressed by the suggestion that the Executive’s formal response to the NITF Report will form the substantive basis for the European focus of the PfG. Furthermore, and in specific policy terms, the Public Service Agreement Framework

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provides enhanced detail on the delivery of key policy objectives. In this context, the PfG document makes reference to, for example, delivery of the Farm Nitrates Directive Action Programme (p. 32); implementation of the third EC Directive on Driver Licensing (p. 44); and compliance with the EU Landfill Directive (p. 52). This level and depth of detail marks the second PfG as different from the first. However, in common with its predecessor, the 2008 PfG necessarily contains commitments to ‘delivery’, ‘implementation’ and ‘compliance’ with EU directives. All are formal legal requirements of the devolved Northern Ireland administration. Many of the action points are thus reactive in character. Evidence of pro­active regional engagement at earlier stages of the EU policy process is largely absent. The most recent PfG for the period 2011–15 draws on the work of the NITF and is heavily informed by the European Priorities 2011–2012 (Northern Ireland Executive 2011c) and the European Priorities 2012–2013 (Northern Ireland Executive 2012b) (see below). These documents are identified as ‘building blocks’ for the delivery of commitments contained in the PfG: All departments of Government must work together to produce policies, plans and strategies – the building blocks – that are consistent with the priorities we have identified and with a focus on delivery. (Northern Ireland Executive 2012a; emphasis in the original)

Northern Ireland Report of the Taskforce (2008) The Northern Ireland Report of the Taskforce was published in April 2008 having drawn on the work of the NITF in the period from May 2007 to April 2008. The Northern Ireland Task Force (NITF) was created by President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso. It aimed to support the new Northern Ireland devolved administration which had taken up office (amidst much fanfare) in May 2007. Implicitly, therefore, the taskforce sought to contribute to the consolidation of the ongoing peace process and the stabilisation of the new administration, particularly in the context of the phasing out of EU regional financial aid. The work of the taskforce had a strong economic focus, and specifically it aimed to assist the region ‘in its efforts to improve its economic competitiveness and to create sustainable employment for its people’ (European Commission 2008: 1). The NITF carried out two distinct exercises. Firstly, it examined Northern Ireland achievements in different EU policy areas during the period 2000–6 (and where appropriate compared Northern Ireland with other EU regions). Secondly, the taskforce developed recommendations on how to encourage and facilitate a better approach to the EU by the devolved administration, the private sector, universities and research institutes, and other economic actors (European Commission 2008: 2). In the context of the diminishing structural fund allocations to Northern Ireland, a key intention was to assist Northern Ireland in accessing higher levels of financial assistance via competitive bidding. The report was welcomed by the Northern Ireland administration (see Northern Ireland Executive, 14 April 2008). The comparative exercise demonstrated that Northern Ireland had performed reasonably well relative to other

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European regions (Hall as referenced by Meehan 2008: 41). Concrete outcomes from the work of the taskforce included the fast-tracking of decisions on new socio-economic development programmes for the 2007–13 period (European Commission 2008: 4). The taskforce also promoted a series of initiatives aimed at achieving closer and improved relations between the European Commission, EU networks and the Northern Ireland administration. Further detailed information on specific sectoral policy areas is contained in the European Commission Staff Working Document annexed to the Taskforce Report. Each chapter presents an overview of a specific policy area in terms of achievements to date, priorities for 2007–13, and suggestions/recommendations for the future. With respect to ongoing reform of the CAP, the European Commission (2008: 31) recommends that it would be advisable for the Northern Ireland authorities to take as pro-active a stance as possible, bearing in mind the broader UK context. This would include participation in the dialogue on the future shape of the CAP at the appropriate national and European levels, as well as maintaining close contact with the Commission services to gain a detailed understanding of the issues at stake and to be able to take more effective anticipatory measures in advance of change.

The report also encourages Northern Ireland’s involvement in particular networks, including European Commission-coordinated Peer Learning Clusters (see Hayward and Murphy 2012). It similarly provides a commitment to develop increasingly constructive relations between the EU and Northern Ireland. For example: The Northern Ireland authorities have regularly proposed to the Commission’s Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry that they engage in secondments of personnel, which would help to increase Northern Ireland’s administrative capacities. Even short, week-long missions could be useful to raise awareness of EU opportunities. In this regard, the Directorate-General will stimulate short visits to SMEs via its ‘Enterprise Experience Programme’. The possibility of longterm secondments is being explored. (European Commission 2008: 67)

The Northern Ireland Report of the Taskforce is a unique document based on a unique initiative. It is targeted and tailored to respond directly to Northern Ireland interests. It provides a richness of information and a solid basis for the conduct of EU–Northern Ireland relations. The document also marks a significant departure for the European Commission in terms of how it has traditionally engaged with Northern Ireland via the structural funds and Peace programmes. The political investment by the European Commission in this exercise has been substantial. Sponsored and facilitated by the European Commission President, the NITF was also supported by UKRep, which informally (and unusually), allowed Northern Ireland to enter into direct relations with the task force. As Hayward and Murphy (2012: 449) note, however, this represented ‘a concrete gesture on the part of the UK government to support Northern Ireland’s regional “empowerment” rather than as a by-passing of the UK state’. Despite the wealth of possibilities implied by the work of the NITF, Euro-

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pean Commission officials were initially disappointed with the Northern Ireland response. This dissatisfaction is echoed by senior Northern Ireland civil servants and some Northern Ireland politicians. The latter are to be found predominantly, although not exclusively, within the ranks of the SDLP. This general dissatisfaction is based on a range of criticisms which have been levied at the devolved administration’s handling of the NITF. The first official response by the devolved administration to the document was almost a year in coming (see below), and furthermore, by mid-2010, the Executive had produced neither a 2009–10 nor a 2010–11 Action Plan in response to the NITF. The production of such reports was deemed important and necessary. It signalled engagement and reciprocity. The failure to agree action plans was viewed with some dismay by senior European Commission officials and with a sense of frustration by officials in Northern Ireland. The proposed development of a CRC in Northern Ireland, which was supported by the NITF, delayed and complicated Northern Ireland’s engagement with the NITF. The Executive’s belated engagement with the work of the NITF was stalled due to a prolonged reluctance on the part of the Executive to agree and pursue plans in relation to the proposed CRC. Sinn Féin MLA Francie Molloy inquired of then Junior Ministers Kelly and Newton: There is stg £20 million for a conflict resolution centre just sitting in there. Considering the shortage of resources here, why [are we] not drawing down money that is sitting in Europe? It makes it difficult for other Departments to look for money when money that is available is not being taken [up]. (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 23 June 2010)

Junior Minister Kelly’s response was short: ‘That has been pointed out, and we are trying to work it out’ (Northern Ireland Assembly Hansard, 23 June 2010). This rather curt reply by the Junior Minister hints at the considerable difficulties experienced by the DUP and Sinn Féin in agreeing, not just how best to approach the highly sensitive issue of conflict resolution, but also, and most controversially, where to site such a facility (see Chapter 5). Agreement on the CRC was temporarily reached in 2011. This prompted a deeper engagement with the NITF and saw the Northern Ireland Executive agree and publish a series of annual updates in response to the work of the NITF (see Northern Ireland Executive 2011c and 2012b).

Priorities for European engagement The first official response by the Northern Ireland administration to the report of the taskforce was published in March 2009. Priorities for European Engagement: Action Plan 2008–2009 utilises the taskforce report as ‘the baseline on which to refine [Northern Ireland] EU policy and programme priorities and to develop enhanced networks with Europe’ (Northern Ireland Executive 2009: 1). It contains a strategic list of key priorities and themes with an accompanying action plan. The action plan sets out a range of specific targets to be achieved by the Northern Ireland administration.

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Priorities for European Engagement: Action Plan 2008–2009 is a highly detailed, methodical and somewhat prescriptive document. Heavily influenced by the NITF Report, it purports to provide an effective framework for optimal regional engagement with the EU. The document outlines a large number of specific targets to be achieved by the Northern Ireland administration. Under Theme 2: Promote our interests within the European Union, the plan proposes specific actions in relation to twelve different policy areas. In broad terms, much of this content is focused on what are, in effect, existing expectations (if not indeed formal requirements) of all devolved administrations as laid out in the MOU and concordat. There remains too a strong and continuing emphasis on EU funding as being a central component of Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU (Northern Ireland Executive 2009: 9). Support for engagement with civil society is somewhat underwhelming (pp. 12–13), although secondments of NICS officials to the EU institutions are supported (p. 12). More interestingly however, it is possible to discern distinctions between different policy areas. Action points in relation to agriculture and fisheries are especially specific and hint at a clearer and more coherent Northern Ireland interest and position. Furthermore, these policy areas also point to positive and beneficial outputs already achieved, for example (p. 39): positive engagement with Commission and other Fisheries Administrations resulting in better outcome on Nephrops Total Allowable Catch compared to rest of UK.

In contrast, for other policy areas, such as the EU budget and sustainable development, action points are somewhat more vague and lacklustre and do not point to tangible achievements. References to sustainable development are markedly more ambiguous and ill-defined than is the case for agriculture and fisheries, in that they vaguely pledge that the Northern Ireland administration will: Resume EU engagement process with the intention of further developing our relationship with national and EU institutions to explore and consequently make use of opportunities associated with innovation and sustainability programmes which complement our plans and priorities. (Northern Ireland Executive 2009: 54)

This distinction between policy areas in terms of the capacity of lead government departments has long been a feature of policy practice and experience for all of the UK’s devolved regions (see Bulmer et al. 2006: 82, and Chapter 5). Devolution (albeit interrupted in Northern Ireland’s case) it seems, did not provide an especially strong spur for an enhanced capacity in relation to policy areas which were traditionally under-developed vis-à-vis the EU. The tone and content of the Action Plan do not necessarily acknowledge or address this gap in any substantial way. It has the hallmarks (and layout) of a box-ticking exercise. The ‘elephant in the room’ – i.e. the CRC – is fudged. The Action Plan includes a loose acknowledgement that Northern Ireland’s experience of conflict resolution is valuable, but it contains no clear ideas about how best to take this forward (pp. 13–14). Reading between the lines of this document, the existence of tensions between the signatories to

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the document (DUP First Minister, Peter Robinson, and Sinn Féin Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness) and their respective parties is clear. The vagueness, couching and fudging of issues is unmistakable. The power-sharing dynamics of the consociational system were not conducive to achieving a substantive response to the work of the NITF. The inability of political leaders to cooperate around the Executive table effectively produced a lowest common denominator response. Later responses by the Northern Ireland Executive to the work of the NITF are, however, more strategic and better considered. Engagement by Northern Ireland officials and politicians with the NITF over a period of years provided a basis for developing and enhancing the sophistication of Northern Ireland’s approach to EU matters. It is also clear that the European Commission exercised some patience in allowing Northern Ireland politicians the time and space to work through political disagreements. Hayward and Murphy (2012: 450) refer to the EU’s ‘enduring commitment’ to Northern Ireland. European Priorities 2011–2012 (Northern Ireland Executive 2011c) and European Priorities 2012–2013 (Northern Ireland Executive 2012b) are very different documents from their 2009 equivalent. In the foreword to the 2011 document, the First Minister and Deputy First Minister suggest that the document (sub-titled Winning in Europe) marks ‘a step-change in the Executive’s European engagement, broadening and deepening our engagement with the European institutions’ (p. 1). This is not an over-statement. The vision, focus and approach which both documents champion demonstrate a distinctively more considered and enhanced approach to engagement with the EU. In fact the documents epitomise features associated with joined-up government. The approach is ‘forward-looking’ and tied to the Executive’s PfG, the European Commission’s work programme and the Europe 2020 strategy.2 The aim to make Northern Ireland a modern, dynamic and competitive European region is clear. A one-time heavy emphasis on EU funding considerations is not present here. The focus is broader and yet targeted. Northern Ireland’s EU priorities align closely with the Europe 2020 strategy. Action plans identify relevant EU policies and both short- and long-term objectives are articulated. Overall, there is a clear emphasis on proactive engagement with the EU agenda, projection of regional preferences and participation in networks. When compared with the Northern Ireland Executive’s first response to the NITF, more recent European Priorities are distinctively and substantively better and accord more closely with the expectations of the governance agenda. Committee of OFMDFM consideration of European Issues (2010) After the reintroduction of devolution in May 2007, the Northern Ireland Executive was generally to the fore in articulating and developing a Northern IrelandEU strategy. However, the Northern Ireland Assembly also contributed to the further development and refinement of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU. In October 2008, the renamed Committee for the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (previously the Committee of the Centre) launched an inquiry into consideration of European issues. The inquiry sought ‘to establish how the Northern Ireland Assembly and the Northern Ireland Executive

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c[ould] improve interaction with the European institutions and raise the profile of Northern Ireland’ (Committee of OFMDFM 2010: 1). As with the 2002 Committee of the Centre inquiry, the methodology included ‘widespread consultation and gathering of evidence, analysis of other regions, benchmarking, best practice’ (p. 12). In total, 41 written submissions were received and the Committee conducted 34 oral evidence sessions with a broad spectrum of interests. The report also drew on a series of visits by the Committee to the Parliament of Catalonia, the House of Commons, the House of Lords, the Scottish Parliament and the Houses of the Oireachtas. Unlike for the earlier 2002 Committee of the Centre report, no specialist advisor was appointed. The report contains a number of recommendations and actions. The ‘actions’ identify the optimal role of the Assembly statutory committees in protecting and pursuing Northern Ireland’s EU interests. Despite an acknowledgment within the report that a majority of written and oral submissions advocated the establishment of a dedicated European Committee, Action 1 states: The Committee for the Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister will continue to be responsible for European issues; this will be reviewed at a later stage to determine if a European Committee needs to be established. (Committee of OFMDFM 2010: 15)

Thereafter, the actions proposed by the Committee report focus on improving communication and contact between all Northern Ireland interests and the EU – a view which complements the work of the NITF by recognising that Northern Ireland needs to enhance relations with the EU institutions and to participate in EU networks. The report also contains a series of recommendations for the Speaker of the Northern Ireland Assembly, the Assembly Commission3 and the OFMDFM in relation to secondments, training and direct engagement with Brussels. The committee’s report is heavily focused on addressing the ways in which the internal dynamics of Northern Ireland’s direct engagement with EU institutions and actors can be improved. Curiously, the only references to the national context are in relation to the JMC[E] – the report recommends that OFMDFM should brief the Assembly Committee after each JMC[E] meeting. The report contains no reference to Whitehall and only minimally alludes to the UK Houses of Parliament, in terms of the structures developed there for scrutinising EU matters. The negligible consideration of the national context is noteworthy. Unionists have traditionally emphasised the pre-eminence of the UK central government, yet the report has not sought to stress this component of Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU. Again this fits with the broad tenor of the work of the NITF and its emphasis on direct and focused engagement between Northern Ireland and the EU. Other previous reports on Northern Ireland’s EU strategy are more forthright in their consideration of the national context and allude more substantively to this aspect of the devolution framework. Although less detailed and extensive a document relative to the 2002 Committee of the Centre report, the 2010 Inquiry into Consideration of EU Issues explicitly recognises the benefits of informal and direct engagement between the Northern Ireland region and the EU and proposes practical ways of achieving influence in

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Brussels via such a route. The more limited terms of reference of the inquiry mean that the focus is predominantly on the Northern Ireland Assembly, rather than the Northern Ireland administration as a whole. Nevertheless, many of the actions and recommendations contained within the report repeat, or in some cases develop, themes already addressed by the Committee of the Centre’s 2002 European Inquiry. Issues including ministerial engagement with the Council of Ministers; the promotion of secondments to EU institutions; the development of relations with MEPs, members of Ecosoc and CoR, and civil society; and a Northern Ireland Assembly presence in Brussels were all previously proposed in 2002. One senior SDLP figure privately branded the document as ‘unexciting’. The suspension of devolution in Northern Ireland provides some explanation for the overlap in content between the 2002 and 2010 inquiries. Nevertheless, the re-appearance of similar themes exposes the difficulties faced by the Northern Ireland administration in advancing an EU strategy. Many of the recommendations highlighted in the report do not require extensive planning, resources or financial support; rather, they need strong political sponsorship coupled with the support of key officials. In the context of the work of the NITF, this has only recently begun to materialise. However, there is some likelihood that many of the proposals in the Committee’s report may in fact be heeded.

Northern Ireland’s EU policy arena: some limited signs of ‘new’ politics The creation of new, devolved institutional structures in Northern Ireland has required that the administration identify and articulate an EU strategy. Crucially, any strategy must be appropriate to the region’s needs and yet also realistic in terms of what is politically and practically possible. Politically, Northern Ireland is a part of the UK and so required to abide by broader UK rules and lines. There is room for manoeuvre, as identified in earlier chapters, but it is not wholesale. Practically, Northern Ireland’s EU strategy must be cognisant of what is possible for a region of the size of Northern Ireland. Increased resources have been committed to the EU agenda, particularly in terms of new personnel in the ONIEB, and this has augmented the capacity for the Northern Ireland administration to engage more deliberately and more effectively in the EU policy process. The NITF has helped to develop and refine that capacity even further. The EU strategy documents, committee inquiries and NITF responses which the Northern Ireland administration has produced since the devolution of powers demonstrate a clear development in thinking and approach. However, the achievement of a better focused and targeted approach to the EU does not automatically presuppose positive outcomes for Northern Ireland per se. The consociational nature of the 1998 Belfast Agreement has, to some extent, institutionalised the communal divide. In so doing, it has allowed for difference to be managed rather than overcome. Mitchell and Bradbury note (2004: 341): Devolution might be expected to allow opportunities for differences and innovation, but the constraints imposed by the peace process in Northern Ireland impede

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such innovation. Overwhelmingly, power-sharing devolution is concerned with the politics of process: it exists simply to sustain the conditions for peace.

The implications for policy innovation and divergence are thus constrained, and in a number of devolved policy areas progress has been bitterly slow and intensely difficult. Additionally, the supremacy of the UK central government, under the terms of devolution, can further stymie the extent to which a devolved region, such as Northern Ireland, can pursue and/or achieve policy divergence within the UK, if indeed that is favourable. Despite some exception, however, EU-related policy issues have not been wholly subject to the worst effects of the consociational system and central government gate-keeping. Two key questions are important. Firstly, to what extent has Northern Ireland’s evolving EU strategy created the conditions whereby tangible policy victories for Northern Ireland have proven achievable, and secondly, is any such pattern of activity compatible with the EU MLG agenda? The report of the NITF provides some overview of Northern Ireland achievements during the period 2000–6. Most of the examples identified by the Taskforce relate to that period. Bearing in mind that the period covers phases of both devolved and direct rule, it is difficult to determine the direct relationship between devolved/direct rule administrations and policy outputs. In answer to a 2009 Written Question to OFMDFM concerning the Department’s progress against key targets (as identified by the NITF), the First Minister and Deputy First Minister highlighted the following achievements: Promotion of our policy interests by input to the UK policy position on Cohesion Policy, the EU Budget Review, Trans-European Networks, and the Common Agricultural Policy Check; fast-tracked approval of four Structural Funds programmes worth €1.1. billion; increased success in Interreg IV trans-national and interregional funding programmes; success in securing €4.5 million of research and development funding from the 7th Framework Programme; and more civil service secondments to European Union institutions. (Northern Ireland Assembly 2009, AQO 147/10)

There is certainly no doubting any of the above. It is unclear, however, whether these achievements are attributable to any different approach which devolution might facilitate. The actors and processes may indeed be different, but it is not evident that the policy outcomes are necessarily different. Indeed a number of interviewees suggested that policy outcomes achieved during the 2007–11 Assembly term likely reflect those that would have emerged had direct-rule arrangements remained in place. There are, nevertheless, some signs that this pattern is being arrested. The renewal of the NITF from late 2010 onwards injected a degree of vigour into the work of the Taskforce and led to the production of documents from 2011 onwards which are more nuanced and better tailored to address Northern Ireland’s key interests. The approach advocates a deeper and more direct engagement with the EU and knowledge networks. The process whereby Northern Ireland reached this point was influenced by the (admirable) ongoing commitment of the European Commission President to Northern Ireland; the pivotal and enabling role played

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by the NITF; and improved receptiveness by the Northern Ireland administration to opportunities emanating from Brussels. Although some difficulties and political tensions continue to dog this new policy environment, it is clear that some progess has been achieved. In broad terms, a formerly limited, narrow and insular focus has dissipated. Instead, the Northern Ireland administration is more outward- and forward-looking and based on a model of cooperation and engagement which reflects many of the features of governance – interdependence at multiple levels; engagement with networks; resource sharing; less formal modes of decisionmaking; and crucially, the development of trust. On the question of ‘autonomy from the state’, however, the evidence is less convincing. The UK remains in control of how much autonomy Northern Ireland is permitted to exercise. Positive achievements and outputs have resulted in terms of the process of devolved politics in Northern Ireland and small policy victories have been recorded. The achievement of larger policy victories such as influencing CAP reform, winning competitive funding bids and promoting environmental priorities, may be more challenging, but they are now within reach.

Conclusion The constitutional question has dominated Northern Ireland politics for decades. The start of the ‘Troubles’ in the late 1960s and the attendant introduction of direct-rule arrangements led to a prolonged and dominant concentration on security and constitutional issues. As a consequence, other policies were sometimes politicised – for example education – whilst others, such as environmental policy, were sidelined and marginalised. An overwhelming focus on constitutional issues did not permit political parties to develop sound policy agendas. Moreover, in the context of direct rule, there was a tendency to follow the UK lead. Devolution challenged this pattern of limited engagement with a broad swathe of policy issues. Although ‘relations with the EU’ are reserved to Westminster, the EU is a pervasive force. In effect, it touches on a large number of transferred or devolved policies and therefore demands the attentions of the devolved administration. The episodic existence of the devolved institutions between 1999 and 2007 certainly hampered sustained progress in many policy fields, and Europe is no exception. Nevertheless, the development of a vision for Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU has tentatively and lately emerged. Early attempts at articulating an effective EU strategy were vague and lacklustre. They lacked vision, focus and substance. Over time, however, Northern Ireland’s pronouncements in relation to managing and directing the region’s EU agenda suggest the development of a more advanced and sophisticated understanding of the EU arena. The European Priorities published from 2011 are noticeably better than previous attempts at articulating an EU strategy for Northern Ireland. This development has been facilitated by the NITF and the maturation of relations between political parties in Northern Ireland. This new and improved approach has been led by the Northern Ireland Executive and OFMDFM in particular. Assembly Committee inquiries – which draw on civil society input – have also informed the process. The

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result is an engagement with the EU which is focused on an agenda encompassing competitiveness, innovation, climate change and social cohesion. The tone is also different. It is less reactive and instead focused on proactivity, preference projection and participation. Northern Ireland’s experience in relation to the development of policy capacity reveals much about the dynamics of politics in Northern Ireland. The devolution of power, under the terms of a consociational settlement, signalled the start of a new era in Northern Ireland. But it was a new era loaded with demands and expectations of political parties and leaders in particular, and also the NICS. The process of adapting to this new environment was challenging. Politicians and civil servants alike had to learn how to engage effectively with their new responsibilities, and many were ill-equipped for the task. Early official documents addressing the Northern Ireland–EU relationship illustrate the difficulties. Considerable and valuable experience of funding had produced a narrow view of the EU among key political and official figures in Northern Ireland. Other opportunities and possibilities, including the Europe 2020 strategy, tended to be overlooked. The intervention of the NITF from 2007 onwards helped to overcome this tendency. The process of engagement with the NITF by the Northern Ireland authorities was initially patchy. Wracked by political tension and indecision, the Northern Ireland Executive was reluctant to pursue engagement. The European Commission’s commitment nevertheless remained steadfast, and as political tensions eased, engagement followed. The outcome has been the articulation of an impressive EU strategy, at least relative to previous attempts. Getting to this point has not always been easy or straightforward. It underlines the importance of practical assistance, patience and commitment in dealing with a post-conflict region. The political difficulties could only be resolved by the parties themselves; the EU’s role was removed and tangential, but nevertheless it constituted a significant supporting role. When the time was right and the conditions conducive, the EU authorities helped to jumpstart a process of regional engagement with Europe which will likely strengthen as the devolved system beds down further. Direct engagement between Brussels and Northern Ireland has been instrumental to the outcomes achieved here. Crucial to understanding this relationship and the broader dynamics of devolution in the UK, however, is acknowledging that it was permitted by the UK central government. Interactions between the European Commission and Northern Ireland are allowed because they do not undermine or reject the UK national position. The degree of autonomy which Northern Ireland enjoys vis-à-vis the EU is effectively policed. The benefit of devolution is that it has opened up the possibility for opportunities to be identified where Northern Ireland can legitimately act in an ‘autonomous’ manner and with the approval of UKRep and the central state. Additionally and perhaps most significantly, the EU policy dimension in Northern Ireland draws on a wider and more diverse range of inputs. The involvement of the European Commission is clear. The support of the cross-party power-sharing Executive is important and has proved crucial. Consideration of the EU by Assembly committees has generated broader political interest. The capacity of the NICS has been developed. Civil society is consulted, although its input is not structured.

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The development of an EU policy community may in time correct this situation. On the basis of all these features of Northern Ireland’s evolving EU strategy, the characteristics of a governance-influenced approach are present and have proved valuable. They are not, however, comprehensively evident. The shadow of the UK central state lingers and has meant that the traditional and dominant role of the state is intact. The legacy of Northern Ireland’s troubled political history and the fraught relations that survive mean that despite promising advances, progress is dependent on the domestic political arena. Governance has not displaced government to any significant extent. Old politics and parameters remain relevant, even if tentative examples of ‘new’ politics are in evidence.

Notes   1 The eleven EU policy areas identified by Taking Our Place in Europe 2006–2010 are agriculture; fisheries; the economy; energy harmonisation; trans-European networks; Euro preparations; the environment; cohesion policy; peace and reconciliation; education; and culture (pp. 3–5).   2 The documents are based on four thematic priorities: competitiveness and employment; innovation and technology; climate change and energy; and social cohesion.   3 The Northern Ireland Assembly Commission is the body corporate of the Northern Ireland Assembly. It provides the Assembly with the property, staff and services for the institution to operate effectively. It is chaired by the Speaker of the House and consists of five other MLAs.

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Northern Ireland, regional governance and the European Union Introduction Northern Ireland has traditionally been regarded as a ‘place apart’.1 In many ways, this label was justified. In a comparative European context, the conflict marked Northern Ireland out as being distinct. The impact of the ‘Troubles’ was farreaching, with the most extreme effect being the loss of almost 4,000 lives over the course of three decades. The related economic, political and social damage wreaked by the conflict was widespread and intense. Its long duration and intensity made the process of achieving peace profoundly difficult. However, the signing of the Belfast Agreement in 1998 and the St Andrews Agreement in 2006, signalled moves towards new and agreed governance structures. These developments have been accompanied by a tentative start to the normalisation of political and societal relations in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, the creation and operation of new political structures has not been without its difficulties, although it is apparent that politics in Northern Ireland appears to have stabilised since devolution was restored in 2007. However, although the peace process is advanced and new political structures are operational, problems and challenges remain. Political struggles, economic difficulties and contentious policy issues continue to exist. Many of these positive and negative features of contemporary Northern Ireland politics are evident in relation to Northern Ireland’s developing relationship with the EU. The changing dynamics of relations between Northern Ireland and the EU suggest much about the region’s system of devolved power and the extent to which it serves to overcome the difficulties and troubles of the past. The features of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU since 1998 reveal a range of seemingly positive developments. The shift from direct rule to devolution has involved the creation of new and novel political institutions with responsibility for a range of devolved policy areas, including many with an EU dimension. Formal developments such as these have had a clear impact in terms of including new actors in the governance of Northern Ireland. Indeed, ‘the pace at which Northern Ireland made the transition from a riven political community ruled from outside in proconsular fashion to an apparently stable consociational democracy governed by the leaders of the competing domestic blocs has been extraordinary’ (Coakley 2008: 110). The immediate effect has been enhanced levels of cooperation between politicians and a diversification of the policy process.

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It is clear that Northern Ireland has changed, and changed remarkably over the course of the last decade, and that this change has embraced both the political and economic dimensions of Northern Ireland life. In particular, institutional changes have modified political relations, processes and outputs. The apparent positive impact of this process of change, however, is worthy of deeper interrogation. Although the new political arrangements differ from those which preceded them, they have produced effects which may not necessarily be markedly different or indeed, substantially better. The implementation of the 1998 Belfast Agreement has institutionalised politics in Northern Ireland. For matters with an EU dimension, this process of institutionalisation has arguably lent heightened influence to political actors in Northern Ireland. On occasion, this has been at the expense of other societal actors who have been excluded from involvement in the policy process. Such a development is partly to be expected. The absence of legitimate local democratic structures allowed civil society a somewhat privileged place in Northern Ireland politics and society. Devolution and the accompanying new political institutions in Northern Ireland address this democratic imbalance. However, the presumption that these new political arrangements equate to a more diverse and improved approach to governance is open to question. The institutionalisation, and in some cases the formalisation, of political relationships in Northern Ireland has made the political system more diverse, complex and cumbersome, and this has produced mixed results. New structures are evidently more democratic and increasingly less volatile, yet in terms of political behaviour, processes and outputs, the distinction between the periods pre- and post-1998 is less manifest. The broad dynamics of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU demonstrate how devolution has not facilitated manifestly different forms of governance. In this instance, equating devolution with a more governance-inspired political system in Northern Ireland is misleading. Indeed, evidence of a movement from government to governance in Northern Ireland as implied by MLG theorists is not apparent. In relation to a variety of political, economic, social and cultural indicators, traditional power relations remain largely intact. This can be best explained with reference to: 1. The constraints which devolution imposes on Northern Ireland authorities visà-vis EU affairs. 2. The complexity of devolved arrangements in Northern Ireland and their impact on the Northern Ireland-EU relationship. 3. The way in which communal division and historic rivalries hinder Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU. The evolution of the Northern Ireland–EU relationship since the introduction of devolution in 1998 has been marked by these three features. Collectively, they have served to limit the extent to which Northern Ireland has – practically and politically – optimised its engagement with the EU.

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The constraints Devolution promised much in Northern Ireland – not least the consolidation of the peace process. In addition, the new political arrangements offered an opportunity for Northern Ireland to pursue local democratic politics and a more regionally tailored policy agenda. Promises and opportunities, however, are not always realisable. In the context of the EU policy agenda, it is clear that the nature of devolution in the UK constrains the freedom of action of Northern Ireland in EU-related matters. Many Northern Ireland politicians and citizens intuitively greeted the introduction of devolution in Northern Ireland as an opportunity for Northern Ireland to exercise greater control over its own destiny. This was premised on a supposedly improved ability to pursue alternative policy agendas to the rest of the UK, and simultaneously it was seen as offering the ability to overcome the perceived undemocratic features of the direct rule system. Experience shows, however, that although devolution may offer the potential for change, the actual effect of devolution has been neither extensive nor comprehensive. This can be explained with reference to the terms of devolution and the practical operation of devolved structures in Northern Ireland. Devolution, although it is an advanced form of regionalisation, is not comparable to the stronger form of regionalisation embodied in federalism. Unlike a federal system, devolution involves a sharing of powers as opposed to a separation of powers between the national and regional units. In this way, the constituent units of the state do not possess exclusive policy responsibilities, unlike their counterparts in federal states. Thus, the national unit remains the supreme source of national sovereignty and retains authority over all aspects of government, be they national, regional or international. In this way, devolution, by virtue of its terms, imposes automatic constraints on the freedom of action of devolved units by denying them the capacity to pursue autonomous regional policies without fear of possible interference from London. As Clark suggests (1999: 523): it is unrealistic to expect the new governments in Scotland and Wales [and by extension Northern Ireland] to wield as much power as those autonomous governments which exist within a fully federal system.

The detail of the Northern Ireland Act (1998) is important in this regard. According to Hadfield (1999: 5): ‘Westminster through the devolution Acts attempts to impose not inconsiderable restraints upon the operation and potential development of devolved government’ (emphasis in the original). Of most significance in this respect is that transferred powers do not constitute exclusive legislative powers. In other words, the UK central government can legislate for devolved regions in transferred matters (in addition to their exclusive right to legislate in excepted areas and on reserved matters). In this way therefore, the central UK state ultimately retains the authority to act as a check on the freedom of action of devolved authorities. A clear example of the way in which devolution undermined Northern Ireland’s freedom of action is apparent in the context of the requirement for Northern Ireland not to depart from the UK line in Brussels. In practice,

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Northern Ireland politicians and officials have not deviated from this convention. Indeed, although there is some recognition of the limitations associated with the terms of the devolution package, there exists a seemingly deep-rooted respect for the primacy of the UK central government and an unwillingness to challenge this. There was a tendency among all officials interviewed to stress that work is conducted within established UK structures. Acknowledgement of the legal terms of the devolution project, however, is just one basis for understanding the actual and practical dynamics of the devolved system across the UK. There are other ways in which the devolved units can challenge, or perhaps even manipulate, the primacy of the central state. In that context, financial and administrative resources are an important factor in determining the capacity and the strength of the devolved unit. In financial terms, Northern Ireland has traditionally benefited from a block grant from Westminster which is disproportionately more generous than that enjoyed by other parts of the UK. However, in the context of the global economic recession and heavy pressures on UK public finances, this ‘generosity’ will not continue. A decrease in block funding to Northern Ireland has significant implications for the Northern Ireland regional economy, the unusual features of which potentially maximise any expected negative impact. Even in the context of devolution therefore, Northern Ireland’s continued financial reliance on the UK central state hampers its autonomy. This is antagonised by the inability of the Northern Ireland devolved unit to raise taxes (unlike its Scottish neighbour). Generally, those regions with independent sources of revenue (i.e. tax-raising powers) enjoy an increased degree of autonomy from the central state. Not entirely the fault of the UK government, the devolution of tax-varying powers was regarded in some unionist circles ‘as too radical a departure from uniformity with the UK’ (Meehan 1999: 26). However, in terms of facilitating the pursuit of a policy approach in Northern Ireland which is distinctive from that of the UK, the inability to raise taxes is obstructive. And furthermore, it may in fact impede the work of the NSMC and the development of all-island strategies in areas such as waste management and pollution control, where the ability to create and impose financial penalties may be advantageous. Financial resources, however, are not the only resource available to the devolved Northern Ireland unit. Other political and administrative resources may allow Northern Ireland to better adapt to the changed political environment. In particular, they may allow Northern Ireland to establish some enhanced degree of autonomy vis-à-vis central government and also influence the EU policy process in ways that promote Northern Ireland interests. In this context, the achievement of effective administrative adaptation to new political circumstances on the part of the devolved administration coupled with shrewd political leadership is crucial, particularly in the context of facilitating useful and beneficial coalition-building within and beyond the state. In Northern Ireland’s case, the devolved polity has responded – politically and administratively – to the changed political context. This response has produced mixed results. The introduction of devolved power prompted a restructuring of Northern Ireland’s civil administration. An increase in the number of government depart-

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ments and the installation of elected Ministers appeared to promise some element of change. In practice, however, a range of factors have served to undermine and limit the extent to which new arrangements have assisted in advancing a more tailored Northern Ireland EU agenda. Significantly, the creation of new administrative structures was not accompanied by any substantial degree of cultural change. Burch et al. (2005: 473) note that the assumptions and values underlying the handling of EU policy in the UK remain largely unchanged subsequent to the introduction of devolution. This has limited the extent to which any type of ‘new politics’ vis-à-vis the EU might emerge from the new political and administrative dispensation. Northern Ireland’s presence in Brussels, in the form of the ONIEB, has been an important development (see Murphy 2011). However, the office does operate within the broader UKRep family and this can on occasion be problematic. There is general agreement among officials and politicians that the major benefit of the UKRep–ONIEB relationship is the access to information which it provides. However, such benefits are sometimes offset by UKRep being unaware of Northern Ireland interests and therefore failing to defend those interests. This is particularly so if Northern Ireland is promoting an agenda which is counter to wider UK interests. Senior officials have thus suggested that the ONIEB is constrained by UKRep. The MOU sets out the terms of this relationship and so formally limits the extent to which devolved regions can depart from the national line. It is important to note too, however, that the ONIEB has itself been deemed to be constrained by limited resources and a degree of ambiguity concerning whether the office represents the Northern Ireland Executive or Northern Ireland more generally. The fault here lies with the Northern Ireland authorities. The MOU details the composition and remit of the JMC[E]. The committee facilitates central coordination of EU policy issues. Indeed, the value of this additional administrative layer is unclear. The JMC structure has developed a reputation for lack of transparency, making it difficult to judge its deliberations. However, it is apparent that Northern Ireland participants have not found it to be an especially useful forum for advancing regional policy objectives and priorities where these positions conflict with national priorities. Northern Ireland politicians and officials alike are of the view that participation in the JMC[E] does not necessarily promise a better outcome for Northern Ireland interests. Rather the JMC[E] is viewed as a means via which the centre seeks to assert a degree of control over regional preferences and activities, thus limiting the autonomy of the regional unit. The creation of the committee has, therefore, not proven to be an innovative institutional development. Instead, it polices the scope for Northern Ireland involvement in the EU policy process by effectively facilitating (and continuing) a gate-keeping role for central government. Although the impact of devolution has not been a game-changer in terms of the Northern Ireland–EU relationship, some interesting developments have nevertheless been achieved. The NITF is worthy of specific mention here in terms of how it has stimulated an improved engagement between Northern Ireland and Brussels. It is likely too that further progress may be achieved in the context of possible

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changes to the nature of the devolved system and the ongoing maturation of political relations. A wholesale reliance on consociational principles may diminish as the peace process continues to evolve and as relations between political parties and communities stabilise further. Indeed, ideas have already been mooted in relation to abandoning the requirement for MLAs to designate identity in the Northern Ireland Assembly (UUP proposals), and the UUP has toyed with the idea of assuming the role of opposition in the Assembly chamber. These types of developments may further legitimise the devolved administration and impact positively on the development of a stronger Northern Ireland position on the EU. Such an agreed position would be difficult for the central state to ignore (particularly in the case of Northern Ireland) and may challenge the constraints which the devolved administration currently faces.

The complexity The constraints facing Northern Ireland politicians in progressing an EU agenda are clearly related to the legal terms of the devolution experiment, but they are also linked to the particular dynamics of a more crowded political space in Northern Ireland. The limited achievements of successive Northern Ireland administrations vis-à-vis their EU responsibilities is complicated by the complexity of Northern Ireland’s distinct political system. Devolution has entailed the creation of new institutions which operate against a particular political backdrop, namely a dualethnic party system. New political structures have increased the number of actors engaged in the political process and simultaneously broadened the spectrum of political representation in Northern Ireland. In addition to internal changes, cross-border and cross-state political relationships have been institutionalised via the creation of the NSMC and the BIC. All of these developments have produced a crowded and complex political system. Such unconventional political arrangements have been born out of a peace process which was resolved to address pressing constitutional and security concerns. The resulting ‘messy’ institutional creations were primarily designed to cement and consolidate peace in Northern Ireland. Devolution in Northern Ireland was thus seen as ‘synonymous with the peace process rather than a focus of governance’ (Knox and Carmichael 2005: 71). The overriding emphasis was on producing an institutional set-up which achieved peace, but not necessarily good governance. Such an approach was clearly warranted. That accepted, its effects have had consequences for the operation and capacity of the new Northern Ireland political dispensation. In other words, the complex character of Northern Ireland’s political system hampers the advancement of Northern Ireland’s EU agenda. A political system is a broad concept which embraces not just the institutions of the state but also the various actors who inhabit and seek to influence those institutions and the relationships which exist between them. The contemporary Northern Ireland political system is one which owes its shape and nature to specific considerations linked to the ‘Troubles’. The number, remit, composition and operation of institutions created by the Belfast Agreement in 1998, and subsequently

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amended by the St Andrews Agreement (2006) and the Hillsborough Agreement (2010), respond to the dynamics of the conflict and attempt to accommodate the interests of two diametrically opposed sets of political aspiration. The resultant political system is complex and composed of three distinct institutional strands. Each strand addresses a particular relationship, be it within Northern Ireland, on the island of Ireland, or between the UK and Ireland. The Northern Ireland political system is evidently unconventional and furthermore, its modus operandi is similarly unusual. In the first instance, the introduction of devolution has added an additional layer of governance to the political architecture of the UK. Devolved powers, however, have not been applied uniformly to the devolved territories of Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales, whilst England does not enjoy devolution at all. This asymmetrical devolution arrangement in the UK is troublesome. Jeffery (2009) notes that the ‘piecemeal’ introduction of devolution to constituent components of the UK has produced a series of problems which inhibit the effectiveness of the UK’s constitutional reform programme. More ominously, the dynamics of devolution also potentially undermine the unity and cohesion of the UK state as nationalist political parties with elevated electoral mandates assume control of devolved governments.2 Furthermore, the limited institutionalisation of intergovernmental relations and some policy divergence between administrations further exacerbate a trend towards what Jeffery terms ‘disequilibrium’ (2009: 291). It appears too that different practices pertain to different regional units. Scotland is more intensively involved, on a largely bilateral basis, with the UK centre than either Wales or Northern Ireland (Jeffery and Palmer 2007: 227). This increasingly fragmented and unbalanced political system, which operates on a non-uniform basis, provides a questionable backdrop against which Northern Ireland might pursue its EU agenda. At the Northern Ireland level, the devolved institutions have assumed specific responsibilities embracing executive, legislative and advisory functions. The exercise of these functions is guided by an adherence to consociational principles. In crude terms, this means that the operation of the Northern Ireland devolved political system is complex and unconventional. In other words, not alone has the system of devolution (across the UK generally) been unable (or unwilling) to challenge traditional approaches to the EU (as detailed above); in Northern Ireland the character and dynamics which animate local politics have also prevented any transformation of the EU dimension to regional politics. The debacle over the proposed CRC at the site of Long Kesh/Maze Prison and, in a related sense, initially lacklustre engagement with the NITF expose how tense political relations can potentially derail the possibilities offered by the EU. The number of political institutions in Northern Ireland is comparatively large, and by necessity the membership of such institutions is diverse. The consociational rules of the game further complicate an already complex and diverse political system by requiring a grand coalition and including veto capacity. EU-related issues have fallen victim to these politically charged decision-making processes. In specific terms, the cross-party nature of the Executive can prevent speedy and

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decisive outputs; the absence of an opposition in the Northern Ireland Assembly can undermine policy development; and the inability to forge a unity of purpose among key political parties can impede progress. At an administrative level, EU-related matters are managed across a variety of different units and institutions. OFMDFM plays a lead role, but the majority of other government departments also have some EU policy dimension to their portfolios. Differences in capacity between departments have not produced a uniform or joined-up approach to all EU policies. Agricultural policy in Northern Ireland is well developed while environmental policy is less so. Other novel and unusual institutions which connect actors on both a cross-border and a cross-state basis also play a role. The North– South SEUPB, which comes under the auspices of the NSMC, has specific responsibility for EU funding, while the BIC also sporadically considers EU policies and developments. At the UK intergovernmental level, the JMC[E] facilitates the central coordination of EU policy. In Brussels, Northern Ireland enjoys support from the ONIEB but must comply with UKRep. This evidently constitutes a crowded institutional space which is made even more complex by the diversity of membership of the various institutions. The quality and quantity of deliberation and outputs produced by all institutions is invariably determined by the membership of those institutions. When relations between members are difficult or strained, this undermines both the efficiency and the effectiveness of the institution and its outputs. It is clear that relations between key political parties and blocs in Northern Ireland have long been problematic. This history of antagonism survives and is facilitated by the resilience of Northern Ireland’s dual-ethnic party system. This system limits the extent to which communities and their political representatives can practically and realistically be reconciled. The consequence of these particular circumstances is a difficulty in establishing constructive relations between political foes. In that context, tensions between the two largest parties, Sinn Féin and the DUP, are ever present. The result is a form of lowest common denominator politics – a trend which Farry (2009: 177) has previously referred to – but one which is more than anecdotal in relation to Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU. Some positive developments are evident – some related to the NITF – but these have been slow to materialise. Instead, instances of unawareness, indecision and political wrangling have been more plentiful. Initially lax engagement with the work of the NITF, minimal acknowledgement of the EU in early PfGs, and the political palaver which characterised the eventual abandonment of an EU-sponsored CRC are high-profile examples of the way in which the devolved system can impede the pursuit of a more decisive and determined Northern Ireland EU agenda. Problems of this nature are further exacerbated by the poor quality of political leadership in Northern Ireland as noted by a number of interviewees. Officials based in Northern Ireland and Brussels suggest that in their attempts to pursue – or in the case of European Commission officials to facilitate – a more rigorous Northern Ireland EU agenda, they are invariably hamstrung by the indecision, lack of direction and sometimes inflexibility of political leaders in Northern Ireland. This criticism is born out of the inadequate levels of knowledge of the EU

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among key political figures. It relates too to the Eurosceptic position of 11 of the 13 Northern Ireland Ministers. Difficulties at the political level are similarly reflected at the administrative level. A general lack of policy capacity within the Northern Ireland civil service has been noted (Birrell 2012a: 318). This problem is evident for EU issues too, although recent attempts to correct this have seen an increase in the capacity of the ONIEB – a development again facilitated by the NITF. Northern Ireland’s political parties, and especially the DUP and Sinn Féin, have been among the main benefactors of the devolution experiment. Parties had much to gain with the introduction of devolution, and particularly so in the context of its consociational character which privileges political elites. For the first time in almost 30 years, parties assumed political control over matters of devolved responsibility. Previous to this period, they were very much on the sidelines of the political system, having no involvement in either national or regional governments. In contrast, during this same period, civil society enjoyed an elevated role in Northern Ireland society, including responsibility for the provision of a range of services. The EU, in the context of supporting the broader peace process, fostered the non-state sector. In this respect, civil society organisations have managed, distributed and benefited from successive Peace funding programmes. The introduction of devolution after 1999 has, however, undermined the role of civil society in Northern Ireland. The regional political elite is resistant to the notion of ‘sharing’ power with civil society actors. In fact, some of the latter’s previous roles have now been assumed by the new political administration. The granting of legal and political authority to elected regional politicians clearly democratises the exercise of power in Northern Ireland. As a consequence, however, the process of institutionalising political power in Northern Ireland has undermined the role of civil society and has focused authority and control in the hands of elected representatives. MLG theorists suggest that this may not be for the best. A lack of synergy between politics and civil society skews the political system and may hamper the advancement of policy. Moves to reinforce the strength and dynamism of Northern Ireland’s EU policy community are afoot in the context of the creation of the Northern Ireland European Regional Forum led by Belfast City Council. The success of this initiative remains to be seen. Importantly therefore, it is not simply the official and legal terms of the devolution package which constrain the freedom of action of Northern Ireland in EU-related matters. These are indeed significant, but they are exacerbated by the particular character of Northern Ireland’s political system. The introduction of devolution has alleviated the more toxic elements of that system. However, political change has not produced a political system which is built on fully cohesive institutions, a clear philosophical or ideological position on the EU, a well equipped civil service (beyond OFMDFM), cooperative relations between parties, and the constructive involvement of civil society. Northern Ireland’s political system, as it has evolved since 1999, is complex, cumbersome and still hamstrung by an inability to overcome the communal divide. The consequence is that contrary to what MLG theorists might espouse, Northern Ireland has been unable to assert its autonomy in any substantial way

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in the realm of EU affairs. Indeed, the introduction of devolution has ‘locked in’ elements of the central state in ways which were not previously obvious. It has effectively resulted in a political system which is more government than governance. To put it more succinctly, in terms of its EU remit, devolution has not occasioned a movement from government to governance in Northern Ireland.

The division The existence of division in Northern Ireland’s political system is a reflection of the division which exists between communities there. Northern Ireland society has long been subjected to profound communal division, which is not just evident in relation to religious affiliation and political aspiration, but also manifests itself in other ways, including segregated housing, education, employment and sport and leisure activities. The intensity of this division had fatal consequences during the ‘Troubles’, but this has subsequently been addressed by the peace process. The divisions between Northern Ireland’s two communities, however, remain apparent. Critics of the Northern Ireland consociational settlement suggest that the physical and figurative distance which continues to exist between communities is problematic and has not been substantially addressed by the 1998 Belfast Agreement. The process of bringing communities together and achieving reconciliation following a long and violent conflict is not easily realised. Despite the near-eradication of political violence from society, communal division lingers. Its intensity may have dissipated, but the construction of communal division around opposing models of national identity remains evident. National identity is the primary source of division in Northern Ireland. With opposing national identities, the unionist and nationalist communities aspire to contrary political futures and often hold distinctly different views in relation to a range of issues and public policies, including those with an EU dimension. As a consequence, the community divide can inhibit Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU because it often exposes and reflects underlying tensions between the two communities. Therefore, although the peace process has stabilised Northern Ireland society, the division between communities has proved resilient and has been an impediment to the development of a Northern Ireland EU strategy. In this way, the communal divide in Northern Ireland undermines the regional pursuit of EU interests. Overcoming historic communal rivalries in Northern Ireland is not solely dependent on the nature of the devolved political system. It is true that devolution in Northern Ireland was primarily tailored to address the conflict, but it is equally clear that a total reliance on consociationalism is insufficient to achieving reconciliation at the popular level. Crucially, some degree of reconciliation and trust is necessary if the devolved political system is to pioneer new, innovative and also more efficient policies and programmes. The political class cannot (and will not) be in a position to introduce and sponsor new initiatives if such initiatives are perceived as favouring one community over another. Lessening the attachment to identity and community, therefore, may facilitate a type of politics which is not restricted by communal division. Achieving a loosening of these types of bonds,

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however, is by no means straightforward. Under any circumstances, resolving differences based on identity is an inherently difficult task. And one that may be made even more difficult by the consociational character of the devolved political system in Northern Ireland. Others, however, are less pessimistic and predict that as the system beds down, there will be an organic and positive impact at the popular level. To date, this has not transpired, at least not to any significant extent. Northern Ireland society remains divided along communal lines and this is evident in relation to perspectives on the EU. Northern Ireland voters tend to judge the EU on economic terms. In this context, Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU is largely focused on the financial support which emanates from Brussels. This includes not just the CAP and structural funds, but perhaps most saliently, the Peace programmes. EU financial transfers to Northern Ireland have been substantial, particularly since the first Peace programme was rolled out in 1995. In the context of successive Peace programmes, the EU has allocated funding directly to a large number and wide range of grassroots organisations. Additionally, District Partnerships and IFBs have been involved in the management and distribution of funding. A number of organisations owe their very existence to the EU and have been sustained as a consequence of Peace funding. A recognition of the financial assistance to Northern Ireland colours attitudes towards the EU. This appreciation of the EU, however, does not always cross the communal divide. The Protestant community has long complained that its members have not benefited to the same extent from EU funding initiatives, particularly the Peace programmes, as the Catholic community has (Racioppi and O’Sullivan See 2007: 381). Considering the utilitarian basis of Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU, explicit identification with the EU is, perhaps unsurprisingly, weak. In 2002, 67 per cent of Northern Ireland respondents indicated that they never think of themselves as European (McGowan and O’Connor 2004: 30). This sentiment, however, is not uniform for both communities in Northern Ireland. A higher proportion of nationalists than unionists always or sometimes identify themselves as European (see Clements 2010). This finding suggests that voters may be taking their cue from political parties. Opposition to the EU among Northern Ireland political parties crosses the communal divide. However, although the DUP, Sinn Féin and the UUP express reservations about the EU, the depth of their opposition varies across the three parties. The UUP has adopted a self-professed ‘Eurorealist’ perspective on the EU which emphasises cooperation between nation-states as opposed to deepening European integration. Sinn Féin is not anti-EU per se – the party’s soft Euroscepticism is based on ‘critical engagement’ with the EU rather than principled objections to European integration (see Maillot 2009). The DUP is the most avowedly Eurosceptic party in Northern Ireland. In contrast, the SDLP and APNI are both strongly supportive of the EU and the European integration process. If public opinion on the EU is influenced by political party cues – and that certainly appears to be the case in Northern Ireland – it is unlikely that voters’ positions on the EU are always instinctive and genuine. In a study of the Europe-

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Table 8.1  Turnout in Northern Ireland elections 2003–11 Election

Turnout (%)

2011 Assembly election

55.6

2010 Westminster election

57.6

2009 EP election

42.4

2007 Assembly election

63.0

2005 Westminster election

63.5

2005 Local election

63.0

2004 EP election

51.7

2003 Assembly election

64.0

Compiled from the Electoral Commission (available at: www.electoralcommission.org.uk).

anisation of political parties on the island of Ireland, North and South, Murphy and Hayward (2009) argue that the process has been characterised by tendencies that include conditionality and pragmatism, and moreover, that it has been an elite-led project. Despite advocating specific views on the EU therefore, it appears that Northern Ireland political parties and their grassroots supporters are not demonstrating deep-rooted ideological and philosophical positions on the EU. Moravscik (2008: 339) captures this view more crudely when he suggests that ‘from the perspective of citizens, the critical fact about EU politics is that it is boring’. The absence of any sort of innate or entrenched socio-psychological attachment to the EU in Northern Ireland results in non-participation and apathy. In turn, this is non-conducive to citizens demanding that their political leaders pursue greater engagement with the EU. The apathy to which Moravscik alludes is evident in relation to turnout rates for elections to the EP. In Northern Ireland, these are consistently less than those for domestic elections (see Table 8.1). Of course, Northern Ireland is not unusual – this trend is in line with experiences in other parts of the EU. Nevertheless, these figures suggest some degree of apathy towards the EU on the part of Northern Ireland voters. Although apathy may not necessarily be obstructive, it can undermine any necessity on the part of political leaders in Northern Ireland to pursue innovation and dynamism – approaches which are important if the region is to develop and enhance its engagement with the EU. Of similar significance is the observation that voter choice in EP elections is often dictated by domestic factors. Northern Ireland voters continue to choose parties according to constitutional preference as opposed to ideological persuasion. The only distinction to be made here is in terms of intrabloc voting. In a study of the 2009 EP election in Northern Ireland, Garry (2012: 123–124) notes that voters distinguish between the SDLP and Sinn Féin on the basis of their pro- versus anti-EU positions. He equates this with a ‘partial “normalisation”’ (emphasis in the original) of Northern Ireland politics. This is because the EU divide drives voter behaviour at EP elections only and has not resulted in pro-EU Protestant voters crossing the communal divide to vote for the pro-EU and nation-

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alist SDLP. It remains substantially the case therefore that the EU preferences of Northern Ireland’s political parties are only decisive in attracting votes under limited circumstances. In both the 2005 and 2009 EP elections, Northern Ireland voters returned MEPs representing the DUP, Sinn Féin and the UUP, all of whom have Eurosceptic tendencies. Prior to 2005, the electorate consistently returned just one Europhile MEP, the SDLP’s John Hume. There is a paradoxical relationship between voter behaviour and public opinion here. More than in any other region of the UK and across a range of policy areas, Northern Ireland respondents view the benefits of EU membership positively, yet their voting behaviour does not reflect this.3 This tendency among Northern Ireland voters not to divorce EU considerations from domestic and constitutional issues is largely explained with reference to the legacy of the conflict. However, it is also affected by other factors. Despite having some appreciation of the advantages of EU membership, the Northern Ireland electorate is, in the same way as the political elite, under-informed when it comes to understanding the EU and its dynamics. An information deficit exists, and this is exacerbated by press and media coverage which often reinforces misinformation. Knowledge is a determining factor in dictating the broad tenor of public discourse on any issue. In the case of the EU, the existence of confusion among voters, coupled with a degree of apathy and a biased press, limits the likelihood of quality critical discussion. Furthermore, although opportunities once existed for a vibrant and dynamic EU policy community to emerge in Northern Ireland, these evaporated with the closing of the independent NICE and the think-tank Democratic Dialogue. Recent attempts to reinvigorate public discourse and civil society input are underway, but little can be concluded at this early stage in the revival of the EU policy community. All of the above influences (or lack thereof) impact equally on both communities. Nevertheless, it is clear that differences exist between the two blocs in terms of their identification with and attitudes towards the EU. Nationalists tend to identify with the EU to a greater extent than their Protestant counterparts and they also view the EU more positively. The backdrop against which these attitudes and positions have developed is important. It bears some relationship to the cues provided by political parties, but it is also related to the absence of trust between communities. In the period immediately after the signing and early implementation of the Belfast Agreement, the Protestant community was substantially more reticent about devolution than the Catholic community. Successive surveys recorded a view among Protestants that their community had benefited less well than the nationalist community in the years after 1998 (see MacGinty and du Toit 2007). Such perceptions were based on policy developments including, most controversially, police reform: ‘Overall [negative] interpretations of the Agreement [among Protestants] are reinforced by perceptions of the implementation of policy provisions stemming from the Agreement’ (MacGinty and du Toit 2007: 24). However, since the reintroduction of devolution in 2007, relations between Catholics and Protestants appear to have improved: ‘it is worth noting that while Catholics have been consistently more positive over the years, the figure for Prot-

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Northern Ireland and the European Union

estants in recent years has risen to nearly that recorded for Catholics’4 (Devine et al. 2011: 2). A clear ‘European’ example of this trend is evident in relation to the finding by Byrne et al. (2009a) that EU funding to Northern Ireland has helped to build trust between communities. Despite some promising signs, however, it is clear that a number of specific policies do not fit this generalisation and expose lingering differences between the two communities which may prove disruptive in the future. For example, Protestants and Catholics do not share similar views in relation to many of the more controversial EU issues including the Euro, enlargement, the question of EU taxation and immigration.5 The root of such disparities often relates to considerations of national sovereignty, and by extension concerns around (national) identity. Both communities have historically displayed very different views in relation to these issues. The existence of different views is not in itself problematic. However, in a society where intergroup trust is low, differing attitudes can be imbued with all sorts of troublesome meanings. This may lead to entrenchment and an inability on the part of each community to respect the other’s position. Gormley-Heenan and MacGinty (2009: 424) note that: ‘for any peacemaking process to take root and become sustained, it would seem that intergroup trust needs to develop’. In the context of many current and future EU issues, the absence of trust limits the possibilities for promoting ‘normal’ politics, good governance and stable communal relations.

Conclusion The relationship between Northern Ireland and the EU has been to the benefit of the former. That benefit is most manifest with respect to the economic component of Northern Ireland’s engagement with the EU. It embraces the effects of the SEM, CAP and particularly the structural funds and successive Peace programmes. Matters financial are also those which receive most attention from the Northern Ireland public. The merits of the Northern Ireland–EU relationship are typically judged on the basis of the financial largesse which emanates from Brussels. Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU, however, has many more dimensions than just the economic. The devolution of power to new and novel Northern Ireland institutions after 1999 marked an important moment in Northern Ireland’s political journey from a turbulent and troubled past to a stable and optimistic future. Part of that journey has involved, at least in theory, greater control over Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU. That control is filtered through a range of new regional institutions and the development of relationships and networks. The very existence of new institutions, actors and networks and the emergence of new processes, priorities and approaches do not automatically imply change for either better or worse. A ‘new politics’ as labelled by Bradbury and Mitchell (2001) has particular resonance in Northern Ireland. For too long, politics in the conventional sense was largely absent; the local political system was problematic; and discourse was dominated by a narrow and contested subject. The breadth of discourse has clearly increased; the focus of politics has broadened; the EU agenda has been

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elevated; and political engagement with the public policy process has materialised. The outcome of this changed political and policy environment, however, has not produced radically different outputs, nor has it substantially redirected the focus of EU policy. No political system exists in isolation from its own society. In effect, the dynamic of the relationship between those who govern and those who are governed is dictated by the terms and character of the political system. Northern Ireland’s political system is comparatively unique. It has struggled since 1999 to reach some degree of equilibrium and its efforts have been stymied by the constraints imposed by the devolution arrangements; the complexity of the devolved system and its consociational dimensions; and the resilience of political division. Nevertheless, in partnership with the EU (particularly the work of the NITF) and in terms of the gradual political maturation of the polity, modest outcomes have been achieved. The focus of Northern Ireland’s relationship with the EU has become more streamlined and more appropriate to the needs and interests of the region. This has been aided not just by the bedding down of devolution since 2007, but also by the adaptation of the NICS to new political realities. The European Division of OFMDFM, and particularly the ONIEB, have been instrumental in this regard. Civil society’s role and contribution to the EU agenda remains rooted in novel and valuable funding initiatives, but a wider role is in the planning. The external relationships which Northern Ireland has fostered, particularly via the NSMC and BIC, are functional in nature and practically focused. They have broadened Northern Ireland’s outlook and provided additional and alternative routes of influence. Their limits, however, are yet to be tested. Governance processes are evident in Northern Ireland. Since 2007, they have been simultaneously enhanced (for example, by closer direct engagement with the EU) and diminished (for example, by some marginalisation of civil society). The resilience of central state oversight is similarly evident. Northern Ireland is a very different place since the turn of the twenty-first century. The stability and peace which the region enjoys has transformed life there and it has transformed politics too. Differences and division persist, but they are now better managed and controlled. The process of agreeing policy is not without its flaws, and it may not always produce optimal outputs, but it does allow for the gradual achievement of progress and a steady (if incomplete) normalisation of the political process. The EU has played a supporting role. This, however, does not mean that the MLG model captures the full complexity and nuance of the dynamics and relationships which characterise the new Northern Ireland and its relationship with the EU. The model is certainly a useful tool with which to interrogate the experiences of a European region. However, not all MLG claims and pronouncements mesh fully with the empirical findings revealed in this study of a European region. Neither the EU nor devolution have occasioned a movement away from government and towards governance. The traditional mechanisms associated with the state may now have a different form, but their intensity and dominance survive. The influence of the EU at the regional level is mediated by the nature of state arrangements and the characteristics of the region itself. In

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Northern Ireland, a series of national and regional constraints, complexities and divisions limit the application of the MLG model. These features and characteristics are likely to be found in other regions. Although their nature and intensity will invariably be different, their impact may well align with the Northern Ireland experience of life as an EU region. The EU is not a singular force which operates without reference to the domestic dynamics and dimensions of individual regions. The EU may potentially edge regions in directions which comply with features of the MLG model, but this is only so if those directions coincide with domestic wishes.

Notes  1 A Place Apart is the title of a book by novelist Dervla Murphy. It was published in 1978 and recounts Murphy’s travels and encounters in Northern Ireland during the 1970s.   2 The significance of this development was underlined in early 2012 when a war of words broke out between the Prime Minister, David Cameron, and Scotland’s First Minister, Alex Salmond, concerning the constitutionality and timing of the referendum on Scottish independence.   3 53 per cent of Northern Ireland residents agree that EU membership has improved their human rights; 60 per cent agree that the SEM has helped consumers; 56 per cent agree that EU membership has improved working conditions; 63 per cent view the EU as having helped the environment; and 54 per cent believe the EU has provided the UK with a greater say in international trade negotiations (Eurobarometer 2007: 64).   4 The figures referred to here are those recorded in response to the question: ‘Have relations between Catholics and Protestants improved over the last five years’?   5 In 2002, when asked ‘would you vote to join the Euro?’, 63 per cent of Protestants, in contrast to 32 per cent of Catholics, responded no. The same survey revealed that 53 per cent of Catholics favoured further enlargement of the EU. The comparable figure for Protestants was 33 per cent. On the question of whether decisions about taxes should be made by the EU a discrepancy is again evident – a larger proportion of Protestants (69 per cent) than Catholics (57 per cent) believe that such decisions should be mostly made by individual governments (Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2002, http:// goo.gl/sYNQo7). A 2006 survey querying support for restrictions on immigration for Bulgarians and Romanians revealed that 82 per cent of Protestants as opposed to 59 per cent of Catholics favour the imposition of restrictions (Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey 2006, http://goo.gl/WZFLnb).

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Index

additionality 49–50, 75 agriculture 12, 126, 161, 169 and British–Irish Council 151 and interest groups 58–59 Ministers 105–107 and North–South cooperation 139–140 and Northern Ireland economy 55–56 and Office of Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels (ONIEB) 56 and structural funds 48–49 and Whitehall 98 see also Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (APNI) 78, 99, 119, 134 Allister, Jim 82, 110–111, 117, 136, 145 see also Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) Anglo-Irish Agreement 72, 74–75 Barroso, José Manuel 139, 166 Belfast Agreement (1998) 9, 29–35, 53, 67, 76–77, 89, 111, 131, 148, 178, 182–183, 186 and British–Irish Council (BIC) 149, 153 and identity 89, 91 and North–South Ministerial Council (NSMC) 139, 141 and Northern Ireland Ministers 103 and OFMDFM Committee 120 and Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) 142, 147 see also consociationalism; devolution Belfast City Council 88, 153n.1, 185 block grant 40, 41, 180 British–Irish Council 33, 148–152, 153, 191

Cameron, David 10, 41, 99, 119 ceasefires 25, 40, 75 Civic Forum 31, 84, 87 civil rights movement 25 civil service 26, 87, 124, 126, 134, 185 policy group 165 see also Northern Ireland Civil Service (NICS) civil society 83–88 collective responsibility 32 Committee of the Centre 114, 115 EU Enquiry (2002) 162 see also OFMDFM Committee Committee of the Regions (CoR) 101, 115, 121, 144, 172 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 55–59 see also agriculture concordat 100–101, 105, 113, 136, 169 Conflict Resolution Centre (CRC) 110–111, 113, 118, 168, 169, 183, 184 Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition 10, 160 Conservative Party 10, 78, 116 alliance with Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 79 consociationalism 30, 34, 84–85, 91, 186 see also devolution; power-sharing constitutional reform 95, 183 corporation tax 41 Council of Ministers 28, 68, 72, 77, 100 and Northern Ireland Ministers 105–107, 163, 172 Delors, Jacques 51, 71 Democratic Unionist Party 9, 33, 34, 70, 75, 78–82 passim, 84, 98–99, 109,

212 110–113 passim, 119, 133, 134, 140, 145, 150, 156, 184, 185, 187 see also Paisley, Revd Dr Ian Deputy First Minister 31, 34, 84, 99, 103–105 passim, 115, 139 devolution 2, 9–12 passim, 29–35, 40–41, 46, 51, 58, 61–62, 63, 73–77, 95, 96, 97, 101, 118, 127, 139, 155, 160, 163, 165, 169, 173, 175, 177–183 passim, 186, 191 and civil society 86–88 passim and identity 91 and political parties 77–78, 80–83 see also consociationalism; power-sharing direct rule 25–27, 29, 74, 84, 88, 158–159, 173 directives 114, 161, 166 d’Hondt 31, 77, 124 District Partnerships 51–52, 53, 85 Downing Street Declaration (1993) 75, 76 Easter Rising (1916) 23 Economic and Social Committee (Ecosoc) 101, 115, 121, 144, 172 education 7, 25, 80, 112, 140, 149, 156, 159, 186 elections 77–81 passim, 188–189 energy 44, 98, 149, 153 nuclear 151 environmental policy 98, 101, 104, 111, 126, 161, 174, 184 Euro 119, 190 see also single currency Europe 2020 38, 44–46, 47, 63, 117, 124, 135, 158, 170, 175 European Commission 57, 63, 85, 93, 106, 111, 117, 152, 164, 170, 175 and British–Irish Council (BIC) 150 and EU funding 148 and Europe 2020 46 and Northern Ireland Civil Service (NICS) 116 and Northern Ireland Taskforce (NITF) 38, 71–72, 167–168 and Peace programmes 53–54, 61 President 51, 105, 108, 139, 166, 173 and Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) 144, 147

Index European Council 68, 97, 98 European Parliament (EP) 70–71, 72, 77, 79, 80–83 passim, 92 see also elections European Regional Forum 185 Europeanisation 15, 81 Executive Committee 31–32, 124, 125 see also Northern Ireland Executive federalism 23, 30, 74, 179 First Minister 31, 34, 79, 84, 99, 103–105 passim, 115, 139 Fiscal Compact 99 see also Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance Frameworks Documents (1995) 60, 72, 75n.k, 76 government departments 50, 86, 97, 100, 102–103, 115, 133, 137, 139, 144, 165, 169 Government of Ireland Act (1920) 24 Green Party 78 Haagerup Report 70, 72 Haas, Richard 109 Hillsborough Agreement (2010) 34, 110, 183 home rule 23–24 Hume, John 70, 82, 189 see also Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) Hunger Strikes 110 identity 4, 7, 28, 88–92, 182, 186–187, 190 implementation bodies 32, 139–141 see also Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) intergovernmentalism 13 Intermediary Funding Bodies (IFBs) 51, 52–53, 54, 85, 148 International Fund for Ireland (IFI) 72 IntertradeIreland 140 ‘Irish dimension’ 32, 70, 74, 75, 131 Irish Government 74, 75, 116, 117 Irish Permanent Representation (IRep) 118, 138, 139, 152 Irish Republican Army (IRA) 78, 111

Index Joint Ministerial Committee on Europe (JMC[E]) 43, 97–100, 127, 171, 181 Junior Ministers 103, 105, 109 Lisbon Treaty 10, 119, 146, 157 Long Kesh/Maze Prison 110, 183 Members of European Parliament (MEPs) 57, 82–83, 92, 115, 121, 133, 138, 144, 152, 189 Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 96–97, 101, 113, 136, 169, 181 multi-level governance (MLG) 1–2, 3, 5, 15–16, 28, 55, 63, 83, 89, 118, 127, 132, 139, 178, 185, 191–192 neofunctionalism 13 New Ireland Forum 74 report of 74, 76 North–South Ministerial Council (NSMC) 32–33, 77, 139–142, 146, 180, 191 Northern Ireland Assembly 31, 32, 113, 118–125, 170–172 passim 2011 election 79 1982–86 74 Northern Ireland Centre in Europe (NICE) 87, 133–134, 135, 139, 189 Northern Ireland Civil Service (NICS) 26, 102, 116–117, 127, 138, 175, 191 secondments 116, 165, 167, 169, 173 see also civil service Northern Ireland Executive 5, 61, 77, 82, 96, 100, 103, 105, 109, 113, 123–125 passim, 156, 175 and Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) 54, 146 see also Executive Committee; Office of Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels (ONIEB) Northern Ireland Office (NIO) 26, 164 Northern Ireland Rural Development Programme (RDP) (2007–13) 57 Northern Ireland Taskforce (NITF) 45, 71, 72, 116, 117–118, 127, 138–139, 170–175 passim report of 166–168 Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) 102,103,

213 114–118 Office of the Northern Ireland Executive in Brussels (ONIEB) 45, 56, 105, 114–117, 132–139, 152, 181 Oireachtas 124–125, 127 opposition 32, 124, 125, 184 Opsahl Commission 69 Paisley, Revd Dr Ian 82, 101, 112, 150 party system 78–79, 83 dual-ethnic 158, 182, 184 Peace programmes 29, 51–54, 62, 84–85, 86, 187 Plaid Cymru 77–78 political parties 77–83, 92–93 see also party system power-sharing 5, 31, 32, 74, 82, 99, 100, 111, 112, 139, 170 see also consociationalism; devolution Programme for Cohesion, Sharing and Integration 110, 112 proportional representation with a single transferable vote (PR-STV) 31 public consultation 43, 58, 86–87, 92, 144, 145, 164 reconciliation 51, 53, 85, 86, 148, 186 Review of Public Administration (RPA) 112 rural development 48, 57, 104, 165 Scottish National Party (SNP) 73, 77–78 single currency 161 see also Euro Single European Market (SEM) 10, 37, 38, 41–45, 59, 62, 63, 190 Single Market Act 37, 38, 43, 62 Sinn Féin 9, 34, 78–83 passim, 92, 109, 110–113 passim, 119, 133, 134, 145, 156, 184, 185, 187–189 passim Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) 17, 28, 71, 77, 78–81 passim, 92, 119, 134, 188–189 see also Hume, John Special EU Programmes Body (SEUPB) 53, 54, 61, 86, 141, 142–148, 153 St Andrews Agreement (2006) 32, 34, 183 Stormont 9, 24–25, 28 structural funds 47–51, 62, 71

214 see also Peace Programmes Sunningdale Agreement (1974) 74 Thatcher, Margaret 71, 75 Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) 83 see also Allister, Jim Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union 157 UK Permanent Representation (UKRep) 101, 102, 118, 136, 152, 175, 181 Ulster Farmers’ Union (UFU) 58–59, 112 Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) 25, 28, 70, 78–82 passim, 108, 119, 125, 182, 187 United States of America (USA) 66, 131 water framework directive 86 Westminster 2, 24, 25, 30, 74, 123–127 passim, 159 2010 election 78, 188 see also elections

Index