No Conquest, No Defeat: Iran's National Security Strategy 9780197554586, 019755458X, 9780197566916, 019756691X, 9780197566923, 0197566928

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NO CONQUEST, NO DEFEAT

ARIANE M. TABATABAI

No Conquest, No Defeat Iran’s National Security Strategy

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3 Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries. Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press 198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America © Ariane M. Tabatabai, 2020 First published in the United Kingdom in 2020 by C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd All rights reserved. No part of Publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above. You must not circulate this work in any other form and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer A copy of this book’s Cataloging-in-Publication Data is on file with the Library of Congress. ISBN 9780197534601

CONTENTS

Author’s Note vii Introduction 1 1. The Rise and Fall of the Qajars 23 2. Reza Shah, the Modernizing Strongman 63 3. The Last King: Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, 97 the Autocratic Reformer 4. The Revolution 147 5. They Were Expendable: The Iran–Iraq War 187 6. The Revolution Matures (1988–2001): Consolidation, 227 Reconstruction, and Reform 7. The Revolution Expands 253 Conclusion 297 Notes Index

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AUTHOR’S NOTE

I joined the faculty of the Edmund A.Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University in January 2015, shortly after I submitted my Ph.D. at King’s College London and completed one of two fellowships I would receive at the Harvard Kennedy School. For the next three and half years, I regularly taught a course I had designed on Iranian national security policies. Each semester, I modified the syllabus, hoping to provide the most comprehensive set of materials on the topic to my students—often wishing I could assign a book contextualizing the themes, topics, and issues we were covering.The absence of such a book pushed me to build on my Ph.D. research and other projects to produce this resource. And as I became more engaged in policy discussions on Iran, the need for the book became clearer: history, politics, and security thinking are deeply intertwined in Iran (as they are in other countries); yet, the three strands of the existing literature on the country’s security policies rarely meet at a junction. I started writing this book in earnest in 2015 to address these gaps but the process began years before. Along the way, I went through the inevitable highs and lows most researchers and writers experience. But a number of academic and policy institutions in the United States and in Europe, family, friends, colleagues, mentors, students, helped me throughout the process. Without them, the research, writing, and editing stages would have been much lonelier and the book in your hands much less appealing. Of course, all deficiencies and mistakes are solely my responsibility. First, I owe gratitude to my parents for their support throughout the years and also for their direct contribution to this work: they read vii

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several versions of this book, provided feedback and helped me gain access to sources—some of which were not easily accessible to me. Thank you also to my partner, siblings, and friends for putting up with me throughout this process. Aubrey Kenton Thibaut’s patience, support, and willingness to read and reread various versions of the manuscript made its realization possible. My friend and colleague Becca Wasser also generously dedicated her (often scarce!) time to reading several iterations of the present book and providing considerable (and, more importantly, ruthless) feedback. Kenton and Becca have made me a better writer and if this book makes sense to the reader, it is largely thanks to them. I am also grateful to the many friends and mentors without whom this project would not have materialized, Professors Elizabeth Stanley, Steven Miller, Stephen Walt, and Jon Alterman for their feedback; Ambassador Linton Brooks, Doug Wilson, Jon Wolfsthal, Richard Nephew, Sharon Squassoni, Elissa Catalano Ewers, Ilan Goldenberg, and Professors Bruce Hoffman, Daniel Byman, Christine Fair, Vali Nasr, and Mohsen Milani for their continuous support and advice; and Michael Eisenstadt and the anonymous reviewers for their insights. The review process is one all scholars dread but, in this case, it has much improved the book. Other friends and colleagues have played an important role in this process, some without even knowing it. My Ph.D. supervisors, Professors Wyn Bowen and James Gow and my examiners Professors Ali Ansari and Robert Gleave—who would likely not recognize much of the present book—helped me lay out the foundations of this project. I finished the book at the RAND Corporation, where I owe a debt of gratitude to a number of my colleagues, particularly Colin Clarke, Christine Wormuth, Jeffrey Martini, Tom Szayna, Molly Dunigan, Molly Dunnigan, and Stephanie Young. My co-authors and editors have helped me become a better writer and thinker. Finally, the accommodating yet uncompromising publication team at Hurst led by Michael Dwyer, Farhaana Arefin, and Daisy Leitch lent rigor to the book and made it possible. Michael and Farhaana believed in this project when I did not and for that, I am forever grateful. My former RAs, who have since gone on to do great things, whose formidable work ethic, legwork, and insight made the book possible: Darya Dolzikova, Zach Kosbie, and Jesse Reif. viii

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This book would not have appeared without the time allocated to me (often continuously) by various colleagues and officials in the United States, Europe, Iran, and the Persian Gulf. I was fortunate to hear from some key protagonists of contemporary Iranian history and their counterparts in relevant countries and to be able to reflect their views on some of the contemporary events that have shaped the modern landscape of the Middle East in this book, and I am grateful to them for this opportunity. Lastly, financial and material resources and other assistance from several institutions were critical to the completion of this work: The Stanton Foundation, the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, King’s College London, and the Georgetown University Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Columbia University, and the RAND Corporation. I also owe a shoutout to a number of coffee shops, vineyards, and bars in the D.C. area, which helped keep me well-fed (and thus grounded) as I wrote and re-wrote several hundred pages over the course of several years. A note on translations and transliterations: All translations are mine unless indicated otherwise. I have tried to be as faithful to the original texts as possible, frequently sacrificing style for fidelity to ensure accuracy. Transliterations are a complex affair, which I must admit I have never fully mastered. For the sake of clarity and simplicity, I have chosen simple transliterations (which many colleagues will undoubtedly frown upon). By doing so, I have sacrificed rigor and consistency to make the book as accessible as possible to a broad audience. Washington, D.C. and Upperville, VA.

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INTRODUCTION

While there exist myriad views on the causes and consequences of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, most scholars and observers agree that the event ushered in a complete reorientation of the country’s internal political dynamics and, consequently, its foreign and security policies. The revolution replaced the US-aligned monarch Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, better known as the Shah, with a religiously conservative and reactionary Islamic Republic. On its face, Iran seemed to have become an altogether different country almost overnight. In the decades that have passed since then, scholars and analysts have vigorously debated various aspects of  Iranian foreign and security policies. Y   et, a significant assumption has underpinned many such investigations: namely, that Tehran’s foreign and security policy direction today is fundamentally divorced from and driven by a largely different calculus to that of the pre-revolution era.1 According to this thinking, the country’s modern history can be divided into two distinct periods: the pre- and post-revolution eras. This supposition is prevalent among students not only of Iran but also of international relations, because observers tend, consciously or not, to underpin their analysis of revolutionary states’ security thinking with the widely accepted notion that ‘a “revolution” [is defined] as the destruction of an existing state by members of  its own society, followed by the creation of a new political order.’2 Hannah Arendt argues that ‘[t]he modern concept of revolution [is] inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of history suddenly begins anew, that an entirely new story, a story never known or told before, is about to unfold.’3 1

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According to this prevalent line of thinking, the new political order ushered in by a revolution entails fundamentally different assumptions about the state’s view of itself and the international system surrounding it. As Samuel Huntington posits, ‘[a] revolution is a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies.’4 And revolutionary states, scholars argue, are more likely to become involved in military conflicts than other states due to such factors as their domestic political structures, the frequency by which they result in personalist dictatorships, or other systemic drivers.5 Those observing Iran today—as is often the case for students of revolutionary states, including twentieth-century Russia and China—see the revolution as a clear and decisive break in the country’s strategic thinking, processes and procedures, and policy outputs. On the surface, the Islamic Republic continues to be a revolutionary state whose outlook and policies today are fundamentally different from those of pre-revolution Iran. Much of the observable present in Iran seems to confirm this presupposition. Four decades after the regime’s inception, hardline clerics still take to state media to call on their fellow Iranians, as well as Muslims worldwide, to stand up to the West by resisting its ‘bullying’ and rejecting its ideals. They work the crowds as their chants of ‘death to America’ echo through the courtyards of mosques and university campuses across the country every Friday following the traditional congregational prayer. ‘The people of Iran,’ Tehran’s hardline Friday prayer leader Ahmad Khatami illustratively claimed in 2019, ‘have seen tribal wars, the Imposed War, coups d’état, conspiracies, American schemes to attack […], and tens of other machinations since the revolution.’6 These mantras also resonate throughout the numerous arms exhibitions and military parades celebrating the revolution and other major events in the nation’s history. There, the armed forces unveil and display missiles, rockets, and drones decorated with revolutionary slogans and emblems—weapons that Iran also supplies to various designated terrorist and insurgent groups in the Middle East and beyond. Iranian military commanders and political officials use these exhibitions to remind domestic and international audiences that the 2

INTRODUCTION

indigenously built equipment and weapons demonstrate the Iranian nation’s resilience in the face of the most stringent Western-imposed sanctions on the country.7 And catchphrases such as ‘We can and we did’ accompany ‘America can’t do a damn thing.’8 Further muddying the waters, Iran’s power centers are opaque, complex, and not always comprehensively understood by outside observers. During every election cycle and with each major incident involving Iran, dozens of reports, news articles, and opinion pieces accompanied by photographs of revolutionary murals strive to shed light on the Iranian system and its policies. These often draw on a rich literature on Iranian politics and different institutions within the system.9 Experts weigh in on myriad questions in public and in private. Is Iran a unitary state? Is Iranian decision-making a simple top-down exercise dominated by the supreme leader? Or do elections matter? Which institutions have the most say on various matters pertaining to foreign and security policy? How do they perceive US and Western actions and how might they respond to them? What do Iran’s leaders think about the issues at hand? The Islamic Republic’s strident revolutionary rhetoric coupled with the opacity and complexity of its power centers mask the elements of continuity between pre- and post-revolution Iran. This, in turn, limits the ability of observers to gain a comprehensive understanding of  Tehran’s security decision-making process and the intentions of its leadership. However, beneath the surface lies a leadership concerned with many of the same fundamental matters as its pre-revolution predecessor, and which is in fact driven by the same core assumptions and beliefs embedded in both the collective and institutional memories of its leadership and organizations. Hence, the Faulknerian supposition, ‘the past isn’t dead. It isn’t even past,’ manifests itself in Iranian strategic thinking and national security policies. In fact, past is present in Iran—and extends not just to the immediate pre-revolution years, but hundreds of years before, to the genesis of the modern state with the advent of the Qajar dynasty. The following pages seek to lay out these continuities, with the core assumption that in order to understand Iran’s security decision-making today—and make more effective and informed policy choices vis-à-vis its government—we have to understand its past. 3

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My argument stands in contrast with that presented by many scholars of  international relations and Iran, whose view of revolutionary states is based on the assumption that they are fundamentally different from their predecessors—organizationally, culturally, politically, and in terms of policy.10 International relations theorist Stephen Walt best captures this thinking. Revolutionaries, as he sees it, view their struggle as one that will bring about the end of the status quo and ‘the seizure of power as a decisive break with the past.’11 This leads them to adopt policies that depart from those pursued by their predecessors once they obtain power. As a result, ‘the change in “identity” produced by the revolution [is] associated with a change in behavior.’12 If revolutions lead to a complete change in the behavior of nations, it is because revolutions are not a mere ‘rearrangement of the administrative apparatus or the replacement of one set of rulers by members of the old elite.’ Instead, they mark a fundamental change in the nature of the regime itself.13 The supposition that successful revolutions mark a fundamental break with the past and usher in an entirely new political system is a widely accepted concept in the existing literature and is applied to virtually all cases of revolutionary states and pre-dates the modern era.14 For example, in his treatment of post-revolution Iran,  Amin Saikal builds on Ghoncheh Tazmini’s discussion of the revolution and defines a revolution as ‘the movement that overthrows one political regime and replaces it with a new system that changes the political, social, cultural, economic, and legal institutions and operations, as well as the external orientation, of a state and society.’15 This characterization of the revolution as an important break in the arc of the country’s history constitutes a core tenet of our thinking about Iran and other revolutionary states. To be sure, the Islamic Revolution fundamentally altered the societal fabric of the country and the institutional landscape of the state. It created a complex web of power centers that did not exist before the revolution, including the office of the supreme leader and that of the president, as well as several assemblies and councils tasked with enforcing revolutionary values and beliefs, and a new paramilitary branch in the form of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (hereafter, IRGC, the Revolutionary Guards, or simply the Guards). The existing institutions that remained were dramatically overhauled 4

INTRODUCTION

by the revolutionaries to reflect their identity and preferences, in particular the injection of religious elements in virtually all aspects of Iranian politics. However, I argue that the revolution fell short of creating a set of fundamentally different beliefs about national security and defense policy in Iran. As we will see later, the revolutionaries would often draw on their country’s history to outline the contours of their security thinking, thus retaining elements of the same belief system that shaped the monarchy.16 And although scholars contend that revolutionary regimes are likely to pursue different policies, the Iranian case demonstrates that this is not always accurate. Instead, the revolution and the war that followed it actually served to reinforce and reify many pre-revolutionary precepts of  Iranian security thinking, leading to a worldview that is much closer to that of the pre-revolution periods than the revolutionaries expected or hoped to see come into being. As a result, this book challenges the assumption that revolutions represent a fundamental break in a country’s history, identity, and, thus, security thinking.17 An important note must be made here about the difference between my treatment of Iranian behavior and that of other scholars who have also picked up the theme of continuity in their work. The idea of  Iran’s past influencing its current posture is not entirely novel. Some scholars and analysts have implied or highlighted this in their work, and the idea has even shaped the thinking of some Western policymakers. As former US president Barack Obama aptly noted in a 2015 interview with the New  York  Times. Part of the psychology of Iran is rooted in past experiences, the sense that their country was undermined, that the United States or the West meddled in first their democracy and then in supporting the Shah and then in supporting Iraq and Saddam during that extremely brutal war. So part of what I’ve told my team is we have to distinguish between the ideologically driven, offensive Iran and the defensive Iran that feels vulnerable and sometimes may be reacting because they perceive that as the only way that they can avoid repeats of the past.18

However, while there is an acceptance among academe and practitioners that Iran’s past informs its current outlook, this book 5

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seeks to fill what is still an important gap: how Iran’s perceptions of its historical experiences shape its national security and defense decisions. My treatment of the question distinguishes itself from other such arguments in two main ways. First, I conduct a historical investigation of Iranian national security and defense policies going back to the eighteenth century (or the dawn of the modern Iranian state) to shed light on contemporary strategic thinking and security policies. Along the way, I highlight major events, Iranian perceptions thereof, and lessons learned to underscore significant strands of Iranian security and defense thinking. This treatment stands in contrast to most discussions of Iranian foreign and security thinking in the contemporary period, which commence with the revolution. I begin my discussion of Iranian security thinking and policies at the dawn of the Qajar rule. This is because the Qajars’ rise to power also marks the country’s entry into the modern age. Theirs is a story of futile wars, unequal peace treaties, unfinished or ineffectual reforms, and movements which gradually laid out the foundations of modern-day Iran, its view of itself, and that of the world surrounding it. Wars and peace treaties drew the map of modern Iran during that period. By investigating the Qajar era, I consider the elements of continuity between the pre- and postrevolutionary periods which have traditionally taken a backseat to other themes in the literature. Second, I connect the dots between two ideas somewhat acknowledged in the literature: Iran’s experiences inform its current thinking, and these lessons create strands of continuity between the worldviews harbored and policies pursued by the Iranian state before and after the revolution. Finally, I focus exclusively on defense and security policy, which naturally lends itself to a treatment that crosses the traditional boundaries established by the current literature on Iran. Mine is a consideration of  Iran that sits at the intersection of two thoroughly populated strands of the literature: Iran’s military history and its politics. I adopt the traditional definition of national security, narrowly focused on ‘material capabilities and the use and control of military force by states.’19 National security entails the use of power for protection. To borrow Melvyn P. Leffer’s words: 6

INTRODUCTION

National security policy encompasses the decisions and actions deemed imperative to protect domestic core values from external threats. The national security approach provides an overall interpretive framework for studying foreign policy because it forces historians to analyze the foreign as well as domestic factors shaping policy.20

This book frequently refers to security thinking, which it defines as the belief system that shapes views of the national interest and priorities, to include threat perceptions, the tools at the state’s disposal to counter threats and to pursue interests, and the effectiveness of these means. I posit that the continuity in modern Iranian security thinking, which has occurred despite an abrupt transition of power and a profound shift in the country’s worldview, is owed to Iranians’ historical experiences and their interpretations thereof. Nations’ historical experiences and how they interpret these events shape their attitudes toward national security and the use of different tools in the pursuit of the national interest. As Iran’s president Hassan Rouhani put it in his memoir on his tenure as the country’s chief nuclear negotiator, ‘In the broadest sense, how we view our history at war and at peace predisposes how we look at present and future uses of military force.’21 In Rouhani’s view, one must not seek to draw precise parallels between historical and current events; however, using history is ‘useful, helpful, and, even, necessary’ for understanding Iranian strategic thinking.22 Hence, the Iranian leadership today shares a set of assumptions with statesmen past and these stem from the country’s historical experiences and perceptions of these events.23 In this book, I seek to shed light on these perceptions of historical experiences and how they guide Iranian strategic thinking and, in turn, mold Iranian national security policies. I contend that a closer look at Iranian strategic thinking reveals a state defined by ideas stemming from collective and historical memory. This societal remembrance is often constructed by states to link the individual to the nation in order to define the group’s identity through narratives and traditions that provide a sense of belonging.24 Simply put, national traumas, myths, traditions, symbols, and other cultural paraphernalia create national identity.25 Myths ‘bring together 7

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in a single potent vision elements of historical fact and legendary elaboration to create an overriding commitment and bond for the community.’26 For their part, national traumas comprise a significant component of national myths. The nation’s wars have created traumas, as have the means by which peace was achieved—negotiations and treaties, often seen by Iranians as capitulation. Encouraged by the state, the narratives surrounding these wars and negotiations have shaped Iranian public and perceptions.27 For example, as we will see in the following chapters, Persia’s wars of the nineteenth century informed Iran’s conduct of the war with Iraq in the 1980s. Reflecting on the Iran–Iraq W   ar (1980–88), then Foreign Minister Ali Akbar V   elayati postulated that at one of the conflict’s most decisive junctures the experience of the Russo–Persian Wars had informed the thinking of Iranian policymakers and military planners. ‘Perhaps it was the experience of the Russo–Persian wars,’ Velayati recalled, that provided the backdrop for Tehran’s push to continue the war despite having regained its territories from the aggressor.28 ‘Imam [Khomeini] was worried about history repeating itself and he was right.’29  The Iran–Iraq War has in turn informed Iranians’ decisionmaking on a number of issues over the past few decades, including the country’s nuclear file and regional interventions in Iraq and Syria over the course of the twenty-first century. Iran’s next war is likely to be similarly shaped by these conflicts. The most prominent element of  Iranian security thinking, I posit, lies in the country’s experience of foreign meddling, which has led to a deep distrust of foreign powers and the international order more generally. Rouhani diagnoses this problem in his memoir, noting there is a deeply ingrained distrust of foreign powers and international institutions in Iran, which he argues is mostly well-founded and understandable.30 However, he advises, such ‘pessimism’ is not conducive to constructive decision-making and the pursuit of the national interest.31 Similarly, the fact that virtually all power transitions in recent Iranian history have almost led to the dismemberment of the nation—due to upheavals in the country’s domestic political and security landscapes and the role of foreign powers in staging coups and empowering separatist groups—has framed the Iranian people’s conception of their national security. As a 2010 RAND study found: 8

INTRODUCTION

The Islamic Revolution enhanced Iran’s sense of exceptionalism and created a potent mixture of religious ideology and deep-seated nationalism. The Islamic Republic today has the ability to act beyond the confines of the revolution as a nation pursuing nonideological state interests, but its viewpoints and behavior continue to be shaped by the country’s tortured history and identity as a revisionist and revolutionary state.32

To be clear, I am not arguing that all of  the regime’s security policies are completely in line with those pursued by previous governments. For example, pre-revolution Iran was a Western-aligned nation whose relatively amicable relationship with Israel made it stand out among other regional states, while today’s Iran is known for its anti-Western and anti-Israeli rhetoric. Nevertheless, as we will see in the final chapters of this book, at their core, many of  Tehran’s security decisions today are guided by the same principles underlying those of eras past. Students of China, Russia, and other area studies specialists may note that Iran is not alone in deriving its security thinking from its historical memory. In fact, even the themes that guide this book may sound familiar to historians and students of international relations whose expertise relate to other parts of the globe. In particular, the themes of survival in an adversarial world, humiliation at the hand of foreign powers, distrust, and self-help and self-reliance, are the bedrocks of many countries’ narratives and some are key concepts of international relations theory. Consequently, I do not contend that Iran is an exceptional state and that the elements that comprise its security thinking are fundamentally different from those drawing the contours of other nations’ worldviews. Instead, I posit that contrary to claims that post-revolution Iran is fundamentally different from the rest of the international community due to its ideology and the policies resulting from it, the country is largely similar to most other states: its historical memory shapes its security thinking, which in turn drives its policies—making it neither a purely rational actor nor uniquely ideological.

A Brief Survey of the Literature In tackling such a broad and complex topic, it is important to share a few words on what this book does and does not seek to do. In this 9

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volume, I endeavor to shed light on a simple question: what shapes Iran’s national security thinking and policies? I undertake to demystify the contradiction between Iran’s rhetoric and its intentions, to lift the veil off the concepts and beliefs guiding Iranian decision-makers and military planners. In short, I strive to illustrate a new perspective on how Iranians think about their security, and most importantly why they think the way they do. I do not place the locus of this book on what Iranian strategy is and how it is deployed—a task that a number of scholars and policy analysts have already undertaken.33 Therefore, instead of assessing the ‘what’ and ‘how’ of Iranian strategy, I investigate the ‘why.’ In other words, when faced with a multitude of national security and defense choices, why do Iranians choose one option over another? Why does Iran emphasize selfreliance in military affairs when it could adopt a different course of action and gain access to international markets and suppliers for its defense needs? Why does the country denounce the West yet negotiate with it at once? Why does it continue to cooperate with Russia and China despite distrusting both? Why does it acquire and test missiles, develop nuclear capabilities, and arm insurgents and terrorist groups when these programs come at such a steep price (in terms of prestige, economic sanctions, and political isolation) for the nation? And why has it seemingly decided to double down on wars when it had the option of a much less costly ceasefire? Specifically, I examine how Iran’s way of war has developed and why it is fashioned as it is; however, of course, descriptive accounts of strategy and doctrine are unavoidable at times in order to illustrate how Iranian security thinking plays out in the real world. By understanding the drivers behind a state’s strategy, one can make sense of the behavior pursued by the state regardless of changes in leadership and policy and strategy. While strategy can change, the fundamental assumptions that drive policy are resilient and passed on from one generation of leaders and planners to the next. While I largely avoid describing Iranian strategy in favor of analyzing its drivers, neither do I intend this monograph to offer a definitive account of Iran’s broader foreign policy, relationships with key countries, role in the region, or its military. A number of authors have already offered persuasive discussions of these issues and many more.34 10

INTRODUCTION

Scholars have investigated key events and periods in Iranian history, including the revolution itself, and their causes and consequences, as well as the lives and legacies of key Iranian decision-makers.35 They have also produced comprehensive works on the history and evolution of parts of the Iranian security establishment, particularly its military—which have helped advance the debate and scholarship on Iranian security thinking and laid out the groundwork for this book.36 Some scholars have convincingly discussed Iranian decision-making as pertaining to security policy.37 Others have offered historically grounded analyses of Iranian security thinking, but often exclusively focused on specific periods in Iranian history. Among these periods, the 1953 coup ousting Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq (1882– 1967), the Islamic Revolution, and the Iran–IraqWar stand out as having generated most of the scholarship (in both quantity and quality).38 To be sure, each of these events is significant enough to warrant its own volume, and there are trade-offs in terms of detail and nuance that one must make when pursuing a more holistic view as I set out to do. Steven Ward’s seminal work on the history and evolution of the Iranian armed forces from the Achaemenid era to the modern day is perhaps the most similar undertaking to date to my own endeavor. The underlying assumption of his argument is also one of continuity— although his is narrowly focused on Iranian military affairs rather than broader security thinking. And though I, too, discuss in some detail the history and evolution of the Iranian armed forces since the nineteenth century, I only do so to place the country’s military in the context of  its broader strategic thinking—a task that was beyond the scope of Ward’s definitive book on the subject of the Iranian military. Similarly, I do not intend to offer comprehensive discussions of specific Iranian security policies and their implications. Scholars have thoroughly documented Iran’s relationship with many of its non-state clients, particularly Lebanese Hezbollah, as well as its relations with some key countries, including the United States, Israel, and the Arab states in the Persian Gulf.39 They have also investigated other key elements of  Iran’s strategy and policy, including its nuclear program and the nuclear negotiations aiming to curb it.40 Rather, I seek to shed light on the underlying assumptions and beliefs that have led to the cultivation of these ties and the development of specific defense programs. 11

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Finally, I do not aim to write a comprehensive history of modern Iran, an account of its politics, or the role of politics in society— monumental tasks that a number of historians and political scientists have already undertaken.41 Instead, my focus is on Iranian security thinking and its implications for security policy specifically. The research questions driving my study are the following: what underpins Iranian strategic thinking? How does the country view itself, its relations with other nations, and its place in the world? What fundamental assumptions draw the contours of Iranian national security policies? Why does Iran behave as it does?

Why Does This Matter? Understanding Iran’s security thinking is not a simple academic exercise—although this book does seek to contribute to an already rich literature on Iran. Instead, key aspects of  Iran’s security policies— including its nuclear, missile, and cyber programs; disinformation and influence operations; support for non-state actors, and regional interventions—continue to preoccupy policymakers in the United States and Europe. After decades of tensions within the context of an increasingly complex and volatile Middle East, Iran’s national security thinking is still a source of some mystery to many students and practitioners of international relations. Since 1979, scholars, policymakers, and pundits have produced hundreds of articles and dozens of books to unpack the intention harbored and policies pursued by the seemingly impenetrable regime. The executive and legislative branches of most W   estern nations, as well as their militaries and intelligence services, regularly hold hearings and briefings to understand  Tehran’s thinking and behavior and to formulate policies to tackle the challenges posed by the Islamic Republic. For the United States, in particular, the quasi-absence of consistently direct diplomatic ties and the lack of exchange have made the government reliant on such sources. Hence, demystifying the contradiction between Iran’s rhetoric and its intentions is critical to a successful Iran policy—one whose implications include matters pertaining to war and peace. To do so requires delving into Iran’s past, to identify the threads of continuity that, woven together, form the tapestry of Iran’s security thinking to this day. 12

INTRODUCTION

Understanding what drives Iranian security thinking, its implications for strategy and doctrine, and, therefore, how to best respond to Iranian actions and anticipate its reactions requires a robust historical analysis. After all, ‘experience has much to do with how different countries assign roles to military power in achieving their goals.’42 My approach is driven by the assumption that one cannot fully understand Iranian strategic thinking if one assesses post-revolution Iran in a vacuum rather than as the continuation and the sum of its experiences throughout its modern history. Iranian decision-makers’ calculations are made by taking into account the country’s past military and political events and perceptions of these events, some going back hundreds of years. In fact, Iranian officials frequently refer to their nation’s long history to convey their deeply rooted beliefs about their country’s security and interests, which their Western counterparts sometimes dismiss as mere propaganda or nonsense.43 While Iranian decision-makers’ references to their history and accounts of current events should not be taken at face value, they cannot be dismissed as entirely nonsensical.When considered together with other primary sources, such as Western government, military, and intelligence reports, news articles, and the scholarly literature, these accounts shed significant light on Iranian decision-makers’ views and the beliefs that shape their security thinking and policies. They also show that historical memory is a key driver of both public perceptions and policies in Iran, which in turn draw the contours of the country’s security thinking. This book seeks to complement the existing literature on Iranian strategy and security policy. A diverse set of factors shape states’ behavior, which, as we have seen, scholars have examined over the course of the past several decades to make sense of revolutionary Iran. The literature has thoroughly assessed bureaucratic politics and constructivist accounts of Iran’s international relations (such as national and religious identities, domestic politics, and ideology). It has also applied realist considerations (to include the need for survival and security, and the desire to maximize power) to the Iranian case. In a more controversial effort, Robert D. Kaplan has discussed the importance of geography in determining outcomes—albeit briefly in the Iranian case.44 13

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My analysis also does not seek to dismiss the role of myriad other factors in shaping strategy. Iran is motivated by more than ideology, religion, and politics. Instead, it holds a set of assumptions that are shared between different leaderships regardless of domestic politics. They even transcend political systems and regime ideologies. It goes without saying that the two last dynasties to have ruled over Persia (as the country was known internationally prior to 1935), the Qajars (1796–1925) and Pahlavis (1925–79) and the Islamic Republic have little in common in terms of leadership, identity, ideology, and domestic dynamics. But what makes them similar, especially in terms of their strategic thinking, has been somewhat lost in the literature. This book fills that gap and examines why that matters.

A Brief History of Contemporary Iran The following sections provide a brief overview of the key events that have shaped the Iranian security landscape and the regime’s image abroad since the fateful winter of 1978–79. That winter ended an over 2,500-year-old monarchic tradition when disparate groups of revolutionaries ousted the country’s last king, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi (1919–80), whose reign had commenced in 1941. The Shah had followed in the footsteps of his father and the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, Reza Shah (1878–1944)—who occupied the throne from 1925 until his forced abdication in 1941—endeavoring to rapidly modernize the country. As part of his efforts to transform Iran, the Shah continued his father and predecessor’s work of expanding and modernizing Iran’s military and creating a contemporary security apparatus. The Shah’s reforms, however, helped unite various groups with different ideologies and worldviews behind an unlikely Islamist leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–89). By the time the Islamic Revolution began to brew in the late 1970s, Iran’s military (known as the Artesh) had become the largest force in the Middle East, with 410,000 well-equipped troops.45 This military heft afforded Iran the ability to project power and exert influence in regional affairs. The country’s place in the Middle East was of key concern to the Shah who viewed himself as the successor of the great Persian emperors of the past and Iran as the natural regional 14

INTRODUCTION

hegemon.46 A modern and powerful military backed by one of the world’s two superpowers, the United States, was critical to this status. But winter 1978–79 put an end to all this. After months of turmoil, one Islamist group emerged as the dominant force among the various revolutionary factions united only in their opposition to the Shah and the Imperial State of Iran—as the country was then known. Khomeini, who had made a name for himself as one of the country’s most radical activists, politically engaged Shia clerics, and vocal critics of the Shah and the monarchy, led this group. After the revolutionaries toppled the Shah, Khomeini returned to his country after a decade and a half in exile to lead the movement and oversee the subsequent transition of power. He founded the Islamic Republic of Iran, of which he became the first supreme leader (or val -e faqih). The newly established Islamic Republic sought to steer the country in an entirely different direction, one which Khomeini had been advocating for decades. Soon, Tehran’s actions at home and abroad began to dominate the headlines.The hostage crisis (November 1979–January 1981)—during which a group of radical revolutionaries detained American diplomatic personnel in the US embassy in  Tehran—was still unfolding when Iraq attacked Iran on 22 September 1980 following a series of skirmishes in the border region. Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) led the Iraqi armed forces as they undertook to seize strategically important swaths of territory from Iran. According to Saddam’s forecast, this would be a quick victory to check the nascent regime—whose ideology and stated policies he viewed as threatening to his own reign. The Iraqi leader’s calculation seemed sound. At the time, the Islamic Republic was still in the midst of reorganizing the country and was embroiled in an international incident as a result of the hostage crisis. Instead, Saddam’s decision led to a devastating eight-year conflict, the Iran– Iraq War, during which he used chemical weapons against Iranians and his own Kurdish population. These two events shaped the world’s perception of the newly established Islamic Republic and Iran’s view of itself. As Iranian officials would later recall, they felt isolated and defenseless, with the international community watching from the sidelines as thousands of Iranian belligerents and civilians perished 15

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at the hands of the aggressor and under chemical and missile attacks. Many Iranian military commanders and politicians in leadership roles in the 1990s–2000s were on the frontlines of the war as soldiers and officers. They witnessed the chemical attacks firsthand. Some were even among the tens of thousands injured by those weapons.47 Tehran’s previous alliances and partnerships came undone as the Islamic Republic settled in. The world watched the hostage crisis unfold against the backdrop of the war’s horrors. The deployment of child soldiers and their reported use to clear out minefields shocked the international community. The new leadership’s rhetoric and its mass crackdown on internal dissent—including the mass executions towards the end of the war—left observers shaken. The country lost the United States as its key backer and severed diplomatic ties with Israel, which the revolutionaries saw as an illegitimate force occupying Muslim lands. And Tehran’s relations with European nations would not be the same for decades to come. With such significant upheaval over a short period of time, many began to view the new regime as unpredictable and chose to latch on to its leaders’ stated policies. As a result, much of the Western world and the majority of Iran’s neighbors began to view the regime with suspicion. This was compounded by the fact that foreign policy circles in the West were equating the difficulty of predicting Iran’s new revolutionary path with it being fundamentally different from ‘normal’ nations. Soon, Washington began imposing restrictions on Iran. Several US administrations undertook efforts to politically isolate the regime while gradually taking measures to squeeze it economically. These efforts started with the hostage crisis and intensified in 1984 when the United States placed the Islamic Republic on its list of State Sponsors of Terrorism. Washington doubled down on its strategy again upon the discovery of covert components of the Iranian nuclear program in the early 2000s.48 However, despite mounting pressure, the Islamic Republic solidified rather than relinquished its ties with terrorist groups and militias. Although the early days of the twenty-first century saw tactical cooperation between Iran and the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies during the war in Afghanistan, the 16

INTRODUCTION

regime’s growing ties with a number of non-state clients, along with the revelation of two then-undeclared nuclear facilities on Iranian territory, fanned the international community’s concerns. As the 2000s progressed, the world powers pursued multi-layered efforts to quash Iran’s nuclear program at the same time as the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001 and 2003, respectively, complicated the security landscape of an already volatile region. It took the international community over a decade of economic sanctions and political pressure, as well as two rounds of negotiations, to reach a deal to limit Iran’s sensitive nuclear activities. First, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom, together known as the EU3 or E3, attempted to settle the matter in 2003–05. The talks collapsed on the eve of hardline Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s rise to the office of president of Iran in summer 2005. Seven years later, China, Russia, the United States, and the European Union (EU) joined the EU3 to form the P5+1 or EU3+3, which successfully negotiated with Iran and delivered the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which they concluded on 14 July 2015. The JCPOA placed limitations on Iran’s fissile material production and stockpiling, as well as research and development activities. However, the country continued to test missiles, defying UN Security Council Resolution 2231 to push the limits of the nuclear agreement while avoiding outright violation of its terms. By this time, Tehran had also established itself as a key player in various critical theaters across the Middle East and South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan, Syria, and Iraq. Several events facilitated Iran’s growing presence and influence in its neighborhood: the 2001 and 2003 invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq; the 2011 Arab Spring; and the rise of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and its July 2014 declaration of a ‘Caliphate.’ The Islamic Republic used an array of tools to overcome its conventional inferiority vis-à-vis key players in the region, especially the United States, and to assert itself as a regional hegemon. To this end, it developed and perfected a strategy of hybrid warfare designed to compensate for the country’s lack of a nuclear deterrent and state-of-the-art military capabilities by leveraging its asymmetric capabilities. Recruiting, training, arming, advising, assisting, and deploying a number of non-state clients throughout the region, the 17

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Iranians were able to extend their country’s strategic depth and project power beyond its borders. Tehran’s intervention in the Syrian conflict on the side of the autocrat, Bashar al-Assad, its support for both Baghdad and various non-state clients operating in Iraq, propping up of Houthi rebels in Yemen to counter a Saudi-led coalition there. Moreover, and its ‘cold war’ with Riyadh—which pitted the two Middle Eastern powers against each other and spilled into several theaters across the region, including Afghanistan, Syria, and Y   emen as they vied for dominance—added to the increasing complexity of the country’s status on the world stage. Following the inauguration of the Republican Donald J.Trump as the forty-fifth president of the United States, America ramped up pressure on Iran for its foreign and domestic policies, including involvement in these theaters, support for various terrorist and insurgent groups, and human rights track record. The United States withdrew from the JCPOA on 8 May 2018 and put an end to a short-lived era of hope that the two countries would be able to work through their respective grievances with one another. In the year that followed, the Trump administration dialed up pressure against Tehran, reimposing sanctions against the regime and designating the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization as part of its ‘maximum pressure campaign,’ aimed at changing the regime’s behavior on a number of issues pertaining to its nuclear and missile programs and regional activities.49 On 8 May 2019, after a year of ‘strategic patience,’ Iran announced that it would start to take steps to dial down its compliance with the nuclear deal.At the same time,Tehran’s kinetic activities complemented its nuclear escalation strategy. These led to a number of incidents in the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, as well as Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula. These included Iran’s downing of a US surveillance drone, mining of a tanker, seizure of several vessels, and alleged attacks against Saudi oil facilities. Several of these episodes almost brought the two countries to the brink of direct military exchange as unrests began to shake Iran once again in fall 2019. Iranians took to the streets of dozens of cities and towns across the country as the maximum pressure campaign took a toll on their nation’s economy. The regime responded with full force, reportedly killing hundreds. The populace’s attention turned from the protests to an external adversary, the United States, 18

INTRODUCTION

when in early January 2020, President Trump made the decision to kill Qassem Soleimani, the 62-year-old leader of the Revolutionary Guards’ elite branch known as the Quds Force. As Iranian rallied around the flag and commemorated the commander, Iran targeted two bases housing US troops in Iraq. As tensions continued to unfold, key question preoccupied American and European policymakers, military planners, analysts, and journalists: what are the Iranians thinking and what action will they take next? And how might they respond to US activities?

Object and Overview I argue that to understand the choices Iran may make when faced with several possible courses of action and why, one must examine Iran’s historical experiences and its perceptions thereof. ‘Iran’s perception of itself is shaped by a long history of victory and defeat; it sees itself as a once-great power humbled and humiliated by the West, particularly the United States.’51 Because the object of my treatment lies in perceptions and their impact on strategic decision-making, this project is only possible with the consultation of Iranian sources in Persian and through interviews with decision-makers, whose input sheds light on how they view their country and the world. This book leverages Iranian sources, including official publications, scholarly articles and monographs, and news outlets, to complement the existing literature—as well as some French primary sources, produced by key French figures whose engagements with Persia are important to understanding the events discussed throughout the first few chapters. I also use material from my extensive fieldwork of about a decade in Iran and the broader Middle East, in particular the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Israel, as well as Europe and the United States. These include interviews with and insights from clerics, high-level political and military officials and former officials from Iran, and regional and Western nations, including the GCC, the EU, and the United States. Notable Iranian officials and former officials include: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif; the founder of the Iranian nuclear program, Akbar Etemad; former Iranian envoy to the International 19

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Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Ali Asghar Soltanieh; and the last chief of staff of the Imperial State of Iran’s armed forces and the man responsible for handing over the Artesh to the revolutionaries, Abbas Gharabaghi. It is important to note that as the matters discussed in the book are considered highly sensitive in Iran and the broader region, as guidelines of ethical academic research dictate, I have refrained from attributing many statements to individuals. This decision does not come without tradeoffs, but it is necessary to avoid exposing identities and spare individuals possible repercussions, such as political reprisals, or worse, security threats. I begin this account of Iranian historical memory as pertaining to security thinking with the fall of the Qajars in Chapter 1. The Qajars reigned over Persia in 1785–1925 and oversaw the genesis of the modern state of Iran. Their policies prepared the ground for the rise of the last of a few dozen dynasties to have ruled over Iran, the Pahlavis (1925–79). The fall of the Qajars and the rise of the Pahlavis sheds light on the creation of the modern state of Iran and the advent of the Islamic Revolution. In Chapter 2, I provide an overview of the early Pahlavi era, a period critical to understanding contemporary Iran’s security structure. The dynasty’s founder, Reza Shah, is the father of modern Iran’s political institutions, security apparatus, and armed forces. Reza Shah abdicated the throne to his son in 1941, when he was forced to choose between his country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and his own resignation by the Allies during World War II. In Chapter 3, I discuss the Shah’s reign. The Shah followed in his father’s footsteps to modernize his country—an ambitious plan, which propelled Iran into the twentieth century, while also disenfranchising parts of the populace, whose grievances brought about his downfall. Next, I tackle the 1979 revolution and its aftermath. In Chapter 4, I provide a brief account of the revolution, before assessing the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88) in Chapter 5. The revolution put in place a new regime, which consolidated its power and fermented the growing influence of the newly created Revolutionary Guards during the war. The war also shaped the Islamic Republic’s view of itself and its place in the region and the world, as well as the international community’s image of the new regime, for decades to come. In Chapter 6, I assess 20

INTRODUCTION

how the revolution matured following the war. I examine the evolution of the Iranian armed forces and security apparatus. Finally, in Chapter 7, I assess Iran’s security policies in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. The chapter demonstrates that the US invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, coupled with the Arab Spring starting in 2011, set the stage for Iranian expansion. Although Tehran’s activities since the turn of the century have finally realized the regime’s wish to export the revolution, I argue that they must not be viewed in purely ideological terms. Instead, Iran’s increased reliance on non-state clients constitutes another area of continuity, as the Shah, too, sought to undermine his rivals by leveraging non-state actors during his reign. The themes dominating Tehran’s security thinking, which I will discuss throughout the book, include Iran’s feeling of otherness in the region, deep distrust of foreign powers and the international system, and the fear of domestic turmoil and resulting internal chaos and disintegration. These have produced a set of foundational drivers behind Iran’s security policies, including the view that the country must be self-reliant; its institutions coup-proofed; and its territorial integrity, national unity, and sovereignty secured through deterrence and constant defense. A number of policies have stemmed from these beliefs, including ‘balancing’ or ‘hedging,’ which have driven Iran’s approach to other nations and even non-state actors. Ultimately, while many perceive Iran to be aggressive, expansionist, and revisionist, Iran’s strategic culture shapes its view of  itself as striving for survival in a deeply anarchic international system—a system in which the nation must go it alone as it cannot trust international law and institutions, and much less, the powers that, as Iran sees it, shape them to suit their own needs. Y   et Iranians do not respond to this realist premise by making purely rational decisions, even as their ideological inclinations do not fully account for their behavior. Instead, they are guided by historical memory. Hence, while the country does not see itself as seeking out conquests, neither does it shrink from doing all it can to avoid defeat. As such, Iran’s security thinking largely contradicts the Persian saying pertaining to the lack of gray areas in the outcome of wars, ‘war has two ends: Conquest or Defeat.’ 21

1

THE RISE AND FALL OF  THE QAJARS

The Qajar period (1796–1925) laid out the foundations for the creation of the modern state of Iran and its worldview. Critical events— including major interstate wars leading to some of the most defining defeats in Iranian history—dominated this era and now shape Iranians’ collective memory.  These events constitute historical traumas and have drawn the contours of Iran’s view of itself and its place in the world, as well as the use of certain foreign policy tools, such as war, diplomacy, and negotiations. As a 2018 RAND study explained: A one-time superpower, Persia had become a relatively weak and backward nation-state by the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It was never colonized by Western powers, but British, Russian, and then American interference in its internal affairs was a rather common and, from an Iranian viewpoint, humiliating occurrence.1

This era also led to key changes in Persia’s governance, politics, laws, religion, and military affairs that were still core to its national identity throughout the twentieth century and remain so today. This chapter briefly outlines the foundational events that marked the Qajar rule, before identifying and assessing key themes that formed the Iranian political and security landscapes as the country entered the twentieth century. As noted at the outset, this chapter does not seek to offer a comprehensive history of the Qajar era—a task best left to historians and which a number of scholars have already undertaken. 23

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Instead, I survey major events pertaining to national security and military affairs to extract themes and developments that drew the contours of and have since dominated Iranian strategic thinking. I treat the Qajar period as the starting point of my historical overview of modern Iranian history as the dynasty’s rule provided the backdrop against which the nation entered modernity, and some of the country’s most significant wars, treaties, and reforms marked the era. These have led to the emergence of deeply engrained assumptions and beliefs, which have transcended political systems and leadership, creating a level of continuity in strategic thinking and behavior from one era to the next.

The Rise of the Qajars From Alborz to Tehran: The Founding of a New Dynasty The Qajar dynasty rose from the ashes of one of the most powerful rulers to govern Persia, Nader Shah Afshar. Ruling from 1736 to 1747, Nader Shah sought to reunify and expand Persia as only the Safavids (1505–1736) had done following the collapse of the Sassanids (224– 651)—or the last pre-Islamic Persian dynasty to rule over the empire. Nader Shah, whose military prowess has earned him a place among the nation’s greatest conquerors, is perhaps best known for leading a number of successful military campaigns. His rule was short-lived, however, and with his assassination, the empire was once again divided between several authorities (known as moluk al-tavayef). Historically, the emperor or shahanshah represented the central authority and ruled over the entirety of the empire. A number of governors administrated autonomous provinces. At times, this system led to significant instability. Regional authorities frequently sought to leverage the power vacuum created by a monarch’s fall or death to assert themselves—a theme that has continued in modern-day Iran. In 1747, Nader was assassinated and an approximately fifty-year contest for the Persian throne ensued.2 Karim Khan Zand, the founder of the Zand dynasty, was able to assert some power over the south of the empire and to create some stability for the population. The dynasty he established would end with Lotf Ali Khan Zand. 24

THE RISE AND FALL OF  THE QAJARS

Lotf  Ali Khan’s reign was short-lived, spanning a five-year period in 1789–94. Prior to his ascension and during Karim Khan’s tenure, he held a castrated Qajar leader, Agha Mohammad Khan, prisoner. Agha Mohammad would accumulate internal knowledge of the court during his period of captivity. Once Lotf Ali Khan acceded to the throne, Agha Mohammad would capitalize on his familiarity with the country to topple the emperor. He thus secured the crown and established the Qajar dynasty, which would rule over Persia for more than a century to come. By the early 1790s, Agha Mohammad Khan had yet to assert his control over the empire’s vast territories. However, he had emerged as the undisputed ruler of Persia. Known for his brutality, Agha Mohammad sought to consolidate power by razing cities, massacring entire populations, and even blinding 20,000 men in the city of Kerman for resisting his siege and for previously supporting his rivals, the Zand rulers.3 By 1794, Agha Mohammad had remedied his imperfect control over the land after he toppled two competitors who had controlled swaths of territory within the empire: Lotf Ali Khan, the Zand dynasty’s last ruler, and the Afsharid’s Shahrokh Khan in the Khorasan province in eastern Persia. Agha Mohammad Khan consolidated these territories and asserted the central government’s authority over them. Two years later, in 1796, Agha Mohammad was coronated and became the first Qajar ruler. Once in power, Agha Mohammad Khan moved the capital to Tehran to create a northward-facing, fairly insulated, and fast-growing commercial center. The decision to move the capital to Tehran was dictated not only by matters of governance but also by the Qajars’ tribal roots. As herders, the Qajars were a Turkic tribe residing in the nearby Alborz mountains. Persian dynasties had long moved the capital upon seizing power. They saw this transfer as a status symbol, telegraphing to the populace and foreign dignitaries that a new king was asserting himself and recreating the empire in his image. The relocation of the capital signaled that the new dynasty and monarch’s reign was no mere continuation of the status quo. As we will see throughout the book, the ambition of successive leaderships to fundamentally change the direction of the country and to depart from their predecessors’ approach to governance was often more aspirational than real. 25

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The change of capital also entailed other implications. Tehran’s establishment as the new center of power required complex infrastructure and a new commercial class, the clerically-allied merchants or bazaaris, critical to the city’s construction and expansion. A fairly stable government in Tehran, economic growth, and a degree of social revival characterized this period.4 Y   et, an almost myopic focus on Tehran would become gradually more significant throughout the Qajars’ tenure and would only intensify after their demise. Agha Mohammad Khan was assassinated in 1797.  Although his reign was brief, it was consequential. He led the country ‘from the political turmoil and economic decline of the late eighteenth century [to] a relatively stable central government, increased social homogeneity, an expanding economy, and gleams of cultural and religious revival.’5 However, these developments took place against the backdrop of challenges from foreign forces, especially the Russians and the British. And while the country never fully succumbed to the powers—as it was not colonized like most of its neighboring territories—it did bow to their wishes on many occasions. Persian relations with the powers—particularly Russia and Britain, but also France—often included the use of a full gambit of statecraft tools, frequently all at once: war, diplomacy, trade, and social, political, economic, and military exchange.6 These foundational experiences with the powers and Persians’ perceptions thereof would crystallize as perhaps the most significant theme in Iranian strategic thinking, one whose implications would reverberate throughout contemporary Iran from the Pahlavis to the Islamic Republic.

War and Peace: The Conflicts and Treaties That Shaped the Era Following the assassination of Agha Mohammad, Fath Ali Mohammad (1772–1834), known as Fath Ali Shah, ascended to the throne. Eager to retain the territory of Georgia against Russian incursions, Fath Ali Shah led Persia into its first war of the modern era: the first Russo– Persian War (1804–13). But the lack of an effective modern military and supporting institutions stymied the Persians’ war effort. The Russians resoundingly defeated the Persian army. Fath Ali Shah ceded the provinces of Derbent, Baku, and Shirvan to Russia in the Treaty 26

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of Golestan at the war’s conclusion in 1813.7 In essence, the Persians lost their first war in the modern era before concluding a treaty that enshrined their defeat and stripped them of historical lands.8 The defeat and resulting treaty left an indelible mark on the Iranian psyche and the country’s strategic thinking. These events would lay out the foundations of Iranians’ deep distrust of foreign powers in general and Russia in particular, as well as their attitudes toward war, the loss of territories, treaties, and negotiations. French emperor Napoleon Bonaparte’s envoy to Persia, Amédée Jaubert, met with the crown prince of Persia shortly after the start of the war and later recounted their conversations, shedding light on the emerging Persian perceptions of the conflict and the country’s capacity, capabilities, and adversaries: Stranger, you see this army, this court, and all the power apparatus. However, do not think that I am happy. Indeed, how can I be? Similar to the forceful waves that crash against immovable boulders, all the efforts of my courage have failed against the Russian phalanxes […]. Which cities have I conquered? Which vengeance have I secured of the invasion of our provinces? I cannot cast my eyes on the surrounding army without blushing [from shame]. What will occur when I have to present myself in front of my father? […] I learned that the Russians’ bravery only afforded them a vain resistance.Yet, a handful of Europeans [i.e. Russians] held all my troops in failure, they constantly threaten us with new advances. And the Aras, this river which once flowed entirely in the bosom of Persian provinces, now has its source in foreign lands and goes and loses itself in a sea covered with our enemies’ vessels.9

In 1807, in the midst of the first Russo–Persian War, Fath Ali Shah signed an agreement with Napoleon, who was at the time preoccupied with his own military campaigns against a coalition of forces—including the British and Russians—as part of the then ongoing Napoleonic W   ars (1803–15). This agreement—signed on 4 May 1807 and known as the Treaty of Finckenstein—guaranteed Persia’s territorial integrity and promised French help to reclaim east Georgia and other Caucasian territories from Russia.10 Napoleon also pledged to send much-needed arms and military advisors to modernize the Persian military, which was at the time dependent on unreliable, ineffective, and disparate tribal cavalry units.11 27

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In exchange, Fath Ali Shah promised to cease all political and commercial ties with and declare war on Britain—and to recruit Afghans and other populations to join the efforts against London. Finally, the treaty provided for Franco–Persian cooperation in the event of the formation of and declaration of war by a Russo–British coalition against Persia.12 General Claude Matthieu de Gardane represented the French emperor in the negotiations. The documents published by his son Comte Alfred de Gardane shed light on the objectives pursued by the French and the Persians in that period. His is an account that could describe a great deal of Persia’s relations with key contemporary powers: having very few levers at its disposal, the Persian state would seek to balance different powers against each other but end up caught in the middle as they competed for influence and resources. According to Gardane, ‘Persia had occupied Napoleon’s attention for some time in his pursuit of India.’13 Napoleon’s calculus was driven by competition with Britain and Russia and the desire to re-establish French influence in Western Asia.14 ‘For its part, Persia was in search of an ally in Europe capable of protecting it against Russia, which was dismembering it.’15 Gardane describes the Persians’ helplessness as they watched Russia take control of Georgia and expand in the region, before turning to the British for protection. However, the conditions imposed by London were too onerous for Tehran, which turned its attention to Paris instead.16 British demands would come at a steep price for Persian sovereignty in particular. The terms stipulated that Persia would lose control over parts of its territory while Britain would build a military presence there. Specifically, the British sought to erect a fort in Bushehr, located in southwestern Persia, and to occupy an island in the Persian Gulf.17 To prevent the imposition of such terms, Tehran ultimately reached an agreement with Paris, which it viewed as a shield against both Moscow and London. However, the Franco–Persian treaty would be short-lived. In what Iranians would come to view as one in a series of betrayals by foreign powers, Napoleon signed the Treaty of Tilsit with Tsar Alexander I on 7 July 1807, just a month after the Treaty of Finckenstein. The treaty recognized Russia’s territorial claims over Persia. To retaliate, Fath Ali Shah turned to Great Britain once more, signing a treaty 28

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of cooperation in 1809. The failure of the French in honoring their commitments highlighted the shortcomings of the Persians’ policy of balancing—whereby they would play off one foreign power against another to prevent any single entity from establishing a monopoly over the country’s key resources and territories. Nevertheless, it would take the Persians decades and many more such episodes to fully learn and seek to implement the lesson that balancing would exacerbate rather than address the challenges stemming from reliance on foreigners. For the rest of the nineteenth and part of the twentieth century, Persia doubled down on balancing. And despite several individuals forcefully advocating against it throughout those decades, this principle would become a key tenet of the Qajars’ foreign policy. As part of the new arrangement, London sent military missions to Persia in an attempt to create a modern military there.  The missions did not meet their objectives, however. Some failed to deliver results while others ended due to Britain reneging on its promises and recalling its delegation. For the British, Persia was simply a means to an end. They largely saw the country through the lens of their competition with other major powers and their colonial endeavors. In particular, Britain strove to keep Persia weak to prevent it from posing a threat to British interests in India. For Persians, Britain’s failure to uphold its end of the bargain was yet another example of a foreign power falling to fulfill its promises. Less than two decades later and growing frustrated with increasing Russian encroachment on Persian territory, Fath Ali Shah led Persia to war once more, thus starting the second Russo–Persian War (1826–28). This time, Fath Ali acted to prevent the Russian seizure of territory in northwestern Persia.18 Again, the war ended in Russian victory with the Treaty of Turkmenchay on 22 February 1928 and the loss of yet more Persian territories—the Erivan and Nakhjavan provinces in the Caucasus. Writing about the Persian approach to the drafting of the treaty, the Persian statesman and writer Mirza Abolqasem Qaem-Maqam Farahani (1779–1835) noted that his country was forced to sign the agreement.19 To minimize the damage Persia was about to suffer, Qaem-Maqam advocated for crafting a document with intentionally 29

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vague wording. As a result, if the balance of power were to change in Tehran’s favor in the future, this vagueness would allow the Persians to reinterpret the treaty provisions.20 However, Qaem-Maqam’s efforts were in vain, as the balance of power would not change and the territories ceded in Turkmenchay would be lost forever. Exploiting the Persians’ post-war weakness, the British appealed to their efforts to balance the powers against each other to extract similar concessions as those provided to the Russians in Turkmenchay. In particular, London requested permission to open its own consulate in the Gilan province by the Caspian Sea, where the  Treaty of   Turkmenchay provided for a Russian consulate.21 Qaem-Maqam had already learned the lessons of his country’s disastrous foreign policy over the course of the previous decades and recognized the limits of balancing. As a result, he argued against adopting this approach again. ‘The result,’ of balancing the powers against each other,’ he argued, ‘will be that the country will be divided up by two lions whose powerful grip has penetrated the body of the nation.’ Persia, he noted, as a ‘unified nation will not survive under the teeth of a lion, let alone two lions.’22 London’s main levers of influence against Tehran were trade and commerce.23 Qaem-Maqam refused to succumb to the British’s efforts on their terms. In words that would continue to echo in Iranian politics into the modern day, he likened trade to warfare, noting that trade would ultimately lead to the annihilation of the nation, and argued against allowing commercial interests to dictate strategic decisions.24 Claiming that he had no interest in implementing the provision affording the Russians a consulate in Gilan, Qaem-Maqam articulated his rationale for rejecting the British requests as follows: the antipoison Britain was selling him (that of balancing the Russians) would lead to the nation’s collapse:25 ‘There is so much poison in our ill body [politic] that in any case if we do not treat it, its death will be inevitable. And if we inject a strong anti-poison, not only will the aching not decrease, but [it] will also bring about [the] death [of the nation].’26 Even as he saw the policy of balancing as deeply flawed and often detrimental to Persian interests, Qaem-Maqam also saw the practical limits of his country’s capacity and ability to stand on its own two feet. As a result, he strove to balance the two powers on his own terms: Persia would provide no concessions to the British but would 30

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renew the 1814 treaty according to which if a third party sought to invade the nation, Britain would back Persia.27 He communicated to his British counterparts that if they did this, his country would ‘leave Persia’s fate to the British’ and would also cede the military and Imperial Guards’ management to them.28  Tehran would also attempt to overturn the provisions of Turkmenchay which London found troublesome. In this case, ‘Persia will serve as a bulwark between the Russians and British colonies.’29 The military blows to Persia resulting from the two wars would become a powerful symbol of defeat, humiliation in negotiations with world powers, and the loss of territory for centuries to come. The Russo–Persian Wars also served as the gateway through which the empire entered modernity. As such, they laid the foundations for what would later become enshrined in the country’s strategy and doctrine: the view that the country must be equipped with a military capable of deterring and countering foreign adversaries. The defeat and resulting treaty would also come to symbolize the failure of Persian statesmen to secure the nation’s interests and assuage a national trauma. As a contemporary later recalled, when told that there was a ‘dearth of [competent] statesmen’ in the country, QaemMaqam retorted that the nation did not just lack a class of leaders, ‘no, sir, the absence is that of [even a single] statesman.’30 Today, Iranians view Golestan and  Turkmenchay as humiliating foreign policy blunders, and frequently use them as an allegory for weakness and defeat. Qaem-Maqam assessed the root causes of the defeat in the war and captured the impact on his nation’s psyche: This damage and great humiliation that resulted for the Iranian people was first due to ignorance, second from division and moral corruption of the elite. Otherwise, they would not have been defeated and would not have paid the price and the Russian government would not have dominated us.31

Persia’s defeats were also tied to its leaders’ inability to successfully balance the powers. Although some statesmen began to internalize the lessons of this failure in the immediate aftermath of the wars, the notion of hedging would frequently resurface in Iranian foreign policy debates for years to come. As we will see later, throughout the early 31

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and mid-twentieth century Reza Shah developed ties with Germany to undermine the British presence in his country, and Mossadeq sought to nationalize oil to eject all powers from the country. Later, in the twenty-first century, the Islamic Republic would pursue a policy we might call ‘light balancing.’ Light balancing was perhaps unconsciously modeled after the Qajars’ approach and would involve allowing a growing Russian and Chinese presence in Iran to offset Western efforts to isolate Iran while seeking to curb Beijing and Moscow’s influence through engagement with Europe. As was the case under the Qajars, these balancing efforts would lead to a series of disappointments.

Reforms and Resistance After two major defeats, Persia was effectively brought under the heel of the powers once more. As a result, Persians began to look inward. The elites turned their attention to domestic issues, including much-needed reforms to modernize the country, albeit not without significant resistance from many within the ruling class and, later, from abroad. Nevertheless, reforms soon followed and were implemented from the top down. At the time, the ruling elite running the state was comprised primarily of the Shah and his court, the nobility, military commanders, and, secondarily, an increasingly powerful Shia clerical body.32 Many of these players were not keen on change as they feared the potential and gradual erosion of their power. Against this backdrop, the northwestern city of Tabriz emerged as Persia’s second court, where reformers deliberated and initiated new policies. The city had become the empire’s most important business and diplomatic center. Its proximity to both Russia and the Ottoman Empire, coupled with the crown prince residing there, made the city a prominent reformist hub.33 The tensions between reformers and the members of the ruling class seeking to maintain the status quo reached their peak during the reign of Nasser al-Dinn Shah (1831–96). Nasser al-Dinn assumed the throne following the death of Mohammad Shah—who, in turn, had succeeded Fath Ali in 1834— and ruled over the empire for nearly half a century, from 1848 until 1896. Although Nasser al-Dinn Shah was himself resistant to change, he visited Europe, witnessed its progress, and sought to establish ties 32

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with the powers—his reign has thus been characterized as ‘the age of concessions to foreigners.’34 Nasser al-Dinn Shah became decreasingly relevant in the operations of the Persian government as his long reign went on, and he gradually withdrew into his expensive court.35  This enabled his first minister— the reform-minded Mirza Taqi Khan Farahani, better known as Amir Kabir (1807–52)—to rise to power and seek to transform Persia. Nasser al-Dinn Shah was assassinated in 1896. His tenure ‘epitomized the transitional nature of the Qajar rule.’36 And despite his reluctance to accept reform, Nasser al-Dinn Shah’s chief legacy lies in the introduction and arrangement of the building blocks upon which his successors would build modern Iran. This transformation was largely thanks to Amir Kabir. Amir Kabir, ‘probably the ablest Iranian public servant of the nineteenth century,’37 came to embody the Qajar period as one of transition. A testament to his tenure’s profound impact on the country, Iranians continue to see him as one of the most capable public figures and greatest reformers in their modern history. Having served in diplomatic missions to Russia and the Ottoman Empire, he was convinced of the necessity of modernizing Persian society if it were to thrive and, indeed, even survive. Chiefly, he saw the introduction of a constitution as a critical step in bringing the nation into modernity. However, the Russians proved to be a ‘great obstacle’, and ultimately an insurmountable one, preventing him from ever attaining this ideal.38 Although he was unable to meet his goal of overhauling the state, Amir Kabir undertook a series of comprehensive reforms. These included the development of a mining industry, establishment of a European-modeled polytechnic school in Tehran, and a balanced budget.39 In 1852, Amir Kabir was also assassinated under the Shah’s command, due to pressure from anti-reformists and the Shah’s mother, who exerted significant influence in the court.40 Today, over a century and a half after his assassination, Amir Kabir’s legacy continues to shape Iranian collective memory and self-perceptions. Iranians see him as a national symbol of reform and courage, a leader and patriot who chose to put country before self in an era when many chose personal enrichment by associating with foreign powers. He serves as an example of resilience, patriotism, and 33

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commitment to bettering the nation, and as a powerful reminder that, in Iran, being a reformer is seldom compensated and, indeed, often exorbitantly costly. His resistance to a weak, corrupt, and incapable ruler and his ability to implement reforms despite the opposition of powerful forces continue to inspire Iranians who seek to improve their country and to stand up to foreign powers. In that sense, Amir Kabir is a unifying figure for Iranians of many political persuasions in an otherwise polarizing landscape. Many still visit Bagh-e Fin—the gardens located in the city of Kashan, in Esfahan province, where the minister was assassinated—to remember and honor him. Just four years after Amir Kabir’s assassination, Persia entered into yet another war it would not win. This time, the Persians fought the other major power of the time, Britain, over the control of Herat— located in western Afghanistan—during the Anglo–Persian War (1856–57). The British saw Persian control over Herat as a threat to their interests in India—as Persian rule over the region would translate into Russian influence there. For their part, to the Persians, Afghanistan was (and would continue to be seen as) an integral part of their historical territory and thus key to national unity and territorial integrity. The empire also yielded parts of modern-day Pakistan to Britain in 1860–1900. With other swaths of territory lost in a humiliating defeat, Persia turned its attention to reforming its weak and ineffective military. By now, it was clear that Persia would not win a campaign, even a limited one against a small or weak army, without significant and structural changes to its military. As an Iranian writer put it a century and a half later in a comprehensive overview of Iranian military history: [W]hat can perhaps be seen as more important than the secession of Afghanistan from Iranian rule is the defeat of Iran from a small foreign military […]. This event showed that with Amir Kabir’s death, Iran missed its last opportunity to recreate its military power and, now, incompetent commanders and decadent princes were even unable to resist a ninethousand-man army.41

The country would have to wait almost a century before finally reaching this goal of establishing a strong military—albeit briefly. In 1879, Nasser al-Dinn Shah created the Cossack Brigade, a cavalry unit 34

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created on the model of the Caucasus Cossack units of the Imperial Russian Army. Nasser al-Dinn Shah’s travels to Russia inspired this enterprise. After its genesis under the Russian officer  LieutenantColonel Aleksei Domantovich, the unit gradually became more prestigious and gained more power and influence.42 The brigade was instrumental in several respects. First, the Cossacks served to increase Russian influence in Persia and to undermine British sway. Second, they helped consolidate the Qajars’ rule and thwarted popular opposition and protests, particularly in the wake of the Constitutional Revolution (1905–11).43 Finally, the Cossack Brigade—later, Cossack Division—would serve to bring about the collapse of the dynasty. The Cossacks’ most prominent member, Reza Khan, would rise to power from within the unit’s ranks and revolutionize the country.44

The Decline of the Qajars and Reza Shah’s Advent A decade after Nasser al-Dinn Shah’s assassination, the Constitutional Revolution sought to create a constitutional monarchy, which would replace the empire’s traditional absolute monarchical system. In 1906, a group of revolutionaries undertook to drastically limit the powers of the monarch by crafting the country’s first modern constitution. That same year, Persians elected their first parliament or majles. The proceedings of the first National Consultative Assembly bring to fore the continued tensions within Persian society and the elite regarding the role of foreign powers in the country’s affairs. In his writings on these proceedings, historian Fereydoun Adamiyat points out the parliamentarians’ dilemma: they knew that Russia and Britain would oppose their plans to undertake economic reforms and establish a national bank to decrease their reliance on Russian and British financial structures, but no one dared discuss it publicly.45 A year later, Britain and Russia formally divided Persia into spheres of influence and Mohammad Ali Shah commenced his brief tenure. The constitutionalists terminated the monarch’s reign in 1909 and the young Ahmad Shah (1898–1930) succeeded his father. He would remain on the throne until 1925.  Two years into Ahmad Shah’s tenure, in 1911, the Russians flouted Persian sovereignty to put a decisive 35

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stop to the revolution. The Shah’s regent, Abolqasem Nasser al-Molk (1856–1927), and others in the court had essentially deferred domestic matters to the Russians and, as Nasser al-Molk reportedly confessed, he had no hope that his country’s sovereignty or territorial integrity would be preserved.46 It was during this revolution that the Germans began to position themselves as an alternative to Russia and Britain.  The Russians and the British were already concerned about these designs and saw Germany’s growing presence in Persia as a threat to their own ambitions. German competition with Russia and Britain in Persia would culminate a few decades later, during Reza Shah’s reign.47 Watching these tensions gradually play out, German officials had observed that: Russia does not want Iran to have relations which could lead to a partnership with any country. Instead, it wants to be the only crediting state for Iran to be able to come to cash its check whenever it wants. Russia is tightening its rope around Iran in order to bring about its political and economic dismemberment.48

Tensions surrounding the fate of Persia did not just play out between Germany on the one hand and Russia and Britain on the other.   They also plagued British–Russian relations, as the two countries’ interests in Persia were often mutually exclusive. The issue even transcended the level of the state and became divisive within Britain, where elites vigorously debated what outcomes were most desirable for their country’s interests and how to obtain them.49 Some saw the Constitutional Revolution as a threat to British interests while others viewed it as a favorable development—then British ambassador to Persia, Cecil Spring-Rice (1859–1918), best exemplifies this latter camp.50 The powers’ concerns about the revolutionaries were justified: rising nationalism and growing anti-Western sentiment were central to the movement. During the first majles, Persian nationalism was defined in part by ‘anti-Western colonialism,’ to include Russian imperialism.51 The parliamentarians wished to eliminate the shadow of foreign debt, capitulations, and agreements.52 For the Russians, an additional driver behind their opposition to the Constitutionalists lay in the first majles’ wish to reform the Cossack Division, which had afforded them 36

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meaningful influence in Persia. The revolutionaries planned to remove Russian commanders from the force and to create a volunteer national standing army.53 While none of the revolutionaries’ aspirations would truly materialize during the remainder of the Qajar period, the parliament’s deliberations would lay out the groundwork for the creation of a modern national military under Reza Shah. And the lawmakers’ emphasis on limiting foreign influence in the country’s military affairs and their initiation of a process whereby the nation would seek to become more self-reliant would draw the contours of contemporary Iran’s security thinking.54  The attitudes toward foreign powers and the emergence of modern Iranian nationalism in that period would also continue to play a key role in shaping the country’s politics and foreign relations for over a century to come. An important step in this direction was taken in 1907, when a coup threatened the first majles. The majles along with a mobilized popular force effectively neutralized the attempt. Strengthened by the episode, the majles engaged in negotiations with Mohammad Ali Shah, who agreed to defer all military matters to the Ministry of W   ar—to include 55 the Cossack Division. Following this, the majles was also equipped with its own Guard. According to Adamiyat, this was the only time the monarch and the legislator reached a negotiated settlement and the last time the parliament led a successful counter-coup effort.56 By 1920, Ahmad Shah had effectively lost control of his empire. As a result, the following year, Reza Khan—then an officer in the Cossack Division—directed his troops to take Tehran and to stabilize and secure the rest of the empire. Reza Khan first took the title of Sardar Sepah, or commander-in-chief, before being appointed prime minister two years later. Finally, in 1925, the majles formally deposed Ahmad Shah and instated Reza Khan as the king. This marked the end of the variegated Qajar reign and inaugurated a new chapter in the nation’s history, that of the last dynasty to rule the nation: the Pahlavis. The two Pahlavi kings—Reza Shah and his son, Mohammad Reza—would set out to place their country on a different trajectory. In doing so, however, they would face many of the same challenges as their predecessors. Chiefly, the Pahlavis, too, would struggle with the influence of foreign powers in their country. Like the Qajars before and the Islamic 37

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Republic after them, Reza Shah and his son would identify self-reliance as an ideal to attain while facing the limits of their country’s capacity. We will return to the Pahlavis in the next chapter. In the case of the Qajars, these and a number of other considerations led rulers and courts to grant foreign monopolies or ‘concessions,’ in infrastructure, commodities, and industry in exchange for minimal profit shares and lowered tariffs. These considerations included logistical constraints (such as the lack of capacity and capabilities) but also corruption and mismanagement—a fact that, as we have seen, was already blatantly obvious to their contemporaries.57 As implemented, the Qajars’ concessions only exacerbated existing shortcomings—the same challenges the original policy had sought to address. It rendered Persian industries uncompetitive and stifled the process of industrialization in the country. Beginning in 1863, foreign, particularly British and Russian, firms and individuals purchased concessions to build telegraph and rail lines—the Persians granted such concessions to a number of nations, although those made to the British and Russians have received more attention and generated more controversy. Soon, these firms and individuals were involved in a vast array of other projects in Persia.58 As a result of their impact on their country’s industry and progress, Persians viewed these concessions negatively and as yet another example of the weakness exhibited by their statesmen in the face of foreign subjugation. The concessions fed into the country’s distrust of foreign powers and contributed to its drive to become self-reliant. The concessions affected not only Persian foreign policy, but also had a deep impact on its domestic politics. Merchants, the clergy, and the middle and working classes began to organize, forming an alliance to assert themselves in the political realm. Many revolted and joined a resistance movement, challenging the authority of the shah. This powerful force affected the viability of the concessions.  This was most obvious in the revolts that drove the British to abandon the Reuter Concession of 1872, which had ceded an array of sectors to London. These included: […] an absolute monopoly of railroads and tramways, government forests and all uncultivated lands; the exclusive working of mines (except those

38

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of precious metal); the exclusive construction of all kinds of irrigation works […] all future enterprises related to roads, telegraphs, gas, mills, factories, workshops, forges and pavements; and all other public works relating to the urban areas, post office, and customs.59

Likewise, the Tobacco Concession of 1891–92 sparked a stark opposition and revolts steered by the religious establishment—known as the Tobacco Protest. The concession granted control over the cultivation and sale of tobacco to the British. The revolts brought the merchant and clerical classes together and led to the concession being revoked. A decade later, Persia concluded the D’Arcy Concession of 1901, which granted the British monopoly over Persia’s petroleum sector. This concession, too, would cause considerable turmoil in subsequent decades, leading to some of the most significant controversies and events in Iranian politics in the twentieth century. The Qajars’ corruption exacerbated the effects of their mismanagement and incompetence. As one of Nasser al-Dinn Shah’s contemporaries put it—and in words that would continue to resonate into the twenty-first century—instead of the two key institutions, the army and the treasury, becoming hubs for reform and modernization, they became nests of corruption and waste.60 The kings’ lack of knowledge and incompetence led to the top-down spread of fraud and bribery across all institutions, making the country a swamp of corruption.61 In the army, the corruption was so widespread that even the reformers did not believe that their efforts would yield any results.62 The corruption and mismanagement made it even more necessary to rely on foreign assistance to manage key institutions within the country, creating a vicious circle. To make matters worse, the Qajars never fully managed to strengthen and assert the authority of the central government, which remained weak and minimally integrated throughout the eighteenth century. By the time the empire entered the twentieth century, it was on the verge of collapse and bankruptcy.63 The extortionary system of madakhel— wherein wealthy nobles placed bids on government positions and then resold them—produced a weak yet colossal bureaucracy filled with competing special interests.64 The Qajars were both cause of and witness to the early stages of the development of Iran’s modern security thinking. In fact, their 39

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incompetence, coupled with European machinations, opened the door to the domination of the country by colonial powers. In particular, major wars and defeats resulting in two disastrous treaties for the nation, foreign influence and perceived betrayals (stemming from the powers’ pursuit of their own interests), and one-sided concessions to the powers began to draw the contours of contemporary strategic outlook. Several key themes emerged in that period, chiefly: deep insecurity; distrust of foreign powers; cynicism that negotiations would ever lead to an acceptable outcome; suspicion of treaties; and the pursuit of self-sufficiency. Hence, the Qajars left a footprint in several key areas, which continue to shape Iran’s worldview today.

Modern Iran and the Legacy of the Qajars The Qajars and Their Military As we have seen, the Qajars’ military campaigns largely led to humiliating defeats and drew the map of contemporary Iran. They also awakened Persian leaders who set out to remedy their country’s military shortcomings by creating a modern army. Hence, the wars and the treaties that resulted from them perhaps constitute the most significant legacy of the Qajars for Iranian strategic thinking and security policy. And the Qajars’ efforts to consolidate various armed forces to create a modern military and the establishment of the Cossack Brigade laid out the foundations upon which Reza Shah founded the Iranian military. Qajar rulers initiated the process of modernizing their country’s armed forces when they began to expand the Persian military manpower by mobilizing the masses. European nations had begun to introduce mass mobilization, or levée en masse, following the 1789 French Revolution. The Europeans were building bigger armies by utilizing nationalism and the Enlightenment ideal of universal conscription. Similarly, the Persians levied religion to appeal to and galvanize what was at the time a largely illiterate and conservative populace.65 Universal conscription in France had led to an increase in the number of soldiers and ‘enabled French commanders to fight more aggressive and costly campaigns, and to fight more of them.’66 Likewise, 40

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the Qajars’ introduction of the levée en masse was highly effective in mobilizing a greater fighting force. The first Russo–Persian War saw an influx of fighters following a fatwa—or holy decree—issued by the Persian Shia clerical establishment, encouraging the population to fight the Russian ‘infidels.’67 Ultimately, the ability to conscribe large numbers of troops did not translate into battlefield effectiveness and victory. The Persians were soundly defeated in the first Russo–Persian War, as they were unable to match Russia’s clear technological and conventional military superiority. Tehran suffered a major defeat resulting in the conclusion of the Treaty of Golestan, ceding most disputed territories to Moscow. Seeking to further weaken Persia, British agents goaded its government to reclaim the lost territory and pushed the feeble monarch toward war with Russia.68  This British machination combined with mobilized masses ready for combat convinced Fath Ali Shah to reluctantly undertake a second campaign against Russia, prompting the second Russo–Persian War.  This campaign was even more catastrophic for the Persian army, leading to the conclusion of the Treaty of  Turkmenchay, in which the nation ceded even more land. Overall, the Qajars’ military thinking was a departure from that of the Safavids (1301–1736). During the nineteenth century, the Safavids’ main military reforms were twofold: to undermine the tribes’ military power and to create a national standing army.  They had some successes in the former but largely failed in the latter—in fact, the country would have to wait until the advent of Reza Shah for the creation of a standing army.69 In turn, this failure stymied the progress made in curbing the tribes’ military might, which continued to exert considerable influence over the country’s foreign and security affairs. In contrast, in the political realm, Qajar rulers managed to somewhat assert the central government’s power, slightly undermining that of the tribes—albeit with significant shortcomings.70 This development spilled into military areas as well, stripping the tribes of some of their military prowess by establishing new military institutions with more authority, resources, and capabilities. But unlike the Safavids, the Qajars failed to fully integrate the tribes into the political and military establishments. Many irregular tribal units, loyal only to their commanders, remained part of the country’s defense structure 41

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over the course of the reform period. Moreover, due to their fiscal and political mismanagement, the Qajars fell short of establishing a proper standing army, despite several attempts. They wasted resources and failed to curb the power of the tribal leaders and their forces and transfer this authority to the state and its military.71 Although the military defeats of the Russo–Persian Wars prompted the Persian elites to endow the country with a strong army, they also rolled back the negligible progress made in that direction. The loss of territory directly affected the Persian military’s potential power—or the resources at its disposal to enhance its actual power and to develop its capabilities. Having ceded swaths of territory to the Russians in Golestan and  Turkmenchay,Tehran had also lost the inhabitants of those regions to Moscow. This meant that the empire was no longer able to conscript those populations into its military, significantly reducing its manpower. Similarly, Persia lost revenue streams, including taxes and industry production, from those territories, which would have contributed to funding the military. The country’s military failures had another significant implication: they put on display the extent of the Persian military’s weakness and demonstrated that violating Persian sovereignty carried little to no consequence for the aggressor. Naturally, having taken note of these developments and their repercussions, foreign leaders capitalized on the defeats and used Persia and its leaders’ weakness to expand their influence.The growing power of foreigners in the empire’s affairs further entrenched the notions of distrust and conspiracy among Persians— which continue to shape the Iranian state and populace’s narrative about the nation and the world, and Tehran’s decision-making, to this day. By the end of the Qajar era, Persia was on the verge of collapse: it had lost substantial territory and rebellions were cropping up in many parts of the empire. Despite attempts at reform, the professional military remained small and fractured. As a result of its shortcomings, the army was unable to either maintain internal security or deter and counter foreign threats. In the decade following the assassination of Nasser al-Dinn Shah, the Qajars increasingly lost their grip on power and failed to resist foreign meddling. Put on full display during the Constitutional Revolution, foreign intrusions gradually became a leitmotif of the Persian political 42

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landscape in the early twentieth century. Fearing for his life and hold on power, Mohammad Ali Shah planned to abolish the majles to secure his throne. From the beginning of this power struggle, the monarch enlisted Moscow’s support. Russia was committed to absolutist rule in Persia, which it saw as being of paramount importance for its national interests. As a result, the Russians undertook a series of actions destined to end the revolutionary movement in Persia. On 23 June 1908, the majles was shelled.72 That day, the Russianled Cossack forces surrounded the British legation in Tehran to deny refuge to the nationalists. They moved artillery units to the majles and bombarded the edifice. For their part, the British opted for nonintervention at first.73 But as the power struggle deteriorated into a potential civil war, one which the king could not win on his own, the British gradually abandoned their initial position and became more involved. By 1911, Russia had actively intervened in Persia, while the British had consolidated their positions in the south.74 At the onset of World War I, Russian and British troops remained positioned in Persia.75 Although the empire declared its neutrality just months into the conflict, in November 1914, the powers ignored the Persians’ wishes. Within months, the Russian, British, German, and Ottoman armies were moving to split up Persia into zones they would each occupy. Once again, the Qajar government was paralyzed and could not enforce its neutrality and assert its sovereignty.  The Russians quickly secured the northern half of the country against the Ottomans, while the British initially struggled against the Germans in the south. German and Ottoman forces managed to conquer the cities of Shiraz and Kerman in southern Persia.76 The central authority lost control over much of the territory.77 From the Persian perspective, Germany stood out amongst the powers. It enjoyed considerable support from Persians, who saw Berlin as an alternative to London, whose meddling in the empire’s affairs they had long bemoaned.78 Aware of the Persians’ desperation to eradicate or at least minimize Russian and British presence and influence in their country, the Germans seized this opportunity to build their own.79 Germany’s newfound power in Persia now spanned intelligence, diplomacy, and trade, and the European power began to open up consulates in major Iranian cities to pursue and secure these interests.80 43

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As the Great War progressed, Persia rebuffed British and Russian requests to declare war on Germany. A year into the conflict, in 1915, nationalist members of the dissolved majles created a proGerman ‘Temporary National Government’ in the city of Qom.81 The Germans mobilized thousands of tribal forces to capitalize on the fighters’ invaluable experience fighting the British. This move further undermined efforts going back centuries to move the Persian military’s center of gravity from the tribes to the central authority.82 But the Persians’ belief that Germany afforded them a shot at successfully balancing Britain and Russia made a number of tradeoffs acceptable. Hence, Persian statesmen once again pursued a strategy that had long proven fruitless. Even so, after the war and through the interwar period, Germany would continue to enjoy popular support in Persia. Russia would soon end its participation in the war as a new government took shape in Moscow. The revolution and advent of a new Communist government in Russia reverberated across the world, and Persia was no exception. Unsurprisingly, given the level of exchange between Persians and Russians, Communism gradually took hold in Persia. The spread of the ideology would add another layer of complexity to the already intricate and multi-layered relationship between Moscow and Tehran.83 Despite a new ideology, worldview, and leadership, Moscow did not dial down its involvement in Persia. Irrespective of Persia’s ostensible neutrality, World War I wrought massive devastation on the populace: ‘In Tehran alone, [in the period of 1917–19] nearly 20 per cent of the population died of starvation.’84 The war fully exposed the government and military as ineffectual institutions and set the stage for the rise of a strong leader presenting a viable alternative to the Qajar rule. The powers’ interventions in Persia during World War I also cemented their image as ruthless states willing to pursue their interests regardless of the tremendous harm inflicted indiscriminately on the population. It also signaled to Persians that international norms and rules did not apply to them in times of need. As they began to see it, neither these nor other foreign powers would protect the nation, which had to stand on its own two feet. The Great Persian Famine that marked the end and aftermath of the war remains engraved in the Iranian psyche. As today’s Iranians see it, the British and the Russians ignored Persia’s declaration of 44

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neutrality and deliberately sacrificed thousands of lives. Setting this precedent, the powers would not hesitate to do so again in the pursuit of their interests.85 In addition to the weakness of its statesmen, lack of battlefield effectiveness, and image as an ineffectual force, the Qajar military suffered from a number of other shortcomings. In particular, a politicized officer corps, corruption, and under-equipped soldiers rendered the Persian military ineffective in that period.86 The shah chose his generals based on personal connection to senior officials rather than professional considerations, such as qualifications and skills. These commanders were often only interested in leadership positions where corruption and profiteering were possible.87 Furthermore, a large number of the country’s highest-ranking military commanders were adolescents and children, including ‘Malijak, the nephew of a favorite wife of [Nasser al-Dinn] shah, who at the age of nine received “the title of amirtouman, the highest rank the army could confer.”’88 The corruption was widespread, severe, and paralyzing. Officers at all levels stole money allotted for their troops’ salaries, which affected morale and led many soldiers to neglect training and drills to work in nearby garrison towns or villages to make ends meet.89 In an illustrative example, Kamran Mirza, the commander-in-chief of the army in the 1890s, ‘first separated the army budget from the ordinary state budget …. [then] began charging the state for an army of 90,000–100,000 men while in actual fact he did not have more than 30,000, “perhaps as few as 15,000.”’90 Further affecting morale, soldiers were ill-equipped to fight their technologically superior and militarily advanced European and Russian adversaries. The infantry fought with old percussion muskets and, later, decrepit Austrian rifles while the artillery used camel mounted zanburak, or light artillery weapons.91 The acquisition of new weapons and maintenance of the military was a financial burden that the Qajars were often unwilling and unable to assume, despite the military taking the lion’s share of the budget.92 Nonetheless, the Qajars made a few attempts at creating a modern military force and saw some success. In 1808, Crown Prince and Governor of Azerbaijan Abbas Mirza established a local force called nezam-e jadid, or the New Order—albeit not without pushback from 45

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clerics, who viewed some of the reforms as contrary to their faith and tradition.93 The force consisted of 12,000 infantrymen, 12,000 cavalrymen, and an artillery force armed with British guns.94 Nezam-e jadid was larger and better-trained than Fath Ali Shah’s army in Tehran, having benefited from French and British instruction.95 However, the New Order suffered from a number of familiar deficiencies, many stemming from Persia’s corruption, lack of understanding of modern warfare, and inability to shift its mindset and adopt an innovative strategy and doctrine. Persian military commanders and political leaders continued to adhere to their traditional ways and were unable and unwilling to embrace modern military concepts. The absence of proper command, management, discipline, and logistical and technical skills, combined with the predominance of old tactics, weapons, and structures, also rendered the new military order ineffective.96 As a result, nezam-e jadid allowed the Persians to make modest progress before stalling altogether. Ultimately, the force performed poorly in the second Russo–Persian War, which the Shah used as justification to halt additional funding for military reforms.97 As we have seen, Nasser al-Dinn Shah later created the Cossack Brigade, which he modeled after the Imperial Russian Army’s Caucasian Cossack Regiment.98 Russian officers, led by Domantovich, set up and ran the brigade. These officers also served in the Russian forces. This was challenging as it meant that foreigners—and Persia’s adversaries in two devastating wars—were effectively in charge of the country’s armed forces. Moreover, many of these officers left Persia in 1917 to return to Russia during the October Revolution to join the anti-Communist White Guard. Following these developments, in the early 1920s Persian officers, with Reza Khan in their ranks, began to lead the Cossacks. But Persia had to await the advent of Reza Shah to be afforded a proper modern standing army. Until then, the Cossacks were the only effective armed forces in Persia.99  These tensions within the country’s military further contributed to the Persians’ complex relationship with the Russians. On the one hand, Tehran was consistently reliant on Moscow in military affairs. On the other, the two nations’ interests were often in conflict. Hence, the Persians sought to balance Russian influence over their armed forces. To this end—and to avoid outsourcing internal 46

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security to Moscow—Tehran enlisted an American to devise a force dedicated to law enforcement. Morgan Schuster, an American appointed head of Persia’s Treasury, would help lay the foundations for Iranian law enforcement and international security forces. He created the Treasury Gendarmerie, which he tasked with internal security and tax collection efforts. The Gendarmerie also served to counterlever the Russians to create a bulwark against their machinations. The Gendarmerie was of similar size to the Cossack Brigade, and Schuster’s initial choice for the unit’s commanding officer was Major Charles Stokes, an outspokenly antiRussian British officer.100 The Gendarmerie came into conflict with the Cossacks at several points during Russia’s counterrevolutionary intervention of 1911.101 The British funded the creation of the South Persia Rifles, a slightly smaller force—also designed to create equilibrium with the Russian-created Cossack Brigade.102 Reza Shah would combine these three forces and the small number of palace guards, known as nezam, in 1926—immediately after the fall of the Qajars. The combination of these forces finally created the first unified Persian military of the modern age.103 Although the country would wait another few decades before formally establishing coup-proofing mechanisms, its elites had already begun to see such measures as critical to their survival and stability. As such, the end of the Qajar era laid the foundations for the organizations that would come to characterize the Iranian national security apparatus a few decades later. Another obstacle in the way of the Qajars’ modest military reforms lay in the controversies surrounding their implementation. The central authority in Tehran was not always the originating force behind plans for reforms and their operationalization. Instead, many changes were introduced in Tabriz. T   here, Crown Prince Abbas Mirza (1789–1833)— who had made a name for himself thanks to his role in the country’s military campaigns—and his entourage took stock and developed an expansive view of their country’s military shortcomings. Abbas Mirza and his men understood that Persia could not prosper or even survive without reform. However, as was the case in prior decades, key individuals in the court in T   ehran were averse to such changes, preferring to maintain the status quo based on tradition and the Sharia.104 47

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Some dissenting voices in the country wished to see reform but not in the manner pursued by their statesmen, which they believed simply resulted in more foreign interference and encroachment on Persian sovereignty. For instance, in one of their last attempts to reform the Persian army, the Qajars tried to further unify the military but faced opposition from within the ranks.105 A joint commission composed of British and Persian officers was tasked with overseeing efforts to build up an army of 80,000 men and to create a more cohesive force, which would, nonetheless, largely operate under British command.106 The Persian army was to be made up of British nationals above the rank of major.107 This would effectively put decision-making on strategy, doctrine, training, and planning in the hands of foreigners. Some Persian commanders objected to these measures and refused to sign the joint commission’s report.108 Dissent also often ensued from the clergy, whose buy-in and support was instrumental to the state’s ability to galvanize the masses to join the army and war efforts (which had been critical during the Russo–Persian Wars). Although largely uninformed about and inexperienced in the conduct of war, the clergy nonetheless did not hesitate to pontificate about the matter and to thwart reform efforts. Some clerics required the king to prioritize faith and tradition over the exigencies of warfare. The king was to instruct his troops to avoid launching offensives and to resort only to defense. The men of the cloth expected the troops to prioritize abiding the faith’s prescriptions over battlefield effectiveness.109 Some clerics went as far as deeming the smallest steps taken toward establishing a modern military as a departure from the faith’s prescriptions. Some objected to the adoption of uniforms and others to the beat of the drums accompanying marches on the grounds that Islam forbids music.110 Theologians engaged in esoteric debates that were largely irrelevant to real-world combat operations, but which nonetheless disrupted efforts to implement change. For some, the use of drums would be acceptable in warfare, provided the music helped morale and boosted jihad against the infidels.111 For others, music was banned regardless of context. Clerical involvement in military affairs sometimes went further than simply weighing on morale and cohesion, with graver implications 48

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for the Persian army. For instance, after Persia lost swaths of territory to the Russians, some clerics prioritized religious considerations over practical ones and issued fatwas encouraging Muslim residents of  those lands to emigrate. Residing in lands governed by infidels, they argued, would render the faithful unable to perform their religious duties. The state, which was hoping to leverage those populations in its struggle to regain control of its lost territories, saw its efforts undermined by the clergy.112 The Shia hierocracy’s interference in the matters of the state would continue and increase in the following decades—partly motivated by religious considerations but also in no insignificant part due to the clerics’ pursuit of power.

The Consolidation of the Shia Hierocracy Another critical development of the Qajar period lies in the gradual consolidation of the Shia hierocracy’s power in Persia.113 The removal of a major obstacle in the eighteenth century facilitated this consolidation and empowerment. Following the Afghan invasion of Persia in 1722 and the collapse of the Safavid dynasty nearly a decade and a half later, Persian rulers gradually relinquished aspects of their authority, particularly those pertaining to religious matters.114 The Shia hierocracy shortly gained control of three key areas of public life: religion, judicial matters, and education.115 As the men of the cloth tightened their grip over these sectors, they also sought to legitimize their consolidation of power and assertion in these arenas in the public eye. Some jurists wrote essays and tracts explaining the division of labor between the state and the religious establishment.116 They claimed that their growing role in these areas would lead to an increase in harmony and cooperation between the state and faith leaders, thus improving the people’s lives.117 The religious establishment was not limiting its ambitions to indirectly exerting influence over Persian public life. Instead, many clerics aspired to enter the realm of politics. The formation of partnerships with key stakeholders within civil society was critical to the clergy’s efforts to assert itself in more areas of social and political life. In particular, faith leaders began to form what would later become a critical alliance in the lead-up to the Islamic 49

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Revolution, the nexus of the religious establishment and the powerful merchant class. This alliance aimed to protect the interests of both the clerical elites and the bourgeoisie against the state and foreign powers. Thanks to these partnerships, the religious elites were able to increase their social and political capital and prestige as their power grew. This newfound capital manifested itself in the decreasing prominence of old titles, such as the Safavid Mulla-Bashi, and the creation by the religious establishment of new, prestigious titles, such as that of Ayatollah—or the ‘sign of God.’118 However, these efforts were divisive within the religious class, where some fervently opposed any clerical meddling in politics while others hoped to continue expanding their influence. The questions surrounding the desirability, nature, and scope of clerical involvement in politics would come back to dominate the internal discussions of Iran’s Shia hierocracy and its broader political landscape in the twentieth century. The Qajar period saw other significant developments in the religious domain. The number of jurists, or mujtahidin, increased during that era and so did their stature. Mujtahidin occupied a privileged position in Shia theology and Persian society thanks to their status as sources of emulation. By the end of the nineteenth century, the jurists controlled the religious life of over 90 percent of the population— and by extension had sway over key aspects of Persian public life.119 The absence of a formal structure and hierarchy, as well as formal disciplinary procedures, paved the way for clerics entering the political realm in pursuit of their own interests or political agendas. But the entry of some clerics into politics divided the hierocracy. Many clerics believed that, as men of God, their place was in mosques and that they should only concern themselves with matters pertaining to the faith. Others saw engagement in politics as a means by which they could improve society and, accordingly, as an extension of their religious duties. Still others simply coveted power and saw it as an end in itself. These frictions became increasingly visible among rural and urban clerical elites, and laid out the foundations for what would decades later become known as the rift between ‘Qom and Najaf’— or between Shia scholars based in Iran and those based in Iraq. This split came to characterize an important part of Shia politics in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, particularly on the eve of the 50

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Islamic Revolution. Throughout the twentieth century and into the period immediately preceding the revolution, a growing number of clerics entered the political realm, leading to those who opposed any entanglement of religion and politics or godly ideals and worldly matters to leave Iran for Iraq. The disagreements between the two camps further intensified and paved the way for more direct engagement in political movements by Iran-based scholars.120 Accordingly, holy sites in Iran offered refuge to political dissidents from the arm of the state during periods of turmoil, and decrees and backing from religious elites lent legitimacy to political movements. Nevertheless, clerics with political ambitions remained in the minority throughout the Qajar period and well into the twentieth century—before gaining prominence in the 1960s. Despite all this, on the eve of the Constitutional Revolution in the early 1900s, the Shia establishment still lacked a strong, formal hierarchy in the vein of the Catholic Church. The only division in ranks was that between the mujtahid and non-mujtahid—and even this separation was not entirely formal. The hierocracy was also split between conservative figures and more open-minded ones. Conservative clerics wished to preserve and enforce traditional values, including religious education and clerical domination over judicial and legal matters. Hence, this class of clerics considered the imposition of non-madrasa education and the expansion of the jurisdiction of secular courts as nonstarters. For their part, forward-leaning clerics were active in opening new schools (such as the Islamic School in Tehran) and more accepting of what could be considered radical progressive reforms for that time. As the Shia hierocracy was formalizing its role and institutions and consolidating its power, Qajar-era thinkers injected a conflicting notion into Persian discourse—one whose influence would reverberate throughout the middle of the twentieth century. Mirza Fathali Akhondzadeh introduced the idea of ‘Islamic Protestantism,’ which he described as religious reformation.121 At the core of this new religious outlook was the concept of reformation ecclesiae, a key principle of Christian reformation centuries prior.122 Building on this idea, Ali Shariati would lay out the ideological foundations of the Islamic Revolution in the mid-twentieth century—to which we will return in a few chapters.123 51

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The Qajar period also saw the re-emergence of what is now known as Shia millenarianism—or the belief that the faithful should prepare the grounds for the reappearance of the Twelfth Imam, also known as Imam Zaman or the Mahdi. According to the Shia Twelver mythos, the Twelfth Imam went into occultation in the tenth century. His reappearance would serve to bring justice to the world. The movement’s re-emergence after centuries of dormancy posed another threat to the nascent mainstream Shia hierocracy and created a division within the sect.124  These developments also led to the inception of the Bábi faith in 1844—which later became known as the Baha’i faith— born out of the womb of Shia  Twelver millenarian tradition. Seyyed Ali Mohammad Shirazi, also known as the ‘Báb’ (gate), saw himself as the conduit to the Twelfth Imam.125 As the notable secular author Ahmad Kasravi (1890–1946) put it, belief in a being whose supernatural arrival or return would bring about the victory of good over evil had resided in the Iranian psyche and tradition since antiquity.126 In that sense, the notion belonged to a set of principles inherited from the nation’s pre-Islamic past and heritage, infused into its own reading of Islam. The Qajars saw both the division resulting within the sect from the re-emergence of this trend and Báb’s followers as a threat to their legitimacy, which was conditional upon the approval of the clerical classes. The Bábis were subsequently massacred by government troops, and the Baha’i remain persecuted in Iran up to the present time of writing. While Shia millenarianism played a significant role in shaping the Baha’i faith, it would remain a marginal factor in Shia life in Iran until the Islamic Revolution began to brew over a century later. During the revolution, Shia millenarianism would contribute to mythmaking and serve as yet another gateway for Iranians’ efforts to fight foreign influence in their country—in addition to feeding into the Islamic Republic’s rhetoric and shaping of  its image abroad, particularly during the Iran–Iraq  War. The Qajar era was significant in another regard: it marked the beginning of the conflict between the protection of the rights and interests of Persians (later, Iranians), and Muslims more generally, and the pursuit of alliances and foreign relations. As the Qajar kings were not just secular figures, but rather the self-anointed kings 52

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of Islam and the Shia world, they enjoyed more power. They also believed that their role imposed responsibilities on them stretching beyond Persian territories. As they saw it, the Qajar monarchs’ responsibilities included the protection of the Muslim communities outside Persia.127  This tension famously manifested itself a number of times during the Pahlavi era, and continues to have great implications for Iranian foreign policy today—in particular, the notion that Iranians must stand up for their Muslim and oppressed brethren shapes the country’s rhetoric. This rhetoric builds on Iran’s own experience with foreign meddling and serves as a means to rally Muslims elsewhere against the powers. The first violent turn of this tension occurred in February 1829, after the Treaty of Turkmenchay sparked vehement anti-Russian sentiment in Persia. That year, rumors spread across the land that the Russian envoy Alexander Sergeyevich Griboyedov was holding captive two Georgian women, who were Muslim converts. A prominent cleric, Hajj Mirza Masih, issued a decree calling on the populace to defend the Muslim women against the infidels, as commanded by holy laws. Crowds gathered at the residence in Tehran and held it under siege, before killing Griboyedov and thirty-seven of his companions.128 This episode would constitute the first but not the last instance of Iranians storming the diplomatic representation of a foreign power. After the 1979 revolution, a number of such incidents would rock Iran’s foreign relations, from the taking of hostages at the US embassy in Tehran in 1979–81 to the 2016 storming of the Saudi representation in Iran. As noted by the scholar Said Amir Arjomand, the Griboyedov residence affair was significant and foreshadowing in another way. It was the first instance of Shia clerics stepping in by leading the people— the Muslim community—when they saw the king as failing to protect their interests against foreigners. In this sense, the incident prefigures the events of the 1960s and 70s, leading to the Islamic Revolution.129 Indeed, during the course of the Griboyedov residence events, the clerics took a clear stance against their king, arguing that he had failed to rescue the Muslim women, leading Hajj Mirza Masih and the populace to take matters into their own hands. According to the court historian, the men of the cloth went as far as ‘bluntly’ stating that, ‘if the government should order us [to act] against our will, we shall 53

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collectively abjure allegiance to the king.’130  The Shia hierocracy seized the opportunity afforded to it by the statesmen’s failure to act and protect Muslims to take the lead in matters where the popular will and the king’s actions and policies were in conflict. Ten years after the siege, the clergy and bazaar joined forces in the Shiraz ‘civil war’ of 1839 in open revolts against the government. Now, the alliance between the two powerful classes was more than the simple tacit defiance of the wishes of the ruling elites. In the uprising against the much-maligned governor, for the first time in a major revolt, mosques and theologians were intimately involved in the resistance.131 Also for the first time in a major incident, and as a sign of the times to come, they openly demanded the removal of a government official. The power struggle between the political and religious leadership of Iran had begun, both because of the increasing strength of the clergy and the incompetence and weakness of the governing elites. This tension would only become more pronounced and violent as the reign of the Qajars continued—and over the next century and a half.

Reforms and Modernization in the Social and Political Spheres The last two decades of the Qajars’ rule paved the way for the reforms and modernization efforts of the Pahlavi era, but also, implicitly, the Islamic Revolution that put an end to the monarchy. The period saw the continuation of existing trends, some going back hundreds of years, which had shaped the Persian state, as well as emerging tendencies, stemming from the ‘forces that altered the makeup and function of the state in modern times.’132 Historian Abbas Amanat identifies four factors that shaped the Qajar period. First, the pre-Islamic Persian tradition of kingship was passed on from generation to generation through ‘political culture and practice of government,’ as well as treaties of government or mirrors, histories, and epic legends.These include Khajeh Nezam al-Molk’s Book of Government and Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh—known in English as The Book of Kings. Shahnameh is the definitive compilation of Persian myths in the form of an epic poem of thousands of verses. The tenth and eleventhcentury poet Abolqasem Ferdowsi, ‘a member of the Persian revivalist 54

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movement,’ composed the oeuvre.133 His work provides ‘an overview of the non-Islamic nature of Persian political thought.’134 It is viewed as a literary masterpiece reviving the Persian language following the Arab invasion of Persia (leading to the collapse of the Sasanian Empire in 651 AD) and the adoption of Arabic as the lingua franca. It holds a central place in the discussions around mythmaking, Iranian culture, and national identity.135 Second, competing with and completing this notion of kingship was Shia Islam and its conception of political authority discussed in this chapter. Third, the legacy of Turkish and Mongol invasions in the eleventh to fourteenth centuries led to the advent of a ‘nomadic concept of power and leadership,’ whose implications even extended to the military domain.136 Lastly, during the nineteenth century, European and Western models with which Persia and its broader region had come into contact completed this picture.137 These models directly and indirectly shaped Persia during the Qajar era. The powers directly molded certain aspects of Persian society and government by asserting themselves in the empire’s affairs. They also had a more indirect yet equally meaningful effect on Persian culture, which as we will see later, was largely due to Persia opening up to the world. Against this backdrop, the major development of the period was the aforementioned Constitutional Revolution, leading to the drafting of the 1906 Constitution, which aimed to end centuries of absolute monarchical tradition in Persia, and to replace it with a constitutional monarchy. The revolution instilled the notion of a constitutional monarchy as the founding idea of modern Iran. The revolution was both a nationalist and democratic one. It sought political, in particular, parliamentary, representation.138 A key development, both stemming from and contributing to the Constitutional Revolution, resides in the political awakening of Persian civil society.139 Political parties began to form in Persia during the early 1900s in general and during the Constitutional Revolution in particular. Parties developed ‘slowly’ throughout the first majles and grew with the second majles (1909–11).140 Consequently, the court was no longer the sole custodian of politics and policy, which were now more accessible to a broader segment of the population—progressively facilitated by the spread of party-affiliated press and other newspapers.141 55

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The Constitutional Revolution The Constitutional Revolution began to stir in the two traditional ‘lungs’ of Iranian public life: the bazaar and the mosques. The former was the ‘precinct of public discourse,’ where men’s reputations were made and ruined.  The latter were virtually the only venues in which to express one’s opinion on various matters. In 1906, a local preacher’s sermon invigorated theology students, who descended on the police station in Tehran. There, one of the students, a seyyed—a so-called descendent of the Prophet Muhammad, and therefore highly regarded by devout individuals—was shot and killed. The next day, thousands of theology students and the bazaaris attended the procession to accompany his body to the mosque. The king, who wished to prevent the body from arriving at the mosque where the clerics had gathered, sent the Cossack Brigade to block the procession. The Cossacks shot at the masses, killing twenty-two and wounding others.142 The sermon that led to the first deaths of the 1906 revolution exposed themes that continue to dominate Iran’s security narrative and policies today: Behold your neighbors [the Russians] who two hundred years ago were in much worse condition than we. Behold how they now possess everything […]. Now we are reduced to such a condition that our neighbors to the south and north already believe us to be their property […]. In the whole of Iran we have not one factory of our own, because our government is a parasite […]. All this backwardness is due to autocracy, injustice, and want of laws.143

The speech highlighted key ideas, which have since become important tenets of Iranian thinking: self-sufficiency and a holistic approach to power. Generations of incapable and corrupt rulers, the remarks emphasized, had stymied progress toward these goals and made their attainment even more vital. The constitutionalists made another key contribution to the Persian system. They envisioned an overhaul of the judiciary and national education; the clerics would no longer oversee these critical sectors, whose control would be granted to the government. However, the state was unable to fully implement these reforms until the dawn of the Pahlavi era, over two decades later, when Reza Shah implemented 56

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the laws, angering many within the clerical establishment. The movement was not a simple clash between the religious class and the rest of society, however. Many clerics were among the architects of the constitution and supported the reforms even as they translated into fewer levers for the religious establishment. These clerics clashed with others who opposed the reforms. This struggle between the state and the clergy on the one hand and within the religious establishment on the other continued to play out until the end of the Pahlavi dynasty. The Persian legal system had encompassed two different and at times conflicting components for centuries: ‘qadi justice,’ or a religious court, and secular or ‘patrimonial’ justice. The latter was based in the ruler’s court.144  The law was not the law of the land or lex terrae but rather that stemming from privileges associated with one’s rite or madhhab.145 The courts did not possess a hierarchical structure. This meant that litigants could go to different courts to receive diverse rulings on the same case.146 This discrepancy produced a natural competition for jurisdiction and superiority between state and religious courts, inherently pitting the governing bodies against the clergy. The Qajar period had empowered the clergy to tighten its grip on the judiciary as well as the education system. The proposed legal reforms were also partly designed to create a bulwark against foreign influence in the country, providing for the abrogation of capitulations or ‘extraterritorial agreements imposed on Iran by various European powers from the first half of the nineteenth century.’147 Capitulations would become a subtheme of Persian struggles for reform and limiting foreign interference within the country. Illustrating a growing understanding of the limits of the Persian judicial system in managing foreign meddling, key figures within the empire built on the Constitutional Revolution to push for legal reforms, many of which would only materialize after Reza Shah’s ascent to the throne. For example, in 1914, Mossadeq wrote ‘an influential pamphlet,’ which linked the abrogation of capitulations ‘to the need to establish a unified legal system compatible, especially in the realm of criminal law, with foreign legal conventions.’148

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Opening Persia to the World The Qajar era also marked the opening of the country to the West. This included trade, academic exchange, and travel overseas, and was partly facilitated by the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. During that period, Persia began to integrate into the embryonic world economy and to see an influx of foreign capital and investment, increase of exports, and decrease in domestic handicraft.149 These developments had several implications. Firstly, as the country started to open up to the world it became increasingly aware of its own shortcomings, and secondly, it saw the emergence of a new social class in the bourgeoisie, whose wealth was generated by industrial and commercial activities and a manufacturing working class. These two new classes were added to the traditional Persian social classes of clerics, landowners, military and political officials, merchants, craftsmen, and peasants.150 Urban merchants and craftsmen began to constitute a political force with the construction of better roads and the adoption of modern telecommunications, comprising the press, telegraph lines, and postal services. Wealthy families, including clerics, merchants, landowners, and administrators, were now able to send their children abroad to further their education. This, in turn, led to the formation of a new intelligentsia whose awareness of and exposure to the outside world opened its eyes to the strengths and weaknesses of the empire. This new group was both vocal and influential despite being fairly small and composed ‘more [of] politicized intellectuals than enlightened politicians.’151These intellectuals were influenced by the Enlightenment and strove to reform and modernize their nation. Upon their return to the country, many of them joined the Constitutional Revolution.152 But not all intellectuals were Western-inclined. An important political force in the nation’s modern history, Communism would begin to take root in Persia as early as the formation of the Soviet Union. The newly established Communist state would largely follow the same thread as Imperial Russia in its policy toward Persia, making full use of its statecraft tools both to increase its influence in the country and, now, to begin exporting its ideology there. According to a 1978 US intelligence assessment of Communism in Iran declassified 58

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in 2008, encouraged by the Soviets, Persian oil workers returned to the country from the Caucasus fields to form the Justice Party, later renamed the Communist Party of Iran in the early 1920s.153 In 1920– 21, Soviet troops backed the Communists as they unsuccessfully strove to create an independent republic in northern Persia.154 Nevertheless, despite some successes, reform from the start of the Qajars’ reign up to 1890 suffered from a number of shortcomings: (1) the reforms were led by the state itself via its liberal-minded members, whose inspiration for reform […] came largely from Europe; (2) the reforms did not go beyond the upper echelons of the hierarchy, and the reformers did not believe in any measure of radical change; (3) the reforms were targeted towards particular institutions, leaving others untouched; and (4) the reforms were largely made dependent on the will of European countries.155

These challenges at times sewed chaos and anarchy in the Qajar state. Failure to implement the reforms envisioned by the constitutionalists and to create a strong central authority translated into conflict, illiteracy, poverty, and famine. The state and military’s weakness invited foreign military interventions on Iranian soil and interference in its political and economic affairs. These disappointments shaped the Iranian psyche and brought about the circumstances under which the Qajar dynasty would ultimately crumble.

Conclusion The Qajars are known for the lavish lifestyles they led, the corruption that benefited them, and their mismanagement of  the country’s political, economic, and military affairs. Still, their reign was instrumental in shaping modern Iran and its worldview, albeit in many ways despite rather than thanks to the Qajars; during the Russo–Persian wars and the following decade, until the reign of Nasser al-Dinn Shah, it was the Tabriz court, not the central authority in Tehran, which recognized the empire’s shortcomings and the need for reform.156 Nevertheless, the events that colored the Qajar years fashioned prominent themes in Iranian strategic thinking and the national security narrative. In the nearly one century since the collapse of the 59

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Qajars, these themes have become deeply embedded in the nation’s collective memory and dampened the impact of the rise and fall of many leaders and governments, providing far more areas of continuity than one might expect. Perhaps the most resilient leitmotif in Iranian thinking stems from foreign meddling in the country’s affairs and the state’s powerlessness in the face of such interference during the Qajar era. The perennial theme of betrayal (by both Persians and foreigners) and the country’s attitudes toward war and diplomacy all spring from this era. Morgan Schuster captured the essence of the Iranian distrust of foreign powers when he put in words a sentiment that could easily have been communicated by an Iranian official or a regular citizen today. Ironically, these words could describe Iranian attitudes to all foreign powers today, including America: Every utterance and claim has been based on a cynical selfishness that shocks all sense of justice. It is in the pursuit of ‘Russian interests’ or ‘British trade’ that innocent people have been slaughtered wholesale. Never a word about the millions of beings whose lives have been jeopardized, whose rights have been trampled underfoot and whose property has been confiscated.157

These words echo those uttered decades prior by Nasser al-Dinn Shah, who complained that: The Persian government is stuck in the competition between the British and Russian governments. Whatever enterprise we wish to undertake for the good of our country and in the interest of developing the south of Persia, the Russian government says, ‘you are doing it [to promote] British interests’ […]. If we undertake [such efforts] in the north and in the west of Iran, the British say, ‘you are doing this work in the pursuit of Russian interests’. Our work is hard and will become harder with every passing day. So, the Russians and British should just come out and say that the Persian government is not independent once and for all.158

The Qajar period also led to the Persians gaining consciousness of their political and military weaknesses and their nation’s vulnerability stemming from their geostrategic location and lack of domestic capacity to stand up to foreign interference.  A number of figures 60

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within the Qajar court struggled to formulate a coherent policy toward the powers only to find the Russians, in particular, stonewalling their reforms. The tensions between securing national sovereignty and minimizing foreign influence in the country on the one hand and the political reality of the period and the nation’s shortcomings on the other only led to a flawed strategy of balancing. Contemporary Iran’s suspicion of foreign powers in general and the West in particular does not begin with the Islamic Revolution in 1979 or even the 1953 coup—although both are significant events and traumas in the nation’s collective memory. Instead, this distrust is grounded in the country’s defining experiences during the nineteenth century. Likewise, that Iranians believe negotiations and treaties rarely yield an outcome beneficial to them can be traced back to the major treaties that drew the current map of their country. And when the Iranians assert that international laws do not secure their interests— as they frequently do—they do so remembering that foreign powers disregarded their declaration of neutrality during World War I. In addition to laying out these critical elements of   Iran’s worldview, the Qajar period was also significant for another reason. Although the ruling dynasty collapsed over fifty years prior to the advent of the Islamic Republic, it helped lay the foundations of the Islamic Revolution by introducing a series of reforms later deemed deplorable by radical clerics, whose empowerment it facilitated. But in the short-term, the Qajar era led to the rise of a reformist strongman. As Schuster had observed a decade prior, the Persians had ‘realized’ that their ‘sole chance for self-redemption lay with the reform of her broken finances,’ and as we will see, also its military.159 This is precisely what Reza Shah strove to accomplish.

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As the guns went quiet on the Western Front, Persia fell deeper into chaos once again.1 Once an upstart officer in the Cossack Brigade, Reza Khan was about to depose the Qajar dynasty and become the next Shah of Persia (soon to be known as Iran). Reza Khan rose to power as the country was virtually disintegrating—with the support of foreign powers, particularly the Russians, rebellions reminiscent of the early days of the Qajar period were brewing throughout the land.2 Reza Khan would quash the rebellions—taking the head of Mirza Kouchak Khan (1880–1921), the most powerful rebel leader in the Caspian region in the process—and bring the empire under the authority of a central power.3 He would then establish the Pahlavi dynasty, which would bear witness to some of the most traumatic events in Iranian history. Reza Shah’s reign began in 1925. His tenure was as ephemeral as it was significant, deeply marking the country’s modern history.4 Key tenets of the Iranian worldview become more embedded in the nation’s psyche and in the minds of its key decision-makers. In that sense, his tenure was instrumental in ensuring a large degree of continuity in Iranian strategic thinking even after his dynasty fell at the hands of revolutionaries whose ideologies were unified in their repudiation of his legacy. Learning from his predecessors’ successes and failures, he sought to address key issues plaguing Iran’s security landscape. Notably, although 63

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his critics (the Islamic Republic among them) have since portrayed him as a ‘foreign puppet,’ he strove to decrease foreign meddling in his country’s affairs by building self-sufficiency. He sought to achieve this by modernizing Iran’s laws, institutions, and infrastructure, and equipping the country with a strong, modernized military. Although he achieved some success in these endeavors, his failure to fully rebuff continued foreign meddling in Iran led to his downfall, and reinforced the nation’s distrust of foreign powers. To this day, Reza Shah remains one of the most polarizing leaders to have ruled the nation. To liberals, he represents a modernizing force whose faults can be forgiven because of the circumstances in which he found himself: a country that had fallen into ruin, which he strove to revive from its ashes. His autocratic tendencies and micromanagement of his country’s affairs are also often viewed by his proponents as symptoms of his time and culture. To traditionalists, however, he is emblematic of the monarchical establishment’s failures. Convinced that Reza Shah had sacrificed tradition for modernity, religion for Westernization, values for power and wealth, and the country for himself—ultimately cementing Iran’s subordination at the hands of the  West—the revolutionaries stormed and destroyed his mausoleum during the Islamic Revolution. In the decades to follow, the Islamists would pledge to repudiate Reza Shah’s legacy, only to follow in his footsteps as they sought to engage in a similar task of nation-building and power consolidation. Much ink has been spilled about Reza Shah’s character, ambitions, methods, and legacy. These are not the objects of this chapter. Instead, this chapter offers a brief overview of the monarch’s rise, tenure, and fall, in order to identify and extract their implications for contemporary Iranian strategic thinking and security policies. The chapter will begin by surveying the events that marked the rise of Reza Shah and his time on the throne, before considering his modernization efforts—in particular pertaining to the military realm—and relations with other nations. By doing so, the chapter will again identify enduring and emerging themes which have shaped the Iranian worldview and led successive leaderships to follow certain patterns of behavior. 64

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The Rise of Reza Shah Rising Through the Ranks and Premiership Chapter 1 noted that the final years of the Qajars’ rule took place against the backdrop of World War I—a war in which Persia had not willingly participated but the shock of which the nation felt acutely. The stakes of the war for the world coupled with corruption and mismanagement at home facilitated continued British and Russian presence in the country, and the powers ultimately dragged a reluctant Persia into the conflict. As a result, although Persia was neutral during the war, it was not immune to its scourges. The Great War inflicted tremendous costs on the country, including a widespread famine and cholera outbreak that took millions of lives.5 An essay published a century after the end of the conflict by a research center connected to the Islamic Republic’s intelligence apparatus captured Iranian perceptions of the country stumbling into the war: The First World War was the result of gaslighting by European countries, which caught other nations to reduce the damage to [European states]. In Iran, which had just come out of the Constitutional Revolution, the war led to a number of developments. Although it had declared neutrality, hostile forces occupied Iran. The occupiers were those same [forces] which had torn apart the Ottoman Empire, leaving only Turkey, whose ideals made a 180-degree turn from the pre-war [era]. Iran, which was [hundreds of] miles away from Europe, and unwilling [to take part in the hostilities], was considered a decisive element in the war due to its strategic situation. Russia and England, with the objective of preventing the scales from favoring their enemy, officially and overtly, violated the norms of neutrality and brought their forces from the north and the south onto Iranian soil and created much economic damage and casualties.6

By 1917, Russian troops had largely left Iran to focus their attention on the October Revolution at home, leaving the Qajars to resist British domination alone.  At the same time, the Ottomans had entered Persia’s northwestern territories while the British were making advances throughout the east and west.7 Unsurprisingly, Ahmad Shah proved unwilling and unable to overcome these forces. The young king and 65

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a number of his officials were on the payroll of the British legation in Tehran.8 In 1919, the British cashed in on their investment to impose an agreement on Persia, which, although never ratified by the majles, forbade Tehran from seeking reparations.9 The agreement also ceded key aspects of Persian sovereignty, including granting control of nearly every key ministry to British ‘advisors.’10  The British sought to unify the disparate armed forces that composed the nation’s security forces and to create more cohesion, including the ranks and uniforms of Gendarmes and Cossacks.11 When the majles refused to ratify the terms of the agreement, Britain attempted to unilaterally impose some of its stipulations, in the end forcing Iran to cede large portions of its military organization to British control.12 However, both Ahmad Shah’s prime minister, Vosuq al-Dowleh, and the British leadership in the country had underestimated the rising nationalist tide in Persia at the time. Fueled by perceptions of foreign interference in Iranian affairs, discontents soon staged uprisings against the monarch’s perceived corruption and weakness.13  The widespread bribery of Persian officials was becoming public knowledge and galvanizing the masses against the shah.14 It was clear to many Persians that profound and structural change, not mere reorganization, was needed. However, there was no consensus over the best way forward.15 In the following years, some would go as far as positing that the country would be best served by parting with its monarchical tradition and installing a republic in its stead. Reza Khan belonged to this camp. But many faith leaders opposed it—including Reza Khan’s opponent, Ayatollah Hassan Modaress (1870–1937). The stage was set for the rise of an austere modernizer. Reza Khan was that austere man. Having lost his father only a few months after his birth, he was essentially raised by the Persian military, of which he remained first and foremost a dedicated member. As a child, he lived with his uncle, an officer in the Cossack Brigade, and later in the household of a general in the same unit. In 1893, aged fifteen, he, too, joined the brigade. Subsequently, he was stationed in provinces across the land and came into contact with his countrymen from all walks of life.16 Throughout his early life, Reza Khan spent much of his time in the barracks and became widely known for his prowess as an officer and his 66

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courage on the battlefield.17 He quickly ascended in the ranks during the flurry of campaigns following the Constitutional Revolution from 1911 until 1920.18 During that decade, Reza Khan was often engaged in campaigns in different parts of the country.19 Finally, in 1920, he was awarded the rank of full general for his bravery in combat against the Bolsheviks. As Reza Khan rose through the ranks of the Persian military, the Soviet Union continued to intervene in northern Persia and to provide support to the separatist movements in key provinces. The Soviets were looking to empower Communist-friendly groups and regimes in Eurasia. In northern Persia, in the Caspian Sea region, they supported the Gilan Republic—a separatist socialist-leaning entity. The fighters allied with the Gilan Republic, known as the Jungle Movement or Jangalis, in Persian, threatened the capital.20 In addition, that year saw a multitude of government and cabinet reshufflings as the empire once again became increasingly unstable. The British and the czarist Cossack Brigade, now aligned in the face of the common Soviet foe, felt increasingly threatened by Soviet advances and decided to take matters into their own hands.  The British were mostly united in their belief that the status quo was untenable, and many thought it imperative to install a strong central authority to contain and prevent the internal disorder and rebellions across Persia.21 The British, however, did not have a single coherent view of what the transition of power and the new central authority should look like.22 Even within Persia, most of the elites and the populace thought about the possibility and utility of a coup.23 In fact, Ahmad Shah himself belonged to this group.24 On 21 February 1921, Reza Khan, along with 2,000 Cossacks, entered Tehran.25 The coup was quick and effective. The Gendarmerie and police did not resist and there were few casualties in the process.26  The Shah elevated Reza Khan to the prestigious rank of Sardar Sepah, bestowing upon him the power to command his military. Seizing the authority afforded him, Reza Khan promptly installed Seyyed Ziya’eddin   Tabatabai (1889–1969) as prime minister.  As Kazem Kandil has argued: By replacing the Qajar monarchy with that of the Pahlavis, rather than declaring a republic, the 1921 coup placed Iran on a different trajectory

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than that of the new regimes in Turkey and Egypt. The regime evolved into an absolutist monarchy, and the court’s micromanagement of the military and security made them partly unwilling and largely incapable of repressing revolt.27

In a lengthy interview later published as a book, Seyyed Ziya, as he was known, provided an overview of the drivers behind his decision to undertake the coup—which should be viewed with a great deal of skepticism, as the minister was hoping to portray himself as playing the leading role in Reza Shah’s ascent. According to Seyyed Ziya, the 1917 revolution in Russia inspired him to launch a coup.28 When asked ‘where the money for the coup came from’ and ‘who’ received it, Seyyed Ziya responded that ‘the English gave [it]’ to him.29 The British, as Seyyed Ziya recalled, ‘absolutely had neither become close to [Reza Khan] nor proposed anything to him.’30 He noted that he had convinced Reza Khan to launch the coup by warning him that ‘the Shah is in danger. The country is in danger.’31 Seyyed Ziya’s account of the coup contradicts the prevalent description of the events. According to this, British Field Marshal William Edmund Ironside (1880–1959), then the head of North Persia Force (more commonly known by its acronym, NORPERFORCE), had at least worked with Reza Khan if not directed him to launch the coup.32 Seyyed Ziya denied any meetings between Reza Khan and Ironside, noting that the reports of this event’s occurrence are ‘completely unfounded. I was the one who received the money.’33 Immediately, in a demonstration of strength, the new government withdrew from the unpopular Anglo–Iranian Agreement of 1919 and signed the Soviet–Iranian Declaration of Friendship.34 Seyyed Ziya would later describe this move as one of the two most important accomplishments of the coup, along with the recognition of the Soviet Union.35 This new treaty waived the terms of the humiliating Treaty of Turkmenchay but still made critical concessions to Moscow.36 The Soviet Union would have the right to intervene if a third party threatened the USSR from Persia. More significant yet, a clause permitted the Soviet Union to invade Persia if  Tehran were to harbor any foreign forces hostile to Moscow.37 This second clause essentially barred non-Soviet-sanctioned military presence in Persia and acted as a deterrent to British intervention.  This clause provided 68

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the Allies with a justification to invade Iran during World War II a few years later. Reza Khan took steps to expand and consolidate his power and implement top-down reforms. Facing the daunting task of uniting a fragmented nation under a new central authority, he began to censor the press and arrest and banish his political opponents. He also established an independent military budget to secure his dominance over the army—this reform, in particular, paid swift dividends.38 In doing so, Reza Khan implemented measures to accomplish his chief goal and made his paramount contribution to the national interest the creation of a strong, modern, centralized national army, which would be free of foreign involvement.39 Just three months after the coup, Reza Khan and Ahmad Shah overthrew Seyyed Ziya—who went into exile only to return to Tehran after Reza Shah’s abdication in 1941.40 On 28 October 1923, Reza Khan was named prime minister. During his tenure, he strove to eliminate ‘domestic disorder and insecurity and chaos of thought, ideas and morals.’41 He also engaged in nationalist mythmaking and sought to further Persian nationalist ideals. In 1925, Reza Khan took the name of Pahlavi—Pahlavi Persian is the name given to middle Persian, which was spoken in pre-Islamic Persia, during the Parthian and Sassanid periods (respectively, 247 BC–224 AD and 224–651 AD). This was an expression of his nationalism and an early sign that the ambitious military man would strive to return to the long-lost ‘glory’ of ancient Persia. Having eclipsed the king as the emblem of Persian power and influence, Reza Khan continued to consolidate his power and suppress resistance. Even within the ranks of the military, many resisted the prime minister, viewing him with suspicion and his military reforms as a threat to their own influence.42 Despite this, on 25 April 1926, Reza Khan was crowned Shah of Persia.

All Hail the New Shahanshah Reza Khan did not seem like a natural candidate to assume the kingship of Persia. Persian elites often came from urban aristocratic lineages, their titles and government positions bestowed upon them by their ancestry and connections. Many lived lavish lives divorced from those 69

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of the majority of Persians. In contrast, Reza Khan was born in a remote village in Mazandaran, in northern Iran by the Caspian Sea. He began his career at the lowest possible rank in the military and was known to be a disciplined man. Unlike the Qajars, and much of the other ruling classes, who were of  Turkic ancestry, he was not of  Turkic heritage.43 This lent him considerable legitimacy in the eyes of many laypeople and nationalists. Adding to his connection with the common people, he was and remains known for being illiterate—although this is inaccurate, as he received an education during his time in the Cossack forces and his writings are available.44 Having served around the country and risen through the ranks, Reza Khan had ample knowledge of his country and the problems plaguing it. This, too, stood in contrast to his predecessors, whose extravagant lifestyles and expansive courts divorced them from the populace. Hence, as his accounts of his travels in the country indicate, Reza Khan instinctively understood the challenges before him.45 These traits afforded him a natural ability to associate with average Iranians and gained him legitimacy as a nationalist strongman—one who, unlike his predecessors, would be able to stand up to foreign powers. Reza Khan embodied the zeitgeist of the interwar period in Iran. Having spent much of his life in the military, he understood his country’s shortcomings in that domain and grasped the importance of deep, structural reforms to transform the Iranian military into an effective modern force.46 He set out to unify and strengthen the Iranian military by reducing corruption and introducing a wide array of reforms, including the addition of new branches of  the armed forces and building the foundations of a defense industry.47 Reza Shah managed to crush the rebellions, stabilize the provinces, and unify the country. A number of the rebellions were sponsored or encouraged by the Soviets and British, and in confronting them he ran the risk of foreign intervention.48 In the process, Reza Shah became increasingly autocratic, aligning himself with totalitarian states, chiefly Germany and Italy, to balance British and Soviet influence in his country. His adamant refusal to allow British or Soviet influence and his friendliness with two of the Axis powers aided his rise, but would also hasten his downfal. 70

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Reza Shah’s Military Reforms Iran and Its New Military As the first Pahlavi king’s most defining traits resided in his background as a career soldier and reformist strongman, his main contributions to Iranian political and security affairs sprang from his efforts to modernize his country’s military. Even prior to his ascension to the throne, as head of the armed forces, he had started to improve the Persian military.49 He restructured the army into five (later six) divisions and set a goal of increasing the size of the standing army to 50,000 men—which would nearly double the numbers from the early 1920s.50 Moreover, he began to send his officers to train in military schools abroad—particularly, the prestigious Saint-Cyr in France. Additionally, he overhauled military education in Persia and introduced a curriculum preparing cadets destined to join the Iranian armed forces for modern warfare. Starting in 1924, the Iranian military took steps toward becoming operational in all three domains: land, sea, and air. To this end, Reza Khan expanded Persian military capabilities by creating two new branches of the armed forces: The air force and the navy. He arranged to equip them with state-of-theart weapons, equipment, vehicles, and systems. For example, Persia obtained a modest air force by purchasing materiel from Russia, Germany, and France, and that same year acquired a vessel (the Pahlavi) from Germany and began to contest Britain in the Persian Gulf. Despite these reforms, the military remained dependent on tribal levies for recruits during much of this period. To remedy this major shortcoming—which had plagued previous military modernization efforts—Tehran needed to assert the dominance of the central government. In 1925, the empire was finally able to address this challenge when the majles adopted universal conscription at Reza Khan’s urging.51 By the following year, Reza Shah had nearly met his goal of 50,000 standing troops, having almost doubled the size of the Iranian military in four years—though it must be noted that the government and military frequently embellished troops numbers.52 Growth in troop numbers stagnated briefly in the turmoil immediately following Reza Shah’s ascendance to the throne but eventually recovered during the 1930s as the modernization cycle intensified. From 1926 until 71

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Reza Shah’s abdication in 1941, Iran added thirteen more divisions and 85,000 men, 100 tanks, over 150 planes, and a moderate number of ships to its military.53 But this rapid modernization was not without its own set of challenges and shortcomings. Importantly, the process left some branches behind. For example, from 1926 onward, the cavalry and artillery lagged behind the infantry in development. That year, the artillery did not fire a single round in practice.54 More generally, the more complex materiel the Iranian military acquired, the less effective it became and the more reliant it grew on the brute force of infantry and tribal cavalry levies.55 By then, Iranians had learned that their adversaries and other powers owed part of their superiority to technology. The Pahlavis viewed the acquisition of modern weaponry and equipment as the key to overcoming this inferiority, and geared much of their modernization efforts in that direction, often at the expense of other key areas. The development of strategy, doctrine, personnel, and training often took a backseat to the more visible arms acquisition. Shortcomings in doctrine and training plagued the Iranian military, which was caught between its traditional outlook and tactics and the introduction of new technology. The country purchased vast numbers of large field guns and mechanized its cavalry as it began to catch up with the advent of the tank a decade prior.  This discrepancy between rapid modernization in equipment and neglect of capacity-building and battlefield readiness would continue throughout the Pahlavi era. All in all, immediately following the 1921 coup and until 1926, Reza Khan restructured the army, provided it with ample funding, and established an independent budget for it. However, the Iranian military appeared significantly stronger on paper than it was on the battlefield. The vague descriptions of officers’ duties and an absence of adequate staff officers contributed to this gap. Additionally, even with the advent of airpower, the Iranian military’s tactics had largely not progressed from the pre-modern set of  intrigues and negotiations. In other words, while the Iranian military was investing in and adopting new military technology, it was failing to update its doctrine, processes, and tactics to integrate its new forces into its toolkit and maximize its efficacy. For example, Iran was now able to operate in air, but it did not use its 72

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air force to its full capacity, largely leveraging it to intimidate, not to engage in combat.56 Still behind the curve in terms of doctrine and training, Iranian commanders were content to simply accrue novel military technology without paying as much attention to the training and operational procedures required to operate the equipment in combat.57 More significantly, the country was still suffering from the absence of well-trained senior military personnel and officers.   The rapid modernization of the Iranian military, including the addition of the new branches whose purpose remained obscure for Iranian military commanders, and an over-reliance on modern technology, stemmed from and contributed to the military’s lack of capacity, know-how, institutional knowledge, and battlefield readiness. Nevertheless, although these shortcomings would pose considerable problems in the face of foreign interventions, Reza Shah’s measures proved to be a sufficient improvement to maintain domestic security. As Reza Shah saw it, the central authority had long failed to provide for the internal stability and security of the country, a challenge he was able to overcome. In his travel writings, Reza Shah notes that his forces were able to push back the tribal leaders in critical regions, including Lorestan and Khuzestan, which had turned into ‘nests of insecurity, murder, theft, revolt, and unruliness.’58 The Iranian military groomed islands of functionality through this paucity of competence—as it would throughout the following century. It failed, however, to develop its capabilities and doctrine in a holistic manner, thus continuing to suffer from a lack of battlefield readiness. For example, Reza Shah paid special attention to the Army’s Central Division tasked with maintaining domestic security.59 The division was the military’s most reliable unit, and Reza Shah kept it under his own close watch in Tehran. The Central Division was exceptionally important in subduing provincial revolts in the mid-1920s.60 By the early 1930s, the central government was able to entirely placate the tribes and achieve domestic security and tranquility. Nevertheless, with the country stabilized once again, the absence of a domestic threat removed pressure on the Iranian military, leading to a decline in its capabilities. Over the course of the 1930s, the Iranian 73

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military became increasingly well-funded, larger, well-organized, and less prepared for combat.61

The Quest for Self-Sufficiency: Iran’s New Defense Industry Throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s, the state assumed political and economic power, an authority that lay with the Shah, ‘whose key institutional base was the army.’62 To reinvigorate this base, the Shah purchased arms from Europe, mostly Germany. However, Reza Shah’s objective was not to simply create a modern military and equip it with weapons procured from foreign suppliers. Instead, seeing a wellequipped force as key to an effective military, he also harbored the long-term goal of making his country more self-sufficient.63 This, Reza Shah believed, would allow the country to stand on its own two feet and meet many of its own defense needs. Ultimately, this self-reliance would serve to minimize the ability of foreign powers to interfere in and influence Iranian affairs. And Iran would no longer be vulnerable to breaches of its sovereignty, territorial integrity, and declarations of neutrality, as it had been in decades past. Reza Shah believed that the advent of the Qajars coincided with the involvement of foreigners in the country, and this ongoing interference was a critical factor in his country’s backwardness. In words that were reminiscent of both Nasser al-Dinn Shah’s and Amir Kabir’s, Reza Shah lamented foreign powers’ interference in his country’s affairs— believing they undermined and stymied his attempts at reforming and modernizing Iran.64 As he noted, ‘During my governing tenure, in every issue I have sought to address and any reforms I have tried to undertake, immediately the interference of strangers and their protests have delayed the matter and paused the work.’65 A similar sentiment was already pervasive during the Qajar era. Iranian elites and the populace resented foreign influence and wished to make the country more self-sufficient and to create a bulwark against the powers, especially in military affairs. However, Reza Shah was the first sovereign to fully operationalize this critical component of  Iranian collective memory, by developing a comprehensive reform plan. He would not be the last, however, and his quest for a self-sufficient military would come to mark Iranian affairs for decades to come. 74

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To develop his country’s indigenous capacity, Reza Shah laid out the foundations of modern Iran’s defense industry. The establishment of a modern military-industrial complex (and armed forces) required restoring and updating the country’s deficient infrastructure, including transportation, communications, factories, and military facilities. Given the state of infrastructure, Reza Shah virtually started this process from scratch. During his tenure, Iran built roads, railways, telecommunications, factories, and military facilities. However, facing the lack of domestic capacity, know-how, and technology once again, Iranians had to enlist foreign help. The monarch was aided by ‘lessened direct domination by Great Britain,’ which afforded him the ability to ‘initiate industrial and infrastructural development by clamping down on society and reasserting central control in a way unseen since the Safavids at their zenith.’66 The modernizing reforms required in the military quickly expanded into industry, starting with transportation and communications, and then fed into regular economic and social life—a trend similar to Turkey and Egypt’s efforts at that time.67 Despite significant efforts, the manufacturing of military goods in Iran nonetheless remained largely dependent on foreign assistance throughout Reza Shah’s reign. During that time, Nazi Germany’s technical assistance was especially critical to the development of the Iranian defense industry. Before the Nazi period (and as early as 1929) Germany had signed treaties of trade and friendship with Iran and began to invest in reforming Iranian industry, architecture, and mining. During the Nazi period, German–Iranian ties increased rapidly as the Third Reich, eager to build its presence in strategically important Iran and to undermine that of Britain, became a more willing economic partner and exporter of arms. As relations between the two countries solidified and became more comprehensive, the Iranian defense industry was gradually becoming cemented with the establishment of new factories and installations. By the time World War II broke out, the Germans had built a machine-gun factory and, more importantly, an airplane factory in Iran.68 By this time, Iran had laid the foundation for the development of an indigenous defense industry that first the Shah and later the Islamic Republic would develop further to keep up with innovations in modern warfare and the exigencies of their time. 75

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The formation of the Iranian defense industry also resulted in broader social and economic changes. Although Reza Shah’s military background was a helpful tool affording him the knowledge and ability to undertake substantial reforms in the military sector, it also led to a number of challenges and tensions when it came to his broader agenda. He aimed to instill discipline in the wider society in a manner similar to the military. His absolutist style and belief in rapid modernization elicited both cooperation and resistance from the populace and elites.

Creating a Modern State: Reza Shah’s Modernization Efforts and Resistance Reza Shah’s ambition to propel his country into modernity was wide-ranging. He curated his agenda with the help of contemporary intellectuals, creating the foundations for the modern Iranian state. In many respects, he more resembled Amir Kabir than he did his Qajar predecessors. In addition to his military reforms, he revived old symbols and created new insignia of national identity and unity, built modern institutions, and introduced a new legal corpus. Reza Shah used the 1906 Constitution as the basis for many of his reforms. In particular, the document laid out the foundations for the rule of law and new codes, which included civil rights, components of which included the first steps toward women’s rights. This was a critical departure from the country’s traditional approach to the judiciary, which was largely dominated by the clergy up until that point. At the same time, the shah’s justification for his modernization project was based on a ‘contradictory blend of secular nationalism and Westernization and further intruded the state’s new bureaucratic apparatus into the lives of the population, urban, tribal, and peasant alike.’69 Reza Shah’s ambitious modernization efforts were as comprehensive as they were rapidly implemented. Similar to many of his contemporaries in the Middle East, in particular his Turkish counterpart, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk—to whom he is often compared—Reza Shah did not intend to gently guide his country into modernity, but to propel it into the twentieth century with full force. This top-down, holistic, and rapid approach turned Reza Shah into one of the most divisive figures in Iranian history. Among his most 76

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controversial actions was the abolition of the veil—which many liberals hail as a critical step toward the empowerment of Iranian women, allowing them to accede higher learning and professional life and which conservatives describe as the repudiation of the country’s traditions and religion in favor of Westernization. This step helped assert Reza Shah as a serious modernizing force, but also revealed his autocratic tendencies.

Political Backdrop Reza Shah enjoyed immense parliamentary enthusiasm and support during the early days of his kingship. Only five opposing votes and thirty abstentions passed the decision to form a Constituent Assembly to confirm him to the throne. Eighty voted in favor.70 At the Assembly, of the 260 representatives, an overwhelming 257 voted for him, while three abstained.71 Reza Shah also received considerable popular support during the first half of his reign, when his autocratic propensities were still masked by massive progress in modernization.72 The tide turned during the second half of Reza Shah’s reign, as he began to take a more direct role in guiding government affairs and, for many, enthusiasm yielded to fear. Reza Shah often personally picked candidates for parliamentary elections and forced them through, leveraging his sway in the Interior Ministry.73 He persecuted political opponents, including many intellectuals, and disbanded and banned the political groups which had previously opposed him. The monarch also shut down many independent newspapers. Government-organized mobs frequently imposed the will of Reza Shah, burning down the buildings of his critics.While this largely commanded obedience, some intellectuals resisted. Government suppression of intellectuals would lead directly to the rise of the Communist Tudeh Party. In addition to the clampdown on his critics in Tehran, Reza Shah aggressively pursued his tribal political opponents. According to the historian Ervand Abrahamian, in the last nine years of his reign, following the defeat of the tribes in a series of revolts, ‘Reza Shah had most of the tribal leaders of Persia executed or exiled.’74 77

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Legal Reforms In keeping with his transition from strongman to autocrat was Reza Shah’s reform, then misuse, of the legal system. During the early days of his reign, the king focused on legal reforms to realize the Constitutional Revolution’s promise to usher in the rule of law with the support of a functioning modern judiciary. By undertaking comprehensive legal reforms, Reza Shah also hoped to fulfill another key objective he shared with the men who had led the revolution: limiting foreign intervention in Iran. A key element of the desire for legal reform in Iran had long been to abrogate capitulations and to hold foreigners accountable within the country’s jurisdiction.75 Previously, foreigners were able to operate within the country with much impunity thanks to the dearth of laws and strong institutions. To this end, Reza Shah closed Iran’s Ministry of Justice for several months in 1927 to restructure it and remove corrupt judges. After that period, he opened a significantly more secular and less corrupt Ministry of Justice. Additional reforms produced a Supreme Court, as well as a hierarchy between the courts and a division of jurisdiction. The new system also imposed much-needed limits to clerical interference in judicial matters. It provided for the determination of cases in two distinct courts with defined jurisdictions. This made clear whether a case ought to be tried in religious or secular court, thus putting an end to a system where it could be tried by one court before being taken to the other, producing a number of conflicting rulings.76 In 1928, the government of Reza Shah produced a civil code based on the Napoleonic Code and principles of Shia jurisprudence, which has since only undergone minimal amendment. Also in 1928, immediately after sending the draft of the Civil Code to the majles for approval, Reza Shah’s government announced that extraterritoriality—a practice that had been in place since the early nineteenth century and allowed Europeans to operate with quasiimpunity inside of  Iran—would cease for foreigners. A few years after this move, Iran introduced its new penal code, marking the end of the implementation of  Islamic legal provisions pertaining to retaliation (eye for an eye) or lex talionis—a source of consternation among some clerics and later reintroduced by the Islamic Republic. 78

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The introduction of legal provisions aimed at holding foreign nationals accountable in Iran was in line with Reza Shah’s wish to make the country more independent. This development, he hoped, would create a strong judiciary where matters were handled by Iranians and without reliance on foreigners.  The provisions also aimed to provide the state with the tools to prosecute foreigners and limit their activities in Iran, a key shortcoming of previous monarchs.Years after Reza Shah’s death, Khomeini would identify the weakness displayed by the state in the face of foreign nationals’ abuses in Iran as a key challenge. He, too, would strive to create a bulwark against foreign interference in the country by pledging to hold foreign nationals accountable for their actions in Iran. However, Khomeini sought to achieve these objectives by undoing the reforms introduced by Reza Shah. Reza Shah’s track record in cementing the rule of law and modernizing the judiciary was not all constructive. He also contributed to undermining the rule of law he had sought to establish. During the 1930s, the monarch became more absolutist and less bound by the law, seeking to modernize Iran by extrajudicial means. In doing so, he would navigate the same paradox his predecessors had grappled with: an understanding of the importance of the rule of law to progress and modernization, while wishing to remain unbound by it where the constraints stymied their ability to meet their other objectives.77

Social Changes In his inaugural address, Reza Shah declared: [F]rom henceforth the governments of my reign must always keep in mind the need for carrying out the basic reforms of the country, such as the extension of the strength of the security forces, the development of education…and immediate and rapid reform of the judiciary.78

Iranian social life proved no exception to Reza Shah’s vision and comprehensive reforms. Later in his reign, various aspects of Iranian public life became the subject of the monarch’s scrutiny. While some of the social policies pursued during that period aimed to improve the lives of Iranians, promoting inclusion, for example, others were fairly intrusive. All in all, the state forced through these social 79

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changes suddenly and in a mostly top-down manner. Consequently, social issues were (and remain) also the most controversial of Reza Shah’s reforms. And although social developments are beyond the scope of the present book, we will briefly survey Reza Shah’s social reforms as they are directly relevant to the events that ensued in the next five decades. Chief among Reza Shah’s social reforms were policies such as the ban on the veil, or chador, which aimed to secularize public life and to empower women—both steps identified by the monarch as fulfilling his promise of modernization. Other policies, like encouraging Iranians to adopt Western garments, aimed to Westernize more mundane aspects of Iranian life.79 Others still had the objective to better organize, tax, and govern the population to create a functioning modern state. These measures included issuing birth certificates for the population. All drew the ire and resentment of parts of the Iranian populace. The set of policies aiming to bring women into the public life by granting them access to education and professional opportunities appeared critical to Reza Shah’s efforts to modernize Iranian society. However, progress remained modest. Despite reforms like the antidiscrimination law, women were still unable to vote or stand for election and did not enjoy equal inheritance rights.80 Y   et, the progress made during that time was still enough to deeply upset the most conservative factions. The clerical establishment, in particular, viewed these changes as endangering religious and traditional values. Iranian women would have to wait for Reza Shah’s son to follow in his father’s footsteps in the 1950s to receive some of these rights, including the ability to vote—others would go unfulfilled. Reza Shah also tried to reform the existing education system to create a modern and secular system. The monarch sought to build domestic capacity to support his key objective of making the nation less reliant on foreign powers in key sectors. As part of these efforts, the country closed most religious schools, excluding seminaries.81 In their stead, Tehran allocated resources to national primary, secondary, and higher education. The number of elementary schools quadrupled between 1925 and 1939 and the number of secondary schools increased by six times. To promote higher education, Reza Shah created the University of  Tehran in 1935 and a Teacher’s College to train a new 80

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academic elite. A Military Academy offered a more comprehensive education and built capacity in the military realm. In addition to rapidly secularizing education, Reza Shah also made schooling mandatory for women at the primary level and opened it to them beyond that. However, separate male-female curricula and a dearth of available infrastructure made mandatory instruction for women extant in name only.82 Reza Shah also made some progress in other areas pertaining to education. For example, the Education Ministry provided extensive adult tutoring to tackle pervasive illiteracy and tap into the populace’s still unrealized potential.83 Furthermore, the government sent students to study in Europe and America to acquire the skills required to take the country’s key sectors into their own hands and to make it more self-reliant. Here, too, progress remained modest. Ultimately, despite investing in sending many students abroad to study and specialize in various fields and with many more trained domestically, Iran did not leap forward as Reza Shah had hoped. Some students went to study in prestigious universities in the West, never to return to Iran. Others attended less recognized universities, with underdeveloped curricula and weaker requirements. Hence, many students returned without an adequate education. Others yet returned to work in a country where their basic needs for research and development were not met—as the nation still was lacking the infrastructure needed for such endeavors and modern higher education remained in its nascent stages in the country.84 On the other end of the spectrum, rural illiteracy remained above 90 percent for the entirety of Reza Shah’s reign.85 Furthermore, many students returned with ideas the government found to be detestable— including Communism. Although a spirit of nationalism initially united intellectuals behind Reza Shah, their opinions led to their persecution.86 Like the nationalist elite, Reza Shah sought to restore Iranian national identity through de-localization and secularization and, accordingly, the abridged importance and societal participation of the tribes.87 Many tribes were forced at gunpoint to adopt sedentary lifestyles and some faced military reprisals for refusing to accommodate the government.88 Hence, as in other sectors, Reza Shah’s social reforms produced a 81

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foundational shift—especially given the societal and technological constraints of the time—but they yielded mixed outcomes.

Infrastructure, Industry, and the Capital Reza Shah’s efforts in modernizing Iranian infrastructure and industry went beyond the defense sector—although they were critical to laying out the groundwork for a self-reliant Iran both for civil and military purposes. He brought Iran into the industrial age by building the Trans-Iranian railroad, imagined half a century prior by Persian intellectuals.89 He also kick-started native Iranian manufacturing. Importantly, he envisioned his infrastructure reforms and development of an indigenous industry as serving to mitigate the challenges that had already shaped so much of Iran’s nascent modern security thinking. In that sense, the monarch sought to eradicate the foreign meddling in Iranian affairs and the powers’ ability to veto or plan key Iranian infrastructure and transportation projects. While Iran was developing in a manner largely similar to Turkey and Egypt at the time, the absence of railways stymied its growth.90 The British and Russians had spent the previous decades ‘vetoing’ each other’s plans for a Trans-Iranian railroad. Both powers were concerned that their competitor’s role in the construction would afford them the ability to hurry troops and material to the edge of their zone of influence, thus threatening their interests.91 Now, with the resurgence of strong central government in Iran, such a project was finally possible. Tehran deliberately planned the system to bypass all major cities except for the capital, thus avoiding routes that would cause consternation among neighboring countries or run through the tribal regions.92 The government completed the Trans-Iranian Railway, the first railway project in the country constructed without a concession, in 1939. During this period, Iran also undertook other key infrastructure and transportation projects. In particular, the country’s roads underwent considerable expansion—facilitating the movement of troops. Similarly, Reza Shah took a number of steps to grow his country’s fledgling air network: in 1926, he awarded a contract to the German firm Junkers to maintain air communications within Iran, as well as between Iran and Germany. 82

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More generally, Reza Shah revitalized Iranian industry. The state took a number of measures to create a manufacturing economy, including raising tariff walls in the interest of the creation of arms manufacturing and directing aid from the state to monopolized industries, such as tobacco.93 From 1925 to 1941, the country built 326 factories and created some 49,000 jobs. Factory workers contributed to the creation of a modern working class in less than two decades.94 The growth of native Iranian industry initiated an era of labor-capital conflict and autocracy, which was to come to a head under Reza Shah’s successor. During this era, the capital experienced rapid growth. The number of  Tehran’s inhabitants leaped from below 200,000 to above 700,000. As the city ballooned, it developed the convoluted sections and quarters which would characterize its geography and composition over the coming decades. Accordingly, the Iranian domestic policy outlook developed an outsized focus on Tehran. Whereas under previous monarchs discontent in other regions of  Iran merited as much consideration as in Tehran, from Reza Shah forward, Tehran enjoyed a special political position from which power radiated. Reforms tended to be instituted in Tehran first and later in other cities and regions. For Iran’s future statesmen, Tehran proved both a fortress and a prison. As we have seen, Reza Shah implemented a wide array of reforms in Iran, spanning from political and legal changes to social and infrastructural—to varying degrees of success. Iran’s image of itself as a modern nation-state and its view of the international order created and guided many of these reforms. In particular, Iran felt foreign meddling in its internal affairs acutely at the end of the Qajar period and through the Pahlavis’ ascension. Iranians viewed it as imperative to tackle the roots and challenges of the powers’ presence in their country. A self-reliant Iranian economy and industry, legal and political checks on foreign nationals and activities, and a strong military were all key components of the struggle for an independent Iran. Yet, as these reforms progressed, Reza Shah became increasingly autocratic, uncompromising, and forceful, fueling popular and elite resistance. By the end of his rule, Reza Shah had cultivated opponents in the clergy, bazaar, intelligentsia, tribes, and leftist groups. 83

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Controversy and Discontent In an effort to create a more functional government, Reza Shah oversaw an extensive revamp of the country’s technocratic establishment. However, as the technocrats’ function generally expanded and improved, the majles was reduced to a rubber-stamp.95 The civil service expanded with the addition of tens of thousands of government positions, reaching 90,000 at its apex. The reorganization extended into Iran’s domestic political map, which aimed to create a hierarchical distribution of power from the state to the provincial governments and down to the county and municipal levels. Previously, the country had a dispersed and arcane power system relying on large provinces and a few districts. The restructuring of the foreign ministry allowed for a newly recruited and reinvigorated diplomatic corps, which the king directed to engage more actively with world powers.96 Generally, the first Pahlavi was more active than his Qajar predecessors in negotiating and signing treaties with Iran’s neighbors, particularly Turkey. These reforms did not come without resistance. Reza Shah would gradually assert himself more and restrain criticism, but in his early years he was more vulnerable. The most controversial aspect of his reform efforts laid in the monarch’s tendency to micromanage seemingly trivial aspects of Iranians’ day-to-day lives. Under his direction, Iranian sport, architecture, music, and other cultural arenas underwent considerable refurbishment. As a result of rapid transformation and perceived threats stemming from it to the traditional lifestyle prevalent in the country until then, the first two decades of the Pahlavi rule saw the continued rise of the alliance between the bazaar and religious establishment. This alliance would constitute another channel of dissent and ultimately end the monarchy in Iran. For his part, Reza Shah did not view religion and modernity in conflict—and had, in fact, tried to cultivate ties to the clergy and had partaken in religious ceremonies.97 However, he was naturally drawn into conflict with the clerical establishment when he directly challenged the clergy’s monopoly on morality and its outsized power in the judiciary and education.98 In that context, the abolition of the guild tax perturbed the merchant class as it eliminated an important 84

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stream of revenue collected by guild leaders, further opening a gap between Reza Shah and the clergy.99 Reza Shah would also make enemies in other areas, further cementing the alliance that would lead to the downfall of the dynasty he established. Throughout the 1930s, Reza Shah’s government gradually embraced a more anti-intellectual stance, as the intelligentsia became more outspoken against the monarch’s growing autocratic tendencies.100 Through all these conflicts, Reza Shah helped force the alignment of interests between the trinity of forces that ultimately brought about the fall of the Pahlavi dynasty: intellectuals, the bazaar, and clerics. The schism between those men of the cloth advocating for a more active clerical role in politics and those promoting a separation between earthly and spiritual matters played out during the 1920s and into the 1930s. During that time, the Iranian clergy became more politicized, although the leader of the clerical establishment, Sheikh Abd al-Karim Haeri, remained apolitical. However, despite an uptick in this trend, the Iranian religious establishment would refrain from becoming overtly and overly involved in politics until as late as the death of Grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi in 1961. Nevertheless, tensions grew between the modernizing monarch and parts of the clergy. This conflict culminated in 1935 and resulted in total victory for Reza Shah, yet in the process the seeds of further conflict were sown, conflict which would erupt with the Islamic Revolution several decades later. In one of the most notable protests in response to Reza Shah’s modernization efforts, in 1935, crowds in the city of Mashhad demonstrated against—among other things—a directive requiring men to swap their traditional headwear for Western-style hats. The incident led to a number of casualties and became known as the incident of Masjed-e Goharshad. Similarly, labor-related protests were not uncommon during Reza Shah’s reign. Controversy and dissent relating to Reza Shah’s efforts to modernize were not limited to Iran. His vision was to force the foreign powers present in the region to accept Iran as a sovereign power. As a result, and in an attempt to assert his dominance and Iran’s sovereignty, the monarch expelled foreign troops and advisors from the country.101 He reduced the number of concessions ceded to foreigners and instituted a more competitive method of granting them. Hence, foreign powers 85

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shared domestic critics’ desire to see the Shah removed from power. With an increasingly powerful coalition wishing to see him ousted, the noose tightened on him as the 1940s approached.

Continued Foreign Presence and Its Consequences Ostensibly known for caving to the powers’ desires, Reza Shah sought to assert Iranian independence. His ascent throughout the ranks of the Persian military and government to the throne is also associated with the yearning within Iran’s populace and elites to finally take the reins of their country into their own hands after years of foreign domination. Hence, Reza Shah’s advent and reign is in reality associated with the quest to deny foreign access to Iran’s territory and resources. The monarch laid the foundations of a modern state whose steps toward self-sufficiency would help promote Iranian interests and secure the country’s territorial integrity, national unity, and sovereignty. He renegotiated and terminated several key treaties and concessions as he began to develop a native Iranian political, military, industrial, and economic core. The shortcomings of his predecessors, which had led to increased interference in Iranian affairs by foreign powers, were a strong motivating force in Reza Shah’s actions. As he put it, ‘for approximately 150 years, our country has grappled with weakness, impotence, and insecurity. And it can be said that since the death of Karim Khan Zand and the domination of the Qajars, [Iran] has not seen a day of comfort and calm.’102 However, he, too, was unable to completely eradicate foreign influence in his country during his reign. Foreign powers, namely the Soviet Union, Britain, Germany, and now the United States, continued to maintain much of their presence in Iran.103 It was this continued foreign interference, specifically that of Germany, that would result in the downfall of Reza Shah.

Iran–Russia Relations Under Reza Shah In replacing Russia following the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet Union initially expressed goodwill towards Iran in the immediate aftermath of World War I—albeit not without attempts to distill friction and exploit fissures within the empire. When Iran refused to acknowledge Soviet 86

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envoys and attempted to lay claim to the territories it had ceded under the treaties of Golestan and  Turkmenchay at the Paris Peace Conference, the Soviets changed their approach.104 Ultimately, Iran–Soviet relations would be reminiscent of Russian–Iranian ties prior to the October Revolution and following the collapse of the USSR.  The two countries’ tense distrust of one another often provided the backdrop against which they cooperated in the pursuit of aligned objectives. As a member of the formerly czarist Cossack Brigade, the king was no friend to the Communists. The Soviet Union lent support to a number of Iranian separatist and Communist movements, most notably the Jangalis, whose leader, Kuchak Khan, Reza Khan had killed prior to his ascension to the throne, displaying his head in Tehran as a symbol of his victory.105 Throughout his reign, Reza Shah aggressively fought these Soviet-supported Communist and separatist groups.106 At the same time, however, a panoply of issues further complicated Soviet–Iranian relations, including economic ties and the Soviet– Iranian Treaty of Friendship. Under the Soviet Union’s New Economic Policy, Iranian merchants were able to gain access to the Soviet market, thereby bolstering the Iranian trade balance.107 In the 1930s, Reza Shah became more protectionist vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in his economic policies. Starting with the revision of the 1921 Soviet–Iranian agreement in 1931 and in parallel to his growing alignment with Germany, he banned Communism and purged Soviet sympathizers from his government.108 These measures produced a number of active clandestine pro-Soviet political cells and a Soviet– Iranian trade relationship that helped sustain a large Russian interest and presence in Iran in the form of merchants, diplomatic officers, and political agents. For its part, the Soviet Union, like Britain and Russia before it, adopted a policy of dumping goods onto the Iranian market to retain a controlling market share, resulting in the enfeebling of native Iranian industries.

Partial Withdrawal, Continued Presence: Reza Shah and the British Reza Shah was more willing to counteract Britain’s influence and reduce its presence in Iran. Because the majles had not ratified the 87

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1919 Anglo–Iranian Agreement, British influence lapsed during the interwar years. In 1921, the South Persia Rifles—a capable unit of Persians, recruited, trained, paid for, and commanded by the British— were disbanded and the vast majority of British military advisers were withdrawn from Iran.109 Some military and administrative advisors remained there upon Seyyed Ziya’s request.110 In 1927, Iran went so far as to claim the islands of Bahrain and to bring the dispute before the League of Nations up until the outbreak of  World War II. Britain lost its place of preeminence in Iranian commerce as well. The country was now to be ‘treated like any other nation that could contribute technically.’111 Yet, much like its military withdrawal, London’s commercial departure remained incomplete. Despite rising anti-British sentiment and the cancellation of the Anglo–Iranian Agreement, the D’Arcy Concession pertaining to petroleum and the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company survived. Britain maintained an important presence in the Iranian oil sector, particularly at the Abadan refinery, a locale that would play a prominent role in British–Iranian tensions and the Islamic Revolution in subsequent decades.112 In 1932, angered by lost revenue in the British-run refinery, Tehran cancelled London’s concession on it, replacing it with a new concession, one ‘much more favorable to Iran.’113 This concession allowed for the gradual ‘Iranianization’ of the company. While this move represented an incremental step in the direction of nationalization, it was one grounded in the reality of the country’s situation given its lack of capacity, know-how, and adequate technology. Domestic shortcomings and political and economic exigencies would routinely force Iranian nationalists to make similar concessions until the collapse of the monarchy, leading to British retention of a considerable power share in Iran. This uneasy history continues to plague Iran’s relations with the United Kingdom.

The Odd Men Out: Iran’s Growing Ties to America and Germany British and Russian losses, particularly in the oil sector, proved to be America’s gain. In the early 1920s, the American companies Sinclair Oil and Standard Oil narrowly missed opportunities to close 88

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negotiations on concessions for Iranian oil. But in 1937, the Amiranian Oil Company received a concession for it.114 Other American business interests continued to grow in Iran. However, US isolationism proved too significant a handicap to allow it to dominate the Iranian market the way other nations did. Whereas after World War II, the United States would play a more active role, the main benefactor of the interwar lapse in British and Soviet presence in Iran was Germany. Germany enjoyed a fast-growing market share in the fledgling Iranian economy from the late 1920s until 1941. This was partly due to attempts by Iranian students who had studied in Germany and who presented themselves as ‘Germanophiles’ to balance Russian and British influence. The Germanophiles counted in their ranks a number of prominent individuals, including Reza Shah himself, as well as Seyyed Ziya.115  Those Iranians who had lived and studied in Germany believed that unlike the British and Russians, the Germans had not exercised a negative role in their country’s affairs. Moreover, they were inspired by Chancellor Otto von Bismarck’s ability to transform his country into a unified political, military, and economic powerhouse. Adding to Germany’s positive image among some Iranian factions stemming from the influence of these returnees, and the lack of centralized political-imperial designs in Persia prior and during this period, were political affinities and economic considerations. Berlin’s capabilities as a rising industrial power and its friendliness towards Reza Shah’s absolutist style of governance helped cement the ties between the two nations.116 The Germans gradually grew their influence in Iran—against a backdrop of domestic tension within Iran about the wisdom of increasing ties with Germany.117  They had begun to lay out the foundations for this move years prior, during the final decade of Qajar rule.118 Following the departure of Reza Shah’s American financial advisor, Germany assumed this role.119 Nazi Germany also became ‘the virtual founder of the young Iranian industry.’120 Accordingly, many foreign technicians who had departed the country during Reza Shah’s nationalization campaigns aimed at building capacity and promoting self-reliance were, in fact, replaced by Germans.121 As a result, Germany’s share of Iran’s total trade grew considerably— although the Iranians kept the number deliberately low to avoid being 89

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completely dependent on yet another foreign power and upsetting other stakeholders. Adolf Hitler’s objectives in Iran were threefold. First, he hoped to ‘minimize or eliminate British influence even if that increased Soviet influence; second, to increase German influence; and, third, to divert Stalin’s attention away from Eastern Europe.’122 While Iran would remain outside the Third Reich sphere of influence, its ties to Germany would prove intolerable for the Allies. Thus, Iran’s reliance on balancing foreign powers against each other as a means by which it would both attain its objectives of building capacity and developing its key sectors while avoiding subjugation to a single power proved as flawed a policy under Reza Shah as it had under his predecessors.

The Fall of Reza Shah and Ensuing PowerVacuum At the onset of World War II, Iran declared neutrality, as it had done in the early days of the Great War. But its experience was reminiscent of that war and, once again, served to remind Iranians that international laws did not protect them in the face of the powers’ interests.123 For British prime minister Winston Churchill, strategic exigencies and thwarting the Nazis took precedence over international norms—a case he had made two years prior regarding Norway.124 When the war broke out, Reza Shah and many of his advisors believed that the conflict would be over in no time.125 As Reza Shah’s treasury minister Abbasgholi Golshaeiyan would later write, the Iranians believed that the Germans would defeat the Soviets in a matter of weeks, thus repealing the Bolshevik threat once and for all.126 At the time, several hundred German nationals were residing or working in Iran, including many who were there to build a factory. Britain and the Soviet Union invaded Iran with a combined force of over 150,000 men in 1941, operating on the pretense that the German nationals were conducting espionage in support of the Axis war effort.127 As Richard A. Stewart later described the episode: British and Soviet armies stormed across Iran’s borders—commencing perhaps the most dramatic and controversial untold episode of W   orld War II. Attacked without provocation, Iran suffered her own ‘Pearl Harbor’ three months prior to the United States’ more famous Day of

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Infamy. Before the incident ended, Iran’s army was crushed, her monarch was overthrown, the beleaguered Red Army was saved from defeat, a German conquest of the Persian Gulf oil fields was thwarted, and the conditions were created for the opening showdown of the Cold War.128

In addition to the continued strategic value of Iran to Britain and the Soviet Union given its geographic position, other factors also prompted the invasion. London and Moscow hoped to pre-empt an Axis coup, secure Iran’s oil resources, and cement its position as a supply line to Russia.129 As Churchill later wrote, ‘[t]he creation of a major supply route to Russia through the Persian Gulf became our prime objective.’130 According to Golshaeiyan, Reza Shah had made an offer to the Russians and the British to expel the Germans and align itself with the Allies.131 In exchange, he had asked for the two powers to hold their forces.132 As Golshaeiyan recalled, on the same day, a number of British aircraft flew over  Tehran and distributed pamphlets according to which London’s only design with regard to the country was the removal of the Germans from it. British forces, the propaganda material claimed, would leave Iran as soon as the Germans did.133 Soon, the Germans and the British were on the march. Iranians were preparing for the war’s spillover into their country. They took a number of steps to ensure the flow of energy, secure national treasures, and stockpile foodstuffs.134 In less than two days, the army Reza Shah had built with great effort surrendered with essentially no resistance. The Allies forced Reza Shah to abdicate his throne to preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of his country. In Churchill’s words, ‘[t]he conditions imposed on the Persian Government were, principally, the cessation of all resistance, the ejection of Germans, neutrality in the war, and the Allied use of Persian communications for the transit of war supplies to Russia.’135 Now, the young Mohammad Reza was to succeed the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty. But as World War II intensified and drew more players into the conflict, Iran was essentially divided between Russia to the north and Britain to the south. The transition of power from Reza Shah to his successor did not take place quickly enough. Instead, for months, ‘Iran seemed to have no government.’136 And during the period between Reza Shah’s exile in 1941 and Mohammad Reza Shah’s effective rise to power, instability 91

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began to brew throughout the country once again. Churchill viewed the transition favorably, noting that Reza Shah ‘went into comfortable exile’ while ‘his gifted twenty-two-year-old son’ took over.137 However, he, too, was concerned about the unrest in the country. As he put it, ‘[t]here are in Persia signs of serious disorder among tribesmen and of breakdown of Persian authority. Disorder, if it spreads, will mean wasting our divisions holding down these people.’138 The renewed fragility of the central government in the interim showcased the limitations of the institutions Reza Shah had created and reinvigorated and the continued outsized role of the monarch in the affairs of the nation nearly three decades after the Constitutional Revolution. Hoping to distinguish himself from his father, the new king took a number of measures, including the mass release of political prisoners as he assumed the throne.  These actions ultimately significantly weakened the position of the Pahlavis, while strengthening several key groups whose activities would define Mohammad Reza Shah’s reign.139 The Soviets backed newly released Communists to form the Tudeh Party, which would soon become an important political force in the country.140 The chaos and the absence of strong native government in Iran during the war again produced the perception of the need for a modernizing strongman, this time Reza Shah’s son and successor. Reza Shah died in exile in Johannesburg in 1944. His son would return his body to Iran to be buried just outside Tehran. Decades later, the revolutionaries who sought to erase his legacy from Iranian history destroyed his mausoleum and grave. But the key events that marked Reza Shah’s tenure cemented core themes in the Iranian collective memory. Consequently, despite their best efforts to erase Reza Shah’s legacy and to turn back the clock on his reforms, the revolutionaries ended up adopting key strands of his thinking and his approach to national security and military affairs.

Conclusion Reza Shah’s relatively short time on the throne was one of the most decisive and divisive eras in Iranian history. Today, some hail him as the founder of modern Iran, transitioning the country into the 92

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twentieth century after two centuries of poor management and stagnation. Others, the founders of the Islamic Republic among them, see Reza Shah’s tenure as symbolizing everything they fought against: authoritarianism, Westernization, and secularization. Regime officials refer to Reza Shah as Reza Khan—negating the legitimacy of his reign to undermine his legacy and erase his mark from history. Regardless of the side of the debate one finds oneself, one must recognize that Reza Shah’s reign led to tremendous successes, as it did to significant failures. Perhaps his chief legacy was to leave a territorially unified Iran, equipped with a relatively strong central authority (albeit one left weakened upon his abdication) and modern institutions to promote the rule of law. And to provide for the country’s security, the monarch created a modern cohesive and centralized military, equipped by a nascent defense industry, that could operate on land, in sea and air. All in all, his ‘fundamental reform was the creation of a strong army capable of enforcing state authority.’141 But perhaps due to his limited time, the meddling of foreign powers, a lack of foresight, his micromanagement—or likely a combination of all these factors— these reforms did not succeed fully in all areas. Although the country was now equipped with modern weapon systems, its military still suffered from a number of tactical and operational inadequacies. Reza Shah placed a large emphasis on modern weapons and equipment and saw technology acquisition as an effective way to overcome Iranian military inferiority. But this focus came at the expense of developing doctrine and battlefield readiness. While his successor mitigated some of these challenges, others remained as obstacles stymying readiness for decades to come. As we will see later, decades after Reza Shah’s military reforms, Iranian armed forces would continue to suffer from conventional inferiority vis-à-vis their adversaries. But unlike Reza Shah and his son, they would recognize the limits of technology and weapons in addressing these shortcomings and try to compensate for them by developing asymmetric capabilities. Reza Shah was not able to make his country, and its military in particular, sufficiently self-reliant as he had hoped. The country still relied heavily on the powers, and this made it vulnerable to their meddling in Iranian affairs, ultimately leading to Reza Shah’s collapse. Nevertheless, by laying the foundations of a defense industry, he enabled 93

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his country to continue its quest for self-reliance. Mohammad Reza Shah initially stepped away from the pursuit of indigenous capabilities. But he, too, eventually came to share his father’s quest for self-reliance. More striking yet, decades later, the Islamic Republic would pick up where Reza Shah had left off and build much of its defense sector around this idea. Today, much like Reza Shah did in the 1920s and 30s, Iran continues to balance its short-term weapons acquisition needs by striking deals with foreign suppliers, while also pursuing its long-term goal of self-sufficiency. Perhaps the single most important and underappreciated component of Reza Shah’s legacy lies in the creation of political and security establishments that, for all their shortcomings, were so deeply rooted, they survived the power vacuum created after his exile. Iran was virtually on autopilot until the Shah took over. During that period, considerable instability and insecurity plagued the country, giving rise to, among others, new terrorist groups. However, the country was nevertheless not fundamentally threatened with collapse. And this remained true nearly four decades later, when an even more radical transition of power took place. Finally, Reza Shah’s end only served as a reminder that the powers would not hesitate to ignore Iranian wishes, including declarations of neutrality, in the pursuit of their own interests. It also reinforced the idea that years after the Constitutional Revolution, Iranians still did not enjoy self-determination, as their leaders were forced in and out by foreign powers. Although, similarly to World War I, Iran was not an active participant in World War II, Iranians remember it as an externally imposed armed conflict. Far from an active player, Iran was a passive observer of a war that deeply affected it, serving as a conduit and a resource. Adding insult to injury—as was the case with the Great War—Iran rarely appears in Western accounts of the war. It is dismissed as a neutral country, even though the occupation of the country indicates otherwise. As we will see in the next chapter, Mohammad Reza Shah initially departed from his father’s security thinking. But like his father, the Shah is known as a puppet of foreign powers, even as he sought to increase Iranian self-reliance, particularly in the second half of his reign. He, too, operationalized critical aspects of Iranian collective memory and 94

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built upon the foundations laid by Reza Shah to build a strong modern military, develop a defense industry, and acquire the technology needed to create a bulwark against foreign interference. Importantly, even as he signed on to a number of international instruments, the Shah viewed them with skepticism and pursued the capabilities required to achieve what treaties and declarations of neutrality could not. Like his father, the Shah’s reign would be deeply divisive both inside Iran and globally, and like Reza Shah, the revolutionaries would seek to repudiate him and negate his legacy. But just as the Shah followed in Reza Shah’s footsteps, the revolutionaries, too, would carry on many aspects of the foreign and security policies envisioned and pursued by the two men.

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THE LAST KING MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI, THE AUTOCRATIC REFORMER

When British and Soviet forces invaded Iran in summer 1941, a dismayed young Mohammad Reza watched as the army his father had arduously built collapsed in a matter of hours. Reza Shah’s subsequent forced abdication and exile only made the defeat more humiliating. Under these wrenching circumstances, Mohammad Reza, often referred to simply as ‘the Shah,’ succeeded his father and became the last king of Iran. The Shah occupies a formative and pivotal position in Iranian history. Like his father, he remains a highly controversial figure who harbored a grandiose vision for his country, which he sought to modernize rapidly—perhaps too rapidly. Most importantly for the purposes of this book, the Shah undertook a series of military and security reforms and modernization efforts, which built on the work of Reza Shah. Perceptions of Iran’s historical experiences, including foreign interference, domestic turmoil, and the ineffectiveness of international laws, were all now firmly part of the country’s strategic thinking and guided the Shah as they had his father before him. But so did the young monarch’s personal memory of the collapse of his father’s rule and the need to see through his legacy. The Shah’s tenure and the revolution that resulted from it profoundly strengthened key elements of  Iranian security thinking, which continue to persist today. In particular, the last decades of Iran’s monarchical 97

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history deeply ingrained the ideas of the distrust of and independence from foreign powers, which became a key pillar of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Iran’s continued experience with foreign meddling coupled with growing domestic opposition injected a key notion, that of the need to create redundant power centers, into the country’s worldview. The following sections will discuss the life, reign, and legacy of the Shah in terms of his impact on Iranian security thinking.

The Formative Y  ears of a Y  oung Monarch Born on 26 October 1919, Mohammad Reza would spend the first few years of his life as a non-royal. He was raised under the imposing and austere shadow of his father, whom he described as ‘one of the greatest in the long line of Persian sovereigns.’1 Intimidated by his father’s strong personality and military ways, Mohammad Reza became famously indecisive, a character trait that would become vital in shaping his tenure. He shared some of his father’s habits and objectives. He, too, was fixated on modernization and Iranian ascension. Mohammad Reza would later claim that his rule was even divinely ordained; at the age of nine, he was healed by Imam Ali—Prophet Muhammad’s successor and the first of twelve imams for Twelver Shias—and then chosen by God to lead Iran to modernize.2 The young Crown Prince attended boarding school in Switzerland for several years starting in 1931, where the ‘Western environment molded [his] character to an extent that was second to only [his] father’s influence.’3 Following this experience, Mohammad Reza joined the Military College his father had built in Tehran and graduated in 1938 as a Second Lieutenant. Although he would not be formally crowned as shahanshah until 1967, he became the sitting Shah following the forced abdication of his father in 1941. At the time Mohammad Reza ascended to the throne, Iran was crumbling in a manner recalling the way it had in the wake of World War I—a circumstance which had characterized many of the power transitions marking Iranian history before him and that would lead him to make a series of choices during the revolution that would end his own reign. As Reza Shah had once described it, the fate of Iran resembled the mythical bird, Samandar, ‘which every day, around 98

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dusk, flaps its wings and from it creates a flame with which it burns itself and turns to ash. Then, in the morning, once again from those ashes it rises, new, floriferous, youthful, and vivacious.’4 His son’s early days were reminiscent of the dusk Reza Shah had once experienced and conquered: rebellions were brewing in different corners of the country as foreign powers vied for influence. During this transition period starting in 1941 and ending with the Shah’s consolidation of power, terrorist groups began to operate across the country as Communism gained ground in Iran. These emerging forces seized the opportunity afforded to them by the absence of a strong central authority and the weakness of the security forces to seek to assert themselves. Although their objectives and the means they employed differed, virtually all objected to the division of lands into spheres of Western influence during World War II. But while some groups had connections with other powers (the Soviet Union, for example), others wished to see all foreign influence erased in Iran. In addition to the separatist groups that had long grappled to detach parts of the empire and to assert their power over them, some of the non-state actors competing for power with the central authority were Islamists—a movement that would ultimately lead to the monarchy’s collapse. Two key domestic challenges to the Shah’s reign were the nascent Tudeh Party and a Shia fundamentalist group known as the Devotees to Islam or Fadayian-e Islam (FI). FI went on to conduct some of the most successful terrorist attacks and high-profile assassinations in contemporary Iranian history during the first half of the Shah’s reign. Although both would lose much of their influence by the time of the Shah’s toppling, they would nonetheless play a role in the revolution. FI was founded by a theology student at the Najaf seminary in Iraq, Seyed Mojtaba Mirlawhi (1924–56), also known by his nom de guerre, Navvab Safavi (hereafter, Navvab).5 For its part, the Tudeh Party of Iran (whose name translates to the Party of the Masses of  Iran) was formed just weeks after Reza Shah’s abdication—although it holds its roots in the early days of Communism in Persia starting in the 1910s. Early on, the Soviet Union sought to export Communism to Persia. As a now declassified US intelligence report assessed, ‘Communist covert activity focused on propaganda and recruiting 99

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among intellectuals, including students returning from Europe.’6 The propaganda and recruitment efforts helped Moscow attain its goals when a group of former political prisoners and individuals who had studied in Europe created the Tudeh Party. But the Soviets also intervened directly in Iran to encourage and facilitate the spread of Communism when they occupied the country’s northern region. Reza Shah’s reforms helped the Soviet cause: they had expanded the middle and working classes without providing them with enough opportunity to participate in politics, leading to growing grievances, which Communists leveraged to spread their ideology in the country.7 The Tudeh Party appealed to a number of Iranians, especially those in the middle class and intelligentsia, claiming 50,000 core members and 100,000 affiliates within five years of being established.8 The party lost much of its political traction following the collapse of the selfproclaimed governments in Azerbaijan and Kurdistan (discussed later in the chapter), which had been backed by the Soviets. However, by virtue of popularizing such notions as the struggle of the masses against imperialism and the bourgeoisie, and class identity and conflict, the party contributed to creating the environment and crafting a language and iconography that facilitated the downfall of the monarchy.9 As a leader, the Shah developed significantly more indulgent tastes than those of his father—who was predominantly concerned with state and military affairs. He was known to spend excessively while accruing a personal fortune. Members of the royal family also reportedly amassed wealth and were, at times, involved in corrupt and illegal activities. By the end of his reign, some estimated the royal family’s net worth at $5–20 billion—although the exact numbers and the degree to which the royal family was corrupt remain disputed.10 The myth surrounding the Shah’s morals, wealth, and ties to foreign players fed into the revolutionaries’ disinformation campaign and played an important role in shaping the revolutionary narrative and his ultimate demise.

First Y  ears in Power: 1941–51 As we have seen, much like his father, the Shah would struggle for over a decade to fully grip the reins of power in Iran. In 1941, ‘Iran 100

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was beginning a decade in which Constitutionalism, accompanied by factional strife, could enjoy free play.’11 In the chaos following the forced abdication of Reza Shah, the government would release thousands of political prisoners, contributing to the country’s insecurity by undertaking criminal activities or joining efforts against the state.12 At the same time, the clergy again became politically active and the tribes that Reza Shah had subdued took up arms once more as their leaders forsook their urban residences to re-join their men back home. These developments took place against the backdrop of increasingly pervasive foreign influence.13 Foreign powers were instrumental to the release of former political prisoners and to the empowerment of the clergy—although the latter would still have to wait two more decades before Grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi’s death fully afforded the men of the cloth the freedom to pursue their political aspirations. In exchange for promises by the Allies to withdraw troops from Iran within six months of the war’s end and a tacit understanding between the powers that the monarchy would continue, the Shah took several measures. Iran signed the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance with Britain and the Soviet Union in 1942—which the United States did not sign—designed to coordinate and harmonize British and Soviet occupation of Iran and to prepare the ground for their withdrawal.14 Notably, the Shah freed over a thousand dissidents, returned lands to the clergy, and took steps to reduce his personal power in governance.15 He would spend the next three decades undoing measures undertaken in less than a year to assuage the Allies. In the early days of the Shah’s reign, numerous and serious divisions emerged within the majles and the populace. A range of issues from the continuation of the monarchy to the role of foreign interests in Iranian politics created a fractured political spectrum. According to Ervand Abrahamian, during the period of 1941–53, the average premiership lasted for only eight months and the average cabinet for five.16  The freer political discourse also brought to the fore intractable conflicts which had lain dormant since the 1920s. These tensions, in turn, produced divisions even among parties with aligned ideologies. Furthermore, the central government lost control over many areas outside of  Tehran and nearly all control of the tribal regions. In Kurdistan, for example, the British Consul noted in 1941 that regular 101

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travel had been interrupted due to the creation of a number of small independent republics.17 The fractured Iranian army disintegrated so quickly that it largely did not disarm. And for much of World War II, armed bands of former Iranian soldiers roamed the countryside.18 Despite continued turbulence throughout the land and foreign occupation, Mohammad Reza Shah was nonetheless able to secure his position by consolidating the Iranian military.19 Although mass desertions in the wake of the Allied invasion stymied the Iranian military’s effectiveness, the Shah had successfully recovered its numerical strength to roughly two thirds of its pre-war size by 1943.20 Accordingly, he retained the minimum command necessary to eventually regain control of the territory and to thwart British designs to re-exert dominance in Iran. That same year, assured that Allied forces would be withdrawn ‘not later than six months’ after the end of the war, Iran formally declared war on Germany.21 However, Iran was anything but an equal partner in its relationship with the Allies. Not three months later, the Americans, British, and Soviets convened in Tehran for the Tehran Conference. Although ostensibly aimed at displaying friendship between the Allies and Iran, the conference was in practice a show of Allied dominance over Iran. Now-famous photographs of the conference feature then US president Franklin D. Roosevelt, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, and Churchill but omit the Shah. In fact, the Shah was largely a passive observer at the conference organized in his own capital. Decades later, members of the Islamic Republic would highlight the Shah’s absence from the conference as a sign of the Shah’s weakness and the country’s humiliation in the face of foreign meddlers. The year 1944 saw the introduction by Mohammad Mossadeq, then a member of parliament, of a law requiring the majles to ratify all concessionary agreements to foreign powers. At first, the bill was of little consequence and, for all intents and purposes, Iran was an occupied country. However, subsequently, including immediately after the war, this reform would have significant consequences concerning Iran’s relationships with foreign powers, as well as the domestic power struggle between the Shah and his legislature. The legislation was aimed at putting an end to one-sided concessions and to check the government’s relationship with foreign powers, particularly the Russians and the British. 102

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The 1946 Crisis in Azerbaijan The end of the war and the departure of the Allies afforded the Iranian central government the space and opportunity to re-assert control over its territory and policies. But while the British and Americans honored the six-month withdrawal agreement, the Soviets refused to leave until they reached an agreement on the issue of oil extraction in the north.22 In Iran, the response to the Soviet demands was the subject of divisions along political lines; though, ultimately, virtually all wished to minimize foreign influence, albeit in different ways. In the meantime, and following the departure of the British, the Soviets had organized the establishment of two pre-secessionist ‘republics’ in Azerbaijan and in Kurdistan, the latter known as the shortlived Republic of Mahabad.23 These developments marked the early stages of what would soon become the decades-long Cold War, pitting the two superpowers against each other and largely playing out in the ‘Third World.’  The Shah would largely side with the United States, albeit while attempting to avoid any provocation of the Soviet Union. Organized by a group of Soviet-backed Communists led by Jafar Pishevari (1893–1947)—a Communist newspaper editor, who according to Abrahamian ‘suddenly discovered his Azeri “roots”’—the Azerbaijani Democratic Party was created in Azerbaijan in summer 1945.24 By that fall, the Party had carried through a local coup d’état while the Soviet army prevented Iranian reinforcements from entering the province.25   The province was governed by an independent republic until December 1946. That same winter, Qazi Muhammad (1893–1947), the Kurdish leader who for a short time served as the president of an independent Kurdistan, headed the creation of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran and the Republic of Mahabad in Kurdistan.26  The Soviets saw the Kurdish efforts to gain independence as beneficial to securing their interests in Azerbaijan, while the British were concerned about a domino effect in the rest of Iran, particularly Khuzestan, and even Iraq.27 The American-backed Artesh eventually pushed the Soviets out of Iran, leading to the collapse of the two short-lived self-proclaimed governments by the end of 1946. The Shah, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, marched swiftly into the rebellious provinces and 103

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executed the separatist leaders. The administration of US president Harry S. Truman lent its support to the Shah, contributing to his effort to oust the Soviets once and for all. This was no small feat, as virtually no Soviet-occupied territory would be returned to its original claimant after World War II. These events damaged the Tudeh Party. The party secretary, Iraj Eskandari (1907–85), ‘later revealed that the Tudeh leaders had publicly supported the Azerbaijan and Kurdish Democratic Parties for the sake of socialist solidarity with the Soviet Union, but privately they had remained “bewildered,” “surprised,” and “shocked.”’28 The Shah’s government accused the party of having aided the separatists and arrested its leaders, forcing Eskandari into exile. The government, backed by the British, declared martial law in Tehran, and, later, proceeded to consolidate power (leveraging the 1949 FI assassination attempt against the Shah).29 The Azeri and Kurdish independence episode was short-lived and Iran regained its territorial integrity and national unity promptly. However, for a nation that had seen its historical territory chipped at for centuries, the events of  that period served as a reminder of  the country’s vulnerability. Domestic separatist forces were simply waiting for the opportune moment to disintegrate the territory, and foreign powers would not hesitate to throw their weight behind any such endeavor.  The events renewed a belief now firmly embedded in the country’s collective memory that the country’s weakness and foreign machinations were an existential threat. Although few Iranians now have first-hand memories of those events, the developments are vividly remembered and, as we will see in the following chapters, any real or perceived attempt at stoking separatism in Iran sparks rage and fear within the population. And as the protests of 2017–18 and November 2019 would demonstrate, anxieties surrounding the possible implications of the weakening of the central authority, albeit one as brutal and incompetent as the Islamic Republic, would often serve to dampen dissent long after the collapse of the two republics. At the same time, labor relations were reaching a boiling point. As the military increased in size again by an additional 12,000 men between 1943 and the time of the exit of Allied troops from Iran, 104

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government spending ballooned.30 In December 1947, the reformer Ahmad Qavam, known as Qavam al-Saltaneh (1873–1955), lost his position as prime minister. His exit propelled the Shah, who had largely taken a backseat until then, into political affairs. In the space of two years, the monarch became the most powerful politician in Iran and sought major constitutional reform.31 In February 1949, the Shah became the target of an assassination attempt. According to a contemporary report, the perpetrator was a ‘reporter-photographer’ who, ‘pretending to take the Shah’s picture, fired at point blank range, when the Shah got out of his car on the steps of Teheran University.’32 The incident occurred ‘a day after 2,000 students marched around the Majlis (Parliament) building and demanded cancellation of the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company’s concession to take oil out of  Iran.’33 Some pointed to a total fabrication of the incident by the Shah and his men.34 Although he survived the attack, the Shah was terrified and enraged, using the assassination attempt as an excuse to relentlessly persecute his political opponents and vigorously pursue political power.35 Later that year, through the adoption of Article 8 in the Iranian Constitution, the Shah gained the ability to ‘dissolve either of the Houses of Senate and Representative separately or together.’36 Meanwhile, during the final stages of the Shah’s rise, discontent over the 1933 oil agreement with Britain was building. In 1949, the Iranian government, under the premiership of General Hajj Ali Razmara (1901–51), renegotiated the concession to the Anglo– Iranian Oil Company. The revised agreement—the Supplemental Oil Agreement or Gass–Gulshayan Agreement, which among other stipulations, covered 50:50 profit-sharing—was set to go before the majles for ratification at a time of high support for the nationalization of oil and general discontent with British influence. The majles lacked the appetite to ratify any agreement, falling short of a 75:25 profit-sharing. The push for ratification dragged on until 1951, when the majles voted to reject the agreement. Soon thereafter, the Special Oil Commission, chaired by Mossadeq, recommended total nationalization of the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company. Within a month of the recommendation to nationalize, Razmara was reportedly assassinated by Khalil Tahmassebi, an FI operative. His assassin was ‘acclaimed as a savior of the nation and granted a pardon by parliament.’37 However, five years 105

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later, Navvab took credit for the assassination, claiming he had shot the prime minister. The assassination became one of the most high-profile successful attacks undertaken by FI. This growing dissent movement joined labor issues with the nationalist drive for the assertion of Iranian interests. The growing discontent and the combination of nationalism and economic grievances proved a potentially deadly threat for the Shah as the country ‘suffered from uneven development.’38 A new reformer, one with a broad backing in both the majles and the populace and with more political experience than the Shah, would soon rise to challenge the Pahlavi dynasty. He would set out to correct what he viewed as Iran’s iniquitous path, one of continued dependence on foreign powers. He, too, would fail to place his country on a different trajectory, ultimately becoming one of the main protagonists of one of the most significant episodes of foreign interference in modern Iranian history—an episode whose implications reverberate in Tehran and Washington to the present time of writing.

Mossadeq and an Absolutist Turn in Leadership (1951–63) The Shah and Mossadeq: A Rocky Start Mohammad Mossadeq (1882–1967) was one of the few ardent opponents of Reza Shah to survive into the Cold War era. He was born into nobility, harboring a solid track record of public service. But much like Reza Shah, Mossadeq was committed to nationalist reforms often at the expense of personal interest. A man ‘famous for his incorruptibility,’ he was the embodiment of nearly all of the domestic groups that the Shah feared and hated.39 For decades to come, he would also personify all the qualities of a national hero to the populace—both for traits that he possessed and those he did not, but which people attributed to him. Today, myths of Mossadeq’s life and struggles for the national interest continue to shape Iranians’ perceptions of him and the 1953 coup ousting him from power. The coup itself remains a source of disagreement even as many of the facts surrounding it have come to light in recent declassified US State Department cables and intelligence documents. 106

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In his autobiography, Mission for My Country, the Shah goes to great length to discredit Mossadeq, devoting an entire chapter to eviscerating the former prime minister.40 Mossadeq’s character, agenda, and personal grievances with Reza Shah were not the only sources of tension between the two men. The monarch also felt threatened by the coalition of interests that aligned to support Mossadeq (at least in the early days of the clash), including the clergy, workers, intelligentsia, leftists, and some merchants. The Shah was acutely aware of the precedent he was setting in his showdown with Mossadeq. For his part, Mossadeq had been expecting a face-off with the Pahlavi dynasty for decades. Like many reformists before him, Mossadeq had refrained from engaging in party politics. He advocated for a nonaligned course in his country’s foreign policy, characterized as ‘negative equilibrium.’ This strategy was in contrast to that pursued by the Shah and generations of Iranian statesmen before him: balancing—or movazeneh. As discussed in the previous two chapters, decades before the Shah and Mossadeq, Qaem-Maqam and other key figures had already viewed this strategy as deeply flawed, but were unable to break away from it due to the outsized influence of the Russians and British in their region and their country’s own shortcomings. In a description reminiscent to that used by Qaem-Maqam, Mossadeq likened the balancing strategy practiced by his country to ‘a person with one hand amputated who, in pursuance of balance, would consent to have his other hand being amputated.’41 By contrast, negative equilibrium relied on the expulsion of foreign interests from Iran in the form of nationalization of key industries, chiefly oil, and the implementation of a typical nationalistic reformist agenda. This plan included elements of what would constitute the Islamic Republic’s policy of ‘resistance’ decades later: the expanded use of the Persian language, political and economic reform in favor of democratization and increased redistribution of wealth, as well as the protection of the clergy.42 Although fundamentally different in their outlooks, the two camps allied with the Shah and Mossadeq were part of a long lineage of Iranian statesmen recognizing their nation’s weakness and foreign interference as critical threats to their national security. In that sense, both were 107

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operationalizing a key element of  Iranian collective memory, albeit in opposing and conflicting ways. While Mossadeq sought to remove foreign powers and to make the country more self-reliant, the Shah initially strove to deny any single power a monopoly over the country’s security and economy by resorting to the same means as his predecessors. The Shah would later come to understand the national interest in a manner more aligned with Mossadeq’s vision and to pursue an approach more consistent with that of the prime minister. The struggle between Mossadeq and Mohammad Reza Shah began in 1944 when the latter offered the former the premiership if he declared the legislative election results void. Mossadeq refused.43 Again, in 1951, the Shah favored Mossadeq’s election as a means of balancing factions against each other.44 Accordingly, the government ‘gave in to the intense public commotion’ over alleged fraud and called a new election in Tehran, which Mossadeq won.45 Mossadeq’s rise to the premiership, however, was preceded by an era of instability in the majles. Prime ministers rose and fell one after another, some lasting just days. Meanwhile, the conflict between labor and capital was building. Perhaps no example of this conflict is more evident than at the Abadan refinery and in the oil-producing region of Khuzestan, Iran’s oil-rich southwestern province—which would later appear as a key stage of the revolutionary movement and the main battlefield of the Iran–Iraq War. By 1946, labor organizations had all but disappeared at Abadan after thousands of oil workers went on strike to no immediate avail. The strikes prompted the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company to eliminate workers’ benefits, further antagonizing the workers.46 Finally, a walkout at Abadan on 22 March 1951 boiled over into another series of strikes. The British, fearful of losing a vital supply of oil and angered by the nationalization of the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company, contemplated military intervention. Mossadeq balanced this threat against the Soviet–Iranian Treaty, which promised a Soviet response in the case of foreign intervention in Iran.47 Mossadeq’s move fanned American and British suspicions that he was dangerously close to the Soviet Union. But they misread Mossadeq, who had declared he had ‘no use for organized labor’ and included many anti-Communists in his 108

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coalition.48 The Americans, in particular, mistook Mossadeq’s hedging for weakness and openness to an anti-Communist coup.49 In response to the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company’s withdrawal of British technicians from Abadan and the diplomatic break with London, Mossadeq lodged a complaint with the newly established United Nations Security Council.50 At the same time, like generations of Iranian statesmen before him, Mossadeq tried to appeal to one foreign power in order to undermine another.  To this end, he travelled across the Atlantic for an audience with President  Truman. As he wrote on 28 May 1953, ‘The Iranian nation hopes that with the help and assistance of the American Government the obstacles placed in the way of the sale of Iranian oil can be removed.’51 Truman refused to extend financial aid to Iran. Understanding the limitations of banking on yet another foreign power’s support, Mossadeq pursued another track. In addition to the nationalization of oil, he pushed for an ‘oil-less economy.’ This would allow the country to diversify its economy—a theme that would become a leitmotif of Iranian economic thinking and, later, a key ingredient of the ‘resistance economy’ championed by the Islamic Republic’s conservatives, without ever truly materializing for decades to come. An oil-less economy would allow the country to become more self-reliant and, therefore, minimize dependence on foreign powers. Mossadeq set out to trim government spending in response to the ballooning deficit, instituted land reforms, and tried to limit the Shah’s direct channels to foreign diplomats.52 Critically, he also sought to reduce the Shah’s hold on the military and to purge it from both extreme left and conservative factions.53 At the same time, Mossadeq pushed the boundaries of democratic ideals. For example, as he was losing power within his tenuous coalition in the run up to the elections of 1952, he called a halt in the votecounting once a quorum had been elected, thereby manufacturing a working coalition.54 In order to do this he used his powers as prime minister, which many (including the Shah) argued circumvented the 1907 constitution. This generated a parliament largely representative of the urban centers and angered the rural masses. The tensions between the Shah and Mossadeq first heightened in July 1952 when the latter attempted to declare himself the Minister 109

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of War to reduce the Shah’s authority over the military—the Shah refused and Mossadeq resigned in protest.55 Realizing the forces it had set against itself and in an abortive attempt at compromise, the royalist establishment selected the hapless Qavam to serve as prime minister once more. This time, Qavam’s premiership lasted only five days. On 21 July 1952, thousands of people ignored the ban on groups of three or more and gathered in the streets of Tehran.56 Riots and fighting between supporters of Mossadeq and those of the Shah, including the army, ensued. By the day’s end, the Tudeh Party’s supporters had solidified gains throughout the capital and Ayatollah Abol-Qassem Kashani (1882– 1962) had issued a fatwa calling for the armed forces to join the protestors.57 Kashani had briefly served as the speaker of  the parliament but, just as importantly, he was a cleric with a following among Iran’s destitute population and, as such, had the ability to quickly galvanize this critical force. Realizing his mistake, the Shah, who nearly left the country, dismissed Qavam and re-instated Mossadeq. Mossadeq had won a near-complete victory over the Shah. But the factions which helped him secure this victory would also seal his downfall. Soon after that day’s events, Mossadeq lost the support of both the leftists and the clergy, the two largest groups out in the streets that day. This loss of popularity was largely due to important figures breaking with the prime minister. For example, Ayatollah Kashani— who had been responsible for much of Mossadeq’s popularity among the religious establishment and, at first, took a pragmatic stance on the role of the clerics—broke with him.58 With the departure of Kashani from Mossadeq’s camp, the religious leaders who ‘exploited Islamic teachings…in order to widen the appeal and intensify the tempo of the new nationalism’ now became the prime minister’s opponents.59 At the same time, Mossadeq’s more left-leaning supporters abandoned him.

The Fateful Summer of 1953 It is a truism that even though for Americans the roots of the distrust marking US–Iran relations over the past few decades can be found in the 1979–81 hostage crisis, for Iranians they are held in the 1953 coup.60 The coup was no doubt one of the most important political 110

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events in modern Iranian history, but its significance is compounded by the role it continues to occupy in the Iranian psyche. To Iranians of many political persuasions, the tale of summer 1953 is one of ‘right and wrong, just and unjust, chivalry and treachery, loyalty to and betrayal of Iran and Iranians.’61 The actual coup and the mythicized events surrounding it also stem from and contribute to an important pillar of Iranian collective memory: foreign powers’ willingness and ability to leverage Iranian weakness to promote their own objectives and interests. The following is a brief overview of the events surrounding the coup. Here, I do not seek to offer a comprehensive history of the coup. Again, a number of historians have undertaken this monumental task. To be sure, a lot remains unknown about the coup and the American role in it. However, existing treatments of the event coupled with contemporary reports and intelligence assessments shed light on it. I draw on historiography and the batches of declassified US State Department cables and intelligence memos to highlight key developments pertaining to my discussion. Importantly, I consider various perceptions of the coup, which are perhaps more critical to Iranian security thinking than the events themselves. The events leading to the coup began in earnest on 27 April 1951, when Mossadeq gained the parliament’s vote of confidence, becoming the new prime minister of Iran.62 Already in the fall and winter of 1952, the British were pushing the Americans to join forces and oust Mossadeq.63 London, like Washington, feared Mossadeq would not counter the Tudeh.64 At the time, the Americans were inclined to make ‘at least one more effort […] to arrive at an oil settlement with Mossadeq.’65 The British, like the Americans, understood that, ‘the scheme had elements of uncertainty and danger.’66 Nevertheless, the British seemed more eager to move forward with a plan to remove Mossadeq, while the Americans seemed more skeptical of the viability of such a proposal.67 By early 1953, however, the future of Mossadeq’s premiership was already in question: in Tehran, the Shah was contemplating replacing Mossadeq, and pro- and anti-Mossadeq demonstrators were clashing.68 Meanwhile in Washington, American officials, particularly President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his secretary of state John Foster Dulles 111

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were watching the events unfold, concerned about a Communist takeover in Iran in light of the British–Iranian conflict over oil. The Tudeh Party had re-emerged in the lead-up to the coup, although it remained ‘nominally outlawed.’69 According to a declassified US intelligence document dated 12 August 1953, ‘[w]hile Mossadeq and Tudeh still appear to be operating at arm’s length, he clearly accepted Tudeh collaboration in the recent referendum and in preliminary demonstrations.’70 Months prior to this assessment, then Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles noted in a memorandum to Eisenhower that: Ever since the assassination of General Razmara in March 1951, and the subsequent impasse and diplomatic break with Britain over the oil negotiations, the Iranian situation has been slowly disintegrating. The result has been a steady decrease in the power and influence of Western democracies and the buildup of a situation where a Communist takeover is becoming more and more of a possibility.71

In Tehran, facing considerable opposition in the majles, Mossadeq pushed to dissolve the parliament in a referendum. According to a US national intelligence estimate dated 12 August 1953: The elements of instability and uncertainty in the Iranian situation have become more pronounced since the beginning of 1953. While Mossadeq has managed to retain control of the government and the political initiative in Iran, he has made no discernable progress toward solution of the serious problems confronting the country and has suffered a long series of political setbacks. The setbacks have narrowed his base of political strength, forced him to resort to openly dishonest methods to retain the initiative, and made his survival more dependent than ever on his aggressiveness and skill as a political antagonist and on the irresolution and disunity of his opponents.72

With the overwhelming majority in favor, Mossadeq won the referendum.73 The Ministry of Interior announced the result on 13 August 1953 and two days later a first coup against Mossadeq took place and failed. In the aftermath of this first coup, the US embassy in Tehran described the city as ‘appear[ing] calm, extra police on duty, with tanks and truck loads security forces around royal palaces 112

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and prime minister’s residence.’74 But behind closed doors, efforts to topple Mossadeq were ongoing. On 18 August, a declassified US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) telegram to the station in Iran assessed the following: This view on basis evidence available to it is that operation has been tried and failed and we should not participate in any operation against Mossadegh which could be traced back to US and further compromise future relations with him which may become only course of action left open to  US […]. In view foregoing and in absence strong contrary recommendations from you and Ambassador  Henderson, operations against Mossadegh should be discontinued.75

But in what would become one of the most decisive choices made by an American intelligence operative in Iran, Kermit Roosevelt—the grandson of US president Theodore Roosevelt and a CIA intelligence officer on the ground—ignored the directive. Meanwhile, on 18 August, having fled, the Shah arrived in Rome.76 On 19 August 1953 (known in Iran as 28 Mordad, in accordance with the Persian calendar), US ambassador to Iran Loy  W.  Henderson met with Mossadeq. Henderson expressed his concerns about the growing attacks on US nationals in Iran, and Mossadeq argued that the attacks were in response to US policy.When Henderson warned Mossadeq that, ‘if the Iranians really wanted the Americans out individual attacks were not necessary, as the Americans would go en masse,’ Mossadeq assured him that he ‘wanted the Aid Missions to remain in Iran.’77 When the two men ended their conversation, the ambassador reported that Mossadeq ‘appeared in a much better frame of mind at the end of the talk but that nevertheless, from his unusual reserve,’ Henderson believed that the prime minister ‘was suspicious that the United States Government or at least United States officials were either implicated in the effort to oust him or were sympathetically aware of such an effort in advance.’78 Mossadeq’s suspicions were well-founded. That same day, he was overthrown with help from the Americans in a CIA operation famously (or perhaps, infamously) codenamed ‘AJAX’. Installed in Mossadeq’s place was General Fazlollah Zahedi (1892– 1963), a former colonel in the Cossack Brigade who had served under 113

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Reza Shah.79 Mossadeq was effectively removed from his position and would be sidelined from the country’s politics until his death in 1967. In a telegram dated the day after the operation, the US embassy in Tehran assessed the reasons behind the success of the coup as follows: ‘Iranian people of all classes,’ yearning for calm and order, ‘were disgusted at bad taste exhibited by anti-Shah elements supporting Mossadeq,’ including the ‘gangs of hooligans bearing red flags and chanting Commie songs,’ taking down the Shah and Reza Shah’s statues. Moreover, Iranians of different persuasions were ‘worried by what seemed to be at least temporary alliance between Mossadeq and Tudeh […] whom they regard as agents [of the] Soviet Union.’ In particular, the documents released point to the centrality of the religious bloc to the coup. Finally, the cable highlights the role played by the armed forces, which it characterizes as ‘extremely friendly’ to the United States, due to a fear of the Soviet Union, as well as ‘great numbers of Iranian civilians inherently loyal to Shah whom they have been taught to believe in symbol of national unity as well as of stability of country.’80 Today, decades after the events of that summer, the extent of US intervention in toppling Mossadeq remains a subject of debate among scholars in the United States and Iran. Despite the US Department of State and CIA releasing several batches of documents (especially in 2013 and 2017), there remain disagreements among scholars about the nature of US involvement and its implications. And as the totality of the documents on the coup have yet to be declassified, a number of blind spots make definitive public assessments of the coup difficult. However, Iranian views of Mossadeq’s life and legacy are shaped as much by myth as by historical fact. To Iranians, Mossadeq serves as an example of yet another failed reformer in the country’s history of struggle with absolutist rule and foreign powers. In the prime minister’s downfall, Iranians see yet another example of foreign, particularly American and British, determination to meddle in Iran. Capturing many Iranians’ sentiments, Zarif tweeted on the sixty-fifth anniversary of the coup on 19 August 2018 that, ‘65 years ago today, the US overthrew the popularly elected democratic government of Dr. Mossadegh, restoring the dictatorship & subjugating Iranians for the next 25 years […]. Never again.’81 114

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Mossadeq’s collapse has come to symbolize Iranian grievances with the United States—akin to Americans’ view of  the hostage crisis as the initiator of the tensions that have shaped the two nations’ contemporary relations. The American public views the hostage crisis as the reason why the two countries severed ties. For their part, Iranians often point to the fateful summer of 1953. This experience also further highlighted the nation’s vulnerability to foreign interference and coups overturning democratic outcomes. In that sense, it ingrained the value of aggressively creating and protecting self-reliant political institutions in the Iranian psyche, including the importance of coupproofing mechanisms—an idea that had already emerged in the country’s nascent security thinking in the early twentieth century with the creation of parallel security forces and that would dominate the state’s approach to military affairs and security policy for many years.

The Aftermath of the Coup With Mossadeq out of power and the United States demonstrating a commitment to supporting the Shah’s reign, the monarch had won a total victory against potential republican rule. He next turned his attention to the fight against constitutionalist and democratic rule, even as he introduced extensive reforms to create a more inclusive societal and political environment. Over the course of the next twenty-two years, the Shah would gradually reduce the power of the majles as he persecuted his political opponents and introduced reforms in an increasingly top-down manner. The Shah’s first task after ousting Mossadeq was to strengthen the military and weaken organized labor. To do so, he installed generals in various ministries and high positions of government. To build the strong military his father had envisioned and the absence of which led to Reza Shah’s downfall, the Shah increased military spending. In the decade following the coup, with the help of $500 million in military aid from the United States, the Shah was able to increase the size of his forces by 67 percent to 200,000 troops.82 As part of his westward political trek, he joined the Baghdad Pact—establishing the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955, which was modeled after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and 115

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aimed at containing the Soviet Union by creating a bulwark against it to its south. The Shah tried in vain to convince Washington to join CENTO. Instead, in 1959, he signed a bilateral defense agreement with the United States.83 The agreement was designed to alleviate both sides’ concerns. The two countries were fearful of increased Soviet influence in the region. The Shah felt threatened by the overthrow of the monarchy and spread of Soviet influence in neighboring Iraq and, a key regional power, Egypt. But he also dreaded the possibility of another American coup, this time aimed at deposing him. To balance these objectives, he began to warm up to the Soviets.84 He even went so far as hosting a high-level Soviet delegation, with meetings aimed at the creation of a mutual nonaggression pact. However, Iran’s bilateral defense agreement with the United States already afforded it the security it sought vis-à-vis the Soviets, Egypt, and Iraq while allowing the Shah to further entrench his country’s position as a force to be reckoned with in the region with the purchase of large quantities of arms from America. For its part, Washington was able to secure a bulwark against Moscow’s expansion in the Middle East and gain a key regional ally—one that was willing to support Israel directly with oil. To cement this newfound position of power, the Shah worked with the CIA and Israeli intelligence operatives to create the Organization of Intelligence and National Security (known by its Persian acronym, SAVAK) in 1957. Thanks to the SAVAK, Iran was finally equipped with a modern intelligence and security organization. The agency was to operate under the supervision of the prime minister’s office.85 The organization was—and continues to be—the source of much controversy, myth, and rumor because of US and Israeli assistance in establishing it, its role in repressing opposition to the Shah, and the methods it employed. The organization, like the Shah and the United States, saw its security and approach to terrorism through the lens of the Cold War; it saw Communism and the Tudeh Party as the main threat to national security and largely ignored the threat presented by Islamism. As a result, the SAVAK would serve to enforce the 1931 law against ‘collectivist ideology’ to pursue both the Tudeh and the nationalist party in Iran, the National Front.86 116

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Modernization and Resistance:  The Legacy of the W   hite Revolution (1963–78) During the second half of the Shah’s rule, Iran underwent one of the most abrupt transitions to modernity of any society. The country undertook to telescope ‘into a few years’ time advances that in the developed countries took generations or centuries to achieve.’87 As the Shah put it: In recent years, I have felt that the national and international situations made it necessary to start a foundational and essential revolution, which must completely change the core of Iranian society and to socially harmonize it with the most advanced societies in the world today and to be backed by the most progressive principles of social justice and individual rights. From the international standpoint, the country was solidly positioned. From a morale perspective, Iranian society was thirstier than ever for real and revolutionary reforms. And from a governance viewpoint, the country’s monarch had the outmost dignity and political and moral influence. As a result, I was able to undertake that tremendous social reform, which was later named, ‘the revolution of the king and the people.’ And with its realization, there was a miracle that until then was almost unprecedented, meaning that the foundations of Iranian society were turned almost without any blood being shed or any fissure in individual and social freedoms.88

Iranian society underwent considerable transformation as the Shah attempted to adjust ‘technology to [Iranian] culture and [Iranian] culture to the technology.’89 The monarch saw his efforts as the continuation of those undertaken by his father, which he described as a ‘miracle,’ saving the country from foreign powers and leading it to quickly progress during a short period of time.90 But, according to the Shah, ‘this great work [Reza Shah] had started remained unfinished as, at the same time, Iran’s geographic location on the one hand and its military weakness on the other, led the country to fall victim of the strategic necessities of the Second World War.’91 This not only led to the country’s ‘leap forward stopping’ but also to the collapse of the central authority and the empowerment of various tribes, corruption, and devolution following Reza Shah’s abdication. The Shah further noted that, ‘my father, who had, seemingly, felt such 117

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a threat instinctively in his own reign, had said that he was seeking to establish such a solid bureaucracy that would, after him, continue its course of action autonomously and naturally.’92 The Shah named his own modernization enterprise the ‘White Revolution’—denoting an opposition to the clerical black. He kickstarted the White Revolution following a 1963 referendum. Khomeini described the revolution as having been ‘conducted at bayonet-point.’93 As the future supreme leader saw it, the White Revolution was largely pro-forma and the Shah proceeded with reforms mostly without consulting public opinion.94 The Shah believed that the impetus for approval and progress came from a state-structured set of incentives imposed on the public: ‘Proverbially, to get things done in Persia, one must both reward and punish.’95 In the following sections, we will primarily focus on the military reforms.

The Shah’s Vision of Military Reforms The Shah produced a set of reforms which, while modernizing Iran in socio-economic terms, failed to transform the country politically. This came to be a significant contributing factor to his downfall. He also continued his outsized investment in the military. From 1963 until the Islamic Revolution, the military expanded from 200,000 to 410,000 men, and the Shah purchased large quantities of hi-tech foreign arms as the air force increased in size by more than ten times.96 During the administration of US president Richard Nixon, the Shah gained access to an essentially unlimited supply of arms partially thanks to his amicable relations with both the president and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Other factors were key in enabling the Shah to build up his military. Chief among these factors was the country’s economic growth. The rise in oil prices during the 1970s expanded Iran’s resources and improved its ability to purchase defense systems and weapons from America.97 A number of other dynamics further facilitated Iran’s growth in military power. These developments included the US– Soviet détente of the 1970s, the British withdrawal from the region as the process of de-colonization advanced, and the Nixon Doctrine emerging at the end of the Vietnam War (1955–75), which enabled 118

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Iran to secure US assistance. In addition to these factors stemming from Iran’s economic and geostrategic position and the Shah’s personal relations, regional developments and a security dilemma also drove the country’s military buildup. In part, intensification of the Shah’s military procurement was a function of an arms race between his country and Iraq, whose new regime the Shah loathed. Iran was no longer constricted by great power competition and interests. Instead, thanks to the power vacuum left by the departure of colonial powers from the Middle East, Iran was able to regain what the Shah saw as his nation’s rightful place in regional affairs. In 1971, Britain announced that it would withdraw its forces from the Persian Gulf as part of a larger move out of ‘East of Suez.’98 Iran stepped in to fill the void left by the former colonial power’s departure, marking the occasion with a swift and decisive move to assert its authority over three small but strategic islands in the Persian Gulf, which remain disputed between Tehran and Abu Dhabi. The following year, the Shah announced the extension of Iran’s naval security perimeter out of the Persian Gulf and into the Indian Ocean.99 By 1977, the Shah was spending nearly a third of his country’s budget on the military.100 And on the eve of the revolution, Iran possessed one of the largest militaries in the world. However, while the Shah’s powerful army was primed for war against other nations, it was ill-prepared to confront its own population (despite a key tenet of Iranian security thinking pointing to the need for a powerful security apparatus capable of managing unrest). After 1967, the Shah began to purchase a vast quantity of arms and military equipment from the Soviet Union, which became Iran’s thirdlargest weapons supplier.101 As declassified US memos from that period indicate, the Shah was looking to diversify his country’s suppliers and partners beyond the United States—although he remained largely reliant on the Americans—an aspiration later shared but never fully achieved by the Islamic Republic.102  The Soviet equipment was limited to artillery and troop transport vehicles and its delivery did not provoke a significant American response. As a result, the United States retained an effective monopoly on the supply of all advanced weapons systems to the Imperial State.103 The British, too, provided Iran with extensive modern weapon systems. 119

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The Shah was eager to demonstrate his credentials as a modernizing commander. To showcase his capabilities, he led Iran to become the first country in the world to establish a military hovercraft fleet.104  The pattern of Iranian arms purchases and orders in 1970–79 follows the path of a state concerned with a potentially aggressive neighbor—as the Shah became more apprehensive about Iraqi and Soviet expansion in its immediate neighborhood. First, the Shah undertook modernization efforts to update and upgrade his forces’ armor, artillery, and infantry. Then he turned his attention to his navy, with consistent investments throughout in the Air Force. But as the Shah was enthusiastic about buying weapons from foreign suppliers, he was also focused on developing the defense industry established by his father. Accordingly, he built factories, particularly in Esfahan, where the country’s steel sector was primarily located. This investment in Iranian industry was designed to put the country on a path to greater self-reliance by gaining the domestic capacity to produce helicopters, tanks, missiles, aircraft, and both light and heavy arms.105 These weapons would largely go unused during the Shah’s reign, as Iran would not fight a major war against a foreign power. Instead, the Shah largely relied on covert operations to expand his country’s influence in the region: Iran’s strategic connections with the Iraqi Kurds and the Lebanese Shia ushered in a strategy toward non-state entities in the Middle East. It was the beginning of Iran’s ‘non-state foreign policy’—a specific foreign policy intended to build connections with political and militant groups and movements. Although he disposed of a large army and considerable conventional military capabilities thanks to his chief supplier, the United States, the Shah sought to maximize Iranian influence in the region, shape the balance of power in Iran’s favor, and do so at a minimal cost for his country—one which would not upset domestic constituents and foreign backers.106

Supporting non-state clients served these purposes and allowed the Shah to project soft power, in addition to the hard power he was leveraging thanks to his powerful military. And as Iran shared ethnic, religious, cultural, and linguistic ties with populations across the region, the Shah was able to use these relationships to build up Iranian 120

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influence in the region. Later, the revolutionaries would build on the foundations laid out by the Shah in Iraq and Lebanon to create what would decades later become an expansive network of  Iranian nonstate allies and partners, spanning South Asia and the Middle East, as a key component of their asymmetric doctrine.107 Today, ‘Iran is one of the few states that has systematically used terrorism, both directly and indirectly, as a tool of foreign policy.’108 In the late 1950s, the Shah supported Lebanese president Camille Chamoun (1900–87) in his struggle with domestic opponents—some supported by the short-lived United Arab Republics.109 Iran’s aid to Chamoun was facilitated by the SAVAK and came in the form of small arms and ammunition.110 Similarly, Major Mojtaba Pashai, who served as the head of SAVAK’s Middle East branch, advocated for leveraging ties with other Muslims in general and the Shia in particular to enhance Iran–Lebanon relations. These religious relationships, Pashai calculated, could be leveraged to get the Lebanese population to identify more with Iranians and distance itself from its ‘proArab stance.’111 Tehran began to provide monetary support to the Lebanese Shia community—to both clerics and the community more generally—under what is known as the SAVAK’s ‘Green Plan.’112 By the mid-1960s, ‘Iran’s non-state foreign policy in Lebanon was at its zenith.’ The country’s network included ‘several Lebanese newspapers and elites, as well as […] the Shia Lebanese.’113 In neighboring Iraq, the SAVAK undertook efforts to restore the monarchy following the 1958 coup—and worked with the Kurds to do so.114 Similarly, Iran leveraged ethnic and sectarian divisions within Iraq, among the Kurds, Shias, and Sunnis, to promote its interests there and in the broader Middle East—increasing its ties with and influence over Iraqi Shias throughout the 1960s.115 Completing this picture, the Shah was lending support to royalists in Yemen, arming and training the forces. Wherever there was an anti-Communist effort underway in the region, the Shah was involved: Egypt, Somalia, Sudan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.116 In words that bear striking similarity to those spoken by Khamenei decades later in justifying Iranian involvement in Syria, Pashai described his country’s efforts beyond its borders as follows: ‘[W]e should combat and arrest the danger (of Nasserism) on the beaches of the 121

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Mediterranean so we do not have to shed blood on Iranian soil.’117 As Iran’s regional policies became more assertive, they more resembled those later pursued by the Islamic Republic. Much like the Islamic Republic decades later, the Shah also preferred covert activities and advise and assist missions to overt and direct military interventions. In fact, the only time Iran deployed its powerful military in that period was when it created the Imperial Task Force and sent 5,000 troops to Oman to lend a hand to a young Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said to crush the 1963–76 Communist insurgency in Dhofar, known as the Dhofar rebellion.118 The newly created 65th Airborne Special Forces were also sent to Oman. They would later deploy in two other conflicts: the Iran–Iraq War and the Syrian civil war. Iran’s involvement in Dhofar allowed the Shah to expose his units to combat and test and enhance readiness. Beyond these tactical and operations gains, the conflict also served to boost Iran’s strategic position. In particular, the Shah was able to assert his country as the major power in the Persian Gulf. Like the revolutionaries who would topple him later, the Shah wished to see foreign powers depart from the Persian Gulf—leaving him in charge of  its security. In fact, the Shah may have been motivated to become involved in pushing back the rebels in part to assert dominance in the Persian Gulf region to counter the support provided by two other regional powers, Egypt and Iraq, to the rebels—the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf and Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman.119 This ambition concerned Iran’s Gulf Arab neighbors who feared Iranian dominance in the region—a perception that would later shape Iran’s relations with its Gulf Arab neighbors.120 Importantly, in a sign of the Shah seeking a more independent foreign policy, he decided to intervene in Oman without consultation with his chief partner, the United States.121 Nixon was eager to see Iran step up and take on more responsibilities for regional security, but the Shah’s trajectory seemed to indicate a more significant change in course than many had imagined.122 More importantly, however, the rebellion helped build a strong friendship between Tehran and an indebted Muscat that would outlast the Shah’s reign. After the Shah’s fall, the Omanis would often be the only Arab nation in the Persian Gulf to retain positive ties to the Iranians. 122

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They would often play the role of mediator between Iran on the one hand and its Arab neighbors and the United States on the other.123 As Iranian officials would remark decades later, Oman became their top partner in the region.124 And virtually all Omani officials I have spoken with begin their discussion on their country’s relations with Iran by expressing their gratitude toward Iran for its role in crushing the Dhofar rebellion.125

The Dhofar Rebellion In many ways, Iran’s involvement in Oman would display characteristics similar to those marking the country’s wars of the nineteenth century and its intervention in Syria decades later. Iranian forces’ lack of combat experience would be obvious on the battlefield. Their ‘inexperience and caution coupled with strong enemy resistance’ thwarted their operations.126 Iranian forces operated under Iranian command, which exhibited a number of deficiencies.127 Internal politics and corruption stymied the military’s effectiveness, as the lack of initiative and strong leadership was prevalent in the Artesh.128 The absence of adequate personnel management at the officer level was also to the Iranian army’s detriment. Nevertheless, the Shah’s support for the Sultan’s efforts was essential, especially later in the rebellion.129 Iran rotated troops throughout the conflict to increase combat exposure and never kept more than 5,000 ground troops in Oman at a given time.130 For most of his country’s participation in the war, the Shah kept fewer than 2,000 troops in Oman after deploying 1,500 special forces in spring 1973. These forces supported the Omanis’ efforts by helping ‘establish a Hornbeam Line, a defensive barrier of wire, minefields, and block houses stretching some thirty-five miles from the coast to the mountains.’131 That winter, 1,200 more troops joined the forces when the Shah deployed the Imperial Iranian Battle Group.132 Although Tehran only put boots on the ground in 1973, the Iranian navy had engaged with rebel craft in the Persian Gulf as early as 1964 due to the American exploitation of the Sino–Soviet split (China had been helping the rebels until around 1972, when support waned). The Iranian Air Force was mostly helping with airlifts and transport.133 123

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In 1974, both the Shah and the Sultan finally admitted that Tehran was involved in the Sultanate, a fact they had denied until that point— as the Islamic Republic later would in the first few months of the Syrian conflict.134 And similarly to Iran’s intervention in Syria decades later, the country’s involvement in Oman became controversial at home.135 For the Shah’s opponents, particularly those of the Communist persuasion, Iran’s presence in Oman was a ‘war of aggression.’136 For many, including some individuals deployed to Oman, the campaign was yet another sign of their monarch’s imperialism.137 That year, the Shah committed even more personnel and materiel to supporting the Omanis, including ‘artillery, aircraft, helicopters, and naval support.’138 But perhaps as important as Iran joining the belligerents was Iran’s departure from Oman. Some were concerned about Tehran maintaining a presence in the Sultanate and perhaps interfering in its affairs. However, ‘[a]ll but a very few Iranian troops had left Oman by 1977; Iran showed no inclination to interfere in Omani affairs; naval cooperation developed; and further diplomatic exchanges continued at the highest level.’139 Only about 1,000 forces remained in Oman until the revolution.140 And for a young Sultan Qaboos whose long reign spanning five decades (1970–2020) would lead him to witness the fall of his ally in Tehran and the rise of the revolutionaries who overthrew him, Dhofar ‘turned out a complete success.’ His association with the Shah afforded him ‘the status of a privileged partner of one of the greatest regional powers of the time (whose Communist inspired revolutions had shaped Iran’s threat perception), forcing others to revise their approach.’141

The Shah’s Modernization Efforts in the Three Domains Thanks to the Shah’s modernization program, the Artesh became a functional modern military for the first time in centuries. Overall, although the Shah’s vision was ambitious, his country was on track to fall close to the objectives he had set out for it by 1982 (his goalpost for modernization). By the end of the Shah’s reign, which occurred only three years short of this goalpost, the army numbered a quarter million troops and possessed both infantry and armored divisions with four full brigades and extensive reserves.142  The Shah was defended by 124

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20,000 troops in the Imperial Guard.143 He also looked to expand this number and increase that of the field guns available to his troops. Iran ostensibly stepped in to fill the vacuum left by Britain as it exited ‘East of the Suez’ and built the core of a blue-water naval force. Nevertheless, the Imperial Iranian Navy was little more than window dressing to the army and air force. In the Shah’s considerable planned expansion of the armed forces set for 1982, the navy only received a modest number of ships, which were in turn dependent on sea-tosea missiles.144 However, due to the withdrawal of the British from the region and the lack of investment by other Persian Gulf states, ‘by 1977, Iran had the largest navy in the Persian Gulf.’145 The country was largely unchallenged at sea and, for the first time since the early sixteenth century, when the Portuguese dominated the Strait of Hormuz, it was the premier power in the Persian Gulf. The air force was the Shah’s crown jewel. First, on a personal level, the Shah and his son, the crown prince, had a soft spot for the air force as they were both pilots. Second, the air force was symbolic of Iran’s forward leap in military and technological progress. Lastly and more pragmatically, airpower provided the country with a conventional advantage vis-à-vis other states in the region in the face of any serious foreign attack. As a result, the Shah sought to increase the size of his air force to over 700 aircraft, including over 100 F14s and F16s each by 1982.146 He also invested extensively in both surface-to-air and air-tosurface missile systems. Iran advanced in the domestic production of these missile systems to move toward greater self-reliance. By the end of the Shah’s reign, the country was fast approaching Israel in aerial dominance over its neighbors and also boasted a large corps of skilled pilots in addition to its hi-tech arsenal.

Nuclear Ambitions The Shah invested his country’s revenues from oil and gas in his attempts to diversify its energy sources.147 He believed that by doing so, he would pave the way for its transition into a post-oil economy when fossil fuels began to drain, therefore becoming more self-reliant.148 Investing in a post-oil economy would also help mitigate the country’s vulnerability to foreign machinations. As part of this, the Shah initiated 125

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a nuclear program in the 1950s, undertaken in close partnership with America, as part of President Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace initiative. Tehran concluded an agreement with Washington in 1957, whereby the latter would provide it with a research reactor at the University of Tehran. Following this, in 1958, the Shah established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, putting the Swiss-educated Akbar Etemad at its head. Almost a decade later, the Americans delivered the country’s first nuclear reactor, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center; to fuel it, they supplied Iran with Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU)—or weapons-grade uranium. The nuclear program was a point of national pride and prestige— showcasing that Iran was modern enough to be able to acquire nuclear technology, which few nations possessed. But from the Shah’s perspective, this initiative was also a pragmatic calculation, as it would reduce Iranian dependency on oil and promote selfsufficiency. In addition to its civil benefits, the nuclear program also served to advance the Shah’s political ambitions thanks to the military applications of nuclear technology. The Shah’s plan was to undertake a policy of hedging: he would establish nuclear infrastructure for civilian use, which he could later leverage to build a nuclear weapon if his country needed one. It is worth quoting Etemad at length on the Shah’s nuclear thinking: At the time, there were several reasons for Iran to start a nuclear program. Iran had a lot of money coming in. The idea was that, if today Iran can sell oil, and has oil, it needs to invest that money, that some of the oil had to be left for future generations. Nuclear energy was a good way to invest because it takes 20–30 years to pay off. You start to invest, and then, after that time, it starts to show results. But I doubted that the Shah only wanted energy. I wasn’t sure if he wanted energy only, or weapons too. So, I spoke to him and asked him what he wanted. I said: ‘Your Majesty, I’ll explain everything [the science and application of nuclear technology] to you, and at the end, you can tell me what you want.’ I began to teach him for six months. For six months, I taught him everything from the atom, to reactors, and nuclear weapons. Then, after six months, I said, ‘now that you know everything, what do you want me to do?’ So, one evening, we sat down. I remember he was eating with the royal family. He asked me if I wanted to sit down with them and eat. I said, no, and, he said, he joked that his food wasn’t good enough for me. Then we spoke

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for two hours, about politics and the military. He said: ‘today, we are the great regional power, we don’t need anything, but if the balance [of power] changes in the region, if other countries get nuclear weapons, we need to have the capability for it.’ So, I said, ‘would nuclear weapons be an option then?’ He said, in English, I remember it exactly: ‘why not?’ I understood that I had to prepare for that. That same day, without telling anyone—because [if it became public] western countries would decrease their cooperation with us—I began the preparations. I didn’t even tell anyone at the organization about this. We were trying to be ready.149

Some Iranians saw the Shah’s nuclear aspirations as yet another example of his inadequacy and corruption—a position shared and adopted by the revolutionaries, who characterized their country’s nuclear program as an act of ‘treason.’150 Decades later, this was how Rouhani would describe the revolutionary view of the nuclear program in his memoirs of the first round of nuclear talks between Iran and the Europeans. But as they had in other key areas, the revolutionaries would largely continue the Shah’s policy in that realm. Theirs became a policy of nuclear hedging, aiming, like the Shah had, to equip the country with a civil nuclear program which could be quickly weaponized if and when needed.

Tradeoffs and Deficiencies Despite all his efforts, however, by the end of his reign, the Shah’s military suffered from a number of shortcomings. Artesh commander General Jalal Pejman’s memoir—published several years after his death in Iran—outlined these shortcomings as follows.151 First, according to Pejman, although the Artesh did have a joint staff overseeing the forces’ operations in the three domains, it did not do so ‘systematically’ and in accordance with hierarchical orders from the command.152 In fact, as he points out, in many instances, the command would issue orders to force commanders without communicating them to the joint staff. Second, Pejman identified intelligence and counter-intelligence as a key disadvantage of the Artesh. For example, he noted that a high-ranking commander of the Artesh had gathered intelligence for foreign entities for a time without Iran’s intelligence organizations becoming aware of this fact.153 Instead, Pejman complained, the 127

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country’s counter-intelligence apparatus was concerned with the marriage between a young officer and a villager, spending resources contemplating the appropriateness of such an act. And corruption and personnel issues remained a challenge to the force’s effectiveness and cohesion. Junior officers attempted to attain the highest ranks of the Artesh by finding shortcuts and circumventing established procedures. Lastly, Pejman recalled, he ‘witnessed significant discrimination within the imperial Guards.’154 For example, there were stark discrepancies between the salaries of the army and the Imperial Guard personnel. Like his father, the Shah emphasized the importance of a centralized, strong, and self-reliant modern military. The Shah took a number of steps to create such a force, one whose efforts would be complemented by a new modern security apparatus, chiefly the SAVAK and a defense industry. While the Shah also had a number of blind-spots, which rendered his reforms less effective, at the heart of his modernization plans lay a number of considerations stemming from his country’s historical memory, including the belief that the armed forces should stand between foreign powers and domestic opponents on the one hand (albeit with an emphasis on the former, to his detriment) and the nation on the other. Deterrence and defense were the Shah’s chief preoccupations, but as his military grew he also became more assertive in the region. Deterrence and defense were the Shah’s chief preoccupations, but as his military grew, he also became more assertive in the region. As the final chapter of this book will show, today’s Iran also prioritizes deterrence and defense even as it has gradually asserted itself more freely in its neighborhood.

Non-Military Reforms In addition to expanding his military, the Shah also instituted a large number of social, political, and economic reforms.We will review these briefly as, though not directly relevant to the topic at hand, they would result in unequal development and serve to fuel dissatisfaction and lay out the groundwork for the revolution. Particularly disastrous for the Shah was the 1962 Land Reform Act. The act forced landowners to sell to the state anything they owned in excess of one village or village-sized collection of plots in multiple locations, which would then be promptly 128

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sold at a modest price to the sharecroppers working the land.155 The government intended for the reform to create an even distribution of land ownership and increase the economic viability of life in rural communities, which lagged behind urban areas in development. The Shah did not heed clerical requests to make religious holdings exempt from the land reform exchanges, a decision which would increase already significant resentment among some of the clergy and, in turn, help usher in the revolution.156 While the inequities in development between the rural and urban regions of the country produced resentment, they also led to internal migration. The growth of Tehran was particularly explosive. The city’s population nearly doubled in size to accommodate more than four million residents during this time period. The capital attracted the central government’s attention away from much of the rest of the country.157 Demographic trends further exacerbated inequality of this scope. Across the country, the population increased by 30 percent and, significantly, the proportion of youth in the population rose abruptly during this era.  This influx of youth strained many of  the Shah’s reforms, such as education, and overcrowded the nation’s infrastructure.158 Mohammad Reza Shah’s reforms also extended into the education system, as those undertaken by his father did. In 1963–77, the education system grew across all sectors.159 Similarly, the Shah worked to complete his father’s project of a modern university system. By the end of the White Revolution, a number of universities throughout the country were serving thousands of students. The monarch presided over an equally large increase in the number of Iranian students studying at foreign universities—a group whose members would play an important role in his downfall. However, the Shah’s reforms did not reach all classes, particularly the rural poor and those who had migrated to shanty-towns. On the eve of the revolution, Iran remained in some respects largely uneducated, with significant illiteracy.160 Despite these shortfalls, the White Revolution did bring more women and religious minorities into the fold thanks to the more expanded and inclusive education system. As part of his social reforms, the Shah sought to incorporate traditionally excluded populations in Iranian society into public life by repealing Islamic statutes in Iranian 129

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law that castigated women and religious minorities. Perhaps more so than any other social policy enacted under the Shah, this decision received significant pushback from the clergy, particularly Khomeini. Khomeini was especially upset about the extension to women and minorities of the right to vote and the ability to hold public office. He voiced his concerns by writing to the Shah: ‘Please order all laws inimical to the sacred and official faith of the country to be eliminated from government policies.’161 Other members of the clergy, even those more moderate, staunchly opposed women’s rights in Iran in general, and were particularly upset at the 1963 referendum granting them the vote. Likewise, the growing relative economic success of the Jewish and Baha’i communities in Iran fueled anti-Semitism and anti-Baha’i sentiment within segments of the populace. Until the late 1970s, the White Revolution appeared to be largely fruitful.162 From the start of the White Revolution until 1970, the country’s GDP grew at an average annual rate of 12 percent per year.163 Mohammad Reza Shah had succeeded in transforming the Iranian economy and in doing so had made his country one of the fastestgrowing in the world. This growth was not exclusively predicated on the oil market. Instead, manufacturing competences expanded rapidly. In addition to the manufacture of consumer goods and arms, Iran was increasingly producing heavy industrial goods, such as steel.164 Hence, the oil industry was not the sole driving force behind the rise of the Iranian economy, although it did provide for an outsized portion of economic growth.

The White Revolution and the Rise of Guerillas The 1960s were fertile ground for the advent of guerrilla groups in Iran. The rapid pace of reforms and their top-down nature coupled with a series of international developments led to the creation of a number of new groups and their adoption of guerrilla warfare.165 Abroad, new revolutionary models were emerging. In China, the civil war had ended in 1950, while in Cuba, Communists were consolidating their gains throughout the decade. Elsewhere in Latin America, as well as in Southeast Asia, guerrilla warfare had become more prevalent. In 1937, Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong had 130

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written On Guerrilla  Warfare. Two decades later, Vietnamese guerrilla fighter Vo Nguyen Giap and the Cuban revolutionary Che Guevara published their respective manuals. In Iran, the successes of revolutionaries elsewhere reignited leftist ideologies after the Tudeh Party lost momentum in the 1950s. As Payman Vahabzadeh writes: [T]wo landmark events transformed the landscape of the Third World Communist movements in the 1960s. First, the rise of the Maoist model (revolution led by a Communist peasant army) inspired activists in Asia and Africa where because of limited industrialization the working class did not have significant political presence. Second the Cuban Revolution of 1959 demonstrated that a group of dedicated intellectuals could act as the agent of revolution. These intellectuals staged rural guerrilla warfare, and in the process of expansion they created liberated zones, recruited members, and organized peasants and the urban masses.166

A number of groups emerged in Iran during this period. Some of these held pro-Chinese or pro-Soviet beliefs, while others also felt an affinity with and promoted the struggles of other groups, including Kurdish separatists and pro-Palestinian movements.167 Although many of these groups differed in their objectives and tactics, they initiated activities and created an environment that ultimately facilitated the collapse of the monarchy. As Crane Brinton put it many years prior to the advent of the revolution in Iran: There seems to be no simple and sole test to determine when and under what conditions the existence of pressure groups may be taken as a symptom of approaching political instability. The prerevolutionary decades in [his case studies] do show, however, an intensity of action on the part of pressure groups, an action more and more directed as time goes on toward the radical alteration of existing government. Certain groups, indeed, begin to go beyond lobbying and propaganda, begin to plan and organize direct action, or at least supplanting of the government in some dramatic way. They are the beginnings of what we shall later know as the ‘illegal government.’168

Brinton’s observation also captures the trajectory of the groups created in the 1960s in Iran and those established in the 1940s and 50s whose activities were carried out throughout the White Revolution. 131

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Many were formed to resist the Shah by employing outreach, advocacy, and propaganda, but later turned to political violence. These groups’ activities, in turn, helped shape the Shah’s approach to governance in the final decade of his reign.The Shah remained more concerned about an external enemy than an internal one. Nevertheless, he saw leftist groups in particular and dissent more generally as a threat to his reign and the country’s stability—a view stemming from a combination of factors, particularly a long history of internal turmoil in Iran, the Soviet Union’s real and perceived motives, the proliferation and increased militancy of many opposition groups at home, and his personal predispositions.

From Peacock Throne to Police State The period of the White Revolution was largely characterized by political stability. Amir-Abbas Hoveida (1919–79) retained the premiership during nearly the entire duration of the enterprise (1965– 77)—in a stark departure from the previous period. During Hoveida’s premiership, the Shah created a one-party state with the autocratic power vested in him. His Resurgence Party—or Hezb-e Rastakhiz, as it was called in reference to the Zoroastrian faith—grew to become, by his decree in 1975, the only legitimate political party in Iran.The party was short-lived, however, as it was dissolved a mere three years later in November 1978 with the revolution’s progress.169 At the time, individuals close to the Shah reportedly evaluated the drivers of this move as residing in tensions within the ruling elite, while SAVAK assessments laid out seven reasons why the Shah sought to create the party.170 Among these drivers were: ‘Reacting to foreign conspiracies;’ responding to corruption within existing parties; finding an excuse to remove Hoveida and to install a new cabinet; and paving the way for the entry of new individuals into politics.171 The Shah’s foreign and national security decision-making echoed the internal policymaking processes of that time. ‘His Imperial Majesty, the Shah,’ wrote Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih in 1974, ‘makes every major foreign policy decision and most of the minor ones. No one occupies a public position except at the tolerance of His Majesty, and all are dependent directly or indirectly on the monarch 132

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for continuance.’172 The two scholars noted that ‘no formal policymaking process as that term is understood in the West’ existed in the country, ‘nor are there any interest groups, lobbies, associational groups, or mass media that influence the content or conduct of foreign policy. The formal governmental structure has no relevance at all to the content of Iran’s foreign policy.’173  This observation would remain rather accurate after the Shah’s revolution and four decades into the Islamic Republic’s tenure. Underground political parties surfaced in opposition to the Shah (especially to his top-down style of governance and foreign and security decisions), many with leftist leanings and several with ties to the Soviet Union. Some also created guerrilla forces and organized terrorist groups. In response, in the 1960s the SAVAK increased its counterterrorism capabilities, including clandestine operations, training, unmarked patrols, surveillance, surprise house searches, and an extensive network of informants throughout the country.174 The organization also reportedly used more controversial interrogation methods and ‘systematic, clinical torture,’ some of which led to the suicide of opposition members.175 As a result, the SAVAK became increasingly controversial and its reputation tarnished throughout the 1960s and 70s, when most of the alleged torture cases took place and became public.176 Through the surfacing rumors, Iranians increasingly saw the SAVAK as a secret police force propped up by the Americans and Israelis to serve as an instrument of the Shah’s oppression. Making matters worse, the size of the bureaucracy also grew in the White Revolution, both placing more Iranians at the direct mercy of the government and increasing the tax burden on Iranians who did not work for the government.177  These factors led to increased dissatisfaction with the Shah’s government. Without an outlet in the legal political sphere, many Iranians turned to radical illegal conduits to make their voices heard.

Dissident Voices and Political Violence The Shah had grappled with terrorism in his early days as a young monarch. But the end of his reign would be marked by a growing threat from domestic terrorists.  Two types of terrorist groups emerged in 133

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that period: the extreme wings of the Communist movement on the left and those of Islamists on the right. The chief groups among these were respectively the FI and the Mujahidin-i Khalq (hereafter MeK or Mujahidin).178 Whereas the FI were the brainchild of several former Tudeh Party members and largely a movement of the intelligentsia, the Mujahidin developed largely from the technocratic and conservative intellectual establishment. Both traced their political origins to the National Front and their inceptions to its disintegration following the collapse of the Mossadeq government. They both achieved notoriety during that period. But the MeK would remain a powerful force threatening the Iranian state for decades to come. For its part, the first terrorist group to emerge in modern Iran, FI, continued to influence the course of events until the Shah’s collapse.The group had appeared on the Iranian security landscape during the power vacuum left by Reza Shah’s abdication and prior to the Shah gaining effective control of his land. The group’s terrorist activities began with a failed assassination attempt against  Ahmad Kasravi, a writer known for his vocal criticism and satire of the Shia hierocracy.179 Ten months after this first attempt, FI ultimately succeeded in assassinating Kasravi, when two of Navvab’s followers stabbed and killed the writer at the Ministry of Justice in 1946.180 The assassination of Kasravi was a turning point for the group, which became incredibly successful, as it began to legitimize its vision and tactics among certain segments of the Iranian populace (notably many in the bazaar and working class). Like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, FI argued for a return to ‘pure’ Islam in Iran.181 Between 1949 and 1951, FI intensified its terrorist attacks, starting with the unsuccessful attempt against the Shah.182 In November 1949, a member of the group assassinated former prime minister and minister of the court Abdolhossein Hazhir (1902–49). In 1951, the group perpetrated its most spectacular attack, when it assassinated Razmara, who was in the midst of negotiating a new oil agreement with the United Kingdom.183 As we saw, the agreement was highly controversial in Iran because it afforded a foreign entity continuous control over the country’s oil reserves and infrastructure. Mossadeq, then backed by Kashani, opposed the deal. Siding with Mossadeq’s camp for the nationalization of oil helped FI gain popular traction. 134

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At the peak of its success, FI leveraged terrorism to promote its ideology. The group helped pave the way for National Front figures in Iranian politics and positioned itself in such a way as to be able to influence the outcome of the oil negotiations.184 But FI’s impact was not restricted to the political realm. The religious establishment was also affected as it grew divided on the appropriate response to the group, with most prominent Shia authorities criticizing the vision and tactics adopted by Navvab and his men, but others supporting FI’s efforts. This division would only gain prominence in the years to come and until the camp advocating for clerical interference in politics gained power and sidelined the apolitical one. FI further tried to create differences within and fracture the religious establishment.185 But the group, and Navvab in particular, had ambitions that reached beyond Iran.186 They wished to promote their vision in the region and the Muslim world more broadly. Besides its effect on Iran’s political and religious establishments, FI had another important impact: the group’s success inspired and encouraged the use of acts of terrorism and political violence among those who wished to create and exploit fear for political change. By the 1950s, terrorism was no longer just the domain of FI. For example, in 1951, the dean of  Tehran University’s Faculty of Law and Political Science, Abdolhamid Zangeneh, was assassinated. Although at first FI was believed to be behind Zangeneh’s assassination, evidence showed otherwise. However, there was no doubting that the ‘atmosphere of terror’ created by the group contributed to the perpetration of other acts of terrorism in the struggle against the Shah and the state.187 In the 1960s, the second wave of terrorism emerged in modern Iran. Navvab was arrested in 1951 and served time in prison until 1953. By the time of his release, he was no longer interested in activism and armed struggle. Instead, he had embraced the more ‘spiritual’ side of the faith.188 Regardless, certain FI elements remained active until the Islamic Revolution, and some even joined the revolution and resulting regime. Before that, the group took part in some of the major events of the 1960s and 70s, including the 1963 protests against the White Revolution. However, the emerging groups of the 1960s were more organized and structured than FI and quickly overshadowed Navvab’s men. 135

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These new groups also attracted members from a much wider pool. Whereas FI was limited in its appeal to individuals who did not subscribe to their particular interpretation of Shia Islam, the second wave of terrorist groups expanded their recruitment to include the Marxist-Leninist and Marxist-Maoist ideologies du jour. Thanks to the common interest in various flavors of Communism and Marxism, the groups gained traction. Ultimately, these nascent entities all opposed the monarchy and what they described as ‘US imperialism’ in their country. Among these groups, the MeK stood out and continues to remain a relevant player today (albeit more so abroad than in Iran). The MeK was founded in 1965 as a crypto-Shia group. But the group largely operated underground until 1972.189 It built on the efforts to create an Islamist populist ideology by Ali Shariati (1933–77). A sociologist with dubious academic credentials, Shariati came to serve as the revolution’s ideologue. He also inspired left-leaning groups, including the MeK, who shared some of the same principles as the Islamists. Of particular appeal to both the Islamists and the leftists was Shariati’s creation of an ideology bringing together elements borrowed from the Shia faith and Marxist-Leninist thinking, an element of much identity contestation between the two factions.190 The MeK’s version of the ideology viewed the notion of ‘class struggle’ as central to Islam, which it did not just consider as founded upon the unity of God (mazhab-e towhidi) but also that of society and classes (nezam-e towhidi).191 The MeK posited that at the core of Shiism laid the notion of opposition to all kinds of oppression, something the imams (or, for Shia’s, the Prophet’s successors) understood. The Mujahidin claimed that Marxism-Leninism and Shiism had a single vision, one ignored by the clerical establishment, which had inaccurately interpreted the faith according to dogma.192 Using the foundations laid out by Shariati, the MeK offered a ‘new reading’ of Islam, supplemented by its own interpretation of Marxism-Leninism. The group was inspired by the ‘struggles’ of its time, including insurgencies and guerrilla warfare in Vietnam, Algeria, Palestine, and Latin America.193 In 1974, the group published its operations and tactics manual, where it discussed its view of guerrilla warfare.194 According to the manual, Iranians’ last guerrilla experience fifty years prior laid in the Jangali movement and this provided the 136

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‘imperialist’ regime with an advantage over the opposition.195 However, the Mujadihin were focused on the use of indigenous ideology in their struggle against the monarchy.196 Hence, they redefined concepts central to Islamic law to frame their tactics. The MeK described jihad as ‘liberation struggle,’ shahid or martyr as ‘revolutionary hero,’ and mujahid or holy warrior as ‘freedom fighter’.197 The group’s vision was to take up arms against the monarchy and its ‘main goal’ was to ‘free Iran of US imperialism.’198 August 1971 marked the MeK’s terrorist debut and first public appearance.199 The group planned a spectacular attack during the festivities marking the 2,500year anniversary of the Persian monarchy. Its operatives had intended to carry out an attack against the main electric plant and power grids supplying Tehran’s electricity. But after his release, an old cellmateturned-police-informant revealed their plans and those supposed to carry them out to law enforcement. As a result, the security forces at first arrested thirty-five MeK operatives before arresting another seventy members of the MeK and their relatives. In 1972, about half of the group’s active membership (or roughly sixty-nine operatives) were put on trial for planning to overthrow the monarchy.200 Following this failed attack, the group led a series of successful operations. In 1972, it targeted a police station in downtown Tehran, before bombing the headquarters of a newspaper a week later.201 Soon, the MeK began a new trend in Iran: attacking US interests and persons. The first of these attacks took place when President Nixon visited the country. The group placed a number of time bombs in locations belonging to several carefully selected targets: the Iran–American Society, the US Information Office, Hotel Intercontinental, Pepsi’s offices, General Motors, the Marine Oil Company, and Reza Shah’s mausoleum.202 These symbolized US–Iran relations, US presence in Iran, and the monarchy. The group was able to draw the sympathies of many who also supported Khomeini.203 The MeK’s communiqué stated that these attacks were to protest American military presence in Iran in particular.204 While in the past the populace had objected to foreign presence in Iran, only the state possessed the tools nominally to dial up or down the powers’ presence and influence in the country. Now, non-state actors were beginning to do so as well. 137

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During that same period, another Communist group was increasing its activities: the Organization of Iranian People’s Fadayi Guerillas (known simply as the ‘Fadayian’).The Fadayian’s ideological leaning was Soviet-style Marxism-Leninism. Similar to the MeK, the organization began its major operations in the early 1970s, although its foundations go back to the 1960s. The group fought against the monarchy, the Shah’s modernization efforts, and the US–Iran partnership.205 To this end, it mostly relied on guerrilla warfare tactics, as did a number of its contemporaries, inspired by similar Marxist-Leninist movements, particularly those in Latin America. The Fadayian also perpetrated terrorist attacks. Their most notorious such attack was the bombing of a Gendarmerie post in Sikhal in 1971. The group assassinated military and business figures, and bombed several Gendarmerie and police posts, government buildings, and transportation booths throughout the country. It also detonated eight bombs during Nixon’s visit to Iran.206 In 1978, the Fadayian split into several groups, which took part in the revolution in the following months.207  The increase in activity by the Fadayian led to an expansion of the MeK’s operations throughout the 1970s as the two groups began to compete for publicity, resources, and influence.208 To remain relevant in light of the Fadayian’s more aggressive campaign, the MeK upped the ante. It recruited operatives and operated networks in prisons, assassinated figures within Iran’s political and security establishments, including Tehran police chief General Taheri, and bombed corporations, factories (some believed to have had ties to Israel), Gendarmerie posts, and the Jordanian embassy.209 The two groups’ rivalry took place against the backdrop of an increasingly populated and fragmented political landscape. Although new groups were proliferating, they all also faced competition from old players. The Tudeh Party, which had lost significant influence since its early days, continued to remain relevant. It sustained its presence and activities but, in its opposition to the White Revolution, the party had lost its individual voice and become lumped into political resistance with much of the previously legitimate National Front.210 Eventually, however, many of these groups joined forces and, together with the Islamist movement, shaped and drove the upheavals that ultimately led to the overthrow of the Shah and the rise of 138

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Khomeini. Khomeini succeeded in winning the support of both the Islamist and many leftist groups as the revolution intensified. The Shah’s White Revolution and the disillusionment it caused in the Iranian populace helped galvanize these organizations and lend them legitimacy, ultimately propelling Khomeini into power. The success of levée en masse  in Iran aided the creation and development of these guerrilla groups as it expanded knowledge of military tactics and weapons among the conscripted populace. Thus, although the state was investing in cultivating potential future forces to secure the country and safeguard the monarchy, it was also inadvertently providing the populace with the tools to resist and ultimately overthrow the state. This litany of political parties, guerillas, and terrorists exposed the military to the idea of a national struggle and created a propaganda campaign designed to recruit operatives from within the ranks. Foreign interference, corruption, and the inequities of the Shah’s modernizing enterprise were among the themes leveraged to build up a resistance force. The Tudeh, in particular, was able to access a range of ranks and units within the Artesh, including the army, navy, and air force, as well as the artillery, cavalry, Gendarmerie, and Shahrbani.211

The Rise of Khomeini Before the White Revolution, the clergy was a considerable political force in Iran, but it had not yet been radicalized. The death of Ayatollah Boroujerdi, who promoted the abstention of the clergy from politics in 1962, turned the religious establishment in a more politically active direction just as the Shah was accelerating the White Revolution.212 Later, in light of the SAVAK’s harassment and persecution of dissidents, the clergy and bazaar, who had formed an alliance decades earlier, found another budding associate: the liberal intelligentsia. Brinton’s words describing the role played by England’s intellectuals ring true in the case of Iran. ‘Many, though by no means all,Victorian intellectuals,’ writes Brinton, ‘were in disagreement among themselves, united apparently in nothing but a profound dislike for their environment.’213 Khomeini and the ‘new’ generation of clerics would capitalize on these trends. 139

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The soon to be leader of  the revolution presented Islamic governance as a substitute to monarchy and a bulwark against corruption, all the while proffering a leftist political narrative centered on oil as the principal cause of foreign exploitation.214 By doing so, Khomeini was able to tap into beliefs that were now strongly embedded in the Iranian psyche. This use of Islam as a political tool in tandem with liberal nationalization had last been used to great success by Mossadeq and Kashani, but the schism between the two had put an end to the movement. This time, the clergy would not be alienated from its nationalist and liberal backers—at least, until it was able to grab the reins of the country. These unlikely allies had all objected to components of the Shah’s agenda and worldview. As a French journalist described it in a 1980 essay in Foreign Affairs: The Shah’s modernization program—which created less an authentic development than a consumer society for privileged elites— quickly enriched the members of the royal family and the court, the entrepreneurs (almost all subcontractors for the large Western firms), the powerful merchants, the importers of spare parts and consumer goods, the speculators fostered by an unbridled capitalism worthy of the nineteenth century. On the other hand, those who suffered were legion: the small manufacturers and craftsmen squeezed by foreign competition, the workers (albeit well paid), the rapidly expanding middle classes, the millions of wage earners whose buying power was being eroded by a galloping inflation (over 50 percent in the two years preceding the fall of the monarchy).215

Throughout the White Revolution, the Shah had irritated the more reactionary members of the religious establishment with his social and economic reforms, while marginalizing and antagonizing moderate and liberal voices by increasing the autocratic nature of the system. From the moment of the referendum, Khomeini and part of the clergy opposed the Shah’s attempt to institute the modernization program. Khomeini and a small but outspoken minority of men of the cloth were determined to re-institute conservative Islamic statutes into Iranian law. In late winter 1963, Khomeini became increasingly outspoken against the White Revolution, ultimately giving a string of speeches 140

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and lectures against it, which prompted student demonstrations in the holy city of Qom. He argued that the planned referendum had no bearing in Islam and was therefore illegitimate. The demonstrators echoed this claim, challenging the very legitimacy of Pahlavi rule.216 In the ensuing violence on 22 March 1963, the Shah’s troops killed a disputed number of demonstrators, arrested and exiled Khomeini, and conducted a raid on the Fayziya Madrasa.217 This event served both to further radicalize Khomeini and to banish him from Iran—where the Shah’s forces could have more effectively marginalized him.218 Hence, that spring, the Shah may have made his greatest strategic mistake, one that would cost him his throne and, in turn, lead to his own exile. In 1972, the government introduced a Religious Corps to match the Literary Corps. The Religious Corps was intended to institute state control of the religious establishment and drew the ire of clerics across Iran.219 As Khomeini became increasingly alienated from the government, he also began to reach a wider audience in large part thanks to new technology. During the White Revolution, in addition to radio becoming ubiquitous, cassette tapes were also increasingly common. Tapes proliferated quickly because they were small and cheap. This made it difficult for the government to control and censor the medium as it did with radio and television. And the populace was able to quickly and cheaply copy material, and easily transport and distribute the tapes. In particular, cassette tapes were used to circulate and consume banned sermons. The medium would ultimately carry the revolution into Iran from Khomeini’s exile.220

The Fall of the Shah and Iran’s Monarchy: 1978–80 1977–78 saw the start of mass protests against the Shah as student demonstrators were joined by a crowd that largely transcended class divisions to protest social inequality and the Shah’s abuses of power—both real and rumored. Adding to ongoing turmoil at home, international developments also helped set the stage for the Shah’s impending collapse. Of particular significance was the ongoing Cold War, which had transformed a number of weaker states into battlegrounds for great power competition between the world’s two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Iran was far 141

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from immune to the effects of the Cold War. The Shah had started his reign with the 1946 Azerbaijan and Mahabad crises and would see it end with the mobilization of a number of Communist groups. In October 1977, Khomeini’s eldest son, Mostafa Khomeini, died in Najaf under circumstances still litigated today. The cleric claimed that the Shah had assassinated—or, as he put it, ‘martyred’—Mostafa, and the incident also fed into the brewing upheavals in the country. Before the fateful Muharram of 1978 began, Khomeini declared, ‘we are about to begin the month of epic heroism and self-sacrifice—the month in which blood triumphed over the sword.’221 Muharram is a holy month for Shias, during which they mourn the martyrdom of their third Imam, Imam Hussein, the symbol of resistance to a corrupt and unjust ruler.  This symbolism would come to dominate not just the events of that month, but those of the revolution that would depose the Shah and elevate Khomeini to supreme leadership. Meanwhile, the Shah had taken a significantly less active role in the management of government affairs due to terminal cancer. Increasingly frail, the Shah was forced to leave Iran in January of 1979 for treatment in the United States. He would never return to Iran. As the Shah left in January to crowds demanding his head, Khomeini arrived on 1 February to public exhilaration. Immediately upon his arrival, he directly pointed to the failure of the Shah’s modernization policies as causes of the revolution and painted himself as the people’s champion. The Shah, Khomeini claimed, had destroyed the land. ‘Our triumph,’ Khomeini vowed, ‘will come when all forms of foreign control have been brought to an end and all roots of the monarchy have been plucked out of the soil of our land.’ 222 From exile, the Shah would observe as the revolutionaries rolled back many of his policies in the short-term as he pointed the finger at the powers for the events that had led to his ousting. In what would be one of his final interviews with the press, the Shah declared from Cairo a mere two months before his death that ‘the West wanted this Islami[c] republic, perhaps thinking that with Islam it could contain communism.’223  According to a contemporaneous Washington Post report, the Shah ‘specifically blamed the British and American governments and the Western media for promoting his downfall. “Well, now you have it. Are you happy? Do you have human rights there now? 142

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Democracy? Liberalization?”’224 As the reporter described, the Shah’s ‘bitterness toward the American role was evident throughout the conversation.’225 Reflecting on what he did wrong, the Shah noted that, ‘[m]y biggest mistake was in listening to the Americans and to the British about our internal problems… Looking back, [the wrong advice] was freeing all the terrorists from jail and letting them loose, giving them the possibility of leading the band of arsonists and terrorists.’226 Mohammad Reza Shah, like his father before him, had come full circle from rising reformist to established autocrat to deposed émigré. Like his father, he operationalized key tenets of Iranian collective memory and further embedded the beliefs associated with it into his country’s fabric. He died on 27 July 1980 in Cairo and remains buried there. Although he did not live to see it, the revolutionaries who overthrew him would go on to continue many components of his foreign and security thinking, programs, and policies.

Conclusion The Shah’s rise resulted from his father’s fall. But although that is typically the case in monarchies, the Pahlavi succession was prompted by the interference of two major powers: the British and the Russians. As we saw in the previous chapter, Reza Shah had grappled with those forces during the entirety of his reign. To minimize their influence in his country, he had undertaken comprehensive reforms and tried to build capacity to make the country self-reliant. However, in designing and implementing those reforms, he aligned himself with the wrong partner, namely Nazi Germany. Following his abdication, his successor seemed less interested in self-reliance. Y   et, the Shah shared his father’s vision, which his own experience of watching Reza Shah’s collapse had reinforced. As a result, during his reign, the Shah followed in his father’s steps in undertaking a set of comprehensive reforms, which would include deep cultural, societal, political, economic, and military reforms. The Shah’s objective was to propel his country into modernity and to restore what he viewed as its long lost glory. However, much like those commenced by his father, the Shah’s reforms were implemented rapidly, and in a top-down fashion. The country did not have the 143

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infrastructure needed to undergo these changes and, as was the case under Reza Shah, many Iranians felt that their traditions were being sacrificed for the dividends of Westernization. These technical challenges and cultural resistance along the way culminated in political discontent, and ultimately led to the Shah’s and, by extension, the Iranian monarchical tradition’s collapse in winter 1979. Ironically, some of the grievances tied to foreign and security policies that led to the Shah’s downfall were also those elements of the country’s collective memory he was hoping to operationalize. Aware of his country’s shortcomings, the Shah had come to rely on foreign powers, particularly the United States during the early days of his reign. For many Iranians, America was a neutral and even benevolent power, one whose track record stood in stark contrast to that of Russia and Britain. But he, too, became increasingly suspicious and distrustful of all powers and, following in his predecessor’s footsteps, strove to make the country more independent. Ultimately, even as the Shah tried to make his country stand on its own two feet, his people saw him as too reliant on America. In that sense, the Shah and the revolutionaries did not disagree on the endgame, but on how to get there. As we will see in the following chapters, after advocating for a departure from business as usual in the country, the revolutionaries finally came to settle for more of the same in the security realm— although, they would undertake fundamentally different domestic policies in the political and social realms. During the lead up to the revolution, disparate groups had been united in their opposition to the Shah—in part because they viewed him as Washington’s ‘puppet’ and their country as the playground of foreign powers due to their leadership’s incompetence. But they did not have a coherent and unified idea of a desirable outcome following the Shah’s collapse. More troubling yet, all the organized groups discussed in this chapter saw themselves as the next leaders of Iran with little will to compromise. Despite often being viewed through the prism of the revolution that led to his demise, the Shah’s legacy is much more complex and comprehensive, especially as it pertains to Iranian national security and military affairs. First, and most importantly, the Shah’s rise and fall once again underscored the country’s inability to rely on foreign powers and the importance of it standing on its own two feet. In fact, 144

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the Shah’s reign made independence from foreign powers such an important part of the Iranian political culture that the revolutionaries placed the word first in their four-word slogan, ‘Independence, freedom, Islamic Republic.’227 And despite vowing to part ways with the Shah’s approach to foreign relations, the revolutionaries would continue to balance their country’s relationships while seeking selfreliance as their predecessors had. Second, although the revolutionaries despised the Shah’s efforts to bolster the country’s security apparatus and built their campaign against him on the premise that they would dismantle many of the organizations comprising the Iranian security landscape, in many instances they continued his efforts. For example, although the revolutionaries dissolved the SAVAK in 1979, replacing it with the revolutionary committees—or komiteh, as they are known in Iran— they soon realized they needed the SAVAK’s expertise. With the start of the Iran–Iraq War, the inexperienced regime needed help to confront Baghdad, and both the revolutionaries and the monarchists could agree that fighting a foreign adversary should take precedence over internal disagreements. As a result, the regime granted some SAVAK operatives immunity as they lent Tehran their skills to support the war effort. Likewise, despite distrusting it, the revolutionaries maintained the Artesh—although they did create the Revolutionary Guards to balance its power and purged Artesh by executing many of its commanders, while others fled the country. And as with the SAVAK, the Shah’s Artesh, or what was left of it, stood with the Guards to defend the country once Iraq invaded just months after the revolution. Additionally, the revolutionaries, who once opposed the Shah’s nuclear program, revived it just years after halting it—and they largely pursued the same nuclear policy as that of the Shah, one of hedging or acquiring nuclear technology for a civil program with the ability to weaponize it if and when needed. The new regime continued the missile program the Shah had started, and the weapons and equipment he had purchased would keep the Artesh and Guards sustained as the country began to be isolated following the hostage crisis. Lastly, as we will see in the following chapters, deterrence and posturing became Iran’s main defense doctrine under the Islamic 145

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Republic. And a key tool placed by the Shah in the Iranian defense and security toolkit, non-state actors, would become Iran’s main deterrent and weapon against its adversaries after the revolution. Tehran’s most significant non-state clients would later include Lebanese Hezbollah and Shias and Kurds in Iraq, all relationships whose groundworks the Shah had laid out. All in all, the Shah’s legacy helped the inexperienced Islamic Republic establish itself and prevent the country from falling apart during the period of transition and instability caused by the revolution. More fundamentally, the Shah continued in his father’s footsteps in shaping his national security policies with Iranian historical memory in mind. He served to further embed key tenets of Iranian security thinking. Scholars and policymakers in the West (and even Iran) treat the Shah’s security policies as inherently different from those pursued by the Islamic Republic. However, much of the new regime’s thinking and policies have, in fact, become reminiscent of those embraced and pursued by the Shah. This is because historical memory provided the backdrop against which the Imperial State of Iran’s decision-making took place and guides that of the Islamic Republic of Iran today.

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Thus far, we have identified the roots for the Islamic Revolution and begun to shed light on the core beliefs drawing the contours of the Iranian leadership’s view of itself and the world from the Qajars to the revolutionaries hoping to depose the Shah. Among the factors leading to the revolution, several stand out as having most greatly facilitated the 1978–79 upheavals and the clergy’s subsequent rise to power. These include some of the earliest developments in the Qajar period such as the consolidation of the Shia hierocracy and its integration into Iranian politics, as well as efforts, beginning with the Constitutional Revolution, to loosen the clerical grip from two important public interest sectors, the judicial system and education. Later, Reza Shah’s rapid top-down modernization process, which his son continued, gave rise to new grievances and amplified existing ones among portions of the populace. The 1940s truly laid out the foundations of what would become the 1979 Islamic Revolution. That decade saw the emergence of several key trends which accelerated and strengthened during the 1960s and 70s, paving the way for the rise of Khomeini. Conflicting trends marked the Shah’s reign, underpinning the complex and often contradictory nature of contemporary Iran. The struggle between tradition and modernity—one that had divided Iranian society, political elites, the religious establishment, and the intelligentsia—culminated in the downfall of the Shah. But prior to 147

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the events of early 1979—which saw the Shah’s departure from Iran, Khomeini’s return to the country, and the collapse of the monarchic tradition and rise of an Islamic Republic—few had predicted the nation’s fate even if rising tensions were already obvious to some observers in the years and months prior to that winter.1 Admiral Stansfield Turner, who headed the CIA during the revolution, is worth quoting at length on the bewildering events that led to the advent of Khomeini and his organization’s assessment of them: Clearly we would like to have done better. But let me point out to you that if we’re realistic about this and predicting how well we will do in future situations like this, forecasting political upheavals and military coups and unexpected election results is probably the most difficult part of intelligence, more difficult than military or economic intelligence. I know of no other intelligence service that predicted the problems in Iran. I know of no newspaper or academic journalists who predicted them in their writings. Clearly this caught up with the Shah without his recognizing it. I would suggest that even Ayatollah Khomeini didn’t realize how well his force was moving along. And the reason I think for all of this is that as we reconstructed our reporting over last summer and fall, clearly we saw lots of dissidence, for religious reasons, for cultural, for political, for economic. It was like a series of volcanos bubbling. But it certainly appeared that no one of them would bubble up so much the government couldn’t control it. What we didn’t forecast was that a single man, a 78-year-old cleric, who’d been in exile for fourteen years, would be a catalyst that would bring these forces together and we had one huge volcano, a truly national revolution.2

As noted by Turner, several factions reacting to the trends in modernization pushed the movement forward, ultimately creating a national revolution. A growing Islamic (and as time went by, Islamist) resistance would ultimately come to characterize the revolution. However, the resistance was not purely religious. A liberal element born out of the fracturing of the National Front contributed to the events that led to the collapse of the monarchy. Perhaps the most decisive forces involved in the revolution were various leftist groups, whose ideologies ranged from Marxist-Leninism to Marxist-Maoism. All these forces were united solely in their opposition to the monarchy 148

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and divided in almost all other areas, but their fissures would narrow down with time—albeit only briefly—to shape the revolution. And the Islamic character of this opposition would grow to subsume the entirety of the revolution’s goals.3 Nevertheless, all the factions that joined hands to overthrow the Imperial State of Iran shared one objective: fundamentally altering the country’s political order. The revolutionaries envisioned their movement and the subsequent transition of power as ‘the destruction of an existing state by members of its own society, followed by the creation of a new political order.’4 In many ways, the revolution did transform Iran. However, the revolution would not present a clear-cut departure from the beliefs and processes that underpinned the Iranian state’s approach to security before the collapse of the Shah. In fact, as the resulting regime settled into the task of governing and matured, it also sought more continuity. The following sections provide an overview of the key themes and events that shaped modern Iran’s most dramatic political development and how they have shaped the country’s strategic outlook.

Islamic Underpinnings The Shah’s reign was generally marked by the intensification of public religious activities throughout the country. The Shah himself was instrumental in bringing religion back into the public sphere and magnifying it. First, as he frequently noted in his statements and interviews, he was a deeply religious man. Second, he saw the faith as a means to counter Communism, which he perceived as the real threat to his country and reign.5 But other developments, particularly in the 1960s and 70s, exacerbated this trend. The rapid urbanization and an uptick in literacy rates in the country led to the population consuming more religious literature—which was now produced by both traditionalist clerics and non-clerical advocates of traditionalism.6 The masses also increasingly galvanized under the banner of religion thanks to the proliferation of faith associations and centers across the land. The popularity of these associations led to an increased demand for preachers, which could not be met.7 This, in turn, created a lucrative market for religious cassette tapes, which 149

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were sold and copied throughout the country and helped disseminate the messages of traditionalists, including those of Ayatollah Khomeini and Ali Shariati. The proliferation of propaganda material, including revolutionary literature, leaflets and pamphlets, and tapes, played a critical role in allowing the masses to familiarize themselves with the message of the fermenting revolution. Ultimately, the momentum created by these developments contributed to the advent of the Islamic revivalist ideology and the Islamic Revolution.8 But this ideology also laid out the foundations of the beliefs of those groups marrying Shia Islam and Communist ideas, such as the MeK.

The Return of Islamism: 1941–53 The long decade of 1941–53 saw the re-emergence of the clergy as a political force following the demise of Reza Shah and the rise of his politically enfeebled son. However, clerical alliances were dispersed across the political spectrum and much of the clergy chose to remain on the sidelines of political life. The clergy tended to operate within the bounds set by Iran’s Constitution and traditions of Shia Islam, Iranian politics, and jurisprudence. Hence, there were almost no revolutionary clergymen, even among the militants. Prominent clerics who set the tone for the rest of the hierocracy remained largely apolitical and maintained that the men of the cloth were spiritual, not political, leaders. This led to a number of clerical alliances and some found themselves in conflict with one another. At the same time, FI acted as a major disrupting force in the period 1941–53. The group enjoyed the backing of several radical clerics, including Khomeini, and created the ‘blueprint’ for an Islamic government in the 1950s.9 From its inception, this was the group’s goal in Iran. However, FI’s vision and the tactics it employed did not enjoy the widespread backing of the clergy. Very few within the Shia establishment in Iran supported FI, and most condemned its ideology, objectives, and, particularly, tactics. The only major religious figure who continued to endorse the group during the course of his career was Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani—Kashani having abandoned FI following his imprisonment and exile. 150

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Meanwhile, the most significant religious figure of the era, Grand Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein Boroujerdi (1875–1961), remained set against the political activity of the clergy.10 Boroujerdi had ascended to leadership in 1944, superseding Ayatollahs Sadr, Hojjat, and Khansari in Qom, and had risen even further in 1946 following the death of Abol-Hassan Isfahani. In 1949, disturbed by his contemporaries’ political activities, he sought to ban Muslim jurists or the ‘ulama from participating in political activity. He was among the most prominent fervent critics of the FI, whose activities he deemed in discordance with the faith. Most members of the clergy followed Boroujerdi and did not involve themselves in politics. Boroujerdi would retain his supremacy until his death in 1961. With the mastodon of Shia jurisprudence deceased, no single cleric had the stature, willingness, and ability to prevent Shia clerical interference in politics and Khomeini’s political activities. Boroujerdi’s death created a power vacuum in the Shia clerical establishment as no other jurist of his caliber was living and could effectively replace him, thus paving the way for the rise of the politically inclined and active clerics, whose flagbearer became Khomeini.

The Forces of Black Reaction: 1953–63 Following the 1953 coup, the state largely crushed FI. Navvab Safavi’s execution in 1956 seemed to place the final nail in the group’s coffin. From that point forward, the group was of minimal significance. Nevertheless, FI’s objectives and tactics continued to shape resistance movements as Navvab and his men influenced the guerrilla movements of the 1960s and 1970s. The guerrillas largely rose to prominence in the 1970s and perpetrated a number of attacks throughout the last years of the monarch’s reign. They also suffered heavy casualties inflicted by the Shah’s security forces and became less relevant as the revolution progressed. An important exception was the MeK, which remained influential throughout the revolution and continues to exist as an organized and active group in the political and security arenas at the present time of writing. A number of less militant organizations also exerted influence in this period. Founded in 1961 as an offshoot of the failed National Front 151

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by Talaqani, Bazargan, and Yad-Allah Sahabi, the Freedom Movement of Iran gained traction in opposition to the Shah’s policy, calling for a return to the Constitution.11 At the same time, in the activist intellectual camp, Shariati was pioneering the blend of populism, Communism, and Islamism that later ignited the flames of revolution and came to characterize the Islamic Republic’s identity. Shariati had spent a few months in prison two decades prior to the revolution. He created a new strand of traditionalist thinking, one engrained in a ‘radically populist theology of revolution,’ which applied deeply Islamic notions to a social order inspired by MarxistLeninist ideals.12 Fundamentally, Shariati advanced the idea of an ‘Islamic Renaissance’ or his notion of  ‘Islamic Protestantism’—a concept whose roots could be found in the Qajar periods.13 For his part, Khomeini gradually became more aggressive in his condemnation of the Shah—especially during the White Revolution. At first, Khomeini sought to steer the Shah in a direction acceptable to traditionalist clerics by offering his guidance: ‘Shah, … I don’t want you to become like your father. Listen to my advice, listen to the ‘ulama of Islam. They desire the welfare of the nation.’14 Khomeini’s devoted student following began to politicize, too. Following the already rising tide of Islamist militant activity in Iran and empowered by his exile, Khomeini became increasingly emboldened. The Ayatollah would leverage all means at his disposal, particularly the press, to raise his profile and draw attention to what he saw as the Shah’s assortment of faults and mistakes.15 As he became gradually more critical of the Shah, Khomeini also radicalized. Soon, he was predicting the fall of the Shah and the rise of a republican government, warning the Shah that ‘the nation will not allow you to continue this way.’16 By the late 1970s, the Ayatollah was no longer calling for reformation but for the overthrow of the monarch.

New Media and the Proliferation of ‘Fake News’ The proliferation of new media, particularly cassette tapes but also the Xerox copy machine, helped amplify the new voices of dissent in the 1960s and 70s.  These new mediums afforded the nascent revolution the ability to bypass government control and to spread its ideas across the 152

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country rapidly. Now, the government was no longer the main source of information and its propaganda would not be left unanswered. The revolutionaries would outperform the Shah in the use of propaganda. The revolutionaries’ disinformation and propaganda campaigns helped shape the narrative surrounding the Shah’s policies and his opponents’ intentions. It is worth mentioning that these efforts were so successful that, even today, much of the information about the events of the revolution available in Persian and published by state-sanctioned media outlets and sources remains reliant on falsehoods. These new sources of news and commentary were not beholden to fact-checking mechanisms of any kind and created an environment in which the revolutionaries could disseminate what we now refer to as ‘fake news,’ including fabricated events and inflated figures.17 For example, if the government killed ten individuals in clashes with protestors, the revolutionaries quickly announced the number at several times the real figure. Embroidered data would then travel across the country and beyond, helping the revolutionaries demonize the monarch and his armed forces and garner sympathy for the opposition. At several key junctures, the disinformation campaign helped dictate the course of events. The small size of the cassette tape made it easy to smuggle it at a cheap price, making Khomeini and Shariati’s speeches widely available and wildly popular. The Xerox copy machine’s ubiquity in Iranian offices also aided the dissemination of propaganda and disinformation, as well as activism. Individuals were now able to produce hundreds or thousands of leaflets, pamphlets, and petitions.18 Like the cassette tape, the Xerox machine allowed for the cost-effective mass distribution of largely un-censorable information—photocopies, like cassettes, are easy to conceal and distribute. As a result, the Shah’s attempts to curtail Communist and other revolutionary outreach efforts were much less effective. These tools also aided the widespread distribution of antiShah posters and tracts, amplifying dissident voices and creating a fairly common popular knowledge of Khomeini’s version of events. Disinformation and propaganda campaigns would remain an important tool in the toolkit of Khomeini’s followers for decades to come—both at home and abroad. Forty years after the revolutionaries used the technology available at the time to their advantage, the Islamic 153

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Republic would use the Internet, particularly social media platforms, in its influence operations in the region and beyond.19 The instability in Lebanon also aided the training of Iranian revolutionaries and the further proliferation and amplifying of Khomeini’s message.20 A long-time strategic focal point for Iran due to its strategic location on the Mediterranean and significant Shia population, Lebanon served as both a gathering point for Islamist revolutionaries and a testing ground for propaganda methods and techniques, serving to improve revolutionary training.21 Although Khomeini’s radical faction benefitted perhaps the most from the advent of cassette tapes and photocopiers, the Ayatollah continued to face stout resistance, especially among the clergy in Iran. Finally, in addition to the myriad propaganda campaigns launched by various Iranian opposition groups, the Soviets were also engaging in disinformation efforts. This was especially true in the final days of the revolution: A steady stream of vitriol was issuing from Soviet-based radio stations. They were getting more active every day, beaming their radio waves on to key areas of Iran and castigating the Americans. Their tone was shrill: ‘Now that the Shah has gone, it is the turn of the Americans. US imperialism should be kicked out of the country and to hell.’22

Clerical Schism The Qajar period had already seen a split between members of the Shia clerical establishment abstaining from political activity and politically motivated faith leaders. The Shah’s reign exacerbated this trend and accelerated the politically inclined clerics’ entry into the political scene. The majority of the clergy, particularly the more authoritative members of the body, remained either apolitical or largely inactive throughout the pre-revolutionary period. However, the minority was especially vocal and became more influential as the revolution began to brew.  The less restive majority remained focused on the grafting of Islamic principles to the Shah’s reforms—a path the Islamic intelligentsia largely favored over more active and, indeed, armed resistance. The relatively junior (in terms of qualifications and status) Khomeini stood out among his contemporaries. He was more willing to depart 154

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from the mainstream and tradition by asserting himself in politics— and doing so in opposition to the monarchy, only becoming more vocal and more critical of the Shah with time.  This amalgamation of religion and politics and the active resistance to the monarchy allowed Khomeini to distinguish himself from rest of his cohort and eased his rise to power.23 The centerpiece of Khomeini’s ideal of Islamic governance in Iran lay in the belief that the hierocracy was responsible for shepherding the people until the coming of the Hidden Imam. For Khomeini, this task required not passive anticipation—as his predecessors had assumed—but active resistance to any non-Islamic government. Hence, the monarchy was unfit to govern as it was unable to interpret religious law. Khomeini gradually moved away from providing unsolicited advice to and critiquing the Shah. In their stead, he was now forcefully advocating for deposing the monarch and replacing him with the only class capable of interpreting religious law: the clergy.24 Inherent to this new message was an anti-imperialist element, whose attractiveness to Iranians stemmed from Iranian collective memory: Khomeini gained traction by appealing to their view of their statesmen as weak and corruptible individuals who allowed foreign powers to take advantage of the nation. Khomeini pledged to ‘struggle against imperialism’ and eradicate foreign interference in the nation’s affairs.25 From the outset, Khomeini rejected the international system based on Westphalian nation-states.26 This anti-imperialism would help galvanize a more diverse group of revolutionaries and dissenters around Khomeini—a group whose ideology did not align with Khomeini’s struggle for an Islamic state but embraced that against the ‘imperialist forces’ backing and symbolizing the monarchy. This strand of  Iranian strategic thinking pertaining to the deep rejection of foreign presence and influence in the country constituted one of the only common threads shared by the diverse factions opposing the Shah. These groups did not have a shared understanding of what would qualify as an adequate government after the Shah’s deposition. They did not embrace the same values and ideals. However, they were all united in their opposition to the Shah—and only in that shared objective, one whose foundations were grounded in the belief that the 155

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nation was helpless in the face of foreign power machinations. Further appealing to the liberal-nationalist younger generation who rallied around Khomeini, Shariati introduced the notion of achieving social justice through Qur’anic principles.27

A New Politico Ruhollah Khomeini began his career as a teacher with few material political concerns. Although perceived as deeply powerful, Khomeini’s lectures on Islam and politics were initially mostly focused on more abstruse ethical concerns.28 It was not until he was solidly in his 40s, in the second half of the 1940s, that Khomeini first wrote solely political material.29 He did so justifying his enterprise using the Qur’an, 34:46: ‘Say: “I enjoin upon you one thing only, that you rise up for God, singly and in pairs.”’ He wove political attacks on the Pahlavi ruling dynasty into his somewhat-philosophical writings, Kashf al-Asrar (‘The Unveiling of Secrets’).30 Despite this early political dabbling, however, Khomeini largely followed Grand Ayatollah Boroujerdi’s doctrine of political noninvolvement for most of that period.  The death of Boroujerdi and the dawn of the White Revolution set in motion the shift in Khomeini’s life and career and, ultimately, helped change the course of Iranian history. Khomeini became increasingly active on the political scene. Khomeini’s entry into politics broke with tradition and shattered a norm and, even, a ‘taboo’ against clerical interference in politics.31 This taboo was instrumental in helping Khomeini establish himself. He benefitted from the relative lack of clerical opposition to the Shah and thus quickly garnered support from the merchant class and among some secular liberals, in addition to his already strong base of Muslim students.32 In 1963, Khomeini was arrested following his harsh criticisms of the monarchy and the Shah’s White Revolution. The failed uprising of 5 and 6 June 1963 (commonly known as 15 Khordad in Persian, in reference to the date in the Iranian calendar), in which protestors gathered to object to Khomeini’s arrest, immediately followed. Khomeini’s arrest led the Shah to make one of the most decisive pronouncements of his reign, one that may well have precipitated his downfall. Faced with a progressively more vocal and critical Khomeini, 156

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the Shah believed that the threat posed by the dissident cleric would only grow if he was allowed to remain in Iran. The monarch opted to minimize Khomeini’s influence in the country by sending him abroad. In 1964, Khomeini began a fourteen-year exile starting in Turkey and ending in France.33 However, the Shah’s calculus turned out to be flawed: Khomeini’s influence only grew in his absence. The popularity of his message and the ability of his followers to amplify his voice using the technologies of the time allowed the Ayatollah to build a following.34  Thus, the cleric exuded considerable influence in Iran through his followers from foreign lands. Furthering Khomeini’s sway was also the widespread knowledge that the moderate clerics had petitioned the Shah to save his life in 1963 and, therefore, tacitly lent him legitimacy from the religious establishment.35 Khomeini built his revolutionary narrative around the contrast between the earthly absolutist power of the Shah and the divine mandate of clerics, chiefly his own.36  The Ayatollah was able to appeal to cross-sections of Iranian society thanks to his ‘agility and skill in deploying narratives that were targeted to the political needs of the moment [which] allowed him to chart an unlikely path from outcast to ruler.’37 Myth played a central role in advancing the revolutionary cause, as it shaped perceptions of the Shah’s intentions and policies, as well as Khomeini’s image among the populace. These legends served to appeal to Iranians’ long quest for a just reformer standing up for good against a corrupt and incompetent ruler. Some claimed that they had seen Khomeini’s face on the moon. Others posited that he was the Twelfth Imam himself. Others yet argued that once Khomeini harnessed political power, every family would have free benefits from the state, including a car.38 These myths and urban legends did not just pertain to Khomeini’s character and personality; they complemented a parallel set of rumors discrediting various aspects of the Shah’s policies and more generally undermining his reign. Later, Khomeini would leverage myth, disinformation, and propaganda tools to sideline his other opponents and assert himself as the leader of the revolutionary movement. Key tenets of Iranian collective memory fed these rumors, particularly the role of foreign powers in the country. Here, too, though the 157

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revolutionaries’ depiction of foreign meddling in Iranian affairs was not completely unfounded and inaccurate, some took liberties with the facts or outright fabricated stories to advance their narrative. For example, the populace widely believed that the Shah had stolen and accumulated a substantial wealth, well beyond what he had amassed in reality. More directly relevant to our discussion, it also often misunderstood the SAVAK’s role, mandate, and methods, which the revolutionaries willingly misrepresented.39 This is not to say that the SAVAK did not conduct its fair share of human rights violations, but that the revolutionaries mischaracterized the scope and extent of them, as well as the institution itself. As Mohsen Milani aptly describes it, Iranians perceived (and perceive) the SAVAK as ‘omnipotent and omnipresent.’40 When in 1978, a 7.4 magnitude earthquake shook the eastern town of  Tabas, leaving over 10,000 people dead, rumors started spreading that this devastation was caused by foreign powers using Iranian soil to advance their nuclear programs. As the rumors insinuated, the United States had conducted an underground nuclear weapon test, leading to the earthquake. The rumors proliferated thanks to a five-page leaflet created by the Hezbollahis—Islamist revolutionaries—which argued that underground US nuclear weapon tests in the nearby desert of Dasht-e Lut had caused the earthquake.41 The fertile ground for myth and fake news existing in Iran’s political landscape at the time helped promote and amplify misinformation. Moreover, these myths leveraged themes embedded in Iranian historical memory. Many Iranians were in essence ready to accept conspiracy theories and rumors as factual. This was due in part to the fact that for decades they had watched helplessly as seemingly obscure yet formidable foreign forces meddled in and dictated the course of their nation’s affairs. As a result, rumors pertaining to the involvement of foreign powers in ushering national catastrophes were not completely unfathomable. The fake news contributed to the creation of the revolutionary environment in the country in the months leading to unrest, bringing to the fore a group of individuals who had amassed influence over the previous several decades.42

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Khomeini’s Men Along with Khomeini, other radical and militant clerics were able to establish themselves in the two decades leading to the revolution. In their quest to assert themselves on the political scene, these clerics cooperated with ‘petty bourgeois intellectuals.’43 Many intellectuals saw the clerics as both a powerful opposition force and one capable of galvanizing the masses.44 Hence, the intelligentsia did not just embrace the fundamentalist Islamist ideology presented by Khomeini and other militant clerics, but accepted its leadership, too. For their part, militant clerics and Khomeini did not limit their outreach efforts to the intelligentsia. They sought to diversify their platforms and allies by galvanizing the masses. Starting in the late 1960s and culminating in a famous 1970 lecture, Khomeini began to use his lectures and writings as a vehicle promoting his idea of an Islamic government, led by a jurist guardian—a system of government known as velayat-e faghih.45 Khomeini was not the first to promulgate this kind of thinking. The militant shade of the Islamic movement in Iran actually began in Najaf at Ayatollah Kashani’s Madresseh-ye Alavi, which had included military training in its curriculum.46  The state exiled Kashani in 1949 for his association with FI, only to witness his return in 1950 advocating the nationalization of oil.47 Once in Iran, he helped organize the July 1952 protests, which reinstated Mossadeq. He died in 1962, shortly before the start of the White Revolution and the rise of Khomeini. Another key figure shaping the dissenting discourse in Iran in the two decades prior to the revolution was Shariati. Shariati began his political career as a student at the University of Mashhad and as a member of the God-Worshipping Socialists—for which, he was jailed in 1959. Shariati advocated for the use of Islamic law and precepts to birth social justice. In this respect, he resembled Kashani.48 Like Kashani, he also managed to draw followers both from the streets and from the universities. This made him seem particularly dangerous to the Shah. In 1965, Shariati was arrested again and ‘kept under strict surveillance’ until 1977, when he left Iran for England.49 His death under mysterious circumstances in England would earn him the title of ‘martyr’ among the revolutionaries and secure his continued 159

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reverence after the revolution up to the present time of writing, despite his leftist inclinations.

Islamist Resistance to the White Revolution Boroujerdi’s death occurred at a pivotal time in Iran’s clerical history. Immediately preceding the White Revolution, the death of the Grand Ayatollah opened the door for considerably more overt radical clerical resistance to the Shah. Boroujerdi was a well-established and wellrespected moderate cleric, who believed in keeping the clergy out of politics. He was a champion of Islamic jurisprudence but also a proponent of modernizing the country. For example, he was a willing participant in the inclusion of modern education alongside traditional Islamic curriculum. Hence, his death paved the way for fissures within the clergy and the rise of Khomeini just as the country was beginning to undergo tremendous reforms. According to a former SAVAK analyst, the Shah ‘spoke in a very tough way’ against radical clergy-members but ‘didn’t follow through with actions.’50 In many respects, the Shah dealt an easy hand to play for the Islamists during the White Revolution and in its aftermath. The group was able to gradually expand its circle of recruits and the scope of its activities. Khomeini created a dissent platform based on the notion of an Islamic government which could best be described as a ‘social myth.’51 As we have seen, revolutionaries rarely offer concrete roadmaps.52 And concrete policies were not what the public was looking for, instead coveting a vision it could rally behind. Hence, the major driver behind the Islamic Revolution did not lie in concrete policy proposals but in a set of general ideas that captured the popular imagination. Grievances stemming from the Shah’s policies and opposition to the monarch created the common denominator for all the different groups and movements that came together to topple him. Indeed, ‘[f]or every one slogan for Khomeini, there were probably more than two against the Shah.’53 Ironically, the lack of a shared positive roadmap helped ensure more continuity in Iranian foreign and security policies following the revolution than the Islamists would undoubtedly have wished to see at the time. 160

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Today, many former revolutionaries in Iran simply confess that they did not have a clear idea of what they were fighting for, but knew exactly what they did not want: the Shah.54 As a result, they became involved in the revolution without a clear understanding of what an Islamic government would entail. Others supported the movement despite its religious undertones. T   hey had simply failed to recognize the prominence of the religious ideology or did not see it for what it was.55 Describing Khomeini’s post-revolution policies, an individual involved in the student movement in the late 1970s noted, ‘That’s not what Khomeini said before coming back to Iran [from exile in France]. He changed his tune when he came back. It was like he had changed the tapes completely.’56 This view reflects that of a segment of the revolutionary force: as many saw it, Khomeini was simply leading a national effort to topple a dictator and forge a path to a more inclusive government. After all, when questioned by his peers about his ambitions in establishing an Islamic government, Khomeini claimed that he did not have any personal ambition to run the state.57 Furthering Khomeini’s campaign, in 1964, Iran concluded a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the United States—the United States routinely concluded such agreements with its allies; so much so in fact that it developed something of a template contract text. The SOFA afforded the Americans extraterritoriality on Iranian soil.58 This was an outrage to Khomeini, who subsequently publicly shunned the agreement on 27 October—within a week, he was exiled from Iran.59 As Khomeini would put it later, an American dog had more rights in his country than his Iranian compatriots—a possible reference to the status of animals, particularly dogs, the US armed forces took abroad that would be covered in the agreement. The SOFA, albeit rarely mentioned by name and discussed openly and properly, fed into Iranians’ larger sense of degradation, insecurity, powerlessness, and distrust of foreign powers entrenched in their country’s collective memory. For many, the notion that Iranians were not even able to prosecute US troops for crimes committed on their soil was yet another manifestation of the weakness of their statesmen and their country’s abuse by foreign powers. Following Khomeini’s exile, Islamist guerrilla organizations began to proliferate. Khomeini’s pamphlets and tape recordings spread his 161

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message and enhanced his reputation.60 This spirit of revolt against the Shah manifested the next year, when, in 1965, the Shah narrowly escaped assassination and Hassan Ali Mansur, the monarch’s next prime minister after Alam, was shot to death by a member of FI.  The gunman had been a member of Khomeini’s Coalition of Islamic Societies, a militant group absorbed by the Fadayian following Khomeini’s exile. Accordingly, Khomeini was most likely complicit in the attack, although the degree of his authority over and involvement in the operation remains disputed. Still, many within the clergy, especially at the level immediately above Khomeini, were opposed to violent resistance to the monarchy. Grand Ayatollah Hakim went so far as to debate Khomeini on the merits of armed revolt against the Shah.61 As the 1960s progressed, the militant movement gained more traction and, by the 1970s, it was planning and executing major attacks. Nowhere was the atmosphere of terror more obvious than the ceremonies celebrating the 2,500-year anniversary of the monarchical tradition. 1971 marked the 2,500-year anniversary of the Iranian monarchy, an opportunity for the Shah to showcase his country’s rich history and bright future. The Shah hoped to impress upon his European and American supporters the largesse Tehran could produce under his leadership. The government poured millions of dollars into lavish ceremonies. The festivities were held in Persepolis, the capital of the first Persian Empire under the Achaemenids. There, the royal family held several banquets and parties. In one such banquet, some 600 guests attended a cocktail reception catering to scholars and journalists.62 Later, the Shah and Empress Farah paid homage to the founder of the Persian Empire and the state, Cyrus the Great, at his mausoleum, surrounded by royals and heads of state from some sixty-three countries.63 All in all, the festivities catered to hundreds of guests, many foreign. As security was a major concern to the state, especially given the increase in insurgent and terrorist activities by various groups, the SAVAK played a major role in securing the site and perimeters. This visible and lavish display of wealth and power alienated considerable segments of the Iranian populace. Simultaneously, guerrilla groups showed their resolve to topple the regime. On 8 February, thirteen poorly armed insurgents attacked a Gendarmerie post and 162

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were subsequently executed, which was widely expected to pass without much notice.64 Instead, reprisal assassinations of government officials erupted inTehran. Sporadic and, more importantly, surprisingly resilient militant attacks continued for months.65 On 13 October, the day the Shah officially commemorated the dawn and evolution of the monarchy, Khomeini for the first time overtly called for its abolition.66 In addition to drawing Khomeini’s ire, as could be expected, the ostentatious displays of wealth at Persepolis further galvanized the ‘ulama and Muslim students against the monarchy. The celebrations also became (and remain) a symbol of the Shah’s corruption and tonedeaf reign, detached from the political, social, and economic realities of his subjects. In 1975, the anniversary of 15 Khordad coincided with the imposition of the Shah’s single-party system. Student protests began that day and continued for several more in Qom until the arrival of commando units two days later. The units dispersed the demonstrations using tear gas, arresting a number of individuals, and killing a still disputed number of protestors.67 An influential newspaper, Etela’at, ran an article two days after the military broke up the protests and served to further the demonstrators’ resolve. The rallies further entrenched the positions of the soon-to-be revolutionaries and the government.68 1976 was a relatively quiet year in the events that culminated in the revolution. However, the Shah further angered a faction of  Iranians by revising the calendar system. The government replaced the religious calendar in use until that point with one based on the start of the rule of Cyrus the Great and the establishment of the Persian Empire. As a result, ‘Iranians went to bed in the year 1355 and woke the next morning in the year 2535.’69 In addition to subverting the Muslim establishment, the move perturbed many non-religious Iranians. This incident would underscore a permanent feature of the Shah’s response to the events of the next three years: he underestimated the emotional and reactive aspects of the movement opposing him.

Intellectual Roots Those who led the revolution on all sides—Islamist, Marxist-Leninist, Maoist—often belonged to the intelligentsia and did not necessarily 163

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assume the views espoused by Khomeini and his followers, according to which an Islamic government should replace the monarchy. But many saw the means (their movement and the process by which they were challenging the monarchy), not necessarily the end (a transition of power), as the realization of an ideal society.70 Although, they had different notions of what would constitute the ideal outcome, these forces joined to see the uprising through—especially as they recognized the Shah’s surprising weakness and inability to hold his ground in the face of increasing opposition. The movement benefitted from a number of internal and external developments. Firstly, the SAVAK began to relax some of its efforts countering dissent. This change was partly due to the growing pressure exercised by the United States on Iran to improve its human rights track record. Under US president Jimmy Carter, the United States had adopted a harder line toward Iran and its human rights record. At the time, a growing number of American lawmakers and decision-makers were questioning US support for the Shah. For example, Senator William Proxmire (D-WI) explained in February 1979 that he had long objected to his country’s Iran policy even as policymakers assured him that the nation remained stable: ‘My interest in Iran has been longstanding. It would be difficult to count the number of speeches I have given on the senseless policy of arming Iran with sophisticated US weaponry beyond its national security needs.’71 However, the changes also stemmed from the Shah’s own efforts to democratize the country in preparation for his son, Reza Pahlavi, to accede to the throne.72 Of the intellectuals backing the revolution, many were associated with Mossadeq in some way. A number of thinkers retained ties to the National Front and saw the revolution that was beginning to brew as the continuation of Mossadeq’s vision for his country.73 In this way, for the revolutionaries, the role of the Amir Kabir-type reformer was portrayed in the revolution by Mehdi Bazargan and his associates. In the same regard, the liberal intellectual camp did not have plans for an abrupt departure of the monarchy from Iran. Accordingly, Khomeini’s radicalism cast it asunder and outwards and, later, filled the void.74 In short, the ultimate failure of the liberal intellectual elements of the revolution can be traced to their inability to compete with the Islamists. 164

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The intellectual leftist movement in Iran rose to prominence starting in the 1940s. The National Front’s rise and fall in the period of 1941–53 embodied the movement. By 1958, the Shah had effectively crushed the Tudeh Party and, by 1963, he had essentially eliminated the National Front’s ability to conduct itself as a cogent instrument of political opposition.75 Although these developments momentarily increased the Shah’s power, they would come to further undermine the monarchy as they created, enhanced, and radicalized resistance. During the 1953–78 timeframe, the government dismembered official outlets of dissent before re-establishing some of them shortly before the Shah was toppled. In that period, students came to bear the mantle of intellectual resistance to the Shah. By the 1970s, there were a number of student guerrilla organizations across the country. In 1971, a group of students attacked a Gendarmerie post in Siakhal— and drew an outsized military response.76 The state crushed Mehdi Bazargan and Ayatollah Taleqani’s Freedom Movement of 1961 in 1963. Like the National Front a decade before it, the movement splintered into several groups. The most significant of these was the MeK, a group which during the 1970s co-opted significantly more Marxist doctrine into its beliefs.77 Accordingly, the MeK became an important link between Islamist and leftist ideologies. In 1977, emboldened by statements supporting human rights from the Carter administration, intellectuals publicly petitioned the government to expand human rights and reduce censorship.78 In April, the Shah relented and introduced some liberalization programs and policies. When the Shah visited Washington, throngs of protestors greeted him. Whereas before this would have been censored on Iranian TV, his reception was broadcast across the land.79 The mid1970s saw the consequences of an overheating economy: prices spiked, quadrupling in some areas over less than five years.80  The intellectually inclined and somewhat devout urban middle classes, especially, felt the impact of the soaring costs. Furthermore, as the price of oil declined, the government became less able to sustain the spending that had bolstered the economy. This, in the face of growing human rights concerns resulting in lessened international support for the monarchy, rendered the Shah vulnerable. 165

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Fallout from Modernization and W   esternization By the 1970s, the educated middle and upper classes of Iran’s urban centers, those most accustomed to the new modern lifestyle in the country and best inclined to support liberal causes, were leaving Iran in mounting numbers due to the lack of freedoms or in pursuit of new opportunities. The populations they left behind did not necessarily reap vast benefits from the Shah’s modernization programs. Instead, the poor found themselves increasingly shut out of Iranian society. Some intellectuals latched on to this disconnect and began to advocate for Western-style political and social reforms. But liberal intellectuals suffered from an association with both the Shah and his modernization campaigns and the much-distrusted powers whose political concerns and values they had adopted. At the same time, intellectual voices complained of the dangers of westernization. Jalal Al-e Ahmad introduced the concept of gharbzadegi, commonly translated as ‘Westoxification,’ into the liberal intellectual discourse in 1962. But the idea held its roots in previous intellectual movements and the disintegration of the Tudeh Party had spread Marxist-Leninist ideals throughout the Iranian Left.81 The resistance grew from merely pushing for reforms to condemning the West altogether during the White Revolution. The revolutionaries viewed and treated different powers singularly.82 Britain and the United States faced the prospect of harsh reprisals under any revolutionary rule, as they respectively represented the most enduring and most recent instances of foreign interference in Iranian affairs. Iran’s relationship with the Soviet Union was more complicated. On the one hand, Russo–Iranian relations were historically tense: the Russians embodied defeat, humiliation, and foreign machinations in Iran. On the other hand, some viewed the Soviet Union as inherently different from pre-revolution Russia and many leftist groups had strong ties to Moscow. Nevertheless, the general distrust of foreign powers and wish to see a more independent Iran shaped the revolutionaries’ worldview.

SAVAK and Guerillas Internally, in the years leading up to the revolution, the SAVAK came to embody the oppression of Iranians by the Shah and foreign powers, 166

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particularly America and Israel. Guerrilla groups now represented and symbolized the Iranian resistance to the Shah’s ironclad grip on power—a rule the revolutionaries denounced as secured not by the people’s will but SAVAK’s brutality and foreigners’ meddling. In the first few years following its inception, the SAVAK was especially brutal in rooting out the last of the Tudeh Party and insurgents in the aftermath of the political unrest of 1953.83 However, immediately before the advent of the White Revolution, the state began to shift its policy slightly. In 1961, Hassan Pakravan became head of the SAVAK and ‘banned’ torture.84 This change proved both transient and ineffectual. Throughout the White Revolution, the SAVAK remained ready to torture and persecute dissidents regardless of the Shah’s stated policies. During the 1970s, as unrest spread, the SAVAK’s response increased in severity. Accordingly, the organization harassed and, in some cases, killed significant (albeit disputed) numbers of activists and guerillas.85 Human rights concerns continued to mount, resulting in a number of condemnations of the SAVAK by the Carter administration and international rights groups such as Amnesty International. At the same time, Amnesty International published accounts of SAVAK’s repressive activities.86 The reports widely publicized SAVAK’s role in both investigation and prosecution (in military tribunals); furthermore, they brought to light the discrepancy between Iran’s international rhetoric and domestic policy. The newly released information about SAVAK’s activities added fuel to the existing real and legitimate concerns about the organization’s work. But it also fed into the rumors and conspiracy theories around it. By the end of 1978, the Shah remained weak in the face of these events. Soon, virtually all of Iran’s public sector was on strike.87 The clash between the army and the prime minister’s office further stymied efforts to prevent the riots. Attacks continued and damaged or destroyed official and public buildings—especially cinemas, bars, cafés, and  Tehran’s red-light district, seen as symbols of the country’s ‘Westoxification.’ The guerillas launched attacks on seventeen different police stations, leading to a response from the SAVAK, which exploited this opportunity to avenge previous grievances.88  To stabilize the situation, the Shah resorted to declaring a military government. 167

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However, the military government was military in name only. This meant that the Shah did not provide it with the authority and mandate it needed to be effective. In turn, this failure only made matters worse. It once again highlighted the Shah’s weakness in facing the revolutionaries, the incapability of his armed forces and security apparatus to stabilize the situation, and the lack of a clear and resolute direction in the government’s policies. Here, too, the Shah pursued conflicting courses of action. He declared martial law once more while stating to his military officials that he did ‘not want anybody’s nose to bleed.’89 The Shah was not the only player sending conflicting signals. The Carter administration, whose strong public advocacy for human rights in Iran had played a role in shaping the events of the revolution, was behind the scenes urging the Shah to resort to the use of force to crush unrest.90 As a December 2019 story by The New  York Times described it, ‘the president’s special envoy to Iran had actually urged the country’s generals to use as much deadly force as needed to suppress the revolt, advising them about how to carry out a military takeover to keep the shah in power.’91

1978–80: Riots and Revolution In 1976 and 77, the Shah endeavored to at least project the image of a government responding to the will of the people. He began to relax his autocratic rule and, especially in 1976, his efforts met with some success. To this end, he loosened restrictions on freedom of speech, constrained the activities of the SAVAK, and kept the army in its barracks. Politically, these years saw stability and little resistance to the military government. However, the seeds of revolution had already been sown and were beginning to bear fruit. These efforts were too little, too late, and 1978 proved to be a radically different year to the previous two. In 1978, discontent with and opposition to the Shah grew.  The state found itself paralyzed. Ultimately, the government would crumble internally, as the Shah’s efforts signaled weakness and exacerbated dissatisfaction. The Shah sought to appease his constituents, and Prime Minister Sharif-Emami implemented his ‘national reconciliation’ agenda.92   This action plan turned out to constitute a series of 168

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unilateral concessions by the government to an increasingly demanding revolutionary force.93 Ultimately, Sharif-Emami’s reform agenda paved the way for the monarchy’s collapse, as ‘[e]mboldened opposition, now led by Khomeini, refused to settle for anything short of the Shah’s removal from power.’94 Contemporaneous reporting described Sarif-Emami as ‘a man of religious background who has maintained links with the Moslem clergy […] known for acting independently of the shah during his [first] term as prime minister [in 1960–61], and he is generally not viewed as just another palace courtesan.’95 In reality, the prime minister’s time at the Senate—the upper chamber, which served as a rubber-stamp—had rendered him largely illegitimate as ‘he lacked independence from the Shah.’96 Reporting from Iran just weeks before the monarchy’s collapse, New  Yorker contributor Joseph Kraft described Sharif-Emami’s efforts as swift and broad: ‘At every opportunity, Sharif-Emami fought to placate the mullahs.’97 As Sharif-Emami saw it, the clergy was divided into two camps: a small group of radicals led by Khomeini and a large, sensible one, which followed the moderate and highly respected Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari (1906–86).98 He hoped the latter would prevail and was negotiating with Shariatmadari to this end.99 The government imposed martial law, leading to clashes between protestors and the armed forces and resulting in casualties.100 For example, the government ‘banned “processions of any kind” during Moharram,’ violating the curfews.101 These failures increased the tensions between the Shah and his prime minister, on the one hand, and the two of them and the military, on the other. Meanwhile, religious leaders, particularly Shariatmadari, were working on striking deals with the government behind closed doors to dial down the violence. These tensions also stretched to the SAVAK, which saw the Shah’s efforts at reconciliation as contributing to the unrest.  The security forces viewed the power granted to the prime minister as undermining the SAVAK and the armed forces. What is more, the steps taken by the Shah in 1978, especially the liberation of political prisoners and increased freedom of speech and of the press, led to more reports surfacing about the SAVAK’s activities, as newly released prisoners 169

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recounted their tales of woe in custody. For his part, Sharif-Emami blamed the challenges faced by the nation on the SAVAK. These conflicting policies and resulting incidents, combined with the internal disagreements and tensions between the Shah, the prime minister’s office, and the military, undermined the political and security establishments.102 Despite the growing discontent and the vicious cycle of conflict between the state and its opponents becoming painstakingly obvious, US intelligence and decision-makers continued to see the episode as an imminent footnote in history. Some even conceived of Iran as one of the world’s most stable, powerful, and fastest-growing countries.103 So much so, in fact, that Carter called the country an ‘island of stability’ in a sea of turmoil, crediting the Shah for accomplishing the monumental task of securing the country in a volatile region on 31 December 1977, during what would ironically become the last visit by a US president to Iran.104 Fourteen months later, Senator Proxmire would publicize a letter from the US Department of State. In response to his inquiries about Iran’s stability, he had received the following communication in March 1978, less than a year from the collapse of the monarchy: The monarchy has been an enduring institution in Iran—over 2,500 years—and we believe the vast majority of Iranians favor continuation of this form of government…We cannot predict whether the currently small radical terrorist groups will attempt to exploit the occasion of a changeover to seize power. Their success in any such effort would appear very doubtful. Other political opposition leaders could very well exert their efforts to reduce the power of the monarchy—but not end it.105

Unrest of 1978 The unrest of 1978 began in Qom following the government’s accusations—tapping into Iranians’ distrust of foreign powers— that Khomeini was a tool of foreign influence.106  The state tried to discredit the opposition by purportedly leaking information pertaining to its alleged ties to foreign powers and to justify its crackdown—an approach that Khomeini and his successor would also adopt. An article published on 7 January in the daily newspaper Ettela’at cast a wide 170

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array of disparaging accusations at Khomeini and claimed the end of Communist appeal in Iran.107 For example, according to the article, Khomeini was ‘connected to British colonization centers’ and was determined to install an imperialist system in Iran. The effort backfired and, on 9 January, thousands of angry residents rioted in Qom out of loyalty to Khomeini.108 Protestors chanted, ‘death to the Shah,’ as the army was called in to quell the unrest—killing multiple people in the ensuing violence.109 At the same time, in Tehran, a series of bombs and boycotts targeted Jewish and Bahai’i citizens. The violence coupled with the content of the article forced Shariatmadari’s hand (he was then the chief marja’ or foremost Islamic jurist) to condemn the Shah’s response.110 Shariatmandi’s condemnation of the Shah’s crackdown in Qom had serious ramifications in Tabriz, his home city—and one of the more politically active large population centers in Iran. Following the unrest, more violent demonstrations broke out in Tabriz. On 18 February, an enraged crowd turned a general strike into an anti-Shah demonstration, leading to fire incidents throughout the city.111 With considerable difficulty, security forces regained control of the city—and the Shah, instead of ordering a violent crackdown, conducted relatively peaceful investigations into the causes of the demonstration. However, the government’s solution to its Khomeini problem was once again counterproductive. In fact, it ‘sparked precisely what the Shah intended to prevent.’112 Far from isolating the Ayatollah, it served to rally around Khomeini ‘reluctant clerics’ whose silence would likely have been interpreted not simply as collaboration with the monarch against one of their own but as undermining Islam.113 Leveraging his newfound position of strength, Khomeini clutched the opportunity to bring the ongoing anti-Shah Communist and nationalist protests into ‘spectacular mass Islamist rallies.’114 The Tudeh Party’s first secretary, Iraj Eskandari, ‘applauded from exile’ the anti-Shah movement and called for a united front against the government.115 He also ‘praised Khomeini.’116 The Shah’s counterproductive approach to Khomeini was obvious to many, particularly Shariatmadari and other senior clerics. They perceived both Khomeini’s activism and the state’s use of force and propaganda as problematic. 171

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Following the suppression of the protests in Tabriz, what was fast becoming a revolution spread across Iran, with particular intensity in Tehran in May that year. The Shah’s security advisors were indecisive. For example, troops were initially called into the field but were then recalled back to base. But for the moment, the strategy seemed to work.  The anniversary of 15 Khordad, on 5 June 1978, passed ‘without incident.’117 The rest of June saw the Shah institute mild reforms in the SAVAK and meet with Iranian liberals, as well as the passage of relatively peaceful protests without deadly crackdowns. Both sides of the revolution were also waiting to gauge international support for the Shah. The calm lasted for nearly two months. But on 20 July, riots broke out once again, this time in Mashhad—following the death of a cleric in a road accident.118 The moderate clergy, led by Shariatmadari, remained largely inactive.119 On 1 August, a wave of major riots swept through Esfahan, causing martial law to be instituted once again. On 10 August, more unrest in Esfahan and the imposition of military rule set off a cascade of demonstrations and violence across Iran. As the month of Ramadan progressed, the violence intensified. On 27 August, the Shah replaced Prime Minister Jamshid Amuzegar with the notoriously corrupt and widely disliked Jafar Sharif-Emani. Massive demonstrations and riots—with the notable exception of those on 4 September, in Tehran—of an increasingly bold and violent nature followed. On 7 September 1978, the Shah reinstituted martial law across Iran. Massive riots and strikes followed once more. On 10 August, the Shah gave his final televised statement in Iran. He promised colossal and systematic liberalizing reforms. As he addressed the nation, he acknowledged the unrest and the populace’s grievances. ‘I have also heard the message of your, the Iranian nation’s, revolution,’ he said in one of the most emblematic phrases to have been uttered by any public figure during the revolution.120 And he pledged to lead the monarchy to respect the boundaries set by the Constitutional Revolution, thus transforming his country into a true constitutional monarchy as envisioned by the framers. He promised to install a government, accountable to the people and free of corruption. However, for the protestors and many others, the Shah’s olive branch came too late. The Shah’s words no longer bore the significance they once did, and the populace was not looking for mere reforms 172

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anymore. It was now pushing for a complete transformation.121 Less than ten days after the Shah’s speech, the southwestern city of Abadan—whose importance in the Iranian oil industry had led it to become a fairly developed and Westernized city, home to European expatriates and Iranian technocrats—became the stage of one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in modern history.122 On 20 August 1978, four individuals associated with the Islamists locked the doors of Cinema Rex and set the movie theater on fire. Approximately 400 people perished in the attack, burned alive. Until then, Abadan had largely avoided the revolutionary activities witnessed in other cities. The revolutionaries blamed the incident on the SAVAK—a narrative many readily bought as the organization’s reputation was already sullied.123 For its part, the government declared that ‘fanatics’ had carried out the attacks as they battled ‘all signs of modern living and Westernization in Iran.’124 Some contemporary reporting pointed to other possible culpable groups, including the MeK.125 Copycat attacks against similar targets occurred on a smaller scale in the days that followed.126 The attack remains a source of controversy, with some claiming that its origins are still mysterious and others pinning it on the Islamists—following the 27 February 1933 Reichstag fire playbook.127 In the weeks that followed, the Shah’s speech did nothing to quell public anger. In the face of mounting unrest, the Shah declared a military government led by General Qolam-Reza Azhari on 6 November 1978. The Cinema Rex fire coupled with increasingly common violent street protests, suicide bombings, and other acts of political violence perpetrated by revolutionary elements precipitated the Shah’s sudden swing from liberalization to military rule. December that year coincided with the month of Muharram, which would see the end of the monarchy in Iran.

Muharram 1978 The military government helped mitigate the instability and riots for two weeks but, by then, Khomeini had imagined the next stage of what had now become his movement. Muharram framed the next and final stage of the revolution.128 Muharram was the ideal time and symbol for the religious revolutionaries, who were increasingly using Shia imagery 173

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to advance their movement. During that month, the faithful would typically adorn public spaces and their own clothes with religious symbols and the colors green and black, those associated with the Prophet Muhammad’s family and mourning respectively. Processions took place on the streets and in squares, mosques, and other public spaces. The month also provided a number of occasions for protestors to gather, as it was punctuated anniversaries, including the ninth and tenth days of the month, respectively known as Tasu’a and Ashura. All this made Muharram a powerful symbol and produced a fantastic galvanizing effect for the revolutionaries. Tapping into a traditional society’s religious zeal and linking the Iranian nation’s struggle in the twentieth century to that of Hussein centuries prior, Khomeini and his men were able to draw large crowds to their events. Faith served to connect the masses to Khomeini. Shia Islam functioned as the common denominator between many different opposition groups, whose ideologies did not otherwise share much overlap. Ironically, it was the Shah who had legalized the celebration of Muharram in 1941 in an attempt at compromise with the clergy.129 The Pahlavi state had extended a large number of government holidays during Muharram, swelling the protests.130 That year, ‘the religious leadership called for marches instead of the traditional mourning processions.’131 The ideological vigor of Shariati came to the fore only a year after his death. From the first night of Muharram, thousands of Iranians, draped in white to symbolize their willingness to be martyred, defied curfew.132 Marches of  increasing size, by some estimates reaching as many as two million people in Tehran, met mixed reactions from security forces until the army responded mid-month.133  The army’s reprisals were brutal and widespread. Meanwhile, the Shah was failing to negotiate a peaceful settlement to the unrest with Karim Sanjabi, the leader of the National Front.134 Atrocities were commonplace in the army’s response. In Esfahan, people were reportedly gunned down waiting to donate blood for victims; in multiple Iranian cities pro-revolutionary doctors and nurses were attacked at hospitals, and Baha’is, other religious minorities, and foreigners throughout Iran faced unbridled violence. Khomeini claimed that the Shah had killed 60,000 Iranians—a number that appears in the preamble of the Islamic Republic’s 174

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Constitution—while the Bazargan government placed the numbers at 314 casualties for the entirety of 1978.135 The number of the revolution’s casualties remains a source of controversy at the time of writing. Nevertheless, Khomeini’s sensationalist propaganda won the day, and some soldiers with pro-revolutionary sentiments shot and killed their commanding officers and guerillas targeted foreigners— Americans and British in particular.136 Towards the end of the month, the state tasked the National Front member Qolam-Hossein Saddiqi to form a civilian government, but he failed. On December 29 (27 Muharram), Shapur Bakhtiar, another member of the National Front appointed by the Shah, began the maneuvering which would eventually succeed in producing a civilian government.137 In the meantime, the cycle of army attacks on demonstrators and mob reprisals only became more violent. On the last day of 1978, General Azhari, the leader of the military government, resigned, leaving Iran’s civilian government with a total political victory. The government relaxed censorship in early January while it befell to Bazargan to attempt restarting oil and gas production. Other services, such as trash collection, remained at a standstill.138 During early January 1979, the various factions that had started the revolution began to compete amongst themselves for power, having wrested it from the Shah. In mid-January, protestors were placing flowers in the gun barrels of soldiers as the parliament approved Bakhtiar’s cabinet.139 On 16 January 1979, the Shah left Iran, ostensibly for cancer treatment. Two weeks later, on 1 February, Khomeini returned from exile to cheering crowds and newspaper headlines welcoming him back. Upon his return to Iran, Khomeini made some of his most famous remarks before a large cheering crowd at the Behesht-e Zahra graveyard near Tehran. The speech was full of catchy one liners and soundbites, which continue to adorn the murals of major cities and small towns across the land. His remarks concerned the Shah’s tenure, the revolution, and what the nation could expect now that Khomeini was heading the movement. In particular, he argued that the Pahlavi dynasty and the Shah’s government were illegitimate, calling them ‘illegal’ and ‘void.’ He claimed that each generation should be able to determine its own fate and that there was no 175

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reason for the forbearers of the nation to have decided the destiny of his contemporaries.140 In one of the more famous excerpts of the speech, Khomeini returned to the leitmotif of his country’s view of itself and international affairs, one that previous statesmen had also invoked before him, including the very figures whose legacies Khomeini deemed detestable. He accused the Shah, whom he described as a ‘servant’ to the powers—one whose legitimacy only stemmed from the Americans and the British, not from his own people, his own court, or his own army—of having made the nation dependent on foreigners under the guise of reforms. Later, officials in the regime he established would use the same language to describe their neighbors, especially Arab states in the Persian Gulf. As Khomeini put it, the Shah ‘destroyed our country and cultivated our graveyards.’141 He famously declared that he would ‘determine a government and slap this government in the face’ as hundreds erupted into chants of ‘Allahu Akbar.’142 The Ayatollah also warned the people that the powers were plotting a similar design to 1953—albeit without directly mentioning that episode. Finally, Khomeini remarked that, ‘we have given blood […] we have given our dignity’ for the independence of the Artesh.143 He thus called on the Artesh to ‘embrace the nation’ rather than the monarch—the Artesh, he noted, should be with the nation not with America.144 Khomeini’s address was rich in promises made to the nation, promises that were not grounded in reality. Moreover, Khomeini’s platform continued to remain vague. In the words of a declassified CIA memo dated November 1978, a few months earlier: Khomeini’s ambiguity reflects a lack of interest in a specific political program. For him Shia Islam is a total social/political/economic system that needs no further explanation. In addition, he would risk losing support from some key elements of the opposition if he tried to spell out a detailed program of action.145

Among Khomeini’s promises were self-determination and the eradication of Iranian reliance on the United States and Israel—a dependence he claimed the Shah had cultivated through his ‘so-called reforms.’146 As Alexis de Tocqueville had astutely observed when 176

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describing the French Revolution decades earlier,‘[p]eople lost interest in what was in order to dream about what might be.’147 Nevertheless, Khomeini’s remarks introduced the new Iranian leader to his nation and the world—one who vowed to deliver radical change but whose government would ultimately not follow through on these promises. Ten days later, on 11 February, the government of Bakhtiar collapsed. Khomeini had begun mass demonstrations against Bakhtiar on 19 January and, along with Mehdi Bazargan, succeeded in winning the support of the army. Bazargan would replace Bakhtiar. He integrated a considerable number of former National Front officials in his cabinet.148 Finally, on 1 April 1979 the Imperial State of Iran toppled, leaving its place to the Islamic Republic of Iran following a referendum. The revolutionaries claimed they had won 99 percent of the votes in the referendum as many autocrats often do. Many individuals who had voted in the referendum would later recount their experience, noting they had witnessed the revolutionaries throw in fistfuls of pro-Islamic Republic votes for every vote cast against it.149 The Islamists were now fully in control. Their ability to ‘gain control over the remnants of the armed forces’ played an important role in handing them victory over other groups and propelling them into power.150 As Brinton had described in the case of other major revolutions, the extremists succeeded while the moderates failed. To borrow Brinton’s words again, radicals were able to ‘obtain [their] monopoly [over organizations whose control they shared with other groups] by ousting, usually in a series of conflicts, any and all active and effective opponents.’151 In this endeavor, the Islamists would be aided by a war. Soon, however, they would face the challenges of running a country. Internal divisions, pressure to provide services, and threats from abroad began to appear as the transition of power was taking place.

The Return of the Ayatollah Khomeini, now vice regent—a position which he claimed made him a ‘guide’—swiftly consolidated his power and sidelined his opposition.152 Soon, ‘almost all of the revolutionary leaders who could be considered part of the old elite had been pushed outside the revolution.’153 The nascent Praetorian force, the Revolutionary Guards, asserted 177

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themselves as a new and powerful player in the country’s security landscape. They were instrumental in ensuring that the country would not descend into chaos during the transition of power, but played an even greater role in eliminating Khomeini’s opposition. Elements of the Mossadeq-esque ‘negative equilibrium’ were firmly in place as the revolutionaries chanted ‘neither East, nor West,’ a slogan that would later adorn the entryway of the Islamic Republic’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The revolutionary slogans would leave the realm of political rhetoric to manifest themselves in the country’s new politics and practice of foreign policy when a group of revolutionaries stormed the US embassy. What would become known as the hostage crisis was starkly reminiscent of the events surrounding the storming of the Russian envoy’s residence in Tehran decades prior.

The End of a Partnership: The Hostage Crisis (1979–81) In the final days before Khomeini’s return to Tehran, the Americans on the ground and the Shah’s men considered the different scenarios, their likelihood, and potential implications. The contingency most concerning to them was an assassination attempt against Khomeini— ‘successful or otherwise.’154 Other possible scenarios, they assessed, ranged from peaceful settlement to mass violence and a call by Khomeini to dissolve the government. Nevertheless, the Americans were considering evacuating US nationals, while the Iranians were ‘deeply concerned about the exodus of foreign nationals from Iran. The country’s technical expertise was almost entirely dependent on foreigners.’155 American nationals would soon leave Iran—most of them, for good—and, as the Iranians had feared, this would have grave implications for their country, particularly in the military realm starting in September 1980. For his part, the ailing Shah demanded medical attention to battle his advanced cancer. David Rockefeller, who was then serving as the chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, of which the Shah was an important client, organized a powerful group of former officials, including Kissinger, to convince Carter to admit the Shah into the United States in a campaign codenamed ‘Project Eagle.’156  The Carter administration had been reluctant to do so for months as it sought 178

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to manage the transition of power in Iran. However, despite the risks posed to the embassy personnel in Tehran and for the future of US– Iran relations, the group succeeded in securing the Shah’s move to America.157  The Shah’s admission into the United States further stirred the anger of radical revolutionaries in Tehran. They saw Washington’s move as yet another example of American efforts to influence events unfolding in their country and to eliminate Iranian agency over its own destiny. Meanwhile, in Washington, Carter and his advisors were scrambling to understand what was happening in Iran and to formulate an adequate policy to respond to the events. The United States did, nonetheless, send an envoy to Tehran. It tasked General Robert E. Huyser, who was then serving as the deputy commander-in-chief of the US European Command, with monitoring the situation in Iran and reporting back to the president. Huyser later described his view of US policy regarding the fast-paced events in Tehran in his memoir, Mission to Tehran. He highlighted the dissonance in Washington as follows: After breakfast, I was driven to the American Embassy to meet Ambassador Sullivan. The drive went off without incident, but crowds were gathering and tyres were flaming […]. When I checked in with Ambassador Sullivan he almost immediately handed me a wire he had received from Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance. The message directed that I ignore all previous instructions. It seemed I was not to make contact with the Iranian military leaders as originally instructed. I was to do nothing until I received further word from Washington. This was not a good omen. It was obvious that the State Department had one view of the situation and the Department of Defense and Executive Branch another. One would have thought that by this time the men in charge would have reached some agreement about my mission.158

A Washington Post report from October 1980 also highlighted this discord. According to the report, Carter held on to the notion that the Shah had a future in Iran well after the monarch himself had come to the conclusion that his reign was over.159 The president, the story reported, had advised the Shah to use force to secure the throne while his advisors, particularly then Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance cautioned against deploying such a strong message. In their view, the 179

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threat of destabilizing turmoil and even civil war was looming as the events unfolded. On 4 November 1979, on the anniversary of a massacre at the University of Tehran, several hundred revolutionaries, known as Peyrovan-e khatt-e Imam or the ‘Followers of the Imam’s Way,’ stormed the US embassy in Tehran. They took members of the American diplomatic corps in Iran hostage.160 Unable to maintain the government after liberal factions decided to support the hostage-takers, Bazargan resigned. The hostages remained in the custody of the revolutionary government for 444 days. In the United States, Americans would follow the fate of their diplomats for the duration of their captivity and question how a seemingly disorganized radical mob was able to hold not just American diplomats but the entire US government hostage.161 The hostage crisis would shape American attitudes toward the Islamic Republic and Iran more generally for decades to come.162 As much as the crisis was a manifestation of the deep anti-American sentiment that drove many revolutionaries to overthrow the Shah and held its roots in the deep grievances harbored by many Iranians, it was also a rejection of Bazargan’s foreign policy.163 Although the Iranian public at large did not endorse the hostage-takers’ actions—and even many within the regime questioned the wisdom of  the move—the crisis was a reaction to what the revolutionaries and many other Iranians viewed as decades of American intervention and non-accountability in their country’s affairs, including the 1953 coup. In Iran, the crisis served to strengthen Khomeini internally. Not only did Khomeini gain ground against Bazargan, but also vis-à-vis his more centrist opponents. Having effectively secured his grip on power, Khomeini negotiated the release of the American hostages and, in a sign of the limits of revolutionary zeal, even the more ideological elements of the new regime supported and were involved in the negotiations.164 Abdolhassan Bani-Sadr was elected as the new president of Iran in the winter of 1980. Bani-Sadr would also experience significant pushback from and tensions with the Islamic Republic Party, the party created to advance the Islamists’ cause shortly after the revolution in what was still a diverse pool of power contenders.165 Within a year, he, too, was removed.166 In the meantime, the revolutionary government swung abruptly to the right as Khomeini and his followers gained influence 180

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over the liberal factions. Even before the hostage crisis, the Bazargan government was in control in name only—mob justice was prevalent in many areas as gangs seeking vengeance and social justice roamed the streets of Iran’s cities.167 At the same time, Bazargan’s plan of establishing a new, original set of state institutions failed as other revolutionary quarters fought the proposal. During that time, the judiciary, national education, political institutions, and military and security apparatuses would be systematically overhauled. Khomeini’s men also directly targeted bastions of liberalism and leftist ideologies, particularly university campuses.168 Ultimately, however, Bazargan himself admitted that the purpose of his government was only to quiet the political and economic waters in Iran and transition to the Islamic Republic.169 But he was unable to even accomplish these limited objectives due to Khomeini’s pervasive influence.170

Fallout from the Revolution In the months following the revolution, internal disagreements on the future of the nascent regime would push and pull the revolutionaries in many directions. The emerging institutions marked a departure from those of the Imperial State and those envisioned decades prior by the Constitutionalists. At long last, as they saw it, the revolutionaries were able to overturn decades of advancement they frowned upon, starting with the reforms of the Constitutional Revolution. They sought to turn back the clock on the Constitutionalists’ reforms, especially as they pertained to the judiciary and national education. The two biggest personalities, Khomeini and Bazargan, vied for dominance. A week after the Islamic Republic succeeded the Imperial State of Iran, the revolutionaries created the Islamic Republic Party— whose goal was to consolidate the Islamist faction and pave its way to dominance.171 Soon, the party would begin to object to a number of Bazargan’s initiatives.172 As the Islamists consolidated their power, their base contracted and ‘within a year’s time, the support for the new revolutionary regime had shrunk dramatically to an intensely loyal support base.’173 After Bazargan’s ousting, the Islamists firmly tightened their grip on power, eager to implement policies more fully in line with their objectives and worldview.  The party was now fully 181

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in charge of key institutions, including the Interior Ministry and the Defense Ministry.174 However, as the scholar David Menashri notes, ‘Khomeini could theorize about an ideal Islamic state; once in power, he (and even more so his disciples) realized that they had to make compromises as a pragmatic response to the exigencies of the situation.’175 The revolutionaries were now to govern while managing an international watershed resulting from the hostage crisis. Soon, an interstate war would place an additional burden on the nascent regime, which had to adopt more pragmatic positions to function as a state.176 In fact, even ‘[m]any clerics who had used revolutionary ideology when it served their purposes now were ready to reshape that ideology to fit their new positions of authority.’177 These exigencies ensured some level of continuity with the Imperial State, whose policies the revolutionaries had sought to reverse. The more the revolution progressed and the regime became embedded in the fabric of Iran, the more this trend intensified, continuously decreasing the gap between the Imperial State of Iran and the Islamic Republic of  Iran. Nevertheless, a few substantial changes occurred in that period, which reshaped the Iranian political and security landscapes. Perhaps the most important such development was the formal creation of the Revolutionary Guards on 5 May 1979. Previously, the Guards, a collection of armed guerillas, had prepared for a long ‘popular struggle’ against the Shah. But after the surprisingly short struggle and the monarchy’s collapse, the threat of internal turmoil, coupled with the belief that a Praetorian force needed to balance the Artesh to prevent coups and possible foreign threats, led to the creation of a new security organization. As he recalls in his memoir—which it must be reminded was published in Iran and, therefore, likely amended—General Pejman witnessed the mobs in full military gear on the streets of Tehran, chanting ‘death to the Artesh,’ on 12 February 1979, the day after the monarchy collapsed.178 Pejman describes his reaction to the scene as one of horror, imagining the consequences of the turmoil for the nation’s security. In particular, Pejman was concerned about the mobs acquiring access to weapons and equipment. T   his prompted him to meet with Khomeini and notify him of the risks of the theft of weapons and military equipment. 182

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Pejman depicts the meeting as an affair starting with a great deal of suspicion and misunderstanding.179 Pejman was horrified to see mobs steal weapons and bring them to the streets, while Khomeini and his advisors retorted that the weapons belonged to the people and that the youths would be able to learn how to use them responsibly. After exchanging views and hearing Pejman’s reasoning, Khomeini ceded. He ordered ‘that very hour’ that individuals having removed any weapons and equipment from military bases and facilities were to return them to the appropriate place promptly.180 With this move, Khomeini sought to curtail the guerrilla forces that had helped bring him to power and the state re-established its monopoly over the use of force. This episode appears to be one of the first instances of the revolutionaries deferring to the expertise of the previous security establishment. This did not lead to a less horrific fate for many members of the Shah’s military and security establishment who nonetheless fled the country or stayed there only to be arrested and/or executed. Two days after the meeting occurred, Pejman, too, was arrested. Meanwhile, Iran fell into the same pattern it had experienced with nearly every transition of power since the eighteenth century. Among the country’s ethnic minorities, activist and separatist groups were once again pushing for self-determination.181 And, as had been the case over the previous centuries, these groups were being faced with a hallowed security force. Guerillas prepared for a clash with the Islamists who were now in power and whose newfound position had afforded them the ability to recruit new members and seize large quantities of weapons.182 Simultaneously, economic woes beset the revolution as the previously struggling economy lurched into freefall.183 Strikes and absenteeism coupled with brain drain and capital flight exacerbated the challenges stemming from lawlessness.184  The United States placed the first of what would become an incredibly comprehensive and intricate sanctions regime on Iran in response to the hostage crisis.185 Despite the country’s negligible foreign debt, high oil revenues, and a native industrialized economy, capital flight in 1978–79 left too little liquidity for the economy. In June 1979, the Bazargan government nationalized banks and insurance companies.186 The government 183

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then nationalized a wide spectrum of the Iranian economy, instantly drawing the (courtroom-backed) ire of the West.187 An inefficient government began to further embroil itself in complex nationalization and redistribution schemes and the looming war would exacerbate these issues. Perhaps the most important legacy of the revolution in the arena of international security lies in the new regime’s recourse to statesponsored terrorism as a tool of foreign policy. As we have seen, the Shah had cultivated ties with various non-state actors in the region— chiefly Lebanese Shias and Iraqi Kurds. Building on these ties, the regime would help create Lebanese Hezbollah and the Badr Brigade in Iraq during the 1980s. But Iran would go much further—in large part to compensate for its degrading conventional capabilities following the revolution—to leverage terrorism and insurgency as a tool of its foreign policy under the new regime than it had previously. In fact, ‘the Iranian revolution marked the striking success of radical Shiite Islamism; its influence was both direct, as with Hezbollah in Lebanon, and indirect, facilitating the rise of suicide bombings by the traditional glorification of martyrdom.’188  The glorification of martyrdom and the rise of suicide bombings would be instrumental to the Iran–Iraq War. The fledgling regime faced its first existential threat less than two years after it had been established. On 22 September 1980, Iraq launched a series of coordinated surprise attacks on Iran and started eight years of brutal conflict between the two countries. While it would devastate Iran, the war would help the revolutionary regime consolidate its power and further embed key tents of Iranian security thinking. In the process, the clerics who had largely opposed Khomeini’s activism at first and militancy later were largely sidelined. Many would pay the price of their tacit support for the Shah or refusal to enter politics and explicitly support Khomeini.189

Conclusion The Islamic Revolution was one of the most significant events of the twentieth century. It injected Islam into politics in a way that had not been seen before in the modern world. It shaped the political and security landscapes of the Middle East for decades to come, arguably 184

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contributing to the region’s deep instability and chaos in the first decades of the twenty-first century. However, the revolution was not just the product of discontent with the Shah’s policies. Instead, the revolution began to ferment decades before, during another movement: the Constitutional Revolution. As we saw in the previous chapters, certain factions were already upset with the course of events in their country.When Reza Shah began to implement constitutional reforms, he upset the more conservative factions in Iran—whom Khomeini came to represent decades later. Adding insult to injury, the Shah’s White Revolution left some clerics feeling like they were increasingly losing their grip on power. And as women and religious minorities began to see increased opportunities and presence in public life, parts of the populace and the clergy felt their influence shrink and traditions undermined. On a political level, many of the Islamic Republic’s policies, particularly in the judicial arena, were stark departures from those of the monarchy. However, Iranian collective memory prevailed and became much more deeply embedded in Iranian security and military circles. And this ensured a level of continuity with the previous governments that is often disregarded in the scholarship on Iran. As David R. Collier put it succinctly, ‘Many of the issues faced during the shah’s reign continue to be present today: reform, regional security, stability, terrorism, nuclear power and weapons, transitions from authoritarian rule, and the promotion of democracy.’190 Now that we have reviewed Iran’s history up to the revolution, we will turn our attention to the post-revolution period. The rest of the book strives to contextualize Iranian national security decisions and policies within the country’s modern history, politics, and strategic thinking. The themes that we have extracted from our historical overview of the Qajar period until the Islamic Revolution will manifest themselves throughout the next few chapters as they re-emerge to continue to shape Tehran’s threat perceptions, view of the toolkit at its disposal, and beliefs about itself and the world. As we will continue to see, the events described in this chapter would not culminate with a fundamental break in the nation’s security thinking but rather serve to reinforce existing beliefs, shaping Iran’s behavior right up to the time of writing. 185

5

THEY WERE EXPENDABLE THE IRAN–IRAQ WAR

The Islamic Revolution left Iranian society shaken to its core. As Tocqueville wrote of the 1789 French Revolution, ‘all the agents of the public administration had been replaced overnight, and all its principles had changed […] everyone in [the country] had experienced a small private upheaval. Everyone’s situation had been disturbed, everyone’s habits disrupted, everyone’s work impeded.’1 Tocqueville’s words find a striking parallel in the aftermath of the shock and implications of the revolution in Iran. In the days and months that followed the establishment of the new regime, domestic upheavals took place against the backdrop of the hostage crisis. The population barely had time to adjust to the new regime before it was propelled into an international predicament. It is against this backdrop that Iranians confronted their next national trauma, one that would prove deeply formative for contemporary Iranian security thinking: the Iran–Iraq War. The Iran–Iraq War had its roots in long-held disagreements and simmering tension between the two countries, catalyzed and brought to an explosive climax with the Islamic Revolution. The revolution served both as a cause for concern and an opportunity for Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. By advocating for a Shia revival and calling to export the revolution, Khomeini and his men created new threat perceptions 187

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in Arab capitals.2 These anxieties intensified existing apprehensions regarding Iran’s standing in the region. According to a now declassified US intelligence assessment produced just six months prior to the start of the war: One year after the fall of the Shah, Iran’s leaders appear more determined than ever to export their Islamic Revolution to other countries in the Near East and South Asia. Although internal problems continue to limit Iran’s ability to export the revolution, Tehran radio broadcasts a steady stream of propaganda every day to Iran’s neighbors […]. Iran’s revolutionary rhetoric and its actions in the last year have greatly alarmed its neighbors. The Arab states of the Persian Gulf region have been the most visibly disturbed. Iraq has initiated a program of aid to dissidents inside Iran in order to weaken the Khomeini regime and prevent it from actively subverting Iraq’s majority Shia Muslim population.3

It must be noted that the authors of this document seem to have taken the regime’s rhetoric at face value. However, what is clear is that they were not the only ones: Iran’s Arab neighbors also interpreted the words coming out of  Tehran as indicating a serious pursuit by the country’s leaders of the export of the revolution. The revolution had left Iran divided and weak. The developments stemming from the transition of power—including the struggle for leadership and the purges within the security and military establishments—combined with the isolation created by the hostage crisis and the loss of the partnership with America, left Iran vulnerable. According to a 1987 RAND study, by the start of  the war in September 1980, the revolutionaries had purged 12,000 military personnel—a number that climbed to 23,000 (17,000 of whom were officers) by 1986.4 The revolutionaries targeted all the services but the ground forces were hit the hardest along with law enforcement, while the navy was least affected due to its distance from most urban centers.5 These developments presented Saddam Hussein (1937–2006) with an opportune moment to reopen the border dispute file and, at the same time, seize control of oil-rich territories in Iran’s southwestern province of Khuzestan, home to the country’s Arab minority. In Baghdad’s calculations, an early victory over the nascent regime in Tehran would put the revolutionary leadership in its place and check 188

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the Iranians. Saddam viewed Iranians as one of his top adversaries, along with Jews and the United States. Eliminating or reducing the Iranian threat, in turn, would allow Saddam to assert his leadership over the Arab world. Saddam imagined a swift victory.6 But he did not ultimately meet any of his objectives. The quick campaign he had planned for turned into a devastating eight-year war, one that would leave hundreds of thousands of casualties and billions of dollars in damage on both sides of the border, without resulting in regime change on either side or even any territorial gains or losses. In the end, what Saddam envisioned as a prompt political and military victory for himself and defeat for Iran would help the Islamic Republic consolidate itself and, ultimately, outlast Saddam’s regime. And as we will see in the final chapter of this book, with his fall, Saddam’s worst fears became reality as Iran would gain ground in Iraq and became a decisive player in the country for decades to come.7 Not only would the war help Khomeini and his men strengthen and assert their power, it would also draw the contours of their security thinking and new military doctrine.8 And this strategy and doctrine would particularly manifest themselves in Iraq two decades after the war. Known as ‘the Sacred Defense’ or the ‘Imposed War’ in Iran, the bloody conflict became a vehicle embedding the lessons of nearly two centuries of few conquests and many defeats for Iranians. So critical was the war even in its early days to Iran that IRGC and Artesh commanders rapidly recognized the importance of documenting it extensively, taking steps to record it even as it was unfolding.9 From Iran’s perspective, the conflict highlighted its deep isolation and otherness in the region, as most regional players sided with Iraq. Iranians would point to their experience in the war as reasons why they should increase their strategic depth, deter their adversaries, and prepare for defense.10 The lessons of the war frame the thinking of Iranian decision-makers and military planners today. For many of them, thinking about the war is not a simple academic exercise, but a trip down memory lane to their time on the battlefields in their formative years.  The war’s lessons now inform Iranian military strategy and operations, foreign policy, and diplomatic efforts. Just as the war has become an integral part of the Iranian psyche, historical experiences also deeply impacted the country’s war effort. 189

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In writing about their ‘core beliefs’ about the war, the Revolutionary Guards refer to the two Russo–Persian Wars and note that while studying modern Iranian history, ‘we constantly face the humiliating defeats of  Iran.’11  They invoke the two ‘disgraceful’ treaties of Golestan and Turkmenchay, which removed ‘vast parts of our golden lands.’12 They also refer to Iran’s loss of Afghanistan and Bahrain before and after those two wars. Invoking these past humiliating losses, the Guards establish their belief that they had a near sacred vow to their country to bring the Iran–Iraq War to term without losing an inch of territory, and to do so despite the ‘Socialist and Imperialist’ backing from outside powers for their adversary.13 The lessons from Iran’s previous modern wars shaped its view of the Iran–Iraq War, which, in turn, embedded these lessons into the country’s security thinking. For Iran’s armed forces, the notion that their country did not seek conquest, but strove to avoid defeat, was primordial.

The W   ar’s Origins The Iran–Iraq War officially started on 22 September 1980. But its causes were long-running and multifold, reaching back nearly half a century by some accounts, and hundreds of years by others.14 First, the ethnic overlap and resulting differences between the two countries were a cause of persistent conflict. Saddam endeavored to lead his country as the flagbearer of the Arab world embroiled in a struggle against the Persian world. As Jerrold M. Post wrote in a political psychology profile of the dictator, ‘conflating the concept of self and state,’ Saddam saw Iraq as ‘the only Middle Eastern state capable of achieving the proper place for the Arab nation in history.’15 Saddam viewed the United States, ‘the international Jewish conspiracy,’ and Iranians as his three key adversaries and threats to his power and the pan-Arab nation.16 Second, and more pragmatically, Saddam strove to assert his country as the dominant military power in the Middle East. Defeating Iran would both remove what had been the region’s principal power (besides Israel) and provide Iraq unfettered access to the Persian Gulf, thereby strengthening its strategic position. With Great Britain 190

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announcing its withdrawal from the Middle East in 1968, the Shah was able to expand his sphere of influence to include the entire Persian Gulf, which irked Saddam.17   When the British completed their withdrawal from the Gulf in 1971, Iran was a military powerhouse in the region and remained so until the collapse of the Shah. As a result, Tehran’s position remained largely unchallenged. However, the revolution and subsequent reduction in Iranian military strength afforded Saddam both the opportunity and the incentive to launch an offensive. The revolutionaries not only purged the Iranian military, which reduced raw fighting strength, but also fractured it to avoid a potential military coup.18 At the same time, many of the Shah’s military reforms handicapped the battlefield capabilities of the armed forces even prior to these developments. On the eve of the revolution, the Iranian military lacked meaningful horizontal communication and training. And the revolution only exacerbated these shortcomings.19 Baghdad seized the opportunity afforded to it by Iran’s internal chaos following the revolution, the ongoing international watershed surrounding the hostage crisis, which put an abrupt end to the US– Iran partnership, and the near collapse of Iran’s security apparatus— including the ongoing purges within the military and the closing of the SAVAK.20 Now, Iraq’s adversary was no longer the Shah’s military powerhouse which enjoyed the backing of the world’s most powerful nation, but a disorganized revolutionary regime with a dismembered security apparatus and patchy armed forces. Infighting over the postrevolutionary order, the lack of experience in governance and national security, and loss of alliances and partnerships further dominated the Iranian security and military landscapes. Furthermore, by antagonizing the United States in the hostage crisis, Iran deprived itself of its support, which directly translated into challenges pertaining to the maintenance of its largely US-made arsenal.21 In fact, in the months leading to the war, the Americans were debating the best course of action to deal with the Iranian situation, particularly the release of the hostages. Some, chiefly National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, argued that Khomeini and his men would likely be undeterred by economic pressure and diplomatic action—instead provoking international blowback. The solution, 191

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as Brzezinski explained, was to increase US leverage through some form of military action.22 ‘I have set up,’ Brzezinski wrote in a memo to President Carter, ‘a very small, tightly held group to see whether we could somehow mesh covert political action designed to create an alternative to Khomeini with a series of military steps which contribute to that end.’23 Third, like many other Arab rulers, Saddam Hussein felt threatened by the new regime’s revolutionary rhetoric, centered on the idea of a Shia revival, led by a leader seeking to liberate the ‘oppressed’ masses and overthrow the corrupt governments of the region. Saddam was particularly sensitive to this narrative, as his rule, although secular, was based on the domination of the Sunni minority over the Shia majority in Iraq. This exclusion from power combined with the Shias’ concentration in the economically disadvantaged but oil-rich south had already led them to become more restive in the mid-1970s. Exacerbating Iraqi threat perceptions stemming from Khomeini’s fiery rhetoric regarding the exportation of the revolution was Iran’s assistance to Shia guerillas.24 Just months before the start of the war, Iranian-backed militias, known as al-Dawa, undertook failed assassination attempts in Iraq—as Khomeini called on Iraqis to wake up and topple their ruler.25 Fourth, the personal relationship between Khomeini and Saddam was particularly antagonistic. Saddam’s sponsorship of leading opponents of Khomeini’s new regime only exacerbated these existing tensions. Already prior to the revolution in Iran, the two countries considered domestic changes next door as a threat to their own stability and security and cultivated groups aligned with their own interests. For example, an Arab nationalist regime in Iraq replaced a friendly monarchy in July 1958 following a military coup.26 The Shah saw this transition of power as a threat to his own reign and Iranian national security.  Then, in 1963, a military dictatorship overthrew and replaced the Iraqi government. In 1968, the Baathists carried out a coup and won full control of the Iraqi government.The Shah cultivated ties with non-state groups to increase its influence in Iraq. Unsurprisingly, the new regime in Iraq did not have a positive view of the Shah and did not seek good relations with him. He embodied what Saddam disliked: a monarch and a Persian. Likewise, the Iranian 192

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revolutionaries harbored a distrust and dislike of their Arab nationalist neighbors and their vision of an Islamic Republic ran counter to the ideals of the Baathists in Iraq. Soon after taking power, the new Iranian government began to agitate for revolt in Iraq’s Shia south in the early months of 1980. Khomeini, however, did not expect Iraq to respond by invading his country.27 Fifth, Iran and Iraq had only recently resolved a border dispute which had already nearly sparked a military confrontation between them. Yet, the two countries had clearly failed to close the file once and for all. Iran and Iraq had a longstanding border dispute over what the Arabs know as the Shatt al-Arab and the Iranians as Arvand Rud. This dispute ran back to the time of Reza Shah, with the creation of the modern state of  Iraq in 1932, following its independence from Britain. In order to increase the viability of the new state they had created, the British supported the Iraqi claim to the full width of the Shatt alArab—most river borders run along the thalweg, or low-point.28 On 29 April 1969, following failed negotiations to resolve the border dispute between his country and his neighbor, the Shah ‘unilaterally abrogated’ the treaty demarking the Iranian bank of the river as the border by sailing a contingent of warships down the contested length of river.29 Iranian military muscle enforced the new border, the thalweg.30 Adding to the tensions concerning the nature of the regimes in power, leadership quarrels, and the border disputes were a set of regional matters. In 1971, the Shah further disturbed the Baathist regime by asserting himself on a set of small islands off the coast of the soon-to-be United Arab Emirates—the two Tunbs and Abu Musa, located by the strategically critical Strait of Hormuz—and throughout the 1970s, the two were on opposing sides of the civil war in Oman. Iraq broke diplomatic ties with Iran which, in turn, severed ties with Iraq. Following a tense two-year period of armed clashes at the border, occasionally involving large numbers of troops, the two resumed diplomatic relations in 1973.31 At the same time, mutually threatened, Iraq and Iran began to procure increasingly large stocks of arms from the Soviet Union and the United States respectively—thus fueling their respective security dilemmas.32 Iran, Israel, and the United States also opened a proxy front in Iraqi Kurdistan against the Baathist regime. By 1975, there were direct 193

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clashes between Iranian and Iraqi units.33 Saddam was aggrieved by this revolt in the north, which drew him into negotiations with the Shah.34  The talks concluded in Algiers in 1975.  The Shah would receive Iraqi recognition that the border lay on the thalweg of the Shatt al-Arab and both countries would discontinue their support for each other’s Kurdish movements. Iraq, however, would comply with the agreement only until it had built up enough strength and its adversary weakened sufficiently to seemingly change the balance of power.35 Having established the causes of the conflict, the rest of this chapter briefly outlines the events shaping the war before discussing its implications for Iranian security thinking. As a reminder, I do not seek to write a military history of the war—a task which many scholars and historians cited throughout this chapter have already undertaken and accomplished in a number of journal articles and monographs published in the United States, Europe, and Iran.

The Stages of the W   ar The eight-year war can roughly be divided into three main phases, each longer than the one before it. Both sides made a number of miscalculations that led to this outcome. The first stage, Iraq’s offensive, covers the brief timeframe immediately after the start of the war in which Saddam’s forces won victories in Iranian territory. This stage of the war saw much of  Iran’s critical military infrastructure destroyed—however, Iraq quickly depleted its forces. In the next year and a half, Iran pushed Saddam’s army out of its territory. Then, in what is often viewed as not just a strategic mistake, but a symbol of the revolutionaries’ suicidal tendencies and irrationality, the Iranian leadership chose to invade Iraq to deter Saddam from attacking the country again. Finally, after both sides respectively tried and failed to seize each other’s territories, they largely continued a war of attrition and ended the conflict in a stalemate.

The Approach to War: 1979–80 In the lead-up to the war, Saddam held designs to quickly establish Iraqi dominance in the region, and assert Iraqi prominence in pre194

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existing border claims, including to ‘reclaim’ Khuzestan. He can, therefore, be counted as the aggressor both in proximate and ultimate terms. However, the immediate pre-war period saw a number of border skirmishes, as the revolutionary regime engaged in a series of clashes with the Iraqi military. These served to catalyze the start of the conflict.36 Skirmishes on the Iran–Iraq border began in the summer of 1979. By the following summer, the conflict was brewing in earnest.37 In June, the Iraqis were scanning Iran’s defenses in anticipation of an offensive. September saw a fast-paced rush to war after the Iranians began to shell Iraqi positions by the border—from villages that Iraq seized by force just days later.38 On 8 September, the conflict would escalate further when the Iraqis shot down an Iranian F4 and captured its pilot.39 Five days later, Iraq’s chief of staff announced that his country had ‘settled [its] dispute with Iran concerning the land differences.’ The following day, Tehran announced that it would abrogate the Algiers Agreement.40 The Iraqis responded by abrogating the Algiers Agreement themselves on 17 September.41  The Iran–Iraq War would start five days later.

Phase 1: Iraq’s Offensive (1980) Both militaries entered the war fractured, with considerable troop strength drawn from sources other than their traditional militaries. In Iraq, the People’s Army provided a large number of troops and, in Iran, the nascent Revolutionary Guards and the Basij—a volunteer force operating under the umbrella of the IRGC—comprised large parts of Iran’s military strength. The IRGC remained a ‘people’s army’ for the length of the Iran–Iraq War.  Tehran provided minimal training and light weaponry to large numbers of volunteers, before sending them to the front. The Basij, the Guards’ less-professional cousins, relied on child soldiers with even more negligible training than the Guards. Both relied heavily on propaganda to create fanatical forces ready to put their lives on the line, including by carrying out suicide missions. The Iraqi military suffered from a number of shortcomings—many of them self-inflicted and not dissimilar to those of  its adversary. For example, as was the case in Iran, after Saddam came to power, 195

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he purged many capable officers and replaced them with loyal but unqualified junior officers. These coup-proofing efforts would stymie battlefield effectiveness for both armies.42 For its part, Iran was only just recollecting itself after the revolution. Purges had reduced the strength of the Artesh in all three domains in terms of overall troop strength, unit and overall cohesion, and equipment available to the troops.43 However, augmenting the strength of the regular Iranian armed forces were the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij, both of which would rapidly expand in the coming years. The rapid growth of the IRGC would lead to some tensions between the new force and the Artesh. The IRGC sought to forge and strengthen its own identity in relation to that of the Artesh, further highlighting these strains.44 As then-speaker of majles, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, described it: The spectacular victories of […] 1981–82 placed our armed forces in a new position.The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps had grown rapidly and, using the spoils from the battlefields and thanks to the people’s backing et cetera, it had become a great and effective military power. As a result, it was requesting to play the leading role in the military and even non-military stages.  The Islamic Republic’s Artesh, which had also proven its effectiveness and competence in war and defense, and in the field, air, sea, and logistics, and had shown its loyalty to the revolution, did not [feel like] it deserved to be underestimated in military matters and to be relegated to the backseat or even to even be given the role of advisor to the newly established armed forces. For the management of war, the Artesh and Sepah both wanted to play the leading role and given the differences in training, spirits, values, normally there were differences in opinion regarding the effectiveness of the management, offense and defense, and use of equipment.45

During the first four months of the war, Iraqi forces took territory in Khuzestan and tried to progress further into Iran. They ultimately settled upon a defense of the territory they held in response to a military stalemate. The invasion began on 22 September 1980 with Iraqi airstrikes on Iranian airbases while nine Iraqi divisions crossed into Iran.46 The Iraqi units were divided into three prongs of attack, southern, central, and northern, and made rapid gains in the face of the largely successful surprise attack.47 196

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As a result of purges, desertions, retirements, and reduced terms of conscription in the wake of the revolution, in addition to active operations against a Kurdish separatist movement, Iran could only muster up two undermanned and underequipped divisions and brigades against Iraq.48 The most effective Iranian units were mostly concentrated in the north along the Soviet frontier, hundreds of miles away from the invasion.49 Iran only had 120 tanks with which to meet the initial attacks. Furthermore, the computerized system tracking spare parts domestically had broken down during the chaos following the revolution, leaving the country with few to no spare parts for the vast majority of its planes, armored personnel carriers, tanks, and artillery.50 Iraq overwhelmed Iranian resistance but soon became bogged down by small bands of Iranian fighters as Iranian society mobilized against the foreign invading force.51 Within two weeks of the outbreak of war, Brzezinski diagnosed the conflict accurately in a memo to President Carter: ‘The war is likely to be one of attrition. Iraq has bitten off more than it can chew, not to speak of digesting. Iran will not acquiesce to this. Accordingly, the conflict will be destructive.’52 Perhaps cognizant of the fact that the campaign would not be as quick and decisive as he had hoped, Saddam requested a ceasefire from Iran following the cessation of the initial offensive. The Iranians did not respond. Having failed to halt the conflict, Iraqi troops pushed ahead into Iranian territory, albeit at a slower pace than before. On 24 October, Khorramshahr fell after a two-week siege. The Iraqi army seemed to be making dents. But soon, and in a sign of events to follow, the Iraqis encountered a staunch resistance, one they had not adequately anticipated.53 As early as 19 November, Iran managed to secure its first victory over the Iraqi forces at Susangerd.54  This all but halted the Iraqi advance into Iran, which had covered roughly 70 kilometers at the farthest— though at most points, it was closer to 20 to 30 kilometers.55 The fronts on land stalled while Iran and Iraq dueled for air supremacy and dominance in artillery. The initial Iranian counterattack provided Iran with a valuable lesson, as the first incidence of inter-armed forces cooperation did not occur on the Iranian side until the 27 November launch of Operation Morvarid.56 The Iranian navy, which 197

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was left relatively unscathed from both the original Iraqi attack and the revolution’s purges, managed to completely stop the flow of oil out of Iraq through the Persian Gulf. Since the beginning of the war, aerial combat had swung overwhelmingly in favor of Iran, which was able to establish nearcomplete air superiority within a month of  the attack. Iraq’s air defense system at the war’s onset largely relied on the People’s Army launching surface-to-air missiles and was largely inadequate to deal with Iranian attacks.57 Iraq’s system of target acquisition was also limited given its reliance for the most part on human intelligence, so that ‘some… aircraft were returning to Iraq with their bomb loads after not finding their targets.’58 By 1981, Saddam called a complete halt to offensive Iraqi airstrikes. Saddam had also failed to instigate revolts either among Khuzestan’s Arabs or in Tehran as he had hoped.59 Similarly, he misjudged the reaction of the Arab world, which, despite providing Baghdad with extensive financial support, collectively declared its neutrality—and in the cases of Libya and Syria announced sympathies withTehran. For their part, the Iranians would lament what they perceived as overwhelming Arab support for Iraq for decades to come—a perception that would further contribute to their feeling of otherness in the region and the need to be constantly on the defensive and achieve self-reliance.60 By some accounts, Syria and members of the Palestine Liberation Organization leadership provided Iran with intelligence about Iraqi operational planning before Saddam’s attack on Iran. This would help cement the Tehran–Damascus alliance for decades to come and prompt the former to commit to the Assad regime’s defense in 2011.61 By November, Saddam publicly conceded that he did not plan to annex Khuzestan. On 7 December 1980, he declared a defensive strategy ending Iraqi offensives further into Iran.62 He also revised his war aims, limiting them to the maintenance of the front rather than the assertion of Iraqi dominance. The Iranians had declared their will to ‘fight against [Iraq] right to the end,’ which Khomeini clarified as the removal of Saddam.63 Iraq had succeeded in seizing 10,000 square miles of territory across roughly half of the Iranian border.64 Y   et, as Saddam’s offensive ground to a halt, the Revolutionary Guards were gaining valuable experience in 198

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battle and were quickly forming into a force which would pose a major threat to Iraq.The element of surprise had faded, and the Iranians, now increasingly accustomed to Iraqi armored advances without infantry cover and their weaknesses at night, soon took the offensive into Iraq.65 Even as Iran was steadily turning the tide of the conflict, internal divisions plagued the war effort. Soon, fissures between pragmatists and ideologues would become clearer, but, as a whole, the revolutionaries would start to move toward greater pragmatism.66 As a now declassified CIA paper noted in the middle of the war, ‘[i]f the revolution fundamentally altered Iran’s perspectives, it could not change regional realities or  Tehran’s continuing geopolitical interests.’67 As a result, the split between those decision-makers devoted to their revolutionary ideology and the pragmatists dominated ‘the general jockeying for power in anticipation of the post-Khomeini era, resulting in unsettled and at times contradictory foreign policy.’68 The role of domestic politics in shaping security thinking and policies in post-revolution Iran began to become more prominent as three factions emerged during the war: hardliners or radicals; conservatives; and pragmatists.69 The contest between these factions determined not just Iran’s foreign policy and strategic thinking but also its military operations.70 Nevertheless, the trend was ‘toward a more pragmatic foreign policy.’71 Hardliners believed that then president Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, who spent more time in Khuzestan close to the front than he did in Tehran, was a ‘Bonapartist’ who, if left unchecked, would subject Iran to military rule. Some hardliners thought it ‘preferable to lose half of Iran than for Bani-Sadr to become ruler.’72 Also, the belief of the clerical establishment in the importance of indoctrination in the army was strong. In the words of then prime minister Mohammad Ali Rajai, ‘A maktabi army…is preferable to a victorious army.’73 The Iranian clerical-political establishment, Khomeini included, began to press for an offensive, if only to move Bani-Sadr farther away from the capital. Iran sought to capitalize on Iraq’s failure as the tide of the war normalized. Saddam’s incursion depended on the element of surprise. Iran was arguably in the stronger overall military position at the time of the invasion. However, due to the chaos of the post-revolution period, Tehran was not adequately prepared for Iraq’s offensive—even though 199

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the attack was not a surprise to its command. Decentralized, often uncoordinated systems of command had replaced the Shah’s hypercentralized structure. This made it nearly impossible for Iran to coordinate operations across branches of its military, which was only compounded by the addition of the Revolutionary Guards and the Basij. Khomeini, with whom the ultimate military decision-making power resided, was not versed in military planning, strategy, operations, and tactics. To make matters worse, he often disregarded military advisors, as he viewed the Sharia as an all-encompassing roadmap providing guidance on all matters, including military affairs. When Bani-Sadr was elected president, the previously unhindered Revolutionary Guards were brought under the command of the Artesh, in an effort to tamp down its more radical elements and to exert more centralized control over the armed forces.74 However, by their own commanders’ admission, the Artesh and IRGC were not seeing eye to eye on the battlefield.75 Artesh commanders now had to work closely with a nascent entity, the IRGC, whose revolutionary culture, decentralized organization, and guerrilla tactics were difficult to grasp let alone accept for an established professional military. Deputy Artesh commander Brigadier General Amir Pourdastan reckoned with the operational shortcomings of his country during the war over three decades after the conflict had ended. There were differences in preferences and ‘divergent tastes’ between the Artesh and IRGC, he noted. Each ‘[felt] that they must conduct their operations with their own strategy and theory.’ The Artesh and IRGC did share their command, but they were not necessarily unified on the operational level.76 The Iraqis, too, had significant challenges. Iraq made strategic blunders which hindered the advance of the invading forces on each front. In the south, Iraqi forces attacked Khorramshahr, which resulted in a lengthy and costly battle. On the central front, Iraqi forces crossed the first major heights of the Zagros mountains. But then, failing to establish defensible positions farther than that or to build any type of fortification to entrench their position, they simply stopped where the offensive did. In the north—the region most likely to turn hostile against the Iraqi forces—Iraq only made a cursory 200

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effort. Still, the Iranian counterattack would require considerable innovation and organization.

Phase 2: Iranian Counteroffensive (1981–82) During the second stage of the war, Iran launched a counteroffensive aimed at pushing Iraqi forces out of the country. It initiated its first counteroffensive on 4 January 1981 and by the end of the year was ‘winning battles, gaining ground, and faced no air or naval challenges.’77 The offensive surprised the Iraqis, who had assumed that Iran would not attack until better weather conditions in the spring.78  The offensive did little to push back the front line (six miles around the Susangerd salient) and was, therefore, limited in its impact. In this offensive, the Revolutionary Guards were under the direct command of the Artesh.79 Despite having won a considerable defensive victory against Iran, Iraq did not press its advantage. In the north, Iran was focused on retaking Iranian Kurdistan, which it did in the course of roughly six weeks.80 Iranian units quickly overwhelmed largely unprepared Peshmerga units and exacted fairly brutal reprisals for opposition to the Islamic Republic. The tables would soon turn as Iran would attack Iraq through Iraqi Kurdistan and align itself with separatist Kurdish fighters there. On the northern front, the heterogeneity of Kurdish forces would thereafter mostly be overcome by a mutual enemy found in Saddam’s Iraq. During this time on the central front, Iran focused on smaller, uncoordinated offensives to throw off the Iraqis. There was little coordinated planning. In Saddam’s words, ‘the [Iranian] air force is planning on hitting targets that may not mean anything to the army.’81 Iraq had failed to create an adequate no man’s land between Iraqi and Iranian units and, as a result, the Iranians peppered it with localized attacks. However, by May, the Iranians had fully secured the region around Susangerd. On 27 September 1981, they launched the main body of the counteroffensive from Abadan.82 At 1:30 in the morning, the Iranian forces launched a surprise attack which broke the siege of Abadan. This freed Iran to pursue the offensive. The operation was a resounding success: Iran claimed to have captured or destroyed 500 tanks and other vehicles.83 On 29 201

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November, Iran launched a week-long offensive which succeeded in effectively retaking Bostan. During the offensive, the country for the first time employed a tactic that would play a disproportionate role in shaping the image of the Islamic Republic and the Guards abroad, known as the ‘human wave’ tactic.84 Other militaries, including the Vietnamese, Chinese, Russians, and Japanese, had long employed the tactic.85 It consisted of frontal assaults using densely concentrated infantry formations to break through the adversary’s line. The tactic leveraged Iranian numerical superiority against Iraqi technological advantage—and sought to find the Iraqi units (usually the People’s Army) least-versed in the use of their technologically superior weapons. What made the tactic controversial was its unprotected nature, as well as the military trading cover and concealment for mobility. It exposed the infantry to enemy fire to start a mêlée. What made Iran’s use of the tactic particularly controversial and gruesome was that the Guards reportedly compelled volunteers (often fairly young ones, including child soldiers) to clear minefields and break through adversary lines.86 They did so by promising them martyrdom and rewards in heaven.87 At the same time, Iraq was reeling under the prospect of continued war. Saddam had bet that by this point the revolutionary government would either collapse or settle for peace. Instead, he had to prepare to continue his operations by increasing conscription and outsize weapons purchases. With Soviet and Chinese supplies slack, Iraq turned to Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, the United States, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Jordan, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Greece.88 For its part, Iran saw its position improving with the resolution of the hostage crisis in January 1981 and the influx of foreign weapons that followed: Iranian arms imports nearly doubled in 1981 compared to 1980.89 Additionally, facilitated by Syria, Lebanese volunteers were joining Iran. At the same time, however, the domestic power struggle surrounding Bani-Sadr was intensifying—and unlike Iraq, Iran could not turn to any major power except China.90 Domestically, Iran had to contend with considerable unrest in 1981, as the MeK—now forced into exile—staged a string of bombings and terror attacks. On 28 June, the group targeted the Islamic Republic Party’s headquarters, killing dozens of government officials, including 202

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the head of Khomeini’s political party and chief justice, Ayatollah Mohammad Beheshti, and many of his possible successors.91 Prime Minister Ali Rajai survived the bombing only to perish in another attack mere weeks later, on 30 August, which also killed the president.92 The government, however, pursued the insurgents with a vengeance and killed far more alleged terrorists.93 The unrest spilled over into 1982, when the Communist League briefly gained control of the city of Amol in fighting against the Revolutionary Guards.94 However, the Islamic Republic would await the final days of the war to try to tackle the leftists once and for all. Even within Iran’s government, competing camps vied for legitimacy and control of the military. Bani-Sadr, the most powerful advocate of a measured and professional military response to Iraq’s invasion, was removed as the commander-in-chief of  Iran’s armed forces on 10 June 1981.95 Two weeks later, Khomeini dismissed him from the presidency.96 This move resulted in increased Iranian aggression, leading to the headlong series of advances that followed in the fall of 1981. The next year proved no different, as Iran continued to gain ground with the utmost speed. In March 1982, Iran began its final push to free Khuzestan ending with Iranian success at the Second Battle of Khorramshahr. On 22 March, Iranian forces launched a large and complex offensive from Dezful and captured over 15,000 Iraqi troops, along with large quantities of materiel. Following intense reconnaissance activity, Iranian units in the area had been able to discern where the People’s Army units were located on the Iraqi lines, which had facilitated their advance. The Iranians would continue to target the People’s Army with human wave tactics. Beginning on 30 April, Iran targeted Khorramshahr—ushering in a new phase of the war. On 3 May, Iraq abruptly terminated what could have been a chance for a negotiated peace when it shot down a plane carrying the foreign minister of Algeria, Muhammad Benyahia, in Iranian airspace.97 Clearly, the Iraqis still believed that they could somehow manipulate the war’s outcome to achieve victory. Over the next month, Iran demonstrated conclusively that this would never again be the case, and the last serious chance for peace evaporated before Tehran achieved equilibrium in the conflict. For the Iranians, ‘not only had Saddam not 203

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issued any guarantees for withdrawal from the border regions in his offers, he had even formally claimed that those large regions which had been occupied and the areas that had not yet been occupied had to join the Iraqi soil.’98 On 7 May, Iran launched an offensive across the Karun River into the region of Khuzestan closest to Iraq and, on the 18th, it began the assault of Khorramshahr.99 By 26 May, Iran effectively controlled the city.100 During the offensive, Iran made extensive use of airborne units, as well as helicopter gunships, and relied heavily on the confusion its attacks induced in the Iraqi defenders. The Battle of Khorramshahr would be a significant victory for Iran. In the short-term, it served as a turning point in the war and boosted morale among Iranian troops. In the long-term, ‘Khooninshahr,’ or ‘City of Blood,’ as it would become known, would serve as a long-lasting symbol of the brutality and high stakes of the war, and chiefly, the country’s territorial integrity. On 20 June 1982, Iraq announced that it would withdraw its forces from Iran, effective 29 June.101 The Iraqi army retreated to regroup while the government built extensive fortifications around Basra and recruited hundreds of  thousands of men into the armed forces. Saddam had previously tried to shield his populace from the war—now, he was faced with a defeat unless he was able to expand his military.102 Two days later, Saddam announced that he would pursue a ceasefire with Iran but Khomeini rejected such a proposal, instead advocating ‘war until victory.’103 A state-sponsored biography of Khomeini captured the views prevalent in Tehran at the time: ‘Iran had not started the war. [So] it could not end it.’104 Some have interpreted this decision as evidence of the Islamic Republic’s irrationality.105 However, as they saw it, Khomeini and his men were ‘trying to make rational decisions about the best way to prosecute the war and to consolidate the Islamic Republic.’106 Hence, Iranian leaders made this decision based on their assumptions about the most effective way to deter Baghdad and to secure a guarantee that once the war was over, Saddam would not reopen the file.107 By this point in the war,  Tehran was no longer just thinking about securing the country’s immediate territorial integrity and national unity. Instead, it was balancing the proximate battlefield needs and the long-term considerations that would, in its view, secure the country post-conflict. 204

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Hence, for Khomeini, this decision was not just about bringing the war to an end but about the long-term implications for both national security and regime survival.108 The Guards recognize this episode as one of the greatest persisting controversies surrounding the war effort.109 IRGC sources argue that there are two sets of questions and issues within this premise that Khomeini’s decision to continue the conflict after Khorramshahr was a strategic blunder. First, as the Guards see it, the assumption that Iran could have ended the war at that point entails the hypothesis that Iraq was interested in peace and that if T   ehran agreed to it, Baghdad would have followed through and ended its aggression against the country.110 Iranian political and military sources reject this notion and point to the leadership’s belief that Saddam was not interested in a sustained peace.111 Second, the Guards also reject the supposition that the regional order and international system provided the grounds and means for such an outcome. Instead, they posit that their decision was one based on ‘cost-benefit’ calculations. The sources identify the factors taken into account during the decision-making process. These include the fact that the country had gained the upper hand in the aftermath of Khorramshahr and could not leverage it to turn the tides. They also encompass belligerents’ lack of clarity regarding the future of military operations and the extent to which the operational landscape could change to Tehran’s advantage (the Clausewitizian notions of chance, fog, and friction).112 For the Iranians, their history had shown that no legal conflict termination instrument would ever be as effective as the Clausewitzian (the notions of chance, fog, and friction, as enumerated by Prussian war theorist Carl van Clausewitz) complete overthrow of  the enemy by military means—state-sanctioned sources call out the treaties of Golestan and Turkmenchay as historical events shaping Iranian decision-makers’ strategic considerations in confronting the future of the conflict.113 As Rafsanjani put it in March 1981, his country would not accept a ceasefire until Saddam’s overthrow.114 According to official Iranian sources, Saddam’s own considerations and mindset coupled with the broad support he was receiving from international and regional players indicated that the war would only truly end with Baghdad’s complete defeat.115 205

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By their own accounts, Khomeini and the Revolutionary Guards saw the UN Security Council Resolutions as lacking ‘seriousness.’ For them, the UN body’s failure to clearly outline Iraqi wrongdoing and to blame the responsible party, Saddam, as well as its unwillingness and inability to uphold the peace, fueled Iranian distrust of international law and institutions. As the Iranians saw it, the Iraqi decision to launch an offensive on Kuwait vindicates these analyses and Khomeini’s decision to press on. IRGC sources outline Khomeini’s view of Saddam as a ‘crazy’ ambitious expansionist, who was not to be trusted.116 Khomeini believed that the driver shaping Iraqi behavior lay in the quest for regional and, particularly, Arab hegemony. Moreover, from Tehran’s perspective, ‘other powers’ played a key role in fashioning Saddam’s calculus. They convinced him to follow his ambitions and led him to think that Iran would be an easy but tremendous win.117 Khomeini viewed his country’s strategic thinking as merely defensive. In his own words: We and our country never sought and do not want to attack any country. But after they [the adversary] attacked us, it became  wajib [obligatory under Shia jurisprudence] for us and for everyone to defend [ourselves] and [it was] rationally [obligatory to do so]. We are in a defensive situation […]. Today, we are again entering Iraq for the defense of our country and the defense of our oppressed people. It is to prevent them from attacking Ahvaz and these [regions] […]. And we want to get them [the Iraqis] to the point where they are unable to do so [to target Iranian territories]—this is a defensive [action] we are taking.118

Likewise, responding to allegations of Iranian aggression and concerns expressed by the country’s Gulf Arab neighbors, Khomeini explained his decision to continue the war: Again, all the media and radios either condemn us or scream that [Iran] is a danger to the region; they incite the countries in the region…. Until now, we have frequently explained to the governments in the region that we do not want to fight with you. We are not like that, looking to bully and intervene in another country as soon as we have power. […] Our entry into Iraq was to occupy neither Iraq nor Basra. Our homeland is not Basra or the Levant, our homeland is Islam. We follow Islam. Islam does not allow us to put a Muslim country under our rule. […] All Islamic

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countries must know that Iran is absolutely not interested in them. Iran has everything it needs for its own population and it is not looking to occupy everything. Iran has rebelled for God and will continue for God and, aside from defense, it will not enter a war with anyone.119

Ultimately, Khomeini decided to continue the war to send a strong signal to Saddam and potential future adversaries: any attack on Iran would come at a cost for the perpetrator.  The decision lacked strategic insight and turned out to be disastrous for the country. Yet, while the effectiveness of the Iranian strategy and the wisdom of incurring the costs associated with it are questionable, there is no doubt that this decision was not merely ideological or revolutionary in nature. Instead, the Iranian leadership viewed its course of action in terms of deterrence (and the credibility thereof) and defense. These ideas did not just stem from the Iranian assessments of the adversary but also collective memory—and the belief forged over centuries that conflicts should be terminated on the nation’s terms or that they would either lead to a devastating dismemberment of the territory or be perceived as an invitation for future foreign violations of the country’s territorial integrity and national unity.120 Then Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati connected Persian experiences during the Russo–Persian Wars to the Iran–Iraq War most explicitly: Perhaps it was the experience of the Russo–Persian wars. During the period of the Russo–Persian wars, Abbas Mirza advanced to Tbilisi, meaning that he had retrieved nearly all the territories that we had lost in the first round. In the month of June, he attacked, and it went on until the autumn, because most of his forces, like our war with Iraq, were jihadis—as we would characterize it today Basiji volunteers—and they were thinking about the winter and they returned to their villages and the harvest […]. All of a sudden, the battlefield became empty and Paskovich launched a reciprocal attack and took back a significant part of our territory. Imam [Khomeini] was worried about history repeating itself and he was right.121

Another oft-ignored fissure within the regime would emerge at the same time as the leadership was debating the soundness of pushing into Iraq. The Israeli invasion of Southern Lebanon during the 1982 207

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Lebanon War created an overture for Iran to expand its influence in that country. But with an ongoing war directly challenging Iranian territorial integrity and national security, many within the system believed that the country’s interests would best be served by focusing on the conflict with Iraq.122 As Velayati would later recount: After the conquest of Khorramshahr, Israel attacked Southern Lebanon, the country’s leaders with the exception of Imam [Khomeini] decided to send forces to help the Lebanese. Imam [Khomeini] stated: ‘The road to Jerusalem goes through Karbala’; meaning that you should first manage our own war as our soil has been violated. And he considered this defense above all other matters. Khomeini would ultimately be vetoed. Iran would deploy some forces to support the Lebanese and build on the ties created by the Shah to lay the foundations of Iran’s closest non-state client: Lebanese Hezbollah.123

Phase 3: Stalemate (1982–88) The last stage of the war started with Iran’s invasion of Iraq on 13 July 1982 and continued largely through a stalemate until the war’s conclusion in 1988. Having ejected the Iraqi forces from Iran, Khomeini turned his focus to Basra. According to Velayati, there was a belief within the system that advancing into the Iraqi territory and its occupation (Basra, for example) would lead Saddam to retreat or topple his regime—it is not clear, Velayati notes, that Khomeini shared this view.124 Nevertheless, Iranian forces pushed into Iraqi territory, using intense bursts of human wave attacks, with the Revolutionary Guards and Basij mixed in with regular army units. For the vast majority of the war’s duration, the Revolutionary Guards, and their even less-welltrained counterparts, the Basij, allowed Iran to overcome its manpower deficiency on the battlefield as rapidly as possible. Unable to dispatch as many units as needed as quickly as necessary, the country deployed, often with only weeks of training, hundreds of thousands of fanatical young recruits in Revolutionary Guard units on the front lines. These units were the mainstay of the Iranian human wave tactic, as Iran threw large numbers of poorly trained recruits at the Iraqi army 208

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in the hope that some would break through the adversary’s deep web of defenses. It was in this offensive that Iraq first drew the human wave farther than it could feasibly advance, into a minefield, then destroyed it with artillery. Iran suffered a heavy defeat, but perhaps more significant was the international reaction to the discovery of  Iran’s widespread use of child soldiers.125 As the use of child soldiers cemented the image of the new regime in the minds of foreign observers as a reckless and revolutionary regime, one dominated and led by power-hungry ‘mad mullahs,’ Iranians were watching several key developments unfold. In the wake of the Iranian onslaught, Iraq was no longer merely engaging Iran conventionally and according to accepted rules of engagement. Instead, Saddam turned to alternative means of warfare. Iraq resorted to the use of chemical weapons and bombing population centers. The employment of these means was designed to drag the Iranian population into the battle and to raise the costs of war, thus bringing the regime to the negotiating table to end the war. For Iranians, each of these steps would only reinforce already existing and persistent historical narratives about the nation at war. These narratives and the lessons learned include the need for Iran to constantly defend itself, deter adversaries, and be self-reliant.126  Iranians believe that they were unable to adequately deter the adversary and defend their territory and population due to their isolation and inability to stand on their own two feet during the war. As a result, the regime chose to start or resume key military programs—chiefly, its nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, missile, and drone programs— while cultivating non-state clients as another weapon of war. In the Persian Gulf, Iraq launched the  Tanker  War starting in August 1982, targeting commercial Iranian shipping to disrupt the country’s oil sales and cripple its economy. Saddam also hoped to provoke a response from Tehran, which would in turn drag Washington into the conflict.127 On the battlefields on the main front, Saddam’s men made use of chemical weapons in order to increase the cost of war for the Iranians.128 In the mountains to the north, Baghdad began to target Kurdish populations as they allied with Iran.129 In Iran’s heartland, Iraq launched a series of bombing campaigns and missile attacks, which marked the beginning of what came to be known as the War of the Cities. 209

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This campaign aimed to demoralize the Iranian populace. The W   ar of the Cities was a product of the mutual realization that the war was no longer a contest of military might between two nations’ armies but one of psychological dominance and attrition. Exhausting the population and destroying troop and civilian morale were at the heart of these efforts. These tactics and campaigns came to be emblematic of the war and the stalemate between Iran and Iraq. The use of chemical weapons and the War of the Cities have deeply marked the Iranian psyche and the worldview of its ruling elite.130 Decades later, Iranian decision-makers would often refer to these events—now part of their collective memory—to justify their positions. For example, Khamenei remembered the War of the Cities, the chemical attacks, and the role played by foreign suppliers thus when speaking about the controversy surrounding his country’s ballistic missile activities: There was a time in this country—this very city of  Tehran, where now, with the help of God, you come and go securely and with ease of mind— where [cities] were under Saddam’s missiles. Many of you were perhaps not born.We had no means to defend ourselves. And, this, while everyone helped Saddam. America helped Saddam with these very missiles, defense equipment, and even battlefield plans. Its satellites and others helped. France helped, France provided both missiles and aircraft. Germany helped and provided chemical agents. You know, on many occasions, Saddam’s army did chemical work. How many victims of chemical weapons do we have! How many left this world! Germany helped. It provided chemical agents. Germany would supply them with chemical agents and [the Iraqis] made chemical bombs. Maybe sometimes they even gave them chemical weapons. Everyone helped. We were emptyhanded. We had no materiel. As a result, we started to think that, well, we must build defensive materiel. We started, we started. We started from scratch.131

In February 1984, Iran launched two major offensives, one on the central front and one in the south aimed at capturing Basra in response to the intensification of the war. From Iran’s perspective, these offensives would help repel the Iraqis—yet both failed to accomplish their objectives and cost Iran tens of  thousands of casualties. In response, Saddam attacked Dezful with Scud missiles.132 Also in February, Iran 210

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attacked and managed to seize the Island of Majnoon in southern Iraq, a considerable source of Iraqi oil. In the counteroffensive, Iraq used chemical weapons, which Iranian sources claimed Iraq had been using throughout the offensive.133 At the end of Operation Kheibar in the spring of 1984—which ended with an Iranian victory and the country seizing Majnoon Island— Khomeini characterized his country’s defense policy as follows: I, too, know that we have seen much damage, given many young [lives], but to make peace with someone who will then stab you in the back even harder, is this an honorable peace? Is it a rational peace? […] If we retreat today, we would have [allowed for] Islam to be defeated. Today, we cannot retreat. Today, we cannot make peace with these [individuals]. On the one hand, these [individuals] make peace and, on the other, they commit crimes. Well, they are not peace-seekers, they lie.134

The rest of 1984 was relatively calm, with both sides reorganizing their militaries and taking care of logistics in preparation for the next round of fighting. Iran debated the merits of continuing the war and, again, chose to push through. January 1985 saw the first Iraqi offensives in over a year, in an attempt to dislodge the Iranian forces from the Island of Majnoon. In March, Iran struck back, again trying and failing to push towards Basra.135 On 11 March 1985, Iraqi planes struck Isfahan, Tabriz, Qazvin, Shiraz, and  Tehran.136 In response, Iran launched missiles at Baghdad. On 19 March, Saddam declared the entirety of Iranian airspace to be a war zone and a viable target for Iraqi airstrikes.137 On 9 February 1986, Iran launched a major offensive with over 150,000 troops involved. It managed to seize Faw, cutting Iraq off from the Persian Gulf. In December 1986 through January 1987, although first rebuffed, Iran gained considerable ground near Basra—in the two weeks between 24 December 1986 and 8 January 1987, an estimated 40,000 Iranians and 20,000 Iraqis were killed.138 In response, Iraq increased its attacks on Iranian civilian targets. Thousands of Iranians died in major cities across Iran’s western regions.139 As Iraq achieved air superiority, Iran increasingly resorted to launching Scud missiles at Baghdad in response to Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil installations. Then, in response to a successful Iranian offensive around Basra, Iraq killed an 211

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estimated 3,000 Iranian civilians between January and mid-February 1987 in airstrikes and missile attacks.140 Iranian victories around Faw in 1986 further entrenched Khomeini in his position, as Rafsanjani promised victory by Persian New Year (March 1987).141 This raised the stakes considerably on the points both of victory and regime control and, therefore, stability and viability. Khomeini would not only be proven wrong, he would also find himself in an intractable position following a string of easy Iraqi victories, which largely pushed the front back to the pre-war borders. In the spring of 1987, the Tanker War took another turn in favor of Iraq as both the United States and the Soviet Union pledged to protect Kuwaiti tankers carrying Iraqi oil. On 17 May 1987, Iraqi aircraft struck the USS Stark and killed thirty-seven American service members. This did not deter the Americans from supporting the flow of Iraqi oil and, less than two months later, eleven re-flagged Kuwaiti vessels left port under the American flag, escorted by US warships.142 In July, France, too, transferred an aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf. On 11 August 1987, the United Kingdom and France announced their intention to send minesweeping craft to the Persian Gulf. Later that month, Iraq intensified its attacks on Iranian tankers. By early fall, US and British forces were drawn into open combat against Iranian vessels. In October, the situation deteriorated further, Iran firing on tankers flying the American flag. Soon, a number of countries would be involved in the Tanker War, further isolating Iran. Summer 1987 saw more limited Iranian gains in northern Iraq, as a combined offensive with the Iraqi Kurds continued. These continued through the late winter of 1988. However, Iranian progress was thwarted on the other fronts. In the early spring of 1988, Iran’s fortunes swung abruptly to the negative in the  Tanker War as the United States and other Western powers intervened, largely to the benefit of Iraq. With the stagnation across all fronts, Iraq now stood poised for a sizeable counterattack. On 19 October 1987, US Marines attacked two Iranian oil platforms, which had been converted to military use. The attack was successful and the platforms set on fire.143 In spring 1988, the US Navy had a considerable engagement with the Iranian Navy, wherein it destroyed or damaged six Iranian vessels.144 The limited 212

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international, particularly Western, interventions and involvement in the conflict would further reinforce the Iranian view of the war as one pitting not just their country against its neighbor but against the powers as well. Then, on 17 April 1988, Iran was repulsed from Faw. This development not only reinstated Iraqi access to the Persian Gulf, it also demonstrated clearly that the haggard Iranian armed forces were unable to advance. The conflict was dragging on with no end in sight and with no major progress by either side. Public discontent was exacerbated further on 3 July 1988 when the USS Vincennes shot down an Iranian civilian airliner in Iranian airspace with 290 passengers and crew aboard. All passengers and crew perished in the subsequent crash. The international community was largely silent, much to the surprise and dismay of the Iranian government and populace. Although the United States stated that the airliner was shot down by mistake, for Iranians, the incident symbolized what they viewed as the one-sided support provided by America to Iraq and its cost for average Iranians—many continue to see the incident through the same lens today.145 The Iranian public was increasingly fed up with the status quo and failed to comprehend why it was still at war—while resenting its leadership, Iraq, and other players alike. Anti-war demonstrations erupted across Iran.146 Khomeini and his men were now increasingly contemplating an end to the hostilities. Finally, on 18 July 1988, Iran accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598, which called for an immediate cessation of hostilities and a return to the ante bellum borders. In the Persian Gulf, Iran was now harried not only by Iraqi aircraft but also by the much superior US Navy. In the south, the country was again facing the prospect of defending Khorramshahr, which it had only been able to secure by paying a tremendous price in the form of both blood and treasure. On the central front, Iran was also staring down a long, arduous defensive. In the north, although the situation was less dire than on the other fronts, progress had not only stalled but reversed as Saddam exterminated Iran’s allies. Khomeini reluctantly ‘drank from the poisoned chalice’ and agreed to a ceasefire, bringing the war to an end a few weeks later, in August 1988.147 This time, the costs of continuing the war clearly outweighed the costs of ending it for the leadership. 213

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Iranians viewed and represented the Iran–Iraq  War in unequal terms. From their point of view, there was nearly unanimous international support for Iraq over Iran. Although reality was more multifaceted, Tehran found itself largely alone against massing quantities of  Western and Soviet-bloc equipment. The international community was still outraged by the hostage crisis and the Islamic Republic’s emerging policies and brutal crackdown. Saddam, on the other hand, had yet to perpetrate most of the atrocities that would gain him notoriety in the international community—including those he committed during the war. The regional stakeholders in the conflict nearly all sided with Iraq, a fact that Iranians would continue to point to in discussions about their country’s defense and regional security approach for decades to come.148 Iranian efforts to export the revolution and stir tensions in the Levant and the Arabian Peninsula framed the threat perceptions of regional states, leading them to support Iraq in containing the new revolutionary regime. From the war’s onset, Jordan had sided with Iraq—to the point that after the Basra offensive in summer 1982, Amman offered direct military support to Baghdad.149 In exchange for cheap Iraqi oil, Jordan permitted Iraq to export goods and oil through the port of Aqaba. Concerned as it often is about the potential implications of regional events for its difficulties with the Kurds, Turkey aided Iraq on the northern front, assisting it directly and inside Iraqi territory in dealing with Iranian-allied groups.150 Riyadh even authorized Baghdad to use Saudi oil to pay for Iraq’s debts to various European countries. All in all, Iraq received extensive material support from nearly every Arab country, Austria, Brazil, China, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, France, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Italy, Poland, South Africa, the Soviet Union, Spain, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States as it surpassed Iran as the world’s top importer of arms for 1980–88.151 The United States also reportedly supplied Iraq with ‘detailed intelligence, including data from sensitive US satellite reconnaissance photography, to assist Iraqi bombing raids on Iran’s oil terminals and power plants.’152 France, as a result of its rapidly deteriorating relations with Iran, decided to sell Mirage Fighter jets to Iraq.153 214

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The United States saw the war’s continuation as advantageous to its own interest. As a now declassified CIA document assessed months before the end of the war: The continuation of the war […] has produced beneficial trends for the United States that may be weakened or reversed if a settlement is reached. The war has distracted the Arabs from the Arab-Israeli arena and focused their attention on the Gulf conflict where US goals complement rather than clash with Arab goals. The war has fostered Iraqi moderation and accelerated Egypt’s political reentry into the Arab world. The conflict also has been a major barrier to improved relations between Syria and Iraq, two important Soviet clients, and provided impetus to improved security cooperation between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council. [redacted]154

The same declassified assessment also highlighted Iran’s isolation: ‘The Iranian leadership is realistic about the substantial military strength of Iraq and the international forces arrayed against Tehran.’155 Today, Iranians still consider their country as isolated from significant foreign support during the war. Its main foreign supporters were Libya and Syria, with North Korea playing an ancillary and somewhat disputed role.156  This further exacerbated Iraq’s advantage in acquiring financial assistance for the war and placed additional pressure on the Iranian government. Feeling surrounded and largely abandoned, the Iranians believed it was clear that their country was essentially on its own financially, as well as militarily. According to Mohsen Rezai, the recovery of Khorramshahr led to the emergence of two camps within the system. On the one hand, some, mostly belonging to Rafsanjani’s bloc, believed that the war was about to end: ‘A single operation could end the war.’157  They had entered the attrition phase of the war.158  The underlining assumption, as described by Rezai, was that Iran could undertake another campaign as it also opened a diplomatic track to end the conflict.159 On the other hand, Khomeini and key IRGC commanders were of the following view: This enemy, as we know it, will not collapse with one or two operations. After Khorramshahr, we must have a ‘military strategy’ similar to that of the liberation of our cities. Now, it may end with the conquest of Baghdad

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or we achieve a great victory and Saddam will surrender.We do not know how many operations are needed for this. Operations cannot be limited. We must advance until Saddam’s surrender. Even when we see in the middle of the way that he is about to surrender, we can still [advance].160

Ultimately, the approach favored by Khomeini and the IRGC prevailed and Iran continued the war with the objective of seeing Saddam’s surrender. However, from Rezai’s perspective, Rafsanjani’s camp was the actual winner of the debate: those focusing on a ‘political strategy’ rather than a military one occupied key roles in the decisionmaking process and effectively led the war effort.161 In that context, for the Iranians, if the Iraqis had the upper-hand in 1985–86, it was largely thanks to American, French, and Soviet intelligence, as well as human intelligence provided by the MeK from the battlefield and within Iran.162 Moreover, from Iran’s perspective, the Iraqis were seeking to internationalize the conflict following Operation Karbala-5—their code name for the siege of Basra in January and February 1987.163 This is what resulted in US–Iranian face-offs and the presence of American and NATO forces in the Persian Gulf, which took place against the backdrop of increased pressure on Iran with the continuation of the War of the Cities and its expansion to hit Tehran. As the war progressed, the Iraqis also substantially increased their chemical weapons attacks and ramped up the bombings of non-military targets, particularly economically significant ones, such as oil refineries.164 As the Iranians saw it, these Iraqi efforts aimed to push the Iranian public to put pressure on its leadership to end the war. According to IRGC sources, Khomeini believed that the success of Khorramshahr would pave the way for peace for Iran and that, if the two countries were unable to settle matters, the war would continue.165 In Khomeini’s opinion, the Americans wanted to see a war of attrition that would end with neither side winning—this would wear out both contestants for regional power and limit the threat posed by both to US interests in the Middle East. But in Khomeini’s view, short of this ideal outcome, the Americans would likely consider an Iranian defeat as the secondbest case scenario.166 This is why, according to the Iranians, Khomeini made the decision to continue the war after Khorramshahr, despite having initially seen the light at the end of the tunnel.  216

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The Iran–Iraq War proved devastating for both countries. The number of casualties remains disputed in 2019. According to different estimates, between 100,000 and 750,000 Iranians perished during the war.167 Missing soldiers’ bodies continue to be dug up over thirty years after the war’s end and mines occasionally go off in the border region. Victims of chemical weapons suffer and some still die from health complications resulting from the damage decades later. Although many Iranians today were not yet born or were too young to witness and remember the war, the conflict is part of their psyche. Evidence of the war is present in virtually all aspects of Iranian public life: at an early age, school children learn to read and write with textbooks recounting stories about the bravery of ‘martyrs;’ massive murals depicting scenes of battle and honoring soldiers adorn Iranian streets; and every neighborhood has streets named after those who died in the war. The conflict left Iranians with deep wounds that remain open decades after the its end.

Iranian Security Thinking and the Sacred Defense What Saddam anticipated as a quick campaign to check Iran and its new revolutionary leaders became an eight-year war with hundreds of thousands of casualties and wounded combatants and civilians. The war drained the two countries’ resources and ended with neither side gaining or losing territory. Neither regime was toppled. But the war left long-lasting impacts for the two sides. Here, we will see the key takeaways from the war for Iranian security thinking. First, the war has become a key part of both the regime’s revolutionary identity, but also Iran’s national identity; the relics of the war outlined above continue to keep the memory of the war vividly present in the nation’s mind. Iran’s political and security establishments are comprised of a large number of the country’s war veterans, many of whom spent their formative years in politics or in the military planning for the conflict. The war also dominates the psyche of the broader Iranian populace. Even for those who were not born or who were too young to clearly remember it, the war remains an identity-shaping experience. As a result, the war is a steady part of Iran’s national and revolutionary narratives and shapes its security outlook. The 217

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conflict deeply embedded lessons previous generations of Iranians had learned from their own experiences with foreign powers and their own wars: the country must be in a state of  ‘constant defense,’ as Iranian officials routinely remind their compatriots and foreign counterparts and interlocutors.168 The country now believes that it must make sure its adversaries are never strong enough to threaten it if it can, or, at the very least, raise the costs of doing so considerably. For Iran, ‘constant defense’ has engrained the idea that deterrence is key to its security. Second, the war helped the Islamic Revolution consolidate its power. When the war started, Khomeini was singularly focused on consolidating power within Iran.  This was no small task, as the country had seen continued power struggle between the different factions that had toppled the Shah and whose objective was now to assert themselves in the post-revolution political landscape. Prior to the start of the war, the many factions and groups involved in the revolution were competing to shape the transition of power. The Shah’s collapse and the advent of the Islamic Republic led to revolts in parts of the territory, particularly in Kurdistan and Khuzestan—events reminiscent of previous transitions of power, including the rise and fall of generations of Qajar rulers, Reza Shah, and the Shah.169 All in all, ‘[t] he transition proved violent and convulsive.’170 During the war, most Iranians’ focus turned to the external enemy: Iraq. Monarchists, leftists, Islamists, and nationalists alike could agree on one thing: it was imperative to preserve the country’s territorial integrity and national unity. Many Shah loyalists put their ideological tensions with the new regime on the backburner to join the war effort, as the revolutionaries curbed their purges and released members of the Shah’s military imprisoned during the previous few months to fight alongside them.171 The only group that did not share this view was the MeK, which sided with Saddam over the new regime and, in addition to sharing intelligence with the Iraqis, also conducted a number of terrorist attacks on Iranian targets during that time. Iranians of all walks of life would see the MeK’s decision to side with Saddam and activities supporting his war effort as treason. And for this betrayal, the group would pay the ultimate cost for decades to come. 218

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By the end of the war, it became clear who was in charge: Khomeini and his revolutionaries. They used the chaos and nationalist zest that characterized the final months and weeks of the conflict to remove the opposition and consolidate their power. As part of this process, the regime perpetrated mass executions, killing ‘hundreds and perhaps thousands’ in a matter of months.172 Groups designated as terrorist entities by the regime paid a particularly heavy price in that period. In particular, Tehran targeted alleged MeK operatives and Kurdish groups—hanging ‘suspected Mujahedeen supporters in retaliation for battlefield setbacks.’173 But the regime did not stop there, executing thousands, including many with nominal roles in opposition groups and even underage boys and girls. The matter would split the leadership at the highest levels, pitting Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, then designated as Khomeini’s successor, against Khomeini himself.174  The former argued against the mass killings on moral, religious, and pragmatic grounds while others, including Khomeini, made counterarguments based on what they claimed were the same premises. While the Islamic Republic came out of the war more powerful than ever, the MeK lost any legitimacy within Iran. To this day, the MeK’s name is synonymous with treason for many Iranians: Though it is difficult to know what would have happened absent Saddam Hussein’s gamble, it seems that the Iran–Iraq War provided Khomeini and his followers both the rationale and the legitimacy for translating the idea of an Islamic republic into a functioning state with the velayat-e faqih (clerical rule) as the central principle of governance.175

Finally, another factor contributing to the alienation of leftist groups in Iran was the collapse of the Soviet Union shortly after the end of the Iran–Iraq War. This event helped discredit the ideologies that underpinned the foundations of myriad Communist groups active in the country and within the diaspora. Domestically, the political landscape in Iran became dominated by the more religious and conservative elements. Bani-Sadr was ousted during the conflict, which immediately created an opportunity for the clerical establishment to increase its power. In addition to the aforementioned executions, arrests, and censorship, the clerical establishment also used both its 219

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volunteer and conscription systems as means to consolidate its power among the masses. The clergy used the threat of the foreign aggressor to instill religious fanaticism in much of the population, particularly— and importantly—the youth who were fighting the war. Anti-war demonstrations further increased the opportunity to suppress popular dissent. At the same time, however, the war prompted the regime to recognize the deficiencies of religion as a galvanizing force. As a result, the revolutionaries began to leverage the nationalist sentiment to rally all segments of the population around the flag.  The war was not just presented as a defense of the revolution and the ideology it brought about, but rather, that of the nation and the ‘Sacred Borders.’ Third, the war forged an international image of the regime as one dominated by irrational mullahs, working to bring about the end of times. The human wave tactic combined with the Iranian decision to continue the war after having already made substantial gains fed this narrative of an irrational revolutionary Iran. Y   et the war showed just how pragmatic the regime could be. Khomeini and his men were focused on preserving Iran’s territorial integrity, putting aside ideology to buy weapons from Israel and the United States. And if Khomeini decided to continue the war, it was not due to a lack of rational costbenefit calculus but rather based on his belief that this would help deter Iraq from attacking the country again. Already during the war, a CIA research paper noted: Since the clerics consolidated their rule in late 1981, they have had to reconcile Iran’s national interests with often conflicting revolutionary goals. We believe Iran is moving toward a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy, primarily because of economic pressures and the war with Iraq.176

The authors of the paper rightly projected the trajectory of the regime’s foreign policy in the following decades, one largely marked by the revolution’s institutionalization and coming of age. As they put it, the analysts behind this now declassified paper ‘believe[d] there is a better-than-even chance that the pragmatists will emerge as the dominant force after Khomeini and will formulate Iranian foreign policy on the basis of perceived state interests rather than 220

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revolutionary aspirations.’177 We will revisit this notion and examine its validity in greater detail in the next chapter, but for now it is worth noting that this departure from revolutionary zeal and ideology would be instrumental in ensuring an important degree of continuity between the new leadership’s belief system and policies and those of Iran’s statesmen past. Fourth, the war shaped the newly incepted regime’s view of international law and institutions, one that was rooted in distrust. Iran came out of the war further strengthened in its belief that the international system was deeply biased, created to assert the power of the West over the rest. The UN Security Council did not intervene to denounce Iraq’s ‘war of aggression’ against Iran, nor did it condemn Saddam’s use of indiscriminate means against Iranians, including chemical weapons. Instead, its language avoided naming and shaming the aggressor and perpetrator, deploring in abstract terms ‘the use of chemical weapons contrary to the obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol’ and demanding ‘the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq observe an immediate cease-fire, discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in the air, and withdraw all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries.’178  What Iranians perceived as the international community’s unwillingness to enforce international laws and norms and to condemn Iraqi aggression and the use of chemical weapons would be reminiscent of their experiences during the two world wars. Once again, the nation would learn that international norms and laws did not evenly apply to all but only to the weak. The mighty would privilege their own interests at the expense of other nations. Fifth, the war also deepened the revolutionary regime’s distrust of the powers and regional players. This notion is deeply rooted in Iranian strategic culture and stems from centuries of poor experiences with foreign powers. The war, however, took this distrust to a new level. It also led the Iranian public to see its country as one existing in isolation and in an adversarial environment. Iraq received aid and loans from its Arab neighbors, allowing it to expand the size of  its military and maintain its technological superiority over Iran.179 For Iran, its experience of the war was predominantly marked by its failure to secure weapons and support in a timely and consistent manner 221

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throughout the conflict. Additionally, the fact that most of the key players in the region either overtly or covertly assisted Baghdad or simply refused to be involved led Tehran to see itself as insulated in its region. Iran came out of the war with its public and leadership having forged a mindset of isolation and self-help. Sixth, the war highlighted the Iranian military’s shortcomings following the revolution. Rear Admiral Ali Shamkhani, who would go on to become the secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, later reflected that ‘If you study to get [a grade of] 15[/20], you would get a 7[/20]. You had to study for a 20[/20] to get a 15[/20].’180 According to Shamkhani, Iran promised ‘war, war, until victory’ but it did not prepare itself adequately to deliver on its promise. Unlike Iraq, Iran made big statements and threatened major repercussions. Conversely, ‘when Saddam threatened, his threats were the size of a match but the capabilities he prepared were the size of a nuclear weapon. This means that our balance of power was crumbling and had crumbled.’181 In that sense, though the Iran–Iraq War was very different from Iran’s previous great wars, especially those against Russia, it was also similar to them, as after decades of  expansion, reform, and modernization, the Iranian armed forces suffered from the same challenges they had in the past. These challenges were exacerbated by the events of the revolution, including the purges undertaken in the military. Nevertheless, the lack of expertise, adequate training, cohesion, and issues pertaining to strategy and doctrine—many of which the Shah, Reza Shah, and some Qajar leaders before them had sought to address—continued to stymie Iranian military effectiveness. The integration of the IRGC into the Iranian armed forces and their cohesion with the Artesh coupled with the country’s degrading of conventional capabilities shaped the Islamic Republic’s defense doctrine. In September 1985, just months before the operations in Faw, Khomeini ordered the creation of two other services within the IRGC: the IRGC Navy and Air Force. Pursuant to Article 150 of the Constitution, Khomeini was seeking to consolidate the IRGC and embed it within the Iranian armed forces, to ‘cooperate with the Artesh of the Islamic Republic of Iran to defend the country’s land, maritime, and air borders when necessary.’182 222

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This order would formalize the force’s status as an integral part of the Iranian armed forces. Even prior to Khomeini’s order, the IRGC was gradually equipping itself with the capabilities to compete at sea and in air. For example, as early as 1981–82, the IRGC had started to establish new units, including naval ones, which had taken shape during Operation Kheibar in February 1984.183 At the same time, Iran had started to equip the Revolutionary Guards with drone and missile capabilities, as well as wings even prior to the official creation of the IRGC Air Force.184 These developments would not take place without opposition within the system. Khomeini wished to formalize the IRGC and ensure its sustainability beyond the revolutionary period and the war effort. Others viewed them as a potential obstacle in the way of merging the IRGC and the Artesh later on, which they saw as beneficial to the nation’s defense.185 Rafsanjani and Montazeri were key proponents of the merger, and the latter had even reportedly designed and presented a plan to combine the two forces (in sessions led by Rouhani), which had received the approval of others within the system. The proponents of the merger pointed to issues plaguing the Iranian armed forces stemming from a lack of cohesion and impeding battlefield effectiveness in the context of the war effort. As IRGC analyses of the war would later assess, during the eight years of the conflict: 19 big operations [and] 19 small operations were conducted, of which, 13 were combined operations by the Artesh and Sepah, three operations were conducted by the Artesh and 11 by the Revolutionary Guards. Perhaps the most important military operations to be conducted during this period were the joint operations undertaken by the Sepah and Artesh on 17 November 1980, which resulted in the liberation of Susangerd. Although the tensions between the two branches of the armed forces lessened during the war, they continue to remain a feature of the Iranian military to the time of writing. Denial and deception and the use of asymmetric warfare and operations in the gray zone came to mark the cornerstones of  Iran’s post-revolution military thinking.186

Finally and relatedly, these factors further led Iran to believe that it needed to stand on its own two feet. The war’s contribution to the 223

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notion of self-sufficiency was the belief that it was no longer enough for Iran to strive to become self-reliant. Iran undertook to increase its efforts to become self-reliant in several key areas, including its economy, military, and technology. The absence of foreign support for Iran extended to nearly every aspect of the war, forcing the country to take these steps by itself. And the need to stand on its own two feet led Iran to resume many of the programs and policies that the revolutionaries had objected to and halted prior to taking power, leading to increased continuity in Iranian national security thinking and policies. Economically, it became one of the few oil-exporting states to develop other significant economic bases. Militarily, it developed its own methods of organization, strategy, and tactics to replace the American-modeled system under the Shah. It resumed its nuclear and missile programs and started a number of other military and dualuse projects, including its chemical weapons and drone programs. Iran also developed an independent technological core: Iranian technicians and engineers produced new items to meet the increasingly unique needs of the Iranian military.

Conclusion The Iran–Iraq   War was one of the most traumatic events in contemporary Iranian history. Although it led to no conquest and no defeat for Iran, it left the country utterly devastated. Though it led to no conquest and no defeat for Iran, it left the country utterly devastated. And the war would continue to reverberate throughout the Iranian national security sphere for decades to come, its impact on the national psyche remaining largely unparalleled. When the US killed Soleimani in January 2020, Iranians took to the streets to commemorate the commander. But more so, they came out to display unity to avoid yet another devastating war. The regime, however, emerged from the war not simply in power but fully consolidated. For its part, the nation ended the conflict feeling isolated, more distrustful of foreign powers and international institutions, and believing in self-reliance as a matter of self-preservation and survival. As the new leadership cemented its position, it fully internalized 224

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these lessons, which like many generations of Iranian statesmen it had learned the hard way. As a result, Tehran doubled its efforts to develop an indigenous capability, which resulted in the resumption and initiation of many of the programs and policies that have since raised the international community’s concerns, including the missile, drone, and nuclear and chemical weapons programs and support for non-state groups. These programs and policies became critical deterrents for the country, as the war also left it feeling in a state of constant defense, seeing deterrence as the single most important tool available to it. What Iran came to see as a means of deterring its adversaries, others began to view as threatening behavior from an irrational regime. In the decade that followed the end of the war, the revolution and the regime matured and became fully established.  The more the revolution became institutionalized, the more its security apparatus and policies became reminiscent of those it had fought prior to the war. In the next chapter, we will see how the revolution matured and returned to many of the policies its founder had criticized for decades before ascending to power.

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THE REVOLUTION MATURES (1988–2001) CONSOLIDATION, RECONSTRUCTION, AND REFORM

Iran emerged from its eight-year war with Iraq without having conquered or ceded any land. It had failed to fully defeat and overthrow its adversary—but it had not submitted to it either. The country had suffered thousands of casualties and billions of dollars in damage to its economy and infrastructure. Despite the considerable costs of war, the Islamic Republic remained in place and leveraged the chaos that resulted from the war and the widespread sentiment of vulnerability felt by the public to consolidate power. Mass executions, which the state had begun in the final weeks of the war, continued after its end, purging the last remnants of the varied factions that had once united to topple the monarchy. By the time Khomeini died in June 1989, just months after the war’s end, the political system he had established had firmly secured its position as the only viable contender to take on the mantle of national leadership. With an ironclad grip on political power, the regime now turned its attention to consolidating its security apparatus and reforming its armed forces, namely restructuring and rebuilding the Artesh, and consolidating and expanding the IRGC and the Basij. At the same time, the war forced the revolutionaries to dial down their ideological policies and think and act as rational decision-makers. As a result, they emerged from the war having adopted the considerations of 227

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decision-makers, many of which resulted in similar policies to, and a continuation of, many elements of the Shah’s national security policies. Although the post-war security apparatus and military fully reflected the regime’s mandate and revolutionary character, the war effort had forced them to operate on an essentially ad hoc basis to address the exigencies of battle. When Iraq invaded Iran, the nation and its leadership were still in transition and the security apparatus and armed forces had yet to complete their organizational transformation. Tehran had to prioritize ensuring the country’s territorial integrity and security, along with the revolution’s survival, over completing its envisioned revamp of the political system. At the end of the war, the regime finally had the bandwidth to complete the transformation and to consolidate its security apparatus and armed forces. However, as we will see in this chapter, although the country’s security establishment underwent significant transformation, its perspective on security remained largely unchanged from the prerevolution era. More intriguing yet, the post-war reforms created a level of continuity between the pre- and post-revolution worldviews that the revolutionaries themselves had neither desired nor anticipated. Iranians emerged from the war having learned—and relearned— several lessons. Chiefly, they came out of the war believing that they were highly vulnerable to external threats, isolated and without allies, and had to be in ‘a state of constant defense,’ as they could not place trust in any foreign power or international body.1 The leitmotif of ‘betrayal’ by foreign powers—a theme which had emerged in the eighteenth century—was now firmly rooted in the Iranian psyche and central to its security thinking.2  The end of the war also signaled a more mature and pragmatic Islamic Republic, one which was gradually putting elements of its founding revolutionary ideology on the backburner to prioritize national security interests—as evidenced in the Iran–Contra affair. At the same time, however, Iranian collective memory led the regime’s decision-making to diverge from its previous path of pure pragmatism. As the revolutionaries found themselves moving from an opposition force to the establishment, they also began to fall more in line with past policies to which they once objected.3 The revolution matured and its leaders with it, progressively making the ideological veil that had covered many of their positions thinner and, thus, revealing a 228

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continuation of policies undertaken by the Shah, rather than a complete departure from them.  Their decisions were a manifestation of the same ideas and beliefs that had once shaped the Shah and even Reza Shah’s security thinking under different circumstances and exigencies, often reflecting the pursuit of the same objectives by other means. The following sections lay out the politics of Iran following the war and during reconstruction, before exploring the reforms in the military sector and the Iranian defense and security establishments more broadly. The chapter argues that although the reconstruction period was meant to consolidate the regime as envisioned by its founders, it instead further embedded key elements of  Iranian security thinking, some dating back to the early periods assessed in this book. These, in turn, led to the period providing for more continuity with the prerevolution era than the revolutionary founders and leaders anticipated and desired.

A Revolutionary State’s Politics The primary driver of the Islamic Revolution was antithetical to that of many movements of the same period. While post-colonial nationalism was shaping the freshly independent former colonies, Iran was, in many ways, undergoing an anti-nationalist revolution—one led by pan-Islamic ideas.4 However, once the Iran–Iraq War started, the Islamic Republic’s political and military establishments—and Khomeini himself—began to face the realities of running a state while fighting internal threats and an external adversary. Soon, the new leaders realized the shortcomings of the revolutionary ideology and the faith that had helped propel them into power. Ideology and religion may have been enough to mount a revolution, but they were not enough to sustain a revolutionary state. Far from a clear and detailed roadmap, the revolution’s ideology had provided a framework within which the regime had laid out its foundations. This was not unique to Iran, as ‘revolutionary ideologies rarely specify the precise tactics to follow to achieve the movement’s general goals; indeed, they often stress the need for tactical flexibility.’5 As yesterday’s revolutionaries ascended to positions of power in Iran, they also faced the urgent realities of governance. Consequently, 229

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they had to quickly become more adept in the business of running a country, and to reconcile the failure of their slogans to provide adequate guidelines on such complex matters as international laws and institutions, trade, diplomacy, and war. The regime also began to see the limitations of religious discourse as a galvanizing force for all segments of Iranian society during the war— to include Jewish and Christian Iranians and other cleavages alienated by the regime’s embrace of a narrowly defined national identity based primarily on Shia Islam. In an effort to rally the masses around the flag, the ruling elites switched course to embrace more realistic tenets of governance and changed their tone to rely more on nationalism.6 In the years following the war, the regime never went back to the purely religious and revolutionary rhetoric on questions pertaining to war and peace, which had characterized Khomeini’s views and statements, particularly prior to the collapse of the Shah. Instead, the leadership formulated a multi-layered security discourse that paid tribute to all these different elements, co-opting revolutionary ideology to appeal to its base and to preserve it, while leveraging nationalism to establish the basis for its legitimate right to rule. Nevertheless, Tehran’s rhetoric largely remained the most revolutionary part of its security policy.7 Even so, regime officials began to downplay in official speeches and remarks the notion of ‘the export of the revolution,’ once a key component of the revolutionary narrative.8 In effect, already in the early days of the revolution, Iranian officials were beginning to shift toward a more pragmatic course of action, and, by the end of the war, had largely stuck to such an approach to security policy. As an Iranian diplomat put it, ‘naturally, the revolution brought ideas, not to be confused with “ideology,” as the Americans understand it. But even at the peak of [the prevalence of] ideas, you had strands of pragmatism.’9 For example, during the hostage crisis, which had occurred at the height of revolutionary fervor in Iran and was led by some of the most fanatical elements within the movement, some of the deeply ideological Islamist forces, albeit not all, had pushed for and accepted negotiating with America to resolve the matter.10 Some had gone as far as opposing the taking of hostages altogether. As the revolutionaries settled into their new roles, gradually, a combination 230

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of factors created a more pragmatic state as it faced the everyday tasks of domestic and foreign policy. With Khomeini’s death on 3 June 1989, the Islamic Republic had to face one of its most significant tests—and, indeed, one of the greatest challenges any newly minted political entity has to tackle: a peaceful transition of power, which would serve to strengthen, not undermine the regime. On 4 June, Khamenei was elected as Khomeini’s successor. Up until the day after the founder of the Islamic Revolution died, Khamenei had served as president. He was known as a hardliner in the early days of the revolution but had gradually moderated some of his positions—so much so, in fact, that Rafsanjani later wrote that ‘according to the reports, the Westerners are happy about Ayatollah Khamenei’s election and are hopeful that moderation will govern and that the radicals will be sidelined.’11 A cleric widely seen as less qualified and prominent than Khomeini, Khamenei nevertheless received all of his predecessor’s political titles, and the powers associated with them, having established himself as a key player in Iranian politics.12 Reluctant to serve as the next supreme leader, Khamenei had the backing of key members of the regime.13 A prominent insider, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1934–2017), and his camp rallied behind Khamenei, in part believing that a weaker supreme leader would provide them with more opportunities to shape the country’s affairs to their liking.14 They faced those who supported a more fundamental transformation in the system. This group wanted to alter the supreme leadership from the rule of a single man to that of a council. They also faced those who wished to preserve the office as it was but with Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammadreza Golpaygani (1899–1993) instated as its head.15 ‘Compared with Khamenei,’ Daniel Byman and Kenneth Pollack wrote in their 2019 essay in Foreign Affairs, ‘Golpaygani was a more traditional conservative, skeptical of what he saw as the regime’s social tolerance by allowing music on radio and television, yet far less revolutionary in his foreign policy views.’16 Others feared that an extended succession battle could lead to a coup or other internal chaos and hoped to end the controversy sooner rather than later and move toward consolidating power. With Western observers already pointing to the possibility of an internal collapse 231

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of the regime during the changeover, the system widely conceded that a quick and smooth transition of power would be imperative.17 As Rafsanjani recalled in his memoir published posthumously, the deliberations took place against the backdrop of existing tensions with Iraq. Rouhani brought the news that the Iraqis were ready for an offensive, leading council members to settle for the quicker and steadier option.18 The powers inherited by Khamenei included a veto power on all issues pertaining to domestic and foreign policy and a role as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The lone exception was the title of ‘Imam’—designed to bring up the status of the individual to the level of the Prophet’s successors and reserved for a select few.19 In August of that year, Rafsanjani, a cleric with significant resistance credentials, joined Khamenei in the Islamic Republic’s leadership ranks. He succeeded Khamenei as the new president of the Islamic Republic of Iran.20 The new president’s political activism had led him to prison on several occasions prior to the revolution. During Rafsanjani’s time at the Qom seminary, Khomeini had inspired him to oppose the White Revolution—leading to his imprisonment by the Shah. A pragmatist who focused on restructuring Iran’s post-war economy, Rafsanjani would gradually become a powerhouse in Iranian politics until his death in January 2017. Throughout his nearly four decades as a regime insider, he occupied a range of critical positions, with tenures in the executive and legislative branches, as well as the powerful Expediency Council and Assembly of Experts, overseeing various processes pertaining to elections and governance. Rafsanjani’s name has become synonymous with corruption within the regime due to his family’s egregious accumulation of wealth—partially facilitated by his role in the postwar reconstruction efforts. During his political career, Rafsanjani would embrace new trends and developments in Iranian society, including increased demands for reform, later even asserting himself as a prominent voice in the moderate and reformist camps. Daniel Brumberg accurately described Rafsanjani’s project as ‘economically liberal, politically authoritarian, and philosophically traditional.’21 In pursuing this enterprise, Rafsanjani, aided by his ally, Khamenei, refashioned Khomeini’s vision, allowing 232

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him to draw the contours of a new reform plan and to legitimize it.22 The dual leadership of Khamenei and Rafsanjani—who put the entire bureaucratic machinery toward implementing a pragmatic plan of political consolidation and economic revival—combined with the resilience of the revolutionary institutions, including the IRGC and various councils, made the transition remarkably uncomplicated.23 This was especially the case for a revolutionary regime, which had just ended an eight-year brutal war and was now undergoing its first major power transition.24 Nevertheless, the advent of Khamenei as supreme leader was not without its challenges for the regime. First, from the start, many observers questioned his qualifications and deemed his accession to the highest leadership position in the land unconstitutional. When he was elected, Khamenei was lacking constitutionally mandated credentials required for supreme leadership. At the time, Khamenei was not a marja, the highest rank in Shia jurisprudence, and whose interpretation of the Sharia is considered as standard-setting for believers—as mandated in the 1979 Constitution’s articles 107 and 109, which was still in force at that time,25 and therefore lacked the religious credentials required for supreme leadership. Second, as far as the Islamic Republic’s base was concerned, Khamenei was filling big shoes: Khomeini’s popularity and authority stemmed from his image as a charismatic leader whose impeccable religious credentials and political courage had afforded him the legitimacy to lead the revolution from exile before returning to the country to preside over the transition of power. The regime’s base and leadership did not have the same regard for Khamenei, who had to compensate for his shortcomings—especially as he shared the power and appeal Khomeini once embodied with another critical player: Rafsanjani. Khamenei achieved this by asserting his control over key institutions, including by pushing his men into relevant positions and empowering them. For his part, Rafsanjani, later dubbed the ‘commander of the reconstruction,’ undertook to rebuild a country that was in dire need of economic revival after the revolution and the war had stalled some of its key industries and destroyed its infrastructure. Immediately after ascending to their new positions and for the next several years, Khamenei and Rafsanjani dedicated their efforts to two 233

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major endeavors: rebuilding the country and consolidating political power.26 At home, the regime was cementing its political and military institutions. During those years, the country made considerable progress in developing its nuclear program after halting it during the revolution and its immediate aftermath. It was building on the infrastructure the Shah had laid down and was acquiring centrifuges to enrich uranium, which could fuel research and power reactors but also nuclear weapons. Abroad, the regime was cultivating ties with non-state actors in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon. In doing so, Tehran was leveraging ties cultivated by the Shah decades prior, in particular with Lebanese Shias and Iraqi Kurds. For Iran, these relationships were instrumental, as the country believed that no state would be a viable ally, and that unless it was able to increase its strategic depth and form relationships with different stakeholders across the region, the country would remain vulnerable. At the same time, Iran was purging remnants of the revolutionary period, namely the MeK and other groups the core regime viewed as separatist threats, predominantly Kurdish entities in Iraq. Tehran was now quietly developing the capabilities, the groundwork for which had been laid out during the Iran–Iraq War. These efforts shaped much of the country’s contemporary security toolkit, which was chiefly centered around hybrid warfare—including its nuclear, missile, and drone programs, as well as its network of non-state clients throughout the region. From Iran’s perspective, this timeframe was tightly associated with America’s growing presence in the region. In a rare interview with a news outlet, Qassem Soleimani put a fine point on his country’s threat perception in the fall of 2019, amidst US–Iran tensions: Following Saddam’s attack against Kuwait in 1991 and subsequently, America’s invasion and Saddam’s defeat, a military deposit formed in our region, which led to the deployment of US forces. But since 9/11, due to the two heavy invasions that America led (of Afghanistan and Iraq), nearly 40 percent of the armed forces at America’s disposal directly entered our region and, later, during this time and due to the replacements and changes that have occurred, even led to the presence of the reserves and the National Guards, meaning nearly that more than 60 percent of America’s military […] entered our region.27

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Amidst these developments, the next major transition of power in Iran would happen in 1997 when the reformist Mohammad Khatami won the presidency in a surprise landslide victory in May, securing 69 percent of the votes.28 The mild-mannered cleric was known for his intellectual outlook at home and openness to the West abroad. His base of support relied heavily upon elements of the population typically discounted by the regime, particularly youths and women. Thanks to their galvanization, Khatami defeated the system-backed candidate, Ali Akbar Nateq-Nouri, shocking and upending the more conservative elements of the regime. Khatami pursued policies of liberalization and strove to minimize tensions with the United States—a country whose very flag was a symbol of subjugation in the eyes of the hardline elements of the regime. The reformist hoped to open up Iranian society and remove political barriers to its fulfillment. In February 2000, Khatami’s supporters won control of the majles and, in June 2001, Iranians voted to re-elect Khatami. But several key events in Iran and the rest of the world marked Khatami’s second term and prevented his administration from achieving expected reforms. First, the revelations by the political branch of the MeK, known as the National Council of Resistance of Iran, of the Natanz enrichment complex and Arak Heavy Water Reactor, raised concerns in the international community that Iran was pursuing a nuclear weapon in violation of its international obligations under the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The two facilities could respectively produce highly enriched uranium and plutonium—two pathways to the bomb.29 Iran had resumed its nuclear program during the Iran–Iraq War. The regime began to revive dormant parts of its nuclear program and to update its nuclear infrastructure. As they had done in other areas of military and security affairs, the revolutionaries called on the Shah’s men for help.The father of  Iran’s nuclear program, Akbar Etemad, was among them.30 In the mid-1990s, Iran concluded a contract with the Russians to complete the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, left unfinished by the Germans after the revolution. Iran was also designing plans to expand the scope of its program. The country procured Pakistani centrifuge designs—which became key components of the nascent Iranian enrichment program. 235

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The technology provided Tehran with the means to enrich uranium for use in fuel for reactors, but also, potentially, for a nuclear weapon. The father of the Pakistani nuclear weapons program and the head of the world’s most successful illicit trafficking network, Abdul Qadeer Khan, also known as A.Q. Khan, facilitated the transfer of centrifuge designs and components, and other nuclear technology to Iran. Tehran worked with A.Q. Khan from the 1980s until roughly 2002, when Khan’s extant illicit trafficking activities became publicly known and the National Council of Resistance of Iran unveiled Tehran’s covert nuclear sites. The revelations opened the Iranian nuclear file, entailing significant international pressure on Iran to halt and clarify any weapon-related activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency as mandated by its international obligations. Khatami would endeavor to settle this dispute in the first round of nuclear talks in 2003–05. The talks took place between Iran and three European nations: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Hassan Rouhani, supported by Javad Zarif, led this first round of talks as Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator. Iran’s nuclear program would continue to raise international concerns for the following decade, as the global community led by the West sought to bring the country back into compliance through the employment of a number of tools, including political isolation, economic sanctions, military threats, and diplomatic efforts. In Iran, many viewed the outrage over their country’s nuclear aspirations as yet another sign of the West’s hypocrisy. The typical retort to questions about Iran’s nuclear program went, ‘Why is Israel allowed to have a nuclear weapon but not Iran?’31 For many Iranians—officials and the regime’s base and those opposed to the Islamic Republic alike—the country’s geography and history provided the rationale for their quest for a nuclear deterrent. Iran, they argued, had been attacked and conquered a number of times, and also had been dragged into conflicts against its wishes (as was the case during the two world wars). Hence, the country had to be able to stand on its own two feet and to deter its adversaries and defend itself, especially as some of these enemies, including Israel and the United States, but also other countries in the region, such as Pakistan and Russia, possessed nuclear capabilities. 236

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The notion of self-reliance, often viewed with suspicion and skepticism in the West, is one shared not just by various blocs within the regime, but also the broader populace and even the regime’s opponents. Etemad’s reasoning on whether or not the country should pursue enrichment, for example, closely aligned with and echoed that of the many regime officials, both conservatives and moderates, and was a view also shared by many within the general public. He noted that his country ‘absolutely’ needed enrichment: Iran had to go after enrichment, the West wants [that technology] to be in their monopoly only. But let me tell you why Iran needs enrichment. We owned 10 percent of a French uranium plant [referring to Eurodif, a joint venture by European nations in which the Shah had invested]. They were supposed to give us enriched uranium. After the revolution, all of a sudden, the Socialists were in power, the president, I think, it was him who announced it, announced that even though Iran owned some of that plant, that they wouldn’t give Iran enriched uranium. We can’t rely on the West.32

Second, the 11 September 2001 attacks against the United States led to the ‘War on Terror.’ As part of these efforts, America intervened in Afghanistan against the Taliban government, in what would become its longest war. During the early stages of the invasion,Tehran provided assistance to Washington politically and militarily by helping bring key stakeholders to the table. It also facilitated the transition of power and the drafting of the new Afghan constitution, all the while providing intelligence on Al-Qaeda strongholds in the country.33 But the Islamic Republic reconsidered its decision after President George W. Bush’s famous 2002 ‘Axis of Evil’ speech, where the president called out Iran for exporting terror and pursuing weapons of mass destruction.34 The following year, the United States invaded Iraq, removing Iran’s aggressor and chief regional adversary, Saddam Hussein. It also ultimately destabilized the country and the region more broadly. Saddam’s removal and the ensuing power vacuum both afforded Iran an opportunity to help shape its neighboring state in a manner consistent with its preferences and interests, while also becoming a source of concern about a potential American intervention to topple the Islamic Republic. 237

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Watching from Tehran as the events of the early 2000s unfolded, Iranian military commanders and political figures were grappling with how to formulate the best response to their country’s new strategic reality. On the one hand, with the Taliban and Saddam Hussein gone, adversaries with whom it shared porous borders were now out of the equation, and Iran’s key competitor in the Persian Gulf region was removed. On the other hand, the Bush administration had made its disdain for the Islamic Republic known and had signaled that no amount of cooperation would change the basic fact that the United States ultimately wished to see a different political system in Iran. As the regime perceived it, America’s ultimate objective was regime change regardless of the course of action chosen by the Islamic Republic. Now, with two victories—as it seemed then—under its belt, Washington could move on to its next target, and Tehran could not discount that it could be next on the list. Meanwhile, domestically, Iranians saw some liberalization in their social and economic lives; however, Khatami’s tenure ultimately failed to meet expectations of increased social freedoms and expanded civil rights due to considerable pushback by hardliners and conservatives. To make matters more complicated, in 2005, the nuclear talks collapsed and a relatively unknown hardliner—both at home and abroad— Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, defeated Rafsanjani in the presidential election. Rafsanjani was seeking another presidential term, but he lost in a close election. Many saw this unexpected victory as an expression of Iranians’ discontent with the status quo and distrust of the religious establishment, which Rafsanjani embodied.35 As we will see in the next chapter, Ahmadinejad’s tenure would lead to the spread and penetration of the IRGC in many aspects of Iranian public life: politics, economy, and the military. Ahmadinejad also presided over the initial expansion of Iranian regional efforts— which started with the collapse of the Taliban and Saddam in 2001 and 2003 and accelerated and increased following the Arab Spring starting in 2011. The quiet period of regrouping, reform, and reconstruction that had occurred during the 1990s later afforded Iran the ability to capitalize on the events following 2001. These events would afford Tehran the opportunity to assert itself regionally in a manner that the Shah could only have dreamt of. 238

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Iran’s Divided Military The post-war conditions created an environment where the Islamic Republic could solidify key elements of its national security apparatus. These conditions included the regime’s consolidation of power at the end of the war and its ability to assert itself as the only key player in Iranian politics. They also stemmed from the ‘rally-around-theflag’ effect generated by the war: the regime’s military activities had a certain level of legitimacy to the public following a devastating and lengthy conflict. Finally, the post-war reconstruction efforts provided a cover for some military activities (including the nuclear program), while affording the IRGC an entryway into key sectors— infrastructure, telecommunications, and transportation. The following sections discuss the military reforms and coup-proofing efforts. The period of reconstruction and modernization which followed the end of the Iran–Iraq War fully cemented Iran’s new political system and facilitated the consolidation of the security establishment and armed forces. As it had strived to do for centuries under various governments, Tehran sought to introduce a level of centralization to streamline the government and its national security decision-making, policy implementation, and military planning and execution. At the same time, the revolution had shaken civil-military relations in Iran and ushered in a number of coup-proofing measures to the armed forces.  The IRGC was meant to provide a check on the Artesh, and the Basij was designed to check both. The IRGC intelligence machinery was similarly designed to remove any monopoly on intelligence in the civilian realm. However, the redundancies that were created to coupproof the security apparatus were in conflict with larger efforts to centralize the military and relevant organizations. Like many revolutionary governments, the new Iranian leadership was deeply suspicious of existing apparatuses and distrustful of emerging institutions. As a result, it resorted to coup-proofing mechanisms to protect itself. If the regime was adamant in establishing redundancies within the system, it was also due to the deep-set belief in Iranian security thinking of the vulnerability of the country to coups and internal dissent. Already in the Qajar period, rulers had sought to balance the Cossacks and their Russian suppliers with other forces, 239

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including the Gendarmerie. Later, the view that the country must create checks on different organizations in the security and military realms strengthened following experiences of foreign powers grooming, imposing, and ousting governments, including the aforementioned 1953 coup against Mossadeq. Immediately after the revolution and during the war, believing that the Artesh would continue to side with the Shah and people over the regime, the Islamic Republic deeply restructured the Artesh.36 Not only did they purge hundreds of officers, but they changed the rules and terms of conscription, as well as the process of promotion. This transformed the role of the Artesh dramatically—from that of an offensive-capable military force designed to respond to attacks by regional and (to some extent) world powers to that of a defense force intended to police Iran’s borders and offer a first layer of resistance in the event of attack. The revolutionaries also diverted resources from the Artesh to operationalize the IRGC, thus corroding whatever tactical and operational effectiveness the Iranian military had gained through decades of efforts by generations of statesmen and military commanders.37 By the end of the war, however, the two organizations were more cohesive and began to divide areas of operation more clearly. The IRGC emerged from those years having tested a new way of war, one that was a departure from the country’s past military practice. As we have seen, this ‘reactionary and innovative’ way of war was born out of necessity as the country had found itself struggling to sustain its war efforts under sanctions and international isolation.38 Iran’s military might had eroded due to the purges, and weapons and equipment had decayed as the war progressed. Iran had to resort to an alternative way of war to counter Saddam’s army.39 The reforms of the late 1980s and early 90s were designed to embed this new way of war into Iranian military doctrine and solidify the place of the IRGC within the Iranian armed forces—essentially, to make the Guards think and act more like a national military, and to better integrate the two forces. These reforms enhanced the IRGC’s professionalization and centralization, as they cemented its organizational structure and hierarchy, thus turning the Guards into a more traditional military than that which its founders had envisioned 240

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a decade prior. With these reforms, the IRGC became a hybrid entity between a revolutionary guerrilla force and the Shah’s Artesh. Perhaps the most important element of discontinuity between the pre- and post-revolution militaries, however, lay in the Guards’ nonmilitary endeavors.40 Empowered by Khamenei, who needed to make up for his perceived lack of charisma and credentials compared to his predecessor, and Rafsanjani, whose chief policy plan was reconstruction and economic development, the Guards expanded and asserted themselves in key sectors of the Iranian economy. The combination of their military and economic powers helped them become a key force in Iranian politics.41 This, in turn, transformed what was originally a grassroots ‘people’s army’ into a colossal powerhouse in virtually all aspects of Iranian public life, one that would largely overshadow the other arm of the country’s divided military, the Artesh.42 Moreover, as the war and subsequent reforms solidified the IRGC’s place as Iran’s leading force, the Artesh struggled to find its place in the new regime: In the ideological sense, the IRGC’s methods were also developed in reaction to the Artesh’s  ‘classic’ military strategies, which were interpreted as imports of Western management techniques and incompatible with Iran’s new revolutionary identity.43

The Artesh came out of the war looking very different from when it had entered it. Its leadership was gutted during the revolution and it no longer received training and weapons from the United States.44 The weakened Artesh also had to compete for resources with the IRGC, which emerged from the war as the country’s main military unit.45 Additionally, the conventional force had to continually prove its loyalty to the regime, while never being fully trusted. The Artesh’s image would remain stained decades after the revolution; due to it being viewed as more closely aligned with the populace than with the state, many within the regime would not trust it to carry out domestic tasks, such as managing unrest.46 By the end of the war it was clear that the IRGC, not the Artesh, would be the dominant force. This was illustrated by the Guards’ influence in various governing bodies, especially the executive branch, 241

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with their grip over the Defense Ministry, as well as their ownership of and influence over critical security and military files, including Iran’s post-US invasion of Iraq policy.47 These dynamics were also apparent at home. For example, during a series of urban demonstrations in the early 1990s, on at least one occasion the IRGC had to take over entirely in the city of Qazvin to manage the unrest when regular troops refused to quell the turmoil.48 Throughout the decade it was rumored that hundreds of soldiers in the regular army were executed and imprisoned for refusing to fire on demonstrators.49 Later, during the events of 2009, the Guards similarly took charge of crushing the Green Movement—using methods they would later provide to their partners to impede the Arab Spring in Syria and the fall 2019 protests in Iraq and Lebanon.50 However, there were also limits to the IRGC’s willingness to intervene in domestic upheavals to quash opposition. For example, in the 1994 Qazvin protests, elements within the Guards refused to partake in cracking down on protestors. Some within the IRGC leadership believed that ‘the organization should no longer offer a blind defense of the ruling politico-clerical establishment against domestic pressures or criticism.’51 Despite these tensions, the Guards would continue to play an important role in curbing domestic opposition to the regime. Militarily, the Guards underwent several key changes during the post-war period. By the end of the war, the IRGC had expanded considerably and counted 120,000 men in its ranks.52 The Guards now had three branches operating in all three traditional domains: IRGC ground, naval, and air forces. They also included the special forces, known as the Quds Force (IRGC-QF), established by direct order from Khamenei about one year into his supreme leadership in 1990.53 Iran created the IRGC-QF to replace the Office of Liberation Movements, which cultivated non-state clients throughout the region.54 Laying out the groundwork for the Quds Force, the first major mission of the Office abroad involved the deployment of a (disputed) number of Guards to Lebanon in 1982 in order to support Shia militias fighting against Israel’s occupation of southern Lebanon—later united under the banner of Lebanese Hezbollah.55 Tehran had a more complicated relationship with the Kurds, with whom it had partnered fighting 242

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against Saddam Hussein during the Iran–Iraq War—in some ways formalizing an already existing relationship, whereby Iran helped sustain the Kurds under the Shah. After the war, Iran saw the Kurds as both an opportunity (in Iraq) and a challenge (at home).The IRGC-QF picked up the mantle from the Office of Liberation Movements and continued many of its activities in the post-war period. These included deploying forces—at times, the IRGC-QF was the first unit to deploy to conflict zones—and indirect intervention by recruiting, training, advising, equipping, financing, assisting, and deploying various clients. The Basij was another key player to emerge from the competition within the IRGC. Following the war, the militia became its own branch of the force and, in some ways, a coup-proofing mechanism within a coup-proofing mechanism (the IRGC). It became a vital asset for the Guards and for Iran’s security apparatus during the Iran–Iraq War and, later, in matters pertaining to internal security. The regime initially created the Basij in 1980 to serve as its most loyal force. Its objective was to protect the state and the revolution if the Artesh, the rest of the IRGC, and law enforcement refused or failed to do so. Subsequently, the Basij went on to become Tehran’s main tool for curbing opposition and unrest.56 In the years following the war, the Basij began to expand until its vast network covered virtually all public institutions, ranging from universities and schools to mosques.57 The duties of the Basij became twofold. Members of the militias, known as Basijis, would monitor civil society, collect and disseminate intelligence, and report any deviation from the values of the revolution, serving as an important resource for the state in intelligence gathering. To this end, the force relied on its extensive and growing network of informants and supported the IRGC’s efforts to enforce security and the revolution’s values at home.58 The Basij served to further fragment the Iranian armed forces and security apparatus to avoid granting a monopoly over military affairs and security policies to any single entity and to put checks on each institution.The Basij would also be instrumental in allowing the regime to implement its asymmetric doctrine—during the Iran–Iraq War and, later and to a lesser degree, in Syria, this more fanatical branch of the armed forces would be an important tool in the execution of Iran’s 243

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most dangerous tactics and operations—including the human wave tactic during the Iran–Iraq War. In addition to the creation and solidification of these critical units, the Guards also undertook a number of structural reforms. Importantly, they adopted formal divisions and a system of ranks, which they had initially opposed, viewing it as clashing with their core revolutionary values. The Guards saw themselves as a ‘people’s army,’ whose commanders embodied humility and modesty, in the image of their political and religious leaders. In that sense, they wanted to contrast themselves with the Artesh, which they viewed as embodying the luxurious lifestyle of the Shah, and modern Western militaries, which in their view were built on hierarchy and opulence.59 In many ways, the revolutionaries’ view of the Artesh echoed that of the clerics of the Qajar period who believed that many aspects of the modern military were a departure from the faith and tradition. Nevertheless, as the Guards established themselves within the Iranian military landscape, they also adopted ranks and expanded their domains of operation and activities only to become more akin to the Artesh they had once opposed. Unlike the Artesh, the Guards had established their unit bottomup. In doing so, they had adopted an image of simplicity—which they were loath to renounce. IRGC commanders wore the same plain uniforms as their subordinates and sat on the floor with them. As Qassem Soleimani reflected decades later: One of our war’s specificities, which removed inequalities, laid in the initiatives that took place on the front of the Sacred Defense.  The difference between us and the world’s classic militaries was one word. If we want to know the difference between [Guard commanders] Hajj Ahmad Motevaselian, Hajj Hemmat […] and a classic military commander, in addition to spiritual and behavioral matters, it [boils down to] ‘come and go.’ This means that our commander would stand on the battlefield and go in the front and say ‘come,’ but the classic commander would stand in the back and say, ‘go.’ This […] had a great impact and brought about many sacrifices.60

However, by the end of the war, the IRGC had adopted a formal ranking system and thus a hierarchy.61  This served to professionalize 244

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the IRGC and institutionalize it as part of  Iran’s formal armed forces, rather than a guerrilla force. Nevertheless, the Guards, and their commanders in particular, preserved—and continued to retain— elements of their early days, especially as it pertained to their uniforms, which were, and remained, fairly devoid of marking and decorations—a fact that IRGC-affiliated social media accounts often publicize at the time of writing to contrast what they view as the Guards’ modesty and achievements with the Shah’s lavishness and bombast despite a lack of meaningful military success. Nevertheless, at the operational level, despite their competition for resources and influence, the Artesh and IRGC began to divide tasks and were gradually able to complement each other. In doing so, the reforms of the late 1980s and 90s created the groundwork for a considerable uptick in Iranian activities outside the country’s borders in the 2000s and 2010s. In the 1990s and over the next two decades, the Artesh and IRGC would develop more distinct and complementary roles and portfolios. IRGC spokesman General Ramazan Sharif would later describe the coordination between the two forces as follows: ‘Our engagement with Artesh is completely planned and these two powerful defensive arms are managed under the command of the commander in chief of the armed forces Ayatollah Khamenei and under the supervision of the general staff of the armed forces.’62 Sharif explained that division of labor between the Artesh and IRGC was well-defined and included clear ‘lines of demarcation’ between the two forces’ missions in the three domains. ‘Fortunately today,’ Sharif added, ‘the two forces have the best level of coordination and it is not an exaggeration to say that we are a single organization in our missions and, at the same time, we perform our duties with clear responsibilities and defined geography.’63 Nonetheless, Sharif made it clear that most of the IRGC’s cooperation with Artesh took place in the air and on sea, and to a lesser extent on land, where the IRGC had become the dominant force.64 The Artesh Navy would take charge of operations in the Caspian Sea and the Gulf of Oman—and later, the Gulf of Aden and Bab alMandab, where its mandate largely focused on anti-piracy—while the IRGC Navy became primarily active in the Persian Gulf.65 In other areas, such as the Strait of Hormuz, the two forces shared tasks and 245

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cooperated.66 The Artesh Air Force took charge of most of Iran’s combat aircraft, leaving the IRGC in control of the missile and drone programs.67 Additionally, the Artesh and IRGC began to share a joint military intelligence capability (J2 unit), which brought together personnel from all the armed forces in Iran. The unit took the lead on coordinating counterintelligence operations and combat.68 In operations, the Artesh became the main air power, providing air cover to IRGC ground forces, including during operations in Iran’s northwestern (Nagorno-Karabakh), eastern (Afghanistan), southeastern (Pakistan), and western (Iraq) borders.69 In cases pertaining to counterterrorism, the two branches of Iran’s armed forces were also joined by another body, the country’s law enforcement, in their operations within the country’s territory and in the border areas.70 However, although the two forces had become more cohesive, their cooperation continued to take place against a backdrop of competition. Regional theaters in which the two forces operated together after 2001 provided the Iranian armed forces with an opportunity to integrate various units more effectively in combat. Pourdastan’s observation about the tensions between the Artesh and IRGC during the war discussed in the previous chapter were not completely erased but the dynamics between them did not change to a large degree. As a result of the reforms that took place during the reconstruction period, at the time of writing the Artesh is the first line of defense for the country whereas the IRGC is largely expeditionary. A twoyear military service is compulsory for Iranian males aged 18 years and older. The conscripts join the Guards and the Artesh. The latter takes the lead in border security, which has backlashed at times—as poorly trained conscripts are sent off to what are often dangerous areas in the country’s borders, especially the ones shared with Afghanistan and Pakistan, where separatist and religious terrorist groups operate. There have been instances of kidnapping or killing of Iranian soldiers in those areas—some have included members of the Guards in addition to Artesh personnel—instances which have raised popular discontent and criticism of the government’s perceived incompetence. In addition to its role in securing the borders, the Artesh continues to operate in the three operational domains. But while the IRGC has superiority in land and sea domains, Artesh dominates the air thanks 246

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to its superior air force (relative to the Guards). Special and cyber operations also predominantly fall within the Guards’ realm. The two entities have also demonstrated an ability to pass the buck effectively, devising a division of labor to tackle emergencies, as was the case when the Artesh identified and the IRGC shot down a US drone in June 2019.71 Overall, the post-war period led to two significant developments within the Iranian armed forces. First, the relative stability of the 1990s coupled with Iran’s broader reconstruction efforts provided fertile grounds for the expansion and further professionalization of the IRGC. The Guards emerged from the decade of reconstruction ready to seize the opportunities that the United States would afford them to assert their presence in the region following 9/11. Second, as the Guards expanded, they also gradually became more embedded in the country’s armed forces and, as a result, evolved into a more professional force replicating many standard operating procedures and elements of the culture and organizational structure of the army they had once opposed. A similar trend would develop in the country’s broader security apparatus.

Security Infrastructure Beyond the Military The contours of Iran’s web of contemporary institutions governing security policies emerged during the Iran–Iraq War and were fully consolidated during the 1990s and early 2000s. These organizations often puzzle Western observers, who have dedicated hundreds of pages in books, reports, memos, and the op-ed pages of major publications to the inner workings of the Iranian system. Despite their opacity, understanding these organizations is critical to comprehending Iranian national security decision-making today. These institutions play a critical role in shaping national security policies in conjunction with or in support of the armed forces. A close examination of these organizations’ mandates and operational procedures reveal more continuity with the prerevolutionary era and highlight once again a decision-making process that is neither exclusively reliant on ideology nor purely rational— instead, it is fairly pragmatic, yet also shaped by collective memory. 247

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The post-war reform period was critical in shaping these organizations and their worldviews. As they transformed throughout the 1990s, they adopted outlooks and policies that presented elements of continuity with the thinking and strategies of the Shah’s men. The following sections provide an overview of the reforms implemented in key components of the security sector throughout the 1980s and especially 90s, which laid out the foundations for the regime’s early twenty-first century decision-making apparatus.

From the SAVAK’s Ashes Iran’s efforts to revamp its military were multifaceted and, perhaps, the last comprehensive reforms to take place in that domain up to the time of writing.  These steps helped consolidate and ground the Iranian military and paved the way for the country’s more assertive posture following 2001. By the time they undertook these military reforms, the revolutionaries had also come to understand the importance of a broader security establishment—many pillars of which they had once denounced. As such, the regime undertook to build a functioning security infrastructure in the decade following the war—which, again, brought it closer to the country’s pre-revolution security thinking and policies, including those the revolutionaries had long criticized. Following the revolution, and the dismantling of the SAVAK in 1979, the country was in dire need of  an entity in charge of  intelligence and counterintelligence. As we have seen, the revolutionaries vowed to fundamentally alter their country’s security apparatus and policies as they sought to topple the Shah. In some ways, they did carry out these transformations; however, many elements of continuity persisted or developed as the revolution matured during the 1990s. At this time, the leadership was struggling with the task of mundane governance, now without the backdrop of all-encompassing interstate conflict. Chief among the institutions the revolutionaries had wanted to remove was the SAVAK, which they viewed as the epitome of what was wrong with the Shah’s reign. The revolutionaries, much like large swaths of the Iranian populace, saw the organization as secret police, created with help from US and Israeli intelligence, which spied on, captured, and tortured Iranians 248

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who opposed the monarchy. Hence, removing the SAVAK was, in some way, a symbol for Iran ridding itself of perceived nefarious foreign influence. Much of the narrative around the SAVAK blended some truth with urban legend.  The SAVAK’s role was, and continues to be, largely understudied from a scholarly and non-biased perspective, leading it to be seen in a skewed light decades after its dismantlement. Consequently, even at the time of writing, Iranians see the SAVAK through a largely conspiratorial lens and hold the West—particularly the United States and Israel—responsible for its activities, further fueling distrust in foreign powers. Yet, as was the case with the military, the ideals behind the revolution did not necessarily translate into an immediate and complete break with the SAVAK’s ways. In fact, during the Iran–Iraq War, it became clear to the new political and security establishments that the SAVAK’s toolkit, including its sources and methods, as well as its operatives’ skills, were needed as the country was facing both internal and external threats. To this end, the regime put ad hoc organizations in the SAVAK’s place, granted immunity to some SAVAK operatives and brought them onboard to defeat the common Iraqi enemy.72 But those organizations, too, had undergone several fundamental and structural changes in the decade following the revolution. The regime had first replaced the SAVAK with revolutionary committees (or komiteh, as they were known in Persian), before disbanding and reconstituting it in the form of the National Intelligence and Security Agency. Finally, the Islamic Republic settled on the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) in 1983, while also equipping the IRGC with an intelligence unit.73 Following the war, the Islamic Republic continued to apply many of the SAVAK’s methods for intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism, which the revolutionaries had once denounced.74 These included the arrest and interrogation of individuals suspected of having ties to opposition, separatist, and terrorist groups operating against Iran, as well as assassinations, such as that of former prime minister Shapour Bakhtiar in August 1991 in France. The new Iranian intelligence services quickly garnered a similarly tarnished reputation to that of the SAVAK, as reports of torture and executions grew from the early days of the revolution onwards. 249

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Following the end of the war, the main intelligence bodies became MOIS and the IRGC intelligence. The latter gained more power after Khatami’s tenure, during which the more conservative elements of the regime saw MOIS as too easily swayed by the president and his cabinet.75 The IRGC intelligence only truly consolidated its power following the 2009 elections when hardliners deemed the ministry’s management of the crisis inadequate. Starting that summer, the IRGC’s intelligence capabilities increased and its mandate expanded.76 In 2019, its units are responsible for intelligence and surveillance and directly report to the supreme leader. In theory, IRGC intelligence is still required to comply with the policy set by MOIS and support its efforts.77 In reality, with increasing frequency the IRGC intelligence services have played a greater role in intelligence, undermining, to some extent, the work of the ministry.78 With ever more capabilities and a stronger mandate, the IRGC intelligence units are at the forefront of intelligence and counter-intelligence efforts in an increasingly volatile security environment. Although the Iranian intelligence apparatus today is much more fragmented than the one built by the Shah, its mandate and methods are largely similar to the SAVAK’s. The 1990s laid out the groundwork for the consolidation and cementing of these organizations. They enabled the country to tackle a threat environment that would progressively become more challenging over the next few decades, while providing fodder for growing Iranian influence.

Decision-Making 1989 was a significant year in Iranian politics as it was the first year in a decade where Iranians were not otherwise occupied with a revolution, hostage crisis, or war, finally having the bandwidth to contemplate the next steps in the regime’s consolidation. Khomeini died that year and with Khamenei’s ascent came the amendment of the constitution, allowing him to take the office of the supreme leader. This new constitution, coupled with the transition of power and Rafsanjani’s election, created the opportune moment for a number of reforms and changes on the policy side of the security establishment. 250

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Iran undertook to formalize and add rigor to the decision-making process that year and, by doing so, improve strategic and policy outputs.   To this end, the regime created the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) to replace the Supreme Defense Council.The entity became the lead organization on security and military matters within the Islamic Republic, streamlining national security decisionmaking.79 Whereas the Supreme Defense Council was comprised of the president, prime minister, minister of defense, chief of the joint staff of the armed forces, and commander-in-chief of the IRGC, the SNSC consisted of the heads of the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches, the chief of the supreme command council of the armed forces, the head of the Planning and Budgeting Organization, the ministers of foreign affairs, the interior, and intelligence, the heads of the Artesh and IRGC, and the supreme leader’s representative.80 This expansion served to include a broader array of policy options than the Supreme Defense Council, allowing for critical national security decisions to be made in consultation with all important players in the system—a key element of the oft-disregarded process of consensus-building within the regime. This platform afforded the regime the ability to bring all factions together and build consensus through an established and formal channel—even as the regime continued to heavily rely on informal processes.81 The resulting policy outputs could then be enacted by the state as a unitary entity. Also in 1989, the regime created the new defense ministry (known as the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics) by merging the old defense ministry and the IRGC Ministry.82 The ministry became responsible for the provision of logistics to the Artesh and IRGC, including equipment maintenance and procurement. Accordingly, the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics managed the domestic production of arms—realizing the core objective of self-reliance in the production of military gear and arms pursued by generations of  Iranian leaders since the end of the Qajar period. To this end, the Defense Industries Organization operated within the ministry and was responsible for the bulk of domestic arms production, which was further delegated to theater-specific organizations (e.g. one agency handled the production of missiles while another oversaw the production of naval vessels). Within the Ministry 251

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of Defense and Defense Industries Organization, there was also a degree of overlap and competition inherent in the mandates of the subordinate organizations. However, the Guards often dominated the ministry’s leadership positions. Rouhani strove to change this balance of power within the ministry, as well as more broadly in the Iranian economy and elsewhere, with some backing from Khamenei—at least until President Trump’s designation of the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in April 2019.83

Conclusion In the aftermath of the Iran–Iraq War, Iran began an extensive and multifaceted reconstruction effort, which involved political consolidation, economic and infrastructural restoration, and military reform. The months immediately following the end of the war afforded the Iranians the opportunity to finish the revolutionary project. They seized this occasion to strengthen the Islamic Republic’s foundations, including its key political and security institutions and the armed forces. This almost became an imperative given Khamenei’s need to compensate for his own shortcomings by strengthening select key institutions. Accordingly, the military underwent a major and lasting reformation. Many of the reforms turned back the clock on the military and security developments of the early days of the revolution, instead further embedding the country’s security apparatus and military into its worldview and providing continuity with pre-revolution eras. Key components of the country’s defense and security policies, particularly those which posed a challenge to international peace and security and the United States and its allies, fit in that context. As we will see in the following chapter, these included Tehran’s nuclear and missile programs, support for non-state actors, and regional activities.

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It is axiomatic that the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States changed the course of American foreign policy, especially pertaining to the Middle East and South Asia. The attacks also marked the beginning of a new chapter in Iranian security thinking spurred by an increased US military presence in the region. The post9/11 regional landscape, which the United States hoped to shape into a more secure environment through its military interventions, paved the way for Iran to increase its reach across the region. Over the next decades, the regime’s regional policies became a source of controversy at home and abroad, but they also brought it closer to following in the footsteps of the Shah. All sides of the political spectrum applied lessons from their country’s history and framed their narrative around its experiences with war and peace to push the country in the direction of their liking. As a 2018 RAND study assessed, ‘Iran’s historical memory of foreign manipulation, combined with its sense of national importance, continues to shape its conduct of political warfare today.’1 On the eve of  the attacks, Iran was largely focusing on myriad internal issues. A new generation of leaders had risen with a determination to reform the regime, and the elevation of the reformist Mohammad Khatami to the presidency in 1997 and again in summer 2001 seemed to provide the country with an opportunity to address these domestic 253

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challenges. The advent of Khatami to power also seemed to signal that the leadership in Tehran was recognizing that change was inevitable— albeit not without significant challenge by hardliners and intensified infighting over the direction of the Islamic Republic.2 Abroad, Iran was more restrained, mostly focused on what it considered immediate threats to regime stability and national security. It occasionally conducted missile strikes against the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran and MeK positions in Iraq to protect the regime from dissent and the country from separatism. Iran was also wrestling with the Taliban in neighboring Afghanistan.3 The regime’s inward focus coupled with its limited activities abroad seemed to signal a more restrained Islamic Republic than the one indicated by the revolutionaries’ ‘export of the revolution’ rhetoric in the early days of their tenure. Yet the inevitable turn US foreign policy took after 9/11, resulting in the invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, and radical changes to the security landscape in the Middle East, both compounded the Islamic Republic’s challenges and offered it an opportunity to expand its reach. What the American leadership hoped would be two quick wins turned into years-long struggles, with Afghanistan becoming the country’s longest war. From Iran’s perspective, the two wars—whose effects on the region would later be exacerbated by the series of protests throughout the Arab world known as the Arab Spring starting in 2011—were a mixed bag.  They had led to an increased US presence in the region, and the regime was nervous about the prospects of finding itself on Washington’s list of potential targets for regime change.4 At the same time, the American interventions toppled two key Iranian adversaries in Baghdad and Kabul, indirectly producing more opportunities to increase the country’s influence. They also afforded Tehran opportunities stemming from close proximity to US troops, whose vicinity granted the regime leverage to extract concessions from or to target the United States in the case of a direct conflict— and which the regime’s clients would target in Iraq in the late 2000s. Critically, the two wars presented Iran with the opportunity to leverage the foundations it created in the 1980s and 90s to establish a presence in half  a dozen countries across the Middle East and South Asia by the end of the 2010s. In doing so, America’s post-9/11 wars helped 254

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Iran assert itself in regional affairs as it had only in the final decades of the Shah’s reign in its contemporary history. The conflicts and the Arab Spring also helped the country solidify its military doctrine by perfecting its mastery of asymmetric warfare and operationalizing it on a scale never seen before.5 By the time the Islamic Revolution turned forty, Iran had seized the opportunities afforded to it by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the civil wars spurred by the Arab Spring—chiefly the Syrian civil war starting in 2011, but also the Yemen conflict—to become a dominant player in the region. Syria, in particular, helped Iran grow its network of non-state clients and deploy its own forces to fight in support of Syrian dictator Bashar alAssad, exposing them to combat and projecting power in the region. This chapter lays out the events that have shaped Iran’s post-9/11 security thinking and policies. It argues that while Iran’s asymmetric tactics and wide reach may appear like a new phenomenon, Iranian security thinking today replicates or is at least inspired by that of generations past and shaped by Iranian collective memory. As such, there are more similarities than differences between 2019’s Iran and that of the 1960s and 70s. Going forward, there are likely to be more parallels with Iran’s past posture and behavior in many key aspects of Iran’s national security policies regardless of leadership decapitation and other major events. The chapter will begin with a brief overview of the events shaping the country’s post-9/11 domestic political landscape, before outlining Tehran’s strategic and doctrinal outlooks, as well as key developments in the country’s armed forces in the 2000s. Finally, the chapter will review Iran’s security policies chronologically to outline Tehran’s expansion.

The Revolution’s Expansion: Political Backdrop The previous chapter ended with Ahmadinejad’s accession to the presidency in 2005. In contrast to Khatami’s political moderation and diplomacy, Ahmadinejad quickly built his reputation outside of Iran’s borders as an agitator, questioning the veracity of the Holocaust and declaring that ‘Israel must disappear from the earth’s surface.’6 The first term of Ahmadinejad’s presidency accelerated Tehran’s growing political and economic isolation. 255

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By the time he was up for re-election in 2009, both the reformist and conservative blocs had created dynamic campaigns to replace Ahmadinejad. On the reformist side, the campaigns centered on revolutionary veterans, Mir Hossein Moussavi and Mehdi Karroubi, who pledged to reverse Ahmadinejad’s policies of economic and diplomatic isolation and restrictions on civil society. The much less popular Iran–Iraq War veteran, Mohsen Rezai, represented the conservatives, who sought to address the deep economic challenges plaguing the country’s economy. Despite galvanizing the populace, the reformists were not able to oust Ahmadinejad, who won a second term in office. Internal and outside observers lambasted the election as fraudulent, and its surprising outcome prompted protests demanding a recount of the votes. The movement that emerged out of these events became known as the Green Movement. For a short period, the Green Movement pushed the government to contend with large-scale calls for change, including the recount of the votes, removal of Ahmadinejad from office, and political freedoms and civil rights.7 However, through widespread crackdowns, mass arrests, and intimidation campaigns, the regime was able to suppress the movement and virtually silence the civil society forces seeking change for the remainder of Ahmadinejad’s term. Despite this, the conservatives were not able to keep power in the next presidential election. The key implications of the 2009 unrest for the country’s security were twofold. First, they led the system to grapple with the extent of its internal vulnerability and to take additional measures to suppress internal dissent. In doing so, the leadership changed some of the internal security force structures, positioning IRGC intelligence as the main intelligence agency within the regime at the expense of MOIS—which many insiders saw as having failed to predict, prevent, and end the unrest.8 This development would mark a toughening of internal security.9 Second, given the prominent role played by social media in helping protestors organize, the regime was prompted to build up its cyber capabilities to manage internal dissent, including by accelerating its efforts to procure spyware and surveillance systems and laying out the groundwork for a national Internet, which would effectively block off 256

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access to any undesirable content coming from abroad—and which would not materialize. At the same time, the regime recognized that without a fairer election during the next cycle, it would further lose legitimacy, possibly with no prospect of regaining it. The second and last term of  the Ahmadinejad presidency was marked by tensions, both internally and on the international stage. By the time Ahmadinejad was preparing to leave office in 2012, having completed his two four-year terms allowed under the constitution, Iran was effectively isolated politically and economically. Domestic pressure, economic sanctions, and international isolation forced the country back to the negotiating table, first behind closed doors, in meetings organized by Oman.10 The talks were not particularly effective, as Ahmadinejad’s team was not always forthcoming— refusing to make concessions and preferring to pontificate about Western philosophy instead of focusing on the matters at hand.11 In June 2013, moderate candidate Hassan Rouhani won the presidency. His campaign drew on the Green Movement, promising to fulfill some of the promises made by the reformists in 2009. The campaign even galvanized individuals and groups who had contended that the political system was rigged and had previously pledged to boycott the elections after 2009.12 After Rouhani’s election, many within the populace joined reformist and moderate blocs to hail his victory as a rejection of the isolationist policies of the Ahmadinejad years and a clear mandate for international engagement. Rouhani’s worldview was centered on the notion of ‘pragmatic engagement’ with the world.13 Accordingly, he set out to reach a diplomatic agreement with the United States and other world powers regarding Iran’s nuclear program, which had profoundly isolated Iran and created momentum for an international coalition sanctioning the country.14 An old theme in Iranian security thinking had reemerged in this period. As was the case centuries prior, the Iranians were concerned about growing Russian (and now, a rising Chinese) influence in their country, having seen the two powers strengthen their grip on key sectors of the Iranian economy upon Europe’s departure from the country after the imposition of sanctions starting in 2006.15 They hoped that striking a deal on their country’s nuclear program would enable them once again to leverage ties with European powers, 257

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and thus undermine Russian and Chinese presence and influence in Iran.16 And for a while, it seemed like Iran was on track to gain access to more markets and create new partnerships. As then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and lead negotiator Wendy Sherman later described it in her book, Rouhani’s election ‘helped break [the] logjam’ that had existed with the Ahmadinejad team, and talks between the United States and Iran were now held in broad daylight. The efforts first led to the Joint Plan of Action or the interim deal, before finally culminating in the signing of the JCPOA in July 2015 after months of marathon talks, undertaken at the highest levels of the US, European, Russian, Chinese, and Iranian diplomatic corps. Rouhani’s engagement effort was backed by Khamenei and, despite some tensions within the regime, also accepted or at least tolerated by all power centers, which saw the status quo as untenable. Despite fissures on the acceptable and desirable scope of the talks and specific provisions, the entire system was in agreement that a deal lifting sanctions and providing Iran with access to the international financial infrastructure and markets would be the best way forward. Nevertheless, critics of the JCPOA would characterize the agreement as a modern-day Turkmenchay, which had led to too many unilateral Iranian concessions—prompting Rouhani’s team to defend the deal’s provisions vigorously at home.17 The UN Security Council adopted a resolution endorsing the deal on 18 October 2015. The accord scrapped nuclear sanctions on Iran in exchange for the country curbing key sensitive elements of its nuclear program. In May 2017, two years after the JCPOA was signed, Rouhani won his re-election bid. This landslide re-election provided him with a stronger mandate than the one he had enjoyed during his first term, signaling a popular endorsement of his approach, despite soaring American reluctance to continue adhering to the agreement. Rouhani’s objective all along was to oversee the economic revival of his country and the JCPOA was the key to unlocking the door to do so. Unsurprisingly, he turned his attention to the country’s economy in his second term. But, to Rouhani’s chagrin, a number of internal and external factors stymied Iran’s economic recovery. Many sanctions remained in place 258

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and deterred risk-averse businesses and financial institutions from entering or regaining the Iranian market. Iran’s own underdeveloped regulatory landscape, corruption, and mismanagement of the economy also contributed to an unattractive environment for investment. To make matters more complicated, Trump’s surprising victory in the United States’ presidential election in November 2016 created an environment of uncertainty. On the campaign trail, the Republican candidate had pledged to ‘tear up the Iranian nuclear deal,’ which he had decried as one of the worst deals in history. On 8 May 2018, President Trump announced that he was pulling America out of the JCPOA and reimposing sanctions on Iran.18 Facing an increasingly volatile international environment and with the future of his chief (and only real significant) legacy in question, Rouhani set out to tackle challenges within his control. To this end, he shifted his government’s focus to addressing problems stemming from the lack of an adequate regulatory landscape, transparency, anti-corruption measures and mechanisms, and proper management. Some critics compared certain measures proposed by the government, including the adoption of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) anti-terrorism and money laundering provisions, to the capitulations provided under the Qajars to foreigners.19 But Rouhani saw these steps as key to steering Iran on a path to much needed growth, and he started with a surprising target: the IRGC. Under Khamenei’s patronage, the IRGC had consolidated its influence in Iranian politics and the economy. Rouhani viewed their corruption and opacity as a hindrance to much-needed institutional reform and the country’s ability to receive the dividends of the nuclear deal.20 So, for the first time in twenty-five years, he took the oversight of the Ministry of Defense away from the IRGC. In doing so, he sought to divest the IRGC of some of the powers it had acquired and consolidated during the supreme leader transition. Now, Khamenei also seemed to switch sides; his tacit approval for this reform process was notable and signaled discontent within the regime with the Guards’ penetration into all aspects of Iranian public life. Unrest broke out throughout the country in late 2017 and early 2018, and again in November 2019, when protestors objected to soaring costs, unemployment, lack of opportunities, and the regime’s 259

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exorbitant foreign policy.21 The demonstrations further telegraphed to the regime that change was needed as they brought to the streets hundreds of blue collar individuals, typically less predisposed to question the regime and take to the streets to voice their discontent.22 With the reimposition of US sanctions and renewed tensions between America and the Islamic Republic further exacerbating the already dire economic situation in Iran, more questions regarding the country’s interventions in foreign theaters arose. Given the nature of the Assad regime and its commitment of mass atrocities, the Iranian role in Syria—which included IRGC, Artesh, and Iranian non-state partner deployments, as well as coordination with Moscow during the Russian air campaign—was already unpopular within the populace and controversial within the regime.23 Now, with the sanctions, the population was increasingly questioning the soundness and viability of the country’s foreign policy. As a result, and in a departure from its traditional modus operandi, the regime began to disclose more information about the costs associated with its defense and regional policies and their benefits—by making available to the public the price of each missile and why its benefits offset its costs, for example.24 Later, the Trump administration’s April 2019 designation of the IRGC as a Foreign Terrorist Organization, which facilitated the targeted killing of Qassem Soleimani in early January 2020, the US–Iran tensions that unfolded in spring and summer 2019, and devastating floods in several regions of Iran in March and April 2019, led to the regime further publicizing its ties to some non-state actors— particularly Afghan Shias deployed in Syria, Iraqi Shia militias, and the Houthi rebels in Y   emen.25  The presence of foreign militiamen in Iran became controversial, leading to some questioning its constitutionality and others debating its soundness.26 This, too, was a stark departure from the regime’s previous behavior, which had long rested on covert support for these groups, and indicated a willingness to formalize and take ownership of this key tenet of the country’s strategy.

The Politics of Personalities at the Turn of the Century In Iran, individuals and informal processes often outweigh formal ones—in large part due to the country’s political and strategic 260

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cultures and lack of robust and lasting institutions. The twenty-first century has been no exception. Although such political figures as Ahmadinejad, Rouhani, and Zarif have often occupied the spotlights in Iran and in the West, the first two decades of the twenty-first century also marked the ascendance of some military officials to the limelight. Of particular note was Qassem Soleimani, one of the key architects of Iran’s security policies, whose personality, leadership style, and ability to navigate multiple theaters by leveraging his IRGC-QF paramilitary force took on an almost mythical quality for many Iranians, as well as Iran’s neighbors and the West. Soleimani occupied such a central role in the design and execution of Iranian national security and defense policies that he was often viewed as second only to Khamenei himself in terms of his influence. The United States killed Soleimani in early January 2020 as the commander was reportedly traveling back from Syria to Iraq. Soleimani’s death, the Trump administration likely hoped, would weaken the IRGC and Iran more generally. Khamenei appointed Soleimani’s deputy, General Esmail Qaani, as the new head of the IRGC Quds Force, leading Qaani to emerge from the shadow of the ‘Shadow Commander’. As former head of the US Joint Operations Command and US and NATO commander in Afghanistan General Stanley McChrystal explained in his 2019 profile of  Soleimani in the Foreign Policy magazine’s ‘Global Thinkers’ series, the Quds Force leader ‘still operates outside the spotlight. Soleimani grew from a military commander into a ghostly puppet master, relying on quiet cleverness and grit to bolster Iran’s international influence.’27 Starting with the rise of ISIS in 2014, social media played a role in highlighting Soleimani’s mystery as accounts linked to or affiliated with the IRGC began to publish content tracing the commander’s steps in Iraq and Syria, showcasing him surrounded by local partners who received support from Tehran. In one representative online video publicized by the IRGC-linked outlet Tasnim, for example, Soleimani is seen sitting on the floor in a modest room, drawing on paper maps and discussing the operation at hand with his men. Later, the camera follows him to the battlefield, where the commander dressed in everyday clothing hugs and kisses each of the men.28 The image these stories projected was one of a calm, collected, confident Soleimani, working with key stakeholders to push back 261

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ISIS and keep Iranians safe—at the same time powerful nations were grappling with the threat ISIS posed.29 To borrow McChrystal’s words again, ‘the humble leader’s steady hand has helped guide Iranian foreign policy for decades—and there is no denying his successes on the battlefield.’30 IRGC-affiliated social media accounts and Iranian leaders would often remind their population that Soleimani and his men stood between Iranians and ISIS, stopping their country from descending into chaos as their neighbors had. Khamenei said as much when he framed the unpopular and controversial Syrian intervention in terms echoing that of Iranian officials justifying their own advise and assist missions abroad decades prior.31 He noted that if Iranian forces were not fighting in Syria, they would have had to fight ISIS operatives on the streets of  Tehran, Esfahan, Shiraz, and other Iranian cities. In this sense, Iran was not just defending the holy Shia sites—as domestic and foreign critics often pointed out—but sending a signal to ISIS and deterring it: These individuals who leave here to go to Iraq or Syria in the name of defending the sites of the Prophet’s family in the face of the takfiris, are in reality defending their own cities. Of course, their intent is [to please] God. But the reality of the situation is this: It is the defense of Iran.32

This powerful narrative popularized Soleimani, whose force was an unlikely candidate to win any popularity contests among a population who had long seen the IRGC as an oppressor.33 The combination of the state-created myth around Soleimani and the public’s threat perceptions pertaining to developments in the region provided a big boost to Soleimani’s public profile. In the days following his death, the commemorations held in Iran were on a scale last seen following Khomeini’s death. Another key factor contributing to the puzzlement surrounding Soleimani’s personality and influence lies in the contrast between the Quds Force commander and Iran’s savvy Foreign Minister, Zarif. Many wondered who represented the ‘real’ Islamic Republic and whose words should be taken seriously: the architect of the regime’s most nefarious policies or its Western-inclined diplomat. In the mid- to late-2010s, the two men were the public faces of Iran and two of the most popular figures in the country. Y   et, everything seemed to separate them. A man of modest background, Soleimani was 262

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born and raised in a rural Iran and did not continue education beyond high school.34 A soft-spoken, yet charismatic and emotive leader, he had risen through the IRGC ranks during and after the war to position himself as one of the most powerful men within the organization.35 The war shaped Soleimani’s worldview as much as it forged his image within his force. Soleimani would later recount his combat experience positively and frame it as an opportunity: ‘I had a lot of enthusiasm toward military plans and issues and was on the battlefield with a lot of interest and this is precisely why I went to the battlefield with a 15-day mission and did not return until the end of the war.’36 His subordinates felt a sense of devotion to the commander they saw as humble and close to his men. As he recalled later, Soleimani and his men did not use titles to refer to each other, choosing instead to call each other by their first names. To the others in the force, he was just Qassem or brother Qassem.37 Soleimani’s attitude toward and relationship with his subordinates highlighted the Guards’ continued effort to preserve their image as the army of the people despite having grown into a fully fledged military apparatus, with a mandate transcending that of a traditional conventional force. This would allow the force to be doubly effective. The IRGC Quds Force, for its part, would outlast Soleimani thanks in large part to the commander’s efforts to institutionalize it and to create the architecture needed for it to operate regardless of leadership. By contrast, Zarif, who has become famous for his jolliness (even becoming known as the ‘Smiling Minister’), was a US-educated diplomat who obtained his doctorate from the University of Denver in Colorado and served as Iran’s representative to the UN. Zarif  had penned articles and co-authored a monograph on multilateral diplomacy, and negotiated with his American and European counterparts with the same aptitude as Soleimani did with the Afghans, Arabs, and Kurds in the region.38 The new foreign minister demonstrated as much fluency in the language of contemporary international affairs and modern international relations theory as he did in English.39 In her profile of  Zarif, the journalist Robin Wright, who covered the nuclear negotiations among other Iranian events, quoted former US vice president Joe Biden describing the Iranian negotiator as ‘pragmatic, not dogmatic.’40 He seemingly found it easier to negotiate with his 263

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Western counterparts than at home with his fellow revolutionaries. At the same time, in January 2014, as talks between Iran and the P5+1 were advancing, Zarif traveled to Lebanon and met with Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. Wright also reports that he deposited flowers at the grave of Imad Mughniyeh, the commander linked to the 1983 bombings of the US embassy and Marine barracks in Beirut, which led to 241 casualties.41 These two faces of the Islamic Republic at forty left some observers perplexed: who was the true voice of this generation of Iranians leaders? What direction was the regime heading toward as it headed toward its fifth decade in power? Many Western, Gulf Arab, and Israeli policymakers wondered how much power Zarif truly exerted and to what extent Iranian policy was shaped by Soleimani. Some asserted that Zarif and his team of diplomats had no sway on their country’s foreign and security policies.42 To them, Soleimani was the true puppet master and he ‘owned’ the key files in those areas. To make matters worse, many posited, these two branches of the Iranian regime operated in silos, rarely communicating. In reality, Iranian officials argued, the two men were responsible for different areas of Iranian security policy, with Soleimani being in charge of much of the portfolio pertaining to regional theaters (specifically, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen), and Zarif the lead on the nuclear file and relations with the West and other regional partners and states.43 This was partially the rationale espoused by the Trump administration when it sanctioned Zarif, whom it labeled the ‘chief apologist,’ in the summer of 2019. Moreover, Zarif and Soleimani had developed a close working relationship, which enabled them to coordinate their efforts much more closely than was often assumed.44 ‘I have a great relationship with Soleimani. We work well together,’ Zarif stated in 2017.45 As Iranian diplomats working closely with Zarif on the nuclear talks explained, Zarif was having regular meetings, often over lunch, with Soleimani to discuss foreign and security policy, including regional developments—some estimated these meetings occurred once a week.46  This, according to Iranian diplomats who had worked for Zarif, was because of Soleimani’s pragmatism. McChrystal echoed the view according to which this pragmatism was key to Soleimani’s ability to become one of the most influential people in 264

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the Middle East.47 Soleimani’s ability to build and sustain personal relationships with key players belonging to all factions within the Iranian system and influential groups in the region was critical to his effectiveness. For example, in 2014, the Houthis informed Iran they were going to topple the Y   emeni president Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi whose policies aimed at sidelining them. Soleimani advised them against going to Sanaa’. Later, upon the Houthis’ takeover of Sanaa’ and in the midst of the Yemen conflict, regional players and the United States made several efforts to bring the Houthis to the table. Soleimani stepped in once again and asked the rebels to be constructive with the Saudis, who led a coalition of Arab states in the Yemeni conflict to support the Houthis’ adversary, Hadi.48 According to US and Iranian officials, the Houthis were, indeed, more forthcoming.49 Soleimani largely stayed above politics in Iran. Surprisingly, he even espoused some moderate views on certain domestic and social issues—typically arenas of tension within the regime and where many conservatives are willing to make the fewest concessions. His July 2017 remarks on the longstanding division between regime insiders and outsiders best illustrate this point: If we always use such titles as [women] without the hijab and hijabi, or reformist and conservative, then who is left?  These are all our people. Are your children religious? Are they all the same to you? No. But a father will absorb all of them and society is your family. […] If we say it is just me and my own Hizbollahi buddies, this will not be protecting the revolution. The prayer leader must be able to absorb the hijabis and those who do not wear the veil together.50

Another aspect of Soleimani’s clout, which is often misunderstood or overstated abroad, lay in his status within the regime and role in the decision-making process. Soleimani as an individual did not yield the power often ascribed to him in the West in shaping Iranian policy; rather, he was leading one of  the power centers—albeit a critical one—involved in the decision-making process.51 Two institutions often stand out in the decision-making process, which is largely based around collective bargaining: the government led by the president, and the IRGC, whose relationship varies depending on the political 265

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landscape. For example, the final number of troops deployed in Syria was the result of bargaining within the regime, with Rouhani advocating for fewer troops deployed to avoid stressing the nuclear talks during a sensitive period and Soleimani advocating for greater numbers, before ultimately settling on a compromise.52 This compromise would become the unitary state’s policy output.

Strategy, Doctrine, and the Armed Forces Iran’s armed forces and security apparatus underwent comprehensive reforms at the end of the Iran–Iraq War. At the same time, the country cemented its contemporary doctrine. With these foundations laid out, Iranian strategy and doctrine saw some closure as the 2000s presented Tehran with a twofold challenge and an opportunity. Sanctions became a permanent feature of Iranian security calculus throughout the first two decades of the twenty-first century. First, Iranians saw sanctions as economic warfare or the continuation of war through economic means (building on Clausewitz’s definition of war as the continuation of policy by other means). The sanctions only reinforced the notion that self-reliance should be the country’s priority. Rezai put a fine point on this idea when he compared the threat of sanctions to that the nation faced during the Sacred Defense and prescribed a similar strategy to overcome this new threat: ‘In the economic war we are in today, there is a need for unity and struggle. We are in an asymmetric economic war, and we cannot be victorious in it with division and dispersion.’53 Iran’s military commanders and political elites viewed their country in a state of ‘constant defense,’ due to the diverse toolkit at its adversaries’ disposal, which included soft power, economic measures, covert operations, and military options. And with the United States doubling down on the maximum pressure campaign, going as far as targeting Soleimani, Iranian resolve to use these tools became even more apparent, as displayed by Tehran’s decision to strike bases housing US forces in Iraq in response to Soleimani’s death. Second, Iranians saw increased US presence in the region following the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq as a direct vital threat, but also as an opportunity. A conventional force-on-force conflict with the 266

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United States would likely not end to Iran’s advantage—a fact that was not lost on the Iranians.54 Hence, Iran’s military doctrine was designed to deter state and non-state adversaries by raising the costs of targeting the nation through mostly unconventional means.55 Should deterrence—mainly exercised through the country’s missile program and non-state partners—fail, Iran would opt for a war of attrition. As Erik Olson argues, ‘The country’s military doctrine defies simple categorization into offensive, defensive, or deterrent models. It is designed to deter adversaries and retaliate if deterrence fails.’56 Iran’s preference was to use asymmetric tools and operate in the gray zone—which enabled the country to overcome much larger military capabilities by utilizing measures short of war, chiefly through nonstate partners and by leveraging psychological warfare, influence operations, and cyberattacks.57 Zarif contextualized his country’s asymmetric approach into its broader foreign policy as follows: [Our] view of foreign policy must be a comprehensive one. What has created power for the Islamic Republic is the asymmetric factor, though other factors of power exist elsewhere. The Islamic Republic has made considerable progress in the material elements of power, but it is still lacking superiority vis-à-vis other regional players, especially international actors, in an equation. But where the Islamic Republic has a special advantage is in the Islamic Revolution’s discourse, one based on self-reliance and independence.58

Similarly Pourdastan described the threat perceptions of Iran and his forces as follows: Today, we are facing a new threat called combined arms warfare, in which transregional enemies are no longer pursuing attrition warfare. [Instead], they plan for firm and rapid operations, which achieve the objective in the shortest amount of time.Thus, we, too, must create the needed capabilities for ourselves and our forces [to be effective in this new] landscape.59

Among the capabilities Iran developed to prepare itself to face adversaries with combined arms capabilities, Pourdastan pointed to electronic warfare and cyber capabilities.60 These capabilities, Pourdastan noted elsewhere, were designed to counter the United 267

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States, whose anti-Iran toolkit included ‘economic sanctions and psychological warfare.’61 According to Pourdastan, US grand strategy vis-à-vis Iran was not limited to the military domain, instead including ‘economic, cultural, cyber, and media’ operations as well, all aiming to overthrow the regime.62 Gholamreza Jalali, who heads Iran’s Civil Defense Organization, put a finer point on these views, arguing that the United States had designed a ‘five layer’ hybrid warfare plan to counter Iran.63 The components of this strategy, as Jalali enumerated them, were: political action, to include the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the maximum pressure campaign; security measures, such as terrorist attacks; cyber operations, which encompass influence operations; information operations, undertaken thanks to social media platforms; and cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.64 Jalali argued that if the United States had resorted to such operations, it was largely due to an acknowledgement that war with Iran would not end on America’s terms.65  To better prepare to counter American efforts, Jalali stated that his country was working with such friendly nations as Russia and China. To help execute Iran’s strategy, the IRGC underwent some restructuring in the early 2000s, helping it transform itself into a regional powerhouse as one of the most effective forces in the Middle East—in large part thanks to its increasing mastery of asymmetric warfare—in many ways realizing the Shah’s hopes and expeditionary aspirations for his military. Throughout the first decade of the new century, past and current members of the IRGC became more active in virtually all aspects of Iranian public life. Economically, many of the Guards were able to fill their coffers through military, financial, and illicit channels. They also gained tremendous political influence, especially during Ahmadinejad’s tenure, which they leveraged to grow their political assets. In the years that followed, the Guards served in various executive and legislative positions and established close ties with other key players—and this, despite much controversy. The highest in the regime, including Khamenei and even some IRGC commanders, began to express concern regarding the Guards’ growing presence in Iranian political life, as well as in the economy.66 268

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Some worried that as the Guards’ power was growing, they were transforming into an unstoppable force that could challenge the clerical rule. Others were concerned that the Corps’ omnipresence in Iranian life would stymie the nation’s ability to prosper. Others yet were troubled by the optics of the IRGC’s reach in politics. Some commanders went as far as asking the force to limit its activities to the military realm—albeit often with limited applicability in practice. As then IRGC commander Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari put it on the eve of the 2017 presidential elections, ‘not one individual among the Guards and the Corps’ commanders is allowed to intervene in politics and parties in the elections.’67 Militarily, the Guards largely overshadowed the Artesh, although the two branches of the Iranian armed forces began to form a much more cohesive unit than they had in the 1980s and 90s.The IRGC’s presence in key sectors of the Iranian economy grew throughout the first decade of the twenty-first century, which directly affected its military affairs. The Guards’ economic revenues now stemmed from three primary sources: the military-industrial complex; non-military and civilian industries; and, relatedly, black market activities and illicit trafficking. Their ability to assert themselves in those arenas was largely a product of the internal and external factors and events that dominated the international security landscape in the 2000s. The Iranian military-industrial complex was made up of several key programs that the Guards began or resumed during the Iran–Iraq War, including the missile and drone programs. The IRGC was now the main player in Iranian weapon and military equipment production and expanded the country’s defense sector largely due to the belief among the public and polity that Iran must be self-reliant, a view shaped, as we have seen, by Iranian collective memory and made critical due to sanctions and the arms embargo.  The Guards both shared this view and capitalized on it. The Guards slowly expanded their presence in non-military industries, particularly in infrastructure during reconstruction. Created in 1990 through the merger of different IRGC units, the IRGC-controlled firm Khatam al-Anbia—a construction conglomerate with approximately 2,500 projects throughout Iran and 170,000 employees—was at the forefront of the Guards’ non-military 269

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business ventures.68 Like other IRGC-affiliated and -controlled financial, commercial, and shipping entities, Khatam al-Anbia was able to utilize the country’s isolation, sanctions, and international investors’ and businesses’ unwillingness or inability to work in Iran to shore up domestic capital investment and effectively monopolize the construction sector. In this way, the IRGC worked as a primary agent of Khamenei’s ‘Resistance Economy,’ a drive for economic self-sufficiency in the face of Western economic isolation and sanctions.69 The notion of Resistance Economy operationalized key elements of Iran’s strategic outlook, particularly the need for self-reliance and the ability to remain resilient in the face of foreign pressure. Although it was more of an abstract set of aspirations than an actual economic game plan, the proposal contained familiar ideas proposed decades prior to the advent of the Islamic Republic and the imposition of sanctions by Iranian statesmen. These included such notions as rendering the country less reliant on oil and foreign markets pursued by opposing camps within Iran from the Shah to Mossadeq—and whose roots could be traced back to the Qajar era. Lastly, the IRGC’s illicit trafficking and black market activities reportedly increasingly included smuggling narcotics and alcohol— the purchase and consumption of which was prohibited for Muslim Iranians by Iranian law. They also engaged in arbitrage by selling gasoline below market price. The Guards procured other illicit items, such as dual use items for various Iranian programs, to include the nuclear and missile programs.70 All in all, the Guards’ illicit activities may have accounted for as much as $12 billion in revenue by the mid2010s. The IRGC largely controlled Iran’s black market economy and was now considered the only organization within Iran capable of undertaking large-scale smuggling operations.71 At the same time, the Guards were tasked with fighting smuggling, a mandate they used to elbow out their competitors.72 In addition to establishing three key revenue streams to bolster it economically, the IRGC also underwent key structural reforms in the 2000s that increased its flexibility and strength, allowing it to expand its hold on power in Iran’s security arena. The most important such reform was the 2005 division of the command and control structure 270

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into thirty-one commands—one for each of the nation’s provinces. This step served to better prepare the IRGC to implement its ‘mosaic defense,’ an asymmetric doctrine based on hybrid warfare (a mix of conventional and irregular tactics) whereby it increased flexibility in executing its strategy domestically while also strengthening each unit locally.73 The notion of ‘mosaic defense’ directly draws its roots from Iranian historical memory, allowing it to stymie foreign invasion and render foreign occupation virtually impossible.74 Similarly, the doctrine was an attempt to achieve what generations of Iranian statesmen and military commanders had desired: greater centralization and flexibility in the armed forces. This step was yet another effort by the Iranian establishment to strike a balance between centralization of command and flexibility in operations—a goal it had pursued for over a century. With the Guards now solidly embedded within the country’s military and economic fabrics and the Islamic Republic’s strategy and doctrine formed, Iran was ready to leverage the post-9/11 regional landscape to shape affairs in several key countries to its liking.

The US Invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq The Bush administration’s Middle East and South Asia policies paved the way for growing Iranian influence in those regions. As many American officials, military planners, and academics would lament for years to come, the Iraq war, in particular, bolstered the regime by removing its chief regional adversary, Saddam Hussein, and the instability that followed the intervention afforded the Islamic Republic the ability to assert itself in that country.75 Iran had laid out the groundwork for its post-9/11 expansion decades prior to the terrorist attacks. If the Bush administration’s Middle East policies ushered in growing influence in Iraq, the Trump administration’s approach to Iran, culminating in the death of Soleimani, would lead the Iraqi government to take steps to kick US forces out of the country. Starting during the Iran–Iraq War, the IRGC had worked to cultivate a network of non-state clients throughout the region. Soleimani would play a key role in forging ties with various ethnic and religious groups in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as 271

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Lebanon. Later, these connections would prove critical to Iran’s ability to operate and project power in those countries. Hence, when the Americans invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, they only paved the way for an already existing apparatus—one whose foundations Iran had laid out prior to the revolution and which it had meticulously strengthened following the Islamic Republic’s rise to power in no small part thanks to its revolutionary ideology—to blossom and for Iran to reap the rewards of its investment. In 2001, Afghanistan seemed to offer a zone of possible agreement between Iran and the United States.Three years prior to the US invasion of Afghanistan, Iran had come close to a direct confrontation with the Taliban when the group launched an attack on Mazar-e Sharif, killing several Iranian nationals—mostly diplomats.76 By some accounts, Tehran deployed some 200,000 troops to the border and flexed its muscles by conducting drills while some political and military officials advocated for a forceful response.77 The outcome of the internal consensus-building process was one of restraint. Soleimani reportedly diffused the situation and formulated a response that would become his (and the regime’s) signature approach to security challenges throughout the region: avoiding direct confrontation with central authorities and national security forces, instead working with and through non-state clients.78 In doing so, Soleimani largely followed in the Shah’s footsteps: as the monarch had done decades prior, the Guards provided friendly entities with support, including financial assistance, in lieu of a direct intervention in Western Afghanistan.79 Whereas the Shah had supported the antiCommunist movement in Afghanistan, the Islamic Republic was now advising and assisting anti-Taliban forces.80 When the United States made the decision to invade Afghanistan, it shared Iran’s goal of toppling the Taliban and establishing a stable central government in Afghanistan—whose territory would no longer serve as a safe haven for jihadist groups, chiefly al-Qaeda.81 Although Tehran had engaged in small-scale cooperation with al-Qaeda on some occasions, it had long considered the network as a critical threat to its security and had, in fact, largely worked with it to deter the terrorists from targeting Iranian interests—while also sharing the objective of poking America in the eye.82 272

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9/11 shed light on the extent of the threat posed by al-Qaeda by displaying its intent and capacity to inflict pain and to do so by targeting large numbers of noncombatants. For Iran, the attacks made it clear that al-Qaeda was more of a threat than previously recognized and ‘cast the international terrorism of al-Qaeda under a different light to Iran.’83 As Gary Sick wrote later, ‘in sharp contrast to much of the Arab world’s scarcely concealed glee that the United States had gotten a taste of its medicine, Iran responded with official statements of condolences and unofficial and organic candlelight vigils in support of the American people.’84 When the Americans invaded Afghanistan, the Iranians welcomed the move. From their perspective, the US invasion would allow them to meet several of their objectives in Afghanistan by removing the Taliban and creating a stable Afghan government.85 Tehran went as far as supporting the NATO military campaign in theater and the political process in Bonn.86 It is worth quoting Ambassador James Dobbins at length on this matter to capture the depth and breadth of US–Iranian alignment in Afghanistan in the early days of the invasion. Dobbins, who served as the Bush administration’s first envoy to Afghanistan, later wrote about his experience working with the Iranians in the Washington Post, describing his interactions with his Iranian counterparts and the working relationship between the US and Iranian delegations as follows: Many believe that in the wake of Sept. 11, the United States formed an international coalition and toppled the Taliban. It would be more accurate to say that the United States joined a coalition that had been battling the Taliban for nearly a decade. This coalition – made up of Iran, India, Russia and the Northern Alliance, and aided by massive American airpower – drove the Taliban from power. The coalition then worked closely with the United States to secure agreement among all elements of the Afghan opposition on the formation of a broadly based successor to the Taliban regime. As the American representative at the U.N. conference in Bonn, Germany, where this agreement was reached, I worked closely with the Iranian delegation and others. Iranian representatives were particularly helpful. It was, for instance, the Iranian delegate who first insisted that the agreement include a commitment to hold democratic elections in Afghanistan. This same Iranian persuaded

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the Northern Alliance to make the essential concession that allowed the meeting to conclude successfully.87

American and NATO military force on the one hand, and key stakeholders’ ability to formulate a coherent policy on the transition of power on the other, led to the rapid toppling of the Taliban and the creation of a new national government in Afghanistan. Iran’s role was not insignificant in the success of the political process and military operations. However, Tehran re-evaluated its support for the US-led alliance when, weeks after the events described by Dobbins, then US president George W. Bush called the Islamic Republic a member of the ‘Axis of Evil’ in his January 2002 State of the Union speech.88 Although Iranian interests broadly continued to overlap with those of the coalition, the apparent hostility of the Bush administration toward the Islamic Republic served as a reminder to the regime’s leadership that the United States could not be trusted as its administrations inevitably sought regime change implicitly or explicitly—and this regardless of party affiliation or leadership. The incident undermined Khatami’s efforts to close the gulf between the two nations at home and provided momentum to hardliners who opposed normalization with America.89 As a whole, the state moved further toward conservatism on the matter of US–Iran engagement for a decade to come. Matters only became more complicated the following year, in 2003. The removal of Iran’s greatest adversary, Saddam Hussein, was no small gain for the country. According to Zalmay Khalilzad, who had led backchannel talks with the Iranians, he and his team held two meetings with the Iranians in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq. Khalilzad’s interlocutor was Zarif, who pledged that his country would refrain from targeting  American aircraft straying into Iranian airspace.90 Khalilzad also hoped to secure Iranian cooperation in bringing the Shias to the negotiating table to establish a new government—as they had done in Afghanistan.91 However, the Iranians would not play such a constructive role in Iraq—in part, as other US officials noted, due to their experience in Afghanistan and with the Axis of Evil speech.92 Moreover, from Iran’s perspective, the country was now surrounded by two warzones where the US military was operating. If the two wars ended successfully for America, Iran could be next 274

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on Bush’s list of authoritarian states to topple and replace with a democratic government. As Bush later wrote in his memoir, Decision Points, his administration did look into the military option against Iran—although this was his ‘last resort.’ As he put it, the president ‘directed the Pentagon to study what would be necessary for a strike.’93 And by his own admission, Khalilzad’s meetings with the Iranians left ‘[t]he important point here […] unsaid: the United States, contrary to public accusations from Iran’s supreme leader […] had no plans to expand the war into Iran.’94 Piling on the missed opportunities that would punctuate US–Iran relations from 1979 onward, at the time, Washington did not authorize ‘the kind of continuous engagement that might have shaped Iran’s conduct.’95 For their part, the Iranians saw war with the world’s sole superpower as a real possibility and prepared for it accordingly, while trying their best to prevent it by deterring the Americans. In this context, Afghanistan and Iraq proved particularly useful for Tehran. They afforded the Guards and their clients proximity to US forces, which in turn enabled them to signal that any military confrontation with Iran would bear significant costs. In Iraq, in particular, the mid2000s saw a number of efforts by Iranian-backed non-state actors to deter and harass Americans to undermine US presence there. For the next few years, Tehran would exert influence in Afghanistan and Iraq to undermine Washington while keeping it busy there. In Afghanistan, Iran leveraged its cultural, linguistic, and religious ties to various groups to secure its objectives of undermining the Americans, as well as Pakistan, while containing the Taliban. When in 2007 it became clear that the United States would not be leaving Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, eager to undermine Washington, Tehran began to work with the Taliban (albeit in a fairly limited fashion).96  The evolution of the Taliban helped this decision. As a RAND study assessed in 2014, ‘today’s Taliban, although not friendly toward Iranian interest, is nevertheless not the zealous and fanatic Taliban of the 1990s.’97 The advent of ISIS only helped cast a less negative light on the Taliban, which now appeared as a more moderate force countering the much more radical and violent ISIS offshoot in Afghanistan. However, Iran remained wary of the Taliban and, as a result, did not provide the same level of support to the group as it did some of 275

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the non-state clients it was working with in Iraq, for example.98 Iran also recognized NATO’s role as a key stabilizing force in Afghanistan.99 Accordingly, it refrained from any activity that would fundamentally damage the alliance’s efforts and create instability and chaos next door—even as, at the height of US–Iran tensions in the spring and summer of 2019, the escalation spilled into the naval domain in the Persian Gulf and on the ground in Iraq.100 In that sense, Iran did not see its competition with America in Afghanistan as a ‘zero-sum game.’101 Nevertheless, thanks to its non-state partners, the regime was able to signal to the United States that its tolerance of American troops should not be taken for granted as it possessed the means to ‘dial up the pressure against US forces’ if and when it needed to do so.102 In Iraq, Tehran saw Washington’s efforts differently. It proved more risk-tolerant than in Afghanistan, especially starting in the mid-2000s. Broadly, Iran’s objectives in Iraq were not fundamentally different from those it was pursuing in Afghanistan. Its goals were to secure a friendly central authority, preferably dominated by Shias. Yet, Iran also hoped for a fairly weak central government, one that would afford Tehran more levers over political and security matters in the country.103 Additionally, Iran saw Iraq as a key theater of its competition with the United States, especially during periods where the two countries did not have similar threat perceptions and a common enemy (prior to the rise of  ISIS and following the collapse of the physical caliphate). Such a government would be too weak to either pose a threat to Iran or to prevent it from playing an active role in Iraq.104 Unlike in Afghanistan, the Iranians had a lower threshold for acceptable US military presence in Iraq: in Afghanistan, the Iranians had come to tolerate and even accept some level of American presence and considered it as a stabilizing force.105 In Iraq, however, they largely saw US presence as a negative factor, one largely stymying their influence after the initial push to overthrow Saddam.106 Until the rise of ISIS in 2014, Iran seemed to be largely meeting its objectives in Iraq. For decades, Iranian forces, particularly the IRGCQF under Soleimani, had built relationships with Iraqis. Now, many of the groups the Iranians had created or supported for years and individuals they had bolstered were in leadership positions.107 A 2015 RAND report aptly described Iran’s strategy in Iraq as using its clients 276

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‘to alter Iraqi political dynamics by dialing the level of violence up or down.’108 This allowed the regime to keep Iraq stable but not enough to allow its central authority to eject Iranian forces from its territory. Having established itself as an arbiter in Iraq, Tehran in general and the IRGC in particular were able to position themselves as an indispensable force in Baghdad and with other Iraqi players—as the 2017 Kurdish referendum and fall 2019 protests in Iraq would later show.109 In the meantime, the Arab Spring would present Iran with another dilemma.  The regime was deeply concerned about the possible domino effect of the movement and its implications for its own survival— especially as the protests across the Arab world were coming only two years after the 2009 Green Movement in Iran. The regime quickly saw some opportunities in the events, however, recognizing that the mass protests and instability created room for an increase in Iranian presence and influence throughout the region. The most important battlefield of the post-Arab Spring years for Iran would be Syria.

The Syrian Civil W   ar (2011–-present)110 Iran became embroiled in the Syrian civil war almost from the onset of the conflict. Assad was the Islamic Republic’s only true ally in the Arab world, rallying to the Islamic Republic’s side during its greatest times of need, namely the Iran–Iraq War.  The 2003 invasion of Iraq only served to align Tehran and Damascus’s concerns and interests even more, as both feared a US attack on their own territories.111 Having effectively strengthened its foothold in Iraq and Lebanon, Iran was striving to secure Syria to project power, increase its strategic depth, and create a corridor to the Mediterranean, affording it easy and cheaper access to Hezbollah. As Soleimani famously put it, ‘today, Iran’s defeat or victory does not occur in Mehran or Khorramshahr. Our borders have gone further. We must witness victory in Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria; and this is the result of the Islamic Revolution.’112 Tehran initially tried to keep its involvement in the conflict covert. Regime officials and military spokespersons often denied any Iranian presence in Syria.113 Unlike Iran’s activities in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iranian officials grappled with their country’s role in supporting Assad from the start. The conflict proved deeply unpopular with the Iranian 277

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populace, as the Syrian opposition to Assad evoked its own struggle against the Islamic Republic in 2009 and the atrocities committed by the Syrian dictator against the opposition were reminiscent of its own rulers’ crackdown on protestors. The aversion of Iranian citizens to the Syrian war coupled with reports of human rights violations and war crimes—such as the employment of chemical weapons by the Assad regime, invoking memories of Saddam Hussein’s use of chemical weapons against the Iranians in the Iran–IraqWar—divided regime officials on their support for Assad’s war. On the one hand, Assad remained Iran’s only true ally in the Arab world, who had supported Tehran during the Iran–Iraq War. A friendly government in Syria was also crucial to maintaining access to Lebanon and providing a clear path to supplying Hezbollah and the Mediterranean. On the other hand, as the conflict progressed, it imposed greater moral and reputational costs on Assad’s backers. The Syrian issue was perhaps the only regional portfolio where deep divisions were clearly visible to outsiders. By 2012, it was publicly evident that Iranian-backed Lebanese Hezbollah operatives and Iranian military advisors (mostly IRGC) were present on the ground and playing a critical role in securing Assad’s regime, working alongside Syrian forces even as they were committing atrocities against armed groups and civilians alike.114 The Guards had also seen their first casualties in the conflict, and Tehran’s support for Damascus could no longer be kept secret. At home, the regime had a hard time standing by its support for Assad. Iranians wondered why their compatriots were being sent off to die in a conflict that did not affect them and in support of a brutal dictator, as the international community named and shamed the Islamic Republic as complicit in and enabling mass atrocities. The rise of ISIS in 2014 provided an opportunity for Iran to rationalize its presence in Syria and to cast it in a different light. Iranians felt the ISIS threat intensely: the group had gained significant ground in neighboring Iraq and had displayed signs of brutality rarely seen even in a region that had long struggled with terrorism.115 Moreover, ISIS’s stringent anti-Shia ideology and its stated objective of recruiting in and targeting Iran placed it among the country’s most critical menaces in recent years.116 278

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ISIS’s rapid territorial gains in Iraq and Syria and its declaration of a ‘Caliphate’ also ensured that Iran could maximize its benefits in Syria, as the chaos allowed it to increase its influence in the country, while also seemingly legitimizing its presence in the theater both internationally and domestically. Now, Iran was no longer just supporting a dictator crushing an opposition whose protests were fueled by legitimate grievances; instead, Tehran was supporting Damascus in the face of a transnational terrorist threat. By 2015, Russia had joined the Assad-Hezbollah-Iran triangle in Syria and was now providing air cover to these ground troops. The Russian intervention would be instrumental to the progress made by the Tehran-Damascus-Hezbollah axis—known as the Axis of Resistance. It allowed Assad to regain control of swaths of territory. But it would also create tensions with Iran. As in other areas of partnership between Tehran and Moscow, deep and historically rooted distrust provided the backdrop for the two countries’ operational cooperation.117 And with Russia’s involvement in Syria, Iran was no longer Assad’s main ally, instead relegated to playing the role of junior partner. Significant disagreements among the troika arose along the way. In a notable episode, Iran granted the Russians access to one of its airbases—the Nojeh airbase in the Western province of Hamadan—an arrangement that Iranian officials were hoping to keep quiet as Russian presence, even temporary, would provoke substantial backlash in Iran. Collective memory played an important role in this decision and the episode that followed: Russia had a long history of interventions and interference in Iran, and if Iranians had banned any foreign military presence in their country in their constitution, it was in large part due to their experiences with Russia. To Tehran’s dismay, Russian officials did not hesitate to discuss the arrangement in public, leading to infighting within Iran’s elite. Some went as far as accusing the government of violating article 146 of the constitution, which prohibits foreign military bases in the country.118 Following these events, the Iranians initially rescinded the Russians’ access to the base, before authorizing it again but on an ad hoc basis and only for refueling purposes (not for bombing campaigns).119 Iranian officials would make it clear that Syria was too important to 279

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their country’s strategic interests and Russia’s aircover too vital to be derailed over such disagreements. Iran would gradually commit two other types of forces to Syria to complement the IRGC’s efforts. First, the Artesh would deploy troops to Syria to operate under the auspices of the IRGC.120  Typically, the two forces would operate side by side but under their own command. This time, it was clear that the IRGC was taking the lead in the operations and the Artesh would only play a secondary role in Syria. The benefits of deploying the Artesh alongside the IRGC were twofold: sending all Iranian forces was partially designed to help legitimize the conflict at home (building on the Artesh’s relative popularity compared to the Guards and its image as a force only concerned with the national interest) and served to provide the two forces with joint combat experience. The close cooperation between the Artesh and IRGC allowed the two branches—which by their own admission had failed to properly coordinate during much of the last major combat, the Iran–Iraq War—to be integrated more effectively. As Pourdastan explained it, ‘the Quds Force base position was there and our forces [the Artesh] were detailed to the Quds Force.  This means that the […] our [troops] operate under the supervision of the Quds Force and they do not work independently.’121 Second, the IRGC would also recruit, train, arm, advise, assist, and deploy thousands of militias from across the region, chiefly Afghan, Lebanese, Iraqi, and Pakistani units—including the Fatemiyoun, a division composed of Afghans, and Zeynabiyoun, comprised of Pakistani fighters.122 Iran’s ability to deploy thousands of non-Iranian forces enabled it to maximize the benefits it could extract from its presence in Syria, including projecting power beyond its means, and to do so at a relatively low cost to the country—minimizing Iranian casualties, for example. According to IRGC intelligence open-source reporting, Ali Reza Tavassoli (also known as Abu Hamed) established the Fatemiyoun in 2012 by bringing together twenty-two fighters to ‘defend the holy sites.’123  Tavassoli’s story resembles that of many of the men he recruited to join the brigade: he was an Afghan-born fighter, who had lived in Iran. Tavassoli died in combat in Syria in February 2015. 280

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Tavassoli had previously fought with Iranian forces during the Iran– Iraq War, where by some estimates more than 2,000 Afghans died in combat.124 Iran had started weaponizing its own Afghan refugees and recruiting many in Afghanistan during the Iran–Iraq War—forces that it would cultivate following the war in Afghanistan, and later, in Syria, building on relations established by the Shah.125 Soleimani’s successor, Esmail Qaani, had overseen two units which counted many Afghan fighters within their ranks during the Iran–Iraq War. Later, he would use this experience to work with the Fatemiyoun in Syria.126 As we have seen, the idea of recruiting and deploying Afghan fighters can be traced back to the Qajar periods.127 The IRGC’s ability to recruit, train, and deploy thousands of forces by the end of that decade indicated that the Guards had made considerable progress in implementing its train, advise and assist-style program aimed at supporting its network of non-state partners abroad.128 By the time President Trump announced he was withdrawing the United States from the JCPOA and reimposing sanctions in May 2018—leading to growing discontent with the state of affairs in Iran— the public was aware of the costs of Iran’s involvement beyond its borders and, therefore, more critical of Iranian security policies. Yet, by most measures, the costs associated with Iran’s regional policies remained low relative to what the country’s defense budget would require if Tehran were to pursue the same objectives by different means.129 Indeed, Iran was now able to project power across its region without deploying its own troops and suffering too many casualties. Moreover, the Syrian conflict provided the Iranian military with much-needed and sometimes crucial battlefield experience. Iranian troops had not seen combat since the end of the Iran–Iraq War. As was the case with Dhofar under the Shah, Syria provided Iranian troops with real-life combat experience and an opportunity to increase their military effectiveness.130 Ultimately, by the time the United States announced it would be drawing down its military presence in the country in 2018, the results of the Syrian civil war for Iran were mixed. On the one hand, Iran had clearly gained significant battlefield exposure and military experience from its presence there and established itself as an important player in the region. Tehran had also projected power beyond its borders while securing its proximate 281

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objectives of securing Assad’s grip on power and maintaining access to its corridor to Lebanon. On the other hand, the conflict had incurred significant reputational costs for Iran. The country’s leadership and armed forces had not just stood by as Assad had committed atrocities but actively supported those policies. And with its threat perception heightened, Israel was increasingly targeting Iranian and Iraniansupported groups’ positions in Syria and, by 2019, Iraq. Syria is perhaps the most clear-cut of Iran’s military interventions in the post2001 Middle Eastern operational landscape. Unlike in Afghanistan and Iraq, where Iran’s role had both positive and negative implications, its presence in Syria had been almost exclusively devastating.

The Rise of ISIS Against this backdrop, ISIS emerged in Iraq and Syria.  The organization quickly clutched swaths of territory and formed a government as its brutality made headlines across the world. In Iran, the organization’s atrocities were not just in the headlines, they were part of daily conversations. The prospect of a new adversary in Iraq was a grave threat to Iranians. After all, the last time a brutal adversary held the reins in Baghdad, a devastating eight-year conflict ensued and led to hundreds of thousands of casualties, the use of chemical weapons, and the targeting of population centers. Iran quickly responded to ISIS by dispatching the Quds Force and leveraging members of its network of non-state allies in Iraq. It provided the Kurds and Shia militias with assistance in the form of training, advice and intelligence, and weapons.131 Iran was anxious to push back ISIS in Iraq. In Syria, the calculus was different. ISIS provided the Islamic Republic with a much-needed justification for its support for Assad. Hence, the regime’s objective was not necessarily the group’s complete destruction in Syria; rather, it was hoping to keep ISIS weak but contained there—both to legitimize Iranian presence in the theater and to avoid ISIS’s empowerment in Iraq, a much more vital threat to Iran’s own territory and population. Ultimately, although Iran wished to see some level of stability in and to secure the national unity and territorial integrity of both Iraq and Syria to avoid a potential domino effect into its own territory, it 282

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was willing to tolerate more instability in Syria. Tehran would thrive most in managed chaos in Syria. This strategy would prove effective in allowing Iran to grow its presence in the region and to do so at a low cost. It would, however, come with a number of drawbacks, chiefly, the country and its clients (Hezbollah in particular) being viewed as sectarian actors in the region—a fact that some Iranian officials acknowledged and recognized as a challenge.132 The ISIS offshoot in Afghanistan, known as the Islamic State in Khoraran, further complicated the regional landscape for Iran. The Iranians started to view Islamic State in Khoraran as a threat as early as 2014, at a time when Western military officials and military planners were still skeptical of the extent of the organization’s penetration there.133 Similarly to Iraq, Iranian officials were concerned about instability in Afghanistan. In fact, Afghanistan’s security was arguably even more critical to Iran’s own. The linguistic, cultural, and ethnic ties coupled with the number of Afghan refugees and migrants in Iran and the porous border shared by the two countries meant that instability in Afghanistan would have major ramifications for Iran. At the same time, as in Iraq and Syria, the instability in Afghanistan also translated into a strengthened Iranian foothold there.134 Iran strengthened its position in Afghanistan by once again working with various non-state actors. In this case, Tehran was not just working with its traditional clients but even its former foe, the Taliban.135 Iran believed that the Taliban were gaining ground in Afghanistan, progressively retaking territories lost over a decade prior to the United States. As such, the country’s interests would be better served by remaining on good terms with the network. Likewise, from Iranians’ perspective, the Taliban were the lesser of two evils and could be leveraged to counter the much more threatening Islamic State in Khorasan—even as the fluidity of the groups and the changing Afghan security landscape meant that some operatives wore Talib hats one day and the Islamic State’s the next.136 Moreover, by 2014, the Saudi-Iran rivalry was intensifying throughout the region, culminating in January 2016 when the two Middle Eastern powers severed ties.137 In 2016, the Iranians believed that their efforts to negotiate with the Saudis about regional matters 283

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were effectively at an impasse, having seen several of their overtures rebuked by their counterparts.138 At the same time, from their perspective, the Saudis were now opening new fronts in the rivalry, expressing more interest in Afghanistan than they had in the past.139 Unlike other battlegrounds in the region, particularly Yemen, Afghanistan was directly relevant to Iranian security and interests. As a result, by cultivating relationships with relevant stakeholders, Tehran hoped to stymie Riyadh’s advances in Afghanistan and saw countering the Islamic State in Khorasan as a critical element of this strategy. As the Iranians saw it, the Saudis were a vital force behind ISIS and its Afghan offshoot.140 The counter-ISIS campaign, which placed Iran and the United States tacitly on the same side, was one aspect of what seemed like a positive trend in Iran’s relations with the West in general and US–Iran relations in particular. Although the West and Iran continued to have major disagreements on Syria and, soon, Yemen, the Iranians were edging toward normalizing their status within the international community. The resumption of the nuclear talks in 2012 and their culmination in the JCPOA in 2015 provided an overture for more engagement with Tehran. The talks provided a platform where ideas about Iranian national security, relations with the outside world, negotiations, war, and defense capabilities collided, once again testing and reinforcing core tenets of Iranian security thinking.

Nuclear Negotiations and the JCPOA Virtually half of the nuclear talks took place against the backdrop of the counter-ISIS campaign. For the Europeans, solving the nuclear issue would pave the way for engagement on other issues—particularly regional security and human rights.141 The Americans viewed the nuclear file as their chief concern with Iran but also saw its settlement as an opportunity to discuss and potentially address other challenges stemming from Iran’s behavior—to include the country’s missile program and regional activities.142 The Iranians, for their part, believed that a US or Israeli attack on the country was imminent. The Iranian concerns were not unfounded. At the time, it seemed like a US or Israeli campaign targeting the 284

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country’s nuclear infrastructure was a matter of when and not if.143 Under Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, the Israeli government was also pressuring the Obama administration to take action to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon—viewed by the Israelis as a potential existential threat.144 The Iranian threat perception was a key driver behind its willingness to return to the negotiating table and to strike a comprehensive deal. As Rouhani noted time and again after the JCPOA was signed, the country was on the path to another war and was able to come out of the shadow of a looming confrontation thanks to the deal.145 Often referring to Iran’s experience during the Iran–Iraq War, Rouhani rejected what he described as the hardliners’ belief that ‘one must either enter a war with the world or surrender to the powers,’ noting he saw a ‘third way,’ that of  ‘cooperation with the world.’146 Conservatives and hardliners often contested this argument, especially following Trump’s inauguration in January 2017.147 Throughout the talks, the Iranian negotiating team strove to shape the emerging agreement such that it would allow the country to continue working toward self-reliance. For example, the P5+1 wanted the Arak Heavy Water Reactor to be turned into a light water reactor, which would reduce Iran’s capacity to produce plutonium useable for nuclear weapons but that would allow Tehran to continue working on its desired goal of research and the production of medical isotopes indigenously. The Iranians pushed back. This, as Zarif explained, was because their country did not possess domestic know-how of light water technology: ‘light water reactor [technology] is not a technology we have.’ As a result, if it converted the reactor, it would have to ‘rely on others’ to help complete, maintain, and operate the reactor. Zarif concluded, ‘And we can’t rely on others.’148 Although Zarif’s words cannot be taken at face value, they did resonate with the Iranian public and even individuals close to the ancien régime. Ultimately, the JCPOA provided for a redesign of Arak, which would preserve it as a heavy water reactor but which would produce less plutonium, helping put both sides’ concerns at ease.149  The JCPOA aimed to limit Tehran’s sensitive nuclear activities, while providing it with sanctions relief and placing it on the path to normalize its status 285

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on the world stage once again. However, the Iranian nuclear program remained controversial, as does the JCPOA. Upon withdrawing from the JCPOA, Trump highlighted the deal’s failure to address concern surrounding Iran’s missile program.150 Iran’s missile program had exacerbated international concerns related to its nuclear program and gradually become a more prominent and visible aspect of Iranian national security strategy and military posture. For Tehran, the program fulfilled the vital pillars of self-sufficiency and deterrence. Iran possessed a varied missile arsenal capable of striking all of the Middle East, including Israel, as well as, potentially, parts of Eastern Europe.151 The program remained part of Iran’s attempt to ensure selfreliance, to compensate for the conventional inferiority that had characterized its military since the collapse of the Shah, and to deter its adversaries. What made missiles particularly attractive to Iran, as for other conventionally inferior US adversaries, was that they could be deployed without putting Iranian lives on the line or concerns of safely repatriating expensive equipment, lessening the costs of Iranian action against the United States and its allies, for example. Moreover, reliance on missiles was particularly attractive for Iran given some of its adversaries’ lack of strategic depth. As Zarif put it in 2017, ‘Iran’s missile program is the only deterrent that makes peace in the region.’152 Without its missiles, believing they have ‘a military edge over Iran,’ the country’s adversaries in the Persian Gulf would attempt to disrupt the status quo.153 Later, Zarif noted in a series of tweets on 5 March 2018 that his country’s missile program was critical to preventing another campaign like the War of the Cities: US & Europeans should stop pouring hundreds of billions of dollars of weapons into our region instead of questioning Iran’s missiles. Not restricted by UNSC, but necessary to deter repeat of our people’s suffering when Saddam—with western support—showered us with missiles.154

While Iranian officials saw Israel and the United States as simply thumping their chests, they believed that some Gulf Arabs would actually be inclined to target Iran if the country did not have its missile program. This was because while the United States and Israel had checks and balances, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 286

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were deeply hierarchical systems, where a single irrational actor could tilt the balance and lead the region into conflict.155 The events of the spring and summer of 2019 may have proven Iran right, as Gulf Arab nations previously pushing for a hard line on Iran (chiefly Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates) adopted and lobbied for more restraint at the height of US–Iran escalation.156 This could be attributed to their acknowledgment that any direct or indirect conflict between the two sides would play out at least in part on their soil—as was the case when Iran allegedly targeted Saudi and Emirati oil production facilities and shipping during that period.157 Critically, some of these missiles could serve as delivery vehicles for weapons of mass destruction, although Iran had not demonstrated the ability to miniaturize warheads prior to the curtailing of its nuclear program under the JCPOA. Rouhani echoed Zarif during his remarks at the 2017 United Nations General Assembly meeting: ‘I am stating right here that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s defensive capabilities, including its missile capabilities, only have defensive and deterrent aspects, and they are meant for the preservation of peace and stability in the region, and the dissuasion of foolish adventurism.’158 Military officials, including IRGC commander Jafari, also supported this view, stating that deterrence and defense, not offense, determined the technical dimensions of the country’s missile program, including the vehicles’ range. As Jafari put it in October 2017 in response to new US sanctions targeting the IRGC’s missile activities: The range of our missiles is limited to 2,000 kilometers, as defined by the Supreme Leader and although the capability to increase it exists, this range is currently sufficient as the Americans have enough presence in the 2,000-kilometer range of our country and we can respond to them in the case of an attack.159

The regime’s typically divided factions shared a consensus around the centrality of the country’s missile program in its defense doctrine. Virtually all Iranian politicians and military officials echoed one another in discussing the missile program, albeit with some nuances. Here, too, the policy adopted by the regime seemed to reflect a middle ground, as some advocated for increasing the range of the 287

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missiles while others posited that further limiting the range would assuage the West. Moreover, some believed that the missiles were a red line in any talks with the West while others believed that certain areas of compromise could be reached.160 As hard-line politician Ebrahim Raisi—who ran against Rouhani in the 2017 presidential elections— explained in 2018: ‘The enemies are trying to limit our missile power, and this, despite the missiles being meant to avoid war, not wage it.’161 Nevertheless, the United States and many of its allies came to see the Iranian missile program as a challenge to international and regional peace and security in the late 2010s.Yet, much like other key elements of  Tehran’s defense doctrine, the missile program was not a novelty introduced by the Islamic Republic. Instead, already prior to the revolution, the Shah had pursued such a capability with the help of Israel.162 The revolutionaries halted the ballistic missile program, as they did other defense programs, before resuming it during the Iran–Iraq War and in response to the swift and crushing US victory during the 1991 Persian Gulf War.163 As a result, far from a drastic change in doctrine and policy, Iran’s missile program was instead an element of continuity. What changed was the perception of the program outside Iran’s borders—although a number of experts tried to shed light on the nature, objectives, technical specifics, and limitations of the Iranian missile program.164 The country symbolically unveiled new missiles on the anniversary of Iraq’s attack against Iran, on 22 September, to send a strong signal to adversaries that history would not repeat itself. For example, on 22 September 2017, just days after Trump took the stage to issue a harsh criticism of Iran during his first address before the United Nations General Assembly, the IRGC unveiled the latest addition to its missile panoply, the Khorramshahr—a liquid-fuel missile capable of carrying multiple warheads and reaching 2,000 km (thereby reaching Israel).165 The missile, named after one of the main battlefields and most significant campaigns of the Iran–Iraq War, was tested the following day. Iran’s missile program had become one of the chief points of  tension between  Tehran and the West and its neighbors. After all, Iran’s missiles were often adorned with anti-Israeli slogans and unveiled against the 288

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backdrop of anti-American imagery and US flag desecration. These tensions only worsened as regional turmoil spread, with Iran at the forefront of several key regional conflicts.

The Legacy of the Post-9/11 Conflicts in the Middle East and South Asia At the time of this writing, military campaigns continue in several theaters in the Middle East and South Asia. The Afghanistan war has now become America’s longest and the US-led coalition continues to battle ISIS in Iraq and Syria—even as US drawdowns in these wars have started, albeit not without a great deal of confusion and controversy in light of the Trump administration’s nontraditional approach to military strategy.166 The Syrian civil war seems to be winding down but remains far from over. The war in Yemen has translated into the largest humanitarian crisis in the world, creating the intra-Gulf Cooperation Council and US-Saudi divisions—both later exacerbated by the Gulf rift and the killing of Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, infuriating Capitol Hill in particular.167 Thus, it is too early to produce a comprehensive assessment of the legacy of these conflicts and their impact on Iran’s security thinking and military posture—areas that will undoubtedly provide researchers with fodder for decades to come. Nevertheless, some initial insights can be highlighted. First and foremost, these conflicts have brought the Islamic Republic’s long-term non-state client strategy—intended to maximize Tehran’s power projection and minimize Iran’s culpability—into fruition. These wars have served as a testing ground for Iran’s nonstate clients, affording them and their Iranian backers invaluable battle exposure and increased assistance from Tehran in the form of new forces, training, intelligence, arms, and logistical support.168 The collapse and weakening of central authorities throughout the Middle East and South Asia has provided Iranian-backed militias and groups with more influence over their countries’ affairs and more room for maneuver. Iran’s network of non-state actors has become an indispensable and, indeed, fruitful component of its grand strategy. The growing Iranian reliance on non-state clients after 9/11 is perhaps the single starkest point of departure from the country’s 289

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military doctrine under the Shah—aside from the shift away from the West. The Shah also leveraged non-state actors, particularly the Kurds, against his rivals but he did not build his entire military strategy around non-Iranian and non-state militias as the Islamic Republic has over the first two decades of the twenty-first century. As these groups became more professional and robust, the value of this network for Iran and the regime’s emphasis on them as a cornerstone of its grand strategy also increased.169 Illustratively, as these groups proved ever more successful and thus more useful to Iran, the regime also made its ties with them more overt. It is worth noting that no individual group is indispensable to the regime, which has cultivated a number of clients throughout the region with different levels of command and control. Instead, it is Tehran’s leveraging of non-state actors that has become an indispensable part of the Islamic Republic’s grand strategy. As Iran military historian Afshon Ostovar has laid out succinctly, these relationships provide the Islamic Republic with five key gains: they allow Iran to remain independent from the West; export its worldview; counter Iranian adversaries while preserving some deniability; reduce the costs of intervention; and overcome its lack of alliances with state actors.170 To these benefits, one can add lowering the cost of defeat for Iran. If Iran engages adversaries directly, defeat can beget material and reputational costs—including the loss of  Iranian lives and territory and debilitated prestige. In contrast, the defeat of a client by an adversary does not affect the country directly. And for a nation whose history paints the picture of a ‘conqueror, [which] was, over time, repeatedly invaded, conquered, and humiliated by other powers,’ minimizing the cost of defeat while maximizing the likelihood of success is critical to maintaining its narrative.171 Hezbollah, in particular, has greatly benefited from Iran’s growing presence in the region and, in turn, the Islamic Republic’s ability to become active in various theaters and to do so at a relatively low cost is dependent on the group. Hezbollah provides the Islamic Republic with intelligence, deters Iran’s adversaries, and serves as a vehicle for Iranian support missions across the region. For example, Iran has reportedly leveraged Hezbollah in training and supplying the Houthis in Y   emen and in supporting Assad.172 290

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This ‘train-the-trainer’ model had allowed Iran to further remove itself by another degree from the network’s activities and thus to lower their costs. At the same time, it had provided these groups with more know-how.173 If the model has been so effective it is due to its ability to ‘produce highly elite, specialized hybrid units capable of fighting both state and non-state actors’ at a low cost for Iran.174 Moreover, the model allowed Tehran to further distance itself from and to increase plausible deniability around its support for its non-state clients and their activities—as has been the case in Yemen, where Hezbollah often serves as a middleman between Tehran and the Houthis.175 Second, these conflicts—Syria in particular—have provided Iranian forces with critical combat experience. Combat requirements have led the two branches of the Iranian armed forces to work together outside their borders for the first time since the Iran–Iraq War, affording them the opportunity to increase cohesion, interoperability, improve joint planning and warfighting, and ultimately increasing military effectiveness. In so doing, Iran has essentially implemented the lessons of the Sacred Defense. In this regard, the Syrian civil war was ‘a learning curve toward enhancing conventional capabilities’ for Iranian forces and their clients, particularly Hezbollah. The war increased their interoperability and provided them ‘with experience in combined arms warfare and a large battle space to integrate its multinational units.’176  Third, although Iran’s capabilities remain negligible when compared with the other adversaries singled out by the US government in its 2018 National Defense Strategy, the regime has created significant angst in America. Unlike China, Russia, and North Korea, the other nations in focus in the National Defense Strategy, Iran does not currently possess nuclear weapons and its conventional military capabilities are no match for the United States and its allies. Nevertheless, at a relatively low cost, the regime has been able to project power throughout the region. The extent of Iran’s image as a force to be reckoned with in the Middle East is perhaps best captured by a statement once uttered by an Iranian parliamentarian and which has since become a go-to talking point for American and Arab officials: Iran controls four Arab capitals and, unless stopped, it will be on its way to controlling a fifth.177 It is far from the truth that Tehran controls Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus, 291

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and Sanaa’ and is able to control Manama. In fact, the level of Iran’s command and control over many of its own clients in those countries is questionable. Even Tehran’s closest non-state ally, Hezbollah, has not always abided by Iranian wishes (most significantly in the context of the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah War) and has at times distanced itself from its patron to avoid being seeing as too dependent on it.178 Similarly, despite having committed thousands of non-Iranian militias and its forces to propping up Assad, Tehran has had to compete with Moscow to preserve its influence in Damascus. Yet, the mere fact that Iran’s adversaries see it as such a powerful force is enough of a victory for a state isolated for the better part of several decades and whose economy and military suffer from critical shortages due to US and international sanctions and arms embargos—at times backed by other relevant states and institutions. Perhaps in an attempt to further boost this image of a power broker and a powerful force with expansive ties across the region, the regime started to publicize its ties to several members of its nonstate partner network in 2018–19. In a stark departure from previous practice, the regime went as far as publicizing photos of members of these groups, chiefly Iraqi Shia militias and the Fatemiyoun, engaged in flood relief efforts in Iran in spring 2019 and, later, even a meeting between Houthi operatives and Khamenei. In the past, Tehran had carefully navigated its ties to its non-state clients so as not to upset the population,179 only disclosing and publicizing its ties to a select number of groups and figures within the network—with Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah benefitting from the most visibility, including photo ops with Khamenei. Progressively, the Iranians also became more forthcoming about their relationship with the Taliban. For over a decade, Iran had denied any ties to the Taliban. In 2018 and 2019, however, when the United States developed plans to withdraw from the theater and US officials began to meet with the Taliban, Tehran started to acknowledge that it had been in contact with and had some exchange with the group.180 During the US– Taliban talks, Zarif admitted that his country viewed it as indisputable that the Taliban would remain an important actor in Afghanistan.181 A few months before Zarif’s remarks, the IRGC intelligence affiliated 292

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outlet Tasnim published a lengthy report outlining the Guards’ views of the Taliban as a buffer between US installations and Iran, a counterIslamic State force, and a de facto power broker in Afghanistan.182 Generally, Iran became more forthcoming about its ties to non-state actors throughout the region, even as the United States sought to raise the costs of the regime’s non-state client strategy. In doubling down on these ties and, in a departure from past practice, even publicizing them at home, the regime has sought to highlight for the populace that reliance on foreign powers is a flawed approach to national security and to project power abroad.

Conclusion The post-9/11 regional landscape in the Middle East paved the way for Iran to realize its early revolutionary aspiration of projecting power throughout the region. In so doing,Tehran also met the Shah’s objective of transforming his country into a regional powerhouse, albeit in a drastically different fashion to the one the monarch would have likely envisioned. While some have interpreted Tehran’s policies in the Middle East and South Asia since the turn of the century as the export of the revolution beyond the country’s borders, these observers must exercise caution in reading regional developments in this light. As we have seen throughout this book, Iran’s post-9/11 security policies are instead a continuation of its pre-1979 national security thinking. While some regime officials at times frame Iranian activities in the context of ideology, the post-9/11 regional security policies pursued by the Islamic Republic are shaped largely by its historical experiences and the country’s quest for security and power. The US interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, followed by the Arab Spring, have provided the environment for Iran to achieve these objectives. Today, the country boasts greater strategic depth and the ability to reach friendly actors throughout the region by land, particularly Hezbollah, which serves as a key security partner for the regime—reducing logistical costs and challenges.183 ‘Today,’ Soufan wrote in his profile of Soleimani, ‘with Assad’s impending victory in his country’s calamitous civil war, this Iranian alliance has become stable enough that Qassem Soleimani, should he 293

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be so minded, could drive his car from Tehran to Lebanon’s border with Israel without being stopped.’184 Ideology has played a critical role in allowing Tehran to secure its influence in vast parts of the region; indeed, ideology is an important means by which the regime has been able to achieve its objective. After all, by appealing to Shias and other ‘oppressed peoples’ in the region, Tehran has been able to leverage real and perceived threats and grievances and to turn them into strengths for their country. And this, despite many Iranian officials recognizing the danger of playing the sectarian card for a nation whose ethnic, linguistic, cultural, and religious identity put it at odds with its neighbors.185 Nonetheless, Iran’s key objectives remain similar to those pursued by the Shah in the region: the pursuit of Iranian security and interests (as it defines them), as well as power projection. However, unlike the Shah, today’s Islamic Republic seeks to achieve these goals at a low cost. Where the Shah, like his father, invested a hefty budget in his military and purchased equipment and weapons from the West while acquiring Western doctrinal concepts, training, and capabilities, the Islamic Republic has pursued a fairly robust regional agenda since 9/11 on a relatively low budget. In many ways, the Islamic Republic’s leaders have identified the same challenges to their defense and security as generations of Iranian statesmen going back to the Qajar era: they fundamentally lack the ability to compete with their adversaries. However, they have formulated a vastly different response to this shortcoming than that pursued by the Qajars and Pahlavis. The two dynasties had sought to enhance their conventional capabilities by modernizing their military to address their battlefield deficiencies, but due to limited domestic capacity, they had to rely on the powers to gain the capabilities needed. The Islamic Republic decided to bypass these limitations and to curate a military strategy and doctrine based on hybrid warfare. This strategy used the building blocks laid out by the Pahlavis and the Qajars and leveraged such strengths as groups sharing religious and ethnic identity with Iranians to build asymmetric tools the country can leverage both at war and in peace. Similarly, like the Shah, the regime invested in nuclear, missile, and space programs, as well as cyber capabilities and unmanned vehicles— 294

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although the Shah procured much of his country’s military technology from the West and the Islamic Republic tends to produce many of these items indigenously or acquire them from Russia and China or on the black market. However, the cornerstone of Iran’s military strategy in 2019 lies in its ties to its non-state clients—a relatively small part of the Shah’s strategy in his time. In that sense, Iranian decision-makers have pursued many of the same objectives as their pre-revolution predecessors, albeit through somewhat different means—largely embedded in the country’s asymmetric doctrine.

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A prevailing trend of thought in Western foreign policy circles is that the Islamic Revolution created an unambiguous break in Iran’s view of its national security strategy. Many voices in an often-contentious debate on Iranian defense and security policies largely accept as fact the proposition that the country’s strategic thinking is fundamentally different from that of pre-1979 Iran. Proponents of this line of thinking put forward such examples as Iranian enmity with the United States and Israel today, which they compare with and contrast to the partnership between Tehran and Washington and Jerusalem prior to the monarchy’s collapse. In this book, I have attempted to demonstrate that this conventional wisdom does not adequately capture the country’s strategic outlook. Instead, I have argued that despite trying to reverse the course of the nation’s security strategy, the revolution fell short of creating a set of fundamentally different beliefs about Iranian national security and defense policy. A closer look at Iranian strategic thinking reveals a state defined by ideas stemming from collective and historical memory, which have ensured this continuity. I have contended that divorcing pre- and post-revolution Iran can be misleading at best and counterproductive at worst. It can (and often does) lead to a policy toward the regime whose key assumption resides in the belief that a different government in Tehran would act 297

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in a fundamentally different manner. To be sure, it would be foolish to discount important areas of divergence in the worldviews of the monarchical elite and the Islamic Republic—including the regime’s view of the West. However, a more comprehensive look at Iranian security thinking since the nineteenth century—the period whose major events, including Persia’s first wars and treaties of the modern era, have deeply shaped Iranian collective memory—illustrates a different picture of Tehran’s thinking, one that includes many important elements of continuity. And many of these elements of continuity are also those that many Western policymakers find most challenging. These include the Iranian nuclear program, support for non-state clients, and meddling in the affairs of regional states—all practices shaped by past experiences and continued across diverse political and security landscapes in the country’s history. These elements of continuity are due to the resilience of three key ideas, which stand out in Iranian strategic thinking. First, for all the reasons outlined throughout this book, the single most defining pillar of Iranian security thinking lies in a deep distrust of world powers and the international order. Other elements of Iranian strategic thinking stem from this distrust. As Western travelers to Iran and the broader Middle East know, the region is prone to conspiracy theories. As caricatures of sayings in the region go, ‘if it’s raining, it’s the Brits’ fault.’1 But a close examination of key events in Iran since at least the Qajar period shows that while there is, no doubt, a lot of mythology surrounding the role of foreign powers in Iran, the feelings of helplessness, humiliation, and lack of agency stemming from foreign involvement in the region are real.  As early as the Qajars’ reign, Morgan Schuster captured this sentiment and turned it into the major theme of his book discussing Persian affairs through American eyes. The real components of the narrative of foreign presence and influence in Iran, combined with the myths and legends of it, have shaped the distrust that exists and plagues Iranian collective memory. Hence, today, Iranians still harbor deep-seated distrust toward foreign powers, particularly Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, whose actions they view as having long stymied reforms initiated by Iranian intellectuals and leaders for the betterment and 298

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prosperity of the nation. As we have seen, for centuries, Iranians wished to undermine or eliminate foreign influence in their country. But they also recognized their own shortcomings in terms of capacity, knowhow, capabilities, and technology. Thus, they understood that these powers could not be easily removed from Iran altogether. As a result, they developed a policy of balancing, which allowed them to leverage one power against another. However, this policy, too, came with its own set of trials—particularly the powers outbidding each other to receive ever more concessions from weak Iranian governments. Additionally, Iranians hold a deep belief in the need for self-reliance. In this view, foreign powers cannot be trusted, as they will ultimately ‘betray’ Iranians—a word often used by regime officials, academics, and the general public to describe their historical experiences. Hence, Iranians have long harbored a deep suspicion of settling disputes through negotiations with the powers or international bodies. Fath Ali Shah captured this sentiment when describing Russian intentions and attitudes, complaining that ‘on the one hand, they speak of peace, on the other, they think of war.’2 Qaem-Maqam similarly contended that ‘in the vicinity of Russia, one cannot expect any good news. Their war is wicked and their peace, even more so.’3 This deep suspicion both contributed to and became embedded in the country’s security thinking during its most recent existential interstate conflict, the Iran– Iraq  War. Self-reliance is not a novel idea in Iran. Instead, it goes back decades, with generations of  Iranian statesmen striving to build domestic capacity and to develop indigenous capabilities in many areas, particularly in the military domain. The reforms of the military, which started during the Qajar rule and accelerated under the Pahlavis, were critical to this pursuit, as were the attempts to build an indigenous defense industrial base. Today, this belief is at the heart of the regime’s most controversial projects, including its nuclear and missile programs. Self-reliance is particularly important to Iran as it pertains to defense. Iran’s consolidated efforts to build a strong military and security apparatus, which would be able to deter and any threats to national security, can be traced back to Reza Shah, and even the Qajar era. The mindset of Iranian decision-makers can best be characterized as one of ‘constant defense.’ In my years of fieldwork in the country and 299

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interviewing and meeting with various officials, no notion dominated the conversation more than these ideas of defense and self-reliance. And these words echo ideas that Persian statesmen were beginning to learn in the nineteenth century: ‘There is no peace that is not the prelude to another war.’4 This leads us to the third premise: the Iranian belief that the nation’s chief security policy is one of deterrence and ‘constant defense’ stands in stark contrast to what observers in the West—and some of Iran’s neighbors—see as the Islamic Republic’s export of the revolution.This notion of constant defense is, in turn, tied to perhaps the most sacred concepts shaping Iranian strategic thinking (which the country shares with virtually all other states): territorial integrity, national unity, and sovereignty. This is not to say that Iran does not (and has not) engaged in aggressive behavior. The core tenets of the Shah’s national security policy also resided in deterrence and defense, but his regional policies also became gradually more assertive as his reign progressed. Similarly, the turn of the century coincided with a number of opportunities for Islamic Republic to expand its influence abroad. As noted in the final chapter of this book, Iran’s policies toward and interference in its neighbors’ affairs through direct military interventions and support for proxies also seem to point to a more emboldened Iran today. However, fundamentally, both sets of decisionmakers saw their country’s actions as creating a balance of power favorable to Iran in a region where it has often been and felt ‘othered.’ As we have seen throughout this book, Iran views itself as existing in a deeply troubled neighborhood, one plagued by fragile and failed states, terrorist groups, and foreign presence. And it wants to make sure none of these pose a threat to its own borders, territorial integrity, unity, sovereignty, and national security. As a result, the country has pursued policies that observers have often misinterpreted as expansionist. This is not to say that Iran’s behavior in the region is not challenging at best or nefarious at worst in certain areas. For example,Tehran stood by the Assad regime as it employed chemical weapons against and massacred tens of thousands of Syrians. Iran has also supported terrorist groups in the region and beyond. Hence, Iranian regional policies, especially since the Arab Spring, are often destabilizing and, certainly, a critical challenge to the international community. Understanding where these 300

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outlooks originated and how they drive policies is vital to adequately tackling the Iranian challenge in the region. Early on in the book, I posed a series of questions seeking to explore why, faced with a multitude of national security and defense options, Iranians have made the choices they have. First, I posed the following question: why does Iran emphasize self-reliance in military affairs when it could adopt a different course of action and gain access to international markets and suppliers for its defense needs? Iran’s focus on self-reliance in a globalized world often puzzles or raises the skepticism of observers. But from the Iranian perspective, unless the country can stand on its own two feet, it will ultimately be too weak to withstand foreign machinations and prove unable to defend itself against foreign threats. Far from a mere revolutionary slogan, this is a deeply embedded belief in the Iranian psyche, with roots in the late nineteenth century. Why does the country denounce the West yet negotiate with it at the same time? And why does it continue to cooperate with Russia and China despite distrusting both? The concept of balancing entered Iranian strategic thinking during the Qajar era and almost immediately proved to be a deeply flawed notion. Nonetheless, it has become one of the most resilient, albeit often unspoken, ideas shaping Iranian foreign and security policies. A deep distrust underpins Iranians’ attitudes and policies toward other powers but so does the understanding that the country needs them. Hence, Iranians recognize the need to engage outside powers, while trying to minimize their penetration into their country by seeking to balance the powers against each other while pursuing self-reliance. Why does Iran acquire and test ballistic missiles, develop nuclear capabilities, and arm insurgents and terrorist groups when these initiatives come at such a steep price (in terms of prestige, economic sanctions, and political isolation) for the nation? The notions of selfreliance, preparedness, and deterrence all drive Iranian procurement activities and support for various non-state actors. Generations of Persian and Iranian statesmen sought to build a modern military to overcome foreign and domestic threats to the state. However, these attempts mostly failed. Reza Shah’s army crumbled as the powers’ troops and airplanes entered the Iranian territory and airspace. 301

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The Shah’s military was purged in the revolution and thrown in dismembered form into the Iran–Iraq War. Subsequently, the Islamic Republic has formulated its own response to the challenge Iranian policymakers and planners grappled with for centuries: it built its military doctrine and strategy of hybrid warfare around the capabilities available to it and which would enhance its battlefield effectiveness regardless of its relations with other countries. Finding itself often isolated, othered, and betrayed, it built a network of non-state allies and partners and defense programs that it could pursue with minimal foreign support. In presenting the progress of the country’s nuclear program, the head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, Ali Akbar Salehi, alluded to the failures of the Qajars and the Pahlavis to explain Iranian attitudes toward the program today: [T]he value and greatness and stature of this glorious revolution is in this new look, which it gave to the great Iranian nation—a nation, which saw itself as weakened and looked down upon, especially during the Qajar and Pahlavi eras. Exactly when the world was in the current of the industrial revolution, we went into deep sleep. With his [call to] ‘be awake,’ Imam [Khomeini] made it clear where we stood. We had a revolution to know how to build ourselves and this was the first step in being released from the arrogant [powers]. If you are perpetually a servant, you will not get anywhere. As long as the servant accepts that he is a servant, he will not get to become a master and have pride.5

Finally, why has Tehran seemingly decided to double down on wars when it had the option of a much less costly ceasefire? Generations of Iranian statesmen have contended with how to end wars and have learned lessons that seemingly reinforce their belief that negotiated settlements are mere preludes to future wars. Hence, although the literature on Iran and the Iran–Iraq War largely sees Khomeini’s decision to continue the war in 1982 as an aberration and a sign of revolutionary zeal, inexperience, and incompetence, it was actually in line with previous Iranian conflict termination thinking. As Steven Ward notes: During the first Qajar war with Russia, the Iranians turned aside repeated offers by Czar Alexander to end the conflict. In 1837 and 1858 British

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military expeditions were required to turn aside Iran’s appetite for reasserting control over Herat in Afghanistan. In early 1982, the Soviets were similarly disappointed when they tried to persuade Iran to accept a negotiated settlement with Baghdad.6

What this mindset indicates is perhaps bad news for many observers, particularly those who hope to see a different Iran, one governed by a more reasonable leadership, whose policies would fall in line with Western hopes and aspirations for this seemingly modern, young, educated, and urban society. In reality, the century-long exploration of the evolution of Iran’s security thinking and policies tells a different story, one of continuity. It is likely that even with a different government in place, even a democratic one pleasing the international community in general and the West in particular, the very policies observers have found so troubling would not cease. After all, the Qajars, Reza Shah, the Shah, and the revolutionaries could not be any more different in terms of backgrounds and philosophies, and yet their security thinking would imply otherwise. By taking into account these elements of continuity and their root causes, scholars and policymakers can gain a fuller and richer understanding of  Iran today. This in turn can help Western governments formulate policies that adequately address the challenges posed by, and seize the opportunities stemming from, one of the most critical players in one of the world’s most troubled regions. Grasping the disconnect between how Iran sees itself and how it is viewed from abroad can help lessen threat perceptions, prevent escalatory chains of events, and anticipate Iranian responses to US and Western actions. This disconnect can be boiled down to the Western image of Iran as harboring intentions of conquest—while Iranians see their objective as ‘no conquest, no defeat.’

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NOTES

INTRODUCTION 1. There are some exceptions to this rule in both the scholarship and the policy debates on Iran’s national security policies. The alternative thesis of continuity appears in some of the literature on Iran, albeit often as a secondary consideration rather than the prism through which the country’s thinking is examined. Scholars have not provided a comprehensive overview of key events in Iranian history establishing the themes that contribute to and shape this continuity. Similarly, neither the literature nor the policy discussion taking into account this notion present an assessment of the causes and consequences of this continuity in a systemic and comprehensive manner and through the lens of national security—those scholars who do consider the element of continuity frequently do so in the context of broader politics and foreign policy. For example, Mahmood Sariolghalam writes about continuity in Iranian foreign policy since the revolution in ‘Chapter 7: Sources of Continuity in Iran’s Foreign Policy,’ in Michael Hudson and Mimi Kirk, Gulf  Politics and Economics in a Changing World (Singapore: World Scientific, 2014). Similarly,Arshin Adib-Moghaddam and R.K. Ramazani also discuss elements of continuity in Iranian thinking in their respective books: Iran in World Politics: The Question of the Islamic Republic (London: Hurst & Co., 2007) and Independence without Freedom  – Iran’s Foreign Policy (Charlottesville, VA: University of  Virginia Press, 2013). 2. Stephen Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), 12. It must be noted that the definition of revolution is

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3. 4. 5.

6.

7.

pp. [1–3]

contested in the academic literature on the topic. Nevertheless, many scholars implicitly or explicitly take for granted that revolutions entail a fundamental break between the ancien régime and the resulting new order. For examples of this academic debate and various definitions of revolution, see Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New Haven, CT: Penguin Books, 1963); Charles Tilly, From Mobilization to Revolution (Reading, MA: McGraw-Hill, 1978); Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in   ale University Press, 1968); Isaac Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Y Kramnick, ‘Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in Recent Scholarship,’ in Rosemary H.T. O’Kane, Revolution: Critical Concepts in Political Science, Vol. 2 (New York, N.Y.: Taylor & Francis, 2000); John Foran, Theorizing Revolutions (New York, N.Y.: Routledge,   orld Order: The Revolutionary 1997); David Armstrong, Revolution and W State in International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). Hannah Arendt, On Revolution, 29. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 264. See, for example, Jeff Carter et al., ‘Social Revolution, the State, and War: How Revolutions Affect War-Making Capacity and Interstate War Outcomes,’ Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 56, Issue 3 (2012), 439– 466; Andrew J. Enterline, ‘Regime Changes and Interstate Conflict, 1816–1992,’ Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 51, Issue 2 (1998), 385– 409; Jeff D. Colgan and Jessica L.P. Weeks, ‘Revolution, Personalist Dictatorships, and International Conflict,’ International Organization,Vol. 69, Issue 1 (Winter 2015), 163–194. For example, see, ‘Ayatollah Khatami: Mozakereh ba America divanegi ast/Trump niazmand-e mozakereh ast,’ Tasnim, 30 August 2019, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1398/06/08/2086416/ - - - For example, see ‘Namayesh-e bish az 500 dastavard-e nezami-e tolid-e dakheli dar Mosala-ye Tehran,’ Khabargozari-e Daneshgah-e Azad-e Islami, 30 January 2019, https://ana.ir/fa/news/17/356588/- - - -500- - ; ‘Mohemtarin rooydadha-ye defaee-ye Iran dar sal-e 97 + tasaavir,’ Bashgah-e khabarnegaran-e javan, 3 April 2019, https://www.yjc.ir/fa/ news/6884707/ %E2%80%8C- -

8. ‘Namayesh-e bish az 500 dastavard-e nezami-e tolid-e dakheli dar Mosala-ye Tehran,’ Khabargozari-e Daneshgah-e Azad-e Islami. 9. For some treatments of the Iranian political system, see Mehran Kamrava and Houchang Hassan-Yari, ‘Suspended Equilibrium in Iran’s   orld, Vol. 94, Issue 4 (1 November 2004); Political System,’ The Muslim W

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pp. [4–6]

Notes

Anoushiravan Ehteshami, After Khomeini – The Iranian Second Republic (London: Routledge, 2002); H.E. Chehabi, ‘The Political Regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran in Comparative Perspective,’ Government and Opposition, Vol. 36, Issue 1 (January 2001), 48–70. For examples of scholarship on the Iranian decision-making process pertaining to national security, see Daniel Byman, Iran’s Security Policy in the PostRevolutionary Era (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2001); Kevjn Lim, ‘National Security Decision-Making in Iran,’ Comparative Strategy, Vol. 34, Issue 2 (2015), 149–168; Jalil Roshandel, ‘Iran’s Foreign and Security Policies: How the Decisionmaking Process Evolved,’ Vol. 31, No. 1 (March 2000), 105–117; Michael Rubin, ‘Deciphering Iranian Decision Making and Strategy Today,’ American Enterprise Institute, 28 January 2013, https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/ deciphering-iranian-decision-making-and-strategy-today/ 10. See, for example, Amin Saikal, Iran Rising – The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2019), 20–21; Ghoncheh Tazmini, Revolution and Reform in Russia and Iran: Modernisation and Politics in Revolutionary States (London: I.B.Tauris, 2012), 20. 11. Stephen Walt, Revolution and  War, 341. 12. Ibid., 341. 13. Ibid., 12. 14. For example, Edmund Burke built on the notion that revolutionary states are necessarily more ideologically driven. See Edmund Burke, ‘First Letter on Regicide’ in TheWorks of the Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Other significant contributions to the literature on the foreign policies of revolutionary states that assume a break between pre- and post-revolution states include: Peter Calvert, Revolution and International Politics (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s, 1984); and David Armstrong, Revolution and World Order:  The Revolutionary State in International Society. 15. Saikal, Iran Rising – The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic, 21. 16. Author interviews with Iranian officials, Tehran, Berlin, New York, Geneva, and Vienna, 2013–17. 17. Walt, Revolution and W   ar, 341. 18. Thomas L. Friedman, ‘Iran and the Obama Doctrine,’ The New York   Times, 5 April 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/opinion/ thomas-friedman-the-obama-doctrine-and-iran-interview.html 19. Peter J. Katzenstein, ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security,’ in Peter J. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University

307

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20. 21. 22. 23.

24.

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

308

pp. [7–10]

Press, 1996), 9; Arnold Wolfers, ‘‘National Security’ as an Ambiguous Symbol,’ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 67, No. 4 (December 1952), 481–502, 481. Melvyn P. Leffler, ‘National Security,’ The Journal of American History, Vol. 77, No. 1 (June 1990), 143–152, 143. Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy, 70. Hassan Rouhani, Amniat-e melli va diplomacy-e hasteh-e (Tehran: Markaz-e tahqiqt-e Strategic, 2012), 675–676. This book seeks to present both the realities and perceptions of the events that have shaped Iranian national security thinking. This task is complicated by several factors. As Melvyn P. Leffler notes: ‘In studying the systematic sources of foreign policy behavior, the national security approach demands that analysts distinguish between realities and perceptions. This task, as simple as it sounds, is fraught with difficulty because it is often harder for historians to agree on what constituted an actual danger than on what was a perceived threat.’ Melvyn P. Leffler, ‘National Security,’ 144. Johan Galtung, ‘The construction of national identities for the cosmic drama: chosenness-myths-trauma (CMT) syndromes and cultural pathologies,’ in S.P. Udayakumar, Handcuffed to History: Narratives, Pathologies, and Violence in South Asia (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2001), 66–81. Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992), 37–120. Anthony D. Smith, Myths and Memories of the Nation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 57. Stephen M. Walt, ‘Great Powers Are Defined by Their Great Wars,’ Foreign Policy, 21 September 2017, http://foreignpolicy. com/2017/09/21/great-powers-are-defined-by-their-great-wars/ Mohammad Hassan Mohaqqeqi, Asrar-e maktum – Nagofteha-ye defa-e hasht saleh az zaban-e masulan-e keshvari va lashkari-e doran-e jang (Tehran: Markaz-e motaleat-e pazhuheshi-e 27 Bessat, 2014), 316. Ibid., 316. Hassan Rouhani, Amniat-e melli va diplomacy-e hasteh-e, 675. Ibid. David E. Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads, xii. For example, David E. Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010); Michael Eisenstadt, The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University, Monographs, No. 1, August 2001;

pp. [10–11]

Notes

Erik A. Olson, ‘Iran’s Path Dependent Military Doctrine,’ Strategic Studies Quarterly, Summer 2016, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/ Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-10_Issue-2/Olson.pdf, 63– 93; Robert Czulda, ‘The Defensive Dimension of Iran’s Military doctrine: How Would They Fight?’ Middle East Policy, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, Spring 2016, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/ mepo.12176; Michael Connell, Iranian Operational Decision Making  – Case Studies from the Iran–Iraq War (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2013); Michael Connell, Deterring Iran’s Use of Offensive Cyber: A Case Study (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 2014). 34. The list of monographs, peer-reviewed articles, and policy reports on these items is too long to be adequately reflected here. I have listed some key works in this brief discussion of the existing literature. Dozens of treatments of Iranian history, strategy, and security policies not mentioned in this introduction nonetheless inform my investigation and are highlighted elsewhere in the book. 35. For example, Kaveh Farrokh, Iran at War (Oxford: Osprey, 2011); Mohsen Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution (New York, N.Y.: Westview Press, 2018); Abbas Amanat, Pivot of the Universe – Nasir alDin Shah and the Iranian Monarchy (London: I.B.Tauris, 1997); Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011); Janet   ork, N.Y.: Afary, The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911 (New Y Columbia University Press, 1996); Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 2014); Gholam Reza Afkhami, The Life and Times of the Shah (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley University Press, 2009); Thomas Juneau, Squandered Opportunity: Neoclassical Realism and Iranian Foreign Policy (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015); Daniel Byman and Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘Beyond Great Forces: How Individuals Still Shape History,’ Foreign Affairs, November/December 2019, 148–161. 36. Stephanie Cronin, The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1921–1926 (London: I.B.Taurus, 1997); Stephanie Cronin, The Making of Modern Iran: State and Society Under Riza Shah, 1921–1941 (London: Routledge, 2003); Afshon Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam: Religion, Politics, and Iran’s Revolutionary Guard; Steven Ward, Immortal. 37. David E.  Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010); Michael Eisenstadt, The Strategic Culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University, Monographs, No. 1, August 2001. 38. See, for example, Ervand Abrahamian, The Coup: 1953, the CIA, and the Roots of Modern US–Iranian Relations (New York, N.Y.: The New Press,

309

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pp. [11–11]

2013); Ali Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran: Thugs, Turncoats, Soldiers, and Spooks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown:The Islamic Republic in Iran (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran–Iraq Military Conflict (London: Grafton, 1989); David Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power (New York: Routledge, 2001); Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods, The Iran– IraqWar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Pierre Razoux, The Iran–Iraq War (Cambridge, Mass:  The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2015); Stephen C. Pelletiere, The Iran–Iraq W   ar: Chaos in a Vacuum (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1992); J.M.  Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran: The Years   of Crisis (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University, 1984); Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp, Iran and Iraq atWar (London: I.B.Tauris, 1988); Shirin Tahir-Kheli and Shaheen Ayubi, eds., The Iran– Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conflicts (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1983); Efraim Karsh, ed. The Iran–IraqWar: Impact and Implications (Houndmills: MacMillan, 1989); Stephen C. Pelletiere and Douglas V. Johnson II, Lessons Learned:The Iran–IraqWar (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 1991). 39. For example, Daniel Byman, Deadly Connections: States that Sponsor Terrorism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Kenneth Pollack, The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America (New York: Random House, 2005); Trita Parsi, Treacherous Alliance: The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the United States (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008); Trita Parsi, A Single Roll of the Dice – Obama’s Diplomacy with Iran (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012); Joseph M. Humire and Ilan Berman, Iran’s Strategic Penetration of Latin America (London: Lexington Books, 2014); Alireza Nader et al., Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014); F. Stephen Larrabee and Alireza Nader, Turkish–Iranian Relations in a Changing Middle East (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013); William O. Beeman, The ‘Great Satan’ vs. the ‘Mad Mullahs’ (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2005); Edward Burman, China and Iran – Parallel History, Future Threat? (Stroud: History Press, 2009); Dina Esfandiary and Ariane Tabatabai, Triple Axis: Iran’s Relations with Russia and China (London: I.B.Tauris, 2018); Frederic Wehrey et al., Saudi–Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009); David Menashri, Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society, and Power (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2001). 40. Kenneth M. Pollack, Unthinkable – Iran, the Bomb, and American Strategy (New Y  ork, N.Y.: Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2013); Richard

310

pp. [12–16]

Notes

Nephew, The Art of Sanctions (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University,   ars (New Y   ork, N.Y.: Random House, 2018); Jay Solomon, The Iran W 2016). 41. For example, see Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Republic in Iran (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1989); Ali Ansari, Modern Iran (New York, N.Y.: Routledge Press, 2014); Ervand Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008); Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982); R.K. Ramazani, ‘Iran’s Revolution: Patterns, Problems and Prospects,’ International Affairs, Vol. 56, Summer 1980, https://doi.org/10.2307/2617391, 443–457; Mehran Kamrava, Revolution in Iran:The Roots of Turmoil (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2018); Michael Axworthy, Revolutionary Iran – A History of the Islamic Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Manochehr Dorraj and Mehran Kamrava, Iran Today – An Encyclopedia of Life in the Islamic Republic (Westport. CT: Greenwood, 2008); Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2002); Said Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini – Iran Under His Successors (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); Vanessa Martin, Creating An Islamic State (London: I.B.Tauris, 2003); Amin Saikal, Iran Rising:The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic (Princeton, N.J.: 2019); Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, Religious Statecraft – The Politics of Islam in Iran (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University, 2018); Suzanne Maloney, Iran’s Political Economy Since the Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). 42. Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Twenty-First-Century Strategy (Maxwell Air Force Base, Al.: Air University Press, 2006), 70. 43. Author interviews with senior US, European, and Iranian officials, Tehran, Washington, D.C., New York, Brussels, London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, Geneva, 2013–18. 44. Robert D. Kaplan, The Revenge of Geography (New York, N.Y.: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2013). 45. Steven Ward, Immortal: A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2009), 196. 46. Steven Ward, Immortal, 194. 47. Author interviews with Javad Zarif, Majid Ravanchi, and other senior Foreign Ministry officials, Tehran, New York, Berlin, and Vienna, 2013– 17; ‘Iraq’s Chemical Warfare Program,’ Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD: Vol. 3, 30 September 2004, https:// www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/ 48. Richard Nephew, The Art of Sanctions, 30–42.

311

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pp. [18–26]

49. Mike Pompeo, ‘After the Deal: A New Iran Strategy,’ US Department of State, 21 May 2018, https://www.state.gov/iran-strategy/; Donald J. Trump, ‘Statement from the President on the Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps As A Foreign Terrorist Organization,’ White House, 8 April 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/statement-president-designation-islamic-revolutionaryguard-corps-foreign-terrorist-organization/ 50. Thomas Gibbons-Neff et al., ‘Trump Says U.S. Shot Down Iranian Drone as Both Nations Dig In,’ The New York Times, 18 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/18/us/politics/iranian-droneshot-down.html; Michael R. Gordon et al., ‘U.S. Planned Strike on Iran After Downing of Drone but Called Off Mission,’ Wall Street Journal, 21 June 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-and-iran-move-closerto-military-conflict-after-downing-of-drone-11561076307; Michael D. Shear et al., ‘Strikes on Iran Approved by Trump, Then Abruptly Pulled Back,’ The New York Times, 20 June 2019, https://www.nytimes. com/2019/06/20/world/middleeast/iran-us-drone.html; Ellen Nakashima, ‘U.S. Military Carried Out Secret Cyberstrike on Iran to Prevent It From Interfering with Shipping,’ The Washington Post, 28 August 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/ us-military-carried-out-secret-cyber-strike-on-iran-to-prevent-itfrom-interfering-with-shipping/2019/08/28/36202a4e-c9db-11e9a1fe-ca46e8d573c0_story.html?arc404=true; Farnaz Fassihi and Richard Pérez-Peña, ‘Iranians Close Ranks Behind Leaders After U.S. Kills Popular General,’ The New York Times, 4 January 2020, https:// www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/world/middleeast/iran-suleimanikilling.html; Jared Malsin, ‘U.S.-Iran Tensions Have Set Back Middle East Street Protests,’ The Wall Street Journal, 10 January 2020, https:// www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-iran-tensions-have-set-back-middle-eaststreet-protests-11578675523. 51. David E. Thaler et al., Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads, xii. 1.  THE RISE AND FALL OF  THE QAJARS 1. Linda Robinson et al., Modern PoliticalWarfare (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2018), 126. 2. Cyrus Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah (London: I.B.Tauris, 1998), 1. 3. Ibid., 1. 4. Abbas Amanat, Pivot of the Universe – Nasir al-Din Shah and the Iranian Monarchy (London: I.B.Tauris, 2008), 1.

312

pp. [26–32]

Notes

5. Ibid., 1. 6. Ibid., 1. 7. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 2. 8. For an overview of the treaties concluded in that era from the Iranian perspective, see Abbas Ramezani, Moahedat-e tarikhi-e Iran (Tehran: Entesharat-e tarfand, 2007). 9. Amédée Jaubert, Voyage Arménie et en Perse, fait dans les années 1805–1806 (Paris: Pélicier, 1821), 174–175. 10. Comte Alfred de Gardane, Mission du Général Gardane en Perse sous le Premier Empire (Paris: Librairie de Ad. Lainé, 1865), 72–80; see also Alexander Mikaberidze, ‘Finckenstein, Treaty of (1807)’ in Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia, ed. Alexander Mikaberidze (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2011), 312. 11. Gardane, Mission du Général Gardane en Perse, 72–80; see also Hooshang Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars: Society, Politics, Economics and Foreign Relations 1796–1926 (London: I.B.Tauris, 2012), 101. 12. Gardane, Mission du Général Gardane, 76. 13. Ibid., 9. 14. Ibid., 14. 15. Ibid., 10. 16. Ibid., 11. 17. Ibid., 11–12. 18. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 2. 19. Javad Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 174. 20. Ibid., 175. 21. Ibid., 174–175. 22. Ibid., 175. 23. Fereydoun Adamiyat, ‘Sarnevesht-e Qaem-Maqam,’ Maqalat-e tarikhi (Tehran: Shabgir, 1974), 15–16. 24. Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 175. 25. Fereydoun Adamiyat, Maqalat-e tarikhi, 15–16. 26. Ibid., 16–17. 27. Ibid., 15–17. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Hajj Sayyah, Khaterat-e Hajj Sayyah ya doreh-ye khofuf va vahshat (Tehran: Amir Kabir, 1981), 268. 31. Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 175. 32. Amanat, Pivot of the Universe, 5. 33. Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 138–141.

313

NOTES

pp. [33–39]

34. Ramezani, Moahedat-e tarikhi-e Iran, 14. 35. Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars, 90 [Table 5.4]. 36. Amanat, Pivot of the Universe, 1. 37. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 3. 38. Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 151. 39. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 4. 40. Ibid., 4. 41. Ali Ghaffouri, Tairkh-e jangha-ye Iran – Az Madha ta be emruz (Tehran: Entesharat-e Ettela’at, 2011), 446. 42. Uzi Rabi and Nugzar Ter-Oganov, ‘The Russian Military Mission and the Birth of the Persian Cossack Brigade: 1879–1894,’ Iranian Studies, Vol. 42, No. 3 (June 2009), https://www.jstor.org/stable/25597565, 445–463, 446–448. 43. Uzi Rabi and Nugzar Ter-Oganov, ‘The Russian Military Mission and the Birth of the Persian Cossack Brigade: 1879–1894,’ 447. 44. Ibid. 45. Fereydoun Adamiyat, Ideology-e nehzat-e mashrootiyat-e Iran, Vol. II, Majles-e avval va bohran-e azadi (Tehran: Entesharat-e roshangaran), 81. 46. Mohammad-Taqi (Malek al-Shoara) Bahar, Tarikh-e mokhtasar-e ahzab-e siyasi-e Iran, Vol. I (Tehran: Sherkat-e sahami-ye ketabha-ye jibi, 1978), 16. 47. Fereydoun Adamiyat, Majles-e avval va bohran-e azadi, 84. 48. Ibid., 86. 49. Ibid., 88. 50. Ibid., 89. 51. Fereydoun Adamiyat, Ideology-e nehzat-e mashroutiat-e Iran –Vol. I (Tehran: Kanoun-e ketab-e Iran, 1985), 433. 52. Ibid., 433. 53. Adamiyat, Majles-e avval va bohran-e azadi, 209. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid., 226–236. 56. Ibid., 237. 57. Amanat, Pivot of the Universe, 5. 58. Hooshang Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars: Society, Politics, Economics and Foreign Relations 1796–1926, 28. 59. Ibid., 159. 60. Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 472; Mirza Mohammad Khan Majd al-Molk, Resaleh-ye majdiyeh (Tehran: Eqbal, 1980), 62–63. 61. Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 472; Majd alMolk, Resaleh-ye majdiyeh, 62–63.

314

pp. [39–45]

Notes

62. Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 473; Majd alMolk, Resaleh-ye majdiyeh, 62–63. 63. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 16. 64. Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars, 78–81. 65. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 241; Peter Paret, ‘Napoleon and the Revolution in War,’ in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Peter Paret (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 124. 66. Paret, ‘Napoleon and the Revolution in War,’ 124. 67. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 241. 68. Timothy C. Winegard, The First World Oil War (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 32. 69. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 23. 70. Nikki R. Keddie, ‘Class structure and political power in Iran since 1796,’ Iranian Studies, 11:1-4 (1978), 309, DOI: 10.1080/00210867808701547 71. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 23. 72. Vanessa Martin, ‘Hartwig and Russian policy in Iran 1906–8,’ Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 29, Issue 1 (1993), 1 https://www.tandfonline. com/doi/abs/10.1080/00263209308700931 73. Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia: Imperial Ambitions in Qajar Iran (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013), 525. 74. Ibid., 644–669. 75. Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars, 226. 76. Deep Kanta Lahiri Choudhury, Telegraphic Imperialism: Crisis and Panic in the Indian Empire, c. 1830–1920 (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 209. 77. Ghaffouri, Tairkh-e jangha-ye Iran, 453. 78. Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars, 226–27. 79. Reza Niyazmand, Reza Shah – Az tavalod ta saltanat (Bethesda, MD: Foundation for Iranian Studies, 1996), 117. 80. Ibid., 117. 81. H Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars, 226–27. 82. Ghaffouri, Tairkh-e jangha-ye Iran, 453. 83. ‘Intelligence Memorandum, Iran: The Tudeh Party and the Communist Movement [Redacted],’ Central Intelligence Agency, 8 December 1978,  https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIARDP80T00634A000500010030-8.pdf, 2. 84. Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars, 227. 85. See Mohammad Gholi Majd, The Great Famine & Genocide in Iran 1917–19 (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2013); author interviews in Iran, 2009–2014. 86. Ghaffouri, Tairkh-e jangha-ye Iran, 446. 87. Ward, Immortal – A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces, 69–70.

315

NOTES

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88. Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars, 89. 89. Ward, Immortal, 70. 90. Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars, 105. 91. Ward, Immortal, 72. 92. Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars, 90. 93. Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 79–85, 109–113. 94. Ward, Immortal, 67. 95. Ibid. 96. Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 84–85, 111, 134. 97. Ward, Immortal, 68. 98. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 24. 99. Ibid. 100. Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars, 106; Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 584–86; 101. Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia, 615–617. 102. Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars, 106. 103. Ibid. 104. Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 83. 105. Mohammad-Taqi (Malek al-Shoara) Bahar, Tarikh-e mokhtasar-e ahzab-e siyasi-e Iran, Vol. I, 39. 106. Ibid., 39–40. 107. Ibid. 108. Ibid., 40. 109. Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 79–85. 110. Ibid., 85. 111. Ibid. 112. Ibid. 113. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 252. 114. John F. Foran, ‘The Long Fall of the Safavid Dynasty: Moving beyond the Standard Views,’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol, 24, Issue  2 (1992), 281–304. doi:10.1017/S0020743800021577; Touraj Atabaki ‘Ethnic diversity and territorial integrity of Iran: Domestic harmony and regional challenges,’ Iranian Studies, Vol. 38, Issue 1 (2005), 23–44, DOI: 10.1080/0021086042000336528. 115. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 15. 116. Ibid. 117. Ibid. 118. Said Amir Arjomand, ‘The Office of Mulla-Bashi in Shi’ite Iran,’ Studia Islamica, no. 57 (1983): 135–46. doi:10.2307/1595486; Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 15. 119. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 14.

316

pp. [51–57]

Notes

120. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 257. 121. Tabatabai, Nazariyeh-ye hokumat-e Qanun dar Iran – Mabani-ye nazariyehye mashroutehkhani, 162–163. 122. Ibid., 166–167. 123. Ibid., 162–163; Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 28–31. 124. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 253. 125. D. M. MacEoin, ‘BĀB, ʿAli Moḥammad Širāzi,’ Encyclopaedia Iranica, III/3, 278–284, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/bab-alimohammad-sirazi 126. See Ahmad Kasravi, Baha’igari (Tehran: Peyman, 1944). 127. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 252. 128. Ishaan Tharoor, ‘A Russian Ambassador was Murdered. The apology came in the shape of a huge diamond,’ Washington Post, 22 December 2016,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/ 2016/12/22/a-russian-ambassador-was-murdered-the-apology-camein-the-shape-of-a-huge-diamond/?utm_term=.0f2d15478acb 129. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 251. 130. Ibid., 251. 131. Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars, 188. 132. Amanat, Pivot of the Universe, 7. 133. Javad Tabatabai in Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Mirror for the Muslim Prince – Islam and the Theory of Statecraft (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2013), 112. 134. Ibid., 112. 135. Amanat, Pivot of the Universe, 7; Nezam al-Molk (1064–1092) was an omniscient vizier who served in the Ghaznavid (977–1186) and Seljuq (1037–1194) courts; Javad Tabatabai in Mehrzad Boroujerdi Mirror for the Muslim Prince – Islam and the Theory of Statecraft, 112. 136. Amanat, Pivot of the Universe, 7. 137. Ibid., 7. 138. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 35–36. 139. Ibid., 34. 140. Mansoureh Ettehadieh-Nezam Maafi, Peydayesh va tahavol-e ahzab-e siyasiye mashrootiat (doreh-ye avval va dovom-e majles-e shora-ye melli) (Tehran: Nashr-e gostardeh, 1981), 9. 141 Ibid., 17–18. 142. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, 37. 143. Ibid. 144. ‘Judicial and Legal Systems iv. Judicial System from the Advent of Islam Through the 19th Century,’ Encyclopedia Iranica, http://www.

317

NOTES

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iranicaonline.org/articles/judicial-and-legal-systems-iv-judicialsystem-from-the-advent-of-islam-through-the-19th-century#sec3 145. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 50. 146. Ibid., 243. 147. Hadi Enayat, Law, State, and Society in Modern Iran – Constitutionalism, Autocracy, and Legal Reform, 1906–1941 (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 8. 148. Enayat, Law, State, and Society in Modern Iran, 8. 149. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 34. 150. Ibid. 151. Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars, 236. 152. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 34–35. 153. ‘Intelligence Memorandum, Iran: The Tudeh Party and the Communist Movement [Redacted],’ Central Intelligence Agency, 2. 154. Ibid. 155. Amirahmadi, The Political Economy of Iran under the Qajars, 122. 156. For a comprehensive review of the role played by the ‘Tabriz court’ in the formation of modern Iran, see Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi. 157. Schuster, The Strangling of Persia, xvii. 158. Tabatabai, Hokumat-e qanun dar Iran, 309–310. 159. Schuster, The Strangling of Persia, 333–34. 2.  REZA SHAH, THE MODERNIZING STRONGMAN 1. 2. 3. 4.

Reza Niyazmand, Reza Shah – Az tavalod ta saltanat, 314. Ibid., 316–317. Ibid., 315–317. Because of the controversial nature of Reza Shah’s character and reforms, much of the literature produced in Iran—both before and after the revolution—pertaining to his ties with foreign powers, policies, and legacy is biased. For an example of biased efforts to document the history of Reza Shah’s reign, see Iraj Rudgarkia, Iran – Az coup d’Etat-ye sevom-e Esfand 1299 ta doqut-e Reza Shah (Tehran: Pardis-e danesh, 2014). 5. Cyrus Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavi Power (London: I.B.Tauris Publishers: 1998), 17. 6. Seyyed Jalal al-Dinn Maadani,‘Bi e’tenaee-ye Engilis va Rusieh be bitarafiye Iran dar jang-e jahani-e avval,’ Paygah-e Jame’-e tarikh-e mo’aser-e Iran (Tehran: Moassesse-ye motaleat va pazhoheshha-ye siyasi), http:// mashrootiat.pchi.ir/show.php?page=contents&id=9677

318

pp. [65–68]

Notes

7. Mohammad-Taqi (Malek al-Shoara) Bahar, Tarikh-e mokhtasar-e ahzab-e siyasi-e Iran, Vol. I, 34. 8. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 26–27. 9. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 26–27; 35/47; Homa Katouzian, ‘The Campaign against the Anglo–Iranian Agreement of 1919’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 25, Issue 1 (1998). 10. Mohammad-Taqi (Malek al-Shoara) Bahar, Tarikh-e mokhtasar-e ahzab-e siyasi-e Iran, Vol. I, 35. 11. Bahar, Tarikh-e mokhtasar-e ahzab-e siyasi-e Iran, Vol. I, 34–35, 47. 12. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 114. 13. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 80. 14. Ibid., 55. 15. Homa Katouzian, State and Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the Pahlavis (London: I.B.Tauris, 2006), 27. 16. Donald N.  Wilbur, Riza Shah Pahlavi:  The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran (Hicksville, N.Y.: Exposition Press, 1976), 1–16. 17. His skill with the machine gun earned him the nickname ‘Reza Maxim’ (the name of the gun). 18. Niyazmand, Reza Shah – Az tavalod ta saltanat, 107. 19. Ibid. 20. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 11, 112. 21. Bahar, Tarikh-e mokhtasar-e ahzab-e siyasi-e Iran, Vol. I, 109. 22. Ibid. 23. Bahar, Tarikh-e mokhtasar-e ahzab-e siyasi-e Iran, Vol. I, 66. 24. Ibid. 25. Niloofar Shambayati, ‘Coup d’Etat of 1299/1921,’ Encyclopedia Iranica, Vol. VI, Fasc. 4, 351–354, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ coup-detat-of-1299-1921; Stephanie Cronin, ‘Opposition to Reza Khan within the Iranian Army,’ Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (October 1994), 724–750, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283674, 724. 26. Katouzian, State and Society in Iran, 242. 27. Kazem Kandil, The Power Triangle – Military, Security, and Politics in Regime Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 33. 28. Sadr al-Dinn Elahi, Seyyed Ziya – Mard-e avval ya mard-e dovom-e Coup d’Etat (Los Angeles, CA: Ketab Corp., 2011), 27–28. 29. Ibid., 32. 30. Ibid., 59. 31. Ibid., 59. 32. Shambayati, ‘Coup d’Etat of 1299/1921.’ 33. Elahi, Seyyed Ziya – Mard-e avval ya mard-e dovom-e Coup d’Etat, 59. 34. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 118.

319

NOTES

pp. [68–74]

35. Elahi, Seyyed Ziya – Mard-e avval ya mard-e dovom-e Coup d’Etat, 49. 36. Richard A. Stewart, Sunrise at Abadan – The British and Soviet Invasion of Iran, 1941 (New York, N.Y.: Praeher, 1988), 9. 37. Ibid., 9. 38. Wilbur, Riza Shah Pahlavi:The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran, 66. 39. Cronin, ‘Opposition to Reza Khan within the Iranian Army,’ 724. 40. Katouzian, State and Society in Iran, 242. 41. Wilbur, Riza Shah Pahlavi, 73. 42. Cronin, ‘Opposition to Reza Khan within the Iranian Army,’ 725–26. 43. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, 147. 44. Ibid., 60. 45. See Harun Vohouman, Safarnamey-ye Reza Shah Pahlavi be Khuzestan va Mazandaran (Los Angeles, CA: Ketab Corp, 2007). 46. Ghaffouri, Tairkh-e jangha-ye Iran – Az Madha ta be emruz, 457–58. 47. Ibid., 457. 48. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, 60. 49. The first statement of Seyyed Ziya al-Din, the new prime minister, called for ‘An army before and above everything.’ Wilbur, Riza Shah Pahlavi:  The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran, 49. 50. Cronin, The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1910–1926, 54–88, 110. 51. With the exemption of religious students—but the notable inclusion of religious minorities, representing ‘a complete break with the past’ and symbolizing ‘the triumph of nationalism over religious and communal identity.’ Stephanie Cronin, The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1910–1926, 122–128. 52. Ibid., 54–88, 110. 53. Cronin, Armies and State-Building in the Modern Middle East, 143; Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 136. 54. Cronin, Armies and State-Building in the Modern Middle East, 138–148. 55. Ibid. 56. Cronin, The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 140. 57. Cronin, Armies and State-Building in the Modern Middle East, 138–148. 58. Vohouman, Safarnamey-ye Reza Shah Pahlavi be Khuzestan va Mazandaran, 20–21. 59. Cronin, The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 113–114. 60 Ibid., 113–114. 61. Ibid., 232–233. 62. John Foran, Fragile Resistance – Social Transformation in Iran from 1500 to the Revolution (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 220. 63. Ghaffouri, Tairkh-e jangha-ye Iran – Az Madha ta be emruz, 457.

320

pp. [74–82]

Notes

64. Vohouman, Safarnamey-ye Reza Shah Pahlavi be Khuzestan va Mazandaran, 19–20. 65. Ibid. 66. Foran, Fragile Resistance, 220. 67. Cronin, The Army and the Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 2. 68. George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918–1948: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1949), 155. 69. Foran, Fragile Resistance, 220. 70. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 135. 71. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 380. 72. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 120. 73. Ibid., 138. 74. Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, Charles Melville, The Cambridge History of Iran: V  olume 7, From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, 228. 75. Hadi Enayat, Law, State, and Society in Modern Iran – Constitutionalism, Autocracy, and Legal Reform, 1906–1941, 8. 76. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 140. 77. For an example of this paradox, see the account of  Nasser al-Dinn’s Shah’s journey to Warsaw: Nasser al-Dinn Shah recognized the importance of the rule of law to progress and that of progress to the security of the empire and his throne. He failed, however, to reconcile his wish for reforms and his unwillingness to be bound by the rule of law. Javad Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 507–509. 78. Wilbur, Riza Shah Pahlavi:  The Resurrection and Reconstruction of Iran, 115. 79. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 389. 80. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 144. 81. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, 68. 82. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 399. 83. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 145. 84. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, 65–67. 85. See Homa Katouzian, Iran: A Beginner’s Guide (London: Oneworld Publications, 2013), Chapter 4. 86. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 154–162. 87. Ibid., 123. 88. Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, Charles Melville, The Cambridge History of Iran: V  olume 7, From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, 226. 89. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, 60. 90. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 397; Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918–1948: A Study in Big-Power Rivalry, 73. 91. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 110. 92. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 398.

321

NOTES

pp. [83–89]

93. Avery, Hambly, Melville, The Cambridge History of Iran: Volume 7, 230. 94. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 146–7. 95 Ibid., 136–7. 96. Peter Avery, Gavin Hambly, Charles Melville, The Cambridge History of Iran: Volume 7, From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic, 239. 97. Niyazmand, Reza Shah – Az tavalod ta saltanat, 311. 98. In his own words, ‘the great Law Giver of Islam, were he living today and confronted by the progress of the world, would himself demonstrate the conformity of the basic features of his laws with the conditions and forms of present day civilization.’ Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 399–400. 99. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 151–152. 100. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 377. 101. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, 60. 102. Vohouman, Safarnamey-ye Reza Shah Pahlavi be Khuzestan va Mazandaran, 52. 103. Even the Trans-Iranian Railway, the symbol of Iranian independence from foreign influence, was built by engineers from Germany, Britain, the US, Sweden, Italy, Belgium, Switzerland, and Czechoslovakia. 104. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 49–50. 105. Pezhmann Dailami, ‘Bravin in Tehran and the origins of Soviet policy in Iran,’ Revolutionary Russia, Vol 12, Issue 2 (1999), 63–82, DOI: 10.1080/09546549908575710. 106. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 100–118. 107. Ibid., 92. 108. Ibid., 91–95. 109. Niyazmand, Reza Shah, 310; Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 118. 110. Niyazmand, Reza Shah, 310; Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 118. 111. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 74. 112. James Bamberg, The History of the British Petroleum Company: Vol. 2, the Anglo–Iranian Years, 1928–1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 68–69. 113. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 80. 114. Ibid., 81–84. 115. Niyazmand, Reza Shah, 118. 116. Although it is true that Germany, especially under Nazi leadership, had designs to bring Iran into its sphere of influence (particularly given the ‘Aryan’ connection—‘Iran’ signifying the ‘land of the Aryans’ and the Iranians as speakers of an Indo–European language enjoying considerable status in the Nazi hierarchy), it chose mostly soft-power

322

pp. [89–93]

Notes

means of accomplishing this goal. Iranians were not unmoved by certain tenets of Nazi ideology, although they did not subscribe to the genocide undertaken by Adolf Hitler—with Iran even hosting Jewish European refugees during the Holocaust. 117. Stewart, Sunrise at Abadan, 15. 118. Adamiyat, Majles-e avval va bohran-e azadi, 84. 119. Millspaugh, the American advisor, was often at odds with Reza Shah and sought to curtail Reza Shah’s military spending. 120. Lenczowski, Russia and the W   est in Iran, 154. 121. Ibid., 160. 122. Stewart, Sunrise at Abadan, 15. 123. Nominally, Iran was prohibited from joining the British due to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact; entering the war on the side of the Allies would have drawn the ire of the Soviets. 124. Stewart, Sunrise at Abadan, 2; Winston Churchill, The Second World War: The Gathering Storm (New York, N.Y.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), 545–556; Winston Churchill, The Second World War: The Grand Alliance (New York, N.Y.: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1985), 424–432. 125. Abbasqoli Golshaeiyan, Yaddashtha-ye shahrivar-e 1320 (Iran Liberal, March 2014), 22. 126. Ibid., 22. 127. Ghani, Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah, 406. 128. Stewart, Sunrise at Abadan, 1. 129. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 164. 130. Churchill, The Second World War:  The Grand Alliance, 432. 131. Golshaeiyan, Yaddashtha-ye shahrivar-e 1320, 26. 132. Ibid., 27. 133. Ibid., 26. 134. Ibid., 26-30. 135. Churchill, The Second W   orld W   ar:  The Grand Alliance, 431. 136. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, 105. 137. Churchill, The Second W   orld W   ar:  The Grand Alliance, 432. 138. Ibid., 430–431. 139. Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 174. 140. David R. Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influence in Iran, 1941–1979 (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2017), 17; Stewart, Sunrise at Abadan, 219. 141. Foran, Fragile Resistance, 220.

323

NOTES

pp. [98–102]

3.  THE LAST KING: MOHAMMAD REZA PAHLAVI 1. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Mission For My Country (New York, N.Y.: Hutchinson & Co., 1961), 12. 2. Ibid., 54. 3. Ibid., 60. 4. Vohouman, Safarnamey-ye Reza Shah Pahlavi be Khuzestan va Mazandaran, 51. 5. Although FI was the first organized group perpetrating acts of violence against targets viewed as going against the faith, this was not the first instance of religious-based political violence in Iran. Already in the eighteenth and ninteenth centuries, clerics promoted acts of violence against Sufis, inciting the masses to target them. Farhad Kazemi, ‘Fed ʾ n-e Esl m,’ Encylopædia Iranica, Vol. IX, Fasc. 5, 470–474; Roy Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, 105; Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, 250. 6. ‘Intelligence Memorandum, Iran: The Tudeh Party and the Communist Movement [Redacted],’ Central Intelligence Agency, 2. 7. Ibid., 2–3. 8. Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 108–109. 9. Ibid., 112–113. 10. William Branigin, ‘Pahlavi Fortune: A Staggering Sum,’ The Washington Post, 17 January 1979; Jeff Gerth, ‘Bids By Iran to Recover Shah’s Wealth Face Obstacles,’ The New York Times, 16 January 1981; Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 437–438. 11. Avery, Hambly, Melville, The Cambridge History of Iran: Volume 7, 244. 12. Pahlavi, Mission For My Country, 77. 13. Ibid., 70–82. 14. Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah, 8. 15. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 176–177. 16. Ibid., 170. 17. Ibid., 175. 18. Cronin, Armies and State-Building in the Modern Middle East, 158–159. 19. Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah, 8. 20. Cronin, Armies and State-Building in the Modern Middle East, 165–67; Habib Ladjevardi, Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1985), 29–31. 21. Ali Asghar Shamin, Iran in the Reign of His Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi (Central Council Celebration of the 25th Century of the Foundation of the Iranian Empire), 17. This source is a mouthpiece for the Shah and monarchy.

324

pp. [103–109]

Notes

22. Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974), 38. 23. Avery, Hambly, Melville, The Cambridge History of Iran:V  olume 7, 245–246. 24. Ervand Abrahamian, ‘Communism and Communalism in Iran: The Tudah and the Firqah-i Dimukrat,’ International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 1, No. 4 (October 1970), 291–316, https://www.jstor. org/stable/162649, 291; Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 111. 25. Abrahamian, ‘Communism and Communalism in Iran,’ 291. 26. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (London: I.B.Tauris, 2014), 240. 27. Ibid., 232. 28. Abrahamian, A History of Modern Iran, 112. 29. Ibid. 30. Sepehr Zabih, The Mossadegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution (Chicago, IL: Lake View Press, 1982), 71; Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 220. 31. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 249. 32. ‘Ruler of Iran Is Wounded Slightly by Two Bullets Fired by Assassin,’ The New  York Times, 5 February 1949. 33. Ibid. 34. Cosroe Chaqueri, The Left in Iran – 1941–1957 (Pontypool: Merlin Press, 2011), 76. 35. Pahlavi, Mission For My Country, 56–57. 36. Shamin, Iran In the Reign of His Majesty Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, 71. 37. Avery, Hambly, Melville, The Cambridge History of Iran: V  olume 7, 253. 38. Kandil, The Power Triangle – Military, Security, and Politics in Regime Change, 32. 39. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 260. 40. Pahlavi, Mission For My Country, 83. 41. Zabih, The Mossadegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution, 6. 42. Ibid. 43. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 199. 44. Zabih, The Mossadegh Era, 27. 45. Ibid., 21. 46. Ladjevardi, Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran, 188. 47. Zabih, The Mossadegh Era, 30. 48. Ladjevardi, Labor Unions and Autocracy in Iran, 190. 49. According to declassified CIA documents, there was a disconnect reinforcing this misunderstanding between top-level American officials and intelligence operatives on the ground. There was also a difference of opinion between the State Department and the CIA. Both the State

325

NOTES

pp. [109–113]

Department and lower-level CIA officials believed that Mossadeq did not express aggressive Communist sympathies and that he would not be particularly dangerous as a leader. 50. Zabih, The Mossadegh Era, 77–78. 51. David M.Watry, Democracy at the Brink: Eisenhower, Churchill, and Eden in the Cold War (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 2014), 95. 52. Zabih, The Mossadegh Era, 68–84. 53. Cronin, Armies and State-Building in the Modern Middle East, 175–176. 54. Avery, Hambly, Melville, The Cambridge History of Iran: V  olume 7, 259. 55. Zabih, The Mossadegh Era, 48. 56. Ibid., 57. 57. Ibid., 62. 58. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 259. 59. Zabih, The Mossadegh Era, 6. 60. For example, see Ali Khamenei, 3 November 2019 remarks. 61. Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran, 1. 62. Ibid., xv. 63. ‘Memo from NSA – Byroade re. Proposal to Organize Coup d’etat in Iran and Oil Problem,’ US Department of State, 26 November 1952. 64. ‘Memorandum of Conversation: British Proposal to Organize a Coup d’Etat in Iran,’ US Department of State, 3 December 1952; ‘Memo from NSA – Byroade re. Proposal to Organize Coup d’etat in Iran and Oil Problem,’ US Department of State. 65. ‘Memorandum of Conversation: British Proposal to Organize a Coup d’Etat in Iran,’ US Department of State. 66. Ibid. 67. Ibid. 68. Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran, xxi. 69. ‘Intelligence Memorandum, Iran: The Tudeh Party and the Communist Movement [Redacted],’ Central Intelligence Agency, 3. 70. ‘Draft National Intelligence Estimate,’ US Department of State, 12 August 1953. 71. Ibid. 72. Ibid. 73. Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran, xxv. 74. ‘Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,’ US Department of State, 16 August 1953. 75. ‘Telegram from the Central Intelligence Agency to the Station in Iran,’ US Department of State, 18 August 1953. 76. ‘Telegram from the Embassy in Italy to the Department of State,’ US Department of State.

326

pp. [113–120]

Notes

77. ‘Memorandum for the Record,’ US Department of State, 19 August 1953. 78. Ibid. 79. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 278. 80. ‘Telegram from the Embassy in Iran to the Department of State,’ US Department of State, 20 August 1953. 81. ‘Zarif on Twitter: Never Again,’ ISNA, 19 August 2019, https://en.isna. ir/news/97052814814/Zarif-on-Twitter-Never-again 82. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 420. 83. Cronin, Armies and State-Building in the Modern Middle East, 185. 84. Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan: 2011), 200–225. 85. ‘Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile,’ The Federal Research Division of Congress, 4–6 86. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 419. 87. Pahlavi, Mission For My Country, 13. 88. Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, Enqelab-e Sefid (Los Angeles, CA: Ketab Corp, 2009), 3. 89. Pahlavi, Mission For My Country, 132. 90. Pahlavi, Enqelab-e Sefid, 6. 91. Ibid., 6–7. 92. Ibid. 93. Khumayni, Islam and Revolution, 178. 94. Ibid. 95. Pahlavi, Mission For My Country, 49. 96. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 435. 97. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Nuclearisation of the Middle East (MacLean, VA: Brassey’s, 1989), 99. 98. Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah:  The United States and Iran in the Cold W   ar, 30. 99. Cronin, Armies and State-Building in the Modern Middle East, 192. 100. Ibid. 101. ‘Intelligence Memorandum ER IM 72–79: Recent Trends in Iranian Arms Procurement,’ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Vol. E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972, US Department of State, May 1972. 102. ‘Intelligence Memorandum ER IM 72-79, Washington, May 1972: Recent Trends in Iranian Arms Procurement,’ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976. 103. Ibid. 104. Ibid.

327

NOTES

pp. [120–123]

105. Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Nuclearisation of the Middle East (MacLean, VA: Brassey’s: 1989), 100. 106. Arash Reisinezhad, The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 2. 107. Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, ‘Iranian Strategy in Iraq – Politics and “Other Means”,’ Combatting  Terrorism Center at West Point Occasional Paper Series, 13 October 2008; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Support of the Hezbollah in Lebanon (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 15 July 2006). 108. Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, The History of Terrorism – From Antiquity to ISIS (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2007), xxxiii. 109. Abbas William Samii, ‘The Shah’s Lebanon Policy: The Role of the SAVAK,’ Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January 1997), 66–91, https://www.jstor.org/stable/4283847, 67. 110. Ibid. 111. Ibid., 70. 112. Ibid. 113. Reisinezhad, The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia, 134. 114. Samii, ‘The Shah’s Lebanon Policy: The Role of the SAVAK,’ 68–69. 115. Reisinezhad, The Shah of Iran, the Iraqi Kurds, and the Lebanese Shia, 133. 116. James F. Goode, ‘Assisting Our Brothers, Defending Ourselves: The Iranian Intervention in Oman, 1972–75,’ Iranian Studies, Vol 47, Issue 3 (2014), 441–462, DOI: 10.1080/00210862.2014.880631, 443. 117. Samii, ‘The Shah’s Lebanon Policy: The Role of the SAVAK,’ 69. 118. J.E. Peterson, ‘Guerrilla Warfare and Ideological Confrontation in the Arabian Peninsula: The Rebellion in Dhufar,’ World Affairs, Vol. 139, no. 4 (1977), 278–95 (284–86), http://www.jstor.org/stable/20671698; Jeremy Jones, Oman, Culture and Diplomacy (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2013), 159. 119. Jeremy Jones and Nicholas Ridout, A History of Modern Oman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 182. 120. Goode, ‘Assisting Our Brothers, Defending Ourselves: The Iranian Intervention in Oman, 1972–75,’ 444. 121. Ibid., 442. 122. Ibid., 448. 123. Author interviews with senior Omani officials, Muscat, May 2016 and March 2017. 124. Author interview with senior Iranian diplomat, New York, N.Y., September 2016. 125. Author interview with senior Omani officials, Muscat, 2016–17. 126. Steven Ward, Immortal, 204.

328

pp. [123–125]

Notes

127. Goode, ‘Assisting Our Brothers, Defending Ourselves: The Iranian Intervention in Oman, 1972–75,’ 448. 128. Ward, Immortal, 204–06 129. Ward, Immortal, 204. 130. Goode, ‘Assisting Our Brothers, Defending Ourselves: The Iranian Intervention in Oman, 1972–75,’ 442. 131. Ward, Immortal, 204. 132. Ibid. 133. Goode, ‘Assisting Our Brothers, Defending Ourselves: The Iranian Intervention in Oman, 1972–75,’ 448. 134. Marc Valeri, ‘Iran–Oman Relations Since the 1970s: A Mutually Beneficial Modus Vivendi,’ in Gawdat Baghat, Anoushiravan Ehteshami, and Neil Quilliam, Security and Bilateral Issues Between Iran and Its Arab Neighbours (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 152. 135. Shireen Hunter, ‘Iran’s Policy Toward the Persian Gulf: Dynamics of Continuity and Change,’ in Gawdat Baghat et al. Security and Bilateral Issues Between Iran and Its Arab Neighbours, 27. 136. For an example of the opposition’s views on the campaign, see this MeK document from that period: Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran, Asnadi az jang-e tajavozkaraneh-ye regime-eh Shah dar Oman, http:// peykar.info/PeykarArchive/Mojahedin/khaterate-yek-afsare-iranidar-oman.pdf 137. For examples of the opposition’s views on the campaign, see Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran, Asnadi az jang-e tajavozkaraneh-ye regime-eh Shah dar Oman. 138. Ward, Immortal, 204. 139. Jones, Oman, Culture and Diplomacy, 159. 140. Marc Valeri, ‘Iran-Oman Relations Since the 1970s: A Mutually Beneficial Modus Vivendi,’ Gawdat Baghat et al., Security and Bilateral Issues Between Iran and Its Arab Neighbours, 153. 141. Jones, Oman, Culture and Diplomacy, 159; Shireen Hunter, ‘Iran’s Policy Toward the Persian Gulf: Dynamics of Continuity and Change,’ in Iran– Oman Relations Since the 1970s: A Mutually Beneficial Modus Vivendi,’ Gawdat Baghat et al. Security and Bilateral Issues Between Iran and Its Arab Neighbours, 25. 142. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 435. 143. Andrew S. Cooper, The Fall of Heaven: the Pahlavis and the Final Days of Imperial Iran, 24. 144. Pahlavi, Answer to History, 198. 145. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 435. 146. Pahlavi, Answer to History, 197.

329

NOTES

pp. [125–132]

147. Author interview with Akbar Etemad, phone, 6 October 2014. 148. Ibid. 149. Ibid. 150. Rouhani, Amniat-e melli va diplomacy-e hasteh-e, 27. 151. Because the book was published years later in Iran, it is important to note that it may not constitute the full and exact account of Pejman’s memoir and was most likely censored by the authorities. 152. Jalal Pejman, Foroupashi-e Artesh-e Shahanshani – Khaterat-e Sepahbod Jalal Pejman Farmandeh-ye Lashkar-e Guard-s Shahanshahi (Tehran: Namak, 2016), 517. 153. Ibid., 518. 154. Ibid., 519. 155. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 423. 156. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, 244. 157. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 270. 158. Ibid., 438. 159. Ibid., 431. 160. World Bank Data, ‘Literacy rate, adult total (% of people ages 15 and above),’ https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.LITR. ZS?locations=IR 161. Abbas Milani, The Shah (New York, N.Y.: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 291. 162. The full set of six points was as follows: land distribution, nationalization of forests, sale of state factories to private entrepreneurs, profitsharing for industrial workers, extension of the vote to women, and establishment of a rural literacy corps. Of these, nationalization of forests, profit-sharing for industrial workers, and the rural literacy corps proved largely inconsequential compared to land distribution, sale of state factories, and the extension of the vote to women. 163. Abrahamian, Iran BetweenTwo Revolutions, 428;  World Bank Data: https:// data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG?locations=IR 164. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 430. 165. Payman Vahabzadeh, A Guerrilla Odyssey (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press (2010), 5. 166. Vahabzadeh, A Guerrilla Odyssey, 6. 167. Ibid., 9–13. 168. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York, N.Y.: Vintage Books, 1965), 40. 169. Morad Saqafi, ‘Rastakhizi ke nabud: Hameh-ye karkardha-ye yek hezb-e hokumati,’ Goftogu, No. 78, January 2015, 41. 170. Ibid., 47.

330

pp. [132–137]

Notes

171. Ibid. 172. Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1974), 10. 173. Chubin and Zabih, The Foreign Relations of Iran, 10. 174. Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 143; ‘Special Series: Iranian Intelligence and Regime Preservation,’ Stratfor. 175. Vahabzadeh, ‘Fad ʾ n-e alq.’ 176. Parviz Sabeti, Dar Damgah-e Hadeseh (Los Angeles, CA: Ketab Corp, 2012), 306. 177. Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 438. 178. Ibid., 482. 179. Kazemi, ‘Fed ʾ n-e Esl m,’ 470–474; Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, 98, 104. 180. Kazemi, ‘Fed ʾ n-e Esl m,’ 470–474. 181. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 94. 182. Ibid. 183. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, 72. 184. Kazemi, ‘Fed ʾ n-e Esl m’. 185. Ibid. 186. Arjomand, From Nationalism to Revolutionary Islam, 167. 187. Ibid., 164. 188. Rahnema, Behind the 1953 Coup in Iran, 247–48. 189. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 103. 190. Ali Asghar Amini Dehaghi, ‘Ali Shariati’s Use of Traditional Media and the Historical Memory for Promoting Islamic Revolution in Iran,’ Asian Social Science, Vol. 12, No. 4 (2016), 41, http://www.ccsenet.org/ journal/index.php/ass/article/viewFile/55394/31146 191. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 93. 192. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 93–95. 193. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 135. 194. Sazeman-e Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran, Sazemandehi va tactic-ha, Summer 1974, 14. 195. Ibid. 196. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, 147. 197. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 96. 198. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 133–35. 199. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, 147. 200. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 128; ‘No Exit: Human Rights Abuses Inside the Mojahedin-e Khalq Camps,’ Human Rights Watch,

331

Fed ʾ n-

NOTES

pp. [137–145]

18 May 2005, http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/rwmain? docid=45d085002 201. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 140. 202. Ibid. 203. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, 148. 204. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 140. 205. Peyman Vahabzadeh, ‘Fadāʾ ān-e Ḵalq,’ Encyclopædia Iranica, online edition, 2015, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/fadaian-e-khalq 206. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 140; Vahabzadeh, ‘Fad ʾ n-e alq.’  207. Vahabzadeh, ‘Fad ʾ n-e alq.’  208. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 128; Vahabzadeh, ‘Fad ʾ n-e alq.’  209. Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin, 139, 140–143. 210. Afshin Matin-Asghari, ‘From social democracy to social democracy: The twentieth-century odyssey of the Iranian Left,’ in Stephanie Cronin, et al., Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left (New York, N.Y.: Routledge Curzon: 2004), 42–43. 211. Ali Mirfetros, Dr. Mohammad Mossadeq – Assibshenassi-e yek shekast (Los Angeles, CA: Ketab Corp, 2008), 211–12. 212. Sepehr Zabih, The Mossadegh Era: Roots of the Iranian Revolution (Chicago, IL: Lake View Press: 1982), 14. 213. Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, 42. 214. Ruhallah Khumayni, Islam and Revolution (Berkeley, CA, Mizan Press: 1981), 31–39. 215. Eric Rouleau, ‘Khomeini’s Iran,’ Foreign Affairs, Fall 1980, https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/1980-09-01/khomeinis-iran 216. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution, 91. 217. Khomeini puts the number at over 15,000—however, this is almost certainly vastly inflated. Many other accounts peg the number in either the low dozens or below ten. Khumayni, Islam and Revolution, 15–17. 218. Khumayni, Islam and Revolution, 174 and 15, respectively. 219. Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet, 328. 220. Ibid., 351. 221. Khumayni, Islam and Revolution, 242. 222. Ibid., 252. 223. Jim Hoagl, ‘Shah Regrets His ‘Policy of Surrender,’’ The Washington Post, 27 May 1980. 224. Ibid. 225. Ibid. 226. Ibid. 227. ‘Esteqlal, azadi, jomhoori-ye Islami,’ in Persian.

332

pp. [148–153]

Notes

4.  THE REVOLUTION 1. For examples of these tensions, see the Brookings Institution timeline of events preceding the revolution, Suzanne Maloney and Keian Razipour, ‘The Iranian Revolution—A Timeline of Events,’ The Brookings Institution, 24 January 2019, https://www.brookings. edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/24/the-iranian-revolution-atimeline-of-events/ 2. ‘Full Test: An Interview with Director Turner,’ Central Intelligence Agency, 4 February 1979, 4. 3. Stephanie Cronin, Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2004), 47. 4. Walt, Revolution and W   ar, 12. 5. For the Shah’s own account, see Mission for My Country. 6. These included Khomeini’s Islam and Revolution and various publications by the Fada’iyan. 7. Maryam Y.Yekta Steininger, The United States and Iran: Different Values and Attitudes towards Nature: Scratches on our Hearts and Minds (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2010), 84. 8. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 92–93. 9. Ibid., 94. 10. Shahram Kholdi, ‘The Hedging Mullah: A Historical Review of the Clergy’s Struggle for Hegemony and Independence in Modern Iran,’ Constellations, 17: 31–49 (2010). doi:10.1111/j.1467-8675. 2009.00584.x 11. ‘The Freedom Movement of  Iran,’ Iran Data Portal, 30 December 2011, http://irandataportal.syr.edu/the-freedom-movement-of-iran 12. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 93. 13. Shariati be revayat-e asnad-e SAVAK, Vol. 2 (Tehran: Markaz-e asnad-e enqelab-e Islami, 1999), 272–273; Tabatabai, Nazariyeh-ye hokumat-e Qanun dar Iran, 162–163;Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadodkhahi, 28–31. 14. Ruhallah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution (Berkeley, CA, Mizan Press: 1981), 179. 15. Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, Religious Statecraft Religious Statecraft – The Politics of Islam in Iran (New York, N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2018), 65–68. 16. Ruhallah Khomeini, Islam and Revolution (Berkeley, CA, Mizan Press: 1981), 179. 17. Najibullah Lafraie, Ideology and Islamic Militancy: The Iranian Revolution and Interpretations of the Quran (London: I.B.Tauris, 2009), 74.

333

NOTES

pp. [153–156]

18. Andrew Scott Cooper, The Fall of Heaven (New York, N.Y.: Henry Holt and Company, LLC, 2016), 264. 19. For the US intelligence community’s assessment of the Iranian disinformation campaign, see, Daniel R. Coats, ‘Statement for the Record Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community,’ Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 29 January 2019, https:// www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/osdcoats-012919.pdf, 5–7. For examples of other media reports about the nature, depth, and breath of activities undertaken by Iranian intelligence, see Craig Timberg et al., ‘Sprawling Iranian Influence Operation   ashington Post, 21 August Globalizes Tech’s War on Disinformation,’ The W 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/08/21/ russian-iran-created-facebook-pages-groups-accounts-mislead-usersaround-world-company-says/?utm_term=.facd9127f6b6; Jack Stubbs and Christopher Bing, ‘Special Report: How Iran Spreads Disinformation Around the World,’ Reuters, 30 November 2018, https://www.reuters. com/article/us-cyber-iran-specialreport/special-report-how-iranspreads-disinformation-around-the-world-idUSKCN1NZ1FT; Sheera Frenkel et al., ‘Russia’s Playbook for Social Media Disinformation Has   Times, 31 January 2019, https://www. Gone Global,’ The New York nytimes.com/2019/01/31/technology/twitter-disinformation-unitedstates-russia.html; Cristiano Lima, ‘Facebook, Twitter Take Down Disinformation Campaigns Linked to Iran, Russia, Venezuela,’ Politico, 31 January 2019, https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/31/ facebook-twitter-disinformation-iran-2608393 20. See Houshang E. Chehabi, ‘Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade,’ in Houshang E. Chehabi, Distant Relations: Iran and Lebanon in the Last 500 years (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2006). 21. Chehabi, ‘Iran and Lebanon in the Revolutionary Decade.’ 22. General Robert E. Huyser, Mission to Tehran (London: André Deutsch, 1986), 244. 23. Cooper, The Fall of Heaven, 108–109. 24. Ibid., 143. 25. Fawaz A. Gerges, Journey of the Jihadist: Inside Muslim Militancy (New York, N.Y.: Harcout Books, 2007), 83. 26. See R.K. Ramazani, Independence without Freedom: Iran’s Foreign Policy (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2013). 27. Shariati be revayat-e asnad-e SAVAK, Vol. 2, 272–273. 28. Baqer Moin, ‘Khomeini, Ruhollah al-Musavi,’ in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World, Oxford Islamic Studies Online, http://www. oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0457

334

pp. [156–160]

Notes

29. Avery et al, The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 7, 752. 30. Ruhallah Khomeini, Kashf Al-Asrar (Ketab Corp, 2009). 31. Cooper, The Fall of Heaven, 109. 32. Ibid. 33. For examples of state sanctioned timelines and descriptions of the events surrounding Khomeini’s exile, see ‘Roozshomar-e tab’eed-e hazrat-e Imam Khomeini’, Hozoor, No. 2 (Fall 1991), https://hawzah. - net/fa/Magazine/View/130/3638/17006/ )- - ); ‘Negahi be tab’eed-e Imam Khomeini az Iran be Torkiyeh va Iraq (1343–44), Markaz-e barresi-ye asnad-e tarikhi, 1 November 2018, http://historydocuments.ir/?page=post&id=1570; ‘Tab’eed-e Imam Khomeini az Torkiyeh be Iraq,’ Jamaran, https://www.jamaran. - - / -   - - ir/ -4936/ 34. See Annabelle Sreberny-Mohammadi and Ali Mohammadi, Small Media Big Revolution: Communication, Culture and the Iranian Revolution (Saint Paul, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); ‘Negahi be tab’eed-e Imam Khomeini az Iran be Torkiyeh va Iraq (1343–44), Markaz-e barresi-ye asnad-e tarikhi. 35. Cooper, The Fall of Heaven, 117. 36. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 103–104. 37. Tabaar, Religious Statecraft – Religious Statecraft, 60. 38. Author interviews in Iran, 2009–14. 39. Abbas Milani, Eminent Persians – The Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941–1979, Vol. I (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press and Persian World Press, 2008), 290. 40. See Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. 41. Sreberny-Mohammadi and Mohammadi, Small Media, Big Revolution, 129/148. 42. Ibid., 129. 43. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 95. 44. Ibid., 97. 45. Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1993), 22–24. 46. Avery et al, The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 7, 745. 47. Ibid. 48. See Mahdi Ahouie, ‘Ali Shariati on the Question of Palestine: Making a Sacred Symbol for Uprising against Injustice and Domination,’ in Dustin J. Byrd and Seyed Javad Miri, Ali Shariati and the Future of Social Theory (Boston, MA: Brill, 2018). 49. Avery et al, The Cambridge History of Iran, vol. 7, 757. 50. Cooper, The Fall of Heaven, 112.

335

NOTES

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51. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 103. 52. Walt, Revolution andWar, 8. 53. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 103. 54. Author interviews with former revolutionaries, Tehran, 2009–14. 55. Author interviews in Iran, 2008–14. 56. Author interviews in Iran, 2009–10. 57. Cooper, The Fall of Heaven, 296. 58. James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American–Iranian   ale University Press, 1988), 158. Relations (New Haven, CT: Y 59. Cooper, The Fall of Heaven, 121. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid., 140. 62. Charlotte Curtis, ‘First Party of Iran’s 2,500-Year Celebration,’ The New York Times, 13 October 1971. 63. Curtis, ‘First Party of Iran’s 2,500-Year Celebration.’ 64. Ervand Abrahamian, The Iranian Mojahedin (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 128. 65. Cooper, The Fall of Heaven, 161. 66. Ibid., 168–169. 67. Charles Kurzman, ‘The Qum Protests and the Coming of the Iranian Revolution, 1975 and 1978,’ Social Science History, Vol. 27, Issue 3 (Fall 2003), 287–325,http://kurzman.unc.edu/files/2011/06/Kurzman_ Qum_Protests.pdf 68. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, 128. 69. Cooper, The Fall of Heaven, 217. 70. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 106. 71. ‘A Few Thoughts About Iran,’ Congressional Record—Senate, 26 February 1979. 72. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 108. 73. R.K. Ramazani, et al. Iran’s Revolution: The Search for Consensus (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute and Indiana University Press, 1990), 4. 74. Ramazani, et al. Iran’s Revolution:  The Search for Consensus, 4. 75. Stephanie Cronin, Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran: New Perspectives on the Iranian Left (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2004), 192. 76. Nikki R. Keddie, Roots of Revolution: An Interpretive History of Modern Iran (New Haven, CT: Y   ale University Press, 1981), 237. 77. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, 239. 78. Mark Thiessen, An Island of Stability: The Islamic Revolution of Iran and the Dutch Opinion (Leiden: Sidestone Press, 2009), 42. 79. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, 234.

336

pp. [165–170]

Notes

80. Ervand Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1982), 497. 81. Cronin, Reformers and Revolutionaries in Modern Iran, 44. 82. R.K. Ramazani, et al. Iran’s Revolution: The Search for Consensus (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute and Indiana University Press, 1990), 71–77, 82–83. 83. ‘Communism iii. In Persia after 1953,’ Encyclopedia Iranica, Vol. VI, Fasc. 1, 27 October 2011, 105–112, http://www.iranicaonline.org/ articles/communism-iii 84. Milani, Eminent Persians – The Men and Women Who Made Modern Iran, 1941–1979, Vol. I, 478. 85. For a brief examination of the immense discrepancies in estimates, see Robert C. de Camara, ‘The Shah as Tyrant: A Look at the Record,’ The Washington Post, 23 March 1980. 86. ‘Iran –Trial Procedures for Political Prisoners,’ Amnesty International, August 1972; another major report was published in 1976. 87. William Branigin, ‘Opposition in Iran Calls General Strike,’ The Washington Post, 16 December 1978. 88. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 116–118. 89. Ibid., 116. 90. David D. Kirkpatrick, ‘How A Chase Bank Chairman Helped the Deposed Shah of Iran Enter the U.S.,’ The New York Times, 29 December 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/29/world/middleeast/ shah-iran-chase-papers.html. 91. Ibid. 92. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 118; William Branigin, ‘Iran’s Cabinet to Resign to Pacify Critics,’ The Washington Post, 27 August 1978. 93. Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran – History and the Quest for Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 73. 94. Gheissari and Nasr, Democracy in Iran, 73. 95. Branigin, ‘Iran’s Cabinet to Resign to Pacify Critics.’ 96. Gheissari and Nasr, Democracy in Iran, 73. 97. Joseph Kraft, ‘Letter from Iran,’ The New Yorker, 18 December 1978. 98. Ibid. 99. Ibid. 100. Gheissari and Nasr, Democracy in Iran, 73. 101. Kraft, ‘Letter from Iran.’ 102. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 114–115. 103. Cooper, The Fall of Heaven, 23. 104. Jimmy Carter, ‘Iran T   oasts of the President and the Shah at a State Dinner,’ 31 December 1977, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7080

337

NOTES

pp. [170–174]

105. ‘A Few Thoughts About Iran,’ Congressional Record—Senate. 106. Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, Religious Statecraft, 61. 107. Ibid. 108. Kurzman,‘The Qum Protests and the Coming of the Iranian Revolution, 1975 and 1978.’ 109. Cooper, The Fall of Heaven, 291. 110. Ibid., 294–295. 111. Brenda Shaffer, Borders and Brethren: Iran and the Challenge of Azerbaijani Identity (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 81. 112. Tabaar, Religious Statecraft, 62. 113. Ibid. 114. Ibid. 115. ‘Intelligence Memorandum, Iran: The Tudeh Party and the Communist Movement [Redacted],’ Central Intelligence Agency, 9. 116. Ibid. 117. Cooper, The Fall of Heaven, xvi. 118. Maloney and Razipour, ‘The Iranian Revolution—A Timeline of Events.’ 119. Cooper, The Fall of Heaven, 360–61. 120. Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, ‘Seday-e enqelab-e shoma ra shenidam,’ 10 August 1978. 121. Ibid. 122. Daniel L. Byman, ‘The Rise of Low-Tech Terrorism,’ Brookings Institution, 6 May 2007, http://www.brookings.edu/articles/therise-of-low-tech-terrorism/amp/ 123. William Branigan, ‘Terrorists Kill 377 by Burning Theater in Iran,’ The Washington Post, 21 August 1978. 124. Ibid. 125. Ibid. 126. Ibid. 127. See, for example, Tabaar, Religious Statecraft, 64; Byman, ‘The Rise of Low-Tech Terrorism.’ 128. Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown, 116. 129. Avery et al, The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 7, 745. 130. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, 194. 131. Ibid., 183. 132. Parviz Daneshvar, Revolution in Iran (London: MacMillan Press, 1996), 110; John Calvert, Islamism:  A Documentary and Reference Guide (London: Greenwood Press, 2008), 108. 133. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, 206. 134. Shaul Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs: Iran and the Islamic Revolution (New York, N.Y.: Basic Books, 1984), 17.

338

pp. [175–179]

Notes

135. ‘Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran’; the book published by the Bazargan government detailing this inquiry is entitled Lalehha-ye Enqelab: Yadnameh-e Shaheda; Ervand Abrahamian, ‘The Crowd in the Iranian Revolution,’ Radical History Review, Vol. 2009, Issue 105 (1 January 2009), 13–38. doi: https://doi.org/10.1215/01636545-2009-002 136. For an example, see William Branigin, ‘U.S. Oilman is Killed in Iran Attack,’ The Washington Post, 24 December 1978. 137. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, 207. 138. Ibid., 210. 139. Abbas Milani, The Persian Sphinx: Amir Abbas Hoveyda and the Riddle of the Iranian Revolution (London: I.B. Tauris, 2000), 303. 140. Ruhollah Khomeini, ‘Matn va video-ye kamel-e sokhanrani-e Imam Khomeini dar Behesht-e Zahra, 12 Bahman, 57,’ Tabnak, 1 February 2018, http://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/770100/ - - - - - - -141. Ibid. 142. Ibid. 143. Ibid. 144. Ibid. 145. ‘Intelligence Memorandum: The Politics of Ayatollah Khomeini,’ Central Intelligence Agency, 20 November 1978, 8. 146. Khomeini, ‘Matn va video-ye kamel-e sokhanrani-e Imam Khomeini dar Behesht-e Zahra, 12 Bahman, 57.’ 147. de Tocqueville, The Ancien Régime and the French Revolution, 133. 148. Fischer, Iran: From Religious Dispute to Revolution, 183. 149. Author interviews in Iran, 2009–14. 150. Ahmed F. Hashim, ‘Civil-Military Relations in the Islamic Republic of Iran,’ in Joseph A. Kechichian, Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States (New York, N.Y.: Plagrave, 2001), 37. 151. Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, 149. 152. Ramazani, et al. Iran’s Revolution:The Search for Consensus, 8. 153. Ibid., 4. 154. General Robert E. Huyser, Mission to Tehran, 241. 155. Ibid., 241–243. 156. Kirkpatrick, ‘How A Chase Bank Chairman Helped the Deposed Shah of Iran Enter the U.S.’ 157. ‘Why Carter Admitted the Shah,’ The New York Times, 17 May 1981. 158. Huyser, Mission to Tehran, 23–24. 159. Scott Armstrong, ‘Carter Held Hope Even After Shah Had Lost His,’ The Washington Post, 25 October 1980.

339

NOTES

pp. [180–183]

160. For a detailed account of the events that occurred during the period where radical revolutionaries held captive members of the American foreign service in Iran, see Robert Ode’s diary. Ode was on a special assignment to Iran when the revolutionaries took him hostage. He describes his time as a captive, including his interactions with the hostage takers’ spokeswoman, Masoumeh Ebtekar, known as ‘Mary,’ who would later become a vice president. Robert C. Ode, ‘Iran’s Hostage Diary,’ The Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, https://www. jimmycarterlibrary.gov/research/iran_hostages_diary 161. Catherine V. Scott, ‘The Hostage Crisis as Captivity Narrative in Iran,’ International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, No. 1 (March 2000), https:// www.jstor.org/stable/3013974, 177–188. 162. Scott, ‘The Hostage Crisis as Captivity Narrative in Iran,’ 178, 184. 163. Ramazani, et al. Iran’s Revolution:The Search for Consensus, 53. 164. Author interview with Iranian diplomat, telephone, 4 July 2017. 165. Majid Pirooz, ‘Hezb-e taraz-e Islami; barressi-ye karnameh va amalkard-e hezb-e jomhoori-ye Islami (1357–66),’ Goftogu, No. 78, January 2015, 15, 21. 166. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, 259. 167. Ramazani et al., Iran’s Revolution:The Search for Consensus, 5. 168. Keddie, Roots of Revolution, 260. 169. Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, 54. 170. Ibid., 53. 171. Majid Pirooz, ‘Hezb-e taraz-e Islami; barressi-ye karnameh va amalkard-e hezb-e jomhoori-ye Islami,’ 11–15. 172. Ibid., 15. 173. Ramazani et al., Iran’s Revolution:The Search for Consensus, 3. 174. Pirooz, ‘Hezb-e taraz-e Islami; barressi-ye karnameh va amalkard-e hezb-e jomhoori-ye Islami (1357–66),’ 17. 175. David Menashri, Revolution at a Crossroads – Iran’s Domestic Politics and Regional Ambitions, Policy Brief No. 43 (Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1997), xiii. 176. ‘Iran: The Struggle to Define and Control Foreign Policy [redacted],’ Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of  Intelligence, 10 April 1985. 177. Ibid., 1. 178. Pejman, Foroupashi-e Artesh-e Shahanshahi, 492–93. 179. Ibid., 493–95. 180 Ibid., 495. 181. Mark Gasiorowski, ‘US Covert Operations Toward Iran, February– November 1979:Was the CIA Trying to Overthrow the Islamic Regime?’

340

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Notes

Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 51, Issue 1 (2014), 115–135, http://dx.doi. org/10.108000263206.2014.938643, 116. 182. Ibid. 183. Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, 175–176. 184. Gasiorowski, ‘US Covert Operations Toward Iran, February– November 1979: Was the CIA Trying to Overthrow the Islamic Regime?’ 116. 185. ‘Iran Sanctions,’ US Department of State, https://www.state.gov/e/ eb/tfs/spi/iran/index.htm 186. Iran Country Study Guide:  Volume 1, Strategic Information and Developments (Washington, D.C.: International Business Publications USA, 2013), 69. 187. William N. Eskridge Jr., ‘The Iranian Nationalization Cases: Toward a General Theory of Jurisdiction over Foreign States,’ Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 382, 1981, http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fss_ papers/3820 188. Gérard Chaliand and Arnaud Blin, The History of Terrorism, 221. 189. Tabaar, Religious Statecraft, 71. 190. Collier, Democracy and the Nature of American Influence in Iran, 1941– 1979, 6. 5.  THEY WERE EXPENDABLE: THE IRAN–IRAQ WAR 1. Alexis de Tocqueville, Ancien Régime and the French Revolution, 178. 2. For examples of these calls, see Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imam, Vol. 13 (Tehran: Moassesseh-ye Tanzim va Nashr-e Assar-e Imam Khomeini, 1982), 90–96, 281; Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imam, Vol. 18 (Tehran: Moassesseh-ye Tanzim va Nashr-e Assar-e Imam Khomeini, 1982), 72, 157–158, 264. 3. ‘Iran: Exporting the Revolution [redacted],’ Central Intelligence Agency, March 1980. 4. Nikola B. Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1987), 26. 5. Ibid., 26–27. 6. Jerrold M. Post, ‘Saddam Hussein of Iraq: A Political Psychology Profile,’ Political Psychology, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 1991), 279–289, https://www.jstor.org/stable/3791465, 284; Williamson Murray and Kevin M. Woods, The Iran–Iraq War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 1; John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, ‘An Unnecessary War,’ Foreign Policy, January and February 2003, 52–53. 7. Tim Arango et al., ‘The Iran Cables: Secret Documents Show How Tehran Wields Power in Iraq,’ The New  York Times, 19 November

341

NOTES

pp. [189–192]

2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/11/18/world/ middleeast/iran-iraq-spy-cables.html?smid=nytcore-ios-share 8. Michael Connell, ‘Iran’s Military Doctrine,’ The United States Institute of Peace Iran Primer, https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iransmilitary-doctrine; author interviews with Iranian officials, Tehran 2014. 9. Ehsan Hosseini-Nasab, ‘Gozaresh-e avalin gerdehamai-e ravian-e markaz-e asnad va tahqiqat-e defa-e moqaddas,’ Negin-e Iran, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2012, 137–140; Gozari bar do sal-e jang (Tehran: Daftar-e siyasiye Sepah-e Pasdaran-e enqelab-e Islami, 1982), 10–31; ‘Tarikhnegari-e jang-e tahmili dar Artesh-e jomhuri-ye Islami-e Iran,’ Iran Defa’, - https://irandefa.com/archive-id=635/ / 10. Author interviews with senior Iranian officials, Tehran, New York, Berlin, Vienna, 2013–17; United Nations General Assembly Sideline Meeting with Hassan Rouhani, New York, N.Y., 27 October 2015. 11. ‘Bavarha-ye Assassi-ye Pasdaran dar Defa-e Moqaddas,’ Defa-e Moqaddas, 18 January 2016, http://defamoghaddas.ir/fa/news/ - 12. ‘Bavarha-ye Assassi-ye Pasdaran dar Defa-e Moqaddas,’ Defa-e Moqaddas.’ 13. Ibid. 14. Efraim Karsh, Osprey Guide to the Iran–Iraq War (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014), 1. 15. Murray and Woods, The Iran–Iraq War, 26. 16. Ibid., 33–34. 17. Francis Fukuyama, The Soviet Union and Iraq Since 1968 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1980), 30. 18. For a detailed account of the purges and their impact, see Nikola B. Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic, 17–28. 19. Stephen C. Pelletiere, The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum (New York, N.Y.: Praeger Publishers, 1992), 15. 20. Ibid., 34–35. 21. Ibid., 18. 22. Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘Memorandum: NSC Weekly Report #122,’ 21 December 1979. 23. Ibid. 24. For a comprehensive collection of Khomeini’s statements and remarks on the export of the revolution, see Sodur-e enqelab – az didgah-e Imam Khomeini (Tehran: Moassesse-ye Tanzim va nashr-e asar-e Imam Khomeini), http://statics.imam-khomeini.ir/userfiles/fa/Files/News Attachment/2018/519-t.pdf

342

pp. [192–196]

Notes

25. Devin Kennington et al., ‘Iran-Iraq War Timeline,’ The Wilson Center, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Iran-IraqWar_ Part1_0.pdf, 1. 26. ‘Military Coup in Iraq Ousts Monarchy,’ The Guardian, 26 July 1958, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jul/26/iraq-revolutionousts-monarchy-1958 27. Behrouz Souresrafil, The Iran–Iraq War (New York, N.Y.: Guinan Co., 1989), 37. 28. Pelletiere, The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum, 4–5. 29. Ibid., 8. 30. Souresrafil, The Iran–Iraq War, 16. 31. Ibid., 17. 32. This was not an arms race per se: the Iranian military was by far the Iraqi military’s superior. The Shah possessed a massive air force and army and a competent navy while still in 1970, Iraq’s army was ‘really just a robust police force.’ This dynamic of  Iranian dominance, though, would change throughout the 1970s as Iraq began to purchase considerable arms from the Soviet Union. Pelletiere, The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum, 13. 33. Iraq and Iran were on the verge of war in other areas as well. In 1974, Iran occupied five square kilometers of Iraqi territory near Basra after Iraq shelled Iranian border towns and incited the inhabitants of Khuzestan to revolt—this episode quickly resulted in a ceasefire, but not before it set off a series of clashes in other regions. Souresrafil, The Iran–Iraq War, 18; Pelletiere, The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum, 9. 34. Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq War, 62. 35. Pelletiere, The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum, 10. 36. Souresrafil, The Iran–Iraq War, 25–26. 37. Ibid. 38. Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq  War: A Military and Strategic History, 47; R. K. Ramazani, ‘Who Started the Iraq–Iran War—A Commentary,’ Virginia Journal of International Law, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Fall 1992), 69–90. 39. Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq War:A Military and Strategic History, 4892. 40. Sick, Gary. ‘Trial by Error: Reflections on the Iran–Iraq War,’ Middle East Journal 43, no. 2 (1989), 230–245. 41. Souresrafil, The Iran–Iraq War, 25–26, 50, 92. 42. Charles Tripp, A History of  Iraq (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 203; Caitlin Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2015), 139–179. 43. Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic, vi.

343

NOTES

pp. [196–198]

44. Brandon A. Pinkley, Guarding History – The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Memory of the Iran–Iraq War (Washington, D.C.: Joint History Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), 2. 45. Mohammad Heydari, ‘Negahi be Moravedat-e Sepah va Artesh dar jang-e Iran va Iraq,’ Shahrvand, Vol. 18, October 2007, http://ensani. ir/fa/article/45727/ -- - -- - 46. Pierre Razoux, The Iran–Iraq War, 23–26; Woods and Murray, The Iran– Iraq War: A Military and Strategic History, 100–101. Ward, Immortal – A Military History of Iran and Its Armed Forces, 249. 47. Souresrafil, The Iran–Iraq War, 55. 48. Ward, Immortal, 244. 49. Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, 127. 50. Ibid. 51. Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes, 181; Ward, Immortal, 251. 52. Zbigniew Brzezinski, ‘Memorandum: NSC Weekly Report #156,’ 3 October 1980. 53. Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq War, 121; Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, 127; Souresrafil, The Iran–Iraq War, 56. 54. Souresrafil, The Iran–Iraq War, 56. 55. Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq War, 124. 56. Razoux, The Iran–Iraq War, 141. 57. Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq War, 105. 58. Ibid., 107. 59. Ibid., 115. 60. Author interviews with senior Iranian officials, Tehran, New York, Berlin, Geneva, and  Vienna, 2014–17;‘Abaad-e hemayatha-ye Arabestan az regime-e Baathi-e Saddam dar doran-e jang-e tahmili,’ IRIB, 23 September 2016, http://www.iribnews.ir/fa/news/1302470/ - - - - ;  ‘Khadamat-e hokkam-e Arab-e khalik-e Fars be Saddam dar tul-e jang-e tahmili,’ Fars News, 21 September 2018, https://www.farsnews.com/ news/13970623000759/ - - - - 61. ‘Hazf-e asnad-e komakha-ye ettelaati-e ‘Surieh’ qabl az shoru-e jang-e tahmili tavassot’s Bani Sadr,’ Farhangikhtegan, 27 September 2017, http://fdn.ir/news/11453/ - %E2%80%8C - - - %E2%80%8C 62. Author interviews with GCC officials, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Dubai, Kuwait City, Muscat, 2014–17; R.K. Ramazani, The Gulf Cooperation

344

pp. [198–202]

Notes

Council: Record and Analysis (Charlottesville, VA: University Press of Virginia, 1988). 63. Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq War, 117. 64. Ibid., 131. 65. Ibid., 111. 66. ‘Iran: The Struggle to Define and Control Foreign Policy [redacted],’ Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence, iii. 67. Ibid., 1. 68. Ibid. 69. Ibid., 3. 70. For a treatment of factional politics in the war, see Mohammad Ayatollai Tabaar, ‘Factional Politics in the Iran–Iraq War,’ Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 42, Issue 3-4 (2019), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10. 1080/01402390.2017.1347873 71. ‘Iran: The Struggle to Define and Control Foreign Policy [redacted],’ Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence, 3. 72. Bakhash, The Reign of the Ayatollahs, 136. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid., 97. 75. ‘Majara-ye gofteh nashodeh az bombaran-e mavaze’-e DAESH tavasot-e jangadeha-ye Artesh,’Tasnim News, 21 September 2017, https://www. - - tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1396/06/30/1526280/ - - - - 76. ‘Majara-ye gofteh nashodeh az bombaran-e mavaze’-e DAESH tavasot-e jangadeha-ye Artesh,’ Tasnim News. 77. Ward, Immortal, 254, 256. 78. Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq War, 143. 79. Razoux, The Iran–Iraq War, 181; Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq War, 144. 80. Razoux, The Iran–Iraq War, 183. 81. Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq War, 148. 82. Razoux, The Iran–Iraq War, 181. 83. Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq War, 173. 84. Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Wrath of Militant Islam (New York, N.Y.: Simon and Schuster, 2001), 37; Razoux, The Iran–Iraq War, 186. 85. For examples of the use of the tactic by other militaries, see Andrew Weist, The Vietnam War – 1956–1975 (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2005), 4;Yuki Tanaka, Hidden Horrors – JapaneseWar Crimes in World War II (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2018); Bernard B. Fall, Street Without Joy (Mechanicsburg, PA: Tackpole Books, 1994), 52– 60, 105.

345

NOTES

pp. [202–204]

86. Maryam Elahi, ‘The Rights of the Child under Islamic Law: Prohibition of the Child Soldier,’ 19.2 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 259, 280 (1988); http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/ colhr19&div=13&g_sent=1&collection=journals# 87. Many sources speak of plastic ‘keys to paradise’ being promised to those killed (‘martyred’) by landmines. 88. Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq War, 157–159. 89. Data from ‘Arms imports (SIPRI trend indicator values),’ World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.MPRT.KD?locations=IR 90. In 1982, the United States estimated that 40 percent of Iranian arms imports came from China and North Korea—by 1987 that figure had risen to 70 percent. John W. Garver, China and Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2011), 72. 91. Reuters, ‘33 high Iranian Officials Die in Bombing at Party Meeting; Chief Judge is Among Victims,’ The New  York Times, 29 June 1981. 92. UPI, ‘Iranian Says Secretary to Premier Hid Fatal Bomb in Teheran Office,’ The New York Times, 14 September 1981. 93. In that same period (June–July 1981) Iran executed over 6,000 suspected terrorists. 94. Mohsen M. Milani, The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution: From Monarchy to Islamic Republic (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), 12. 95. Bani-Sadr, as a moderate, favored the Artesh over the IRGC and Basij and military decisions made by generals over those made by clerics. 96. ‘Bani-Sadr Is Dismissed by Khomeini As Chief of Iran Armed Forces,’ The New York Times, 11 June 1981. 97. Sick, Gary. ‘Trial by Error: Reflections on the Iran–Iraq War,’  Middle East Journal, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1989), 230–45, http://www.jstor.org/ stable/4327921 98. ‘Chera jang edameh yaft?’ Jamaran, https://www.jamaran.ir/ - - -4945- - / 99. Simultaneous to that offensive was another Iranian offensive in the vicinity of Ahvaz, in which the Iraqi units implemented for the first time the strategy of Deep Defense, with rings of minefields and barricades to slow the advance of the human wave and succeed in repelling the Iranian attack. 100. Souresrafil, The Iran–Iraq War, 59. 101. Ibid. 102. Timothy D. Hoyt,‘Social Structure, Ethnicity, and Military Effectiveness: Iraq, 1980–2004,’ in Risa A. Brooks and Elizabeth A. Stanley, Creating Military Power – The Sources of Military Effectiveness, 62.

346

pp. [204–209]

Notes

103. Ward, Immortal, 258. 104. ‘Chera jang edameh yaft?’ Jamaran. 105. For example, see Dore Gold, The Rise of Nuclear Iran: How Tehran Defies the West (Washington, D.C.: Regnery Publishing, 2009), 25. 106. Annie Tracy Samuel, ‘Attacking Iran: Lessons from the Iran–Iraq War,’ Policy Brief, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, Cambridge, M.A., 2011, 7. 107. ‘Chera jang edameh yaft?’ Jamaran; Mohammad Fardi, ‘Eshghal-e Kuwait tavassot-e Iraq; mohemtarin sanad-e haqaniat-e Iran,’ Defa-e Moqaddas, 3 August 2015, http://defamoghaddas.ir/fa/news/ %E2%80%8C - 108. Ruhollah Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imam (Tehran: Moassesseh-ye Tanzim va Nashr-e Assar-e Imam Khomeini, 1982), Vol. 16, 390–91; ‘Chera jang edameh yaft?’ Jamaran; Mohammad Fardi, ‘Eshghal-e Kuwait tavassot-e Iraq; mohemtarin sanad-e haqaniat-e Iran.’ 109. Mohammad Fardi, ‘Eshghal-e Kuwait tavassot-e Iraq; mohemtarin sanad-e haqaniat-e Iran.’ 110. Ibid. 111. ‘Chera jang edameh yaft?’ Jamaran. 112. Fardi, ‘Eshghal-e Kuwait tavassot-e Iraq; mohemtarin sanad-e haqaniat-e Iran.’ 113. ‘Bavarha-ye Assassi-ye Pasdaran dar Defa-e Moqaddas,’ Defa-e Moqaddas.’ 114. Kennington et al., ‘Iran–Iraq War Timeline,’ 6. 115. ‘Chera jang edameh yaft?’ Jamaran. 116. Fardi, ‘Eshghal-e Kuwait tavassot-e Iraq; mohemtarin sanad-e haqaniat-e Iran.’ 117. Ibid. 118. Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imam, Vol. 16, 390–91. 119  Ibid., 392–93. 120. ‘Bavarha-ye Assassi-ye Pasdaran dar Defa-e Moqaddas,’ Defa-e Moqaddas.’ 121. Mohammad Hassan Mohaqqeqi, Asrar-e maktum – Nagofteha-ye defa-e hasht saleh az zaban-e masulan-e keshvari va lashkari-e doran-e jang, 316. 122. Ibid., 315–316. 123. Marc R. DeVore and Armin B. Stähli, ‘Explaining Hezbollah’s Effectiveness: Internal and External Determinants of the Rise of V   iolent Non-State Actors,’ Terrorism and Political Violence, 27:2, 331–357, DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2013.808194, 341. 124. Mohaqqeqi, Asrar-e maktum – Nagofteha-ye defa-e hasht saleh az zaban-e masulan-e keshvari va lashkari-e doran-e jang, 318. 125. The United Nations, as well as several humanitarian groups and reporters for the Associated Press, began to encounter child soldiers

347

NOTES

pp. [209–214]

being held as prisoners of war in Iraq in 1982. Subsequent articles ran in newspapers well into 1984. 126. Author interview with Iranian diplomat, 4 July 2017. 127. For a timeline of the Tanker War, see Ronald O’Rourke, ‘The Tanker War,’ Proceedings, May 1988, Vol. 114/5/1,023, https://www.usni. org/magazines/proceedings/1988/may/tanker-war 128. Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq War, 221; Robin Wright, ‘Iran Still Haunted and Influenced by Chemical Weapons Attacks,’ Time, 20 January 2014, http://world.time.com/2014/01/20/iran-still-haunted-andinfluenced-by-chemical-weapons-attacks/ 129. Pelletiere, The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum, 76; Razoux, The Iran– IraqWar, 412. 130. Spencer C. Tucker, The Roots and Consequences of 20th-Century Warfare: Conflicts that Shaped the Modern World (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC CLIO, 2016), 462. 131. Ali Khamenei, ‘Bayanat dar didar-e nokhbegan-e javan-e elmi,’ Khamenei. ir, 18 October 2017, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speech-content?id=37949 132. Souresrafil, The Iran–Iraq War, 63. 133. ‘Chemical Attack Charged by Iran,’ The New York Times, 14 March 1984. 134. Khomeini, Sahifeh-ye Imam, Vol. 18, 285. 135. The Middle East and North Africa: 2004 (London: Taylor and Francis Group, 2004) 369. 136. Souresrafil, The Iran–Iraq W   ar, 64. 137. Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq W   ar, 259. 138. Souresrafil, The Iran–Iraq War, 67–68. 139. Charles Kurzman, ‘Death Tolls of the Iran–Iraq War,’ 31 October 2013, http://kurzman.unc.edu/death-tolls-of-the-iran-iraq-war/ 140. Souresrafil, The Iran–Iraq War, 68. 141. Joyner, The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy, 104. 142. Souresrafil, The Iran–Iraq War, 69. 143. Ibid., 71. 144. Ibid., 74. 145. Author interviews in Iran, 2009–14. 146. Robert Pear, ‘Iran Action Linked to Anti War Mood,’ The New York Times, 22 July 1988. 147. Ward, Immortal, 296. 148. Author interviews with senior Iranian officials, Tehran, New York, Berlin, Vienna, 2013–17; United Nations General Assembly Sideline Meeting with Hassan Rouhani, New York, N.Y., 27 October 2015. 149. Woods and Murray, The Iran–Iraq War, 197. 150. Pelletiere, The Iran–Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum, 79.

348

pp. [214–219]

Notes

151. Rachel Schmidt, Global Arms Exports to Iraq, 1960–1990 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1991), 10. 152. Bob Woodward, ‘CIA Aiding Iraq in Gulf War,’ The Washington Post, 15 December 1986. 153. Iran’s aggression in Lebanon angered France, which was on the opposite side of the conflict. 154. ‘Iran–Iraq: Negotiating an End to the War [redacted],’ Central Intelligence Agency, May 1988, v. 155. Ibid., 5. 156. A declassified 1984 CIA memo suggests that China and North Korea were Iran’s main partners—more likely is what the memo lists as secondary but important: Syria and Libya. ‘Iran–Iraq: Buying Weapons for War,’ Central Intelligence Agency, 1984. 157. Mohaqqeqi, Asrar-e maktum – Nagofteha-ye defa-e hasht saleh az zaban-e masulan-e keshvari va lashkari-e doran-e jang, 157. 158. Mohammad Doroudian, ‘Taasirat-e moteqabel-e tahavolat-e strategic-e jang-e Iran va Iraq dar mavazeh-e rahbordi-ye Imam Khomeini; Qesmat-e dovom,’ Defa-e Moqaddas, 3 June 2016, http://defamoghaddas.ir/fa/ node/9203 159. Mohaqqeqi, Asrar-e maktum – Nagofteha-ye defa-e hasht saleh az zaban-e masulan-e keshvari va lashkari-e doran-e jang, 157. 160. Ibid. 161. Ibid. 162. Mohammad Doroudian, ‘Taasirat-e moteqabel-e tahavolat-e strategic-e jang-e Iran va Iraq dar mavazeh-e rahbordi-ye Imam Khomeini; Qesmat-e dovom.’ 163. Ibid. 164. Ibid. 165. Ibid. 166 Ibid. 167. Bethany Lacina and Nils Petter Gleditsch, ‘Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths,’ European Journal of Population, Vol. 21, No. 2 (June 2005), 145–166, doi:10.1007/s10680-005-6851-6. 168. Author interview with Iranian diplomat, phone, 4 July 2017. 169. James J. Walsh, ‘Iran and Iraq,’ in Gawdat Baghat et al., Security and Bilateral Issues Between Iran and Its Arab Neighbours, 88. 170. Walsh, ‘Iran and Iraq,’ 88. 171. Kennington et al., ‘Iran–Iraq War Timeline,’ 3. 172. ‘Amnesty Reports Wave of Executions in Iran,’ The New York Times, 13 December 1988. 173. Ibid.

349

NOTES

pp. [219–230]

174. For communications between key regime officials on the matter of the executions, including those by Khomeini, see Hossein Ali Montazeri, Khaterat, Vol. 1, https://amontazeri.com/static/books/Khaterat.pdf, 620–625. Montazeri’s son publicized the recordings of the proceedings on the mass executions, which had deeply troubled his father, after his death in 2009. Although the Grand Ayatollah’s website later removed the recordings, they can be accessed at the following URL, created by BBC Persian: https://soundcloud.com/bbcpersian/1367a 175. Walsh, ‘Iran and Iraq,’ 88. 176. ‘Iran: The Struggle to Define and Control Foreign Policy [redacted],’ Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence, iii. 177. Ibid., iv. 178. UN Security Council Resolution 598 (1987), ‘Iraq–Islamic Republic of Iran,’ http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/598 179. Ward, Immortal, 296. 180. Mohaqqeqi, Asrar-e maktum – Nagofteha-ye defa-e hasht saleh az zaban-e masulan-e keshvari va lashkari-e doran-e jang, 157. 181. Ibid., 157. Ibid., 300. 182. ‘Gozaresh | Aya Imam Khomeini movafeq-e edgham-e Artesh o Sepah bud?’ Tasnim, 17 September 2019, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/ - - - - news/1398/06/26/2098031/ - - 183. Ibid. 184. Ibid. 185. Ibid. 186. Michael Connell, ‘Iranian Operational Decision Making – Case Studies from the Iran–Iraq War,’ Center for Naval Analyses, 2013, https:// www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/COP-2013-U-005291-Final.pdf, 36–39. 6.  THE REVOLUTION MATURES (1988–2001) 1. Author interview with Iranian diplomat, phone, 4 July 2017. 2. Author interviews with Iranian officials and academics, Tehran, New York, Berlin, Abu Dhabi, 2014–17. 3. Author interview with Iranian diplomat, phone, 4 July 2017. 4. David Menashri, ‘Khomeini’s Vision: Nationalism or World order?’ in David Menashri, The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), 43. 5. Walt, Revolution and War, 8. 6. Menashri, ‘Khomeini’s Vision: Nationalism or World order?’, 48. 7. Ibid., 51.

350

pp. [230–235]

Notes

8. Ibid., 51. 9. Author interview with Iranian diplomat, phone, 4 July 2017. 10. Ibid. 11. Robert Pear, ‘Man in the News; Iran’s New Supreme Leader; Ali Khamenei,’ The New York Times, 5 June 1989; See Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Bazsazi o Sazandegi (Tehran: Daftat-e Nashr-e Maaref-e Enqelab-e Eslami, 2019). 12. Arjomand, After Khomeini (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 36. 13. Hossein Bastani, ‘Nagofteha-ye video-ye efshashodeh az entekhabat-e Ayatollah Khamenei be rahbari,’ BBC Persian, 10 January 2018, http:// www.bbc.com/persian/iran-features-42630586; See Rafsanjani, Bazsazi o Sazandegi. 14. Hossein Bastani, ‘Nagofteha-ye video-ye efshashodeh az entekhabat-e Ayatollah Khamenei be rahbari,’ BBC Persian. 15. See Rafsanjani, Bazsazi o Sazandegi. 16. Byman and Pollack, ‘Beyond Great Forces – How Leaders Still Shape History.’ 17. Rafsanjani, Bazsazi o Sazandegi. 18 Ibid. 19. Khamenei’s most adamant supporters did begin to call him Imam Khamenei later. Arjomand, After Khomeini, 36. 20. Reuters, ‘Rafsanjani Declared Iran Election Winner,’ The New York Times, 30 July 1989. 21. Daniel Brumberg,  Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2001), 153. 22. Ibid., 37, 153. 23. Arjomand, After Khomeini, 36. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini, 37. 27. ‘Goftogoo ba Sarlashkar Qassem Soleimani: Jang-e 33 ruze motevaqef nemishod,regime Sehyonist-I motelashi mishod,’Tasnim,1 October 2019, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1398/07/09/2109382/ - - - 33- - 28. Stephen Kinzer, ‘Moderate Leader Is Elected in Iran By A Wide Margin,’ The New York Times, 25 May 1997. 29. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, ‘ISIS Issue Brief: Iran Building Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities: International Transparency Needed,’ Institute for Science and International Security, 12 December 2002, https://www.isis-online.org/publications/iran/iranimages.html

351

NOTES

pp. [235–242]

30. Author interview with Akbar Etemad, phone, 6 October 2014. 31. Author interviews with US and Iranian officials, Washington, D.C., Tehran, New York, Berlin, Lausanne, Vienna, 2014–17; author interviews in Iran, 2009–14; author interviews with dissidents, phone, 2013–14. 32. Author interview with Akbar Etemad, phone, October 6, 2014. 33. James Dobbins, ‘How to Talk to Iran,’ The Washington Post, 22 July 2007,  http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 2007/07/20/AR2007072002056.html; author interviews with US and Iranian officials, Washington, D.C., Tehran, New York, Berlin, Lausanne, Vienna, 2014–17. 34. Dobbins, ‘How to Talk to Iran.’ 35. Author interviews in Iran, 2006–14. 36. Arjomand, After Khomeini, 59; Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic, 26. 37. Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army, 140–141. 38. Pinkley, Guarding History, 48. 39. Ibid. 40. Frederic Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), xi–xv. 41. Ibid. 42. Ibid. 43. Pinkley, Guarding History, 48. 44. Schahgaldian, The Iranian Military Under the Islamic Republic, 26–27. 45. Iranian Naval Forces – A Tale of Two Navies (Washington, D.C.: Office of Naval Intelligence, 2017), https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/ Intel%20agencies/iran/Iran%20022217SP.pdf, 10. 46. Iranian Naval Forces – A Tale of Two Navies, 10. 47. Author interviews with Iranian officials, Tehran, New York, Berlin, Lausanne, Geneva, Vienna, 2013–17. 48. Cordesman, Iran’s Military Forces in Transition, 135. 49. Ibid. 50. Alireza Nader, ‘The Revolutionary Guards,’ The Iran Primer, The United States Institute of Peace, http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/ revolutionary-guards; author interviews in Iran, 2009. 51. Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran, 46. 52. Arjomand, After Khomeini, 59. 53. ‘Fact Sheet: Designation of Iranian Entities and Individuals for Proliferation Activities and Support for Terrorism,’ US Department of Treasury, October 25, 2007, https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/ press-releases/Pages/hp644.aspx

352

pp. [242–250]

Notes

54. Pollack, The Persian Puzzle, 198. 55. Magnus Ranstorp, ‘The Hezbollah Training Camps of Lebanon,’ in James J.F. Forest, The Making of a Terrorist,Volume II: Training (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2006), 244. 56. Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2019), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/ pdf/R/R44017/60, 17. 57. ‘Special Series: Iranian Intelligence and Regime Preservation,’ Stratfor. 58. Ibid. 59. Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam, 145. 60. ‘Speech from February 2013,’ Ali Akbari Mozdabadi, Hajj Qassem (Tehran,Ya Zahra Publishers, 2014), 137. 61. Wehrey et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran, 56. 62. ‘Artesh va Sepah behtarin sath-e ta’aamol ra darand,’ Jam-e Jam Online, 18 April 2018, http://jamejamonline.ir/online/3259360005120634680/ - - - -63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65. Kenneth Katzman, Iran, Gulf Security, and US Policy (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2015), https://www.everycrsreport. com/files/20150814_RL32048_a21c0d06d64cf8ef4051127ce 0819313ad691b54.pdf, 25; Iranian Naval Forces – A Tale of  Two Navies, 11. 66. Iranian Naval Forces – A Tale of  Two Navies, 11. 67. Katzman, Iran, Gulf Security, and US Policy, 25. 68. ‘Special Series: Iranian Intelligence and Regime Preservation,’ Stratfor, June 20, 2010, https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/special-seriesiranian-intelligence-and-regime-preservation; Sepehr Zabih, The Iranian Military in Revolution and War (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, 2011), 148. 69. ‘Majara-ye gofteh nashodeh az bombaran-e mavaze’-e DAESH tavasot-e jangadeha-ye Artesh,’ Tasnim News. 70. Ibid. 71. Rory Jones et al., ‘Trump Says Downing of US Drone May Have Been Unintentional,’ The Wall Street Journal, 20 June 2019, https://www.wsj. com/articles/iran-says-it-shot-down-a-u-s-drone-11561005235 72. ‘Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile,’ The Federal Research Division of Congress, December 2012, https://fas.org/irp/ world/iran/mois-loc.pdf, 8. 73. Ibid., 8. 74. Ibid., 9. 75. Author interview with former Iranian intelligence official, Abu Dhabi, November 2016.

353

NOTES

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76. Ibid. 77. ‘Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security: A Profile,’ The Federal Research Division of Congress, 13. 78. Carl Anthony Wege, ‘Iran’s Intelligence Establishment,’ Intelligencer: Journal of US Intelligence Studies, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Spring/Summer 2015), 63-67, 65. 79. Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam, 145. 80. ‘Supreme National Security Council of Iran,’ The Iran Primer, The United States Institute of Peace, 1 April 2019, https://iranprimer.usip. org/blog/2019/apr/01/supreme-national-security-council-iran 81. For a detailed discussion of the SNSC, see Kevjn Lim, ‘National Security Decision-Making in Iran,’ Comparative Strategy, 34:2, 2015, 149–168, DOI: 10.1080/01495933.2015.1017347. 82. Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam, 145. 83. Najmeh Bozorgmehr, ‘Iran Cracks Down on Revolutionary Guards Business Network,’ The Financial Times, 13 September 2017, https://www. ft.com/content/43de1388-9857-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b; Thomas Erdbrink, ‘Iran Saps Strength of Revolutionary Guards with Arrests and Cutbacks,’ The New York Times, 21 October 2017, https://www.nytimes. com/2017/10/21/world/middleeast/iran-revolutionary-guards.html; Asa Fitch and Aresu Eqbali, ‘Re-Elected Iran Moderate Rouhani Faces Entrenched Interests,’ The Wall Street Journal, 21 May 2017, https://www. wsj.com/articles/re-elected-iran-moderate-rouhani-faces-entrenchedinterests-1495388811; Donald Trump, ‘Statement from the President on the Designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps As A Foreign Terrorist Organization,’ White House, 8 April 2019, https://www. whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-designationislamic-revolutionary-guard-corps-foreign-terrorist-organization/ 7.  THE REVOLUTION EXPANDS 1. Linda Robinson et al., Modern PoliticalWarfare, 126. 2. Mark Tran, ‘Iran’s Reformist President Set for Re-Election,’ The Guardian, 5 June 2001, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/jun/06/iran 3. For accounts of Iranian missile strikes against Kurdish and MeK positions, see: Amin Tarzi and Darby Parliament, ‘Missile Messages: Iran Strikes MKO Bases in Iraq,’ The Nonproliferation Review, Summer 2001, 125–133, https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/ npr/82tarzi.pdf; Paul Iddon, ‘Iran Bombarded Iraq Throughout the 1990s,’ War Is Boring, 23 July 2018, https://warisboring.com/iranbombarded-iraq-throughout-the-1990s/.

354

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Notes

4. Steven R. Ward, ‘The Continuing Evolution of Iran’s Military Doctrine,’ Middle East Journal, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Autumn 2005), 559–576, DOI:https://doi.org/10.3751/59.4.12, 563. 5. Ali Soufan, ‘Qassem Soleimani and Iran’s Unique Regional Strategy,’ CTC Sentinel, Vol. 11, Issue 10 (November 2018), https://ctc.usma. edu/app/uploads/2018/11/CTC-SENTINEL-112018.pdf, 1. 6. ‘Ahmadinejad speaks; outrage and controversy flow,’  CNN, 24 September 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/09/24/us.iran/; ‘Ezharat-e Ahmadinejad darbare-ye regime-e Sahionist-i, khashme hamian-e Sahionism ra barangikht,’ Fars News, 27 October 2005, http://www.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=8408040372 7. Author interviews with members of the Karroubi and Moussavi campaigns, Tehran, May–July 2009. 8. Author interviews with former MOIS and other Iranian officials, Tehran, Abu Dhabi, Berlin, 2016–17; ‘Iran’s Ministry of  Intelligence and Security: A Profile,’ The Federal Research Division of Congress, 16. 9. Author interviews with former MOIS and other Iranian officials, Tehran, Abu Dhabi, Berlin, 2016–17; ‘Iran’s Ministry of  Intelligence and Security: A Profile,’ The Federal Research Division of Congress, 31. 10. Wendy Sherman, Not for the Faint of Heart (New York, N.Y.: Hachette Brook Group, 2018), 33–34; author interviews with US and EU officials, Paris, London, Washington, D.C., Vienna, 2013–15. 11. Sherman, Not for the Faint of Heart, 33–34; William J. Burns, The Back Channel (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 2019), 355–376; author interviews with US and EU officials, Paris, London, Washington, D.C., Vienna, 2013–15. 12. Author interviews in Iran, 2014. 13. Author interviews with Iranian Foreign Ministry officials, Tehran, Berlin, New York, 2014–17. 14. For a detailed account of the US efforts to create such a coalition, see Richard Nephew, The Art of Sanctions. 15. Author interviews with Iranian officials and businesses in Tehran, June 2014. 16. Author interviews with the Iranian nuclear negotiators, Geneva, Lausanne, Vienna, and New York, 2014–16. 17. Zarif had to respond in majles to critics attempting to delegitimize the JCPOA by linking it to Turkmenchay, one of the country’s most devastating and humiliating defeats. See ‘Dar pasokh be soal-e Adyani, Zarif: Chera eftekharat-e melli ra be nam-e ‘Turkmenchay’ minamid?’ ISNA, 28 January 2019, https://www.isna.ir/news/97110804133/ . A member of the

355

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Iranian negotiating team, later Iran’s ambassador to the United Kingdom, Hamid Baeidinejad, published a volume responding to critics by explaining and defending the deal’s provisions in a series of questions and answers, titled Gam be gam ba BARJAM – az aghaz ta farjam (Tehran: Nashr-e mokhatab, 2015). 18. Author interviews with US, European, Gulf Arab, and Iranian officials and businesses in Abu Dhabi, Berlin, Doha, Dubai, Kuwait City, Muscat, New York, and Washington, D.C., 2015–17; Jay Solomon and Carol E. Lee, ‘White House Intervened to Toughen Letter on Iran Nuclear Deal,’ The Wall Street Journal, 25 April 2017, https:// www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-intervened-to-toughen-letteron-iran-nuclear-deal-1493151632; ‘Transcript: Donald Trump at the G.O.P. Convention,’ The New York Times, 22 July 2016, https:// www.nytimes.com/2016/07/22/us/politics/trump-transcript-rncaddress.html 19. Ali Sodayi, ‘FATF va Capitulation; rasti azmayi-e tashbih-e Imam Jomehye Tehran,’ BBC Persian, 10 November 2018, http://www.bbc.com/ persian/iran-features-46137266. 20. Nasser Karimi and Jon Gambrell, ‘Iran president’s Cabinet Cuts Guard From Defense Ministry,’ The  Washington Post, 8 August 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iranspresident-proposes-same-cabinet-for-his-second-term/2017/08/08/ d2ed0c3e-7c12-11e7-b2b1-aeba62854dfa_story.html?utm_term=. d9874d976687 21. Erin Cunningham and Brian Murphy, ‘Working-Class Anger in Iran Shows Government’s Vulnerability,’ The Washington Post, 3 January 2018,  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/iransleaders-showcase-pro-regime-rallies-to-counter-street-unrest/ 2018/01/03/9b0ec3dc-1341-431c-ba11-db5ba32964ca_story.html 22. Cunningham and Murphy, ‘Working-Class Anger in Iran Shows Government’s Vulnerability.’ 23. Author interviews, Tehran, 2014; author interviews with Iranian officials, New York, N.Y., Vienna, Berlin, 2014–17. 24. For example, see ‘Rahbari goftand moshakha be gheyr-e nezamian nakhorad,’ Alef, 22 November 2018, https://www.alef.ir/ news/3970901009.html?show=text 25. ‘Hozur-e Hashd al-Shaabi dar Iran; khalaf-e qanun-e assassin ya neshaneh-ye hamdeli-e do mellat,’ Fars News, 23 April 2019, https:// www.farsnews.com/news/13980201000301/ - - - - ; ‘Film | Sarlashkar Baqeri:

356

pp. [260–263]

Notes

Inke gofte mishavad az Iran mooshak be Yemen haml mishavad dorugh ast,’ Donya-ye Eqtesad, 1 October 2019, https://donya-e-eqtesad.com/ - - - - - - - - - - - - -3577869/6226. ‘Hozur-e Hashd al-Shaabi dar Iran; khalaf-e qanun-e assassin ya neshaneh-ye hamdeli-e do mellat,’ Fars News. 27. Stanley McChrystal, ‘Iran’s Deadly Puppet Master,’ Foreign Policy, https://foreignpolicy.com/gt-essay/irans-deadly-puppet-masterqassem-suleimani/ 28. ‘Film-e jaded az hozur-e sardar Soleimani dar khatt-e moqadam-e jang ba Da’esh,’ Tasnim News, 1 December 2017, https://www.tasnimnews. com/fa/news/1396/09/10/1588660/ - - - - - - 29. Mozdabadi, Hajj Qassem, 9. 30. McChrystal, ‘Iran’s Deadly Puppet Master.’ 31. Ayatollah Khamenei, ‘Bayaniat dar Didar-e Khanevadeh-haye Shohadaye Haftom-e Tir va Jam’ee az Khanevadeh-haye Shohada-ye Modafe’e Haram,’ Khamenei.ir, 25 June 2016, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/speechcontent?id=33600 32. Ayatollah Khamenei, ‘Bayaniat dar Didar-e Khanevadeh-haye Shohadaye Haftom-e Tir va Jam’ee az Khanevadeh-haye Shohada-ye Modafe’e Haram.’ 33. Sune Engel Rasmussen, ‘Iran General’s Profile Rises as Tehran Flexes Mideast Muscle,’ The Wall Street Journal, 20 February 2018, https:// www.wsj.com/articles/iran-generals-profile-rises-as-tehran-flexesmideast-muscle-1519128000 34. McChrystal, ‘Iran’s Deadly Puppet Master.’ 35. Ibid. 36. Ali Akbari Mozdabadi, Hajj Qassem, 11. 37. Ibid., 139. 38. See Javad Zarif and Kazem Sajjadpour, Diplomacy-e chandjanebeh (Tehran: Markaz-e amouzesh o pazhouheshha-ye beynolmellali, 2012); Mohammad Javad Zarif, ‘Tackling the Iran–US Crisis: The Need for A Paradigm Shift,’ Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Spring/ Summer 2007), 73–94; Robin Wright, ‘The Adversary,’ The New  Yorker, 26 May 2014, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/26/ the-adversary-2 39. Zarif and Sajjadpour, Diplomacy-e chandjanebeh; author interviews with American and European diplomats and negotiators, Brussels, Vienna, Washington, D.C., 2014–16.

357

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40. Wright, ‘The Adversary,’ The New  Yorker. 41. Ibid. 42. Author interviews with Gulf Arab, Israeli, and US officials,Washington, D.C., Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Doha, Kuwait City, Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, 2016–19. 43. Author interviews with Iranian diplomats, Tehran, New York, Vienna, Geneva, and Berlin, 2014–17. 44. Author interviews with senior Iranian diplomats, Berlin, Geneva, and Vienna, 2015–16. 45. Author interview with Javad Zarif, Berlin, 26 June 2017. 46. Author interviews with senior Iranian diplomats, Berlin, Geneva, and Vienna, 2015–16. 47. McChrystal, ‘Iran’s Deadly Puppet Master.’ 48. Author interviews with Iranian officials, Berlin, Lausanne, Geneva, and Vienna, 2014–17. 49. Author interviews with US and Iranian officials, Washington, D.C., Berlin, phone, July–September 2017. 50. ‘Sardar Soleimani: Imam-e jamaat bayad ba hijab va bihijab ra ba ba ham jazb konad,’ Donya-ye Eqtesad, 23 July 2017, http://donya-e-eqtesad. com/ - - - - - - -3249871/6251. Author interviews with Iranian diplomats, Tehran, New York, Vienna, Geneva, Berlin, 2014–17. 52. Ruth Sherlock, ‘Iran Boosts Support to Syria,’ The Telegraph, 21 February 2014, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/ iran/10654144/Iran-boosts-support-to-Syria.html 53. ‘Emruz niyaz darim dobareh haman formule-eh jang ra piyadeh konim,’ Markaz-e asnad o tahqiqat-e defa-e moqaddas, 28 January 2019, http:// defamoghaddas.ir/fa/news/ - - - - - #top 54. Michael Connell, ‘Iran’s Military Doctrine,’ The United States Institute of Peace Iran Primer, https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/iransmilitary-doctrine 55. Connell, ‘Iran’s Military Doctrine’; author interviews with Iranian officials, Tehran 2014. 56. Erik A. Olson, ‘Iran’s Path Dependent Military Doctrine,’ Strategic Studies Quarterly, Vol. 10, Issue 2 (Summer 2016), 63–93, 63. 57. Connell, ‘Iran’s Military Doctrine’; author interviews with Iranian officials, Tehran 2014. 58. ‘Mossahebe-ye ekhtessassi ba Dr. Mohammad Javad Zarif,’ 14–15.

358

pp. [267–270]

Notes

59. ‘Amir Pourdastan: Ba chehreh-i az tahdid be nam-e ‘jang-e tarkibi’ roo be roo hastim,’  Tasnim, 11 September 2017, https://www.tasnimnews. com/fa/news/1396/06/20/1515412/ - - - - - 60. Ibid. 61. ‘Bahman-e tamashaee-ye 97 | Amir Pourdastan: America ba rahbord-e jadid-e “jang-e tarkibi” mobarezeh alayh-e Iran ra aghaz karde ast,’ Tasnim, 11 February 2019, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/ news/1397/11/22/1944847/ - - - - - - - - -9762. Ibid. 63. ‘Sardar Jalali: Jang-e tarkibi-e panj layeh-ye America ra mahar kardim / be donbal-e peymanha-ye defae Cyber-I hastim,’ ISNA, 29 October - - 2019, https://www.isna.ir/news/98080703296/ - - - 64. Ibid. 65. Ibid. 66. Morteza Golpour, ‘Vazir-e defa’ az ma’muriyat-e maqam-e moazam-e rahbari be setad-e koll-e niruha-ye mossalah khabar dad,’ Iran, 20 January 2018, http://www.iran-newspaper.com/newspaper/item/454808 67. ‘Ahadi az Sepah va farmandehan-e Sepah Haq-e dekhalat-e siasi va jenahi dar entekhabat nadarad,’ Tasnim, 7 March, 2017, https://www. - - tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1395/12/17/1348445/ -- - -- 68. Ostovar, Vanguard of the Imam, 146. 69. Ayatollah Khamenei, ‘Statement in Imam Reza’s Shrine,’ Khamenei.ir, 20 March 2014, http://farsi.khamenei.ir/news-content?id=32687 70. A correspondent in Tehran, ‘Billion dollar smuggling industry drains Iran’s economy,’ Al-Monitor, 13 February 2015, http://www.almonitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/iran-smuggling-trafficing. html 71. As much as 75 percent of smuggling reportedly occurs through official channels, and the IRGC is the only domestic organization which controls enough ports of entry, including Payam International Airport, to facilitate that degree (as much as $12 billion) of contraband. Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, ‘Illegal Trade in the Iranian Economy: Evidence from a structural model,’ European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 5, No. 4 (Dec. 2009), 489–507; Frederic Wehrey, et al., The Rise of the Pasdaran (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2009). 72. Mahtab Alam Rizvi, ‘Evaluating the Political and Economic Role of the IRGC,’ Strategic Analysis, Vol. 36, No. 4 (2012), 584–596.

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73. Michael Connell, ‘Iran’s Military Doctrine,’ The Iran Primer, http:// iranprimer.usip.org/resource/irans-military-doctrine 74. Wehrey et al., Dangerous But Not Omnipotent, 53. 75. For example, see Col. Joel D. Rayburn and Col. Frank K. Sobchak, The US Army in the Iraq War – Volume I – Invasions, Insurgency, Civil War – 2002–2006 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2019), 22; Col. Joel D. Rayburn and Col. Frank K. Sobchak, The US Army in the Iraq War – Volume II – Surge and Withdrawal – 2007– 2011 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: United States Army War College Press, 2019), 473–477; William J. Burns, The Back Channel, 196–197; Thomas E. Ricks, ‘Who Won the War in Iraq? (Here’s A Big Hint: It Wasn’t the United States),’ Foreign Policy, 29 September 2011, https:// foreignpolicy.com/2011/09/29/who-won-the-war-in-iraq-heres-abig-hint-it-wasnt-the-united-states/ 76. Douglas Jehl, ‘Iran Holds Taliban Responsible for 9 Diplomats’ Deaths,’ The New York Times, 11 September 1998; for a regime-sanctioned Iranian account of the incident, see ‘Dar hamleh-ye shebh-e nezamiyan-e efrati be ‘consul-gari-ye Iran dar Mazar-e Sharif’ che gozasht?’ Bashgah-e khabarnegaran-e javan, 8 August 2016, https://www.yjc.ir/fa/ - - - news/5724664/ - - %E2%80%8C - ; Ali Soufan, ‘Qassem Soleimani and Iran’s Unique Regional Strategy,’ 3. 77. Douglas Jehl, ‘For Death of Its Diplomats, Iran Vows Blood for Blood,’ The New York Times, 12 September 1998; Mohsen Milani, ‘Iran and Afghanistan,’ USIP The Iran Primer, https://iranprimer.usip.org/ resource/iran-and-afghanistan 78. Soufan, ‘Qassem Soleimani and Iran’s Unique Regional Strategy,’ 3. 79. Mohsen Milani, ‘Iran’s Policy Toward Afghanistan,’ The Middle East Journal, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Spring 2006), 235–256, https://www.jstor. org/stable/4330248, 236. 80. Adam Tarock, ‘The Politics of the Pipeline: The Iran and Afghanistan Conflict,’ Third World Quarterly,Vol. 20, No. 4 (1999), 801–820, https:// www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3993589.pdf?refreqid=excelsior% 3Abd9debf7ba6c4284abe4ce5b11566233 81. Alireza Nader et al., Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014), 3. 82. Ossama bin Laden, ‘Letter to Karim,’ Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Bin Laden’s Bookshelf, 2007 (declassified 1 March, 2016), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ubl2016/arabic/ Arabic%20Letter%20to%20Karim.pdf; Joby Warrick, ‘Iran, al-Qaeda Relationship Is Showing Cracks, US Officials and Analysts Say,’ The

360

pp. [273–274]

Notes

Washington Post, 13 March 2013, https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/national-security/iran-al-qaeda-relationship-is-showingcracks-us-officials-and-analysts-say/2013/03/12/f1fdace2-8b3911e2-9838-d62f083ba93f_story.html; Daniel Byman, Al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Global Jihadist Movement – What Everyone Needs to Know, 10–11; Assaf Moghadam, ‘Marriage of Convenience: The Evolution of Iran and al-Qa`ida’s Tactical Cooperation,’ CTC Sentinel, Vol. 10, Issue 4 (April 2017), 12–19, https://ctc.usma.edu/app/ uploads/2017/05/CTC-Sentinel_Vol10Iss41.pdf; Daniel Byman, ‘Unlikely Alliance: Iran’s Secretive Relationship with Al-Qaeda,’ HIS Defense, Risk and Security Consulting, July 2012, https://www. brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/iran-al-qaeda-byman. pdf; Nelly Lahoud, ‘Al-Qa’ida’s Contested Relationship with Iran – The View from Abbottabad,’ New America, 20 August 2018, https:// s3.amazonaws.com/newamericadotorg/documents/Al-Qaidas_ Contested_Relationship_with_Iran_2018-08-20_151707.pdf 83. Author interview with Iranian Foreign Ministry official, email, 22 August 2016. 84. Gary Sick, ‘Iran: Confronting Terrorism,’ The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, Issue 4 (2003), 83–98, DOI:10.1162/016366003322387127, 90. 85. Alireza Nader et al., Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan, 3. 86. Author interview with Iranian Foreign Ministry official, 4 July 2017, phone; Soufan, ‘Qassem Soleimani and Iran’s Unique Regional Strategy,’ 3. 87. James Dobbins, ‘How to Talk to Iran,’ The Washington Post, 22 July 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/ 07/20/AR2007072002056.html 88. C. Christine Fair, ‘When It Comes to Afghanistan, America Should Ditch Pakistan for Iran,’ The National Interest, 7 September 2015, https:// nationalinterest.org/feature/when-it-comes-afghanistan-americashould-ditch-pakistan-iran-13788 89. Alireza Nader et al., Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan, 10; Soufan, ‘Qassem Soleimani and Iran’s Unique Regional Strategy,’ 3. 90. Zalmay Khalilzad, The Envoy: From Kabul to the While House, My Journey Through A Turbulent World (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press, 2016), 164–165. 91. Ibid., 164–165. 92. Michael R. Gordon, ‘US Conferred with Iran Before Iraq Invasion, Book Says,’ The New York Times, 6 March 2016, https://www.nytimes. com/2016/03/07/world/middleeast/us-conferred-with-iran-beforeiraq-invasion-book-says.html

361

NOTES

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93. George W. Bush, Decision Points (New York, N.Y.: Crown Publishers, 2010), 417. 94. Khalilzad, The Envoy, 165. 95. Ibid., 275. 96. Milani, ‘Iran and Afghanistan.’ 97. Nader et al., Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan, 7. 98. Ibid., 15. 99. Author interviews with senior Iranian officials, Tehran, New York, N.Y., Berlin, 2014–17. 100. Author interviews with US military personnel, Washington, D.C., October 2019. 101. Nader et al., Iran’s Influence in Afghanistan, 3. 102. Ibid., 3, 15. 103. Richard R. Brennan Jr. et al., Ending the US War in Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 127. 104. Brennan Jr. et al., Ending the US War in Iraq, 127. 105. Author interviews with Iranian officials, Tehran and Berlin, 2014–16. 106. Brennan Jr. et al., Ending the US War in Iraq, 127. 107. Alireza Nader, Iran’s Role in Iraq: Room For Cooperation? (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 2; Soufan, ‘Qassem Soleimani and Iran’s Unique Regional Strategy,’ 3. 108. Brennan Jr. et al., Ending the US War in Iraq, xxiv. 109. ‘Exclusive: Iran Intervenes to Prevent Ousting of Iraqi Prime Minister – Sources,’ Reuters, 31 October 2019, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-iraq-protests-iran-exclusive/exclusive-iran-intervenes-toprevent-ousting-of-iraqi-prime-minister-sources-idUSKBN1XA2DI; Alissa J. Rubin,‘Iraqis Rise Against A Reviled Occupier: Iran,’ The New York Times, 4 November 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/ world/middleeast/iraq-protests-iran.html; Michael Georgy and Ahmed Rasheed, ‘Iranian Commander Issued Stark Warning to Iraqi Kurds Over Kirkuk,’ Reuters, 20 October 2017, https://www.reuters. com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kirkuk-fall/iranian-commanderissued-stark-warning-to-iraqi-kurds-over-kirkuk-idUSKBN1CP2CW; Raya Jalabi, ‘Iran Seen As Winner After Iraq’s Kurds Lose Referendum Gamble,’ Reuters, 31 October 2017, https://www.reuters.com/ article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq-kurds-politics/iran-seen-as-winnerafter-iraqs-kurds-lose-referendum-gamble-idUSKBN1D01XQ 110. As of the time of writing (2019). 111. Soufan, ‘Qassem Soleimani and Iran’s Unique Regional Strategy,’ 3. 112. ‘Agar Iran dar bohran-e Suriyeh sokut mikard… Pasokh be muntaqedani ke amniat-e anha madyoun-e rashadat-haye mudafean-e haram ast,’

362

pp. [277–280]

Notes

Mashreq News, 21 November 2016, https://www.mashreghnews.ir/ - - - - news/653008/ - . 113. Simon Tisdall, ‘Iran Helping Syrian Regime Crack Down On Protestors, Say Diplomats,’ The Guardian, 8 May 2011, https://www.theguardian. com/world/2011/may/08/iran-helping-syrian-regime-protestors 114. Rick Gladstone and Anne Barnard, ‘US Accuses Hezbollah of Aiding Syria’s Crackdown,’ The New York Times, 10 August 2012, https:// www.nytimes.com/2012/08/11/world/middleeast/us-officials-sayhezbollah-helps-syrias-military.html; Thom Shanker and Damien Cave, ‘Syrian Rebels Said to Be Holding Elite Fighters from Iran,’ The New York Times, 15 August, 2012, https://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/16/ world/middleeast/iran-revolutionary-guards-among-syrian-hostagesus-says.html; Ian Black, ‘Iran Confirms It has Forces in Syria and Will Take Military Action if Pushed,’ The Guardian, 16 September 2012, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/sep/16/iran-middleeast 115. Author interviews in Tehran, 2014. 116. Ibid. 117. Dmitri Trenin, ‘Russia and Iran: Historical Mistrust and Contemporary Partnership,’ Carnegie Endowment for Peace Moscow Center, 18 August 2016, http://carnegie.ru/2016/08/18/russia-and-iranhistoric-mistrust-and-contemporary-partnership-pub-64365; author interviews with senior European military officials, Brussels, August 2016. 118. Author interviews with senior European military officials, Brussels, August 2016; ‘Presence of Russian jets in Iran not in violation of Constitution: MP,’ Tasnim News, 21 August 2016, https://www. tasnimnews.com/en/news/2016/08/21/1163671/presence-ofrussian-jets-in-iran-not-in-violation-of-constitution-mp; ‘Sardar Dehqan dar nameh-ee be Larijani: Sha’n o jaygah-e Majles baraye mellat-e ma shenakhte shodeh ast,’ Fars News, 23 August 2016, http://www. farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=13950602001072 119. Anne Barnard and Andrew E. Kramer, ‘Iran revokes Russia’s use of air base, saying Moscow “betrayed trust”,’ The New York Times, 22 August 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/world/middleeast/ iran-russia-syria.html; ‘Iran Says Russia Can Use Its Military Bases “On Case By Case Basis”,’ Reuters, 28 March 2017, http://www.reuters. com/article/us-russia-iran-rouhani-base-idUSKBN16Z0NU 120. ‘Amir Pourdastan tashrih kard: Jozeeyat-e hozoor-e Artesh-e Iran dar Iraq va Sooriyeh,’ Fararu, 21 October 2017, https://fararu.com/fa/ -- - . news/333412/

363

NOTES

pp. [280–282]

121. Ibid. 122. Ahmad Shuja Jamal, ‘The Fatemiyoun Army: Reintegration into Afghan Society,’ USIP Special Report No. 443, https://www.usip.org/sites/ default/files/2019-03/sr_443-the_fatemiyoun_army_reintegration_ into_afghan_society-pdf_0.pdf; March 2019, Farnaz Fassihi, ‘Iran Pays Afghans to Fight for Assad,’ The Wall Street Journal, 22 May 2014, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-recruiting-afghan-refugees-tofight-for-regime-in-syria-1400197482; Babak Dehghanpisheh, ‘Iran Recruits Pakistani Shi’ites for Combat in Syria,’ Reuters, 10 December 2015,  https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syriapakistan-iran/iran-recruits-pakistani-shiites-for-combat-in-syriaidUSKBN0TT22S20151210; Soufan, ‘Qassem Soleimani and Iran’s Unique Regional Strategy,’ 4. 123. ‘Amozesh-e tirandazi-e razmandegan-e Fatemiyoun dar Surieh+film,’ Tasnim News, 24 January 2018, https://www.tasnimnews.com/ - fa/news/1396/11/04/1636897/ ; ‘Didar-e Sardar Soleimani ba khanevadeh-ye hashid Tavassoli,’ Press TV, 2 August 2016, https://www.presstv.com/ DetailFr/2016/08/02/478127/qassem-soleimani-iran-syria-alirezatavasoli 124. ‘Abu Hamed: Farmandeh-e jahad-e bedun-e marz,’ Javaan, 9 May 2015, http://www.javanonline.ir/fa/news/717244/ - - . 125. Milani, ‘Iran’s Policy Toward Afghanistan,’ 237–238. 126. ‘Gozaresh | Sardar Qaani; Farmandeh-ye dar Sayeh-ee Ke Beh Maydan Amad / Harekat-e Porshetab Dar Maseer-r Hajj Qassem,’ Tasnim, 4 January 2020, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1398/ 10/14/2174260/ ‫گ زارش‬-‫رسدا ر‬-‫یق اآن‬-‫ف رمان د ه‬-‫در‬-‫هی سا‬-‫یا‬-‫ک ه‬-‫ب ه‬-‫دانیم‬-‫آمد‬-‫رک ت‬

‫ف‬-‫در‬-‫هی سا‬-‫یا‬-‫ک ه‬-‫ب ه‬-‫دانیم‬-‫آمد‬-‫ح رک ت‬-‫پ ر ش تاب‬-‫در‬-‫ریمس‬-‫حاج‬-‫ق ا سم‬.

127. de Gardane, Mission du Général Gardane en Perse sous le Premier Empire, 76. 128. ‘Amozesh-e tirandazi-e razmandegan-e Fatemiyoun dar Surieh+film,’ Tasnim; ‘Didar-e Sardar Soleimani ba khanevadeh-ye hashid Tavassoli,’ Press TV. 129. The cornerstone of Iranian regional policy lies in the country’s non-state allies and partners—whose costs are estimated here: Afshon Ostovar, ‘The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War,’ Security Studies, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2018.150862 130. James F. Dunnigan, How to Make War (NewYork, N.Y.: Harper, 2003), 7. 131. Kurdistan’s president Massoud Barzani noted that ‘Iran was the first country to provide us with weapons and ammunition’ to fight ISIS. Isabel Coles, ‘Iran Supplied Weapons to Iraqi Kurds; Baghdad Bomb Kills 12,’

364

pp. [283–285]

Notes

Reuters, 26 August 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraqsecurity-kurds/iran-supplied-weapons-to-iraqi-kurds-baghdad-bombkills-12-idUSKBN0GQ11P20140826 132. Author interviews with Arab academics and experts, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Doha, Kuwait City, and Muscat, 2014–17. 133. Author interviews with US and NATO officials, Brussels andWashington, D.C., 2015. 134. Carlotta Gall, ‘In Afghanistan, US Exists, and Iran Comes In,’ The New York Times, 5 August 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/05/ world/asia/iran-afghanistan-taliban.html 135. Yochi Dreazen, ‘Exclusive: Iran Teams With Taliban to Fight Islamic State in Afghanistan,’ Foreign Policy, 26 May 2016, https://foreignpolicy. com/2016/05/26/exclusive-iran-teams-with-taliban-to-fight-islamicstate-in-afghanistan/ 136. Amira Jadoon et al., ‘Challenging the ISK Brand in Afghanistan-Pakistan: Rivalries and Divided Loyalties,’ CTC Sentinel, Vol. 11, Issue 4 (April 2918), 23–30, https://ctc.usma.edu/app/uploads/2018/04/CTCSENTINEL-042018-3.pdf, 25. 137. Ben Hubbard, ‘Saudi Arabia Cuts Ties with Iran Amid Fallout from Cleric’s Execution,’ The New York Times, 3 January 2016, https://www. nytimes.com/2016/01/04/world/middleeast/iran-saudi-arabiaexecution-sheikh-nimr.html 138. Author interviews with Javad Zarif, New York, Vienna, Geneva, 2014– 16. 139. Author interviews with senior Iranian diplomat, New York, September 2016. 140. Author interviews with senior Iranian Foreign Ministry official, Berlin, New York, and Vienna, 2014–16; Y   ochi Dreazen, ‘Exclusive: Iran Teams With Taliban to Fight Islamic State in Afghanistan.’ 141. Author interviews with European officials, Paris, London, Berlin, Brussels, Vienna, 2014–16. 142. Author interviews with US officials, Washington, D.C. and Vienna, 2014–16. 143. Author interviews with US and Israeli officials, Washington, D.C., Tel Aviv, 2016–2019; Burns, The Back Channel, 355. 144. Ronen Bergman and Mark Mazzetti, ‘The Secret History of the Push to Strike Iran,’ The New York Times, 6 September 2019, https://www. nytimes.com/2019/09/04/magazine/iran-strike-israel-america.html 145. ‘Rouhani: Bara-ye ejraye khasteh-ye mellat az hich chiz nemiharasam/ barkhi chahar sal-e ghabl ra faramoush kardeh-and,’ ISNA, 22 April 2017,  http://www.isna.ir/news/96020301843/ - -

365

NOTES

pp. [285–287]

- - - - ; ‘Rouhani: BARJAM saye-ye jang, tahdid va tahrim ra az keshvar bardasht,’ Khabar Online, 30 March 2017, http://www.khabaronline.ir/detail/650175/Politics/government; ‘Dar Jam-e Olama, Issargaran va bargozidegan-e ostan-e Semnan,’ Rouhani.ir, 20 March 2016, http://rouhani.ir/event.php?event_id=925 146. ‘Sokhanan-e Raeis-e Jomhoori piramoon-e mozakerat-e hasteh-ei va bayanieh-ye Lausanne,’ Rouhani.ir, 21 March 2015, http://rouhani.ir/ event.php?event_id=853 147. The IRGC-affiliated outlet Tasnim, for example, ran an opinion piece critiquing Rouhani’s comments during the 2017 presidential campaign; Abdollah Abdollahi, ‘Rouhani saye-ye kodam jang ra az keshvar door kard?’ Tasnim, 28 April 2017, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/ - - - - . news/1396/02/08/1391626/ - Likewise, the hardliner newspaper, Kayhan, published similar arguments in that same period, taking aim at the president’s comments, including a piece titled, ‘Do not fool people with the “shadow of war,” respond to the economic disaster.’ ‘Ba saye-ye jang mardom ra farib nadahid/ javabgoo-ye faje’eh-ye eqtesadi bashid,’ Kayhan, 15 May 2017, http:// - kayhan.ir/fa/news/104008/ - 148. Author interview with Javad Zarif, New York, 19 September 2014. 149. ‘Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,’ 14 July 2015, https://www. state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf 150. Donald J. Trump, ‘Remarks by President Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,’ White House, 8 May 2018, https:// www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-presidenttrump-joint-comprehensive-plan-action/ 151. Anthony H. Cordesman, Abdullah Toukan, ‘GCC – Iran: Operational analysis of Air, SAM and TMB forces,’ CSIS, 20 August 2009, https:// www.csis.org/analysis/gcc-iran-operational-analysis-air-sam-andtbm-forces 152. Author interview with Javad Zarif, Berlin, 26 June 2017. 153. Ibid. 154. Javad Zarif, Tweet, 5 March 2018, https://twitter.com/JZarif/ status/970737338874781697 155. Author interviews with Iranian officials, Berlin, Geneva, Lausanne, Vienna, New York, 2014–17. 156. Liz Sly, ‘The UAE’s Ambitions Backfire As It Finds Itself on the Front Line of US–Iran Tensions,’ The Washington Post, 11 August 2019, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/the-uaes-ambitions-backfire-as-

366

pp. [287–288]

Notes

it-finds-itself-on-the-front-line-of-us-iran-tensions/2019/08/11/ d3ee41a0-509d-11e9-bdb7-44f948cc0605_story.html; Matt Spetalnick and Timothy Gardner, ‘Saudi Crown Warns of Escalation with Iran,’ Reuters, 29 September 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-mideast-crisis-saudi/saudi-crown-prince-warns-of-escalation-withiran-says-he-prefers-political-solution-idUSKBN1WE0VA 157. Sly, ‘The UAE’s Ambitions Backfire As It Finds Itself on the Front Line of US–Iran Tensions’; Spetalnick and Gardner, ‘Saudi Crown Warns of Escalation with Iran.’ 158. ‘Matn-e kamel-e khetabeh-ye Hassan Rouhani dar Sazeman-e Mellal-e Mottahed,’ Eghtessad News, 20 September 2017, http://www. eghtesadnews.com/ - - -183848/61- - 159. ‘Tavan-e afzayesh-e bord-e mooshakha-ye Iran vojud darad,’ Fars News, 31 October 2017, http://www.farsnews.com/13960809000633 160. ‘Tavan-e mooshaki, ‘khatt-e qermez-e Iran’/mooshakha-ye Sepah ‘amadeh-ye shelik’ tasaavir,’ Bashgah-e khabarnegaran-e javan, 12 March 2016, https://www.yjc.ir/fa/news/5534780/ - - %E2%80%8C - - 161. ‘Raisi: Mooshak baraye najangidan ast, na jangidan,’ Tasnim, 20 October 2017, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1396/07/ 28/1551302/ - 162. Elaine Sciolino and Special to the New York Times, ‘Documents Detail Israeli Missile Deal with the Shah,’ The New York Times, 1 April 1986, https://www.nytimes.com/1986/04/01/world/documents-detailisraeli-missile-deal-with-the-shah.html. 163. For an illustrative example, see Michael Elleman, ‘Statement of Mr. Michael Elleman, Iran’s Ballistic Missile Program Before the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs.’ 164. Author interviews with Iranian officials, Tehran, New York, Berlin, Lausanne, Geneva, and Vienna, 2014–17; for a detailed assessment of Iran’s missile capabilities, see Michael Elleman and Mark Fitzpatrick, ‘Are Iran’s Ballistic Missiles Designed To Be Nuclear Capable?’ IISS, 28 February 2018, https://www.iiss.org/en/iiss%20voices/ blogsections/iiss-voices-2018-2623/february-704f/assessing-iranballistic-missiles-6cca 165. ‘Bord-e moushak-e Khorramshahr “2000 kilometre” elam shod + vizhegiha-ye moushak,’ Tasnim News, 22 September 2017, https:// - www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1396/06/31/1526472/ - - -2000-

367

NOTES

pp. [289–292]

166. Author interviews with senior US and Gulf Cooperation Council officials,   Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Doha, Kuwait City, Muscat, and Washington, D.C., 2016–18; Catie Edmondson, ‘Senate Votes Again to End Aid to Saudi War in Yemen, Defying Trump,’ The NewYork Times, 13 March 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/13/us/politics/ yemen-saudi-war-senate.html 167. Shuaib Almosawa, Ben Hubbard, and Troy Griggs, ‘“It’s A Slow Death”: The World’s Worst Humanitarian Crisis,’ The New York Times, 23 August 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/23/world/ middleeast/yemen-cholera-humanitarian-crisis.html 168. Clarke and Smyth, ‘The Implications of Iran’s Expanding Shi`a Foreign Fighter Network,’; Soufan, ‘Qassem Soleimani and Iran’s Unique Regional Strategy,’ 6–7. 169. Clarke and Smyth, ‘The Implications of Iran’s Expanding Shi`a Foreign Fighter Network,’ 14. 170. Ostovar, ‘The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War.’ 171. Thaler, Mullahs, Guards, and Bonyads, 5. 172. Erika Solomon, ‘Lebanon’s Hizbollah and Yemen’s Houthis Open Up On Links,’ The Financial Times, 8 May 2015, https://www.ft.com/ content/e1e6f750-f49b-11e4-9a58-00144feab7de#axzz3b0HOY1h4; Soufan, ‘Qassem Soleimani and Iran’s Unique Regional Strategy,’ 6–7. 173. Clarke and Smyth, ‘The Implications of Iran’s Expanding Shi`a Foreign Fighter Network,’ 14. 174. Ibid. 175. Brian Katz, ‘Axis Rising,’ CSIS Brief, October 2018, https://csis-prod. s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/181011_Katz_Axis_ Rising_layout_v3.pdf?_Bbwp3yhVvp6NnRLf1nnCKXNIUHOa7D9, 3. 176. Katz, ‘Axis Rising,’ 2–3; Clarke and Smyth, ‘The Implications of Iran’s Expanding Shi`a Foreign Fighter Network,’ 16. 177. Author interviews with Gulf Arab officials, Abu Dhabi, Doha, Dubai, Kuwait City, 2016–18. 178. David Makovsky and Jeffrey White, Lessons and Implications of the Israel–Hizbullah War – A Preliminary Assessment, Washington, D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, October 2006, https://www. washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyFocus60. pdf, 18. 179. Ali Khamenei, Tweet, 13 August 2019, https://twitter.com/ Khamenei_fa/status/1161288695900712966 180. Saeed Shah, Craig Nelson, Sami Yousafzai, ‘US Faces Newly Muscular Taliban in Peace-Talk Efforts,’ The Wall Street Journal, 5 November 2018,

368

pp. [292–303]

Notes

https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-faces-newly-muscular-taliban-inpeace-talk-efforts-1541413803; ‘Iran Says Taliban Must Have Afghan Role, But Can’t Dominate,’ Reuters, 9 January 2019, https://www. reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-talks-iran/iran-says-taliban-musthave-afghan-role-but-cant-dominate-idUSKCN1P311Z 181. ‘Iran Says Taliban Must Have Afghan Role, But Can’t Dominate,’ Reuters. 182. ‘Gozaresh-e vizheh-ye Tasnim: Taliban, velayat-e “Ferah” va nazdiktarin payegah-e nezami-yeh America be khak-e Iran,’ Tasnim, 7 March 2018, https://www.tasnimnews.com/fa/news/1396/12/16/1667788/ - - - - - 183. Jones, ‘War by Proxy: Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East,’ 5. 184. Soufan, ‘Qassem Soleimani and Iran’s Unique Regional Strategy,’ 1. 185. Author interviews with senior Iranian diplomats and former officials, Tehran, New York, Vienna, and Berlin, 2013–17. CONCLUSION 1. Interview with former British official based in the region, February 2013, Prague. 2. Tabatabai, Maktab-e Tabriz va mabani-ye tajjadod-khahi, 192. 3. Ibid., 193. 4. Ibid., 192. 5. ‘Khabar-e khosh-e hasteh-ee darbareh-ye Reactor-e Arak,’ Tabnak, 29 August 2019, https://www.tabnak.ir/fa/news/920849/ %E2%80%8C 6. Ward, Immortal, 325.

369

INDEX

Note: Page numbers followed by “n” refer to notes. 15 Khorad uprising (1963), 156 anniversary of, 163, 172 65th Airborne Special Forces, 122 Abadan refinery, 88, 109 oil workers’ strike, 108 Abadan, 173, 201 Cinema Rex on fire (20 Aug 1978), 173 Abu Dhabi, 119 Abu Hamed. See Tavassoli, Ali Reza Achaemenids, 11, 162 Afghanistan, 17, 34, 121, 190, 246, 272, 181, 260, 283, 289, 292, 293 ISIS offshoot, 283–4 new constitution, drafting of, 237 new national government, creation of, 274 Persia, invasion of (1722), 49 US, invasions of (2001), 16–7, 21, 237, 238, 254, 255, 266, 271–7 US-Iranian alignment in, 273–4 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 17, 238, 261, 268

presidency, 255–7 Akhondzadeh, Mirza Fathali, 51 al-Dawa, 192 Alexander, Tsar, 28–9 Algeria, 136 Algiers agreement (1975), 194, 195 Al-Qaeda, 237, 273 Amir Kabir, 74, 164 reforms of, 33–4 assassination of, 33, 34 Amiranian Oil Company, 89 Amol, 203 Anglo–Iranian Agreement (1919), 68, 88 Anglo–Iranian Oil Company, 88, 108, 109 Gass–Gulshayan Agreement, 105 Anglo-Persian treaty (1814), 31 Anglo–Persian War (1856–57), 34 ante bellum, 213 anti-discrimination law, 80 anti-imperialism, 155 anti-semitism, 130 anti-terrorism, 259 anti-Western colonialism, 36 Aqaba (port), 214

371

INDEX

Arab invasion of Persia, 55 Arab Spring (2011), 17, 21, 238, 242, 254, 255, 277, 300 Arabian Peninsula, 18, 214 Arabic language, 55 Arak Heavy Water Reactor, 235 redesign of, 285 Armed Forces Logistics, 251 Artesh, 14, 20, 103, 123, 139, 145, 176, 189, 196, 200, 201, 222, 239, 240, 241, 244, 346n95 Air Force operation, 246–7 and IRGC, 222–3, 240, 245–6, 280 Artesh Navy, 245 disadvantage of, 127–8 expansion of, 124–5 rebuilding, 227, 240 Arvand Rud, 193 Aryan connection, 322–3n116 Ashura, 174 Assad regime, 260, 278, 282 chemical weapons, use of, 278, 300 ISIS, support for Assad, 282 al-Assad, Bashar, 18, 255, 277, 290, 292 Assembly of Experts, 232 Associated Press, 347–8n125 Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, 302 Atoms for Peace initiative, 126 Axis coup, 91 Axis of Resistance, 279 Azerbaijan (self-proclaimed government), 100, 103, 104 Azerbaijani Democratic Party, 103 Baathist regime, 192–3 Bábi faith (1844), 52 Badr Brigade, 184

372

Baghdad Pact, 115 Baghdad, 18, 145, 188, 191, 198, 204, 205, 209, 222, 254, 277, 282, 291 missiles attacks on, 211 Riyadh-Baghdad relations, 214 Bagh-e Fin, Kashan (Esfahan province), 34 Baha’i communities, 52, 130, 174 Bahrain, 88, 190 Bakhtiar, Shapour, 175, 249 cabinet, 175, 177 demonstrations against, 177 Bani-Sadr, Abdolhassan, 180, 199, 200, 202, 203, 219, 346n95 Barzani, Massoud, 364–5n131 Basij, 195, 196, 200, 208, 239, 243, 346n95 network expansion, 243 Basra, 204, 208, 211, 214, 216 Iran offensive on, 210, 211–2 Bazargan government, 175, 180–4 banks and insurance companies nationalization, 183 Bazargan, Mehdi, 152, 164, 165, 177 foreign policy, 180 Beijing, 32 Beirut, 264, 291 Benyahia, Muhammad, 203 Berlin, 43, 89 Biden, Joe, 263 Bolshevik Revolution, 86, 90 Bolsheviks, 66 Book of Government, 54 Boroujerdi, Ayatollah Seyyed Hossein, 139, 151, 156 death of, 101, 151 Bostan, 202 Britain, 28, 47, 67, 86, 91, 166 and Russia split Persia, 35

INDEX

in Iranian oil sector, 88 joint commission, 48 transition of power, views on, 67 withdrawal from Middle East (1968), 190–1 withdrawal from Persian Gulf, 119, 125 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 191–2, 197 Bush, George W. administration of, 238, 271, 274–5 Axis of Evil speech (2002), 237, 274 Decision Points (memoir), 275 Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, 235 calendar system (Iran), 163 Capitol Hill, 289 Carter, Jimmy, 164, 170, 197 administration, 165, 167, 168, 178–9 Caspian Sea, 30, 67, 70 casualties, 264, 282 in Iran-Iraq War, 211–2, 217 riots (1978), 175 ceasefire, 204–5 CENTO (Central Treaty Organization), 115, 116 central government, 39, 71, 73, 92 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 113, 116, 148, 325–6n49 declassified CIA documents, 114, 176, 199, 215, 220, 325–6n49, 349n156 operation (AJAX), 113–4 Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), 115, 116 Chase Manhattan Bank, 178 Che Guevara, 131 chemical weapons, use of, 209, 210, 211, 216, 217, 278

China, 2, 9, 10, 202, 349n156 civil war, 130 influence in Iran, 32, 258 join in EU3, 17 Churchill, Winston, 90, 91, 92, 102 CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Cinema Rex fire (20 Aug 1978), 173 civil war (China), 130 civil war (Oman), 193 civil war (Shiraz) [1839], 54 civil war (Syria). See Syrian civil war (2011–present) civil war, 43 civilian government, 175 Clerical Schism, 154–63 clerics, 51, 53, 84, 154 in politics, 49–50, 50–1, 85, 135, 150 military affairs, involvement in, 48–9 Cold War, 103, 106, 116, 141, 142 Communism, 81, 99, 116, 136, 152 Communist League, 203 Communist movement, 134 Communist Party of Iran, 59 Constituent Assembly, 77 Constitution (1906), 55, 76 Constitution (1979) Articles 107 and 109, 233 Constitution (Article 146), 279 Constitution (Article 150), 222 Constitution (Article 8), 105 Constitution (1907), 109 Constitutional Revolution (1905– 11), 35–6, 42, 51, 55–7, 58, 67, 78, 92, 94, 147, 172, 181, 185 Constitutionalism, 101 corruption, 45, 66, 100, 123, 128, 140, 232

373

INDEX

Cossack Brigade, 40, 56, 63, 67, 87, 239 Cossack Division, 36, 37 counter-ISIS campaign, 284 counterterrorism, 133, 246 coup (1907), 37 coup (1921), 67–8, 72 coup (1953) 110–1 aftermath of, 115–6 against Mossadeq, 11, 61, 106, 110–1, 112 151, 180, 240 America, role in, 111 Axis coup, 91 Tudeh Party in, 112 Zarif tweets on 65th anniversary of, 114 coup (1958), 121 coup (1968), 192 coup d’état (Azerbaijan), 103 coup-proofing mechanisms, 47, 243 Cuba, 130 Cyrus the Great, 162, 163 D’Arcy Concession (1901), 39, 88 Damascus, 291 Tehran–Damascus alliance, 198, 277–9, 281 Dasht-e Lut (desert), 158 Defense Industries Organization, 251, 252 defense industry, formation of, 74–5 demonstration (1963), 141 Dezful attack, 210 Dhofar rebellion (1963–76), 122, 123–4, 281 al-Dinn Shah, Nasser, 32, 60, 74 assassination of, 33, 42 corruption and mismanagement, 39 Cossack Brigade, creation of, 34–5, 46

374

Europe visit, 32–3 foreigners, concessions to, 32–3 Russia visit, 35 Warsaw, journey to, 321n77 disinformation, 153–4 Domantovich, Aleksei, 35, 46 Dulles, Allen, 112 Dulles, John Foster, 111–2 earthquake (1978), 158 East of Suez, 119, 125 Ebtekar, Masoumeh (Mary), 340n160 economic warfare, 266 economy, 58, 83, 165, 241, 257 nationalization, 183–4 oil-less economy, 109 post-oil economy, 125 Resistance Economy, 270 Egypt, 116, 121, 122 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 111, 112 elections, 3 elections (1952), 109 elections (2009), 250 legislative election (1944), 108 parliamentary elections, 77 presidential elections (2017), 269, 288 re-election (2009), 256 electronic warfare, 267 Esfahan, 120, 139, 174 riots (10 Aug 1978), 172 Eskandari, Iraj, 104, 171 Etela’at (newspaper), 163, 170–1 Etemad, Akbar, 19, 126, 235, 237 Ettela’at (newspaper), 163, 170–1 EU3 (E3), 17 Europe, 12, 74 nationalism, 40 European and Western models, 55 European Union (EU), 17

INDEX

Expediency Council, 232 Fadayian-e Islam (FI), 99, 132, 162, 324n5 Hazhir assassination, 134 high profile assassination, 99, 105–6 Kasravi assassination, 134 objectives and tactics, 150, 151 protests against White Revolution (1963), 135 Razmara assassination, 134 split of, 138 terrorist attacks (1949–51), 134–5 Zangeneh assassination, 135 fake news, 152–4, 242 in Iran’s politics, 157–8 Farah (Empress), 162 Farahani, Mirza Taqi Khan. See Amir Kabir Fatemiyoun, 281, 292 FATF (Financial Action Task Force), 259 fatwas, 49, 110 Faw, 211, 212, 213 Ferdowsi, Abolqasem, 54–5 Shahnameh, 54 FI. See Fadayian-e Islam (FI) Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 259 Finckenstein, Treaty of, 27–8 foreign presence and consequences, 86–90 Reza Shah and British 87–8 France, 17, 40, 212, 214 nuclear talks (2003–05), 236 Franco–Persian treaty, 28 Freedom Movement (Iran), 151–2, 165 freedom of speech, 168, 169

French Revolution (1789), 40, 177, 187 Gardane, Claude Matthieu de, 28 Gardane, Comte Alfred de, 28 Gass–Gulshayan Agreement, 105 GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council), 19 Gendarmerie post attack (1971), 138, 162, 165 Geneva Protocol (1925), 221 Georgia, 26 Germanophiles, 89 Germany, 17, 43, 44, 86 Germany-Iran trade and friendship treaties, 75 Iran, relation with, 88–90 nuclear talks (2003–05), 236 Persia, presence in, 36, 43, 75, 89 Iran’s total trade, share of, 89–90 Gharbzadegi, 166 Ghaznavid court, 317n135 Gilan Republic, 30, 67 Golestan, Treaty of, 26–7, 31, 41, 42, 87, 190, 205 Golpaygani, Ayatollah Seyyed Mohammadreza, 231 Great Britain, 75 Great Persian Famine, 44 Great War. See World war I Green Movement (2009), 242, 256, 257, 277 Griboyedov, Alexander Sergeyevich, 53 guerrilla groups (Iran), 130–2, 151, 162, 167 creation of, 138 Islamists, clash with, 183 guerrilla warfare, 130–1, 136 guild tax, 84–5 Gulf Arabs, 198, 214, 286, 287

375

INDEX

Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 19 Gulf of Aden, 245 Gulf of Bab al-Mandab, 245 Hadi, Abdrabbuh Mansur, 265 Herat, 34 Hezb-e Rastakhiz, 132 Hezbollah, 11, 146, 158, 184, 234, 242, 277, 278, 291, 292 and Islamic Republic, 290, 291, 292 Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU), 126 Hitler, Adolf, 90, 322–3n116 hostage crisis (1979–81), 15, 16, 53, 110, 115, 145, 178–81, 183, 188, 191, 202, 214, 230, 250 Houthi rebels, 18, 260, 265, 290, 291, 292 Hoveida, Amir-Abbas, 132 human rights, 167, 168, 278 human wave tactic, 202, 208–9, 220, 244 Hussein, Saddam, 15, 187, 188, 190, 198, 201, 204, 205, 214, 237, 271 and Khomeini, 192 and MeK, 218 and Shah border dispute negotiation, 194 and Taliban collapse (2001 and 2003), 238 ceasefire announcement, 204–5 chemical weapons against Iran, 209, 278 chemical weapons against Kurdish, 15–6 in Iran–Iraq War, 15, 209 in Iraq, 187 overthrow of, 276

376

Scud missiles attack on Dezful, 210 US removal of, 237–8, 274 view on Iranian, 189, 190 weapons purchase, expansion of, 202 hybrid warfare, 17–8, 234, 271 IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), 19–20, 236 Imperial Guards, 128 Imperial Iranian Navy, 125 Imperial Russia, 58 Imperial Russian Army, 35, 46 Imperial State of Iran, 15, 117, 181, 182 Imperial Task Force, 122 imperialism, 100 Imposed War (Iran), 189 Industrial Revolution, 58 Intellectual leftist movement, 163–5 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 19–20, 236 intra-Gulf Cooperation Council, 289 Iran and Gulf Arab neighbors, 122–3 and Taliban, 292 armed forces, 2, 34, 11, 71, 102, 123, 240, 243, 246, 247, 261, 291 arms purchase, 2–3, 193, 202, 346n90 Britain and Soviet Union in, 38, 90, 97, 87–8 British leadership in, 66 civil-military relations, 239 contemporary Iran, history of 14–9 decision-making, 3, 13, 250–2 defense industry, formation of, 74–5

INDEX

Dhofar Rebellion, 123–4 divided military, 239–47 domestic politics, 83, 84, 199 first modern constitution (1906), 35 foreign debt (1978–79), 183 foreign influence, 8, 32, 13, 53, 86, 121, 60, 258 foreign policy, 10, 11, 133, 193–4, 245, 247, 267, 300 foreign powers, distrust of, 9, 26–7, 37, 40, 61, 206 Germany relations, 89–90 in World War I, 98 in World War II, 91–2 industrialization, 38 Iran (post-9/11), 21, 271, 289–93, 293 Iran execution, 346n93 Iran–Contra affair, 228 Iraq, invasion of (13 Jul 1982), 208 Israel, relationship with, 9 leadership, 3, 7, 207 literature, survey of, 9–14 main partners, 349n156 military strategy (2019), 295 missile program, 286–9 national security, 6–7 new penal code, 78 nuclear program, 11, 16–7, 125, 236, 258, 285, 286, 298 objectives, 276–7 oil agreement with Britain (1933), 105 politics after Iran-Iraq War, 229–38 pre-revolution Iran policies, 1, 2 protests (2017–18) and Nov (2019), 104 public life, 56, 213, 79–81

public sector strike (1978), 167 regional policy, 364n129 security policies, 9, 256, 298–9 security thinking, 1, 6, 8, 12, 13, 31–2, 268, 297, 298, 305n1, 308n23 Self-reliance, need for, 286, 299–301 split of, 91 strategy, doctrine, and the armed forces, 266–71 transition of power, 91–2, 98–9 Tripartite Treaty of Alliance (1942), 101 US and Germany, relation with, 88–90 US maximum pressure campaign against, 18–9 Iranian intelligence, 249–50 Iranian Kurdistan, 201 Iranian law enforcement, 47 Iranian oil platforms, US Marines attack on, 212 Iran–Iraq War (1980–88), 8, 11, 15, 20, 52, 108, 122, 145, 184, 187, 249, 266, 269, 277, 278, 288, 302, 343n33 aftermath of, 252 casualities in, 281 Iranian public life, impact in, 217 IRGC, analyses of, 223 literature on Iran, 302 origin of, 190–4 Soleimani (IRGC) role in, 271–2 stages of the war, 194–217 Iraq, 15, 17, 18, 103, 116, 122, 145, 192, 193, 212, 216 arms purchase, 202, 193 attack against Iran, anniversary of, 288

377

INDEX

attack on Benyahia, Muhammad, 203 bombing campaigns, 209 border conflict, Iran–Iraq (1979), 195 Iran, invasion of, 8, 197, 228 Iran, withdrawal from, 204 see also Iran–Iraq War (1980–88) Iraq airstrikes, 195, 196, 198, 211, 212 military adversaries in Iran–Iraq War, 191, 195–6 modern state of Iraq, creation of (1932), 193 offensives (1985), 211 Tanker War (1987), 209, 212 Iraqi Kurdistan, 193, 201 Iraqi Kurds, 184, 212, 234 Iraqi Shias, 121, 260, 292 IRGC Quds Force (IRGC-QF), 19, 242, 243, 261, 263, 282 under Soleimani, 276 IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps), 4, 189, 195, 200, 205, 233, 239, 240, 241–2, 346n95, 359n71 and Artesh cooperation, 280 and Artesh divided areas of operation, 240 and Artesh in Iranian armed forces, 222–3 and Artesh joint military intelligence, 245, 246 and Basij, expansion of, 227 as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (Apr 2019), 18, 252, 260 black market economy, 270 economic revenues, primary sources of, 269–70 expansion of, 242

378

formal ranking system, adoption of, 244–5 Green Movement (2009) 242 growth of, 196 in Iranian public life, 268 in Khamenei regime, 241 in Lebanon (1982), 242 in Persian Gulf, 245 in Resistance Economy, 270 Iran-Iraq War analyses of, 223 IRGC Air Force, creation of, 222–3 Ministry of, 251 missile activities, 287 mosaic defense, 271 Navy and Air Force, 222 operations areas of, 246 political reach of, 268–9 Pourdastan’s observation, 246 professionalization and centralization of, 240–5 recruitment and training ability of, 281 restructuring in early 2000s, 268 social media accounts, 245, 262 Soleimani role in, 271–2 structural reforms, 244, 270–1 Tasnim, 366n147 US drone shut down (Jun 2019), 247 Ironside, William Edmund, 68 Islam, 48, 53, 136, 140, 141, 171, 184 Islamic government, 160, 161, 164 Islamic jurisprudence, 160 Islamic law, 159 Islamic Protestantism, 51, 152 Islamic Republic of Iraq, 221 Islamic Republic Party, 180, 181 headquarters, attack on 202–3

INDEX

Islamic Republic of Iran, 2, 3, 12, 14, 15, 17, 32, 49–50, 65, 78, 102, 104, 119, 122, 124, 133, 148, 177, 181, 182, 185, 203, 204, 214, 219, 221, 227, 237, 238, 239, 249, 251, 254, 264, 270, 277, 289, 290, 300, 302 Constitution, 174–5 defense doctrine, 222, 271 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 178 policy of ‘resistance’, 107 rise to power, 272 social media platforms, 154 Islamic Revolution, 1, 4, 11, 14, 51, 53, 54, 61, 63, 85, 88, 98, 118, 135, 147, 187, 218, 229, 255, 297 Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), 262, 284 Afghanistan offshoot, 283–4 and Islamic Republic, 282 declaration of Caliphate, 17, 279 Iran response to, 282–3 rise of (2014), 17, 261, 275, 276, 278, 279, 282–4 social media, 261 support for Assad, 282 US-led coalition battle with, 289 Islamic State in Khoraran, 283–4 Islamism, 116, 152 Islamists, 99, 134, 154, 173, 177, 181 Israel, 11, 125, 167, 176, 193, 236, 242, 249, 282, 285, 286, 297 Israel–Hezbollah War (2006), 292 Israeli intelligence, 248 Jangalis, 67, 87 JCPOA. See Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)

Jerusalem, 297 Jewish communities, 130, 189, 230 Jihad, 48, 137 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 17, 258 delegitimize, 355–6n17 nuclear negotiations, 284–9 Trump withdrawl from, 259, 281, 286 Joint Plan of Action, 258 Jordan, 214 Jungle Movement (Jangalis), 67, 87, 136 Kabul, 254 Karroubi, Mehdi, 256 Kashani, Ayatollah Abol-Qassem, 110, 134, 140, 150 exile and death, 159 Kasravi, Ahmad, 52 Kayhan (newspaper), 366n1479 Kerman, 25, 43 Khajeh Nezam, al-Molk Book of Government, 54 Khamenei regime, 233, 234, 251 IRGC’s place in, 241 Khamenei, 121, 231, 232, 241, 258, 262, 268, 351n19 and Rafsanjani, 232–4 Iraq missile activities, views on, 210 IRGC under, 259 Khan, Abdul Qadeer (A.Q. Khan), 236 Khan, Agha Mohammad assassination of, 26 capital relocation, 25–6 Kerman brutality, 25 Khatam al-Anbia (IRGC-controlled firm), 269–70 Khatami government, 235

379

INDEX

Khatami, Mohammad, 238 nuclear talks (2003–05), 236 presidency, 235, 253–4 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 14–5, 79, 130, 147, 150, 152, 154–5, 157, 159, 164, 180, 187–8, 189, 192, 204, 205, 206– 7, 211, 212, 218, 220, 221–2, 332n217 advent of, 148 and IRGC commanders, 215–6 arrest of, 156 Behesht-e Zahra speech, 175–6 ceasefire, view of, 204–5, 213 death of, 227, 231 exile of, 157, 177–81 hostage crisis (1979–81), 178–81 Iran-Iraq War, view on, 216 Islamic Republic of Iran establishment, 15 Kashf al-Asrar, 156 Khomeinim, rise of, 139–43 life and career, 156–7 militant clerics and, 159 pamphlets and tape recordings, 161–2 regime, 155, 162, 221 return from exile, 175 Sharia, views on, 200 Khomeini, Mostafa, 142 Khorramshahr (liquid-fuel missile), 288 Khorramshahr, battle of, 25, 197, 203, 204, 213, 215, 216 Khuzestan, 73, 103, 108, 188, 195, 196, 198, 203, 204, 218, 343n33 Kissinger, Henry, 118, 178 Kurdish Democratic Party, 103, 254 Kurdish independence, 103, 104 Kurdish referendum (2017), 277

380

Kurdish separatist movement, 131, 194, 197 Kurdistan (self-proclaimed government), 100, 101, 218 Kurds, 121, 146, 201, 282, 290 Kuwait, 206, 212 Land Reform Act (1962), 128–9 Latin America, 136, 138 Lebanon War (1982), 207–8 Lebanon, 154, 202, 242, 272 Iran–Lebanon relations, 121 protests in (2019), 242 leftist groups, 132, 136, 166 Levant, 214 Libya, 198,215 literature, Iranian politics, 3, 6, 12–3, 305n1, 305–6n2, 309n34, 318n4 London, 28, 38, 43, 88, 91, 109, 111 influence against Tehran, 29, 30 madakhel system, 39 Mahabad crises 1946, 142 majles, 36, 37, 43, 44, 66, 71, 84, 87, 235, 355–6n17 legislation1944, 102 second majles (1909–11), 55 Majnoon Island, 211 Manama, 292 Mansur, Hassan Ali, 162 Mao Zedong, 130–1 On Guerrilla W   arfare, 131 martial law, 104, 168, 169, 172 Marxism, 136, 165 Marxism-Leninism, 136, 138, 148, 166 Marxist-Maoism, 148 Mashhad demonstration (1935), 85 Mashhad riots (20 July 1978), 172 Masjed-e Goharshad, incident of, 85

INDEX

MeK. See Mujahidin-i Khalq (MeK) Middle East, 12, 17, 116, 184, 254 colonial powers, departure of, 119 post-9/11, 289–93 Military College (Tehran), 98 military coup (1958), 192 Ministry of Defense, 251–2, 259 Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), 249, 250, 256 Ministry of Interior, 112 Ministry of Justice, 78, 134 Ministry of War, 37 Mirza, Abbas, 47 nezam-e jaded (New Order), 45–6 Modaress, Ayatollah Hassan, 66 Mohammad, Fath Ali. See Fath Ali Shah MOIS (Ministry of Intelligence and Security), 249, 250, 256 al-Molk, Abolqasem Nasser, 36 al-Molk, Nezam, 317n135 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, 323n123 monarchical tradition’s collapse, 144, 162 Mongol invasions, 55 Montazeri, Grand Ayatollah, 219, 223 Moscow, 28, 32, 41, 42, 43, 46, 91, 100, 116, 260, 292 Tehran, relationship with, 44 Mossadegh, 114 Mossadeq, Mohammad, 11, 57, 102, 105, 134, 140, 164, 325–6n49 and Shah, 106–10 as Minister of War, 109–10 Atlantic travel, 109 CIA operation against, 113–4 coup against, 112 death of, 114

foreign policy, 107–9 in leadership (1951–63), 106–16 nationalize oil, sought to, 32 negative equilibrium, 107, 178 Moussavi, Mir Hossein, 256 Mughniyeh, Imad, 264 Muhammad, Prophet, 56, 174 Muhammad, Qazi, 103 Muharram (1978), 142, 173–7 Mujahidin-i Khalq (MeK), 50, 134, 150, 151, 165, 173, 202, 219, 234, 254 National Council of Resistance of Iran, 235 ‘new reading’ of Islam, 136 operations, 136–8 Muslim Brotherhood (Egypt), 134 Najaf, 50, 159 Napoleon, 27, 28 Napoleonic Code, 78 Napoleonic Wars (1803–15), 27 Nasrallah, Hassan, 264, 292 Nateq-Nouri, Ali Akbar, 235 National Consultative Assembly, 35 National Council of Resistance of Iran, 236 National Front, 116, 134, 135, 138, 148, 151, 164, 175 rise and fall of, 165 National Intelligence and Security Agency, 249 Nazi Germany, 75, 89, 143 Netanyahu, Benjamin, 285 nezam-e jaded, 45–6 Nixon, Richard, 122, 137 administration of, 118 and Kissinger relations with Shah, 118 doctrine of, 118–9 in Afghanistan war, 16, 276

381

INDEX

in Persian Gulf, 216 military campaign, 273 military force, 274 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 115–6 Nojeh airbase (Hamadan), 279 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 115–6 in Afghanistan war, 16, 276 in Persian Gulf, 216 military campaign, 273 military force, 274 North Korea, 215, 349n156 Norway, 90 nuclear programs, 145, 126–7, 235, 236, 257, 264, 284 nuclear talks (2003–05), 127, 236, 238, 264, 284 Obama, Barack, 5 October Revolution (1917), 46, 65, 68, 87 Office of Liberation Movements, 242, 243 oil and foreign markets, 270 nationalization of, 109, 134, 159 oil industry, 130 oil workers’ strike, 108 price decline of (1970s), 118, 165 Oman, 43, 257 civil war, 193 Iran relations with, 122–3 Operation Karbala-5, 216 Operation Kheibar (1984), 211, 223 Organization of Iranian People’s Fadayi Guerillas (Fadayian), 138 Ostovar, Afshon, 290 Ottoman Empire, 32, 65

382

P5+1, 285 Pahlavi (vessel) 71 Pahlavi dynasty, 14, 20, 37, 53, 54, 63, 72, 141, 156, 175, 299 fall of, 85 state and clergy, struggle between, 57 Pakistan, 34, 121, 236, 246, 275 nuclear weapons program, 236 Pakistani centrifuge designs, 235–6 Palestine, 136 pan-Arab nation, 190 Paris Peace Conference, 87 Paris, 28 Parthian periods, 69 Payam International Airport, 359n71 Persepolis, 162 Persia Arab invasion of, 55 clerical involvement in, 48–9 Communism in, 44, 58, 99, 100 control over Herat, 34 first parliament, majles (1906), 35 foreign interference in, 26, 57 foreign policy, 26–31 judicial system, 57 military failures, 42 Political parties, formation of, 55 revenue streams, 42 roads construction, 58 Russo–British coalition against, 28 split of, 43 telecommunications, adoption of, 58 under Qajar, 23–61 under Reza Shah, 63–95 under Shah (Mohammad Reza Pahlavi), 97–146 World War I, impacts of, 44, 65

INDEX

Persian Gulf War (1991), 288 Persian Gulf, 11, 18, 71, 122, 213, 276 Britain withdrawal from, 119, 125, 191 IRGC Navy in, 245 Tanker War (1987), 209, 212 US and NATO forces in, 216 Persian (language), 55, 107 Persian New Year (March 1987), 212 Persian sovereignty, 28, 42, 48 Peshmerga units, 201 Pishevari, Jafar, 103 Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, 122 Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf, 122 populism, 152 Portuguese, 125 post-war reforms, 228, 239, 247, 248 Pourdastan, Amir, 200, 267–8, 280 Artesh and IRGC, observation of, 246 pre-Islamic Persia, 54, 69 presidential campaign (2017), 366n147 prisoners of war, Iraq (1982), 347–8n125 Project Eagle, 178 protests (July 1952), 159 protests, Iraq (2019), 242, 277 Qaani, Esmail, 261, 281 Qaem-Maqam Farahani, Mirza Abolqasem, 29–31, 107, 299 Qajar dynasty, 3, 6, 14, 25, 41, 43, 58, 61, 63, 74, 154, 239–40, 244, 270, 294, 298 concessions and impact, 38–9

conflicts and treaties, 26–32 Constitutional Revolution, 55–6 corruption and mismanagement, 38–40 end of, 20, 37, 39, 42, 47 foreign policy, 29, 38, 60 Kings, 52–3 legacy of, 40–61 levée en masse, introduction of, 41 military campaigns, 40, 41 military, 40–9 military, incompetence of, 45–7 reforms and modernization, 54–5 reforms and resistance, 32–5 responsibilities, 53 Reza Shah’s advent and decline of, 35–40, 74 rise of, 24–35 Shia hierocracy, consolidation of, 49–54 Qazvin protests (1994), 242 Qazvin, 242 Qom riots (1978), 50, 141, 163, 170–3 Qur’an, 156 Qur’anic principles, 154, 156 Rafsanjani, Ali Akbar Hashemi, 196, 205, 212, 215, 223, 231, 232, 238, 241, 250 and Khamenei, 232–4 death of, 232 Raisi, Ebrahim, 288 Rajai, Mohammad Ali, 199, 203 Razmara, Hajj Ali, 105 Assassination of, 105–6, 134 referendum (1953), 112 referendum (1963), 118, 130 referendum (1979), 177 reformation ecclesiae, 51 Reichstag fire (27 Feb 1933), 173

383

INDEX

religion, 40, 49, 50, 51, 155, 229, 230 Religious Corps, 141 religious establishment, 85, 139, 140, 141 religious literature, 149 Republic of Mahabad, 103 Resistance Economy, 109, 270 Reuter Concession (1872), 38–9 Revolution (1978–80), 20, 53, 168–77, 181–4 Iran-line of thinking, 1–2, 4, 5 political backdrop, 255–66 politics of personalities (21st century), 260–6 State’s Politics, 229–38 White Revolution, legacy of (1963–78), 117–32 revolutionaries, 5, 15, 108, 161, 166, 173–4 Reza Khan, Mohammad, 1, 14–5, 37, 47, 38, 56–7, 63–95, 97– 146, 147, 185, 299, 318n4 abdication, 20, 36, 63, 69, 72 advent, decline of, 35–40, 74, 90–2 against Communism, 87 arms purchasing, 71, 72 army, 73, 301–2 ban on the veil (chador), 80 civil code, production of, 78 clerical establishment, conflict with, 84 combat against Bolsheviks, 66 Controversy and Discontent, 84–6 death of, 92 Defense Industry, 74–6 domestic security management, 73, 75 early life, 65–6, 70, 71 economic growth, 83

384

educational reforms, 80–1 exile, 91 foreign intervention in, 64, 70 foreign powers, overthrow of, 85–6 Germany, relationship with, 32, 82 inaugural address, 79 infrastructure, industry, and the capital, 82–3 intellectuals, suppression of, 77 Iran–Russia relations under Reza Shah, 86–7 judiciary modernization, 78–9 legacy, 64, 94 legal reforms, 78–9 Mashhad demonstration (1935), 85 military challenges and shortcomings, 72–3 military budget, 69, 72 military reforms, 40, 69, 71–6 modernization efforts and resistance, 76–83 modernizing Iranian infrastructure and industry, 82–3 nationalism, 69 nationalization campaigns, 89 parliamentary support to, 77 persian tribes, views on, 77, 81 political backdrop, 77 rise of, 14, 37, 35, 65–70 social reforms, 79–82 Supreme Court, establishment of, 78 technology and weapons, limits of, 93–4 transportation projects, 82 Reza Maxim, 319n17 Rezai, Mohsen, 215, 216, 266 Riyadh, 18, 214, 284

INDEX

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 102 Roosevelt, Kermit, 113 Roosevelt, Theodore, 113 Rouhani, Hassan, 7, 8, 127, 232, 236, 252, 257, 258, 259, 261, 285, 287, 366n147 Iran economy, views on, 258–9 national security, views on, 7 rule of law, 78, 79, 93 rumors, 157, 158 earthquake (1978), 158 Russia, 2, 10, 29, 32, 35, 44, 202, 236 air campaign, 260 Cossack forces surround British legation, 43 imperialism, 36 influence in Persia, 26, 32, 35, 43, 46, 47, 65, 68 join EU3 in, 17 Russo–Iranian relation, 166 Russo–Persian Wars, 8, 31, 42, 59, 190, 207 War I (1804–13), 26–7, 41 War II (1826–28), 29, 41, 46 Sacred Defense, 189, 266, 291 Safavi, Navvab, 99, 106, 135 arrest of, 135 execution of, 151 Safavids, 24, 50 collapse of, 49 military reforms, 41–2 al Said, Qaboos bin Said, 122, 124 Saikal, Amin, 4 al-Saltaneh, Qavam, 105 Qavam’s premiership, 110 Sanaa’, 265, 291–2 Sassanids, 24, 69 Saudi Arabia, 18, 53, 265, 286, 287 Saudi-Iran rivalry (2014), 283

SAVAK (Organization of Intelligence and National Security), 121, 128, 132, 145, 158, 162, 164, 172, 173, 191 and Guerillas, 166–8 counterterrorism, 133 creation of, 116 dismantling of, 248–50 Green Plan, 121 harassment, 132–3, 167 schism, 85, 140 Schuster, Morgan, 47, 60, 61, 298 secular nationalism, 76 Secularization, 93 security policies, 9, 256 self-proclaimed governments, 100 collapse of, 1946, 103 Seljuq court, 317n135 separatism, 99, 104 Seyyed Ziya, 68, 69, 88, 89 Shah (Mohammad Reza Pahlavi), 1, 15, 21, 37, 98, 153, 156, 157, 192, 240, 244, 281, 290, 294–5, 343n32 Afghanistan anti-Communist movement, 272 Air Force, 120, 125 and Chamoun, 121 and Mossadeq, a rocky start, 106–10 and Mossadeq, Riots and fighting between, 110 and Nixon and Kissinger relationship, 118 and Saddam border dispute negotiation, 194 and Saddam, 192 and Sharif-Emami, 169–70 anti-Shah demonstration (18 Feb 1978), 171 armed forces expansion, 125

385

INDEX

arms purchase from Europe, 74 arms purchasing, 118–20 Artesh, 241 assassination attempts, 105, 162 Azerbaijan Crisis (1946), 103–6 Baghdad Pact, 115 bilateral defense agreement with US (1959), 116 cancer treatment (16 Jan 1979), 142, 175, 178–9 Cario press, interviews with, 142–3 CIA and Israeli intelligence, 116 collapse of, 218, 286 corruption of, 163 death of, 142 decree (1975), 132 departure from Iran, 148 Dhofar, Communist insurgency (1963–76), 122, 123–4 domestic challenges of, 99–100 educational reforms, 129 Esfahan factories, 120 fall of, 168 government views on, 192–3 Hezb-e Rastakhiz (party), 132 in (1941–51), 100–6 in Iraq and Lebanon, 121 in World War II, 102 investments, 120, 125 Iran’s growth in military power, 118–9, 120 Iran’s naval security perimeter extension, 119 Iranian society transformation under, 117 Land Reform Act (1962), 128–9 legacy, 144–6 lost control over territory, 101–2 majles power reduction, 115 majles, division within, 101

386

martial law, 104, 168, 172 mass protests against (1977–78), 141 military budget and expansion, 104–5, 115, 119 military generals selection, 45 military government declaration, 167–8, 173 military reforms, 191 military shortcomings, 127 Mission for My Country, 107 Muharram celebration, legalization of (1941), 174 nuclear thinking, 125–7, 145 on Khomeini exile, 157 overthrow of, 138 public religious activities, 149 reconciliation efforts, 169 Rome, arrival of, 113 royal family was corrupt, 100 Shah and Iran’s Monarchy, fall of (1978–80), 141–3 single-party system, 163 televised statement, 172 terrorist groups in, 99 Tudeh Party (1958), 165 Washington to join CENTO, 116 Washington visit, 165 White Revolution, 118 women and religious minorities, reforms of, 129–30 Yemen, 121 youth reforms, 129 Shah Afshar, Nader, 24 assassination, 24 Shah, Ahmad, 35–6, 67, 69 foreign powers, unwillingness to overcome, 65–6 Shah, Fath Ali, 26, 28, 32, 41, 299 and Amédée Jaubert, 27 Napoleon, agreement with, 27

INDEX

Shah, Mohammad Ali, 35, 37, 43 Shahnameh, 54 Sharia, 47, 200, 233 Shariati, Ali, 51, 136, 150, 152, 156, 174 political career, 159 Shariatmadari, Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem, 169, 171, 172 Sharif-Emani, Jafar, 172 reform agenda, 168–9 tensions between Shah, 169–70 Shatt al-Arab, 193, 194 Shia hierocracy, 49–54, 147 Shia Islam, 55, 136, 150, 173, 174, 230 Shia jurisprudence, 78, 151, 233 Shia millenarianism, 52 Shia politics, 50–1 Shias, 32, 53, 121, 146, 187, 192, 274, 294 Shiism, 136 Shiite Islamism, 184 Shiraz civil war (1839), 54 Shiraz, 43, 211 Siakhal, 165 Sino–Soviet split, 123 smuggling, 359n71 social media, 154, 256, 261 SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement), 161 Soleimani, Qassem, 19, 224, 234, 244, 260, 261, 262, 264, 265, 277, 362 death of, 271 Somalia, 121 post-9/11, 289–93 Soviet Union, 58, 86, 87, 100, 116, 133, 141, 154 collapse of, 219 in Persia, 59, 67, 68

New Economic Policy, 87 pre-secessionist republics, establishment of, 103 Soviet–Iranian agreement, revision of (1931), 87 Soviet–Iranian Declaration of Friendship, 68 Soviet–Iranian Treaty of Friendship, 87, 108 Special Oil Commission, 105 Stalin, Joseph, 90, 102 Standard Oil, 88 State Department (United States), 106, 111, 114, 170, 325–6n49 Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 161 Strait of Hormuz, 18, 125, 193, 245 strategy of Deep Defence (Iraq), 346n99 student movement (1970s), 161, 165 Student protests (Qom), 141, 163 Sudan, 121 suicide bombings, 184, 195 Sunnis, 121, 192 Supreme Defense Council, 251 Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), 251 Susangerd, 197, 201 Syria and Palestine Liberation Organization, 198 Syria, 17, 198, 202, 215, 243, 266, 291 Russia involvement in Syria 2015, 279–80 Syria-Iran relations, 255 Syrian Civil War (2011–present), 122, 255, 277–82, 289, 291 Artesh and IRGC, cooperation between, 280 IRGC’s efforts in, 280 Tehran involvement in, 277–8

387

INDEX

Tabriz court, 32, 59, 318n156 Tabriz, 32, 47 protest (1978), 171, 172 Taheri, 138 Taleqani, Ayatollah Mahmoud, 150, 152 Freedom Movement, 165 Taliban, 238, 275, 283 Afghanistan against, 237 and Saddam collapse (2001 and 2003), 238 anti-Taliban forces, 272 Mazar-e Sharif attack on, 272 toppling of, 274 US–Taliban talk, 292 Tanker War (1987), 209, 212 tapes, cassette, 141, 149–50, 152, 153, 154 Khomeini and Shariati’s speeches, 153 religious tapes, 149–50 Tasu’a, 174 Tehran Nuclear Research Center, 126 Tehran, 195, 199, 236, 266 al-Qaeda, cooperation with, 272 and Israel, 16 and Muscat, 122 bombs and boycotts (1978), 171 British legation in, 66 defense doctrine, 288 Tehran-Washington nuclear agreement (1957), 126 European nations, relations with, 16 growth of (capital), 83, 129 in Syrian Civil War, 18, 277–8 in World War I, 44 Kurds, relationship with, 242–3 Lebanese Shia community, support to, 121

388

militant attacks in, 162–3 nuclear escalation strategy, 18 Paris, agreement with, 28 population growth, 83 population, 129 relocation of the capital, implications of, 26 security thinking, 1, 3, 9, 21 Tehran and Moscow, partnership between, 279 Washington, provide assistance to, 237 terrorism, 121, 133, 135, 184 Third Reich, 75, 90 Tilsit, Treaty of (7 Jul 1807), 28–9 Tobacco Concession (1891–92), 39 Tobacco Protest, 39 traditionalism, 149 Trans-Iranian Railway project (1939), 82, 322n103 Treasury Gendarmerie, 47, 240 Truman, Harry S., 104, 109 Trump, Donald J. administration, 18–9, 264, 271, 289 inauguration (Jan 2017), 285 IRGC, designation of, 18, 252, 260 JCPOA, withdrawing from, 259, 281, 286 presidential election (Nov 2016), 259 Tudeh Party, 77, 92, 99, 100, 110, 116, 131, 134, 138, 166, 167 events causes damages to, 103–4 in coup (1953), 112 rise of, 77 Turkey, 55, 84, 214 Turkmenchay, Treaty of (22 Feb 1928), 29–30, 31, 41, 42, 53, 68, 87, 190, 205

INDEX

Twelfth Imam, 52, 157 ‘ulama, 152, 163 United Arab Emirates, 193, 286 United Arab Republics, 121 United Kingdom, 17, 88 nuclear talks (2003–05), 236 United Nations (UN), 347–8n125 United Nations General Assembly, 287, 288 United Nations Security Council, 109, 206, 221, 258 Resolution (2231), 17 Resolution (598), 213 United States (US), 11, 12, 15, 16, 86, 89, 101, 103, 113, 116, 141, 144, 161, 166, 167, 176, 180, 183, 189, 193, 212, 247, 249, 254, 265, 267, 268, 289, 292, 293, 297 assessment on Iran Communism (1978), 58 coup (1953), role in, 111 foreign policy (after 9/11), 254 hostage crisis (1979–81), 15, 16, 53, 110, 115, 145, 178–81, 183, 188, 191, 202, 214, 230, 250 human rights track record, 164 intelligence (United States), 112, 170, 248 Iran-US nuclear program, 126 Iraq, invasions of (2003), 16–7, 21, 237, 238, 254, 255, 266, 271–7 joined EU3, 17 Joint Operations Command, 261 Mossadeq, overthrow of, 111–4 oil negotiations, 88–9 on Iran policy, 18, 164, 179, 242 provide intelligence to Iraq, 214

State Department (United States), 106, 111, 114, 170, 325–6n49 US embassy (Tehran), 15, 112, 113, 178, 180 US embassy, bombings of (1983), 264 US–Iran relations, 110, 275, 284 US–Iran tensions, 18–9, 234, 260, 268, 276 US–Soviet détente (1970s), 118 War on Terror, 237 withdrew from JCPOA, 18 universal conscription, 40 US isolationism, 89 USSR, 68, 87 velayat-e faghih, 159 Velayati, Ali Akbar, 8, 208, 207 Vietnam, 136 Vo Nguyen Giap, 131 von Bismarck, Otto, 89 War of the Cities, 209–10, 216, 286 War on Terror, 237 Washington, 16, 111, 179, 209, 238, 254, 275 Western foreign policy, 297, 303 Westernization, 64, 76, 77, 93, 144, 173 Westoxification, 166, 167 White Revolution, 129, 130, 138, 139, 140, 141, 156, 160–3, 167, 185 legacy of (1963–78), 117–32 women rights and education in Iran, 130 in public life, 80 in Reza Shah period, 80–1 Shah reforms for, 129–30

389

INDEX

World War I, 43, 61, 86, 90, 94 casualties in, 44 famine and cholera, 65 Iran in, 98 Persia in, 44, 65 World War II, 20, 69, 75, 88, 89, 91, 94, 99, 104, 117 Iran instability, 91–2 Iran’s neutrality declaration, 90 Iranian military in, 90, 102 Xerox copy machine, 152, 153 Yemen, 255, 265, 284, 289, 291

390

Zagros mountains, 200 Zaman, Imam (Mahdi), 52 Zand dynasty, 24, 25 Zand, Karim Khan, 24, 86 Zand, Lotf Ali Khan, 24 Zarif, Javad, 19, 236, 261, 262, 263, 267, 274, 285, 287, 355–6n17 and Soleimani relationship, 264 coup (1953), tweets of, 114 Iranian nuclear program tweets, 286 US-Taliban talk, 292 Zoroastrian faith, 132